Conflict of Myths: The Development of Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War
Cable succeeds in showing that America's failure in Vietnam was the result of faulty military doctrine, not a loss of will, as Harry Summers asserts in On Strategy (G.P.O., 1981). He sets the stage by reviewing the history of five small 20th-century wars, and the lessons the U.S. military learned from each in developing its doctrine of counterinsurgency war. Too often the lessons were invalid, leading to an almost total misunderstanding of the struggle in Vietnam. This is an excellent addition to the growing number of books critical of basic U.S. military doctrine, one both well researched and well written. It strongly challenges the idea that the United States could have won in Vietnam. For most academic, military, and public libraries, especially larger ones. Edward Gibson, Union Coll. Lib., Barbourville, Ky.Copyright 1986 Reed Business Information, Inc.--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.