Russia's Revolution: Essays 1989-2006
"[Aron's] heart is still in Russia, or at least with the Russian  people, whom he views as long-suffering and deserving of a better future  than their past." --SeniorWomenWeb, July 2007"Aron takes a much broader approach to analyzing Russia's "epic experiment in democracy and modern capitalism". . .[and] documents well the birth of a new Russia" --Times Literary Supplement, November 2, 2007Finally, a book with real insight into RussiaA LOT of nonsense is said about Russia, and particularly about the West's relationship with it. Among the fatuous questions is "Who lost Russia?" (as if a careless Western politician could lose it as easily as a set of keys). Equally fatuous is the idea that the answer is to "Forget Russia" (as if the largest country in the world were a poorly chosen girlfriend).Leon Aron is an émigré whose sharp understanding of his homeland is matched by an appreciation of the mistakes that outsiders, particularly his fellow Americans, make in interpreting it. In a new book, "Russia's Revolution", he compares Russia's first sustained experiment in democracy and modern capitalism to "the movement of a long and disorderly caravan on a vast swampy plain: stopping, stumbling...drowning in muck, yet stubbornly creaking forward". Following closely behind are the Russia-watchers, who ignore the distance travelled, any comparison with other travellers, and the road ahead. "Their eyes seem forever to be on the dirt covering the wheels, the ruts in the road, and the ugly swamp creatures feasting on the piles of refuse in the wagons' wake."That is harsh, but largely fair. The asinine "Who lost Russia?" argument hangs on the misconception that Russia in 1989 (or 1986 or 1996 or whenever) was ripe for reform, and that only the policies and their sequencing were wrong. If only privatisation had preceded price liberalisation, or if savings had been indexed, or if reform could have been more gradual--the wishful thinkers' list of "what ifs" is as endless as it is vacuous. The truth is that with any conceivable combination of policies, the 1990s in Russia would have been horrible for most Russians, because of the appalling starting point.Mr Aron, who emigrated in 1978, portrays the utter failure and despair of the late Soviet Union accurately. An admiring biographer of Boris Yeltsin, Russia's president from 1991-99, he reckons the 1990s were mostly a triumph. The planned economy was replaced by a functioning if messy capitalist one; the Communist revanche evaporated; a middle class grew quickly. That compares well with the record of Mikhail Gorbachev, leader from 1985-91, who admirably let the Berlin Wall come down, but also allowed his uniformed thugs to slaughter unarmed demonstrators in Lithuania and Georgia.Some may find this assessment too Panglossian. But Mr Aron makes some irrefutable points in favour of the changes of the 1990s. "The nation that for ages told itself that it is lazy and unlucky and incapable of getting anything done right has become, among many 25- to 45-year-olds, a country of perfectionist workaholics."On a lighter note, he points out the colossal improvement in Russian food since the days of greasy gristle, shortages and squalor that marked Soviet gastronomy. He might have also highlighted improvements in transport by road, rail and air--where progress, incidentally, has accelerated since the Yeltsin years.Unsurprisingly, Mr Aron deplores the direction Russia has taken under Vladimir Putin. He laments lawlessness (especially the arbitrary force of the executive), the failure to renew Soviet-era power infrastructure and the resulting risk of energy shortages.He argues that Russia has neither the means nor the will to be a global superpower. It may complain, but it accepts the rules of the global game on issues such as terrorism and proliferation (old cold-war hawks may raise an eyebrow here). But his main point is that by centralising Russia and removing constitutional checks and balances, the Kremlin has made the system highly unstable. It lacks the military, political, economic and bureaucratic elements necessary to make Soviet-style authoritarian rule work properly. That--he says tantalisingly--may risk the unravelling of the Russian state itself. --Economist.com, June 21, 2007 by Edward Lucas, Central and Eastern Europe correspondent for the The EconomistAron is an emigre whose sharp understanding of his homeland is  matched by an appreciation of the mistakes that outsiders, particularly his  fellow Americans, make in interpreting it. --The Economist, 06/21/07Aron takes a much broader approach to analyzing Russia's "epic experiment in democracy and modern capitalism" including in Russia's Revolution his research on popular novels and Russian cuisine. His essays and articles cover the years from 1989 to 2006, resulting he suggests, in a "dairy kept by a fairly well-informed and analytically inclined spectator at a great historic drama". The second chapter is actually his Moscow diary for January 12-17, 1991, recalling with tragic immediacy the reactions to the storming of the television station in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, by troops from the Ministry of the Interior.... Aron documents well the birth of a new Russia: the rapid development of Russian capitalism; the first moves to privatize land; the beginning of a shift "from state-owned justice to a law-based state". His optimism seems to wane, however, as he moves further into the Putin era. Since 2003, he observes, "many a precious opportunity has been wasted and many a potential danger made more acute". He shows how the Kremlin abused the law for political reasons to imprison Mikhail Khodorkovsky, one of the most successful and charitable new business men; his private oil company YUKOS passed to the incompetent and corrupt state controllers. He points out the dangers which will flow from Putin's decision to have regional governors appointed by the Kremlin rather than directly elected by their constituents, arguing that this risks destabilization "and perhaps even disintegration". There are good chapters on the military and the failure to move from a conscripted to a professional army, on Russia's oil ("natural abundance and political shortages"), and on US-Russian relations (Aron expects stormy seas, but considers a new Cold War unlikely).Aron is concerned that Putin's move from democracy now threatens the Russian federation. According to polls, most citizens thought that governors should be elected rather than appointed by the Kremlin. Further diminishing of local autonomy could provoke popular resistance with the "horrifying prospect" that Muslim Tatarstan could become another Chechnya.Some of the benefits of Aron's broader but disparate approach emerge from his section on "reinventing values and virtues". He examines the expansion of the private sector's share in the economy and the development of middle-class attitudes, and analyses popular reading habits as a relevant source for evaluating changes in attitudes. In the popularity of Boris Akunin's detective novels he sees a return to Chekhov's virtues of decency, dignity, competence and hard work. The hero of these novels, Fandorin, is scrupulously law-abiding, refuses bribes, and values individual liberty; his patriotism lies not in blindly serving the regime, but in honorably doing what he himself judges is in Russia's best interests. Polls by the Russian Academy of Sciences indicate dramatic changes in attitudes since1990: a growing majority prefer to work for the private sector, rely on themselves rather than the state, and choose democracy that guarantees freedom over strict state control that guarantees security. Perhaps there is some hope that these positive trends in Russian society will prove more lasting than Putins' restoration of authoritarian rule. --Times Literary Supplement, November 2, 2007Leon Aron is one of the most astute observers of Russian politics  in the world today. Everything he writes is simply 'must read' material.  His essays have the rare ability to combine sharp analytical statements  with meticulous research. To have his articles from the last two decades  collected in a single  volume is an invaluable resource for any serious student of Russian  politics, economics, and culture. --Michael McFaul, professor of political science and Hoover fellow,  Stanford UniversityLeon Aron is one of the most astute observers of Russian politics in the world today.  Everything he writes is simply "must read" material.PLEASE POST THIS REVIEW AS THE SECOND EDITORIAL REVIEW ON THE WEBSITE (UNDER THE ECONOMIST REVIEW) --Michael McFaul, Professor of Political Science and Hoover Fellow, Stanford UniversityRussia's Revolution is a collection of essays written over 28 years which provide contemporaneous (at that time) commentary on Russia's efforts to shed its Communist past and join the capitalist and democratic Western mainstream.Leon Aron is a resident scholar and director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank in Washington DC, which published this volume.  Aron came to the US as a refugee 30 years ago when he was 24 and has made his career as a commentator on Soviet and Russian affairs. Although he is now an American citizen, his heart is still in Russia, or at least with the Russian people, whom he views as long-suffering and deserving of a better future than their past.No fan of the Soviet Union, he does put that regime's rule into the context of four centuries of Russian "patrimonialism" in which political authority meant control of the economy and ownership of property. Nonetheless, "Soviet totalitarianism created the most venal Russia that ever existed." One in which "thievery and bribery were universal."This left a barren field for the seeds of democracy and capitalism because "the Communist regime delivered to its successor not citizens but wards of the state" who complied with the laws only when forced to do so.After the 1991 revolution, Russia became what he calls a "poor democracy," one of many in the post- Cold War era.  They have the basic attributes of democratic government -- elections, enough political liberty to criticize the government and organize an opposition, and newspapers free of government censorship.  But they also have deficits in their civic culture and low per capita GDPs.In poor democracies the separation of political and economic power is vestigial and experience at self rule is embryonic. These plus poverty foster a culture of corruption.  Aron acknowledges that corruption is not absent in the West, or from Western history, but observes that it is not embedded in governmental institutions as it is in the poor democracies.Aron admires Yeltsin, whom he portrayed as a true revolutionary in his 2000 biography (Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life) but not Putin, whom he sees as the restorer of the authoritarian state.  In a 1999 chapter he writes that "Yeltsin's is the most open and liberal regime in the country's history," whose policies "are beneficial for the United States and its allies."One of Yeltsin's quasi successes was changing the very nature of the criminal justice system, from "all-powerful prosecutors, timid and demoralized judges, decrepit courts, no trial by jury, and a conviction rate of over 99 percent" to one in which Russians sued the government and sometimes won, and in which "a Russian environmentalist [was] acquitted of charges of espionage brought ... by the heir to the KGB" -- an historical first.From the "creative chaos of the revolution" also emerged a middle class, though the lack of good economic and survey data make it hard to identify.  It has grown in fits and starts, as the country met various economic crises. Within this group "income and prestige... were redistributed away from professionals serving the state to those needed by individuals and private business."  Consequently "the younger one is in Russia today (2000), the more educated and the closer to a large metropolis, the better one lives."Like most poor democracies and all post-revolutionary governments, Russia has had trouble collecting taxes. Much income is "off the books" and hidden. A long delayed shift in the economy from manufacturing to services facilitated keeping wealth "under the radar."  It was encouraged by the fact that full payment of all taxes would exceed the income of most businesses.Although quite critical of how the newly born market economy is "linked to the state by myriad crooked `deals'," Aron also believes that the "YUKOS affair" -- in which the CEO of Russian's largest private oil company was arrested, tried and convicted and the company dismantled -- is a "scapegoat for the misdeeds of the 1990s." Despite its troubling origins, YUKOS was the "first Russian megafirm to switch to international accounting standards" and "the most transparent of Russia's largest industrial corporations." Aron argues that CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky was punished by the regime for daring to challenge Putin in the political arena.He concludes by describing the many ways in which Putin is recentralizing the government: choosing the 89 regional governors himself and then having them choose the members of the upper chamber of the parliament, changing direct election of the Duma (lower chamber) by the voters to a strict party list system and curbing judicial independence.Yet, despite these concerns Aron remains hopeful that "the vertical of power" that Putin espouses will not prevail.  While he thinks that things may get worse before they get better, in the end he says that "having defended their right to be treated as free and thinking people, the Russians never surrendered it to a new tyranny" and never will. --Leon Aron, Published by the American Enterprise Institute ©2007