The Place of Mind
Introduction. I. CARTESIAN DUALISM. Human Minds and Animal Machines. II. THE GHOST IN THE MACHINE. Gilbert Ryle: Descartes' Myth. Norman Malcolm: Knowledge of Other Minds. III. THE HUMAN BRAIN. Brian Cooney: Brain Events. IV. MATERIALISM. A. The Identity Thesis. U. T. Place: Is Consciousness a Brain Process? J. J. C. Smart: Sensations and Brain Processes. Saul Kripke: The Identity Relation: Selections from Naming and Necessity. B. Eliminative Materialism. Richard Rorty: Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories. Paul M. Churchland: Eliminative Materialism. C. Functionalism. David M. Armstrong: The Nature of Mind. Jerry A. Fodor: Materialism. D. Supervenience. John Haugeland: Ontological Supervenience. Jaegwom Kim: The Mind-Body Problem: Taking Stock After Forty Years. V. MINDS AND COMPUTERS. Harper's Magazine: Our Machines, Ourselves. Richard B. White: Some Basic Concepts of Computability Theory. Hilary Putnam: The Nature of Mental States. Jerry A. Fodor: Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology. John R. Searle: Do Minds Compute? VI. INTENTIONALITY. Roderick M. Chisholm: Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional. Daniel C. Dennett: Intentional Systems. Fred Dretske: If You Can't Make One, You Don't Know How It Works. VII. CONSCIOUSNESS AND QUALIA. Thomas Nagel: What Is It Like to Be a Bat? Keith Campbell: A Critique of Central-State Materialism. Frank Jackson: Epiphenomenal Qualia. Patricia Smith Churchland and Paul M. Churchland: Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality. Colin McGinn: Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? David Chalmers: Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Brian Loar: Phenomenal States. VIII. SELVES. John Locke: Of Identity and Diversity. David Hume: Of Personal Identity. Derek Parfit: Selections From Reasons and Persons. Thomas Nagel: Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness. Daniel C. Dennett: Why Everyone is a Novelists. Sydney Shoemaker: Self and Substance. GLOSSARY. WORKS CITED.