Engineering the Financial Crisis: Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation
Selected byChoicemagazine as an Outstanding Academic Title for 2012"This book argues that the incentive distortions of bank capital-adequacy regulations were the proximate cause of the 2007 financial crisis. The systemic instability that followed was fueled by blind-sided experts who perpetuated the myths of too-big-to-fail and overcompensated corporate managers. A serious read for those struggling to make sense of the worst crisis since the Depression."—Vernon Smith, 2002 Nobel Laureate in Economics"An excellent conceptual book on the financial crisis, full of deep research and intellectual honesty." —Tyler Cowen,Marginal Revolution"For anyone wanting to read only a single book about the crisis and its origins, this is the book to read."—Choice"Jeffrey Friedman and Wladimir Kraus distinguish themselves by presenting the most systematic and rigorously argued empirical analysis of the crash to date."—Perspectives on Politics"While this is the single best book on the financial crisis, it also offers an outstanding analysis of decision making in modern regulatory states."—Samuel DeCanio, Yale University"If you thought you understood the causes of the financial crisis, think again. This thought-provoking exploration of the financial crisis provides a convincing argument that much of what we thought we knew about the crisis is, at best, misleading. In thinking about the cause, much more focus needs to be given to ignorance on everyone's part, and models that don't include ignorance will be, at best, incomplete. Ignorance of the importance of ignorance is a sign of ignorance."—David Colander, Middlebury College