The Mayaguez Incident: Testing America's Resolve in the Post-Vietnam Era (Modern Southeast Asia Series)
Mere weeks after the 1975 Communist conquests of Cambodia and South Vietnam, American leaders instantly perceived the Khmer Rouge’s seizure of an American merchant ship and crew as an intolerable affront to national prestige. There are other books about the ensuing military events of the Mayaguez incident (e.g., The Last Battle, by Ralph Wetterhahn, 2001); this one examines the top-level decision making behind the combat. Tapping into transcripts of meetings of the National Security Council, Mahoney observes that President Ford’s order for military retaliation was made quickly, and his narrative minutely takes the pulse through the chain of command of Ford’s resolution. Since the crisis had a mixed result—strategic success (safe return of ship and crew) but tactical failure (91 American casualties)—Mahoney searches for explanations of operational snafus and identifies, among other factors, Ford’s determination to act fast to foil repetition of the similar 1968 Pueblo incident and a defective distribution of intelligence to combat forces. Wherever serious military study occurs, Mahoney’s definitive case study should be recruited. --Gilbert Taylor