Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War
Drawing on evidence that the atomic bomb was regarded as a weapon like  any other before its first use, Princeton University's Gordin offers a concise  and provocative reinterpretation of the beginning of the nuclear age. For the  American military commanders in charge of the bomb, the main consideration was  whether it would destroy enemy personnel and infrastructure as part of a "shock  strategy" for winning Japan's unconditional surrender. Launching the nuclear  missions from Tinian Island, the B-29 airplane base, further normalized the  bomb's use within the matrix of Pacific island combat. Consideration of such  special characteristics as radiation was muted until after the Japanese  capitulation—indeed, discussions of a "Third Shot," with Tokyo the probable  target, continued until the successful American occupation began in September  1945. The initially overwhelming support of the American public for the nuclear  strikes reflected a belief that the war might have lasted more than another  year. Even in that context, half the population opposed using gas in an  attack—another indication, according to Gordin, that the atom bomb's special  status was a postwar development. His worthy study concludes that the bomb's  uniqueness has inappropriately encouraged Japan's reluctance to recognize and  evaluate its war responsibility, and points toward the importance of examining  nuclear weapons outside the familiar context of a nuclear standoff.(Feb.)Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.