The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays
Hume's and much 20th-century moral philosophy contrasted moral  with factual judgments and led people to conclude that the  former, unlike the latter, are subjective in the sense of not  being rationally supportable. Putnam (philosophy, emeritus,  Harvard) believes that the contrast is ill conceived and that  the conclusion is both unwarranted and false. He acknowledges  the usefulness of the fact/value distinction but denies that  anything metaphysical follows from it. Indeed, he goes so far as  to assert that knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of  values. He grounds his argument in Amartya Sen's discussions of  non-self interested human motives and of "capabilities" people  rationally value and enjoy freely exercising. Putnam covers such  matters as imperative logic, economics vis- -vis ethics, and  preference theory and such thinkers as V. Walsh, L. Robbins, and  R.M. Hare. A fine philosophical workout for attentive  readers.Robert Hoffman, York Coll. of CUNYCopyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc.--This text refers to theHardcoveredition.