Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community
This account of basic moral rights concerns whether they are necessary, to what kind of being they can be ascribed, their nature, and to whom they extend. Lomansky contends that rights are a kind of shorthand category for well-entrenched moral intuitions, principles, and standards whose aim is to support individualism as of paramount moral significance. The category is useful, he thinks, even though we lack a fully adequate theory generating these rights. They derive from a person's identity as a purposive agent, but must be sensitive also to ends that are not his exclusively. Intended primarily for professional philosophers, the book includes interesting discussions of welfare liberalism and of the (alleged) rights of children, fetuses, animals, etc. Robert Hoffman, Philosophy Department, York College, CUNYCopyright 1987 Reed Business Information, Inc.--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.