Religious Freedom and the Constitution
The authors argue that the "wall of separation" between church and state is a clumsy metaphor that, in the past sixty years, has repeatedly led courts into "jurisprudential quicksand." In its place, they offer a principle that they call equal liberty, which diverts attention from "imponderable questions about the goodness of religion" and focusses it on individual cases. Free religious expression thus becomes largely a function of other freedoms—like those of speech and association. The authors proceed patiently and sensibly through considerations of crèche displays, conscientious objectors, ritual animal slaughter, and peyote smoking. Their recommendations may prove more useful as a philosophical corrective than as a set of juridical guidelines, but their careful attention to the social meaning of symbols, and their nuanced concern with the sociological role and ideological sway of religion in American culture, insures the persuasive force and continuing relevance of their arguments.Copyright © 2007Click here to subscribe to The New Yorker--This text refers to theHardcoveredition.