The National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Study in Cartel Behavior
The authors, Fleisher (economics, Metropolitan State Coll. of Denver), Brian L. Goff (economics, Western Kentucky Univ.), and Robert D. Tollison (economics, George Mason Univ.), cite numerous examples where victory and profit are the bottom line in big-time college sports. Hypothesizing that key NCAA enforcement committees have been controlled by schools with strong athletic programs, they argue that agreements reducing competition for recruits (inputs) and restrictions on the number of games played (outputs), have enabled the NCAA to obtain more durable return on its behavior than such notable cartels as OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Export Companies). Illicit payments to athletes and recent conference realignments are explained in light of the NCAA's cartel behavior. Although written from a scholarly perspective, this book also provides an overview of the NCAA and will be an excellent addition to both specialized and general collections.- Albert Spencer, Coll. of Education, Univ. of Nevada-Las VegasCopyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.