How can a monograph focus when **[3]** "a defendant is culpable for taking an unjustified risk with the interests of others", but not **[1]** "whether risking the interests of others itself should be criminalised or **[2]** "justifying risk-taking"? In other words, can you kindly distinguish more clearly 1, 2, 3? They look intertwined to me. I never studied philosophy, please explain like I'm 5.


If you're adjudicating 3 (when a defendant is culpable for taking an unjustified risk with others' interests), then aren't you


* "justifying risk-taking" in some circumstances" [1]
* and adjudicating WHEN 2 happens (when risking others' interests should be criminalized)?


"taking an unjustified risk with others' interests" means same as "risking others' interests". To adjudicate when these [1] [2] happen, you have to "justify risk-taking" in some circumstances.


Findlay Stark. [*Culpable Carelessness*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/culpable-carelessness/4B489D7BFB8141FFDD66F887C623E0AD) (2017).


p 2



> 
>       It is because of its concern with all things considered wrongdoing that
> Anglo-American criminal law concentrates on the idea of *unjustified*
> risk-taking.11 Importantly, the focus of this book is not on the question
> of **[Boldening 1] whether risking the interests of others *itself* should be criminalised**
> even where the risked consequence or circumstance does not materialise
> (in other words, whether simple *endangerment* should be criminalised)12
> or about **[Boldening 2] the idea of justifying risk-taking**. Separate books could be
> 
> 
> 


p 3



> 
> written about these topics. More will have to be said about them in this
> book, but the main focus is on the circumstances in which a **[Boldening 3] defendant is
> *culpable* for taking an unjustified risk with the interests of others**.  
> 
>       The term ‘culpability’ is used loosely in criminal law theory.13 There
> nevertheless appears to be an acceptance, in much of the theoretical
> literature on criminal law, that culpability is demonstrated through the
> defendant’s *insufficient concern* for the interests of others. The idea of
> insufficient concern for the interests of others links those who hold
> vastly different perspectives on other issues. For instance, Alexander,
> Ferzan and Morse and Tadros adopt different approaches to the wider
> matter of criminal responsibility: Alexander, Ferzan and Morse think
> choice is the sole basis of responsibility;14 Tadros explains responsibility
> in terms of character.15 They also adopt different accounts of
> the justification of punishment: Alexander, Ferzan and Morse are
> retributivists;16 Tadros supports (in *Criminal Responsibilit*y, where he
> develops his thoughts on insufficient concern) a communication view
> of punishment.17 They agree, however, that the element of culpability
> required for a criminal conviction is a demonstration (through choices
> or ‘in-character’ behaviour) of *insufficient concern for the interests of
> others*.18 Furthermore, focussing on the defendant’s lack of sufficient
> concern for others is one way of understanding accounts of culpable
> carelessness in terms of ‘indifference’ towards risk.19 The basic understanding
> of culpability as insufficient concern for the interests of others
> will thus be adopted in this book. It is *the way* in which this lack of
> concern is demonstrated that is more controversial, and which requires
> much more explanation.
> 
> 
> 


p 258



> 
>       This is not a cause for concern, however. The ‘objective’ aspects of
> negligence as failure of belief are not unduly troubling. Absent a strong
> attachment to ‘subjectivity’ – which would require independent justification
> of the sort that the Exclusive Thesis needs170 – the presence of some
> ‘objectivity’ is not fatal to a defensible theory of culpable carelessness.
> ‘Objectivity’ comes in degrees, and the argument here is that negligence
> as failure of belief is ‘subjective’ *enough* to suffice for criminal conviction, in
> a way that a conduct-based view of negligence is not. Where there is
> disagreement over the proper social expectations concerning risk-taking
> and belief formation, importantmoral and political questions are, of course,
> raised.171 But it is not the aim of this book to remove them from the
> attribution of criminal responsibility and liability. If anything, ‘objective’
> 
> 
> 


p 259



> 
> considerations are simply made more transparent by the theory of negligence
> as failure of belief. This might be a good reason to limit the use of
> negligence as failure of belief, but **that is a point not about *culpability* but
> about *criminalisation*.** This point will be returned to later in this chapter.
> 
> 
> 



Culpablility for taking an unjustified risk with the interests of others v. Criminalisation