Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations

2.7.2009 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 172/18
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2009/71/EURATOM
of 25 June 2009
establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and in particular Articles 31 and 32 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, drawn up after obtaining the opinion of a group of persons appointed by the Scientific and Technical Committee from among scientific experts in the Member States, and after having consulted the European Economic and Social Committee (1),
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (2),
Whereas:
(1) Article 2(b) of the Treaty provides for the establishment of uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public.
(2) Article 30 of the Treaty provides for the establishment of basic standards within the Community for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiations.
(3) Council Directive 96/29/Euratom of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation (3) establishes the basic safety standards. The provisions of that Directive have been supplemented by more specific legislation.
(4) As recognised by ‘the Court of Justice’ of the European Communities (hereinafter referred to as the Court of Justice) in its case-law (4), the Community shares competences, together with its Member States, in fields covered by the Convention on Nuclear Safety (5).
(5) As recognised by the Court of Justice in its case-law, the provisions of Chapter 3 of the Treaty, related to health and safety, form a coherent whole conferring upon the Commission powers of some considerable scope in order to protect the population and the environment against risks of nuclear contamination.
(6) As recognised by the Court of Justice in its case-law, the tasks imposed on the Community by Article 2(b) of the Treaty to lay down uniform safety standards to protect the health of the population and of workers does not mean that, once such standards have been defined, a Member State may not provide for more stringent measures of protection.
(7) Council Decision 87/600/Euratom of 14 December 1987 on Community arrangements for the early exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency (6) established a framework for notification and provision of information to be used by the Member States in order to protect the general public in case of a radiological emergency. Council Directive 89/618/Euratom of 27 November 1989 on informing the general public about health protection measures to be applied and steps to be taken in the event of a radiological emergency (7) imposed obligations on the Member States to inform the general public in the event of a radiological emergency.
(8) National responsibility of Member States for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations is the fundamental principle on which nuclear safety regulation has been developed at the international level, as endorsed by the Convention on Nuclear Safety. That principle of national responsibility, as well as the principle of prime responsibility of the licence holder for the nuclear safety of a nuclear installation under the supervision of its national competent regulatory authority, should be enhanced and the role and independence of the competent regulatory authorities should be reinforced by this Directive.
(9) Each Member State may decide on its energy mix in accordance with relevant national policies.
(10) When developing the appropriate national framework under this Directive, national circumstances will be taken into account.
(11) The Member States have already implemented measures enabling them to achieve a high level of nuclear safety within the Community.
(12) While this Directive concerns principally the nuclear safety of nuclear installations, it is also important to ensure the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, including at storage and disposal facilities.
(13) Member States should assess, where appropriate, the relevant fundamental safety principles set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (8) which should constitute a framework of practices that Member States should have regard to when implementing this Directive.
(14) It is useful to build on the process where the national safety authorities of the Member States having nuclear power plants on their territory have been working together in the context of Western European Nuclear Regulators′ Association (WENRA) and have defined many safety reference levels for power reactors.
(15) Following the Council’s invitation to set up a High Level Group at EU level, as recorded in its Conclusions of 8 May 2007 on nuclear safety and safe management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) was established by Commission Decision 2007/530/Euratom of 17 July 2007 on establishing the European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management (9) to contribute to the achievement of the Community objectives in the field of nuclear safety.
(16) It is useful to establish a unified structure for reports of Member States to the Commission on the implementation of this Directive. Given its members′ wide experience ENSREG could make a valuable contribution in this respect, thereby facilitating consultation and cooperation of national regulatory authorities.
(17) On 15 October 2008 at its fifth meeting ENSREG adopted 10 principles to be used when drafting a nuclear safety Directive, as noted in its minutes dated 20 November 2008.
(18) Advances in nuclear technology, lessons learnt from operating experience and safety research and improvements in regulatory frameworks could have the potential to further improve safety. In keeping with the commitment to maintain and improve safety, Member States should take those factors into account when extending their nuclear power programme or deciding to use nuclear power for the first time.
(19) The establishment of a strong safety culture within a nuclear installation is one of the fundamental safety management principles necessary for achieving its safe operation.
(20) Maintenance and further development of expertise and skills in nuclear safety should be based, inter alia, on a process of learning from past operating experience and employing developments in methodology and science, as appropriate.
(21) In the past, self-assessments have been carried out in Member States in close connection with international peer reviews under the auspices of the IAEA as International Regulatory Review Team or Integrated Regulatory Review Service missions. These self-assessments were carried out and these missions were invited by Member States on a voluntary basis in the spirit of openness and transparency. Self-assessments and accompanying peer reviews of the legislative, regulatory and organisational infrastructure should be aimed at strengthening and enhancing the national framework of Member States, whilst recognising their competencies in ensuring nuclear safety of nuclear installations on their territory. The self-assessments followed by international peer reviews are neither an inspection nor an audit, but a mutual learning mechanism that accepts different approaches to the organisation and practices of a competent regulatory authority, while considering regulatory, technical and policy issues of a Member State that contribute to ensuring a strong nuclear safety regime. The international peer reviews should be regarded as an opportunity to exchange professional experience and to share lessons learned and good practices in an open and cooperative spirit through advice by peers rather than control or judgement. Recognising a need for flexibility and appropriateness in regard to different existing systems in Member States, a Member State should be free to determine the segments of its system being subject to the specific peer review invited, with the aim of continuously improving nuclear safety.
(22) In accordance with point 34 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making (10), Member States are encouraged to draw up, for themselves and in the interests of the Community, their own tables illustrating, as far as possible, the correlation between this Directive and the transposition measures and to make them public,