Council Regulation (EEC) No 1535/85 of 4 June 1985 opening, allocating and providing for the administration of a Community tariff quota for cod, dried, salted or in brine, whole, headless or in pieces, falling within subheading 03.02 A I b) of the Common Customs Tariff

COUNCIL  REGULATION (EEC) No 1535/85
of 4 June 1985
opening, allocating and providing for the administration of a Community tariff quota for cod, dried, salted or in brine, whole, headless or in pieces, falling within subheading 03.02 A I b) of the Common Customs Tariff
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES
,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 113 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Whereas the Community has undertaken to open an annual duty free Community tariff quota for 25 000 tonnes of cod, dried, salted or in brine, whole, headless or in pieces, falling within subheading 03.02 A I b) of the Common Customs Tariff;
Whereas this undertaking was fulfilled in recent years through the total suspension of the Common Customs Tariff duty provided for by Council Regulation (EEC) No 3796/81 of 29 December 1981 on the common organization of the market in fishery products (1), as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 3655/84 (2); whereas, however, this suspension comes to an end on 30 June 1985 pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No 3655/84; whereas, therefore, it is necessary to open on that date and for the remainder of the current year the tariff quota in question and to allocate it among the Member States;
Whereas, under Article 64 of the Act of Accession of 1979, Greece is required to apply in full the Common Customs Tariff duty in respect of the product in question since 1 January 1981; whereas, therefore, it is necessary to cover, in favour of the tariff quotas in question, the requirements of that Member State during the quota period;
Whereas equal and continuous access to the quota should be ensured for all Community importers and the rate of levy for the tariff quota should be applied consistently to all imports until the quota is used up; whereas, in the light of the principles outlined above, a Community tariff arrangement based on an allocation between the Member States would seem to preserve the Community nature of the quota; whereas, to represent as closely as possible the actual development of the market in the said goods, the allocation should follow proportionately the requirements of the Member States calculated both from statistics of imports from third countries during a representative reference period and according to the economic outlook for the tariff year in question;
Whereas, during the last three years for which complete statistics are available, the corresponding imports into each of the Member States represented the following percentages of total imports of the product in question coming from third countries which do not benefit from a preferential tariff measure having equivalent effect:
1.2.3.4 //   //   //   //   //   // 1981  // 1982  // 1983  //   //   //   //   // Benelux  // 1,94  // 1,57  // 1,71  // Denmark  // 0,32  // 0,47  // 2,29  // Germany  // 2,77  // 2,31  // 3,19  // Greece  // 17,96  // 15,22  // 14,16  // France  // 26,91  // 24,32  // 24,71  // Ireland  // 0  // 0  // 0  // Italy  // 47,88  // 54,81  // 52,45  // United Kingdom  // 2,22  // 1,30  // 1,49  //   //   //   //
Whereas, in view of these factors and of market forecasts for this product for 1985, the initial percentage shares in the quota volume can be expressed approximately as follows:
Benelux 1,74
Denmark 1,03
Germany 2,76
Greece 15,79
France 25,34
Ireland 0,01
Italy 51,65
United Kingdom 1,68
Whereas, to take account of the possible import trends for these fish, the quota volume should be divided into two instalments, the first being allocated between the Member States and the second held as a reserve to cover any subsequent requirements of Member States
which have used up their initial share; whereas, to give importers some degree of certainty, the first instalment of the tariff quota should be fixed at a high level, which in this case could be 80 % of the amount of the quota;
Whereas initial shares may be used up at different rates; whereas, to avoid disruption of supplies on this account, it should be provided that any Member State which has almost used up its initial share should draw an additional share from the reserve; whereas each time its additional share is almost used up a Member State should draw a further share and so on as many times as the reserve allows; whereas the initial and additional shares should be valid until the end of the quota period; whereas this form of administration requires close collaboration between the Member States and the Commission and the Commission must be in a position to keep account of the extent to which the quotas have been used up and to inform the Member States accordingly;
Whereas, if at a given date in the quota period a considerable quantity of a Member State's initial share remains unused it is essential that such State should return a significant proportion thereof to the reserve, in order to prevent a part of the Community tariff quota from remaining unused in one Member State while it could be used in others;
Whereas, since the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg are united within and jointly represented by the Benelux Economic Union, any measure concerning the administration of the shares allocated to that economic union may be carried out by any one of its members,