Tokens: 3
.
It
would
,
however
,
be
a
quantum
leap
to
conclude
that
the
positive
developments
in
the
applicant
’s
conditions
of
detention
,
particularly
his
placement
in
an
appropriate
therapeutic
institution
,
also
suffice
to
justify
the
impugned
detention
in
the
light
of
Article
7
§
1
of
the
Convention
.
It
should
be
remembered
that
the
impugned
facts
date
back
to
1997
,
when
the
applicant
was
nineteen
years
old
,
and
that
he
was
convicted
in
1999
.
At
the
time
,
the
Law
on
Youth
Courts
had
not
authorised
preventive
detention
orders
for
minors
or
young
adults
such
as
the
applicant
.
That
option
has
only
been
available
since
12
July
2008
,
when
the
Act
of
8
July
2008
introducing
subsequent
preventive
detention
in
cases
of
convictions
based
on
criminal
law
applicable
to
young
offenders
came
into
effect
(
see
paragraphs
55
and
56
of
the
judgment
)
.
The
3
August
2012
order
placing
the
applicant
in
preventive
detention
was
based
on
that
new
law
.
Consequently
,
it
is
obvious
that
the
applicant
’s
situation
was
affected
by
a
legislative
provision
which
had
not
been
applicable
at
the
time
of
the
offence
.
Now
,
according
to
Article
7
§
1
of
the
Convention
“
...
a
heavier
penalty
(
shall
not
)
be
imposed
than
the
one
that
was
applicable
at
the
time
the
criminal
offence
was
committed
”
.
The
whole
question
is
therefore
whether
the
impugned
measure
amounted
to
a
“
penalty
”
within
the
autonomous
meaning
of
that
concept
under
the
Convention
.
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