Tokens: 77
.
As
regards
the
authority
competent
to
authorise
the
surveillance
,
authorising
of
telephone
tapping
by
a
non
-
judicial
authority
may
be
compatible
with
the
Convention
(
see
,
for
example
,
Klass
and
Others
,
cited
above
,
§
51
;
Weber
and
Saravia
,
cited
above
,
§
115
;
and
Kennedy
,
cited
above
,
§
31
)
,
provided
that
that
authority
is
sufficiently
independent
from
the
executive
(
see
Roman
Zakharov
,
cited
above
,
§
258
)
.
However
,
the
political
nature
of
the
authorisation
and
supervision
increases
the
risk
of
abusive
measures
.
The
Court
recalls
that
the
rule
of
law
implies
,
inter
alia
,
that
an
interference
by
the
executive
authorities
with
an
individual
’s
rights
should
be
subject
to
an
effective
control
which
should
normally
be
assured
by
the
judiciary
,
at
least
in
the
last
resort
,
judicial
control
offering
the
best
guarantees
of
independence
,
impartiality
and
a
proper
procedure
.
In
a
field
where
abuse
is
potentially
so
easy
in
individual
cases
and
could
have
such
harmful
consequences
for
democratic
society
as
a
whole
,
it
is
in
principle
desirable
to
entrust
supervisory
control
to
a
judge
(
see
Klass
and
Others
,
cited
above
,
§
§
55
and
56
)
.
The
Court
recalls
that
in
Dumitru
Popescu
(
cited
above
,
§
§
70
-
73
)
it
expressed
the
view
that
either
the
body
issuing
authorisations
for
interception
should
be
independent
or
there
should
be
control
by
a
judge
or
an
independent
body
over
the
issuing
body
’s
activity
.
Accordingly
,
in
this
field
,
control
by
an
independent
body
,
normally
a
judge
with
special
expertise
,
should
be
the
rule
and
substitute
solutions
the
exception
,
warranting
close
scrutiny
(
see
Klass
and
Others
,
cited
above
,
§
§
42
and
55
)
.
The
ex
ante
authorisation
of
such
a
measure
is
not
an
absolute
requirement
per
se
,
because
where
there
is
extensive
post
factum
judicial
oversight
,
this
may
counterbalance
the
shortcomings
of
the
authorisation
(
see
Kennedy
,
cited
above
,
§
167
)
.
Indeed
,
in
certain
respects
and
for
certain
circumstances
,
the
Court
has
found
already
that
ex
ante
(
quasi-)judicial
authorisation
is
necessary
,
for
example
in
regard
to
secret
surveillance
measures
targeting
the
media
.
In
that
connection
the
Court
held
that
a
post
factum
review
can
not
restore
the
confidentiality
of
journalistic
sources
once
it
is
destroyed
(
see
Telegraaf
Media
Nederland
Landelijke
Media
B.V.
and
Others
v.
the
Netherlands
,
no
.
39315/06
,
§
101
,
22
November
2012
;
for
other
circumstances
necessitating
ex
ante
authorisation
see
Kopp
v.
Switzerland
,
25
March
1998
,
Reports
1998
II
)
.
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