Tokens: 20
.
I
of
course
appreciate
the
force
of
the
point
that
the
lapse
of
time
could
have
been
prejudicial
in
certain
ways
,
-
but
it
could
not
have
amounted
to
a
bar
.
The
fact
that
the
access
might
have
been
in
less
favourable
circumstances
does
not
amount
to
a
denial
of
it
.
Access
,
provided
it
is
allowed
,
or
possible
,
does
not
mean
access
at
precisely
the
litigant
’s
own
time
or
on
his
own
terms
.
In
the
present
case
there
was
at
the
most
a
factual
impediment
of
a
temporary
character
to
action
then
and
there
,
but
no
denial
of
the
right
because
there
could
not
be
,
in
law
.
The
element
of
"
remoteness
"
,
of
which
the
English
legal
system
takes
considerable
account
,
also
enters
into
this
.
Some
distance
,
conceptually
,
has
to
be
travelled
before
it
can
be
said
that
a
refusal
to
allow
communication
with
a
solicitor
"
now
"
,
amounts
to
a
denial
of
access
to
the
courts
-
either
"
now
"
,
or
still
less
"
then
"
.
In
no
reasonable
sense
can
it
be
regarded
as
a
proximate
cause
or
determining
factor
.
Golder
was
not
prevented
from
bringing
proceedings
:
he
was
only
delayed
,
and
then
,
in
the
end
,
himself
failed
to
do
so
.
A
charge
of
this
character
can
not
be
substantiated
on
the
basis
of
a
series
of
contingencies
.
Either
the
action
of
the
authorities
once
and
for
all
prevented
Golder
’s
recourse
or
it
did
not
.
In
my
opinion
it
did
not
.
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