Tokens: [
31
]
See
also
my
separate
opinion
in
Draksas
,
cited
above
,
page
26
,
point
(
2
)
.
Hence
,
I
can
not
share
the
Chamber
’s
statement
that
“
the
requirement
of
“
foreseeability
”
of
the
law
does
not
go
so
far
as
to
compel
States
to
enact
legal
provisions
listing
in
detail
all
situations
that
may
prompt
a
decision
to
launch
secret
surveillance
operations
”
(
paragraph
64
of
the
judgment
)
,
which
not
only
downgrades
the
role
of
the
principle
of
legality
in
a
field
of
law
where
its
rigorous
reading
is
most
needed
,
but
also
leaves
the
door
wide
open
to
creative
interpretation
of
the
law
by
Government
and
therefore
to
State
abuse
.
An
example
of
this
worrying
creative
interpretation
is
given
by
the
Government
themselves
in
the
present
case
,
when
they
refer
to
the
following
two
tasks
pursued
by
secret
intelligence
gathering
subject
to
ministerial
authorisation
in
Hungary
:
“
one
the
one
hand
,
to
detect
and
eliminate
acts
of
terrorism
and
,
on
the
other
hand
,
to
find
and
rescue
Hungarian
nationals
[
who
have
]
got
into
trouble
in
a
foreign
country
.
The
applicants
may
only
be
regarded
to
be
affected
by
the
contested
provisions
in
so
much
that
the
Act
does
not
exclude
them
from
the
circle
of
persons
who
in
the
context
of
the
detection
and
identification
of
a
person
or
a
group
of
persons
potentially
linked
to
an
act
of
terrorism
may
,
among
the
persons
or
at
a
location
or
in
a
facility
endangered
by
an
act
of
terrorism
,
be
affected
by
secret
intelligence
gathering
…
”
(
see
page
8
of
the
Government
observations
of
31
October
2014
)
.
This
means
that
any
person
with
a
“
potential
link
”
to
an
act
of
terrorism
or
a
place
endangered
by
an
act
of
terrorism
,
including
the
potential
victims
,
may
be
submitted
to
a
surveillance
measure
,
as
well
as
any
person
potentially
linked
to
an
incident
with
an
Hungarian
who
“
got
into
trouble
in
a
foreign
country
”
!
In
their
security
-
purposed
logic
,
the
Government
conclude
that
“
the
national
security
aspects
to
be
weighed
can
be
specified
under
the
law
in
very
broad
terms
,
as
in
the
actual
assessment
security
policy
aspects
,
that
is
,
non
-
legal
aspects
will
have
priority
…
In
the
field
of
authorising
national
security
-
purposed
secret
intelligence
gathering
no
positive
law
specifying
an
exact
criteria
system
providing
grounds
for
a
judicial
decision
exists
or
can
be
created
…
Therefore
in
the
field
of
combatting
terrorism
authorisation
for
national
security
-
purposed
secret
intelligence
gathering
is
granted
on
the
basis
of
a
politically
influenced
criteria
-
system
which
can
not
be
specified
under
positive
law
…
”
(
see
page
12
of
the
Observations
)
.
Summing
up
the
Government
’s
perspective
,
State
secret
surveillance
is
the
realm
of
politics
and
no
law
“
exits
or
can
be
created
”
to
limit
this
realm
.
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