Tokens: 10
.
More
recently
,
in
March
2015
the
Venice
Commission
adopted
the
“
Update
of
the
2007
report
on
the
democratic
oversight
of
the
security
services
and
report
on
the
democratic
oversight
of
signals
intelligence
agencies
”
,
which
distinguishes
between
targeted
surveillance
(
covert
collection
of
conversations
,
telecommunications
and
metadata
)
and
“
strategic
surveillance
”
which
“
does
not
necessarily
start
with
a
suspicion
against
a
particular
person
or
persons
”
.
The
Commission
insists
on
a
system
of
judicial
authorisation
complemented
by
some
form
of
follow
-
up
control
that
conditions
are
being
complied
with
.
The
power
to
“
contact
chain
”
,
i.e.
to
identify
people
in
contact
with
each
other
,
should
be
framed
narrowly
:
contact
chaining
of
metadata
should
normally
only
be
possible
for
people
suspected
of
“
actual
involvement
in
particularly
seriously
offences
”
,
such
as
terrorism
.
Strengthened
justification
requirements
and
procedural
safeguards
should
apply
,
such
as
the
involvement
of
a
privacy
advocate
,
with
regard
to
searches
of
content
data
.
In
the
view
of
the
Commission
,
notification
that
one
has
been
subject
to
strategic
surveillance
is
not
an
absolute
requirement
of
Article
8
of
the
Convention
.
If
a
State
has
a
general
complaints
procedure
to
an
independent
oversight
body
,
this
can
compensate
for
non
-
notification[19
]
.
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