http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/03/us-bank-mexico-...

That is a decent article from the Guardian concerning Wachovia's activities. In particular, it contains the statements of a highly involved whistleblower that are indicting on their own. But I find the statement of facts from the deferred prosecution agreement to be more compelling:

http://www.justice.gov/usao/fls/PressReleases/Attachments/10...

>24.) During the investigation, law enforcement reviewed the CDC banking activity that occurred at Wachovia and found readily identifiable evidence and red flags of large-scale drug money laundering....

>26.) These BSA investigations have determined that from May 2003 through at least July 2007, Wachovia violated the anti-money laundering ("AML") and suspicious activity reporting requirements of the BSA and its implementing regulations. The violations at Wachovia were serious and systemic...

>31.) ...This wire activity was principally monitored through the use of a computer system.... The actual number of alerts that the system was designed to generate per month was pre-set, based, in part, on the number of investigators available to review the alerts. In addition, AML personnel were not allowed to carry investigations into the next month.... The net result was that the understaffed AML unit in Philadelphia could not keep up with the volume of wires. The suspicious activity went effectively unmonitored.

>32.) With regard to the bulk cash business, Wachovia had no written formal AML policy or procedure for the monitoring of bulk cash to ensure that suspicious activity was reported.... As a result, at least $4,728,626,300 in bulk cash from the CDCs went through Wachovia during the period of May 1, 2004 through May 31, 2007, with essentially no AML monitoring.

>33.) Wachovia never reviewed any of the RDC deposits made from the time the product was first offered in the summer of 2005 until approximately November 2007. During this time, approximately $47 billion was deposited into Wachovia through RDC without AML monitoring.

>34.) With regard to standard pouch activity, Wachovia also failed to enforce a self-imposed policy regarding traveler's checks. In 2005, Wachovia was warned that the CDCs were sending in large quantities of sequentially numbered traveler's checks for deposit and that this was potentially suspicious activity. As a result of this warning and other internal discussions, Wachovia sent a letter to its customers noting that, "due to the strict U.S. regulatory mandates associated with anti-money laundering policies, Wachovia has decided to limit acceptance of bulk deposits of traveler's checks through our cash letter service." The letter stated that Wachovia "will require that you no longer remit deposits containing sequentially numbered USD traveler's checks where the total value of the series exceeds $10,500." Wachovia, however, failed to establish any internal policy or monitoring procedures to implement or enforce this rule. As a result, from April 2005 through May 2007, Wachovia accepted more than 1000 pouch deposits that contained thousands of sequentially numbered traveler's checks in violation of its own policy.

That's about as intentional as it gets in my book. I would argue that those above statements of fact are enough on their own to indicate intent. Particularly number 34, which makes it plain as day that they were certainly aware of the problems --and made public-facing gestures at addressing them-- but internally were more than happy to keep rolling in the drug money.