Counterinsurgency 3.0

After eight years of war, more than 907 Americans dead and 4,400 wounded, and $227 billion in aid from United States alone, Afghanistan was deteriorating badly, according to NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander, General Stanley McChrystal, in an August 2009 report to Secretary of Defense. (1) Although General McChrystal has been more optimistic of late, fact remains that Taliban's reach is more extensive now than at any time since being expelled from Kabul eight years ago. They have shadow governors in every province except Kabul. People turn to Taliban courts rather than state courts for justice in many parts of Afghanistan. And many Afghans prefer Taliban's austerity over Karzai government's corruption and incompetence. Why? Why have Taliban and their al Qaeda allies, who just a few years ago were reviled by vast majority of Afghans for their brutality and fanaticism, grown in strength and popularity during nearly a decade of US and international assistance? More broadly, why has massive international development assistance in Iraq, and elsewhere failed to defeat grip of extremist ideologies among many people who have benefited from billions of dollars worth of aid? Is it even possible for international development aid to help defeat radical Islam and other ideologies hostile to West and, if so, how? The conflict in Iraq taught US military many valuable lessons about how to gain trust and cooperation of local populace in fight against radical Islamic insurgents, demonstrated in new counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy implemented during 2007 surge. First, Anbar Awakening established a successful precedent of US military partnering with local tribes against insurgents, a tactical approach that could be considered 1.0. Next, COIN theorists led by General David Petraeus described Clear-Hold-Build strategy to transition and expand tribal security alliances into long-term governance arrangements, a strategic advance that can be termed 2.0. General McChrystal and ISAF forces are applying many of these lessons in their current COIN operations in Afghanistan. There remains, however, a substantial doctrinal need to move from tactical methods that cultivate and develop tribal alliances to strategic use of international aid to defeat insurgencies broadly and decisively. The authors term this new strategic approach to providing development aid in conflict areas 3.0. (2) This article explains how civilian and military policy-makers have incorrectly assumed that international development aid is inherently beneficial to local populations; necessarily fosters stability; and invariably leads to a grateful populace that will shun insurgents, thereby advancing US strategic goals. The article posits that using international aid to combat radical Islamic insurgencies is more complex than aid advocates assume and outlines a different conception of what constitutes development. Finally, it explains how small-scale, micro-development based on corporate social responsibility practices, rather than traditional foreign aid, will have greatest and most enduring impact against Islamic insurgencies. Such an approach most effectively inculcates beliefs and institutionalizes behaviors that are congenial to West while being sensitive to local conditions. Afghanistan: More of Same At recent London Conference on which brought together leaders and ministers from 60 nations, the international community pledged to maintain its long-term commitment to Afghanistan, without explaining why prior eight years of assistance had produced such limited results. (3) The new US Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, announced week before London Conference, also omitted any explanation. (4) Except for calling past efforts historically under-resourced, last summer's report from General McChrystal also offered no account. …

Topic: Military History and Strategy
Subfield: Political Science and International Relations
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences