Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance by Valerie s> Sperling Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991 by Yitzhak M. s> Brudny Reconstructing the State: Personal Networks and Elite Identity in Soviet Russia by Gerald M. s> Easter (review)

Field: Social Sciences (Social Sciences)

584 SEER, 8o, 3, 2002 Sperling, Valerie (ed.). Building theRussianState:Institutional CrisisandtheQuest for Democratic Governance. The John M. Olin Critical Issues Series. Westview Press, Boulder, CO, and Oxford, 2000. Xiii + 245 pp. Notes. Tables. Figures.Index. 1i8.95. Brudny, Yitzhak, M. Reinventing Russia:Russian Nationalism andtheSoviet State, I953-I99I. RussianResearchCenterStudies,9I. HarvardUniversity Press, Cambridge, MA, and London, I998. x + 352 pp. Notes. Index. ?7I 3.95. Easter, Gerald, M. Reconstructing theState.Personal Networks andEliteIdentity in SovietRussia.Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge andNewYork,2000. Xiii + 22 I pp. Notes. Bibliography.Index. $54.95. OF all the problems that Russia has had to deal with duringthe course of the last ten years, few can doubt that the most serious one of all has been in the sphere of state building. As the Soviet Union began to disintegrate,in many ways it was Russia, more than any of the other republicswhich made up the Union, which was the leastpreparedto cope with the institutionaldemandsof outright independence. Learning to live with the new requirements of modern-day statehood and nationhood was thereforealways going to be the ultimate test for its new leaders. It is a test, however, that up until now they have singularlyfailed;a conclusion that is virtuallyunanimouslyaccepted, at least in most Western academic circles. The only real subjectfor debate and argument, then, is why and how this has been the outcome. To what degree can the failures experienced here be located in the legacy unwittingly bequeathed by the Soviet system or even by a much older Russian political tradition?Or, alternatively,how much of it is down to the outright mistakes and failures committed exclusively during the course of the last ten years themselves? If one islookingfora seriousindictmentof mistakescommitted sinceRussia acquiredher independence, then the collection of essaysin Valerie Sperling's volume on Building theRussian State:Institutional CrisisandtheQuestfor Democratic Governance would be a very good place to commence. One after another the contributors appear to compete with each other to find the most negative terms and metaphors so as to adequately convey the current depths of the crisis facing the Russian state. For some, the conclusion is that what we are witnessing is a state almost on its last legs, almost in ruins, unable and unwilling to do the things that it should be doing: for example, providing welfare provisions for its citizens; levying taxes; paying its wages on time; regulating commerce and banking; providing an orderly framework for relations between its constituent federal components; and providing a common defence of its territory.For others, given the extent of its inabilities and failures,the suggestionis made thatwe might have reached a point where we can even questionwhetherRussiareallyconstitutesa stateat all. As for the cause of failure, again virtually all contributors are in broad agreement. Although the Soviet legacy was alwaysgoing to be a difficultone to overcome and one should not underestimatethe problems it bequeathed, REVIEWS 585 neverthelessthe main targetof indictment for the failuresof the last ten years is placed fairlyand squarelyon the shouldersof BorisYeltsinand the team of statepersonnel that he himself assembled.And of all the chargesmade, none carriesmore weight and conviction than the allegation that the Russian state itselfhas become to all intentsand purposesprivatized in thisperiod. That is to say, what we are facing here is notjust a classicalkind of 'predatorystate' or even 'patrimonialstate', but one which has almost completely detached itself from society as a whole. As a consequence, not only is power personalized ratherthan institutionalized,but it is run by individuals'who know that they can take what they wish without fear of accountability' (Corbin B. Lyday, p. 2I5). Nor, quite properly, is the West sparedfrom criticismeither, for all of this has been done with at least the tacit connivance of most Westernpowers. As Louise Shelley puts it in her contribution:'The desire by the West to support reformersratherthan overallprocessesof reformmeant that the Westdid not practicewhat itpreached.Insteadof focusingon largerissuesof implementing good governance, many Westerncountriesand internationalfinancialinstitutions dealtwith a smallclique aroundtheYeltsingovernmentand engaged the new oligarchy,orthe newlyrichandpowerfulbusinessmogulswho dominated banking, the media, and Russia's natural resources, and were key Yeltsin advisers.They bypassed Parliament,supported a constitution that personalized power in the president, and failed to encourage and support...