Kant and the Categories of Freedom

Field: Arts and Humanities (Social Sciences)

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1Precursors of the categories of freedom can be found in the form of the categories of morality and the categories of pure Willkür which Kant mentions in marginalia in his copy of Baumgarten's Initia philosophiae practicae primae (cf. R6854, R6888 and R6948, all of which were probably written between 1776 and 1778). The closest to the categories of freedom that can be found after the publication of the Critique of Practical Reason are the categories of right and of morality to which Kant refers at various places in the Vorarbeiten to the Metaphysics of Morals (e.g. 23: 218, 23: 274 and 23: 382), and which are also mentioned in the draft of a letter to Heinrich Jung-Stilling, written sometime after 1 March 1789 (cf. 11: 10 and 23: 494). With the exception of references to the Critique of Pure Reason, which will take the usual form of citing the page numbers in the A- and B-editions, all references to Kant's works will be to the Akademie-Ausgabe (Kant, Citation1900) and will be cited by giving the volume and page numbers. When referring to the Reflexionen, which are Kant's hand-written notes collected in volumes 14 to 23 of the collected works, I will cite the R-numbers that are given in the Akademie-Ausgabe. Translations are my own, though I generally follow the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. 2Practical rules have to be understood in a broad sense as first-personal rules in general and are not to be solely identified with the specific rules deriving from pragmatic imperatives (cf. Beck, Citation1960: 138). 3All the examples of sensibly conditioned features and morally determined features will be explained in detail later on when the individual categories are examined. 4For ease of reference, I will refer to this interpretation as the ‘proposed interpretation’ and to the other interpretation as the ‘alternative interpretation’. 5This reading is accepted by, among others, Bobzien and C. G. Schütz (cf. Bobzien, Citation1988: 208–9 and Section 3.4). 6It is also noteworthy that Kant attributes a special significance to the third categories of nature since they play a crucial role in making possible the unity of experience. 7As a result of this situation some have argued that 5: 66 does not commit us to any general criterion that is supposed to apply to all headings (cf. Graband, Citation2005: 56 fn. 65). 8Moreover, both the notion of ‘transition’ (Übergang) and of ‘introducing’ (einleiten) seem to have connotations of referring to gradual processes. 9Cf. Metaphysics of Morals: ‘A division according to an a-priori principle (in contrast to one that is empirical) can now be called dogmatic’ (6: 284). 10Kant himself does not use this notion of phenomenal personality. However, it should be noted that ‘personality’ does not always have moral connotations for him since he frequently uses the notion of transcendental or psychological personality (e.g. 28: 296) and in one place even refers to ‘empirical personality’ (21: 19). 11Mellin accepts a similar interpretation, arguing that the second category of modality should be understood as involving assertoric imperatives and, accordingly, a broader understanding of ‘duty’ that is not specifically moral (cf. Mellin, 1802: 534). Benton also argues for a non-moral interpretation of the second category though he claims that all categories, except that of perfect and imperfect duty, are neither purely moral nor merely prudential (cf. Benton, Citation1980: 186 and 189). 12Paton also appears to make room for a broad notion of ‘duty’ or ‘obligation’ since he states that all three kinds of imperative involve a kind of obligation –‘corresponding to the three kinds of good action there will be three kinds of action in some sense obligatory’ (Paton, Citation1947: 114). This view can also be found in Kant's claim that ‘[a]ll imperatives are expressed by an ought and indicate by this the relation of an objective law of reason to a will that by its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (a necessitation)’ (4: 413). 13Kant gives the geometry example both in the footnote in the Preface and at 5: 31. 14The universal end of every thinking being is, of course, self-love or happiness. As Kant says, there is ‘one end that can be presupposed as actual in the case of all rational beings … and that purpose is happiness' (4: 415). 15 Daß in der Vorrede zur Critik der reinen praktischen Vernunft zu den erlaubten Handlungen als ein Beyspiel angeführt wird, was einem Redner qua tali erlaubt sey etc. scheint mir eine metabasis eis allo genos zu seyn, nemlich in die Regeln der Geschicklichkeit, die Sie selbst so scharfsinnig von den Geboten der Sittlichkeit unterschieden haben. 16 Es ist hier merkwürdig, dass die unvollkommene Pflicht eigentlich nicht das ist, was einem in der Vernunft nothwendig liegenden Gesetz widerstreitet, (wie es bei den andern Kategorien, dem Erlaubten und Unerlaubten, der Pflicht und dem Pflichtwidrigen der Fall ist), welches das Pflichtwidrige einer vollkommenen Pflicht seyn würde. 17It is clear that for Kant necessary duties are to be equated with perfect duties and that contingent duties are equivalent to imperfect duties (cf. 4: 429–30). 18 Der jeweilige negative Korrelatbegriff kann nach dem Prinzip gebildet worden sein, innerhalb des je durch den entsprechenden Grundsatz aufgespannten Bereichs eine vollständige Zweiteilung zu erhalten. 19I would like to thank Jens Timmermann and Allen Wood for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to the participants of the conference on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason at the University of St Andrews and to an audience at Stanford University.