Analyzing strategic stability in South Asia with pathways and prescriptions for avoiding nuclear war

Field: Social Sciences (Social Sciences)

Abstract Deterrence and strategic stability are closely interlinked. This paper explores the relationship between the two, which finds its clearest expression in the concept of deterrence stability. The paper examines contending views of strategic stability in South Asia, and considers deterrence stability during the 1999 Kargil Crisis. This discussion is developed with an analysis of the drivers of deterrence instability in the region. Finally, the paper concludes with an overview of different pathways to nuclear war in South Asia, and the policy prescriptions that might mitigate the risks of this happening. Acknowledgements The views expressed here are the author's own and do not reflect his institutional affiliations. The author wishes to express his gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. Notes 1. C. Babington and P. Constable, ‘Kashmir killings mar Clinton visit to India’, Washington Post, 22 March 2000, p A1. 2. C. Braun and C.F. Chuba, ‘Proliferation rings: new challenges to nuclear non-proliferation regime’, International Security Vol 29, No 2 (2004), 5–49. 3. M. Krepon (ed), Strategic Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia (Washington, DC: Stimson Centre, 2004), chapt 1. 4. Patrick Morgan draws a distinction between general deterrence and immediate deterrence. The former refers to a policy stance of regulating an adversary relationship and balancing power over a long period of time through maintenance of a satisfactory level of forces. In immediate deterrence, the actor has a military capability and issue threats to a specific opponent when the opponent is already contemplating and preparing an attack: ‘Immediate deterrence situation is a crisis, or close to it, with war distinctly possible, while general deterrence is far less intense and anxious because the attack to be forestalled is still hypothetical’. See P.M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p 9. 5. As quoted in F.C. Zagare and D.M. Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p 4. Following John. J. Mearsheimer, Zagare and Kilgour define a system or a deterrence relationship as stable when ‘the status quo is likely to survive’, and a system or a deterrence relationship as unstable when ‘a crisis or war is possible’ (see p 5). 6. P.A. McCarthy, Hierarchy and Flexibility in World Politics: Adaptation to Shifting Power Distributions in the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996), p 11. 7. B. Loo, ‘Geography and strategic stability’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 26, No 1, 2003, p 157. 8. Ibid, p 156. 9. According to M.A. Kaplan, a stable system is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable equilibrium. On the other hand, a stable equilibrium is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the existence of a stable system. See M.A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (Boston: Brown and Little, 1957), pp 6–7. 10. As quoted in McCarthy, op cit, Ref 6, p 13. 11. R.N. Rosencrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963). 12. K. Deutsch and J.D. Singer, ‘Multi-polar power systems and international stability’, World Politics, Vol 16, No 1 April, 1964, pp 390–406. 13. K.N. Waltz, ‘The stability of a bipolar world’, Daedalus, Vol 3, 1964, pp 881–909. 14. It is worth pointing out that crisis management requires novel concepts of planning, control and conduct of military operations, and that these requirements may strain the experience, imagination, and patience of military professionals. G.A. Craig and A.L. George have mentioned the following seven requirements of crisis management for leaders: maintain top-level control of military options; create pause in the tempo of military actions; coordinate diplomatic and military moves; confine military moves to those that constitute clear demonstration of one's resolve and are appropriate to one's limited objectives; avoid military moves that give the opponents the impression that one is about to resort to large-scale warfare and, therefore, force him to consider preemption; choose diplomatic–military options that signal a desire to negotiate rather than to seek a military solution; and select diplomatic–military options that leave the opponent a way out of the crisis that is compatible with his fundamental interests. See G.A. Craig and A.L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp 206–207. 15. K. Deutsch and J. D. Singer, op cit, Ref 12, p 394. 16. Ibid, pp 392–400. 17. J.E. Dougherty and R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 5th edition (New York: Longman, 2001), p 588. 18. B. Miller, Why Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002) p 60. 19. Ibid, p 61. 20. Ibid, pp 66–67. 21. In contrast, J.H. Kahn has suggested three key elements of a policy of stable deterrence: maintaining a confident retaliatory deterrent posture comparable in effectiveness and size with that of one's adversary; avoiding weapons and doctrines that pose a threat to adversary's deterrent and seeking security through negotiated arms limitations; and reducing the relative reliance on nuclear power in defense and foreign policy. See J.H. Kahn, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p 330. 22. L.V. Signal, ‘No first use and NATO's nuclear posture’, in J.D. Steinbruner and L.V. Sigal (eds), Alliance Security: NATO and the No First Use Question (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1984). 23. T. Schelling and M. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p 50. 24. Krepon, op cit, Ref 3, p 3. 25. See S.D. Sagan, ‘Perils of proliferation’, Asian Survey,Vol XLI, No 6, November–December 2001, pp 1044–1063; and F.H. Khan, ‘The independence–dependence paradox: stability dilemmas in South Asia’, Arms Control Today, Vol 33, No 8, October 2003, pp 29–34. 26. Quoted in C.W. Kegley, Jr and G. Raymond, A Multipolar Peace? Great-Power Politics in the Twenty–first Century (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), p 38. 27. K.N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p 24. 28. This ‘peace through peril’ thesis is well summarized by Kegley and Raymond: ‘when both sides in an enduring rivalry can mutually assure each other's destruction, the terror of utter devastation preserves peace between them’. See Kegley, Jr and Raymond, op cit, Ref 26, p 38. 29. While the structural deterrence theory finds the key to interstate stability in the structure and distribution of power, decision-theoretic deterrence theory focuses on the interplay of outcomes, preferences and choices in determining interstate conflict behaviour. Factors such as strategic uncertainty, subjectivity and rationality form the core assumptions of decision-theoretic variant best exemplified in the game of ‘Chicken’. 30. F.C. Zagare and D.M. Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p 9. 31. A.J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), pp 741–743. 32. K.N. Waltz, ‘The emerging structure of international politics’, International Security, Vol 18, No 2, 1993, p 77. 33. Several policy implications flow from these axioms of the classical deterrence theory, including the following: quantitative arms races, which serve to increase the cost of conflict, can help prevent wars; by contrast, qualitative arms races, which threaten to provide one side or another with a first-strike advantage, increase the probability of preemptive war; comprehensive and effective defense systems make conflict more likely; the selective proliferation of nuclear weapons can help prevent war and promote peace; and accidental war is the greatest threat to peace. 34. J.J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War’, in M.E. Brown et al. (eds), Theories of War and Peace (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), p 17. 35. A. Katsouris and D. Goure, ‘Strategic crossroads in South Asia: the potential role for missile defense’, Comparative Strategy, Vol 18, 1999, p 178. 36. S.D. Sagan, ‘For the worse: “till death do us part” ’, in S.D. Sagan and K. Waltz (eds), The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003), pp 106–107. See also D. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). 37. P.R. Chari, ‘Nuclear restraint, nuclear risk reduction, and the security–insecurity paradox in South Asia’, in M. Krepon and C. Gagne (eds), The Stability–Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2001), p 16. 38. Michael Krepon, ‘The stability–instability paradox, misperception, and escalation control in South Asia’, in Krepon and Gagne (eds), ibid, p 72. 39. C.P. Bowen and D. Wolven, ‘Command and control challenges in South Asia’, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring–Summer, 1999, pp 25, 33–34. 40. G. Snyder, ‘The balance of power and the balance of terror’, in P. Seabury (ed), Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), p 198. 41. S.P. Kapur, ‘Nuclear proliferation, the Kargil Conflict, and South Asian security’, Security Studies, Vol 13, No 1, 2003, p 81. 42. M.A. Durrani, Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons, CMC Occasional Paper (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, July 2004), p 31. 43. M. Lodhi, ‘Anatomy of a debacle’, Newsline, July 1999, pp 32–33. 44. S.M. Mazari, The Kargil Conflict, 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003), pp 42–43. 45. T.J. van Gelder, ‘Credible threats and usable weapons: some dilemmas of deterrence’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol 18, 1989, p 163. 46. According to H. Abbas, ‘the Kargil operation had been discussed at least twice before in earlier years. It was first discussed during the time of General Zia ul Haq who was given a briefing by the Military Operations Directorate. Zia turned down the plan on grounds that “it would lead us into full-scale war with India” ’. See H. Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p 170. 47. R.G. Wirsing, Kashmir In The Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2003). 48. M.A. Durrani, op cit, Ref 42, p 30. 49. M.R. Kraig, ‘The political and strategic imperatives of nuclear deterrence in South Asia’, India Review, Vol 2, No 1, January 2003, p 3. 50. M. Quinlan, ‘Nuclear tests in the subcontinent: prospects and significance for the world’, International Relations, Vol 16, No 4 April, 1999, p 6. 51. Following the two-day talks at the Additional Secretary level that were held in New Delhi on 19–20 June 2004, a number of steps designed to ensure nuclear stability between the two countries were announced, including: existing hotlines between Directors General of Military Operations to be upgraded, dedicated and secured; dedicated hotline to be established between Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan; draft agreement handed over by the Indian side, requiring both countries to work towards concluding an agreement on technical parameters on pre-notification of flight testing of missiles; unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests was re-affirmed by both sides; unless in exercise of national sovereignty, it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests; and commitment by both sides to continue bilateral discussions and hold further meetings towards implementation of the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding of 1999. See www.Indianembassy.org/SouthAsia/Pakistan/MOU(Lahore 0/21/1999).html