Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (review)

Field: Social Sciences (Social Sciences)

200 SAIS REVIEW Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. By Paul K. Huth. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. 227 pp. Reviewed by Bernard I. Finel, M.A. Candidate, SAIS. The essence of deterrence is to threaten the opponent, either implicitly or explicitly . Central to the success of deterrence is the credibility of that threat. When a state is attempting to deter an attack on its homeland, the credibility of threats is very high. However, when a state threatens an opponent on behalf of a third state, that threat may be much less credible. This is the problem of extended deterrence. In studying the reasons for the success or failure of extended deterrence, Paul K. Huth has embarked on a very challenging course. Extended deterrence is itself a subset of general deterrence theory, and is closely related to escalation , crisis management, and bargaining and negotiation. It is largely because the study ofextended deterrence is linked so tightly with other fields that Professor Huth's book suffers from several serious, although not fatal, flaws. It is, after all, difficult to create a coherent theory which blends several different disciplines without slipping into abstractions which tend to blur the focus and to render the theory unusable. In essence, Huth's thesis argues that extended deterrence will most likely succeed when local military imbalances are eroded by tit-for-tat military escalations and when a firm-but-flexible diplomatic posture is adopted. Huth sets forward eleven theories about successful extended deterrence, which he then tests on the basis of 58 cases from 1885-1983. This testing process could be the most interesting part of the book, but Huth relies too heavily on statistical methods. Unless one is endowed with an affinity for complex statistics, this material can be rough going. For example, Huth uses probit analysis, which he explains as "analogous to multiple regression analysis for situations in which the dependent variable is dichotomous." In addition, Huth tells us whether or not his theories are verified by the probit analysis without giving us the details of the cases. Thus the book cannot be used as a source for general information about specific cases of extended deterrence, nor can the reader check Huth's facts or dispute his claims. Apparently realizing the limitations of statistical analysis, Huth includes two chapters of case studies. However, these are misused. Instead of comprehensively analyzing a few cases, Huth takes a cursory glance at ten. In addition , Huth uses the case studies to illustrate, rather than test, his arguments. For example, one of the case study chapters is devoted specifically to the effects of military balance on extended deterrence, while another focuses on the diplomacy of extended deterrence. But, since deterrence succeeds or fails based on the interaction of might and diplomacy, the cases are incomplete. The case studies are incomplete because Huth uses them to illustrate only certain points. He illustrates the principle of firm-but-flexible diplomacy with the Russo-British dispute over Afghanistan in 1885. Huth deals mostly with the actual diplomacy, though some movement of forces is duly noted as a tit-for-tat BOOK REVIEWS 201 escalation. The role of Bismarck in the crisis is ignored, as is the value of the League of Three Emperors in strengthening the Russian bargaining position. Finally, and most grievously, the context ofthe dispute within the broader scheme of Russo-British relations is ignored. The fact that neither side wanted war over Afghanistan when conflict over the Turkish straits was looming is not mentioned, nor is the Russian fear of pushing Britain into a new Crimean coalition in the case of a Balkan conflict. When Huth discusses the advantages of tit-for-tat military escalations to offset local military imbalances, he crosses the line between extended and direct deterrence. According to deterrence theory, when a country begins to deploy troops in its protege country, an attack on the protege is also an attack on its protector. For example, with nearly 300,000 American troops in Europe, a Soviet attack in Europe would be considered an attack on the United States, according to deterrence theory. It is an effective form of deterrence, but it is not extended...