1. Flexing the Sable Arm: Emancipation, Black Troops, and Hard War

Field: Arts and Humanities (Social Sciences)

AS THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR began, few people could have envisioned fratricidal carnage and physical devastation to come. Few indeed could have foreseen that this conflict would strike down suddenly centuries-old institution of slavery and thrust nearly two hundred thousand black men into armed forces of United States. At beginning of war, United States followed a policy that historians Mark Grimsley and Ethan S. Rafuse refer to, respectively, as conciliation and moderation. Northerners reasoned that Southerners were their countrymen before war and would be countrymen again once conflict was won and nation restored. Many Americans including President Abraham Lincoln wanted to avoid any harsh actions against in rebellion in order to effect an amicable reunification as free of bitterness and resentment as possible. They aimed to crush Confederate Army, but they wished to leave civilians unmolested and to keep intact economic and social structure of South, slavery included.1 At war's outset Lincoln embraced this approach. He counseled against and extreme measures, which may reach loyal as well as disloyal. He also wanted war to end quickly so that it would not degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle. His general in chief, Winfield Scott, planned to avoid bloody conflict, defeating South by blockading its coast and taking control of Mississippi River. Scott's successor, Major General George B. McClellan, even more strongly supported kid-glove approach. According to McClellan, not only should constitutional, civil, and political rights of Southern civilians be protected, but the people of South should understand that we are not making war upon institution of slavery, but if they submit to Constitution and Laws of Union they will be protected. He declared that armed forces of United States must by their actions prove government to be benign and beneficent. Any other policy might render impossible reconstruction of Union.2 Through early months of war, Lincoln administration's policy of moderation ruled out draconian military measures and actions that would hurt Southern civilians, many of whom were presumed to be loyal to Union. Had U.S. military achieved final victory in first year of contest, it is unlikely that it would have resorted to hard war. The government would have implemented no radical policies and would have made no assault on slavery. The want of military success forced government's hand. Between first year of Civil War and its concluding twelve months, conflict was transformed dramatically from a war of civility to a remorseless war of exhaustion. The change came, however, in stages. Congressional legislation and executive actions employing hard hand of war seemed to mirror fortunes of Union armed forces in Eastern theater of operations. The North suffered a humiliating defeat at First Bull Run (or First Manassas) in July 1861. Barely two weeks after this debacle, Congress passed first Confiscation Act, which authorized emancipation of slaves of rebels as well as slaves who had been forced to assist Confederate war efforts. The patience of Lincoln and Congress began to dissipate as policy of leniency and restraint failed to achieve its purpose. Lincoln announced that those enemies must understand that they cannot experiment for ten years trying to destroy government, and if they fail still come back into Union unhurt.3 Lincoln reevaluated his commitment to a conciliatory policy. McClellan did not. The general in chief reasserted his faith in restraint and rejected tampering with slavery. His attitude raised questions about his commitment to decisive victory, and his inactivity prompted Congress and president to act more decisively themselves. …