The economics of modern business enterprise Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986) The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration Journal of Political Economy 94 (4) August 691 719 Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990) Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm Journal of Political Economy 98 (6) December 1119 58 Oliver Hart (1995) Established Theories of the Firm and The Property Rights Approach in Firms Contracts and Financial Structure Chapters 1 and 2 Oxford: Clarendon Press 15 28 29 55 references Bengt Holmström and John Roberts (1998) The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited Journal of Economic Perspectives 12 (4) Fall 73 94 Adam Gifford Jr. (1991) A Constitutional Interpretation of the Firm Public Choice 68 91 106 Henry Hansmann (1996) A Theory of Enterprise Ownership in The Ownership of Enterprise Part I Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 11 49 notes Benjamin Ward (1958) The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism American Economic Review XLVIII (4) September 566 89 Eirik G. Furubotn (1988) Codetermination and the Modern Theory of the Firm: A Property Rights Analysis Journal of Business 61 (2) April 165 81 Eugene Kandel and Edward P. Lazear (1992) Peer Pressure and Partnerships Journal of Political Economy 100 (4) August 801 17 Henry Hansmann (1987) Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization in Walter W. Powell (ed) (ed.) The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook Chapter 2 New Haven CT and London: Yale University Press 27 42 Edwin G. West (1989) Nonprofit Organizations: Revised Theory and New Evidence Public Choice 63 (2) November 165 74 Paul H. Rubin (1978) The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract Journal of Law and Economics XXI (1) April 223 33 G. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter (1985) The Economics of Franchise Contracts Journal of Law and Economics XXVIII (3) October 503 26 Robert E. Martin (1988) Franchising and Risk Management American Economic Review 78 (5) December 954 68 Antony W. Dnes (1992)  Unfair Contractual Practices and Hostages in Franchise Contracts Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 148 (3) September 484 504 Alanson P. Minkler (1992) Why Firms Franchise: A Search Cost Theory Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 148 (2) June 240 59 Kenneth J. Arrow (1975) Vertical Integration and Communication Bell Journal of Economics 6 (1) Spring 173 83 Benjamin Klein Robert G. Crawford and Armen A. Alchian (1978) Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process Journal of Law and Economics XXI (2) October 297 326 Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece (1982) Appropriable Rents and Quasi Vertical Integration Journal of Law and Economics XXV (2) October 321 8 Ramon Casadesus Masanell and Daniel F. Spulber (2000) The Fable of Fisher Body Journal of Law and Economics XLIII (1) April 67 104 Ronald Coase (2006) The Conduct of Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General Motors Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 15 (2) Summer 255 78 Benjamin Klein (2007) The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body General Motors International Journal of the Economics of Business 14 (1) February 1 36 John M. Vernon and Daniel A. Graham (1971) Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration Journal of Political Economy 79 (4) 924 5 Richard Schmalensee (1973) A Note on the Theory of Vertical Integration Journal of Political Economy 81 (2 Part 1) March April 442 9 Martin K. Perry (1980) Forward Integration by Alcoa: 1888 1930 Journal of Industrial Economics XXIX (1) September 37 53 John H. Dunning (1973) The Determinants of International Production Oxford Economic Papers 25 (3) New Series November 289 336 Alfred D. Chandler (1980) The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in the United States and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis Economic History Review 33 (3) New Series August 396 410 John Cantwell (2000) A Survey of Theories of International Production in Christos N. Pitelis (ed) and Roger Sugden (ed) (eds) The Nature of the Transnational Firm Second Edition Chapter 2 London: Routledge 10 56 Keith Cowling and Roger Sugden (1987) The Rise of Transnationals and the International Division of Labour in Transnational Monopoly Capitalism Chapter 4 Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books and New York NY: St. Martins Press 61 79 references Oliver E. Williamson Michael L. Wachter and Jeffrey E. Harris (1975) Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange Bell Journal of Economics 6 (1) Spring 250 78 Joseph E. Stiglitz (1975) Incentives Risk and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy Bell Journal of Economics 6 (2) Autumn 552 79 Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1984) Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device American Economic Review 74 (3) June 433 44 Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981) Rank Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts Journal of Political Economy 89 (5) October 841 64 Edward P. Lazear (1981) Agency Earnings Profiles Productivity and Hours Restrictions American Economic Review 71 (4) September 606 20 Robert M. Hutchens (1989) Seniority Wages and Productivity: A Turbulent Decade Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (4) Fall 49 64 Edward P. Lazear (2000) The Future of Personnel Economics Economic Journal 110 November F611 F639 Bruno S. Frey (1993) Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort The Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty Economic Inquiry XXXI (4) October 663 70 Armen A. Alchian (1969) Corporate Management and Property Rights in Henry G. Manne (ed) (ed.) Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 337 60 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4) October 305 60 Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990) Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives Journal of Political Economy 98 (2) April 225 64 Joseph G. Haubrich (1994) Risk Aversion Performance Pay and the Principal Agent Problem Journal of Political Economy 102 (2) April 258 76 Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman (1998) Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats Quarterly Journal of Economics CXIII (3) August 653 91 Eugene F. Fama (1980) Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm Journal of Political Economy 88 (2) April 288 307 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen (1983) Agency Problems and Residual Claims Journal of Law and Economics XXVI (2) June 327 49 Oliver D. Hart (1983) The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme Bell Journal of Economics 14 (2) Autumn 366 82 Henry G. Manne (1965) Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control Journal of Political Economy 73 (2) April 110 20 Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1980) Takeover Bids the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation Bell Journal of Economics 11 (1) Spring 42 64 Michael C. Jensen (1988) Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (1) Winter 21 48 Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers (1988) Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers in Alan J. Auerbach (ed) (ed.) Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences Chapter 2 Chicago IL: NBER and University of Chicago Press 33 56 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1986) Large Shareholders and Corporate Control Journal of Political Economy 94 (3 Part 1) June 461 88 Masahiko Aoki (1990) Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm Journal of Economic Literature XXVIII (1) March 1 27 Jens Köke and Luc Renneboog (2005) Do Corporate Control and Product Market Competition Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth Evidence from Market Oriented and Blockholder Based Governance Regimes Journal of Law and Economics XLVIII October 475 516 Martin Ricketts a leading scholar in this field has selected the seminal papers from a variety of traditions that illustrate the evolution of thinking on the firm over a considerable period of time. The firm as a vehicle for entrepreneurial initiative and the exercise of business judgement is contrasted throughout with the firm as a policing mechanism in response to known contractual hazards. The selection is in three volumes that cover respectively the general theoretical background; the ownership and scope of the firm its degree of vertical and transnational integration; and agency issues relating to employee incentives and the control of managers. This authoritative collection will provide a valuable reference of interest to students postgraduates and professional economists seeking an overview of the subject and its evolution Recommended readings (Machine generated): Frank H. Knight (1921) Enterprise and Profit in Risk Uncertainty and Profit Chapter IX Boston MA and New York NY: Houghton Mifflin Company 264 90 R.H. Coase (1937) The Nature of the Firm Economica 4 (16) New Series November 386 405 Fritz Machlup (1967) Theories of the Firm: Marginalist Behavioral Managerial American Economic Review LVII (1) March 1 33 Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972) Production Information Costs and Economic Organization American Economic Review 62 (5) December 777 95 Oliver E. Williamson (1979) Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations Journal of Law and Economics XXII (2) October 233 61 Oliver E. Williamson (1981) The Modern Corporation: Origins Evolution Attributes Journal of Economic Literature XIX (4) December 1537 68 Robert B. Ekelund Jr. and Robert D. Tollison (1980) Mercantilist Origins of the Corporation Bell Journal of Economics 11 (2) Autumn 715 20 Armen A. Alchian and Susan Woodward (1987) Reflections on the Theory of the Firm Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143 (1) March 110 36 Alfred Marshall ([1925]1953) Industrial Organization Continued. Business Management in Principles of Economics 8th Edition Book IV Chapter XII New York NY: Macmillan Company 291 313 Joseph A. Schumpeter (1950) Crumbling Walls in Capitalism Socialism and Democracy Chapter XII London: Allen & Unwin 131 42 Israel M. Kirzner (1973) The Entrepreneur in Competition and Entrepreneurship Chapter 2 Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press 30 87 B.J. Loasby (1982) The Entrepreneur in Economic Theory Scottish Journal of Political Economy 29 (3) November 235 45 Ulrich Witt (1987) How Transaction Rights Are Shaped to Channel Innovativeness Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143 (1) March 180 95 Nicolai Juul Foss (1993) Theories of the Firm: Contractual and Competence Perspectives Journal of Evolutionary Economics 3 (2) May 127 44 Mark Casson (2000) An Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm in Enterprise and Leadership: Studies on Firms Markets and Networks Chapter 3 Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 47 82 Kenneth J. Arrow (1985) The Economics of Agency in John W. Pratt (ed) and Richard J. Zeckhauser (ed) (eds) Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business Chapter 2 Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press 37 51 Steven Shavell (1979) Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship Bell Journal of Economics 10 (1) Spring 55 73 Martin Ricketts (1986) The Geometry of Principal and Agent: Yet Another Use for the Edgeworth Box Scottish Journal of Political Economy 33 (3) August 228 48 Harold Demsetz (1995) Agency and Nonagency Explanations of the Firms Organization in The Economics of the Business Firm: Seven Critical Commentaries Second Commentary Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press 15 39 references