Game theory and international environmental cooperation 1. Introduction 2. Important terms notation and classification of games 3. Static games with discrete strategy space 4. Finite dynamic games with discrete strategy space : a first approach 5. Infinite dynamic games with discrete strategy space : a first approach 6. Finite dynamic games with discrete strategy space : a second approach 7. Infinite dynamic games with discrete strategy space : a second approach 8. Issue linkage 9. Static games with continuous strategy space : global emission game 10. Finite dynamic games with continuous strategy space and static representations of dynamic games 11. Bargaining over a uniform emission reduction quota and a uniform emission tax 12. Infinite dynamic games with continuous strategy space 13. Coalition models : a first approach 14. Coalition models : a second approach 15. Coalition models : a third approach 16. Summary and conclusions The book investigates various strategies to provide countries with an incentive to accede agree and comply to an international environmental agreement (IEA). Finus shows that by integrating real world restrictions into a model game theory is a powerful tool for explaining the divergence between first best policy recommendations and second best designs of actual IEAs. For instance he explains why (inefficient) uniform emission reduction quotas have played such a prominent role in past IEAs despite economists recommendations for the use of (efficient) market based instruments as for example emission targets and permits. Moreover it is stated that a single global IEA on climate is not necessarily the best strategy and small coalitions may enjoy a higher stability and may achieve more