The economic theory of incentives 20. Jacques Crémer and Richard P. McLean (1988) Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions Econometrica 56 (6) November 1247 57 21. Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu (2001) Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations Econometrica 69 (5) September 1237 59 22. Eric Maskin and John Riley (1989) Optimal Multi unit Auctions in Frank Hahn (ed.) The Economics of Missing Markets Information and Games Chapter 14 Oxford UK: Clarendon Press 312 35 23. Roger B. Myerson (1981) Optimal Auction Design Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1) February 58 73 24. John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson (1981) Optimal Auctions American Economic Review 71 (3) June 381 92 25. Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris (2005) Robust Mechanism Design Econometrica 73 (6) November 1771 1813 26. Philippe Jehiel Moritz Meyer ter Vehn Benny Moldovanu and William R. Zame (2006) The Limits of Ex Post Implementation Econometrica 74 (3) May 585 610 27. Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1992) Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules Journal of Economic Theory 56 (2) April 378 99 28. Zvika Neeman (2004) The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design Journal of Economic Theory 117 (1) July 55 77 29. Robert Wilson (1987) Game Theoretic Analyses of Trading Processes in Truman F. Bewley (ed.) Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress Chapter 2 Cambridge UK New York NY USA and Melbourne Australia: Cambridge University Press 33 70 30. Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite (1983) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading Journal of Economic Theory 29 (2) April 265 81 31. Peter Cramton Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer (1987) Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently Econometrica 55 (3) May 615 32 1493 (Erratum) 32. Steven R. Williams (1999) A Characterization of Efficient Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms Economic Theory 14 (1) July 155 8 33. Bengt Holmström (1982) Moral Hazard in Teams Bell Journal of Economics 13 (2) Autumn 324 40 34. Patrick Legros and Steven A. Matthews (1993) Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships Review of Economic Studies 60 (3) July 599 611 35. Eric Rasmusen (1987) Moral Hazard in Risk Averse Teams RAND Journal of Economics 18 (3) Autumn 428 35 36. David Rahman (2012) But Who Will Monitor the Monitor American Economic Review 102 (6) October 2767 97 37. Yeon Koo Che and Seung Weon Yoo (2001) Optimal Incentives for Teams American Economic Review 91 (3) June 525 41 38. Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981) Rank Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts Journal of Political Economy 89 (5) October 841 64 Recommended readings (Machine generated): 1. Claude dAspremont and Louis André Gérard Varet (1979) Incentives and Incomplete Information Journal of Public Economics 11 (1) February 25 45 2. Jerry Green and Jean Jacques Laffont (1977) Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods Econometrica 45 (2) March 427 38 3. Theodore Groves (1973) Incentives in Teams Econometrica 41 (4) July 617 31 4. Jean Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1979) A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms in Jean Jacques Laffont (ed.) Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences: Studies in Public Economics Volume 2 Part IV Chapter 16 Amsterdam the Netherlands New York NY USA and Oxford UK: North Holland Publishing Company 289 308 5. Jean Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1980) A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms Econometrica 48 (6) September 1507 20 6. George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite (1990) Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents Review of Economic Studies 57 (3) July 351 67 7. Allan Gibbard (1973) Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result Econometrica 41 (4) July 587 601 8. Partha Dasgupta Peter Hammond and Eric Maskin (1979) The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility Review of Economic Studies 46 (2) April 185 216 9. Roger B. Myerson (1979) Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem Econometrica 47 (1) January 61 73 10. Roger B. Myerson (1982) Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal Agent Problems Journal of Mathematical Economics 10 (1) June 67 81 11. Joel S. Demski and David Sappington (1984) Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents Journal of Economic Theory 33 (1) June 152 71 12. Eric Maskin (1999) Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality Review of Economic Studies Special Issue: Contracts 66 (1) January 23 38 13. Eric Maskin and John Moore (1999) Implementation and Renegotiation Review of Economic Studies Special Issue: Contracts 66 (1) January 39 56 14. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988) Subgame Perfect Implementation Econometrica 56 (5) September 1191 1220 15. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1990) Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization Econometrica 58 (5) September 1083 99 16. Thomas R. Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava (1989) Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies Econometrica 57 (1) January 115 34 17. Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1990) Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms Review of Economic Studies 57 (3) July 453 75 18. Bengt Holmström and Roger B. Myerson (1983) Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information Econometrica 51 (6) November 1799 1819 19. John O. Ledyard and Thomas R. Palfrey (1999) A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods Econometrica 67 (2) March 435 48 39. Hideshi Itoh (1991) Incentives to Help in Multi Agent Situations Econometrica 59 (3) May 611 36 40. Dilip Mookherjee (1984) Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents Review of Economic Studies LI (3) July 433 46 41. Barry J. Nalebuff and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1983) Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition Bell Journal of Economics 14 (1) Spring 21 43 42. Ching To Ma (1988) Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents Review of Economic Studies LV (4) October 555 71 1. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1992) An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting Review of Economic Studies 59 (3) July 473 94 2. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997) Formal and Real Authority in Organizations Journal of Political Economy 105 (1) February 1 29 3. Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan Reichelstein (1996) Holdups Standard Breach Remedies and Optimal Investment American Economic Review 86 (3) June 478 501 4. Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (1994) A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager Shareholder Congruence Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (4) November 1027 54 5. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986) The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration Journal of Political Economy 94 (4) August 691 719 6. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990) Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm Journal of Political Economy 98 (6) December 1119 58 [40] 7. Jean Tirole (1986) Procurement and Renegotiation Journal of Political Economy 94 (2) April 235 59 8. Ilya Segal (1999) Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts Review of Economic Studies Special Issue: Contracts 66 (1) January 57 82 9. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (1999) Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts Review of Economic Studies Special Issue: Contracts 66 (1) January 83 114 10. Jonathan Levin (2003) Relational Incentive Contracts American Economic Review 93 (3) June 835 57 11. W. Bentley MacLeod and James M. Malcomson (1989) Implicit Contracts Incentive Compatibility and Involuntary Unemployment Econometrica 57 (2) March 447 80 12. W. Bentley MacLeod (2003) Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation American Economic Review 93 (1) March 216 40 13. Hideshi Itoh (1993) Coalitions Incentives and Risk Sharing Journal of Economic Theory 60 (2) August 410 27 14. Jean Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1999) Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior RAND Journal of Economics 30 (2) Summer 232 62 15. Jean Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1991) The Politics of Government Decision Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (4) November 1089 1127 16. Jean Tirole (1986) Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations Journal of Law Economics and Organization 2 (2) Fall 181 214 17. Hal R. Varian (1990) Monitoring Agents With Other Agents Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146 (1) March 153 74 18. Yeon Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim (2006) Robustly Collusion Proof Implementation Econometrica 74 (4) July 1063 1107 19. Jean Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1997) Collusion under Asymmetric Information Econometrica 65 (4) July 875 911 20. Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjöström (1998) Decentralization and Collusion Journal of Economic Theory 83 (2) December 196 232 21. David P. Baron and David Besanko (1992) Information Control and Organizational Structure Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1 (2) Summer 237 75 22. Jean Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1998) Collusion and Delegation RAND Journal of Economics 29 (2) Summer 280 305 23. Nahum D. Melumad Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1995) Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts RAND Journal of Economics: Symposium on the Economics of Organization 26 (4) Winter 654 72 24. Dilip Mookherjee and Masatoshi Tsumagari (2004) The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of Delegation and Intermediation Econometrica 72 (4) July 1179 1219 25. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986) Menu Auctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influence Quarterly Journal of Economics CI (1) February 1 31 26. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986) Common Agency Econometrica 54 (4) July 923 42 27. David Martimort and Lars Stole (2002) The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games Econometrica 70 (4) July 1659 73 28. David Martimort and Lars Stole (2009) Market Participation in Delegated and Intrinsic Common Agency Games RAND Journal of Economics 40 (1) Spring 78 102 29. Ilya Segal (1999) Contracting with Externalities Quarterly Journal of Economics CXIV (2) May 337 88 30. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998) Exclusive Dealing Journal of Political Economy 106 (1) February 64 103 31. David Martimort (1996) Exclusive Dealing Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory RAND Journal of Economics 27 (1) Spring 1 31 This comprehensive research review recaps major literary contributions to the economic theory of incentives. These carefully selected papers both classic and contemporary analyse collective decision problems in the context of asymmetric information moral hazard and incomplete contracting. This review is an essential tool for any serious scholar and student in the field