Democratic Armament : US Democracy and Military Innovation during Periods of Transition This disseration provides an answer to the question what influence societal preferences have on US military innovation. For this purpose it connects theoretical threads from Governmental Political and New Liberalism with the literature on military innovation and democratic peace. Four periods of military transition during which the incentive for military innovation is particularly strong are analysed based on a structured focused comparison: The Post World War II (1945 1949) the Korean War period (1959 1953) the Post Cold War (1990 1998) and the War on Terror period (2001 2007). The findings of this study show that the domestic and international levels of US military policy increasingly follow conflicting logics which reduce the likelihood of innovation. The public majoritys interest in innovation as a means to maintain efficient military forces in a changing world remains latent most of the time. In contrast special interest groups preferences for the benefitial domestic status quo result in a permanent push towards military stability. Only in cases of perceived failure the public majority actively engages in military policy and triggers reform through elections.