Classics in game theory Equilibrium points in n person games ; The bargaining problem John F. Nash Jr. Non cooperative games John Nash An iterative method of solving a game Julia Robinson Equivalence of games in extensive form F.B. Thompson Extensive games and the problem of information H.W. Kuhn A value for n person games ; Stochastic games L.S. Shapley Recursive games H. Everett Von Neumann Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments R.J. Aumann and B. Peleg A limit theorem on the core of an economy Gerard Debreu and Herbert Scarf The bargaining set for cooperative games Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders Robert J. Aumann The core of an n person game Herbert E. Scarf Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players. Pt. 1. The basic model ; Pt. 2. Bayesian equilibrium points ; Pt. 3. The basic probability distribution of the game John C. Harsanyi The big match David Blackwell and T.S. Ferguson On market games Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games R. Selten