Auction theory : introductory exercises with answer keys This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game theoretic tools so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy to answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second price auctions which can be studied without using calculus and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first price auctions all pay auctions third price auctions the Revenue Equivalence principle common value auctions multi unit auctions and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty with a letter (A C) next to the exercise title which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate Masters Ph.D. Providing a practical customizable approach to auction theory this textbook is appropriate for students of economics finance and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory market design economics of information contract theory or topics in microeconomics. Chapter 1: Second price auctions Chapter 2: First price auctions Chapter 3: First price auctions Extensions Chapter 4: All pay auctions and auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders Chapter 5: Third price auctions kth price auctions and lotteries Chapter 6: The Revenue Equivalence principle Chapter 7: Common value auctions Chapter 8: Multi unit auctions Chapter 9: Mechanism design Chapter 10: Procurement auctions Game Theory Appendix References.