On reference Most of the times we open our mouth to communicate we talk about things. This can happen because (some of) the linguistic expressions we use have semantic properties that connect them to extra linguistic entities. Thanks to these properties they may be used by us to refer to things. Or as we may also say they themselves refer to things though in certain cases they do so only relative to a context of use. But how can we characterize the semantic properties in question What exactly is reference Philosophers have been trying to answer these questions at least since Platos Cratylus but not until the last century when language occupied center stage in philosophy did the problem come to be felt as really pressing. In the last decade of the nineteenth century Gottlob Frege produced an account of reference that set the stage for the contemporary discussion. Nevertheless around 1970 a number of powerful arguments against it were produced by Saul Kripke and others. As a result many philosophers began to look at reference from a new perspective which highlighted the crucial role played in its determination by mundane aspects that are not under the direct control of the speaker. This semantic revolution however left us with a number of open problems. The eighteen original essays collected in this volume deal with many of these problems thus contributing to our understanding of the nature of reference its role in cognition and the place it should be given in semantic theory