Draft: draft-ietf-quic-tls

Commentary: The restriction for ClientHello to fit in a single UDP datagram was back when the retry mechanism was more tightly coupled to the TLS crypto . At this point , the restriction does n't get us much , and is preventing us from running some post - quantum experiments . 
 This proposed changes imposes some new , nontrivial requirements on the server side . As a server , would I be required to support multi - packet client initials ? Do we really need this in V1 ? 
 I share concern : The pain in the ass would be quite real . Is post - quantum crypto in scope ? 
 I 'd point out that endpoints are already required to support muti - packet client Initials when the TLS handshake uses  . Therefore , IMO the PR does not add new threats . 
  is not stateless ( at the QUIC layer ) though , correct ? The client 's first packet still must completely contain ALPN and ( optionally )  . That information is used by WinQuic to decide initially if the connection should be accepted and more server resources commit to processing the connection . Adding another point to the QUIC layer to decide if Retry is needed is additional work . 
 I might argue that this PR does not prevent you from using the ALPN and SNI in the first packet as a way to " skip " Retry . In that hack , the difference between the status quo and this PR is that an incomplete CH in the first packet becomes a signal to send a Retry rather than an error . I do not think it adds complexity . Considering the fact that we can remove other complexities due to the 1 - packet restriction , this PR is a good simplification . 
 I 'm not arguing that this PR would require loads more code , but I definitely do n't agree that it 's a " good simplification " of the current design . This adds additional attack surfaces that must be analyzed and implementations ensure they have adequate defense . Again , I ask is this absolutely required for V1 ? What chartered requirements for QUIC deem this change necessary for V1 ? 
 At the moment , a QUIC stack is required to indicate to the TLS stack that the CH should be constructed in a way that invokes  ( by omitting the keyshare extension ) , if the CH is otherwise going to not fit in one packet . This requirement is not only complex but also imposes one additional roundtrip ( when the rule is invoked ) . Regarding the charter , we are tasked to create a protocol that minimizes connection establishment latency , while having " security and privacy properties that are at least as good as a stack composed of TLS 1.3 using TCP . " We already have post - quantum extensions proposed for TLS 1.3 , it is my understanding that  is already doing experiments . They require use of CH that do not fit in single packet , which , without resolving this issue , imposes complexity and one extra round - trip . Considering these aspects , I might argue that we are encouraged _ by the charter to resolve the problem :-) 
 Regardless of post - quantum and  , I agree with that it is problematic to commit multiple packets before any kind of validation . If that is already the case due to  , I hope there is a way to avoid that without relying on client generated content . Otherwise the server is wide open to slow loris connection attacks . As to post - quantum - fine to have an experimental setting - in a real post - quantum world , perhaps min MTU can be larger ? 
 draft - ietf - quic - tls says " QUIC requires that the first Initial packet from a client contain an entire cryptographic handshake message , which for TLS is the ClientHello . " My ( possibly incorrect ) understanding is this was needed so the server can , in the old QUIC / TLS embedding , statelessly send a HelloRetryRequest without having to statefully assemble a ClientHello out of multiple packets . In the new QUIC / TLS embedding , this concern no longer applies because the stateless rejects are entirely external to TLS . Thus , should we simply delete most of the # clienthello - size section ? This avoids a number of awkward pitfalls because the ClientHello size is a function of many factors , with both client and server considerations that change over time . Perhaps we add a new TLS extension or key share type and some SNIs work but larger SNIs were closer to the limit and this brings them over . Or perhaps the server 's NewSessionTicket is large [ ] and breaks subsequent connections from some client . Perhaps that server tested it against one client , but another client has a larger baseline ClientHello and then it breaks . Finally , post - quantum key exchange candidates tend to come with . The current text prevents QUIC from experimenting with or deploying such schemes . This is particularly fun because QUIC clients typically also speak TLS over TCP , so the security of connections to a server is bound by the weaker of TLS over QUIC and TCP . [ ] Client certificates are often inserted into the ticket , so now we have a client - specific limit being influenced by a server - specific implementation decision which is , in turn , dependent on client / CA - controlled size of client certificate . Additionally , draft - ietf - quic - transport#zerortt - parameters implies servers may wish to remember QUIC transport parameters in the ticket . 
 This seems like a reasonable change to me . I do n't anticipate this creating any new issues with recovery / etc , though it might exacerbate some of the existing ones . 
 I believe a main motivation for a single packet is that it avoids binding a lot of state on the server which can be a significant DoS vector . If anything we can expect certificates to get smaller with more widespread use of EC25519 . As to post quantum , lets make another QUIC version in about 30 - 60 years or so . 
 As says , I believe there was a concern about state at the server for connections that have not yet been established , if it receives only part of a ClientHello . I do n't think this is a debilitating concern however . I would like to air this for a little while though ... I remember us using the assumption that the ClientHello is a single packet a few times , and I 'm not sure if we did document them all . 
 I agree we should not hurry on this . From a text perspective , it 's a simple change . I 'd like the chairs ( ) to briefly bring this up at the next QUIC session to ensure we can be aware of any potential pitfalls before making this change . 
 Could you elaborate on this ? There are other client messages than the initial ClientHello , which would all require state at the server for unestablished connections . There is certainly a need to statelessly do something with unestablished connections , but there 's a point where the server transitions to being stateful . In the old TLS / QUIC embedding , yes , that point was at the first ClientHello and you needed the entire ClientHello to produce a HelloRetryRequest+cookie , which was the mechanism for statelessly bouncing a connection . That 's no longer the case in the new embedding , as far as I can tell . The retry packets do n't actually depend on the full ClientHello or interact with the TLS handshake at all . It should work equally well if that initial packet has a full ClientHello or half of one . This time estimate is not consistent with what people are already doing in this space . 
 I 'm not sufficiently deep into the handshake to detail this - but you are correct that there is less dependency on the TLS engine than what went before . I 'm not sure when ClientCerts land in this process - I know they ca n't always fit in one piece but all else being equal , it simplifies bad content defence a lot to have a consistent starting point . 
 If we did allow for multiple packets for the ClientHello , I 'd still want to retain the ability to decide whether or not to accept the incoming connection from every one of those initial packets . This would mean things like ALPN and SNI would need to be duplicated in each packet . I would n't want to accept a design where an attacker forces the server to buffer packets while it wait for the necessary information just to decided if it can accept the connection . IMO , this sounds like a v2 feature . Does this prevent us from shipping v1 ? 
 So if a client is forced to split the ClientHello into two datagrams , you can use Retry . I do n't think that this is crazy . The only thing we know to be true is that the restriction is annoying . 
 My mistake : late stage process means that only chairs mark things as design . This is a design change . 
 I agree with . We should remove the restrictions and add text explaining that servers can either buffer or send retry . I can write the PR if it helps . 
 Thanks  . We 'll probably want to raise this on the list , but I 'd greatly appreciate a PR . It should be mostly deleting text , but some advice about how to handle multi - packet startups is probably wise , because it is n't a great situation to be dealing with . 
 I observed that the size of ticket OpenSSL issues if client certificate is used becomes quite large and it does not fit into a single QUIC packet . 
 NSS does the same because it puts the entire certificate ( if not the certification path ) into the ticket . 
 BoringSSL as well . 
 If we do a change like that , how do we test it ? 
 Discussed in Cupertino . PR exists . assigned . 
 to add a test to the interop matrix 
 I just defined the test matrix option Q for Quantum Readiness . 
 The text of this PR looks good . I share the concern about whether we want to support multi - packet ClientHello messages , though the discussion ( which should be on the issue , not the PR ) seems fairly convincing that we 'll need to do this at some point if we do n't do it now . LGTM
Paragraph (version B):
At any time, the TLS stack at an endpoint will have a current sending
encryption level and receiving encryption level.  Each encryption
level is associated with a different flow of bytes, which is reliably
transmitted to the peer in CRYPTO frames.  When TLS provides
handshake bytes to be sent, they are appended to the current flow and
any packet that includes the CRYPTO frame is protected using keys
from the corresponding encryption level.
Paragraph (version A):
This construction is secure against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-
CPA) IMC.
Paragraph (version B):
The header protection variants in this document use a pseudorandom
permutation (PRP) in place of a generic PRF.  However, since all PRPs
are also PRFs IMC, these variants do not deviate from the HN1
construction.
Paragraph (version B):
As "hp_key" is distinct from the packet protection key, it follows
that header protection achieves AE2 security as defined in NAN and
therefore guarantees privacy of "field", the protected packet header.
Future header protection variants based on this construction MUST use
a PRF to ensure equivalent security guarantees.