Draft: draft-ietf-rats-architecture

Commentary: May be duplicated by dthaler pull request , second part might belong in privacy considerations instead of here . to redraft . 
 * * Section 12.2 It is also important that the appraisal policy was itself obtained securely . If an attacker can configure appraisal policies for a Relying Party or for a Verifier , then integrity of the process is compromised . In addition to reconfiguration , would n't the ability to intercept either the appraisal policy for evidence or attestation results potentially provide the attacker insight into defensive mitigations ? This suggests that this policy might need confidentiality protection . 
 see . 
 Maybe fixed this one along with 
 -- The overall Section 12 seems silent on : o Endorsers and endorsements ? o Reference values ? o What is the implication of combining roles into a single entity as described in Section 3.4 and 6 . Does this lack of separation present any additional issues ? o Compositional devices per Section 3.3 ? 
 " If an attacker can modify appraisal policies ,  , or   , then integrity of the process is compromised . " 
 ` 
 maybe already fixed with recent changes 
 maybe helps ?
Paragraph (version A):
The conveyance of Evidence and the resulting Attestation Results
reveal a great deal of information about the internal state of a
device as well as potentially any users of the device.  In many
cases, the whole point of attestation procedures is to provide
reliable information about the type of the device and the firmware/
software that the device is running.  This information might be
particularly interesting to many attackers.  For example, knowing
that a device is running a weak version of firmware provides a way to
aim attacks better.
Paragraph (version A):
Many Claims in Evidence, many Claims in Attestation Results, and
Appraisal Policies potentially contain Personally Identifying
Information (PII) depending on the end-to-end use case of the remote
attestation procedure.  Remote attestation that includes containers
and applications, e.g., a blood pressure monitor, may further reveal
details about specific systems or users.
Paragraph (version B):
The conveyance of Evidence and the resulting Attestation Results
reveal a great deal of information about the internal state of a
device as well as potentially any users of the device.
Paragraph (version B):
In many cases, the whole point of attestation procedures is to
provide reliable information about the type of the device and the
firmware/software that the device is running.
Paragraph (version B):
This information might be particularly interesting to many attackers.
For example, knowing that a device is running a weak version of
firmware provides a way to aim attacks better.
Paragraph (version B):
In some circumstances, if an attacker can become aware of
Endorsements, Reference Values, or appraisal policies, it could
potentially provide an attacker with insight into defensive
mitigations.  It is recommended that attention be paid to
confidentiality of such information.
Paragraph (version B):
Additionally, many Claims in Evidence, many Claims in Attestation
Results, and appraisal policies potentially contain Personally
Identifying Information (PII) depending on the end-to-end use case of
the remote attestation procedure.  Remote attestation that includes
containers and applications, e.g., a blood pressure monitor, may
further reveal details about specific systems or users.
Paragraph (version A):
It is also important that the appraisal policy was itself obtained
securely.  If an attacker can configure appraisal policies for a
Relying Party or for a Verifier, then integrity of the process is
compromised.
Paragraph (version B):
It is also important that the appraisal policy was itself obtained
securely.  If an attacker can configure or modify appraisal policies,
Endorsements or Reference Values for a Relying Party or for a
Verifier, then integrity of the process is compromised.