Draft: draft-ietf-rats-architecture

Commentary: It would be helpful to identify which issues this PR addresses .
Paragraph (version A):
Systems that have been attested and verified to be in a good state
(for some value of "good") can improve overall system posture.
Conversely, systems that cannot be attested and verified to be in a
good state can be taken out of service, or otherwise flagged for
repair.
Paragraph (version B):
Systems that have been attested and verified to be in a good state
(for some value of "good") can improve overall system posture.
Conversely, systems that cannot be attested and verified to be in a
good state can be given reduced access or privileges, taken out of
service, or otherwise flagged for repair.
Paragraph (version A):
Network operators want a trustworthy report that includes identity
and version information about the hardware and software on the
machines attached to their network, for purposes such as inventory,
audit, anomaly detection, record maintenance and/or trending reports
(logging).  The network operator may also want a policy by which full
access is only granted to devices that meet some definition of
hygiene, and so wants to get Claims about such information and verify
its validity.  Remote attestation is desired to prevent vulnerable or
compromised devices from getting access to the network and
potentially harming others.
Paragraph (version B):
Network operators want trustworthy reports that include identity and
version information about the hardware and software on the machines
attached to their network.  Examples of reports include purposes,
such as inventory summaries, audit results, anomaly notifications,
typically including the maintenance of log records or trend reports.
The network operator may also want a policy by which full access is
only granted to devices that meet some definition of hygiene, and so
wants to get Claims about such information and verify its validity.
Remote attestation is desired to prevent vulnerable or compromised
devices from getting access to the network and potentially harming
others.
Paragraph (version A):
Other biometric authentication protocols such as the Chinese IFAA
standard and WeChat Pay as well as Google Pay make use of remote
attestation in one form or another.
Paragraph (version A):
Another example is a multi-chassis router composed of multiple single
carrier-grade routers.  Multi-chassis router setups create redundancy
groups that provide higher throughput by interconnecting multiple
routers in these groups, which can be treated as one logical router
for simpler management.  A multi-chassis router setup provides a
management point that connects to the Verifier.  Typically one router
in the group is designated as the main router.  Other routers in the
multi-chassis setup are connected to the main router only via
physical network links and are therefore managed and appraised via
the main router's help.  In consequence, a multi-chassis router setup
is a composite device, each router is an Attester, and the main
router is the lead Attester.
Paragraph (version B):
Another example is a multi-chassis router composed of multiple single
carrier-grade routers.  Multi-chassis router setups create redundancy
groups that provide higher throughput by interconnecting multiple
routers in these groups, which can be treated as one logical router
for simpler management.  A multi-chassis router setup provides a
management point that connects to the Verifier.  Typically one router
in the group is designated as the main router.  Other routers in the
multi-chassis setup are connected to the main router only via
physical network links and are therefore managed and appraised via
the main router's help.  Consequently, a multi-chassis router setup
is a composite device, each router is an Attester, and the main
router is the lead Attester.