Draft: draft-ietf-rats-architecture

Commentary: This is the portion of the complete review that contains minor / editorial changes aggregated in a single PR and various commits as discussed in the last editor meeting . 
 Are you sure that making Composite Device a term is n't a better idea ? 
 I agree with that . There are also some other terms that I would capitalize . But this is the editorial part of the changes so I stuck with the groups consensus . Could you open an issue on " terms you want to capitalize " ? 
 When I ask  to render the diff , it says that it can not . ( " Oh my " ) it says . I wonder if there is an error in the markdown ?
Paragraph (version A):
The quality of the Attestation Results depend upon the ability of the
Verifier to evaluate the Attester.  Different Attesters have a
different _Strength of Function_ strengthoffunction, which results in
the Attestation Results being qualitatively different in strength.
Paragraph (version B):
The quality of the Attestation Results depends upon the ability of
the Verifier to evaluate the Attester.  Different Attesters have a
different _Strength of Function_ strengthoffunction, which results in
the Attestation Results being qualitatively different in strength.
Paragraph (version A):
By default, the Relying Party does not believe the Attester to be
compliant.  Upon receipt of an authentic Attestation Result and given
the Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results is satisfied, then the
Attester is allowed to perform the prescribed actions or access.  The
simplest such Appraisal Policy might authorize granting the Attester
full access or control over the resources guarded by the Relying
Party.  A more complex Appraisal Policy might involve using the
information provided in the Attestation Result to compare against
expected values, or to apply complex analysis of other information
contained in the Attestation Result.
Paragraph (version B):
By default, the Relying Party does not believe the Attester to be
compliant.  Upon receipt of an authentic Attestation Result and given
the Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results is satisfied, the
Attester is allowed to perform the prescribed actions or access.  The
simplest such appraisal policy might authorize granting the Attester
full access or control over the resources guarded by the Relying
Party.  A more complex appraisal policy might involve using the
information provided in the Attestation Result to compare against
expected values, or to apply complex analysis of other information
contained in the Attestation Result.
Paragraph (version A):
Thus, Attestation Results often need to include detailed information
about the Attester, for use by Relying Parties, much like physical
passports and drivers licenses include personal information such as
name and date of birth.  Unlike Evidence, which is often very device-
and vendor-specific, Attestation Results can be vendor-neutral if the
Verifier has a way to generate vendor-agnostic information based on
the appraisal of vendor-specific information in Evidence.  This
allows a Relying Party's appraisal policy to be simpler, potentially
based on standard ways of expressing the information, while still
allowing interoperability with heterogeneous devices.
Paragraph (version B):
Thus, Attestation Results often need to include detailed information
about the Attester, for use by Relying Parties, much like physical
passports and drivers licenses include personal information such as
name and date of birth.  Unlike Evidence, which is often very device-
and vendor-specific, Attestation Results can be vendor-neutral, if
the Verifier has a way to generate vendor-agnostic information based
on the appraisal of vendor-specific information in Evidence.  This
allows a Relying Party's appraisal policy to be simpler, potentially
based on standard ways of expressing the information, while still
allowing interoperability with heterogeneous devices.
Paragraph (version A):
In all cases, attestation key provisioning must ensure that only
attestation key material that is generated by a valid Endorser is
established in Attesters.
Paragraph (version B):
In all cases, attestation key provisioning must ensure that only
attestation key material that is generated by a valid Endorser is
established in Attesters.  For many use cases, this will involve
physical security at the facility, to prevent unauthorized devices
from being manufactured that may be counterfeit or incorrectly
configured.