Draft: draft-ietf-lake-edhoc

Commentary: There has been a lot of suggestions and discussion regarding the key derivation latelely . Below is an attempt to summarize all the current suggstions that currently seems relatively likely to be done . This is not an issue in itself but I think it is good to have somewhere to discucess the complete changes to the key derivation . Suggested to permute the order of element in the TH2 sequence to be more resistant to any future collision attacks in hash functions . Exact order unclear but suggested to put the random and unpredictable GY first . Suggested to use PLAINTEXT instead of CIPHERTEXT in transcript hashes to simplify formal verification . Endpoints agree on that they received the same plaintext rather then the same cipertext . Suggested to use a salt derived from PRK in Extract to avoid usign the PRK keys directly in both Extract and ExpandSuggested to use unsigned integer instead of text string for label to save memory . Suggestion to add a final key derivation PRKout and use that in the exporter . Note that the exporter would also have uint labelsSuggestion to base Key - Update on Expand instead of extract . The label would need IANA registration .  is a new variable that the implementation needs to keep track of . Should considered whether using Exporter for KeyUpdate has any disadvantages . Suggested that more info on how an application protocol is supposed to use KeyUpdate and  together is needed . The EDHOC internal key derivations ( i.e. , not using the  ) would then be something like below . The exact labels should be discussed . Note that that only some of the derivations actually need a label to avoid collisionIncluding KeyUpdate , the IANA registered exporter labels could be : 
 Looks good . I had different naming in mind of the salts : PRK3e2 m = Extract ( SALT3e2 m , GRX ) PRK3 m = Extract ( SALT3 m , GIY ) where SALT3e2 m = EDHOC - KDF ( PRK2e , TH2 , 0 , h '' , hashlength ) SALT3 m = EDHOC - KDF ( PRK3e2 m ,  , 0 , h '' , hashlength ) With this the salts are named by its use rather than from what key they are derived . 
 The labels was just to illustrate the fact that they do n't need to be separate . I think it is still better to just use 0 - 7 . That makes it very easy for the reader to see that there are no collisions . 
 Was this a comment on my proposed names of salts , or a separate comment ? ( I agree labels 0 - 7 is good . ) 
 It was a separate comments . Your suggestion for salt naming is fine with me . Some other non - technical naming things that a hidden in my summary above I think keylength should use different terms in the derivation of K4 and OSCORE Master Secret . The current naming gives the idea that they are the same . I think the contexts in the MAC2 and MAC3 derivations should be given names . Should consider collection all the EDHOC - KDF derivations in a single place . 
 Might want to derive : K4 = EDHOC - KDF ( PRK3 m , TH4 , 0 , h '' , keylength ) IV4 = EDHOC - KDF ( PRK3 m , TH4 , 0 , h '' , ivlength ) to avoid that the applicaiton gets K4 and IV4 . Another alternative is to use K4 = EDHOC - Exporter ( 7 , h '' , keylength ) IV4 = EDHOC - Exporter ( 8 , h '' , ivlength ) and forbid the application to use the labels for K4 and IV4 
 Editorial ; should be : K4 = EDHOC - KDF ( PRK3 m , TH4 , 1 , h '' , keylength ) IV4 = EDHOC - KDF ( PRK3 m , TH4 , 2 , h '' , ivlength ) or , if we want all KDF labels distinct : K4 = EDHOC - KDF ( PRK3 m , TH4 , 8 , h '' , keylength ) IV4 = EDHOC - KDF ( PRK3 m , TH4 , 9 , h '' , ivlength ) Alternatively , application access to Exporter only allows uint with : K4 = EDHOC - Exporter ( -1 , h '' , keylength ) IV4 = EDHOC - Exporter ( -2 , h '' , ivlength ) 
 Trying to compile the suggestions . These have a PR : Suggested to permute the order of element in the TH2 sequence … Suggested to use PLAINTEXT instead of CIPHERTEXT in transcript hashes … Suggestion to add a final key derivation PRKout and use that in the exporter The following needs to be addressed : Suggested to use a salt derived from PRK in Extract define salt derive salt Suggested to use unsigned integer instead of text string for label to save memory suggestion to base Key - Update on Expand consider whether using Exporter for KeyUpdate has any disadvantages . more info on how an application protocol is supposed to use KeyUpdate and Exporter together distinguish keylength in K3 / K_4 and OSCORE Master Secret define contexts explicitly table of KDF derivations 
 Trying to put things together . Let 's call this variant A , part 1 . where and ( edit : depending on method ) New salts to avoid double use of PRK , named by its use . Same construction for K4 / IV4 as K3 / IV3 , motivating the renaming of 3 m in as 4e3 m. The label in the KDF , third argument , is an uint , all distinct for simplicity . 
   , part 2 : Distinct " transcript hash " in KeyUpdate and Exporter . Exporter does not give access to EDHOC internal keys . OSCORE key length separate from key_length . Edit : Not clear that ' context ' is needed in the EDHOC - Exporter . Also , to be strict in labelling we could continue enumeration . Here is variant B , part 2 ( B.1 = A.1 ): 
 Variant C.2 ( C.1 = A.1 ): ( edited :) Same as B.2 but with different labels . With variant C we have essentially : the internal KDF labels with current list : 0 , ... , 9 ; and the IANA EDHOC Exporter Registry with current list : 0 , 1 . 
 and all : Any implementation considerations or other comments on variant C above ? We 'll start with the PR(s ) soon . 
 The last posts here are confusing .... I do n't agree . These are separate . We should definitly not try to keep them separate . I.e. it should be Master Secret = EDHOC - Exporter ( 0 , h '' , oscorekeylength ) Master  = EDHOC - Exporter ( 1 , h '' , oscoresaltlength ) 
 The above looks good to me with the following not so interesting options . order of the 0 - 9 labels use 10 or 0 label for Key - Update order of the h'00 ' and h'01 ' " transcripts " 
 I think we should maybe merge the " context " and " transcript hash " inputs . This simplifies things and avoids using h'00 ' and h''01 ' as " transcript hashes . 
 Alternatively 
 The latest version of the summary looks good . 
 Overview of main changes needed :   PRK3 m as PRK4e3 m Section 4.1 update PRK definitions move section PRKout to 4.2 Section 4.2 Update EDHOC - KDF and info definition Update derivations Include derivations of salts and K4 / IV4 List EDHOC - KDF derivations with labels 0 - 9 Section 4.3 Update EDHOC - Exporter ( use label 10 instead of 11 ) Remove derivation of K4 / IV4 Section 4.4 Update EDHOC - KeyUpdate ( use label 11 instead of 10 ) Section 5.3.2 Define context2 Section 5.4.2 Define context3 Section 9.1 Update EDHOC Exporter labels     Secret / Salt derivation 
 Additional updates : As noted in previous comment , a proposal to interchange labels 10 and 11 to enumerate labels in the order they appear in the specification . ( Other proposal for assignment of   is welcome . ) Should we align / adapt definition of contextx and externalaad ? Currently ( for message2 and similar for message3 ): externalaad = < < TH2 , CREDR , ? EAD2 context2 = < < TH2 , IDCREDR , CREDR , ? EAD2 Edit : Seems to be favourable to at least align this blobs , so changed context2 to < < IDCREDR , TH2 , CREDR , ? EAD2 and similar for context_3 , in 
 PRKexporter is a key which we only introduce for simple distinction between different KDF applications . Perhaps an overkill ? May open up for unnecessary discussion about properties of that key . Here is another variant : Edit : As commented before ,  thinks a separate PRKExporter is preferred ; less error prone etc . 
 Most old comments are now addressed , and there are quite a few changes , so it is a good time to merge PR . Remaining points : derivation of K4/ IV4 and text about key confirmation . Not clear if there is any difference in practice between K4 /IV4 being derived from PRK4e3 m or PRKout , but the current text about explicit key confirmation is not valid in the former case . May alternatively tune down the key confirmation terminology . Suggested to make clearer distinction between key derivation for EDHOC processing , resulting in PRKout , and key derivation for application , i.e. making use of PRKout in EDHOC - Exporter and EDHOC - KeyUpdate . More guidance on the latter is also proposed . 
 Tried to address the remaining points in the previous comment with the latest two commits : and . More guidance on KeyUpdate may still be needed . Other points ? 
 What more guidance is needed on KeyUpdate ? 
 Was a request from someone . Might be hard to understand how to use it . E.g. that you should alternate key update and exporter Exporter Key Update Exporter Key Update Exporter ... 
 Another guidance needed is how to manage overwrite of PRKout pending confirmation of the derived key from the other endpoint . When the Initiator is updating PRKout it needs both old and new derived keys to be able to communicate securely in lock - step the change to the new key . 
 Perhaps good to remark that the entire application contexts ( including e.g. sequence numbers ) need to be maintained before a transition is made . 
 see instead . The current discussion has very little to do with
Paragraph (version A):
CIPHERTEXT_2 is calculated by using the Expand function as a
binary additive stream cipher.
Paragraph (version A):
Compute KEYSTREAM_2 = EDHOC-KDF( PRK_2e, TH_2, "KEYSTREAM_2",
h'', plaintext_length ), where plaintext_length is the length
of the plaintext.
Paragraph (version B):
Compute KEYSTREAM_2 = EDHOC-KDF( PRK_2e, TH_2, "KEYSTREAM_2",
h'', plaintext_length ), where plaintext_length is the length
of PLAINTEXT_2.
Paragraph (version A):
Compute the transcript hash TH_3 = H(TH_2, CIPHERTEXT_2) where H()
is the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite.  The
transcript hash TH_3 is a CBOR encoded bstr and the input to the
hash function is a CBOR Sequence.  Note that H(TH_2, CIPHERTEXT_2)
can be computed and cached already in the processing of message_2.
Paragraph (version B):
Compute the transcript hash TH_3 = H(TH_2, PLAINTEXT_2) where H()
is the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite.  The
transcript hash TH_3 is a CBOR encoded bstr and the input to the
hash function is a CBOR Sequence.  Note that H(TH_2, PLAINTEXT_2)
can be computed and cached already in the processing of message_2.