jiebi/ids-paragraph-commentary-corpus huggingface dataset:
Draft: draft-ietf-detnet-mpls

Commentary: OK . Thanks
Paragraph (version A):
MPLS encapsulated DetNet flows can carry different types of traffic.
The details of the types of traffic that are carried in DetNet are
also out of scope of this document.  An example of IP using DetNet
MPLS sub-networks can be found in [I-D.ietf-detnet-ip].  DetNet MPLS
may use an associated controller and Operations, Administration, and
Maintenance (OAM) functions that are defined outside of this
document.
Paragraph (version B):
MPLS encapsulated DetNet flows can carry different types of traffic.
The details of the types of traffic that are carried in DetNet are
also out of scope of this document.  An example of IP using DetNet
MPLS sub-networks can be found in I-D.ietf-detnet-ip.  DetNet MPLS
may use an associated controller and Operations, Administration, and
Maintenance (OAM) functions that are defined outside of this
document.
Paragraph (version A):
RFC3473, RFC4875, RFC5440, and RFC6006.
Paragraph (version B):
RFC3473, RFC4875, RFC5440, and RFC8306.
Draft: draft-ietf-detnet-mpls

Commentary: Removing unused abbreviations .
Paragraph (version A):
Attachment Circuit.
Paragraph (version A):
Customer Edge equipment.
Paragraph (version A):
DetNet Flow.
Paragraph (version A):
DetNet Inter-Working Function.
Paragraph (version A):
Layer 2.
Paragraph (version A):
Layer 2 Virtual Private Network.
Paragraph (version A):
Layer 3.
Paragraph (version A):
Multi-Segment PseudoWire (MS-PW).
Paragraph (version A):
Native Service Processing.
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Provider Edge.
Paragraph (version A):
Packet Switched Network.
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Traffic Engineering.
Draft: draft-ietf-detnet-ip

Commentary: Cleaning up Draft Nits from Make
Paragraph (version A):
Operations, Administration, and Maintenance.
Paragraph (version A):
OAM consideration are out-of-scope in this document.
Draft: draft-ietf-detnet-mpls

Commentary: Fixing up MPLS draft as agreed . Also fixing some Warnings in other drafts from doing a full make . 
 LGTM
Paragraph (version A):
The security considerations of DetNet in general are discussed in I-
D.ietf-detnet-architecture and I-D.sdt-detnet-security.  Other
security considerations will be added in a future version of this
draft.
Paragraph (version B):
MPLS Service Label and d-CW labels at a DetNet end system.
Paragraph (version B):
MPLS Service Label and d-CW in the context of one or more MPLS
Forwarding Labels at any DetNet aware device along the path.
Paragraph (version B):
Any aggregate flow by one or more MPLS Forwarding Labels at any
DetNet aware device along the path.
Paragraph (version B):
Any other DetNet flow information for example IP Flow
Identification beyond the MPLS service label as specified in I-
D.ietf-detnet-ip at a DetNet aware device.
Paragraph (version B):
Security considerations for DetNet are described in detail in I-
D.ietf-detnet-security.  General security considerations are
described in I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture.  This section considers
exclusively security considerations which are specific to the DetNet
MPLS data plane.
Paragraph (version B):
Security aspects which are unique to DetNet are those whose aim is to
provide the specific quality of service aspects of DetNet, which are
primarily to deliver data flows with extremely low packet loss rates
and bounded end-to-end delivery latency.
Paragraph (version B):
The primary considerations for the data plane is to maintain
integrity of data and delivery of the associated DetNet service
traversing the DetNet network.  Application flows can be protected
through whatever means is provided by the underlying technology.  For
example, encryption may be used, such as that provided by IPSec
RFC4301 for IP flows and/or by an underlying sub-net using MACSec
IEEE802.1AE-2018 for IP over Ethernet (Layer-2) flows.
Paragraph (version B):
From a data plane perspective this document does not add or modify
any header information.
Paragraph (version B):
At the management and control level DetNet flows are identified on a
per-flow basis, which may provide controller plane attackers with
additional information about the data flows (when compared to
controller planes that do not include per-flow identification).  This
is an inherent property of DetNet which has security implications
that should be considered when determining if DetNet is a suitable
technology for any given use case.
Paragraph (version B):
To provide uninterrupted availability of the DetNet service,
provisions can be made against DOS attacks and delay attacks.  To
protect against DOS attacks, excess traffic due to malicious or
malfunctioning devices can be prevented or mitigated, for example
through the use of existing mechanism such as policing and shaping
applied at the input of a DetNet domain.  To prevent DetNet packets
from being delayed by an entity external to a DetNet domain, DetNet
technology definition can allow for the mitigation of Man-In-The-
Middle attacks, for example through use of authentication and
authorization of devices within the DetNet domain.