jiebi/ids-paragraph-commentary-corpus huggingface dataset:
Draft: draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile

Commentary: This part got reworded a bit in response to IESG comments and this ( admittedly unusual ) grammatical construction got changed to something that does n't make sense . 
 Thanks . " which is considerably more token provisioned " is clearly not right . I think the intent was " tokens provisioned " but " token provisionings " is more accurate . Unless there are any objections I will merge on Monday .
Paragraph (version A):
Since the use of nonces N1 and N2 during the exchange guarantees
uniqueness of AEAD keys and nonces, it is REQUIRED that the exchanged
nonces are not reused with the same input keying material even in
case of re-boots.  This document RECOMMENDS the exchange of 64 bit
random nonces.  Considering the birthday paradox, the average
collision for each nonce will happen after 2^32 messages, which is
considerably more token provisioned than would be expected for
intended applications.  If applications use something else, such as a
counter, they need to guarantee that reboot and loss of state on
either node does not provoke reuse.  If that is not guaranteed, nodes
are susceptible to reuse of AEAD (nonce, key) pairs, especially since
an on-path attacker can cause the use of a previously exchanged
client nonce N1 for Security Context establishment by replaying the
corresponding client-to-server message.
Paragraph (version B):
Since the use of nonces N1 and N2 during the exchange guarantees
uniqueness of AEAD keys and nonces, it is REQUIRED that the exchanged
nonces are not reused with the same input keying material even in
case of re-boots.  This document RECOMMENDS the exchange of 64 bit
random nonces.  Considering the birthday paradox, the average
collision for each nonce will happen after 2^32 messages, which is
considerably more token provisionings than would be expected for
intended applications.  If applications use something else, such as a
counter, they need to guarantee that reboot and loss of state on
either node does not provoke reuse.  If that is not guaranteed, nodes
are susceptible to reuse of AEAD (nonce, key) pairs, especially since
an on-path attacker can cause the use of a previously exchanged
client nonce N1 for Security Context establishment by replaying the
corresponding client-to-server message.