Original text:
This property allows the application to express a preference for the use of temporary local addresses, sometimes called "privacy" <del> addresses RFC4941.  Temporary addresses are generally used to prevent </del>  linking connections over time when a stable address, sometimes called "permanent" address, is not needed.  There are some caveats to note when specifying this property.  First, if an application Requires the If there are multiple Local Endpoints or Remote Endpoints configured, then initiating a Rendezvous() action will systematically probe the reachability of those endpoint candidates following an approach such <del> as that used in Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) RFC5245. </del>  If the endpoints are suspected to be behind a NAT, Rendezvous() can be initiated using Local Endpoints that support a method of discovering NAT bindings such as Session Traversal Utilities for NAT <del> (STUN) RFC8489 or Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN) RFC5766. </del>  In this case, the Local Endpoint will resolve to a mixture of local and server reflexive addresses.  The Resolve() action on the Preconnection can be used to discover these bindings:

Reviewer comments:
As noted in the issue unsure if you also want to add a reference to for ICE.
15 from this . Trimmed to only outdated references because the outdated ones will be auto-fixed with a new version of -implementation. What follows are the I-D nits references to check. Some of these might be on purpose: ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 4941 (Obsoleted by RFC 8981) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 5245 (Obsoleted by RFC 8445, RFC 8839) NOTE: The PR only replaced 5245 with 8445. Unsure if you should also want to add a reference to 8839. -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 5766 (Obsoleted by RFC 8656) Reviewer: Sean Turner Review result: Has Issues This is an early sector review. Based on the ARTART early reviews of this I-D and the -arch I-D, there is no doubt going to need to be another review after the authors get done restructuring both I-Ds. BTW: Theresa thank you for the heads up about that restructuring. It forced me to read the -arch and -impl I-Ds, but that probably helped me not make silly requests of the authors/WG. tl;dr: I picked "has issues" knowing there is a rewrite on the way and I would like to reserve final judgement until then. I apologize upfront because I am going to ramble a bit before I get to the specifics: The taps I-Ds are about “a protocol-independent Transport Services Application Programming Interface (API).” I took a pretty liberal approach when reviewing this I-D from a security perspective because these I-Ds are somewhat different than the “normal” protocol I-Ds. As noted in the -arch I-D: these I-Ds do not specify “specific protocols or algorithms” … gasp. But, that’s probably okay in this context. I wondered what you would say about an API: Apps need to use the API properly! check: see -arch I-D Implementation/Library needs to be from trust source! check: see -interface I-D - Apps need to use the right keys at the right time! check: see -arch I-D - Avoid fallback/downgrade to insecure protocols! check: see -arch I-D and -impl I-D - Deal with 0-RTT! check: see -impl I-D - Address privacy aspects! check: see -interface I-D I mean maybe you could add something about: randomness for keys - but that better already be in the security protocol specifications so I do not think it is absolutely needed here. following good programming techniques - but I am not sure where you would point nor whether it really makes sense to do so. I think I found what I was looking for is somewhere in the stack of I-Ds. Am I worried somebody can implement this wrong. Sure. But, not any more than I would be for any other protocol. Now on to the specifics: NOTE: I tried not repeat anything from the ARTART review. 0) s6: maybe this wording would be better? For these two sentences are you trying to say that MUST else if? OLD: At least one Local Endpoint MUST be specified if the Preconnection is used to Listen() for incoming Connections, but the list of Local Endpoints MAY be empty if the Preconnection is used to Initiate() connections. NEW: At least one Remote Endpoint MUST be specified if the Preconnection is used to Initiate() Connections, but the list of Remote Endpoints MAY be empty if the Preconnection is used to Listen() for incoming Connections 1) s6.3.1 I know this is an example, but can we replace: SecurityParameters.Set(supported-group, "secp256k1") with SecurityParameters.Set(supported-group, "secp256r1") r1 the current MTI for TLS. k1 is for bitcoin :) Or, is this where I get a bitcoin because I caught the shiny object? :) 2) s6.3.2: Is this like checking the certificate status? 3) s8.1.1- I read this definition a bunch. Are there two special values? The Type line says “Full Coverage” is special, but then the description says “0” is special too. Maybe look at s91.3.6 for inspiration? 4) s8.1.2: Any reason it’s not called connPriority? Seems arbitrary to drop the end of the word when connTimeout is even longer. 5) s8.1.2-should “Type” line also include (non-negative) like s8.1.1 and s9.1.3.2 do? 6) s8.1.3/.4: The Numeric values specifies seconds, minutes, hours, or millennia? 7) s8.1.6: don’t you need to specify the Type? I guess Enumeration is what you’re after? 8) s8.1.11.2/.3/.4: Are these sizes in bytes too like 8.1.11.1? 9) s8.2.1: RFC 5482 allows granularity of minutes or seconds don’t you need to say which it is here? 10) s8.2.2: Is there some reason it’s not called tcp.userTimeoutEnabled? 11) s8.2.3: Is there some reason it’s not called tcp.userTimeoutChangable? 12) s9.1.3.2: Why 100? 13) s9.1.3.2: Why shorten to msrPrio when msgOrdered is almost as long and safelyReplayable is longer? 14) A.1: Could the caution about freeing memory be generalized? 15) What follows are the I-D nits references to check. Some of these might be on purpose: == Outdated reference: A later version (-11) exists of draft-ietf-taps-arch-10 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 4941 (Obsoleted by RFC 8981) == Outdated reference: A later version (-06) exists of draft-ietf-httpbis-priority-03 == Outdated reference: A later version (-10) exists of draft-ietf-taps-impl-09 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 5245 (Obsoleted by RFC 8445, RFC 8839) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 5766 (Obsoleted by RFC 8656)

Revised text:
This property allows the application to express a preference for the use of temporary local addresses, sometimes called "privacy"  <ins> addresses RFC8981.  Temporary addresses are generally used to prevent </ins> linking connections over time when a stable address, sometimes called "permanent" address, is not needed.  There are some caveats to note when specifying this property.  First, if an application Requires the If there are multiple Local Endpoints or Remote Endpoints configured, then initiating a Rendezvous() action will systematically probe the reachability of those endpoint candidates following an approach such  <ins> as that used in Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) RFC8445. </ins> If the endpoints are suspected to be behind a NAT, Rendezvous() can be initiated using Local Endpoints that support a method of discovering NAT bindings such as Session Traversal Utilities for NAT  <ins> (STUN) RFC8489 or Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN) RFC8656. </ins> In this case, the Local Endpoint will resolve to a mixture of local and server reflexive addresses.  The Resolve() action on the Preconnection can be used to discover these bindings: