Original text:
HSM-based: A Hardware Security Module (HSM) based cryptoprocessor which hashes one or more streams of security measurements from an Attester within the Attesting Environment.  Maintenance of this <del> hash enables detection of an Attester which is lying about the set of security measurements taken.  An example of a HSM is a TPM2.0 </del>  TPM2.0. Process-based: An individual process which has its runtime memory The configuration includes or exposes known vulnerabilities.  The configuration is unsupportable as it exposes unacceptable security vulnerabilities. 3.1.2. A simplified Background-Check Model may exist in a very specific <del> case. This is where the Relying Party and Verifier functions are co- </del>  resident.  This model is appropriate when: Some hardware-based private key is used by an Attester while gap with Zero Trust.  The credentials used for authentication and admission control can be manipulated on the endpoint.  Attestation can fill this gap through the generation of a compound credential <del> called AR-augmented Evidence. This compound credential is rooted in the hardware based Attesting Environment of an endpoint, plus the trustworthiness of a Verifier. The overall solution is known as "Below Zero Trust" as the compound credential cannot be manipulated or spoofed by an administrator of an endpoint with root access.  This solution is not adversely impacted by the potential drawbacks with pure background-check described above. </del>  To kick-off the "Below Zero Trust" compound credential creation sequence, a Verifier evaluates an Attester and returns signed

Reviewer comments:
Based on request from Yogesh for a new Configuration encoded claim.
Thanks Eric! As you may have guessed, we have an immediate use for this 36 :-)

Revised text:
HSM-based: A Hardware Security Module (HSM) based cryptoprocessor which hashes one or more streams of security measurements from an Attester within the Attesting Environment.  Maintenance of this  <ins> hash enables detection of an Attester which is not reporting the exact set of security measurements (such as log entries) taken within the Attesting Environment.  An example of a HSM is a TPM2.0 </ins> TPM2.0. Process-based: An individual process which has its runtime memory The configuration includes or exposes known vulnerabilities. <ins> Elements of the configuration relevant to security are unavailable to the Verifier. </ins> The configuration is unsupportable as it exposes unacceptable security vulnerabilities. 3.1.2. A simplified Background-Check Model may exist in a very specific  <ins> case.  This is where the Relying Party and Verifier functions are co- </ins> resident.  This model is appropriate when: Some hardware-based private key is used by an Attester while gap with Zero Trust.  The credentials used for authentication and admission control can be manipulated on the endpoint.  Attestation can fill this gap through the generation of a compound credential  <ins> called AR-augmented Evidence.  This compound credential is rooted in the hardware based Attesting Environment of an endpoint, plus the trustworthiness of a Verifier.  The overall solution is known as "Below Zero Trust" as the compound credential cannot be manipulated or spoofed by an administrator of an endpoint with root access.  This solution is not adversely impacted by the potential drawbacks with pure background-check described above. </ins> To kick-off the "Below Zero Trust" compound credential creation sequence, a Verifier evaluates an Attester and returns signed