Original text:
1.2.  draft-08 Remove support for weak and lesser used named curves. The length (in bytes) of the following TLSCiphertext.fragment. <del> The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 2048. </del>  The AEAD encrypted form of TLSPlaintext.fragment. encryption operation.  The length will generally be larger than TLSPlaintext.length, but by an amount that varies with the AEAD cipher.  Since the ciphers might incorporate padding, the amount of <del> overhead could vary with different TLSPlaintext.length values.  Each AEAD cipher MUST NOT produce an expansion of greater than 1024 bytes. </del>  Symbolically, <del> [[OPEN ISSUE: Reduce these values? https://github.com/tlswg/tls13- spec/issues/55]] </del> In order to decrypt and verify, the cipher takes as input the key, nonce, the "additional_data", and the AEADEncrypted value.  The output is either the plaintext or an error indicating that the If the decryption fails, a fatal "bad_record_mac" alert MUST be generated.  As a special case, we define the NULL_NULL AEAD cipher which is simply the identity operation and thus provides no security.  This cipher MUST ONLY be used with the initial TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a length more than <del> 2^14+2048 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSPlaintext record </del>  with more than 2^14 bytes.  This alert is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted in the network).

Reviewer comments:
As discussed on list.
Minor suggestions: 1) Explicitly specify the expectation of a "record_overflow" alert after the two "MUST NOT"s. 2) Also drop the issue "OPEN ISSUE" note that's on line 1087-1088. 3) Amend the changelog to mention this. 4) Add a sentence noting the overhead cap has changed to the "Note: In versions of TLS prior to 1.3" paragraph, or elsewhere.
As NAME suggests, I've updated the PR. I have not added the Note. I don't like those. The change log is enough.
Why was the changelog amended as for draft-09? The draft-08 hasn't been published yet. Is it in the progress of being released? (not shown on DataTracker and releases haven't been tagged on GitHub since draft-05)
Pilot error. Please feel free to submit a PR. , Dave Garrett EMAIL wrote:
This is currently 2^{14} + 2048 (in TLSCiphertexT) and then 2^{14} + 1024 later. This is introduced by leaving room for compression. Should we just reduce this entirely across the board. Certainly we don't need to leave room for compression.
Proposal at interim: 256 octets total.

Revised text:
1.2. <ins> draft-09 The maximum permittion record expansion for AEAD has been reduced from 2048 to 256 octets. </ins> draft-08 Remove support for weak and lesser used named curves. The length (in bytes) of the following TLSCiphertext.fragment.  <ins> The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 256.  An endpoint that receives a record that exceeds this length MUST generate a fatal "record_overflow" alert. </ins> The AEAD encrypted form of TLSPlaintext.fragment. encryption operation.  The length will generally be larger than TLSPlaintext.length, but by an amount that varies with the AEAD cipher.  Since the ciphers might incorporate padding, the amount of  <ins> overhead could vary with different TLSPlaintext.length values. </ins> Symbolically,  In order to decrypt and verify, the cipher takes as input the key, nonce, the "additional_data", and the AEADEncrypted value.  The output is either the plaintext or an error indicating that the If the decryption fails, a fatal "bad_record_mac" alert MUST be generated. <ins> An AEAD cipher MUST NOT produce an expansion of greater than 256 bytes.  An endpoint that receives a record that is larger than 2^14+256 octets MUST generate a fatal "record_overflow" alert. </ins> As a special case, we define the NULL_NULL AEAD cipher which is simply the identity operation and thus provides no security.  This cipher MUST ONLY be used with the initial TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a length more than  <ins> 2^14+256 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSPlaintext record </ins> with more than 2^14 bytes.  This alert is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted in the network).