jiebi/TextFlow huggingface dataset:
Original text:
1.1. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", <del> "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119. </del>  2.

Reviewer comments:
— Section 1.1 — Please use the new BCP 14 boilerplate from RFC 8174.

Revised text:
1.1. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",  <ins> "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. </ins> 2.
Original text:
3. A device may learn about Captive Portal API URIs through more than <del> one of (or indeed all of) the above options.  It is a network configuration error if the learned URIs are not all identical. However, if the URIs learned are not in fact all identical the captive device MUST prioritize URIs learned from network provisioning or configuration mechanisms before all other URIs.  Specifically, URIs learned via any of the options in option should take precedence over any URI learned via some other mechanism, such as a redirect. </del>  If the URIs learned via more than one option described in option are not all identical, this condition should be logged for the device <del> owner or administrator.  Implementations can select their own precedence order. </del>  4.

Reviewer comments:
""" — Section 3 — Specifically, URIs learned via any of the options in Section 2 should take precedence over any URI learned via some other mechanism Given the MUST that comes before this, I think the word “should” ought to be removed, to avoid any confusion. """ Actually, this text is left over from the brief period of time when there was an HTTP redirect Link-Relation header. That option was removed, and I think the 2nd paragraph can be deleted. The 1st and 3rd paragraphs can probably be reworked into two much tighter paragraphs.

Revised text:
3. A device may learn about Captive Portal API URIs through more than  <ins> one of (or indeed all of) the above options.  Implementations can select their own precedence order (e.g., prefer one of the IPv6 options before the DHCPv4 option, or vice versa, et cetera). </ins> If the URIs learned via more than one option described in option are not all identical, this condition should be logged for the device  <ins> owner or administrator; it is a network configuration error if the learned URIs are not all identical. </ins> 4.
Original text:
portal API endpoint, conforming to the recommendations for such URIs [draft-ietf-capport-api]. <del> A captive portal server MAY redirect requests that do not have an Accept header field (RFC7231 Section 5.3) containing a field item whose content-type is "application/capport+json" to the URL conveyed in the "user-portal-url" API key.  When performing such content negotiation (RFC7231 Section 3.4), implementors of captive portals need to keep in mind that such responses might be cached, and therefore SHOULD include an appropriate Vary header field (RFC7231 Section 7.1.4) or mark them explicitly uncacheable (for example, using Cache-Control: no-store RFC7234 Section 5.2.2.3). </del> A captive portal MAY do content negotiation (RFC7231 section 3.4) and attempt to redirect clients querying without an explicit indication of support for the captive portal API content type (i.e. without application/capport+json listed explicitly anywhere within an Accept header vis.  RFC7231 section 5.3).  In so doing, the captive portal SHOULD redirect the client to the value associated with the "user- <del> portal-url" API key. </del>  The URI SHOULD NOT contain an IP address literal.

Reviewer comments:
""" It looks like the two consecutive paragraphs that both begin with “A captive portal” have some duplication with regard to the absence of “Accept” headers; please check that and adjust if you agree that some information can be merged or removed. """ Indeed, these paragraphs seem to be saying almost the exact same thing. I think the 2nd paragraph can be removed, once it's clear whether/how to move its SHOULD to the 1st paragraph.
A bunch of unrelated changes :)

Revised text:
portal API endpoint, conforming to the recommendations for such URIs [draft-ietf-capport-api].  A captive portal MAY do content negotiation (RFC7231 section 3.4) and attempt to redirect clients querying without an explicit indication of support for the captive portal API content type (i.e. without application/capport+json listed explicitly anywhere within an Accept header vis.  RFC7231 section 5.3).  In so doing, the captive portal SHOULD redirect the client to the value associated with the "user-  <ins> portal-url" API key.  When performing such content negotiation (RFC7231 Section 3.4), implementors of captive portals need to keep in mind that such responses might be cached, and therefore SHOULD include an appropriate Vary header field (RFC7231 Section 7.1.4) or mark them explicitly uncacheable (for example, using Cache-Control: no-store RFC7234 Section 5.2.2.3). </ins> The URI SHOULD NOT contain an IP address literal.
Original text:
mark them explicitly uncacheable (for example, using Cache-Control: no-store RFC7234 Section 5.2.2.3). <del> The URI SHOULD NOT contain an IP address literal. </del>  Networks with no captive portals MAY explicitly indicate this condition by using this option with the IANA-assigned URI for this

Reviewer comments:
Approved -- discussed on phone...
""" The URI SHOULD NOT contain an IP address literal. Why not, and how does it maintain interoperability to have this as SHOULD NOT, rather than MUST NOT? """
My recollection (possibly faulty), is that we could have made this a MUST NOT in large part because we want the URI to be identical across IPv4 and IPv6 -based options, but that going from SHOULD NOT to MUST NOT could be over-prescriptive. Is my recollection correct, and would such a move be over-prescriptive?
That is right. It is also somewhat more challenging to get a valid certificate for an IP address than a domain name.

Revised text:
mark them explicitly uncacheable (for example, using Cache-Control: no-store RFC7234 Section 5.2.2.3).  <ins> The URI SHOULD NOT contain an IP address literal.  Exceptions to this might include networks with only one operational IP address family where DNS is either not available or not fully functional until the captive portal has been satisfied. </ins> Networks with no captive portals MAY explicitly indicate this condition by using this option with the IANA-assigned URI for this
Original text:
Note that the URI parameter is not null terminated.  2.3. This section describes the Captive-Portal Router Advertisement Note that the URI parameter is not guaranteed to be null terminated.  3. A device may learn about Captive Portal API URIs through more than

Reviewer comments:
Additionally, clarify recommended URI limit of 255 in each of DHCPv6 and IPv6 RA option description text.
Approved (text crafted on phone). The duplication of the warning length is intentional....
""" — Sections 2.1 and 2.2 — Why aren’t the diagrams for the two in the same format? And neither explicitly says what the length of the “len” field is. In the v4 version, one has to guess that it’s the same size as the “code” field, 1 byte. In the v6 version, one can look at the diagram. I suggest making the diagrams the same format (calibrated with bit/byte markings) and explicitly specifying in the text the size of the “len” field. """ I rather suspect this goes back to whichever source documents from which the option format text was copied. Nevertheless, harmonizing them seems reasonable.
Additionally: we should restate the 255 byte limit from DHCPv4 in each option's description.

Revised text:
Note that the URI parameter is not null terminated. <ins> The maximum length of the URI that can be carried in IPv4 DHCP is 255 bytes, so URIs longer than 255 bytes should not be provisioned via IPv6 DHCP options. </ins> 2.3. This section describes the Captive-Portal Router Advertisement Note that the URI parameter is not guaranteed to be null terminated. <ins> The maximum length of the URI that can be carried in IPv4 DHCP is 255 bytes, so URIs longer than 255 bytes should not be provisioned via IPv6 RA options. </ins> 3. A device may learn about Captive Portal API URIs through more than
Original text:
5.  An attacker with the ability to inject DHCP messages or RAs could include an option from this document to force users to contact an address of his choosing.  As an attacker with this capability could expectations of being hijacked - this may improve security by making users more reluctant to accept TLS hijacking, which can be performed from beyond the network associated with the captive portal. <del> By simplifying the interaction with the captive portal systems, and doing away with the need for interception, we think that users will be less likely to disable useful security safeguards like DNSSEC validation, VPNs, etc.  In addition, because the system knows that it is behind a captive portal, it can know not to send cookies, credentials, etc.  By handing out a URI which is protected with TLS, the captive portal operator can attempt to reassure the user that the captive portal is not malicious. </del>

Reviewer comments:
""" — Section 5 — Purely a judgment thing here, so do what you hink is best: it seems to me that the Security Considerations in 7710 rather buried the lede. The bottom line is that by removing the MitM interception, this mechanism improves security by making the portal and its actions visible, rather than hidden, and that vulnerabilities that exist here also existed before and are now lessened. I would say something like that up front, in a new first paragraph, and then continue with the existing text as is. But, again, as you judge best; this is just a comment. """

Revised text:
5. <ins> By removing or reducing the need for captive portals to perform MITM hijacking, this mechanism improves security by making the portal and its actions visible, rather than hidden, and reduces the likelihood that users will disable useful security safeguards like DNSSEC validation, VPNs, etc.  In addition, because the system knows that it is behind a captive portal, it can know not to send cookies, credentials, etc.  By handing out a URI which is protected with TLS, the captive portal operator can attempt to reassure the user that the captive portal is not malicious. </ins> An attacker with the ability to inject DHCP messages or RAs could include an option from this document to force users to contact an address of his choosing.  As an attacker with this capability could expectations of being hijacked - this may improve security by making users more reluctant to accept TLS hijacking, which can be performed from beyond the network associated with the captive portal.
Original text:
the captive portal operator can attempt to reassure the user that the captive portal is not malicious.  An attacker with the ability to inject DHCP messages or RAs could include an option from this document to force users to contact an address of his choosing.  As an attacker with this capability could <del> simply list himself as the default gateway (and so intercept all the victim's traffic); this does not provide them with significantly more capabilities, but because this document removes the need for </del>  interception, the attacker may have an easier time performing the <del> attack.  As the operating systems and application that make use of </del>  this information know that they are connecting to a captive-portal device (as opposed to intercepted connections) they can render the page in a sandboxed environment and take other precautions, such as

Reviewer comments:
Thread: URL
Perhaps a reference to URL as well as the security considerations sections of 2131, 4861, 4862, and 8415.
The new paragraph is good. The other sentence is a little hard to understand and risks opening questions that we probably don't want opened. Reviewer: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef Review result: Has Issues Since the use of IP address literal is not forbidden by this document, what if an attacker with the ability to inject DHCP messages or RAs uses this option to force the user to contact an IP address of his choosing? In this case, the use of TLS and presenting the identity in the certificate might not be of much help. I think this case should be discussed in the security consideration section.

Revised text:
the captive portal operator can attempt to reassure the user that the captive portal is not malicious. <ins> Each of the options described in this document is presented to a node using the same protocols used to provision other information critical to the node's successful configuration on a network.  The security considerations applicable to each of these provisioning mechanisms also apply when the node is attempting to learn the information conveyed in these options.  In the absence of security measures like RA Guard (RFC6105, RFC7113) or DHCP Shield RFC7610, an attacker could inject, modify, or block DHCP messages or RAs. </ins> An attacker with the ability to inject DHCP messages or RAs could include an option from this document to force users to contact an address of his choosing.  As an attacker with this capability could  <ins> simply list themselves as the default gateway (and so intercept all the victim's traffic); this does not provide them with significantly more capabilities, but because this document removes the need for </ins> interception, the attacker may have an easier time performing the  <ins> attack. However, as the operating systems and application that make use of </ins> this information know that they are connecting to a captive-portal device (as opposed to intercepted connections) they can render the page in a sandboxed environment and take other precautions, such as
Original text:
4.1. This document registers a new entry under the IETF URN Sub-namespace <del> defined in RFC3553: </del>  <del> Captive Portal Unrestricted Identifier urn:ietf:params:capport:unrestricted </del>  RFC TBD (this document) <del> RFC TBD (this document) </del>  <del> Only one value is defined (see URN above).  No hierarchy is defined and therefore no sub-namespace registrations are possible. </del>  4.2.

Reviewer comments:
Looking at this now it's really not clear what I was thinking before. Fortunately, IANA folks are on top things. =)
""" First, Section 4.1 states that "This document registers a new entry under the IETF URN Sub-namespace defined in [RFC3553]" however, the registry at URL defined by RFC 3553 is actually the IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol Parameter Identifiers registry. In addition, neither registry's columns match the columns named in the registration. IANA Question --> The authors provide the following registration information in Section 4.1 of the draft: Registry name: Captive Portal Unrestricted Identifier URN: urn:ietf:params:capport:unrestricted Specification: RFC TBD (this document) Repository: RFC TBD (this document) Index value: Only one value is defined (see URN above). No hierarchy is defined and therefore no sub-namespace registrations are possible. The IETF URN Sub-namespaces registry records the following information: Sub-namespace Reference IANA Registry Reference And the IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol Parameter Identifiers provide the following information: Registered Parameter Identifier Reference IANA Registry Reference Is the registration information in Section 4.1 of the draft for a different registry; or, is the information provided different from the requirements for the IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol Parameter Identifiers registry? """
Per Barry: """ The way we'd normally do this sort of registration is to register "capport" in the "IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol Parameter Identifiers" registry, and create a new registry (probably with Expert Review or Specification Required, but it also could be FCFS) for "Captive Portal URN Labels" or some name like that, and that registry would have "unrestricted" in it, resulting in the full URN we want. The "Captive Portal URN Labels" registry would be the IANA Registry Reference for the first registration. """ I propose we go for the Fully Monty registration.
Given recent discussion that capport:unrestricted may be fine on its own I will close this (again) for now.

Revised text:
4.1. This document registers a new entry under the IETF URN Sub-namespace  <ins> for Registered Protocol Parameter Identifiers defined in RFC3553: </ins>  <ins> capport:unrestricted </ins> RFC TBD (this document)  <ins> https://www.iana.org/assignments/params/params.xml#params-1 </ins>  <ins> Only one value is defined (see URN above).  No hierarchy is defined and therefore no sub-namespace registrations are possible. </ins> 4.2.
Original text:
Captive-Portal Identification in DHCP / RA <del> draft-ietf-capport-rfc7710bis-09 </del>  Abstract information faster and more reliably.  Note that, for the foreseeable future, captive portals will still need to implement interception techniques to serve legacy clients, and clients will need to perform <del> probing to detect captive portals. </del>  Clients that support the Captive Portal DHCP option SHOULD include the option in the Parameter Request List in DHCPREQUEST messages.

Reviewer comments:
Ben suggested: "I was just thinking that if we have a whole sentence about how "you're going to have to do the old thing anyway, though", someone might read that and say "well, if I have to keep doing the old thing, why should I bother with this new thing". So, appending a "; nonetheless, the mechanism provided by this document provides a more reliable and performant way to do so, and is therefore the preferred mechanism for captive-portal detection" or similar is what I had in mind."
Will do, and just submit ('ain't nobody got time for nit PRs :-P)
Maybe de-hyphenate captive-portal

Revised text:
Captive-Portal Identification in DHCP / RA  <ins> draft-ietf-capport-rfc7710bis-10 </ins> Abstract information faster and more reliably.  Note that, for the foreseeable future, captive portals will still need to implement interception techniques to serve legacy clients, and clients will need to perform  <ins> probing to detect captive portals"; nonetheless, the mechanism provided by this document provides a more reliable and performant way to do so, and is therefore the preferred mechanism for captive-portal detection. </ins> Clients that support the Captive Portal DHCP option SHOULD include the option in the Parameter Request List in DHCPREQUEST messages.
Original text:
techniques to serve legacy clients, and clients will need to perform probing to detect captive portals.  In order to support multiple "classes" of clients (e.g.  IPv4 only, IPv6 only with DHCPv6 (RFC3315), IPv6 only with RA) the captive portal can provide the URI via multiple methods (IPv4 DHCP, IPv6

Reviewer comments:
Fixes issue
Aaaaannd fixed the merge conflicts again. NAME NAME please take a look!
In our interop testing, all of the implementations of portals require that the DHCP option is in the request list in order for it to be sent. We should be explicit that this is what SHOULD be done in the document (clients SHOULD request).

Revised text:
techniques to serve legacy clients, and clients will need to perform probing to detect captive portals. <ins> Clients that support the Captive Portal DHCP option SHOULD include the option in the Parameter Request List in DHCPREQUEST messages. DHCP servers MAY send the Captive Portal option without any explicit request. </ins> In order to support multiple "classes" of clients (e.g.  IPv4 only, IPv6 only with DHCPv6 (RFC3315), IPv6 only with RA) the captive portal can provide the URI via multiple methods (IPv4 DHCP, IPv6
Original text:
Captive-Portal Identification in DHCP / RA <del> draft-ietf-capport-rfc7710bis-01 </del>  Abstract 4. <del> This document requests two new IETF URN protocol parameter (RFC3553) entries.  This document also requests a reallocation of DHCPv4 option </del>  codes (see exp106 for background). Thanks IANA!

Reviewer comments:
Earlier version of this document requested a parameter to be used for Link Relation purposes. This LinkRel use was removed as was the explicit parameter request, but the surround grammar was overlooked. Also: rev draft version to -02 and document month to February in anticipation of post a new version.

Revised text:
Captive-Portal Identification in DHCP / RA  <ins> draft-ietf-capport-rfc7710bis-02 </ins> Abstract 4.  <ins> This document requests one new IETF URN protocol parameter (RFC3553) entry.  This document also requests a reallocation of DHCPv4 option </ins> codes (see exp106 for background). Thanks IANA!
Original text:
As recommended in Section 5.8 of I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz, this specification uses CBOR web tokens to convey claims within an access token issued by the server.  While other formats could be used as <del> well these are out of scope for this document. </del>  1.1.

Reviewer comments:
Change last sentence of Introduction from: While other formats could be used as well these are out of scope for this document. to: While other formats could be used as well, those are out of scope for this document.
Good point, thank you!

Revised text:
As recommended in Section 5.8 of I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz, this specification uses CBOR web tokens to convey claims within an access token issued by the server.  While other formats could be used as  <ins> well, those are out of scope for this document. </ins> 1.1.
Original text:
request, and therefore not stored at the RS. This specification RECOMMENDS that an RS stores only one token per <del> proof-of-possession key, meaning that an additional token linked to the same key will overwrite any existing token at the RS.  The reason is that this greatly simplifies (constrained) implementations, with </del>  respect to required storage and resolving a request to the applicable token.

Reviewer comments:
Feedback from implementers: Section 5.10.1 of the ACE framework uses the term "overwrite" "This specification RECOMMENDS that an RS stores only one token per proof-of-possession key, meaning that an additional token linked to the same key will overwrite any existing token at the RS. The reason is that this greatly simplifies (constrained) implementations, with respect to required storage and resolving a request to the applicable token." and this is mirrored in the OSCORE profile. However, this is not strictly an overwrite of a token because some information in the original token needs to be kept. For example, if the client requests new access rights only using the kid as reference, and the corresponding access token overwrites the original token, then information about the actual key would be lost. Proposed reformulation: "This specification RECOMMENDS that an RS stores only one token per proof-of-possession key. This means that an additional token linked to the same key will supersede any existing token at the RS, by replacing the corresponding authorization information. The reason is that ..."

Revised text:
request, and therefore not stored at the RS. This specification RECOMMENDS that an RS stores only one token per  <ins> proof-of-possession key.  This means that an additional token linked to the same key will supersede any existing token at the RS, by replacing the corresponding authorization information.  The reason is that this greatly simplifies (constrained) implementations, with </ins> respect to required storage and resolving a request to the applicable token.