Original text:
at a time, reducing an exponential-time attack into a linear-time attack. <del> 7.2. </del>  QPACK mitigates but does not completely prevent attacks modeled on CRIME (CRIME) by forcing a guess to match an entire field line, connection by different web origins (RFC6454) are made by mutually distrustful entities. <del> 7.3. </del>  Users of HTTP that require confidentiality for header or trailer fields can use values with entropy sufficient to make guessing field name might occur for shorter values more quickly or with higher probability than for longer values. <del> 7.4. </del>  Implementations can also choose to protect sensitive fields by not compressing them and instead encoding their value as literals. Note that these criteria for deciding to use a never-indexed literal representation will evolve over time as new attacks are discovered. <del> 7.5. </del>  There is no currently known attack against a static Huffman encoding. A study has shown that using a static Huffman encoding table created attacker could not take advantage of this information leakage to recover any meaningful amount of information (see PETAL). <del> 7.6. </del>  An attacker can try to cause an endpoint to exhaust its memory. QPACK is designed to limit both the peak and stable amounts of memory new streams, reading only from the encoder stream, or closing the connection. <del> 7.7. </del>  An implementation of QPACK needs to ensure that large values for integers, long encoding for integers, or long string literals do not

Reviewer comments:
Magnus Nystrom : not be able (based on no current known attack against static Huffman encodings) to mount the previously described "probing" attack? If so, adding a sentence at the end of the section along the lines of "Thus, the previously mentioned probing attack is not known to be applicable for any fields where static Huffman encoding is used."
This section is not related to the probing attack. I think some of the confusion here is lost formatting when importing from RFC 7541. The TOC should be:

Revised text:
at a time, reducing an exponential-time attack into a linear-time attack.  <ins> 7.1.1. </ins> QPACK mitigates but does not completely prevent attacks modeled on CRIME (CRIME) by forcing a guess to match an entire field line, connection by different web origins (RFC6454) are made by mutually distrustful entities.  <ins> 7.1.2. </ins> Users of HTTP that require confidentiality for header or trailer fields can use values with entropy sufficient to make guessing field name might occur for shorter values more quickly or with higher probability than for longer values.  <ins> 7.1.3. </ins> Implementations can also choose to protect sensitive fields by not compressing them and instead encoding their value as literals. Note that these criteria for deciding to use a never-indexed literal representation will evolve over time as new attacks are discovered.  <ins> 7.2. </ins> There is no currently known attack against a static Huffman encoding. A study has shown that using a static Huffman encoding table created attacker could not take advantage of this information leakage to recover any meaningful amount of information (see PETAL).  <ins> 7.3. </ins> An attacker can try to cause an endpoint to exhaust its memory. QPACK is designed to limit both the peak and stable amounts of memory new streams, reading only from the encoder stream, or closing the connection.  <ins> 7.4. </ins> An implementation of QPACK needs to ensure that large values for integers, long encoding for integers, or long string literals do not