Original text:
6. <del> [Editor's Note] The following will summarize the set of information that is needed to support the MPLS DetNet data plane. </del>  7. <del> The security considerations of DetNet in general are discussed in I- D.ietf-detnet-architecture and I-D.sdt-detnet-security.  Other security considerations will be added in a future version of this draft. </del>  8.

Reviewer comments:
Fixing up MPLS draft as agreed. Also fixing some Warnings in other drafts from doing a full make.
LGTM

Revised text:
6.  <ins> The following summarizes the set of information that is needed to identify an individual DetNet flow in an MPLS context: MPLS Service Label and d-CW labels at a DetNet end system. MPLS Service Label and d-CW in the context of one or more MPLS Forwarding Labels at any DetNet aware device along the path. Any aggregate flow by one or more MPLS Forwarding Labels at any DetNet aware device along the path. Any other DetNet flow information for example IP Flow Identification beyond the MPLS service label as specified in I- D.ietf-detnet-ip at a DetNet aware device. </ins> 7.  <ins> Security considerations for DetNet are described in detail in I- D.ietf-detnet-security.  General security considerations are described in I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture.  This section considers exclusively security considerations which are specific to the DetNet MPLS data plane. Security aspects which are unique to DetNet are those whose aim is to provide the specific quality of service aspects of DetNet, which are primarily to deliver data flows with extremely low packet loss rates and bounded end-to-end delivery latency. The primary considerations for the data plane is to maintain integrity of data and delivery of the associated DetNet service traversing the DetNet network.  Application flows can be protected through whatever means is provided by the underlying technology.  For example, encryption may be used, such as that provided by IPSec RFC4301 for IP flows and/or by an underlying sub-net using MACSec IEEE802.1AE-2018 for IP over Ethernet (Layer-2) flows. From a data plane perspective this document does not add or modify any header information. At the management and control level DetNet flows are identified on a per-flow basis, which may provide controller plane attackers with additional information about the data flows (when compared to controller planes that do not include per-flow identification).  This is an inherent property of DetNet which has security implications that should be considered when determining if DetNet is a suitable technology for any given use case. To provide uninterrupted availability of the DetNet service, provisions can be made against DOS attacks and delay attacks.  To protect against DOS attacks, excess traffic due to malicious or malfunctioning devices can be prevented or mitigated, for example through the use of existing mechanism such as policing and shaping applied at the input of a DetNet domain.  To prevent DetNet packets from being delayed by an entity external to a DetNet domain, DetNet technology definition can allow for the mitigation of Man-In-The- Middle attacks, for example through use of authentication and authorization of devices within the DetNet domain. </ins> 8.