Original text:
Abstract <del> RFC5280 specifies several extended key usages for X.509 certificates. This document defines a general purpose document signing extended key usage for X.509 public key certificates which specifies the usage of the certificates for document signing. </del>  1. RFC5280 specifies several extended key usages for X.509 certificates. <del> In addition, several extended key usage had been addedRFC7299 as public OID under the IANA repository.  While usage of any extended key usage is bad practice for publicly trusted certificates, there are no public and general extended key usage explicitly assigned for Document Signing certificates.  The current practice is to use id-kp- emailProtection, id-kp-codeSigning or vendor defined Object ID for general document signing purposes. </del>  In circumstances where code signing and S/MIME certificates are also widely used for document signing, the technical or policy changes This specification defines the KeyPurposeId id-kp-documentSigning. Inclusion of this KeyPurposeId in a certificate indicates that the <del> use of the certified public key is allowed to be used for verifying the signature on a document. </del>  <del> Term of "Document Sign" in this document is digitally signes contents </del>  that are consumed by humans.  To be more precise, contents are intended to be shown to human with printable or displayable form by means of services or software, rather than processed by machines. This specification defines the KeyPurposeId id-kp-documentSigning. Inclusion of this KeyPurposeId in a certificate indicates that the <del> Subject named in the certificate signed the document content, and the associated keys can be used by a document signing service or a software for authentication, message integrity, and non-repudiation of origin (using digital signatures, along with any usages allowed by other EKU values). </del>  4. The signed contents of Internet-Drafts are primarily intended to be consumed by human.  To be more precise, contents are intended to be shown to human in a printable or displayable form by means of <del> services or software, rather than processed by machines.  The digital signature on the contents is to indicate to the recipient of the contents that the content has not changed since it was signed by the identity indicated as the subject of the certificate.  To validate the digital signature which is signed on contents intended to be consumed by humans, implementations MAY perform the steps below during certificate validation: </del>  The implementation MAY examine the Extended Key Usage value(s): If there are restrictions set for the replying party and relying party software, proceed as following. <del> Each Restriction on the EKUs can be "Excluded EKU" or "Permitted EKU" and handled. The procedure is intended to permit or prohibit presence of a certain EKU or complete absence of EKUs.  It is outside the scope of this document, but the relying party can permit or prohibit combinations of EKU.  A consideration on prohibiting combinations of EKUs is described in the security consideration section of this document. 2.1.  Excluded EKUs procedure "Excluded EKU" is an EKU which the relying party or the relying party software prohibits.  Examples of "Excluded EKU" are, presence of anyEKU or complete absence of EKU extension on a certificate.  If an EKU of the certificate meets the conditions set by the "Excluded EKU" restriction, the relying party or the relying party software rejects the certificate. 2.2.  Permitted EKU procedure "Permitted EKU" is an EKU which the relying party or the relying party software accepts.  Examples of "Permitted EKU" are, presence of this general document signing EKU and/or protocol specific document signing-type EKUs.  If an EKU of the certificate meets the condition set by a "Permitted EKU" restriction, the certificate is acceptable.  Otherwise, relying party or the relying party software rejects the certificate. When a single software has the capability to process various data </del>  formats, the software may choose to make the excluded and permitted decisions separately in accordance with the format it is handling (e.g. text, pdf, etc). 6. <del> The usage of id-kp-documentSigning EKU is to provide an alternative to id-kp-emailProtection being used for non-email purposes and id-kp- codeSigning being used to sign objects other than binary code.  This </del>  EKU does not introduce new security risks but instead reduces existing security risks by providing means to separate other EKUs used for communication protocols namely, TLS or S/MIME etc. in order to minimize the risk of cross protocol attacks. To reduce the risk of specific cross protocol attacks, the relying <del> party or relying party software may additionally prohibit use of </del>  specific combination of EKUs. While a specific protocol or signing scheme may choose to come up <del> with their own EKU, some may not have significant motive or resources to set up and manage their own EKU.  This general document signing </del>  EKU may be used as a stop gap for those that intend to set up their own EKU or those who do not intend to set up an EKU but still would <del> like to distinguish document signing from other usages. </del>  Introduction of this id-kp-documentSigning EKU value does not introduce any new security or privacy concerns.

Reviewer comments:
This also made the references to RFCs 7229 and 8358 Informative references, as was approved by in PR. More importantly, neither of these refs are required for implementation. This also changes the line breaks in the .md hence it looks like a lot more changes than there really are. Done to aid readability. NAME please double check that the new formatting in s4 works. It seemed to the me that the paragraphs after "2." were part of the numbered item so I indented them. The .md will result in the following .txt: If there are restrictions set for the replying party and relying party software, proceed as following. Each Restriction on the EKUs can be "Excluded EKU" or "Permitted EKU" and handled. The procedure is intended to permit or prohibit presence of a certain EKU or complete absence of EKUs. It is outside the scope of this document, but the relying party can permit or prohibit conbinations of EKU. A consideration on prohibiting combination of EKUs is described in the security consideration section of this document. Excluded EKUs procedure: "Excluded EKU" is an EKU which the relying party or the relying party software prohibits. Examples of "Excluded EKU" are, presence of anyEKU or complete absence of EKU extension on a certificate. If an EKU of the certificate meets the conditions set by the "Excluded EKU" restriction, the relying party or the relying party software rejects the certificate. Permitted EKU procedure: "Permitted EKU" is an EKU which the relying party or the relying party software accepts. Examples of "Permitted EKU" are, presence of this general document signing EKU and/or protocol specific document signing-type EKUs. If an EKU of the certificate meets the condition set by a "Permitted EKU" restriction, the certificate is acceptable. Otherwise, relying party or the relying party software rejects the certificate. When a single software has capability to process various data formats, the software may choose to make the excluded and permitted decisions separately in accordance with the format it is handling (e.g. text, pdf, etc).
Also
Section 4: s/prohibit conbinations/xxclude combinations/ Section 4: s/anyEKU/anyExtendedKeyUsage/ Section 6: s/none-email purposes/purposes other than email/ Note the comment about the abstract was addressed via .
I-D Nits complains about: one line being too long: the 2nd line of the ASN.1 module the abstract containing a reference: [RFC5280]
approved. after building into txt, it seems same in my environment also.

Revised text:
Abstract  <ins> RFC 5280 specifies several extended key usages for X.509 certificates.  This document defines a general purpose document signing extended key usage for X.509 public key certificates which restricts the usage of the certificates for document signing. </ins> 1. RFC5280 specifies several extended key usages for X.509 certificates.  <ins> In addition, several extended key usage had been added RFC7299 as public Object Identifier (OID) under the IANA repository.  While usage of any extended key usage is bad practice for publicly trusted certificates, there are no public and general extended key usage explicitly assigned for Document Signing certificates.  The current practice is to use id-kp-emailProtection, id-kp-codeSigning or vendor defined OID for general document signing purposes. </ins> In circumstances where code signing and S/MIME certificates are also widely used for document signing, the technical or policy changes This specification defines the KeyPurposeId id-kp-documentSigning. Inclusion of this KeyPurposeId in a certificate indicates that the  <ins> use of any Subject names in the certificate is restricted to use by a document signing. </ins>  <ins> Term of "Document Sign" in this document is digitally sign contents </ins> that are consumed by humans.  To be more precise, contents are intended to be shown to human with printable or displayable form by means of services or software, rather than processed by machines. This specification defines the KeyPurposeId id-kp-documentSigning. Inclusion of this KeyPurposeId in a certificate indicates that the  <ins> use of any Subject names in the certificate is restricted to use by a document signing service or a software (along with any usages allowed by other EKU values). </ins> 4. The signed contents of Internet-Drafts are primarily intended to be consumed by human.  To be more precise, contents are intended to be shown to human in a printable or displayable form by means of  <ins> services or software, rather than processed by machines.  To validate the digital signature which is signed to contents intended to be consumed by human, implementations MAY perform the steps below as a certificate validation. </ins> The implementation MAY examine the Extended Key Usage value(s): If there are restrictions set for the replying party and relying party software, proceed as following.  <ins> Each Restriction on the EKUs can be "Excluded EKU" or "Permitted EKU" and handled. The procedure is intended to permit or prohibit presence of a certain EKU or complete absence of EKUs.  It is outside the scope of this document, but the relying party can permit or exclude combinations of EKU.  A consideration on prohibiting combination of EKUs is described in the security consideration section of this document. "Excluded EKU" is an EKU which the relying party or the relying party software prohibits.  Examples of "Excluded EKU" are, presence of anyExtendedKeyUsage or complete absence of EKU extension on a certificate.  If an EKU of the certificate meets the conditions set by the "Excluded EKU" restriction, the relying party or the relying party software rejects the certificate. "Permitted EKU" is an EKU which the relying party or the relying party software accepts.  Examples of "Permitted EKU" are, presence of this general document signing EKU and/or protocol specific document signing-type EKUs.  If an EKU of the certificate meets the condition set by a "Permitted EKU" restriction, the certificate is acceptable.  Otherwise, relying party or the relying party software rejects the certificate. When a single software has capability to process various data </ins> formats, the software may choose to make the excluded and permitted decisions separately in accordance with the format it is handling (e.g. text, pdf, etc). 6.  <ins> The usage of id-kp-documentSigning EKU intends to prevent id-kp- emailProtection from being used for purposes other than email and id- kp-codeSigning used to sign objects other than binary codes.  This </ins> EKU does not introduce new security risks but instead reduces existing security risks by providing means to separate other EKUs used for communication protocols namely, TLS or S/MIME etc. in order to minimize the risk of cross protocol attacks. To reduce the risk of specific cross protocol attacks, the relying  <ins> party or relying party software may additionaly prohibit use of </ins> specific combination of EKUs. While a specific protocol or signing scheme may choose to come up  <ins> with their own EKU, some may not have significant motive or resource to set up and manage thier own EKU.  This general document signing </ins> EKU may be used as a stop gap for those that intend to set up their own EKU or those who do not intend to set up an EKU but still would  <ins> like to distinguish from other usage. </ins> Introduction of this id-kp-documentSigning EKU value does not introduce any new security or privacy concerns.