Original text:
8.  Concerns with TLS 1.2 implementations falling back to SHA-1 is an issue.  This draft updates the TLS 1.2 specification to deprecate support for MD5 and SHA-1 for digital signatures.  However, this document does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection. <del> 9. </del>  The authors would like to thank Hubert Kario for his help in writing the initial draft.  We are also grateful to Daniel Migault, Martin

Reviewer comments:
SHA-1 entries in the signature scheme registry should not be recommended this pull request creates an IANA considerations section to remove the recommended status.
Partially addresses .
Please address the following IDNits: -- The document seems to lack an IANA Considerations section. (See Section 2.2 of URL for how to handle the case when there are no actions for IANA.) -- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC5246, but the abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should. -- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC7525, but the abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should. Section 1. Editorial. -- s/RFC 5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/ -- s/RFC 6151 [RFC6151]/[RFC6151]/ -- s/RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/ Section 1. Editorial. For symmetry with the rest of the text: OLD RFC 6151 [RFC6151] details the security considerations, including collision attacks for MD5, published in 2011. NEW In 2011, [RFC6151] detailed the security considerations, including collision attacks for MD5. Section 1. Please provide a reference for "Wang, et al". Is there a reference to provide for the "the potential for brute-force attack" Section 6. Editorial Nit. s/RFC5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/ Section 6. Move the text "In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from" out of the "OLD" block of text to be its own intro paragraph so that the OLD vs. NEW is a clear cut-and-paste. Section 7. Editorial. s/ RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/ Section 7. SHA-1 is also not mentioned in RFC7525. Recommend: OLD The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 and this text adds it to ensure it is understood as having been deprecated. NEW The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; and this text adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been deprecated. Section 7. Editorial. Grammar. OLD In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED, SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used NEW In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED; and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used Section 10.2 Please make RFC5246 a normative reference.
This looks good to merge!

Revised text:
8. <ins> The document updates the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry to change the recommended status of SHA-1 based signature schemes to N (not recommended) as defined by RFC8447.  The following entries are to be updated: Other entries of the resgistry remain the same. 9. </ins> Concerns with TLS 1.2 implementations falling back to SHA-1 is an issue.  This draft updates the TLS 1.2 specification to deprecate support for MD5 and SHA-1 for digital signatures.  However, this document does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection.  <ins> 10. </ins> The authors would like to thank Hubert Kario for his help in writing the initial draft.  We are also grateful to Daniel Migault, Martin