Original text:
6.1. <del> If a caching forwarder consults multiple resolvers, it may be possible for it to cache records for the "resolver.arpa" Special Use Domain Name (SUDN) for multiple resolvers.  This may result in clients sending queries intended to discover Designated Resolvers for resolver "foo" and receiving answers for resolvers "foo" and "bar". A client will successfully reject unintended connections because the authenticated discovery will fail or the resolver addresses do not match.  Clients that attempt unauthenticated connections to resolvers discovered through SVCB queries run the risk of connecting to the wrong server in this scenario. To prevent unnecessary traffic from clients to incorrect resolvers, DNS caching resolvers SHOULD NOT cache results for the "resolver.arpa" SUDN other than for Designated Resolvers under their control. </del>  6.2.

Reviewer comments:
Addressing issues and to make the SUDN forwarding a SHOULD NOT unless the operator understands and accepts the implications to authenticated discovery.
This is exactly what was intended, so we're on the same page.
Migrated from original DEER issue: URL
The Special Use Domain Name (SUDN) URL needs more clarification. Specifically: Queries against the .arpa nameservers The draft should mention that .arpa is a delegated zone, currently served by the root nameservers. Clients that query a resolver that is unaware of this requirement will "leak" queries to the root nameservers. When URL is not present in a resolver configuration Section 6.1 discusses how a forwarder should behave and suggests that results should not be cached other than for Equivalent Encrypted Resolvers under their control. How is that determined? There is no discussion around a non-forwarding resolver's behaviour. Should it return NODATA? Forwarding queries to URL will attempt to attach a client to an upstream resource's equivalent resolver. If that equivalent resolver's cert doesn't include the forwarder, the client must reject the answer. Is it not therefore the case that the forwarder caching behaviour is irrelevant? All valid responses to this query must be equivalent to the forwarder itself. When URL is present in a resolver configuration I would suggest some clarification wording something like this: The expectation is that this record set will detail equivalent resolvers. A client that chooses not to interact with any of these equivalent resolvers SHOULD continue to use the unencrypted resolver, honouring the SVCB TTL. When the SVCB TTL expires, the client may choose to re-query in an attempt to discover newly available equivalents. I would suggest (prefer?) changing the SUDN behaviour so that queries against it are never sent upstream. Resolvers (and forwarders) that do not have a configured URL RRset should return NODATA. This would mean that URL SUDN RRsets are always specific to the IP queried.
It may be good to model the advice after RFC8880, which defines URL
I am leaving this open so I can re-review the text after addressing other PRs; PR 14 addressed some of the points raised in this issue but not all of them.
Migrated from original DEER issue: URL
The text says This is not true of any reasonable forwarder. RRsets are atomic collections, and cannot be mixed from multiple sources. Doing so would entirely break DNSSEC, for example. Unless you know of a forwarder that exhibits this seriously broken behavior, I don't think it bears mentioning.
Addressed with PR 14
Typo, but this seems like a reasonable tweak. The description on list was a bit worrying regarding IP address, but this just says don't forward unless it is deliberate. And by deliberate, I mean that the forwarder knows it will work or that clients might not care. That seems ok.

Revised text:
6.1.  <ins> A DNS forwarder SHOULD NOT forward queries for "resolver.arpa" upstream.  This prevents a client from receiving an SVCB record that will fail to authenticate because the forwarder's IP address is not in the upstream resolver's Designated Resolver's TLS certificate SAN field.  A DNS forwarder which already acts as a completely blind forwarder MAY choose to forward these queries when the operator expects that this does not apply, either because the operator knows the upstream resolver does have the forwarder's IP address in its TLS certificate's SAN field or that the operator expects clients of the unencrypted resolver to use the SVCB information opportunistically. Operators who choose to forward queries for "resolver.arpa" upstream should note that client behavior is never guaranteed and use of DDR by a resolver does not communicate a requirement for clients to use the SVCB record when it cannot be authenticated. </ins> 6.2.