Original text:
during the lifetime of an ongoing DTLS session then the receiver will be unable to locate the correct security context.  1. The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) RFC6347 protocol was

Reviewer comments:
As suggested by Éric Vyncke, mention that the new ciphertext record format provides ContentType encryption and per-record padding in both abstract and introduction.
URL Update from Éric re: Section 6
About "-- Section 3 --, DTLS / zero-length CID" "An extension type MUST NOT appear in the ServerHello unless the same extension type appeared in the corresponding ClientHello." The "zero-length CID" therefore is mainly used for the very common cases, where only the clients are required to send such a CID, but not the server. Maybe adding a hint to RFC5246 7.4.1.4 will help?
About "-- Section 6 --" Yes, that's still very complex: First, processing the record seems to be easier (less restricted), than use a changed source address for sending data back. Using a changed source address for sending data back to, is not generally solved. There are some special case, e.g., if the data sent back is very small, there is no risk (at least, none has explained one). There may also be some upper-layer mechanisms, which helps out (e.g. for coap). And there is a idea of a general solution , but that will require more time. Because of the required time, the idea was to release this spec without RRC and postpone that general work (see also issue ).
also in the abstract ? Some initial attempt at this in
LGTM Éric Vyncke has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-11: No Objection When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to URL for more information about DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: URL COMMENT: Thank you for the work put into this document. This specification addresses the IPv4-mainly issue of NAT binding and is still required. I am also trusted the security ADs for section 5. Please find below some non-blocking COMMENT points (but replies would be appreciated), and some nits. I hope that this helps to improve the document, Regards, -éric == COMMENTS == -- Abstract -- As an important part of this document is the padding, should it be mentioned also in the abstract ? -- Section 3 -- While I am not a DTLS expert, I find this section quite difficult to understand the reasoning behind the specification as little explanations are given about, e.g, what is the motivation of "A zero-length value indicates that the server will send with the client's CID but does not wish the client to include a CID." -- Section 6 -- I am puzzled by the text: "There is a strategy for ensuring that the new peer address is able to receive and process DTLS records. No such strategy is defined in this specification." Does this mean that there is no way to update the peer IP address ? == NITS == -- Section 1 -- Please expand CID on first use outside of the abstract. -- Section 4 -- Suggest to add a short paragraph as a preamble to figure 3. Currently, it looks like figure 3 belongs to the 'zeros' field description.

Revised text:
during the lifetime of an ongoing DTLS session then the receiver will be unable to locate the correct security context. <ins> The new ciphertext record format with CID also provides content type encryption and record-layer padding. </ins> 1. The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) RFC6347 protocol was