Original text:
renders 5-tuple based filtering insufficient and requires more state to be maintained by DDoS defense systems.  For the common case of NAT rebinding, DDoS defense systems can detect a change in the client's <del> endpoint address by linking flows based on the first 8 bytes of the server's connection IDs, provided the server is using at least 8- bytes-long connection IDs.  QUIC's linkability resistance ensures that a deliberate connection migration is accompanied by a change in the connection ID and necessitates that connection ID-aware DDoS defense system must have the same information about connection IDs as the load balancer I-D.ietf-quic-load-balancers.  This may be complicated where mitigation and load balancing environments are logically separate. </del>  It is questionable whether connection migrations must be supported during a DDoS attack.  If the connection migration is not visible to

Reviewer comments:
Merged... with the neurons I have left on 22 December, this seems broadly true. I'm not sure we should be too prescriptive about load balancing in this doc, though -- in part because I suspect the challenge of handling DDoS attacks using QUIC traffic will lead to divergent innovation in the LB space in the near term...
So if the 5-tuple changes because of NAT, the connection ID might actually not change. So in case of DDoS you might want to look at the connection ID to at cover those cases. For DDoS you usually don't need a hard guarantee to track all flows (if you block a flow incorrectly, it has to reconnect), but where you can track the flow when the 5-tuple changes, it might actually help. That is what this paragraph is/was about.
"QUIC's linkability resistance ensures that a deliberate connection migration is accompanied by a change in the connection ID and necessitate that connection ID aware DDoS defense system must have the same information about connection IDs as the load balancer {{?I-D.ietf-quic-load-balancers}}. This may be complicated where mitigation and load balancing environments are logically separate." This is insufficient. Even the load balancer is only able to identify the end server, not the connection.
On a related note, the suggestion to use the "first 8 bytes" of a server's connection ID is somewhat strange. Why not observe the CIDL it's using in long headers, or just have common configuration?
How about if we just remove any wording about load balancers here? Like this maybe:
On the 8 bytes: I actually not sure where this comes from, however, I assume that the thinking was that using the first 8 bytes might be good enough to avoid collisions if you don't know the connection ID length. But I guess we can remove it or add some more explanation... any thoughts?
If you read the Retry Services section of QUIC-LB, you'll see that there is no dependence on the Connection ID encoding at all. It is a common format for Retry Tokens that allows servers to (at a minimum) extract the original CIDs necessary for verification. Certainly, no device should drop packets simply because the CID has changed, which is maybe what you're trying to say here? But I'm not sure that this is a DDoS thing.
The point is when a DDoS attack is on-going you want to make sure that on-going connections keep running while new connections are handled more carefully. So you have to be flow aware. However, maybe it's acceptable if connectivity breaks during a DDoS when the 5 tuple changes...? Otherwise you would need to be CID aware.
This PR removes the problems I cited in the issue. Ship it. I wonder if we should hit the point in the last sentence a little harder. If you want to support connection migration, there's nothing you can do in this space except the Retry Service stuff in QUIC-LB, is there?

Revised text:
renders 5-tuple based filtering insufficient and requires more state to be maintained by DDoS defense systems.  For the common case of NAT rebinding, DDoS defense systems can detect a change in the client's  <ins> endpoint address by linking flows based on the server's connection IDs.  QUIC's linkability resistance ensures that a deliberate connection migration is accompanied by a change in the connection ID. </ins> It is questionable whether connection migrations must be supported during a DDoS attack.  If the connection migration is not visible to