Original text:
The guidance provided by RFC7519 and RFC8725 applies.  8. 8.1.

Reviewer comments:
Add security consideration for replay attack prevention and add nonce as optional value for PoP JWT URL
Currently the specification does not define a mechanism for an AS contributed nonce to feature in the client attestation PoP meaning replay attack detection by authorisation servers requires tracking the JTI within the time window set by the PoP's iat claim. We should elaborate on an AS contributed nonce for the specification.
What about using the authorization code or pre auth code as suggested in our demo?
I think this is an option, however the nonce for client authentication becomes dependent on the grant type which creates a bit of an awkward coupling when an application wants to say use this mode of client authentication for grant type other than pre auth code or authorisation code.
How many implemantations out there actually use different grant types than auth-code? Given that this serves our purposes and imo everybody is using auth-code, I think that we should RECOMMEND that scenario but I#m ok with showing up alternatives as you suggested. NAME What's your opinion on this?
I think the flow can be used with and without nonce. If it is used without nonce, jti and short expiration must be used to limit the risk. If a nonce is used, I think using the codes is a pragmatic option. Alternatively, the AS could provide a dedicated nonce with the credential offer or authorization response. It could also provide the nonce with a token error response.
discussion on 23.05 is leaning towards DpoP-style error providing nonce
can we please bring this issue forward, it is very important? I see some advantages in that approach as it would allow the AS to request nonce use for all endpoints (including PAR).
on that topic, I would suggest such an AS provided nonce should be good up until the AS says otherwise. That would allow a client to use the same nonce for PAR and token endpoint.
Update provided in
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Revised text:
The guidance provided by RFC7519 and RFC8725 applies. <ins> 7.1. The following mechanisms exist within this client authentication method in order to allow an authorization server to detect replay attacks for presented client attestation PoPs: The client uses "jti" (JWT ID) claims for the Client Attestation PoP JWT and the authorization server maintains a list of used (seen) "jti" values for the time of which the JWT would be considered valid based on the applicable "exp" claim.  If any Client Attestation PoP JWT would be replayed, the authorization server would recognize the "jti" and respond with an authentication error. The authorization server provides a nonce for the particular transaction and the client uses it for the "nonce" claim in the Client Attestation PoP JWT.  The authorization server validates that the nonce matches for the transaction.  This approach may require an additional roundtrip in the protocol.  The authorization server MUST ensure that the nonce provides sufficient entropy. The authorization server may expect the usage of a nonce in the Client Attestation PoP JWT, but instead of providing the nonce explicitly, the client may implicitly reuse an existing artefact, e.g. the authorization code.  The authorization server MUST ensure that the nonce provides sufficient entropy. The approach using a nonce explicitly provided by the authorization server gives stronger replay attack detection guarantees, however support by the authorization server is OPTIONAL to simplify mandatory implementation requirements.  The "jti" method is mandatory and hence acts as a default fallback. </ins> 8. 8.1.