jiebi/TextFlow huggingface dataset:
Original text:
with an algorithm such as HMAC or an AEAD algorithm. The PublicMessage and PrivateMessage formats are defined in message- <del> framing; they represent integrity-protected and confidentiality- protected messages, respectively.  Security notions such as forward secrecy and post-compromise security are defined in security- considerations. </del>  2.1.

Reviewer comments:
URL This definition of a handshake message is being defined in terms of a Proposal or Commit object, neither of which are defined in this session. Furthermore, PublicMessage or PrivateMessage aren’t defined either as this point in the text. To improve clarity, consider defining these key terms. The use of "respectively" in the text is suggesting that PrivateMessages don’t have integrity protection which is not accurate. (see the Cryptographic Dependencies section of the HPKE specification for more information). Is this Section 4 of RFC9180?  If so, why not say that? What would be the circumstance where the application_id extension would be treated with equal standing as something from the AS?  Why can’t this be a "MUST"? Unsaid is what to do if the proposal list is not valid.  Please clarify. Is this normative behavior required, or could it be left up to application?  The mixing of updates/removes on the same node and the SHOULD guidance already means that this "recovery from an invalid node" may not be consistent across clients/DS-es. Same observation on recovering from ReInit with any other proposals. Is there any additional retry mechanism?  Let’s say the sender of the proposal doesn’t see it reflect in the epoch after it sent proposal.  And then not in the next epoch.  Does it try resending indefinitely? This setup seems a little simplistic. If the application data is encrypted to begin with, how does the adversary know the question being posed by Alice?

Revised text:
with an algorithm such as HMAC or an AEAD algorithm. The PublicMessage and PrivateMessage formats are defined in message-  <ins> framing.  Security notions such as forward secrecy and post- compromise security are defined in security-considerations. </ins> 2.1.
Original text:
5.1.1. HPKE public keys are opaque values in a format defined by the <del> underlying protocol (see the Cryptographic Dependencies section of the HPKE specification for more information). </del>  Signature public keys are likewise represented as opaque values in a format defined by the ciphersuite's signature scheme.

Reviewer comments:
URL This definition of a handshake message is being defined in terms of a Proposal or Commit object, neither of which are defined in this session. Furthermore, PublicMessage or PrivateMessage aren’t defined either as this point in the text. To improve clarity, consider defining these key terms. The use of "respectively" in the text is suggesting that PrivateMessages don’t have integrity protection which is not accurate. (see the Cryptographic Dependencies section of the HPKE specification for more information). Is this Section 4 of RFC9180?  If so, why not say that? What would be the circumstance where the application_id extension would be treated with equal standing as something from the AS?  Why can’t this be a "MUST"? Unsaid is what to do if the proposal list is not valid.  Please clarify. Is this normative behavior required, or could it be left up to application?  The mixing of updates/removes on the same node and the SHOULD guidance already means that this "recovery from an invalid node" may not be consistent across clients/DS-es. Same observation on recovering from ReInit with any other proposals. Is there any additional retry mechanism?  Let’s say the sender of the proposal doesn’t see it reflect in the epoch after it sent proposal.  And then not in the next epoch.  Does it try resending indefinitely? This setup seems a little simplistic. If the application data is encrypted to begin with, how does the adversary know the question being posed by Alice?

Revised text:
5.1.1. HPKE public keys are opaque values in a format defined by the  <ins> underlying protocol (see Section 4 of RFC9180 for more information). </ins> Signature public keys are likewise represented as opaque values in a format defined by the ciphersuite's signature scheme.
Original text:
the "extensions" field of a LeafNode object with the "application_id" extension. <del> However, applications SHOULD NOT rely on the data in an </del>  "application_id" extension as if it were authenticated by the Authentication Service, and SHOULD gracefully handle cases where the identifier presented is not unique.

Reviewer comments:
URL This definition of a handshake message is being defined in terms of a Proposal or Commit object, neither of which are defined in this session. Furthermore, PublicMessage or PrivateMessage aren’t defined either as this point in the text. To improve clarity, consider defining these key terms. The use of "respectively" in the text is suggesting that PrivateMessages don’t have integrity protection which is not accurate. (see the Cryptographic Dependencies section of the HPKE specification for more information). Is this Section 4 of RFC9180?  If so, why not say that? What would be the circumstance where the application_id extension would be treated with equal standing as something from the AS?  Why can’t this be a "MUST"? Unsaid is what to do if the proposal list is not valid.  Please clarify. Is this normative behavior required, or could it be left up to application?  The mixing of updates/removes on the same node and the SHOULD guidance already means that this "recovery from an invalid node" may not be consistent across clients/DS-es. Same observation on recovering from ReInit with any other proposals. Is there any additional retry mechanism?  Let’s say the sender of the proposal doesn’t see it reflect in the epoch after it sent proposal.  And then not in the next epoch.  Does it try resending indefinitely? This setup seems a little simplistic. If the application data is encrypted to begin with, how does the adversary know the question being posed by Alice?

Revised text:
the "extensions" field of a LeafNode object with the "application_id" extension.  <ins> However, applications MUST NOT rely on the data in an </ins> "application_id" extension as if it were authenticated by the Authentication Service, and SHOULD gracefully handle cases where the identifier presented is not unique.
Original text:
12.2. A group member creating a commit and a group member processing a <del> commit MUST verify that the list of committed proposals is valid </del>  using one of the following procedures, depending on whether the <del> commit is external or not. </del>  For a regular, i.e. not external, commit the list is invalid if any of the following occurs:

Reviewer comments:
URL This definition of a handshake message is being defined in terms of a Proposal or Commit object, neither of which are defined in this session. Furthermore, PublicMessage or PrivateMessage aren’t defined either as this point in the text. To improve clarity, consider defining these key terms. The use of "respectively" in the text is suggesting that PrivateMessages don’t have integrity protection which is not accurate. (see the Cryptographic Dependencies section of the HPKE specification for more information). Is this Section 4 of RFC9180?  If so, why not say that? What would be the circumstance where the application_id extension would be treated with equal standing as something from the AS?  Why can’t this be a "MUST"? Unsaid is what to do if the proposal list is not valid.  Please clarify. Is this normative behavior required, or could it be left up to application?  The mixing of updates/removes on the same node and the SHOULD guidance already means that this "recovery from an invalid node" may not be consistent across clients/DS-es. Same observation on recovering from ReInit with any other proposals. Is there any additional retry mechanism?  Let’s say the sender of the proposal doesn’t see it reflect in the epoch after it sent proposal.  And then not in the next epoch.  Does it try resending indefinitely? This setup seems a little simplistic. If the application data is encrypted to begin with, how does the adversary know the question being posed by Alice?

Revised text:
12.2. A group member creating a commit and a group member processing a  <ins> Commit MUST verify that the list of committed proposals is valid </ins> using one of the following procedures, depending on whether the  <ins> commit is external or not.  If the list of proposals is invalid, then the Commit message MUST be rejected as invalid. </ins> For a regular, i.e. not external, commit the list is invalid if any of the following occurs:
Original text:
For example, assuming the IV value is "6b26114b9cba2b63a9e8dd4f", the connection ID sequence number is "3", and the packet number is <del> "aead", the nonce will be set to "6b2611489cba2b63a9a873e2". </del>  6.3.2.

Reviewer comments:
The draft states that Shouldn't be the result 6b2611489cba2b63a9e873e2 instead of 6b2611489cba2b63a9a873e2?
Yes, I submitted PR for this issue.

Revised text:
For example, assuming the IV value is "6b26114b9cba2b63a9e8dd4f", the connection ID sequence number is "3", and the packet number is  <ins> "aead", the nonce will be set to "6b2611489cba2b63a9e873e2". </ins> 6.3.2.
Original text:
Path Identifier (Path ID): An identifier that is used to identify a path in a QUIC connection at an endpoint.  Path Identifier is <del> used in multipath control frames (etc.  PATH_ABANDON frame) to identify a path.  The Path ID is defined as the sequence number of the destination Connection ID used for sending packets on that particular path. Packet Number Space Identifier (PNS ID): An identifier that is used to distinguish packet number spaces for different paths.  It is used in 1-RTT packets and ACK_MP frames.  Each node maintains a list of "Received Packets" for each of the CID that it provided to the peer, which is used for acknowledging packets received with that CID. The difference between Path Identifier and Packet Number Space Identifier, is that the Path Identifier is used in multipath control frames to identify a path, and the Packet Number Space Identifier is used in 1-RTT packets and ACK_MP frames to distinguish packet number spaces for different paths.  Both identifiers have the same value, which is the sequence number of the connection ID, when a new path is established. The initial path that is used during the handshake (and multipath negotiation) has the path ID 0 and therefore all 0-RTT packets are also tracked and processed with the path ID 0.  For 1-RTT packets, the path ID is the sequence number of the Destination Connection ID present in the packet header, as defined in Section 5.1.1 of QUIC- TRANSPORT. </del>  2.

Reviewer comments:
From PR from NAME
Let's do another editorial pass and evtl. some re-org first and then address this issue. I think we all already agreed that we only need one of the two. So we only need to decide with name we keep.
I prefer to use the name "Path ID", as it is more intuitive in the context of multipath.
The conflict was solved. LGTM.Sounds good.

Revised text:
Path Identifier (Path ID): An identifier that is used to identify a path in a QUIC connection at an endpoint.  Path Identifier is  <ins> used in multipath control frames (e.g., PATH_ABANDON frame) to identify a path.  The initial path that is used during the handshake (and multipath negotiation) has the path ID 0 and therefore all 0-RTT packets are also tracked and processed with the path ID 0.  For 1-RTT packets, the path ID is the sequence number of the Destination Connection ID present in the packet header, as defined in Section 5.1.1 of QUIC-TRANSPORT that is used for sending packets on that particular path. </ins> 2.
Original text:
Associated Destination Connection ID: The Connection ID used to send packets over the path. <del> If multiple packet number spaces are used over the connection, hosts MUST also track the following information. </del>  <del> Path Packet Number Space: The endpoint maintains a separate packet number for sending and receiving packets over this path.  Packet number considerations described in QUIC-TRANSPORT apply within the given path. </del>  In the "Active" state, hosts MUST also track the following information.

Reviewer comments:
From PR from NAME
Let's do another editorial pass and evtl. some re-org first and then address this issue. I think we all already agreed that we only need one of the two. So we only need to decide with name we keep.
I prefer to use the name "Path ID", as it is more intuitive in the context of multipath.
The conflict was solved. LGTM.Sounds good.

Revised text:
Associated Destination Connection ID: The Connection ID used to send packets over the path.  <ins> In Active state, hosts MUST also track the following information: </ins>  <ins> Path ID: The endpoint maintains a separate packet number space for sending and receiving packets over this path which is identified by the path ID.  Packet number considerations as described in Section 12.3 of QUIC-TRANSPORT apply within the given path. </ins> In the "Active" state, hosts MUST also track the following information.
Original text:
The ACK_MP frame, as specified in ack-mp-frame, is used to acknowledge 1-RTT packets.  Compared to the QUIC version 1 ACK frame, <del> the ACK_MP frames additionally contains a Packet Number Space Identifier (PN Space ID).  The PN Space ID used to distinguish packet number spaces for different paths and is simply derived from the sequence number of Destination Connection ID.  Therefore, the packet number space for 1-RTT packets can be identified based on the Destination Connection ID in each packet. </del>  Acknowledgements of Initial and Handshake packets MUST be carried using ACK frames, as specified in QUIC-TRANSPORT.  The ACK frames, as

Reviewer comments:
From PR from NAME
Let's do another editorial pass and evtl. some re-org first and then address this issue. I think we all already agreed that we only need one of the two. So we only need to decide with name we keep.
I prefer to use the name "Path ID", as it is more intuitive in the context of multipath.
The conflict was solved. LGTM.Sounds good.

Revised text:
The ACK_MP frame, as specified in ack-mp-frame, is used to acknowledge 1-RTT packets.  Compared to the QUIC version 1 ACK frame,  <ins> the ACK_MP frame additionally contains a Path ID.  The Path ID is used to distinguish packet number spaces for different paths and is simply derived from the sequence number of Destination Connection ID. Therefore, the Path ID for 1-RTT packets can be identified based on the Destination Connection ID in each packet. </ins> Acknowledgements of Initial and Handshake packets MUST be carried using ACK frames, as specified in QUIC-TRANSPORT.  The ACK frames, as
Original text:
Section 5.3 of QUIC-TLS specifies AEAD usage, and in particular the use of a nonce, N, formed by combining the packet protection IV with <del> the packet number.  If multiple packet number spaces are used, the </del>  packet number alone would not guarantee the uniqueness of the nonce. In order to guarantee the uniqueness of the nonce, the nonce N is calculated by combining the packet protection IV with the packet number and with the path identifier. <del> The path ID for 1-RTT packets is the sequence number of the </del>  Connection ID as specified in QUIC-TRANSPORT.  Section 19 of QUIC- TRANSPORT encodes the Connection ID Sequence Number as a variable- length integer, allowing values up to 2^62-1; in this specification,

Reviewer comments:
From PR from NAME
Let's do another editorial pass and evtl. some re-org first and then address this issue. I think we all already agreed that we only need one of the two. So we only need to decide with name we keep.
I prefer to use the name "Path ID", as it is more intuitive in the context of multipath.
The conflict was solved. LGTM.Sounds good.

Revised text:
Section 5.3 of QUIC-TLS specifies AEAD usage, and in particular the use of a nonce, N, formed by combining the packet protection IV with  <ins> the packet number.  When multiple packet number spaces are used, the </ins> packet number alone would not guarantee the uniqueness of the nonce. In order to guarantee the uniqueness of the nonce, the nonce N is calculated by combining the packet protection IV with the packet number and with the path identifier.  <ins> The Path ID for 1-RTT packets is the sequence number of the </ins> Connection ID as specified in QUIC-TRANSPORT.  Section 19 of QUIC- TRANSPORT encodes the Connection ID Sequence Number as a variable- length integer, allowing values up to 2^62-1; in this specification,
Original text:
nonce. For example, assuming the IV value is "6b26114b9cba2b63a9e8dd4f", the <del> connection ID sequence number is "3", and the packet number is </del>  "aead", the nonce will be set to "6b2611489cba2b63a9e873e2". 5.3.

Reviewer comments:
From PR from NAME
Let's do another editorial pass and evtl. some re-org first and then address this issue. I think we all already agreed that we only need one of the two. So we only need to decide with name we keep.
I prefer to use the name "Path ID", as it is more intuitive in the context of multipath.
The conflict was solved. LGTM.Sounds good.

Revised text:
nonce. For example, assuming the IV value is "6b26114b9cba2b63a9e8dd4f", the  <ins> Connection ID Sequence Number is "3", and the packet number is </ins> "aead", the nonce will be set to "6b2611489cba2b63a9e873e2". 5.3.
Original text:
If the client has used all the allocated CID, it is supposed to retire those that are not used anymore, and the server is supposed to provide replacements, as specified in QUIC-TRANSPORT.  Usually, it is <del> desired to provide one more connection ID as currently in use, to </del>  allow for new paths or migration. 6.2.

Reviewer comments:
From PR from NAME
Let's do another editorial pass and evtl. some re-org first and then address this issue. I think we all already agreed that we only need one of the two. So we only need to decide with name we keep.
I prefer to use the name "Path ID", as it is more intuitive in the context of multipath.
The conflict was solved. LGTM.Sounds good.

Revised text:
If the client has used all the allocated CID, it is supposed to retire those that are not used anymore, and the server is supposed to provide replacements, as specified in QUIC-TRANSPORT.  Usually, it is  <ins> desired to provide one more Connection ID as currently in use, to </ins> allow for new paths or migration. 6.2.
Original text:
PATH_ABANDON frame is considered lost, the peer SHOULD repeat it. PATH_ABANDON frames MAY be sent on any path, not only the path <del> identified by the Packet Number Space Identifier. </del>  8.2.

Reviewer comments:
From PR from NAME
Let's do another editorial pass and evtl. some re-org first and then address this issue. I think we all already agreed that we only need one of the two. So we only need to decide with name we keep.
I prefer to use the name "Path ID", as it is more intuitive in the context of multipath.
The conflict was solved. LGTM.Sounds good.

Revised text:
PATH_ABANDON frame is considered lost, the peer SHOULD repeat it. PATH_ABANDON frames MAY be sent on any path, not only the path  <ins> identified by the Path Identifier. </ins> 8.2.
Original text:
The ACK_MP frame (types TBD-00 and TBD-01; experiments use 0xbaba00..0xbaba01) is an extension of the ACK frame defined by QUIC- TRANSPORT.  It is used to acknowledge packets that were sent on <del> different paths when using multiple packet number spaces.  If the frame type is TBD-01, ACK_MP frames also contain the sum of QUIC packets with associated ECN marks received on the connection up to this point. </del>  ACK_MP frame is formatted as shown in fig-ack-mp-format. Compared to the ACK frame specified in QUIC-TRANSPORT, the following field is added. <del> The identifier of the path packet number space of the 1-RTT packets which are acknowledged by the ACK_MP frame. If an endpoint receives an ACK_MP frame with a packet number space ID which was never issued by endpoints (i.e., with a sequence number larger than the largest one advertised), it MUST treat this as a connection error of type MP_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION and close the connection.  If an endpoint receives an ACK_MP frame with a packet number space ID which is no more active (e.g., retired by a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame or belonging to closed paths), it MUST ignore the ACK_MP frame without causing a connection error. </del>  9.

Reviewer comments:
From PR from NAME
Let's do another editorial pass and evtl. some re-org first and then address this issue. I think we all already agreed that we only need one of the two. So we only need to decide with name we keep.
I prefer to use the name "Path ID", as it is more intuitive in the context of multipath.
The conflict was solved. LGTM.Sounds good.

Revised text:
The ACK_MP frame (types TBD-00 and TBD-01; experiments use 0xbaba00..0xbaba01) is an extension of the ACK frame defined by QUIC- TRANSPORT.  It is used to acknowledge packets that were sent on  <ins> different paths using multiple packet number spaces.  If the frame type is TBD-01, ACK_MP frames also contain the sum of QUIC packets with associated ECN marks received on the connection up to this point. </ins> ACK_MP frame is formatted as shown in fig-ack-mp-format. Compared to the ACK frame specified in QUIC-TRANSPORT, the following field is added.  <ins> The identifier of the path to identify the packet number space of the 1-RTT packets which are acknowledged by the ACK_MP frame. If an endpoint receives an ACK_MP frame with a Path ID which was never issued by endpoints (i.e., with a sequence number larger than the largest one advertised), it MUST treat this as a connection error of type MP_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION and close the connection.  If an endpoint receives an ACK_MP frame with a Path ID which is no more active (e.g., retired by a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame or belonging to closed paths), it MUST ignore the ACK_MP frame without causing a connection error. </ins> 9.
Original text:
7.2.1. <del> Packet protection for QUIC version 1 is specified is Section 5 of </del>  QUIC-TLS.  The general principles of packet protection are not changed for QUIC Multipath.  No changes are needed for setting packet protection keys, initial secrets, header protection, use of 0-RTT

Reviewer comments:
Each line is limited to 72 characters.
I verified that this PR produces the draft that we expect. I did one small change: remove spaces at the end of lines.
There are many isntances in the markdown source where a whole paragraph is entered in a single line of text. This makes the reviewing harder, and messes up the "what changed" view when reviewing PRs.
Just to be on the same page, how should we format the text? I see two possible ways. Hard-constraint the number of characters per line to a given limit (e.g., 80) Make one sentence = one line I have a slight preference for option 2, but I can of course live with the other or a mix of both.
I would prefer something like 72 characters, because the last 8 positions are used for numbering the cards in your deck.

Revised text:
7.2.1.  <ins> Packet protection for QUIC version 1 is specified in Section 5 of </ins> QUIC-TLS.  The general principles of packet protection are not changed for QUIC Multipath.  No changes are needed for setting packet protection keys, initial secrets, header protection, use of 0-RTT