Original text:
reveal previous message or root keys.  Post-compromise security is provided by Commit operations, in which a new root key is generated from the latest ratcheting tree.  If the adversary cannot derive the <del> updated root key after an Commit operation, it cannot compute any </del>  derived secrets. In the case where the client could have been compromised (device

Reviewer comments:
The credentials we have defined at the moment only contain a single public key and no information regarding what signature scheme that keypair works with (even though the Spec actually says it should include the signature scheme as well). It would be nice, however, to support potential CredentialTypes that, similar to KeyPackages, include multiple supported signature schemes, each accompanied by a corresponding public key. The Key that should be used in any given group is then determined by the CipherSuite of the group (which includes a Signature Scheme). When choosing a KeyPackage of a new member, it has to be one that contains a Credential which supports that Signature Scheme. Note, that I'm not suggesting that this be the case in all Credentials, or even that we change the BasicCredential. I understand that it's possible to have multiple credentials per identity, but in some authentication settings it can be beneficial to have a 1-to-1 mapping between Credential and identity.
KeyPackages don't support multiple signature schemes? In what scenario is it beneficial?
Ah, right. I think that was the case in the past, but you're right, they don't. Of course it's always possible to just bundle a bunch of certificates, each supporting a different signature scheme and then treat that as your "Multi-Scheme Credential" in the grand scheme of things. However, if you end up rotating them a lot, where you have to sign them and potentially store the whole chain for a longer period of time, being able to support multiple signature schemes in only one credential means less overhead.
Credentials are stored in each group's ratchet tree though, so you're keeping a bunch of unnecessary key material in the group's tree which everyone has to store
That's fair. And it's not something you have to do if you don't want to. I'm just proposing for MLS to support that type of Credential in general.
To support hybrid PQ/standard schemes at any point in the future, allowing for multiple schemes is reasonable (in addition to the above arguments for it). Most applications probably will not use the feature, especially to start with, but providing support for just the option is not going to cause any of the problems noted.
PQ schemes can be used by switching the entire group to a new ciphersuite using those schemes. Requiring everybody in the group to store a bunch of unused key material isn't reasonable
The statement was not about PQ, but hybrid PQ/standard schemes. Those require use to two signature schemes, for which both types of keying material are used.
Then you need a ciphersuite that specifies a hybrid scheme.
It would be ideal to have a ciphersuite specifying a single hybrid scheme, but even that does not imply use of a single credential, unfortunately. In fact, hybrid schemes may rely on two separate credentials, with the ciphersuite specifying the hybrid algorithm for combining them. Since the "main" method of building a solo hybrid credential is under patent, there is also additional motivation for applications to use two.
I concur with Brendan here. To be consistent with our earlier decisions to (a) keep KeyPackages to one ciphersuite and (b) include the signature algorithm in the ciphersuite, we should keep credentials to one signature algorithm as well. Propose closing this PR without merging.
Discussed at 2020-10-06 interim, TODO: Re-add SignatureScheme enum, re-using the TLS signature schemes Clarify that the main job of a Credential is to provide a public key for verifying messages How it provides the credential might be different per credential type e.g., in BasicCredential, it's provided directly, X509Credential, have to parse the leaf certificate
LGTM with a couple nits.

Revised text:
reveal previous message or root keys.  Post-compromise security is provided by Commit operations, in which a new root key is generated from the latest ratcheting tree.  If the adversary cannot derive the  <ins> updated root key after a Commit operation, it cannot compute any </ins> derived secrets. In the case where the client could have been compromised (device