Original text:
3.  This section aims to improve understanding by describing a possible workflow of solutions adhering to the architecture. <del> 3.1. </del>  This section describes a possible work-flow when User Equipment initially joins a Captive Network.

Reviewer comments:
We need to discuss what information will be used to identify the UE from the perspective of the various components in the system. This updates the draft to discuss this concept, including desired properties of the identifier and some examples. This aims to address issue 5 (URL)

Revised text:
3. <ins> Multiple components in the architecture interact with both the User Equipment and each other.  Since the User Equipment is the focus of these interactions, the components must be able to both identify the user equipment from their interactions with it, and be able to agree on the identify of the user equipment when interacting with each other. The methods by which the components interact restrict the type of information that may be used as an identifying charactertics.  This section discusses the identifying charactersitics. 3.1. An Identifier is a chatacteristic of the User Equipment used by the components of a Captive Portal to uniquely determine which specific User Equipment is interacting with them.  An Identifier MAY be a field contained in packets sent by the User Equipment to the External Network.  Or, an Identifier MAY be an ephemeral property not contained in packets destined for the External Network, but instead correlated with such information through knowledge available to the different components. 3.2. The set of possible identifiers is quite large.  However, in order to be considered a good identifer, an identifier SHOULD meet the following criteria.  Note that the optimal identifier will likely change depending on the positino of the components in the network as well as the information available to them.  An identifier SHOULD: Uniquely Identify the User Equipment Be Hard to Spoof Be Visible to the API Be Visible to the Enforcement Device 3.2.1. In order to uniquely identify the User Equipment, at most one user equipment interacting with the other components of the Captive Portal MUST have a given value of the identifier. Over time, the user equipment identified by the value MAY change. Allowing the identified device to change over time ensures that the space of possible identifying vallues need not be overly large. Independent Captive Portals MAY use the same identifying value to identify different User Equipment.  Allowing indendent captive portals to reuse identifying values allows the identifier to be a property of the local network, expanding the space of possible identifiers. 3.2.2. A good identifier does not lend itself to being easily spoofed.  At no time should it be simple or straightforward for one User Equipment to pretend to be another User Equipment, regardless of whether both are active at the same time.  This property is particularly important when the user equipment is extended externally to devices such as billing systems, or where the identity of the User Equipment could imply liability. 3.2.3. Since the API will need to perform operations which rely on the identify of the user equipment, such as query whether it is captive, the API needs to be able to relate requests to the User Equipment making the request. 3.2.4. The Enforcement Device will decide on a per packet basis whether it should be permitted to communicate with the external network.  Since this decision depends on which User Equipment sent the packet, the Enforcement Device requires that it be able to map the packet to its concept of the User Equipment. 3.3. To evaluate whether an identifer is appropriate, one should consider every recommended property from the perspective of interactions among the components in the architecture.  When comparing identifiers, choose the one which best satifies all of the recommended properties. The architecture does not provide an exact measure of how well an identifier satisfies a given property; care should be taken in performing the evaluation. 3.4. This section provides some examples of identifiers, along with some evaluation of whether they are good identifiers.  The list of identifiers is not exhaustive.  Other identifiers may be used.  An important point to note is that whether the identifiers are good depends heavily on the capabilities of the components and where in the network the components exist. 3.4.1. The physical interface by which the User Equipment is attached to the network can be used to identify the User Equipment.  This identifier has the property of being extremely difficult to spoof: the User Equipment is unaware of the property; one User Equipment cannot manipulate its interactions to appear as though it is another. Further, if only a single User Equipment is attatched to a given physical interface, then the identifier will be unique.  If multiple User Equipment is attached to the network on the same physical interface, then this property is not appropriate. Another consideration related to uniqueness of the User Equipment is that if the attached User Equipment changes, both the API server and the Enforcement Device must invalidate their state related to the User Equipment. The Enforcement Device needs to be aware of the physical interface, which constrains the environment: it must either be part of the device providing physical access (e.g., implemented in firmware), or packets traversing the network must be extended to include information about the source physical interface (e.g.  a tunnel). The API server faces a similar problem, implying that it should co- exist with the Enforcement Device, or that the enforcement device should extend requests to it with the identifying information. 3.4.2. A natural identifier to consider is the IP address of the User Equipment.  At any given time, no device on the network can have the same IP address without causing the network to malfunction, so it is appropriate from the perspective of uniqueness. However, it may be possible to spoof the IP address, particularly for malicious reasons where proper functioning of the network is not necessary for the malicious actor.  Consequently, any solution using the IP address should proactively try to prevent spoofing of the IP address.  Similarily, if the mapping of IP address to User Equipment is changed, the components of the architecture must remove or update their mapping to prevent spoofing.  Demonstrations of return routeability, such as that required for TCP connection establishment, might be sufficient defense against spoofing, though this might not be sufficient in networks that use broadcast media (such as some wireless networks). Since the IP address may traverse multiple segments of the network, more flexibility is afforded to the Enforcement Device and the API server: they simply must exist on a segment of the network where the IP address is still unique.  However, consider that a NAT may be deployed between the User Equipment and the Enforcement Device.  In such cases, it is possible for the components to still uniquely identify the device if they are aware of the port mapping. In some situtations, the User Equipment may have multiple IP addresses, while still satisfying all of the recommended properties. This raises some challenges to the components of the network.  For example, if the user equipment tries to access the network with multiple IP addresses, should the enforcement device and API server treat each IP address as a unique User Equipment, or should it tie the multiple addresses together into one view of the subscriber?  An implementation MAY do either.  Attention should be paid to IPv6 and the fact that it is expected for a device to have multiple IPv6 addresses on a single link.  In such cases, idenfication could be performed by subnet, such as the /64 to which the IP belongs. 4. </ins> This section aims to improve understanding by describing a possible workflow of solutions adhering to the architecture.  <ins> 4.1. </ins> This section describes a possible work-flow when User Equipment initially joins a Captive Network.