Original text:
Authorization Data" under the new group name "Ephemeral Diffie- Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)".  The registration procedure is "Specification Required".  The columns of the registry are Label, <del> Message, Description, and Reference, where Label is an integer and the other columns are text strings. </del>  9.6.

Reviewer comments:
Addressing
Issue needed.
Should we allow or forbid that eadlabel = k and eadlabel = -k correspond to different ead-values? For example, if an (eadlabel, eadvalue) is always critical: Say, eadvalue is an ACE Access Token with eadlabel = -4, always critical. Then we can either: forbid the use of eadlabel = 4 altogether, or allocate an always non-critical EAD to eadlabel = 4, say, eadvalue is "service indication" as in In case 1 we will have some "holes" in the register. One positive integer blocked for each always critical (eadlabel, eadvalue) , one negative blocked for each always non-critical (eadlabel, eadvalue), and 0 cannot be used. (It is not clear to me that there are many always non-critical, but always critical is probably common.) In case 2, we could still have the registration policy that: if an EAD can be either critical or non-critical then two eadlabel with same absolute value should be reserved for it. What is the main risk with case 2? If someone misunderstands or by accident changes sign on an always /non-/critical EAD this results most likely in an error due to wrong eadvalue (like in the example above), but potentially in an unintended EAD message. (Another registration policy could be that the eadvalues corresponding to ead_labels k and -k should have incompatible CDDL so the error is discovered ...) The EAD specification needs anyway to specify what are the processing rules and if you violate those more or less anything could happen. Comments?
BTW, we may want a term for the ordered pair (eadlabel, eadvalue). The term "EAD" or "EAD field" is referring to the message field, which may consist of multiple (eadlabel, eadvalue).
Just seems like overoptimization to me. I would prefer if we follow the model that we agreed on for C509 which is similar to what CoAP Options is using. If you think it is important to use the complete code point space I think it would be better not assign any functionality to the minus sign and register critical and non-critical idenpendently. The original proposal seems to give two different meanings to the minus sign. The minus value is either a criticallity toggle or a completly different EAD.
Introducing the term "EAD item" for (eadlabel, eadvalue)
Edit: Let's include the main points of this PR in -15 as a input to the design team meeting.
I made a proposal. The text now include the concepts "EAD item" and "critical"/"non-critical" EAD item. There is also more details about how applications makes use of EAD: each application registers its own eadlabels eadlabel is a positive integer associated to a particular eadvalue if the application transports different eadvalues then multiple eadlabels need to be registered the application specifies how EAD items are transported in EDHOC messages, a particular EAD item may be transported in multiple messages (i.e. different EADx). I'll merge this into -15 and look forward to comments!
There is a new PR suggesting this. There is no background discussion in the PR . There would be good with some use case. The definition of what critical need and how the recipient handles critical would need a lot of discussion and fine-tuning.The handling of critical extensions in C.509 is to my understanding confusing and problematic. Both in the specification and in implementations.
Please see for background discussion and use cases.
Seems very unclear that the current PR can be the basis for a ECH type mechanism. PR should motivate why it is the basis for an ECH type mechanism or we should have some discussion regarding use cases for a general critical non-critical EAD mechanism. I do not see that follow from .
Having critical/non-critical EAD seems like a reasonable thing in its own, but it is not clear to me that it is a step on the way to a ECH mechanism in EDHOC.
Should we add another column in IANA register? Type: always critical / always non-critical / application determines criticality
If we define such a Type, the following text can be removed from specification and replaced by IANA consideration: "A specification registring a new EAD label MUST describe if the EAD item is always critical, always non-critical, or if it can be decided by the application in the sending endpoint."
I merged which addresses some points raised in this issue. Please review and comment if there is anything missing. The consequences of EDHOC processing of critical / non-critical EAD items is described, but how the security application makes use of this property is left to the associated specification. (In particular, no registration of criticality in the IANA register.)
This is motivated by two considerations, the concerns for clients selecting a hidden service in a protected way (pinging NAME do you have a pointer to your hackathon project), and TLS's encrypted Client Hello (superseding eSNI, encrypted server name indication). The rough situation for either case is that a client has some out-of-band information about the server that includes a public key for encryption (even if the encryption key on its own may be insufficient to authenticate the server). As a straw man proposal (mainly as scaffolding for the "how to enable it" steps later), consider the following: (I bet that reading the will give valuable input for making this complete). To ensure that responders (who are, in their identity selection, the more exposed side) can't be probed for their support of encrypted EAD, encrypted EAD should be marked as "elective" in the sense that a server may ignore it if it does not support it. (It'd still become part of the transcript). If a server receives an EAD it can not decrypt (or which, after decryption, contains nothing valid, eg. because the wrong GE was used), it needs to just continue and pick the CREDR / IDCREDR it would always have picked. AIU we do not yet distinguish between EAD that are elective and those that are critical. I do not know whether we'll even have any "critical" ones (as the peer's lack of action on them should be enough indication that they were unsupported), but if we do distinguish (eg. along the positive/negative number line), encrypted EAD should be optional. This has the upside that initiators that can spare the few bytes can always include some random bytes in the encrypted EAD, and thus ensure that actual users of encrypted EAD do not stand out (or that connections with encrypted EAD would be blocked). It should be a design goal of encrypted EAD that any use of EAD can always be plausibly claimed to just be random bytes added because the specification says one should do that ever now and then. For a practical example, a vulnerable service (say, anything civil rights related) might be operated at the same IP address as a more wide-spread service (say, a large public LwM2M provider). The civil rights service would publish its address together with the public key GE and its service name in DNS records similar to . A client contacting it would start an EDHOC exchange with the public address and encrypt the service name with GEX in the EAD1. The server would respond with credentials for the civil rights service, to which the client then may either present an anonymous (CCS) identity, or (now that it knows it's speaking to the right peer) its own CREDI / IDCREDI. If the CRED sizes are always the same, this exchange should be indistinguishable from an exchange done between an LwM2M client and the LwM2M backend when the client has chosen to send some more garbage bytes. (For application such as eighthalve's, it should be noted that there is probably no need for any further proof of identity inside the EAD1 plaintext: Possession of GE in combination with the suitable plaintext should suffice to open the present alternative server credentials, any secret whose possession is proven in the plaintext part would be exactly as secret as GE, as no attacker without E can obtain the plaintext.). To condense this all into a few actionable points: We should have a code point in eadlabel for "encrypted EAD" data. (We may not even have to specify how it works, that can be specified later or even be guided by the out-of-band information that needs to be present for all of this anyway). That code point either needs to be described explicitly as "MUST ignore if not supported / content not understood" for all of EDHOC from the start, or there needs to be general wording about which ead_labels are to be ignored if unprocessable. We should encourage initiators to send some random garbage there if they can afford it. (A LoRA device certainly can't, a 6lo device probably neigther, but a guard proxy establishing a connection probably can). This is not only to protect initiators that need it, but also to ensure that it is not being blocked, and that responders don't reveal whether they support it.
This has parallels to , which will take some work to pick out in detail.
I'm trying to understand what would need to be changed in EDHOC to support this functionality. The distinction between critical and elective EADs. This seems like a good general construct. Perhaps by designated subsets of labels, e.g. negative or even eablabel are elective. The use of a designated eablabel for encrypted EAD1 seems less general and is somewhat breaking with the mindset that one application is reserving a label and defines the associated processing. Is there a problem with specifying a particular (elective) EAD for this application and associate a policy that it is used by default, with garbage when there is nothing to send? (I couldn't see obfuscating eadlabel really achieved much in practice, but I may have missed something.)
The first, yes. As for the labels, if the application reserves a label and defines the processing, it is showing a passive attacker that it is being used; this may be undesirable. Applications should have some label behind which they can hide the fact that this application is being used; I think it is preferable if that is shared by as many applications as practical (including the "it's really just garbage" application that some hosts may want to run). Whether that requires that they also share an encryption mechanism or not, I am unsure.
NAME at the IETF Hackathon, we put together a working proof of concept for URL Is that what you mean? That's not really related to ECH, but came out of MASQUE.
NAME The three-party setup seems very useful in different settings, so there may be multiple use cases where R receives EAD1 intended for a third party and needs to know that to do with it. Currently eadlabel is filling that function. If we can assume that R by default has designated third party, or sufficient information about the third party is carried in EAD1, then eadlabel could probably be encrypted. (In principle, EAD1 could be a COSEEncrypt0 or any tagged COSE object, with information needed by R in the unprotected header.) So how do we handle the case when there are multiple candidate third parties and you want to hide both the intent and the third party identity? A designated eadlabel is possible (or two, if critical / elective is baked into the label) but I don’t see how this label will be used other applications (so to acheive uncertainty about what is intended) because the co-existence of different candidate applications using EAD1 requires a method for R to distinguish between them. Maybe I'm missing something?
For the attacker to be unable to know which service the user is contacting, it would be important that an initiator receiving the credentials to the wrong service name fails in the same way has an initiator for which verification of the responder signature would fail. Otherwise, an active attacker could test if I intended to use the protected service by xoring the encrypted EAD1 with some random bytes. The responder would always see EAD1 as some random bytes and answer with the unprotected service, and then, if the initiator wanted to talk to the protected service, it will fail after decrypting the message and seeing the wrong service credentials if the initiator want to talk to the unprotected service, it will fail during the verification of the signature as the two transcript will not match. Those two failures should then be indistinguishable from the attacker point of view (even with timing attacks).
At least critical / elective EAD should be included in -15
The critical / elective logic could in principle be implemented in each application. It would be good to provide more use cases to support the case of making this a standardized feature. Clearly there is a benefit with tagging an EAD as "critical" since some operations require the information carried in the EAD to complete, e.g. authorization information from a trusted third party may be required for the Initiator to make any use of the authentication. But what EAD content is not critical? Is the following a good example for elective EAD? A service provider is allowing a variety of devices in its network to authenticate using EDHOC and grants different access rights depending on the capabilities and trustworthiness of the device. Later, the IETF specifies the EAD for remote attestation (see Appendix E). New devices which implements this EAD and appropriately attests to the attestation request carried in the EAD field get certain access which old devices doesn't get. But the old devices should still get basic access. If all EAD were critical then the old device which doesn't understand the new EAD would be forced to discontinue the protocol at the arrival of the remote attestation EAD. If the EAD is elective, then both old and new devices can be supported. Question: With this example in mind, is critical / elective a property of the EAD type, or isn't it rather a boolean set by the application? I can think of another use case where remote attestation is mandatory and it doesn't make sense to define different EADs for these two use cases. (Then we are somehow back at the application specified property. But it may still make sense to have a standardized way of expressing criticality.) Thoughts?
The critical/elective property always needs to be encoded in the message (as an LSB, or as the number's sign) no matter whether criticality is the sender's choice or whether it's part of the registration. From a recent chat I think that registering one number, and then allowing it to be used in positive (elective) or negative (critical) role as by the sender's choice. Application authors would describe in which criticality/-ies it makes sense to use their number, just as they describe in which of the messages it makes sense. (The alternative is to allow registering elective and critical options independently, and that application authors who do need to give the senders a choice of using either would register a pair of options; really would work just as well). Introducing RATS data seems like a very good use case to illustrate EAD examples. (In this particular case I don't know why a sender would insist the attestation to be processed into its network joining). To rephrase the original use cases with recently published terminology, we can refer to . That reference might go with a suggestion that devices that can afford sending a few more bytes should occasionally do so in a grease-style non-critical option, or maybe in a non-critical Encrypted-EAD1 option right away. I'd welcome if ace-ake-autz already defined an EAD field for what could resemble Encrypted-Client-Hello; AIU it currently refers to an older version of EDHOC. It could be updated to place LOCW and ENCID into separate EAD items, and the latter could be more generally defined as "a container for encrypted data which the responder, possibly guided by other EAD1 fields, can use to come up with a suitable IDR". (How encid is then constructed would not be a property of using that particular option, but follow from using the LOCW option). Then, there would be no need for a defined Grease field, as that ENCID field could serve the very same purpose.
Since there seems to be a case for non-critical EAD I made PR . Please review. (Yes, ace-ake-authz needs to be updated, following the closing of this issue.)
I did not read this discussion before now as it did not seem relevant for the base EDHOC protocol. The PR seems quite far from the use case described here. PR described a general critical, non-critical mechanism similar to X.509 extensions while the discussion in this issue is about an ECH type of mechanism..... PR does not seem to be the basis of a good ECH mechanism.... NAME could you have a short presentation at LAKE IETF 114? (edit: fixed Christian's github name)
I think it is clear that PR does not solve the use case outlined here. In particular, the comment from NAME above is not considered as far as I can see. But the point about critical / non-critical (eadlabel, eadvalue) appeared in this discussion and merits to be specified as a general feature.
I think it would be good with longer discussion about ECH type mechanisms in EDHOC. Might be added on later but it could also benefit from being added alrady in the base EDHOC specification. For a use case where the Initiator knows the long term key of the Responder the TLS ECH solution is a quite ugly hack that uses two different keys and an ineficient message flow. The use of a single key as discussed above is an improvement, but the use of a noise XX pattern is not optimal. If you want to design something for the use case where the Initiator knows the long term key of the Responder it makes more sense with noise IK which is used by WireGuard. If the use case where Initiator knows the long term key of the Responder is small the above approach makes sense. If is is big it might make more sense to define new method(s) based on the noise IK pattern.
Could we have a design team meeting or an interim to discuss this issue?
In the use case that the Initiator gets the Responders static public key beforehand The Responder would in this case have a static DH key. The Initiator could use Static DH or a singature.
Perhaps a breakout meeting during/just before IETF 114?
Closing this since NAME agreed that the introduction of critical/non-critical EAD (PR , included in -15) in combination with an example using third party encrypted EAD (as in ace-ake-authz) resolves the issue.

Revised text:
Authorization Data" under the new group name "Ephemeral Diffie- Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)".  The registration procedure is "Specification Required".  The columns of the registry are Label,  <ins> Description, and Reference, where Label is a positive integer and the other columns are text strings. </ins> 9.6.