Original text:
security considerations for this document. While formally the JSEP interface is an API, it is better to think of <del> it is an Internet protocol, with the JS being untrustworthy from the perspective of the endpoint.  Thus, the threat model of RFC3552 applies.  In particular, JS can call the API in any order and with any inputs, including malicious ones.  This is particularly relevant when we consider the SDP which is passed to setLocalDescription(). While correct API usage requires that the application pass in SDP which was derived from createOffer() or createAnswer(), there is no guarantee that applications do so.  The JSEP implementation MUST be prepared for the JS to pass in bogus data instead. Conversely, the application programmer needs to be aware that the JS does not have complete control of endpoint behavior.  One case that bears particular mention is that editing ICE candidates out of the SDP or suppressing trickled candidates does not have the expected behavior: implementations will still perform checks from those candidates even if they are not sent to the other side.  Thus, for instance, it is not possible to prevent the remote peer from learning your public IP address by removing server reflexive candidates. Applications which wish to conceal their public IP address should instead configure the ICE agent to use only relay candidates. </del>  9.

Reviewer comments:
From "Opsdir last call review of draft-ietf-rtcweb-jsep-21" A minor observation, not even a nit, is that the text in the Security Considerations "While formally the JSEP interface is an API, it is better to think of it is an Internet protocol, with the JS being untrustworthy from the perspective of the endpoint. " could be more clear.
I have no idea what to do with this. Obviously I thought it was clear when wrote it, and still do.
This is the only place in the document where we use "JS". I think it would be good to spell out "JavaScript", and potentially use "application JavaScript" in the first usage. Finally, I think we should use "implementation" rather than "endpoint" in this para.
LGTM

Revised text:
security considerations for this document. While formally the JSEP interface is an API, it is better to think of  <ins> it is an Internet protocol, with the application JavaScript being untrustworthy from the perspective of the JSEP implementation.  Thus, the threat model of RFC3552 applies.  In particular, JavaScript can call the API in any order and with any inputs, including malicious ones.  This is particularly relevant when we consider the SDP which is passed to setLocalDescription().  While correct API usage requires that the application pass in SDP which was derived from createOffer() or createAnswer(), there is no guarantee that applications do so. The JSEP implementation MUST be prepared for the JavaScript to pass in bogus data instead. Conversely, the application programmer needs to be aware that the JavaScript does not have complete control of endpoint behavior.  One case that bears particular mention is that editing ICE candidates out of the SDP or suppressing trickled candidates does not have the expected behavior: implementations will still perform checks from those candidates even if they are not sent to the other side.  Thus, for instance, it is not possible to prevent the remote peer from learning your public IP address by removing server reflexive candidates.  Applications which wish to conceal their public IP address should instead configure the ICE agent to use only relay candidates. </ins> 9.