jiebi/TextFlow huggingface dataset:
Original text:
their peer.  This update changes the suggestion to assume support for SHA-256 instead, due to MD5 and SHA-1 being deprecated.  OLD: <del> In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from " Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer supports MD5 and SHA- 1." </del>  NEW:

Reviewer comments:
Addressing Roman's AD comments.
has 2 conflicts, not sure how to resolve, the updates look fine. Please merge.
There was a conflict with the 8174 reference being in the other branch. I added it in because it's now part of the terminology paragraph.
Please address the following IDNits: -- The document seems to lack an IANA Considerations section. (See Section 2.2 of URL for how to handle the case when there are no actions for IANA.) -- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC5246, but the abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should. -- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC7525, but the abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should. Section 1. Editorial. -- s/RFC 5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/ -- s/RFC 6151 [RFC6151]/[RFC6151]/ -- s/RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/ Section 1. Editorial. For symmetry with the rest of the text: OLD RFC 6151 [RFC6151] details the security considerations, including collision attacks for MD5, published in 2011. NEW In 2011, [RFC6151] detailed the security considerations, including collision attacks for MD5. Section 1. Please provide a reference for "Wang, et al". Is there a reference to provide for the "the potential for brute-force attack" Section 6. Editorial Nit. s/RFC5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/ Section 6. Move the text "In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from" out of the "OLD" block of text to be its own intro paragraph so that the OLD vs. NEW is a clear cut-and-paste. Section 7. Editorial. s/ RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/ Section 7. SHA-1 is also not mentioned in RFC7525. Recommend: OLD The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 and this text adds it to ensure it is understood as having been deprecated. NEW The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; and this text adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been deprecated. Section 7. Editorial. Grammar. OLD In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED, SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used NEW In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED; and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used Section 10.2 Please make RFC5246 a normative reference.

Revised text:
their peer.  This update changes the suggestion to assume support for SHA-256 instead, due to MD5 and SHA-1 being deprecated. <ins> In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from: </ins> OLD:  <ins> "Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer supports MD5 and SHA- 1." </ins> NEW:
Original text:
(TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) recommends use of SHA-256 as a minimum requirement.  This update moves the minimum recommendation to use stronger language deprecating use of both SHA-1 <del> and MD5.  The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 and this text adds it to ensure it is understood as having been deprecated. </del>  Section 4.3:

Reviewer comments:
Addressing Roman's AD comments.
has 2 conflicts, not sure how to resolve, the updates look fine. Please merge.
There was a conflict with the 8174 reference being in the other branch. I added it in because it's now part of the terminology paragraph.
Please address the following IDNits: -- The document seems to lack an IANA Considerations section. (See Section 2.2 of URL for how to handle the case when there are no actions for IANA.) -- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC5246, but the abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should. -- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC7525, but the abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should. Section 1. Editorial. -- s/RFC 5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/ -- s/RFC 6151 [RFC6151]/[RFC6151]/ -- s/RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/ Section 1. Editorial. For symmetry with the rest of the text: OLD RFC 6151 [RFC6151] details the security considerations, including collision attacks for MD5, published in 2011. NEW In 2011, [RFC6151] detailed the security considerations, including collision attacks for MD5. Section 1. Please provide a reference for "Wang, et al". Is there a reference to provide for the "the potential for brute-force attack" Section 6. Editorial Nit. s/RFC5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/ Section 6. Move the text "In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from" out of the "OLD" block of text to be its own intro paragraph so that the OLD vs. NEW is a clear cut-and-paste. Section 7. Editorial. s/ RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/ Section 7. SHA-1 is also not mentioned in RFC7525. Recommend: OLD The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 and this text adds it to ensure it is understood as having been deprecated. NEW The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; and this text adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been deprecated. Section 7. Editorial. Grammar. OLD In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED, SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used NEW In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED; and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used Section 10.2 Please make RFC5246 a normative reference.

Revised text:
(TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) recommends use of SHA-256 as a minimum requirement.  This update moves the minimum recommendation to use stronger language deprecating use of both SHA-1  <ins> and MD5.  The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; and this text adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been deprecated.. </ins> Section 4.3:
Original text:
Servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key. <del> In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED, SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used (see CAB-Baseline for more details). Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA-256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS 1.2. </del>  8.

Reviewer comments:
Addressing Roman's AD comments.
has 2 conflicts, not sure how to resolve, the updates look fine. Please merge.
There was a conflict with the 8174 reference being in the other branch. I added it in because it's now part of the terminology paragraph.
Please address the following IDNits: -- The document seems to lack an IANA Considerations section. (See Section 2.2 of URL for how to handle the case when there are no actions for IANA.) -- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC5246, but the abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should. -- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC7525, but the abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should. Section 1. Editorial. -- s/RFC 5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/ -- s/RFC 6151 [RFC6151]/[RFC6151]/ -- s/RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/ Section 1. Editorial. For symmetry with the rest of the text: OLD RFC 6151 [RFC6151] details the security considerations, including collision attacks for MD5, published in 2011. NEW In 2011, [RFC6151] detailed the security considerations, including collision attacks for MD5. Section 1. Please provide a reference for "Wang, et al". Is there a reference to provide for the "the potential for brute-force attack" Section 6. Editorial Nit. s/RFC5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/ Section 6. Move the text "In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from" out of the "OLD" block of text to be its own intro paragraph so that the OLD vs. NEW is a clear cut-and-paste. Section 7. Editorial. s/ RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/ Section 7. SHA-1 is also not mentioned in RFC7525. Recommend: OLD The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 and this text adds it to ensure it is understood as having been deprecated. NEW The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; and this text adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been deprecated. Section 7. Editorial. Grammar. OLD In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED, SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used NEW In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED; and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used Section 10.2 Please make RFC5246 a normative reference.

Revised text:
Servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key.  <ins> In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED; and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used (see CAB-Baseline for more details).  Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA- 256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS 1.2. </ins> 8.
Original text:
will typically be the minimum of the server's self-imposed limit and TicketRequestContents.count. <del> Servers that support ticket requests MUST NOT echo "ticket_request" in the EncryptedExtensions message.  A client MUST abort the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert if the "ticket_request" extension is present in the EncryptedExtensions message. </del>  If a client receives a HelloRetryRequest, the presence (or absence) of the "ticket_request" extension MUST be maintained in the second

Reviewer comments:
Addresses and . The server hint came up in the context of QUIC, e.g., as a possible optimization to let clients know if they should expect any post handshake messages. cc NAME NAME
Looks like this got merged without any business days to review it :) but otherwise the text looks good, approved.
Every day is a business day! ;-)
From NAME
Fixed by .
You probably want to be clear that ticket_request cannot appear in HRR, given that you have a section on it.
Fixed in .
I'm not a huge fan of sending extensions that aren't really needed, but this seems fine. I missed the QUIC discussion (or maybe it's still in my inbox). BTW, I still like the idea of hoisting tickets to the application layer, but ekr seems to think that they belong at the TLS layer. I guess we'll just have to keep disagreeing on that point :)

Revised text:
will typically be the minimum of the server's self-imposed limit and TicketRequestContents.count.  <ins> A server that supports ticket requests MAY echo the "ticket_request" extension in the EncryptedExtensions message.  If present, it contains a TicketRequestContents structure, where TicketRequestContents.count indicates the number of tickets the server expects to send to the client. Servers MUST NOT send the "ticket_request" extension in ServerHello or HelloRetryRequest messages.  A client MUST abort the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert if the "ticket_request" extension is present in either of these messages. </ins> If a client receives a HelloRetryRequest, the presence (or absence) of the "ticket_request" extension MUST be maintained in the second
Original text:
IANA is requested to Create an entry, ticket_request(TBD), in the existing registry for ExtensionType (defined in RFC8446), with "TLS <del> 1.3" column values being set to "CH", and "Recommended" column being set to "Yes". </del>  5.

Reviewer comments:
Addresses and . The server hint came up in the context of QUIC, e.g., as a possible optimization to let clients know if they should expect any post handshake messages. cc NAME NAME
Looks like this got merged without any business days to review it :) but otherwise the text looks good, approved.
Every day is a business day! ;-)
From NAME
Fixed by .
You probably want to be clear that ticket_request cannot appear in HRR, given that you have a section on it.
Fixed in .
I'm not a huge fan of sending extensions that aren't really needed, but this seems fine. I missed the QUIC discussion (or maybe it's still in my inbox). BTW, I still like the idea of hoisting tickets to the application layer, but ekr seems to think that they belong at the TLS layer. I guess we'll just have to keep disagreeing on that point :)

Revised text:
IANA is requested to Create an entry, ticket_request(TBD), in the existing registry for ExtensionType (defined in RFC8446), with "TLS  <ins> 1.3" column values being set to "CH, EE", and "Recommended" column being set to "Yes". </ins> 5.
Original text:
Coding is a reliability mechanism that is distinct and separated from the loss detection of congestion controls.  Using coding can be a useful way to better deal with tail losses or with networks with non- <del> congestion losses.  However, coding mechanisms could hide congestion signals to the server.  This memo proposes a discussion on how coding and congestion signals could interact and proposes best current practice. </del>  1.

Reviewer comments:
This proposes a complete re-vamp of the document. I would also suggest to completely remove sections 6 and 7, but rather than doing this yet, I inserted comments that explain why.
Le 17/01/2020 à 09:28, mwelzl a écrit : Yes ! Definitely agree.
Le 17/01/2020 à 13:50, francoismichel a écrit : OK for me.

Revised text:
Coding is a reliability mechanism that is distinct and separated from the loss detection of congestion controls.  Using coding can be a useful way to better deal with tail losses or with networks with non-  <ins> congestion losses.  However, coding mechanisms should not hide congestion signals.  This memo offers a discussion of how coding and congestion control interact. </ins> 1.
Original text:
it is not an IETF product and is not a standard. There are cases where deploying coding improves the quality of the <del> transmission.  As example, the server may hardly detect tail losses that impact may impact the application layer.  Another example may be the networks where non-congestion losses are persistent and prevent the server from exploiting the link capacity.  RFC5681 defines TCP as a loss-based congestion control and coding mechanisms can hide congestion signals to the server. </del>  Coding is a reliability mechanism that is distinct and separated from the loss detection of congestion controls.  This memo discusses

Reviewer comments:
This proposes a complete re-vamp of the document. I would also suggest to completely remove sections 6 and 7, but rather than doing this yet, I inserted comments that explain why.
Le 17/01/2020 à 09:28, mwelzl a écrit : Yes ! Definitely agree.
Le 17/01/2020 à 13:50, francoismichel a écrit : OK for me.

Revised text:
it is not an IETF product and is not a standard. There are cases where deploying coding improves the quality of the  <ins> transmission.  As an example, the server may hardly detect tail losses that impact may impact the application layer [MICHAEL: I don't understand this.  Why would it not detect them?  And why is detecting them the problem?].  Another example are networks where non- congestion losses are persistent and prevent a sender from exploiting the link capacity.  RFC5681 defines TCP as a loss-based congestion control; because coding repairs such losses, blindly applying it may easily lead to an implementation that also hides a congestion signal to the sender.  It is important to ensure that such information hiding does not occur. </ins> Coding is a reliability mechanism that is distinct and separated from the loss detection of congestion controls.  This memo discusses
Original text:
3.2. <del> The document focuses on end-to-end coding, i.e. in cases where coding is added at the server and client end points.  The discussions should </del>  then consider fairness with non-coding solutions. 4. <del> The solution can be described as follows: </del>  <del> The client MUST indicate to the server that one or multiple packets have been repaired using a coding scheme.  The "repaired packet" signal does not guarantee that the packet actually needed to be repaired, since it could have been delayed but not lost. </del>  <del> The server MUST be able to detect the "repaired packet" signal. </del>  The base solution does not describe how the congestion control reacts to such signal. The rationale behind this solution is the following: the server has more information on the congestion status and the application <del> characteristics.  Moreover, congestion control should not be splitted between multiple entities otherwise non-optimized decisions may be taken. </del>  The proposed solution applies for coding in the transport and <del> application layers.  The proposed approach is inline with the one in </del>  I-D.swett-nwcrg-coding-for-quic.  The proposed solution does not <del> applies for the interaction between coding under the transport layer </del>  (i.e. not end-to-end), such as coding for tunnels. 5.

Reviewer comments:
This proposes a complete re-vamp of the document. I would also suggest to completely remove sections 6 and 7, but rather than doing this yet, I inserted comments that explain why.
Le 17/01/2020 à 09:28, mwelzl a écrit : Yes ! Definitely agree.
Le 17/01/2020 à 13:50, francoismichel a écrit : OK for me.

Revised text:
3.2.  <ins> The document focuses on end-to-end coding, i.e. cases where coding is added at the server and client end points.  The discussions should </ins> then consider fairness with non-coding solutions. 4.  <ins> The solution can be described as follows: [MICHAEL: So far, it hasn't been clear that we're going to describe a "solution".  A solution to which problem?  I thought we're only discussing how FEC and CC relate.] </ins>  <ins> The client indicates to the server that one or multiple packets have been repaired using a coding scheme.  The "repaired packet" signal does not guarantee that the packet actually needed to be repaired, since it could have been delayed but not lost. </ins>  <ins> The server must be able to detect the "repaired packet" signal. </ins> The base solution does not describe how the congestion control reacts to such signal. The rationale behind this solution is the following: the server has more information on the congestion status and the application  <ins> characteristics.  Moreover, congestion control should not be split between multiple entities, as otherwise non-optimized decisions may be taken. </ins> The proposed solution applies for coding in the transport and  <ins> application layers.  The proposed approach is in-line with the one in </ins> I-D.swett-nwcrg-coding-for-quic.  The proposed solution does not  <ins> apply for the interaction between coding under the transport layer </ins> (i.e. not end-to-end), such as coding for tunnels. 5.
Original text:
In this solution, the coded packets are sent on top of what is allowed by a congestion window.  Examples of the solution could be <del> adding a given pourcentage of the congestion window as supplementary </del>  packets or sending a given amount of coded packets at a given rate. The redundancy flow can be decorrelated from the congestion control <del> that manages source packets : a secondary congestion control can be </del>  introduced, such as in coupled congestion control for RTP media I- D.ietf-rmcat-coupled-cc.  An example would be to exploit a lower than best-effort congestion control RFC6297. <del> The advantage of such solution is that coding would help in challenges cases where transmission losses are persistent. </del>  <del> The drawback of such solution is that it may result in coding </del>  solutions being unfair towards non-coding solutions.  This solutions may result in adding congestion in congested networks.

Reviewer comments:
This proposes a complete re-vamp of the document. I would also suggest to completely remove sections 6 and 7, but rather than doing this yet, I inserted comments that explain why.
Le 17/01/2020 à 09:28, mwelzl a écrit : Yes ! Definitely agree.
Le 17/01/2020 à 13:50, francoismichel a écrit : OK for me.

Revised text:
In this solution, the coded packets are sent on top of what is allowed by a congestion window.  Examples of the solution could be  <ins> adding a given percentage of the congestion window as supplementary </ins> packets or sending a given amount of coded packets at a given rate. The redundancy flow can be decorrelated from the congestion control  <ins> that manages source packets: a secondary congestion control can be </ins> introduced, such as in coupled congestion control for RTP media I- D.ietf-rmcat-coupled-cc.  An example would be to exploit a lower than best-effort congestion control RFC6297.  <ins> The advantage of such a solution is that coding would help in challenging cases where transmission losses are persistent. </ins>  <ins> The drawback of such a solution is that it may result in coding </ins> solutions being unfair towards non-coding solutions.  This solutions may result in adding congestion in congested networks.
Original text:
6.2. <del> In this solution, the server does not reduce the congestion window with the same amount when the "repaired packet" signal is received, i.e. when a packet has been lost but repaired.  Example of this solution could be based on RFC8511 or considering that recovering an isolated packet is not an actual sign of congestion. </del>  The advantage of the solution is that in cases where there is no actual congestion, coding could help in improving the transmission

Reviewer comments:
This proposes a complete re-vamp of the document. I would also suggest to completely remove sections 6 and 7, but rather than doing this yet, I inserted comments that explain why.
Le 17/01/2020 à 09:28, mwelzl a écrit : Yes ! Definitely agree.
Le 17/01/2020 à 13:50, francoismichel a écrit : OK for me.

Revised text:
6.2.  <ins> [MICHAEL: this is even just a terrible idea.  There's no good rationale to back off less when a packet is repaired.]  In this solution, the server does not reduce the congestion window with the same amount when the "repaired packet" signal is received, i.e. when a packet has been lost but repaired.  Example of this solution could be based on RFC8511 or considering that recovering an isolated packet is not an actual sign of congestion. </ins> The advantage of the solution is that in cases where there is no actual congestion, coding could help in improving the transmission
Original text:
6.3. <del> This is the case for delay-based congestion controls.  The interaction between delay-based congestion controls and the delay induced by a coding mechanisms is an open research activity.  That being said, a potential approach would be that loss-based congestion control ignores the "repaired packet" signal. </del>  The advantage of this solution is that coding would provided substantial benefits in cases where there are transmission losses.

Reviewer comments:
This proposes a complete re-vamp of the document. I would also suggest to completely remove sections 6 and 7, but rather than doing this yet, I inserted comments that explain why.
Le 17/01/2020 à 09:28, mwelzl a écrit : Yes ! Definitely agree.
Le 17/01/2020 à 13:50, francoismichel a écrit : OK for me.

Revised text:
6.3.  <ins> [MICHAEL: as above, also here, the signals are discussed as going into both blocks, leading to a strange unification of things that shouldn't be together.  Let's remove this.  Also, the idea of ignoring packet loss for CC is appalling anyway.]  This is the case for delay-based congestion controls.  The interaction between delay- based congestion controls and the delay induced by a coding mechanisms is an open research activity.  That being said, a potential approach would be that loss-based congestion control ignores the "repaired packet" signal. </ins> The advantage of this solution is that coding would provided substantial benefits in cases where there are transmission losses.