Change:
fix typos
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Removing the editorial label after the last change (which is normative)
This discovery method is great for usability but worrying from a security POV. The RS is telling the Client to create a request to an arbitrary AS using an arbitrary access specification and the Client's credentials. The Client doesn't have any way to understand, validate or filter anything in the RS's response, so it cannot protect itself. By the way, shouldn't we use a semicolon before the parameter? A possible workaround is to add something analogous to a parameter to the AS access request containing the RS address, require the Client to include it, and require that the AS validate that the request is indeed to that RS.
In this scenario the client is explicitly looking to the RS to provide a pointer to which AS to talk to. In most cases this is pre-configured (the client knows which AS protects which RS). In some cases this will be communicated at runtime, using this mechanism. There are both security and privacy ramifications for this choice, which we've covered at least some of in the current text. I'm sure this can be expanded.
GNAP is a delegation protocol that enables separation of control from processing with obvious advantages to all three parties (subject, controller, processor). The RS is typically a processor. The choice of AS as delegated controller SHOUlD lie with the subject in order to better represent their interest. This perspective is, of course, not absolute but it the should makes it the preferred path.
NAME I don't see anything explicit about this call. The client just makes a normal-but-unauthenticated call to the RS, with no special indication that it's doing discovery. In fact a malicious RS can redirect the client anyway, even if the client is in fact authenticated. And I don't see anything in the text about the threat vector of a malicious RS. Please also respond to my syntactic comment above.
I've got a few comments on wording. Mostly though: I'm not sure about changing the field to , since it's not just ANY opaque value but specifically an opaque value for use in the access section of the request. As such, I think is too generic in this use. If we change the parameter name back I think this is OK.

Discussion:
9.1. If the client instance calls an RS without an access token, or with <del> an invalid access token, the RS SHOULD respond to the client instance with a WWW-Authenticate header field indicating that GNAP needs to be used to access the resource.  The address of the GNAP endpoint MUST be sent in the "as_uri" parameter.  The RS MAY additionally return a resource reference that the client instance SHOULD use in its access token request.  This resource reference MUST be sufficient for at least the action the client instance was attempting to take at the RS and MAY be more powerful.  The means for the RS to determine the resource reference are out of scope of this specification, but some dynamic methods are discussed in I-D.ietf-gnap-resource-servers.  The content of the resource reference is opaque to the client instance. </del> <ins> an invalid access token, the RS SHOULD be explicit about the fact that GNAP needs to be used to access the resource, by responding with the WWW-Authenticate header field and a GNAP challenge. In some situations, the client instance might want to know with which specific AS it needs to negotiate for access to that RS.  The RS MAY additionally return the address of the GNAP endpoint in the "as_uri" parameter, a "referrer" parameter to indicate which RS initiated the discovery process, and an opaque "access" reference.  The client instance SHOULD then use both the "referrer" and "access" parameters in its access token request.  The "referrer" parameter MUST be the URI of the RS, and the client instance MUST check its value to protect itself.  The opaque "access" reference MUST be sufficient for at least the action the client instance was attempting to take at the RS and MAY be more powerful. The means for the RS to determine the value for the "access" reference are out of scope of this specification, but some dynamic methods are discussed in I-D.ietf-gnap-resource-servers. When receiving the following response from the RS: </ins> The client instance then makes a request to the "as_uri" as described <del> in request, with the value of "access" as one of the members of the </del> <ins> in request, with the value of "referrer" passed as an HTTP Referer header field and the "access" reference passed unchanged into the </ins> "access" array in the "access_token" portion of the request.  The client instance MAY request additional resources and other <del> information.  The client instance MAY request multiple access tokens. </del> <ins> information. </ins> In this non-normative example, the client instance is requesting a <del> single access token using the resource reference "FWWIKYBQ6U56NL1" received from the RS in addition to the "dolphin-metadata" resource reference that the client instance has been configured with out of </del> <ins> single access token using the opaque access reference "FWWIKYBQ6U56NL1" received from the RS in addition to the "dolphin- metadata" that the client instance has been configured with out of </ins> band. <ins> The client instance includes the Referer header field as a way for the AS to know that the process is initiated through a discovery process at the RS. </ins> If issued, the resulting access token would contain sufficient access to be used at both referenced resources. <ins> Security considerations, especially related to the potential of a [compromised RS]{#security-compromised-rs} redirecting the requests of an otherwise properly authenticated client, need to be carefully considered when allowing such a discovery process.  This risk can be mitigated by an alternative pre-registration process so that the client knows which AS protects which RS. </ins> 9.2. Additional methods of discovering the appropriate grant endpoint for

generous in supporting many different key formats to allow different types of client software and client instance deployments. <ins> 12.34. An attacker may aim to gain access to confidential or sensitive resources.  The measures for hardening and monitoring resource server systems (beyond protection with access tokens) is out of the scope of this document, but the use of GNAP to protect a system does not absolve the resource server of following best practices.  GNAP generally considers a breach can occur, and therefore advises to prefer key-bound tokens whenever possible, which at least limits the impact of access token leakage by a compromised or malicious RS. </ins> 13. The privacy considerations in this section are modeled after the list