Change:
Align Section 8.2 with the definition in Section 4.2 Relax the definition of Endorser in Section 4.1 to drop the exclusive coupling between Endorsements and authenticity appraisal
In §4.2 Endorsement is defined as: "A secure statement that an Endorser vouches for the integrity of an Attester's various capabilities such as Claims collection and Evidence signing." uses a more restrictive description: "An Endorsement is a secure statement that some entity (e.g., a manufacturer) vouches for the integrity of the device's signing capability.", which seems to limit the scope of an Endorsement to the verification of the Attester's signature on Evidence. I think §8.2 should be rephrased to align with §4.2 so to allow Endorsements to be more than just verification keys. Besides, the definition of Endorser in §4.1: "[…] Endorsements help Verifiers appraise the authenticity of Evidence" could be relaxed to drop the (seemingly) exclusive coupling of Endorsements with authenticity appraisal.
+1 Re: §4.1 the alignment of "Endorsements" with "Evidence" seems overly constraining since Reference Values are expected to match Evidence while Endorsements are not expected to be compared to Evidence. The wording "authenticity of Evidence" is what Endorsements qualify but that is too narrow as it could also appraise other Attesting Environment functionality such as Claims Collection, key generation, signing as well as launching code, transitioning to other environments, storing secrets and there could be more.
Huh. I checked both sections and... I think you both might be right here. While it's not the intent of Section 8.2, factually it seems to be artificially constraining (by accident?). I have to admit, I did not catch that discrepancy. My initial assessment is that - as we took great care with the "normative anchor" that is Section 4.2 - we did not pay enough attention to align Section 8.2 with that. Taking into account NAME and NAME assessment, I think this is an editorial issue. Could NAME please provide a proposal and NAME please review that first, so that we can address this issue along the upcoming next review phase. This action depends on this change remaining to be a editorial harmonization (again, which I think it is). If there are any counter indications that this is bordering on normative impact, please highlight so.
"In some cases, an Endorsement is a secure statement that some entity (e.g., a manufacturer) vouches for the integrity of the device's signing capability."
reads good to me

Discussion:
Produces: Appraisal Policy for Evidence A role performed by an entity (typically a manufacturer) whose <del> Endorsements help Verifiers appraise the authenticity of Evidence. </del> <ins> Endorsements may help Verifiers appraise the authenticity of Evidence and infer further capabilities of the Attester. </ins> Produces: Endorsements

8.2. An Endorsement is a secure statement that some entity (e.g., a <del> manufacturer) vouches for the integrity of the device's signing capability.  For example, if the signing capability is in hardware, then an Endorsement might be a manufacturer certificate that signs a public key whose corresponding private key is only known inside the device's hardware.  Thus, when Evidence and such an Endorsement are used together, an appraisal procedure can be conducted based on appraisal policies that may not be specific to the device instance, but merely specific to the manufacturer providing the Endorsement. For example, an appraisal policy might simply check that devices from a given manufacturer have information matching a set of Reference Values, or an appraisal policy might have a set of more complex logic on how to appraise the validity of information. </del> <ins> manufacturer) vouches for the integrity of the device's various capabilities such as claims collection, signing, launching code, transitioning to other environments, storing secrets, and more.  For example, if the device's signing capability is in hardware, then an Endorsement might be a manufacturer certificate that signs a public key whose corresponding private key is only known inside the device's hardware.  Thus, when Evidence and such an Endorsement are used together, an appraisal procedure can be conducted based on appraisal policies that may not be specific to the device instance, but merely specific to the manufacturer providing the Endorsement.  For example, an appraisal policy might simply check that devices from a given manufacturer have information matching a set of Reference Values, or an appraisal policy might have a set of more complex logic on how to appraise the validity of information. </ins> However, while an appraisal policy that treats all devices from a given manufacturer the same may be appropriate for some use cases, it