Change:
localhostNodePorts:       localhostNodePorts, nodePortAddresses:        nodePortAddresses, networkInterfacer:        proxyutil.RealNetwork{}, <ins> conntrackTCPLiberal:      conntrackTCPLiberal, </ins> } burstSyncs := 2

Discussion:
When packets with sequence number out-of-window arrived k8s node, conntrack marked them as INVALID. kube-proxy will ignore them, without rewriting DNAT. However, there is no corresponding session link on the host, and the host sends a reset packet, causing the session link to be interrupted connection not reset This problem can be solved by command iptables -t filter -I INPUT -p tcp -m conntrack --ctstate INVALID -j DROP Similar But this issue "drop" is placed on the forward chain, our scenario needs to be placed on the input chain. $ kubectl version Client Version: version.Info{Major:"1", Minor:"22", GitVersion:"v1.22.0", GitCommit:"", GitTreeState:"clean", BuildDate:"2021-08-04T18:03:20Z", GoVersion:"go1.16.6", Compiler:"gc", Platform:"linux/amd64"} Server Version: version.Info{Major:"1", Minor:"22", GitVersion:"v1.22.0", GitCommit:"", GitTreeState:"clean", BuildDate:"2021-08-04T17:57:25Z", GoVersion:"go1.16.6", Compiler:"gc", Platform:"linux/amd64"} <details</details<details</details<details</details<details</details<details</details
/sig network is this about pods with hostNetwork: true ? if not, why is this a kube-proxy issue if the problem is in INPUT?
/assign
Yeah, to be clear - filter INPUT applies to packets which are going to be delivered to a process. Is that kube-proxy's job to define?
The "How can we reproduce" sounds a bit like this always happens. Here is a better instruction
IMO is the best description of the problem:
This may be a better solution than let add rules in the INPUT chain
hehe, ironically we should decide to or , one is a sysctl call the other is one (or two) iptables rules. The iptables rule has also the side effect of breaking people (cc ) If we switch to set the option, the change does not seem to be backportable. I tend to agree with Lars, remove the iptables INVALID drop rule and set the sysctl, we are already setting more host sysctls what do you think?

it will be nice to have some iptables hackers opinion too
I tried to recreate this problem on virtual en (kvm/qemu) by requsting a 100MB file with curl and do; to provoke some packet loss. The transfer took longer time, but never failed.
IMO kube-proxy should not set any sysctls that are not literally required for functionality that the user has explicitly opted into (eg for most network plugins). Kube-proxy does not own the host network namespace, and it should not be doing things that will affect other people's host-network traffic, because if we do it's going to break some users. (See also: .) We can document that we think it's a good idea for users/distros to set , and if we think it's almost always a better idea than not, we can warn at startup if it's not set, but (IMO) we shouldn't set it ourselves. If we can get the same effect with an iptables rule that only affects kube-proxy's own traffic, then I think that's better than setting a sysctl that will also affect non-kube-proxy traffic. If I understand the situation here correctly, if kube-proxy a drop rule for the invalid conntrack packets, but then the administrator set , then the result would be that conntrack would not mark some packets as invalid, and so our drop rule would just not get hit, and so our drop rule wouldn't interfere with the "better" sysctl-based solution?
Agree in general. We have done it in the past (e.g. route-localnet) and mostly it seems like a not-great idea. Also agree.
If we see this as a known bug, please consider documenting it in - even if latest Kubernetes includes a fix (we can nevertheless point that out!)
I'll fix this in the next few days.
From further googling, it seems like there have been situations in the past where people were setting that sysctl to work around bugs in conntrack, which were later fixed. I think this may be another such situation; it seems like our problem is that there is some state involving dropped or retransmitted packets which linux would cope with fine in the non-conntrack case, but which it doesn't handle in the conntrack case, unless "be_liberal" is set, and that seems like a bug.

Every time I look away from this set of issues/PRs for longer than 15 minutes I forget the exact scenario that causes the bug, but if someone could summarize it very clearly we could try dragging some kernel developers in. (The regression test in the e2e suite creates a packet with an intentionally-bad sequence number, but it's not clear to me what sort of real-world issue that's supposed to be representing.)
Thanks now that was an excellent article! Well written (not TL;DR that is), and IMO perfect technical level. If there is some collection of recommended reading for persons who want to know about K8s networking, this article should be in it.
Hi thank you for the , it's really helpful! I have some questions: , should we update this sentence accordingly ==we use the above workaround, would there any side effect for the cluster network or cluster nodes?
That says "this problem will occur if conntrack is unable to recognize a packet", but it doesn't explain the real-world scenario that causes conntrack to be unable to recognize a packet. If we go to the kernel developers and say "manually injecting random incorrect packets into a conntrack'ed connection causes it to get confused", then they'll likely respond either "don't do that then" or "use ". But if we can tell them something like "if a connection has a duplicated packet after a dropped packet, then conntrack gets confused", then that sounds a lot more like a bug in conntrack that they ought to fix, such that then everything will just work for everyone in the future without needing any DROP rules or sysctls.
So do we need to revert the drop rules? As mentioned in , it now seems that this makes sense.
There are three potential "fixes" here: this is unambiguously a conntrack bug, then we should figure out the details, and get the kernel devs to fix it. However, getting kernel bug fixes into all k8s clusters in the world takes "a long time", so even if it is a kernel bug, we should still think about the other fixes. cluster admins can use . We should advertise this better, but we feel that it would be dubious to have kube-proxy set this flag itself ().

per we could probably tweak the existing rule so that it didn't interfere with non-k8s packets ~and as suggested by the OP of this issue, we could add a similar rule to the INPUT chain (though this would need a bit of further thinking about to make sure we weren't introducing any new conflicts with non-k8s traffic)~.
We could revert the DROP rules and tell people to use the sysctl instead (and actually, probably that's a better answer for this issue than adding a new DROP rule to the INPUT chain is). But we'd need to warn users in advance if we were going to do that, since it would break existing clusters.
Totally agree, This is a better fix for this issue. If this is a kernel bug and it gets fixed someday, we can easily tell the user that you don't need to set anymore. Also, If we revert the DROP rule, which can solve the routing asymmetry issue mentioned in , which is a big fix for us Yes, We need to document it and tell the user. and In order not to break the existing cluster, Do we need a flag to decide if we need the DROP rule? I'll make it default to , and make it consistent with the current logic.
but the change to only apply the DROP rule to pod traffic should also fix that We should not require administrators to choose between "high-traffic TCP services work" and "asymmetric routing works". The current DROP rule is broken. We should either fix it to work with asymmetric routing, or else remove it and tell people who needed it to use the sysctl instead. In the latter case, we might want to make the transition via a feature gate. Then people who need asymmetric routing to work can enable the feature gate in Alpha (to make kube-proxy stop creating the DROP rule), and people who need high-traffic services to work but who didn't get the memo about using the sysctl can disable the feature gate in Beta until they have a chance to update their node configs to set the right sysctl.
Refer to , The DROP rule to pod doesn't fix our case. In our case, the pods of the external cluster subnet failed to access the pods of the cluster subnet to connect due to asymmetric routing, So the packet still matches The DROP rule to pod. Do we need a KEP for this or only a feature gate?

In general, feature gates imply KEPs (and any change that will take multiple releases to complete, where we want to make sure we don't forget about it halfway through, should get a KEP, because we have processes for tracking those). It doesn't have to be a big KEP, and some of the sections of the KEP template will be irrelevant and can be omitted, because you're not introducing a new feature. (See for example.)
We are going to break users, unfortunatly features gates does not have the effect that we are assuming, and we know that all the users have to set the "ipconntracktcpbeliberal" because eventually some connections will be broken. I do no like to set sysctl, but 'm not in favor of replacing the rule and leaving the problem to users that may not even know what a sysctl is ... agree the DROP rule is broken and breaks some esoteric but legit scenarios, but we are already setting sysctls, so I think that if we don't find any alternative to the DROP rule we should try to set the sysctl for the user by default
If we skip a KEP, make sure that the release team know to track the details (comms, docs, etc) as if it were a KEP. This is an important thing to track.
Should we at least triage this as Accepted?
/triage accepted Some alternatives DROP rule and ask users to set sysctl (I'm not in favor per my previous comment and the least surprise principle) DROP rule and we set sysctl set DROP rule if is not set the DROP rule with a flag/config so users can opt-out if don't want to set it (they can decide to use the sysctl or live with that risk) ...
I can accept KEP, but I think this may take multiple releases to complete. how about this? We remove the DROP rule Control the sysctl with a flag or a feature-gate. If it's a flag, I believe it's relatively simple and we can finish it in 1.29. In the case of feature-gate, this may take multiple releases to complete.
If sets the to true by default, we can safely remove the DROP rule
Yes, but if we were doing it that way, that would be because we considered that to be a feature rather than a bug.

We want to avoid breaking working clusters on upgrade. Maybe just having a release note saying "you may need to pass to kube-proxy" is enough. I think we agreed we don't want to change any sysctls except by explicit admin request (because that affects the behavior of non-kubernetes networking as well).
Agree, but we need to think in the users, this is a problem where the fix that solve a sublte and complex bug that may affect 100% of kubernetes users and most probably they don't know they are affected, impact a esoteric network configuration on the cluster networking, and the solution we are offering is "please read the release notes", that we know only 20% of users do ... I think that advanced users can opt-out to the DROP rule if we don't want to mess with the sysctl,
If setting was a no-brainer good idea, then the kernel would just have that behavior by default. There must be some reason why they don't, and so I worry that if we set that flag by default, then we're just going to start breaking some other subset of users. Also, if it turns out that this is all just a conntrack bug, which eventually gets fixed, then we wouldn't want to be setting the sysctl after it got fixed. But at that point it would be likely that there were some users unknowingly relying on the sysctl for some other side effect.
We could potentially have an iptables rule to count invalid conntrack packets, and expose the count as a metric
I completely and absolutely agree. we should not make that sysctl a default in kube-proxy ... what if we read the sysctl and install the DROP rule only if it is not set? Users that apply the sysctl we no longer have the DROP rule
/assign let me send a PR , I think that approach covers all cases
FWIW, my kernel conntrack informant tells me that there really aren't any bad side effects of setting it ("I don't see anything that could break by enabling this mode"), and in fact OVN sets it unconditionally on hosts it's running on. He also tells me that the bug (at least in ) is fixed in kernel ~6.2~ 6.1 ("").

So I'm not sure if that means "we should just go ahead and set the sysctl because it's harmless" or "we should just keep it like it is now and not set the sysctl since it won't be needed in the future"... (NB: if the latter we still need a docs update to go along with this PR, telling admins about the sysctl.)
If we can determine that the kernel fixes the issue in a certain version, then I think we can do this: Do not install the DROP rule.If the kernel version of the host is greater than the safe kernel version, we do not set sysctl.If less than, we have a flag to set sysctl. I'll make it default to 1. (refer to ), And let the user know that we may remove this sysctl in the future.
Exactly my thought. I made this mistake with route_localnet, and we still pay for it. Let me do some internal outreach too, see if I can get a concurring opinion?
Kernel ppl here concur: "I say : if kernel can not be fixed, set tcpbeliberal to one " "having Kubernetes set net.netfilter.nfconntracktcpbeliberal=1 always SGTM, since you want it to work on any kernel version" argues for a flag, default to true (or a hegative flag, defsult false) which seems a bit paranoid, but probably smart :) Are we all in agreement? Who wants to do the PR?
already has a PR to add to the existing set of configurable conntrack sysctls in kube-proxy () so it's just a matter of flipping the default
If the sysctl defaults to true, I think this still keeps backward compatibility, So we don't need the DROP rule anymore.
I just realized that we need this to be a flag because there are cases that run kube-proxy on environments with readonly /sys subsystem, so trying to set it always will fail will and make kube-proxy unusable for those environments
if people does not set it, they will hit the bug until they use kernel 6.1
I mean this sysctl defaults to true in kube-proxy, I can't imagine why users would need to set it to false unless the kernel version is safe (6.1). Of course, we can also document that the user that it is better not to do this.

There are cases where we CAN'T set sysctls but should not hard-fail kube-proxy. On Wed, Sep 6, 2023, 11:25 PM Cyclinder
after setting the jobs for nftables and hitting the conntrack bug continuously I think we should default the flag to true and set the sysctl nfconntracktcpbeliberal to 1 , We are already setting some sysctl and for rootless or other environment they can always opt out, this is what we do in kind
Sounds OK to me. Risk should be ~zero, right?
Yes, I assumed the risk is when to 1, we do not set it by default, so default to 0(see ). I'd be happy with it, Can I have this one?
Talked with offline, I don't have very strong arguments to make this enable by default , so let's wait for more user feedback, nftables will move to beta this release, we can revisit if we have more feedback from users
we are considering turning on by default in our kube-proxy 1.29+ deployments. Based on the recent discussion here that seems fine and the risk should "be ~zero"(), correct? And you are all even discussing turning this on by default in kube-proxy in some future version? One thing I'm a little confused on: is doing the same thing as turning on ? So by setting you're just turning on behavior that will be on by default in 6.1. Did I get that right?
Not exactly. affects a handful of situations. 6.1 only "normalized" one of them. The general intent of is something like "make conntrack work better with packets from broken TCP implementations". But the netfilter devs realized that one of the places it was being used was actually something that could happen due to totally normal TCP packet drops/retransmissions. And so in 6.1+, that particular situation is just handled correctly automatically, whether is enabled or not. My argument against this is that once we do it, we have to keep doing it forever, because people might start unwittingly depending on the other side effects of that sysctl. And particularly given that people never hit the bug anyway.

(It seems like we got more reports of the "my cluster is broken because of the DROP rule" bug than we ever got of the "my cluster is broken because of conntrack invalid packet handling" bug.) day once everyone has moved to 6.1 the bug will be gone forever ISTM that it's better to still not set it by default.
Thanks for the clarification on the 6.1 bugfix That's true and they probably will. I'm just trying to leverage some of the earlier discussion here to make a decision about the safety of flipping this to true, as it seems like the concern was not too high / basically nil.