Change:
Cookie-based DoS mitigation similar to DTLS and IKEv2. <del> 3.9.3. </del> <ins> 3.8.3. </ins> Datagram transport. Out-of-band key distribution and management. <ins> 3.9. MinimalT is a UDP-based transport security protocol designed to offer confidentiality, mutual authentication, DoS prevention, and connection mobility MinimalT.  One major goal of the protocol is to leverage existing protocols to obtain server-side configuration information used to more quickly bootstrap a connection.  MinimalT uses a variant of TCP's congestion control algorithm. 3.9.1. MinimalT is a secure transport protocol built on top of a widespread directory service.  Clients and servers interact with local directory services to (a) resolve server information and (b) public ephemeral state information, respectively.  Clients connect to a local resolver once at boot time.  Through this resolver they recover the IP address(es) and public key(s) of each server to which they want to connect. Connections are instances of user-authenticated, mobile sessions between two endpoints.  Connections run within tunnels between hosts. A tunnel is a server-authenticated container that multiplexes multiple connections between the same hosts.  All connections in a tunnel share the same transport state machine and encryption.  Each tunnel has a dedicated control connection used to configure and manage the tunnel over time.  Moreover, since tunnels are independent of the network address information, they may be reused as both ends of the tunnel move about the network.  This does however imply that the connection establishment and packet encryption mechanisms are coupled. Before a client connects to a remote service, it must first establish a tunnel to the host providing or offering the service.  Tunnels are established in 1-RTT using an ephemeral key obtained from the directory service.  Tunnel initiators provide their own ephemeral key and, optionally, a DoS puzzle solution such that the recipient (server) can verify the authenticity of the request and derive a shared secret.  Within a tunnel, new connections to services may be established. 3.9.2. 0-RTT forward secrecy for new connections. DoS prevention by client-side puzzles. Tunnel-based mobility. (Transport Feature) Connection multiplexing between hosts across shared tunnels. (Transport Feature) Congestion control state is shared across connections between the same host pairs. 3.9.3. A DNS-like resolution service to obtain location information (an IP address) and ephemeral keys. A PKI trust store for certificate validation. </ins> 3.10. <del> SRTP - Secure RTP - is a profile for RTP that provides confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection for data and control packets RFC3711.  SRTP packets are encrypted using a session key, which is derived from a separate master key.  Master keys are derived and managed externally, e.g., via DTLS, as specified in RFC 5763 RFC5763, under the control of a signaling protocol such as SIP RFC3261 or WebRTC I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch. </del> <ins> CurveCP CurveCP is a UDP-based transport security protocol from Daniel J.  Bernstein.  Unlike other transport security protocols, it is based entirely upon highly efficient public key algorithms.  This removes many pitfalls associated with nonce reuse and key synchronization. </ins> 3.10.1. <del> SRTP adds confidentiality and optional integrity protection to RTP data packets, and adds confidentially and mandatory integrity protection to RTP control (RTCP) packets.  For RTP data packets, this is done by encrypting the payload section of the packet and optionally appending an authentication tag (MAC) as a packet trailer, with the RTP header authenticated but not encrypted.  The RTP header itself is left unencrypted to enable RTP header compression RFC3545. For RTCP packets, the first packet in the compound RTCP packet is partially encrypted, leaving the first eight octets of the header as cleartext to allow identification of the packet as RTCP, while the remainder of the compound packet is fully encrypted.  The entire RTCP packet is then authenticated by appending a MAC as packet trailer. </del> <ins> CurveCP is a UDP-based transport security protocol.  It is built on three principal features: exclusive use of public key authenticated encryption of packets, server-chosen cookies to prohibit memory and computation DoS at the server, and connection mobility with a client- chosen ephemeral identifier. </ins> <del> Packets are encrypted using session keys, which are ultimately derived from a master key and some additional master salt and session salt.  SRTP packets carry a 2-byte sequence number to partially identify the unique packet index.  SRTP peers maintain a separate rollover counter (ROC) for RTP data packets that is incremented whenever the sequence number wraps.  The sequence number and ROC together determine the packet index.  RTCP packets have a similar, yet differently named, field called the RTCP index which serves the same purpose. </del> <ins> There are two rounds in CurveCP.  In the first round, the client sends its first initialization packet to the server, carrying its (possibly fresh) ephemeral public key C', with zero-padding encrypted under the server's long-term public key.  The server replies with a cookie and its own ephemeral key S' and a cookie that is to be used by the client.  Upon receipt, the client then generates its second initialization packet carrying: the ephemeral key C', cookie, and an encryption of C', the server's domain name, and, optionally, some message data.  The server verifies the cookie and the encrypted payload and, if valid, proceeds to send data in return.  At this point, the connection is established and the two parties can communicate. </ins> <del> Numerous encryption modes are supported.  For popular modes of operation, e.g., AES-CTR, the (unique) initialization vector (IV) used for each encryption mode is a function of the RTP SSRC (synchronization source), packet index, and session "salting key". </del> <ins> The use of only public-key encryption and authentication, or "boxing", is done to simplify problems that come with symmetric key management and synchronization.  For example, it allows the sender of a message to be in complete control of each message's nonce.  It does not require either end to share secret keying material.  Furthermore, it allows connections (or sessions) to be associated with unique ephemeral public keys as a mechanism for enabling forward secrecy given the risk of long-term private key compromise. </ins> <del> SRTP offers replay detection by keeping a replay list of already seen and processed packet indices.  If a packet arrives with an index that matches one in the replay list, it is silently discarded. </del> <ins> The client and server do not perform a standard key exchange. Instead, in the initial exchange of packets, each party provides its own ephemeral key to the other end.  The client can choose a new ephemeral key for every new connection.  However, the server must rotate these keys on a slower basis.  Otherwise, it would be trivial for an attacker to force the server to create and store ephemeral keys with a fake client initialization packet. </ins> <del> DTLS RFC5764 is commonly used as a way to perform mutual authentication and key agreement for SRTP RFC5763.  (Here, certificates marshal public keys between endpoints.  Thus, self- signed certificates may be used if peers do not mutually trust one another, as is common on the Internet.)  When DTLS is used, certificate fingerprints are transmitted out-of-band using SIP. Peers typically verify that DTLS-offered certificates match that which are offered over SIP.  This prevents active attacks on RTP, but not on the signaling (SIP or WebRTC) channel. </del> <ins> Unlike TCP, the server employs cookies to enable source validation. After receiving the client's initial packet, encrypted under the server's long-term public key, the server generates and returns a stateless cookie that must be echoed back in the client's following message.  This cookie is encrypted under the client's ephemeral public key.  This stateless technique prevents attackers from hijacking client initialization packets to obtain cookie values to flood clients.  (A client would detect the duplicate cookies and reject the flooded packets.)  Similarly, replaying the client's second packet, carrying the cookie, will be detected by the server. CurveCP supports a weak form of client authentication.  Clients are permitted to send their long-term public keys in the second initialization packet.  A server can verify this public key and, if untrusted, drop the connection and subsequent data. Unlike some other protocols, CurveCP data packets leave only the ephemeral public key, the connection ID, and the per-message nonce in the clear.  Everything else is encrypted. </ins> 3.10.2. <del> Optional replay protection with tunable replay windows. </del> <ins> Forward-secure data encryption and authentication. </ins> <del> Out-of-order packet receipt. </del> <ins> Per-packet public-key encryption. </ins> <del> (RFC5763) Mandatory mutually authenticated key exchange. </del> <ins> 1-RTT session bootstrapping. </ins> <del> Partial encryption, protecting media payloads and control packets but not data packet headers. </del> <ins> Connection mobility based on a client-chosen ephemeral identifier. </ins> <del> Optional authentication of data packets; mandatory authentication of control packets. </del> <ins> Connection establishment message padding to prevent traffic amplification. </ins> <del> 3.10.3. </del> <ins> Sender-chosen explicit nonces, e.g., based on a sequence number. </ins> <del> External key derivation and management mechanism or protocol, e.g., DTLS RFC5763. </del> <ins> 3.10.3. </ins> <del> External signaling protocol to manage RTP parameters and locate and identify peers, e.g., SIP RFC3261 or WebRTC I-D.ietf-rtcweb- security-arch. </del> <ins> An unreliable transport protocol such as UDP. </ins> 4.

Discussion:
Sort the protocols we describe based on perceived importance, popularity, etc. Basically, put non-standard ones at the end, and all else towards the front.
Correct!
I'm assuming the content itself hasn't changed, just moved around? It's not obvious from the diff, so LMK if not and I'll un-approve.