Code change:
DISCUSS: CC NAME See my discuss on draft-ietf-add-ddr-11 for my generic ADD DNR/DDR concerns Resolver without some sort of validation Why not? What is the alternative? Using unencrypted DNS to the party that told you how and where to contact these (unvalidated) Designated Resolvers. Resolver that does not use a private or local IP address and can be verified using the mechanism described in Section 4.2, it MAY be used on different network connections so long as the subsequent connections over other networks can also be successfully verified using the mechanism described in Section 4.2. This seems to go against a lot of advise in the documents that networks must be treated independently. Also, the network wants you to use their designated resolver, so to say it is okay to use a totally different Designated Resolvers seems to violate the whole DNR/DDR architecture. This will also cause failure if there is split-DNS or internal-only data. Also, using "public IP" is not a good trustworthy method to prove that these IPs are truly the same Designated Resolver used by both networks. I can easily use an internal only zone with . IN A 8.8.8.8 and get a valid ACME'd certificate with SAN=. The user connecting to another network might now be switching from my private DNS on my stolen 8.8.8.8 IP to the real google DNS. address of the designating Unencrypted Resolver in a subjectAltName extension. How feasible is it to get a certificate with SAN=ip from one of the generally accepted root store CA's? Can you give me one example where I can get a certificate for with SAN=193.110.157.123 ? I do not think this is currently possible or easy. If I am right, that means all of Section 4.2 is wishful thinking and not realistic to get rolled out. (I know we can see the cert for 1.1.1.1, so it is possible, but I know of no ACME supported CA that issues these) discovered Designated Resolver. This creates a strange policy when compared to DNR where if you get a DHCP or RA for the Designated Resolver, which is also not validatable, that you do end up using it? And section 6.5 states DNR trumps DDR. address, clients MAY choose to opportunistically use the Designated Resolver even without this certificate check (Section 4.3). Why only when the IP is the same? Why not for when the IP is different? What's to lose, since the only fallback option is stick to using the unencrypted resolver? yields an IP address that was not presented in the Additional Answers section or ipv4hint or ipv6hint fields of the original SVCB query, the connection made to that IP address MUST pass the same TLS certificate checks before being allowed to replace a previously known and validated IP address for the same Designated Resolver name. How does the appearance of an (unsigned) Additional Answer entry convey any kind of real world trust/authentication? In other words, why should it not ALWAYS pass the same TLS certificate checks ? is to use unencrypted DNS, why not just use it anyway? use DDR to discover details about all supported encrypted DNS protocols. It's a little odd to mention this as the DNR draft really tries hard to say to only use the network's offered encrypted DNS servers, so this option is in conflict with the DNR draft. Unfortunately, all currently deployed software does not know this, so it will be very common that this happens. URL SHOULD treat URL as a locally served zone per [RFC6303] Why is this not a MUST ? queries being dropped either maliciously or unintentionally, clients can re-send their SVCB queries periodically. I don't see how this would improve security for the client. It also mixes up behaviour of proper DNS clients that have their own retransmit logic for if they get no answer. attack where an attacker can block connections to the encrypted DNS server, and recommends that clients prevent it by switching to SVCB- reliant behavior once SVCB resolution does succeed. For DDR, this means that once a client discovers a compatible Designated Resolver, it SHOULD NOT use unencrypted DNS until the SVCB record expires I wonder which attacker can block encrypted DNS connections but not spoof (or block!) an unsigned SVCB record to the local client? And even if that is the case, this would be a denial of service attack if the DNS client cannot fallback to unencrypted DNS. Spoofing an SVCB to a bogus IP with an SVCB TTL of a few hours would be a very cheap 1 packet attack to keep the DNS client down for hours. This seems dangerous to implement. unencrypted DNS MUST NOT provide differentiated behavior based on the HTTP path alone, since an attacker could modify the "dohpath" parameter. For example, if a DoH resolver provides provides a filtering service for one URI path, and a non-filtered service for another URI path, [...] It seems likely that this advise will get ignored a lot, eg by people who have limited public IPs to use to spin up a DoH server, or who have to pay-per-IP. This advise seems more appropriate for local private IP DoH servers. So I would change this MUST NOT to SHOULD NOT for that reason. Unencrypted Resolver, clients applying Verified Discovery (Section 4.2) MUST validate that the IP address of the Unencrypted Resolver is covered by the SubjectAlternativeName of the Designated Resolver's TLS certificate. How would one obtain such a certificate via ACME? Since on the IP of the unencrypted resolver, there would be no HTTP server running? Additionally, if the client notices a failed verification of the Designated Resolver's TLS certificate, wouldn't it fallback to the Unencrypted Resolver? But now it may not? So this becomes a denial of service then ? to cases where the Unencrypted Resolver and Designated Resolver have the same IP address. Based on earlier text, this should read "the same non-public IP address". you use "unilateral probing" (draft-ietf-dprive-unilateral-probing) to just connect to the DoT or DoQ ports of the Unencrypted Resolver and see if you get anything back. It might be unauthenticated TLS but better than port 53? Special-Use Domain Names (SUDN) registry established by [RFC6761]. Why not pick URL As .local is already handled to not be forwarded by DNS forwarders. It would also not require an addition to SUDN. Even if someone was already using URL, it would not interfere with that usage because that usage would not be using SVCB records. To avoid name lookup deadlock, Designated Resolvers SHOULD follow the guidance in Section 10 of [RFC8484] regarding the avoidance of DNS- based references that block the completion of the TLS handshake. I find that reference to list more the issues than solutions that can be followed. The solution to use another DoH server is not really appropriate in most cases The client's other interface likely resides on other networks where its private DoH server cannot resolve the name of another network's private DoH server. It is also not easy to get an IP based certificate (eg SAN=ip) that is accepted by general webpki root stores. And things like OCSP stapling doesn't help if the target is malicious - they just would omit the stapling that proves against its malicious use. The only real advise usable from RFC8484 is "use the local unencrypted resolver to resolve the encrypted resolver". Might as well say that and remove the 8484 reference. as the protocol is mentioned throughout the document as interacting with this protocol. when accessing web content on a dual-stack network: A, AAAA, and HTTPS queries. Discovering a Designated Resolver as part of one of these queries, without having to add yet another query, minimizes the total number of queries clients send. I don't understand this paragraph. Once clients can send SVCB queries for web content, they already have had to do all the DDR/DNR related queries, so I don't understand the argument of "saving queries" ? Also, it is adding queries for a specific target, eg URL, and this cannot be "saved" either? What am I misunderstanding here? provides provides -> provides
We should reference Security Considerations, because if you don't have any validation, an attacker can point you to any server they want (someone other than the server you were configured with by DHCP, etc).
We can probably just remove this, not using it in implementations right now.
It's already done by the major public resolvers, and there is an RFC to support this (RFC 8738). The IP address validation is clearly important and a matter of WG consensus. Hopefully, this will push adoption of RFC 8738 by more ACME services.
We can reference the DNR section. The MUST NOT should only apply to DDR, but doesn't invalidate other ways of using the resolver.
If they are different, it can be a random attacker (see security considerations). The client may also have other better options to fall back to.
Agree, this should be simplified to say "even if you connect over a different IP address for any reason, still validate the original IP address"
There are definitely cases where the client can have directly selected their own resolver name, etc. We don't have to use the network resolver.
Correct, and that's why we need this document, and it was added to the IANA section.
Sure, we can make this a MUST.
It makes the attacker's job harder by requiring them to be persistent. Normal retransmission logic is fine too.
This is a direct outcome of the svcb-dns document. Spoofing SVCB shouldn't be enough to cause a DoS here, because we should continue to use the previously used encrypted DNS server while on this network (even if you get a bad SVCB packet).
For the security reasons, I think this needs to stay as a MUST NOT. However, if you differentiate based on hostname + path, you can still differentiate, it just isn't a differentiation that can be discovered by IP address queries.
Yes, you'd fall back to unencrypted resolution if you can't have a secure trusted connection for encrypted resolution.
Yes, but that part is SHOULD. Will fix.
I think that's just opportunistic DoT / DoQ. That's already specified.
.local is the SUDN for multicast DNS, but it is also squatted on by some internal networks. Following the patterns for URL, etc, .arpa is a much more appropriate name. This is what the group had consensus on years ago and has been deployed widely already.
I think we can say "as explained in RFC 8484, don't loop on the resolver name."
Sure, that's fine.
Yeah, this paragraph is old and can be removed.
Looks good! Just silly editorial nits

Related discussion:
text: address on multiple different networks, a Designated Resolver that has been discovered on one network SHOULD NOT be reused on any of the other networks without repeating the discovery process for each <del> network. However, if a given Unencrypted DNS Resolver designates a Designated Resolver that does not use a private or local IP address and can be verified using the mechanism described in verified, it MAY be used on different network connections so long as the subsequent connections over other networks can also be successfully verified using the mechanism described in verified.  This is a tradeoff between performance (by having no delay in establishing an encrypted DNS connection on the new network) and functionality (if the Unencrypted DNS Resolver intends to designate different Designated Resolvers based on the network from which clients connect). </del> <ins> network, since the same IP address may be used for different servers on the different networks. </ins> 4.2.