Code change:
Hi all, Our previous formal analysis on draft 12 and 14 lead to a publication at USENIX 23 available here URL As the two other previous formal analysis were cited in the draft, I'm proposing to add next to them our new one with this PR. As a side remark, our models are here (URL), and we are trying to update everything according to draft 17 with a new overall pass. It might be tight for IETF115, but we are trying our best! And anyway, it should only be positive results by now ;)
NAME Thanks! Great that you follow up with the latest version. The latest relevant changes are probably in -16 and only adds things to the key derivation (some of which was proposed by you :-).
Thanks for the pointer! Though, the biggest issue is not so much updating the model of the protocol, but rather making a new full pass on the security claims and new appendices, trying to have a clear systematized link between claims from the draft and what we check in the model.
NAME let's check if there are some other papers missing and what we want to say about them.
We should at least add references to work by ETH and ENS. Let's merge this as a starting point and continue discussion in .
Given the various security analyses EDHOC has seen and their insights being discussed in Section 8, would it make sense to add informative references to those (as done, e.g., for TLS 1.3, RFC 8446 Appendix E)? URL
Seems like a good idea to me
Related to
This was discussed on the IETF 116 LAKE WG meeting, and in absence of volunteers to draft such an appendix we decided to start with adding references. We may want to go somewhere in between a whole appendix and a sentence, and expand with a paragraph about each reference. We still need someone to draft that paragraph for the different references and would like to conclude on this fairly soon. We start by merging now.
Closing since is merged. Hi all, While we do not have any explicit comments on the document, we thought it is maybe still worthwhile to share the following analysis confirmation. We updated our computational analysis of the SIG-SIG mode, of which Marc presented an earlier version at IETF 114, to draft 17. We could confirm that with some of the later cryptographic suggestions (PR , ) included, EDHOC SIG-SIG achieves key exchange security (key secrecy and explicit authentication) in a strong model capturing potentially colliding credential identifiers, assuming, among others, an "exclusive ownership" property of the signature scheme (established for Ed25519, conjectured for the way ECDSA is used in EDHOC SIG-SIG). Our updated analysis is not publicly available yet at this point. Let us know if a public reference would be helpful for the draft RFC; we can also share the document individually upon request. The last point actually maybe does lead to a comment on the document: Given the various security analyses EDHOC has seen and their insights being discussed in Section 8, would it make sense to add informative references to those (as done, e.g., for TLS 1.3, RFC 8446 Appendix E)? Kind regards, Felix Günther (with Marc Ilunga)

Related discussion:
text: With static Diffie-Hellman key authentication, the authenticating endpoint can deny having participated in the protocol. <del> Two earlier versions of EDHOC have been formally analyzed Norrman20 Bruni18 and the specification has been updated based on the analysis. </del> <ins> Three earlier versions of EDHOC have been formally analyzed Jacomme23 Norrman20 Bruni18 and the specification has been updated based on the analysis. </ins> 8.2.