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Addresses .
.Add some additional text to highlight that sig on server cert and DC can be different. from . Hi Sean, Thanks for the follow-up. I refreshed my memory as much as I could. Please see my responses in line. Yours, Daniel Sean Turner wrote: I think I would rather take the structure: 1 - Use case 2 - Problem description 3 - Solution I am fine with whatever fits best to you. Server operators often deploy TLS termination services in locations such as remote data centers or Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) where it may be difficult to detect key compromises. Short-lived certificates may be used to limit the exposure of keys in these cases. However, short-lived certificates need to be renewed more frequently than long-lived certificates. If an external CA is unable to issue a certificate in time to replace a deployed certificate, the server would no longer be able to present a valid certificate to clients. With short-lived certificates, there is a smaller window of time to renew a certificates and therefore a higher risk that an outage at a CA will negatively affect the uptime of the service. Typically, a TLS server uses a certificate provided by some entity other than the operator of the server (a "Certification Authority" or CA) [RFC8446 ] [RFC5280 ]. This organizational separation makes the TLS server operator dependent on the CA for some aspects of its operations, for example: Whenever the server operator wants to deploy a new certificate, it has to interact with the CA. The server operator can only use TLS signature schemes for which the CA will issue credentials. To reduce the dependency on external CAs, this document proposes a limited delegation mechanism that allows a TLS peer to issue its own credentials within the scope of a certificate issued by an external CA. These credentials only enable the recipient of the delegation to speak for names that the CA has authorized. Furthermore, this mechanism allows the server to use modern signature algorithms such as Ed25519 [RFC8032 ] even if their CA does not support them. We will refer to the certificate issued by the CA as a "certificate", or "delegation certificate", and the one issued by the operator as a "delegated credential" or "DC". I think my concern has been clarified by Ilari. It was resolved by your b). I am fine with both text. works for me. The text does not address my concern and will recap my perspective of the discussion. My initial comment was that the reference [KEYLESS] points to a solution that does not work with TLS 1.3 and currently the only effort compatible with TLS 1.3 is draft-mglt-lurk-tls13. I expect this reference to be mentioned and I do not see it in the text proposed text. If the intention with [KEYLESS] is to mention TLS Handshake Proxying techniques, then I argued that other mechanisms be mentioned and among others draft-mglt-lurk-tls12 and draft-mglt-lurk-tls13 that address different versions of TLS. This was my second concern and I do not see any of these references being mentioned. The way I understand your response is that the paper pointed out by [KEYLESS] is not Cloudflare's commercial product but instead a generic TLS Handshake proxying and that you propose to add a reference to an academic paper that discusses the LURK extension for TLS 1.2. I appreciate that other solutions - and in this case LURK, are being considered. I am wondering however why draft-mglt-lurk-tls12 is being replaced by an academic reference [REF2] and why draft-mglt-lurk-tls13 has been omitted. It seems that we are trying to avoid any reference of the work that is happening at the IETF. Is there anything I am missing ? My suggestion for the text OLD: (e.g., a PKCS interface or a remote signing mechanism [KEYLESS]) NEW: (e.g., a PKCS interface or a remote signing mechanism such as [draft-mglt-lurk-tls13] or [draft-mglt-lurk-tls12] ([LURK-TLS12]) or [KEYLESS]) with [KEYLESS] Sullivan, N. and D. Stebila, "An Analysis of TLS Handshake Proxying", IEEE TrustCom/BigDataSE/ISPA 2015, 2015. [LURK-TLS12] Boureanu, I., Migault, D., Preda, S., Alamedine, H.A., Mishra, S. Fieau, F., and M. Mannan, "LURK: Server-Controlled TLS Delegation”, IEEE TrustCom 2020, URL, 2020. [draft-mglt-lurk-tls12] IETF draft [draft-mglt-lurk-tls13] IETF draft It is unclear to me what is generic about the paper pointed by [KEYLESS] or [REF1]. In any case, for clarification, the paper clearly refers to Cloudflare commercial products as opposed to a generic mechanism, and this will remain whatever label will be used as a reference. Typically, Cloudflare co-authors the paper appears 12 times in the 8 page paper. The contribution section mentions: """ Our work focuses specifically on the TLS handshake proxying system implemented by CloudFlare in their Keyless SSL product [6], [7] """ The methodology mentions says: """ We tested TLS key proxying using CloudFlare’s implementation, which was implemented with the following three parts: """ """ The different scenarios were set up through CloudFlare’s control panel. In the direct handshake handshake scenario, the site is set up with no reverse proxy. In the scenario where the key is held by the edge server, the same certificate that was used on the origin is uploaded to CloudFlare and the reverse proxy is enabled for the site. """ Cloudflare appears in at least references URL CloudFlare Inc., “CloudFlare Keyless SSL,” Sep. 2014, URL N. Sullivan, “Keyless SSL: The nitty gritty technical details,” Sep. 2014, URL works for me. works for me seems clearer. I suspect earlier clarifications addressed this. thanks that it way clearer. Daniel Migault Ericsson

Related discussion:
text: entire certificate and the delegated credential, cannot. Each delegated credential is bound to a specific signature <del> algorithm for use use in the TLS handshake (RFC8446 section 4.2.3).  This prevents them from being used with other, perhaps unintended signature algorithms. </del> <ins> algorithm for use in the TLS handshake (RFC8446 section 4.2.3). This prevents them from being used with other, perhaps unintended signature algorithms.  The signature algorithm bound to the delegated credential can be chosen independantly of the set of signature algorithms supported by the end-entity certificate. </ins> 3.2.