jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
Code change:
NAME Please take a look at this updated text to see if it addresses your concerns.
To edit notification comments on pull requests, go to your .
Thinking about possible extensions to GNAP's interaction modes, I had the impression that the specification could be a bit clearer regarding requirements on such extensions. From reading Section 3.3, my understanding is that all implementations of GNAP, including ones using extensions which define additional interaction finish methods, MUST include a nonce in the grant response (given that the AS wants to use the finish method offered by the client instance): URL However, Section 3.3.5 sounds a bit different, only referring to the two interaction finish methods defined by GNAP core: URL Section 4.2 could be a bit clearer as to what is expected of future extensions to GNAP, it currently says: URL with the two following sections describing the finish methods defined by GNAP core. This is, however, somewhat clearer in Section 4.2.3: I.e., Section 4.2.3 implies that AS must (somehow) provide the client instance with an interaction reference and interaction finish nonce. But it may be helpful to make this more explicit throughout the relevant Sections. There seem to be no requirements for future interaction start methods. It may be helpful to document some minimal requirements, e.g., enough information to identify the grant has to be conveyed to AS via RO in the interaction start (such as the redirect URI in GNAP core).
Thanks NAME for taking the time! The proposed text looks good to me (just one possible typo, I'm not a native speaker, so I'm not 100% sure about that).

Related discussion:
text: methods: If interaction finishing is supported for this client instance and <del> request, the AS response-interact-finish used by the client instance to validate the callback.  Requests to the callback URI MUST be processed as described in interaction-finish, and the AS MUST require presentation of an interaction callback reference as described in continue-after-interaction. </del> <ins> request, the AS will response-interact-finish used by the client instance to validate the callback.  All interaction finish methods MUST use this nonce to allow the client to verify the connection between the pending interaction request and the callback.  GNAP does this through the use of the interaction hash, defined in interaction- hash.  All requests to the callback URI MUST be processed as described in interaction-finish. All interaction finish methods MUST require presentation of an interaction reference for continuing this grant request.  This means that the the interaction reference MUST be returned by the AS and MUST be presented by the client as described in continue-after- interaction.  The means by which the interaction reference is returned to the client instance is specific to the interaction finish method. </ins> 2.5.2.1.
Code change:
NAME Please take a look at this updated text to see if it addresses your concerns.
To edit notification comments on pull requests, go to your .
Thinking about possible extensions to GNAP's interaction modes, I had the impression that the specification could be a bit clearer regarding requirements on such extensions. From reading Section 3.3, my understanding is that all implementations of GNAP, including ones using extensions which define additional interaction finish methods, MUST include a nonce in the grant response (given that the AS wants to use the finish method offered by the client instance): URL However, Section 3.3.5 sounds a bit different, only referring to the two interaction finish methods defined by GNAP core: URL Section 4.2 could be a bit clearer as to what is expected of future extensions to GNAP, it currently says: URL with the two following sections describing the finish methods defined by GNAP core. This is, however, somewhat clearer in Section 4.2.3: I.e., Section 4.2.3 implies that AS must (somehow) provide the client instance with an interaction reference and interaction finish nonce. But it may be helpful to make this more explicit throughout the relevant Sections. There seem to be no requirements for future interaction start methods. It may be helpful to document some minimal requirements, e.g., enough information to identify the grant has to be conveyed to AS via RO in the interaction start (such as the redirect URI in GNAP core).
Thanks NAME for taking the time! The proposed text looks good to me (just one possible typo, I'm not a native speaker, so I'm not 100% sure about that).

Related discussion:
text: hash.  The client instance will use this value to validate the "finish" call. <del> The AS MUST send the hash and interaction reference based on the interaction finish mode as described in the following sections. </del> <ins> All interaction finish methods MUST define a way to convey the hash and interaction reference back to the client instance.  When an interaction finish method is used, the client instance MUST present the interaction reference back to the AS as part of its continue- after-interaction. </ins> Note that in many error cases, such as when the RO has denied access, the "finish" method is still enacted by the AS.  This pattern allows
Code change:
Expands the discovery document and aligns it with changes made to the discovery process in core. Addresses
:heavycheckmark: Deploy Preview for gnap-resource-servers-editors-draft ready! :hammer: Explore the source changes: ac397efc4f491e2003a3f8059eef765b8e3075b3 :mag: Inspect the deploy log: :sunglasses: Browse the preview:

Related discussion:
text: 3.1. A GNAP AS offering RS-facing services can publish its features on a <del> well-known discovery document using the URL ".well-known/gnap-as-rs". </del> <ins> well-known discovery document using the URL ".well-known/gnap-as-rs" appended to the grant request endpoint URL. </ins> <del> This endpoint contains a JSON document RFC8259 consisting of a single JSON object with any combination of the following optional fields: </del> <ins> The discovery response is a JSON document RFC8259 consisting of a single JSON object with the following fields: </ins> <del> The URL of the endpoint offering introspection. </del> <ins> OPTIONAL.  The URL of the endpoint offering introspection.  The location MUST be a URL RFC3986 with a scheme component that MUST be https, a host component, and optionally, port, path and query components and no fragment components. </ins> A list of token formats supported by this AS. <del> The URL of the endpoint offering resource registration. The grant endpoint of the GNAP AS. </del> <ins> The URL of the endpoint offering resource registration.  The location MUST be a URL RFC3986 with a scheme component that MUST be https, a host component, and optionally, port, path and query components and no fragment components. REQUIRED.  The location of the AS's grant request endpoint, used by the RS to derive downstream access tokens.  The location MUST be a URL RFC3986 with a scheme component that MUST be https, a host component, and optionally, port, path and query components and no fragment components.  This URL MUST be the same URL used by client instances in support of GNAP requests. OPTIONAL.  A list of the AS's supported key proofing mechanisms. The values of this list correspond to possible values of the "proof" field of the key section of the request. </ins> 3.2.
Code change:
Expands the definition of the resource set registration protocol, used by an RS to declare a resource set to an AS at runtime and receive a reference identifier for that resource set to hand to a client.
:heavycheckmark: Deploy Preview for gnap-resource-servers-editors-draft ready! :hammer: Explore the source changes: f9aac0b2af163c0f9a58ba17e93db7e8956140bf :mag: Inspect the deploy log: :sunglasses: Browse the preview:
Registering a Resource Handle: Editor's note: It's not an exact match here because the "resource_handle" returned now represents a collection of objects instead of a single one. Perhaps we should let this return a list of strings instead? Or use a different syntax than the resource request? Also, this borrows heavily from UMA 2's "distributed authorization" model and, like UMA, might be better suited to an extension than the core protocol

Related discussion:
text: If the RS needs to, it can post a set of resources as described in the Resource Access Rights section of I-D.ietf-gnap-core-protocol to <del> the AS's resource registration endpoint. </del> <ins> the AS's resource registration endpoint along with information about what the RS will need to validate the request. REQUIRED.  The list of access rights associated with the request in the format described in the "Resource Access Rights" section of I-D.ietf-gnap-core-protocol. REQUIRED.  The identification used to authenticate the resource server making this call, either by value or by reference as described in authentication. OPTIONAL.  The token format required to access the identified resource.  If the field is omitted, the token format is at the discretion of the AS.  If the AS does not support the requested token format, the AS MUST return an error to the RS. OPTIONAL.  If present and set to "true", the RS expects to make a token introspection request as described in introspection.  If absent or set to "false", the RS does not anticipate needing to make an introspection request for tokens relating to this resource set. </ins> The RS MUST identify itself with its own key and sign the request. <del> The AS responds with a handle appropriate to represent the resources list that the RS presented. </del> <ins> The AS responds with a reference appropriate to represent the resources list that the RS presented in its request as well as any additional information the RS might need in future requests. REQUIRED.  A single string representing the list of resources registered in the request.  The RS MAY make this handle available to a client instance as part of a discovery response as described in I-D.ietf-gnap-core-protocol or as documentation to client software developers. </ins> <del> The RS MAY make this handle available as part of a discovery response as described in I-D.ietf-gnap-core-protocol or as documentation to developers. </del> <ins> OPTIONAL.  An instance identifier that the RS can use to refer to itself in future calls to the AS, in lieu of sending its key by value. </ins> <del> [[ See issue #117 [2] ]] </del> <ins> OPTIONAL.  The introspection endpoint of this AS, used to allow the RS to perform token introspection. </ins> 4.
Code change:
Expands the definition of the resource set registration protocol, used by an RS to declare a resource set to an AS at runtime and receive a reference identifier for that resource set to hand to a client.
:heavycheckmark: Deploy Preview for gnap-resource-servers-editors-draft ready! :hammer: Explore the source changes: f9aac0b2af163c0f9a58ba17e93db7e8956140bf :mag: Inspect the deploy log: :sunglasses: Browse the preview:
Registering a Resource Handle: Editor's note: It's not an exact match here because the "resource_handle" returned now represents a collection of objects instead of a single one. Perhaps we should let this return a list of strings instead? Or use a different syntax than the resource request? Also, this borrows heavily from UMA 2's "distributed authorization" model and, like UMA, might be better suited to an extension than the core protocol

Related discussion:
text: itself with its own key in the "client" field and sign the request just as any client instance would. <del> [[ See issue #116 [3] ]] </del> <ins> [[ See issue #116 [2] ]] </ins> The AS responds with a token for the downstream RS2 as described in I-D.ietf-gnap-core-protocol.  The downstream RS2 could repeat this
Code change:
Expands the definition of the resource set registration protocol, used by an RS to declare a resource set to an AS at runtime and receive a reference identifier for that resource set to hand to a client.
:heavycheckmark: Deploy Preview for gnap-resource-servers-editors-draft ready! :hammer: Explore the source changes: f9aac0b2af163c0f9a58ba17e93db7e8956140bf :mag: Inspect the deploy log: :sunglasses: Browse the preview:
Registering a Resource Handle: Editor's note: It's not an exact match here because the "resource_handle" returned now represents a collection of objects instead of a single one. Perhaps we should let this return a list of strings instead? Or use a different syntax than the resource request? Also, this borrows heavily from UMA 2's "distributed authorization" model and, like UMA, might be better suited to an extension than the core protocol

Related discussion:
text: [1] https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/115 <del> [2] https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/117 [3] https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/116 </del> <ins> [2] https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/116 </ins>
Code change:
This adds an XML example. The only question is whether we need a prefix for ietf-https-notif in the example.

Related discussion:
text: 6. <del> Encoding notifications for the HTTPS notifications is the same as the encoding notifications as defined in RFC8040 Section 6.4, with the following changes.  Instead of saying that for JSON-encoding purposes, the module name for "notification" element will be "ietf- restconf, it will say that for JSON-encoding purposes, the module name for "notification" element will be "ietf-https-notif". With those changes, the SSE event notification encoded JSON example that would be sent over the HTTPS notif transport would appear as follows: </del> <ins> Notifications are encoded as defined in RFC8040 Section 6.4.  The examples in that section apply for sending notifications over the "https-notif" based transport. An example of YANG-Push in JSON would look something like this: An example of YANG-Push in XML would look something like this: </ins> 7.
Code change:
Issue
NAME NAME pl review re issue
Looks good
the examples of errors use a pattern of using a link in a header, and then (supposedly) using a human-readable error message. what about using RFC 7807 instead and using examples that use problem reports to indicate failure semantics in addition to the status code?
I agree. coming up in the next draft.
NAME should we close this issue if it is resolved?
NAME closing this issue. Let me know if not addressed with my latest PR.

Related discussion:
text: If the "Idempotency-Key" request header is missing for a documented idempotent operation requiring this header, the resource server SHOULD reply with an HTTP "400" status code with body containing a <del> link pointing to relevant documentation.  Alternately, using the HTTP header "Link", the client can be informed about the error as shown below. </del> <ins> link pointing to relevant documentation.  Following examples shows an error response describing the problem using RFC7807. Alternately, using the HTTP header "Link", the client can be informed about the error as shown below. </ins> If there is an attempt to reuse an idempotency key with a different request payload, the resource server SHOULD reply with a HTTP "422" status code with body containing a link pointing to relevant documentation.  The status code "422" is defined in Section 11.2 of <del> RFC4918.  The server can also inform the client by using the HTTP header "Link" as shown below. </del> <ins> RFC4918. The server can also inform the client by using the HTTP header "Link" as shown below. </ins> If the request is retried, while the original request is still being processed, the resource server SHOULD reply with an HTTP "409" status <del> code with body containing a link or the HTTP header "Link" pointing to the relevant documentation. </del> <ins> code with body containing problem description. Or, alternately using the HTTP header "Link" pointing to the relevant documentation </ins> Error scenarios above describe the status of failed idempotent requests after the resource server prcocesses them.  Clients MUST
Code change:
Change "Evidence Appraisal Policy" -> "Appraisal Policy for Evidence" Fixes editorial nit reported to me by Tolga Acar Signed-off-by: Dave Thaler
looks good.

Related discussion:
text: An Attester creates Evidence that is conveyed to a Verifier. The Verifier uses the Evidence, and any Endorsements from Endorsers, <del> by applying an Evidence Appraisal Policy to assess the </del> <ins> by applying an Appraisal Policy for Evidence to assess the </ins> trustworthiness of the Attester, and generates Attestation Results for use by Relying Parties.  The Appraisal Policy for Evidence might be obtained from an Endorser along with the Endorsements, or might be
Code change:
Also, my assumption is that all messages, configs and such go over one of the arrows in the figure. There are no back channels for things that are vital to or a major part of attestation. Seems like it would be a poor document if the major parts of attestation are not explicitly carried in the flows depicted.

Related discussion:
text: by applying an Appraisal Policy for Evidence to assess the trustworthiness of the Attester, and generates Attestation Results for use by Relying Parties.  The Appraisal Policy for Evidence might <del> be obtained from an Endorser along with the Endorsements, or might be obtained via some other mechanism such as being configured in the Verifier by an administrator. </del> <ins> be obtained from an Endorser along with the Endorsements, and/or might be obtained via some other mechanism such as being configured in the Verifier by the Verifier Owner. </ins> The Relying Party uses Attestation Results by applying its own Appraisal Policy to make application-specific decisions such as authorization decisions.  The Appraisal Policy for Attestation <del> Results might, for example, be configured in the Relying Party by an administrator. </del> <ins> Results is configured in the Relying Party by the Relying Party Owner, and/or is programmed into the Relying Party. </ins> 4.1.
Code change:
Merged from draft-thaler-rats-URL Signed-off-by: Dave Thaler
PR and PR merged text that I had, and continue to have, problems with. A summary of the problems follows: 1) It includes events (CC, RP) that are not used in any checks in the text. I had pointed this out before when the PR was generated, but the PR was merged without addressing this comment. 2) The section about using timestamps with synchronized clocks was removed and replaced with a section that talks about a different mechanism (handles) that is not in any RFC or WG document. I believe that such replacement is inappropriate. If the WG adopts a document that talks about a handle distribution mechanism, then a section can be added. Or if there is a standard from another org that can be referenced then it's fine to add one in that case too. But I think it should not replace the section discussing the well known technique of synchronized clocks (e.g., using secure NTP, or PTP (IEEE 1588-2002) or whatever other standard mechanism). 3) time(HD) is problematic as phrased since all the other events are times as seen by a single entity, whereas time(HD) does not clearly say whose perspective (i.e., whose clock) it is from... is it the distributor's? Text is unclear. 4) It talks about nonces in a timestamp section, which I think causes confusion since there's already a separately section about nonces and this section is labeled to be scoped to timestamps. Addressing might address this naturally, if it uses a different section title. 5) There are some editorial typos, such as capital "The" in the middle of a sentence, etc. 6) I have no idea what "delta(time(HD),time(EG))distribution-interval" is supposed to mean. Normally I would expect an equality for any condition to be evaluated, but I have no idea what this check is. 7) time(HD) and time(EG) are according to different clocks (if my guess about point 3 above is right) and so the delta is not directly comparable. I'm not sure how point 6 accounts for this. 8) The phrase "A nonce not predictable to an Attester (recentness & uniqueness) is sent to an Attester" has "(recentness & uniqueness)" which doesn't read well (sounds like bad grammar) to me, and is not explained.
Hopefully PR now addresses this issue.
PR reverts the text, leaving the work in progress in PR
fixed by .

Related discussion:
text: 12. <ins> This document does not require any actions by IANA. 13. </ins> Special thanks go to David Wooten, Joerg Borchert, Hannes Tschofenig, Laurence Lundblade, Diego Lopez, Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay, Frank Xia, and Nancy Cam-Winget.
Code change:
adding the Reference Values to fix issue 185
` And the Verifier uses the Reference Values
I agree that Reference Values should be mentioned here.

Related discussion:
text: An Attester creates Evidence that is conveyed to a Verifier. <del> The Verifier uses the Evidence, and any Endorsements from Endorsers, by applying an Appraisal Policy for Evidence to assess the trustworthiness of the Attester, and generates Attestation Results for use by Relying Parties.  The Appraisal Policy for Evidence might be obtained from an Endorser along with the Endorsements, and/or might be obtained via some other mechanism such as being configured in the Verifier by the Verifier Owner. </del> <ins> The Verifier uses the Evidence, any Reference Values from Reference Value Providers, and any Endorsements from Endorsers, by applying an Appraisal Policy for Evidence to assess the trustworthiness of the Attester, and generates Attestation Results for use by Relying Parties.  The Appraisal Policy for Evidence might be obtained from an Endorser along with the Endorsements, and/or might be obtained via some other mechanism such as being configured in the Verifier by the Verifier Owner. </ins> The Relying Party uses Attestation Results by applying its own appraisal policy to make application-specific decisions such as
Code change:
update the "Combinations" section to fix issue .
How does this show that both models are required in this example? I suggest changing this sentence in this way. Because I think the combinations have several possibilities and there is no need to detail all possibilities. Any other thoughts?

Related discussion:
text: It is also worth pointing out that the choice of model is generally up to the Relying Party.  The same device may need to create Evidence for different Relying Parties and/or different use cases.  For <del> instance, it would provide Evidence to a network infrastructure device to gain access to the network, and to a server holding confidential data to gain access to that data.  As such, both models may simultaneously be in use by the same device. </del> <ins> instance, it would use one model to provide Evidence to a network infrastructure device to gain access to the network, and the other model to provide Evidence to a server holding confidential data to gain access to that data.  As such, both models may simultaneously be in use by the same device. </ins> combination shows another example of a combination where Relying Party 1 uses the passport model, whereas Relying Party 2 uses an
Code change:
Signed-off-by: Dave Thaler
` Isolate? From what? “Isolation” seems to be used several times in this and later sections without saying who’s isolating what from whom.
I don't understand that sentence either. Propose removing it. Another sentence: Propose removing "isolation and" Other uses of isolation I think are fine, where it means that an Attesting Environment cannot be modified by a Target Environment it measures. Any way of protecting that might be called "isolating" the two environments from each other in some way.

Related discussion:
text: As a system bus-connected entity, a Verifier consumes Evidence from other devices connected to the system bus that implement Attester roles.  As a wide-area network connected entity, it may implement an <del> Attester role.  The entity, as a system bus Verifier, may choose to fully isolate its role as a wide-area network Attester. </del> <ins> Attester role. </ins> In essence, an entity that combines more than one role creates and consumes the corresponding conceptual messages as defined in this