Code change:
interaction models in general, the following set of prerequisites MUST be in place to support the implementation of interaction models: <del> A statement about a distinguishable Attester made by an Endorser without accompanying evidence about its validity, used as proof of identity. </del> <ins> An Authentication Secret MUST be available exclusively to an Attesting Environment of an Attester. The Attester MUST protect Claims with that Authentication Secret, thereby proving the authenticity of the Claims included in Evidence.  The Authentication Secret MUST be established before RATS can take place. A statement about a distinguishable Attester made by an Endorser. </ins> The provenance of Evidence with respect to a distinguishable Attesting Environment MUST be correct and unambiguous. <del> An Attester Identity MAY be a unique identity, MAY be included in a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), MAY be part of a group signature, or it MAY be a randomized DAA credential DAA. </del> <ins> An Attester Identity MAY be an Authentication Secret which is available exclusively to one of the Attesting Environments of an Attester.  It MAY be a unique identity, MAY be included in a zero- knowledge proof (ZKP), MAY be part of a group signature, or it MAY be a randomized DAA credential DAA. </ins> Attestation Evidence MUST be authentic. In order to provide proofs of authenticity, Attestation Evidence SHOULD be cryptographically associated with an identity document <del> (e.g. an PKIX certificate or trusted key material, or a randomized DAA credential DAA), or SHOULD include a correct and unambiguous and stable reference to an accessible identity document. An Authentication Secret MUST be available exclusively to an Attester's Attesting Environment. The Attester MUST protect Claims with that Authentication Secret, thereby proving the authenticity of the Claims included in Evidence.  The Authentication Secret MUST be established before RATS can take place. </del> <ins> (e.g., a PKIX certificate or trusted key material, or a randomized DAA credential DAA), or SHOULD include a correct, unambiguous and stable reference to an accessible identity document. </ins> Evidence MUST include an indicator about its freshness that can be understood by a Verifier.  Analogously, interaction models MUST

Related discussion:
text: Signed-off-by: Michael Eckel
Based on URL Previous section says “Attester Identity” is about “a distinguishable Attesting Environment”, and here says it’s about “a distinguishable Attester”.
How to understand “without accompanying evidence about its validity”?
I think it means that there is no certificate conveyed along with it which proves its validity.
I think this is related to and should be fixed.
Based on URL The Attester Identity is to identify which Attester the Evidence comes from. But if the Attester has multiple Attesting Environments, what should be the Attester Identity?
The TPM’s AIK certificate is one kind of Attester Identity, right?
"The TPM’s AIK certificate is one kind of Attester Identity, right?": Correct.
"The Attester Identity is to identify which Attester the Evidence comes from. But if the Attester has multiple Attesting Environments, what should be the Attester Identity?" I see the point, too, and agree. So, perhaps it should be renamed to "Attesting Environment identity"!? The Attester Identity then should be something different. It may be the TPM AK/AIK of one of the Attesting Environments, but not necessarily.
As discussed, polish can happen later Hi Henk, I've reviewed the reference interaction models I-D recently, I hope the comments below can help improve the draft before the IETF110 draft submission cut-off. Section 3 Disambiguation Comment > This section is talking about the disambiguation of terminology, so I suggest making it a sub-section of Section 2 Terminology. Examples of these types of co-located environments include: a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), Baseboard Management Controllers (BMCs), as well as other physical or logical protected/isolated/shielded Computing Environments (e.g. embedded Secure Elements (eSE) or Trusted Platform Modules (TPM)). Comment > About "these types of co-located environments", The previous sentences are about the Verifier and Attester don't need to be remote. So "these" is weird here, because here is about the attesting environment and target environment. Section 5 Direct Anonymous Attestation Comment > I think it's better to move this section to the bottom of the draft.