jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
Code change:
_mandatory_ <del> A statement about a distinguishable Attester made by an Endorser without accompanying evidence about its validity - used as proof of identity. _mandatory_ </del> A statement representing an identifier list that MUST be associated with corresponding Authentication Secrets used to protect Claims included in Evidence.

Related discussion:
text: o The associated private keys are used by the DAA Issuer to provide an Attester with a credential that it can use to convince the Verifier that its Evidence is valid. To keep their anonymity the Attester randomizes this credential each time that it is used. Comment > How to understand "Evidence is valid"? Does it mean the Evidence is sent from an authentic Attester and not tampered during the conveyance? Or does it mean the Evidence comes from a RoT and is trustable (although the Evidence can diverge from the Reference Values)? Comment > When saying "Attester randomizes this credential", how many credentials does an Attester have? 1) Can a DAA Issuer have multiple key pairs and use them for one Attester? 2) Can a DAA Issuer use one key pair to generate multiple credentials for one Attester? o A credential is conveyed from an Endorser to an Attester in combination with the conveyance of the public key certificates from Endorser to Verifier. Comment > Is there another way to convey the public key certificate, for example, can the public key certificates be conveyed from Endorser to Attester first and then from Attester to Verifier? The zero-knowledge proofs required cannot be created by an Attester alone - like the Endorsements of RoTs - and have to be created by a trustable third entity - like an Endorser. Due to that semantic overlap, the Endorser role is augmented via the definition of DAA duties as defined below. This augmentation enables the Endorser to convey trustable third party statements both to Verifier roles and Attester roles. Comment > For "the definition of DAA duties as defined below", what is the definition of DAA duties? Comment > In the last sentence, the Endorsement with its original definition is the third party statement for Verifier and Attester, isn't it? So, "augmentation" isn't the correct expression. Section 6 Normative Prerequisites Attester Identity: The provenance of Evidence with respect to a distinguishable Attesting Environment MUST be correct and unambiguous. Comment > The Attester Identity is to identify which Attester the Evidence comes from. But if the Attester has multiple Attesting Environments, what should be the Attester Identity?
Code change:
_mandatory_ <del> A statement about a distinguishable Attester made by an Endorser without accompanying evidence about its validity - used as proof of identity. _mandatory_ </del> A statement representing an identifier list that MUST be associated with corresponding Authentication Secrets used to protect Claims included in Evidence.

Related discussion:
text: Comment > The TPM's AIK certificate is one kind of Attester Identity, right? Attestation Evidence Authenticity: Attestation Evidence MUST be correct and authentic. Comment > Is it appropriate to say "correct Evidence"? If saying so, I think it means that the Evidence satisfies the Attestation Policy for Evidence. Authentication Secret: An Authentication Secret MUST be available exclusively to an Attester's Attesting Environment. The Attester MUST protect Claims with that Authentication Secret, thereby proving the authenticity of the Claims included in Evidence. The Authentication Secret MUST be established before RATS can take place. Comment > Does the Authentication Secret represent the identity of the Attesting Environment? Comment > How to understand the Authentication Secret, and is it necessary all the time? For example, in our implementation, during the router booting up, the BIOS measures the BootLoader and records the measured hash value into the TPM, and the BootLoader measures the OS Kernel and records the measured hash value into the TPM as well. From the Layered Attestation perspective, I think (BIOS + TPM) is the Attesting Environment and (BootLoader + TPM) is also the Attesting Environment. But the Claims (measured hash values) aren't protected separately, and they finally becomes the Evidence (TPM Quote) and it's only protected by the TPM's AIK. So, what is the Authentication Secret? Section 7 Generic Information Elements Attester Identity ('attesterIdentity'): mandatory A statement about a distinguishable Attester made by an Endorser without accompanying evidence about its validity - used as proof of identity. Comment > Previous section says "Attester Identity" is about "a distinguishable Attesting Environment", and here says it's about "a distinguishable Attester". Comment > How to understand "without accompanying evidence about its validity"? Attester Identity ('attesterIdentity'): mandatory In DAA, the Attester's identity is not revealed to the verifier. The Attester is issued with a credential by the Endorser that is randomized and then used to anonymously confirm the validity of their evidence. The evidence is verified using the Endorser's public key. Comment > I think here means the DAA credential represents the Attester Identity. Comment > There is ambiguity of "that is randomized", does it mean randomized Endorser or randomized credential?
Code change:
_mandatory_ <del> A statement about a distinguishable Attester made by an Endorser without accompanying evidence about its validity - used as proof of identity. _mandatory_ </del> A statement representing an identifier list that MUST be associated with corresponding Authentication Secrets used to protect Claims included in Evidence.

Related discussion:
text: Comment > For "confirm the validity of their evidence", what does "their" refer to? And what does "the validity of evidence" mean? Authentication Secret IDs ('authSecID'): mandatory A statement representing an identifier list that MUST be associated with corresponding Authentication Secrets used to protect Evidence. Comment > Previous section says "Authentication Secret" is used to protect Claims, but here says it's used to protect Evidence. Comment > As I understand, if Authentication Secret represents the identity of Attesting Environment, then it's not mandatory, at least in our implementation. Authentication Secret IDs ('authSecID'): mandatory In DAA, Authentication Secret IDs are represented by the Endorser (DAA issuer)'s public key that MUST be used to create DAA credentials for the corresponding Authentication Secrets used to protect Evidence. In DAA, an Authentication Secret ID does not identify a unique Attesting Environment but associated with a group of Attesting Environments. This is because an Attesting Environment should not be distinguishable and the DAA credential which represents the Attesting Environment is randomised each time it used. Comment > In my understanding, here says that the DAA credential identities the Attesting Environment. Compared with the description in the "Attester Identity" part, what does the DAA credential represent actually? Reference Claims ('refClaims') mandatory Reference Claims are components of Reference Values as defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]. [Editor's Note: Definition might become obsolete, if replaced by Reference Values. Is there a difference between Claims and Values here? Analogously, why is not named Reference Claims in the RATS arch?] Comment > I suggest using Reference Values to keep consistent with the RATS arch. Reference Claims are used to appraise the Claims received from an Attester via appraisal by direct comparison. Comment > "Direct comparison" isn't the correct expression, the comparison can have other rules. Claim Selection ('claimSelection'): optional A statement that represents a (sub-)set of Claims that can be created by an Attester. Claim Selections can act as filters that can specify the exact set of Claims to be included in Evidence. An Attester MAY decide whether or not to provide all Claims as requested via a Claim Selection.
Code change:
_mandatory_ <del> A statement about a distinguishable Attester made by an Endorser without accompanying evidence about its validity - used as proof of identity. _mandatory_ </del> A statement representing an identifier list that MUST be associated with corresponding Authentication Secrets used to protect Claims included in Evidence.

Related discussion:
text: Comment > The "all Claims" may be ambiguous, I'd like to double check, does it refer to all Claims that the Attester can create or refer to all Claims requested in the Claim Selection? Section 8.1 Challenge/Response Remote Attestation Comment > In the sequence diagram, some elements in the bracket are not defined in the "Information Elements" section, such as targetEnvironment, collectedClaims, eventLog. Should these elements be defined? Section 9 Additional Application-Specific Requirements Depending on the use cases covered, there can be additional requirements. An exemplary subset is illustrated in this section. Comment > Here starts to talk about "additional requirements", but I wonder there is no other places in this draft talking about requirement, so what are the basic requirements? Regards & Thanks! Wei Pan
Code change:
should be able to use those records while safely ignoring the third record. <del> To avoid name lookup deadlock, Designated Resolvers SHOULD follow the guidance in Section 10 of RFC8484 regarding the avoidance of DNS- based references that block the completion of the TLS handshake. </del> <ins> To avoid name lookup deadlock, clients that use Designated Resolvers need to ensure that a specific Encrypted Resolver is not used for any queries that are needed to resolve the name of the resolver itself or to perform certificate revocation checks for the resolver, as described in Section 10 of RFC8484.  Designated Resolvers need to ensure this deadlock is avoidable as described in Section 10 of RFC8484. </ins> This document focuses on discovering DoH, DoT, and DoQ Designated Resolvers.  Other protocols can also use the format defined by I-

Related discussion:
text: DISCUSS: CC NAME See my discuss on draft-ietf-add-ddr-11 for my generic ADD DNR/DDR concerns Resolver without some sort of validation Why not? What is the alternative? Using unencrypted DNS to the party that told you how and where to contact these (unvalidated) Designated Resolvers. Resolver that does not use a private or local IP address and can be verified using the mechanism described in Section 4.2, it MAY be used on different network connections so long as the subsequent connections over other networks can also be successfully verified using the mechanism described in Section 4.2. This seems to go against a lot of advise in the documents that networks must be treated independently. Also, the network wants you to use their designated resolver, so to say it is okay to use a totally different Designated Resolvers seems to violate the whole DNR/DDR architecture. This will also cause failure if there is split-DNS or internal-only data. Also, using "public IP" is not a good trustworthy method to prove that these IPs are truly the same Designated Resolver used by both networks. I can easily use an internal only zone with . IN A 8.8.8.8 and get a valid ACME'd certificate with SAN=. The user connecting to another network might now be switching from my private DNS on my stolen 8.8.8.8 IP to the real google DNS. address of the designating Unencrypted Resolver in a subjectAltName extension. How feasible is it to get a certificate with SAN=ip from one of the generally accepted root store CA's? Can you give me one example where I can get a certificate for with SAN=193.110.157.123 ? I do not think this is currently possible or easy. If I am right, that means all of Section 4.2 is wishful thinking and not realistic to get rolled out. (I know we can see the cert for 1.1.1.1, so it is possible, but I know of no ACME supported CA that issues these) discovered Designated Resolver. This creates a strange policy when compared to DNR where if you get a DHCP or RA for the Designated Resolver, which is also not validatable, that you do end up using it?
Code change:
should be able to use those records while safely ignoring the third record. <del> To avoid name lookup deadlock, Designated Resolvers SHOULD follow the guidance in Section 10 of RFC8484 regarding the avoidance of DNS- based references that block the completion of the TLS handshake. </del> <ins> To avoid name lookup deadlock, clients that use Designated Resolvers need to ensure that a specific Encrypted Resolver is not used for any queries that are needed to resolve the name of the resolver itself or to perform certificate revocation checks for the resolver, as described in Section 10 of RFC8484.  Designated Resolvers need to ensure this deadlock is avoidable as described in Section 10 of RFC8484. </ins> This document focuses on discovering DoH, DoT, and DoQ Designated Resolvers.  Other protocols can also use the format defined by I-

Related discussion:
text: And section 6.5 states DNR trumps DDR. address, clients MAY choose to opportunistically use the Designated Resolver even without this certificate check (Section 4.3). Why only when the IP is the same? Why not for when the IP is different? What's to lose, since the only fallback option is stick to using the unencrypted resolver? yields an IP address that was not presented in the Additional Answers section or ipv4hint or ipv6hint fields of the original SVCB query, the connection made to that IP address MUST pass the same TLS certificate checks before being allowed to replace a previously known and validated IP address for the same Designated Resolver name. How does the appearance of an (unsigned) Additional Answer entry convey any kind of real world trust/authentication? In other words, why should it not ALWAYS pass the same TLS certificate checks ? is to use unencrypted DNS, why not just use it anyway? use DDR to discover details about all supported encrypted DNS protocols. It's a little odd to mention this as the DNR draft really tries hard to say to only use the network's offered encrypted DNS servers, so this option is in conflict with the DNR draft. Unfortunately, all currently deployed software does not know this, so it will be very common that this happens. URL SHOULD treat URL as a locally served zone per [RFC6303] Why is this not a MUST ? queries being dropped either maliciously or unintentionally, clients can re-send their SVCB queries periodically. I don't see how this would improve security for the client. It also mixes up behaviour of proper DNS clients that have their own retransmit logic for if they get no answer. attack where an attacker can block connections to the encrypted DNS server, and recommends that clients prevent it by switching to SVCB- reliant behavior once SVCB resolution does succeed. For DDR, this means that once a client discovers a compatible Designated Resolver, it SHOULD NOT use unencrypted DNS until the SVCB record expires I wonder which attacker can block encrypted DNS connections but not spoof (or block!) an unsigned SVCB record to the local client? And even if that is the case, this would be a denial of service attack if the DNS client cannot fallback to unencrypted DNS.
Code change:
should be able to use those records while safely ignoring the third record. <del> To avoid name lookup deadlock, Designated Resolvers SHOULD follow the guidance in Section 10 of RFC8484 regarding the avoidance of DNS- based references that block the completion of the TLS handshake. </del> <ins> To avoid name lookup deadlock, clients that use Designated Resolvers need to ensure that a specific Encrypted Resolver is not used for any queries that are needed to resolve the name of the resolver itself or to perform certificate revocation checks for the resolver, as described in Section 10 of RFC8484.  Designated Resolvers need to ensure this deadlock is avoidable as described in Section 10 of RFC8484. </ins> This document focuses on discovering DoH, DoT, and DoQ Designated Resolvers.  Other protocols can also use the format defined by I-

Related discussion:
text: Spoofing an SVCB to a bogus IP with an SVCB TTL of a few hours would be a very cheap 1 packet attack to keep the DNS client down for hours. This seems dangerous to implement. unencrypted DNS MUST NOT provide differentiated behavior based on the HTTP path alone, since an attacker could modify the "dohpath" parameter. For example, if a DoH resolver provides provides a filtering service for one URI path, and a non-filtered service for another URI path, [...] It seems likely that this advise will get ignored a lot, eg by people who have limited public IPs to use to spin up a DoH server, or who have to pay-per-IP. This advise seems more appropriate for local private IP DoH servers. So I would change this MUST NOT to SHOULD NOT for that reason. Unencrypted Resolver, clients applying Verified Discovery (Section 4.2) MUST validate that the IP address of the Unencrypted Resolver is covered by the SubjectAlternativeName of the Designated Resolver's TLS certificate. How would one obtain such a certificate via ACME? Since on the IP of the unencrypted resolver, there would be no HTTP server running? Additionally, if the client notices a failed verification of the Designated Resolver's TLS certificate, wouldn't it fallback to the Unencrypted Resolver? But now it may not? So this becomes a denial of service then ? to cases where the Unencrypted Resolver and Designated Resolver have the same IP address. Based on earlier text, this should read "the same non-public IP address". you use "unilateral probing" (draft-ietf-dprive-unilateral-probing) to just connect to the DoT or DoQ ports of the Unencrypted Resolver and see if you get anything back. It might be unauthenticated TLS but better than port 53? Special-Use Domain Names (SUDN) registry established by [RFC6761]. Why not pick URL As .local is already handled to not be forwarded by DNS forwarders. It would also not require an addition to SUDN. Even if someone was already using URL, it would not interfere with that usage because that usage would not be using SVCB records.
Code change:
should be able to use those records while safely ignoring the third record. <del> To avoid name lookup deadlock, Designated Resolvers SHOULD follow the guidance in Section 10 of RFC8484 regarding the avoidance of DNS- based references that block the completion of the TLS handshake. </del> <ins> To avoid name lookup deadlock, clients that use Designated Resolvers need to ensure that a specific Encrypted Resolver is not used for any queries that are needed to resolve the name of the resolver itself or to perform certificate revocation checks for the resolver, as described in Section 10 of RFC8484.  Designated Resolvers need to ensure this deadlock is avoidable as described in Section 10 of RFC8484. </ins> This document focuses on discovering DoH, DoT, and DoQ Designated Resolvers.  Other protocols can also use the format defined by I-

Related discussion:
text: To avoid name lookup deadlock, Designated Resolvers SHOULD follow the guidance in Section 10 of [RFC8484] regarding the avoidance of DNS- based references that block the completion of the TLS handshake. I find that reference to list more the issues than solutions that can be followed. The solution to use another DoH server is not really appropriate in most cases The client's other interface likely resides on other networks where its private DoH server cannot resolve the name of another network's private DoH server. It is also not easy to get an IP based certificate (eg SAN=ip) that is accepted by general webpki root stores. And things like OCSP stapling doesn't help if the target is malicious - they just would omit the stapling that proves against its malicious use. The only real advise usable from RFC8484 is "use the local unencrypted resolver to resolve the encrypted resolver". Might as well say that and remove the 8484 reference. as the protocol is mentioned throughout the document as interacting with this protocol. when accessing web content on a dual-stack network: A, AAAA, and HTTPS queries. Discovering a Designated Resolver as part of one of these queries, without having to add yet another query, minimizes the total number of queries clients send. I don't understand this paragraph. Once clients can send SVCB queries for web content, they already have had to do all the DDR/DNR related queries, so I don't understand the argument of "saving queries" ? Also, it is adding queries for a specific target, eg URL, and this cannot be "saved" either? What am I misunderstanding here? provides provides -> provides
We should reference Security Considerations, because if you don't have any validation, an attacker can point you to any server they want (someone other than the server you were configured with by DHCP, etc).
We can probably just remove this, not using it in implementations right now.
It's already done by the major public resolvers, and there is an RFC to support this (RFC 8738). The IP address validation is clearly important and a matter of WG consensus. Hopefully, this will push adoption of RFC 8738 by more ACME services.
We can reference the DNR section. The MUST NOT should only apply to DDR, but doesn't invalidate other ways of using the resolver.
Code change:
should be able to use those records while safely ignoring the third record. <del> To avoid name lookup deadlock, Designated Resolvers SHOULD follow the guidance in Section 10 of RFC8484 regarding the avoidance of DNS- based references that block the completion of the TLS handshake. </del> <ins> To avoid name lookup deadlock, clients that use Designated Resolvers need to ensure that a specific Encrypted Resolver is not used for any queries that are needed to resolve the name of the resolver itself or to perform certificate revocation checks for the resolver, as described in Section 10 of RFC8484.  Designated Resolvers need to ensure this deadlock is avoidable as described in Section 10 of RFC8484. </ins> This document focuses on discovering DoH, DoT, and DoQ Designated Resolvers.  Other protocols can also use the format defined by I-

Related discussion:
text: If they are different, it can be a random attacker (see security considerations). The client may also have other better options to fall back to.
Agree, this should be simplified to say "even if you connect over a different IP address for any reason, still validate the original IP address"
There are definitely cases where the client can have directly selected their own resolver name, etc. We don't have to use the network resolver.
Correct, and that's why we need this document, and it was added to the IANA section.
Sure, we can make this a MUST.
It makes the attacker's job harder by requiring them to be persistent. Normal retransmission logic is fine too.
This is a direct outcome of the svcb-dns document. Spoofing SVCB shouldn't be enough to cause a DoS here, because we should continue to use the previously used encrypted DNS server while on this network (even if you get a bad SVCB packet).
For the security reasons, I think this needs to stay as a MUST NOT. However, if you differentiate based on hostname + path, you can still differentiate, it just isn't a differentiation that can be discovered by IP address queries.
Yes, you'd fall back to unencrypted resolution if you can't have a secure trusted connection for encrypted resolution.
Yes, but that part is SHOULD. Will fix.
I think that's just opportunistic DoT / DoQ. That's already specified.
.local is the SUDN for multicast DNS, but it is also squatted on by some internal networks. Following the patterns for URL, etc, .arpa is a much more appropriate name. This is what the group had consensus on years ago and has been deployed widely already.
I think we can say "as explained in RFC 8484, don't loop on the resolver name."
Sure, that's fine.
Yeah, this paragraph is old and can be removed.
Looks good! Just silly editorial nits