jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
Code change:
4.2. <ins> In the specific case of media ingestion into a streaming service, some assumptions can be made about the server-side which simplifies the WebRTC compliance burden, as detailed in WebRTC-gateway document draft-ietf-rtcweb-gateways. </ins> In order to reduce the complexity of implementing WHIP in both clients and media servers, WHIP imposes the following restrictions regarding WebRTC usage:

Related discussion:
text: The text says: "The media codecs used in older protocols do not always match those being used in WebRTC, mandating transcoding on the ingest node," I don't understand this sentence. If I use an "older protocol", e.g, RTMP, why do I need to care about WebRTC codecs?
That refers if you use RTMP for ingest and WebRTC for viewing.
rewriten the editorial in
The text says: "These protocols are much older than webrtc and lack by default some important security and resilience features provided by webrtc with minimal delay." I assume you refer to RTMP, which is mentioned in the previous Section. Doesn't RTMPS solve some of the security issues? But in general, if you want to put up WHIP against RTMP, I think you need a little more text. Also, as WHIP is supposed to be an "easy to implement" protocol, I think it would be fair to also list some of the functions NOT supported compared to e.g., RTMP. As I have mentioned before, there is no command for start the ingestion - it is assumed to have begun when the connection has been established. Also, there is no PAUSE/RESUME.
It is more referring to RTSP which lacks DTLS support. no command for start the ingestion - it is assumed to have begun when the connection has been established. Also, there is no PAUSE/RESUME. RTMP protocol was intended as an RPC mechanism between the flash player and server. It allowed to create custom apps both on client and server side, which supported a wide range of methods using AMF. However, current "RTMP protocol" implemented for ingesting is a reversed engineered version of the implementation done by the FMS and it lacks support for PAUSE/RESUME and the publication is started from the start of the RTMP connection (same as whip).
rewriten the editorial in
Code change:
12.3.16. <del> Protocol Property (Generic) Integer Connection This property specifies the part of the received data that needs to be covered by a checksum.  It is given in Bytes.  A value of 0 means that no checksum is required, and a special value (e.g., -1) indicates full checksum coverage. </del> <ins> Integer Connection Property - see </ins> 12.3.17.

Related discussion:
text: This is the second step towards applying our new Properties Classification. It moves up the Connection Properties and annotates most places with stuff to do.
As discussed in
Thanks for moving this forward! I only found a few nits. Also, I have a question about whether two of these Properties should maybe be changed to be Selection Properties, but that's more of a discussion and not something that needs to be done in this URL modulo NAME commentsI carefully checked it, but I find it very hard to be sure that this is 100% ok (as is usually the case IMO with diff's about text blocks being moved around). My suggestion is to land it and see.
Code change:
stored or transported, as compared to the less efficient text-based form of the original vocabulary. <ins> Through use of CDDL-based integer labels, CoSWID allows for future expansion in subsequent revisions of this specification and through extensions (see model-extension).  New constructs can be associated with a new integer index.  A deprecated construct can be replaced by a new construct with a new integer index.  An implementation can use these integer indexes to identify the construct to parse.  The CoSWID Items registry, defined in iana-coswid-items, is used to ensure that new constructs are assigned a unique index value on a first-come, first-served basis.  This approach avoids the need to have an explicit CoSWID version. </ins> The root of the CDDL specification provided by this document is the rule "coswid" (as defined in tagged):

Related discussion:
text: Addressed the following comments: [Per IETF 110] Add text on the order of native CDDL approach for handling version is used. If a future version of SWID is published which alters the semantics of exists fields, a future version of CoSWID SHOULD (MUST?) use a different tag to represent it. [daw: A new paragraph was added to section 2 detailing how index values are used to support revisions and extensions.] [Per IETF 110] see -16. Use ISO SWID reference for the IANA registry and if desired, used [SEMVER] as an informal reference in the text [daw: This has been done in section 4.1.] [daw: The FIXME markers have been replaced with actual text.] [daw: Section 7 now details the construction of a signed CoSWID. A SHOULD sign requirement was also added to section 7.] [Per IETF 110] We discussed adding language on the order of "This document specifies a data format and an associated integrity mechanism agnostic of a deployment. Application which choose to use CoSWID will need to specify explicit guidance which security properties are needed and under which circumstances." > ** [-15] Section 6. Per "When an authoritative tag is signed, the software [daw: Authenticating the signer is the software provider will require a match between a CoSWID entity and the signer. We are working out a means to do this.] 2 [daw: Not sure which tags this applies to? Signing? All of section 2?] [daw: done.] [daw: This confusing text has been removed.] [daw: done.] [daw: We added a note about this.] [daw: Done.] [daw: Added signature validation as a way.] Regards, Roman
Code change:
5.1. The media type is "application/dns-udpwireformat".  The body is the <del> DNS on-the-wire format is defined in RFC1035.  The body MUST be encoded with base64url RFC4648.  Padding characters for base64url MUST NOT be included. </del> <ins> DNS on-the-wire format is defined in RFC1035. When using the GET method, the body MUST be encoded with base64url RFC4648.  Padding characters for base64url MUST NOT be included. When using the POST method, the body is not encoded. </ins> DNS API clients using the DNS wire format MAY have one or more EDNS(0) extensions RFC6891 in the request.

Related discussion:
text: I think that we should specify behaviour for truncated responses with the TC bit more clearly. Right now the text is a little vague. There seem to be three options: mandate the generation of an HTTP error mandate the forwarding of the truncated response explicitly allow either forbid the use of truncated responses and recommend fallback to TCP if the DNS API server is just making DNS requests to another server I think that the draft current vacilates in the direction of 3, but I tend to like 1 or 4. Choosing 4 wouldn't be consistent with the dnsop DNS-over-HTTP draft using DOH though.
is the right answer, so the text should just be stronger about it. If DOH requires or , that means that the DNS server code will need to be heavily reworked to capture these from going out, which seems pointless. DOH clients can act like normal stubs: either they do or don't know about truncation and TC.
I agree - I don't think doh needs to behave differently here than any other datagram based client - i.e. its not a transport error. NAME can you do a pr to clarify?
Will do.
Code change:
RFC2119. This document assumes that readers are familiar with the terms and <del> concepts that are used in RFC6455 and RFC7252. </del> <ins> concepts that are used in RFC6455, RFC7252, and RFC7641. </ins> The term "reliable transport" only refers to stream-based transport protocols such as TCP.

Related discussion:
text: Added tag for updates: Removed Observe references scattered throughout the draft Added appendix to collect clarifications to RFC7641 in one place
Captured from : There needs to be a section on how resources can be observed over TCP/TLS. Questions include: Do servers need to include a sequence number in notifications, given that TCP/TLS provides reliable, in-order delivery? How do servers throttle the stream of notifications when the resource changes its state more frequently than the server can send notifications? Does a client have to re-register its interest in a resource if it hasn't received a notification for a while but the connection is still up?
URL In a conference call with Klaus, Simon, Bill and myself we discussed the issue and the raised questions. QUESTION 1: Do servers need to include a sequence number in notifications, given that TCP/TLS provides reliable, in-order delivery? The text from the CoAP over Websockets could be re-used. Here is what it could say: Since the TCP provides ordered delivery of messages, the mechanism for reordering detection when observing resources [RFC7641] is not needed. The value of the Observe Option in notifications therefore MAY be empty on transmission and MUST be ignored on reception. The Observe Option still has to be sent since it contains other information as well. QUESTION 2: Does a client have to re-register its interest in a resource if it hasn't received a notification for a while but the connection is still up? We believe it is enough to send keep-alive message for the CoAP over TCP draft (as opposed to send a re-registration message when used over UDP). QUESTION 3: How do servers throttle the stream of notifications when the resource changes its state more frequently than the server can send notifications? TCP offers a flow control mechanism as a means for the receiver to govern the amount of data sent by the sender. This is functionality that can be re-used.
URL (1) -- I agree with the proposed solution. (2) -- we need text that empty messages are no-ops and can be used as a keep-alive mechanism. (3) -- this is a problem that most applications that start using reliable streams run into. Early implementations sometimes ignore the need for proper flow control.
Code change:
RFC2119. This document assumes that readers are familiar with the terms and <del> concepts that are used in RFC6455 and RFC7252. </del> <ins> concepts that are used in RFC6455, RFC7252, and RFC7641. </ins> The term "reliable transport" only refers to stream-based transport protocols such as TCP.

Related discussion:
text: That is not a reason to add more mechanism (that would also not be in those early implementations), but the solution should be to use the flow control mechanisms we already have. Maybe an LWIG document could have information about flow control support in implementations, e.g., ​URL
URL Has someone thought about the following setup, that is, will it work with keep-alives only? There is a cluster behind a load balancer. I client sets up a connection, is assigned to one node and starts observing. For some reason the node fails and through a fail-over strategy the client is handed over to another node. All further requests are answered transparently be the new node. However, the Observe relationship got lost...
URL Subissue 1 is covered by the Websockets draft; close this when merged. Subissue 2 is covered by text in the Websockets draft; the failover problem described can be addressed by proper implementation of failover. This may however be costly, so we should have some more discussion about this. Subissue 3 is an implementation quality issue. Just don't implement stream-based without some flow control.
On the 7/6 call with the authors, NAME agreed to review and determine whether all issues were addressed.
This issue does not include a question about the use of confirmable messages for notifications in to determine client aliveness and interest: A notification can be confirmable or non-confirmable ... An acknowledgement message signals to the server that the client is alive and interested in receiving further notifications; if the server does not receive an acknowledgement in reply to a confirmable notification, it will assume that the client is no longer interested and will eventually remove the associated entry from the list of observers This is inappropriate for CoAP over reliable transports.
The phrasing is a bit unfortunate. What is meant is "if the confirmable notification times out". The same would be true in TCP -- if the connection times out, you remove the interests. We could clarify this in a section of CoAP-TCP about the impact of no longer sending back and forth acknowledgements.
Discussing the scope of this issue with the authors. This probably needs a more complete treatment rather than small references like: Since the TCP protocol provides ordered delivery of messages, the mechanism for reordering detection when observing resources [RFC7641] is not needed.
Code change:
RFC2119. This document assumes that readers are familiar with the terms and <del> concepts that are used in RFC6455 and RFC7252. </del> <ins> concepts that are used in RFC6455, RFC7252, and RFC7641. </ins> The term "reliable transport" only refers to stream-based transport protocols such as TCP.

Related discussion:
text: The value of the Observe Option in notifications MAY be empty on transmission and MUST be ignored on reception.
My reading of the discussion thread gives me the impression that we had closed the initial set of questions. The subsequently raised issue regarding the wording in RFC 7641 I am wondering whether there is any change needed. We definitely are not going to change RFC 7641. I personally don't think that the highlighted text from RFC7641 will be wrongly implemented. I would suggest to close issue.
NAME - this would be - any comments on that pull request?
Code change:
If the argument is "Nothing" or contains multiple nodes, the result is "Nothing". <del> Note: a Singular Query may be used anywhere where a ValueType is </del> <ins> Note: a singular query may be used anywhere where a ValueType is </ins> expected, so there is no need to use the "value" function extension <del> with a Singular Query. </del> <ins> with a singular query. </ins> 2.6.9.

Related discussion:
text: Also, delete a term which is used only in the definition of the next term. Fixes URL
I only found the two occurrences you suggested changing. If there are others, please let me know!
Sometimes the spec uses "Singular Query" and sometimes "singular query". We should be consistent. (If we decide to use lower case, it's probably best to address this issue after PR has been merged, since that PR adds some usages of "Singular Query".) Also, there is one instance of "Logical context", which I think would be better uncapitalised ("logical context").
Thanks.
Code change:
Specify a Local Endpoint using a STUN server: <del> 6.1.4. </del> <ins> 6.1.5. </ins> Specify a Local Endpoint using an Any-Source Multicast group to join on a named local interface:

Related discussion:
text: Explain the different use-cases on specifying interfaces to
There's something obvious I'm not seeing: if I want to specify a multicast or link-local address for an endpoint, why not simply specify that address? What's the use of adding the interface into it? Some addresses will inherently limit interfaces; I thought interface preference was about preferring wifi to 4G, etc.
Like, in section 6.1.1:
Multicast groups can be scoped (see RFC7346), thus, may only be available on certain interfaces or even have different meanings based on the interface. So for Interface- and Link-Local scope, specifying the interface is strictly required. For others use cases (like coping with non-unique use of RFC1918 addresses) this may also be helpful.
Why does the API have both the ability to say LocalSpecifier.WithInterface and to set interface requirements on TransportProperties? Why not just keep the latter and remove the former?
There's history here: LocalSpecifier.WithInterface predates explicitly setting the interface name in interface requirements. There might be reasons to keep this: LocalSpecifier is more likely to show up in application UI than in transport properties. Any text proposed to keep both would need to have an unambiguous way to resolve conflicts between the two. This might be a source of hard-to-debug errors.
To discuss next interim
Code change:
where Ns is as defined in OPRF, Section 4. The Issuer generates an HTTP response with status code 200 whose body <del> consists of TokenResponse, with the content type set as "message/ token-response". </del> <ins> consists of TokenResponse, with the content type set as "application/ private-token-response". </ins> 5.3.

Related discussion:
text: I also moved from the message namespace to the application namespace. The difference is helpfully summarized .
I see in the current draft that they register and . Since "token" is a very broad term, I'm wondering if something slightly more specific to Privacy Pass such as and might be reasonable?
If we make it more specific, it should be "private" instead of "privacy", to be "private-token" and align with the auth scheme. There's a fair amount of deployment on these types today, so this would be a relatively large change, or servers would need to tolerate both versions.
I'm in favor of making this change and having issuers support both for a little while.
Cool, that would work. NAME want to make the proposed update?
Will do!
NAME PR's up!
Looks good!
Code change:
value than what was included in a previous ACK frame could cause ECN to be unnecessarily disabled; see ecn-validation. <ins> ack-tracking describes an exemplary approach for determining what packets to acknowledge in each ACK frame.  Though the goal of this algorithm is to generate an acknowledgment for every packet that is processed, it is still possible for acknowledgments to be lost. 13.2.4. When a packet containing an ACK frame is sent, the largest acknowledged in that frame may be saved.  When a packet containing an ACK frame is acknowledged, the receiver can stop acknowledging packets less than or equal to the largest acknowledged in the sent ACK frame. </ins> A receiver that sends only non-ack-eliciting packets, such as ACK frames, might not receive an acknowledgement for a long period of time.  This could cause the receiver to maintain state for a large

Related discussion:
text: It's no longer normative and it's in a single section. I only moved text so far, and not as far as NAME suggested. I can go farther here or in a follow-up PR.
NAME I would like to merge this. WDYT?
Can we merge this soon. I'm worried about it developing conflicts.
Yep, NAME lost the chance to fix the PR. We are - of course - still open for editorial improvements in the form of new pull requests though.
calls them "exemplary" but 13.2.4 has MUST in it.
For reference, this refers to and in the editor's copy. I'm in favour of striking the exemplary note and saying that while the recovery draft is advisory, this document depends on implementations following something like what is recommended.
The specific MUSTs aren't really about the ACK algorithm per se, but about state endpoints will have to maintain for other reasons that are typically folded into your loss recovery code. If an implementation is unable to do duplicate detection for a packet number range, it MUST fail toward rejecting all packets, not toward accepting potential duplicates. An implementation must track the greatest packet number ever received, for use in recovering future packet numbers. In fact, the first requirement is discussed in 12.3 and could probably be dropped here. The second isn't actually called out (MUST) in 17.1, but could easily be moved there.
I think I'm inclined towards reorganizing the text and putting all the 'exemplary' parts into one section(ie: "Limiting ACK Ranges") and moving the normative text either into "Managing ACK Ranges" or elsewhere in the draft.
I thought I could clean this up fairly quickly, but I think a fair number of paragraphs need to move, including some of NAME suggestions. I'm happy to try to improve this in a few days if no one else has beaten me to it.
Anyone want to help NAME out and take this on?
Sorry about dropping this one. I'm fine with it, and happy to make editorials one later.Thanks Ian. When you lay it out like this, it seems so obvious. I checked that we don't have citations for {{ack-tracking}}, so this works nicely. If you care about the "MAY", then we can fix that in another PR.
Code change:
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular MLS DE, that MLS DE SHOULD defer to the judgment of the other MLS DEs. <del> 17.9. </del> <ins> 17.10. </ins> This document registers the "message/mls" MIME media type in order to allow other protocols (e.g., HTTP RFC7540) to convey MLS messages.

Related discussion:
text: As discussed in the virtual interim 2022-12-16, it is possible that extensions might be tempted to re-use HPKE public keys created for MLS. Even within MLS, we have two different public-key encryption cases, Welcome and Commit (though these currently use different keys). Currently, for Commit encryption, the HPKE parameter is set to the group context. The content of is actually undefined for Welcome encryption (!) This PR makes the following changes: Define general and functions that populte the HPKE parameter with an encoded label and context Apply these to Commit and Welcome encryption: Commit: label="UpdatePathNode", context= Welcome: label="Welcome", context= Add an IANA registry of public-key encryption labels (as for signing) There is also a bit of reorganization of the Ciphersuites section to split it into three subsections.
Note that any previous analysis of MLS had to take this particular reuse into account. This can't be the case for any arbitrary extensions reusing the key. So if MLS uses an extension that reuses the key, none of the existing analysis applies, which is a much bigger issue. This said, this reuse did decrease security -- it weakened FS in that a joiner had to hold on to their HPKE leaf key, which also allowed to decrypt the init secret from the welcome message, long after joining.
I think this captures what we discussed during the interim. FWIW, I'm wondering if we didn't have a domain separation issue in the past when we only had one HPKE public key in KeyPackages and used it for both the Welcome subsequently for UpdatePath as well. Either way, I think this is a good defense-in-depth mechanism.