jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
Code change:
is the only one that can choose the new account key that receives the capabilities held by the account being recovered. <del> MAC-based recovery can be performed if the attacker knows the account key and registration URI for the account being recovered.  Both of these are difficult to obtain for a network attacker, because ACME uses HTTPS, though if the recovery key and registration URI are sufficiently predictable, the attacker might be able to guess them. An ACME MitM can see the registration URI, but still has to guess the recovery key, since neither the ECDH in the provisioning phase nor HMAC in the recovery phase will reveal it to him. ACME clients can thus mitigate problems with MAC-based recovery by using long recovery keys.  ACME servers should enforce a minimum recovery key length, and impose rate limits on recovery to limit an attacker's ability to test different guesses about the recovery key. Contact-based recovery uses both the ACME channel and the contact channel.  The provisioning process is only visible to an ACME MitM, and even then, the MitM can only observe the contact information provided.  If the ACME attacker does not also have access to the contact channel, there is no risk. The security of the contact-based recovery process is entirely dependent on the security of the contact channel.  The details of this will depend on the specific out-of-band technique used by the server.  For example: </del> <ins> Account recovery uses both the ACME channel and the contact channel. The provisioning process is only visible to an ACME MitM, and even then, the MitM can only observe the contact information provided.  If the ACME attacker does not also have access to the contact channel, there is no risk. The security of the recovery process is entirely dependent on the security of the contact channel.  The details of this will depend on the specific out-of-band technique used by the server.  For example: </ins> If the server requires a user to click a link in a message sent to a contact address, then the contact channel will need to ensure

Related discussion:
text: As discussed at the F2F meeting at IETF94, MAC-based account recovery is not adding a lot of value, and it adds significant complexity to the spec. (And nobody has implemented it.) This PR removes MAC-based recovery and the crypto that it depends on.
Seeing no complaints on the mailing list, merging.
Code change:
A rollback may be performed if the PeerConnection is in any state except for "stable".  This means that both offers and provisional answers can be rolled back.  Rollback can only be used to cancel <del> proposed changes; there is no support for rolling back from a stable state to a previous stable state.  If a rollback is attempted in the "stable" state, processing MUST stop and an error MUST be returned. Note that this implies that once the answerer has performed setLocalDescription with its answer, this cannot be rolled back. </del> <ins> proposed changes; there is no support for rolling back from a "stable" state to a previous "stable" state.  If a rollback is attempted in the "stable" state, processing MUST stop and an error MUST be returned.  Note that this implies that once the answerer has performed setLocalDescription with its answer, this cannot be rolled back. </ins> The effect of rollback MUST be the same regardless of whether setLocalDescription or setRemoteDescription is called.

Related discussion:
text: Various fixes for 60.2: Removed parens from API names, removed comment. - put the term stable in quotes, removed comment. - put the term sess-id in angle brackets to match SDP spec, removed comment. - made the tls-id attribute consistent with other SDP attributes, removed comment. - removed quotes from IceRestart option, removed comment.

"IceRestart" option / IceRestart option Justin: LGTM
tls-id value / "a=tls-id" value Justin: The source RFC seems to prefer "tls-id" when discussing values.
During the editing of the Cluster 238 docs, it was decided that it's author's choice when formatting SDP attributes. Although RFC 8842 uses the format '"tls-id" attribute', this document more consistently uses "a=attribute-name" format for SDP attributes, which is the format that the SDP spec [RFC8866] uses. I'll update this document to consistently use "a=tls-id"
sess-id / (Section 5.2.1, second bullet item) Justin: LGTM
the stable state (1 instance) / the "stable" state (3 instances) >(Also, should 'the previous stable state' be 'a previous stable state' (per Section 5.7) or 'the previous "stable" state'?) Justin: The quoted form is preferred, including the case of "previous stable state".
[Breaking up issue /60 into smaller bites] The following terms appear to be used inconsistently in this document. Please let us know which form is preferred. Justin: There seems to be a pretty clear preponderance for the non-parenthetical form, so let's keep that. W3C also does not use (). Jean: We'll remove the parens (camelCase is sufficient formatting).
Code change:
using the KDF provided by TLS.  In TLS 1.3, the HKDF-Expand-Label function described in Section 7.1 of TLS13 is used, using the hash function from the negotiated cipher suite.  Other versions of TLS <del> MUST provide a similar function in order to be used QUIC. </del> <ins> MUST provide a similar function in order to be used with QUIC. </ins> The current encryption level secret and the label "quic key" are input to the KDF to produce the AEAD key; the label "quic iv" is used

Related discussion:
text: I suspect these are uncontroversial.
All three Mart[ie]ns now agree, no further objections allowed.
LGTM, with the one change altered.
Code change:
The User Equipment accesses the external network. <del> 4. </del> <ins> 5. </ins> This memo includes no request to IANA. <del> 5. </del> <ins> 6. </ins> <del> 5.1. </del> <ins> 6.1. </ins> When joining a network, some trust is placed in the network operator. This is usually considered to be a decision by a user on the basis of

Related discussion:
text: We need to discuss what information will be used to identify the UE from the perspective of the various components in the system. This updates the draft to discuss this concept, including desired properties of the identifier and some examples. This aims to address issue 5 (URL)
Code change:
Clients are configured to use IP proxying over HTTP via an URI Template TEMPLATE.  The URI template MAY contain two variables: <del> "target" and "ipproto" (scope).  The optionality of the variables </del> <ins> "target" and "ipproto"; see scope.  The optionality of the variables </ins> needs to be considered when defining the template so that either the variable is self-identifying or it is possible to exclude it in the syntax.

Related discussion:
text: I'll just use a single example here because I think it makes it easier to express my point but the problems might be wider The URI template may include a variable, which is later defined in URL as . The value can only be between 0 through 255, I presume this is a decimal value. What is expected to happen if I send some bad values like: I presume that the recipient would reject the request with a bad path, by virtue of applying the requirement in section 4 that :path SHALL NOT be empty and following the expansion requirements in Section 3 and following those requirements on to Section 4.5. That's a lot of hops to get things right. Is there any easier way to present these?
Agreed, we need better text to specify server handling. For example, we don't currently explicitly that the server has to percent-decode these variables (but we say they have to be percent-encoded). When we add new text about how to extract the variables and decode them, let's also say that the server has to validate that they match requirements and has treat the request as malformed if they don't
NAME can you write up some text?
Appear to look good.
Code change:
For cases where the device is not specifically configured with a way to find an RD, the network may want to provide a suitable default. <del> If the address configuration of the network is performed via SLAAC, this is provided by the RDAO option rdao. </del> <ins> The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery option RDAO rdao can do that. </ins> <del> If the address configuration of the network is performed via DHCP, this could be provided via a DHCP option (no such option is defined at the time of writing). </del> <ins> When DHCP is in use, this could be provided via a DHCP option (no such option is defined at the time of writing). </ins> Finally, if neither the device nor the network offers any specific configuration, the device may want to employ heuristics to find a

Related discussion:
text: See-Also: URL This is quite literally from my notes on URL A bit of uncertainty remains whether this change should be two-sided. Should the line above say "When SLAAC is in use," (or "When ND is in use,"?) as well? Can RA options be used in presence of DHCP or static address configuration?
Updated to a more plain and not SLAAC related statement about the RDAO as per last interim. Thank you for the work put into this document. As you can noticed, I have cleared my 2 DISCUSS points (kept below for archive) thank you also for replying to my comments over email. BTW, I appreciated the use of ASCII art to represent an entity-relationship diagram ! I hope that this helps to improve the document, -- Section 4.1 -- It will be trivial to fix, in IPv6 address configuration (SLAAC vs. DHCP) is orthogonal to DHCP 'other-information'. E.g., even if address is configured via SLAAC, DHCPv6 other-information can be used to configure the Recursive DNS Server (or possibly the RD). -- Section 4.1.1 -- Another trivial DISCUSS to fix: in which message is this RDAO sent ? I guess unicast Router Advertisement but this MUST be specified. In general, I wonder how much interactions and exchanges of ideas have happened in the long history of this document with the DNSSD (DNS Service Discovery) Working Group that has very similar constraints (sleeping nodes) and same objectives. -- Section 2 -- To be honest: I am not too much an APP person; therefore, I was surprised to see "source address (URI)" used to identify the "anchor="... I do not mind too much the use of "destination address (URI)" as it is really a destination but the anchor does not appear to me as a "source address". Is it common terminology ? If so, then ignore my COMMENT, else I suggest to change to "destination URI" and simply "anchor" ? -- Section 3.3 -- Should the lifetime be specified in seconds at first use in the text? -- Section 3.6 -- Is the use of "M2M" still current? I would suggest to use the word "IoT" esp when 6LBR (assuming it is 6LO Border Router) is cited later.
Code change:
For cases where the device is not specifically configured with a way to find an RD, the network may want to provide a suitable default. <del> If the address configuration of the network is performed via SLAAC, this is provided by the RDAO option rdao. </del> <ins> The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery option RDAO rdao can do that. </ins> <del> If the address configuration of the network is performed via DHCP, this could be provided via a DHCP option (no such option is defined at the time of writing). </del> <ins> When DHCP is in use, this could be provided via a DHCP option (no such option is defined at the time of writing). </ins> Finally, if neither the device nor the network offers any specific configuration, the device may want to employ heuristics to find a

Related discussion:
text: Please expand and add reference for 6LBR. Using 'modern' technologies (cfr LP-WAN WG) could also add justification to section 3.5. -- Section 4.1 -- About "coap://[MCD1]/.well-known/core?rt=core.rd*", what is the value of MCD1 ? The IANA section discuss about it but it may help the reader to give a hint before (or simply use TBDx that is common in I-D). Any reason to use "address" rather than "group" in "When answering a multicast request directed at a link-local address" ? Later "to use one of their own routable addresses for registration." but there can be multiple configured prefixes... Which one should the RD select ? Should this be specified ? As a co-author of RFC 8801, I would have appreciated to read PvD option mentionned to discover the RD. Any reason why PvD Option cannot be used ? -- Section 4.1.1 -- I suggest to swap the reserved and lifetime fields in order to be able to use a lifetime in units of seconds (to be consistent with other NDP options). -- Section 5 -- May be I missed it, but, can an end-point register multiple base URI ? E.g., multiple IPv6 addresses. -- Section 9.2 -- For information, value 38 is already assigned to RFC 8781. -- Section 2 -- The extra new lines when defining "Sector" are slighly confusing. Same applies to "Target" and "Context". This is cosmetic only.
Code change:
10. <del> The first example shows a deprecation header field without date information: The second example shows a deprecation header with date information </del> <ins> The first example shows a deprecation header with date information </ins> and a link to the successor version: <del> The third example shows a deprecation header field with links for the successor version and for the API's deprecation policy.  In addition, it shows the sunset date for the deprecated resource: </del> <ins> The second example shows a deprecation header field with links for the successor version and for the API's deprecation policy.  In addition, it shows the sunset date for the deprecated resource: </ins>

Related discussion:
text: Looks good to me.
... are considered a 'bad smell'. Instead of a date vs. a fixed string, could we just say that a date in the past is equal to 'true'?
i guess we could. and we already say that a date in the past means that the resource is deprecated. the motivation to allow a flag was to not force services to make up a date when they don't have one and simply want to flag something as deprecated. but we could also "force" them to make up a date by not allowing the "true" flag. i am fine either way and i do see the point that the syntax may cause some implementations to not parse the field correctly. maybe others can weigh in as well?
FWIW, I see it like Expires -- if it's already stale, you just assign a date in the past.
i could definitely live with such a design.
One use case was to align the header's usage with API contract as defined using OpenAPI. Having boolean helps align this header with OpenAPI's flag which does not require date. Forcing API developers to add a random date in the past in case if it is not available due toe various reasons would not be desirable for various other reasons (SLA?). Although, I wish that OpenAPI adds date for . >If the deprecation date is not known, the header field can carry the simple string "true", indicating that the resource context is deprecated, without indicating when that happened: On Jul 31, 2021, at 06:46, Mark Nottingham NAME wrote: FWIW, I see it like Expires -- if it's already stale, you just assign a date in the past.
For Expires, January 1 1970 (epoch 0) is widely used.
NAME I wish OpenAPI supported deprecated date also. But when we do, it won't be with a property that can be boolean or date.
Ok NAME thanks for clarification on the OpenAPI side of things. I agree. We can just use date. There are some implementations out there, I would not know if any of those use boolean but since we are not an RFC yet, such a change should not be unexpected.
it seems like we can safely remove the alternative syntax. i have created a PR asking for review by NAME
LGTM
Code change:
servers set up their HPKE context and decrypt ClientECH as follows: ClientHelloOuterAAD is computed from the second ClientHelloOuter as <del> described in authenticating-outer. </del> <ins> described in authenticating-outer.  The "info" parameter to SetupPSKR is computed as above. </ins> If the client offered ECH in the first ClientHello, then it MUST offer ECH in the second.  Likewise, if the client did not offer ECH

Related discussion:
text: The spec describes an optional trial decryption mode, but most of the text contradicts it. This PR fixes the text up and tries to unify their processing models. In doing so, it flips the error handling from decrypterror to fallback to be consistent. This, combined with the ClientHelloOuterAAD change, plugs an active sticking out attack for free. It also makes easier because GREASE configid collisions with real configids are now harmless. Along the way, NAME and NAME observed that we're not authenticating the ECHConfig at all. (It used to be authenticated by way of the configid, which was a digest.) Instead, just pass the ECHConfig into the info field of the HPKE context. They also noticed the server rule about PSKs on ClientHelloOuter didn't work with GREASE. Instead, we can simply remove it.
This matches the acceptance signal length, and we've already accepted that probability of collision.
Code change:
prevents passive observers from correlating sessions unless tickets are reused.  Note: because ticket lifetimes are restricted to a week, 32 bits is enough to represent any plausible age, even <del> in milliseconds.  External tickets SHOULD use an obfuscated_ticket_age of 0; servers MUST ignore this value for external tickets. </del> <ins> in milliseconds.  For identities established externally an obfuscated_ticket_age of 0 SHOULD be used, and servers MUST ignore the value. </ins> A list of the identities that the client is willing to negotiate with the server.  If sent alongside the "early_data" extension

Related discussion:
text: Ticket is a term that refers to a PSK identity established using an handshake. For out-of-band PSK, we do not use the term.
Code change:
on.  Connections in a Connection Group share all Protocol Properties that are not applicable to a Message. <ins> In addition, incoming entangled Connections can be received by creating a Listener on an existing connection: </ins> Changing one of these Protocol Properties on one Connection in the group changes it for all others.  Per-Message Protocol Properties, however, are not entangled.  For example, changing "Timeout for

Related discussion:
text: This adds an explicit Listener object to the API ( to clarify behaviour of multi-streaming protocols ( clarify behaviour and enable re-use of Preconnections (
We talk about listen objects in architecture and implementation, but not in the API. Changes needed: Let return a Listener Move the the Listener Allow Preconnection to be used multiple times.
This issue popped up while discussing and seem to be a wired QUIC multi-streaming issue, possible affecting SCTP too): When a multi-streaming protocol like QUIC allows both ends to open new streams (e.g. by cloning the QUIC connection representing the stream), the both side needs a way to get a ConnectionReceived event for a new stream. That might result in the following weird pattern: I think this needs to be documented somehow and we may need to add a Selection Property do turn off this behaviour.
Calling is an active open. Once the connection is open, the peer can open new streams, but those would surely be events on the not on the .
NAME I am not sure with this one: assuming you have a bunch of ? The first one? What happens if I close the first one?
That's a good point, and I'm not sure I know the answer, but I don't think the should fire the events. A is a potential connection, yet to be instantiated, but these connections come from an already active connection. I've never been entirely comfortable with cloning a connection as the multi-streaming abstraction. This is perhaps the first scenario where it struggles though.
I do not understand the pattern in the example. You do not get a ConnectionReceived after an active open, you need a Listen?
NAME Your assumption is true for TCP, but not for multi-streaming transports like QUIC. With QUIC, you can indeed get additional TAPS connections (QUIC streams) based on an existing, initiated connections. The question is how to handle this. NAME A possible way out would be making itself is returned by an event then.
NAME the TAPS interface is the same weather you have TCP or QUIC underneath. For TAPS an active open generates a READY event not a ConnectionReceived? I do not think your example is a valid TAPS sequence.
NAME the Ready event is not shown in the example (it would be within the first ). The problem I raised is how to model the addition of streams to a multi-streaming connection.
Code change:
on.  Connections in a Connection Group share all Protocol Properties that are not applicable to a Message. <ins> In addition, incoming entangled Connections can be received by creating a Listener on an existing connection: </ins> Changing one of these Protocol Properties on one Connection in the group changes it for all others.  Per-Message Protocol Properties, however, are not entangled.  For example, changing "Timeout for

Related discussion:
text: In case of QUIC, additional streams can be initiated by the server/listening side of the QUIC connection. If we model QUIC streams as TAPS connections, this results in events at the client (and server) side for each new QUIC stream.
NAME agree we could add , although it's a significant shift in the model. If we did that, we might also want to revisit as the way of creating a new stream on a connection, in favour of a method on . NAME did you implement this with QUIC? How does your implementation work?
I also see a problem with the communication pattern here. To me, modelling a stream as a TAPS connection means that for every new connection that a peer creates (be it a stream of an existing connection or not), I'll have to listen. So: if I expect 5 incoming connections, which may e.g. be 1 connection with 1 stream and 4 later-added streams below the API, I'll have to listen 5 times. What this also means is that the grouping notion should be a readable property - I believe that we currently only describe it as something that's actively created via clone(). Regarding code, no idea how NAME has done this, but I believe that the NEAT implementation is like I describe here. For more details on this specific aspect, see: URL
NAME We create a Listener from a Connection to handle inbound streams associated with the same parent transport connection. NAME Currently, our Listener object doesn't require calling Listen() for each new connection—you can get the event invoked many times, so it doesn't require knowing how many streams may be opened by the peer. In order to get back pressure, we're talking about having a window for how many new inbound connections will be allowed at a time.
Ok, that also sounds perfectly reasonable. Actually it seems that this (receiving multiple ConnectionReceived events on one Preconnection) is already supported by our current text, sorry for missing this! So... what is the problem we're discussing here - what do we need to change in the text? I think we need only the following: do we have a use case for one Listener getting multiple Connections without having these Connections grouped? (I guess not? Grouping is not a promise of multi-streaming.)