jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
Code change:
If an authenticator request is present, the extensions used to guide the construction of these messages are taken from the authenticator <del> request.  If the certificate_request_context from the authenticator request has already been used in the connection, then no authenticator should be constructed.  If there is no authenticator request, the extensions are chosen from the TLS handshake.  Only servers can provide an authenticator without a corresponding request. In such cases, ClientHello extensions are used to determine permissible extensions in the Certificate message. </del> <ins> request.  Unrecognized extensions MUST be ignored.  If the certificate_request_context from the authenticator request has already been used in the connection, then no authenticator should be constructed.  If there is no authenticator request, the extensions are chosen from the TLS handshake.  Only servers can provide an authenticator without a corresponding request.  In such cases, ClientHello extensions are used to determine permissible extensions in the Certificate message. </ins> 4.2.1.

Related discussion:
text: In Section 3 of the RFC, it states that the authenticator request includes those extensions allowed for the CertificateRequest message. However, this does not mean it could only includes them and other extensions could also be sent. In the TLS spec CertificateRequest explicitly states "Clients MUST ignore unrecognized extensions.", we should have the same here.
Code change:
Servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key. <del> In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED, SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used (see CAB-Baseline for more details). Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA-256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS 1.2. </del> <ins> In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED; and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used (see CAB-Baseline for more details).  Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA- 256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS 1.2. </ins> 8.

Related discussion:
text: Addressing Roman's AD comments.
has 2 conflicts, not sure how to resolve, the updates look fine. Please merge.
There was a conflict with the 8174 reference being in the other branch. I added it in because it's now part of the terminology paragraph.
Please address the following IDNits: -- The document seems to lack an IANA Considerations section. (See Section 2.2 of URL for how to handle the case when there are no actions for IANA.) -- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC5246, but the abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should. -- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC7525, but the abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should. Section 1. Editorial. -- s/RFC 5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/ -- s/RFC 6151 [RFC6151]/[RFC6151]/ -- s/RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/ Section 1. Editorial. For symmetry with the rest of the text: OLD RFC 6151 [RFC6151] details the security considerations, including collision attacks for MD5, published in 2011. NEW In 2011, [RFC6151] detailed the security considerations, including collision attacks for MD5. Section 1. Please provide a reference for "Wang, et al". Is there a reference to provide for the "the potential for brute-force attack" Section 6. Editorial Nit. s/RFC5246 [RFC5246]/[RFC5246]/ Section 6. Move the text "In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from" out of the "OLD" block of text to be its own intro paragraph so that the OLD vs. NEW is a clear cut-and-paste. Section 7. Editorial. s/ RFC7525 [RFC7525]/[RFC7525]/ Section 7. SHA-1 is also not mentioned in RFC7525. Recommend: OLD The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 and this text adds it to ensure it is understood as having been deprecated.
Code change:
Servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key. <del> In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED, SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used (see CAB-Baseline for more details). Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA-256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS 1.2. </del> <ins> In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED; and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used (see CAB-Baseline for more details).  Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA- 256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS 1.2. </ins> 8.

Related discussion:
text: NEW The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; and this text adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been deprecated. Section 7. Editorial. Grammar. OLD In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED, SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used NEW In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED; and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used Section 10.2 Please make RFC5246 a normative reference.
Code change:
IANA is requested to register the following Service Names: <ins> 7.5. The IANA is requested to list the name "masa" in the MUD extensions registry defined in I-D.ietf-opsawg-mud.  Its use is documented in mud-extension. </ins> 8. 8.1.

Related discussion:
text: (n.b., i was not able to "make" and test the change, due to external pyang dependencies of some form.
Code change:
compromised parties refresh their credentials securely. Beware that in both oracle and private key access, an active adaptive <del> attacker, can follow the protocol and request to update its own </del> <ins> attacker can follow the protocol and request to update its own </ins> credential.  This in turn induces a signature key rotation which could provide the attacker with part or the full value of the private key depending on the architecture of the service provider.

Related discussion:
text: For the authors' consideration: Section 3 A member with a valid credential authenticates its MLS messages by signing them with the s/its/it's/ mechanisms for a user to monitor and control which keys are associated to their identity. s/to their/with their/ Operational Requirements A extension can help maintain interoperability s/A extension/An extension/ Whether there should be a extension in groups. s/a extension/an extension/ Forward and Post-Compromise Security MLS partially defend against this problem by active member including freshness, however not s/defend/defends/ s/member/members/ Mandate a key updates from clients that are not otherwise sending messages s/a key/key/ Compromise of AEAD key material authentication is not affected in neither of these s/neither/either/ Compromise of the Group Secrets of a single group for one or more group epochs of the compromised party with no ability to an honest group to recover message secrecy. s/to an/for an/ Compromise by an active adversary with the ability to sign messages the attacker can perform all operations which are available to an legitimate client s/an legitmate/a legitimate/ Compromise of the authentication with access to a signature key Beware that in both oracle and private key access, an active adaptive attacker, can follow th s/attacker, can/attacker can/ Security consideration in the context of a full state compromise They also are providing the strong authentication guarantees to other clients s/providing the strong/providing strong/ hence we consider that their protection by additional security mechanism should be a priority. s/mechanism/mechanisms/ Overall there is no way to detect or prevent these compromise, as discussed s/compromise/compromises/ Privacy of delivery and push notifications For secure messaging systems, push notification are often sent real-time s/notification/notifications/ Authentication Service Compromise MLS client (which is under the control of the user) have often the ability s/have often/often have/
Approved with nits.These changes look good to me.
Code change:
wishes to open an IP forwarding tunnel with no target or protocol limitations, it could send the following request: <del> 4.2. </del> <ins> 4.3. </ins> The IP proxy indicates a successful response by replying with the following requirements:

Related discussion:
text: I'll just use a single example here because I think it makes it easier to express my point but the problems might be wider The URI template may include a variable, which is later defined in URL as . The value can only be between 0 through 255, I presume this is a decimal value. What is expected to happen if I send some bad values like: I presume that the recipient would reject the request with a bad path, by virtue of applying the requirement in section 4 that :path SHALL NOT be empty and following the expansion requirements in Section 3 and following those requirements on to Section 4.5. That's a lot of hops to get things right. Is there any easier way to present these?
Agreed, we need better text to specify server handling. For example, we don't currently explicitly that the server has to percent-decode these variables (but we say they have to be percent-encoded). When we add new text about how to extract the variables and decode them, let's also say that the server has to validate that they match requirements and has treat the request as malformed if they don't
NAME can you write up some text?
Appear to look good.
Code change:
shown with a '*'.  Once completed, endpoints are able to exchange application data. <del> An endpoint validates support for Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) by observing whether the ACK frames acknowledging the first packets it sends carry ECN counts, as described in ecn-validation. </del> <ins> Endpoints can use packets sent during the handshake to test for Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) support; see ecn.  An endpoint validates support for ECN by observing whether the ACK frames acknowledging the first packets it sends carry ECN counts, as described in ecn-validation. </ins> Endpoints MUST explicitly negotiate an application protocol.  This avoids situations where there is a disagreement about the protocol

Related discussion:
text: This is my best stab at it.
Erik Kline said:
I thought that section reference was wrong, but Section 7 does indeed mention ECN twice. Once is almost too much for this section. I checked the history and the commits that affected this text likely are the result of a merge, and one that either git resolved incorrectly for us, or one that we messed up. Either way, this is worth fixing.
one nit
Code change:
Specify a Local Endpoint using a local interface name and local port: <ins> As an alternative to specifying an interface name for the Local Endpoint, an application can express more fine-grained preferences using the "Interface Instance or Type" Selection Property, see prop- interface.  However, if the application specifies Selection Properties which are inconsistent with the Local Endpoint, this will result in an error once the application attempts to open a Connection. </ins> Specify a Local Endpoint using a STUN server: Specify a Local Endpoint using a Any-Source Multicast group to join

Related discussion:
text: In the "Specifying Endpoints" section, added a reference to the Selection Property that does a similar thing but with more fine-grained control. It wasn't clear to me what is the best place to add this, so I put it right below the first example of specifying an interface name for the Local Endpoint to say that you can also do it differently. If you have better suggestions, please let me know. To the ListenError and RendezvousError, I added text mentioning the "reconcile Endpoints and Properties" pitfall. I think this is probably more general, i.e., there might be more sources of errors than just local interface, so I kept it generic.
For Local Address Preference we only have the option to prefer stable or temporary. However, I guess we would also need a way to e.g. specify that stable is required, no?
Is this addressed by PR ?
I don't think so.
When reading the current API draft, I was wondering the following: If an application wants to specify one or multiple local network interfaces, it can either set the Local Endpoint(s) or it can set the "Interface Instance or Type" Selection Property. I think both ways are valid and should exist, but I'm wondering if we should specify anything on the interaction of these two ways to do a similar thing. For example, should we explicitly mention the Selection Property in Section 5.1 ("Specifying Endpoints"), to make readers aware that there is a "better" way to do this, which allows more flexibility? Also, if an application specifies conflicting things, I guess this leads to an InitiateError, ListenError, or RendezvousError. Our current text already says this for the InitiateError: But should we make this particular issue more explicit here and/or should we add it for the ListenError or RendezvousError?
I think so, yes! Regarding the error in case of a conflict: I think so, yes - to all your questions: make it more explicit, state it in the description of both the ListenError and RendezvousError. Just my 2 cents
Thank you - works for me!
Code change:
The syntax for the URI schemes in this section are specified using Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) RFC5234.  The definitions of <del> "host", "port", "path-abempty", and "query" are adopted from RFC3986. </del> <ins> "host", "port", "path-abempty", "query", and "fragment" are adopted from RFC3986. </ins> Section 8 (Multicast CoAP) in RFC7252 is not applicable to these schemes.

Related discussion:
text: Do we need to include the RFC7252 note for emphasis?
Probably not, as we are not changing anything about 5.10.1, are we? (But then 7.5 also points out a place where we maintain a property of 5.10.1.) ((But then, again, where would be put this?))
We need to identify the ABNF fragments as ABNF as in so they become easier to check in BAP.
We could add the note to Section 7, right after the new reference to "fragment":
Merged in abnf annotations from
is relevant to Section 7.
Good point. So I assume applying the same fix (add »[ "#" fragment ]«) four times to the ABNF in 7.1 to 7.4 would fix that? (We probably want to line-break before path-abempty in all four cases.)
If would be helpful to have more context for how the fragment identifier is used in CoAP. I don't see much detail in RFC7252 besides: Note: Fragments ([RFC3986], Section 3.5) are not part of the request URI and thus will not be transmitted in a CoAP request.
Fragment identifiers are not used in a transfer protocol; their use is a local matter on the client side. The mistake we made in RFC 7252 is providing ABNF that doesn't show fragment identifiers at all in the URI syntax. While CoAP as a protocol does not care about them, they are intended to be allowed in CoAP URIs so they can indeed be used on the client side. The note mentions this, but the ABNF does not reflect that. Same for coap-tcp-tls. Does it matter? The meaning of fragment identifiers is defined by the media type. So far, there has been little use of fragment identifiers in the media types being used with CoAP. Now, SenML actually does go ahead and defines a meaning for them, and other media types in the future might as well. So it would be good if the ABNF in the CoAP standards did not give the impression fragment identifiers cannot be used at all with CoAP URIs.
Code change:
The syntax for the URI schemes in this section are specified using Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) RFC5234.  The definitions of <del> "host", "port", "path-abempty", and "query" are adopted from RFC3986. </del> <ins> "host", "port", "path-abempty", "query", and "fragment" are adopted from RFC3986. </ins> Section 8 (Multicast CoAP) in RFC7252 is not applicable to these schemes.

Related discussion:
text: Note from Carsten: We may have to reopen that issue based on the about-face that the HTTP WG made here:
From URL which references: Absolute URI Some protocol elements allow only the absolute form of a URI without a fragment identifier. For example, defining a base URI for later use by relative references calls for an absolute-URI syntax rule that does not allow a fragment. absolute-URI = scheme ":" hier-part [ "?" query ] URI scheme specifications must define their own syntax so that all strings matching their scheme-specific syntax will also match the grammar. Scheme specifications will not define fragment identifier syntax or usage, regardless of its applicability to resources identifiable via that scheme, as fragment identification is orthogonal to scheme definition. However, scheme specifications are encouraged to include a wide range of examples, including examples that show use of the scheme's URIs with fragment identifiers when such usage is appropriate. and URL further states: Requirements for Permanent Scheme Definitions This section gives considerations for new schemes. Meeting these guidelines is REQUIRED for 'permanent' scheme registration. 'Permanent' status is appropriate for, but not limited to, use in standards. For URI schemes defined or normatively referenced by IETF Standards Track documents, 'permanent' registration status is REQUIRED. [RFC3986] defines the overall syntax for URIs as: URI = scheme ":" hier-part [ "?" query ] [ "#" fragment ] A scheme definition cannot override the overall syntax for URIs. For example, this means that fragment identifiers cannot be reused outside the generic syntax restrictions and that fragment identifiers are not scheme specific. A scheme definition must specify the scheme name and the syntax of the scheme-specific part, which is clarified as follows: URI = scheme ":" scheme-specific-part [ "#" fragment ] scheme-specific-part = hier-part [ "?" query ] On Jan 28, 2015, at 1:56 PM, Julian Reschke wrote: The answer is "no". URL I don't know how I got beaten into submission on that for RFC7230. ....Roy
Code change:
This section considers an adversary who can add or remove responses to the SVCB query. <del> Clients MUST authenticate the server to its name during secure transport establishment.  This name is the hostname used to construct the original SVCB query, and cannot be influenced by the SVCB record contents.  Accordingly, this draft does not mandate the use of DNSSEC.  This draft also does not specify how clients authenticate the name (e.g. selection of roots of trust), which might vary according to the context. </del> <ins> During secure transport establishment, clients MUST authenticate the server to its authentication name, which is not influenced by the SVCB record contents.  Accordingly, this draft does not mandate the use of DNSSEC.  This draft also does not specify how clients authenticate the name (e.g. selection of roots of trust), which might vary according to the context. </ins> Although this adversary cannot alter the authentication name of the service, it does have control of the port number and "dohpath" value.

Related discussion:
text: This should help with the case in DDR. See URL
Much better. Thanks for indulging me.
Code change:
the RTCP transmission for this media section to use reduced- size RTCP, as specified in RFC5506. <ins> [TODO: enable appropriate rtcp-fb mechanisms] </ins> If the directional attribute in the answer is of type "sendrecv" or "sendonly", prepare to start transmitting media <del> using the specified primary SSRC and one of the selected payload types, once the underlying transport layers have been established.  If RID values are specified, include the RID header extension in the RTP streams, as indicated in I-D.ietf- mmusic-rid, Section 4).  If simulcast is negotiated, send the number of Source RTP Streams as specified in I-D.ietf-mmusic- sdp-simulcast, Section 6.2.2.  If the directional attribute is of type "recvonly" or "inactive", stop transmitting RTP media, although RTCP should still be sent, as described in RFC3264, Section 5.1. </del> <ins> using the most preferred media format from the remote description that is also present in the answer, as described in RFC3264, Sections 6.1 and 7, once the underlying transport layers have been established.  [TODO: add discusssion of RED/FEC/RTX/CN] The payload type mapping from the remote description is used to determine payload types for the outgoing RTP streams.  Any RTP header extensions that were negotiated should be included in the outgoing RTP streams, using the extension mapping from the remote description; if the RID header extension has been negotiated, and RID values are specified, include the RID header extension in the outgoing RTP streams, as indicated in I-D.ietf-mmusic-rid, Section 4).  If simulcast is negotiated, send the number of Source RTP Streams as specified in I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-simulcast, Section 6.2.2. If the directional attribute is of type "recvonly" or "inactive", stop transmitting RTP media, although RTCP should still be sent, as described in RFC3264, Section 5.1. </ins> If the media section proto value indicates use of SCTP:

Related discussion:
text: Talk about what to do with header extensions in a remote description Expand discussion of how to handle payload types in a remote description Fail things we don’t know about in an answer ,
LGTM
NAME PTAL at my responses
URL If any indicated payload type is unknown, it MUST be ignored. [TODO: should fail on answers] (q: does this logic need to also include processing for other lines - extmap, rtcp-fb, etc - that weren't present in the offer?)
Fixed by
URL 2) * For each specified payload type that is also supported by the local implementation, establish a mapping between the payload type ID and the actual media format. [TODO - Justin to add more to explain mapping.]
Relevant to as well
Fixed by
URL 1) If the media section proto value indicates use of RTP: [TODO: header extensions]
LGTM
Code change:
hash.  The client instance will use this value to validate the "finish" call. <del> The AS MUST send the hash and interaction reference based on the interaction finish mode as described in the following sections. </del> <ins> All interaction finish methods MUST define a way to convey the hash and interaction reference back to the client instance.  When an interaction finish method is used, the client instance MUST present the interaction reference back to the AS as part of its continue- after-interaction. </ins> Note that in many error cases, such as when the RO has denied access, the "finish" method is still enacted by the AS.  This pattern allows

Related discussion:
text: NAME Please take a look at this updated text to see if it addresses your concerns.
To edit notification comments on pull requests, go to your .
Thinking about possible extensions to GNAP's interaction modes, I had the impression that the specification could be a bit clearer regarding requirements on such extensions. From reading Section 3.3, my understanding is that all implementations of GNAP, including ones using extensions which define additional interaction finish methods, MUST include a nonce in the grant response (given that the AS wants to use the finish method offered by the client instance): URL However, Section 3.3.5 sounds a bit different, only referring to the two interaction finish methods defined by GNAP core: URL Section 4.2 could be a bit clearer as to what is expected of future extensions to GNAP, it currently says: URL with the two following sections describing the finish methods defined by GNAP core. This is, however, somewhat clearer in Section 4.2.3: I.e., Section 4.2.3 implies that AS must (somehow) provide the client instance with an interaction reference and interaction finish nonce. But it may be helpful to make this more explicit throughout the relevant Sections. There seem to be no requirements for future interaction start methods. It may be helpful to document some minimal requirements, e.g., enough information to identify the grant has to be conveyed to AS via RO in the interaction start (such as the redirect URI in GNAP core).
Thanks NAME for taking the time! The proposed text looks good to me (just one possible typo, I'm not a native speaker, so I'm not 100% sure about that).