Code change:
and bounded end-to-end delivery latency. The primary considerations for the data plane is to maintain <del> confidentiality of data traversing the DetNet network, application flows can be protected through whatever means is provided by the underlying technology.  For example, encryption may be used, such as that provided by IPSec RFC4301 for IP flows and by MACSec IEEE802.1AE-2018 for Ethernet (Layer-2) flows. DetNet flows are identified on a per-flow basis, which may provide attackers with additional information about the data flows (when compared to networks that do not include per-flow identification). This is an inherent property of DetNet which has security implications that should be considered when determining if DetNet is a suitable technology for any given use case. To provide uninterrupted availability of the DetNet quality of service, provisions can be made against DOS attacks and delay attacks.  To protect against DOS attacks, excess traffic due to malicious or malfunctioning devices can be prevented or mitigated, for example through the use of traffic admission control applied at the input of a DetNet domain.  To prevent DetNet packets from being delayed by an entityexternal to a DetNet domain, DetNet technology definition can allow for the mitigation of Man-In-The-Middle attacks, for example through use of authentication and authorization of devices within the DetNet domain. Because DetNet mechanisms or applications that rely on DetNet can make heavy use of methods that require precise time synchronization, the accuracy, availability, and integrity of time synchronization is of critical importance.  Extensive discussion of this topic can be found in RFC7384. </del> <ins> integrity of data and delivery of the associated DetNet service traversing the DetNet network.  Application flows can be protected through whatever means is provided by the underlying technology.  For example, encryption may be used, such as that provided by IPSec RFC4301 for IP flows and/or by an underlying sub-net using MACSec IEEE802.1AE-2018 for IP over Ethernet (Layer-2) flows. From a data plane perspective this document does not add or modify any header information. At the management and control level DetNet flows are identified on a per-flow basis, which may provide controller plane attackers with additional information about the data flows (when compared to controller planes that do not include per-flow identification).  This is an inherent property of DetNet which has security implications that should be considered when determining if DetNet is a suitable technology for any given use case. To provide uninterrupted availability of the DetNet service, provisions can be made against DOS attacks and delay attacks.  To protect against DOS attacks, excess traffic due to malicious or malfunctioning devices can be prevented or mitigated, for example through the use of existing mechanism such as policing and shaping applied at the input of a DetNet domain.  To prevent DetNet packets from being delayed by an entity external to a DetNet domain, DetNet technology definition can allow for the mitigation of Man-In-The- Middle attacks, for example through use of authentication and authorization of devices within the DetNet domain. </ins> 8.

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text: Sorry, now it is uploaded to the right folder. Simple accept pull request. Thx Bala'zs