jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
Code change:
role.  The entity, as a system bus Verifier, may choose to fully isolate its role as a wide-area network Attester. <del> In essence, an entity that combines more than one role also creates and consumes the corresponding conceptual messages as defined in this </del> <ins> In essence, an entity that combines more than one role creates and consumes the corresponding conceptual messages as defined in this </ins> document. 7.

Related discussion:
text: The unifying component is the root of trust and the nested, staged, or chained attestations produced. The nested or chained structure should include claims, collected by the attester to aid in the assurance or believability of the attestation Evidence." The following sentence should be broken into two: "This example could be extended further by, say, making the kernel become another Attesting Environment for an application as another Target Environment, resulting in a third set of Claims in the Evidence pertaining to that application." Proposed: "This example could be extended further by making the kernel become another Attesting Environment for an application as another Target Environment. This results in a third set of Claims in the Evidence pertaining to that application." How about changing the following sentence from: "Among these routers, there is only one main router that connects to the Verifier. " To: "A multi-chassis router, provides a management point and is the only one that connects to the Verifier. " For the following sentence, trying to remove the use of a word twice in a row and convey the same intent. Old: "After collecting the Evidence of other Attesters, this inside Verifier verifies them using Endorsements and Appraisal Policies (obtained the same way as any other Verifier), to generate Attestation Results." Proposed: "After collecting the Evidence of other Attesters, this inside Verifier uses Endorsements and Appraisal Policies (obtained the same way as any other Verifier) in the verification process to generate Attestation Results." I may try another pass at section 4 to improve readability. Section 5, Consider breaking this into 2 sentences, from: "This section includes some reference models, but this is not intended to be a restrictive list, and other variations may exist." To: "This section includes some reference models. This is not intended to be a restrictive list, and other variations may exist." Section 5.1 Two result words together is not necessary. Change from: "The second way in which the process may fail is when the resulting Result is examined by the Relying Party, and based upon the Appraisal Policy, the result does not pass the policy. "
Code change:
role.  The entity, as a system bus Verifier, may choose to fully isolate its role as a wide-area network Attester. <del> In essence, an entity that combines more than one role also creates and consumes the corresponding conceptual messages as defined in this </del> <ins> In essence, an entity that combines more than one role creates and consumes the corresponding conceptual messages as defined in this </ins> document. 7.

Related discussion:
text: To: "The second way in which the process may fail is when the Result is examined by the Relying Party, and based upon the Appraisal Policy, the result does not pass the policy. " I suggest making the last paragraph the second paragraph. It's easier to read than the others and provides an introduction to the model before you begin talking about how it might fail. ** I may come back to this section to provide wording suggestions. Section 5.2 I suggest moving the last paragraph to the first in this instance. It also provides a nice high-level overview. The current paragraph 1&2 flow well together, hence this order suggestion. The third paragraph is a really long way of stating that interoperability is required. Entities must be able to create, send, receive, and process data (hence the need for a standard). It's fine, but could be shorter. Section 5.3: OLD: "One variation of the background-check model is where the Relying Party and the Verifier on the same machine, and so there is no need for a protocol between the two." Proposed: "One variation of the background-check model is where the Relying Party and the Verifier are on the same machine, performing both functions together. In this case, there is no need for a protocol between the two." I think the addition is necessary or you could scratch your head wondering why no protocol is needed. If they are separate functions on the same system, you'd need some way for the relying party to access the results of the verifier. The next sentence could benefit from being made into several. OLD: "It is also worth pointing out that the choice of model is generally up to the Relying Party, and the same device may need to create Evidence for different Relying Parties and different use cases (e.g., a network infrastructure device to gain access to the network, and then a server holding confidential data to get access to that data). As such, both models may simultaneously be in use by the same device." If the server holds confidential data, why does it need to create evidence to access the data? I'm not following the second example as written, so my proposed text may not be as intended.
Code change:
role.  The entity, as a system bus Verifier, may choose to fully isolate its role as a wide-area network Attester. <del> In essence, an entity that combines more than one role also creates and consumes the corresponding conceptual messages as defined in this </del> <ins> In essence, an entity that combines more than one role creates and consumes the corresponding conceptual messages as defined in this </ins> document. 7.

Related discussion:
text: Proposed: "It is also worth pointing out that the choice of model is generally up to the Relying Party. The same device may need to create Evidence for different Relying Parties and/or different use cases. For instance, a network infrastructure device may attest evidence to gain access to the network or a server holding confidential data may require attestations of evidence to gain access to the data. As such, both models may simultaneously be in use by the same device." Section 6: The first 3 sentences are fine, but if you wanted to reduce it, it could be one sentence. Current: "An entity in the RATS architecture includes at least one of the roles defined in this document. As a result, the entity can participate as a constituent of the RATS architecture. Additionally, an entity can aggregate more than one role into itself. " Proposed: "An entity in the RATS architecture includes at least one [or more] of the roles defined in this document. " Or more is redundant, so that really isn't necessary to convey the same point. Then the last sentence: I'd change it a little from: "In essence, an entity that combines more than one role also creates and consumes the corresponding conceptual messages as defined in this document." To: "In essence, an entity that combines more than one role may create and consume the corresponding conceptual messages as defined in this document." It might not, it could be the verifier and relying party. Section 5: Consider changing from: "That is, it might appraise the trustworthiness of an application component, or operating system component or service, under the assumption that information provided about it by the lower-layer hypervisor or firmware is true. " To: "That is, it might appraise the trustworthiness of an application component, operating system component, or service under the assumption that information provided about it by the lower-layer hypervisor or firmware is true. " Section 7: I'd say it's really a stronger level of assurance of security rather than a stronger level of security in the following: "A stronger level of security comes when information can be vouched for by hardware or by ROM code, especially if such hardware is physically resistant to hardware tampering. "
Code change:
role.  The entity, as a system bus Verifier, may choose to fully isolate its role as a wide-area network Attester. <del> In essence, an entity that combines more than one role also creates and consumes the corresponding conceptual messages as defined in this </del> <ins> In essence, an entity that combines more than one role creates and consumes the corresponding conceptual messages as defined in this </ins> document. 7.

Related discussion:
text: Then with the following sentence, "The component that is implicitly trusted is often referred to as a Root of Trust." I think it would be worth mentioning that a hardware RoT is immutable and mutable RoTs in software are also possible, offering different levels for an assurance of trust/security. Section 9. Since ROLIE [RFC8322] has been added to SCAP2.0, it would be good to list that as an option since a lot of time and effort went into how to secure the exchange of formatted data for that protocol. Section 11. Privacy This is a good start. Remote attestation also provides a way to profile systems as well as the user behind that system. If attestation results go higher in the stack to include containers and applications, it could reveal even more about a system or user. The scope of access needs to be emphasized, including the administrators access to data (or restrictions). If there is a way to make inferences about attestations from their processing, that should be noted as well. Section 12: This will need to state an explicit requirement for transport encryption. In the introductory paragraph, the text is as follows: "Any solution that conveys information used for security purposes, whether such information is in the form of Evidence, Attestation Results, Endorsements, or Appraisal Policy, needs to support end-to-end integrity protection and replay attack prevention, and often also needs to support additional security protections. For example, additional means of authentication, confidentiality, integrity, replay, denial of service and privacy protection are needed in many use cases. " Proposed: "Any solution that conveys information used for security purposes, whether such information is in the form of Evidence, Attestation Results, Endorsements, or Appraisal Policy must support the security properties of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. A conveyance protocol includes the typical transport security considerations: o end-to-end encryption, o end-to-end integrity protection, o replay attack prevention, o denial of service protection, o authentication, o authorization, o fine grained access controls, and o logging in line with current threat models and zero trust architectures." Best regards, Kathleen
Code change:
If a zero-length connection ID is selected, the corresponding transport parameter is included with a zero-length value. <del> fig-auth-cid shows the connection IDs that are used in a complete </del> <ins> fig-auth-cid shows the connection IDs (with DCID=Destination Connection ID, SCID=Source Connection ID) that are used in a complete </ins> handshake.  The exchange of Initial packets is shown, plus the later exchange of 1-RTT packets that includes the connection ID established during the handshake.

Related discussion:
text: Editorial NiTs when reviewing the invariant text. These NiTs address readability issues, and do not intend to change the meaning of the text.
Is there an associated issue?
Thanks Gorry, these are all quite helpful. 1) I understand the acronyms DCID and SCID, but these aren't really expanded on first use in sect 5.1. 2) There's mention of "the high bit", but there doesn't seem to be any statement of bit order saying. Is it worth declaring network byte/bit order earlier in section 4? This also clarifies the placement of fields within a byte, which was basically assumed knowledge otherwise. 3) Personally, I don't think: "The length of the Destination Connection ID is not specified" is a great choice of words. Surely, this needs to be specified somewhere for a protocol instance to use it? This reads better as something like: The length of the Destination Connection ID is not encoded in packets with a short header and is not constrained by this specification. 4) The brackets here seem to point to connection IDs in general, not the DCID "(see Section 5.3)". Is it worth writing that as "Connection IDs are described in Section 5", rather than use brackets? The same is true for versions. 5) In section 5.3: "the wrong endpoint" is taken as the wrong transport endpoint, but some of our IP and subIP colleagues would use the term endpoint for other uses, so one insertion of "transport" would perhaps help? 6) In the appendix A, this: "QUIC forbids acknowledgments of packets" - still has me wondering what is actually intended to be understood, because the list of bullets is not guarenteed ... : /The last packet before a long period of quiescence might be assumed to contain an acknowledgment (it should be assumed that QUIC could allow acknowledgments of packets that only contain ACK frames)/ I'm not sure what to say here I think the combination of not... forbids threw me off the meaning. Changes proposed in
Thanks for changing SCID/DCID to "Source Connection ID" and "Destination Connection ID", that seems like a good change.
Code change:
The basic operations that the applications can have the media engine do are: <del> Start exchanging media to a given remote peer, but keep all the </del> <ins> Start exchanging media with a given remote peer, but keep all the </ins> resources reserved in the offer. Start exchanging media with a given remote peer, and free any

Related discussion:
text: I was reading this draft and noticed a couple of minor wording issues that made the text not as clear as it could be. I don't believe the changes are controversial, or change the intention of the draft.
These changes look good - I agree the rewrite of the offer/answer paragraph is a nice improvement.
Looks fine to me
Code change:
notifies its peer that if the receiver of the ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule sends IP packets for this prefix in HTTP Datagrams, the sender of the capsule will forward them along its preexisting route. <del> This capsule uses a Capsule Type of 0xfff102.  Its value uses the following format: </del> <ins> Any of these addresses can be used as the destination address on IP packets originated by the receiver of this capsule.  This capsule uses a Capsule Type of 0xfff102.  Its value uses the following format: </ins> IP Version of this route advertisement.  MUST be either 4 or 6.

Related discussion:
text: This change adds text that addresses conveyed by ADDRESSASSIGN can be used in the "source address" field of an IP packet, while addresses conveyed by ROUTEADVERTISEMENT can be used in the "destination address" field. While we're here, also add a small clarification when a prefix is assigned/advertised that any of these addresses can be used in the source/destination field, respectively. A future extension could create semantics for these addreses, but that is not called out in the text at this time.
I'm know I'm late looking at this but thanks as this small clarification is really helpful
The current text in this draft needs to be updated to match the changes from URL I'll write up a PR once existing conflicting PRs are merged.
NAME is this unblocked now?
We need to clearly state that ADDRESSASSIGN defines a set of addresses the receiver of the capsule can use as a source IP address on packets it generates We need to clearly state that ROUTEADVERTISEMENT defines a set of addresses the receiver of the capsule can use as a destination IP address on packets it generates Should we rename the capsules to make this relationship more clear in all use cases?
Let's bike shed the name here NAME NAME NAME
(to clarify Tommy's comment - if anyone comes up with a new name they like, they should post it here. If not, we'll go with advertisement and withdraw)
Thanks!
Code change:
7.3. <del> IANA is requested to add srtp_ekt_key_transport as a new extension name to the "ExtensionType Values" table of the "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions" registry with a reference to this specification and allocate a value of TBD to for this.  Note to RFC Editor: TBD will be allocated by IANA. </del> <ins> IANA is requested to add as a new extension name to the "ExtensionType Values" table of the "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions" registry with a reference to this specification and allocate a value of TBD to for this. [[ Note to RFC Editor: TBD will be allocated by IANA. ]] </ins> Considerations for this type of extension are described in Section 5 of RFC4366 and requires "IETF Consensus". 7.4. <del> IANA is requested to add srtp_ekt_message as an new descriptions name to the "TLS ContentType Registry" table of the "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions" registry with a reference to this specification, a DTLS-OK value of "Y", and allocate a value of TBD to for this content type.  Note to RFC Editor: TBD will be allocated by IANA. </del> <ins> IANA is requested to add as a new entry in the "TLS HandshakeType Registry" table of the "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters" registry with a reference to this specification, a DTLS-OK value of "Y", and allocate a value of TBD to for this content type. [[ Note to RFC Editor: TBD will be allocated by IANA. ]] </ins> This registry was defined in Section 12 of RFC5246 and requires "Standards Action".

Related discussion:
text: This is much more compatible with extensibility patterns in TLS stacks, and in a way that is very forward-compatible with the forthcoming DTLS 1.3, while still being implementable in pre-1.3 stacks. DTLS 1.3 has a notion of post-handshake handshake messages, like and , which are acknoweldged with an message. The framework described here simply sends as yet another post-handshake message. Depends on
r? NAME
I have a bunch of comments but really I could live with this like you have it now.
Code change:
Load balancers SHOULD drop short header packets with unroutable DCIDs. <del> The routing of long headers with unroutable DCIDs depends on the server ID allocation strategy, described in sid-allocation.  However, the load balancer MUST NOT drop these packets, with one exception. </del> <ins> When forwarding a packet with a long header and unroutable DCID, load balancers MUST use a fallback algorithm as specified in fallback- algorithm. </ins> Load balancers MAY drop packets with long headers and unroutable DCIDs if and only if it knows that the encoded QUIC version does not

Related discussion:
text: and .
In light of , NAME concerns about the framework, and NAME declining interest in implementing, I think it's time to simply eliminate this from the document.
Thanks for all the hard work, but sorry to be the cause of it.
Fixed by
How does a dynamic framework survive an HA handover? It would seem to lose all the SID allocations and break all connections.
Code change:
depend on the ServerHello and therefore has weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the data is authenticated either with TLS client authentication or inside the application protocol. <del> The same warnings apply to any use of the early_exporter_main_secret. </del> <ins> The same warnings apply to any use of the early_exporter_secret. </ins> 0-RTT data cannot be duplicated within a connection (i.e., the server will not process the same data twice for the same connection), and an

Related discussion:
text: While we're renaming these anyway, exportersecret and resumptionsecret are just as descriptive.
exportermainsecret and resumptionmainsecret strike me as not needing an adjective in the middle at all. Perhaps exportersecret and resumptionsecret? For the exporter secret, dropping "main" avoids the acronym collision with the EMS extension, and there are no other secrets associated with exporters, so there's no use in designating this as the main one. For the resumption secret, there is a potential confusion between resumption[main]secret and the derived PSK associated with the ticket (section {#NSTMessage}), but we don't seem to give the latter a name in the first place so I think that's fine. This also gives us nice short KDF labels when we're able to change those: "exporter" and "resumption". (Or perhaps even "export" and "resume" if those don't fit in a hash block.)
Code change:
the only possible choice for hosting.  There are other services that host revision control repositories and provide similar additional features to GitHub.  For instance, BitBucket [4], or GitLab [5] <del> provide a similar feature set.  In additional to a hosted service, </del> <ins> provide a similar feature set.  In addition to a hosted service, </ins> software for custom installations exists. This document concentrates primarily on GitHub as it has a large and

Related discussion:
text: A good start. Would you like to open another PR adding yourself as an author?
Let me know if what I created (experiences + author) needs to be something different. This is a very scary world for me. Ultra light description is next. Barbara
Code change:
The Welcome message contains the information that the new member needs to initialize a GroupState object that can be updated to the current state using the Add message.  This information is encrypted <del> for the new member using ECIES.  The recipient key pair for the ECIES </del> <ins> for the new member using HPKE.  The recipient key pair for the HPKE </ins> encryption is the one included in the indicated UserInitKey, corresponding to the indicated ciphersuite.

Related discussion:
text: This does not handle the removal of DH uses instead of KEM which will be done as part of Issue / PR ...
I would be happier if this PR were moving the draft to use draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke, which is one of the changes I had in mind for -04. Do you think that's premature?
This text is wrong:
This could also be addressed by using draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke.
This has been fixed by
Enable, e.g., P-256 with both AES-GCM and ChaChaPoly Re-use code points from TLS
We should discuss that today