jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
the namespace used for the TLS-based challenge (the "acme.invalid" namespace for "tls-sni-02"). <del> 10.3. An ACME-based CA will often need to make DNS queries, e.g., to validate control of DNS names.  Because the security of such validations ultimately depends on the authenticity of DNS data, every possible precaution should be taken to secure DNS queries done by the CA.  It is therefore RECOMMENDED that ACME-based CAs make all DNS queries via DNSSEC-validating stub or recursive resolvers.  This provides additional protection to domains which choose to make use of DNSSEC. An ACME-based CA must use only a resolver if it trusts the resolver and every component of the network route by which it is accessed.  It is therefore RECOMMENDED that ACME-based CAs operate their own DNSSEC-validating resolvers within their trusted network and use these resolvers both for both CAA record lookups and all record lookups in furtherance of a challenge scheme (A, AAAA, TXT, etc.). </del> 11.  References 11.1.  URIs
7.3.5. The server MAY require a value to be present for the "external- <del> account-binding" field.  This can be used to an ACME account with an existing account in a non-ACME system, such as a CA customer database. </del> <ins> account-binding" field.  This can be used to associate an ACME account with an existing account in a non-ACME system, such as a CA customer database. </ins> To enable ACME account binding, a CA needs to provision the ACME client with a MAC key and a key identifier.  The key identifier MUST
the "challenges" dictionary. The client sends these updates back to the server in the form of a <del> JSON object with the response fields required by the challenge type, carried in a POST request to the challenge URL (not authorization URL) once it is ready for the server to attempt validation. </del> <ins> JSON object with contents as specified by the challenge type, carried in a POST request to the challenge URL (not authorization URL) once it is ready for the server to attempt validation. </ins> For example, if the client were to respond to the "http-01" challenge in the above authorization, it would send the following request: The server updates the authorization document by updating its <del> representation of the challenge with the response fields provided by </del> <ins> representation of the challenge with the response object provided by </ins> the client.  The server MUST ignore any fields in the response object that are not specified as response fields for this type of challenge. The server provides a 200 (OK) response with the updated challenge
Clients SHOULD NOT respond to challenges until they believe that the server's queries will succeed.  If a server's initial validation <del> query fails, the server SHOULD retry the query after some time. While the server is still trying, the status of the challenge remains "pending"; it is only marked "invalid" once the server has given up. </del> <ins> query fails, the server SHOULD retry the query after some time, in order to account for delay in setting up responses such as DNS records or HTTP resources.  The precise retry schedule is up to the server, but server operators should keep in mind the operational scenarios that the schedule is trying to accommodate.  Given that retries are intended to address things like propagation delays in HTTP or DNS provisioning, there should not usually be any reason to retry more often than every 5 or 10 seconds.  While the server is still trying, the status of the challenge remains "pending"; it is only marked "invalid" once the server has given up. </ins> The server MUST provide information about its retry state to the client via the "errors" field in the challenge and the Retry-After
for a human user to navigate to.  If the user chooses to complete this challenge (by visiting the website and completing its instructions), the client indicates this by sending a simple <del> acknowledgement response to the server. The string "oob-01" </del> <ins> acknowledgement response to the server.  The payload of this response is an empty JSON object ("{}", or "e30" base64url-encoded). </ins> On receiving a response, the server MUST verify that the value of the "type" field is "oob-01".  Otherwise, the steps the server takes to
according to this encoding, then the verifier MUST reject the JWS as malformed. <del> 5.6. Certain elements of the protocol will require the establishment of a shared secret between the client and the server, in such a way that an entity observing the ACME protocol cannot derive the secret.  In these cases, we use a simple ECDH key exchange, based on the system used by CMS RFC5753: Inputs: Client-generated key pair Server-generated key pair Length of the shared secret to be derived Label Perform the ECDH primitive operation to obtain Z (Section 3.3.1 of SEC1) Select a hash algorithm according to the curve being used: For "P-256", use SHA-256 For "P-384", use SHA-384 For "P-521", use SHA-512 Derive the shared secret value using the KDF in Section 3.6.1 of SEC1 using Z and the selected hash algorithm, and with the UTF-8 encoding of the label as the SharedInfo value In cases where the length of the derived secret is shorter than the output length of the chosen hash algorithm, the KDF referenced above reduces to a single hash invocation.  The shared secret is equal to the leftmost octets of the following: </del> 6. In this section, we describe the certificate management functions
registration, to allow a client to retrieve the "new-authorization" and "terms-of-service" URI <del> 6.3.1. If the client wishes to establish a secret key with the server that it can use to recover this account later (a "recovery key"), then it must perform a simple key agreement protocol as part of the new- registration transaction.  The client and server perform an ECDH exchange through the new-registration transaction (using the technique in key-agreement), and the result is the recovery key. To request a recovery key, the client includes a "recoveryKey" field in its new-registration request.  The value of this field is a JSON object. The client's ECDH public key The length of the derived secret, in octets. In the client's request, this object contains a JWK for a random ECDH public key generated by the client and the client-selected length value.  Clients need to choose length values that balance security and usability.  On the one hand, a longer secret makes it more difficult for an attacker to recover the secret when it is used for recovery (see mac-based-recovery).  On the other hand, clients may wish to make the recovery key short enough for a user to easily write it down. The server MUST validate that the elliptic curve ("crv") and length value chosen by the client are acceptable, and that it is otherwise willing to create a recovery key.  If not, then it MUST reject the new-registration request. If the server agrees to create a recovery key, then it generates its own random ECDH key pair and combines it with the client's public key as described in key-agreement above, using the label "recovery".  The derived secret value is the recovery key.  The server then returns to the client the ECDH key that it generated.  The server MUST generate a fresh key pair for every transaction. The server's ECDH public key On receiving the server's response, the client can compute the recovery key by combining the server's public key together with the private key corresponding to the public key that it sent to the server. Clients may refresh the recovery key associated with a registration by sending a POST request with a new recoveryKey object.  If the server agrees to refresh the recovery key, then it responds in the same way as to a new registration request that asks for a recovery key. </del> 6.4. Once a client has created an account with an ACME server, it is
is the only one that can choose the new account key that receives the capabilities held by the account being recovered. <del> MAC-based recovery can be performed if the attacker knows the account key and registration URI for the account being recovered.  Both of these are difficult to obtain for a network attacker, because ACME uses HTTPS, though if the recovery key and registration URI are sufficiently predictable, the attacker might be able to guess them. An ACME MitM can see the registration URI, but still has to guess the recovery key, since neither the ECDH in the provisioning phase nor HMAC in the recovery phase will reveal it to him. ACME clients can thus mitigate problems with MAC-based recovery by using long recovery keys.  ACME servers should enforce a minimum recovery key length, and impose rate limits on recovery to limit an attacker's ability to test different guesses about the recovery key. Contact-based recovery uses both the ACME channel and the contact channel.  The provisioning process is only visible to an ACME MitM, and even then, the MitM can only observe the contact information provided.  If the ACME attacker does not also have access to the contact channel, there is no risk. The security of the contact-based recovery process is entirely dependent on the security of the contact channel.  The details of this will depend on the specific out-of-band technique used by the server.  For example: </del> <ins> Account recovery uses both the ACME channel and the contact channel. The provisioning process is only visible to an ACME MitM, and even then, the MitM can only observe the contact information provided.  If the ACME attacker does not also have access to the contact channel, there is no risk. The security of the recovery process is entirely dependent on the security of the contact channel.  The details of this will depend on the specific out-of-band technique used by the server.  For example: </ins> If the server requires a user to click a link in a message sent to a contact address, then the contact channel will need to ensure
In practice, many contact channels that can be used to reach many clients do not provide strong assurances of the types noted above. <del> In designing and deploying contact-based recovery schemes, ACME servers operators will need to find an appropriate balance between using contact channels that can reach many clients and using contact- based recovery schemes that achieve an appropriate level of risk using those contact channels. </del> <ins> In designing and deploying recovery schemes, ACME servers operators will need to find an appropriate balance between using contact channels that can reach many clients and using contact-based recovery schemes that achieve an appropriate level of risk using those contact channels. </ins> 9.4.
certificate. If the revocation succeeds, the server responds with status code 200 <del> (OK).  If the revocation fails, the server returns an error. </del> <ins> (OK).  If the revocation fails, the server returns an error.  For example, if the certificate has already been revoked the server returns an error response with status code 400 (Bad Request) and type "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:alreadyRevoked". </ins> 8.
configuring their TLS implementations.  ACME servers that support TLS 1.3 MAY allow clients to send early data (0-RTT).  This is safe because the ACME protocol itself includes anti-replay protections <del> (see replay-protection). </del> <ins> (see replay-protection) in all cases where they are required.  For this reason, there are no restrictions on what ACME data can be carried in 0-RTT. </ins> ACME clients MUST send a User-Agent header field, in accordance with RFC7231.  This header field SHOULD include the name and version of
"status" field. For pending authorizations, the challenges that the client can <del> fulfill in order to prove possession of the identifier.  For final authorizations (in the "valid" or "invalid" state), the challenges that were used.  Each array entry is an object with parameters required to validate the challenge.  A client should attempt to fulfill one of these challenges, and a server should consider any one of the challenges sufficient to make the authorization valid. </del> <ins> fulfill in order to prove possession of the identifier.  For valid authorizations, the challenge that was validated.  For invalid authorizations, the challenge that was attempted and failed.  Each array entry is an object with parameters required to validate the challenge.  A client should attempt to fulfill one of these challenges, and a server should consider any one of the challenges sufficient to make the authorization valid. </ins> For authorizations created as a result of a newOrder request containing a DNS identifier with a value that contained a wildcard
Authorization objects are created in the "pending" state.  If one of the challenges listed in the authorization transitions to the "valid" state, then the authorization also changes to the "valid" state.  If <del> there is an error while the authorization is still pending, then the </del> <ins> the client attempts to fulfill a challenge and fails, or if there is an error while the authorization is still pending, then the </ins> authorization transitions to the "invalid" state.  Once the authorization is in the valid state, it can expire ("expired"), be deactivated by the client ("deactivated", see deactivating-an-
can't obtain illegitimate authorization by acting as an ACME client (legitimately, in terms of the protocol). <ins> ACME does not protect against other types of abuse by a MitM on the ACME channel.  For example, such an attacker could send a bogus "badSignatureAlgorithm" error response to downgrade a client to the lowest-quality signature algorithm that the server supports.  A MitM that is present on all connections (such as a CDN), can cause denial- of-service conditions in a variety of ways. </ins> 10.2. ACME allows anyone to request challenges for an identifier by
9.1. A file of this type contains one or more certificates encoded with <del> the PEM textual encoding, according to RFC 7468 RFC7468.  In order to provide easy interoperation with TLS, the first certificate MUST be an end-entity certificate.  Each following certificate SHOULD directly certify the one preceding it.  Because certificate validation requires that trust anchors be distributed independently, a certificate that represents a trust anchor MAY be omitted from the chain, provided that supported peers are known to possess any omitted certificates. </del> <ins> the PEM textual encoding, according to RFC 7468 RFC7468.  The textual encoding of certificates in this file MUST use the strict encoding and MUST NOT include explanatory text.  The ABNF for this format is as follows, where "stricttextualmsg" and "eol" are as defined in Section 3 of RFC 7468: In order to provide easy interoperation with TLS, the first certificate MUST be an end-entity certificate.  Each following certificate SHOULD directly certify the one preceding it.  Because certificate validation requires that trust anchors be distributed independently, a certificate that represents a trust anchor MAY be omitted from the chain, provided that supported peers are known to possess any omitted certificates. </ins> The "Media Types" registry should be updated with the following additional value:
anchors.  Clients can fetch these alternates and use their own heuristics to decide which is optimal. <del> An ACME client MAY attempt to fetch the certificate with a GET request.  If the server does not allow GET requests for certificate resources, then it will return an error as described in post-as-get. On receiving such an error, the client SHOULD fall back to a POST-as- GET request. </del> A certificate resource represents a single, immutable certificate. If the client wishes to obtain a renewed certificate, the client initiates a new order process to request one.
with an array of supported "alg" values.  See errors for more details on the structure of error responses. <ins> If the server supports the signature algorithm "alg" but either does not support or chooses to reject the public key "jwk", then the server MUST return an error with status code 400 (Bad Request) and type "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:badPublicKey".  The problem document detail SHOULD describe the reason for rejecting the public key; some example reasons are: "alg" is "RS256" but the modulus "n" is too small (e.g., 512-bit) "alg" is "ES256" but "jwk" does not contain a valid P-256 public key "alg" is "EdDSA" and "crv" is "Ed448", but the server only supports "EdDSA" with "Ed25519" the corresponding private key is known to have been compromised </ins> Because client requests in ACME carry JWS objects in the Flattened JSON Serialization, they must have the Content-Type header field set to "application/jose+json".  If a request does not meet this
process can be represented and performed by Internet protocols with no out-of-band human intervention. <del> When an operator deploys a current HTTPS server, it generally prompts him to generate a self-signed certificate.  When an operator deploys an ACME-compatible web server, the experience would be something like this: </del> <ins> When deploying a current HTTPS server, an operator generally gets a prompt to generate a self-signed certificate.  When an operator deploys an ACME-compatible web server, the experience would be something like this: </ins> The ACME client prompts the operator for the intended domain name(s) that the web server is to stand for.
certificate was issued, and one with relation "author" to indicate the registration under which this certificate was issued. <del> The server MAY include an Expires header as a hint to the client about when to renew the certificate.  (Of course, the real expiration of the certificate is controlled by the notAfter time in the certificate itself.) </del> If the CA participates in Certificate Transparency (CT) RFC6962, then they may want to provide the client with a Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT) that can be used to prove that a certificate was
for a certificate using a Link relation header field with relation "ct-sct". <del> A certificate resource always represents the most recent certificate issued for the name/key binding expressed in the CSR.  If the CA allows a certificate to be renewed, then it publishes renewed versions of the certificate through the same certificate URI. Clients retrieve renewed versions of the certificate using a GET query to the certificate URI, which the server should then return in a 200 (OK) response.  The server SHOULD provide a stable URI for each specific certificate in the Content-Location header field, as shown above.  Requests to stable certificate URIs MUST always result in the same certificate. To avoid unnecessary renewals, the CA may choose not to issue a renewed certificate until it receives such a request (if it even allows renewal at all).  In such cases, if the CA requires some time to generate the new certificate, the CA MUST return a 202 (Accepted) response, with a Retry-After header field that indicates when the new certificate will be available.  The CA MAY include the current (non- renewed) certificate as the body of the response. Likewise, in order to prevent unnecessary renewal due to queries by parties other than the account key holder, certificate URIs should be structured as capability URLs W3C.WD-capability-urls-20140218. From the client's perspective, there is no difference between a certificate URI that allows renewal and one that does not.  If the client wishes to obtain a renewed certificate, and a GET request to the certificate URI does not yield one, then the client may initiate a new-certificate transaction to request one. </del> <ins> A certificate resource represents a single, immutable certificate. If the client wishes to obtain a renewed certificate, the client initiates a new-certificate transaction to request one. Because certificate resources are immutable once issuance is complete, the server MAY enable the caching of the resource by adding Expires and Cache-Control headers specifying a point in time in the distant future.  These headers have no relation to the certificate's period of validity. </ins> 6.6.
In addition, the client MAY advise the server at which IP the challenge is provisioned: <del> An IPv4 or IPv6 address which, if given, MUST be included in the set of IP addresses to which the domain name resolves.  If given, the server will connect to that specific IP address instead of arbitrarily choosing an IP from the set of A and AAAA records to which the domain name resolves.  If the field is given but equal to ""peer"", the server MUST treat the field as if it contained the IP address from which the response was received. </del> <ins> An IPv4 or IPv6 address which, in dotted decimal form or RFC4291 form, respectively.  If given, this address MUST be included in the set of IP addresses to which the domain name resolves.  If given, the server SHOULD connect to that specific IP address instead of arbitrarily choosing an IP from the set of A and AAAA records to which the domain name resolves. </ins> On receiving a response, the server MUST verify that the key authorization in the response matches the "token" value in the
Data Unit: Datagram The Transport Services API mappings for UDP-Lite are identical to <del> UDP.  Properties that require checksum coverage are not supported by UDP-Lite, such as "msgChecksumLen", "fullChecksumSend", "recvChecksumLen", and "fullChecksumRecv". </del> <ins> UDP.  In addition, UDP-Lite supports the "msgChecksumLen" and "recvChecksumLen" Properties that allow an application to specify the minimum number of bytes in a message that need to be covered by a checksum. </ins> 10.5.
of efficiency.  This is not a strict requirement.  The default is to not have this option. <del> Notification of special errors (excessive retransmissions, ICMP error message arrival): This boolean property specifies whether an application considers it useful to be informed in case sent data was retransmitted more often than a certain threshold, or when an ICMP error message arrives.  This property applies to Connections and Connection Groups.  This is not a strict requirement.  The default is to have this option. </del> <ins> Notification of excessive retransmissions: This boolean property specifies whether an application considers it useful to be informed in case sent data was retransmitted more often than a certain threshold.  This property applies to Connections and Connection Groups.  This is not a strict requirement.  The default is to have this option. Notification of ICMP error message arrival: This boolean property specifies whether an application considers it useful to be informed when an ICMP error message arrives.  This property applies to Connections and Connection Groups.  This is not a strict requirement.  The default is to have this option. </ins> Control checksum coverage on sending or receiving: This boolean property specifies whether the application considers it useful to