jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
Code change:
8.1. <del> Please update the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Registry" registry at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-fields> with the </del> <ins> Please update the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-fields> with the </ins> field names listed in the two tables of header.field.definitions. 8.2.

Related discussion:
text: This is related to issue On the flight back from Switzerland, I spent time looking at the cache directives and how they differ from the descriptions in RFC2616. I worked out these problems and drafted a pull request, but I haven't checked whether we changed these deliberately for RFC7234, or if the distinctions just got lost in the rewrite. In any case, I think this is an improvement, but definitely needs reviews.
This ended up being an editorial change between drafts because the only normative changes were already noted for and , and this is just rewording what we had for .
From : Both state that a (depending on context private, shared or both types of) "cache MAY store the response and reuse it for later requests, even if the response would normally be non-cacheable". To my understanding, this does not intend to override the requirements from the "Storing Responses in Caches" section (URL) altogether. Instead, I would assume that it only refers to the condition "has a status code that is defined as heuristically cacheable" in that section (or, as it was stated in RFC7234, "has a status code that is defined as cacheable by default")? Would it make sense to amend the list of conditions in that section, appending to the "the response either..." second-level list: "contains a private response directive if the cache is not shared"?
OP here
lists some directives that allow responses with Authentication to be stored, but some of those directives' definitions do not mention this.
I think this should also be added for ; see .
I think this issue needs to be reopened and the specification text reverted to something more like what was in RFC2616. That spec specifically requires public be present to allow responses to a request with Authorization to be stored by a shared cache, regardless of must-revalidate or proxy-revalidate. This is not implied by those other directives.
Code change:
it in the CAD application, after which the CAD application displays the user's most recent designs. <ins> 2.4.9. A network administrator wants to access an adminstration portal used to configure network assets and deploy new applications.  When attempting to access the service, the network administrator receives a notification in an app on their mobile device, requesting them to confirm access to the portal.  The network administrator approves the request on their mobile phone and is granted access to the portal. </ins> 3. Attackers exploit cross-device flows by initiating an authorization

Related discussion:
text: Added an example described at OSW 2023 (see issue )
There are two new attacks, the consent bombing and fake helpdesk attacks, that may be added as examples of attacks, or as extensions of existing attacks.
After discussing ith Daniel we agreeed: Add an example for the consent bombing attacks Add a sub-attack to example B.4 (split into two attacks).
Approved with editorial changes.
Code change:
dictionary already contains a name this_key (comparing character-for-character), overwrite its value. <del> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. </del> <ins> Discard any leading OWS characters from input_string. </ins> If input_string is empty, return dictionary. Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not ",", fail parsing. <del> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. </del> <ins> Discard any leading OWS characters from input_string. </ins> If input_string is empty, there is a trailing comma; fail parsing.

Related discussion:
text: From Magnus's feedback
also NAME PTAL
This does not instill much of a panicked reaction in me, which is probably a good sign. I trust it is intentional to not apply a similar treatment to inner lists (which also has a prose description I had commented on previously) on the grounds of them not resembling existing top-level header field structures? That's certainly defensible, though I have to wonder whether someone will simply assume that it must be the same (not that we have much hope of changing such a person's behavior).
How does this vibe with ? I know we spent a bit of time on it, but it's long enough ago that I can't recall detail.
Ah, right, I think I remember. Doing it this way means inner-list is different: The original motivation to remove tabs was because the above was going to be but there was consternation about RWS. Most of the discussion is in
NAME was where my mind went first too, but that seems to be just about in inner lists (which makes sense). I think this is separate; intermediaries that don't know about the semantics and syntactic limitations of a given field shouldn't be meddling inside it (which inner list delimitation is).
NAME I think so -- that's the only reason to allow this. Existing servers may already legitimately be using TAB when combining multiple field lines. And I suppose it makes sense, given the recent discussion about not breaking up individual list or dictionary members over multiple lines, that we don't need to replace *SP with OWS everywhere. I'm okay with this change -- does it warrant a note in the prose somewhere that this special case only exists to accommodate field concatenation? Let's hope we don't need to add VTAB or FF to this, too :)
NAME I don't know that that's necessary; we already pretty clearly. In SF, I looked at changing "whitespace", but in each case the ABNF and algorithms make it clear what we're talking about, so I don't see a strong need to disambiguate.
I'm ok with the change over here; that said, the Semantics spec could be clearer. Opened URL
NAME and I have been talking about this, and have come to the conclusion that this change went too far.
Code change:
dictionary already contains a name this_key (comparing character-for-character), overwrite its value. <del> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. </del> <ins> Discard any leading OWS characters from input_string. </ins> If input_string is empty, return dictionary. Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not ",", fail parsing. <del> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. </del> <ins> Discard any leading OWS characters from input_string. </ins> If input_string is empty, there is a trailing comma; fail parsing.

Related discussion:
text: Specifically, steps 1 and 5 in "Parsing Structured Fields" should just be SP, not OWS, because there isn't any risk of an intermediary inserting TAB before the first field line or after the last field line; it's only between List and Dictionary members that we need to be concerned. Reverting that part of the change also makes writing the test cases considerably simpler. See 6842793e.
This is so that field line combination as per the Semantics spec can happen, right? I note that currently says: Note that it says "comma an optional whitespace", not "OWS". Depending on how you read it, it might include other whitespace characters. I believe this needs to be fixed in the Semantics spec.I dont think I ever saw a TAB in a HTTP header in real life, but I am OK with this.
Code change:
malicious) request.  Thus, the reload request should be considered cross-site, like the request that initially navigated to the page. <ins> Because requests issued for, non-user initiated, reloads attach all SameSite cookies, developers should be careful and thoughtful about when to initiate a reload in order to avoid a CSRF attack.  For example, the page could only initiate a reload if a CSRF token is present on the initial request. </ins> 8.8.6. The "Lax" enforcement mode described in strict-lax allows a cookie to

Related discussion:
text: This PR removes the requirement of checking the request's redirect chain during the computation of same-site-ness. This is being done because RFC6265bis is blocked by this work but we have yet to find a way to implement it in a web compatible way. In the interest of moving RFC6265bis forward the requirement is being removed.
The work to re-add the requirement back into RFC6265tris is being track by issue
Yeah, we did implement this - but we had to back it out (and re-spin stable, IIRC?) because it broke too many sites. :(
Correct, Chrome had to disable the change. Firefox had a similar experience.
We noticed a difference between Firefox & Chrome’s behavior for same-site cookies. Specifically, if a web page is requesting a resource whose final redirect target is same-site with the web page, . Firefox follows what was originally decided in URL and specified in recent i.e., Firefox looks at the whole redirect chain. For context: Firefox shipped SameSite=Lax by default this January and had to backpedal due to this (and some other webcompat issues). Firefox does not ship SameSite=Lax as the default setting for new cookies as of now. While we’re still working on our own metrics, we’ve noticed that Chrome is seeing about 1% of page loads potentially affected, which seems prohibitively high. At the same time, we would prefer not to weaken our implementation of explicit SameSite cookies, given that the redirect check was specifically added to prevent CSRF abuse scenarios. With these things in mind, we’ve been exploring the idea that we might treat cookies differently depending on whether the cookie was set to lax by default or is an explicit samesite cookie. NAME NAME it would be nice to hear some thoughts about this idea and also NAME how other browsers may have implemented . CC: NAME NAME NAME NAME NAME NAME
Yeah, I agree this is unfortunate. We did , but it broke a few sites and was backed out (or rather, put behind an off-by-default feature flag). NAME has been collecting better metrics so we can hopefully make progress on this. Can you give some more detail what you're thinking here? (also cc NAME


With these things in mind, we’ve been exploring the idea that we might treat cookies differently depending on whether the cookie was set to lax by default or is an explicit samesite cookie.
Code change:
malicious) request.  Thus, the reload request should be considered cross-site, like the request that initially navigated to the page. <ins> Because requests issued for, non-user initiated, reloads attach all SameSite cookies, developers should be careful and thoughtful about when to initiate a reload in order to avoid a CSRF attack.  For example, the page could only initiate a reload if a CSRF token is present on the initial request. </ins> 8.8.6. The "Lax" enforcement mode described in strict-lax allows a cookie to

Related discussion:
text: Firefox is already enforcing that all redirects are same-site for cookies that have an explicit or strict attribute. We would like to keep that restriction of course. From my understanding the idea would be that only cookies that don't define their own SameSite attribute and are then "lax-by-default" we would ignore the redirects.
As a side note, Chrome does send with these redirected sub-resource requests, so internally the networking code does seem to know the correct same-site value of the request. Obviously we'd like to do the more secure behavior all the time, but we are committed to doing the specified secure behavior for explicit SameSite cookies. Firefox has enforced this for explicit SameSite cookies for maybe around a year and has not suffered a noticeable amount of web incompatibility. We are in the (slow!) process of gathering telemetry to measure the impact of this on laxByDefault vs explictly SameSite cookies. Our hope is that we can convince Chrome folks to honor the spec for explicit SameSite cookies so that users and sites will be secure as promised by the spec, and that Firefox will be less likely to run into Web Compatibility problems in the future because of this. And that if we must weaken the behavior of laxByDefault (as it appears we must based on site breakage) that we explicitly change the spec to say "lax-ish by default" cookies follow Chrome's current behavior of ignoring redirects and comparing only the originator and the final request URL.
Hello and sorry for my late response. Our (Chrome's) metrics continue to show around 1% of page loads containing 1 or more cookies that would be blocked by this enforcement. While I'm unable to share numbers (yet, I'll add them to URL once they're approved) I can say that the vast majority of values triggering this are unspecified (lax by default). I wonder then if many of these cookies are likely those being accessed after a POST request from some login or payment flow redirect chain. I don't have any data to back this hunch up but URL hints this may be the case. If it is then perhaps we can tie the redirect chain enforcement to the 2 min Lax+POST mitigation. I.e.: Allow unspecified cookies to be accessible after cross-site redirects for up to 2 minutes.
Code change:
malicious) request.  Thus, the reload request should be considered cross-site, like the request that initially navigated to the page. <ins> Because requests issued for, non-user initiated, reloads attach all SameSite cookies, developers should be careful and thoughtful about when to initiate a reload in order to avoid a CSRF attack.  For example, the page could only initiate a reload if a CSRF token is present on the initial request. </ins> 8.8.6. The "Lax" enforcement mode described in strict-lax allows a cookie to

Related discussion:
text: While I worry this will further ossify that "temporary" mitigation it feels better than a blanket except for unspecified cookies. Given our metrics I don't think your proposal is unreasonable, but the more we can tighten the restriction the better. Any thoughts? Does Firefox have any data that could support or refute my idea? (Tangentially: I'd still like to see the 2 min exception removed, but I get a headache even thinking about it.)
tagging NAME NAME for visibility to the above comment. I think tying this to the 2 minute exception is fairly reasonable - 1% of page loads is sadly much too high to ship what the spec describes in any reasonable time frame. Perhaps some pages would still break, but it's worth a shot. And I agree we should change the spec to match (whatever becomes) reality here.
What about the idea of differentiating between explicit and -defaulted ? Not ideal, but then at least there won't be a security regression for those who opt into . Then for -defaulted we could do something along the lines you propose, in name of webcompat.
Right, we already differentiate between explicitly Lax () and unspecified () when it comes to the 2 min Lax+POST mitigation. Only the unspecified cookies qualify for that mitigation, explicitly Lax do not. (Perhaps it would have been better to name it Unspecified+POST, oh well) I'm suggesting to continue that pattern for the redirect chain exception, so I think we're in agreement.
NAME Yes, that's aligned with our thinking right now. Do you have numbers that can help us gain more clarity for these exact cases (a redirect where the final URL is same-site, but the overall chain is to be considered cross-site, also called "boomerang redirect") and split up into explicit-lax and default-lax? We're still in the process of collecting those within Firefox, but are obviously interested in your insights so far.
NAME I think URL has what you want. Those numbers are from roughly a week ago. tl;dr Between 80-90% of cookies are unspecified/default lax. Cookies that are being newly written are on the higher end of the range, cookies being read are lower.
Hi! John from Apple WebKit here.
Code change:
malicious) request.  Thus, the reload request should be considered cross-site, like the request that initially navigated to the page. <ins> Because requests issued for, non-user initiated, reloads attach all SameSite cookies, developers should be careful and thoughtful about when to initiate a reload in order to avoid a CSRF attack.  For example, the page could only initiate a reload if a CSRF token is present on the initial request. </ins> 8.8.6. The "Lax" enforcement mode described in strict-lax allows a cookie to

Related discussion:
text: If we standardize different behavior for default vs explicit SameSite=lax … We increase the complexity of SameSite cookies significantly. Is that desirable? Will developers be able to know the difference without this effectively being displayed as an additional cookie attribute in developer tools? Are we arriving at the desired end state or piling on more legacy and technical debt? It looks to me like this should instead be a fourth SameSite value, beside none, lax, and strict. Then we’ll have to decide if the new, fourth value is the default or the old explicit lax. I generally don’t like fixing legacy problems by increased spec complexity since it doesn’t help the web/Internet progress. I will bring this up with the CFNetwork folks at Apple to see what they have to say.
Hi John, You bring up some good points. I'm curious if the CFNetwork folks had anything to add.
I think what's under discussion is making the fourth value explicit in the specification. It apparently is already a thing in some implementations. I'm not sure we have a good reason to expose it in syntax though. But yeah, a clear name in the specification would help with tooling and such.
+1
"Default" is an explicit value for the in the algorithms and storage model defined in Section 5. It's not a part of the syntax. Unfortunately it looks like the algorithm only sets the if there's an explicit SameSite attribute in step 17 ("Default" is used for an otherwise unknown value). Presumably the should be initialized to "Default" somewhere, but that's an assumption and not explicit. The value of same-site-flag is technically undefined if there isn't a SameSite attribute and that's clearly not the intent.
Hi, Zhenchao Li from Apple working on CFNetwork. This change sounds quite complex to me. Although, if it means minimizing website breakage and tightening cookie restriction, I'm in favor of explicitly adding the behavior to the RFC. It does sound like we need to move from "SameSite=lax by default" to "SameSite=[fourth value] by default". Also, "default" still needs to be a separate state persisted in "Storage Model" so as not to be conflated any time.
Code change:
malicious) request.  Thus, the reload request should be considered cross-site, like the request that initially navigated to the page. <ins> Because requests issued for, non-user initiated, reloads attach all SameSite cookies, developers should be careful and thoughtful about when to initiate a reload in order to avoid a CSRF attack.  For example, the page could only initiate a reload if a CSRF token is present on the initial request. </ins> 8.8.6. The "Lax" enforcement mode described in strict-lax allows a cookie to

Related discussion:
text: (I believe this is intended by latest draft, but as NAME pointed this might need some changes to the Storage Model section) NAME Could you help clarify more about "2 min Lax+POST mitigation"? I see it mentioned above but it would be great to discuss how the mitigation should behave exactly.
URL is the spec language around the behavior. As a quick refresher: the goal is to allow unsafe http methods (commonly POST) to attach cookies that do not specify a attribute but are being treat as "lax by default". This behavior is intended for newly created cookies and so has a lifetime limit of up to 2 minutes. Let me know if you have any more specific questions.
We (NAME NAME NAME and I) discussed this at TPAC and came to the following suggestion: We think that browsers have to apply a compatibility measure here, and it could be including cookies on cross-site redirects if they’re younger than, for example, 2 minutes. We’ll collect metrics to get a better understanding of what that number should be. We will update "Lax-Allowing-Unsafe" in the spec to document that behavior, which would make Chromium compliant to that and Firefox could (AFAIU) ship a compliant version as well. We’ll continue to recommend "Lax-Allowing-Unsafe" as the default behavior in the spec. We’ll note that this is a compatibility mechanism that browsers may support or not support at their own discretion. It's not a behavior sites should opt into.
I believe the "same-site redirect chain consideration" change should be removed from RFC6265bis, with the intention of adding it back to RFC6265Tris. RFC6265bis contains a number of improvements over RFC6265 that are being stalled due to UAs being unable to implement "same-site redirect chain consideration" in a web compatible way. My efforts examining metrics collected by Chrome haven't yet offered much insight into how this issue could be solved and I have no idea how much longer it could take. Because no UAs (to my knowledge) have shipped "same-site redirect chain consideration" I don't believe reverting the language will have any practical effect and shouldn't weaken any active protections. But publishing RFC6265bis as a new spec will have a number of benefits, including security/privacy benefits for the web's users.
This seems like a reasonable, pragmatic step to me.
Code change:
malicious) request.  Thus, the reload request should be considered cross-site, like the request that initially navigated to the page. <ins> Because requests issued for, non-user initiated, reloads attach all SameSite cookies, developers should be careful and thoughtful about when to initiate a reload in order to avoid a CSRF attack.  For example, the page could only initiate a reload if a CSRF token is present on the initial request. </ins> 8.8.6. The "Lax" enforcement mode described in strict-lax allows a cookie to

Related discussion:
text: The current limbo state isn't helping anyone :) cc NAME
Yes, +1 to documenting reality and no longer blocking the IETF process for 6265bis on this particular item (which I do agree we should treat as a security bug to be eventually solved).
Not an editor, but LGTM (given that it reflects reality).LGTM, given the context.