Code change:
2.1. <ins> In cases where a signed statement is issued by one party and registered by another, there is a need to prove posession of key material and detect tampering while authenticating both parties. Typically a nonce would be chosen by the transparency service and the second party would sign over the nonce, when registering the first issuer's signed statement. In order to avoid interactivity and improve interoperability, document describes a non-exclusive, but mandatory to support, confirmation scheme In this scheme the verifier's challenge is a recent unix timestamp, the presenting party need not request this information from the transparency service. Here is an example key binding token that can be paired with the confirmation claim in a signed statement: When applying registration policies to signed statements with confirmation, the transparency service acts as a verifier, and performs the following checks: verify the integrity of the issuer's signed statement confirm the verified content meets the registration policy for the transparency service. verify the key binding token, using the confirmation claim in the verified issuer signed statement ensure the key binding token has a nonce that is a string representation of a recent unix timestamp The exact window of validity for proving possession is a configuration detail of the transparency service. unix timestamps are used so that only a losely synchronised notion of time need be assumed and there is no requirement to account for timezones If the confirmation key is stolen, the attacker can produce key binding tokens from that point forward in time.  In an interactive confirmation schema, the transparency service can force the confirmation key holder to produce a signature over a nonce that is not guessable, and this prevents certain attacks related to the duration of access to a signing capability and other timing details. However, the cost of coordinating with the transparency service, coupled with the purpose of registering with a transparency service (to obtain a receipt, proving a signed statement was acceptable at a point in time) justify specifying the recent timestamp nonce as a mandatory to implement context binding. In the case that a SCITT transparency service wants to support challenges (nonces) that are context binding, the transparency service can expose a "challenge token endpoint". This endpoint can process request paramters, and issuer a challenge token, that future regsitrations can use to bind to the original request.  This interaction model works well for scenarios where requirements for a given regsitration might change over time, but it is important for the registering party to commit to acceptable values at the time that a signed statement is registered.  These endpoints are optional to implement. 2.1.1. 2.1.1.1. 2.1.1.2. Header: "Content-Type: application/json" (Optional) Header: "Retry-After: <seconds>" Query: "?intention={todo}" Body: "{ "token": "JWT | SD-JWT | base64url( CWT | SD-CWT )>" }" 2.1.2. 2.1.2.1. Headers: "Content-Type: application/cose" Body: SCITT COSE_Sign1 message Note: that the challenge token MUST be present and integrity protected when submitting signed statements to this endpoint.  Note: this endpoint is a duplicate of "POST https://transparency.example/ entries" 2.2. </ins> All messages are sent as HTTP GET or POST requests. If the Transparency Service cannot process a client's request, it

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text: The transparency service knows that animal products require certificates to be imported, and issues a challenge token that looks like this: iss: "https://transparency.example" aud: "https://transparency.example" iat: ${now} exp: ${now + 7 day} currenttreehead: ... (not all TS are trees) currentpolicyhash: ... (not all policies are stored in trees) entrynumber: 42 htscodes: [ 16056100 ] The holder starts registering signed statements, each is bound to the same "challenge token". The first signed statement covers a phytosanitary certificate for the sea cucumber processing facility. The regulatory requirements change. The second signed statement covers the (now required) export certificate for sea cucumbers. The transparency service would normally have rejected the second signed statement, but because of the context in the challenge token, the transparency service knows that the second signed statement is now actually required. The holder did not need to request a "new challenge token" when the regulatory changes happened, and the holder still had to prove possession of the public key bound to both certificates ( and these public keys are different ). I chose to make this context scenario about sea cucumbers, but it could easily have been about network capable hardware devices that need to comply with regulations specific to Radio Antennas and GPUs... In those cases there would be firmware certifications required, and compliance requirements might change inside the transaction window. This also solves the problem of forcing the issuer to commit to the registration policies as they exist at the time the "challenge token" is issued. The TS can reject registrations that are committing to stale policies, or accept registrations that are commiting to stale policies, because the TS will know which policies the issuer is committing to by checking the challenge token. In the case that proof of possession is not required, and there is no need to commit to policies, the challenge token can be omitted, and the registration can proceed exactly as it is specified today. OS ORIE STEELE Chief Technology Officer www.transmute.industries