Code change:
The retrieval's URI's path path-matches the cookie's path. If the cookie's secure-only-flag is true, then the retrieval's <del> URI's scheme must denote a "secure" protocol (as defined by the user agent). </del> <ins> URI must denote a "secure" connection (as defined by the user agent). </ins> <del> NOTE: The notion of a "secure" protocol is not defined by this document.  Typically, user agents consider a protocol secure if the protocol makes use of transport-layer security, such as SSL or TLS.  For example, most user agents consider "https" to be a scheme that denotes a secure protocol. </del> <ins> NOTE: The notion of a "secure" connection is not defined by this document.  Typically, user agents consider a connection secure if the connection makes use of transport-layer security, such as SSL or TLS, or if host is trusted.  For example, most user agents consider "https" to be a scheme that denotes a secure protocol and "localhost" to be trusted host. </ins> If the cookie's http-only-flag is true, then exclude the cookie if the retrieval's type is "non-HTTP".

Related discussion:
text: This PR removes the requirement of checking the request's redirect chain during the computation of same-site-ness. This is being done because RFC6265bis is blocked by this work but we have yet to find a way to implement it in a web compatible way. In the interest of moving RFC6265bis forward the requirement is being removed.
The work to re-add the requirement back into RFC6265tris is being track by issue
Yeah, we did implement this - but we had to back it out (and re-spin stable, IIRC?) because it broke too many sites. :(
Correct, Chrome had to disable the change. Firefox had a similar experience.
We noticed a difference between Firefox & Chrome’s behavior for same-site cookies. Specifically, if a web page is requesting a resource whose final redirect target is same-site with the web page, . Firefox follows what was originally decided in URL and specified in recent i.e., Firefox looks at the whole redirect chain. For context: Firefox shipped SameSite=Lax by default this January and had to backpedal due to this (and some other webcompat issues). Firefox does not ship SameSite=Lax as the default setting for new cookies as of now. While we’re still working on our own metrics, we’ve noticed that Chrome is seeing about 1% of page loads potentially affected, which seems prohibitively high. At the same time, we would prefer not to weaken our implementation of explicit SameSite cookies, given that the redirect check was specifically added to prevent CSRF abuse scenarios. With these things in mind, we’ve been exploring the idea that we might treat cookies differently depending on whether the cookie was set to lax by default or is an explicit samesite cookie. NAME NAME it would be nice to hear some thoughts about this idea and also NAME how other browsers may have implemented . CC: NAME NAME NAME NAME NAME NAME
Yeah, I agree this is unfortunate. We did , but it broke a few sites and was backed out (or rather, put behind an off-by-default feature flag). NAME has been collecting better metrics so we can hopefully make progress on this. Can you give some more detail what you're thinking here? (also cc NAME


With these things in mind, we’ve been exploring the idea that we might treat cookies differently depending on whether the cookie was set to lax by default or is an explicit samesite cookie.