Code change:
with a certificate, a client presents its X.509 certificate RFC5280 and proves possession of the corresponding private key to a server when negotiating a TLS connection or the resumption of such a <del> connection.  In contemporary versions of TLS RFC8446 RFC5246 this requires that the client send the Certificate and CertificateVerify messages during the handshake and for the server to verify the </del> <ins> connection.  In contemporary versions of TLS TLS TLS1.2 this requires that the client send the Certificate and CertificateVerify messages during the handshake and for the server to verify the </ins> CertificateVerify and Finished messages. <del> HTTP/2 restricts TLS 1.2 renegotiation (RFC7540) and prohibits TLS </del> <ins> HTTP/2 restricts TLS 1.2 renegotiation (RFC9113) and prohibits TLS </ins> 1.3 post-handshake authentication RFC8740.  However, they are sometimes used to implement reactive client certificate <del> authentication in HTTP/1.1 RFC7230 where the server decides whether </del> <ins> authentication in HTTP/1.1 RFC9112 where the server decides whether </ins> to request a client certificate based on the HTTP request.  HTTP application data sent on such a connection after receipt and verification of the client certificate is also mutually-authenticated

Related discussion:
text: If the spec says TLS order, it's implicitly saying the interpretation is (1). But as that leaves a security-critical check to the origin, it should be explicit about this. Also, as it leaves all certificate validity to the origin, it'd need to further define an error-handling story to properly tell the client the certificate was invalid. But I know of no client that uses HTTP-level errors to clear client certificate decisions, only TLS alerts. I think (2) may be a more robust/compatible.
It is definitely 1. You do 2 and you don't need this client-cert-chain field at all. That doesn't mean that a proxy can't be configured to do the work and pass the info along. But one of the two needs to be in the hook for enforcement. A consequence of 1 is that alerts at the TLS layer won't be used to signal errors, aside from those that the proxy detects (or has to, like if the signature is invalid). That is ok, mostly. The main protocol issue here that might be a problem is validation of signatureschemecert. I can't see how failing to validate that would be a significant problem though.
In on the PR that introduced the chain I was aiming for 2. But eventually relented to MT. Some additional considerations about the security implications are likely warranted though.
I see. If it's (1), that should probably be clearer in the draft. That also means the draft needs to define an error-signaling scheme. Moreover, if the proxy doesn't then translate that error into TLS alerts, we'd need changes in clients for servers relying on this to work right. I'll file a bug.
I ran into real reservations as I looked at making this change. I still don't like pushing the trust chain validation to the origin. For many reasons. The proxy also has no means of signaling to the client which trust anchors the origin is okay with. The current text is somewhat ambiguous about what goes in Client-Cert-Chain but I think that's actually better than saying it has to be same as in the TLS handshake. I dunno, I think I might raise the question of WTF actually goes in Client-Cert-Chain at the next interim or real meeting.
At the last virtual interim (in May/June yikes!)