jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
This would result in the following unsigned response message: <del> The server signs the response with its own key and includes the signature of "sig1" from the request in the covered components of the response.  The signature input string for this example is: </del> <ins> To cryptographically link the response to the request, the server signs the response with its own key and includes the signature of "sig1" from the request in the covered components of the response. The signature input string for this example is: </ins> The signed response message is:
long enough to validate the signature of the response that uses this component identifier. <ins> Note that the ECDSA algorithm in use here is non-deterministic, meaning a different signature value will be created every time the algorithm is run.  The signature value provided here can be validated against the given keys, but newly-generated signature values are not expected to match the example.  See security-nondeterministic. </ins> The "@request-response" component identifier MUST NOT be used in a request message.
produce an error and not create an input string.  Such situations are included but not limited to: <del> The signer or verifier does not understand the component </del> <ins> The signer or verifier does not understand the derived component </ins> identifier. The component identifier identifies a field that is not present in the message or whose value is malformed. The component identifier indicates that a structured field <del> serialization is used, but the field in question is known to not be a structured field or the type of structured field is not known to the verifier. </del> <ins> serialization is used (via the "sf" parameter), but the field in question is known to not be a structured field or the type of structured field is not known to the implementation. </ins> The component identifier is a dictionary member identifier that references a field that is not present in the message, is not a
The component identifier is a dictionary member identifier or a named query parameter identifier that references a member that is not present in the component value, or whose value is malformed. <del> E.g., the identifier is ""x-dictionary";key="c"" and the value of the "x-dictionary" header field is "a=1, b=2" </del> <ins> E.g., the identifier is ""example-dictionary";key="c"" and the value of the "Example-Dictionary" header field is "a=1, b=2", which does not have the "c" value. </ins> In the following non-normative example, the HTTP message being signed is the following request: The covered components consist of the "@method", "@path", and <del> "@authority" derived component identifiers followed by the "Cache- Control", "X-Empty-Header", "X-Example" HTTP headers, in order.  The signature parameters consist of a creation timestamp is "1618884475" and the key identifier is "test-key-rsa-pss".  The signature input string for this message with these parameters is: </del> <ins> "@authority" derived component identifiers followed by the "Content- Digest", "Content-Length", and "Content-Type" HTTP header fields, in order.  The signature parameters consist of a creation timestamp of "1618884473" and a key identifier of "test-key-rsa-pss".  Note that no explicit "alg" parameter is given here since the verifier is assumed by the application to correctly use the RSA PSS algorithm based on the identified key.  The signature input string for this message with these parameters is: Note that the example signature input here, or anywhere else within this specification, does not include the final newline that ends the example. </ins> 3.
HTTP Message signatures MAY use any cryptographic digital signature or MAC method that is appropriate for the key material, environment, <del> and needs of the signer and verifier.  All signatures are generated from and verified against the byte values of the signature input string defined in create-sig-input. </del> <ins> and needs of the signer and verifier. </ins> Each signature algorithm method takes as its input the signature <del> input string as a set of byte values ("I"), the signing key material ("Ks"), and outputs the signature output as a set of byte values ("S"): </del> <ins> input string defined in create-sig-input as a byte array ("M"), the signing key material ("Ks"), and outputs the signature output as a byte array ("S"): </ins> Each verification algorithm method takes as its input the <del> recalculated signature input string as a set of byte values ("I"), the verification key material ("Kv"), and the presented signature to be verified as a set of byte values ("S") and outputs the verification result ("V") as a boolean: </del> <ins> recalculated signature input string defined in create-sig-input as a byte array ("M"), the verification key material ("Kv"), and the presented signature to be verified as a byte array ("S") and outputs the verification result ("V") as a boolean: </ins> This section contains several common algorithm methods.  The method to use can be communicated through the algorithm signature parameter
client in fields when forwarding the request to a service host, including a signature over the client's original signature values. <del> The following is a non-normative example of header fields a reverse proxy sets in addition to the examples in the previous sections. </del> <ins> The following is a non-normative example starts with a signed request from the client.  The proxy takes this request validates the client's signature. </ins> <del> The client's request includes a signature value under the label "sig1", which the proxy signs in addition to the "Forwarded" header defined in RFC7239.  Note that since the client's signature already covers the client's "Signature-Input" value for "sig1", this value is transitively covered by the proxy's signature and need not be added explicitly.  This results in a signature input string of: </del> <ins> The proxy then alters the message before forwarding it on to the origin server, changing the target host and adding the "Forwarded" header defined in RFC7239. The proxy includes the client's signature value under the label "sig1", which the proxy signs in addition to the "Forwarded" header. Note that since the client's signature already covers the client's "Signature-Input" value for "sig1", this value is transitively covered by the proxy's signature and need not be added explicitly. The proxy identifies its own key and algorithm and, in this example, includes an expiration for the signature to indicate to downstream systems that the proxy will not vouch for this signed message past this short time window.  This results in a signature input string of: </ins> And a signature output value of:
RFC8441 defines a mechanism for running the WebSocket Protocol RFC6455 over a single stream of an HTTP/2 connection.  It defines an <del> Extended CONNECT method which specifies a new ":protocol" pseudo </del> <ins> Extended CONNECT method which specifies a new ":protocol" pseudo- </ins> header field and new semantics for the ":path" and ":authority" <del> pseudo header fields.  It also defines a new HTTP/2 setting sent by a </del> <ins> pseudo-header fields.  It also defines a new HTTP/2 setting sent by a </ins> server to allow the client to use Extended CONNECT. The HTTP/3 stream closure is also analogous to the TCP connection
FIN bit on the stream (HTTP3).  RST exceptions are represented with an stream error (HTTP3) of type H3_REQUEST_CANCELLED (HTTP3). <del> The semantics of the headers and setting are identical to those in HTTP/2 as defined RFC8441.  HTTP3 requires that HTTP/3 settings be registered separately for HTTP/3.  The </del> <ins> The semantics of the pseudo-header fields and setting are identical to those in HTTP/2 as defined RFC8441.  HTTP3 requires that HTTP/3 settings be registered separately for HTTP/3.  The </ins> SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL value is 0x08 (decimal 8), as in HTTP/2.
The component identifier is a dictionary member identifier or a named query parameter identifier that references a member that is not present in the component value, or whose value is malformed. <del> E.g., the identifier is ""example-dictionary";key="c"" and the value of the "Example-Dictionary" header field is "a=1, b=2", which does not have the "c" value. </del> <ins> E.g., the identifier is ""example-dict";key="c"" and the value of the "Example-Dict" header field is "a=1, b=2", which does not have the "c" value. </ins> In the following non-normative example, the HTTP message being signed is the following request:
The QUERY method provides a solution that spans the gap between the use of GET and POST.  As with POST, the input to the query operation <del> is passed along within the payload of the request rather than as part </del> <ins> is passed along within the content of the request rather than as part </ins> of the request URI.  Unlike POST, however, the method is explicitly safe and idempotent, allowing functions like caching and automatic retries to operate.
HTTP GET method, which requests that a server return a representation of the resource identified by the target URI (as defined by RFCHTTP), the QUERY method is used to ask the server to perform a query <del> operation (described by the request payload) over some set of data scoped to the effective request URI.  The payload returned in </del> <ins> operation (described by the request content) over some set of data scoped to the effective request URI.  The content returned in </ins> response to a QUERY cannot be assumed to be a representation of the resource identified by the effective request URI. <del> The body payload of the request defines the query.  Implementations MAY use a request body of any content type with the QUERY method, </del> <ins> The content of the request defines the query.  Implementations MAY use a request content of any media type with the QUERY method, </ins> provided that it has appropriate query semantics. QUERY requests are both safe and idempotent with regards to the
including either header compression (HPACK, QPACK) or a generic framing layer. <del> This format provides an alternative to the "message/http" content type defined in MESSAGING.  A binary format permits more efficient encoding and processing of messages.  A binary format also reduces exposure to security problems related to processing of HTTP messages. </del> <ins> This format defines "message/bhttp", a binary alternative to the "message/http" content type defined in MESSAGING.  A binary format permits more efficient encoding and processing of messages.  A binary format also reduces exposure to security problems related to processing of HTTP messages. </ins> Two modes for encoding are described:
5.1. <del> The example HTTP/1.1 message in ex-request shows the content of a "message/http". </del> <ins> The example HTTP/1.1 message in ex-request shows the content in the "message/http" format. </ins> Valid HTTP/1.1 messages require lines terminated with CRLF (the two bytes 0x0a and 0x0d).  For simplicity and consistency, the content of
A commitment is not bound to a particular alternative service. Clients are able to use alternative services that they become aware of.  However, once a valid and authenticated commitment has been <del> received, clients SHOULD NOT use an unauthenticated alternative service.  Where there is an active commitment, clients SHOULD ignore advertisements for unsecured alternative services.  A client MAY send requests to an unauthenticated origin in an attempt to discover potential alternative services, but these requests SHOULD be entirely generic and avoid including credentials. </del> <ins> received, clients SHOULD NOT use an alternative service without both reasonable assurances (see auth) and strong authentication.  Where there is an active commitment, clients SHOULD ignore advertisements for unsecured alternative services. A client MAY send requests to an unauthenticated origin in an attempt to discover potential alternative services, but these requests SHOULD be entirely generic and avoid including credentials. </ins> 5.3.
For field names, byte values that are not permitted in an HTTP field name cause the message to be invalid; see HTTP for a definition of <del> what is valid and invalid for handling of invalid messages. Field names and values MUST be constructed and validated according to the rules of H2.  A recipient MUST treat a message that contains field values that would cause an HTTP/2 message to be malformed (H2) as invalid; see invalid. </del> <ins> what is valid and invalid for handling of invalid messages.  A recipient MUST treat a message that contains field values that would cause an HTTP/2 message to be malformed according to H2 as invalid; see invalid. </ins> The same field name can be repeated in multiple field lines; see HTTP for the semantics of repeated field names and rules for combining values. <ins> Fields that relate to connections (HTTP) cannot be used to produce the effect on a connection in this context.  These fields SHOULD be removed when constructing a binary message.  However, they do not cause a message to be invalid (invalid); permitting these fields allows a binary message to capture the content of a messages that are exchanged in a protocol context. </ins> Like HTTP/2, this format has an exception for the combination of multiple instances of the "Cookie" field.  Instances of fields with the ASCII-encoded value of "cookie" are combined using a semicolon
an indefinite-length encoding enables efficient generation of messages where lengths are not known when encoding starts. <ins> This format is designed to convey the semantics of valid HTTP messages as simply and efficiently as possible.  It is not designed to capture all of the details of the encoding of messages from specific HTTP versions (MESSAGING, H2, H3).  As such, this format is unlikely to be suitable for applications that depend on an exact recording of the encoding of messages. </ins> 2. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
prefixed name and length-prefixed value; see fields. The format allows for the message to be truncated before any of the <del> length prefixes that precede the field sections or content.  This reduces the overall message size.  A message that is truncated at any other point is invalid; see invalid. </del> <ins> length prefixes that precede the field sections or content; see padding. </ins> The variable-length integer encoding means that there is a limit of 2^62-1 bytes for each field section and the message content.
indeterminate-length, it can only appear in response messages. Indeterminate-length messages can be truncated in a similar way as <del> known-length messages.  Truncation occurs after the control data, or after the Content Terminator field that ends a field section or sequence of content chunks.  A message that is truncated at any other point is invalid; see invalid. </del> <ins> known-length messages; see padding. </ins> Indeterminate-length messages use the same encoding for field lines as known-length messages; see fields.
Unlike other parts of a message, a processor MAY decide not to validate the value of padding bytes. <ins> Truncation can be used to reduce the size of messages that have no data in trailing field sections or content.  If the trailers of a message is empty, it MAY be omitted by the encoder in place of adding a length field equal to zero.  An encoder MAY omit empty content in the same way if the trailers are also empty.  A message that is truncated at any other point is invalid; see invalid. Decoders MUST treat missing truncated fields as equivalent to having been sent with the length field sent to zero. </ins> Padding is compatible with truncation of empty parts of the messages. Zero-valued bytes will be interpreted as zero-length part, which is semantically equivalent to the part being absent.
value, and a trailer section that is terminated by a zero value. Response messages that contain informational status codes result in a <del> different structure; see informational. </del> <ins> different structure; see informational.  Note that while the Indeterminate-Length Informational Response field is shown in format- indeterminate-length, it can only appear in response messages. </ins> Indeterminate-length messages can be truncated in a similar way as known-length messages.  Truncation occurs after the control data, or
arise from receiving large messages, particularly those with large numbers of fields. <del> The format is designed to allow for minimal state when translating for use with HTTP proper.  However, producing a combined value for fields, which might be necessary for the "Cookie" field when translating this format (like HTTP/1.1 MESSAGING), can require the commitment of resources.  Implementations need to ensure that they aren't subject to resource exhaustion attack from a maliciously crafted message. </del> <ins> Implementations need to ensure that they aren't subject to resource exhaustion attack from a maliciously crafted message.  Overall, the format is designed to allow for minimal state when processing messages.  However, producing a combined field value (HTTP) for fields might require the commitment of resources.  In particular, combining might be necessary for the "Cookie" field when translating this format for use in other contexts, such as use in an API or translation to HTTP/1.1 MESSAGING, where the recipient of the field might not expect multiple values. </ins> 9.
compliant implementation. Remove any obsolete line-folding within the line and replace it <del> with a single space (""), as discussed in MESSAGING.  Note that </del> <ins> with a single space (" "), as discussed in MESSAGING.  Note that </ins> this behavior is specific to MESSAGING and does not apply to other versions of the HTTP specification. Concatenate the list of values together with a single comma (",") <del> and a single space ("") between each item. </del> <ins> and a single space (" ") between each item. </ins> The resulting string is the canonicalized component value.
empty "valueString" are included with an empty string as the component value. <del> If a parameter name occurs multiple times in a request, all parameter values of that name MUST be included in separate signature input lines in the order in which the parameters occur in the target URI. </del> <ins> If a query parameter is named as a covered component but it does not occur in the query parameters, this MUST cause an error in the signature input string generation. </ins> For example for the following request: Indicating the "baz", "qux" and "param" named query parameters in would result in the following "@query-param" value: <ins> If a parameter name occurs multiple times in a request, all parameter values of that name MUST be included in separate signature input lines in the order in which the parameters occur in the target URI. Note that in some implementations, the order of parsed query parameters is not stable, and this situation could lead to unexpected results.  If multiple parameters are common within an application, it is RECOMMENDED to sign the entire query string using the "@query" component identifier defined in content-request-query. </ins> If used in a related-response, the "@query-params" component identifier refers to the associated component value of the request that triggered the response message being signed.
the verification result ("V") as a boolean: This section contains several common algorithm methods.  The method <del> to use can be communicated through the algorithm signature parameter defined in signature-params, by reference to the key material, or through mutual agreement between the signer and verifier. </del> <ins> to use can be communicated through the explicit algorithm signature parameter "alg" defined in signature-params, by reference to the key material, or through mutual agreement between the signer and verifier. </ins> 3.3.1.
The JWS algorithm MUST NOT be "none" and MUST NOT be any algorithm with a JOSE Implementation Requirement of "Prohibited". <del> There is no use of the explicit "alg" signature parameter when using JOSE signing algorithms, as they can be signaled using JSON Web Keys or other mechanisms. </del> <ins> JWA algorithm values from the JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry are not included as signature parameters.  In fact, the explicit "alg" signature parameter is not used at all when using JOSE signing algorithms, as the JWS algorithm can be signaled using JSON Web Keys or other mechanisms common to JOSE implementations. </ins> 4.
how those content encoding(s) can be removed. The "Encryption" header field uses the extended ABNF syntax defined <del> in Section 1.2 of RFC7230 and the "parameter" rule from </del> <ins> in Section 1.2 of RFC7230 and the "parameter" and "OWS" rules from RFC7231. </ins> If the payload is encrypted more than once (as reflected by having multiple content-codings that imply encryption), each application of
material used in the Encryption header field. The Crypto-Key header field uses the extended ABNF syntax defined in <del> Section 1.2 of RFC7230 and the "parameter" rule from RFC7231. </del> <ins> Section 1.2 of RFC7230 and the "parameter" and "OWS" rules from RFC7231. </ins> The "keyid" parameter corresponds to the "keyid" parameter in the Encryption header field.
consumes the resources of both endpoints.  See also digest-and- content-location. <del> Digest fields SHOULD always be used over a connection that provides integrity at the transport layer that protects HTTP fields. A "Representation-Digest" field using NOT RECOMMENDED hashing algorithms SHOULD NOT be used in signatures. Using signatures to protect the checksum of an empty representation allows receiving endpoints to detect if an eventual payload has been stripped or added. </del> <ins> Signatures are likely to be deemed an adversarial setting when applying Integrity fields; see algorithms.  Using signatures to protect the checksum of an empty representation allows receiving endpoints to detect if an eventual payload has been stripped or added. </ins> Any mangling of digest fields, including de-duplication of representation-data-digest values or combining different field values
IANA is asked to initialize the registry with the entries in iana- hash-algorithm-table. <del> 7.2. This section registers the "Representation-Digest" field in the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" SEMANTICS. Field name: "Representation-Digest" Status: permanent Specification document(s): representation-digest of this document 7.3. This section registers the "Content-Digest" field in the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" SEMANTICS. Field name: "Content-Digest" Status: permanent Specification document(s): content-digest of this document 7.4. This section registers the "Want-Representation-Digest" field in the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" SEMANTICS. Field name: "Want-Representation-Digest" Status: permanent Specification document(s): want-fields of this document 7.5. This section registers the "Want-Content-Digest" field in the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" SEMANTICS. Field name: "Want-Content-Digest" Status: permanent Specification document(s): want-fields of this document </del> 8.  References 8.1.  URIs
The resulting string is the canonicalized component value. <ins> Note that some HTTP fields have values with multiple valid serializations that have equivalent semantics.  Applications signing and processing such fields MUST consider how to handle the values of such fields to ensure that the signer and verifier can derive the same value, as discussed in security-field-values. </ins> Following are non-normative examples of canonicalized values for header fields, given the following example HTTP message fragment: