jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
network.  Therefore, cache contents need to be protected as sensitive information. <del> In particular, various attacks might be amplified by being stored in a shared cache; such "cache poisoning" attacks use the cache to distribute a malicious payload to many clients, and are especially effective when an attacker can use implementation flaws, elevated privileges, or other techniques to insert such a response into a cache.  One common attack vector for cache poisoning is to exploit </del> <ins> 7.1. Various attacks might be amplified by being stored in a shared cache. Such "cache poisoning" attacks use the cache to distribute a malicious payload to many clients, and are especially effective when an attacker can use implementation flaws, elevated privileges, or other techniques to insert such a response into a cache. One common attack vector for cache poisoning is to exploit </ins> differences in message parsing on proxies and in user agents; see <del> message.body.length for the relevant requirements. </del> <ins> message.body.length for the relevant requirements regarding HTTP/1.1. 7.2. Because one of the primary uses of a cache is to optimise performance, its use can "leak" information about what resources have been previously requested. For example, if a user visits a site and their browser caches some of its responses, and then navigates to a second site, that site can attempt to load responses that it knows exists on the first site.  If they load very quickly, it can be assumed that the user has visited that site, or even a specific page on it. Such "timing attacks" can be mitigated by adding more information to the cache key, such as the identity of the referring site (to prevent the attack described above).  This is sometimes called "double keying." </ins> <del> Likewise, implementation flaws (as well as misunderstanding of cache operation) might lead to caching of sensitive information (e.g., authentication credentials) that is thought to be private, exposing it to unauthorized parties. </del> <ins> 7.3. </ins> <del> Furthermore, the very use of a cache can bring about privacy concerns.  For example, if two users share a cache, and the first one browses to a site, the second may be able to detect that the other has been to that site, because the resources from it load more quickly, thanks to the cache. </del> <ins> Implementation and deployment flaws (as well as misunderstanding of cache operation) might lead to caching of sensitive information (e.g., authentication credentials) that is thought to be private, exposing it to unauthorized parties. </ins> Note that the Set-Cookie response header field RFC6265 does not inhibit caching; a cacheable response with a Set-Cookie header field
2.1. <del> All HTTP/1.1 messages consist of a start-line followed by a CRLF and a sequence of octets in a format similar to the Internet Message Format RFC5322: zero or more header fields (collectively referred to as the "headers" or the "header section"), an empty line indicating the end of the header section, and an optional message body. An HTTP message can be either a request from client to server or a response from server to client.  Syntactically, the two types of message differ only in the start-line, which is either a request-line (for requests) or a status-line (for responses), and in the algorithm for determining the length of the message body (message.body). </del> <ins> An HTTP/1.1 message consists of a start-line followed by a CRLF and a sequence of octets in a format similar to the Internet Message Format RFC5322: zero or more header fields (collectively referred to as the "headers" or the "header section"), an empty line indicating the end of the header section, and an optional message body. A message can be either a request from client to server or a response from server to client.  Syntactically, the two types of message differ only in the start-line, which is either a request-line (for requests) or a status-line (for responses), and in the algorithm for determining the length of the message body (message.body). </ins> In theory, a client could receive requests and a server could receive responses, distinguishing them by their different start-line formats.
2.2. <del> HTTP uses a "<major>.<minor>" numbering scheme to indicate versions of the protocol.  This specification defines version "1.1". protocol.version specifies the semantics of HTTP version numbers. The version of an HTTP/1.x message is indicated by an HTTP-version field in the . HTTP-version is case-sensitive. When an HTTP/1.1 message is sent to an HTTP/1.0 recipient RFC1945 or a recipient whose version is unknown, the HTTP/1.1 message is constructed such that it can be interpreted as a valid HTTP/1.0 message if all of the newer features are ignored.  This specification places recipient-version requirements on some new features so that a conformant sender will only use compatible features until it has determined, through configuration or the receipt of a message, that the recipient supports HTTP/1.1. Intermediaries that process HTTP messages (i.e., all intermediaries other than those acting as tunnels) MUST send their own HTTP-version in forwarded messages.  In other words, they are not allowed to blindly forward the without ensuring that the protocol version in that message matches a version to which that intermediary is conformant for both the receiving and sending of messages.  Forwarding an HTTP message without rewriting the HTTP-version might result in communication errors when downstream recipients use the message sender's version to determine what features are safe to use for later communication with that sender. A server MAY send an HTTP/1.0 response to an HTTP/1.1 request if it is known or suspected that the client incorrectly implements the HTTP specification and is incapable of correctly processing later version responses, such as when a client fails to parse the version number correctly or when an intermediary is known to blindly forward the HTTP-version even when it doesn't conform to the given minor version of the protocol.  Such protocol downgrades SHOULD NOT be performed unless triggered by specific client attributes, such as when one or more of the request header fields (e.g., ) uniquely match the values sent by a client known to be in error. 2.3. </del> The normal procedure for parsing an HTTP message is to read the start-line into a structure, read each header field into a hash table by field name until the empty line, and then use the parsed data to
response. <ins> 2.3. HTTP uses a "<major>.<minor>" numbering scheme to indicate versions of the protocol.  This specification defines version "1.1". protocol.version specifies the semantics of HTTP version numbers. The version of an HTTP/1.x message is indicated by an HTTP-version field in the . HTTP-version is case-sensitive. When an HTTP/1.1 message is sent to an HTTP/1.0 recipient RFC1945 or a recipient whose version is unknown, the HTTP/1.1 message is constructed such that it can be interpreted as a valid HTTP/1.0 message if all of the newer features are ignored.  This specification places recipient-version requirements on some new features so that a conformant sender will only use compatible features until it has determined, through configuration or the receipt of a message, that the recipient supports HTTP/1.1. Intermediaries that process HTTP messages (i.e., all intermediaries other than those acting as tunnels) MUST send their own HTTP-version in forwarded messages.  In other words, they are not allowed to blindly forward the without ensuring that the protocol version in that message matches a version to which that intermediary is conformant for both the receiving and sending of messages.  Forwarding an HTTP message without rewriting the HTTP-version might result in communication errors when downstream recipients use the message sender's version to determine what features are safe to use for later communication with that sender. A server MAY send an HTTP/1.0 response to an HTTP/1.1 request if it is known or suspected that the client incorrectly implements the HTTP specification and is incapable of correctly processing later version responses, such as when a client fails to parse the version number correctly or when an intermediary is known to blindly forward the HTTP-version even when it doesn't conform to the given minor version of the protocol.  Such protocol downgrades SHOULD NOT be performed unless triggered by specific client attributes, such as when one or more of the request header fields (e.g., ) uniquely match the values sent by a client known to be in error. </ins> 3. A request-line begins with a method token, followed by a single space
Connections can be closed at any time, with or without intention. Implementations ought to anticipate the need to recover from <del> asynchronous close events. When an inbound connection is closed prematurely, a client MAY open a new connection and automatically retransmit an aborted sequence of requests if all of those requests have idempotent methods (idempotent.methods). </del> <ins> asynchronous close events.  The conditions under which a client can automatically retry a sequence of outstanding requests are defined in idempotent.methods. </ins> 9.4.2.
header field.  The s-maxage directive also implies the semantics of the proxy-revalidate response directive. <del> The must-revalidate directive also has the effect of allowing a stored response to be used to satisfy a request with an Authorization header field; see caching.authenticated.responses. </del> <ins> The s-maxage directive also has the effect of allowing a stored response to be used to satisfy a request with an Authorization header field; see caching.authenticated.responses. </ins> This directive uses the token form of the argument syntax: e.g., 's-maxage=10' not 's-maxage="10"'.  A sender SHOULD NOT generate the
2.5.4. <del> The URI generic syntax for authority also includes a deprecated userinfo subcomponent (RFC3986) for including user authentication information in the URI.  Some implementations make use of the userinfo component for internal configuration of authentication information, such as within command invocation options, configuration files, or bookmark lists, even though such usage might expose a user identifier or password.  A sender MUST NOT generate the userinfo subcomponent (and its "@" delimiter) when an "http" URI reference is generated within a message as a request target or header field value. Before making use of an "http" URI reference received from an untrusted source, a recipient SHOULD parse for userinfo and treat its presence as an error; it is likely being used to obscure the </del> <ins> The URI generic syntax for authority also includes a userinfo subcomponent (RFC3986) for including user authentication information in the URI.  In that subcomponent, the use of the format "user:password" is deprecated. Some implementations make use of the userinfo component for internal configuration of authentication information, such as within command invocation options, configuration files, or bookmark lists, even though such usage might expose a user identifier or password. A sender MUST NOT generate the userinfo subcomponent (and its "@" delimiter) when an "http" or "https" URI reference is generated within a message as a request target or header field value. Before making use of an "http" or "https" URI reference received from an untrusted source, a recipient SHOULD parse for userinfo and treat its presence as an error; it is likely being used to obscure the </ins> authority for the sake of phishing attacks. 2.5.5.
5.2.2.6. <del> The "public" response directive indicates that any cache MAY store the response, even if the response would normally be non-cacheable or cacheable only within a private cache.  (See caching.authenticated.responses for additional details related to the use of public in response to a request containing </del> <ins> The "public" response directive overrides certain conditions that would otherwise make a cache unable to store the response. Specifically, see caching.authenticated.responses regarding the use of public in response to a request containing </ins> <del> , and response.cacheability for details of how public affects responses that would normally not be stored, due to their status codes not being defined as heuristically cacheable; see heuristic.freshness.) </del> <ins> , and response.cacheability for how public affects responses that would normally not be stored, due to their status codes not being defined as heuristically cacheable; see heuristic.freshness. </ins> 5.2.2.7.
Desc"; "Description" is too generic, and "Foo-Description" is needlessly long. <ins> While the field-name syntax is defined to allow any token character, in practice some implementations place limits on the characters they accept in field-names.  To be interoperable, new field names SHOULD constrain themselves to alphanumeric characters, "-", "_", "." and ".", and SHOULD begin with an alphanumeric character. </ins> Field names ought not be prefixed with "X-"; see BCP178 for further information.
trailing whitespace in values is significant will have to use a container syntax such as quoted-string (quoted.strings). <del> Because commas (",") are used as a generic delimiter between field values, they need to be treated with care if they are allowed in the field value.  Typically, components that might contain a comma are protected with double-quotes using the quoted-string ABNF production. </del> <ins> Because commas (",") are used as a generic delimiter between members of a list-based field value, they need to be treated with care if they are allowed as data within those members.  Typically, list members that might contain a comma are enclosed in a quoted-string. </ins> For example, a textual date and a URI (either of which might contain <del> a comma) could be safely carried in field values like these: </del> <ins> a comma) could be safely carried in list-based field values like these: </ins> Note that double-quote delimiters almost always are used with the quoted-string production; using a different syntax inside double-
identifying the protocol capabilities of senders along the request/ response chain. <del> Multiple Via field values represent each proxy or gateway that has forwarded the message.  Each intermediary appends its own information about how the message was received, such that the end result is ordered according to the sequence of forwarding recipients. </del> <ins> Each member of the Via field value represents a proxy or gateway that has forwarded the message.  Each intermediary appends its own information about how the message was received, such that the end result is ordered according to the sequence of forwarding recipients. </ins> A proxy MUST send an appropriate Via header field, as described below, in each message that it forwards.  An HTTP-to-HTTP gateway
protocol.version.  For brevity, the protocol-name is omitted when the received protocol is HTTP. <del> The received-by portion of the field value is normally the host and optional port number of a recipient server or client that subsequently forwarded the message.  However, if the real host is considered to be sensitive information, a sender MAY replace it with a pseudonym.  If a port is not provided, a recipient MAY interpret that as meaning it was received on the default TCP port, if any, for the received-protocol. </del> <ins> The received-by portion is normally the host and optional port number of a recipient server or client that subsequently forwarded the message.  However, if the real host is considered to be sensitive information, a sender MAY replace it with a pseudonym.  If a port is not provided, a recipient MAY interpret that as meaning it was received on the default TCP port, if any, for the received-protocol. </ins> <del> A sender MAY generate comments in the Via header field to identify the software of each recipient, analogous to the </del> <ins> A sender MAY generate comments to identify the software of each recipient, analogous to the </ins> and <del> header fields.  However, all comments in the Via field are optional, and a recipient MAY remove them prior to forwarding the message. </del> <ins> header fields.  However, comments in Via are optional, and a recipient MAY remove them prior to forwarding the message. </ins> For example, a request message could be sent from an HTTP/1.0 user agent to an internal proxy code-named "fred", which uses HTTP/1.1 to
the firewall by an appropriate pseudonym for that host. An intermediary MAY combine an ordered subsequence of Via header <del> field entries into a single such entry if the entries have identical </del> <ins> field list members into a single member if the entries have identical </ins> received-protocol values.  For example, could be collapsed to <del> A sender SHOULD NOT combine multiple entries unless they are all </del> <ins> A sender SHOULD NOT combine multiple list members unless they are all </ins> under the same organizational control and the hosts have already been <del> replaced by pseudonyms.  A sender MUST NOT combine entries that have </del> <ins> replaced by pseudonyms.  A sender MUST NOT combine members that have </ins> different received-protocol values. 5.6.2.
the request to the origin server.  A proxy MUST NOT generate a Vary field with a "*" value. <del> A Vary field value consisting of a comma-separated list of names indicates that the named request header fields, known as the selecting header fields, might have a role in selecting the representation.  The potential selecting header fields are not limited to those defined by this specification. </del> <ins> A Vary field value consisting of a list of field names indicates that the named request header fields, known as the selecting header fields, might have a role in selecting the representation.  The potential selecting header fields are not limited to those defined by this specification. </ins> For example, a response that contains
If a DELETE method is successfully applied, the origin server SHOULD send <del> A payload within a DELETE request message has no defined semantics; sending a payload body on a DELETE request might cause some existing </del> <ins> A client SHOULD NOT generate a body in a DELETE request.  A payload received in a DELETE request has no defined semantics, cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and might lead some </ins> implementations to reject the request. Responses to the DELETE method are not cacheable.  If a successful
A recipient MAY combine multiple field lines with the same field name into one field line, without changing the semantics of the message, by appending each subsequent field line value to the initial field <del> line value in order, separated by a comma.  The order in which field lines with the same name are received is therefore significant to the interpretation of the field value; a proxy MUST NOT change the order of these field line values when forwarding a message. </del> <ins> line value in order, separated by a comma and optional whitespace. For consistency, use comma SP. The order in which field lines with the same name are received is therefore significant to the interpretation of the field value; a proxy MUST NOT change the order of these field line values when forwarding a message. </ins> This means that, aside from the well-known exception noted below, a sender MUST NOT generate multiple field lines with the same name in a
by the recipient. When defining new connection options, specification authors ought to <del> survey existing field names and ensure that the new connection option does not share the same name as an already deployed field.  Defining a new connection option essentially reserves that potential field name for carrying additional information related to the connection option, since it would be unwise for senders to use that field name for anything else. </del> <ins> document it as reserved field name and register that definition in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry (field.name.registry), to avoid collisions. </ins> The "
12.1. <del> Please update the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Registry" registry at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-fields> with the </del> <ins> Please update the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-fields> with the </ins> field names listed in the two tables of header.field.syntax. 12.2.
A shared cache MUST NOT use a cached response to a request with an header field (header.authorization) to satisfy any subsequent request <del> unless a response directive that allows such responses to be stored is present. </del> <ins> unless the response contains a </ins> <del> In this specification, the following </del> <ins> field with a response directive (cache-response-directive) that allows it to be stored by a shared cache and the cache conforms to the requirements of that directive for that response. </ins> <del> response directives (cache-response-directive) have such an effect: must-revalidate, public, and s-maxage. </del> <ins> In this specification, the following response directives have such an effect: must-revalidate (cache-response-directive.must-revalidate), public (cache-response-directive.public), and s-maxage (cache- response-directive.s-maxage). </ins> 3.3.
5.2.2.1. <del> The "must-revalidate" response directive indicates that once it has become stale, the response MUST NOT be used to satisfy any other request without forwarding it for validation and receiving a successful response; see validation.model. </del> <ins> The "must-revalidate" response directive indicates that once the response has become stale, a cache MUST NOT reuse that response to satisfy another request until it has been successfully validated by the origin, as defined by validation.model. </ins> The must-revalidate directive is necessary to support reliable operation for certain protocol features.  In all circumstances a cache MUST obey the must-revalidate directive; in particular, if a <del> cache is disconnected, it MUST generate a </del> <ins> cache is unable to validate a stale response containing must- revalidate, for any reason, the cache MUST generate a </ins> <del> response. </del> <ins> response rather than reuse the stale response. </ins> The must-revalidate directive ought to be used by servers if and only if failure to validate a request on the representation could result in incorrect operation, such as a silently unexecuted financial transaction. <del> The must-revalidate directive also has the effect of allowing a stored response to be used to satisfy a request with an Authorization header field; see caching.authenticated.responses. </del> <ins> The must-revalidate directive also permits a shared cache to reuse a response to a request containing an Authorization header field, subject to the above requirement on revalidation (caching.authenticated.responses). </ins> 5.2.2.2.