jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
allowing use of non-local Internet services, and within corporate firewalls to enforce network usage policies. <del> HTTP is defined as a stateless protocol, meaning that each request message can be understood in isolation.  Many implementations depend on HTTP's stateless design in order to reuse proxied connections or dynamically load balance requests across multiple servers.  Hence, a server MUST NOT assume that two requests on the same connection are from the same user agent unless the connection is secured and specific to that agent.  Some non-standard HTTP extensions (e.g., RFC4559) have been known to violate this requirement, resulting in security and interoperability problems. </del> 3.8. A
prevent parsing errors due to integer conversion overflows (attack.protocol.element.length). <del> If a message is received that has a Content-Length header field value consisting of the same decimal value as a comma-separated list (abnf.extension) -- for example, "Content-Length: 42, 42" -- </del> <ins> Because Content-Length is used for message delimitation in HTTP/1.1, its field value can impact how the message is parsed by downstream recipients even when the immediate connection is not using HTTP/1.1. If the message is forwarded by a downstream intermediary, a Content- Length field value that is inconsistent with the received message framing might cause a security failure due to request smuggling or response splitting. As a result, a sender MUST NOT forward a message with a Content- Length header field value that is known to be incorrect. Likewise, a sender MUST NOT forward a message with a Content-Length header field value that does not match the ABNF above, with one exception: If a message is received that has a Content-Length header field value consisting of the same decimal value as a comma-separated list (abnf.extension) -- for example, "Content-Length: 42, 42" -- </ins> indicating that duplicate Content-Length header fields have been generated or combined by an upstream message processor, then the recipient MUST either reject the message as invalid or replace the
One design goal of HTTP is to separate resource identification from request semantics, which is made possible by vesting the request semantics in the request method (methods) and a few request-modifying <del> header fields.  If there is a conflict between the method semantics and any semantic implied by the URI itself, as described in safe.methods, the method semantics take precedence. </del> <ins> header fields.  A resource cannot treat a request in a manner inconsistent with the semantics of the method of the request.  For example, though the URI of a resource might imply semantics that are not safe, a client can expect the resource to avoid actions that are unsafe when processing a request with a safe method (see safe.methods). </ins> HTTP relies upon the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) standard RFC3986 to indicate the target resource (target.resource) and
act as a client on some connections and a server on others. HTTP is defined as a stateless protocol, meaning that each request <del> message can be understood in isolation.  Many implementations depend on HTTP's stateless design in order to reuse proxied connections or dynamically load balance requests across multiple servers.  Hence, a server MUST NOT assume that two requests on the same connection are from the same user agent unless the connection is secured and specific to that agent.  Some non-standard HTTP extensions (e.g., RFC4559) have been known to violate this requirement, resulting in security and interoperability problems. </del> <ins> message's semantics can be understood in isolation, and that the relationship between connections and messages on them has no impact on the interpretation of those messages.  For example, a CONNECT request (CONNECT) or a request with the Upgrade header field (field.upgrade) can occur at any time, not just in the first message on a connection.  Many implementations depend on HTTP's stateless design in order to reuse proxied connections or dynamically load balance requests across multiple servers. As a result, a server MUST NOT assume that two requests on the same connection are from the same user agent unless the connection is secured and specific to that agent.  Some non-standard HTTP extensions (e.g., RFC4559) have been known to violate this requirement, resulting in security and interoperability problems. </ins> 3.4.
is version dependent; some versions of HTTP use implicit ordering of messages, while others use an explicit identifier. <del> Responses (both </del> <ins> All responses, regardless of the status code (including </ins> <del> and </del> <ins> responses) can be sent at any time after a request is received, even if the request is not yet complete.  A response can complete before its corresponding request is complete.  Likewise, clients are not expected to wait any specific amount of time for a response.  Clients (including intermediaries) might abandon a request if the response is not forthcoming within a reasonable period of time. </ins> <del> ) can be sent at any time after a request is received, even if it is not yet complete.  However, clients (including intermediaries) might abandon a request if the response is not forthcoming within a reasonable period of time. </del> <ins> A client that receives a response while the associated request is still being sent SHOULD continue sending that request, unless it receives an explicit indication to the contrary (see, e.g., persistent.failures and RFC7540). </ins> 7.6.
8.3.3. <del> Media types are registered with a canonical form in order to be interoperable among systems with varying native encoding formats. Representations selected or transferred via HTTP ought to be in canonical form, for many of the same reasons described by the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) RFC2045.  However, the performance characteristics of email deployments (i.e., store and forward messages to peers) are significantly different from those common to HTTP and the Web (server-based information services). Furthermore, MIME's constraints for the sake of compatibility with older mail transfer protocols do not apply to HTTP (see differences.between.http.and.mime). MIME's canonical form requires that media subtypes of the "text" type use CRLF as the text line break.  HTTP allows the transfer of text media with plain CR or LF alone representing a line break, when such line breaks are consistent for an entire representation.  An HTTP sender MAY generate, and a recipient MUST be able to parse, line breaks in text media that consist of CRLF, bare CR, or bare LF.  In addition, text media in HTTP is not limited to charsets that use octets 13 and 10 for CR and LF, respectively.  This flexibility regarding line breaks applies only to text within a representation that has been assigned a "text" media type; it does not apply to "multipart" types or HTTP elements outside the content (e.g., header fields). If a representation is encoded with a content-coding, the underlying data ought to be in a form defined above prior to being encoded. 8.3.4. </del> MIME provides for a number of "multipart" types -- encapsulations of one or more representations within a single message body.  All multipart types share a common syntax, as defined in RFC2046, and
A recipient MUST be able to parse and decode the chunked transfer coding. <del> Note that HTTP/1.1 does not define any means to limit the size of a chunked response such that an intermediary can be assured of buffering the entire response. </del> <ins> HTTP/1.1 does not define any means to limit the size of a chunked response such that an intermediary can be assured of buffering the entire response.  Additionally, very large chunk sizes may cause overflows or loss of precision if their values are not represented accurately in a receiving implementation.  Therefore, recipients MUST anticipate potentially large decimal numerals and prevent parsing errors due to integer conversion overflows or precision loss due to integer representation. </ins> The chunked encoding does not define any parameters.  Their presence SHOULD be treated as an error.
most origin servers do not implement CONNECT. A client sending a CONNECT request MUST send the authority component <del> (described in Section 3.2 of RFC3986) as the request target; i.e., the request target consists of only the host name and port number of the tunnel destination, separated by a colon.  For example, </del> <ins> (described in RFC3986) as the request target, excluding userinfo but always with a port; i.e., the request target consists of only the host name and port number of the tunnel destination, separated by a colon.  For example, If the port is missing or invalid in the request target of a CONNECT request, the request MUST be rejected (typically, with a 400 (Bad Request) response). </ins> The recipient proxy can establish a tunnel either by directly connecting to the request target or, if configured to use another
Intermediaries that process HTTP messages (i.e., all intermediaries other than those acting as tunnels) MUST send their own HTTP-version <del> in forwarded messages.  In other words, they are not allowed to blindly forward the </del> <ins> in forwarded messages, unless it is purposefully downgraded as a workaround for an upstream issue.  In other words, an intermediary is not allowed to blindly forward the </ins> without ensuring that the protocol version in that message matches a version to which that intermediary is conformant for both the
seconds (see delta-seconds). Although it is defined as a singleton header field, a cache <del> encountering a message with multiple Age field lines SHOULD use the first field line, discarding subsequent ones. </del> <ins> encountering a message with a list-based Age field value SHOULD use the first member of the field value, discarding subsequent ones. </ins> <del> If the field value (after discarding additional lines, as per above) is invalid (e.g., it contains a list or something other than a non- negative integer), a cache SHOULD consider the response to be stale. </del> <ins> If the field value (after discarding additional members, as per above) is invalid (e.g., it contains something other than a non- negative integer), a cache SHOULD ignore the field. </ins> The presence of an Age header field implies that the response was not generated or validated by the origin server for this request.
A recipient SHOULD treat other octets in field content (obs-text) as opaque data. <del> Field values containing control ( ) characters such as CR or LF are invalid; recipients MUST either reject a field value containing control characters, or convert them to SP before processing or forwarding the message. </del> <ins> Field values containing CR or NUL characters are invalid and dangerous, due to the varying ways that implementations might parse and interpret those characters; a recipient of CR or NUL within a field value MUST either reject the message or replace each of those characters with SP before further processing or forwarding of that message.  Field values containing other CTL characters are also invalid; however, recipients MAY retain such characters for the sake of robustness if they only appear within safe field value contexts (e.g., data not required by HTTP). </ins> Leading and trailing whitespace in raw field values is removed upon field parsing (e.g., field.parsing).  Field definitions where leading
user's bookmarks/favorites), the user agent MUST either exclude the Referer header field or send it with a value of "about:blank". <ins> The Referer header field value need not convey the full URI of the referring resource; a user agent MAY truncate parts other than the referring origin. </ins> The Referer header field has the potential to reveal information about the request context or browsing history of the user, which is a privacy concern if the referring resource's identifier reveals
supposed to be confidential (such as behind a firewall or internal to a secured service).  Most general-purpose user agents do not send the Referer header field when the referring resource is a local "file" or <del> "data" URI.  A user agent MUST NOT send a </del> <ins> "data" URI.  A user agent SHOULD NOT send a header field if the referring resource was accessed with a secure protocol and the request target has an origin differing from that of the referring resource, unless the referring resource explicitly allows Referer to be sent.  A user agent MUST NOT send a </ins> <del> header field in an unsecured HTTP request if the referring page was received with a secure protocol.  See sensitive.information.in.uris for additional security considerations. </del> <ins> header field in an unsecured HTTP request if the referring resource was accessed with a secure protocol.  See sensitive.information.in.uris for additional security considerations. </ins> Some intermediaries have been known to indiscriminately remove Referer header fields from outgoing requests.  This has the
the user agent MAY reuse the same credentials for all other requests within that protection space for a period of time determined by the authentication scheme, parameters, and/or user preferences (such as a <del> configurable inactivity timeout).  Unless specifically allowed by the authentication scheme, a single protection space cannot extend outside the scope of its server. </del> <ins> configurable inactivity timeout). The extent of a protection space, and therefore the requests to which credentials might be automatically applied, is not necessarily known to clients without additional information.  An authentication scheme might define parameters that describe the extent of a protection space.  Unless specifically allowed by the authentication scheme, a single protection space cannot extend outside the scope of its server. </ins> For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string syntax.  Recipients might have to support both token and quoted-
An implementation is considered conformant if it complies with all of the requirements associated with the roles it partakes in HTTP. <del> Conformance includes both the syntax and semantics of protocol elements.  A sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements that convey a meaning that is known by that sender to be false.  A sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements that do not match the grammar defined by the corresponding ABNF rules.  Within a given message, a sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements or syntax alternatives that are only allowed to be generated by participants in other roles (i.e., a role that the sender does not have for that message). </del> <ins> A sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements that do not match the grammar defined by the corresponding ABNF rules.  Within a given message, a sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements or syntax alternatives that are only allowed to be generated by participants in other roles (i.e., a role that the sender does not have for that message). Conformance to HTTP includes both conformance to the particular messaging syntax of the protocol version in use and conformance to the semantics of protocol elements sent.  For example, a client that claims conformance to HTTP/1.1 but fails to recognize the features required of HTTP/1.1 recipients will fail to interoperate with servers that adjust their responses in accordance with those claims. Features that reflect user choices, such as content negotiation and user-selected extensions, can impact application behavior beyond the protocol stream; sending protocol elements that inaccurately reflect a user's choices will confuse the user and inhibit choice. When an implementation fails semantic conformance, recipients of that implementation's messages will eventually develop workarounds to adjust their behavior accordingly.  A recipient MAY employ such workarounds while remaining conformant to this protocol if the workarounds are limited to the implementations at fault.  For example, servers often scan portions of the User-Agent field value, and user agents often scan the Server field value, to adjust their own behavior with respect to known bugs or poorly chosen defaults. </ins> 2.3.
Framing and control data is sent first, followed by a header section containing fields for the headers table.  When a message includes <del> content, the content is sent after the header section and potentially interleaved with zero or more trailer sections containing fields for the trailers table. </del> <ins> content, the content is sent after the header section, potentially followed by a trailer section that might contain fields for the trailers table. </ins> Messages are expected to be processed as a stream, wherein the purpose of that stream and its continued processing is revealed while
Note that this message abstraction is a generalization across many versions of HTTP, including features that might not be found in some versions.  For example, trailers were introduced within the HTTP/1.1 <del> chunked transfer coding as a single trailer section after the content.  An equivalent feature is present in HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 within the header block that terminates each stream.  However, multiple trailer sections interleaved with content have only been deployed as frame extensions. </del> <ins> chunked transfer coding as a trailer section after the content.  An equivalent feature is present in HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 within the header block that terminates each stream. </ins> 6.1.
(protocol.version).  Response message control data includes a status code (status.codes), optional reason phrase, and protocol version. <del> In HTTP/1.1 Messaging and earlier, control data is sent as the first line of a message.  In HTTP/2 (RFC7540) and HTTP/3 (HTTP3), control data is sent as pseudo-header fields with a reserved name prefix (e.g., ":authority"). </del> <ins> In HTTP/1.1 (Messaging) and earlier, control data is sent as the first line of a message.  In HTTP/2 (RFC7540) and HTTP/3 (HTTP3), control data is sent as pseudo-header fields with a reserved name prefix (e.g., ":authority"). </ins> Every HTTP message has a protocol version.  Depending on the version in use, it might be identified within the message explicitly or
6.5. <del> Fields (fields) that are sent/received after the header section has ended (usually after the content begins to stream) are referred to as "trailer fields" (or just "trailers", colloquially) and located within a </del> <ins> Fields (fields) that are located within a </ins> <del> .  Trailer fields can be useful for supplying message integrity checks, digital signatures, delivery metrics, or post-processing status information. </del> <ins> are are referred to as "trailer fields" (or just "trailers", colloquially).  Trailer fields can be useful for supplying message integrity checks, digital signatures, delivery metrics, or post- processing status information. </ins> Trailer fields ought to be processed and stored separately from the fields in the header section to avoid contradicting message semantics
6.5.2. <ins> The "Trailer" header field (field.trailer) can be sent to indicate fields likely to be sent in the trailer section, which allows recipients to prepare for their receipt before processing the content.  For example, this could be useful if a field name indicates that a dynamic checksum should be calculated as the content is received and then immediately checked upon receipt of the trailer field value. </ins> Like header fields, trailer fields with the same name are processed in the order received; multiple trailer field lines with the same name have the equivalent semantics as appending the multiple values <del> as a list of members, even when the field lines are received in separate trailer sections.  Trailer fields that might be generated more than once during a message MUST be defined as a list-based field even if each member value is only processed once per field line received. </del> <ins> as a list of members.  Trailer fields that might be generated more than once during a message MUST be defined as a list-based field even if each member value is only processed once per field line received. </ins> <del> Trailer fields are expected (but not required) to be processed one trailer section at a time.  That is, for each trailer section received, a recipient that is looking for trailer fields will parse the received section into fields, invoke any associated processing for those fields at that point in the message processing, and then append those fields to the set of trailer fields received for the overall message. This behavior allows for iterative processing of trailer fields that contain incremental signatures or mid-stream status information, and fields that might refer to each other's values within the same section.  However, there is no guarantee that trailer sections won't shift in relation to the content stream, or won't be recombined (or dropped) in transit.  Trailer fields that refer to data outside the present trailer section need to use self-descriptive references (i.e., refer to the data by name, ordinal position, or an octet range) rather than assume it is the data most recently received. Likewise, at the end of a message, a recipient MAY treat the entire set of received trailer fields as one data structure to be considered as the message concludes.  Additional processing expectations, if any, can be defined within the field specification for a field intended for use in trailers. </del> <ins> At the end of a message, a recipient MAY treat the set of received trailer fields as a data structure of key/value pairs, similar to (but separate from) the header fields.  Additional processing expectations, if any, can be defined within the field specification for a field intended for use in trailers. </ins> 7.
reflect the message received, excluding some fields described below, back to the client as the content of a <del> response with a of "message/http" (media.type.message.http).  The final recipient is either the origin server or the first server to receive a </del> <ins> response.  The "message/http" (media.type.message.http) format is one way to do so.  The final recipient is either the origin server or the first server to receive a </ins> value of zero (0) in the request (field.max-forwards).
application or data format, since orthogonal technologies deserve orthogonal specification. <del> Since message parsing (message.body) needs to be independent of method semantics (aside from responses to HEAD), definitions of new methods cannot change the parsing algorithm or prohibit the presence of content on either the request or the response message. </del> <ins> Since message parsing (message.abstraction) needs to be independent of method semantics (aside from responses to HEAD), definitions of new methods cannot change the parsing algorithm or prohibit the presence of content on either the request or the response message. </ins> Definitions of new methods can specify that only a zero-length content is allowed by requiring a Content-Length header field with a value of "0".
Content coding registrations MUST include the following fields: Names of content codings MUST NOT overlap with names of transfer <del> codings (transfer.codings), unless the encoding transformation is identical (as is the case for the compression codings defined in content.codings). </del> <ins> codings (as per the "HTTP Transfer Coding registry", located at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters/>), unless the encoding transformation is identical (as is the case for the compression codings defined in content.codings). </ins> Values to be added to this namespace require IETF Review (see RFC8126) and MUST conform to the purpose of content coding defined in