jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
The "next-hop-aliases" parameter's value is a String that contains one or more DNS names in a comma-separated list.  The items in the <del> list include all names received in CNAME records DNS during the course of resolving the next hop's hostname using DNS.  Since DNS names can include comma (",") characters in them, any commas that appear in a DNS names MUST be represented using a percent-encoded "%2C" value instead.  The aliases SHOULD appear in the order in which they were received in DNS; that is, if a name has a CNAME record with a first alias, which has a CNAME record for a second alias, the aliases should appear in that order. For example: indicates that proxy.example.net, which used the IP address "2001:db8::1" as the next hop for this request, encountered the CNAMEs "tracker.example.com" and "service1.example-cdn.com" in the DNS resolution chain.  Note that while this example includes both the </del> <ins> list include all alias names and canonical names received in CNAME records DNS during the course of resolving the next hop's hostname using DNS, not including the original requested hostname itself.  The names SHOULD appear in the order in which they were received in DNS. If there are multiple CNAME records in the chain, the first name in the "next-hop-aliases" list would be the value in the CNAME record for the original hostname, and the final name in the "next-hop- aliases" list would be the name that ultimately resolved to one or more addresses. For example, consider a proxy "proxy.example.net" that receives the following records when performing DNS resolution for the next hop "host.example.com": The proxy could include the following proxy status in its response: This indicates that proxy.example.net, which used the IP address "2001:db8::1" as the next hop for this request, encountered the names "tracker.example.com" and "service1.example-cdn.com" in the DNS resolution chain.  Note that while this example includes both the </ins> "next-hop" and "next-hop-aliases" parameters, "next-hop-aliases" can be included without including "next-hop".
aliases" list would be the name that ultimately resolved to one or more addresses. <ins> The list of DNS names in "next-hop-aliases" use a comma (",") as a separator between names.  DNS names normally just contain alphanumeric characters and hyphens ("-"), although they are allowed to contain any character RFC1035, Section 3.1, including a comma.  To prevent commas or other special characters in names leading to incorrect parsing, any characters that appear in names in this list that do not belong to the set of URI Unreserved Characters RFC3986, Section 2.3 MUST be percent-encoded as defined in RFC3986, Section 2.1. </ins> For example, consider a proxy "proxy.example.net" that receives the following records when performing DNS resolution for the next hop "host.example.com":
Algorithms".  Initial values for this registry are given in iana-hsa- contents.  Future assignments and modifications to existing assignment are to be made through the Expert Review registration <del> policy RFC8126 and shall follow the template presented in iana-hsa- template. Algorithms referenced by algorithm identifiers have to be fully defined with all parameters fixed.  Algorithm identifiers in this registry are to be interpreted as whole string values and not as a combination of parts.  That is to say, it is expected that </del> <ins> policy RFC8126. The Designated Expert (DE) is expected to ensure that the algorithms referenced by a registered algorithm identifier are fully defined with all parameters (such as salt, hash, required key length, etc) are fixed by the defining text.  The DE is expected to ensure that the algorithm definition fully specifies the "HTTP_SIGN" and "HTTP_VERIFY" primitive functions, including how all defined inputs and outputs map to the underlying cryptographic algorithm.  The DE is expected to reject any registrations that are aliases of existing registrations.  The DE is expected to ensure all registrations follow the template presented in iana-hsa-template, including that the length of the name is not excessive while still being unique and recognizable.  When setting a registered item's status to "Deprecated", the DE should ensure that a reason for the deprecation is documented, along with instructions for moving away from the deprecated functionality. This specification creates algorithm identifiers by including major parameters in the identifier string.  However, algorithm identifiers in this registry are to be interpreted as whole string values and not as a combination of parts.  That is to say, it is expected that </ins> implementors understand "rsa-pss-sha512" as referring to one specific <del> algorithm with its hash, mask, and salt values set as defined here. Implementors do not parse out the "rsa", "pss", and "sha512" portions of the identifier to determine parameters of the signing algorithm from the string, and the registry of one combination of parameters does not imply the registration of other combinations. Algorithms added to this registry MUST NOT be aliases for other entries in the registry. </del> <ins> algorithm with its hash, mask, and salt values set as defined in the defining text that establishes this identifier.  Implementors do not parse out the "rsa", "pss", and "sha512" portions of the identifier to determine parameters of the signing algorithm from the string, and the registry of one combination of parameters does not imply the registration of other combinations. </ins> 6.2.1.
the signature parameters structure.  Initial values for this registry are given in iana-param-contents.  Future assignments and modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the <del> Expert Review registration policy RFC8126 and shall follow the template presented in iana-param-template. </del> <ins> Expert Review registration policy RFC8126. The DE is expected to ensure that the name follows the template presented in iana-param-template, including that the length of the name is not excessive while still being unique and recognizable for its defined function.  The DE is expected to ensure that the defined functionality is clear and does not conflict with other registered parameters.  The DE is expected to ensure that the definition of the metadata parameter includes its behavior when used as part of the normal signature process as well as when used in an Accept-Signature field. </ins> 6.3.1.
values.  Initial values for this registry are given in iana-content- contents.  Future assignments and modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the Expert Review registration <del> policy RFC8126 and shall follow the template presented in iana- content-template. </del> <ins> policy RFC8126. The DE is expected to ensure that the name follows the template presented in iana-content-template, including that the length of the name is not excessive while still being unique and recognizable for its defined function.  The DE is expected to ensure that the component value represented by the registration request can be deterministically derived from the target HTTP message.  The DE is expected to ensure that any parameters defined for the registration request are clearly documented, along with their effects on the component value.  The DE should also ensure that the registration request is not sufficiently distinct from existing derived component definitions to warrant its registration.  When setting a registered item's status to "Deprecated", the DE should ensure that a reason for the deprecation is documented, along with instructions for moving away from the deprecated functionality. </ins> 6.4.1.
are associated with, and the modifications these parameters make to the component value.  Definitions of parameters MUST define the targets to which they apply (such as specific field types, derived <del> components, or contexts) and any incompatibilities with other parameters known at the time of definition.  Initial values for this registry are given in iana-component-param-contents.  Future assignments and modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the Expert Review registration policy RFC8126 and shall follow the template presented in iana-component-param-template. </del> <ins> components, or contexts).  Initial values for this registry are given in iana-component-param-contents.  Future assignments and modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the Expert Review registration policy RFC8126. The DE is expected to ensure that the name follows the template presented in iana-component-param-template, including that the length of the name is not excessive while still being unique and recognizable for its defined function.  The DE is expected to ensure that the definition of the field sufficiently defines any interactions incompatibilities with other existing parameters known at the time of the registration request.  If the parameter changes the component value, the DE is expected to ensure that the component value defined by the component identifier with the parameter applied can be deterministically derived from the target HTTP message. </ins> 6.5.1.
The "@method" derived component refers to the HTTP method of a request message.  The component value is canonicalized by taking the value of the method as a string.  Note that the method name is case- <del> sensitive as per HTTP, and conventionally standardized method names are uppercase US-ASCII. </del> <ins> sensitive as per HTTP.  While conventionally standardized method names are uppercase US-ASCII, no transformation to the input method value's case is performed. </ins> For example, the following request message:
And the following signature base line: <del> If the query string is absent from the request message, the value is the leading "?" character alone: </del> <ins> Just like including an empty path component, the signer can include an empty query component to indicate that this component is not used in the message.  If the query string is absent from the request message, the component value is the leading "?" character alone: </ins> Resulting in the following signature base line:
chances of the field value remaining untouched through intermediaries.  Where that approach is not possible and multiple instances of a field need to be sent separately, it is RECOMMENDED <del> that signers and verifiers process any list-based fields by parsing out individual field values and combining them based on the strict </del> <ins> that signers and verifiers process any list-based fields taking all individual field values and combining them based on the strict </ins> algorithm below, to counter possible intermediary behavior.  When the field in question is a structured field of type List or Dictionary, <del> this effect can be accomplished more directly by using the strict </del> <ins> this effect can be accomplished more directly by requiring the strict </ins> structured field serialization of the field value, as described in http-field-structured. <del> Note that some HTTP fields, such as Set-Cookie COOKIE, do not follow a syntax that allows for combination of field values in this manner (such that the combined output is unambiguous from multiple inputs). Even though the component value is never parsed by the message signature process and used only as part of the signature base in create-sig-input, caution needs to be taken when including such </del> <ins> Note that some HTTP fields, such as Set-Cookie (COOKIE), do not follow a syntax that allows for combination of field values in this manner (such that the combined output is unambiguous from multiple inputs).  Even though the component value is never parsed by the message signature process and used only as part of the signature base in create-sig-input, caution needs to be taken when including such </ins> fields in signatures since the combined value could be ambiguous. The "bs" parameter defined in http-field-byte-sequence provides a method for wrapping such problematic fields.  See security-non-list
response, it indicates that the server would like the client to provide the respective Integrity field on future requests. <ins> Integrity preference fields are only a hint.  The receiver of the field can ignore it and send an Integrity field using any algorithm or omit the field entirely, for example see ex-server-selects- unsupported-algorithm.  It is not a protocol error if preferences are ignored.  Applications that use Integrity fields and Integrity preferences can define expectations or constraints that operate in addition to this specification.  How to deal with an ignored preferences is a scenario that should be considered. </ins> "Want-Content-Digest" and "Want-Repr-Digest" are of type "Dictionary" where each:
origin server, changing the target host and adding the Forwarded header field defined in RFC7239. <del> The proxy includes the client's signature value from the original message under the label "sig1", which the proxy signs in addition to the Forwarded field.  Note that since the client's signature already covers the client's Signature-Input value for "sig1", this value is transitively covered by the proxy's signature and need not be added explicitly.  The proxy identifies its own key and algorithm and, in this example, includes an expiration for the signature to indicate to downstream systems that the proxy will not vouch for this signed message past this short time window.  This results in a signature base of: </del> <ins> While the proxy is in a position to validate the client's signature, the changes the proxy makes to the message will invalidate the existing signature when the message is seen by the origin server. While it is possible for the origin server to have additional information in its signature context to account for the change in authority, this practice requires additional configuration and extra care (see further discussion in security-context-multiple- signatures).  To counter this, the proxy adds its own signature over the new message before passing it along.  The proxy includes the new "@authority" derived component and the Forwarded header, which it added to the message.  The proxy's signature also includes the client's signature value from the original message in its covered components, as a dictionary field member under the label "sig1". Note that since the client's signature already covers the client's Signature-Input value for "sig1", this value is transitively covered by the proxy's signature and need not be added explicitly.  While the origin server may not be able to directly verify this original signature, it can verify that the proxy has vouched for the signature's validity.  The proxy identifies its own key and algorithm and, in this example, includes an expiration for the signature to indicate to downstream systems that the proxy will not vouch for this signed message past this short time window.  This results in a signature base of: </ins> And a signature output value of:
2.2.8. If a request target URI uses HTML form parameters in the query string <del> as defined in HTMLURL, the "@query-param" derived component allows addressing of individual query parameters.  The query parameters MUST be parsed according to HTMLURL, resulting in a list of ("nameString", "valueString") tuples.  The REQUIRED "name" parameter of each component identifier contains the "nameString" of a single query parameter as a String value.  Several different named query parameters MAY be included in the covered components.  Single named parameters MAY occur in any order in the covered components. </del> <ins> as defined in the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" section of HTMLURL, the "@query-param" derived component allows addressing of individual query parameters.  The query parameters MUST be parsed according to the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded parsing" section of HTMLURL, resulting in a list of ("nameString", "valueString") tuples.  The REQUIRED "name" parameter of each component identifier contains the "nameString" of a single query parameter as a String value.  Several different named query parameters MAY be included in the covered components.  Single named parameters MAY occur in any order in the covered components. </ins> The component value of a single named parameter is the "valueString" <del> of the named query parameter defined by HTMLURL, which is the value after percent-encoded octets are decoded.  Note that this value does not include any leading "?" characters, equals sign "=", or separating "&" characters.  Named query parameters with an empty "valueString" are included with an empty string as the component value. </del> <ins> of the named query parameter defined by "application/x-www-form- urlencoded parsing" section of HTMLURL, which is the value after percent-encoded octets are decoded.  Note that this value does not include any leading "?" characters, equals sign "=", or separating "&" characters.  Named query parameters with an empty "valueString" are included with an empty string as the component value. </ins> If a query parameter is named as a covered component but it does not occur in the query parameters, this MUST cause an error in the
could include additional information known to the application, such as an external host name. <ins> The error messages and codes that are returned from the verifier to the signer when the signature is invalid, the key material is inappropriate, the validity time window is out of specification, a component value cannot be calculated, or any other errors in the signature verification process.  For example, if a signature is being used as an authentication mechanism, an HTTP status code of 401 Unauthorized or 403 Forbidden could be appropriate.  If the response is from an HTTP API, a response with an HTTP status code of 400 Bad Request could include details as described in RFC7807, such as an indicator that the wrong key material was used. </ins> When choosing these parameters, an application of HTTP message signatures has to ensure that the verifier will have access to all required information needed to re-create the signature base.  For
For example, a fictitious Foo-Example header field might be specified as: <ins> Note that because the definition of a Structured Field references a specific RFC for Structured Fields, the types available for use in its value are limited to those defined in that RFC.  For example, a field whose definition references this document can have a value that uses the Date type (date), whereas a field whose definition references RFC 8941 cannot, because it will be treated as invalid (and therefore discarded) by implementations of that specification. Also note that this limitation also applies to future extensions to a field; for example, a field that is defined with reference to RFC 8941 cannot use the Date type, because some recipients might still be using an RFC 8941 parser to process it. However, this document is designed to be backwards-compatible with RFC 8941; a parser that implements the requirements here can also parse valid Structured Fields whose definitions reference RFC 8941. The effect of upgrading a Structured Fields implementation is that some field values that were invalid according to RFC 8941 might become valid when processed.  For instance, though it would not be valid for a field defined against RFC 8941, a field might include include a Date value.  An RFC 8941 implementation would reject the entire field, whereas an updated Structured Field implementation might permit the value.  In some cases, the resulting Date value will be rejected by field-specific logic, but values in fields that are otherwise ignored (such as extension parameters) might not be detected and the field might subsequently be accepted and processed. </ins> 3. This section defines the abstract types for Structured Fields, and
2.1.1. If the value of an HTTP field is known by the application to be a <del> structured field (STRUCTURED-FIELDS), and the expected type of the structured field is known, the signer MAY include the "sf" parameter in the component identifier.  If this parameter is included with a component identifier, the HTTP field value MUST be serialized using the rules specified in STRUCTURED-FIELDS applicable to the type of the HTTP field.  Note that this process will replace any optional internal whitespace with a single space character, among other potential transformations of the value. </del> <ins> structured field type (as defined in STRUCTURED-FIELDS or its extensions or updates), and the expected type of the structured field is known, the signer MAY include the "sf" parameter in the component identifier.  If this parameter is included with a component identifier, the HTTP field value MUST be serialized using the formal serialization rules specified in STRUCTURED-FIELDS (or the applicable formal serialization section of its extensions or updates) applicable to the type of the HTTP field.  Note that this process will replace any optional internal whitespace with a single space character, among other potential transformations of the value. </ins> If multiple field values occur within a message, these values MUST be combined into a single List or Dictionary structure before serialization. <ins> If the application does not know the type of the field, or the application does not know how to serialize the type of the field, the use of this flag will produce an error.  As a consequence, the signer can only reliably sign fields using this flag when the verifier's system knows the type as well. </ins> For example, the following dictionary field is a valid serialization: If included in the signature base without parameters, its value would
STRUCTURED-FIELDS on the "member_value" and its parameters, not including the dictionary key itself.  Specifically, the value is serialized as an Item or Inner List (the two possible values of a <del> Dictionary member). </del> <ins> Dictionary member), with all parameters and possible sub-fields serialized using the strict serialization rules defined in STRUCTURED-FIELDS (or the applicable section of its extensions or updates). </ins> Each parameterized key for a given field MUST NOT appear more than once in the signature base.  Parameterized keys MAY appear in any
component identifiers and their associated values, along with any additional signature parameters discussed in signature-params. <del> Component identifiers are serialized using the production grammar defined by STRUCTURED-FIELDS.  The component identifier has a </del> <ins> Component identifiers are serialized using the strict serialization rules defined by STRUCTURED-FIELDS.  The component identifier has a </ins> component name, which is a String Item value serialized using the "sf-string" ABNF rule.  The component identifier MAY also include defined parameters which are serialized using the "parameters" ABNF
most situations, violating field-specific constraints should have the same effect.  Thus, if a header is defined as an Item and required to be an Integer, but a String is received, the field will by default be <del> ignored.  If the field requires different error handling, this should be explicitly specified. </del> <ins> ignored.  If the field requires different handling for type mismatches it should be explicitly specified, but note that field definitions cannot override how parsing failures are handled. </ins> Both Items and Inner Lists allow parameters as an extensibility mechanism; this means that values can later be extended to