jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
The stored response(s) to update are identified by using the first match (if any) of: <del> For each stored response identified for update, the cache MUST use the header fields provided in the response to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response, with the following exceptions: In some cases, caches (especially in user agents) store processed representations of the received response, rather than the response itself, and updating header fields that affect that processing can result in inconsistent behavior and security issues.  Caches in this situation MAY omit these header fields from updating stored representations on an exceptional basis, but SHOULD limit such omission to those fields necessary to assure integrity of the stored representation. For example, a browser might store a response's body after removing content-codings, thereby making its metadata inaccurate.  Updating that stored metadata with a different Content-Encoding header field would be problematic.  Likewise, a browser might store a post-parse tree representation of HTML, rather than the body received in the response; updating the Content-Type header field would not be workable in this case, because any assumptions about the format made in parsing would now be invalid. Furthermore, some fields are automatically processed and removed by the HTTP implementation; for example, the Content-Range header field. Implementations MAY automatically omit such header fields from updates, even when the processing does not actually occur. </del> <ins> For each stored response identified, the cache MUST update its header fields with the header fields provided in the </ins> <del> Note that the Content-* prefix is not a signal that a header field is omitted from update; it is only a convention for naming content- related fields. </del> <ins> response, as per update. </ins> 4.3.5.
If a cache updates a stored response with the metadata provided in a HEAD response, the cache MUST use the header fields provided in the <del> HEAD response to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response (subject to the exceptions in freshening.responses) and append new header fields to the stored response's header section unless otherwise restricted by the header field. </del> <ins> HEAD response to update the stored response (see update). </ins> 4.4.
collected.abnf shows the collected grammar with all list operators expanded to standard ABNF notation. <del> The following core rules are included by reference, as defined in RFC5234: ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return), CRLF (CR LF), CTL (controls), DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double quote), HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), HTAB (horizontal tab), LF (line feed), OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), and VCHAR (any visible USASCII character). </del> <ins> The following core rule is included by reference, as defined in RFC5234: DIGIT (decimal 0-9). </ins> Semantics defines the following rules:
feeds, traffic cameras, real-time ad selectors, and video-on-demand platforms. <del> 3.6. </del> Most HTTP communication consists of a retrieval request (GET) for a representation of some resource identified by a URI.  In the simplest case, this might be accomplished via a single bidirectional connection (===) between the user agent (UA) and the origin server (O). <del> The following example illustrates a typical message exchange for a GET request (GET) on the URI "http://www.example.com/hello.txt": Client request: Server response: 3.7. </del> <ins> 3.6. </ins> HTTP enables the use of intermediaries to satisfy requests through a chain of connections.  There are three common forms of HTTP
multicast cache entries, archives of pre-fetched cache entries for use in off-line or high-latency environments, and so on. <ins> 3.8. The following example illustrates a typical HTTP/1.1 message exchange for a GET request (GET) on the URI "http://www.example.com/ hello.txt": Client request: Server response: </ins> 4. Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) RFC3986 are used throughout HTTP
all implementation details behind the resource interface are intentionally hidden by the server. <ins> This extends to how header and trailer fields are stored; while common header fields like will typically be stored and returned upon subsequent GET requests, header and trailer field handling is specific to the resource that received the request.  As a result, an origin server SHOULD ignore unrecognized header and trailer fields received in a PUT request (i.e., do not save them as part of the resource state). </ins> An origin server MUST NOT send a validator field (response.validator), such as an
6. <del> The message body (if any) of an HTTP message is used to carry the payload body (payload.body) of that request or response.  The message body is identical to the payload body unless a transfer coding has been applied, as described in field.transfer-encoding. </del> <ins> The message body (if any) of an HTTP/1.1 message is used to carry payload data (payload) for the request or response.  The message body is identical to the payload data unless a transfer coding has been applied, as described in field.transfer-encoding. </ins> The rules for determining when a message body is present in an HTTP/1.1 message differ for requests and responses.
or header field.  Request message framing is independent of method <del> semantics, even if the method does not define any use for a message body. </del> <ins> semantics. </ins> The presence of a message body in a response depends on both the request method to which it is responding and the response status code <del> (status.line), and corresponds to when a payload body is allowed; see payload.body. </del> <ins> (status.line), and corresponds to when payload data is allowed; see payload. </ins> 6.1. The Transfer-Encoding header field lists the transfer coding names corresponding to the sequence of transfer codings that have been (or <del> will be) applied to the payload body in order to form the message </del> <ins> will be) applied to the payload data in order to form the message </ins> body.  Transfer codings are defined in transfer.codings. Transfer-Encoding is analogous to the Content-Transfer-Encoding field
A recipient MUST be able to parse the chunked transfer coding (chunked.encoding) because it plays a crucial role in framing <del> messages when the payload body size is not known in advance.  A </del> <ins> messages when the payload data size is not known in advance.  A </ins> sender MUST NOT apply chunked more than once to a message body (i.e., chunking an already chunked message is not allowed).  If any transfer <del> coding other than chunked is applied to a request payload body, the </del> <ins> coding other than chunked is applied to a request's payload data, the </ins> sender MUST apply chunked as the final transfer coding to ensure that the message is properly framed.  If any transfer coding other than <del> chunked is applied to a response payload body, the sender MUST either apply chunked as the final transfer coding or terminate the message by closing the connection. </del> <ins> chunked is applied to a response's payload data, the sender MUST either apply chunked as the final transfer coding or terminate the message by closing the connection. </ins> For example, <del> indicates that the payload body has been compressed using the gzip </del> <ins> indicates that the payload data has been compressed using the gzip </ins> coding and then chunked using the chunked coding while forming the message body.
When a message does not have a header field, a Content-Length header field can provide the <del> anticipated size, as a decimal number of octets, for a potential payload body.  For messages that do include a payload body, the </del> <ins> anticipated size, as a decimal number of octets, for potential payload data.  For messages that do include payload data, the </ins> Content-Length field value provides the framing information necessary <del> for determining where the body (and message) ends.  For messages that do not include a payload body, the Content-Length indicates the size of the selected representation (field.content-length). </del> <ins> for determining where the data (and message) ends.  For messages that do not include payload data, the Content-Length indicates the size of the selected representation (field.content-length). </ins> 6.3.
If the final response to the last request on a connection has been completely received and there remains additional data to read, a user agent MAY discard the remaining data or attempt to determine if that <del> data belongs as part of the prior response body, which might be the </del> <ins> data belongs as part of the prior message body, which might be the </ins> case if the prior message's Content-Length value is incorrect.  A client MUST NOT process, cache, or forward such extra data as a separate response, since such behavior would be vulnerable to cache
7. Transfer coding names are used to indicate an encoding transformation <del> that has been, can be, or might need to be applied to a payload body in order to ensure "safe transport" through the network.  This </del> <ins> that has been, can be, or might need to be applied to a payload's data in order to ensure "safe transport" through the network.  This </ins> differs from a content coding in that the transfer coding is a property of the message rather than a property of the representation that is being transferred. <del> Parameters are in the form of a name=value pair. </del> All transfer-coding names are case-insensitive and ought to be registered within the HTTP Transfer Coding registry, as defined in transfer.coding.registry.  They are used in the <del> (field.te) and </del> <ins> (field.transfer-encoding) and </ins> <del> (field.transfer-encoding) header fields. </del> <ins> (field.te) header fields (the latter also defining the "transfer- coding" grammar). </ins> 7.1. <del> The chunked transfer coding wraps the payload body in order to transfer it as a series of chunks, each with its own size indicator, followed by an OPTIONAL trailer section containing trailer fields. Chunked enables content streams of unknown size to be transferred as a sequence of length-delimited buffers, which enables the sender to </del> <ins> The chunked transfer coding wraps payload data in order to transfer it as a series of chunks, each with its own size indicator, followed by an OPTIONAL trailer section containing trailer fields.  Chunked enables content streams of unknown size to be transferred as a sequence of length-delimited buffers, which enables the sender to </ins> retain connection persistence and the recipient to know when it has received the entire message.
This specification does not prohibit the application from taking HTTP caching into account; for example, a history mechanism might tell the user that a view is stale, or it might honor cache directives (e.g., <del> Cache-Control: no-store).  In particular, when an application caches data and does not make this apparent to or easily controllable by the user, it is strongly encouraged to honour basic control mechanisms like Cache-Control: no-store, as they indicate the resource's intent regarding caching. </del> <ins> Cache-Control: no-store). However, when an application caches data and does not make this apparent to or easily controllable by the user, it is strongly encouraged to define its operation with respect to HTTP cache directives, so as not to surprise authors who expect caching semantics to be honoured.  For example, while it might be reasonable to define an application cache "above" HTTP that allows a response containing Cache-Control: no-store to be reused for requests that are directly related to the request that fetched it (such as those created during the same page load), it would likely be surprising and confusing to users and authors if it were allowed to be reused for requests unrelated in any way to the one from which it was obtained. </ins> 7.
given pathname.  This original protocol is now referred to as HTTP/0.9 (see HTTP09). <del> HTTP's version number consists of two decimal digits separated by a "." (period or decimal point).  The first digit ("major version") indicates the messaging syntax, whereas the second digit ("minor version") indicates the highest minor version within that major version to which the sender is conformant (able to understand for future communication). </del> As the Web grew, HTTP was extended to enclose requests and responses within messages, transfer arbitrary data formats using MIME-like media types, and route requests through intermediaries, eventually
of an underlying connection failure, as described in idempotent.methods. <ins> 2.5. HTTP's version number consists of two decimal digits separated by a "." (period or decimal point).  The first digit ("major version") indicates the messaging syntax, whereas the second digit ("minor version") indicates the highest minor version within that major version to which the sender is conformant (able to understand for future communication). While HTTP's core semantics don't change between protocol versions, the expression of them "on the wire" can change, and so the HTTP version number changes when incompatible changes are made to the wire format.  Additionally, HTTP allows incremental, backwards-compatible changes to be made to the protocol without changing its version through the use of defined extension points (extending). The protocol version as a whole indicates the sender's conformance with the set of requirements laid out in that version's corresponding specification of HTTP.  For example, the version "HTTP/1.1" is defined by the combined specifications of this document, "HTTP Caching" Caching, and "HTTP/1.1" Messaging. HTTP's major version number is incremented when an incompatible message syntax is introduced.  The minor number is incremented when changes made to the protocol have the effect of adding to the message semantics or implying additional capabilities of the sender. The minor version advertises the sender's communication capabilities even when the sender is only using a backwards-compatible subset of the protocol, thereby letting the recipient know that more advanced features can be used in response (by servers) or in future requests (by clients). When a major version of HTTP does not define any minor versions, the minor version "0" is implied and is used when referring to that protocol within a protocol element that requires sending a minor version. </ins> 3. HTTP was created for the World Wide Web (WWW) architecture and has
can change versions as it passes through intermediaries, because the semantics of a HTTP message are independent of its version. <del> While HTTP's core semantics don't change between protocol versions, the expression of them "on the wire" can change, and so the HTTP version number changes when incompatible changes are made to the wire format.  Additionally, HTTP allows incremental, backwards-compatible changes to be made to the protocol without changing its version through the use of defined extension points (extending). The protocol version as a whole indicates the sender's conformance with the set of requirements laid out in that version's corresponding specification of HTTP.  For example, the version "HTTP/1.1" is defined by the combined specifications of this document, "HTTP Caching" Caching, and "HTTP/1.1" Messaging. HTTP's major version number is incremented when an incompatible message syntax is introduced.  The minor number is incremented when changes made to the protocol have the effect of adding to the message semantics or implying additional capabilities of the sender. The minor version advertises the sender's communication capabilities even when the sender is only using a backwards-compatible subset of the protocol, thereby letting the recipient know that more advanced features can be used in response (by servers) or in future requests (by clients). </del> A client SHOULD send a request version equal to the highest version to which the client is conformant and whose major version is no higher than the highest version supported by the server, if this is
7. Transfer coding names are used to indicate an encoding transformation <del> that has been, can be, or might need to be applied to a payload body in order to ensure "safe transport" through the network.  This </del> <ins> that has been, can be, or might need to be applied to a payload's data in order to ensure "safe transport" through the network.  This </ins> differs from a content coding in that the transfer coding is a property of the message rather than a property of the representation that is being transferred.
7.1. <del> The chunked transfer coding wraps the payload body in order to transfer it as a series of chunks, each with its own size indicator, followed by an OPTIONAL trailer section containing trailer fields. Chunked enables content streams of unknown size to be transferred as a sequence of length-delimited buffers, which enables the sender to </del> <ins> The chunked transfer coding wraps payload data in order to transfer it as a series of chunks, each with its own size indicator, followed by an OPTIONAL trailer section containing trailer fields.  Chunked enables content streams of unknown size to be transferred as a sequence of length-delimited buffers, which enables the sender to </ins> retain connection persistence and the recipient to know when it has received the entire message.
The request target's host and port value are passed within each HTTP request, identifying the origin and distinguishing it from other <del> namespaces that might be controlled by the same server.  It is the origin's responsibility to ensure that any services provided with control over its certificate's private key are equally responsible for managing the corresponding "https" namespaces, or at least prepared to reject requests that appear to have been misdirected.  A server might be unwilling to serve as the origin for some hosts even when they have the authority to do so. </del> <ins> namespaces that might be controlled by the same server (field.host). It is the origin's responsibility to ensure that any services provided with control over its certificate's private key are equally responsible for managing the corresponding "https" namespaces, or at least prepared to reject requests that appear to have been misdirected.  A server might be unwilling to serve as the origin for some hosts even when they have the authority to do so. </ins> For example, if a network attacker causes connections for port N to be received at port Q, checking the target URI is necessary to ensure
The "Host" header field in a request provides the host and port information from the target URI, enabling the origin server to distinguish among resources while servicing requests for multiple <del> host names on a single IP address. </del> <ins> host names. </ins> <del> Since the Host field value is critical information for handling a request, a user agent SHOULD generate Host as the first field in the header section. </del> <ins> In HTTP/2 RFC7540 and HTTP/3 HTTP3, the Host header field is, in some cases, supplanted by the ":authority" pseudo-header field of a request's control data. The target URI's authority information is critical for handling a request.  A user agent SHOULD generate Host as the first field in the header section of a request unless it has already generated that information as an ":authority" pseudo-header field. </ins> For example, a GET request to the origin server for <http://www.example.org/pub/WWW/> would begin with: <del> Since the Host header field acts as an application-level routing mechanism, it is a frequent target for malware seeking to poison a shared cache or redirect a request to an unintended server.  An interception proxy is particularly vulnerable if it relies on the Host field value for redirecting requests to internal servers, or for use as a cache key in a shared cache, without first verifying that the intercepted connection is targeting a valid IP address for that host. </del> <ins> Since the host and port information acts as an application-level routing mechanism, it is a frequent target for malware seeking to poison a shared cache or redirect a request to an unintended server. An interception proxy is particularly vulnerable if it relies on the host and port information for redirecting requests to internal servers, or for use as a cache key in a shared cache, without first verifying that the intercepted connection is targeting a valid IP address for that host. </ins> 7.1.3.
implementing such verification can be difficult (see Georgiev). Authority for a given origin server can be delegated through protocol <del> extensions; for example, RFC7838.  Likewise, the set of servers that a connection is considered authoritative for can be changed with a </del> <ins> extensions; for example, RFC7838.  Likewise, the set of servers for which a connection is considered authoritative can be changed with a </ins> protocol extension like RFC8336. Providing a response from a non-authoritative source, such as a
HTTP depends on the security properties of the underlying transport- or session-level connection to provide confidential transmission of <del> fields.  In other words, if a server limits access to authenticated users using this framework, the server needs to ensure that the connection is properly secured in accordance with the nature of the authentication scheme used.  For example, services that depend on individual user authentication often require a connection to be secured with TLS ("Transport Layer Security", RFC8446) prior to exchanging any credentials. </del> <ins> fields.  Services that depend on individual user authentication require a connection prior to exchanging credentials (https.uri). </ins> 17.15.2.
This section is meant to inform developers, information providers, and users of known security concerns relevant to HTTP semantics and its use for transferring information over the Internet. <del> Considerations related to message syntax, parsing, and routing are discussed in Messaging-security.considerations. </del> <ins> Considerations related to caching are discussed in Caching- security.considerations and considerations related to HTTP/1.1 message syntax and parsing are discussed in Messaging- security.considerations. </ins> The list of considerations below is not exhaustive.  Most security concerns related to HTTP semantics are about securing server-side
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application- level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information <del> systems.  This document defines the semantics of HTTP: its architecture, terminology, the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes, core request methods, request header fields, response status codes, response header fields, and content negotiation. </del> <ins> systems.  This document defines the semantics shared by all versions of HTTP, including its architecture, terminology, core protocol elements, and extensibility mechanisms, along with the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. </ins> This document obsoletes RFC 2818, RFC 7231, RFC 7232, RFC 7233, RFC 7235, RFC 7538, RFC 7615, RFC 7694, and portions of RFC 7230.