jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
payload data is allowed by requiring a Content-Length header field with a value of "0". <ins> Likewise, new methods cannot use the special host:port and asterisk forms of request target that are allowed for and , respectively (target.resource).  A full URI in absolute form is needed for the target URI, which means either the request target needs to be sent in absolute form or the target URI will be reconstructed from the request context in the same way it is for other methods. </ins> A new method definition needs to indicate whether it is safe (safe.methods), idempotent (idempotent.methods), cacheable (cacheable.methods), what semantics are to be associated with the
2.3. <del> When a received protocol element is parsed, the recipient MUST be able to parse any value of reasonable length that is applicable to the recipient's role and that matches the grammar defined by the corresponding ABNF rules.  Note, however, that some received protocol elements might not be parsed.  For example, an intermediary forwarding a message might parse a field into generic field name and field value components, but then forward the field without further parsing inside the field value. </del> <ins> A recipient SHOULD parse a received protocol element defensively, with only marginal expectations that the element will conform to its ABNF grammar and fit within a reasonable buffer size. </ins> HTTP does not have specific length limitations for many of its protocol elements because the lengths that might be appropriate will
likely intended for some other (inbound) server. The proper evaluation of conditional requests by a cache depends on <del> the received precondition header fields and their precedence, as defined in precedence.  The </del> <ins> the received precondition header fields and their precedence.  In summary, the </ins> and <del> conditional header fields are not applicable to a cache. </del> <ins> conditional header fields are not applicable to a cache, and takes precedence over . See precedence for a complete specification of precondition precedence. </ins> A request containing an
The "must-understand" response directive limits caching of the response to a cache that understands and conforms to the requirements <del> for that response's status code.  A cache MUST NOT store a response containing the must-understand directive if the cache does not understand the response status code. </del> <ins> for that response's status code. Responses containing "must-understand" SHOULD also contain the "no- store" directive; caches that implement "must-understand" SHOULD ignore the "no-store" directive in responses that contain both directives and a status code that the cache understands and conforms to any related caching requirements. </ins> 5.2.2.3.
representation. For example, a browser might decode the content coding of a response <del> payload while it is being received, creating a disconnect between the data it has stored and the response payload's original metadata. Updating that stored metadata with a different </del> <ins> while it is being received, creating a disconnect between the data it has stored and the response's original metadata.  Updating that stored metadata with a different </ins> header field would be problematic.  Likewise, a browser might store a <del> post-parse tree representation of HTML, rather than the payload </del> <ins> post-parse tree representation of HTML, rather than the content </ins> received in the response; updating the header field would not be workable in this case, because any
A response's age can be calculated in two entirely independent ways: <del> These are combined as </del> <ins> The corrected_age_value MAY be used as the corrected_initial_age.  In circumstances where very old cache implementations that might not correctly insert </ins> <del> unless the cache is confident in the value of the header field (e.g., because there are no HTTP/1.0 hops in the header field), in which case the corrected_age_value MAY be used as the corrected_initial_age. </del> <ins> are present, corrected_initial_age can be calculated more conservatively as </ins> The current_age of a stored response can then be calculated by adding the time (in seconds) since the stored response was last validated by
4.3.5. A response to the HEAD method is identical to what an equivalent <del> request made with a GET would have been, except it lacks payload data.  This property of HEAD responses can be used to invalidate or update a cached GET response if the more efficient conditional GET request mechanism is not available (due to no validators being present in the stored response) or if transmission of the payload data is not desired even if it has changed. </del> <ins> request made with a GET would have been, without sending the content. This property of HEAD responses can be used to invalidate or update a cached GET response if the more efficient conditional GET request mechanism is not available (due to no validators being present in the stored response) or if transmission of the content is not desired even if it has changed. </ins> When a cache makes an inbound HEAD request for a target URI and receives a
obey this directive, and communications networks might be vulnerable to eavesdropping. <ins> Note that the "must-understand" cache directive overrides "no-store" in certain circumstances; see cache-response-directive.must- understand. </ins> 5.2.2.5. The "no-transform" response directive indicates that an intermediary (regardless of whether it implements a cache) MUST NOT transform the <del> payload, as defined in message.transformations. </del> <ins> content, as defined in message.transformations. </ins> 5.2.2.6.
7.1. Various attacks might be amplified by being stored in a shared cache. <del> Such "cache poisoning" attacks use the cache to distribute a malicious payload to many clients, and are especially effective when an attacker can use implementation flaws, elevated privileges, or other techniques to insert such a response into a cache. </del> <ins> Such "cache poisoning" attacks use the cache to distribute malicious content to many clients, and are especially effective when an attacker can use implementation flaws, elevated privileges, or other techniques to insert such a response into a cache. </ins> One common attack vector for cache poisoning is to exploit differences in message parsing on proxies and in user agents; see
A conditional request is an HTTP request with one or more request header fields that indicate a precondition to be tested before applying the request method to the target resource.  evaluation <del> defines when preconditions are applied.  precedence defines the order of evaluation when more than one precondition is present. </del> <ins> defines when to evaluate preconditions and their order of precedence when more than one precondition is present. </ins> Conditional GET requests are the most efficient mechanism for HTTP cache updates Caching.  Conditionals can also be applied to state-
To evaluate a received If-None-Match header field: <del> An origin server MUST NOT perform the requested method if the condition evaluates to false; instead, the origin server MUST respond with either a) the </del> <ins> An origin server MUST NOT perform the requested method if a received If-None-Match condition evaluates to false; instead, the origin server MUST respond with either a) the </ins> status code if the request method is GET or HEAD or b) the
An origin server that receives an If-Modified-Since header field SHOULD evaluate the condition as per evaluation prior to performing <del> the method.  The origin server SHOULD NOT perform the requested method if the selected representation's last modification date is earlier than or equal to the date provided in the field value; instead, the origin server SHOULD generate a </del> <ins> the method. To evaluate a received If-Modified-Since header field: An origin server SHOULD NOT perform the requested method if a received If-Modified-Since condition evaluates to false; instead, the origin server SHOULD generate a </ins> response, including only those metadata that are useful for identifying or updating a previously cached response.
stored) from a prior request. An origin server that receives an If-Unmodified-Since header field <del> MUST evaluate the condition as per evaluation prior to performing the method. </del> <ins> without an If-Match header field MUST evaluate the condition as per evaluation prior to performing the method. </ins> <del> If the selected representation has a last modification date, the origin server MUST NOT perform the requested method if that date is more recent than the date provided in the field value.  Instead, the origin server MAY indicate that the conditional request failed by responding with a </del> <ins> To evaluate a received If-Unmodified-Since header field: An origin server MUST NOT perform the requested method if an If- Unmodified-Since condition evaluates to false.  Instead, the origin server MAY indicate that the conditional request failed by responding with a </ins> status code.  Alternatively, if the request is a state-changing operation that appears to have already been applied to the selected
representation and the date is a strong validator in the sense defined by lastmod.comparison. <del> A server that evaluates an If-Range precondition MUST use the strong comparison function when comparing entity-tags (entity.tag.comparison) and MUST evaluate the condition as false if an </del> <ins> A server that receives an If-Range header field on a Range request MUST evaluate the condition as per evaluation prior to performing the method. </ins> <del> validator is provided that is not a strong validator in the sense defined by lastmod.comparison.  A valid </del> <ins> To evaluate a received If-Range header field containing an </ins> <del> can be distinguished from a valid </del> <ins> : </ins> <del> by examining the first three characters for a DQUOTE. </del> <ins> To evaluate a received If-Range header field containing an : </ins> <del> If the validator given in the If-Range header field matches the current validator for the selected representation of the target resource, then the server SHOULD process the </del> <ins> A recipient of an If-Range header field MUST ignore the </ins> <del> header field as requested.  If the validator does not match, the server MUST ignore the </del> <ins> header field if the If-Range condition evaluates to false. Otherwise, the recipient SHOULD process the </ins> <del> header field.  Note that this comparison by exact match, including when the validator is an </del> <ins> header field as requested. Note that the If-Range comparison by exact match, including when the validator is an </ins> , differs from the "earlier than or equal to" comparison used when evaluating an
with a set of trust anchors. In general, a client MUST verify the service identity using the <del> verification process defined in RFC6125 (for a reference identifier of type URI-ID) unless the client has been specifically configured to accept some other form of verification.  For example, a client might be connecting to a server whose address and hostname are dynamic, with an expectation that the service will present a specific certificate (or a certificate matching some externally defined reference identity) rather than one matching the dynamic URI's origin server identifier. </del> <ins> verification process defined in RFC6125.  The client MUST construct a reference identity from the service's host: if the host is a literal IP address (https.ip-id), the reference identity is an IP-ID, otherwise the host is a name and the reference identity is a DNS-ID. A reference identity of type CN-ID MUST NOT be used by clients.  As noted in RFC6125 a reference identity of type CN-ID might be used by older clients. A client might be specially configured to accept an alternative form of server identity verification.  For example, a client might be connecting to a server whose address and hostname are dynamic, with an expectation that the service will present a specific certificate (or a certificate matching some externally defined reference identity) rather than one matching the dynamic URI's origin server identifier. </ins> In special cases, it might be appropriate for a client to simply ignore the server's identity, but it must be understood that this
clients MAY provide a configuration setting that disables this check, but MUST provide a setting which enables it. <ins> 4.3.5. A server that is identified using an IP address literal in the "host" field of an "https" URI has a reference identity of type IP-ID.  An IP version 4 address uses the "IPv4address" ABNF rule and an IP version 6 address uses the "IP-literal" production with the "IPv6address" option; see RFC3986.  A reference identity of IP-ID contains the decoded bytes of the IP address. An IP version 4 address is 4 octets and an IP version 6 address is 16 octets.  Use of IP-ID is not defined for any other IP version.  The iPAddress choice in the certificate subjectAltName extension does not explicitly include the IP version and so relies on the length of the address to distinguish versions; see RFC5280. A reference identity of type IP-ID matches if the address is identical to an iPAddress value of the subjectAltName extension of the certificate. </ins> 5. HTTP uses
A client MUST ensure that its HTTP requests for an "https" resource are secured, prior to being communicated, and that it only accepts <del> secured responses to those requests. </del> <ins> secured responses to those requests.  Note that the definition of what cryptographic mechanisms are acceptable to client and server are usually negotiated and can change over time. </ins> Resources made available via the "https" scheme have no shared identity with the "http" scheme.  They are distinct origins with
how trailer field values can be safely merged. The presence of the keyword "trailers" in the TE header field <del> (field.te) indicates that the client is willing to accept trailer fields, on behalf of itself and any downstream clients.  For requests from an intermediary, this implies that all downstream clients are willing to accept trailer fields in the forwarded response.  Note that the presence of "trailers" does not mean that the client(s) will process any particular trailer field in the response; only that the trailer section(s) will not be dropped by any of the clients. </del> <ins> (field.te) of a request indicates that the client is willing to accept trailer fields, on behalf of itself and any downstream clients.  For requests from an intermediary, this implies that all downstream clients are willing to accept trailer fields in the forwarded response.  Note that the presence of "trailers" does not mean that the client(s) will process any particular trailer field in the response; only that the trailer section(s) will not be dropped by any of the clients. </ins> Because of the potential for trailer fields to be discarded in transit, a server SHOULD NOT generate trailer fields that it believes
mapping its semantics into the protocol's wire format. CONNECT is intended only for use in requests to a proxy.  An origin <del> server that receives a CONNECT request for itself MAY respond with a status code to indicate that a connection is established.  However, most origin servers do not implement CONNECT. </del> <ins> server MAY accept a CONNECT request, but most origin servers do not implement CONNECT. </ins> The recipient proxy can establish a tunnel either by directly connecting to the request target or, if configured to use another
charset ISO-8859-1, supporting other charsets only through use of RFC2047 encoding.  In practice, most HTTP field values use only a subset of the US-ASCII charset USASCII.  Newly defined fields SHOULD <del> limit their values to US-ASCII octets.  A recipient SHOULD treat other octets in field content (obs-text) as opaque data. </del> <ins> limit their values to visible US-ASCII octets (VCHAR), SP, and HTAB. A recipient SHOULD treat other octets in field content (obs-text) as opaque data. </ins> Field values containing control (
A server tests whether a content-coding for a given representation is acceptable using these rules: <ins> A representation could be encoded with multiple content codings. However, most content codings are alternative ways to accomplish the same purpose (e.g., data compression).  When selecting between multiple content codings that have the same purpose, the acceptable content coding with the highest non-zero qvalue is preferred. </ins> An Accept-Encoding header field with a field value that is empty implies that the user agent does not want any content-coding in response.  If an Accept-Encoding header field is present in a request
The status code indicates that one or more conditions given in the <del> request header fields evaluated to false when tested on the server. This response status code allows the client to place preconditions on the current resource state (its current representations and metadata) and, thus, prevent the request method from being applied if the target resource is in an unexpected state. </del> <ins> request header fields evaluated to false when tested on the server (conditional.requests).  This response status code allows the client to place preconditions on the current resource state (its current representations and metadata) and, thus, prevent the request method from being applied if the target resource is in an unexpected state. </ins> 15.5.14.
server is unable or unwilling to buffer the entire request before processing. <del> A user agent that sends a request containing a message body MUST send a valid header field if it does not know the server will handle HTTP/1.1 (or later) requests; such knowledge can be in the form of specific user configuration or by remembering the version of a prior received response. </del> <ins> A user agent that sends a request that contains a message body MUST send either a valid header field or use the chunked transfer coding.  A client MUST NOT use the chunked transfer encoding unless it knows the server will handle HTTP/1.1 (or later) requests; such knowledge can be in the form of specific user configuration or by remembering the version of a prior received response. </ins> If the final response to the last request on a connection has been completely received and there remains additional data to read, a user
HTTP does not define a specific mechanism for ensuring message integrity, instead relying on the error-detection ability of underlying transport protocols and the use of length or chunk- <del> delimited framing to detect completeness.  Additional integrity mechanisms, such as hash functions or digital signatures applied to the content, can be selectively added to messages via extensible metadata fields.  Historically, the lack of a single integrity mechanism has been justified by the informal nature of most HTTP communication.  However, the prevalence of HTTP as an information access mechanism has resulted in its increasing use within environments where verification of message integrity is crucial. User agents are encouraged to implement configurable means for detecting and reporting failures of message integrity such that those means can be enabled within environments for which integrity is necessary.  For example, a browser being used to view medical history </del> <ins> delimited framing to detect completeness.  Historically, the lack of a single integrity mechanism has been justified by the informal nature of most HTTP communication.  However, the prevalence of HTTP as an information access mechanism has resulted in its increasing use within environments where verification of message integrity is crucial. The mechanisms provided with the "https" scheme, such as authenticated encryption, provide protection against modification of messages.  Care is needed however to ensure that connection closure cannot be used to truncate messages (see tls.connection.closure). User agents might refuse to accept incomplete messages or treat them specially.  For example, a browser being used to view medical history </ins> or drug interaction information needs to indicate to the user when such information is detected by the protocol to be incomplete, expired, or corrupted during transfer.  Such mechanisms might be selectively enabled via user agent extensions or the presence of <del> message integrity metadata in a response.  At a minimum, user agents ought to provide some indication that allows a user to distinguish between a complete and incomplete response message (incomplete.messages) when such verification is desired. </del> <ins> message integrity metadata in a response. The "http" scheme provides no protection against accidental or malicious modification of messages. Extensions to the protocol might be used to mitigate the risk of unwanted modification of messages by intermediaries, even when the "https" scheme is used.  Integrity might be assured by using hash functions or digital signatures that are selectively added to messages via extensible metadata fields. </ins> 11.4.
HTTP uses <del> names to indicate or negotiate the character encoding scheme of a textual representation RFC6365.  A charset is identified by a case- insensitive token. </del> <ins> names to indicate or negotiate the character encoding scheme (RFC6365) of a textual representation.  In the fields defined by this document, charset names appear either in parameters ( ), or, for , in the form of a plain .  In both cases, charset names are matched case-insensitively. </ins> Charset names ought to be registered in the IANA "Character Sets" registry (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/character-sets>)
The <del> is comprised of, at a minimum, the request method and target URI used to retrieve the stored response; the method determines under which circumstances that response can be used to satisfy a subsequent request.  However, many HTTP caches in common use today only cache GET responses, and therefore only use the URI as the cache key, forwarding other methods. </del> <ins> is the information a cache uses to select a response and is comprised of, at a minimum, the request method and target URI used to retrieve the stored response; the method determines under which circumstances that response can be used to satisfy a subsequent request.  However, many HTTP caches in common use today only cache GET responses, and therefore only use the URI as the cache key, forwarding other methods. </ins> If a request target is subject to content negotiation, the cache might store multiple responses for it.  Caches differentiate these
7.1. <del> Various attacks might be amplified by being stored in a shared cache. Such "cache poisoning" attacks use the cache to distribute malicious content to many clients, and are especially effective when an attacker can use implementation flaws, elevated privileges, or other techniques to insert such a response into a cache. </del> <ins> Various attacks might be amplified by being stored in a cache.  Such "cache poisoning" attacks happen when an attacker uses implementation flaws, elevated privileges, or other techniques to insert a response into a cache.  This is especially effective when shared caches are used to distribute malicious content to many clients. </ins> One common attack vector for cache poisoning is to exploit differences in message parsing on proxies and in user agents; see
programs perform for a particular connection.  The same program might act as a client on some connections and a server on others. <ins> HTTP is defined as a stateless protocol, meaning that each request message can be understood in isolation.  Many implementations depend on HTTP's stateless design in order to reuse proxied connections or dynamically load balance requests across multiple servers.  Hence, a server MUST NOT assume that two requests on the same connection are from the same user agent unless the connection is secured and specific to that agent.  Some non-standard HTTP extensions (e.g., RFC4559) have been known to violate this requirement, resulting in security and interoperability problems. </ins> 3.4. HTTP is a stateless request/response protocol for exchanging