jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
Artifacts, from the build and supply of software and IoT devices to advanced manufacturing and food supply. <del> SCITT is a generalization of Certificate Transparency RFC9162, which can be interpreted as a transparency architecture for the supply chain of X.509 certificates.  Considering CT in terms of SCITT: </del> <ins> SCITT is a generalization of Certificate Transparency (CT) RFC9162, which can be interpreted as a transparency architecture for the supply chain of X.509 certificates.  Considering CT in terms of SCITT: </ins> <del> CAs (Issuers) sign X.509 TBSCertificates (Artifacts) to produce X.509 certificates (Signed Statements) </del> <ins> CAs (Issuers) sign the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertificate structure to produce an X.509 certificate (Signed Statements) </ins> CAs submit the certificates to one or more CT logs (Transparency Services)
Transparency Services MUST also maintain a list of trust anchors, which SHOULD be used by Relying Parties to authenticate Issuers, and which MAY be included in a Registration Policy statement.  For <del> instance, a trust anchor could be an X.509 root certificate, the discovery URL of an OpenID Connect identity provider, or any other COSE compatible PKI trust anchor. </del> <ins> instance, a trust anchor could be an X.509 root certificate, a pointer to an OpenID Connect identity provider, or any other COSE- compatible trust anchor. </ins> Registration Policies and trust anchors MUST be made transparent and available to all Relying Parties of the Transparency Service by
identifying the leaf certificate in the included certification path MAY be included in the unprotected header of the COSE Envelope. <del> When using x509, Support for "x5t" is mandatory to implement. </del> <ins> When using x.509 certificates, support for "x5t" is REQUIRED to implement. </ins> Support for "kid" in the protected header and "x5chain" in the <del> unprotected heaer is optional. </del> <ins> unprotected header is OPTIONAL to implement. </ins> When "x5t" is present, "iss" MUST be a string with a value between 1 and 8192 characters in length that fits the regular expression of a
<del> A Client authenticates with the Transparency Service, to Register Signed Statements on behalf of one or more Issuers. Authentication and authorization is implementation-specific, and out of scope of the SCITT Architecture. </del> <ins> A Client authenticates with the Transparency Service before registering Signed Statements on behalf of one or more Issuers. Authentication and authorization are implementation-specific and out of scope of the SCITT architecture. </ins> <del> The Transparency Service MUST syntactically validate the Issuer's identity Claims, which may be different than the Client identity. </del> <ins> The Transparency Service MUST perform signature verification, as defined in RFC9052, and MAY perform additional checks as part of its Registration Policy. </ins>
, which MAY be asynchronous from Registration.  The Transparency Service MUST be able to provide a Receipt for all registered <del> Statements.  A Receipt for a Signed Statement MAY be provided asynchronously.  Details about generating Receipts are described in Receipt. </del> <ins> Signed Statements.  Details about generating Receipts are described in Receipt. </ins> The last two steps may be shared between a batch of Signed Statements recorded in the Append-only Log.
Signed Statement can be tampered with by a malicious Transparency Service (e.g., one that does not incorporate remote attestation), which may replace the intermediate certificates and ultimately <del> connect to an unexpected root.  This modification can allow malicious TS to forge Claims that look genuine except for the wrong trust anchor.  Auditors MUST perform certification path validation in accordance with PKIX rules specified in RFC5280.  In particular, Auditors MUST verify that certification paths chain to one or more trust anchors (often represented as root certificates). </del> <ins> connect to an unexpected root.  This modification helps protect against person-in-the-middle attacks, but not denial-of-service. Auditors MUST perform certification path validation in accordance with PKIX rules specified in RFC5280.  In particular, Auditors MUST verify that certification paths chain to one or more trust anchors (often represented as root certificates). </ins> 6.1.
be used to protect against malicious or vulnerable replicas. Threshold signatures may be use to protect the service key, etc. <del> Issuers and Transparency Services MUST rotate verification keys for signature checking in well-defined cryptoperiods (see KEY- MANAGEMENT). </del> <ins> Issuers and Transparency Services MUST rotate their keys in well- defined cryptoperiods, see KEY-MANAGEMENT. </ins> A Transparency Service MAY provide additional authenticity assurances about its secure implementation and operation, enabling remote
5. <del> Transparency Services are often publicly accessible.  Issuers should treat Signed Statements (rendering them as Transparent Statements) as publicly accessible.  In particular, a Signed Statement Envelope and Statement payload should not carry any private information in plaintext. Transparency Services can have an authorization policy controlling who can access the Append-only Log.  While this can be used to limit who can read the Log, it may also limit the usefulness of the system. Some jurisdictions have a Right to be Forgotten.  However, once a Signed Statement is inserted into the Append-only Log maintained by a Transparency Service, it cannot be removed from the Log. </del> <ins> Transparency Services MAY support anonymous access, Issuers MUST ensure Signed Statements submitted to public access services are acceptable for public disclosure.  In this case, Signed Statements MUST NOT carry confidential information.  Once a Signed Statement is inserted into the Append-only Log maintained by a Transparency Service, it cannot be removed from the Log.  In some deployments, a Relaying Party, such as an Auditor, might require access to Signed Statements and Statements, which can be made available through adjacent services. Transparency Services MUST enforce access control to the Append-only Log. </ins> 6.
who can access the Append-only Log.  While this can be used to limit who can read the Log, it may also limit the usefulness of the system. <del> Some jurisdictions have a Right to be Forgotten.  However, once a Signed Statement is inserted into the Append-only Log maintained by a Transparency Service, it cannot be removed from the Log. </del> <ins> Once a cryptographic digest of the Signed Statement is registered on the Append-only Log, the registration cannot be removed from the Append-only Log. </ins> 6.
5. <del> Transparency Services are often publicly accessible.  Issuers should treat Signed Statements (rendering them as Transparent Statements) as publicly accessible.  In particular, a Signed Statement Envelope and Statement payload should not carry any private information in plaintext. </del> <ins> Issuers should treat Signed Statements (rendering them as Transparent Statements) as publicly accessible.  In particular, a Signed Statement Envelope and Statement payload should not carry any private information in plaintext. </ins> Transparency Services can have an authorization policy controlling who can access the Append-only Log.  While this can be used to limit
Implementations of Transparency Services may protect their Append- only Log using a combination of trusted hardware, replication and consensus protocols, and cryptographic evidence.  A Receipt is an <del> offline, universally-verifiable proof that an entry is recorded in </del> <ins> offline, universally-verifiable proof that an entry is registered in </ins> the Append-only Log.  Requesting a receipt can result in the production of a new receipt for the same signed statement.  A Receipt's verification key, signing algorithm, validity period,
4.1. Transparency Services MUST feature an Append-only Log.  The Append- <del> only Log is the verifiable data structure that records Signed Statements and supports the production of Receipts. </del> <ins> only Log is the verifiable data structure that records registered Signed Statements and supports the production of Receipts. </ins> All Transparency Services MUST expose APIs for the Registration of Signed Statements and issuance of Receipts.
header of the COSE_Sign1 Envelope, to one of the root certificates most recently registered as a trust anchor of the Transparency Service.  An "x5chain" with a leaf certificate that corresponds to <del> the "x5t" value MAY be included in the unprotected header in support of certain supply chain scenarios. </del> <ins> the "x5t" value MAY be included in the unprotected header. </ins> The Transparency Service MUST apply the Registration Policy that was most recently added to the Append-only Log at the time of
statement-edn.  The Receipt contains inclusion proofs for verifiable data structures.  The unprotected header contains verifiable data structure proofs.  See the protected header for details regarding the <del> specific verifiable data structure used.  Referencing the COSE Verifiable Data Structure Registry, RFC9162_SHA256 is value "1", which supports "-1" (inclusion proofs) and "-2" (consistency proofs). </del> <ins> specific verifiable data structure used.  Per the COSE Verifiable Data Structure Registry documented in I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle- tree-proofs, the COSE key type RFC9162_SHA256 is value "1".  Labels identify inclusion proofs ("-1") and consistency proofs ("-2"). </ins> fig-receipt-protected-header-edn illustrates the decoded protected header of the Transparent Statement in fig-transparent-statement-edn.
Support for "kid" in the protected header and "x5chain" in the unprotected header is OPTIONAL to implement. <del> When "x5t" is present, "iss" MUST be a string with a value between 1 and 8192 characters in length that fits the regular expression of a distinguished name. </del> <ins> When "x5t" is present, "iss" MUST be a string that meets URI requirements defined in RFC8392.  The "iss" value's length MUST be between 1 and 8192 characters in length. </ins> The "kid" header parameter MUST be present when "x5t" is not present. Key discovery protocols are out-of-scope of this document.
COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proof document I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle- tree-proofs. <del> This section describes at a high level, the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: </del> <ins> fig-concept-relationship illustrates entities and processes that comprise a Transparency Service independent of any one use case. </ins> <del> Issuers and Signed Statements </del> <ins> This section describes the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: </ins> <del> Transparency Service and the registration process </del> <ins> Issuers that use their credentials to create Signed Statements about Artifacts </ins> <del> Relying Parties of the Transparent Statements and the Receipt validation process </del> <ins> Transparency Services that evaluate Signed Statements against Registration Policies, producing Receipts upon successful Registration.  The returned Receipt may be combined with the Signed Statement to create a Transparent Statement. Relying Parties that: collect Receipts of Signed Statements for subsequent registration of Transparent Statements; retrieve Transparent Statements for analysis of Statements about Artifacts themselves (e.g. verification); or replay all the Transparent Statements to check for the consistency of the Transparency Service's Append-only Log (e.g. auditing) </ins> The subsequent sections describe the main concepts, namely Transparency Service, Signed Statements, Registration, and
(see RFC8610) for of the protected header and unprotected header of Signed Statements and Receipts. <del> Everything that is optional in the following CDDL definition can potentially be discovered out of band and Registration Policies are not assured on the presence of these optional fields.  A Registration Policy that requires an optional field to be present MUST reject any Signed Statements or Receipts that are invalid according to the Registration Policy. </del> <ins> This definition specifies the minimal mandatory labels. Implementation-specific Registration Policies may define additional mandatory labels.  A Transparency Service implementation MUST reject registering Signed Statements that do not meet their current Registration Policy requirements.  Each implementation SHOULD provide details for their registration policies through documentation or discovery APIs. </ins> fig-signed-statement-edn illustrates an instance of a Signed Statement in Extended Diagnostic Notation (EDN), with a payload that
Statement is accepted to be registered to the Append-only Log. Transparency Services MUST maintain Registration Policies. <del> Transparency Services MUST also maintain a list of trust anchors, which SHOULD be used by Relying Parties to authenticate Issuers, and which MAY be included in a Registration Policy statement.  For </del> <ins> Transparency Services MUST maintain a list of trust anchors (see definition of trust anchor in RFC4949).  Transparency Services MUST authenticate signed statements as part of a Registration Policy.  For </ins> instance, a trust anchor could be an X.509 root certificate, a pointer to an OpenID Connect identity provider, or any other COSE- compatible trust anchor.
COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proof document I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle- tree-proofs. <del> This section describes at a high level, the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: </del> <ins> fig-concept-relationship illustrates the three main roles and associated processes that comprise a Transparency Service, independent of any one use case. </ins> <del> Issuers and Signed Statements </del> <ins> Issuers that use their credentials to create Signed Statements about Artifacts.  Issuer Credentials are also used to verify the Signed Statements within the Transparency Service registration process, and Transparent Statements. </ins> <del> Transparency Service and the registration process </del> <ins> Transparency Services that evaluate Signed Statements against Registration Policies, using credentials to sign Receipts upon successful Registration. </ins> <del> Relying Parties of the Transparent Statements and the Receipt validation process </del> <ins> Relying Parties that: collect Receipts, combining them with the Signed Statements to create a Transparent Statement; retrieve Transparent Statements for analysis of Statements about Artifacts; uses credentials to authenticate the Signed Statement and the Receipts of the Transparent Statement (e.g. verification); replay segments of Transparent Statements checking for the consistency of the Transparency Service's Append-only Log (e.g. auditing) In addition, fig-concept-relationship illustrates multiple Transparency Services and multiple Receipts as a single Signed Statement MAY be registered with one or more Transparency Service. Each Transparency Service produces a Receipt, which may be aggregated in a single Transparent Statement, demonstrating the Signed Statement was registered by multiple Transparency Services. The arrows indicate the flow of information. </ins> The subsequent sections describe the main concepts, namely Transparency Service, Signed Statements, Registration, and
by the Transparency Service MUST be checked. In essence, when using X.509 Signed Statements, the Transparency <del> Service MUST build and validate a complete certificate chain from the Issuer's certificate identified by "x5t" located in the protected header of the COSE_Sign1 Envelope, to one of the root certificates most recently registered as a trust anchor of the Transparency Service.  An "x5chain" with a leaf certificate that corresponds to the "x5t" value MAY be included in the unprotected header. </del> <ins> Service MUST build and validate a complete certification path from an Issuer's certificate to one of the root certificates most recently registered as a trust anchor by the Transparency Service. The protected header of the COSE_Sign1 Envelope MUST include either the Issuer's certificate as "x5t" or the chain including the Issuer's certificate as "x5chain".  If "x5t" is included in the protected header, an "x5chain" with a leaf certificate corresponding to the "x5t" value MAY be included in the unprotected header. </ins> The Transparency Service MUST apply the Registration Policy that was most recently added to the Append-only Log at the time of
affirming multiple Issuers agree. At least one identifier representing one credential MUST be included <del> in the protected header of the COSE Envelope, as one of "x5t" or "kid".  Additionally, "x5chain" that corresponds to either "x5t" or "kid" identifying the leaf certificate in the included certification path MAY be included in the unprotected header of the COSE Envelope. </del> <ins> in the protected header of the COSE Envelope, as one of "x5t", "x5chain" or "kid".  Additionally, "x5chain" that corresponds to either "x5t" or "kid" identifying the leaf certificate in the included certification path MAY be included in the unprotected header of the COSE Envelope. </ins> <del> When using x.509 certificates, support for "x5t" is REQUIRED to implement. </del> <ins> When using x.509 certificates, support for either "x5t" or "x5chain" in the protected header is REQUIRED to implement. </ins> Support for "kid" in the protected header and "x5chain" in the unprotected header is OPTIONAL to implement. <del> When "x5t" is present, "iss" MUST be a string that meets URI requirements defined in RFC8392.  The "iss" value's length MUST be between 1 and 8192 characters in length. </del> <ins> When "x5t" or "x5chain" is present in the protected header, "iss" MUST be a string that meets URI requirements defined in RFC8392.  The "iss" value's length MUST be between 1 and 8192 characters in length. </ins> <del> The "kid" header parameter MUST be present when "x5t" is not present. Key discovery protocols are out-of-scope of this document. </del> <ins> The "kid" header parameter MUST be present when neither "x5t" nor "x5chain" is present in the protected header.  Key discovery protocols are out-of-scope of this document. </ins> The protected header of a Signed Statement and a Receipt MUST include the "CWT Claims" header parameter as specified in CWT_CLAIMS_COSE.
<del> The Transparency Service MUST perform signature verification, as defined in RFC9052, and MAY perform additional checks as part of its Registration Policy. The Transparency Service MUST verify the signature of the Signed Statement, as described in RFC9360, using the signature algorithm and verification key of the Issuer. The Transparency Service MUST check that the Signed Statement includes the required protected headers.  The Transparency Service MAY validate the Signed Statement payload in order to enforce domain specific registration policies that apply to specific content types. </del> <ins> The Transparency Service MUST perform signature verification per RFC9052 and MUST verify the signature of the Signed Statement with the signature algorithm and verification key of the Issuer per RFC9360.  The Transparency Service MUST also check the Signed Statement includes the required protected headers.  The Transparency Service MAY validate the Signed Statement payload in order to enforce domain specific registration policies that apply to specific content types. </ins>
contents of the Registry at the time of registration, and must then yield the same result. <del> The ordering of entries, their cryptographic contents, and the </del> <ins> the ordering of entries, their cryptographic contents, and the </ins> Registry governance may be non-deterministic, but they must be verifiable. <del> A Transparency Services SHOULD store evidence about the resolution </del> <ins> a Transparency Services SHOULD store evidence about the resolution </ins> of distributed identifiers into manifests. <del> A Transparency Service MAY additionally support verifiability of </del> <ins> a Transparency Service MAY additionally support verifiability of </ins> client authentication and access control. 5.2.3.4.
Many Issuers issue Signed Statements about different Artifacts under the same DID, so it is important for everyone to be able to immediately recognize by looking at the Envelope of a Signed <del> Statments what Artifact it is referring to.  This information is </del> <ins> Statements what Artifact it is referring to.  This information is </ins> stored in the Feed header of the Envelope.  Issuers MAY use different signing keys (identified by "kid" in the resolved key manifest) for different Artifacts, or sign all Signed Statements under the same
COSE Envelope of the Signed Statement.  The key of the map entry corresponds to the name of the policy, while its value (including its type) is policy-specific.  For instance, the "register_by" policy <del> defines the maximum timestamp by which a Signed Statemnet can be </del> <ins> defines the maximum timestamp by which a Signed Statement can be </ins> registered, hence the associated value contains an unsigned integer. While this design ensures that all verifiers get the same guarantee
latest version, Issuers SHOULD use the "sequence_no" or "issuer_ts" attributes. <del> Once all the Envelope headers are set, an Issuer SHOULD use a standard COSE implementation to produce an appropriately serialized Signed Statement (the SCITT tag of "COSE_Sign1_Tagged" is outside the scope of COSE, and used to indicate that a signed object is a Signed </del> <ins> Once all the Envelope headers are set, an Issuer MUST use a standard COSE implementation to produce an appropriately serialized Signed Statement (the SCITT tag of "COSE_Sign1_Tagged" is outside the scope of COSE, and used to indicate that a signed object is a Signed </ins> Statement). 6.3.
Signed Statement Issuers rely on being discoverable and represented as the responsible parties for their registered Signed Statements via <del> Transparency Services in a believable manner.  Analogously, </del> <ins> Transparency Services in a believable manner.  The issuer of a Signed Statement should be authenticated and authorized according to the registration policy of the transparency service.  Analogously, </ins> Transparent Statement Consumers rely on verifiable trustworthiness assertions associated with Transparent Statements and their processing provenance in a believable manner.  If trust can be put <del> into the operations that record Signed Statements (i.e., a believable notarization function) in a secure, append-only Registry via online operations, the same trust can be put into a corresponding Receipt that is the resulting documentation of these online operations issued by the Transparency Services and that can be validated in offline operations. </del> <ins> into the operations that record Signed Statements in a secure, append-only log via online operations, the same trust can be put into the resulting transparent statement, issued by the Transparency Services and that can be validated in offline operations. </ins> The Transparency Services specified in this architecture can be implemented by various different types of services in various types
components are based on the Concise Signing and Encryption standard specified in RFC9052, which is used to sign released Statements about Artifacts and to build and maintain a Merkle tree that functions as <del> an append-only Registry for corresponding Signed Statements.  The format and verification process for Registry-based transparency receipts are described in I-D.birkholz-scitt-receipts. </del> <ins> an append-only Registry for corresponding Signed Statements. </ins> 1.1.