jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
The SCITT architecture consists of a very loose federation of Transparency Services, and a set of common formats and protocols for <del> issuing, registering and auditing Transparent Statements.  In order to accommodate as many Transparency Service implementations as possible, this document only specifies the format of Signed </del> <ins> issuing, registering and auditing Transparent Statements. In order to accommodate as many Transparency Service implementations as possible, this document only specifies the format of Signed </ins> Statements (which must be used by all Issuers) and a very thin wrapper format for Receipts, which specifies the Transparency Service <del> identity and the Registry algorithm.  Most of the details of the Receipt's contents are specific to the Registry algorithm.  The I- D.birkholz-scitt-receipts document defines two initial Registry algorithms (for historical and sparse Merkle Trees), but other Registry formats (such as blockchains, or hybrid historical and indexed Merkle Trees) may be proposed later. </del> <ins> identity and the agility parameters for the Merkle Tree Proof.  Most of the details of the Receipt's contents are specified in the COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proof document I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree- proofs. </ins> In this section, a high level the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: Issuers and the Signed Statement issuance
Trees, sparse/indexed Merkle Trees, full blockchains, and many other variants.  The Registry is only required to support concise Receipts (i.e., whose size grows at most logarithmically in the number of <del> entries in the Registry).  This does not necessarily rule out blockchains as a Registry, but may necessitate advanced Receipt schemes that use arguments of knowledge and other verifiable computing techniques. Since the details of how to verify a Receipt are specific to the data structure, no particular Registry format is specified in this document.  Instead, two initial formats for Registry in I-D.birkholz- scitt-receipts using historical and sparse Merkle Trees are proposed. Beyond the format of Receipts, generic properties that should be satisfied by the components in the Transparency Services that have the ability to write to the Registry are required. </del> <ins> entries in the Registry) that can be encoded as a COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proof. It is possible to offer multiple signature algorithms for the COSE signature of receipts' Signed Merkle Tree, or to change the signing algorithm at a later points.  However, the Merkle Tree algorithm (including its internal hash function) cannot easily be changed without beaking the consistency of the Registry.  It is possible to maintain separate Registries for each algorithm in parallel but the Transparency Service is then responsible for proving their mutual consistency. </ins> 5.2.3.1.
headers: Receipts (label: "TBD", temporary: "394"): Array of Receipts, <del> defined in </del> <ins> defined below.  This allows the Receipt to be attached to the Signed Statement, thus making a Transparent Statement. </ins> In CDDL RFC8610 notation, the Envelope is defined as follows: 6.2. <ins> Receipts are based on COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proofs (I-D.draft- steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs) with an additional wrapper structure that adds the following information: version: Receipt version number; this should be set to "0" for implementation of this document.  We envision that future version of SCITT may add support for more complex receipts; for instance, registrations on multiple TS, receipts for dependency graphs and endorsements of Signed Claims, etc. ts_identifier: The DID of the Transparency Service that issued the claim.  Verifiers MAY use this DID as a key discovery mechanism to verify the COSE Merkle Root signature; in this case the verification is the same as for Signed Claims and the signer should include the Key ID header.  Verifiers MUST support the "did:web" method, all other methods are optional. We also introduce the following requirements for the COSE signature of the Merkle Root: The SCITT version header MUST be included and its value match the "version" field of the Receipt stucture. The DID of issuer header (like in Signed Claims) MUST be included and its value match the "ts_identifier" field of the Receipt structure. TS MAY include the Registration policy info header to indicate to verifiers what policies have been applied at the registration of this claim. Since -COSEMTP uses optional headers, the "crit" header (id: 2) MUST be included and all SCITT-specific headers (version, issuer DID and Registration Policy) MUST be marked critical. The following registration policies are built-in and MAY be used by verifiers to help decide the trustworthiness of the Transparent Statement: Registration time: the timestamp at which the TS has added this Signed Claim to its Registry DID Manifest: the manifest that was retured by resolving the DID of the issuer at registration, according to the TS. Sequence number: the sequence number of this statement with relation to other statements with the same issuer and feed.  There is no guarantee that all Signed Statements are registered with contiguous sequence numbers; only that it is monotonic and follows the issuer sequence numbers. 6.3. </ins> There are many types of Statements (such as SBOMs, malware scans, audit reports, policy definitions) that Issuers may want to turn into Signed Statements.  An Issuer must first decide on a suitable format
re-issue Receipts for the Registry content, for instance after a transient fault during Signed Statement Registration. <del> 6.5. </del> <ins> 6.6. </ins> This section provides additional implementation considerations.  The high-level validation algorithm is described in validation; the <del> Registry-specific details of checking Receipts are covered in I- D.birkholz-scitt-receipts. </del> <ins> Registry-specific details of checking Receipts are covered in -COMTRE. </ins> Before checking a Transparent Statement, the Verifier must be configured with one or more identities of trusted Transparency
in how each Transparency Service is implemented and operates.  Each service MAY enforce its own Registration Policy for authorizing entities to register their Signed Statements to the append-only Log. <del> Some Transparency Services may also enforce role based access control (RBAC) policies limiting who can write, read and audit specific Feeds or the full Registry.  It is critical to provide interoperability for all Transparency Services instances as the composition and configuration of involved supply chain entities and their system components is ever-changing and always in flux. </del> <ins> Some Transparency Services may also enforce authorization policies limiting who can write, read and audit specific Feeds or the full registry.  It is critical to provide interoperability for all Transparency Services instances as the composition and configuration of involved supply chain entities and their system components is ever-changing and always in flux. </ins> A Transparency Services provides visibility into Signed Statements associated with various supply chains and their sub-systems.  These
Signed Statement about an Artifact.  Issuers may Register new Signed Statements about Artifacts, but they cannot delete or alter Signed Statements previously added to the append-only Log.  A Transparency <del> Service may restrict access to Signed Statements through Role Based Access Control, however third parties such as Auditors would be </del> <ins> Service may restrict access to Signed Statements through access control policies.  However, third parties (such as Auditors) would be </ins> granted access as needed to attest to the validity of the Artifact, <del> Feed or entirety of the Transparency Service. </del> <ins> Feed or the entirety of the Transparency Service. </ins> Trust in the Transparency Service itself is supported both by protecting their implementation (using, for instance, replication,
Signed Merkle Tree Proof document I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree- proofs. <del> In this section, a high level the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: Issuers and the Signed Statement issuance process, transparency Registry and the Transparent Statement Registration process, as well as Verifiers and the Receipt validation process. </del> <ins> This section describes at a high level, the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: Issuers and the Signed Statement issuance process, Transparency Service and the Signed Statement Registration process, as well as Verifiers of the Transparent Statements and the Receipt validation process. </ins> 5.1.
Beyond the trusted components, Transparency Services may operate additional endpoints for auditing, for instance to query for the <del> history of Transparent Statements registered by a given Issuer via a </del> <ins> history of Signed Statements registered by a given Issuer via a </ins> certain Feed.  Implementations of Transparency Services SHOULD avoid using the service identity and extending the Registry in auditing endpoints; as much as practical, the Registry SHOULD contain enough
the Transparency Service Registration Policy and that has been persisted in the Registry.  Unless advertised in the Transparency Service Registration Policy, the Verifier should not assume that the <del> ordering of Transparent Statements in the Registry matches the ordering of their issuance. </del> <ins> ordering of Signed Statements in the Registry matches the ordering of their issuance. </ins> Similarly, the fact that an Issuer can be held accountable for its Transparent Statements does not on its own provide any mitigation or
10.1.1.1. If a Transparency Service is honest, then a Transparent Statement <del> including a correct Receipt ensures that the Transparent Statement passed its Registration Policy and was recorded appropriately. </del> <ins> including a correct Receipt ensures that the associated Signed Statement passed its Registration Policy and was recorded appropriately. </ins> Conversely, a corrupt Transparency Service may 1. refuse or delay the Registration of Signed Statements, 2. register Signed Statements that
Due to the operational challenge of maintaining a globally consistent append-only Log, some Transparency Services may provide limited <del> support for historical queries on the Transparent Statements they have registered, and accept the risk of being blamed for inconsistent </del> <ins> support for historical queries on the Signed Statements they have registered, and accept the risk of being blamed for inconsistent </ins> Registration or Issuer equivocation. Verifier and Auditors may also witness (1,4) but may not be able to
The Transparency Service is trusted with the confidentiality of the Signed Statements presented for Registration.  Some Transparency <del> Services may publish every Transparent Statement in their logs, to </del> <ins> Services may publish every Signed Statement in their logs, to </ins> facilitate their dissemination and auditing.  Others may just return Receipts to clients that present Singed Statements for Registration, and disclose the Append-only Log only to Auditors trusted with the confidentiality of its contents. <del> A collection of Transparent Statements must not leak information about the contents of other Transparent Statements registered on the Transparency Service. </del> <ins> A collection of Signed Statements must not leak information about the contents of other Signed Statements registered on the Transparency Service. </ins> Nonetheless, Issuers should carefully review the inclusion of private/confidential materials in their Statements.  For example,
If the "payload" is detached, the Transparency Service depends on the authentication context of the client in the Registration Policy.  If the "payload" is attached, the Transparency Service depends on both <del> the authentication context of the client, and the verification of the Signed Statement in the Registration Policy.  The details of Registration Policy are out of scope for this document. </del> <ins> the authentication context of the client (if present), and the verification of the Signed Statement in the Registration Policy.  The details of Registration Policy are out of scope for this document. </ins> If registration succeeds the following identifier MAY be used to refer to the Signed Statement that was accepted:
Response: <ins> 2.2.4.1. </ins> If the Signed Statement requested is already included in the Append- Only Log: <del> If the Signed Statement requested is not yet included in the Append- Only Log: </del> <ins> 2.2.4.2. If registration of the Signed Statement requested is in progress but not yet included in the Append-Only Log: 2.2.4.3. If the Signed Statement requested is neither registered in the log nor subject to an in-progress registration: 2.2.4.4. If a client is polling for an in-progress registration too frequently then the Transparency Service MAY, in addition to implementing rate- limiting, return a 429 response: 2.2.4.5. </ins> <del> Additional eventually consistent operation details MAY be present. Support for eventually consistent Receipts is implementation specific, and out of scope for this specification. </del> <ins> For all responses additional eventually consistent operation details MAY be present.  Support for eventually consistent Receipts is implementation specific, and out of scope for this specification. </ins> 2.2.5.
If the Transparency Service cannot process a client's request, it MUST return an HTTP 4xx or 5xx status code, and the body SHOULD be a <del> JSON problem details object (RFC9457) containing: </del> <ins> Concise Problem Details object (RFC9290) containing: </ins> <del> type: A URI reference identifying the problem.  To facilitate </del> <ins> title: A human-readable string identifying the error that prevented the Transparency Service from processing the request, ideally short and suitable for inclusion in log messages. detail: A human-readable string describing the error in more depth, ideally with sufficient detail to enable the error to be rectified. instance: A URN reference identifying the problem.  To facilitate </ins> automated response to errors, this document defines a set of standard tokens for use in the type field within the URN namespace of: "urn:ietf:params:scitt:error:". <del> detail: A human-readable string describing the error that prevented the Transparency Service from processing the request, ideally with sufficient detail to enable the error to be rectified. </del> <ins> response-code: The HTTP error response code relating to this error. application/concise-problem-details+cbor </ins> <del> Error responses SHOULD be sent with the "Content-Type: application/ problem+json" HTTP header. </del> <ins> NOTE: SCRAPI is not a CoAP API.  Nonetheless Constrained Problem Details objects (RFC9290) provide a useful CBOR encoding for problem details and avoids the need for mixing CBOR and JSON in endpoint implementations. </ins> As an example, submitting a Signed Statement with an unsupported signature algorithm would return a "400 Bad Request" status code and
Clients SHOULD treat 500 and 503 HTTP status code responses as transient failures and MAY retry the same request without <del> modification at a later date.  Note that in the case of a 503 response, the Transparency Service MAY include a "Retry-After" header field per RFC9110 in order to request a minimum time for the client to wait before retrying the request.  In the absence of this header field, this document does not specify a minimum. </del> <ins> modification at a later date. Note that in the case of any error response, the Transparency Service MAY include a "Retry-After" header field per RFC9110 in order to request a minimum time for the client to wait before retrying the request.  In the absence of this header field, this document does not specify a minimum. </ins> 2.1.
Authentication SHOULD be implemented for this endpoint. This endpoint enables Transparency Service APIs to act like Artifact <del> Repositories, and serve "payload" values directly, instead of </del> <ins> Repositories, and serve Signed Statements directly, instead of </ins> indirectly through Receipts. Request: Response: <del> 2.2.3. Authentication SHOULD be implemented for this endpoint. </del> <ins> One of the following: </ins> <del> This endpoint enables Transparency Service APIs to act like Artifact Repositories, and serve Signed Statements directly, instead of indirectly through Receipts. </del> <ins> 2.2.2.1. </ins> <del> Request: </del> <ins> 2.2.2.2. </ins> <del> Response: </del> <ins> The following expected errors are defined.  Implementations MAY return other errors, so long as they are valid RFC9290 objects. </ins> <del> 2.2.4. </del> <ins> 2.2.3. </ins> Authentication SHOULD be implemented for this endpoint.
Response: <del> 2.2.4.1. </del> <ins> 2.2.3.1. </ins> If the Signed Statement requested is already included in the Append- Only Log: <del> 2.2.4.2. </del> <ins> 2.2.3.2. </ins> If registration of the Signed Statement requested is in progress but not yet included in the Append-Only Log: <del> 2.2.4.3. </del> <ins> 2.2.3.3. </ins> If the Signed Statement requested is neither registered in the log nor subject to an in-progress registration: <del> 2.2.4.4. </del> <ins> 2.2.3.4. </ins> If a client is polling for an in-progress registration too frequently then the Transparency Service MAY, in addition to implementing rate- limiting, return a 429 response: <del> 2.2.4.5. </del> <ins> 2.2.3.5. </ins> For all responses additional eventually consistent operation details MAY be present.  Support for eventually consistent Receipts is implementation specific, and out of scope for this specification. <del> 2.2.5. </del> <ins> 2.2.4. </ins> This endpoint is used to exchange old or expiring receipts for fresh ones.
3.2. <del> In IT industry it is a common practice that once a software product is released, it is evaluated on various aspects.  For example, an auditing company, a code review company or a government body will examine the software product and issue authoritative reports about the product.  The end users (consumers or distribution entities) use these report to make an accurate assessment as to whether the software product is deemed fit to use. </del> <ins> In the IT industry it is a common practice that once a software product is released, it is evaluated on various aspects.  For example, an auditing company, a code review company or a government body will examine the software product and issue authoritative reports about the product.  The end users (consumers or distribution entities) use these report to make an accurate assessment as to whether the software product is deemed fit to use. </ins> There are multiple such authoritative bodies that make such assessments.  There is no assurance that all the bodies may be aware of statements from other authoritative entities or actively acknowledge them.  Discovery of all sources of such reports and/or <del> identity of the authoritative bodies adds a significant cost to the </del> <ins> identities of the authoritative bodies adds a significant cost to the </ins> end user or consumer of the product. A consumer of released software product wants:
statement on how to mitigate the vulnerability.  At first, the producer provides an updated software product that still uses the vulnerable software component but shields the issue in a fashion that <del> inhibits exploitation.  Later, A second update of the software </del> <ins> inhibits exploitation.  Later, a second update of the software </ins> product includes a security patch to the affected software component <del> from the software producer.  Finally, A third update includes a new </del> <ins> from the software producer.  Finally, a third update includes a new </ins> release (updated version) of the formerly insecure software component.  For this release, both the software product and the affected software component are deemed secure by the producer and
to know where to get these security statements from producers and third-parties related to the software product in a timely and <del> unambiguous fashion, </del> <ins> unambiguous fashion </ins> <del> how to attribute them to an authoritative issuer, </del> <ins> how to attribute them to an authoritative issuer </ins> how to associate the statements in a meaningful manner via a set <del> of well-known semantic relationships, and </del> <ins> of well-known semantic relationships </ins> how to consistently, efficiently, and homogeneously check their <del> authenticity. </del> <ins> authenticity </ins> There is no standardized way to: <del> know the various sources of statements, </del> <ins> know the various sources of statements </ins> <del> how to express the provenance and historicity of statements, </del> <ins> how to express the provenance and historicity of statements </ins> how to related/link various heterogeneous statements in a simple <del> fashion, and </del> <ins> fashion </ins> check that the statement comes from a source with authority to <del> issue that statement. </del> <ins> issue that statement </ins> 3.4.
A consumer of a released software wants: to understand if a particular provider is actually the original <del> provider or a promoter, </del> <ins> provider or a promoter </ins> to know if and how the source, or resulting binary, of a promoted <del> software component differs from the original software component, </del> <ins> software component differs from the original software component </ins> to check the provenance and history of a software component's <del> source back to its origin, and </del> <ins> source back to its origin </ins> <del> to assess whether to trust a promoter or not. </del> <ins> to assess whether to trust a promoter or not </ins> There is no standardized way to:
acquisition and deployment of software in certain security domains of the organization, a check of software quality and characteristics must succeed.  Compliance and requirement checking includes audits of <del> the results of organisational procedures and technical procedures, </del> <ins> the results of organizational procedures and technical procedures, </ins> which can originate from checks conducted by the organization itself or checks conducted by trusted third parties.  Consecutively, <del> consumers of statements about a released software can be auditors. Examples of procedure results important to audits include: available fresh and applicable code reviews, certification documents (e.g., FIPS or Common Criteria), virus scans, vulnerability disclosure reports (fixed or not fixed), security impact or applicability justification statements.  Relevant compliance, requirement, and check result documents originate from various sources and include a wide range of representations and formats. </del> <ins> consumers of statements about released software can be auditors. Examples of procedure results important to audits include: available fresh and applicable code reviews certification documents (e.g., FIPS or Common Criteria) virus scans vulnerability disclosure reports (fixed or not fixed) security impact or applicability justification statements Relevant compliance, requirement, and check result documents originate from various sources and include a wide range of representations and formats. </ins> A consumer of a released software wants: