jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
3.2. <del> This document defines a workload identity as a URI RFC3986.  This URI is used in the subject fields in the certificates and tokens defined later in this document.  This specification treats the URI as opaque. The format of the URI and the namespace for the URI are at the discretion of the deployment at large.  Other specifications may define specific URI structures for particular use cases.  An example of a defined identity format is the SPIFFE ID [1]. A workload identity only has meaning within the scope of a specific issuer.  Two identities of the same value issued by different issuers may or may not refer to the same workload.  In order to avoid collisions identity URIs SHOULD specify, in the URI's "authority" field, the trust domain associated with an issuer that is selected from a global name space such as host domains.  However, the validator of an identity credential MUST make sure that they are using the correct issuer credential to verify the identity credential and that the issuer is trusted to issue tokens for the defined trust domain. </del> <ins> This document defines a workload identifier as a URI RFC3986.  This URI is used in the subject fields in the certificates and tokens defined later in this document.  The URI MUST meet the criteria for the URI type of Subject Alternative Name defined in Section 4.2.1.6 of RFC5280. In addition the URI MUST include an authority that identifies the trust domain within which the identifier is scoped.  The trust domain SHOULD be a fully qualified domain name belonging to the organization defining the trust domain to help provide uniqueness for the trust domain identifier.  The scheme and scheme specific part are not defined by this specification.  An example of an identifier format that conforms to this definition is SPIFFE ID [1].  While the URI encoding rules allow host names to be specified as IP addresses, IP addresses MUT NOT be used to represent trust domains except in the case where they are needed for compatibility with existing naming schemes. </ins> 4.
A signed response would be: <ins> 4.4. The two options for protecting the workload's traffic vary with respect to implementation complexity, extensibility and security. Here is a summary of the main differences between dpop-esque-auth and http-sig-auth. The DPoP-inspired solution is less HTTP-specific, making it easier to adapt for other protocols beyond HTTP.  This flexibility is particularly valuable for asynchronous communication scenarios, such as event-driven systems. Message Signatures, on the other hand, benefit from an existing HTTP specific RFC with some established implementations.  This existing groundwork means that this option could be simpler to deploy, to the extent such implementations are available and easily integrated. Given that the WIT (Workload Identity Token) is a type of JWT, the DPoP-inspired approach that also uses JWT is less complex and technology-intensive than Message Signatures.  In contrast, Message Signatures introduce additional layers of technology, potentially increasing the complexity of the overall system. Message Signatures offer superior integrity protection, particularly by mitigating message modification by middleboxes. A key advantage of Message Signatures is that they support response signing.  This opens up the possibility for future decisions about whether to make response signing mandatory, allowing for flexibility in the specification and/or in specific deployment scenarios. In general, Message Signatures provide greater flexibility compared to the DPoP-inspired approach.  The draft (and subsequent implementations) can decide whether specific aspects of message signing, such as coverage of particular fields, should be mandatory or optional.  Covering more fields will constrain the proof so it cannot be easily reused in another context, which is often a security improvement.  The DPoP inspired approach could be designed to include extensibility to sign other fields, but this would make it closer to trying to reinvent Message Signatures. </ins> 5. The WIMSE workload identity may be carried within an X.509
"jti": A unique identifier for the token. <ins> "wth": Hash of the Workload Identity Token, defined in to-wit. The value is the base64url encoding of the SHA-256 hash of the ASCII encoding of the token's value. </ins> "ath": Hash of the OAuth access token, if present in the request, which might convey end-user identity and authorization context of the request.  The value, as per RFC9449, is the
token issued to an OAuth 2.0 client running inside the workload by the second authorization server. <del> It is important to note that the workload does not use the Service Account Token with resource servers directly but instead obtains access tokens from this second authorization server.  To obtain these access tokens, the OAuth 2.0 client running in the workload uses the JWT client authentication grant, as defined in RFC7523, with the Service Account Token as input.  The obtained access token may be a bearer token, or a proof-of-possession token. fig-arch illustrates the interaction in the architecture graphically. </del> In recommendations we provide more details about how the content of the tokens and the offered security properties.
Abstract This specification describes three CBOR data structures for primary <del> use in COSE envelopes.  A format for Merkle Tree Root Signatures with metadata, a format for Inclusions Paths, and a format for disclosure of a single hadh tree leaf payload (Merkle Tree Proofs). </del> <ins> use in COSE envelopes.  A CBOR encoding of Merkle Roots for use in COSE payloads.  A CBOR encoding of Inclusions Proofs for use in COSE unprotected headers.  A CBOR encoding of Consistency Proofs for use in COSE unprotected headers. </ins> 1.
7.1.1. <del> IANA will be requested to register the new COSE Header parameters defined below in the "COSE Header Parameters" registry at some point. </del> <ins> This document requests IANA to add new values to the 'COSE Algorithms' and to the 'COSE Header Algorithm Parameters' registries in the 'Standards Action With Expert Review category. 7.1.1.1. </ins> Name: tree_alg <del> Label: TBD </del> <ins> Label: TBD_1 </ins> Value type: tree_alg
Description: Merkle tree algorithm used to produce a COSE Sign1 payload. <del> 7.2. </del> <ins> Name: inclusion_proof Label: TBD_2 Value type: inclusion_proof Value registry: See Description: Merkle tree inclusion proof for the given tree_alg. </ins> <del> IANA will be asked to add a new registry "TBD" to the list that appears at IANA Assignments [1]. </del> <ins> Name: consistency_proof </ins> <del> The rest of this section defines the subregistries that are to be created within the new "TBD" registry. </del> <ins> Label: TBD_2 </ins> <del> 7.2.1. </del> <ins> Value type: consistency_proof Value registry: See Description: Merkle tree consistency proof for the given tree_alg. 7.1.2. </ins> IANA will be asked to establish a registry of tree algorithm identifiers, named "Tree Algorithms" to be administered under a
<ins> Although the word transparency implies to some degree read access, it is important to note that transparency logs might include sensitive information. Depending on the leaf algorithm used, a log operator might be able to count unique entries. In the case that a leaf is produced from a cose sign 1 envelope, adding information to the unprotected header can be used to produce a unique leaf entry. However, this could impact privacy, and some transparency service operators might prefer only integrity protected content be made transparent. </ins> 5.1. In cases where a single merkle root and multiple inclusion paths are
alg (label: 1): REQUIRED.  Signature algorithm identifier.  Value type: int / tstr. <del> tree_alg (label: TBD): REQUIRED.  Merkle tree algorithm identifier.  Value type: int / tstr. </del> <ins> verifiable_data_structure (label: TBD): REQUIRED.  Merkle tree algorithm identifier.  Value type: int / tstr. </ins> crit (label: 2): REQUIRED.  Criticality marker.  Value type: [ +label ] <del> The criticality header MUST contain the tree_alg label. </del> <ins> The criticality header MUST contain the verifiable_data_structure label. </ins> The envelope payload MUST be computed by the process defined for the <del> tree_alg. </del> <ins> verifiable_data_structure. </ins> The envelope payload MUST be detached, and recomputed by the verifier.
Editors note: tree-size-1, could be ommited, if an inclusion-proof is always present, since the inclusion proof contains, tree-size-1. <del> 4.2. </del> <ins> 5.4. </ins> In a signed inclusion proof, the previous merkle tree root, maps to tree-size-1, and is a detached payload.  In a signed consistency proof, the latest merkle tree root, maps to tree-size-2, and is an attached payload. <del> 5. </del> <ins> 6. </ins> See the privacy considerations section of:
<del> 6.1. </del> <ins> 7.1. </ins> The choice of cryptographic hash function is the primary primitive impacting the security of authenticating payload inclusion in a merkle root.  Tree algorithm designers should review the latest guidance on selecting a suitable cryptographic hash function. <del> 7. </del> <ins> 8. </ins> <del> 7.1. </del> <ins> 8.1. </ins> <del> 7.1.1. </del> <ins> 8.1.1. </ins> This document requests IANA to add new values to the 'COSE Algorithms' and to the 'COSE Header Algorithm Parameters' registries in the 'Standards Action With Expert Review category. <del> 7.1.1.1. </del> <ins> 8.1.1.1. </ins> <del> Name: tree_alg </del> <ins> Name: verifiable_data_structure </ins> Label: TBD_1 <del> Value type: tree_alg </del> <ins> Value type: verifiable_data_structure </ins> Value registry: See
Value registry: See <del> Description: Merkle tree consistency proof for the given tree_alg. </del> <ins> Description: Merkle tree consistency proof for the given verifiable_data_structure. 8.1.2. IANA will be asked to establish a registry of tree algorithm identifiers, named "Verifiable Data Structures" to be administered under a Specification Required policy RFC8126. Template: Identifier: The two-byte identifier for the algorithm Algorithm: The name of the data structure Reference: Where the data structure is defined Initial contents: Provided in </ins> <del> 7.1.2. </del> <ins> 8.1.3. </ins> IANA will be asked to establish a registry of tree algorithm <del> identifiers, named "Tree Algorithms" to be administered under a Specification Required policy RFC8126. </del> <ins> identifiers, named "Verifiable Data Structures Proof Types" to be administered under a Specification Required policy RFC8126. </ins> Template: Identifier: The two-byte identifier for the algorithm <del> Tree Algorithm: The name of the algorithm </del> <ins> Algorithm: The name of the proof type algorithm </ins> <del> Reference: Where this algorithm is defined </del> <ins> Reference: Where the algorithm is defined </ins> Initial contents: Provided in
Abstract <del> This specification describes three CBOR data structures for primary use in COSE envelopes.  A CBOR encoding of Merkle Roots for use in COSE payloads.  A CBOR encoding of Inclusions Proofs for use in COSE unprotected headers.  A CBOR encoding of Consistency Proofs for use in COSE unprotected headers. </del> <ins> This specification describes verifiable data structures and associated proof types for use with COSE.  The extensibility of the approach is demonstrated by providing CBOR encodings for RFC9162. </ins> 1. <del> Merkle trees are verifiable data structures that support secure data storage, through their ability to protect the integrity of batches of documents or collections of statements. A merkle proof is a path from a leaf to a root in a merkle tree. Merkle proofs can be used to prove a document is in a database (proof of inclusion), or that a smaller set of statements are contained in a large set of statements (selective disclosure proofs). Typically, merkle trees are constructed from simple operations such as concatenation and digest via a cryptographic hash function. The simple design and valuable cryptographic properties of merkle trees have been leveraged in many network and database applications. Differences in the representation of a merkle tree, merkle leaf and merkle inclusion proof can increase the burden for implementers, and create interoperability challenges. This document describes the three data structures necessary to use merkle proofs with COSE envelopes. </del> <ins> Merkle trees are one of many verifiable data structures that enable tamper evident secure information storage, through their ability to protect the integrity of batches of documents or collections of statements. Merkle trees can be constructed from simple operations such as concatenation and digest via a cryptographic hash function, however, more advanced constructions enable proofs of different properties of the underlying verifiable data structure. Verifiable data structure proofs can be used to prove a document is in a database (proof of inclusion), that a database is append only (proof of consistency), that a smaller set of statements are contained in a large set of statements (proof of disclosure, a special case of proof of inclusion), or proof that certain data is not yet present in a database (proofs of non inclusion). Differences in the representation of verifiable data structures, and verifiable data structure proof types, can increase the burden for implementers, and create interoperability challenges for transparency services. This document describes how to convey verifiable data structures, and associated proof types in COSE envelopes. </ins> 1.1.
4.1. <del> For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. where "d(0)" is computed as: with extra data defined as: 4.2. For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. where "d(0)" is the payload.  This algorithm takes no extra data. 4.3. For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. where "d(0)" is computed as: with extra data defined as: 4.4. For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. where "d(0)" is the payload.  This algorithm takes no extra data. 4.5. </del> <ins> The "RFC9162_SHA256" tree algorithm uses the Merkle tree definition from RFC9162 with SHA-256 hash algorithm. </ins> For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n.
Abstract <del> This specification describes three CBOR data structures for primary use in COSE envelopes.  A CBOR encoding of Merkle Roots for use in COSE payloads.  A CBOR encoding of Inclusions Proofs for use in COSE unprotected headers.  A CBOR encoding of Consistency Proofs for use in COSE unprotected headers. </del> <ins> This specification describes verifiable data structures and associated proof types for use with COSE.  The extensibility of the approach is demonstrated by providing CBOR encodings for RFC9162. </ins> 1. <del> Merkle trees are verifiable data structures that support secure data storage, through their ability to protect the integrity of batches of documents or collections of statements. </del> <ins> Merkle trees are one of many verifiable data structures that enable tamper evident secure information storage, through their ability to protect the integrity of batches of documents or collections of statements. </ins> <del> A merkle proof is a path from a leaf to a root in a merkle tree. </del> <ins> Merkle trees can be constructed from simple operations such as concatenation and digest via a cryptographic hash function, however, more advanced constructions enable proofs of different properties of the underlying verifiable data structure. </ins> <del> Merkle proofs can be used to prove a document is in a database (proof of inclusion), or that a smaller set of statements are contained in a large set of statements (selective disclosure proofs). </del> <ins> Verifiable data structure proofs can be used to prove a document is in a database (proof of inclusion), that a database is append only (proof of consistency), that a smaller set of statements are contained in a large set of statements (proof of disclosure, a special case of proof of inclusion), or proof that certain data is not yet present in a database (proofs of non inclusion). </ins> <del> Typically, merkle trees are constructed from simple operations such as concatenation and digest via a cryptographic hash function. </del> <ins> Differences in the representation of verifiable data structures, and verifiable data structure proof types, can increase the burden for implementers, and create interoperability challenges for transparency services. </ins> <del> The simple design and valuable cryptographic properties of merkle trees have been leveraged in many network and database applications. Differences in the representation of a merkle tree, merkle leaf and merkle inclusion proof can increase the burden for implementers, and create interoperability challenges. This document describes the three data structures necessary to use merkle proofs with COSE envelopes. </del> <ins> This document describes how to convey verifiable data structures, and associated proof types in COSE envelopes. </ins> 1.1.
is important to note that transparency logs might include sensitive information. <del> Depending on the leaf algorithm used, a log operator might be able to count unique entries. </del> <ins> Depending on the verifiable data structure used, a service provider might be able to count unique entries. </ins> <del> In the case that a leaf is produced from a cose sign 1 envelope, </del> <ins> In the case that an entry is produced from a cose sign 1 envelope, </ins> adding information to the unprotected header can be used to produce a <del> unique leaf entry. </del> <ins> unique entry. </ins> However, this could impact privacy, and some transparency service operators might prefer only integrity protected content be made
8.1.1.1. <del> Name: verifiable_data_structure </del> <ins> Name: verifiable-data-structure </ins> <del> Label: TBD_1 </del> <ins> Label: TBD_1 (requested assignment 12) </ins> <del> Value type: verifiable_data_structure </del> <ins> Value type: int / tstr </ins> Value registry: See <del> Description: Merkle tree algorithm used to produce a COSE Sign1 payload. </del> <ins> Description: Tag indicating the Verifiable Data Structure, see sec-generic-verifiable-data-structures. </ins> <del> Name: inclusion_proof </del> <ins> Editors note: Authors are discussing how to avoid flooding the cose header parameters registry with new proof types. </ins> <del> Label: TBD_2 </del> <ins> Name: inclusion-proof </ins> <del> Value type: inclusion_proof </del> <ins> Label: TBD_2 (requested assignment 13) Value type: bstr </ins> Value registry: See <del> Description: Merkle tree inclusion proof for the given verifiable_data_structure. </del> <ins> Description: Tag indicating the "inclusion" Proof Type, see sec- generic-inclusion-proof. </ins> <del> Name: consistency_proof </del> <ins> Name: consistency-proof </ins> <del> Label: TBD_2 </del> <ins> Label: TBD_2 (requested assignment 14) </ins> <del> Value type: consistency_proof </del> <ins> Value type: bstr </ins> Value registry: See <del> Description: Merkle tree consistency proof for the given verifiable_data_structure. </del> <ins> Description: Tag indicating the "consistency" Proof Type, see sec- generic-consistency-proof. </ins> 8.1.2.
Reference: Where the algorithm is defined Initial contents: Provided in <ins> 9.  References 9.1.  URIs [1] https://github.com/ietf-scitt/draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree- proofs/issues/21 [2] https://github.com/ietf-scitt/draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree- proofs/issues/21 </ins>
where "d(0)" is the payload.  This algorithm takes no extra data. <ins> 4.2. The "QLDB_SHA256" tree algorithm uses the Merkle tree definition from TBD with SHA-256 hash algorithm. For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. where "d(0)" is the payload.  This algorithm takes no extra data. </ins> 5. TBD
FIXME bit vector: 0 right, 1 left, so no bit labels <del> For some tree algorithms, like Quantum Ledger Data Base (QLDB), the direction is derived from the hashes themselves and both the index and direction can be left out in the path: </del> <ins> For some tree algorithms, the direction is derived from the hashes themselves and both the index and direction can be left out in the path: </ins> Note: Including the tree size and leaf index may not be appropriate in certain privacy-focused applications as an attacker may be able to
where "d(0)" is the payload.  This algorithm takes no extra data. <del> 4.2. The "QLDB_SHA256" tree algorithm uses the Merkle tree definition from TBD with SHA-256 hash algorithm. For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. where "d(0)" is the payload.  This algorithm takes no extra data. </del> 5. TBD
The designated expert(s) should ensure that the proposed algorithm has a public specification and is suitable for use as [TBD]. <del> 7.2.2. IANA might be asked to establish a registry of signature algorithm identifiers, named "Signature Algorithms", with the following registration procedures: TBD The "Signature Algorithms" registry initially consists of: The designated expert(s) should ensure that the proposed algorithm has a public specification and is suitable for use as a cryptographic signature algorithm. </del> 8.  References 8.1.  URIs
1. <del> Merkle proofs are verifiable data structures that support secure data </del> <ins> Merkle trees are verifiable data structures that support secure data </ins> storage, through their ability to protect the integrity of batches of documents or collections of statements. <del> Merkle proofs can be used to prove a document is in a database (proof of existence), or that a smaller set of statements are contained in a large set of statements (proof of disclosure). </del> A merkle proof is a path from a leaf to a root in a merkle tree. <del> Merkle trees are constructed from simple operations such as concatenation and digest via a cryptographic hash function. </del> <ins> Merkle proofs can be used to prove a document is in a database (proof of inclusion), or that a smaller set of statements are contained in a large set of statements (selective disclosure proofs). Typically, merkle trees are constructed from simple operations such as concatenation and digest via a cryptographic hash function. </ins> The simple design and valuable cryptographic properties of merkle trees have been leveraged in many network and database applications.
several different representations. Some differences in representations are necessary to support <del> efficient verification of proofs and compatibility with deployed tree algorithms used in specific implementations. </del> <ins> efficient verification of different kinds of inclusion proofs and for compatibility with deployed tree algorithms used in specific implementations. </ins> 3.1. <del> A Merkle tree root is signed with COSE_Sign1, creating a Signed Merkle Tree Root: </del> <ins> A Merkle root is signed with COSE_Sign1: </ins> Protected header parameters: