jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
processing. The JWT MAY contain an "iat" (issued at) claim that identifies the <del> time at which the JWT was issued.  Note that the authorization server may reject JWTs with an "iat" claim value that is unreasonably far in the past. </del> <ins> time at which the JWT was issued. </ins> The JWT MAY contain a "jti" (JWT ID) claim that provides a unique identifier for the token.  The authorization server MAY ensure
The JWT MAY contain other claims. <del> The JWT MUST be digitally signed or have a Message Authentication Code (MAC) applied by the issuer.  The authorization server MUST reject JWTs with an invalid signature or MAC. </del> <ins> The JWT MUST be digitally signed using an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm.  The authorization server MUST reject the JWT if it is using a Message Authentication Code (MAC) based algorithm.  The authorization server MUST reject JWTs with an invalid signature. </ins> The authorization server MUST reject a JWT that is not valid in <del> all other respects per "JSON Web Token (JWT)". </del> <ins> all other respects per "JSON Web Token (JWT)" RFC7519. </ins> The following example is the decoded header and payload of a JWT meeting the processing rules as defined above.
Note that the authorization server may reject JWTs with an "exp" claim value that is unreasonably far in the future. <ins> The JWT MUST contain a "jti" (JWT ID) claim that provides a unique identifier for the token.  The authorization server MAY ensure that JWTs are not replayed by maintaining the set of used "jti" values for the length of time for which the JWT would be considered valid based on the applicable "exp" instant. The JWT MUST contain an "aud" (audience) claim containing a value that identifies the authorization server as an intended audience. The RFC8414 issuer identifier URL of the authorization server MUST be used as a value for an "aud" element to identify the authorization server as the intended audience of the JWT. </ins> The JWT MAY contain an "nbf" (not before) claim that identifies the time before which the token MUST NOT be accepted for processing.
server may reject JWTs with an "iat" claim value that is unreasonably far in the past. <del> The JWT MAY contain a "jti" (JWT ID) claim that provides a unique identifier for the token.  The authorization server MAY ensure that JWTs are not replayed by maintaining the set of used "jti" values for the length of time for which the JWT would be considered valid based on the applicable "exp" instant. </del> The JWT MAY contain other claims. The JWT MUST be digitally signed using an asymmetric cryptographic
the "cnf" claim of the corresponding client key attestation JWT. The authorization server MUST reject a JWT that is not valid in <del> all other respects per "JSON Web Token (JWT)". </del> <ins> all other respects per "JSON Web Token (JWT)" RFC7519. </ins> The following example is the decoded header and payload of a JWT meeting the processing rules as defined above. 4. <del> TODO Security </del> <ins> 4.1. Implementers should be aware that the design of this authentication mechanism deliberately allows for a client instance to re-use a single Client Attestation JWT in multiple interactions/requests with an authorization server, whilst producing a fresh Client Attestation PoP JWT.  Client deployments should consider this when determining the validity period for issued Client Attestation JWTs as this ultimately controls how long a client instance can re-use a single Client Attestation JWT. </ins> 5. <del> This document has no IANA actions. </del> <ins> TODO 6. 6.1. This section registers the value "client-assertion-type:jwt-key- attestation" in the IANA "OAuth URI" registry established by "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth" RFC6755. o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-key- attestation o Common Name: OAuth2 Attested Key Based Client Authentication Authentication o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document: TBC 6.2. This section registers the value "attest_key_client_auth" in the IANA "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry established by OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol RFC7591. o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "attest_key_client_auth" o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): TBC </ins>
3. <ins> Client Attestation JWT A JSON Web Token (JWT) generated by the client backend that authenticates the client instance. Client Attestation Proof of Possession (PoP) A Proof of Possession generated by the client instance for the key that is used in the Client Attestation JWT. Client Instance Key A cryptographic, asymmetric key generated by the client instance and proven to the client backend.  The public key is contained in the Client Attestation JWT and is used to sign the Client Attestation Proof of Possession 4. </ins> To perform client authentication using this scheme, the client instance uses the following parameter values and encodings. The value of the "client_assertion_type" is <del> "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-key-attestation". </del> <ins> "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-client-attestation". </ins> The value of the "client_assertion" parameter contains two JWTs, separated by a '~' character.  It MUST NOT contain more or less than <del> precisely two JWTs seperated by the '~` character.  The first JWT MUST be the client key attestation JWT defined in client-key- attestation-jwt, the second JWT MUST the client key attestation PoP defined in client-key-attestation-pop-jwt. </del> <ins> precisely two JWTs seperated by the '~' character.  The first JWT MUST be the client attestation JWT defined in client-attestation-jwt, the second JWT MUST the client attestation PoP defined in client- attestation-pop-jwt. </ins> The following example demonstrates client authentication using this scheme during the presentation of an authorization code grant in an access token request (with extra line breaks for display purposes only): <del> 3.1. </del> <ins> 4.1. </ins> In order to authenticate the client using this scheme, the authorization server MUST validate BOTH the JWTs present in the "client_assertion" parameter according to the criteria below. It is RECOMMENDED that the authorization server validate the Client <del> Key Attestation prior to validating the Client Key Attestation PoP. </del> <ins> Attestation JWT prior to validating the Client Attestation PoP. </ins> <del> 3.1.1. </del> <ins> 4.1.1. </ins> <del> The following rules apply to validating the client key attestation JWT.  Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the </del> <ins> The following rules apply to validating the client attestation JWT. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the </ins> discretion of the authorization server. The JWT MUST contain an "iss" (issuer) claim that contains a
The following example is the decoded header and payload of a JWT meeting the processing rules as defined above. <del> 3.1.2. </del> <ins> 4.1.2. </ins> <del> The following rules apply to validating the client key attestation PoP JWT.  Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the authorization server. </del> <ins> The following rules apply to validating the client attestation PoP JWT.  Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the authorization server. </ins> The JWT MUST contain an "iss" (issuer) claim with a value corresponding to the "client_id" of the OAuth client.
ultimately controls how long a client instance can re-use a single Client Attestation JWT. <del> 4.2. </del> <ins> 5.2. </ins> Authorization servers issuing a refresh token in response to a token request using the "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt- <del> key-attestation" client authentication method MUST bind the refresh token to the client instance, and NOT just the client as specified in section 6 [@!RFC6749].  To prove this binding, the client instance MUST authenticate itself to the authorization server when refreshing an access token using the "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion- type:jwt-key-attestation" authentication method.  The client MUST also use the same client attestation key that was used for authentication when the refresh token was issued. </del> <ins> client-attestation" client authentication method MUST bind the refresh token to the client instance, and NOT just the client as specified in section 6 [@!RFC6749].  To prove this binding, the client instance MUST authenticate itself to the authorization server when refreshing an access token using the "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-client-attestation" authentication method.  The client MUST also use the same Client Attestation that was used for authentication when the refresh token was issued. </ins> <del> 5. </del> <ins> 6. </ins> <del> 5.1. </del> <ins> 6.1. </ins> Implementers should be aware that using the same client attestation across multiple authorization servers could result in correlation of
are therefore RECOMMENDED to use different client attestations across different authorization servers. <del> 6. </del> <ins> 7. </ins> TODO <del> 7. </del> <ins> 8. </ins> <del> 7.1. </del> <ins> 8.1. </ins> <del> This section registers the value "client-assertion-type:jwt-key- </del> <ins> This section registers the value "client-assertion-type:jwt-client- </ins> attestation" in the IANA "OAuth URI" registry established by "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth" RFC6755. <del> o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-key- </del> <ins> o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-client- </ins> attestation o Common Name: OAuth2 Attested Key Based Client Authentication Authentication o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document: TBC <del> 7.2. </del> <ins> 8.2. </ins> <del> This section registers the value "attest_key_client_auth" in the IANA </del> <ins> This section registers the value "attest_jwt_client_auth" in the IANA </ins> "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry established by OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol RFC7591. <del> o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "attest_key_client_auth" </del> <ins> o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "attest_jwt_client_auth" </ins> o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): TBC
ultimately controls how long a client instance can re-use a single Client Attestation JWT. <ins> 4.2. Authorization servers issuing a refresh token in response to a token request using the "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt- key-attestation" client authentication method MUST bind the refresh token to the client instance, and NOT just the client as specified in section 6 [@!RFC6749].  To prove this binding, the client instance MUST authenticate itself to the authorization server when refreshing an access token using the "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion- type:jwt-key-attestation" authentication method.  The client MUST also use the same client attestation key that was used for authentication when the refresh token was issued. </ins> 5. TODO
Note that the protocol for steps 2 and 4 and how the client instance authenticates with the client backend is out of scope of this <del> specification. </del> <ins> specification.  Note also that this specification can be utilized without the client having a backend server at all; in this case, each client instance will perform the functions described as being done by the backend for itself. </ins> This specification defines the format of the Client Attestation that a client instance uses to authenticate in its interactions with an authorization server, which is comprised of two key parts: <del> A Client Attestation JWT- produced by the client backend. </del> <ins> A Client Attestation JWT - typically produced by the client backend. </ins> A Client Attestation Proof of Possession (PoP) - produced by the client instance.
3. <del> Client Attestation JWT A JSON Web Token (JWT) generated by the client backend which is bound to a key managed by a client instance which can then be used by the instance for client authentication. Client Attestation Proof of Possession (PoP) JWT A Proof of Possession generated by the client instance using the key that the Client Attestation JWT is bound to. Client Instance Key A cryptographic, asymmetric key generated by the client instance and proven to the client backend.  The public key is contained in the Client Attestation JWT and is used to sign the Client Attestation Proof of Possession. </del> 4. To perform client authentication using this scheme, the client
attestation" in the IANA "OAuth URI" registry established by "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth" RFC6755. <del> o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-client- attestation o Common Name: OAuth2 Attested Key Based Client Authentication Authentication o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document: TBC </del> <ins> URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-client- attestation Common Name: OAuth 2.0 Attested Key-Based Client Authentication Change Controller: IESG Specification Document: TBC </ins> 8.2.
"OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry established by OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol RFC7591. <del> o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "attest_jwt_client_auth" o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): TBC </del> <ins> Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "attest_jwt_client_auth" Change Controller: IESG Specification Document(s): TBC </ins>
time at which the JWT was issued. The JWT MAY contain a "jti" (JWT ID) claim that provides a unique <del> identifier for the token.  The authorization server MAY ensure that JWTs are not replayed by maintaining the set of used "jti" values for the length of time for which the JWT would be considered valid based on the applicable "exp" instant. </del> <ins> identifier for the token. </ins> The JWT MAY contain other claims.
instance MUST authenticate itself to the authorization server when refreshing an access token using the "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client- assertion-type:jwt-client-attestation" authentication method.  The <del> client MUST also use the same Client Attestation that was used for authentication when the refresh token was issued. </del> <ins> client MUST also use the same key that was present in the "cnf" claim of the client attestation that was used for client authentication when the refresh token was issued. </ins> 6.
To perform client authentication using this scheme, the client instance uses the following parameter values and encodings. <del> The value of the "client_assertion_type" is "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-client-attestation". The value of the "client_assertion" parameter contains two JWTs, separated by a '~' character.  It MUST NOT contain more or less than precisely two JWTs seperated by the '~' character.  The first JWT MUST be the client attestation JWT defined in client-attestation-jwt, the second JWT MUST the client attestation PoP defined in client- attestation-pop-jwt. </del> <ins> The value of the "client_assertion_type" parameter (as defined in RFC7521) set to "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt- client-attestation". The value of the "client_assertion" parameter (as defined in RFC7521) set to a value containing two JWTs, separated by a '~' character.  It MUST NOT contain more or less than precisely two JWTs separated by the '~' character.  The first JWT MUST be the client attestation JWT defined in client-attestation-jwt, the second JWT MUST be the client attestation PoP defined in client-attestation-pop-jwt. </ins> The following example demonstrates client authentication using this scheme during the presentation of an authorization code grant in an
5. <del> TODO </del> <ins> 5.1. Implementers should be aware that using the same client attestation across multiple authorization servers could result in correlation of the end user using the client instance through claim values (including the public key in the "cnf" claim).  Client deployments are therefore RECOMMENDED to use different client attestations across different authorization servers. </ins> 6. <del> 6.1. </del> <ins> TODO 7. 7.1. </ins> This section registers the value "client-assertion-type:jwt-key- attestation" in the IANA "OAuth URI" registry established by "An IETF
be used as a value for an "aud" element to identify the authorization server as the intended audience of the JWT. <ins> The JWT MAY contain an "nonce" claim containing a String value that is provided by the authorization server to associate the Client Attestation PoP JWT with a particular transaction and prevent replay attacks. </ins> The JWT MAY contain an "nbf" (not before) claim that identifies the time before which the token MUST NOT be accepted for processing.
The guidance provided by RFC7519 and RFC8725 applies. <ins> 7.1. The following mechanisms exist within this client authentication method in order to allow an authorization server to detect replay attacks for presented client attestation PoPs: The client uses "jti" (JWT ID) claims for the Client Attestation PoP JWT and the authorization server maintains a list of used (seen) "jti" values for the time of which the JWT would be considered valid based on the applicable "exp" claim.  If any Client Attestation PoP JWT would be replayed, the authorization server would recognize the "jti" and respond with an authentication error. The authorization server provides a nonce for the particular transaction and the client uses it for the "nonce" claim in the Client Attestation PoP JWT.  The authorization server validates that the nonce matches for the transaction.  This approach may require an additional roundtrip in the protocol.  The authorization server MUST ensure that the nonce provides sufficient entropy. The authorization server may expect the usage of a nonce in the Client Attestation PoP JWT, but instead of providing the nonce explicitly, the client may implicitly reuse an existing artefact, e.g. the authorization code.  The authorization server MUST ensure that the nonce provides sufficient entropy. The approach using a nonce explicitly provided by the authorization server gives stronger replay attack detection guarantees, however support by the authorization server is OPTIONAL to simplify mandatory implementation requirements.  The "jti" method is mandatory and hence acts as a default fallback. </ins> 8. 8.1.
Abstract <del> This specification defines a new method of client authentication for OAuth 2.0 RFC6749 by extending the approach defined in RFC7521.  This new method enables client deployments that are traditionally viewed as public clients to be able to authenticate with the authorization server through an attestation based authentication scheme. </del> <ins> This specification defines an extension to the OAuth 2 protocol as defined in RFC6749 which enables a Client Instance to include an attestation in interactions with an Authorization Server or a Resource Server.  This new method enables Client Instances involved in a client deployment that is traditionally viewed as a public client, to be able to provide an attestation in order to authenticate. </ins> 1. <del> RFC7521 defines a way for a client to include an assertion in a token request to an authorization server for the purposes of client authentication.  This specification uses this framework to define a new assertion type that provides a way for a client instance to authenticate itself with the authorization server through an assertion that is bound to a public key (for proof of possession). This assertion is designated with the name of Client Attestation in this draft. </del> The following diagram depicts the overall architecture and protocol flow.
token request.  The authorization server validates the Client Attestation and thus authenticates the Client Instance. <del> Note that the protocol for steps (2) and (4) and how the Client Instance authenticates to the Client Backend is out of scope of this specification.  Note also that this specification can be utilized without the client having a backend server at all; in this case, each client instance will perform the functions described as being done by the backend for itself. This specification defines the format of the Client Attestation that a Client Instance uses to authenticate in its interactions with an authorization server, which is comprised of two key parts: A Client Attestation JWT - typically produced by the client backend. </del> <ins> Please note that the protocol details for steps (2) and (4), particularly how the Client Instance authenticates to the client Backend, are beyond the scope of this specification.  Furthermore, this specification is designed to be flexible and can be implemented even in scenarios where the client does not have a backend server. In such cases, each Client Instance is responsible for performing the functions typically handled by the backend on its own. </ins> <del> A Client Attestation Proof of Possession (PoP) - produced by the client instance. </del> <ins> This approach acknowledges the evolving landscape of OAuth 2.0 deployments, where the ability for public clients to authenticate securely and reliably has become increasingly important. </ins> 2.
4. <del> To perform client authentication using this scheme, the client instance uses the following parameter values and encodings. </del> <ins> This draft introduces the concept of client attestations to the OAuth 2 protocol, using two JWTs: a Client Attestation and a Client Attestation Proof of Possession (PoP).  These JWTs are transmitted via HTTP headers in an HTTP request from a Client Instance to an Authorization Server or Resource Server.  The primary purpose of these headers is to authenticate the Client Instance. </ins> <del> The value of the "client_assertion_type" parameter (as defined in RFC7521) set to "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt- client-attestation". </del> <ins> 4.1. </ins> <del> The value of the "client_assertion" parameter (as defined in RFC7521) set to a value containing two JWTs, separated by a '~' character.  It MUST NOT contain more or less than precisely two JWTs separated by the '~' character.  The first JWT MUST be the client attestation JWT defined in client-attestation-jwt, the second JWT MUST be the client attestation PoP defined in client-attestation-pop-jwt. </del> <ins> A Client Attestation JWT and Client Attestation PoP JWT is included in an HTTP request using the following request header fields. </ins> <del> The following example demonstrates client authentication using this scheme during the presentation of an authorization code grant in an access token request (with extra line breaks for display purposes only): </del> <ins> The following is an example of the OAuth-Client-Attestation header. </ins> <del> 4.1. </del> <ins> The following is an example of the OAuth-Client-Attestation-PoP header. </ins> <del> In order to authenticate the client using this scheme, the authorization server MUST validate BOTH the JWTs present in the "client_assertion" parameter according to the criteria below. </del> <ins> Note that per RFC9110 header field names are case-insensitive; so OAUTH-CLIENT-ATTESTATION, oauth-client-attestation, etc., are all valid and equivalent header field names.  Case is significant in the header field value, however. The OAuth-Client-Attestation and OAuth-Client-Attestation-PoP HTTP header field values uses the token68 syntax defined in Section 11.2 of RFC9110 (repeated below for ease of reference). </ins> It is RECOMMENDED that the authorization server validate the Client Attestation JWT prior to validating the Client Attestation PoP. <del> 4.1.1. </del> <ins> 4.2. </ins> <del> The following rules apply to validating the client attestation JWT. </del> <ins> The following rules apply to validating the Client Attestation JWT. </ins> Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the <del> discretion of the authorization server. </del> <ins> discretion of the Authorization Server. </ins> The JWT MUST contain an "iss" (issuer) claim that contains a unique identifier for the entity that issued the JWT.  In the