jiebi/CodeConvo huggingface dataset:
header fields (or lack thereof) as determining factors while choosing the content for this response. <del> An origin server might send Vary with a list of header fields for two purposes: An origin server SHOULD send a Vary header field when its algorithm for selecting a representation varies based on aspects of the request message other than the method and target URI, unless the variance cannot be crossed or the origin server has been deliberately configured to prevent cache transparency.  For example, there is no need to send the Authorization field name in Vary because reuse across users is constrained by the field definition (field.authorization).  Likewise, an origin server might use Cache- Control response directives (field.cache-control) to supplant Vary if it considers the variance less significant than the performance cost of Vary's impact on caching. </del> <ins> A Vary field containing selecting field names has two purposes: An origin server SHOULD generate a Vary header field on a cacheable response when it wishes that response to be selectively reused for subsequent requests.  Generally, that is the case when the response content has been tailored to better fit the preferences expressed by those selecting header fields, such as when an origin server has selected the response's language based on the request's header field. Vary might be elided when an origin server considers variance in content selection to be less significant than Vary's performance impact on caching, particularly when such variance is already being limited by Cache-Control response directives (field.cache-control). Cached content selection is only improved by Vary if there is some chance that the origin server's selection algorithm might prefer a different representation for the recipient in a subsequent request. For example, there is no need to send the Authorization field name in Vary because reuse of that response for a different user is prohibited by the field definition (field.authorization).  Likewise, if the response content has been selected by network region but the origin server wants the cached response to be reused even if recipients move from one region to another, then there is no need for the origin server to indicate such variance in Vary. </ins> 13.
When an "http" URI is used within a context that calls for access to the indicated resource, a client MAY attempt access by resolving the host identifier to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to <del> that address on the indicated port, and sending an HTTP request message to the server containing the URI's identifying data. </del> <ins> that address on the indicated port, and sending over that connection an HTTP request message containing a request target that matches the client's target URI (target.resource). </ins> If the server responds to such a request with a non-interim HTTP response message, as described in status.codes, then that response is
host identifier to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to that address on the indicated port, securing the connection end-to- end by successfully initiating TLS over TCP with confidentiality and <del> integrity protection, and sending an HTTP request message over that connection containing the URI's identifying data. </del> <ins> integrity protection, and sending over that connection an HTTP request message containing a request target that matches the client's target URI (target.resource). </ins> If the server responds to such a request with a non-interim HTTP response message, as described in status.codes, then that response is
used to satisfy the request.  Proxy configuration is implementation- dependent, but is often based on URI prefix matching, selective authority matching, or both, and the proxy itself is usually <del> identified by an "http" or "https" URI.  If a proxy is applicable, the client connects inbound by establishing (or reusing) a connection to that proxy. </del> <ins> identified by an "http" or "https" URI. If an "http" or "https" proxy is applicable, the client connects inbound by establishing (or reusing) a connection to that proxy and then sending it an HTTP request message containing a request target that matches the client's target URI. </ins> 7.3.3. If no proxy is applicable, a typical client will invoke a handler <del> routine, usually specific to the target URI's scheme, to connect directly to an origin for the target resource.  How that is accomplished is dependent on the target URI scheme and defined by its associated specification. </del> <ins> routine (specific to the target URI's scheme) to obtain access to the identified resource.  How that is accomplished is dependent on the target URI scheme and defined by its associated specification. http.origin defines how to obtain access to an "http" resource by establishing (or reusing) an inbound connection to the identified origin server and then sending it an HTTP request message containing a request target that matches the client's target URI. https.origin defines how to obtain access to an "https" resource by establishing (or reusing) an inbound secured connection to an origin server that is authoritative for the identified origin and then sending it an HTTP request message containing a request target that matches the client's target URI. </ins> 7.4.
header field value containing a member "*" always fails to match. <del> The stored response with matching selecting header fields is known as the . If multiple selected responses are available (potentially including responses without a Vary header field), the cache will need to choose one to use.  When a selecting header field has a known mechanism for doing so (e.g., qvalues on </del> <ins> If multiple stored responses match the selecting header fields (potentially including responses without a Vary header field), the cache will need to choose one to use.  When a selecting header field has a known mechanism for ranking preference (e.g., qvalues on </ins> and similar request header fields), that mechanism MAY be used to <del> select a preferred response.  If such a mechanism is not available, </del> <ins> choose a preferred response.  If such a mechanism is not available, </ins> or leads to equally preferred responses, the most recent response (as determined by the <del> header field) is used, as per constructing.responses.from.caches. </del> <ins> header field) is chosen, as per constructing.responses.from.caches. </ins> Some resources mistakenly omit the Vary header field from their default response (i.e., the one sent when no more preferable response is available), with the effect of selecting it for requests to that resource even when more preferable responses are available.  When a <del> cache has multiple responses for a target URI and one or more omits the Vary header field, it SHOULD use the most recent (see age.calculations) valid Vary field value available to select an appropriate response for the request. </del> <ins> cache has multiple stored responses for a target URI and one or more omits the Vary header field, the cache SHOULD choose the most recent see age.calculations) stored response with a valid Vary field value. </ins> <del> If no selected response is available, the cache cannot satisfy the presented request.  Typically, it is forwarded to the origin server in a (possibly conditional; see validation.model) request. </del> <ins> If no stored response matches, the cache cannot satisfy the presented request.  Typically, the request is forwarded to the origin server, potentially with preconditions added to describe what responses the cache has already stored (validation.model). </ins> 4.2.
When a cache has one or more stored responses for a requested URI, but cannot serve any of them (e.g., because they are not fresh, or <del> one cannot be selected; see caching.negotiated.responses), it can use </del> <ins> one cannot be chosen; see caching.negotiated.responses), it can use </ins> the conditional request mechanism (preconditions) in the forwarded <del> request to give the next inbound server an opportunity to select a </del> <ins> request to give the next inbound server an opportunity to choose a </ins> valid stored response to use, updating the stored metadata in the process, or to replace the stored response(s) with a new response. This process is known as
receives a response, the cache SHOULD update or invalidate each of its stored <del> GET responses that could have been selected for that request (see </del> <ins> GET responses that could have been chosen for that request (see </ins> caching.negotiated.responses). <del> For each of the stored responses that could have been selected, if the stored response and HEAD response have matching values for any </del> <ins> For each of the stored responses that could have been chosen, if the stored response and HEAD response have matching values for any </ins> received validator fields ( and
The message/http media type can be used to enclose a single HTTP request or response message, provided that it obeys the MIME restrictions for all "message" types regarding line length and <del> encodings. </del> <ins> encodings.  Because of the line length limitations, field values within message/http are allowed to use line folding ( ), as described in line.folding, to convey the field value over multiple lines.  A recipient of message/http data MUST replace any obsolete line folding with one or more SP characters when the message is consumed. </ins> 10.2.
8859-1, supporting other charsets only through use of RFC2047 encoding.  Specifications for newly defined fields SHOULD limit their values to visible US-ASCII octets (VCHAR), SP, and HTAB.  A recipient <del> SHOULD treat other octets in field content (obs-text) as opaque data. </del> <ins> SHOULD treat other allowed octets in field content (i.e., </ins> <del> Field values containing CR or NUL characters are invalid and </del> <ins> ) as opaque data. Field values containing CR, LF, or NUL characters are invalid and </ins> dangerous, due to the varying ways that implementations might parse <del> and interpret those characters; a recipient of CR or NUL within a field value MUST either reject the message or replace each of those </del> <ins> and interpret those characters; a recipient of CR, LF, or NUL within a field value MUST either reject the message or replace each of those </ins> characters with SP before further processing or forwarding of that message.  Field values containing other CTL characters are also invalid; however, recipients MAY retain such characters for the sake <del> of robustness if they only appear within safe field value contexts (e.g., opaque data). </del> <ins> of robustness when they appear within a safe context (e.g., an application-specific quoted string that will not be processed by any downstream HTTP parser). </ins> Fields that only anticipate a single member as the field value are referred to as
forms, the meaning of a parameter value ought to be the same whether it was received as a token or a quoted string. <del> Historically, HTTP field values could be extended over multiple lines by preceding each extra line with at least one space or horizontal tab ( ).  This document assumes that any such obsolete line folding has been removed prior to interpreting the field value (e.g., as described in line.folding). </del> 5.6. 5.6.1.
8.8. <del> Validator fields convey metadata about the </del> <ins> Resource metadata is referred to as a if it can be used within a precondition (preconditions) to make a conditional request (conditional.requests).  Validator fields convey a current validator for the (representations). </ins> <del> (representations).  In responses to safe requests, validator fields describe the selected representation chosen by the origin server while handling the response.  Note that, depending on the status code </del> <ins> In responses to safe requests, validator fields describe the selected representation chosen by the origin server while handling the response.  Note that, depending on the method and status code </ins> semantics, the for a given response is not necessarily the same as the
For example, an ETag field in a response communicates the entity-tag of the newly created resource's <del> representation, so that it can be used in later conditional requests to prevent the "lost update" problem (preconditions). </del> <ins> representation, so that the entity-tag can be used as a validator in later conditional requests to prevent the "lost update" problem. </ins> This specification defines two forms of metadata that are commonly used to observe resource state and test for preconditions:
indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see heuristic.freshness). <ins> In 200 responses to GET or HEAD, an origin server SHOULD send any available validator fields (response.validator) for the , with both a strong entity-tag and a date being preferred. In 200 responses to state-changing methods, any validator fields (response.validator) sent in the response convey the current validators for the new representation formed as a result of successfully applying the request semantics.  Note that the PUT method (PUT) has additional requirements that might preclude sending such validators. </ins> 15.3.2. The
header field is received, by the target URI. The 201 response content typically describes and links to the <del> resource(s) created.  See response.validator for a discussion of the meaning and purpose of validator fields, such as and , in a 201 response. </del> <ins> resource(s) created.  Any validator fields (response.validator) sent in the response convey the current validators for a new representation created by the request.  Note that the PUT method (PUT) has additional requirements that might preclude sending such validators. </ins> 15.3.3.
deliberately crafted to bypass security filters along the request chain. <del> A client MUST send a Host header field in all HTTP/1.1 request messages.  If the target URI includes an authority component, then a client MUST send a field value for Host that is identical to that authority component, excluding any userinfo subcomponent and its "@" delimiter (http.uri).  If the authority component is missing or undefined for the target URI, then a client MUST send a Host header field with an empty field value. </del> <ins> A client MUST send a header field (field.host) in all HTTP/1.1 request messages.  If the target URI includes an authority component, then a client MUST send a field value for Host that is identical to that authority component, excluding any userinfo subcomponent and its "@" delimiter (http.uri). If the authority component is missing or undefined for the target URI, then a client MUST send a Host header field with an empty field value. </ins> A server MUST respond with a
9.8. <del> TLS provides a facility for secure connection closure through an exchange of closure alerts prior to closing a connection TLS13.  When a valid closure alert is received, an implementation can be assured that no further data will be received on that connection. </del> <ins> TLS uses an exchange of closure alerts prior to (non-error) connection closure to provide secure connection closure; see TLS13. When a valid closure alert is received, an implementation can be assured that no further data will be received on that connection. </ins> When an implementation knows that it has sent or received all the message data that it cares about, typically by detecting HTTP message
for proxy requests for "http" URIs, whereas other requests might require translation to and from entirely different application-level protocols.  Proxies are often used to group an organization's HTTP <del> requests through a common intermediary for the sake of security, annotation services, or shared caching.  Some proxies are designed to apply transformations to selected messages or content while they are being forwarded, as described in message.transformations. </del> <ins> requests through a common intermediary for the sake of security services, annotation services, or shared caching.  Some proxies are designed to apply transformations to selected messages or content while they are being forwarded, as described in message.transformations. </ins> A
status code indicates that the has been assigned a new permanent URI and any future references to <del> this resource ought to use one of the enclosed URIs.  Clients with link-editing capabilities ought to automatically re-link references to the target URI to one or more of the new references sent by the server, where possible. </del> <ins> this resource ought to use one of the enclosed URIs.  The server is suggesting that a user agent with link-editing capability can permanently replace references to the target URI with one of the new references sent by the server.  However, this suggestion is usually ignored unless the user agent is actively editing references (e.g., engaged in authoring content), the connection is secured, and the origin server is a trusted authority for the content being edited. </ins> The server SHOULD generate a
status code indicates that the has been assigned a new permanent URI and any future references to <del> this resource ought to use one of the enclosed URIs.  Clients with link editing capabilities ought to automatically re-link references to the target URI to one or more of the new references sent by the server, where possible. </del> <ins> this resource ought to use one of the enclosed URIs.  The server is suggesting that a user agent with link-editing capability can permanently replace references to the target URI with one of the new references sent by the server.  However, this suggestion is usually ignored unless the user agent is actively editing references (e.g., engaged in authoring content), the connection is secured, and the origin server is a trusted authority for the content being edited. </ins> The server SHOULD generate a
concerns related to HTTP semantics are about securing server-side applications (code behind the HTTP interface), securing user agent processing of content received via HTTP, or secure use of the <del> Internet in general, rather than security of the protocol.  Various organizations maintain topical information and links to current research on Web application security (e.g., OWASP). </del> <ins> Internet in general, rather than security of the protocol.  The security considerations for URIs, which are fundamental to HTTP operation, are discussed in URI.  Various organizations maintain topical information and links to current research on Web application security (e.g., OWASP). </ins> 17.1.
new registration procedure and moving HTTP field definitions into a separate registry. <del> Please create a new registry as outlined in fields.registry. </del> <ins> Please create a new registry as outlined in fields.registry, and let that registry link to this specification (e.g., "See section fields.extensibility of [this document] for information on defining and registering new HTTP Header Fields."). </ins> After creating the registry, all entries in the Permanent and Provisional Message Header Registries with the protocol 'http' are to
Please annotate the Permanent and Provisional Message Header registries to indicate that HTTP field name registrations have moved, <del> with an appropriate link. </del> <ins> with an appropriate link (such as: "HTTP field name registrations have been moved to <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-fields> per [this document].") and furthermore remove the existing note pointing to RFC7231 ("See section 8.3.1 of [RFC7231] for information on registering new HTTP Header Fields."). </ins> After that is complete, please update the new registry with the field names listed in the following table.
An Accept-Encoding header field with a field value that is empty implies that the user agent does not want any content coding in <del> response.  If an Accept-Encoding header field is present in a request and none of the available representations for the response have a content coding that is listed as acceptable, the origin server SHOULD send a response without any content coding. </del> <ins> response.  If a non-empty Accept-Encoding header field is present in a request and none of the available representations for the response have a content coding that is listed as acceptable, the origin server SHOULD send a response without any content coding unless the identity coding is indicated as unacceptable. </ins> When the Accept-Encoding header field is present in a response, it indicates what content codings the resource was willing to accept in
behaviours, and the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of RFC5234 to illustrate expected syntax in HTTP header fields.  In doing so, uses the VCHAR, SP, DIGIT, ALPHA and DQUOTE rules from <del> RFC5234.  It also includes the OWS and tchar rules from RFC7230. </del> <ins> RFC5234.  It also includes the tchar rule from RFC7230. </ins> When parsing from HTTP header fields, implementations MUST follow the algorithms, but MAY vary in implementation so as the behaviours are
Append the result of running Parsing an Item or Inner List (parse-item-or-list) with input_string to members. <del> Discard any leading OWS from input_string. </del> <ins> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. </ins> If input_string is empty, return members. Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not COMMA, fail parsing. <del> Discard any leading OWS from input_string. </del> <ins> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. </ins> If input_string is empty, there is a trailing comma; fail parsing.
Add name this_key with value member to dictionary. <del> Discard any leading OWS from input_string. </del> <ins> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. </ins> If input_string is empty, return dictionary. Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not COMMA, fail parsing. <del> Discard any leading OWS from input_string. </del> <ins> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. </ins> If input_string is empty, there is a trailing comma; fail parsing.
The ABNF for a byte sequence in HTTP headers is: <del> In HTTP headers, a byte sequence is delimited with asterisks and encoded using base64 (RFC4648, Section 4).  For example: </del> <ins> In HTTP headers, a byte sequence is delimited with colons and encoded using base64 (RFC4648, Section 4).  For example: </ins> Parsers MUST support byte sequences with at least 16384 octets after decoding.
Given an ASCII string as input_string, return a byte sequence. input_string is modified to remove the parsed value. <del> If the first character of input_string is not "*", fail parsing. </del> <ins> If the first character of input_string is not ":", fail parsing. </ins> Discard the first character of input_string. <del> If there is not a "*" character before the end of input_string, </del> <ins> If there is not a ":" character before the end of input_string, </ins> fail parsing. Let b64_content be the result of consuming content of input_string <del> up to but not including the first instance of the character "*". </del> <ins> up to but not including the first instance of the character ":". </ins> <del> Consume the "*" character at the beginning of input_string. </del> <ins> Consume the ":" character at the beginning of input_string. </ins> If b64_content contains a character not included in ALPHA, DIGIT, "+", "/" and "=", fail parsing.
Note that a header field definition cannot relax the requirements of this specification because doing so would preclude handling by generic software; they can only add additional constraints (for <del> example, on the numeric range of integers and floats, the format of </del> <ins> example, on the numeric range of integers and decimals, the format of </ins> strings and tokens, the types allowed in a dictionary's values, or the number of items in a list).  Likewise, header field definitions can only use Structured Headers for the entire header field value,