The Dutch military had not got much new equipment since before the First World War. During the 1920s, the Dutch government limited their defense budget because of an economic recession that lasted from 1920 until 1927. In that decade, only 1.5 million guilders per year was spent on equipment. Only in February 1936 was a bill passed creating a special 53.4 million guilder defence fund.
The lack of trained troops, a large professional organization, or good weapons made it hard to make the Dutch forces larger. There was just enough artillery for the larger units. Light infantry battalions were spread all over the country to delay enemy movement.
They had many pillboxes, about two thousand in number, but the lines were thin. Modern large fortresses like the Belgian fortress of Eben Emael did not exist. The only modern fortification was the one at Kornwerderzand.
Total Dutch forces were 48 regiments of infantry, as well as 22 infantry battalions for border defence. In comparison, Belgium had 22 full divisions and 30 divisions when smaller units were included.
After September 1939, the Dutch tried to improve the situation, but with little result. Germany delayed its deliveries of weapons. France did not want to sell weapons to an army that would not take its side. The Dutch could not get weapons from the other possible source, the Soviet Union, because the Dutch did not recognize their communist government.
Other countries had good armoured forces. The Dutch Army had two groups of armoured cars, each with a dozen vehicles; A single platoon of five Carden-Loyd Mark VI tankettes was all the armour they had.
The Dutch Artillery had 676 howitzers and field guns: 310 Krupp 75 mm field guns; 52 105 mm Bofors howitzers, the only really modern pieces; 144 obsolete Krupp 125 mm guns; 40 150 mm sFH13's; 72 Krupp 150 mm L/24 howitzers and 28 Vickers 152 mm L/15 howitzers.
As antitank-guns 386 Böhler 47 mm L/39s were available, but there were not enough. There were another three hundred old "6 Veld" (57 mm) and "8 Staal" (84 mm) field guns. Only eight of the 120 modern 105 mm pieces ordered from Germany had been delivered at the time of the invasion. Most artillery was horse-drawn.
The Dutch Infantry used about 2,200 7.92 mm Schwarzlose M.08 machine guns, and eight hundred Vickers machine guns. Many of these were in the pillboxes; each battalion had a heavy machine gun company of twelve.
The Dutch infantry squads had a light machine gun, the M.20 Lewis machine gun of which about eight thousand were available. This weapon often jammed and it was not good for attacks. Most Dutch infantry had the Dutch Mannlicher rifle. This weapon had been used for over 40 years, and it was out of date, but the Dutch military did not have the money to replace it.
There were but six 80 mm mortars for each regiment. This made it hard for the Dutch infantry to fight.
Despite the Netherlands having the company of Philips, one of Europe's largest producers of radio equipment, the Dutch army mostly used telephones. Only the Artillery had been given 225 radio sets.
After the German attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940, when the Germans used large numbers of airborne troops, the Dutch were worried about a similar attack.
To stop this type of attack, five infantry battalions were put at the main ports and airbases, such as The Hague airfield of Ypenburg and the Rotterdam airfield of Waalhaven. These were given AA-guns, two tankettes and twelve of the 24 operational armoured cars. The Dutch put 32 hospital ships throughout the country and fifteen trains to help make troop movements easier.
The Dutch air force had 155 aircraft: 28 Fokker G.1 twin-engine destroyers; 31 Fokker D.XXI and seven Fokker D.XVII fighters; ten twin-engined Fokker T.V, fifteen Fokker C.X and 35 Fokker C.V light bombers, twelve Douglas DB-8 dive bombers (used as fighters) and seventeen Koolhoven FK-51 reconnaissance aircraft. 74 of the 155 aircraft were biplanes. Of these aircraft 125 worked.
The air force school used three Fokker D.XXI, six Fokker D.XVII, a single Fokker G.I, a single Fokker T-V and seven Fokker C.V, along with several training airplanes. Another forty aircraft were the marine air service along with about an equal number of reserve and training craft.
There was a Dutch military aircraft industry, consisting of Fokker and Koolhoven. However, the Dutch military could not afford new planes.
The Dutch Army was poorly equipped. It was also poorly trained. There was little experience leading forces bigger than the battalion level. From 1932 until 1936, the Dutch Army did not hold summer field exercises to save money. Also, soldiers lacked many skills. Until 1938, those who were joined only served for 24 weeks, just enough to receive basic infantry training. That same year, service time was increased to eleven months. There was not many professional military staff. In 1940 there were only 1206 professional officers.
Most available time was spent constructing defences. During this period, munition shortages limited live fire training, and units were not organized. In May 1940, the Dutch Army was not ready for battle. It could not do a major attack or move around on the battlefield.
German generals and Hitler thought that the Dutch military was weak. They expected that Holland could be captured in about three to five days.
In the 17th century, the Dutch Republic had developed a defensive system called The Dutch Water Line. It could protect all major cities in the west by flooding part of the countryside. In the early 19th century this line was shifted to the east, beyond Utrecht. Later, fortresses were built.
This new position was called the New Holland Water Line. The line was given new pillboxes in 1940. The line was below sea level. This allowed it to be flooded with a few feet of water. This was too shallow for boats, but deep enough to turn the soil into mud. The area west of the New Holland Water Line was called Fortress Holland (Dutch: "Vesting Holland"; German: "Festung Holland"). The eastern side was covered by Lake IJssel and the southern side protected by three rivers. It was expected to hold out for a long period of time.
Some people thought the defences would protect the country for three months without any Allied help. Before the war the intention was to move to this position, and hope that Germany would only travel through the southern provinces on its way to Belgium and leave Holland undamaged.
In 1939, this attitude made it impossible to negotiate with the Allies about defence. Proposals by German diplomats that the Dutch government would accept a German advance into the country were rejected.
From September 1939 a more easterly Main Defence Line (MDL) was built. This second defensive position was dug on orders from the commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant-General Jan Joseph Godfried baron van Voorst tot Voorst. This line was extended by a southern part between the river Maas and the Belgian border. In the south the goal was to delay the Germans so that the French could advance.
Fourth and Second Army Corps were put at the Grebbe Line; Third Army Corps were put at the Peel-Raam Position with the Light Division behind it to cover its southern side. Brigade A and B were positioned between the Lower Rhine and the Maas. First Army Corps was a reserve in the Fortress Holland, the southern edge of which was protected by another ten battalions and the eastern side by six battalions. All these lines were protected by pillboxes.
In front of this Main Defence Line was the "IJssel-Maaslinie". It had pillboxes and fourteen "border battalions". Late in 1939 General Van Voorst tot Voorst wanted to use the rivers as a defence. He proposed a battle at the crossing sites near Arnhem and Gennep to force the German divisions to use a lot of their energy before they had reached the MDL.