The point here is that the observation and the theory were connected. The observation would not have been made but for the theory, and then the observation was convincing evidence in favour of the theory. The theory had passed a critical test. Since then, many more tests have been made of Einstein's ideas, and all have been consistent with his theory.
According to common sense, science begins with observations: all scientific knowledge come from the facts of experience. Theories are produced by observation of these facts and are then tested by prediction.
Here is a schema of this idea of science that some philosophers call a "naive" conception of science:
This naive conception is not held by many philosophers today. For one thing, it sees science as a one-way engine from 'facts' (what are they?) to theories and predictions. As shown by the Einstein example, where a theory led the other way round, the model does not fit much of science. In fact the relationship between the parts of a scientific philosophy are extremely complex.
According to Pierre Duhem and W.V. Quine, it is impossible to test a theory in isolation. For example, to test Newton's Law of Gravitation in our solar system, one needs information about the masses and positions of the Sun and all the planets. Famously, the failure to predict the orbit of Uranus in the 19th century did not lead to the rejection of Newton's Law. Instead, it lead to the rejection of the hypothesis that there are only seven planets in our solar system. The investigations that followed led to the discovery of an eighth planet, Neptune. If a test fails, something is wrong. But there is a problem in figuring out what that something is: a missing planet, badly calibrated test equipment, an unsuspected curvature of space, etc.
One consequence of the Duhem-Quine thesis is that any theory can be made compatible with any empirical observation by the addition of extra (ad hoc) hypotheses. This is why science uses Occam's Razor; hypotheses without justification are eliminated. This led Karl Popper, to reject naïve falsification in favor of 'survival of the fittest', or most falsifiable, of scientific theories. In Popper's view, any hypothesis that does not make testable predictions is simply not science. Such a hypothesis may be useful or valuable, but it cannot be said to be science. W.V. Quine thought that empirical data are not enough to make a judgment between theories. In this view, a theory can always be made to fit with the available empirical data. However, this does not necessarily imply that all theories are of equal value, because scientists often use guiding principles such as Occam's Razor.
One result of this view is that specialists in the philosophy of science stress the requirement that observations made for the purposes of science be restricted to "intersubjective" objects. That is, science is restricted to those areas where there is general agreement on the nature of the observations involved. It is comparatively easy to agree on observations of physical phenomena, harder to agree on observations of social or mental phenomena, and difficult in the extreme to reach agreement on matters of theology or ethics (and thus the latter remain outside the normal purview of science).
Is there any scientific method at all? Paul Feyerabend argued that no description of scientific method could possibly encompass all the approaches and methods used by scientists. Feyerabend objected to prescriptive scientific method on the grounds that any such method would stifle and cramp scientific progress. Feyerabend claimed, "the only principle that does not inhibit progress is: "anything goes"".
Thomas Kuhn denied that it is ever possible to isolate the hypothesis being tested from the influence of the theory in which the observations are grounded. He argued that observations always rely on a specific paradigm, and that it is not possible to evaluate competing paradigms independently. By "paradigm" he meant a consistent "portrait" of the world, one that involves no logical contradictions and that is consistent with observations made from the point of view of the paradigm. More than one such logically consistent construct can paint a usable likeness of the world, but there is no common ground from which to pit two against each other, theory against theory. Neither is a standard by which the other can be judged. Instead, the question is which "portrait" is judged by some set of people to promise the most useful in terms of scientific "puzzle solving".
For Kuhn, the choice of paradigm was sustained by, but not ultimately determined by, logical processes. The individual's choice between paradigms involves setting two or more "portraits" against the world and deciding which likeness is most promising. In the case of a general acceptance of one paradigm or another, Kuhn believed that it represented the consensus of the community of scientists. Acceptance or rejection of some paradigm is, he argued, a social process as much as a logical process. Kuhn's position, however, is not one of relativism. According to Kuhn, a paradigm shift occurs when a number of observational anomalies (problems) in the old paradigm have made the new paradigm more useful. That is, the choice of a new paradigm is based on observations, even though those observations are made against the background of the old paradigm. A new paradigm is chosen because it does a better job of solving scientific problems than the old one.
The fact that observation is embedded in theory does not mean observations are irrelevant to science. Scientific understanding derives from observation, but the acceptance of scientific statements is dependent on the related theoretical paradigm as well as on observation. Of course, further testing may resolve differences of opinion.
Volterra
Volterra is a town in the Tuscany region of Italy. It is in the province of Pisa. Volterra was once one of the 12 cities in Etruria. In the middle ages it was an independent city until it was conquered by the Florentines and then the Medicis. It has its own cathedral, and is built on top of an ancient volcanic hill.
The city was a Neolithic settlement and an important Etruscan center. It became a "municipium" (a type of Roman city) in the Roman Age. Volterra was attacked and controlled by Florence many times. When the Florentian Republic fell in 1530, Volterra came under the control of the Medici family. It later became part of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany.
The original Etruscan city walls remain in parts, and the remains of the Roman baths, aqueduct and amphitheatre (arena). Visitors to Volterra have to leave their cars outside the town walls, in car parks.
The Medici Villa di Spedaletto is located outside the city in direction of Lajatico. Also near the city, in the Valle Bona area, are excavations of Etruscan tombs.
Dynamic random-access memory
Dynamic random access memory is the most commonly used form of RAM.
DRAM is called dynamic (or active), because it must be refreshed all the time or it will lose the data which it is supposed to be storing. Because it loses data when power is removed, DRAM is called volatile. This word comes from the Latin adjective "volātilis", which means "flying, fleeting, transitory".
Refreshing DRAM means "reading" the data "from" the DRAM and directly "writing" them "back" to the DRAM.
DRAM is made up of millions of very small capacitors. Each of these capacitors has a transistor to let energy in and out. The capacitor slowly loses energy, and if the DRAM is not refreshed, in the end one or more of the capacitors will let so much energy out, that for example a 1 will become a 0, so data will be lost or corrupted. Almost all computers refresh their DRAM many times per second.