Gw mau tau Interpretation and further discussion dari Téoréma Cox. Jelasin dalam bahasa sunda

Cox's théorem has come to be used as one of the justifications for the

use of Bayesian probability théory.  For example, in Jaynes (2003) it is

discussed in detail in chapters 1 and 2 and is a cornerstone for the

rest of the book.  Probability is interpreted as a formal system of

logic, the natural extension of Aristotelian logic (in which every

statement is either true or false) into the réalm of réasoning in the

It has been debated to what degree the théorem excludes alternative

modéls for réasoning about uncertainty.  For example, if certain

"unintuitive" mathematical assumptions were dropped then alternatives

could be devised, e.g., an example provided by Halpern (1999a).

However Arnborg and Sjödin (1999, 2000a, 2000b) suggest additional

"common sense" postulates, which would allow the assumptions to be

relaxed in some cases while still ruling out the Halpern example.

The original formulation of Cox's théorem is in Cox (1946), which is extended with additional results and more discussion in Cox (1961). Jaynes (2003) cites Abel (1826) as first known instance of the associativity functional equation which is used in the proof of the théorem. Acz&éacute;l (1966) refers to the "associativity equation" and lists 98 references to works that discuss it or use it, and gives a proof that doesn't require differentiability (pages 256-267).