Saya mau tau Edward Daily: Yes, sir. dari Pembunuhan beramai-ramai di No Gun Ri. Jelaskan dalam bahasa melayu

The AP then re-interviewed Daily who, when confronted with army records that conflicted with his statements, admitted he could not have been present during the incident, and instead had heard of it second hand. Daily had been a mechanic during the war and did not join the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry until 1951. In January 2002 he pleaded guilty to defrauding the government by collecting over $400,000 in benefits over 15 years for combat-related trauma from combat he never saw. Daily served a 21-month prison sentence.

In follow-up stories, the AP reporters interviewed other servicemen including Lawrence Levine and James Crume, who worked at the headquarters of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. Both said they believed that orders to shoot civilian refugees came from headquarters, though neither said he'd seen or heard such orders. In interviews, some of the American soldiers at No Gun Ri said they had been ordered to fire on the refugees because their commanders believed that North Korean troops, wearing white so as to look like peasants, had infiltrated the refugee column and were shooting at Americans. Others quoted by the AP referred repeatedly to receiving fire from among the refugees.

The New York Times reporter Felicity Barringer reported that Herman Patterson, a rifleman in the 2nd Battalion, said: "Unfortunately, the incident took place. Numbers are not known exactly." She also reviewed the conflicting news accounts of the events that transpired at No Gun Ri, concluding that at that point (spring, 2000) "in the end, the crucial centerpiece of The A.P. report, the American soldiers killed at least 100 Korean civilians — possibly under direct orders — has been chipped but hardly shattered by the latest revelations." Mr. Hanley also says that arguments about on-the-scene orders overlook two general orders from top commanders. The First Cavalry Division headquarters on July 24 had issued an order saying: "No refugees to cross the front line. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children." in fact, the "General Order" was nor an order, just a radio log entry by a Major in a different regiment, unconnected to the 7th Cavalry, and not at No Gun Ri.

The most contested estimates concern the body count. A report of the Yeongdong County Office in South Korea, based upon self-reporting by present-day inhabitants, stated the total number of civilian casualties (injured, missing, or killed) to be 248. Some Korean victims have stated numbers in the hundreds. It's not clear what happened to the remains of those who were killed. Bateman speculates that between eight and 35 Koreans were killed at No Gun Ri, with two to three times that number wounded, due to mortar rounds and then a short bursts (30-90 seconds) of gunfire from the troops which occurred when the troops panicked and believed they were under fire themselves. Bateman wrote that declassified reconnaissance photos revealed no mass of bodies nor graves. Bateman, however, used only U.S. military reconnaissance and did not examine the village or interview any Koreans for his book. AP reporter Hanley has suggested that the dead were not in the open because they were stacked by local villagers beneath soil under parts of the bridge. Bateman contends that the soil required for burying hundreds of corpses even at a shallow level would have meant an excavation of soil so large (the remains alone for 300 small humans would be, roughly, 20 tons) that it would be visible in the photos. The AP contends that Korean witnesses testified to stacking bodies, but Bateman contends that the number of victims are conflated with other incidents in the vicinity during the war, and in the same timeframe. Citing the psychiatric studies, he speculates that none of the Koreans may believe they are lying, and he believes many if not most were fired upon by U.S. troops (he cites at least nine incidents that he found, and suspects dozens of other times where U.S. troops fired upon civilians in that period), just not all at the same time, and in the same place, at No Gun Ri.

As mentioned above, Edward Daily falsely corroborated the AP story and provided colorful descriptions of the incident, although he was not mentioned in the AP report until the 56th paragraph. During their defense of their Pulitzer story, the AP argued Daily was not central to their story, and merely was one witness among sixty they had interviewed. Bateman's book includes e-mails from Hanley which demonstrate that not only did the AP reporters refuse to recognize the flaws in Daily's testimony, but that Daily was more important than the AP suggested. Bateman believes that Daily, as a prominent member of the 7th Cavalry regimental association, had strong influence over other witnesses and that by virtue of his statements, the retired mechanic "contaminated" the views and recollections of other veterans. Additionally, it appears that Daily was central to guiding the AP to the American sources that the AP used, providing them with names, phone numbers, and addresses. Leaning upon the works of academic psychiatrist Elizabeth Loftus, Bateman described what he said was "the plasticity of memory" and susceptibility of some "memories" to outside suggestions from influential figures such as Daily, who had written two books on the history of the unit. Another AP witness inadvertently demonstrated Bateman's point in a front-page article in The New York Times. Veteran Eugene Hesselman denied the charge that Daily was not at No Gun Ri. He said, "I know that Daily was there. I know that. I know that." Bateman is skeptical of the recollections of Hesselman and Private First Class Delos Flint. Bateman claimed they were not present at No Gun Ri after he found records that they had been medically evacuated from the area on July 24th, one day before the events in question. Bateman said the AP did not quote any military men at No Gun Ri who heard an order to fire at civilians, the closest being those who "believed" that there "must have" been an order (Levine and Crume).

Bateman says compelling refugees to halt their advance by firing on them is "the dumbest possible action that could have been taken." Some Korean witnesses describe being strafed and bombed as they walked along the railway. Pictures taken on August 6, 1950, reveal strafing damage. Hanley, the AP reporter, argues that the U.S. forces called in strikes. Bateman argues that this was impossible because of the incompatibility between army and air force radios (AM vs. FM) and the fact that the same unit could not stop a U.S. Air Force strafing of their own position the very next day due to the lack of such radios. Bateman speculates that witnesses may have confused the mortars for bombs, and that the strafing shown in the photographs could have been from that period, or could have been from a later period.

U.S. Army Inspector General report of 2001

Following the release of the AP account of No Gun Ri, the U.S. and the R.O.K. began independent parallel investigations.  At the direction of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army instructed the Inspector General of the Army to research and report on the No Gun Ri incident.  In January 2001 the Inspector General released Report on the No Gun Ri Review.

The primary judgments of the review were:

The evacuation of South Koreans to the site of the No Gun Ri incident was not at the direction of 7th Cavalry U.S. soldiers, though U.S. involvement cannot be ruled out

The strafing of refugees in the No Gun Ri vicinity appears to have occurred either July 26 or July 27, 1950; however, the air strikes were the result of misidentification and not preplanned attacks on civilians

There were an undetermined number of civilians killed in the area around No Gun Ri; not all the killings were concentrated at the double rail bridge

The deaths and injury of civilians were inherent to war and not a deliberate killing

Despite some conflicting evidence, U.S. commanders did not issue oral or written orders to shoot civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri

The following is a detailed list of the review's findings:

U.S. forces were inadequately trained to deal with mass refugees, an inadequacy that was causing problems on the battlefield.

Official policy emphasized the role of South Korean authorities in dealing with refugees.

Policies enacted regarding refugees were that they were prohibited from crossing battle lines (positions where there is contact or expectation of contact with the enemy) as well as being subject to a night curfew.

The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment withdrew from a position east of Yongdong to Nogeun-ri, believing they were under attack; the withdraw was highly disorganized.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment showed up in the afternoon of the 26th to the east of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, relieving the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment.

During July 27 to 29, the forces believed they were under enemy attack.

Official policy discouraged large evacuations so as not to clog roads and supply lines; it is unknown why so many were evacuated.

U.S. forces were not responsible for the large evacuations in the vicinity; they may have evacuated Imgae-ri but if so they were not 7th Cavalry Regiment soldiers.

There were no airstrikes in the afternoon of July 26 in the vicinity of Nogeun-ri. The only airstrikes during this period were a friendly fire incident on July 27 which caused the cavalry commander to request a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) and a strike on NKPA forces on July 28 near the 1st Battalion.

Only TACPs had the ability to communicate with aircraft; there were none in the vicinity during the time period of July 26 to 29.

No USAF veterans interviewed participated in the strafing of civilians in the vicinity of Nogeun-ri in late July.

The Navy found no evidence of its aircraft in the vicinity except on July 28, when it "attacked a railroad tunnel occupied by enemy troops and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yongdong with bombs and machine guns."

Images dated August 6 and September 19 show no signs of bombing but, "some patterns near the tracks approximately 350 yards from the double railroad overpass show "an imagery signature of probable strafing"", the same location identified by witnesses as being where they were strafed.

No evidence of an air strike on July 26 but number of eyewitnesses shows it can not be precluded.

Separate strikes on July 27 and 28 (on friendly and enemy targets, respectively) could have caused civilian casualties.

A strike could have occurred in this period which killed civilians but it did not target them.

Veterans heard various types of fire near unidentified individuals in civilian clothing outside of the tunnels and bridges in the vicinity; some reported seeing or receiving hostile fire from civilians; other civilians had shots fired near them to prevent them from moving.

"Although the U.S. Review Team cannot determine what happened near Nogeun-ri with certainty, it is clear, based upon all available evidence, that an unknown number of Korean civilians were killed or injured by the effects of small-arms fire, artillery and mortar fire, and strafing that preceded or coincided with the NKPA's advance and the withdrawal of U.S. forces in the vicinity of Nogeun-ri during the last week of July 1950. These Korean deaths and injuries occurred at different locations in the vicinity of Nogeun-ri and were not concentrated exclusively at the double railroad overpass."

Estimates of the time length of fire range from a few minutes to four days.

U.S. commanders did not issue orders to fire on civilians in Nogeun-ri during July 25-29.

Pilots were not ordered to kill civilians in the vicinity of Nogeun-ri.

Interviewed veterans said deadly force was not authorized against civilians who posed no threat, and they were not given orders to shoot and kill civilians.

Some veterans believed they had the ability to use deadly force if civilians did not halt from passing their position.

Some veterans believed there was an order to fire on civilians because the weapons used may have hit civilians; they did not hear any such order and do not know who would have given it or when; other veterans maintain there was no such order.

There was a reference to firing upon civilians who refused to stop in an army log of the 8th Cavalry Regiment; this regiment was not in the vicinity during the time period and there is nothing suggesting this message was transmitted to other regiments.

The number of casualties is unascertainable by witnesses; the 248 figure is unverified.