Kamu bisa jelasin ke aku soal Pilihan publik?

Pilihan publik, atau teori pilihan publik, adalah "penggunaan alat ekonomi untuk menangani masalah tradisional dalam ilmu politik". Isinya meliputi kajian perilaku politik. Dalam ilmu politik, itu adalah bagian dari teori politik positif yang mempelajari kepentingan diri agen (pemilih, politisi, birokrat) dan interaksi mereka, yang dapat diwakili dalam sejumlah cara – menggunakan (misalnya) pemaksimalan utilitas terkendala standar, teori permainan, atau teori keputusan. Ini adalah asal dan landasan intelektual kerja kontemporer dalam ekonomi politik.

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_ (1968). The Demand and Supply of Public Goods. Rand McNally.

_ (1986). "The Constitution of Economic Policy, Nobel Prize lecture. Republished in 1987,  American Economic Review, 77(3), pp.  243–250.

_ (2003). "Public Choice: The Origins and Development of a Research Program," Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University, Fairfax: Virginia.

_, and Gordon Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Buchanan, James M. and Richard A. Musgrave (1999). Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State, MIT Press. Description and scrollable preview links.

Downs, Anthony. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Cambridge: York: Cambridge University Press.

Hansjürgens, Bernd – The influence of Knut Wicksell on Richard Musgrave and James Buchanan

Holcombe, R. G. (1989). "The Median Voter Model in Public Choice Theory", Public Choice 61, 115–125

McKelvey, R. D. (1976). "Intransitivities in Multi Dimensional Voting Models and some Implications for Agenda Control", Journal of Economic Theory 12(3) 472–482

MacKenzie, D. W. (2008). The Use of Knowledge about Society. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.

_ (2008). Politics and Knowledge: Expectations formation in Democracy. Working paper, Presented at the Southern Economics Association Conference in 2005.

Mueller, Dennis C. (1976). "Public Choice: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, 14(2), pp. 395–433.

_ (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Description and preview.

Niskanen, William A. (1987). "Bureaucracy." In Charles K. Rowley, ed. Democracy and Public Choice. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Olson, Mancur, Jr. (1965, 2nd ed., 1971). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Description and chapter-previews links, pp.  ix– x.

Ostrom, Elinor (1990). Governing the Commons The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. Description and preview links. .

_ (2010). "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," American Economic Review, 100(3), pp. 641–672.

Ostrom, Vincent (1986). The Theory of the Compound Republic. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. Second edition.

Palda, Filip (2016). A Better Kind of Violence: The Chicago School of Political Economy, Public Choice, and The Quest for an Ultimate Theory of Power. Cooper-Wolfling Press.

Riker, William H. (1962). The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Romer, T. & Rosenthal, H. (1979). "The Elusive Median Voter", Journal of Public Economics 12(2) 143–170

Rowley, Charles K., and Friedrich Schneider, ed. (2004). The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2 v. Springer. Description, v. 1, chapter abstract and preview  links, and review

_ and _, eds. (2008). Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, Springer. Description and chapter-preview links.

_ and Laura Razzolini, eds. (2001). The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar,  Description.

Wicksell, Knut ([1896] 1958). "A New Principle of Just Taxation," trans. J.M. Buchanan, in Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, ed., Classics in the Theory of Public Finance'',  Palgrave Macmillan.