In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: for these terms in the specifications or prosecution histories of the ’403-S or ’838 patents. Furthermore, the fact that the inventors removed the term “comprising” from Claim 1 of the ’403-S patent does not change the plain meaning of the term “composition,” which remains in the final version of the claim. Moreover, if the court were to adopt the construction of the ’403-S claims put forth by Glaxo, Claim 1 would contradict Claim 1 of the ’838 patent, which retains the term “comprising” and claims the process for producing the compositions described in ’403-S patent. Such a construction would be inconsistent. In light of these findings, the court concludes that the terms “comprising” and “composition” must be construed according to their plain meanings. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (<HOLDING>). As a result, the phrases “immunoglobulin 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that words in claims are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning unless the patentee clearly sets forth a different in the specification or file history (B) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (C) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning (D) recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning (E) holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning

A: holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning
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Q: by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir.1997). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quotation omitted). We may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.1991). Plaintiff argues that (1) the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ ignored medical evidence of her disability; (2) the ALJ failed to analyze plaintiffs pain properly under Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 162-64 (10th Cir.19 95) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, plaintiff has not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding aljs listing of factors he considered was inadequate when court was left to speculate what specific evidence led the alj to his conclusion (B) holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion (C) holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion and thus the aljs unexplained conclusion was beyond meaningful review (D) holding the record must demonstrate that the alj considered all of the evidence and the alj must discuss  the evidence supporting his decision  the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon and significantly probative evidence he rejects (E) holding an aljs failure to adequately explain the weight given to treating sources opinions not harmless because the aljs reasoning was not sufficiently specific to make clear that the alj recognized and evaluated the treating relationships

A: holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion
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Q: court by any party ... (iii) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment ... the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. Carr concedes that Osteopathic’s motion for reconsideration was really a Rule 59(e) motion to amend judgment. Consequently, the date from which the clock started ticking under Rule 4(a)(4) was April 1, 1993. Osteopathic filed its notice of appeal on April 22, 1993, well within 30 days of the district court's April 1 denial of Osteopathic's motion for reconsideration. 6 . The only cases Carr cites in support of his position—-Funkhouser v. City of Newark, 312 F.2d 383, 384 (3d Cir.1962) and District 65, Distributive, Processing & Off Calif., 779 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 10 . In analyzing Amoco's petition for writ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver (B) holding remand on the basis of partys waiver of right to remove not within  1447c (C) holding that partys failure to develop issue in argument section constitutes waiver of issue (D) holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error (E) holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver

A:
holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver
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