In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: interests that a lawful permanent resident or even an illegal entrant residing more than two weeks may have developed.... Diaz Rodriguez has not shown that he has been lawfully admitted, so the due process rights of a lawfully admitted citizen are not implicated here.”). Accordingly, Petitioner has no constitutional due process rights in relation to her admission beyond that authorized by Congress. The restricted habeas review provisions set forth in Section 1252 adequately protect Petitioner’s rights because she has a meaningful review of the cause for her exclusion and of the Executive’s power to exclude her. The writ therefore has not been suspended and the Court lacks jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s claims. See Garcia de Rincon, 539 F.3d at 1140-41; Lorenzo, 508 F.3d at 1281 (<HOLDING>); Vaupel, 244 Fed.Appx. at 895 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1252e2 clearly does not permit court to review whether expedited removal statute applies in first place (B) holding that court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review aliens habeas claims seeking review of expedited removal order including whether expedited removal statute was lawfully applied to alien and whether expedited removal procedures violated his right to due process because language of section 1252e5 clearly precludes review in habeas proceedings of whether alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal (C) holding that strict limitations set forth in section 1252e preclude judicial review of any constitutional or statutory claims related to the underlying expedited removal order (D) holding that  1252a2a barred review of petitioners claims including asapplied due process challenges to expedited removal order (E) holding prior to enactment of section 1326d that a person charged with illegal reentry has a constitutional right to collaterally attack the underlying removal order when a due process violation in a removal proceeding amounts to a complete deprivation of judicial review
[EX A]: holding that section 1252e2 clearly does not permit court to review whether expedited removal statute applies in first place

[EX Q]: how much more of a connection to interstate commerce, if any, must be shown under a substantial rather than a de minimis standard. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 859-60 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 2455 (suggesting in a pre-Lopez opinion that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress could only reach criminal activity “ ‘substantially affecting interstate commerce.’ ”). It is clear, however, that the direct interstate connection required by Instruction 10 is much more substantial than the indirect interstate connection articulated by the government and disapproved of by the Court in Lopez. In Lopez, the connections articulated by the government between the possession of a firearm in a local school zone and interstate commerce were, to say the least, attenuated. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (<HOLDING>); see also Hicks, 106 F.3d at 189 (describing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference (B) holding that adverse inference rule is permissive (C) recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference (D) holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference (E) recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference
[EX A]: holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference

[EX Q]: The Washington Supreme Court upheld its similar statute against a special legislation challenge in Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P. 2d 108 (1972). The court found persuasive the fact that “the scope of the Washington provision is not limited as to vocation. The subject statute bars actions against any person having constructed, altered or repaired any improvement upon real property.” Id. at 532, 503 P. 2d at 111 (emphasis original) ; see also Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N. J. 190, 293 A. 2d 662 (1972). We cannot conclude that the 1965 Act is a special law coming within the constitutional proscription. See Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, supra; contra, Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N. E. 2d 588 (1967) (<HOLDING>). II Similarly, we find no violation of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statute authorizing creation of community councils in certain counties was unconstitutional special law (B) holding there was no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor of equipment lease although payments were made to illinois bank the guaranty was accepted in illinois and it provided that it would be gov erned by illinois law (C) holding  122604a companion legislation to  122603 unconstitutional (D) holding the illinois statute unconstitutional as violating a special legislation proscription (E) holding that illinois public policy did not require the application of illinois law to an illinois accident involving only indiana residents insured in indiana
[EX A]:
holding statute authorizing creation of community councils in certain counties was unconstitutional special law