TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: in some respect. To me, such an approach invites municipal officials to substitute rank speculation and conjectural claptrap for genuine engineering expertise and constitutes an open invitation for local planners to engage in incompetent fear-mongering about perceived or imagined development risks, no matter how unfounded, unlikely, or controllable such risks may be. Such an open-textured standard for upholding the denial of subdivision applications will all too easily be converted into an impermeable cloak to cover confiscatory regulatory takings, official pandering to neighbors’ antidevelopment biases, political shenanigans, and other such local governmental capriciousness of the sort that we recently condemned in L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202 (R.I.1997) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the mere fact that the municipality 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (B) holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states (C) holding that 42 usc  1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations (D) holding that the petitioner property owners had established 42 usc  1983 substantive and procedural dueprocess violations against town officials who arbitrarily denied the plaintiffs request for subdivision approval (E) holding that plaintiffs had claim under 42 usc  1983 against state where state had created an intermediate care facility but placed plaintiffs on waiting list

SOLUTION: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983

PROBLEM: made in open court. It also serves as a stipulation that no proof by the prosecution need b[e] advanced .... It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending controversy.’ ” Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n. 4, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (quoting Woodard v. State, 42 Ala.App. 552, 171 So.2d 462, 469 (1965)). See also Dingier v. State, 408 So.2d 530, 531 (Ala.1981) (same). In the case at hand, Clark entered into a “good behavior” stipulation that the State could prove a prima facie case of guilt. When Clark failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, he was adjudicated guilty based on his stipulation. During a hearing on Clark’s motion for a new trial, the prosecutor described a “goo (Ala.Crim.App.1999), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Because Clark was adjudicated guilty based 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed (B) holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea (C) holding that court must decide case on basis of facts admitted unaffected by stipulation made by counsel (D) holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional (E) holding that a defendants strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendants stipulation did not establish guilt

SOLUTION: holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed

PROBLEM: Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(a). But neither the Seventh Amendment, nor any other provision of the Constitution, preserves any right to a bench trial. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959). Plaintiff initially sought compensatory damages in an amount to be determined by the court, which triggered Principal Summa’s Seventh Amendment rights. See U.S. Const, amend. VII. But the right to a jury trial does not depend only on the initial pleadings. See Hildebrand, 607 F.2d at 709-10. When subsequent events leave only equitable issues to be resolved, the right to a jury trial does not exist and is not preserved by the Seventh Amendment or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38. See id.; see also Wall v. Trust Co. of Ga., 946 F.2d 805, 809 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). So, the dismissal of Principal Summa’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well (B) holding that no right to a jury trial existed after one of the plaintiffs claims was dismissed leaving only an equitable claim (C) holding one example of a claim is a right to an equitable remedy that can be satisfied by an alternative right to payment (D) recognizing that the determination is an equitable one (E) holding that back pay was an integral part of title vips equitable remedies and that therefore no right to jury trial existed

SOLUTION:
holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well