In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
--------
Question: of limitations have been held as not capable of waiver or subject to an estoppel, whether pled or not.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The dissenting opinion cites several re-, cent Supreme Court decisions in support of the proposition that the statute of limitations set forth at section 2501 is not jurisdictional, including Day v. McDonough, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006), Eberhart v. United States, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam), Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 124 S.Ct. 1856, 158 L.Ed.2d 674 (2004), and Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). None of the foregoing decisions address section 2501. Day, 126 S.Ct. at 1681 (<HOLDING>); Arbaugh, 126 S.Ct. at 1245 (addressing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 is not jurisdictional (B) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act aedpa begins to run on the date a prisoner dismisses his direct appeal because his conviction is then final (C) holding that aedpas oneyear period of limitations does not support a delay of filing of habeas petition by capital defendant (D) holding that in a designation of a foreign terrorist organization under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 aedpa the governments use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organizations due process rights (E) holding that neither the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 nor the illegal immigration reform act of 1996 repealed the district courts jurisdiction to review aliens habeas petitions

Answer: (A)


Question: (second factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the [private] insurer and the insured”). Finally, despite the MSP provision that the United States can pursue "any entity” for reimbursement, see id. (third factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry''), the MSP provision limits reimbursement to recoveries from "primary plans,” whose definition lists only entities which are clearly "within” the insurance industry. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) ("primary plan" means “a group health plan or large group health plan, ... a workmen's compensation law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan ... or no-fault insurance”); cf. Kachanis, 844 F.Supp. 877 (D.R.I.1994) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Finally, the Fund raises a puzzling 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  1012 applicable to feca provision allowing united states to recover from any third party (B) holding that the secretary of the interior breached the united states duty of loyalty despite the absence of any applicable treaty or statutory provision (C) holding that a states entitlement to indemnification from a third party does not vitiate the states sovereign immunity against a money judgment (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding that an ancillary forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 usc  853n is a civil action for the purpose of allowing a third party to recover attorneys fees

Answer: (A)


Question: on a motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard. Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir.1999) (stating that whether to hold evidentiary hearing on admissibility of contested evidence “rests in the sound discretion of the district court.’’). 2 . Other Courts of Appeals likewise require a defendant to raise significant factual disputes in order to receive a pretrial evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir.2000) (stating “An eviden-tiary hearing on a motion to suppress need be held only when the moving papers allege facts with sufficient definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable the trial court to conclude that contested issues of fact exist.”); United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1408-1409 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when material facts that affect the resolution of a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search are in conflict the appropriate way to resolve the conflict is by holding an evidentiary hearing after which the district court will be in a position to make findings (B) holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required if there are no factual issues in dispute (C) holding that a defendant must present sufficiently detailed and controverted factual allegations in order to receive an evidentiary hearing (D) holding that defendant bears the burden of showing there are material facts in dispute and an evidentiary hearing is only required when the motion to suppress raises factual allegations that are sufficiently definite specific detailed and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in issue (E) holding plenary hearings are required when there are contested issues of material fact on the basis of conflicting affidavits

Answer:
(D)