In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: Dubé, who held a hearing on the summary judgment motions on December 11, 2003. On January 14, 2004, Judge Dubé issued his R & R, which recommended that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and that Defendant’s Motion be denied, thereby reversing the decision of the Appeals Council. Having received objections from both parties, the R & R is now ripe for consideration by this Court. Analysis The issues appealed from the Appeals Council are purely questions of law. Although a more restrictive standard of review applies if an appeal of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is based on that decision’s factual findings, no presumption of validity attaches to the Commissioner’s conclusions of law. See Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore; the Court must conduct its own 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the district court was not required to discuss each of the factors on the record a decision to dismiss stands a better chance on appeal if the appellate court has the benefit of the district courts reasoning (B) holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted (C) holding the courts scope of review is  limited to determining whether the commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the commissioners findings of fact  (D) recognizing that when reviewing for clear error we usually must reverse if the district court applied incorrect legal standards to reach its findings (E) holding the district court can reverse the commissioners decision based on her failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: not impliedly preempt the field of law related to the price, route, and service of motor carriers of property, and does not impliedly preempt by conflict her state-law claims. As stated above, in Kelley the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that § 14501(c) preempts the field of law regarding price, route, and service of motor carriers of property. See Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1509-10 (“Here, Congress has clearly chosen ... to preempt the entire field of price, service, and route regulation of intrastate motor carrier activities.”). Furthermore, other federal courts have held that § 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts state tort claims relating to price, route, or service against motor carriers of property. See, e.g., Data Mfg., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 557 F.3d 849 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs statelaw claims alleging common law misrepresentation and statutory misrepresentation under the texas insurance code art 2121 not preempted because they were not dependent on  the right to recover benefits under the erisa plan (B) holding fraudulent representations to the fda could not sustain statelaw claims (C) holding that  14501c1 preempted statelaw claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and money had and received related to billing practices of motor carrier of property (D) holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient (E) holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: his failure to appear personally at the hearing. This distinguishes this case from cases where a party never appears in an action, and a default judgment is granted at trial. See, e.g., Ladson v. BPM Corp., 2004 S.D. 74, ¶¶ 22-25, 681 N.W.2d 863, 869 (upholding a default judgment granted to the plaintiff at trial where the defendant corporation never answered the complaint or otherwise appeared in the action by counsel as required by law and as repeatedly instructed by the circuit court). 6 . Accord Bloch v. Bentfield, 1 Ariz.App. 412, 403 P.2d 559, 564 (1965) ("When a case is regularly called for trial, the trial may proceed although one party does not appear and this is not a hearing as by default.”); Heidary v. Yadollahi, 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 695, 699 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Ohio Valley Radiology Assocs., Inc. v. Ohio 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that despite failure to appear for trial default could not be entered without notice to defendant (B) holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact (C) holding that default judgment was not warranted where the defendant answered late but answered (D) holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment (E) holding 1 that where a defendant who previously answered does not appear for trial a plaintiffs only remedy is to make a motion with the court to continue with that trial 2 that entry of default is not authorized and 3 that the hearing held under such circumstances is uncontested as distinguished from a default hearing 1 quoting warden v lamb 98 calapp 738 277 p 867 868 1929


Output: (E)