TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: Parker, we vacate the sentence and remand for resen-tencing. Nearly a month before trial, Parker opted to waive his right to counsel and elected to represent himself. At that time, the trial court conducted a Faretta inquiry and allowed Parker to represent himself throughout the trial. However, when the jury returned with the guilty verdict, the trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing without renewing the offer of counsel. In doing so, the trial court erred. “Once a defendant waives the right to counsel in a criminal case, the court must renew the offer of counsel at each subsequent critical stage of the proceedings, one of which is sentencing.” Serrano v. State, 113 So.3d 895, 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see also Ingraham v. State, 32 So.3d 761, 768-69 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, vacate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage (B) holding postindictment lineup is critical stage of trial at which defendant is entitled to presence of counsel (C) holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel (D) recognizing that brooks protects against denial of counsel at a critical stage of his trial (E) holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 142 (1st Cir.2006). Moreover, the broad scope of the Copyright Act definitions may be of limited assistance as the court applies a “common sense” analysis of whether a particular unfinished work may be covered by VARA. One of the co-sponsors of VARA observed that “we have gone to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the works of art that will be covered.... The definition is not synonymous with any other definition in the Copyright Act....” H.R.Rep. No. 101-514, at 11. In Lilley v. Stout, 384 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C.2005), the district judge noted that “VARA established a new and distinct genus of art: ‘works of visual art,’ which differs in many respects from the pre-existing categories in Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act.” Id. at 86 (<HOLDING>). While this overview leaves much that is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a set of photographs taken to be used as studies for a painting did not qualify for vara protection (B) holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence (C) holding negligence on the part of the attorney does not qualify for such relief (D) holding that use of a pretext phone call did not qualify for protection because the technique is generally known to the public (E) holding that purely reputational damage does not qualify for dueprocess protection

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: sentences for bank robbery consecutively or concurrent ly. However, the statute does not permit the court to decide whether any future sentence would be consecutive or concurrent to those five sentences. Rather, when sentences are imposed at different times, § 3584(a) only authorizes a court to determine whether a sentence should be consecutive or concurrent if the defendant is “already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (emphasis added). Another sentence must exist at the time a district court imposes its sentence; a court cannot impose its sentence consecutively to a sentence that does not yet exist. The better-reasoned cases from our sister circuits have reached the same conclusion. See Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Quintero, 157 F.3d 1038, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a term of imprisonment begins at the time a prisoner is sentenced (B) holding that   3584a allows the district judge to specify the sequence of service of terms of imprisonment only when sentences are imposed at the same time or the other sentence is an undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant is already subject  (C) holding that  5g13c applied because the defendants case involved multiple undischarged terms of imprisonment only one of which was used to enhance his instant sentence (D) holding that the term of imprisonment for purposes of application note 5 is the sentence imposed by the state court and that it shall not be decreased to reflect a suspension of any part of the sentence (E) holding that the concurrent sentencing requirement of  5g13b  is only triggered when there is an undischarged term of imprisonment at the time of sentencing

SOLUTION:
(B)