In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: the justifiable use of deadly force to specific circumstances, such as when the actor “reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another.” Id. § 776.012(1). As discussed at length above, Lieutenant Weippert’s conduct was objectively reasonable and he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Penley posed a threat of great bodily harm to the lieutenant and others. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Penleys, the evidence reveals no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lieutenant Weippert’s use of force was reasonably necessary. Under Florida law, Lieutenant Weippert had no duty to retreat and his use of force was justifiable. See State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 337-38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle (B) holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded (C) holding that after being chased by a carfull of angry men it would have been reasonable for mr rivera a private citizen to believe that deadly force was necessary even if only a single unarmed pursuer had approached his nowstopped car because the pursuer and his friends had already threatened riveras life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a highspeed chase and throwing deadly missiles namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna (D) holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure (E) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car

A: holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle
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Q: by assenting to forfeiture provisions included in plea agreements. In United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir.1999), a criminal defendant entered into a plea bargain under which he “agree[d] to forfeit and otherwise waive any ownership right he might possess in all items seized during the investigation of any of the acts alleged.” The defendant then filed a motion for the return of his property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), and the district court denied the motion. Id. We affirmed the district court’s decision, observing that “[t]he district court was entirely correct in denying Le’s motion because Le ... relinquished any ownership rights he may have had in the property.” Id. at 1278. See also United States v. Grover, 119 F.3d 850, 852 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). On appeal Mr. Montoya suggests that he should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that a rule 41e claimant relinquished any possessory claim he had to the property when he signed a forfeiture agreement at the time he entered into a plea bargain (C) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (D) holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present (E) holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel

A: holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea
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Q: investigation. Disclosure of this information, Durney declares, “could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety” of such persons, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F), and “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” see id. § 552(b)(7)(C), since release of such information would expose them to the risk of physical harm, harassment, and identity theft. Durney Decl. ¶ the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Government on its Exemption 7(A) claim and this court issued its order in August’s first appeal. In light of the substantiation of the important third-party interests at stake, it seems quite likely that the Government’s failure to invoke Exemptions 7(C ted States Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 903-04 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Schanen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court erred in refusing to grant the secret services fedrcivp 60b motion to rehear arguments about the applicability of foia exemptions 7c and 7d in light of the secret services belatedly proffered proof of a promise of confidentiality noting that the case was not the ordinary one since it involves not only the interests of the secret service but that of a third party whose identity and information are expressly protected by foia (B) holding that disclosure of trade secret without protection of express confidentiality agreement was not fatal to trade secret protection where disclosure occurred during sale negotiation (C) holding that it was impossible for the court to say that the information met the definition of a trade secret because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the information derived economic value from an element of secrecy that is known only to plaintiff and its employees (D) holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents (E) holding that the burden of establishing the true existence of a trade secret and its value to the owner remains on the claimant who must submit evidence relating to the six factors that texas law considers for trade secret status

A:
holding that disclosure of trade secret without protection of express confidentiality agreement was not fatal to trade secret protection where disclosure occurred during sale negotiation
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