TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: CURIAM. Appellant, Roberto Trejo, was indicted for racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering. His predicate offenses included attempted first degree murder, shooting into a building, and three armed robberies with a firearm. He was also charged on substantive counts for the same five offenses. Trejo was acquitted on the racketeering, conspiracy, and shooting into a building charges, but convicted of attempted second degree murder with a firearm and the three armed robberies. We affirm on all issues raised in this appeal, including his fifty-year sentence. The United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) does not apply to appellant’s sentence. See Guzman v. State, 110 So.3d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>). As we did in Guzman, we certify conflict with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham (B) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (C) holding that the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile does not violate the holding of roper (D) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (E) holding that double jeopardy clause does not prohibit imposition of death sentence in alabama despite life sentence in georgia in murdertrial arising from same homicide

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: customs and practices of the trade could conclude that WQIS’s liability under Coverage C ceased once the Coverage A limit was reached. See Morgan Stanley, 225 F.3d at 275 (describing when a contract provision is ambiguous). First, the phrase “liabilities covered” in the Coverage C insuring provision could reasonably be read to refer only to liabilities that WQIS was required to cover under Coverage A, that is, up to $5 million per vessel. Under this interpretation, any liability above $5 million was not “covered,” and - therefore defense costs incurred with respect to liabilities above $5 million did not arise from “liabilities covered.” See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on other grounds by 85 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable person could conclude that once 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due (B) holding that allied may not be held liable for portion of attorneys fees paid pretender of defense due to policy provision precluding reimbursement for defense costs voluntarily incurred (C) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself (D) holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the  insurance policy (E) holding where an insurance policy indemnifies defense costs paid as a result of occurrences covered that the insurer need only reimburse defense costs for claims that are established to be covered through judgment and settlement and not for claims only potentially falling within the policys coverage

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: shelter it provides. “A vast majority of state rules regarding qualified privilege include a requirement of ‘good faith.’ ” A.G. Harmon, Defamation in Good Faith: An Argument for Restating the Defense of Qualified Privilege, 16 Barry L.Rev. 27, 30 n. 16 (2011). Modern iterations of the privilege by Michigan appellate courts make clear that a showing of “good faith” is essential to a defendant’s ability to invoke the privilege: “The elements of a qualified privilege are (1) good faith, (2) an interest to be upheld, (3) a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, (4) a proper occasion, and (5) publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only.” Prysak, 193 Mich.App. at 14-15, 483 N.W.2d at 636 (emphasis added) (citing Bufalino v. Maxon B . App. 590, 174 N.W.2d 875 (1970) (<HOLDING>); see also Haddad v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 526 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant was not entitled to any qualified privilege for false accusations of theft given under the guise of employment references despite earlier holdings by michigan courts that had extended the privilege to statements of reference from a prior to a prospective employer (B) holding that defendant could be charged for making false statements to treasury officials under the tax evasion statute or the statute prohibiting false statements to government officials (C) holding that the doctrine of commonlaw privilege that grants immunity to witnesses in quasijudicial proceedings does not extend to disciplinary proceedings against a state employee who makes false statements in the course of an official investigation (D) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (E) holding both that a defendants prior disciplinary history was properly precluded because it did not involve an element of deceit or falsification and that defendants earlier allegedly false statements could not be admitted because proving their falsehood would have required the introduction of extrinsic evidence showing the statements made to be false

SOLUTION:
(A)