In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
to preserve evidence exists between a third party and another in the absence of a special relationship, such as one created by contract or statute. Id. Under that analysis, this court will need to consider the primary purpose of the third-party here, Giant Eagle. (2) “Duty” of a third-party employer to its employee Pennsylvania courts have not directly considered whether the existence of an employer/employee relationship creates a duty on the part of a third-party employer to preserve evidence of a work-related accident for a potential products liability suit by an employee. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is no such duty. See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F.Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D.Ark.1989); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 179 Mich.App. 136, 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither common law nor workers disability compensation act imposed affirmative duty on employer to preserve evidence which might be used in employees thirdparty liability action (B) holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme (C) holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability (D) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (E) holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
despite the underlying circumstances. See United States v. Moudy, 132 F.3d 618, 620 (10th Cir.1998) (stating that “[ejvery escape scenario is a powder keg, which may or may not explode into violence and result in physical injury to someone at any given time, but which always has the serious potential to do so” and that this characterization applies “to all escapes, whether or not violence was actually involved”) (citing United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir.1994)). C. Sixth Amendment Claim Finally, Mr. Flowers argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by failing to submit the fact of his prior convictions to a jury. This argument is also foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1223, 1226 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we AFFIRM Mr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact of prior convictions under  924e need not be charged in an indictment and proven to a jury and also that the government need not charge in an indictment and prove to a jury that a defendants prior conviction constitutes a violent felony under  924e (B) holding that district court may enhance sentence based on fact of prior convictions under  924e regardless of whether admitted by defendant or found by jury (C) holding that facts regarding prior convictions need not be charged in an indictment nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that elements of statute which became  924e need not be reflected in indictment for crime charged

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
of properties served by the town’s water and sewer systems, the minimum rates “help[] to maintain rate stability and insure}] that everyone who benefits from the system helps to defray the fixed costs of delivering the product that do not vary with the level of individual consumption.” This ruling is supported by the evidence. We similarly uphold the trial court’s finding that the $20.00 per quarter availability charge is just, as this finding is also supported by the evidence. See Andrews v. Town, of New London, 117 N.H. 747, 749 (1977) (“absolute mathematical equality” not required). The plaintiffs assertion that equitable rates must be based upon use is belied by the plain language of the statutes themselves, which permit rates to be based upon “some other equitable basis.” See id. (<HOLDING>). His reliance upon Concord Steam Corp. v. City 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that residential rate not based upon water usage is reasonable (B) holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine (C) holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate (D) holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract (E) holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate

Ex Output:

(A)