In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

the B-side breakers were cross-phased caused transformer B to fail, and the failure of transformer B necessitated its testing, removal, oil disposal, repair and reinstallation. No additional link in the causal chain was necessary to bring about the injury or damages. The parties can be “conclusively presumed to have foreseen” that Powell’s substandard performance would result in the failure of the transformer and that failure of a transformer would require HP to incur costs associated with repairing it. Cf. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 816. We are not persuaded otherwise by Powell’s argument that direct damages in this case should be limited to the cost of uncrossing the wrongfully crossed cables or the difference between the value of Powell’s actual services and the value of t *8-9 (<HOLDING>). Powell asserts that these provisions refer to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury (B) holding costs of providing power during construction delay were direct damages because contract provision specified that owner would provide electricity to construction site (C) recognizing the rights of third parties who were not signatories to a construction contract (D) holding that construction safety manuals and codes were properly admitted as objective standards of safe construction (E) holding that whether clause in construction contract providing that no damages would be available for delay was enforceable was a factual question where there was evidence that damages resulted from unreasonable delay beyond the contemplation of the parties
(B)

616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
(C)

acted to remove the children from the Mann home. Defs. Mot. 10. “[Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil dam ages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Thus, on summary judgment, a court “appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727; see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (<HOLDING>). “If, the law was clearly ' established, the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a cause of action for damages against officials who violate constitutional or statutory rights under color of federal law (B) recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights (C) holding that a plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant officials qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conductat issue (D) holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right (E) recognizing that qualified immunity shields officials unless the plaintiff demonstrates the defendant violated a constitutional right that was clearly established

(C)