In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: rule is limited to questions that seek evidence about the informant’s police sanctioned conduct in apprehending a suspect, then the informant’s claim of privilege under such circumstances would be spurious. In this context he is immune from prosecution. We believe that this is the correct limitation because Norman is premised on a line of cases holding that state agents are not accomplices to illegal conduct of which they are charged to discover. Norman quotes Ex parte Turner, 545 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.Cr.App.1977) for the proposition that the law is well settled that if an informant is acting as a state agent, then the informant’s claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment is spurious. Id. at 344. In turn, Turner, supra, is premised upon Woodward v. State, 490 S.W.2d 850 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (<HOLDING>). See also, Vela v. State, 373 S.W.2d 505 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred (B) holding that an undercover agent is not an accomplice as long as the agent does not bring about the crime but merely obtains evidence to be used against those engaged in crime (C) holding that expert testimony of irs agent regarding tax liability did not usurp the function of the jury as agent did not give her opinion about the guilt of the defendant (D) holding that a private citizen acting as undercover agent is not an accomplice witness so long as he does not bring about the crime (E) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent
[EX A]: holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred

[EX Q]: rights by initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt without probable cause. After trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on these claims. The court held that it is not “clearly established” that malicious prosecution is a violation of constitutional rights, and. thus the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm. Section 1983 creates a cause of action to remedy certain deprivations of federal rights, but it is not a source of substantive rights. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (noting that “[section 1983] is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United State 16 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution (B) holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person (C) holding sbm is not a violation of the defendants fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures (D) holding that there is no fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution and suggesting that such a cause of action might lie under the fourth amendment (E) recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment
[EX A]: holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution

[EX Q]: entitled to a “continuing violation” instruction — that is, that the jury could conclude that, as long as one act fell within the limitations period (i.e., after July 9, 1999), other related acts that took place outside the limitations period were actionable as part of a continuing violation. See Pl.’s Mem. 7-9; Pl.’s Reply at 8-10. In response, defendant argues that the Supreme Court in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), foreclosed application of the “continuing violation” doctrine in c 1343 (D.Kan.2006) (reasoning that, under Morgan, “rejection of an employee’s proposed accommodation is a discrete act” that begins the ADA limitations period); Lipka v. Potter, No. 03CV381A, 2006 WL 839421, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.28, 2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., 318 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context (B) holding that claim for reasonable accommodation under the ada was timebarred the continuing violation doctrine applies only to cases of alleged hostile work environment or other claims which involve a series of acts necessary to comprise the alleged discriminatory act (C) recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 (D) holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive (E) recognizing that the elements of title vii sexually hostile work environment claims apply to icra sexually hostile work environment claims
[EX A]:
recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context