In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
39:4-88(b), the mandate to drive within a single lane to the extent practicable applies, whether or not a deviation from that lane imposes a risk to another driver. The statute’s second clause addresses a related, but discrete, mandate of the Code. It requires a driver to ascertain the safety of switching lanes before conducting a lane change. N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b). Unlike the violation described in the first clause of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b), the violation described in the second clause is avoided if a driver, in a roadway with multiple lanes traveling in the same direction, first determines that departure from a lane may be conducted safely. The Appellate Division’s limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b) to the violation identified in the statute’s second clause would render t .App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the courts of our sister states, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness (B) holding that tex transp code ann  545060a describes one offense (C) holding that no offense alleged where affidavit described offense as felony (D) holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense (E) holding that the statute describes but one offense which can be committed by either or both of two methods

Ex Output:
holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness


Ex Input:
398, 407 (1988) (concluding that the act of inserting an adult’s tongue into a child’s mouth constituted an “immoral, improper, or indecent” act within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1) and a “lewd or lascivious” act within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2)); State v. Hammett, 182 N.C. App. 316, 323, 642 S.E.2d 454, 459 (concluding that masturbating in a child’s presence constituted an offense punishable pursuant to N.C.G.S. 14-202.1(a)(2)), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 572, 651 S.E.2d 227 (2007); State v. Turman, 52 N.C. App. 376, 377, 278 S.E.2d 574, 575 (1981) (concluding that masturbating in a child’s presence constituted an offense pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(l)); cf. State v. Jones, 172 N.C. App. 308, 314-16, 616 S.E.2d 15, 19-20 (2005) (<HOLDING>). In light of these decisions, at least four 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction (B) holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (C) holding that a single act cannot support two convictions under both ncgs  142021al and ncgs  142021a 2 respectively (D) recognizing that dui manslaughter and vehicular homicide are two separate crimes neither being a lesser included offense of the other but holding that a single death cannot support convictions for both crimes (E) holding that separate sentences may be imposed for a violation of section 36bd and the predicate offense where both convictions were the result of the same act so long as the charges are brought in a single trial

Ex Output:
holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction


Ex Input:
court’s interim order and the entirety of its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 1 . See Johnson v. Johnson, 836 P.2d 930, 933 (Alaska 1992); Burrell v. Burrell, 537 P.2d 1, 7 (Alaska 1975). 2 . See Ulsher v. Ulsher, 867 P.2d 819, 821 (Alaska 1994). 3 . See Monette v. Hoff, 958 P.2d 434, 436-37 (Alaska 1998); Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371, 375 (Alaska 1996); J.F.E. v. J.A.S., 930 P.2d 409, 411 (Alaska 1996). 4 . See Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550, 552 (Alaska 1990). 5 . See Burrell, 537 P.2d at 7. 6 . See Vachon, 931 P.2d at 375. 7 . See Kowalski v. Kowalski, 806 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Alaska 1991). 8 . See Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a) (requiring trial courts to make findings in support of their decisions in non-jury cases); see also Duffus v. Duffus, 932 P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska 1997) (<HOLDING>); Bird v. Starkey, 914 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Alaska 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it improper to independently review the record to find support for a trial courts decision so long as it is unclear whether the trial court considered statutory factors (B) holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts (C) holding that wjhile trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written child custody orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review (D) holding that that choices as to selection and arrangement are entitled to copyright protection only so long as they are made independently (E) holding that even though defendants response does not affirmatively state in the document itself that they are competent to testify as to the facts to which they swore does not necessarily doom their testimony  so long as the record taken as a whole demonstrates that their testimony meets the requirements of rule 56

Ex Output:

holding it improper to independently review the record to find support for a trial courts decision so long as it is unclear whether the trial court considered statutory factors