In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: initially stopping the truck for failing to illuminate the rear license plate in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1706(e). See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998) (“An initial traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment ... if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” (citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc))). Wilson also does not dispute that the smell of alcohol on VanHouden together with VanHouden’s admission that he had been drinking justified the further detention of the truck and its occupants in order for Deputy Watkins to conduct field sobriety tests on VanHouden. See United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops (B) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (C) holding that the discovery of 2000 in cash during a traffic stop supported a finding of reasonable suspicion (D) holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment (E) holding detection of alcohol on a drivers breath during a routine traffic stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion
Example Output: holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops

Example Input: money judgment can be satisfied out of any of the defendant’s assets.” Billman, 915 F.2d at 920 (citing United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 800-03 (7th Cir.1985)). Consequently, after a conviction on a forfeiture count, the district court may order forfeiture of the defendant’s substitute assets. The Billman Court then examined the question of whether substitute assets could be restrained pending trial and ruled in the affirmative. 915 F.2d at 920-21. With an eye to the remedial purposes of the forfeiture statute, the court read the provision allowing for a restraining order in connection with the substitute assets provision as calling for the preservation and restraint of substitute assets pending trial. Id. at 921; see also United States v. Skiles, 715 F.Supp. 1567 (N.D.Ga.1989) (<HOLDING>). The Fourth Circuit in Billman relied on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that additional witnesses were not needed to corroborate the defendants drug abuse problems because counsel had already introduced sufficient evidence of drug use (B) holding that prior drug trafficking conviction was admissible to prove intent to distribute (C) holding that a state conviction is a drug trafficking offense because the trafficked drug is listed in a csa schedule (D) holding in the drug trafficking context that the government is allowed to restrain additional assets pretrial to ensure sufficient assets for forfeiture (E) recognizing the connection between guns and drug trafficking
Example Output: holding that additional witnesses were not needed to corroborate the defendants drug abuse problems because counsel had already introduced sufficient evidence of drug use

Example Input: Id. Oriedo objected that this was an undisclosed expert opinion, so the government withdrew the question and rephrased to ask whether the agent was “personally concerned” about the presence of two vehicles. Id. The agent responded in the affirmative because “more than one vehicle ... raises concerns about being countersurveillance [sic].” Id. (omission and bracketed text in original). We concluded that this was lay testimony under Rule 701 because, although the agent’s “specialized knowledge informed his mental state, he was not called upon to testify generally about narcotics counter-surveillance practices or to offer an explicit opinion that what he observed was counter-surveillance.” Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 831-32 (7th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, Agent Labno’s experience with the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment (B) holding that agent could testify as to his impressions of intercepted telephone conversations under rule 701 because he was explaining coded  words and phrases that were unique such that his understanding came only as result of things he had perceived not from specialized knowledge (C) holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals cordless telephone conversations as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations (D) holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live (E) holding that a witness may testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue
Example Output:
holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment