TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *3-5 (D.Or. Dec. 13, 2010) (collecting cases); see also Nelson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 446 Fed.Appx. 158, 158 (11th Cir.2011) (similar). 93 . See, e.g., Wright v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, No. CV 11-00095-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 4101513, at *2 (D.Ariz. Sept. 14, 2011) (citing Fletcher v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 798 F.Supp.2d 925, 930 (N.D.Ill.2011)). 94 . Vida, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5. 95 . Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1069 (N.D.Cal.2011) (citations omitted). 96 . Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir.2011). 97 . Id. at 1040 (citations omitted). 98 . Id. 99 . Id. at 1039. 100 . Id. 101 . Id. (citation omitted). 102 . Dkt. 30 at 5-6; Dkt. 47 at 17-27. 103 . See In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 397-405 (D.Idaho 2009) (<HOLDING>); Saxon Mortg. Servs. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that creditors could not seek relief from a bankruptcy stay because they were not the real parties in interest and lacked standing as they were not holders of the notes and failed to establish that mers was the holder or had authority to transfer the notes (B) holding that the creditors had standing because the plan eliminated their interests in the borrower notes and deeds of trust and disposed of the assets in the estate from which they seek to be paid (C) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because they failed to demonstrate any likelihood that they would end up back in jail where alleged constitutional violations occurred (D) holding that despite evidence of voluntary transfer of promissory notes and the plaintiffs possession thereof the plaintiff was not the holder of the note under the ucc as the notes were not drawn issued or indorsed to her to bearer or in blank the plaintiff testified to some of the circumstances under which she obtained possession of the notes but the trial court made no findings of fact with respect thereto (E) holding that mers was not the beneficiary of a deed of trust under the oregon trust deed act absent conveyance to mers of the beneficial right to repayment and that mers could not hold or transfer legal title to the deed as the lenders nominee

SOLUTION: holding that the creditors had standing because the plan eliminated their interests in the borrower notes and deeds of trust and disposed of the assets in the estate from which they seek to be paid

PROBLEM: Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 523-26 (6th Cir.2008). Here, the Plaintiff was terminated by the Defendants three weeks after the filing of the Complaint in this case. This close temporal proximity between the Plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse employment action is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for his engagement in pro tected activity. See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection (B) holding in a discrimination case that a close temporal proximity sufficient to survive summary judgment existed where the challenged employment action occurred one month after the protected activity (C) holding that intervening misconduct can sever the temporal proximity connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment (D) holding that temporal proximity between the alleged retaliators knowledge of a protected activity and an adverse employment action may be sufficient to establish causal connection or retaliatory motive in some cases (E) holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection

SOLUTION: holding in a discrimination case that a close temporal proximity sufficient to survive summary judgment existed where the challenged employment action occurred one month after the protected activity

PROBLEM: Phillips’s sentence. As an initial matter, we review the procedural reasonableness of Phillips’s sentence for plain error. In United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir.2004), we instructed district courts, after announcing a proposed sentence, to “ask the parties whether they have any objections to the sentence ... that have not previously been raised.” Id. at 872. If a party failed to raise an objection after being asked this question, we held that plain-error review applies on appeal to any arguments not preserved. Id. Our recent en banc opinion in United States v. Vonner, No. 05-5295, 516 F.3d 382, 2008 WL 320773 (6th Cir. Feb.7, 2008) (en banc), makes clear that the Bostic rule applies to post -Booker procedural reasonableness challenges. See Vonner, 2008 WL 320773 at *3 (<HOLDING>). Here, after the district court announced a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence (B) holding that plainerror review applied to appellants procedural reasonableness argument where defendant answered no to district courts bostic question at sentencing and explaining that although this answer did not undermine vonners right to appeal issues he had previously raised it did undermine his right to challenge the adequacy of the courts explanation for the sentence  an issue that became apparent as soon as the court finished announcing its proposed sentence and that counsel nonetheless declined the courts invitation to address (C) holding that when a sentencing issue centers upon a courts statutory authority to impose a sentence rather than the courts exercise of discretion in fashioning the sentence the issue raised implicates the legality of the sentence imposed (D) holding that under subsection al as then written the defendant had no right to appeal whether his sentence was supported by evidence presented because he entered into a plea agreement as to the sentence (E) holding that the defendant waived the right to appeal his sentence including the terms and conditions of his supervised release when he agreed to a plea agreement that said he expressly waives his right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed on any ground emphasis added

SOLUTION:
holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence