In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
of decision, and this is how the INS has consistently understood these terms.”); Fierro v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2000) (“[Sjubject to possible limitation, we think that the requirement of ‘legal custody’ in section 1432 should be taken presumptively to mean legal custody under the law of the state in question.”). Our decision to look to state law is consistent with our practice in other areas of federal law generally, and immigration law specifically. For example, entitlement to federal social security benefits often hinges on marital status as defined by state law. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52-53 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977); Purganan v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 269, 270-71 (9th Cir.1982); see also Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in the immigration context, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment (B) holding that statute does not provide for the adjudication by the alj of a state law breach of contract action for damages that is independent of the aljs determination of entitlement to benefits under the terms of the applicable agreement (C) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law (D) holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law (E) holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest

Ex Output:
holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment


Ex Input:
of the debt itself that is the key factor in determining dischargeability.” 21 B.R. at 912. Therefore, in determining whether a debt to a former spouse is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support, the court must look behind the designation assigned by a state court, or by the parties themselves, as to whether or not a particular obligation was in the nature of support or a property settlement, and to determine the true nature of the obligation. Parisi v. White, 26 B.R. 572, 574 (Bankr.R.I.1983). With this test in mind, we turn to the relevant factors in determining wheth er payments are m the nature of support. Whether the payments are made contingent upon conditions reflecting a need for support is one relevant factor. Cf. Warren v. Taff, 10 B.R. 101, 104 (Bankr.Conn.1981) (<HOLDING>). In the present case the child support 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding that the failure to condition a transfer on death or remarriage of the wife was a factor showing that the transfer was not in the nature of alimony (C) holding transfer restriction granted right of first refusal in event of voluntary or involuntary transfer of stock (D) holding that a denial of transfer was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff asserted only that the transfer would allow him to work closer to home (E) holding that oneyear period commences on date of discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer

Ex Output:
holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court


Ex Input:
F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir.1996)). We conclude that, although the district court erroneously determined that the principles of Daubert did not apply to the re-creation and Agent Constantino’s testimony, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence. Under Daubert, the district court conducts a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2796; see Fed.R.Evid. 702 . This “gate-keeping” obligation on the part of the district court applies to all types of expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Many factors may bear on this inquiry, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dauberts basic gatekeeping obligation  applies to all expert testimony (B) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (C) recognizing the basic principle of contract law that the obligation of good faith is an implied condition in every contract (D) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (E) holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions

Ex Output:

holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive