TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: to obtain the benefit of the bond, for which it paid a significant premium, only through legal action. Accordingly, Olympic Steamship applies here. Colorado Structures, 125 Wn. App. at 928 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We agree. ¶27 Lastly, in McGreevy, where this court awarded reasonable attorney fees in addition to the limits of the insurance policy, we reasoned, “when an insurer unsuccessfully contests coverage, it has placed its interests above the insured. Our decision in Olympic Steamship remedies this inequity by requiring that the insured be made whole.” McGreevy, 128 Wn.2d at 39-40. Likewise, West placed “its interests” above that of Structures. Id. Structures should be awarded attorney fees under Olympic Steamship, so as to be made “whole.” Dayton, 124 Wn.2d at 280 (<HOLDING>)- Without the application of Olympic Steamship 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the contract was not authorized by law (B) recognizing that under georgia law attorneys fees are allowed where authorized by statute or contract (C) holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case (D) holding that an award of attorney fees was authorized by ocga  13111 a 3 when the requirements of that statute were satisfied (E) holding that a court has power to award attorney fees when authorized by contract statute or recognized ground of equity

SOLUTION: holding the contract was not authorized by law

PROBLEM: rules or orders.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 382.113(a). The legislature imposed only the two restrictions previously mentioned: an ordinance must be consistent with the Act and the commission’s rules and orders and may not make unlawful a condition or act approved or authorized under the Act or the commission’s rules or orders. Id. § 382.113(b). If the ordinance violates one of these restrictions, however, then its preemption is implied with unmistakable clarity. We therefore turn next to the first of these restrictions and address the question of whether the Act and the ordinance are consistent. 3. The Clean Air Act and the tent with state legislation, we begin by comparing the purpose of each. See City of Weslaco v. Melton, 158 Tex. 61, 63-64, 308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1958) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute (B) holding state and federal actions not parallel for colorado river purposes because the remedies were different  one was equitable and the other compensatory  and the sources of law came from different states (C) holding that an implied warranty of merchantability does not create a labeling requirement different from or in addition to those mandated by fifra because the implied warranty of merchantability arises from the sale itself not from a state labeling regulation citation omitted (D) holding that completing sixth grade and a limited ability to read were not inconsistent with a valid iq score of 68 (E) holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade a raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes

SOLUTION: recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute

PROBLEM: criminality of the behavior. It remains unclear to this court whether the deciding officials at the FBI interpreted its policy to require a criminal finding, such that they could only investigate Doe if his surreptitious videotaping of his sexual liaisons was criminal. The record indicates that the deciding officials at OPR as well as Doe’s own supervisors were under the impression that Doe’s conduct violated state voyeurism laws, and was reasonably subject to criminal prosecution. On appeal, the AJ held that Doe’s conduct likely did not violate the Ohio state voyeurism law, because Doe had not shown the videotapes to any other person and the females who had been taped waived their right to privacy with respect to Doe. See State v. Frost, 92 Ohio App.3d 106, 634 N.E.2d 272, 272 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Yet, while the Board agreed with the AJ’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when an employee had his duties changed but had no interest created or protected by the constitution or state law in those duties then no liberty interest claim was stated (B) holding the government waived its standing argument when it was put on notice the defendant would claim a privacy interest (C) holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived (D) holding no violation of ohio state voyeurism statute when the privacy interest to be protected had been waived by the females who probably expected to be observed (E) holding statute of limitations is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time but noting other ohio appellate courts have held the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and may be waived if not asserted at the trial level

SOLUTION:
holding that when an employee had his duties changed but had no interest created or protected by the constitution or state law in those duties then no liberty interest claim was stated