In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 398, 407 (1988) (concluding that the act of inserting an adult’s tongue into a child’s mouth constituted an “immoral, improper, or indecent” act within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1) and a “lewd or lascivious” act within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2)); State v. Hammett, 182 N.C. App. 316, 323, 642 S.E.2d 454, 459 (concluding that masturbating in a child’s presence constituted an offense punishable pursuant to N.C.G.S. 14-202.1(a)(2)), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 572, 651 S.E.2d 227 (2007); State v. Turman, 52 N.C. App. 376, 377, 278 S.E.2d 574, 575 (1981) (concluding that masturbating in a child’s presence constituted an offense pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(l)); cf. State v. Jones, 172 N.C. App. 308, 314-16, 616 S.E.2d 15, 19-20 (2005) (<HOLDING>). In light of these decisions, at least four 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction (B) holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (C) holding that a single act cannot support two convictions under both ncgs  142021al and ncgs  142021a 2 respectively (D) recognizing that dui manslaughter and vehicular homicide are two separate crimes neither being a lesser included offense of the other but holding that a single death cannot support convictions for both crimes (E) holding that separate sentences may be imposed for a violation of section 36bd and the predicate offense where both convictions were the result of the same act so long as the charges are brought in a single trial

A: holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction
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Q: appealed the judgment of the Court of Veterans Appeals to this court. On appeal the Secretary contends that the Court of Veterans Appeals erred by not deferring to the Department’s reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions governing claims for accrued benefits. The Secretary also disputes Mrs. Jones’s assertion that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. ANALYSIS I. Jurisdiction to hear appeals from final decisions of the Court of Veterans Appeals is conferred upon this court by 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (1994). Under the express terms of that statute, however, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U 625, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2663-64, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to hear 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district courts remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the secretary of health and human services was an immediately appealable order (B) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (E) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order

A: holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable
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Q: Third, we agree with both the arbitrator and the district court that Polk and Standard Brands are distinguishable. Those cases involved only successorship provisions; here, we have an obligation that arose independently of a successorship clause and pursuant to a separate, specific contractual provision. Finally, we find no merit in Van Waters’ contention that a remedy which extends beyond the expiration date of a collective bargaining agreement is per se inappropriate. Indeed, in Enterprise Wheel, the Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals decision that vacated an arbitral award because the award extended beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 363 U.S. at 599, 80 S.Ct. at 1362; see also ILWU Local 142 v. Land & Constr. Co., 498 F.2d 201, 204 (9th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that back pay awards are not excludable from gross income under 26 usc  104a2 1988 because the overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that an award of back pay under title vii does not constitute the legal remedy of damages (B) holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment (C) holding that an arbitral award of back pay that continued beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement was perfectly appropriate because the agreement contained no provision restricting back pay to the term of the agreement (D) holding that oral agreement made in connection with reinstatement should be treated as part of collective bargaining agreement (E) holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court

A:
holding that back pay awards are not excludable from gross income under 26 usc  104a2 1988 because the overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that an award of back pay under title vii does not constitute the legal remedy of damages
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