In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: by [the motorist].” Freitas II, 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (citing Desmond, 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353) (brackets in original). In Desmond, the ICA noted that “it is advisable that, at the commencement of the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer inform the parties what procedure he or she will follow.” 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353 (emphasis added). In rejecting Freitas’s argument, this court observed that “procedural due process requires that a person have an ‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (quoting Farmer v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 94 Hawai'i 232, 238, 11 P.3d 457, 463 (2000)); cf. Padilla-Agustin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 21 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Since the hearing officer had advised Freitas 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due process requires not only notice but sufficient information to allow petitioner to prepare and present objection to the agencys preliminary action or decision (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action
[EX A]: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner

[EX Q]: States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). By assenting to settlement in this action, Defendants waived, for example, the right to contest the EPA’s regulatory jurisdiction, which would have been an element of the EPA’s substantive claim. See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir.2000) (“[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were ‘waters of the United States,’ is merely an element of the United States’ Clean Water Act case under section 301.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 482, 148 L.Ed.2d 455 (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, a consent decree “is an agreement 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (B) recognizing the existence of the special relationship (C) recognizing existence of two tests (D) recognizing the existence of purely jurisdictional elements (E) holding that one of the essential elements of an abuse of process claim is the existence of an ulterior motive
[EX A]: recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional

[EX Q]: does not violate the Equal Terms Provision if it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Other circuits, by contrast, require that a comparator be “similarly situated” to the plaintiff religious assembly or institution with regard to the regulation at issue or to its purpose. For instance, the Third Circuit restricts comparison to “secular assemblies or institutions that are similarly situated [to the religious assembly] as to the regulatory purpose.” Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir.2007). The Second Circuit compares the plaintiff religious assembly to a nonreligious assembly “similarly situated for all functional intents and purposes of the regulation.” Elijah Grp., Inc. v. C p. 581 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (<HOLDING>). Ill Do TOL Christian Schools and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the standard of proof in summary judgment rulings is the same as it would be at trial (B) holding that where defendants assertion depends on proof to be offered at trial summary judgment is inappropriate (C) holding that an unsworn letter is not proper summary judgment proof (D) holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default  when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient (E) holding summary judgment inappropriate to resolve an essentially procedural conflict
[EX A]:
holding the standard of proof in summary judgment rulings is the same as it would be at trial