In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: improperly determined that the “neither expected nor intended” language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an “occurrence.” ¶21 The CGL policy’s core provision defines “occurrence” by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was “neither expected nor intended.” This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured’s expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an “occurrence” and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). ¶22 Here the District Court found that Ribi 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: before it was in assumpsit for attorney fees purposes. See Schulz, 67 Haw. at 436, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Higa is not directly on point, its reasoning is a compelling indication of how the Hawaii Supreme Court would rule on the attorney fee question before us. The plaintiffs also seek to distinguish Higa because it involved a client suing his own attorney, and thus in that case there was privity of contract between the two parties. In the present case, Mrs. Helfand was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the defendants and Mr. Helfand. This distinction is irrelevant. Courts have extended the right to sue for breach of contract to intended third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12, 883 P.2d 38, 48 n. 12 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 82 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies (B) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (C) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (D) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract (E) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 03 Civ. 8258 (SAS), 2004 WL 868211, at * 7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.21, 2004). In order to establish a prima facie claim of negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show reliance upon a false statement or material misrepresentation or omission made by the defendant to the plaintiff. See, Prohaska, 138 F.Supp.2d at 447; Sita, 43 F.Supp.2d at 260. Assuming that there existed a special relationship and corresponding duty on the part of CVS ProCare to provide plaintiff with correct information regarding the prescription drug it was providing him, “an issue generally not susceptible to resolution at the pleadings stage,” Century Pacific, 2004 WL 868211, at * 8 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Bombardier Capital, 2003 WL 22137989, at * 4 (<HOLDING>), plaintiff cannot establish the second element 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that whether a plaintiffs reliance on defendants misrepresentations was justified is a question of fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding it is a question of fact (C) holding that whether the plaintiffs reliance on a negligent misrepresentation is justified generally raises a question of fact (D) holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient (E) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact
[EX A]:
(C)