In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 526 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that “retire” is not synonymous with “age,” and holding that without more, employer’s statement that' plaintiff should “retire and make everybody happy” was not direct evidence of age discrimination); Erickson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 271 y attitude during the 2010 discussion, Dunn has failed to show a specific link between the Board’s attitude and its decision to nonrenew his contract. After all, not only was there an almost two-year gap between the Board’s 2010 discussion and the 2012 nonrenewal, but the Board rehired Dunn twice during this period despite him being at least sixty years old. Given these circumstances, any link between the 2010 discussion and the 2012 nonrenewal is too attenuated to constitute direct evidence. See Bone, 686 F.3d at 954 (<HOLDING>); Haigh v. Gelita USA, Inc., 632 F.3d 464, 470 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to raise prejudicial comments of trial court on appeal defendant must object to comments when made and move for a mistrial (B) holding that a supervisors repeated comments to an employee that the supervisor wanted to have sex with the employees fifteenyearold daughter were extremely severe because the comments were significantly more offensive than the typical crass comments we have found to be insufficient to constitute harassment in other cases (C) holding that comments relating to age made some three to fifteen or more years prior to plaintiffs discharge were not relevant to show that he was fired because of his age (D) holding that comments made at least four months before the adverse employment action were not connected to the decisionmaking process and thus were not direct evidence of age discrimination (E) holding that supervisors reactions to comments did not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination where comments were made six months prior to plaintiffs discharge and were unconnected to the discharge decision
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: between cases brought under the federal law and those brought under Maine law. While the First Circuit does make a distinction, it ultimately holds that the negligence per se doctrine of Pratico is strictly limited to cases brought under FELA, and it strongly implies that the doctrine will not be expanded. Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998). 4 . Castine argues that the trooper testified at trial to matters that he had not previously indicated he would address, and therefore, it was unfairly surprised at trial. Generally, a continuance is the appropriate remedy when a party seeks to admit “surprise" evidence at trial. Because Castine did not seek a continuance, however, it may not now claim unfair surprise. See Pettitt v. Lizotte, 454 A.2d 329, 332-33 (Me.1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Because violation of a safety regulation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify (C) holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify (E) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing a defendants surprise fact witness to testify because the plaintiff did not request a continuance
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: language, petitioner urges us to entertain jurisdiction on two bases. First he argues that because he challenges the constitutionality of INA § 212(a)(2)(C), resolution of the constitutional claim is a necessary part of the jurisdictional inquiry. Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir.2000) (when determination of the merits is necessary to determine jurisdiction, “the jurisdictional question and the merits collapse into one”). We have held that “the terms of [IIRIRA section 309(c)(4)(G) ] preclude direct appellate review of constitutional issues” and that “[a] literal reading of IIRIRA section 309(c)(4)(G), precluding direct review of constitutional claims, is consistent with one of the central purposes of IIRIRA.” Alfaro-Reyes v. INS, 224 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, because the constitutionality of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because 28 usc  2241 habeas corpus relief is available to review constitutional claims congress preclusion of direct appeals in iirira see tion 309c4g does not offend the due process clause of the constitution (B) holding that iirira  309c4g repealed this courts jurisdiction over petitions for review filed by aliens who are deportable for having committed enumerated criminal offenses but did not repeal 28 usc  2241 (C) recognizing that after iirira habeas review remains available  to raise substantial constitutional questions (D) holding that because the farr act does not expressly mention habeas corpus or 28 usc  2241 it does not eliminate habeas jurisdiction (E) holding that jurisdictionstripping provisions of iirira did not preclude aliens convicted of aggravated felonies from pursuing habeas relief pursuant to 28 usc  2241
[EX A]:
(A)