In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: performance is a matter that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Jordan v. Boisvert, 632 So.2d 254, 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). While forfeitures are not favored, a forfeiture will be enforced where it is clear that the parties intended such a result. Nelson v. Hansard, 143 Fla. 898, 197 So. 513, 514 (1940). However, due to this harsh result, a court of equity will “always mitigate forfeitures when it can be done without doing violence to the contract of the parties.” Rader v. Prather, 100 Fla. 591, 130 So. 15, 16-17 (1930) (citing McCaskill v. Union Naval Stores Co., 59 Fla. 571, 52 So. 961, 962 (1910)). A court of equity, though, will not grant relief from a situation traceable to a party’s own neglect, gross negligence, or willful and persistent vio 37, 538 (Fla.1953) (<HOLDING>). Here, the parties intended that a forfeiture 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the equities involved did not lead to an unconscionable result where purchaser planned to use the land for a particular purpose and brought lumber to the site after he defaulted on the agreement (B) holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages (C) holding that a later concession to strike an unconscionable term does not change the fact that the arbitration agreement as written is unconscionable and contrary to public policy (D) holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute (E) holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land
[A]: holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages


[Q]: reimbursement decisions to be made on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 549. Of note here, we explained that “even if the Commission had promulgated fee guidelines, the provider would not have a statutory right or privilege to be paid the amount set out in the guideline.” Id. According to East Side, Vista is, likewise, neither entitled to a fee guideline nor entitled to any set amount of reimbursement. See id. Given that no specific reimbursement amount is required, even where the Division has established fee guidelines, and that the Division can reason ng statute and rule as whole to find broad definition of “prohibited activities” and absence of definition for “market power” as providing constitutionally permissible notice of type of prohibited conduct contemplated); Tinning, 875 S.W.2d at 409 (<HOLDING>). The language in these cases, similar to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (B) holding term share legal fees although not expressly defined provides adequate notices of type of conduct it would include (C) holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment (D) holding that although term was not limited by the specification it was expressly defined in a narrow manner in the prosecution history (E) holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution
[A]: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance


[Q]: County of Henrico, 10 Va. App. 558, 561, 393 S.E.2d 644, 646 (1990) (citation omitted). “While [two] statutes [may be] related as to [their] subject matter, [one] cannot be utilized to create doubt in [the related and] otherwise clear statute.” Seehorn v. Seehorn, 1 Va. App. 375, 383, 375 S.E.2d 7, 11 (1988). This is especially true where, as here, the later-enacted statute deals with a specific and limited exception. “[W]hen one statute speaks to a subject in a general way and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more specific manner, the two should be harmonized, if possible, and where they conflict, the latter prevails.” Virginia Nat’l Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 340, 257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979); see also Houtchens v. Lane, 246 Ind. 540, 545, 206 N.E.2d 131, 134 (1965) (<HOLDING>). Compare Code § 19.2-215.7 (addressing the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter (B) holding that a general statute is superseded by a more recent specific statute only if the two statutes are in conflict (C) holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls (D) holding that a specific statutory provision prevails over a more general one (E) holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision
[A]:
holding that a general statute is superseded by a more recent specific statute only if the two statutes are in conflict