TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: position and whether the party would receive “an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.” Id. at 751, 121 S.Ct. 1808. The doctrine is designed to prevent “intentional self-contradiction” and is improperly applied “when the former position was the result of inadvertence or mistake.” Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prod., 228 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2000). Thus, the court does no disservice to the important purposes underlying holding parties to judicial admissions by acknowledging that a response to an injunctive action is an evolving position, and the facts and legal positions should be taken in view of the emerging facts as they become known to the litigating parties. See SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prod., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). It is also necessary to note that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous (B) holding that a transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit (C) holding that courts should not use doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent evolution of arguments but should permit preliminary constructions made without full development of the record or issues to remain open to revision (D) holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact (E) holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: to its policy holders. For example, the company’s purpose can be readily revealed to the policyholder by the addition of a single line or sentence to the declarations page or by defining the term “driver name.” Thus, this court concludes that the arguments of the defendant are unavailing and that although our holding in this case comports with that of the minority of jurisdictions, we are of the opinion that it represents the better public policy. “And we are also convinced that reasonable expectations of coverage raised by the declaration page cannot be contradicted by the policy’s boilerplate unless the declaration page itself clearly so warns the insured.” Id. at 347, 638 A.2d at 892; see also Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 118 R.I. 321, 327, 373 A.2d 810, 812 (1977) (<HOLDING>). In conclusion, therefore, we affirm the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant (B) holding that an ordinary reader in the face of such detail would be warranted in concluding that any significant limitation on collision insurance would have been explicitly noted (C) holding that the patentees argument that any shape would be equivalent to the conical limitation would write such a limitation out of the claim (D) holding that it is most improbable that a significant change to bankruptcy procedure would have been made without even any mention in the legislative history (E) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: by telling the accused he or she is only a witness, when, in fact, the person is a suspect. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96, 97 S.Ct. 711; see also Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); Cummings, 27 Md.App, at 379-80, 341 A.2d 294. Police may also exaggerate the evidence they have accumulated against the person being interviewed. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96, 97 S.Ct. 711. A third factor, perhaps most important for this case, is that there is rarely custody when the person questioned leaves the interrogation unencumbered, only to be arrested at a later time. See Bartram v. State, 33 Md.App. 115, 148-49, 364 A.2d 1119 (1976); Cummings, 27 Md.App. at 378-79, 341 A.2d 294; see also United States v. Scully, 415 F.2d 680, 683-84 (2d Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Manglona, 414 F.2d 642, 644 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that accused was not in custody when asked to give his side of the story and then left the station unencumbered (B) holding that accused was not in custody when asked to go to the police station and left the station freely (C) holding the defendant was not under arrest when police asked him to go to the station and then offered him a ride because he did not have transportation (D) holding that police failure to inform the accused of his attorneys attempts to contact him and misstatements to the attorney as to whether the accused was at the police station did not violate the accuseds due process rights (E) holding that having the defendant follow an officer to a police station three to four miles away after the officer had asked for and retained the defendants drivers license reg istration and title was not permissible as part of a terry stop and stating that we understand the hayes decision as eliminating the option of forcing the suspect to go to the police station from the alternatives available to the officer during an investigative detention

SOLUTION:
(B)