In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: is correct. We will also assume that the court’s erro umed error prejudiced him is that other evidence supports the finding that he was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy. In the district court, Vasquez did not object to the PSR’s statement that he “recruited Wornick and Sella” into the conspiracy. Although the district court did not explicitly find that Vasquez recruited two of his co-conspirators, “[i]t is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a[PSR] admits those facts for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.2006). And we have held many times that a defendant’s recruitment of co-conspirators supports a § 3B1.1 enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 n. 2 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1304 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer leader manager or supervisor under  3bllc in part because the defendant actively recruited two individuals to transport drugs (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was a manager or supervisor under  3bllb in part because he recruited accomplices (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer or leader under  3blla in part because he recruited coconspirators
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: arrest for a misdemeanor is permitted only when one of the statutory exceptions is met. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-10-207© (2008). 5 . "According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a 0 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that the duration of the stop was unreasonably extended where the officer admitted that, for thirteen minutes of the sixteen minute stop, he asked the defendant questions that were unrelated to the traffic violation); Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1172— 73 (Del.2010) (concluding that the stop, during which the officer asked the defendant for identification and ran a background check, “did not exceed the permissible scope of a routine traffic stop”); Bucalo v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-CA-000176-MR, 2012 WL 246245, at *5-7 (Ky.Ct.App. Jan. 27, 2012) (<HOLDING>); State v. Mason, 173 Md.App. 414, 919 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a traffic stop which lasted 105 minutes from the time of the initial stop until the defendant was arrested on drugrelated charges was unreasonable because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for purposes of conducting a drug dog sniff because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant was engaged in drugrelated activity (B) holding circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion to make a stop included that the defendant was on a comer on which recent multiple drugrelated arrests had been made (C) holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished (D) holding that an officer does not need reasonable articulable suspicion of drugrelated criminal activity prior to subjecting defendants car to a dog sniff subsequent to a lawful traffic stop (E) holding duration of stop was reasonable as it lasted under thirty minutes
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: they fail to analyze the language of the statute itself, the court finds does not find the cases instructive much less persuasive. The court does, however, find persuasive the Gutierrez court’s reliance on other provisions of the TCPA in support of this reading. Specifically, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C) provides that the FCC may exempt calls to a cellular telephone service that are not charged to the called party from the requirements of § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). If § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) did not include “calls to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service that are not charged to the called party,” the exemption would be meaningless. See Gutierrez, 2011 WL 579238 at *6; see also Smith v. Microsoft Corp., No. 11-cv-1958-JLS, 2012 WL 2975712 (S.D.Cal. July 20, 2012) (slip op.) (<HOLDING>). Based on the court’s reading of the statute, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the government not the relator must have suffered the injury in fact required for article iii standing (B) recognizing that while in a diversity case a federal court may not address the plaintiffs claim unless the plaintiff has standing to sue under state law the plaintiff must also meet article iii standing requirements (C) holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention (D) holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention (E) holding that the tcpa does not limit its protection to instances in which the plaintiff is charged within the context of article iii standing
[EX A]:
(E)