In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: was indeed barred (or limited) under the mandatory Guidelines regime, see Koon, 518 U.S. at 92-95, 116 S.Ct. 2035, the alternative sentencing methodology employed by his sentencing court did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory. Nor did the court exclude or limit its consideration of any category of sentencing factors. To the contrary, the court extended Simpson an open-ended invitation to make mitigating arguments, regardless of whether they would have been available under the Guidelines scheme. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 25-26. And Simpson responded to that invitation by citing a series of factors in support of a sente 440 (D.C.Cir.1995). In later cases, we settled on a plain error standard of review for such claims. See United States v. Draffin, 286 F.3d 606, 609 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); In re Sealed Case, 204 F.3d 1170, 1173 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts denial of a downward departure was an exercise of discretion and therefore not reviewable (B) holding that failure to identify ground of admissibility limited appellate review to plain error (C) holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure (D) holding that the failure to grant a sentencing departure on an unrequested ground is reviewable only for plain error (E) holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error

A: (D)
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Q: and to seek collateral relief (except for ineffective assistance of counsel),” United States v. Arevalo-Juarez, 464 F.3d 1246, 1248 (11th Cir.2006) (citation omitted), but only in judicial districts that participate in a[n] "early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General of the United States and the United States attorney for the district in which the court resides.” U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1. This court has rejected Bravo’s argument that the “fast track” program creates a sentencing disparity, and we are bound by decisions of prior panels until overruled by this court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Anaya Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 1252-1253 (11th Cir.2006) (addressing fast-track programs); United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). 2 . This court has rejected the government's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a multipanel circuit prior panel decisions generally are binding upon newlyconstituted panels (B) holding that the panel is bound by decisions of prior panels (C) holding that decisions by prior panels are binding (D) recognizing that a prior panels holding is binding on all subsequent panels (E) holding that a prior panel decision is binding on subsequent panels

A: (C)
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Q: tort liability. On the other hand, there are a number of principles that would lead to the opposite conclusion. First, our courts have held that a statute is to be interpreted as the legislature understood it at the time of enactment. State v. Morrison, 1999 NMCA th. 207, 477 A.2d 36, 39 (1984) (applying state statute to public lands), overruled by Pennsylvania Dep’t of Envtl. Res. v. Auresto, 511 Pa. 73, 511 A.2d 815, 816-17 (1986). Our courts cited this proposition the very year the legislature passed the RUS, providing some evidence that the legislature would not have understood the word “owner” to include government entities, even if they were subject to tort liability at the time. See State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. City of Aztec, 77 N.M. 524, 526, 424 P.2d 801, 803 (1967) (<HOLDING>); see also S. Union Gas Co. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional provision requiring municipalities to pass an ordinance in order to incur debt applied to debt to the state as well as private entities but acknowledging the canon of construction that a sovereign is presumptively not intended to be bound by its own statute unless included by the clearest implication (B) holding same as to an easement by implication (C) holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or (D) holding that effect of bankruptcy discharge under arizona law is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debtor (E) holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt

A:
(A)
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