In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
take place in federal court. The Government maintains that a facially valid certification is not subject to review by this Court and must be held sufficient. It further contends that even if the certification can be reviewed by this Court, the certification at issue here was correct. “Whether the government complied with [the juvenile delinquency certification requirements of] 18 U.S.C. § 5032 is an issue of statutory interpretation which this court reviews de novo.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 241 F.3d 684, 686 (9th Cir.2001). A certification filed in the district court by a United States Attorney is presumed to be accurate, absent circumstances calling into question its accuracy or validity. See Pasadena Research Labs., Inc. v. United States, 169 F.2d 375, 381-82 (9th Cir.1948) (<HOLDING>). A Section 5032 provides in relevant part: A 
 Holding statements: (A) holding generally the law presumes that every man in his private and official character does his duty until the contrary is proved it will presume that all things are rightly done unless the circumstances of the case overturn this presumption (B) holding law court will not overturn conclusions supported by competent and substantial evidence (C) holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under  1346 (D) recognizing a presumption of regularity that undergirds the official acts of public officers causing courts to presume that they have properly discharged their official duties (E) holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation

Ex Output:
holding law court will not overturn conclusions supported by competent and substantial evidence


Ex Input:
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and part of the “unified judicial system,” is an arm of the state. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir.2000) (“All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system ... are part of ‘Commonwealth government’ and thus are state rather than local agencies.”). As a state agency, the Board has Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. Therefore, as an arm of the state, Lucas may not sue the Board unless one of the three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply. See MCI Telcomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503 (listing immunity exceptions). On appeal, Lucas argues that the Ex Parte Young exception precludes the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to the present action against the Board. Howe 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Neither of these exceptions are applicable in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action (B) holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action (C) holding that a remedial scheme created by congress even if incapable of addressing all of plaintiffs injuries precluded a bivens action (D) holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction (E) holding that young will not apply where congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state

Ex Output:
holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action


Ex Input:
law and fact. Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008). Because these mixed questions are primarily questions of law, we exercise free review. Id.; Highlands, Inc. v. Hosac, 130 Idaho 67, 69, 936 P.2d 1309, 1311 (1997). Estoppel may not ordinarily be invoked against a government or public agency functioning in a sovereign or governmental capacity. Terrazas v. Blaine County ex rel. Bd. of Comm’rs, 147 Idaho 193, 200-01, 207 P.3d 169, 176-77 (2009); State ex rel. Williams v. Adams, 90 Idaho 195, 201, 409 P.2d 415, 419 (1965); Buell v. Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 151 Idaho 257, 265, 254 P.3d 1253, 1261, (Ct.App.2011). Cf. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 138, 997 P.2d 591, 599 (2000) n of Nez Perce County, 138 Idaho 82, 87, 57 P.3d 793, 798 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Willig v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that based upon the facts presented the arbitration provisions restricting or banning class actions are substantively unconscionable (B) holding quasiestoppel did not apply when boards actions were not unconscionable without discussing whether the case presented extraordinary circumstance (C) holding quasiestoppel did not apply when department did not take an inconsistent position without discussing whether the case presented extraordinary circumstances (D) holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable (E) holding that an arbitration clause was not unconscionable because it did not unreasonably favor the defendants

Ex Output:

holding that based upon the facts presented the arbitration provisions restricting or banning class actions are substantively unconscionable