In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: contractor’s work is accepted and end day it is accepted and that, while one “who assumes control over a dangerous condition left by a contractor may be liable,” it “does not necessarily mean that he who creates the danger should escape liability”). Third, the defect in Preston— the design and construction of the pool— was “a patent one as a matter of law.” 227 Cal.Rptr. 817, 720 P.2d at 485. Moreover, other jurisdictions have faced more factually analogous circumstances and have rejected arguments similar to Occidental’s. These cases have imposed liability on former plant owners whose negligent design work resulted in an injury to a third-party after the sale of the plant to a new owner. See Stone v. United Eng’g, a Div. of Wean, Inc., 197 W.Va. 347, 475 S.E.2d 439, 443-44 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Dorman v. Swift & Co., 162 Ariz. 228, 782 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor (B) holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner (C) holding that section 150002 was satisfied with respect to hotel owners claims against former owners architect for negligent design of foundation and drainage (D) holding former plant owner liable for its negligent design of conveyor belt (E) holding that in the context of construction litigation regarding the alleged negligence of design professionals a tort action for negligent misrepresentation alleging damages based purely on economic loss is not available to a party in privity of contract with a design professional

A: recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor
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Q: County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Ban zure beyond its lawful duration, such theft violates the Fourth Amendment. See Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 151 (7th Cir.1994). The remaining question is whether Colaprete’s Fourth Amendment right against having his property converted following a search was clearly established when the alleged conversion occurred. The Seventh Circuit has held that the existence of this right is “[s]o obvious ... that we do not think the absence of case law can establish a defense of immunity.” Id. We respectfully disagree. This court has never applied the Fourth Amendment in this manner, and Supreme Court precedent tilts slightly against the existence of any constitutional right against theft during the course of a search. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533(<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional (B) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (C) holding that theft by prison guards does not violate due process when postdeprivation remedy exists (D) holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies (E) holding that a prison guards intentional destruction of a prisoners possessions did not give rise to a federal due process claim because state law provided an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy

A: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional
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Q: therefore is not owed Chevron deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”); see also Wilderness Soc’y v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (“If, under these canons, or other traditional means of determining Congress’s intentions, we are able to determine that Congress spoke clearly ..., then we may not defer to the[agency’s] contrary interpretation.”). Moreover, the Secretary’s regulation conflicts with NAGPRA’s plain language and so is invalid for that reason. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 481, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law (B) holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency (C) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference (D) holding that under a due weight deference standard a more reasonable interpretation overcomes an agency interpretation (E) holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority

A:
holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law
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