In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Eighth Circuit and a pair of nonprece-dential decisions from this court, all of which assume that lying to a supervising probation officer is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), a felony. See United States v. Wagner, 573 Fed.Appx. 598, 598-99 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Quillman, 409 Fed.Appx. 18, 21 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Grimes, 54 F.3d 489, 491-92 (8th Cir. 1995). But Grimes was decided before Congress amended § 1001 to exempt from its coverage any false statement made to a “judge or magistrate” by a party in a “judicial proceeding,” 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b), and we haven’t yet considered whether, or to what extent, that exemption covers lies made to a probation officer by a person under supervision, compare United States v. Horvath, 492 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Vreeland, 684 F.3d 653, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probation is not a sentence (B) holding that defendants lies to probation officer preparing presentence report fall within  1001b exception if probation officer must include particular statement in report (C) holding defendants statement that presentence report was correct did not constitute admission to the nature and cireumstances of the crime reflected in the report (D) holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error (E) holding that the defendants statements to the probation officer were insufficient to satisfy the safety valves fifth requirement the probation officer is for purposes of  5c12 not the government
(B)

(second factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the [private] insurer and the insured”). Finally, despite the MSP provision that the United States can pursue "any entity” for reimbursement, see id. (third factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry''), the MSP provision limits reimbursement to recoveries from "primary plans,” whose definition lists only entities which are clearly "within” the insurance industry. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) ("primary plan" means “a group health plan or large group health plan, ... a workmen's compensation law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan ... or no-fault insurance”); cf. Kachanis, 844 F.Supp. 877 (D.R.I.1994) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Finally, the Fund raises a puzzling 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  1012 applicable to feca provision allowing united states to recover from any third party (B) holding that the secretary of the interior breached the united states duty of loyalty despite the absence of any applicable treaty or statutory provision (C) holding that a states entitlement to indemnification from a third party does not vitiate the states sovereign immunity against a money judgment (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding that an ancillary forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 usc  853n is a civil action for the purpose of allowing a third party to recover attorneys fees
(A)

30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered, fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The test for when the period, under which an appeal must be taken or a petition for certiorari filed, begins to run anew is “whether the lower court, in its second order, has disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which, by its prior judgment, had been plainly and properly settled with finality.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 211-12, 73 S.Ct. 245, 97 L.Ed. 245 (1952). We find that the district court did not, by its Rule 70 order, disturb, revise or alter the legal rights or obligations plainly and properly settled in its final judgment. As a result, the time to take an appeal of the underlying judgment in this case does not run anew. See id. (<HOLDING>). We find, therefore, that Baldwin will not be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supreme court need not consider issue not raised in petition for certiorari (B) holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment (C) holding that the solicitor generals ratification of an unauthorized petition for certiorari could not cure a failure to meet the mandatory and jurisdictional 90day deadline to file a petition (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that the judgment at issue did not meet the test for whether the time to file a petition for certiorari ran anew as the judgment at issue simply reiterated without change everything which had been decided previously

(E)