In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975), and is consistent with the holdings in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382, 103 S.Ct. 683, 687, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983), and in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, supra. Blue Chip Stamps held that a section 10(b) plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of a security, and thus limited standing under the 1934 Act to “plaintiffs ... who have at least dealt in the security to which the prospectus, representation, or omission relates.” Id. 421 U.S. at 747, 95 S.Ct. at 1931. Put and call option trading on an underlying security is directly affected by the prospecti, representations and omissions of the issuer of the underlying security. See Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 506. Cf. Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303 (D.Mass.1987) (<HOLDING>). In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (B) holding that class representatives cannot appear pro se (C) holding that sellers of covered calls are not atypical class representatives (D) holding that a class representatives ignorance of the case is not a bar to certification unless it impairs the representatives ability to vigorously prosecute the action (E) holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent
[A]: (C)


[Q]: ah officer may ask a question outside the scope of the initial justification for the stop so long as it does not further lengthen the time taken to process the initial justification for the stop. In other words, if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid. This reasoning is explained in both United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc), and United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5th Cir.1993). In both cases, the courts held that questions by police officers during a traffic stop are not seizures or searches proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and cited United States Supreme Court cases dealing with non-custodial police-citizen encounters for support. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent (B) holding that police may approach persons and ask questions or permission to search so long as police do not imply that answers or consent are required (C) holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car
[A]: (B)


[Q]: runoff “caused” the response costs incurred. While defendants have proffered evidence demonstrating that lead was inherent in the tar-like material, and that the lead that was inherent was alone sufficient to justify the removal effort, this does not preclude a finding that lead that entered the property through the storm drain system might also have provided a basis for remediation. See Boeing, supra, 207 F.3d at 1185. The court is mindful of the Ninth Circuit’s formulation of the causation standard in Boeing — i.e., that there must be a showing that “either polluter’s conduct would have caused the same response cost to be incurred in the same amount, and [that] the[ir] conduct was of substantially equal blameworthiness.” Id. See also Browning-Ferris Industries, supra, 195 F.3d at 958 (<HOLDING>). Seemingly, other courts have not required a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parties liable for at least a portion of the costs of remediating a hazardous site are limited to the contribution scheme under section 9613f of cercla (B) holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious (C) holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken (D) holding that a portion of plaintiffs response costs should be allocated to a defendant whose pollution was serious enough  to require that the site be cleaned up (E) holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla
[A]:
(D)