instruction:
In this task, you are given text for US Congressional and California state bills, your task is to generate a summary for this bill.
question:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``American Missile Protection Act of 
1998''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The threat of weapons of mass destruction delivered by 
        long-range ballistic missiles is among the most serious 
        security issues facing the United States.
                    (A) In a 1994 Executive Order, President Clinton 
                certified, that ``I ... find that the proliferation of 
                nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (`weapons of 
                mass destruction') and the means of delivering such 
                weapons, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat 
                to the national security, foreign policy, and economy 
                of the United States, and hereby declare a national 
                emergency to deal with that threat.'' This state of 
                emergency was reaffirmed in 1995, 1996, and 1997.
                    (B) In 1994 the President stated, that ``there is 
                nothing more important to our security and the world's 
                stability than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons 
                and ballistic missiles''.
                    (C) Several countries hostile to the United States 
                have been particularly determined to acquire missiles 
                and weapons of mass destruction. President Clinton 
                observed in January of 1998, for example, that ``Saddam 
                Hussein has spent the better part of this decade, and 
                much of his nation's wealth, not on providing for the 
                Iraqi people, but on developing nuclear, chemical and 
                biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them''.
                    (D) In 1996, the Senate affirmed that, ``it is in 
                the supreme interest of the United States to defend 
                itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile 
                attack, whatever the source.''
            (2) The long-range ballistic missile threat to the United 
        States is increasing.
                    (A) Several adversaries of the United States have 
                stated their intention to acquire intercontinental 
                ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United 
                States.
                            (i) Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has 
                        stated, ``If they know that you have a 
                        deterrent force capable of hitting the United 
                        States, they would not be able to hit you. If 
                        we had possessed a deterrent--missiles that 
                        could reach New York--we would have hit it at 
                        the same moment. Consequently, we should build 
                        this force so that they and others will no 
                        longer think about an attack.''
                            (ii) Abu Abbas, the head of the Palestine 
                        Liberation Front, has stated, ``I would love to 
                        be able to reach the American shore, but this 
                        is very difficult. Someday an Arab country will 
                        have ballistic missiles. Someday an Arab 
                        country will have a nuclear bomb. It is better 
                        for the United States and for Israel to reach 
                        peace with the Palestinians before that day.''
                            (iii) Saddam Hussein has stated, ``Our 
                        missiles cannot reach Washington. If we could 
                        reach Washington, we would strike if the need 
                        arose.''
                            (iv) Iranian actions speak for themselves. 
                        Iran's aggressive pursuit of medium-range 
                        ballistic missiles capable of striking Central 
                        Europe--aided by the continuing collaboration 
                        of outside agents--demonstrates Tehran's intent 
                        to acquire ballistic missiles of ever-
                        increasing range.
                    (B) Over 30 non-NATO countries possess ballistic 
                missiles, with at least 10 of those countries 
                developing over 20 new types of ballistic missiles.
                    (C) From the end of World War II until 1980, 
                ballistic missiles were used in one conflict. Since 
                1980, thousands of ballistic missiles have been fired 
                in at least six different conflicts.
                    (D) The clear trend among countries hostile to the 
                United States is toward having ballistic missiles of 
                greater range.
                            (i) North Korea first acquired 300-
                        kilometer range Scud Bs, then developed and 
                        deployed 500-kilometer range Scud Cs, is 
                        currently deploying the 1000-kilometer range 
                        No-Dong, and is developing the 2000-kilometer 
                        range Taepo-Dong 1 and 6000-kilometer range 
                        Taepo-Dong 2, which would be capable of 
                        striking Alaska and Hawaii.
                            (ii) Iran acquired 150-kilometer range CSS-
                        8s, progressed through the Scud B and Scud C, 
                        and is developing the 1300-kilometer range 
                        Shahab-3 and 2000-kilometer range Shahab-4, 
                        which would allow Iran to strike Central 
                        Europe.
                            (iii) Iraq, in a two-year crash program, 
                        produced a new missile, the Al-Hussein, with 
                        twice the range of its Scud Bs.
                            (iv) Experience gained from extending the 
                        range of short- and medium-range ballistic 
                        missiles facilitates the development of 
                        intercontinental ballistic missiles.
                    (E) The technical information, hardware, and other 
                resources necessary to build ballistic missiles are 
                increasingly available and accessible worldwide.
                            (i) Due to advances in information 
                        technology, a vast amount of technical 
                        information relating to ballistic missile 
                        design, much of it formerly classified, has 
                        become widely available and is increasingly 
                        accessible through the Internet and other 
                        distribution avenues.
                            (ii) Components, tools, and materials to 
                        support ballistic missile development are 
                        increasingly available in the commercial 
                        aerospace industry.
                            (iii) Increasing demand for satellite-based 
                        telecommunications is adding to the demand for 
                        commercial Space Launch Vehicles, which employ 
                        technology that is essentially identical to 
                        that of intercontinental ballistic missiles. As 
                        this increasing demand is met, the technology 
                        and expertise associated with space launch 
                        vehicles also proliferate.
                    (F) Russia and China have provided significant 
                technical assistance to rogue nation ballistic missile 
                programs, accelerating the pace of those efforts. In 
                June of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence, 
                reporting to Congress on weapons of mass destruction-
                related equipment, materials, and technology, stated 
                that ``China and Russia continued to be the primary 
                suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to stem 
                the flow of dual-use goods and modern weapons to 
                countries of concern.''
                    (G) Russia and China continue to engage in missile 
                proliferation.
                            (i) Despite numerous Russian assurances not 
                        to assist Iran with its ballistic missile 
                        program, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
                        State for Nonproliferation testified to the 
                        Senate, that ``the problem is this: there is a 
                        disconnect between those reassurances, which we 
                        welcome, and what we believe is actually 
                        occurring.''
                            (ii) Regarding China's actions to 
                        demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to 
                        nonproliferation, the Director of Central 
                        Intelligence testified to the Senate on January 
                        28, 1998, that, ``the jury is still out on 
                        whether the recent changes are broad enough in 
                        scope and whether they will hold over the 
                        longer term. As such, Chinese activities in 
                        this area will require continued close 
                        watching.''
                    (H) The inability of the United States to defend 
                itself against weapons of mass destruction delivered by 
                long-range ballistic missile provides additional 
                incentive for hostile nations to develop long-range 
                ballistic missiles with which to threaten the United 
                States. Missiles are widely viewed as valuable tools 
                for deterring and coercing a vulnerable United States.
            (3) The ability of the United States to anticipate future 
        ballistic missile threats is questionable.
                    (A) The Intelligence Community has failed to 
                anticipate many past technical innovations (for 
                example, Iraq's extended-range Al-Hussein missiles and 
                its development of a space launch vehicle) and outside 
                assistance enables rogue states to surmount traditional 
                technological obstacles to obtaining or developing 
                ballistic missiles of increasing range.
                    (B) In June of 1997, the Director of Central 
                Intelligence reported to Congress that ``many Third 
                World countries--with Iran being the most prominent 
                example--are responding to Western counter-
                proliferation efforts by relying more on legitimate 
                commercial firms as procurement fronts and by 
                developing more convoluted procurement networks.''
                    (C) In June of 1997, the Director of Central 
                Intelligence stated to Congress that ``gaps and 
                uncertainties preclude a good projection of exactly 
                when `rest of the world' countries will deploy ICBMs.''
                    (D) In 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence 
                testified that Iran would have a medium-range missile 
                by 2007. One year later the Director stated, ``since I 
                testified, Iran's success in getting technology and 
                materials from Russian companies, combined with recent 
                indigenous Iranian advances, means that it could have a 
                medium-range missile much sooner than I assessed last 
                year.'' Department of State officials have testified 
                that Iran could be prepared to deploy such a missile as 
                early as late 1998, nine years earlier than had been 
                predicted one year before by the Director of Central 
                Intelligence.
            (4) The failure to prepare adequately for long-range 
        ballistic missile threats could have severe national security 
        and foreign policy consequences for the United States.
                    (A) An attack on the United States by a ballistic 
                missile equipped with a weapon of mass destruction 
                could inflict catastrophic death or injury to citizens 
                of the United States and severe damage to their 
                property.
                    (B) A rogue state's ability to threaten the United 
                States with an intercontinental ballistic missile may 
                constrain the United States' options in dealing with 
                regional threats to its interests, deter the United 
                States from taking appropriate action, or prompt allies 
                to question United States security guarantees, thereby 
                weakening alliances of the United States and the United 
                States' world leadership position.
            (5) The United States must be prepared for rogue nations 
        acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with weapons of 
        mass destruction.
                    (A) In its resolution of ratification for the START 
                II Treaty, the United States Senate declared that 
                ``because deterrence may be inadequate to protect the 
                United States against long-range ballistic missile 
                threats, missile defenses are a necessary part of new 
                deterrent strategies.''
                    (B) In September of 1994, Secretary of Defense 
                Perry stated that in the post-Cold War era, ``we now 
                have opportunity to create a new relationship based not 
                on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather 
                on another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.''
                    (C) On February 12, 1997, the Under Secretary of 
                Defense for Policy testified to the Senate that ``I and 
                the administration are quite willing to acknowledge 
                that if we saw a rogue state, a potential proliferant, 
                beginning to develop a long-range ICBM capable of 
                reaching the United States, we would have to give very, 
                very serious attention to deploying a limited national 
                missile defense.''
            (6) The United States has no defense deployed against 
        weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-range ballistic 
        missiles and no policy to deploy such a national missile 
        defense system.

SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is 
technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system 
capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited 
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or 
deliberate).
answer:
American Missile Protection Act of 1998 - States as U.S. policy to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending U.S. territory against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).


question:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Cancer Screening and Prevention 
Act''.

SEC. 2. MEDICARE COVERAGE OF COLORECTAL SCREENING.

    (a) In General.--Section 1834 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
1395m) is amended by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
subsection:
    ``(d) Frequency and Payment Limits for Screening Fecal-Occult Blood 
Tests, Screening Flexible Sigmoidoscopies, and Screening Colonoscopy.--
            ``(1) Screening fecal-occult blood tests.--
                    ``(A) Payment limit.--In establishing fee schedules 
                under section 1833(h) with respect to screening fecal-
                occult blood tests provided for the purpose of early 
                detection of colon cancer, except as provided by the 
                Secretary under paragraph (3)(A), the payment amount 
                established for tests performed--
                            ``(i) in 1996 shall not exceed $5; and
                            ``(ii) in a subsequent year, shall not 
                        exceed the limit on the payment amount 
                        established under this subsection for such 
                        tests for the preceding year, adjusted by the 
                        applicable adjustment under section 1833(h) for 
                        tests performed in such year.
                    ``(B) Frequency limit.--Subject to revision by the 
                Secretary under paragraph (3)(B), no payment may be 
                made under this part for a screening fecal-occult blood 
                test provided to an individual for the purpose of early 
                detection of colon cancer--
                            ``(i) if the individual is under 50 years 
                        of age; or
                            ``(ii) if the test is performed within the 
                        11 months after a previous screening fecal-
                        occult blood test.
            ``(2) Screening flexible sigmoid- oscopies.--
                    ``(A) Payment amount.--The Secretary shall 
                establish a payment amount under section 1848 with 
                respect to screening flexible sigmoidoscopies provided 
                for the purpose of early detection of colon cancer that 
                is consistent with payment amounts under such section 
                for similar or related services, except that such 
                payment amount shall be established without regard to 
                subsection (a)(2)(A) of such section.
                    ``(B) Frequency limit.--Subject to revision by the 
                Secretary under paragraph (4)(B), no payment may be 
                made under this part for a screening flexible 
                sigmoidoscopy provided to an individual for the purpose 
                of early detection of colon cancer--
                            ``(i) if the individual is under 50 years 
                        of age; or
                            ``(ii) if the procedure is performed within 
                        the 47 months after a previous screening 
                        flexible sigmoidoscopy.
            ``(3) Screening colonoscopy for individuals at high risk 
        for colorectal cancer.--
                    ``(A) Payment amount.--The Secretary shall 
                establish a payment amount under section 1848 with 
                respect to screening colonoscopy for individuals at 
                high risk for colorectal cancer (as defined in 
                subparagraph (C)) provided for the purpose of early 
                detection of colon cancer that is consistent with 
                payment amounts under such section for similar or 
                related services, except that such payment amount shall 
                be established without regard to subsection (a)(2)(A) 
                of such section.
                    ``(B) Frequency limit.--Subject to revision by the 
                Secretary under paragraph (4)(B), no payment may be 
                made under this part for a screening colonoscopy for 
                individuals at high
                 risk for colorectal cancer provided to an individual 
for the purpose of early detection of colon cancer if the procedure is 
performed within the 23 months after a previous screening colonoscopy.
                    ``(C) Individual at high risk defined.--In this 
                subsection, an `individual at high risk for colorectal 
                cancer' is an individual who, because of family 
                history, prior experience of cancer or precursor 
                neoplastic polyps, a history of chronic digestive 
                disease condition (including inflammatory bowel 
                disease, Crohn's Disease, or ulcerative colitis), the 
                presence of any appropriate recognized gene markers for 
                colorectal cancer, or other predisposing factors, faces 
                a high risk for colorectal cancer.
            ``(4) Reductions in payment limit and revision of 
        frequency.--
                    ``(A) Reductions in payment limit.--The Secretary 
                shall review from time to time the appropriateness of 
                the amount of the payment limit established for 
                screening fecal-occult blood tests under paragraph 
                (1)(A). The Secretary may, with respect to tests 
                performed in a year after 1998, reduce the amount of 
                such
                 limit as it applies nationally or in any area to the 
amount that the Secretary estimates is required to assure that such 
tests of an appropriate quality are readily and conveniently available 
during the year.
                    ``(B) Revision of frequency.--
                            ``(i) Review.--The Secretary shall review 
                        periodically the appropriate frequency for 
                        performing screening fecal-occult blood tests, 
                        screening flexible sigmoidoscopies, and 
                        screening colonoscopy based on age and such 
                        other factors as the Secretary believes to be 
                        pertinent.
                            ``(ii) Revision of frequency.--The 
                        Secretary, taking into consideration the review 
                        made under clause (i), may revise from time to 
                        time the frequency with which such tests and 
                        procedures may be paid for under this 
                        subsection, but no such revision shall apply to 
                        tests or procedures performed before January 1, 
                        1999.
            ``(5) Limiting charges of nonparticipating physicians.--
                    ``(A) In general.--In the case of a screening 
                flexible sigmoidoscopy provided to an individual for 
                the purpose of early detection of colon cancer or a 
                screening colonoscopy provided to an individual at high 
                risk for colorectal cancer for the purpose of early 
                detection of colon cancer for which payment may be made 
                under this part, if a nonparticipating physician 
                provides the procedure to an individual enrolled under 
                this part, the physician may not charge the individual 
                more than the limiting charge (as defined in section 
                1848(g)(2)).
                    ``(B) Enforcement.--If a physician or supplier 
                knowing and willfully imposes a charge in violation of 
                subparagraph (A), the Secretary may apply sanctions 
                against such physician or supplier in accordance with 
                section 1842(j)(2).''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Paragraphs (1)(D) and (2)(D) of 
section 1833(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1395l(a)) are each amended by 
striking ``subsection (h)(1),'' and inserting ``subsection (h)(1) or 
section 1834(d)(1),''.
    (2) Section 1833(h)(1)(A) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1395l(h)(1)(A)) is 
amended by striking ``The Secretary'' and inserting ``Subject to 
paragraphs (1) and (3)(A) of section 1834(d), the Secretary''.
    (3) Clauses (i) and (ii) of section 1848(a)(2)(A) of such Act (42 
U.S.C. 1395w-4(a)(2)(A)) are each amended by striking ``a service'' and 
inserting ``a service (other than a screening flexible sigmoidoscopy 
provided to an individual for the purpose of early detection of colon 
cancer or a screening colonoscopy provided to an individual at high 
risk for colorectal cancer for the purpose of early detection of colon 
cancer)''.
    (4) Section 1862(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1395y(a)) is amended--
            (A) in paragraph (1)--
                    (i) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``and'' at the 
                end,
                    (ii) in subparagraph (F), by striking the semicolon 
                at the end and inserting ``, and'', and
                    (iii) by adding at the end the following new 
                subparagraph:
            ``(G) in the case of screening fecal-occult blood tests, 
        screening flexible sigmoidoscopies, and screening colonoscopy 
        provided for the purpose of early detection of colon cancer, 
        which are performed more frequently than is covered under 
        section 1834(d);''; and
            (B) in paragraph (7), by striking ``paragraph (1)(B) or 
        under paragraph (1)(F)'' and inserting ``subparagraphs (B), 
        (F), or (G) of paragraph (1)''.

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    The amendments made by section 2 shall apply to screening fecal-
occult blood tests, screening flexible sigmoidoscopies, and screening 
colonoscopy performed on or after January 1, 1996.
answer:
Cancer Screening and Prevention Act - Amends title XVIII (Medicare) of the Social Security Act to provide for coverage of various specified colon and colorectal screening tests and corresponding payment and frequency limits.


question:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Trade and Environment Enforcement 
(`Green 301') Act''.

SEC. 2. IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN COUNTRY TRADE PRACTICES THAT 
              NEGATIVELY AFFECT THE ENVIRONMENT.

    (a) In General.--Chapter 1 of title III of the Trade Act of 1974 
(19 U.S.C. 2411 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 311. IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN COUNTRY TRADE PRACTICES THAT 
              NEGATIVELY AFFECT THE ENVIRONMENT.

    ``(a) Identification.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Trade Representative shall identify 
        those foreign country trade practices that cause negative 
        environmental impacts on the protection of human, animal, or 
        plant life or health, or the conservation of exhaustible 
        natural resources in the United States, the foreign country, a 
        third country, or internationally.
            ``(2) Factors.--In identifying foreign country trade 
        practices under paragraph (1), the Trade Representative shall 
        take into account all relevant factors, including--
                    ``(A) the strength of the connection between trade 
                and the negative environmental impact;
                    ``(B) the significance of the negative 
                environmental impact on the protection of human, animal 
                or plant life or health, or the conservation of 
                exhaustible natural resources; and
                    ``(C) the costs and benefits of mitigating the 
                negative environmental impact through the remedies 
                described in this section.
            ``(3) Consultation.--In identifying foreign country trade 
        practices under paragraph (1), the Trade Representative shall 
        provide the opportunity for input by and consultation with 
        interested persons, including private or nongovernmental 
        organizations working towards environmental protection or 
        conservation, domestic industrial users of any goods that may 
        be affected by this section, and appropriate Federal 
        departments and agencies.
    ``(b) Report.--
            ``(1) In general.--Not later than 270 days after the date 
        of submission of a report under section 181(b) of this Act, the 
        Trade Representative shall submit to the Committee on Ways and 
        Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
        Finance of the Senate and publish in the Federal Register a 
        report on the foreign country trade practices identified under 
        subsection (a).
            ``(2) Matters to be included.--The Trade Representative may 
        include in the report, if appropriate--
                    ``(A) a description of other foreign country trade 
                practices that may in the future warrant inclusion in 
                the report as foreign country trade practices that 
                negatively affect the environment; and
                    ``(B) a statement regarding other foreign country 
                trade practices that negatively affect the environment 
                that have not been identified because they are subject 
                to other provisions of United States trade law, 
                existing bilateral trade agreements, or trade 
                negotiations, and progress is being made toward the 
                mitigation, reduction, or elimination of the negative 
                environmental impacts of such foreign country trade 
                practices.
    ``(c) Petitions.--
            ``(1) In general.--Any interested person, as described in 
        subsection (a)(3), may file a petition with the Trade 
        Representative requesting that action be taken under subsection 
        (a) and setting forth the allegations in support of the 
        request.
            ``(2) Review.--The Trade Representative shall review the 
        allegations in any petition filed under paragraph (1) and, not 
        later than 45 days after the date on which the Trade 
        Representative receives the petition, shall determine whether 
        to initiate consultations under subsection (d) with respect to 
        the allegations in the petition.
            ``(3) Determination not to initiate consultations.--If the 
        Trade Representative determines not to initiate consultations 
        under subsection (d) with respect to a petition filed under 
        paragraph (1), the Trade Representative shall inform the 
        petitioner of the reasons therefor and shall publish notice of 
        the determination, together with a summary of such reasons, in 
        the Federal Register.
    ``(d) Consultations.--Not later than 3 weeks after the date on 
which the report required under subsection (b) is submitted to the 
congressional committees specified under subsection (b) or upon 
acceptance of a petition described in subsection (c), the Trade 
Representative shall request consultations with the government of each 
foreign country identified under subsection (a) or in such a petition 
regarding the practices with respect to which the foreign country was 
so identified.
    ``(e) Agreements.--
            ``(1) In general.--As part of the consultations with a 
        foreign country under subsection (d), the Trade Representative 
        shall seek to negotiate an agreement between the United States 
        and the foreign country that provides for the mitigation, 
        reduction, or elimination of the negative environmental impacts 
        that are the result of the trade practices with respect to 
        which the foreign country was identified under subsection (a) 
        or (c).
            ``(2) Failure to reach agreement.--If the United States and 
        a foreign country fail to reach an agreement described in 
        paragraph (1), the Trade Representative--
                    ``(A) shall take all appropriate and feasible 
                action authorized under section 301(c) of this Act, 
                subject to the specific direction, if any, of the 
                President regarding any such action; and
                    ``(B) shall take all other appropriate and feasible 
                action within the power of the President that the 
                President may direct the Trade Representative to take 
                under this subsection, to obtain the mitigation, 
                reduction, or elimination of negative environmental 
                impacts that are the result of the trade practices with 
                respect to which the foreign country was identified 
                under subsection (a).
    ``(f) Foreign Country Trade Practice Defined.--In this section, the 
term `foreign country trade practice' or `trade practice'--
            ``(1) means any act, policy, or practice of a foreign 
        country relating to trade as well as the sustained or recurring 
        lack of any act, policy, or practice of a foreign country 
        relating to trade; but
            ``(2) does not include any such act, policy, or practice 
        that reflects a reasonable exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
        or a reasonable decision regarding the allocation of 
        environmental enforcement resources.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Trade Act of 
1974 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 310 the 
following:

``Sec. 311. Identification of countries that engage in trade practices 
                            that negatively affect the environment.''.
answer:

Trade and Environment Enforcement (Green 301) Act - Amends the Trade Act of 1974 to require the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to: (1) identify foreign country trade practices that cause negative impacts on the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health, or the conservation of exhaustible natural resources in the United States, the foreign country, a third country, or internationally; (2) review petitions requesting certain action with respect to such trade practices; and (3) consult with an identified foreign country and seek to negotiate an agreement that mitigates, reduces, or eliminates those negative impacts.