In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
WTT Project area as defined by the Corps. NEF contends that we need not consider the State’s argument because the State failed to raise this argument in its initial motion to clarify, instead raising it for the first time in its Rule 59(e) motion. “Rule 59(e) motions are ‘aimed at reconsideration, not initial consideration.’ ” FDIC v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Bank of New England, 897 F.2d 611, 616 (1st Cir.1990)). In World University, this Court held that the defendant’s argument, which it raised for the first time in a Rule 59(e) motion, was barred where there was no reason why the defendant could not have presented its argument prior to its motion to alter or amend the judgment. Id.; see also Engler, 146 F.3d at 374 (<HOLDING>). This rule, however, does not cover the facts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument (B) holding that a party in a habeas case waives an argument by failing to raise it before the district court (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that an argument was barred where the movant could have but did not raise its argument before the district court ruled in the original motion (E) holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court

Ex Output:
holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument


Ex Input:
California state prisoner, Roy Lee Brown, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand. Brown contends that his § 2254 petition was timely filed because his state habeas petitions statutorilly tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Brown is entitled to tolling during the time he was seeking one full round of collateral review by the California courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Delhomme v. Ramirez, No. 00-56148, 2003 WL 21947183, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed (B) holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice (C) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (D) holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review (E) holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review

Ex Output:
holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed


Ex Input:
S.W.2d at 45-46 (emphasis in original); Jefco, 520 S.W.2d at 922; Martin, 437 S.W.2d at 592. Satterfield has not made it clearly apparent that chapter 149 is unnecessary, unreasonable, and unjustified by the facts. See Bellaire, 317 S.W.2d at 45-46. To invalidate chapter 149, Satterfield, would have this Court reject the statement of legislative intent accompanying the statute’s enactment. However, because there is room for a fair difference of opinion as to the necessity and reasonableness of chapter 149 on subjects that lie within the police power (i.e., promotion of the public interest in jobs and pensions, increasing state industries, developing its resources, and adding to its wealth and prosperity), this Court will not hold it void. See id.; see also Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 634 (<HOLDING>). Chapter 149 handles competing economic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that edwards aquifer acts cap on landowners water withdrawal was necessary to safeguard public welfare and that consideration of preexisting users water consumption before effective date of act did not render act unconstitutional (B) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective (C) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (D) recognizing the importance of public welfare and conservation of water in administering its public waters (E) holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act

Ex Output:

holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective