In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: v. Conlee, 370 Ark. 89, 257 S.W.3d 543 (2007). Kyler Road Home Charles first argues on appeal that the circuit court erred by not awarding him an interest in the home on Kyler Road. Although he acknowledges that Myra had acquired this property prior to the marriage, he asserts that he is entitled to an interest in the home because | ^marital funds were used to reduce the debt on the properly and to make improvements. Our definition of marital properly excludes property acquired before the marriage. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b)(1) (Repl.2009). However, we have long held that a non-owning spouse is entitled to some benefit when marital funds have been expended to improve or reduce the debt on the other spouse’s nonmarital property. See Box v. Box, 312 Ark. 550, 851 S.W.2d 437 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Bagwell v. Bagwell, 282 Ark. 403, 668 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property (B) holding that assets acquired subsequent to separation are not considered marital property absent evidence that spouse used marital property to obtain them (C) holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital (D) holding that the trial court erred in finding that marital property was the former wifes separate property based on a nonseparation agreement in which the former husband purported to relinquish any interest in the marital property (E) holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property

Output: holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property


Input: Consider Input: Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word “claimant” in subsection four. Under the plurality’s view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word “claimant” in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of “prevailing party.” This is because, in order for the word “claimant” in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid

Output: holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence


Input: Consider Input: lead levels, from which “a jury could reasonably infer that if [defendant’s property] was not contributing source [of lead exposure,]” plaintiffs blood lead levels would have decreased while living at that property). And, of course, a plaintiff who overcomes summary judgment still bears the burden of proof as to the element of causation at trial, where expert opinion can play a critical role in persuading a jury. The standard for admissibility of expert testimony as to source causation is thus a vital one in lead paint actions. The Majority holds today that an expert who gives an opinion that a defendant’s property caused a plaintiffs harm does not need to show or explain that other reasonably probable sources did not cause the plaintiffs harm. Majority Op. at 250-51, 164 A.3d at 238 (<HOLDING>) The Majority’s removal of the requirement that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify (B) holding that an expert is not competent to testify as to statutory interpretation (C) holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard (D) holding that it is not the rule that a source causation expert in a lead paint action must exclude other properties before he can testify that the plaintiff was exposed to lead at the subject property (E) recognizing that a plaintiff must produce a medical expert to testify as to causation in all but the most selfevident medical malpractice actions


Output: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify