In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: to the registrations of any party to the action. Decrees and orders shall be certified by the court to the Commissioner, who shall make appropriate entry upon the records of the Patent and Trademark Office, and shall be controlled thereby. 15 U.S.C. § 1119. 27. The legal issue in a cancellation proceeding is the right to register a mark and when a mark is not incontestable, a court may cancel the mark on any ground which would have prevented registration initially. International Order of Job's Daughters, 727 F.2d at 1091. 28. As noted, a mark "which does not fulfill the functions of a trademark, but, rather, serves essentially a utilitarian or functional purpose cannot be registered as a trademark." Id.; see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson, 25 F.2d 833, 834-35 (4th Cir.1928) (<HOLDING>). 29. Because Shakespeare's mark is a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that automobile racing is not an ultrahazardous activity (B) holding that diamondshaped tread on tire which is a mechanically functional feature of an automobile tire cannot be registered (C) holding when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile he may as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest search the passenger compartment of that automobile (D) holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer (E) holding that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered  stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his drivers license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the fourth amendment
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: is correct. We will also assume that the court’s erro umed error prejudiced him is that other evidence supports the finding that he was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy. In the district court, Vasquez did not object to the PSR’s statement that he “recruited Wornick and Sella” into the conspiracy. Although the district court did not explicitly find that Vasquez recruited two of his co-conspirators, “[i]t is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a[PSR] admits those facts for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.2006). And we have held many times that a defendant’s recruitment of co-conspirators supports a § 3B1.1 enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 n. 2 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1304 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer leader manager or supervisor under  3bllc in part because the defendant actively recruited two individuals to transport drugs (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was a manager or supervisor under  3bllb in part because he recruited accomplices (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer or leader under  3blla in part because he recruited coconspirators
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: be overcome. The Director Defendants counter that Delaware state courts frequently dismiss duty of care claims based on a DGCL § 102(b)(7) exculpatory defense at the motion to dismiss stage of a suit. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1094 (Del.2001). Yet, those Delaware courts were interpreting Delaware state procedural rules. The Director Defendants incorrectly assume that Delaware’s procedural rules concerning a motion to dismiss are equivalent to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the Third Circuit stated, “Delaware cases are legion requiring specific allegations of fact to support a plaintiffs demand for relief under Chancery Rule 8.” Tower Air, 416 F.3d at 236; see also Notinger v. Costa. (In re Robotic Vision Systems, Inc.), 374 B.R. 36, 44 (Bankr.D.N.H.2007) (<HOLDING>). Relying on Delaware state court decisions, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied (B) recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard (C) holding the pslra standard for pleading scienter is more stringent than the second circuits standard prior to the act and that motive and opportunity is not an independent basis to show defendants had scienter (D) holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983 (E) holding that state courts must apply the federal pleading standard in fela cases
[EX A]:
(B)