instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
the Society over in Russia when the company began to sell its SMIRNOV vodka there. A pending litigation in a foreign country between essentially the same parties, even one that concerned a slightly different topic, has been found to create a objectively reasonably apprehension of suit. See Ethicon, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 369 F.Supp. 934, 936-37 (D.N.J.1973). Therefore, even though it appears as if the defendants have never directly threatened the plaintiffs with legal action in the United States, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have introduced sufficient evidence to support their claim that they reasonably feared a lawsuit if they attempted to enter the U.S. market. Cf. Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of America, 257 F.2d 485, 490 (3d Cir.1958) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, because the court finds that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the declaratory judgment act is a procedural device (B) recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is procedural in nature and not an extension of federal court jurisdiction (C) holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment (D) holding that letter stating that the defendant was fully prepared to take all necessary legal action in order to protect defendants work was sufficient to show an actual threat of litigation and created a case or controversy for the purposes of the declaratory judgment act (E) recognizing that it is not essential for there to be a direct threat of litigation in order to invoke the declaratory judgment act
answer:
(E)


question:
arrest for a misdemeanor is permitted only when one of the statutory exceptions is met. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-10-207© (2008). 5 . "According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a 0 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that the duration of the stop was unreasonably extended where the officer admitted that, for thirteen minutes of the sixteen minute stop, he asked the defendant questions that were unrelated to the traffic violation); Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1172— 73 (Del.2010) (concluding that the stop, during which the officer asked the defendant for identification and ran a background check, “did not exceed the permissible scope of a routine traffic stop”); Bucalo v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-CA-000176-MR, 2012 WL 246245, at *5-7 (Ky.Ct.App. Jan. 27, 2012) (<HOLDING>); State v. Mason, 173 Md.App. 414, 919 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a traffic stop which lasted 105 minutes from the time of the initial stop until the defendant was arrested on drugrelated charges was unreasonable because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for purposes of conducting a drug dog sniff because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant was engaged in drugrelated activity (B) holding circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion to make a stop included that the defendant was on a comer on which recent multiple drugrelated arrests had been made (C) holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished (D) holding that an officer does not need reasonable articulable suspicion of drugrelated criminal activity prior to subjecting defendants car to a dog sniff subsequent to a lawful traffic stop (E) holding duration of stop was reasonable as it lasted under thirty minutes
answer:
(A)


question:
defective. If anything, his testimony suggests the battery in the ICD device was working too well; the ICD activated at times when he believed his heart rate was normal. At one point, Melton testified that the battery powering the ICD “never malfunctioned between the date that it was implanted and the date it was explanted.” Further, to the extent the ICD was “defective” in the sense that it was prone to over-activation, Melton also failed to present evidence that Dr. Feldman or Columbia Heart Clinic knew this at the time Dr. Feldman implanted the ICD. Accordingly, Melton failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Feldman’s implantation of the ICD, in and of itself, constituted malpractice. 3. Improper Corp., 324 S.C. 359, 365, 478 S.E.2d 81, 84 (Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, Melton failed to present 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury (B) holding expert testimony is generally required to establish proximate cause in medical malpractice cases (C) holding expert testimony is ordinarily required in legal malpractice cases to establish the standard of care (D) holding that expert medical testimony was not necessary to establish negligence where surgeon left a needle in the patients body but stating that proof of proximate cause requires some expert testimony in medical malpractice cases (E) holding expert testimony not required to defeat summary judgment in medical malpractice suit because defendant doctors admissions were sufficient to establish the standard of care
answer:

(B)