In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: court’s description of the panel’s rationale as “one over which reasonable jurists may differ” can hardly be construed as a ringing endorsement of Bush v. Gore’s precedential value or its application to the issue of variations in voting technology. Shelley II, 344 F.3d at 918. At the very least, the Ninth Circuit’s unanimous decision in Shelley II divested the panel decision of whatever precedential value it otherwise would have had. Undeterred, the majority struggles to accord such value to Shelley I because the rationale adopted by the majority is virtually identical to the one provided by the Shelley I panel — namely, that the plaintiffs’ novel equal protection claims are controlled by Supreme Court precedents that mandate the equal weighting of votes. Compare Maj. Op. at 870-71 (<HOLDING>), with Shelley I, 344 F.3d at 894-95 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error (B) holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional (C) holding that the counties use of outdated technology results in the weighting of votes differently (D) holding that a plaintiff need only show that the results of a polygraph examination were a factor in the termination of employment and rejecting requirement that results be the sole factor for employees discharge (E) holding that in a statutory fee case the results obtained factor was already subsumed in the lodestar and that results multipliers should be awarded only in some cases of exceptional success

Output: holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error


Input: Consider Input: litigation. The district court can correct any abuses at the fees for fees stage under the “reasonableness” standard. The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment (B) holding that time entries such as preparation for hearing or preparation for school visit were too vague and reducing overall fee award by twentyfive percent (C) holding that fee application must be sufficiently detailed to allow court to make an independent evaluation as to what fees are actual and necessary and finding that failure to keep contemporaneous records does not automatically result in denial of the fees but the lack thereof justifies a reduction of the fee to the level proven (D) holding that attorneys fees for the preparation of the fee application are compensable (E) holding that the independent counsel reauthorization act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application

Output: holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment


Input: Consider Input: article is no longer manufactured or is not available, we will pay the cost of a new article similar to that damaged or destroyed and which is of comparable quality and usefulness.” See policy at replacement cost settlement on personal property endorsement. 2 . The policy states “[w]e will pay no more than the actual cash value of the damage until actual repair or replacement is completed....” See policy at replacement cost settlement on personal property endorsement. 3 . This court notes that Gilderman’s summary of the Ferguson holding is inaccurate when read against the actual language of Ferguson, quoted herein. 4 . See also, Kastendiek v. Millers Mutual Insurance Co., 946 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Brachter v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 961 P.2d 828, 831 (Okla. 1998) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The provision does favor defendant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  672316 and  672719 stand for the principle that parties to a contract may properly limit the remedies for a breachofwarranty to repair and replacement when such limitations are reasonable but noting that the limitation is not valid when the limitation causes the product to fail of its essential purpose (B) holding limitation of liability provision limiting damages to replacement or correction of defective material andor installation in service contract for improvements to plaintiffs residence was valid and enforceable citing restatement of contracts  339 cmt g other citations omitted  (C) holding replacement cost provisions making payment of replacement cost dependant upon actual repair or replacement are unambiguous (D) holding that where log home construction kit contained defects that could not be repaired contractual provision limiting damages to cost of repair failed of its essential purpose and therefore the limitation on liability was not enforceable (E) holding that written warranty may limit a remedy to repair or replacement of parts so long as limitation is clearly expressed


Output: holding that  672316 and  672719 stand for the principle that parties to a contract may properly limit the remedies for a breachofwarranty to repair and replacement when such limitations are reasonable but noting that the limitation is not valid when the limitation causes the product to fail of its essential purpose