In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court’s order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants’ arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment
holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied

where he admitted that other Dunkin’ Donuts shops do sell soft drinks such as milk, juice or soda. See Trpko Taseski Depo., attached as Exh. 3B to plaintiffs motion, p. 61. Defendants’ only response to plaintiffs argument regarding the inapplicability of the rider are these two brief sentences: “Plaintiffs cases are inappositive. The controlling principle of law is that money paid under a mistake of fact can be recouped in an action assumpsit.” However, defendants’ claim of a “mistake of fact” is unsupported by the record. To the contrary, the facts presented confirm that no mistake was made because defendants’ were correct in voluntarily paying fees on the sales of such products. There is therefore no ground for an actio ranchise Guide (CCH) ¶ 11,290 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 30, 1997) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue that the Michigan Franchise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under michigan franchise investment law franchisees failure to comply with lawful provisions in franchise agreements by failing to pay royalties and advertising fees and failing to file monthly sales reports constituted good cause for franchisors termination of agreements where franchisor gave notice of termination in writing and franchisees made no effort to cure (B) holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable (C) holding that franchisees tax evasion scheme provided cause for termination (D) holding that franchisees illegal sale of cigarettes to minors provided cause for termination (E) holding that traditional commercial contract provided for termination at will under arkansas law
holding that under michigan franchise investment law franchisees failure to comply with lawful provisions in franchise agreements by failing to pay royalties and advertising fees and failing to file monthly sales reports constituted good cause for franchisors termination of agreements where franchisor gave notice of termination in writing and franchisees made no effort to cure

and Cotton, we find that the purported error here does not satisfy Olano’s fourth prong. In Johnson and Cotton, the Supreme Court found that violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not overcome the “threat ... to the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings” that would result from reversing convictions supported by overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence. Id. (internal citations omitted). Any error in this case derives not from a constitutional violation, but from a statutory transgression. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702, 68 S.Ct. 793, 92 L.Ed. 1010 (1948) (“[M]ost matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level.”); Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). In light of Johnson and Cotton’s refusal to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the bias analysis insufficient to support its decisions (B) holding that a challenge for cause for actual bias  essentially requires a determination  of credibility (C) holding that the recusal statute should not be construed so broadly as to become effectively presumptive or to require recusal based on unsubstantiated suggestions of personal bias or prejudice (D) recognizing that statutes mandating recusal for actual bias have constitutional bases unlike those that require recusal for a mere appearance of bias or prejudice (E) holding that prejudgment constitutes cause for recusal

holding the bias analysis insufficient to support its decisions