In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence. (b) Nothing in this section is intended to exclude from evidence statements made during a polygraph examination which are otherwise admissible. Under the plain language of this rule, the military judge’s ruling was correct. By adding this Rule, the 1991 amendment to the Manual for Courts-Martial restored the armed forces to the approach followed in the 1969 Manual. Cf. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 253 (C.M.A.1987)(2-1 decision holding that the trial judge has the discretion to admit the results of polygraph examinations); United States v. Williams, 39 M.J. 555, 558 (A.C.M.R.1994)(<HOLDING>). The concerns behind this rule include: that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding ban violated the sherman act (B) holding that the governments use of classified evidence in detentionpendingdeportation proceedings violated detainees due process rights and inter alia justified his release (C) holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence that other persons had a motive to kill the victims because inter alia such evidence was speculative (D) holding that the absolute ban on polygraph evidence violated due process and the right to present evidence citing inter alia chambers v mississippi 410 us 284 93 sct 1038 35 led2d 297 1973 (E) holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material

Ex Output:
holding ban violated the sherman act


Ex Input:
to be heard on the motion have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.” E.D. Mich. Local Rule 7.1(h)(3); see Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 385 (6th Cir.2004). Here, the district court found that Moniz “simply is attempting to re-argue [] issues which were already ruled upon by the Court when it dismissed his Complaint,” and thus denied the motion to reconsider. R. 14 (Dist. Ct. Order at 3) (Page ID # 129). This court has stated that a district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reconsider where the motion “merely raise[s] arguments that were already ruled upon.” Graham, 358 F.3d at 385; see also Lommen v. McIntyre, 125 Fed.Appx. 655, 659 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). There was no abuse of discretion in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (B) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for reconsideration where the motion presented nothing new and merely rephrased allegations in the complaint (E) holding under third circuit law that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion

Ex Output:
holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing


Ex Input:
made by the jury for loss of consortium. In Massachusetts, a parent of a minor child has a statutory claim for loss of consortium to recover for the loss of society and companionship caused by the negligent injury of the child. M.G.L.c. 231, §85X. Massachusetts courts have also recognized a child’s right to recover for loss of a parent’s society and companionship through a defendant’s negligence if the child is a minor who depends on the parent both economically and in filial needs for closeness, guidance and nurture. See Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507 (1980). A claim for loss of consortium stands on its own, separate and distinct from the cause of action of the person seeking compensation for injury. See Feltch v. General Rental Co., 421 N.E.2d 67, 71 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Pinheiro v. Medical Malpractice Joint 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for loss of consortium (B) recognizing loss of consortium claims (C) holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse (D) recognizing that loss of consortium is a right of action separate from that of the spouse (E) holding that a loss of consortium is separate and independent from the primary action

Ex Output:

recognizing cause of action for loss of consortium