In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

v. Eggleston, 202 Ariz. 523, 527, ¶ 16, 47 P.3d 1161, 1165 (App.2002). Second, a statute should be construed in conjunction with other statutes that relate to the same subject or purpose, giving effect to all statutes involved. Id. Third, in furtherance of such harmonization, courts should review the history of the various sections in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature and thereby construe the statutes to further that intent. State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366, 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989). After reviewing the history of the relevant statutory scheme, we conclude that the legislature never intended that the acquisition of land for park purposes be subject to the public auction requirement. See State v. Cornish, 192 Ariz. 533, 537, ¶ 16, 968 P.2d 606, 610 (App.1998) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 12 As part of its comprehensive statutory 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that courts should look to other sources of legislative intent if the statutory language does not convey a clear meaning (B) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent (E) holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous
(D)

period under IAD never commenced); Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 489-90 (D.C. 1997) (rejecting prisoner’s substantial compliance argument and recognizing that court is bound by Fex); State v. Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d 579, 581-82 (Ind. 1996) (requiring strict compliance with IAD procedures and recognizing that procedures are "not mere technicalities”); Pinto v. Warden, C.A. No. 972412, 1999 WL 49378, at *7 (Conn. Super. Jan. 20, 1999) (stating that "[wjhile it is true that earlier decisions of courts were split on when the 180 day period begins, the majority of courts ... have held that the period begins to run once the request is actually received by the appropriate court and prosecutor”); Commonwealth v. Flores, C.A. No. 91-493, 1998 WL 792466, at *3 (Mass. Super. Nov. 6, 1998) (<HOLDING>). 48 . 1993 WL 138993, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court (B) holding that an noa filed by a pro se prisoner is deemed filed on the date that the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for mailing (C) holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing (D) holding that the iad as construed by fex requires that a prisoner must be tried within 180 days of the date when his request for disposition is actu ally received by the state in which the charges are pending not when the prisoner provides that request to his custodial authorities (E) holding time begins when the prisoner knows  the important facts not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance
(D)

but plaintiffs have imposed correspondingly greater fees and costs upon defendants. That fact may constitute grounds for reducing plaintiffs’ fee request, but it does not permit the court to deny the fee request altogether. As the Court of Appeals has stated, “[t]o the extent that Chambless’ actions were ‘vexatious[ ] and wasteful[ ],’ he is obviously pe-nalized by not recovering any attorney’s fees for those efforts. This does not affect his right to a reasonable attorney’s fee for his successful claim.” Chambless, 815 F.2d at 872. Nor is plaintiffs’ supplemental application so untimely as to be denied on the ground that it “unfairly surprise[d] or prejudice^] the affected party.” White v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Defendants do not claim to have been caught 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a fee application under 42 usc  1988 is not governed by the 10day limit imposed on motions to amend judgment under rule 59e frciv p (B) recognizing that rule 59e permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order (C) holding that plaintiffs were prevailing parties under 42 usc section 1988 despite dismissal of the appeal as moot and vacation of the district court judgment (D) recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 usc  1988 (E) holding that the same standards apply for setting reasonable attorneys fees under the clean air acts fee shifting provision as under 42 usc  1988

(A)