In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

an individual has adequately stated a pri-ma facie claim. Cf. Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir.1995) (“An inquiry into the reasonableness of procedures ... belies a claim that liability under [15 U.S.C.] § 1681e(b) must be predicated on the effect of that information once disseminated .... The district court was required to consider whether [the defendant] was liable under § 1681e(b) before it determined that [the plaintiff] had suffered no recoverable damages.”). Several courts have previously recognized the possibility that a claim for actual or compensatory damages under FCRA may include compensation for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury or out-of-pocket expenses. See, e.g., Bakker v. McKinnon, 152 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere  conclusory statements  rather they must  sufficiently articulate  true demonstrable emotional distress  including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any (B) holding that under privacy act federal government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actual damages but not with respect to damages for mental or emotional distress (C) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the incomplete and late submission of expert reports was not harmless (D) holding that under the first amendment where there is no proof of actual malice damages are limited to actual injury which excludes punitive damages but is not limited to outofpocket loss (E) holding that even in the absence of outofpocket expenses or costs incurred the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding actual and punitive damages when appellees testified about how they felt when appellant obtained their credit reports and violated their privacy thereby causing them some emotional distress
(E)

previously discussed Wilson’s subjective complaints, then identified specific discrepancies between those complaints and the medical evidence. He noted that though she claimed back pain since 2000, she continued working till November 2002, when her company merged and she lost her job. He also noted that the record established that she walked with a normal unassisted gait, in contrast with her complaints about her problems walking. Additionally, he indicated that the record showed she had never been hospitalized for any orthopedic reason and had never taken any potent pain medication, though she claimed severely debilitating pain. The ALJ’s credibility finding was fully explained and is supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Wilson also contends, given her inability to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the alj did not err in discounting a claimants reports of pain where they were not supported by the medical record (B) holding that alj may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimants pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimants pain (C) holding that alj properly evaluated credibility where he cited specific instances where claimants complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record (D) holding that the alj properly relied on medical evidence undermining claimants subjective assessment of limitations (E) holding that an alj is entitled to make a credibility determination regarding the claimants subjective complaints after specifically addressing these complaints and reviewing the medical evidence in the record
(C)

The parole officer testified that his job was to supervise convicted felons and that Mr. Prieto was one of his supervisees. And during her testimony, Ms. Prieto stated twice that her son was a convicted felon. This testimony did not violate Old Chief or Rule 404(b)(1). Old Chief does not preclude reference to the fact that the defendant has a prior felony conviction; instead, it precludes any discussion of the nature and substance of the felony: “In dealing with the specific problem raised by § 922(g)(1) and its prior-conviction element, there can be no question that evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” 519 U.S. at 185, 117 S.Ct. 644; see also United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1472 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). However, there was no Old Chief violation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction (B) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (C) holding that to avoid the risk of unfair prejudice the parties should make use of a redacted record stipulation affidavit or other similar technique whereby the jury is informed only of the fact of a prior felony conviction but not the nature or substance of the conviction (D) holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense (E) holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded

(C)