In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: required expert testimony at trial. We agree with other appellate courts that the statute does not violate the open courts provision by requiring an expert report sooner rather than later in the litigation. See, e.g., Gill v. Russo, 39 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Knie v. Piskun, 23 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied). Mocega’s fifth point is overruled. Notice of Hearing Mocega’s final two points assert the trial court was required to grant her the grace period provided under art. 4590i, § 13.01(g). A motion under that section is timely if filed before “any hearing” on a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Urquhart’s motion was “heard” by submission on April 3rd. See Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>). Mocega’s motion was not filed until April 
 Holding statements: (A) holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation (B) holding that a hearing does not contemplate an oral presentation unless required by express language or context (C) holding that oral rendition of judgment supported by the courts docket sheet was insufficient express specific written order is required (D) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes (E) holding that express oral agreement with government agent was not binding because among other factors applicable regulations required contract to be in writing

Output: holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation


Input: Consider Input: Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir.1994))). 17 . See Executone, 26 F.3d at 1320 ("We must sustain an arbitration award even if we disagree with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the underlying contract as long as the arbitrator’s decision 'draws its essence' from the contract.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 18 . See also Parsons & Whittemore, 744 F.2d at 1483-84 (recounting that the arbitration panel awarded postjudgment interest at state statutory rate). 19 . We construe the parties’ intentions "generously” to determine whether they agreed to arbitrate a particular issue. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). 20 . Cf. Newmont, 615 F.3d at 1272, 1276 (<HOLDING>). 21 . Riebesell, 586 F.3d at 794; 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court should consider issues relating to making and performance of agreement to arbitrate (B) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator (C) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate the particular issue any doubt about who should decide the consolidation issue was resolved in favor of the arbitrator (D) holding that companys contention that union repudiated the agreement to arbitrate a particular dispute was a matter for the arbitrator and not the court to decide (E) holding that agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising out of contract authorized arbitrator to decide postjudgment interest issues

Output: holding that court should consider issues relating to making and performance of agreement to arbitrate


Input: Consider Input: The transformers were not within the scope of any demolition work. Shipp specifically informed Leo Gomez, AAA’s owner and Murillo’s worksite supervisor, to consider the transformers to be energized. The signage on the transformer box doors declared “DANGER, KEEP AWAY.” It warned that energized electrical equipment was inside and of the dire consequences that contact could cause. Oncor did not contemporaneously energize the transformer while Murillo worked, or tell anyone at the worksite that it had been switched off when in fact it was not. Without evidence of such acts, Oncor, as an electricity provider, had no general duty to recognize and prevent electrical contact during a construction project. See Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Brooks, 161 Tex. 32, 336 S.W.2d 603, 606 (1960) (<HOLDING>). Because Oncor’s failure to turn off an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the contractor where genuine issues of material fact existed regarding a duty to an injured construction worker (B) holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury (C) holding costs of providing power during construction delay were direct damages because contract provision specified that owner would provide electricity to construction site (D) holding that electrical supplier owed no duty in general negligence to construction worker injured by contact with live highvoltage electrical transmission lines on construction site (E) holding that time workers spent traveling on an employers boat to a construction site was not compensable under the act


Output: holding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the contractor where genuine issues of material fact existed regarding a duty to an injured construction worker