In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: this petition for prohibition. Petitioner is mistaken in an essential respect. Although he characterizes his challenge as involving subject matter jurisdiction, he is mistaken. There can be no dispute that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving dissolution of marriage. See § 26.012(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006) (circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all actions at law not cognizable in the county courts). The fact that petitioner wishes to dispute in the pending dissolution action is whether there was any marriage at all to dissolve. An attack on the validity of an alleged marriage has nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction but is simply an issue to be determined in the dissolution action. See Marden v. Marden, 276 So.2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (<HOLDING>). It is true that a petition for a writ of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding that standing existed (C) holding that in an action brought by alleged wife for permanent alimony suit money attorneys fees and restraining order an issue of fact existed concerning whether a commonlaw marriage existed thus precluding summary judgment (D) holding that material issue of fact existed concerning whether employer orally promised to discharge employee only for cause (E) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife

A: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment
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Q: the evidence of rape discussed above in Division 1, we conclude that the evidence at Martin’s trial was sufficient to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found as to both murders. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (2) (requiring a review of the statutory aggravating circumstances foundby the jury);UAP Rule IV (B) (2) (providing that, in all death penalty cases, this Court will determine whether the verdicts are supported by the evidence). See also Ring, 536 U. S. 584; Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. 20. Considering both the murders for which Martin has been sentenced to death and Martin as a defendant, we find that the death sentences imposed in his case were not disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Georgia law. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3); Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716-717 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited in the Appendix support this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts statutorily mandated proportionality review concerns whether a particular death sentence is excessive per se or is substantially out of line (B) holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable

A: holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial
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Q: charge of the crew.” Criminal cabals do not normally have formal organizational charts, and a finding of managerial control can support-ably be premised on how the enterprise operated in practice. See United States v. Cruz, 120 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc). Here, the record is replete with evidence that, either directly or by fair inference,, solidly supports the district court’s conclusion that the appellant was not “out on the street” but, instead, was responsible for overseeing retail sellers and trusted by Cabrera to exert control over other players in the enterprise. No more was exigible to ground the role-in-the-offense- enhancement. See United States v. Cruz-Rodríguez, 541 F.3d 19, 33 (1st Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 616 (1st Cir. 1993) .(<HOLDING>). Next, the appellant argues that the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges (B) recognizing that a defendant need not be the head of a conspiracy in order to warrant managerial roleintheoffense enhancement (C) holding that heightened evidentiary standard of proof is not required where the sentencing enhancement is based entirely on the extent of the conspiracy to which the defendant pled guilty (D) holding that sentence enhancement for crimes committed against law enforcement officers may be applied when information charges qualifying offense information does not need to recite enhancement statute (E) holding that the  2d11b1 enhancement is not limited to the charged conspiracy

A:
holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges
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