In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: are complete and present within the proscribed state statute of limitations. Id. at 393-94, 127 S.Ct. 1091. Plaintiff argues that because Wallace dealt with a false arrest and not a search and seizure, its analysis is inapplicable. (D.E. 8, Plaintiffs Response). However, the general rule of Wallace soundly applies to a search and seizure scenario, as noted by the Sixth Circuit and several Kentucky district courts. See Harper, 293 Fed. Appx. at 391 n. 1 (“Wallace also clarified that Heck does not delay the accrual of an otherwise complete and present cause of action when judgment in the plaintiffs favor ‘would impugn an anticipated future conviction .... ’ Harper’s claims thus accrued on July 31, 2003, the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure.”); Kenney, 2011 WL 1582125 at *6 (<HOLDING>); Lovins v. Hurt, No. 11-216-JBC, 2011 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiffs  1983 claim accrued on the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure (B) holding that a ruling on preindictment motion that search and seizure were legal collaterally estopped defendant from later moving to suppress evidence claiming that search and seizure were illegal (C) holding that section 1983 action for unlawful search and seizure accrued on dates of seizures rather than date on which state court declared the acts illegal (D) holding that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of the repealer statute not on the date the wrong occurred despite the federal courts ruling as to the statutes unconstitutionality (E) holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: further hold that the district court did not commit any procedural error or abuse its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (assuming sentencing decision is procedurally sound, appellate court considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant’s proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 1309, — L.Ed.2d - (2010); United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Having reviewed the record independently 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district court committed no significant procedural error despite departing downward from the guideline range for multiple reasons without explaining the weight it was attributing to each reason (B) recognizing that a party has not preserved a claim of procedural error if the party did not raise it in a manner sufficient to alert the district court to the specific error (C) holding that reviewing court first ensures that district court committed no significant procedural error then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence describing factors demonstrating procedural error (D) holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error (E) holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide an indication of what facts it relied on to make a significant variance from the advisory guidelines range

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: key distinctions between Mueller and the instant case: (1) unlike a common law claim for loss of consortium, a cause of action for wrongful death is statutory in nature and may not be judicially expanded; and (2) at the time of the operative event—i.e., Mr. Sapp’s death—California law did not preclude Messrs. Ferry and Sapp from marrying. First, as to the nature of the right being asserted, the Connecticut Supreme Court specifically noted that Mueller concerned the expansion of “the judicially created right to maintain a loss of consortium claim....” 312 Conn. at 660, 95 A.3d 1011 (emphasis in original). Thus, the court was “not constrained”- by the limitations that attend the expansion of “a statutory benefit.” Id. (citing Charron v. Amaral, 451 Mass. 767, 773, 889 N.E.2d 946 (2008) (<HOLDING>)). Here, on the other hand, “[i]t is well 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a samesex partner could not recover loss of consortium damages under a massachusetts statute for injuries  suffered by her partner even though samesex marriage was unlawful at the time the underlying tort occurred (B) recognizing that laws prohibiting samesex marriage humiliate tens of thousands of children now being raised by samesex couples (C) holding that although samesex partner may have been able to prove her status as a de facto parent such status was not sufficient to establish parental rights to custody and visitation over the objection of the biological mother (D) holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional (E) holding birth mothers samesex partner was a presumed mother    because she received the children into her home and openly held them out as her natural children


Output: (A)