In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther’s theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts “a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman.” White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther’s termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, § 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law

A: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
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Q: improperly removed the action as there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy fails to meet the $75,000 threshold. (Dkt. No. 5.) Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of “compensatory, special and general damages in an amount according to proof at trial, but not less than $1,000,000.” (Dkt. No., Ex. A.) Plaintiff further states that the amount of the Note on the property in question is $440,000 (Id.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. The question before the Court is whether, for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Wells Fargo is also a citizen of California. See, e.g., Uriarte v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127497 at *9, 2011 WL 5295285 at *2-3 (S.D.Cal. Nov. 3, 2011) (<HOLDING>). But see Flores v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 2012 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for a domestic corporation the foreign principal place of business does not count (B) holding that the location of a corporations principal place of business for diversity purposes is the state where the corporation has its headquarters or nerve center (C) holding that if a domestic corporations principal place of business is abroad the foreign principal place of business cannot be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes (D) holding that wells fargo is also a citizen of california where it has its principal place of business (E) holding that for diversity purposes a national bank is  a citizen of  the state of its principal place of business and the state listed in its organizational certificate

A: holding that for a domestic corporation the foreign principal place of business does not count
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Q: Buck employees by making it appear that their employment would continue uninterrupted at ACS. Second, it made the acquisition of Buck more appealing to ACS, because ACS knew that it could immediately slash costs by eliminating 100 of the employees it had agreed to employ. The existence of such a scheme — seemingly perfectly orchestrated to ensure that MFC would not have to pay, directly or indirectly, the cost of certain promised benefits — • is surely evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could deem relevant to whether MFC’s conflict of interest affected its decision to deny Howley’s claim. Nonetheless, the district court afforded more weight to this evidence than is appropriate when deciding a motion for summary judgment. See Nolan v. Heald Coll., 551 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). It' is uncontested that Buck’s managers 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the nonmoving party must present specific evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor (B) holding that the nonmoving party must produce more than a scintilla of evidence to survive summary judgment (C) recognizing that nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence  to defeat summary judgment (D) holding that a court considering evidence outside of the administrative record because of its relevance to a conflict of interest must still construe that evidence in favor of the nonmoving party for the purposes of summary judgment (E) holding that when deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings the court must construe the material allegations in the complaint in favor of the nonmoving party as true

A:
holding that the nonmoving party must present specific evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor
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