In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Anderson claims that the trial court findings do not justify the decision to “increase” his child support on August 1, 1987. In other words, appellant construes the trial court’s 1987 decision as a modification downward to $250 followed by a modification upward to $400. This is a misconstruction of the trial court’s order. As the majority opinion indicates, the court did not make an upward modification. It does not follow, however, that the trial court could act without making findings on appellant’s ability to pay child support. Without findings on appellant’s ability to pay, or another indication that the trial court considered the facts as to appellant’s ability to pay, the law commands us to remand the case rather than to affirm. Moylan v. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d 859, 864-65 (Minn.1986) (<HOLDING>). The dictates of Moylan should be applied. The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider new trial order as long as case is pending (B) holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous (C) holding that a defendants attorney can waive the defendants sixth amendment confrontation right so long as the defendant does not dissent from his attorneys decision and so long as it can be said that the attorneys decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy (D) holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant (E) holding it improper to independently review the record to find support for a trial courts decision so long as it is unclear whether the trial court considered statutory factors

A: (E)
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Q: we held that, The penetration offense alleged in the first indictment clearly required a separate and distinct act (involving appellee’s sexual organ with the child’s female sexual organ) from the act alleged in the second indictment (which involved appel-lee’s mouth with the child’s sexual organ). In this case the second indictment alleged that appellee caused the child’s sexual organ to contact his mouth ency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct. Appellant concedes to this view, the plain language of the statute supports it, and so does our caselaw. See Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630 (stating that a grammatical analysis suggests that the unit of prosecution for indecency with a child by exposure is the exposure and, ultimately, adopting that viewpoint); Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. State, 550 S.W.2d 89, 91 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive (B) holding that a similar statute created separate offenses (C) holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation (D) holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive (E) holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity

A: (A)
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Q: she failed to file a charge of race discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days, as required. See D.C.’s Mem. at 12-15. The District is correct. The plaintiffs addendum was filed 718 days after the alleged discrimination, and plaintiffs full EEOC charge was filed 1109 days after the alleged discrimination. These are plainly outside the applicable time limits. Moreover, the plaintiffs subsequent filings cannot be said to “relate back” to the original EEOC charge, as they add an entirely new substantive theory. See, e.g., Marshall, 536 F.Supp.2d at 67 (“[W]here administrative complaints for discrimination based- on sex, race and retaliation do not mention critical facts relevant to an age discrimination claim, the later filed age claims do not relate back.”); Wilson, 767 F.Supp. at 306 (<HOLDING>). The District has met its burden to prove a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc (B) holding that claimant exhausted administrative remedies only as to the complaints made in the original charge and factually related claims that reasonably could be expected to grow out of the administrative investigation of that charge (C) holding eeoc could maintain an action alleging discrimination against women and minority groups although the original charge alleged only discrimination against males (D) holding that because the amendment added a new substantive theory which is fundamentally distinct from the original race discrimination charge it did not relate to or grow out of the plaintiffs original eeoc charge (E) holding that where the writings on file were insufficient to constitute an effective charge a charge had not been effectively filed despite the fact that the eeoc had assigned the case a charge number

A:
(D)
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