In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: case commences from the time the discriminatory conduct causes economic injury and ends upon the date of the judgment. In other words, back pay accrues from the date of the commencement of the discriminatory course of conduct causing financial loss until the date damages are “settled.” Palasota, 499 F.3d at 483 (internal citations omitted); see also Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.1999) (“A prevailing ADA claimant is presumptively entitled to all back pay which would have accrued from the termination date to the entry of judgment, provided it is made to appear that reasonable diligence was exercised in the effort to secure other suitable employment.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Sellers v. Delgado College, 781 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Back pay may be denied “only for reasons 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award of back pay under title vii remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion (B) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to require a defendant to pay all back taxes (C) holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment (D) holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court (E) holding there was no jury trial right where court ordered reinstatement and back pay to teachers fired after desegregation order in discrimination case back pay is equitable
[A]: (C)


[Q]: as an exhibit, he was able to make his argument that the victim was vindictive towards defendant. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in this respect, we are not persuaded that it is more probable than not that any such error was outcome determinative. (MCOA Op. at 5.) Petitioner contends that, by barring the introduction of the actual letters sent by Gordon and barring cross-examination that quoted those letters, the trial court prevented him from effectively cross-examining Gordon about her bias and motive for giving false evidence against him. I disagree. Unlike in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, the trial court did not “prohibit! ] all inquiry” into Gordon’s possible bias and motivation to lie. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Vasquez, 496 F.3d at 571 (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Petitioner’s representations, he 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this distinction (B) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel (C) recognizing distinction between barring all inquiry into a witness bias and barring a particular form of crossexamination (D) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (E) recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell
[A]: (C)


[Q]: of Plymouth, 945 F.2d 1416, 1420-21 (8th Cir.1991); Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 924 (1st Cir.1987)). Against this background, this Court must determine whether these findings must necessarily lead to the conclusion that qualified immunity is unavailable to Defendant Rogers. The Court concludes that they do not. Applying the Third Circuit’s observation that police officers generally have a duty to know the elements of the laws they enforce as a starting point, the Court acknowledges that there exist exceptions to this general rule. Indeed, in establishing the general rule that police officers are required to know clearly established law the United States Supreme Court noted that the rule is not absolute. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (<HOLDING>). In Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs assertion that he neither knew nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known about the governments possible liability for his injury was irrelevant to accrual of his ftca claim (B) holding that the destruction of documents which the party knew or should have known would be relevant to a pending or potential lawsuit is sanctionable (C) holding in review of a downward departure that an extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances (D) holding that in extraordinary circumstances where a police officer neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard qualified immunity may still be available (E) holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong
[A]:
(D)