instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
a work-related injury, taking into account such factors as age, education, training, and mental capacity." Id. at 574; see also Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (listing "age, sex, education, economic and social environment, ... [and] permanent impairment" as factors to be weighed (internal quotation marks omitted)). 120 The fact that an employee returned to work for some period of time following his industrial injury does not automatically preclude him from claiming permanent total disability benefits at a later date if he continues to suffer substantial pain throughout the period of his continued employment or if his industrial injury worsens to the point that he is no longer able to maintain regular employment. See Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027-28 (<HOLDING>). See generally Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits (B) holding that an employee who returned to work for six years following his workrelated injury could nevertheless obtain permanent total disability benefits and observing that it may be years before the effect of an injury is felt (C) holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury (D) holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability (E) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence
answer:
holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits


question:
of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990). Petitioner claims that Apprendi falls within the narrow scope of the second category of exceptions and is therefore applicable to his case retroactively. The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether Apprendi should be considered a “watershed rule,” falling within the Teague exceptions. However, every Circuit Court which has considered this question has held that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively on collateral review. United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir.2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir.2001); see, e.g., Abdullah v. United States, 240 F.3d 683, 687 (8th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>); Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review (B) holding apprendi is not retroactive (C) holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review (D) holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review  that was previously unavailable (E) holding that the apprendi decision is not applicable on collateral review
answer:
holding apprendi is not retroactive


question:
must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338, 123 S.Ct. at 1040 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 1604). Accord Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. at 282, 124 S.Ct. at 2569. In a case in which the petitioner wishes to challenge on appeal this Court’s dismissal of a claim for a reason not of constitutional dimension, such as procedural default, limitations, or lack of exhaustion, the petitioner must show jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and whether this Court was correct in its procedural ruling. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 1604 (<HOLDING>). In death penalty cases, any doubt as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds a petitioner is entitled to a coa only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable whether the district courts procedural ruling was correct (B) holding that a plaintiff is not required to state the statutory or constitutional basis for his claim only the facts underlying it (C) holding when a district court denies a habeas claim on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claim a coa may issue only when the petitioner shows that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether 1 the claim is a valid assertion of the denial of a constitutional right and 2 the district courts procedural ruling was correct (D) holding that if the court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds the certificate of appealability must show that jurists of reason would find debatable two issues 1 that the district court was correct in its procedural ruling and 2 that the applicant has established a valid constitutional violation emphasis in original (E) holding that when a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds a petitioner is entitled to a coa only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would conclude it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable whether the district courts procedural ruling was correct
answer:

holding that when a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds a petitioner is entitled to a coa only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable whether the district courts procedural ruling was correct