In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: have been required to examine the entire public record and would have discovered the foreclosure judgment....”). These recorded instruments would charge any subsequent purchaser with the information contained in them. Fairmont Funding, 301 A.D.2d at 564, 754 N.Y.S.2d 54 (“The intended purchaser must be presumed to have investigated the title, and to have examined every deed or instrument properly recorded, and to have known every fact disclosed or to which an inquiry suggested by the record would have led.”). The Foreclosure Judgment provides a purchaser with notice that a foreclosure sale was authorized by the court, and at a minimum would require a purchaser to inquire whether a foreclosure sale had occurred. See In re Davidson Rehab Associates, 103 B.R. 440, 444 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, here the Referee’s Report of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien (B) holding that plaintiffmortgagor lacked standing to enforce the terms of a foreclosure sale since there was no statutory authority allowing a mortgagor to enforce the provisions of a sale agreement when a foreclosure purchaser is in default (C) holding that a properly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale quiets title in the purchaser (D) holding that a wouldbe bona fide purchaser could not simply ignore the recorded notices of an impending nonjudicial foreclosure sale and fail to make inquiry as to whether the announced sale had occurred (E) holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser
[A]: holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien


[Q]: abused its discretion by providing an unreasonable characterization of the record evidence. See McElwee, 896 A.2d at 18 & nn. 7-8. While SEPTA claims that this, too, necessarily entailed unwarranted fact-finding on the part of the Commonwealth Court, we believe that it aligns with the approach utilized in Sienkiewicz I, wherein this Court not only determined that no record evidence existed to support a particular factual finding central to the trial court’s decision to grant relief (i.e., that Penn-DOT had installed curbing along the “Stafford Straightaway”), but proceeded to delineate the essential facts that were proved by the uncontradicted record evidence in ultimately agreeing with Penn-DOT’s position that relief was unjustified. See Sienkiewicz I, 584 Pa. at 282, 883 A.2d at 502 (<HOLDING>). Under the circumstances of this case, then, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (B) holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property (C) recognizing distinction and allowing recovery for impairment of access and not obstructed flow of traffic (D) holding that the landownerlicensee relationship ceased when the licensee left the landowners property (E) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking
[A]: holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property


[Q]: (“Rule 804(b)(6) is an attempt to respond to the problem of witness intimidation[.]”). As a result, the plain language of the rule requires that the defendant not only be involved in causing the witness’s unavailability, but also that the defendant commit the relevant act with the intent to prevent the witness from testifying. {20} Some state and federal courts, however, have decided that the “intent to silence” requirement is only mandated by the federal rules and not by the constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir.2005) (“Though the Federal Rules of Evidence may contain [the intent to silence] requirement, the right secured by the Sixth Amendment does not[.]” (internal citation omitted)); Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603, 611 (Tex.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Ruiz, 2005 WL 1670426, at *6 (“Ultimately, if 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that some states it should be noted have adopted a hybrid approach (B) holding that since the reference in  2461c to the procedures of  853 includes the latter statutes implicit authorization of in personam money judgments we see no reason why this reference should not also include the forfeiture of substitute assets (C) holding that no exception to the invited error doctrine has ever been adopted by this circuit (D) holding that while some courts have adopted the intent to silence requirement we see no reason why the forfeiture doctrine should be limited to such cases (E) holding that the fifth amendment in its direct application to the federal government and in its bearing on the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accuseds silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt
[A]:
recognizing that some states it should be noted have adopted a hybrid approach