instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
entered an order finding probable‘cause that the property was used to facilitate the commission of a felony. Although Flagg’s atto ation of a discovery order will constitute an abuse of discretion where the trial court fails to make express written findings of fact supporting the . conclusion that the failure to obey the court order demonstrated willful or deliberate disregard. Express findings are required to ensure that the trial judge has consciously determined that the failure was more than a mistake, neglect, or inadvertence, and to assist the reviewing court to the extent the record is susceptible to more than one interpretation. Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 495-96 (Fla.2004) (citing Tubero, 569 So.2d at 1273); cf. Ledo v. Seavie Resources, LLC, 149 So.Sd 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Flagg filed a motion to set 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (B) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact (C) holding that where the record plainly reflected ledos willful and deliberate disregard of the courts repeated orders to respond to interrogatory requests the trial courts failure to provide written findings of fact in its order striking ledos pleadings did not require reversal (D) holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment (E) holding that erroneous findings of fact not necessary to support the judgment of the court are not grounds for reversal
answer:
(C)


question:
use of low-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. While we recognize that drivers may be accustomed to quickly flashing their high-beam headlights at an oncoming vehicle as a signal to dim headlights, there is no evidence in this case that the officer was driving with his high-beam headlights. Furthermore, the statute does not provide any exceptions for the momentary flashing of high-beam headlights. Thus, we must conclude the statute prohibits the use of high-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle, for any length of time and for any purpose. [¶ 12] We recognize that at least one other appellate court has interpreted similar statutory language and reached the opposite conclusion. See Waukesha County v. Meinhardt, 2001 WI App 146, ¶¶ 9-10, 630 N.W.2d 277 (<HOLDING>). In another case involving a similar statute, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that meinhardt did not commit a violation by flashing his highbeam headlights two times at an oncoming vehicle because the plain language of the statute did not prohibit the quick flashing of highbeam headlights (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute (D) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (E) holding the trial judge did not commit reversible error through the chosen method of remedying the batson violation
answer:
(A)


question:
and “if the plan administrator ] believe[s] that more information is needed to make a reasoned decision, they must ask for it.” See Booton v. Lockheed Medical Benefit Plan, 110 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir.1997); see also Saffon v. Wells Fargo Company Long Term Disability Plan, 522 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir.2008) (reversing judgment in favor of insurer; noting insurer had failed to explain to claimant “in a manner calculated to be understood by the claimant” what “[claimant] must do to perfect her claim”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Here, however, Broadspire, on three separate occasions, informed plaintiff as to the information it needed. These communications were sufficient to put plaintiff on notice as t 0, at *8-9, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32515, at *25-28 (D.Ariz.2005) (<HOLDING>). With respect to her WC claim, plaintiff 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supreme court need not consider issue not raised in petition for certiorari (B) holding that juvenile court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims (C) holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary (D) holding plan fiduciary need not consider ssa findings further holding no inference of conflict to be drawn from failure to consider such findings (E) holding that where plaintiffs alleged that the plan suffered significant losses and requested that fiduciaries make good to the plan the losses to the plan they need not seek to recover for all plan participants allegedly injured by the fiduciary breach
answer:

(D)