In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: that subsequent extraneous offenses are admissible to show a defendant’s intent as to an earlier offense. See U.S. v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 128 (2nd Cir.1998) (upholding admission of subsequent act under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show intent regarding charged offense and holding, “[t]he fact that the evidence involved a subsequent rather than prior act is of no moment”); U.S. v. Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1449 (D.C.Cir.) (construing Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and holding that it “draws no distinction b Austin 1990, no pet.) (same). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Russell’s contention that the Vogt Street offense was not admissible simply because it occurred after the Fast Freddy’s offense. Cf. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 380 (<HOLDING>). Although, based on the authorities cited by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court (B) recognizing that an appellate court reviews a trial courts decision whether or not to grant equitable relief only for an abuse of discretion (C) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (D) holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (E) recognizing that an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court acts without reference to any guiding principles or rules
[EX A]: holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court

[EX Q]: face,” id. at 61, 90 S.Ct. 1555, it held that the exception for any portrayal that “does not tend to discredit [the] armed force[s]” impermissibly restricted expression on the basis of viewpoint. See id. at 62-63, 90 S.Ct. 1555. Here, as in Schacht, defendants may be constitutionally permitted to prohibit all fraternal organizations from marching in uniform. But it does not follow from this premise that defendants have the seemingly lesser included authority to ban only some organizations from marching in uniform. Under Schacht, and under other Supreme Court cases involving selective prohibitions on expression, defendants’ selectivity must itself pass constitutional muster. Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 425-28, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465, 100 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cincinnati could not ban commercial newsracks from public property while allowing noncommercial newsracks even if  the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property (B) holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content (C) holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property (D) holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence (E) holding not only does cincinnatis categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech but in this case the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted
[EX A]: holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content

[EX Q]: “most damaging” to Vos’ case — Vos’ alleged use of Florida’s banking system to facilitate its sales to A & V. Our review of the evidence on this issue reveals that in the transactions involving A & V, CommerzBank Nederland sent shipping documents to SunBank, Sun-Bank notified A & V of the documents’ arrival, A & V signed the trade acceptance forms and submitted payment to SunBank. SunBank then transferred the funds and paperwork to CommerzBank. Vos’ involvement in the process was virtually non-existent, and SunBank merely operated to facilitate the international transfer of money under a letter of credit. Such contacts are clearly insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Vos. See Banco Continental, S.A. v. Transcom Bank (Barbados) Ltd., 922 So.2d 395, 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>); La. Reunion Franqaise, S.A. v. La Costeña, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the bank liable where the bank had almost complete control over the operation of the company during its last three quarters of operation and where withheld taxes were not paid to the irs on instructions from the bank (B) holding that a bank owed no duty of care to a noncustomer who was defrauded by a bank depositer since the bank had no direct relationship with the noncustomer (C) holding that the mere maintenance of a correspondent account in new york is insufficient to establish minimum contacts with the united states (D) holding that defendants bank account and open line of credit in florida utilized to transfer money in international commerce was insufficient to confer jurisdiction under section 481932 florida statutes where defendant operated its business in honduras had no employees or agents in florida and did not advertise or solicit business in florida (E) holding that a correspondent relationship with a florida bank where the bank merely facilitates the international transfer of monies under a letter of credit is insufficient to meet the minimum  contacts requirement
[EX A]:
holding the bank liable where the bank had almost complete control over the operation of the company during its last three quarters of operation and where withheld taxes were not paid to the irs on instructions from the bank