In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
purpose, we would have some authority to solve taxpayer’s problem. See Rhodes, 166 Vt. at 157, 688 A.2d at 1311 (noting that, to invoke impossibility rule, party “must dem onstrate why this Court should not construe the statute in its ordinary sense or why the consequences of such construction will cause hardship or constitute impossibility”). But our standard under this prudential rule is very limited and does not ordinarily extend to making choices, among many available, to solve the problem. There is simply no way to construe the statute to allow a transfer that occurred 319 days after an LLC’s articles of organization were filed without reading the words “at the time of formation” out of the statute. See Colwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 VT 5, ¶ 15, 175 Vt. 61, 819 A.2d 727 (<HOLDING>). ¶23. It is true that the Department’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (B) recognizing that though statute at hand does not fully address the problem legislature intended to address in view of the number of choices available to solve the problem    this is an inappropriate case for the court to fashion the particular remedy appellants seek because to do so would place court in the position of making policy choices best left to legislature (C) holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature (D) holding that considering an amendment is not the time to address the merits of a case (E) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language

Ex Output:
holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case


Ex Input:
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and learned that the federal license "will not change upon renewal." 4 . The position statement included an Administrator's Memorandum, dated June 19, 1986, indicating how regional offices should handle approval of permits for hydropower purposes. The memorandum indicates that when dealing with a hydropower application coming within FERC jurisdiction, departmental staff need to be aware of FERC licensing conditions for the facility in question. An attachment to the memorandum shows standard conditions of approval for a state water rights permit and the language of one of such conditions is that which was incorporated into the license at issue in this case. The memorandum notes that an applicant "can request Department action on 0-41 (1969) (<HOLDING>). 7 . It was also after the enactment of I.C. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use (B) holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate (C) holding that a water right is a property right created by a person appropriating unappropriated water and applying it to a beneficial use (D) holding that the legislative assembly intended the water right certificate not the permit even when followed by a beneficial use to mark the point at which a water right becomes vested (E) recognizing the right to use water to generate power

Ex Output:
holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use


Ex Input:
presented by the facts of this case, the majority opinion correctly reserves judgment as to that matter for another day. Although I join this Court’s majority opinion’s holding that a trial court generally has continuing authority to rescind its order granting a new trial, I observe that a trial court must always proceed cautiously when either granting or denying a motion for new trial because there are limitations to the grounds upon which a trial court may properly grant a new trial. Recently, in State v. Thomas, this Court reaffirmed the principle that “[tjhere must be some legal basis underpinning the grant of a new trial,” and a trial court may not grant a new trial for a “non-legal or a legally invalid reason.” See State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99, 104, 105, 107 (Tex.Crim.App.2014) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); see also Tex.R.App. P. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court can and should grant a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict (B) holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver (C) holding that if appellant preserves legal sufficiency complaint in motion for new trial new trial is all the relief appellate court can give because that is all the relief appellant requested in trial court (D) holding that to grant a new trial the error must be more than harmless (E) holding that motion for a new trial whether for guilt or punishment requires a valid legal claim a court cannot grant a new trial unless the defendant shows that he is entitled to one under the law

Ex Output:

holding that the trial court can and should grant a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict