TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: 375 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004). Since, as we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we need not consider whether the District’s failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its own case (as opposed to at the close of Smith’s case) further limits our review “to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by the evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice,” Fredrick, 254 F.3d at 162. The District presents two fact-based challenges to the jury’s verdict. First, it argues that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the District had a deliberately indifferent policy or custom under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, it claims that even had such a policy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom (B) holding that county liability under  1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior (C) holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc  1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition (D) recognizing respondeat superior liability (E) holding that municipal liability for purposes of claims brought under 42 usc  1983 must stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom rather than simply from respondeat superior

SOLUTION: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom

PROBLEM: improperly removed the action as there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy fails to meet the $75,000 threshold. (Dkt. No. 5.) Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of “compensatory, special and general damages in an amount according to proof at trial, but not less than $1,000,000.” (Dkt. No., Ex. A.) Plaintiff further states that the amount of the Note on the property in question is $440,000 (Id.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. The question before the Court is whether, for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Wells Fargo is also a citizen of California. See, e.g., Uriarte v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127497 at *9, 2011 WL 5295285 at *2-3 (S.D.Cal. Nov. 3, 2011) (<HOLDING>). But see Flores v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 2012 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for a domestic corporation the foreign principal place of business does not count (B) holding that the location of a corporations principal place of business for diversity purposes is the state where the corporation has its headquarters or nerve center (C) holding that if a domestic corporations principal place of business is abroad the foreign principal place of business cannot be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes (D) holding that wells fargo is also a citizen of california where it has its principal place of business (E) holding that for diversity purposes a national bank is  a citizen of  the state of its principal place of business and the state listed in its organizational certificate

SOLUTION: holding that for a domestic corporation the foreign principal place of business does not count

PROBLEM: search a premises, Weston, 67 M.J. at 393 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988), I do not believe that case to be controlling. Matlock was arrested on the front lawn of the house, Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166, 94 S.Ct. 988, and placed in a nearby police car. Id. at 179, 94 S.Ct. 988 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The arresting officers subsequently approached the house, spoke with a resident who shared a bedroom with Matlock, and received permission to search that bedroom. Id. at 166, 94 S.Ct. 988. The police did not ask Matlock for his consent to search the bedroom, nor did he offer it. Id. The Supreme Court recognized the consent of the cotenant may be valid against a eotenant who has not objected. Id. at 170, 94 S.Ct. 988; see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179-80, 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (<HOLDING>). This case differs from Matlock and Rodriguez 
 Holding statements: (A) holding cotenants consent to search valid where rodriguez who was asleep inside the house was not asked for his consent if police reasonably believed the consenter possessed common authority over the premises (B) holding that the agents superficial and cursory questioning of the consenting party did not disclose sufficient information for the agent reasonably to believe that she had common authority over the premises and that further inquiry was required under rodriguez (C) holding that mother who was resident of house shared with adult daughter could give valid consent to search premises (D) holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises (E) holding that there is no violation of the fourth amendment when the government reasonably believed that the individual giving consent to the search had authority to do so

SOLUTION:
holding that the agents superficial and cursory questioning of the consenting party did not disclose sufficient information for the agent reasonably to believe that she had common authority over the premises and that further inquiry was required under rodriguez