In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: by this Court. The documents presented to the Court are not forms as prescribed by the Secretary of which the Debtors have verified under penalty of perjury. Instead, the Debtors submitted affidavits of Charles D. Tobias and documents entitled “Actual and Constructive Notice of Declaration.” In filing bankruptcy, the Debtors have sought this Court’s protection from creditors, including the Internal Revenue Service. However, the Debtors have continued to ig nore this Court’s orders and the Internal Revenue laws in failing to file tax returns. The Court finds that the Debtors’ disregard of this Court’s orders as well as their duty to file tax returns is evidence that the Debtors lacked good faith in filing this bankruptcy case. Matter of Crayton, 169 B.R. 243, 245 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1994) (<HOLDING>). Section 1307(c) of Title 11 provides that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to file correct tax returns constitutes bad faith and makes it difficult for the court to confirm a plan (B) holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge (C) holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case (D) holding that debtors failure to pay postconfirmation taxes pursuant to terms of court order constituted cause for dismissal as a lack of good faith (E) holding on an objection to confirmation of plan that the debtors failure to file tax returns before filing the chapter 13 plan and debtors failure for six months to comply with federal law constituted a lack of good faith sufficient to warrant dismissal of the case

Output: holding that failure to file correct tax returns constitutes bad faith and makes it difficult for the court to confirm a plan


Input: Consider Input: 375 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004). Since, as we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we need not consider whether the District’s failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its own case (as opposed to at the close of Smith’s case) further limits our review “to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by the evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice,” Fredrick, 254 F.3d at 162. The District presents two fact-based challenges to the jury’s verdict. First, it argues that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the District had a deliberately indifferent policy or custom under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, it claims that even had such a policy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom (B) holding that county liability under  1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior (C) holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc  1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition (D) recognizing respondeat superior liability (E) holding that municipal liability for purposes of claims brought under 42 usc  1983 must stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom rather than simply from respondeat superior

Output: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom


Input: Consider Input: 1176 (D.S.D. 2012); Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund, Inc., 658 N.E.2d 989, 993 (N.Y. 1995). It appears that being incorporated under State law rather than tribal law “militate[s] against sovereign immunity”. J.L. Ward Assocs., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. 15 See Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distribs., Inc., 686 F.3d 1144, 1150 (10th Cir. 2012) (“a separate legal entity organized under the laws of another sovereign, Oklahoma, cannot share in the Nation’s [i.e., the tribe’s] immunity from suit”). 16 See Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he College serves as an arm of the tribe and not as a mere business and is thus entitled to tribal sovereign immunity”); Dillon v. Yankton Sioux Tribe Hous. Auth., 144 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>); Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an inn which was a subentity of the tribe rather than a separate corporate entity enjoyed tribal immunity (B) holding that disputes involving questions of interpretation of a tribal constitution and tribal law is not within the jurisdiction of the district court (C) holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret a tribal constitution or tribal laws (D) holding that the tribes housing authority was exempt from the adea a general statute because the tribal entity was not just a business but also functioned as an arm of tribal government by providing housing to tribe members (E) holding that a tribal housing authority established by tribal council pursuant to its powers of selfgovernment was a tribal agency rather than a separate corporate entity created by the tribe


Output: holding that an inn which was a subentity of the tribe rather than a separate corporate entity enjoyed tribal immunity