In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: on behalf of’ MBC. The record also discloses that the contract makes no reference to MBC and was signed by Mullís as “Contractor.” The record further discloses that payments were made to Mullís, not MBC, and that the payments were deposited into Mullis’s personal account, not into MBC’s account in a separate bank. This evidence supports the trial court’s findings and its ultimate conclusion that Mullís was individually liable for any damages suffered by the Brennans. If Mullís wanted to act as agent for MBC and bind the corporation to the contract, he should have signed the contract in his corporate capacity. This would have had the effect of insulating him from liability. See Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), aff'd, 638 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind.1994) (<HOLDING>). Mullís, without any citation to authority, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (B) holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity (C) holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to determine whether the defendant intended to be bound in his personal andor corporate capacity where the agreement contained certain personal guarantees by the defendant but where the defendant signed the agreement only in a corporate capacity with no signature blocks provided for signing in a personally capacity (D) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (E) holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents
[A]: (D)


[Q]: 676 F.2d 969, 975 (3d Cir. 1982); Carty v. Schneider, 986 F. Supp. 933, 38 V.I. 213 (D.V.I. 1997). In contrast, a fine is a criminal contempt sanction if the amount of the fine is fixed and imposed unconditionally as a punishment for past disobedience. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632-33 (“An unconditional penalty is criminal in nature because it is solely and exclusively punitive in character.” (citations and quotations omitted)); see also Latrobe Steel Co., 545 F.2d at 1343 (“[T]he penalties arising out of adjudications of criminal contempt are generally an absolute fine of a specific amount . . . .”). Criminal fines are retroactive, and may not be avoided by purging the contemptuous conduct. See Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590, 67 S. Ct. 918, 921, 91 L. Ed. 1117 (1947) (<HOLDING>). Here, the June 13, 2006, order was phrased in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error (B) holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it (C) holding that a flat unconditional fine for 50 was a criminal sanction because the contemnor had no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance (D) holding that a fiftytwo million dollar fine could not be imposed as a sanction for criminal contempt except through a jury trial (E) holding that the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for imposition of that fine
[A]: (C)


[Q]: Phillips’s sentence. As an initial matter, we review the procedural reasonableness of Phillips’s sentence for plain error. In United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir.2004), we instructed district courts, after announcing a proposed sentence, to “ask the parties whether they have any objections to the sentence ... that have not previously been raised.” Id. at 872. If a party failed to raise an objection after being asked this question, we held that plain-error review applies on appeal to any arguments not preserved. Id. Our recent en banc opinion in United States v. Vonner, No. 05-5295, 516 F.3d 382, 2008 WL 320773 (6th Cir. Feb.7, 2008) (en banc), makes clear that the Bostic rule applies to post -Booker procedural reasonableness challenges. See Vonner, 2008 WL 320773 at *3 (<HOLDING>). Here, after the district court announced a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence (B) holding that plainerror review applied to appellants procedural reasonableness argument where defendant answered no to district courts bostic question at sentencing and explaining that although this answer did not undermine vonners right to appeal issues he had previously raised it did undermine his right to challenge the adequacy of the courts explanation for the sentence  an issue that became apparent as soon as the court finished announcing its proposed sentence and that counsel nonetheless declined the courts invitation to address (C) holding that when a sentencing issue centers upon a courts statutory authority to impose a sentence rather than the courts exercise of discretion in fashioning the sentence the issue raised implicates the legality of the sentence imposed (D) holding that under subsection al as then written the defendant had no right to appeal whether his sentence was supported by evidence presented because he entered into a plea agreement as to the sentence (E) holding that the defendant waived the right to appeal his sentence including the terms and conditions of his supervised release when he agreed to a plea agreement that said he expressly waives his right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed on any ground emphasis added
[A]:
(B)