In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. 6 . The Supreme Court of Connecticut has already rejected the ¡ex loci delicti rule in workers’ compensation actions in favor of “interest analysis” and the Restatement (Second) “most significant relationship” approach. See Simaitis v. Flood, 182 Conn. 24, 29-33, 437 A.2d 828, 831-32 (1980); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 181 (1971). 7 . See Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-555 (1977) (measure of wrongful death recovery equal to value of decedent’s life and expenses); Marko v. Stop and Shop, Inc., 169 Conn. 550, 553, 364 A.2d 217, 219 (1975) (<HOLDING>); see also Halstead II, supra, 535 F.Supp. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective (B) holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control (C) recognizing that a violation of the mbta is a strict liability offense (D) recognizing the significance of control in strict products liability (E) recognizing strict product liability actions

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: despite the underlying circumstances. See United States v. Moudy, 132 F.3d 618, 620 (10th Cir.1998) (stating that “[ejvery escape scenario is a powder keg, which may or may not explode into violence and result in physical injury to someone at any given time, but which always has the serious potential to do so” and that this characterization applies “to all escapes, whether or not violence was actually involved”) (citing United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir.1994)). C. Sixth Amendment Claim Finally, Mr. Flowers argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by failing to submit the fact of his prior convictions to a jury. This argument is also foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1223, 1226 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we AFFIRM Mr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact of prior convictions under  924e need not be charged in an indictment and proven to a jury and also that the government need not charge in an indictment and prove to a jury that a defendants prior conviction constitutes a violent felony under  924e (B) holding that district court may enhance sentence based on fact of prior convictions under  924e regardless of whether admitted by defendant or found by jury (C) holding that facts regarding prior convictions need not be charged in an indictment nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that elements of statute which became  924e need not be reflected in indictment for crime charged

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: immunity defense ordinarily fails, since “a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” See id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727). Thus, the aldermen are entitled to qualified immunity only if Belk’s right to free speech was not clearly established at the time of her discharge. See id. Belk was discharged in 1995. As early as 1985, the Supreme Court had found a clear First Amendment protection for public employees. “It is clearly established that a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech.” Rankin, 483 U.S. at 382, 107 S.Ct. 2891. Our own precedent evidences this principle as well. See Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 267 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Casey, 12 F.3d at 804 (“No right is more 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that retaliatory discharge based solely on protected speech by ones spouse is actionable under the first amendment (B) recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act (C) holding that it is clearly established that retaliation against private citizens for exercising their first amendment rights is actionable (D) recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge (E) holding that retaliatory discharge is a clearly established first amendment violation


Output: (E)