In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: appeals from the district court’s order denying his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion for reconsideration challenging the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm. Henderson contends that the district abused its discretion by denying his motion, which we construe as a motion for relief from final judgment based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Straw v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 1167, 1171-72 (9th Cir.1989). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Henderson’s motion because his almost two-year delay before filing the motion was not reasonable. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c) (“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.... ”); In re Hammer, 940 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an over twoyear delay without any excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law (B) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to find an unexcused twoyear delay unreasonable (C) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (D) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony (E) holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable

Answer: (B)


Question: The agency reasonably found that unfulfilled threats, which were the only individualized harm Yang alleged he had suffered, did not rise to the level of persecution. See Ci Pan v. United States Atty. General, 449 F.3d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir.2006). This is so, even when considered in conjunction with his father’s alleged beating, because, as the IJ noted, Yang did not allege that this incident resulted in any injuries to his father or caused Yang any continuing harm. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir.2007) (“the statutory scheme unambiguously dictates that applicants can become candidates for asylum relief only based on persecution that they themselves have suffered or must suffer”); see also Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141-42 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the agency did not err in finding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an asylum applicant cannot claim past persecution based solely on the harm that was inflicted on a family member on account of that family members political opinion or other protected characteristic (B) recognizing that an applicant may be able to demonstrate persecution based on persecution of family members where the applicant shares  the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family member was in the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident citing jorgetzoc v gonzales 435 f3d 146 150 2d cir2006 (C) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution (D) recognizing that the harm suffered by family members in combination with other factors  would presumably only be persecution where  the applicant not only shares or is perceived to share the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family members but was also within the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident (E) holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person

Answer: (D)


Question: court found that "lilt is elementary that there can be no deputy without there first being a principal; the principal being the duly elected, qualified and acting official of the county." Id. at 290. The general and well-affirmed rule is that, in the absence of some statutory provision to the contrary, the commission or appointment of a deputy officer runs or continues only during the term of the officer making the appointment. Of course, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, the principal has the right, at his pleasure, to remove his deputy. Id. (quoting Hord v. State, 167 Ind. 622, 79 N.E. 916, 922 (1907)). "If the principal officer is re-elected or reappointed for another term, his deputies must also be reappointed in order to continue them in office." Hord, 79 N.E. at 922 (<HOLDING>). Our court concluded in Roberts that, because 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where state attorney general files suit on behalf of a specified group of individuals that suit qualifies as a de facto class action and the statute of limitations is tolled during the period in which the individuals are participants in the attorney generals suit (B) holding that delegation of attorney regulation to judiciary did not prevent attorney generals prosecution of law for engaging in fraudulent business practices (C) holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term (D) holding there is no constitutional right to an attorney much less an effective attorney in state postconviction proceedings (E) holding under section 1420 district attorney lacks authority to appoint deputy attorney general as an assistant prosecutor in a drug possession case

Answer:
(C)