In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: reliance is essential element of negligent misrepresentation claim). Since Purchasers are estopped from relying on a representation outside of the agreement, they cannot sustain any of the causes of action that require justifiable reliance. Therefore, the fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and FBPA claims fail, even construing the pleadings most favorably to Purchasers. Nevertheless, Purchasers argue that the determination of justifiable reliance is a jury question. While justifiable reliance may be a jury question in a fraud case where no contract exists or where the contract has become void, it is a question of law in a case where the contract language prevails and the contract’s merger clause precludes reliance on oral representations. Compare City Dodge, 232 Ga. at 770 (<HOLDING>) with First Data POS, 273 Ga. at 796 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law (B) holding that in fraud and nondisclosure claims a plaintiff must show actual and justifiable reliance (C) holding that where a merger clause is included in the written contract alleged collateral promises will not be enforced through fraud because under fraud the reliance must be reasonable (D) holding that the only fraud that could vitiate the contract is fraud that would invalidate the merger clause itself ie fraud relating to the merger clause or fraud that invalidates the entire contract including the merger clause quoting 3 corbin contracts  578 (E) holding that justifiable reliance is a jury question where the contract containing the merger clause was found invalid due to an antecedent fraud

A: (E)
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Q: uncon-scionability.” Woebse, 977 So.2d at 632 (citing Bland ex rel. Coker v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 927 So.2d 252, 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). Procedural uncon-scionability necessarily takes into account the manner in which the agreement was made. Id. At the hearing, the Estate argued that the facts are identical, really, to the Woebse case, in that it was a five-minute process where she was told to sign here and here, that she didn’t read the agreement. It wasn’t explained as an arbitration agreement to her. It was not explained that it was a voluntary process. Thus, the Estate sufficiently demonstrated that a disputed issue exists as to the making of the agreement so as to require an evidentiary hearing. See Linden v. Auto Trend, Inc., 923 So.2d 1281, 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court should have held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that an evidentiary hearing is necessary only if the party requesting the hearing raises a significant disputed factual issue (C) holding university grievance committee hearing was not an arbitration proceeding even though hearing had significant characteristics of arbitration without substantial evidence to support an arbitration agreement (D) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (E) recognizing that a party may demonstrate that a disputed issue exists as to the making of an arbitration agreement through arguments of counsel at a hearing

A: (E)
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Q: could not reach the merits of the motion to dismiss,” and “the court of appeals correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over [the healthcare defendant’s] appeal.” Id. Since Ogletree, many healthcare defendants have argued that courts of appeal have interlocutory jurisdiction under section 51.104(a)(9), even when a trial court enters an order denying a motion to dismiss which includes a section 74.351(c) order granting an extension, because if a timely served report is “so deficient that it [is] no report,” the trial court has no discretion to grant a thirty-day extension. In McKeever v. Cerny, two doctors appealed an order granting an extension and made such an argument. 266 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.). The rep (Tex.App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In support of his argument that this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report (B) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel (C) holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement (D) holding no jurisdiction when trial court granted extension even though appellants argued expert report was so woefully deficient on necessary elements so as to constitute no report and report was missing experts curriculum vitae (E) holding no jurisdiction where appellant argued report was no report because it failed to mention appellant in any substantive way but trial court found report was merely deficient on element of causation as to appellant and granted extension

A:
(E)
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