In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Ban zure beyond its lawful duration, such theft violates the Fourth Amendment. See Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 151 (7th Cir.1994). The remaining question is whether Colaprete’s Fourth Amendment right against having his property converted following a search was clearly established when the alleged conversion occurred. The Seventh Circuit has held that the existence of this right is “[s]o obvious ... that we do not think the absence of case law can establish a defense of immunity.” Id. We respectfully disagree. This court has never applied the Fourth Amendment in this manner, and Supreme Court precedent tilts slightly against the existence of any constitutional right against theft during the course of a search. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533(<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional (B) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (C) holding that theft by prison guards does not violate due process when postdeprivation remedy exists (D) holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies (E) holding that a prison guards intentional destruction of a prisoners possessions did not give rise to a federal due process claim because state law provided an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy

Output: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional


Input: Consider Input: such entities from exercising their right of eminent domain. We disagree. The statute unambiguously prohibits any curtailment or limitation of an FmHA-indebted water association’s services resulting from municipal annexation or inclusion. This language indicates a congressional mandate that local governments not encroach upon the services provided by such associations, be that encroachment in the form of competing franchises, new or additional permit requirements, or similar means. To read a loophole into this absolute prohibition, as Madison would have us do, and allow a city to do via condemnation what it is forbidden by other means, would render nugatory the clear purpose of § 1926(b). See Moore Bayou Water Association, Inc. v. Town of Jonestown, 628 F.Supp. 1367 (N.D.Miss.1986) (<HOLDING>). Madison contends that this construction of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents (B) holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate (C) holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted (D) holding municipal condemnation of water associations facilities and certificate violative of  1926b (E) holding that because exclusion was not provided to certificate holder terms of the certificate controlled

Output: holding that  1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents


Input: Consider Input: specifically, how to define “adjoining area” under the Act. Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.1980) (en bane), cert denied, 452 U.S. 905, 101 S.Ct. 3031, 69 L.Ed.2d 406 (1981). The Winchester majority adopted a broad definition of “adjoining area” that was in keeping with the plain meaning of the words, as well as “the spirit of the congressional purposes.” Id. at 514. The decades since Winchester was decided have re Appx. 793 (5th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming LHWCA situs status for job shop specializing in the repair and construction of marine parts where shop was one-hundred feet from river and located in area customarily used for maritime activity); Mobil Mining & Minerals v. Nixson, 209 F.3d 719 (5th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); Sisson v. Davis & Sons, Inc., 131 F.3d 555 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that floating casino was not a covered situs (B) holding that a fixed oil production platform was not a covered situs (C) holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees (D) holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs (E) holding injury at premises adjacent to the houston ship channel occurred on a covered situs


Output: holding that floating casino was not a covered situs