TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: immunity exists. In Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984), the fifth circuit held that when a probation officer erroneously prepared a motion for revocation of appellant’s probation, she was only entitled to qualified immunity. The court distinguished its earlier case of Spaulding v. Nielsen, supra: We find Spaulding not controlling in the case at hand. Whereas in Spaulding the probation officer was acting at the direction of the court during the presen-tence report process, in the immediate case the probation officer acted at her own initiative and at a different phase of the criminal process less intimately associated with the judiciary. Galvan, at 215. See also Griffin v. Leonard, 821 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We note also third circuit decisions, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (B) holding under facts presented that probation officer was entitled to at least qualified immunity (C) holding officials are entitled to qualified immunity for reasonable mistakes of law (D) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted (E) holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: the peremptory strike. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). In this case, we cannot say that the Florida state court’s judgment was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, specifically the Supreme Court’s holding in Bat-son. As for the State’s strike of the first black prospective juror, the interaction between the parties and the state court (where, upon being challenged, the State revealed that it wished to strike this juror because two prosecutors had seen her sleeping during the jury selection process, and the trial court then moved onto the next juror) was adequate under Batson, so trial counsel was not ineffective in that respect. See Hightower v. Terry, 459 F.3d 1067, 1072 n. 9 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even assuming that Sneed’s counsel 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this purpose albeit implicitly (B) recognizing that a trial judge can implicitly find a prosecutors proffered reasons credible (C) holding that the trial judge cannot simply rjubber stamp  a prosecutors nonracial explanation no matter how whimsical or fanciful  but in order to permit a questioned peremptory challenge  must conclude that the proffered reasons are first neutral and reasonable and second not a pretext (D) holding that findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate substantial and credible evidence (E) holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: judge erred when he changed his mind as to the admissibility of the shed statement. She contends she was entitled to rely upon the inadmissibility of this evidence and that the district court violated her due process rights in changing its ruling one week before trial without granting her request for a continuance. The State argues that due process does not prevent a trial court from changing a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of evidence and that a decision to grant or deny a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, which discretion was not abused in this case. “The Due Process Clause guarantees every defendant the right to a trial comporting with basic tenets of fundamental fairness.” State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 248, 192 P.3d 1065, 1072 (2008) (<HOLDING>). However, “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness (B) recognizing the purpose of crossexamination is to enlighten the jury as to whether the witness actuallyas a matter of fact knows the general reputation of the defendant and to place the jury in a better position to pass upon the credibility of the witness testimony (C) holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error (D) holding no due process violation where the state took one position regarding the credibility of a witness during the trial against defendant and changed its position in a subsequent trial of another defendant involved in the underlying crime (E) holding that section 90403 florida statutes did not preclude testimony that a critical state witness knew that the defendant had previously murdered a child when the credibility of the witness was at issue due to his failure initially to fully cooperate with law enforcement officers investigating the crime for which the defendant was on trial

SOLUTION:
(D)