In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 142 (1st Cir.2006). Moreover, the broad scope of the Copyright Act definitions may be of limited assistance as the court applies a “common sense” analysis of whether a particular unfinished work may be covered by VARA. One of the co-sponsors of VARA observed that “we have gone to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the works of art that will be covered.... The definition is not synonymous with any other definition in the Copyright Act....” H.R.Rep. No. 101-514, at 11. In Lilley v. Stout, 384 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C.2005), the district judge noted that “VARA established a new and distinct genus of art: ‘works of visual art,’ which differs in many respects from the pre-existing categories in Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act.” Id. at 86 (<HOLDING>). While this overview leaves much that is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a set of photographs taken to be used as studies for a painting did not qualify for vara protection (B) holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence (C) holding negligence on the part of the attorney does not qualify for such relief (D) holding that use of a pretext phone call did not qualify for protection because the technique is generally known to the public (E) holding that purely reputational damage does not qualify for dueprocess protection
[A]: (A)


[Q]: interim orders issued by arbitration panel were resolution of separate and independent claim and subject to confirmation even though the orders did not dispose of all claims submitted to arbitration); The Home Insurance Company v. RHA/Pennsylvania Nursing Homes, Inc., 127 F.Supp.2d 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (an interim award which adjudicated a portion of a damages claim and ordered the payment of that sum is final even though liability and potential damages issues remained to be resolved with respect to the remainder of the same claim; court held that an arbitration award that fully disposes of a separate and independent claim is final for purposes of confirmation under the FAA even if other claims remain pending); Hart Surgical, Inc. v. Ultracision, Inc., 244 F.3d 231 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Publicis Communication v. True North 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award (B) holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants (C) holding that an award which finally and definitely disposes of a separate independent claim may be confirmed although it does not dispose of all the claims that were submitted to arbitration (D) holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 (E) holding that section nine does not limit confirmation of an award to the district court in the district of arbitration and confirmed a new york arbitration over whose parties the court had personal jurisdiction
[A]: (C)


[Q]: parties’ memoranda of law in assessing the facts relevant to the arbitration issue. The trial court concluded that, although there was a valid agreement to arbitrate to which Epstein was not a party, he was nevertheless bound based on an agency relationship and the fact that the issues relating to him were intertwined with the issues already being litigated. While these theories might, if proved, subject Epstein to the authority of the arbitration clause, see generally Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 688 (Fla.1999); Qubty v. Nagda, 817 So.2d 952, 957-58 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), the facts supporting the issues of arbitration were disputed and the trial court should have held an eviden-tiary hearing to resolve them. See Sanchez v. Woemer Mgmt., Inc., 867 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). We accordingly reverse and remand for the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an unsworn memorandum is a pleading and not an evidentiary document therefore it had no evidentiary value and should not have been admitted as an exhibit (B) holding that the supreme court does not require an evidentiary hearing in every case (C) holding that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing when the petitioners habeas submissions demonstrate that the petitioner is conclusively entitled to relief in such circumstances an evidentiary hearing would be a waste of judicial resources (D) holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required if there are no factual issues in dispute (E) holding that such statements were not even enough for an evidentiary hearing
[A]:
(A)