In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: and systematic,” even when the cause of action has no relation to those contacts. LSI Indus. Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2000) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). The district court correctly found that it lacked general jurisdiction over Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer has very limited contacts with California. Oppenheimer has shipped unspecified items to the defendant Spectrum Effects, Inc. of California. However, the record gives no indication of the context and significance of these shipments for Oppenheimer’s business. Appellants failed to show that these acts amount to continuous and systematic contacts with California. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Oppenheimer has exhibited 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a choice of law provision is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant (B) holding that purchases even if occurring at regular intervals were insufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation (C) holding that business visits and purchases within a forum even if occurring at regular intervals are not enough to support general jurisdiction over a defendant (D) holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction (E) holding no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor
[A]: (B)


[Q]: federal courts intervene in the matter. The argument is unavailing, however, where the pending question is whether the Board’s proceedings constitute an effort by the state to impose its regulatory authority in a field preempted by Congress. See Association of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 208 F.3d 1, 2000 WL 298563, at *3 (1st Cir. March 27, 2000)(finding that the court’s initial invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was unwise where “the ultimate legal determination of whether the Massachusetts regulations are preempted by the [federal Clean Air Act] is a question of federal preemption law for the courts alone to decide”); Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 41 (1st Cir.1972)(<HOLDING>). The state defendants also move to dismiss 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and it does not matter that the plaintiff was using state law as the vehicle to press her assertion (B) holding that plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before the puerto rico labor relations board before invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine whether the boards assertion of jurisdiction was proper (C) recognizing the general rule that parties must exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from federal courts  (D) holding that plaintiff could not present his erisa estoppel claim to the district court because he did not properly exhaust it before the administrative review board (E) holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court
[A]: (B)


[Q]: omitted). Accordingly we concluded that because misdemeanor battery could be violated through the “least touching,” the statute did not require the use of violent force and thus was not a crime of violence under the federal generic statute. Id. Ortegar-Mendez, however, is readily distinguishable because a conviction under § 273.5(a) requires more than a simple battery. Unlike § 242, which criminalizes the use of “force or violence,” § 273.5(a) contains no differentiating provision. California Penal Code § 273.5(a) requires that the defendant “willfully inflict ... corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition.” (emphasis added). The commonsense reading of this language is that § 273.5(a) requires the use of violence. See United States v. Jimenez, 258 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Unlike simple battery, which requires 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that marital communications which arise from an act of violence by a spouse committed against the children of either spouse should constitute an exception to the marital privilege because such communications fail to satisfy the conditions underlying the creation of the privilege (B) holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor (C) holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium (D) holding that a defendant could not reasonably  dispute that inflicting corporal injury on his spouse involved the use of violence (E) holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that the code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse
[A]:
(D)