In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444, 221 A.2d 521 (1966))); Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170, 733 A.2d 1159 (1999). Our construction of N.J.S.A 39:4-88(b) is thus consonant with established principles of statutory construction. | IV. Applying statutes that are identical or very similar to the statute before the Court, courts of other states have reached varying conclusions. Several decisions have construed analogous statutes to describe two offenses, as this Court construes N.J.S.A 39:4-88(b). See People v. Butler, 81 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 146 Cal.Rptr. 856, 857 (Cal.Ct.App.1978) (construing Cal. Veh.Code § 21658 to state “two affirmative duties placed upon the operator of a motor vehicle”); People v. Smith, 172 Ill.2d 289, 216 Ill.Dec. 658, 665 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Marx, 289 Kan. 657, 215 P.3d 601, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders (B) holding that plain language of 625 ill comp stat ann 511709 establishes two separate requirements for lane usage (C) holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning (D) holding that in context of motion for reconsideration or to reopen congress envisioned two separate timely petitions for review of two separate final orders (E) holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms

Answer: holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders


Question: L.Ed.2d at 1035-86). Unfortunately, the adjective "readily" is subject to differing interpretations, and there has been disagreement regarding the meaning of "readily mobile." Decisions of the Indiana Court of Appeals are not consistent regarding whether automobiles under police observation or control are readily mobile so as to be subject to warrantless search under the automobile exception. E.g., compare, v. State, T5 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (legally parked automobile surrounded by police officers held not inherently mobile to qualify for automobile exeeption), transfer denied, and Edwards v. State, 768 N.E.2d 506, 508-09 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (impounded vehicle no longer "inherently mobile"), trams. not sought, with Johnson v. State, 766 N.E2d 426, 483 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002) (<HOLDING>), trans. demied, and Justice v. State, 765 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver (B) holding that ready mobility existed when a car was capable of being driven even after the driver was arrested and despite the absence of other potential drivers (C) holding that ocga  40520 as safeharbor provision requires a defendant to produce a drivers license that was valid at the time the vehicle was being driven (D) holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key (E) holding detention lawful when police referred driver to secondary to check ownership of the vehicle after the driver admitted that the car did not belong to him and the registration revealed that the car was owned by another

Answer: holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver


Question: The district court found that there was “no possibility of confusion by the purchaser at or near the point of sale.” 894 F.Supp. at 1200. The grounds for this conclusion are apparent, but are certainly useful to discuss. Companies in the corn wet milling industry purchase clamshells directly from the manufacturers, after extensive negotiations and discussions. Fluid-Quip held itself out to this limited market as a competitor of Dorr-Oliver and conspicuously marked its elam-shells with its company name. Clearly, any purchasers of clamshells would know from whom they were buying. There is therefore no realistic possibility that anyone would purchase a Fluid-Quip clamshell believing it to be a Dorr-Oliver clamshell. See Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. Mfg. Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 212 (3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 54, 133 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even several isolated incidents of actual confusion are insufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion (B) holding that most important factors in evaluating confusion in product configuration eases are marketing and labeling of products (C) holding that although the district court recognized confusion based on similarity of products it failed to give proper weight to the virtual identity of the parties products (D) holding attending and marketing products at national trade show in texas insufficient to confer general jurisdiction (E) recognizing that among other factors the location and level of the precedent as well as its age are important factors in a qualified immunity analysis

Answer:
holding that even several isolated incidents of actual confusion are insufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion