In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: business is a disputed question of fact which cannot be resolved on summary judgment. State Auto disputes Appellants’ arguments and also posits in the alternative that, even if Kraus was an “insured” at the time he committed the acts in question, Appellants’ false imprisonment claims were subsumed by their sexual assault claims. As discussed below, we conclude that the district court correctly found that the determination of whether Kraus was an “insured” under the policy is a question of law where the pertinent facts are undisputed, that the policy is not ambiguous, and that Kraus’s acts fall within the Criminal-Acts Exclusion. Because we affirm the district court on those grounds, we do not reach State Auto’s alternative argument in support 2d 349, 633 N.W.2d 707 (Wis.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Michelet v. Scheuring Sec. Servs. Inc., 680 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question (B) holding that the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment or while performing duties related to the conduct of the employers business for purposes of insurance coverage were questions of fact that precluded summary judgment particularly since there was a question regarding the employees intent in performing the act in question (C) holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred (D) holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury (E) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact
[A]: (B)


[Q]: failed to ' pay Tomlin at the time-and-a-half rate for the hours he worked in excess of forty per week. In the event of such a failure, we instruct the ALC to determine the rate of compensation to which Tomlin was entitled, the number of overtime hours that were underpaid, and the amount the Department owes Tomlin for his labor. II. Remaining Issues With regard to Tomlin’s remaining issues, we affirm based upon the following authorities: 1. As to the circuit court’s remand to the ALC for determination of the prevailing wage: Condor, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, City of N. Charleston, 328 S.C. 173, 178, 493 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1997) (preventing an appellant from arguing on appeal an issue conceded in the trial court); Bowman v. Bowman, 357 S.C. 146, 160, 591 S.E.2d 654, 661 (Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). 2. As to whether Tomlin was an employee of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even when the issue is constitutional in nature an argument is not preserved on appeal unless the appellant raised and made the argument at trial and obtained a ruling on it nor will a particular theory be addressed on appeal if it was not presented below (B) holding a party cannot seek and receive a particular result at trial and then challenge it on appeal (C) holding that defendant must object at trial to preserve as applied challenge for appeal (D) holding that we cannot properly receive and consider evidence that was not presented to and considered by the trial court (E) holding that claims based on grounds not objected to at trial cannot be considered on appeal
[A]: (B)


[Q]: the magistrate’s finding — which was adopted by the district court — that “[o]n December 18, 1981, JESUS GUADALUPE OLIVAREZ was the record owner of the property [at 814 East Citrus Street].” 4 . See also Capitol Aggregates, 448 S.W.2d at 836 (noting that where “the claimant would not have the right of possession or title ... there would be nothing to which a claim of homestead could attach”). 5 .See also Cleveland v. Milner, 141 Tex. 120, 170 S.W.2d 472, 475 (1943) ("Possibly the homestead laws, liberally construed, would have prohibited interference by judicial process with Milner's possession of the premises in a contest between him and his creditor.... Milner had merely permissive and partial possession....”) 6 . See Greene v. White, 137 Tex. 361, 153 S.W.2d 575, 579, 586 (1941) (<HOLDING>); Rettig v. Houston West End Realty Co., 254 
 Holding statements: (A) holding even though debtor would have been entitled to iowa homestead exemption but for former spouses iowa code section 59821 lien debtor could not avoid the lien because it attached to the homestead prior to or simultaneously with debtors acquisition of the interest in the homestead (B) holding that homestead exemption was unavailable even though claimants were  living on the land and claiming it as homestead with the permission or acquiescence of the owner for they could have no homestead right or interest in land to which they had no title (C) holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property (D) holding that even if divorced wife only owned a beneficial interest and not title interest in the residence constituting her homestead she was nonetheless entitled to claim a homestead exemption from the forced sale of the property (E) holding that a wife could claim a homestead exemption even though she only had a beneficiary interest in the property held in trust
[A]:
(B)