In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990). Petitioner claims that Apprendi falls within the narrow scope of the second category of exceptions and is therefore applicable to his case retroactively. The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether Apprendi should be considered a “watershed rule,” falling within the Teague exceptions. However, every Circuit Court which has considered this question has held that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively on collateral review. United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir.2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir.2001); see, e.g., Abdullah v. United States, 240 F.3d 683, 687 (8th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>); Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review (B) holding apprendi is not retroactive (C) holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review (D) holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review  that was previously unavailable (E) holding that the apprendi decision is not applicable on collateral review
holding apprendi is not retroactive

398, 407 (1988) (concluding that the act of inserting an adult’s tongue into a child’s mouth constituted an “immoral, improper, or indecent” act within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1) and a “lewd or lascivious” act within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2)); State v. Hammett, 182 N.C. App. 316, 323, 642 S.E.2d 454, 459 (concluding that masturbating in a child’s presence constituted an offense punishable pursuant to N.C.G.S. 14-202.1(a)(2)), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 572, 651 S.E.2d 227 (2007); State v. Turman, 52 N.C. App. 376, 377, 278 S.E.2d 574, 575 (1981) (concluding that masturbating in a child’s presence constituted an offense pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(l)); cf. State v. Jones, 172 N.C. App. 308, 314-16, 616 S.E.2d 15, 19-20 (2005) (<HOLDING>). In light of these decisions, at least four 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction (B) holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (C) holding that a single act cannot support two convictions under both ncgs  142021al and ncgs  142021a 2 respectively (D) recognizing that dui manslaughter and vehicular homicide are two separate crimes neither being a lesser included offense of the other but holding that a single death cannot support convictions for both crimes (E) holding that separate sentences may be imposed for a violation of section 36bd and the predicate offense where both convictions were the result of the same act so long as the charges are brought in a single trial
holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction

§ 4.3(e), at 473 n. 56. As the Second Circuit has held: The moral, religious and legal significance of the undertaking remains the same whether the oath taker and the witness communicate face-to-face or over the telephone. In a ritualistic sense, it may be that an oath taken over the telephone appears less formal or less solemn than one taken in the physical presence of the oath taker. The constitutionality of oaths does not depend, however, on such purely ritualistic considerations. Turner, 558 F.2d at 50. So, here, the mere fact that the Probable Cause Statement was faxed, rather than presented in person, to the magistrate judge does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Jones v. City of Santa Monica, 382 F.3d 1052, 2004 WL 2047140, 2004 WL 2021285, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2004) (<HOLDING>). Because he gave the Statement under penalty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission of testimonial statements against a defendant is unconstitutional when the declarant does not appear at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination (B) holding that a preprinted probablecause form sent to the magistrate judge which requires a signed statement by the declarant under penalty of perjury that the statements that follow are true satisfies the fourth amendment (C) holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment (D) holding that testimonial evidence is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant (E) holding that an inculpatory statement by a declarant was not reliable when he viewed the defendant like an older brother providing a motivation to lie the statement was made only to defense investigators and not to prosecutors the declarant was not under oath had not been read his miranda rights and was not represented by counsel and the declarant ultimately recanted his admission

holding that the admission of testimonial statements against a defendant is unconstitutional when the declarant does not appear at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination