In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: tam complaints, Relator Mayes and Relators Lutz and Webster have filed amended complaints. 2 . In briefing related to the multiple pending motions to dismiss, some Defendants argue that the 2010 amendment that made it clear that a claim resulting from an AKS violation was a false claim operated only in a prospective nature, (See, e.g,, Dkt. No. 146-1 at 17). However, this Court finds that the weight of authority supports the conclusion that the 2010 amendment adding 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(g) was merely a clarification of the law; claims tainted by AKS violations constitute false claims for the purposes of the FCA regardless of whether the violation occurred before or after the 2010 amendment. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 312 n.19 (3d Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>); U.S. ex rel. Westmoreland v. Amgen, Inc., 812 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a legislative amendment that appeared to approve the analysis of a recent indiana supreme court case was a clarification rather than an amendment (B) holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel (D) holding that federal rule of civil procedure 15c2 giving court discretion to permit amendment of complaint applies to  2255 petitions insofar as a district court may in its discretion permit an amendment to a petition to provide factual clarification or amplification after the expiration of the oneyear period of limitations as long as the petition itself was timely filed and the petitioner does not seek to add an entirely new claim or new theory of relief (E) holding that the 2010 amendment was a clarification

A: (E)
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Q: relevant facts. See Mot. at 13-14. Defendant, too, claimed in its subsequent statement of the issues that this talk happened between April 1 and April 4 and cited the same supportive evidence to this effect. See SOF, ¶ 73 (citing Howe Dep. at 32:7-12, 34:12-19 and May 13, 2014, Howe Email). Because Marks never refuted this fact by offering his own statement of the issues, as required under Local Rule 7(h), the Court could thus consider WWL’s account admitted on this ground alone. See LCvR 7(h) (“[I]n determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to- the motion.”); Jackson, 101 F.3d at 153 (<HOLDING>). The Court, however, need not rest on this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion (B) holding district court has complete discretion whether to treat facts as conceded where local rule is violated (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that the predecessor to local rule 561b3 provides the only acceptable means of  presenting additional facts to the district court (E) holding a district court has discretion under rule 55b2 once a default is determined to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action

A: (B)
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Q: within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occürred... , It is undisputed that the 300-day limitations period applied here, and that the filing date of Kassaye’s charge for EEOC purposes was January 18, 1991. It is also undisputed that Kassaye received actual notice of the tenure denial, at the latest, by January 20, 1990 Thus, Kassaye’s EEOC charge was timely only if “the alleged unlawful employment practice” occurred within 300 days before January 18, 1991. Kassaye concedes that if, as the district court held, the gravamen of his complaint was the tenure denial, his charge was filed too late because it was not filed until 363 days after January 20, 1990. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 504, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Kassaye’s administratively-filed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included (B) holding that the statute of limitations for an employment discrimination lawsuit by a college professor who did not receive tenure began when the college made the tenure decision and communicated that decision to the plaintiff (C) holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run (D) holding that when prisoner diligently seeks information about the status of his case the limitations period may be equitably tolled until he receives notice of its denial (E) holding that the limitations period for a discrimination charge based on tenure denial begins when aggrieved person receives notice of denial not on the last day of employment

A:
(E)
****