In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5653(PAC), 2011 WL 3874821 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2011) ("NJ v. DLJ"); NJ Carpenters, 272 F.R.D. 160 (finding Rule 23(a) requirements were met, but not Rule 23(b)(3) requirements). 59 . DI 294, at 30-33. 60 . Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., 714 F.Supp.2d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (stating Section 12(a)(2) standing is limited to “persons who have directly purchased the securities from underwriting defendants in the subject public offering(s), and not in the secondary market”); In re Sterling Foster & Co., Inc., Sec. Litig., 222 F.Supp.2d 216, 244 (E.D.N.Y.2002) ("[P]urchasers in private or secondary market offerings are precluded from bringing actions under Section 12(a)(2).”). 61 . DI 294, at 30; DI 300, at 17. 62 . See IndyMac I, 718 F.Supp.2d at 513 (<HOLDING>). 63 . This of course means that it does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party waived the claims she failed to pursue in her merit brief (B) holding that because  544b1 provides only the power of avoidance it does not confer authority on the trustee to pursue state law damage claims but that the trustee could pursue such claims under  544a1 or 2 if the claims could have been asserted by the debtor corporation (C) holding pinter analysis to apply to claims arising under  12a2 (D) holding that a trustee had no standing to pursue claims of fraud against the debtors accountant because under connecticut law those claims belonged to investors (E) holding wyoming only had standing to pursue section 12a2 claims as to indx 2006ar11
(E)

1 We note that the Supreme Court of Georgia recently vacated portions of the trial court’s injunction order in Barham v. City of Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375 (738 SE2d 52) (2013). 2 Am. Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Mom & Pop Stores, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 1, 7 (3) (497 SE2d 616) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 3 Levine v. Sun Trust Robinson Humphrey, 321 Ga. App. 268, 275 (3) (740 SE2d 672) (2013) (punctuation omitted). 4 Am. Petroleum Prods., 231 G 215 SE2d 294) (1975) (“[When] the complaining party cannot legitimately claim surprise, either because he knew of the existence of the witness or had equal means of knowing, it is not error to fail to invoke the sanctions of postponement, mistrial, barring the witness, etc.”). Cf. Malley Motors, Inc. v. Davis, 183 Ga. App. 599, 600 (1) (359 SE2d 394) (1987) (<HOLDING>). 18 See Hunter v. Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (B) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (C) holding that trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of a witness who was not listed in the pretrial order and no reason was given for the failure to list the witness (D) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (E) holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony
(C)

the effort does not involve filing or threatening a lawsuit. Compare McMahon, 744 F.3d at 1020 (dunning letters offering to “settle” time-barred debts could violate Act by leading debtors to believe the debts were legally enforceable); Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 2016) (effort to collect is not automatically unlawful, but letter violates FDCPA if it could lead unsophisticated consumer to believe her time-barred debt is legally enforceable); and Buchanan v. Northland Group, Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 2015) (reversing dismissal on pleadings; offer to settle time-barred debt could violate Act by failing to disclose that suit would be time-barred or that partial payment would remove statute of limitations bar), with Huertas, 641 F.3d at 33 (<HOLDING>), and Freyermuth, 248 F.3d at 771 (same). Even 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attempt to collect a timebarred debt was permissible if litigation not threatened (B) holding that because secured creditor did not attempt to collect its entire debt through the bankruptcy proceeding the liens in question were not property dealt with by the plan for  1141c purposes (C) holding assignee could collect debt on stated account (D) holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt (E) holding that plaintiffs allegation that debt collectors attempted to collect on a debt to a condominium association notwithstanding their knowledge that plaintiff did not really owe that debt to the condominium was sufficient to state a claim under the fdutpa

(A)