In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

of common law fraud, it is considered a fraudulent act and is protected by 9(b)). We conclude that 9(b) applies to FCA fraud claims because not only is such a conclusion in accord with other courts and our more recent decisions, but also because its applicability is consistent with the purposes of Rule 9: (1) to inhibit claims that are filed as a pretext to uncover unknown wrongs; (2) to protect defendants from the harm that results from charges of serious wrongdoing; and (3) to give defendants notice of the complained-of conduct, enabling defendants to prepare a defense. Coronet Insurance Co. v. Seyfarth, 665 F.Supp. 661, 666 (N.D.Ill.1987). See also U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 755 F.Supp. 1055, 1058 (S.D.Ga.1990) (<HOLDING>); U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a broad claim with no factual support was insufficient to satisfy rule 9b (B) holding that rule 9b applies to fca (C) holding that californias ucl claims are subject to rule 9b pleading standards (D) holding that charge of money laundering need not satisfy rule 9b (E) holding plaintiffs speculations did not satisfy rule 9b requirements
holding a broad claim with no factual support was insufficient to satisfy rule 9b

a “public official,” places a great emphasis on two of the elements: (1) the statutory powers and duties of a position, and (2) whether that position exercised sovereign power. See, e.g., Spaulding, 102 Iowa at 649, 72 N.W. at 291 (concluding that the treasurer of the commissioners of pharmacy was not a public officer because the position of treasurer “was a creation of the commission ... and at all times subject absolutely to their control”); McKinley, 228 Iowa at 1189-91, 293 N.W. at 451 (concluding that county engineer was an “official” because he furnished a bond and took an oath of office; but more importantly because several statutes defining the powers and duties of the county engineer delegated certain sovereign powers to that position); Whitney, 232 Iowa at 71, 4 N.W.2d at 398 (<HOLDING>); Hutton, 235 Iowa at 56, 16 N.W.2d at 20 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (C) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was an employee not an official and therefore entitled to benefits under the workers compensation act (D) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was not an official because she was not required to give bond or take an oath none of the statutes impose upon her the exercise of discretion in any way they delegate no sovereign power to her (E) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment
holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment

law torts committed by employees of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. However, the waiver only extends to torts committed by government employees “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the [tortious] act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The plain meaning of section 1346(b) is that the United States cannot be held liable when there is no comparable cause of. action against a private citizen. The language of 28 U.S.C. § 2674 restates the threshold limitation on the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity: ‘The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same maimer and to the same extent 1990) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. United States, 644 F.2d 846 (10th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the united states was a statutory employer under missouri law (B) holding that the united states was a statutory employer under puerto rico law (C) holding that the united states was a statutory loaning employer under illinois law (D) holding the act inapplicable to the united states in its role as employer (E) holding that the united states was a statutory employer under kansas law

holding that the united states was a statutory employer under puerto rico law