In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: terms, “pending” refers to the status of an action before a final decision on the merits. Beetham v. Georgia-Pacific, 87 Or App 592, 743 P2d 755 (1987); see also Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, 1669 (unabridged ed 1993) (pending means “not yet decided”). Although that meaning is useful in determining whether an action remains pending, it does not fully resolve the problem before us, which is to determine when an action becomes pending. The solution to that problem, however, is readily apparent from relevant contextual sources. ORCP 3 provides that an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint rather than by service of summons. An action becomes pending when it is commenced. See Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Corbett, 66 Or App 668, 672, 675 P2d 1097, rev den 297 Or 340 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, after a complaint is filed, an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a complaint which will not support a claim against the specific property at issue cannot provide a basis for tying it up by a filing of notice of lis pendens (B) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (C) holding that under orcp 3 lis pendens attaches upon the filing of a complaint because the action is pending (D) holding that action of filing a complaint and notice of lis pendens based on a contract without simultaneously requesting a stay and an order compelling arbitration waives that partys contractual right to arbitrate (E) holding that filing of an administrative complaint did not meet the requirement that the employee seek counseling prior to filing
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: magistrate judge denied the motion, explaining that Mr. Schueller’s subjective perceptions did not demonstrate judicial bias and his claims were not based on any extrajudicial source to support a bias or partiality challenge. We generally review the denial of a recusal motion for abuse of discretion. ClearOne Comm’cns, Inc. v. Bowers, 651 F.3d 1200, 1217 (10th Cir.2011). For the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s order denying recusal, we determine that recusal was not warranted and we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to recuse. To the extent Mr. Schueller now claims that the district judge was biased against him, he did not raise this issue to the district court, so we do not address it. See Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1239 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Wells Fargo’s motion for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs waived their bias argument on appeal because they failed to timely move for disqualification (B) holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument (C) holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal (D) holding argument not asserted before district court is waived on appeal (E) holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: 504 U.S. 655, 659-60, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 119 L.Ed.2d 441 (1992) (recognizing the continuing authority of Rauscher)). 47 . Id. at 1244. (Emphasis added) (citing Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4 th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J. concurring) (stating, that "[t]he provisions of the Conventions should be implemented before trial when they can be appropriately addressed.”)). 48 . Id. (citing Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d at 622 (Butzner, J. concurring)). 49 . See State’s Let. of June 23, 1999, at 6. 50 . See Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 38, para. 1(c). 51 . See State’s Let. of June 23, 1999, at 2. 52 . See State’s Let. of June 23, 1999, at 6-7. 53 . See Kadish, supra note 10, at 605 (referring to Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377, 91 S.Ct. 1848; 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (<HOLDING>)). 54 . See Aceves, supra note 5, at 314-315 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution (B) holding that central assessment by the unit method of valuation did not violate the equal protection clause of the united states constitution or the uniform operation of laws provision in the utah constitution (C) holding that state outdoor recreational immunity statute did not violate equal protection clause of united states constitution under rationalbasis test (D) holding that aliens constitute a specific minority deserving enhanced judicial protection and making alienage a suspect classification under the equal protection clause of the united states constitution (E) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause
[EX A]:
(D)