In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: Plaintiff did not meet the notice requirements of the CFRA and the FMLA. Plaintiff did not notify Defendant in advance that Plaintiff would be absent from March 31, 2014 through April 3, 2014. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo., Exhs. Vol. II. Additionally, Plaintiff did not call in sick or ask someone to call Defendant on his behalf on any of those four days of absence, even though Plaintiff made 26 phone calls to individuals or entities other than McCale or Defendant. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo,, Exhs. Vol. II. Thus, unlike in Avila, upon which Plaintiff relies, Plaintiff did not call in sick during his absence from March 31, 2014 through April 3,2014. See Avila, 165 Cal.App.4th at 1258, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, two weeks prior to Plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party (B) holding that absence from prior state was temporary during the time it was contemplated that the parent and child would return to the other state (C) holding that spouse was not required to return to work immediately upon divorce to avoid judicial imputation of income (D) holding that calling in sick during an absence and providing hospital forms describing the illness upon return to work is sufficient notice (E) holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: case commences from the time the discriminatory conduct causes economic injury and ends upon the date of the judgment. In other words, back pay accrues from the date of the commencement of the discriminatory course of conduct causing financial loss until the date damages are “settled.” Palasota, 499 F.3d at 483 (internal citations omitted); see also Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.1999) (“A prevailing ADA claimant is presumptively entitled to all back pay which would have accrued from the termination date to the entry of judgment, provided it is made to appear that reasonable diligence was exercised in the effort to secure other suitable employment.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Sellers v. Delgado College, 781 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Back pay may be denied “only for reasons 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award of back pay under title vii remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion (B) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to require a defendant to pay all back taxes (C) holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment (D) holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court (E) holding there was no jury trial right where court ordered reinstatement and back pay to teachers fired after desegregation order in discrimination case back pay is equitable

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: “that an implied warranty to repair or modify existing tangible goods or property in a good and workmanlike manner is available to consumers suing under the DTPA.” Id. at 358-54. Although Nelda’s petition alleged a claim for breach of a common law implied warranty and a claim for breach of the DTPA implied warranty, “consumers of services do not have the protection of a ... common law implied warranty scheme.” See id. at 353. Following Melody Home, a claim for such a breach is available under the DTPA. Accordingly, we conclude the DTPA’s two-year statute of limitations applies. See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 17.565 (Vernon 2002) (limitations); see also Koehler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 05-98-01325-CV, 2001 WL 611453, at *5 (Tex.App.-Dallas June 6, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); Howard v. Fiesta Tex. Show Park, Inc., 980 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statute of limitations for dtpa action including claim for breach of express or implied warranty under the dtpa is two years (B) holding that an implied warranty to perform services in a good and workmanlike manner is an action available under the dtpa and is subject to the twoyear limitations provided by the dtpa (C) holding plaintiff had to commence his breach of implied warranty action under the dtpa within two years because tjhis special statute of limitations denies plaintiffs alternative proposal of entitlement to recover for breach of the common law implied warranty (D) holding that texas law does not recognize an implied warranty that services incidental to helicopter maintenance will be performed in a good and workmanlike manner (E) holding that because the dtpa is the only way of pursuing an implied warranty claim for repairs to existing tangible goods such a claim must necessarily be brought within the twoyear dtpa limitations period


Output: (B)