In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

558, 563, 564 S.E.2d 94, 96 (2002). DISCUSSION Moody argues the circuit court erred in granting Dairy-land’s motion for summary judgment, asserting Dairyland did not make a meaningful offer of UIM coverage because it failed to offer coverage in amounts less than the statutory minimum limits. We disagree. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Hawkins v. Bruno Yacht Sales, 353 S.C. 31, 40, 577 S.E.2d 202, 207 (2003).. Moreover, “[w]here the terms of the statute are clear, [this Court] must apply those terms according to their literal meaning.” Brown v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 515, 560 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2002); see also Rowe v. Hyatt, 321 S.C. 366, 369, 468 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In relevant part, section 38-73-470 provides 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning (B) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (C) holding when interpreting a statute words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statutes operation (D) holding that where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation (E) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning
holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning

with ever since his age of 13 and believes that this criminal record and his continued violation of the law does require a sentence at the top of the guideline range.” Id. at 8. I. A. Commerce Clause Challenge to Section 922(g)(1) Williams first challenges the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute as it applies to his possession of the Smith and Wesson revolver. Williams posits that because he possessed the gun solely within the State of Wisconsin, and because the record reveals no substantial connection between his possession of the gun and interstate commerce, Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to reach his possession of the gun. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Williams did not make this argument below, so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce (B) holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (C) holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that gunfree school zones act of 1990 which proscribed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school exceeded congressional authority under commerce clause because it reached conduct that did not substantially affect or have a meaningful connection with interstate commerce (E) holding that the gunfree school zones act exceeds congress power under the commerce clause
holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce

3604(c). B. Plaintiff Adequately Pleads a Section 3604(d) Violation Based on Defendant’s Statements Regarding Housing Availability Under Section 3604(d), it is illegal to represent to someone that housing is unavailable, when in fact it is available, because that person has a disability. (See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d).) The section is intended to afford a legal right to all persons to have access to truthful housing information. See Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir.1990) (“The statute creates a right to be free from ... misrepresentations”) (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-374, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982)); see also Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 296-97 (7th Cir.2000) (citing Dwivedi, 895 F.2d at 1526) (<HOLDING>). In Havens, the Supreme Court held that an 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing provisions of the fair housing act that forbid false statements that housing is unavailable to a person because of his race (B) holding inter alia that real estate brokers who treat customers differently from one another because of their race violate the fair housing act (C) holding that the state has no obligation to provide adequate housing (D) holding that the department of agricultures rural housing services alleged failure to implement the fair housing act was not discrete agency action for purposes of  7061 (E) holding that the brooke amendment to the housing act provided a cause of action under  1983

holding inter alia that real estate brokers who treat customers differently from one another because of their race violate the fair housing act