TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: court, in addition to other disbursements allowed by law, the following costs: . . . For travel, such sum as the court may allow”); Mass.RCiv.P. 54(d) (“Except when express provision therefore is made either in a statute of the Commonwealth or on these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing pariy unless the court otherwise directs”). However, the Supreme Judicial Court cautioned that “(i]n taxing costs, courts do not seek to compensate litigants fully for the cost of litigation.” Waldman v. American Honda Motor Co., supra, 413 Mass, at 322. Furthermore, the Supreme Judicial Court has advised that “where such costs are permitted, an award of costs is allowable only when based on ‘specific affirmative authority.’ ” Demoulas v. Demoulas, 432 Mass. 43, 64 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 4.Travel Costs of Prevailing Party In 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees and court costs are recoverable under general hold harmless indemnity agreement (B) holding costs of service of subpoenas recoverable (C) holding that costs of daily transcripts during trial are not recoverable (D) holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered (E) holding that fees are not recoverable for work for which the client could not be charged

SOLUTION: holding that attorneys fees and court costs are recoverable under general hold harmless indemnity agreement

PROBLEM: court’s conclusion that the Jarvisons had a traditional ceremonial marriage under the Navajo Code. Moreover, because the Jarvi-sons had not completed the procedure under Navajo law to validate a traditional or common law marriage, the government argues that their marriage was invalid. In evaluating the government’s contentions, we observe that the district court could have produced a more robust order detailing its findings of fact and evidentia-ry basis similar to the detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in Beller v. United States, 221 F.R.D. 679 (D.N.M.2003). Nonetheless, on our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence in the record is sufficient to establish a valid marriage between the Jarvisons. See United States v. Taylor, 97 F.3d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Esther testified to having 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that despite a trial courts failure to make specific factual findings an appellate court is free to affirm on any grounds for which there is sufficient record to permit conclusions of law (B) holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required (C) holding that an appellate court can affirm a district courts order on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law including grounds upon which the district court did not rely (D) holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds (E) holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact

SOLUTION: holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required

PROBLEM: by sheer momentum. This is a danger independent of the materials used in the bike’s construction. To link a failure to warn of the potential of damaged carbon fiber to fail to Miguelez’s choice of bicycle, and, in turn, to an event that might occur to any bicyclist using the equipment as intended, is stretching the concept of proximate legal causation too far. See Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So.2d 1015, 1018 (Fla.1984) (“A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant” (quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 41 (4th ed. 1971))); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Jones, 138 Fla. 746, 190 So. 26, 27 (1939) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Mi-guelez failed to prove 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury (B) holding in the medical malpractice context that a plaintiff must prove that the alleged negligence more likely than not caused the victims death (C) holding that in negligence actions florida courts follow the more likely than not standard of causation ie they require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiffs injury (D) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence (E) holding that the intervening act breaks the chain of causation set in operation by a defendants negligence thereby insulating his negligence as a direct cause of the injury

SOLUTION:
holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury