In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: subpoena does not fit within the statutory language. The question surrounding the subpoena’s validity in no way relates to any information that Star Bank would be required to disclose under FCRA, even assuming that FCRA’s requirements apply to Star Bank. {See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) for the definition of a “consumer reporting agency.”) The Hahns’ claimed reliance on whatever Bonynge said regarding the subpoena therefore provides them with no basis to toll the two year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Hahns have failed to demonstrate that the wilful misrepresentation tolling exception applies to their case. We therefore hold that all of their claims raised under FCRA are barred by the statute of limitations. See Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We find no inequity in reaching this result. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim (B) holding that equitable tolling is available to avoid time limitations in the statutory provisions governing veterans benefits (C) holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims (D) holding that an ohio tolling statute violated the commerce clause because it gave nonresident corporations the choice between being subject to general jurisdiction in the state by appointing an instate agent for service of process or being subject to a tolling of the statute of limitations on claims against them (E) holding that a plaintiff must fit within the precise wording of the tolling exception to avoid being barred by fcras statute of limitations provision

Output: holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim


Input: Consider Input: quantity function as elements by increasing the maximum penalty a defendant may receive, are they elements of an aggravated offense or are they sentencing factors with heightened due process requirements? See id. at 573, 575 (Hug, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s apparent conclusion that the penalty provisions of § 841(b) are not elements of the offense). The district court correctly interpreted Buckland as holding that drug type and quantity are not elements of the offense, but rather are material facts that must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Buckland opinion emphasized that the relevant inquiry is not whether a penalty provision is an element, but rather whether it exposes the defendant to a longer sentence than woul (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so (B) holding jury is entitled to accept the states version of the facts and reject appellants version or reject any of the witnesses testimony (C) holding that biased on buckland we must reject valensias contention that the sentencing provisions of  841 create separate crimes (D) holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes (E) holding the crimes merge where the jury was not asked to determine whether two assaults occurredeventhough the evidence may have been sufficient to support separate crimes

Output: recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so


Input: Consider Input: immunity defense ordinarily fails, since “a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” See id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727). Thus, the aldermen are entitled to qualified immunity only if Belk’s right to free speech was not clearly established at the time of her discharge. See id. Belk was discharged in 1995. As early as 1985, the Supreme Court had found a clear First Amendment protection for public employees. “It is clearly established that a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech.” Rankin, 483 U.S. at 382, 107 S.Ct. 2891. Our own precedent evidences this principle as well. See Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 267 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Casey, 12 F.3d at 804 (“No right is more 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that retaliatory discharge based solely on protected speech by ones spouse is actionable under the first amendment (B) recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act (C) holding that it is clearly established that retaliation against private citizens for exercising their first amendment rights is actionable (D) recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge (E) holding that retaliatory discharge is a clearly established first amendment violation


Output: holding that retaliatory discharge based solely on protected speech by ones spouse is actionable under the first amendment