In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for “anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,” because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for “wil-fully taking away her husband” and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability). But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute (B) holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses (C) recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that police officers were immune from liability for damages resulting from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress

Output: holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute


Input: Consider Input: P.2d 171, 174-75 (1997) (providing that a party seeking to change custody must establish that circumstances have substantially changed since the most recent custodial order, and that any events that took place before the prior proceedings cannot be used to show changed circumstances). Although we will not substantively review the decree’s child custody arrangement because of mootness, we note, in passing, that a district court, faced with evidence that one parent is attempting to disrupt the other parent’s 8 (1993); see also NRS 125.480(1) (providing that the sole consideration in awarding custody of a child is the best interest of the child). 11 84 Nev. 710, 447 P.2d 664 (1968). 12 Id. at 711, 447 P.2d at 665. 13 Cf. Hopper v. Hopper, 113 Nev. 1138, 1143, 946 P.2d 171, 174-75 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 14 Most v. Most, 477 A.2d 250, 263 (Me. 1984) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that conduct that preceded the prior custody determination cannot be admitted to show a change in circumstances (B) holding the teenage childrens preference to live in fathers home was sufficient evidence to support a change in physical custody in a modification of a split physical custody arrangement even though the party seeking the change failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances (C) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (D) holding that a subsequent petition may be filed upon a showing of a change in circumstances (E) holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child

Output: holding the teenage childrens preference to live in fathers home was sufficient evidence to support a change in physical custody in a modification of a split physical custody arrangement even though the party seeking the change failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances


Input: Consider Input: reference to service of process, a diverse defendant could effectively create federal jurisdiction by removing prior to service on a nondiverse co-defendant. Thus, rejection of the notion that service is determinative of diversity "avoids any potential expansion of the court's jurisdiction beyond the clear mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” Id. 3 . See also In re Bridgestone/ Firestone, Inc., 184 F.Supp.2d 826, 828 (S.D.Ind.2002) (in case where complete diversity clearly existed, court held that "[sjection 1441(b) would have precluded removal ..only if [resident of forum state] had been properly served, and [since] it had not been served at the time Ford filed the removal petition,” case was removable); Maple Leaf Bakery v. Raychem Corp., No. 99 C 6948, 1999 WL 1101326, at *1 (N.D.Ill.1999) (<HOLDING>); Recognition Communications, Inc. v. American 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties (B) holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective (C) holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served (D) holding that the plain language of section 1441b indicates that an action may be removed unless a properly joined and served defendant is a resident of the state in which the action was initiated and reiterating that the plain language of  1441b particularly in light of the 1948 amendment inserting the language and served precludes removal on the basis of the presence of resident defendants only when those defendants were properly joined and served at the time of removal (E) holding that the absence in the notice of removal of copies of the summonses served on the defendants uncorrected until after the thirty 30 day removal period had expired violates 28 usc  1446a and bars removal


Output: holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties