In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Thus, CERC-LA specifically provides for a private right of action to institute civil actions to recover the costs involved in the cleanup of hazardous wastes from those responsible for their creation. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir.1989); 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 917, 111 S.Ct. 2014, 114 L.Ed.2d 101 (1991). Moreover, an entity that is responsible for the remediation of a hazardous waste site under CERCLA may assert a claim for contribution against other responsible parties under § 9613(f). New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1122 (3d Cir.1997). See also SC Holdings, Inc. v. AAA Realty Co., 935 F.Supp. 1354, 1362 (D.N.J.1996)(<HOLDING>). In its reply papers, the Novak Group does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the michigan department of natural resources liable under cercla for remedial actions which exacerbated the contamination at a site (B) recognizing a right to contribution (C) holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla (D) holding that parties liable for at least a portion of the costs of remediating a hazardous site are limited to the contribution scheme under section 9613f of cercla (E) holding that site control alone is an improper basis for imposition on lessees of owner liability under cercla
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: of serious physical harm,” Gamer, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. at 1701, to Ponseti, or to others if the suspects were allowed to flee. Because Pon-seti could have reasonably believed that the suspects posed an imminent, deadly threat, we conclude that he was justified in using deadly force. Conclusion We therefore conclude that the magistrate judge erred in denying Ponseti’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment below is REVERSED. 1 . The woman was struck once in the right side of her abdomen. 2 . Under the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, the terms "directed verdict” and "judgment notwithstanding the verdict” have been replaced by the single term “judgment as a matter of law.” 3 . But see Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Smith also observes: “Furthermore, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law (B) holding that a violation of the wellestablished rule of brignoniponce constituted an egregious violation of the fourth amendment (C) holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts (D) holding that the notice requirement found in rule 41d is not required by the fourth amendment (E) holding that the significant injury requirement of johnson v morel 876 f2d 477 5th cir1989 a case involving a fourth amendment violation is no longer valid in the wake of hudson v mcmillianus 112 sct 995 117 led2d 156 1992 in which the supreme court held that a showing of a significant injury was not required to prove an eighth amendment violation
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: of equitable estoppel is founded on the notion that a litigant should not be permitted to assert a claim or defense that is predicated on his own wrongdoing. The elements that must be established to succeed on an equitable estoppel claim are as follows: (1) the party to be estopped must know the facts, (2) the party to be estopped must intend that his conduct be acted on or must act so that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended, (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the facts and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must rely on the other party’s conduct to his injury. Emeco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 202 Ct.Cl. 1006, 1015, 485 F.2d 652, 657 (1973). The Supreme Court has cast considerabl 2 F.2d 1554, 1561-64 (Fed.Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). In any event, “it is well settled that the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing estoppel based on bank officers conduct (B) holding that estoppel was a question of fact (C) holding that this court erred in concluding that richmond stands for the proposition that equitable estoppel will not lie against the government for any monetary claim and remanding for consideration of the facts supporting the estoppel claim (D) recognizing that richmond was limited to estoppel claims involving payment from the public treasury (E) holding that collateral estoppel applies to  1983 claims
[EX A]:
(D)