In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav
holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241

would allow for the award of attorney fees whenever a statute or contract provides for one side to pay expenses, even when such attorney fees were not contemplated. The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent in this regard. Therefore, I do not join in the majority’s opinion that the term “expenses” as used in section 13-7-4(d) includes attorney fees, but would hold that because that section does not specifically provide for an award of attorney fees, such award was improper here. For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority’s determination that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. However, I dissent rs of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986); In re Olliff, 258 Ga. 157, 366 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Head v. Savage, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 32, 38 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan (D) holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs (E) holding that expenses refers to costs
holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid

Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The Constitutional Rights of Putative Fathers and a Proposal for Reform, 31 B.C. L.Rev. 1173 (1990). Some jurisdictions follow the line of reasoning established in Michael H. and hold statutes which deny a putative father standing constitutional under the state or federal constitutions. See, e.g., Dawn D. v. Superior Ct., 17 Cal.4th 932, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 952 P.2d 1139, 1146 (1998) (finding alleged biological father seeking to establish relationship with child born to married mother did not have constitutionally protected liberty interest in forming relationship with child under California Constitution); Hauser v. Reilly, 212 Mich.App. 184, 536 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1995) (agreeing with Justice Brennan’s dissent in Michael H.; in the absence of a pa .1998) (<HOLDING>); A v. X,Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1224-27 (Wyo. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statute denying putative father standing to bring legitimation action under statute in effect at the time did not violate due process or equal protection of state or federal constitutions (B) holding statute that conferred putative father no standing to challenge paternity of a child born in wedlock did not deny due process or equal protection (C) holding that statute that imposed different requirements to establish parental rights on father than on mother did not violate fathers right to equal protection under the law (D) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection (E) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection

holding statute that conferred putative father no standing to challenge paternity of a child born in wedlock did not deny due process or equal protection