In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: indorsers, and other persons conditionally liable also receive benefits from payment of the debt. If called on to pay, guarantors and the like would have been creditors; the “benefit” to them is that extinguishing the primary debt means that they receive a larger percentage of their claim than they would have had they paid and been converted to general creditors of the bankrupt. Cases under the 1898 Act routinely held that unless a person escapes an obligation to pay and so reaps a larger portion of his claim than do other creditors, he has not received a statutory “benefit”. E.g., Mayes v. Palmer, 208 F. 97 (8th Cir.1913); Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 F. 850 (5th Cir.1924); Mansfield Lumber Co. v. Sternberg, 38 F.2d 614 (8th Cir.1930). See also Bonded Financial, 838 F.2d at 895-96 (<HOLDING>). The Liquidator has not identified, and we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subparagraphs a and b are mutually exclusive and thus any travel between work and home even if it is also for a dual purpose must be analyzed exclusively under paragraph a (B) holding that transferee and beneficiary are mutually exclusive categories (C) holding trial court is sole and exclusive judge of witnesses credibility (D) holding that the remedies are exclusive (E) recognizing that  1983 and  2254 proceedings are mutually exclusive so that if a claim can be properly raised in one of those proceedings it cannot be raised in the other type of proceeding

A: holding that subparagraphs a and b are mutually exclusive and thus any travel between work and home even if it is also for a dual purpose must be analyzed exclusively under paragraph a
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Q: This Court has reviewed these decisions and is in agreement with their reasoning and conclusions that the public policy exception does not give rise to a protected property interest in continued employment in this case. Likewise, the implied covenant is not the source of a protected property interest. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to at-will employment and affords an employee the right to be dealt with fairly and in good faith. See Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 191 P.3d 205, 213-14 (2008). Breach of the covenant may give rise to an action for wrongful termination but it does not convert at-will employment to term employment nor form the basis for a protected property interest. See Hollister v. Forsythe, 22 F.3d 950, 952-52 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate (B) recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract (C) holding an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was insufficient to create a property interest in continued employment under montanas statutory scheme for at will employment (D) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (E) recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages

A: recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate
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Q: Ga. App. at 323 (1) (“[Rjights such as those conferred by the Fourth Amendment are personal in nature, and cannot bestow vicarious protection on those who do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place to be searched.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 49 See Division 1 (a), supra. 50 See McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 383 (3) (a) (477 SE2d 814) (1996) (while reiterating that the issue of the defendant’s future dangerousness may be relevant to sentencing but not to the question of his guilt, the Court concluded that, given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, it was highly unlikely that the improper portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument contributed to the jury’s verdict); cf. Collier v. State, 266 Ga. App. 345, 351-355 (2) (596 SE2d 795) (2004) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. State, 261 Ga. App. 511, 517-518 
 Holding statements: (A) holding counsels failure to investigate alibi witness and eyewitnesses to the crime amounted to constitutionally deficient performance (B) holding that there was no material prejudice arising from trial counsels repeated references to an accuseds invoking his right to counsel (C) holding that trial counsels failure to object to the prosecutors repeated pervasive and clearly improper references during closing arguments to similar transactions committed by the defendant constituted deficient performance and amounted to prejudice that required a new trial (D) holding that plaintiffs failure to object to the improper comments of defendant during closing arguments resulted in waiver of plaintiffs right to argue the issue on appeal because the trial court was not given an opportunity to rule on the issue (E) holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel

A:
holding counsels failure to investigate alibi witness and eyewitnesses to the crime amounted to constitutionally deficient performance
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