In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: factors to the State’s requested accommodation. The use of two-way video conferencing can satisfy a defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation in certain limited circumstances like those present here. ¶ 20 Applying Craig, we conclude that the strong preference for face-to-face confrontation must give way in the special circumstances of this ease to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case. The State’s requested accommodation is necessary to further two important public policies: protecting the rights of a vulnerable alleged sexual assault victim who has been ruled to be outside Arizona’s subpoena power and preserving society’s interest in prosecuting accused sexual offenders. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court properly refused to permit the defendant to question the nineyearold victim as to whether he had been sexually abused in the past because indianas rape shield statute shields the victim of a sex crime from a general inquiry into the history of past sexual conduct (B) recognizing michigans rape shield law furthers the legitimate state interests of protecting a sexual assault victim from surprise harassment and unnecessary invasions of privacy (C) holding that a prosecutors questions eliciting testimony from a victim as to issue of virginity prior to the assault did not violate colorados rape shield statute because that statute does not specifically prohibit a victim from testifying as to a lack of prior sexual activity id at 1020 (D) holding that application of the rape shield law to a case in which the underlying events occurred prior to the enactment of the rape shield law was not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws (E) holding that a public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality
[A]: holding that the trial court properly refused to permit the defendant to question the nineyearold victim as to whether he had been sexually abused in the past because indianas rape shield statute shields the victim of a sex crime from a general inquiry into the history of past sexual conduct


[Q]: and sold it to nonre-latives. We conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the property is marital. The form of the transaction, while not dispositive, is compelling in the instant case because of Klem’s knowledge of, and experience with, joint tenancies. Klem was fully aware of how joint tenancies operated. As the husband of Hazel, he became the sole owner of Hazel’s family property as a surviving joint tenant, a fact he acknowledged during his deposition. Subsequent to his sole ownership of the property, he knowingly deeded the property to Larry and Colleen as joint tenants. In so doing, he gave both parties an interest in the property. See Melina v. Melina, 411 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Minn.App.1987); Erdahl v. Erdahl, 384 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Finally, also indicative of the donor’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that devise of real estate to one spouse was nonmarital and noting that had testator intended such property to be devised as marital property he could have designated appellant as a joint tenant (C) holding money received from inheritance as nonmarital property presumptively became marital property when placed in joint account under arkansas law (D) holding that transferring joint property into one partys name for estate planning purposes does not convert marital property into nonmarital property (E) holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property
[A]: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate


[Q]: to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any individual or other party in removal proceedings, in litigation with the United States, or in any other form or manner.”); United States v. Ng, 699 F.2d 63, 71 (2d Cir.1983) (concluding that a “policy [that] is merely an internal guideline for exercise of prosecutorial discretion [is] not subject to judicial review,” and emphasizing that the policy “is not a statute or regulation; nor is it constitutionally mandated”); see also United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d 260, 264 (1st Cir.1990) (“[T]he internal guidelines of a federal agency, that are not mandated by statute or the constitution, do not confer substantive rights on any party.”); cf. Firstland Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 377 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 166 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding moot appeal from revocation of visa petition where immigrant subsequently obtained lpr status (B) holding that the beneficiary of a form 1130 visa petition did not have standing to challenge a denied petition (C) holding no abuse of discretion where ij denied aliens request for continuance because alien had no immigrant visa available and it was unlikely attorney general would exercise discretion to permit excludable alien to stay (D) holding that it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available (E) holding that the ins was deprived of any discretion to revoke approval of an immigrant visa petition when it failed to follow statutorilymandated notice requirement
[A]:
holding moot appeal from revocation of visa petition where immigrant subsequently obtained lpr status