instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
answer:
holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language


question:
the only issues to be determined by the reviewing court were whether the Commission acted within the scope of its authority and whether the order complained of is reasonable and not arbitrarily made. See, In re Proposed Amend. to Title 291, 264 Neb. 298, 646 N.W.2d 650 (2002); In re Application of E. Neb. Non-stock Trucking Coop, 243 Neb. 662, 501 N.W.2d 712 (1993). The district court should have addressed those issues in this case. We do so here. The fact that § 75-110 gives the Commission authority to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations which it “deems necessary to regulate persons within the commission’s jurisdiction” does not require the Commission to exercise such authority in any given instance. See In re Application No. C-1889, 264 Neb. 167, 647 N.W.2d 45 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Under § 84-907.08, the Commission could 
 Holding statements: (A) holding some competitive rules clearly related to ratemaking power and thus within commissions constitutional authority to promulgate (B) recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure (C) holding statutory authority of commission to promulgate rules to interpret law does not impose affirmative rulemaking requirement (D) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (E) recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence
answer:
holding some competitive rules clearly related to ratemaking power and thus within commissions constitutional authority to promulgate


question:
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 5. As noted, Mr. Amores pled guilty to two counts, but went to trial on the other three counts in the indictment. At the sentencing, the district judge denied a downward departure because Mr. Amores “required the government to go to trial on three counts, disputing the government’s factual basis for a conviction.” Ill R. at 14. Adjustments are not proper where a defendant “puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 2. Although there are “rare situations” where a defendant may exercise his right to proceed to trial and still be found to have demonstrated an acceptance of responsibility for his conduct, this is not such a case. Id.; see Gauvin, 173 F.3d at 806 (<HOLDING>). The district court’s determination was not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a remmer presumption but noting that sometimes the circumstances are such that the remmer presumption does not even apply (B) recognizing that such adjustments are rare (C) recognizing rule (D) recognizing change (E) holding that such provisions are valid
answer:

recognizing a remmer presumption but noting that sometimes the circumstances are such that the remmer presumption does not even apply