In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: in favor of William Spencer, et al., (Spencer) and setting the penalties for violation of the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Spencer cross-appeals the denial of post-trial motions and refusal to award attorney’s fees. We affirm on all grounds. I BART’s unjust enrichment claim fads for want of a loss. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 881 (2000) (noting that the elements of unjust enrichment are “receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.”). Even assuming that County of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 158 Cal.App.4th 533, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 (2008), recognized an exception to this rule, BART’s claim does not fall into that exception. See Peterson v. Cellico P’ship, 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1594, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Concrete financial loss is required for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (B) holding that walsh does not support plaintiffs assertion that they need not allege any actual injury to bring an unjust enrichment claim (C) holding that where plaintiffs filed a complaint for conversion unjust enrichment and injunctive relief they had an adequate remedy at law (D) holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed
[EX A]: holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement

[EX Q]: effect of an admission by a defendant against a codefendant. {10} Although Rule 1-036 does not address whether a defendant’s deemed admissions can be used against a codefendant, this Court has held that such admissions may not be used against a codefendant. See Wilson v. Galt, 100 N.M. 227, 236, 668 P.2d 1104, 1113 (Ct.App.1983) (stating that Rule 1-036 admissions apply to and bind the party making the admissions, not codefendants). Moreover, other courts that have addressed this issue have likewise concluded that the admissions of a defendant cannot be used against a codefendant. See, e.g., Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1048 (5th Cir.1997) (“Deemed admissions by a party opponent cannot be used against a co-party.”); United States v. Wheeler, 161 F.Supp. 193, 198 (W.D.Ark.1958) (<HOLDING>); Darnall v. Petersen, 8 Neb.App. 185, 592 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies when his claim is deemed denied because of failure of administrator to respond in a timely manner (B) holding that failure to file timely responses to a request for admissions renders them admitted (C) holding that plaintiffs failure to respond to argument warranted dismissal with prejudice (D) holding that facts deemed admitted as to one defendant because of his failure to respond to the plaintiffs request for admissions are not binding on a codefendant (E) holding that requests for admissions seeking purely legal conclusions are inappropriate and the failure to respond to such a request may not be the basis for a summaiy judgment
[EX A]: holding that a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies when his claim is deemed denied because of failure of administrator to respond in a timely manner

[EX Q]: the statute unambiguously defines the operative event as the discovery of the disposition of the asset, the statute cannot mean, that the one-year period runs from the claimant’s discovery of facts showing that the disposition of the asset may have been fraudulent as to creditors. To make the existing statutory term “transfer” carry that meaning, we would in effect have to delete it and replace it with a phrase like “fraudulent nature of the transfer” or “facts constituting the cause of action.” It is not within our authority, however, to rewrite an unambiguous statute. See Hayes v. State, 750 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1999) (“We are not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not placed there by the Legislature.”); FINR II, Inc. v. Hardee Cty., 164 So.3d 1260, 1264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (<HOLDING>). That exercise is instead the respo'nsibility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court may not under the guise of statutory construction rewrite a statutory provision (B) holding that a court may not rewrite the statute to insert an additional requirement not placed there by the legislature (C) holding that the courts in the absence of ambiguity should as a general rule confine themselves to a construction of a statute as written and not attempt under the guise of construction to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute or to insert exceptions not made by the legislature (D) holding that the legislature may create or expand privileges by statute (E) holding that a court may not rewrite the insurance contract under the guise of judicial interpretation
[EX A]:
holding that the court may not under the guise of statutory construction rewrite a statutory provision