In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: waived his attorney-client privilege when his attorney failed to make timely objections to questions that it alleged sought privileged communications. This argument has no merit for two reasons. First, many of the questions Airdata asked did not seek confidential communications. Therefore, no objection was necessary to preserve the privilege. Second, Jenney’s current attorney did make timely objections to those questions actually seeking confidential communications. The fact that Jenney’s attorney had to interrupt him to make the objection is not sufficient to establish a waiver. Because the objections were made as soon as the confidential nature of the communication became apparent, Jenney did not waive the privilege. Cf. Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee, 837 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege (C) holding that disclosure orders adverse to the attorneyclient privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine (D) holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts (E) holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: as an entity wholly owned by the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Raccoon relies on that portion of § 1603(b) which states that “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” does not include an entity created under the laws of a third country. Raccoon’s argument is without merit. Navoi has presented credible evidence showing that in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Republic of Uzbekistan’s declaration of independence, ownership and control of Navoi passed to the Uzbek Government by decree of the Cabinet of Ministers. At all times relevant to the instant litigation, Navoi was an Uzbek entity created by the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers under the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan. See Gould v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Raccoon challenges Navoi’s prima 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statutory good time credits must be calculated under the law in effect at the time of resentencing after an appeal of the sentence is determined (B) holding that for purpose of the fsia a foreign entitys status is determined based upon the jurisdictional facts existing at the time the act complained of occurred (C) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action (D) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (E) holding that clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court under aedpa is the law at the time of the statecourt adjudication on the merits not at the time the conviction becomes final

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: contains the right of passage and access to the premises. Thus, the fact that TIA had such a right does not distinguish the present case from Gibbs, in which the defendant also had a license to use the premises but was not found to have maintained or controlled the premises. The plaintiffs’ argument in this case is further weakened by the fact that, under the contract between NYCCOC and TIA, just as was the case in Gibbs, NYCCOC, the “licensor,” explicitly retained the duty of maintenance and repair. (Varvaro Deck Ex. I, Feb. 10, 2006 Revised Agreement ¶ 22.) Hence, the plaintiffs have failed to present evidence showing that TIA owned, maintained, or controlled the space to justify imposing on TIA the nondelegable duty of the owner of premises. See Lyons, 2007 WL 2265577, at *5 (<HOLDING>). Because the plaintiffs have not proffered any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decoration contractor freeman was not subject to premises liability because it did not occupy own control or make special use of the premises at the javits center (B) holding that defendant properly established that it did not owe premises liability duty because it did not own occupy or control premises where injury occurred but that defendant was not entitled to traditional summary judgment because it failed to address duty arising out of alleged creation of dangerous condition (C) holding that while a lawfully issued warrant to search premises authorizes the officers executing it to search in a reasonable manner whatever spots within the described premises their professional experience indicates may be used as a cache for the items named in the warranty such a warrant does not by its own force permit a search of the persons residents or visitorswho chance to be at the premises at the time the warrant is executed or belongings of a nonresident visitor present on the premises (D) holding that the policy insured property but failure to occupy premises negated coverage (E) holding that a contractor had no duty of care to a third party under a premises liability theory because the contractor was not a landowner or occupier but expressing no opinion as to whether the contractor owed a duty to the third party under general negligence principles because the third partys legal theory was restricted to premises liability


Output: (A)