instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
not explicitly mentioning the prior art problem of having to store complete copies of the web site’s content on multiple servers, claim 6 contains provisions that refer to the solution to this problem: the preamble language indicating that the nodes (servers) contain different resources, and the steps relating to the delayed resource-binding aspect of the invention. The claim does not, however, make any reference to the bottleneck problem or to the bypass solution of that problem. Therefore, without explicit claim language relating to the bottleneck problem, we see no reason why the invention as recited in claim 6 must include the bypass feature described in the written description as a solution to that problem. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 298 F.3d 1817 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Alteon also relies on the “Detailed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the computer readable code claimed in claim 6 the product claim was a part or component of that invention (B) holding that claimed invention did not need to solve both problems in the prior art when claim included language addressing only one problem (C) recognizing that courts must be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the claimed invention without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention (D) holding that the moving party must show prior art references which alone or combined with other references would have rendered the invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (E) holding that the one challenging the patent must in part show that the subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered it obvious by its addition to the prior art
answer:
(B)


question:
speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav
answer:
(E)


question:
Detecting no reaso ent of sentence and we remand, leaving the trial court to reconsider its entire sentencing plan. Justice Dougherty joins the opinion. Chief Justice Saylor and Justice Donohue join the opinion with respect to Parts I, II, and 111(B) except with respect to footnote 29. Justice Baer joins the opinion with respect to Part II(C). Justice Todd joins • the opinion with respect to Parts I, II, and III(B). Justice Baer files a concurring and dissenting opinion. Justice Donohue files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Saylor joins and in which Justice Todd joins with respect to Part II. 1 . See 65 Pa.C.S. § 1103(a) (conflict of interest), deemed unconstitutional in part by Shaulis v. Penna. State Ethics Comm'n, 574 Pa. 680, 833 A.2d 123 (2003) (<HOLDING>); see also 65 Pa.C.S. § 1102 (defining 
 Holding statements: (A) holding subsection 1103g unconstitutional to the extent that it regulates the conduct of former government employees who are also attorneys (B) holding that interests of plaintiffs former employees of defendant company in combating discriminatory policies were coextensive with the interest of all former and present employees subjected to the discriminatory policy (C) holding that whether error in failing to ask a question about bias in favor of law enforcement testimony requires reversal hinges on such factors as the importance of the government agents testimony to the case as a whole the extent to which the question concerning the venire persons attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions  the extent to which the credibility of the government agentwitness is put into issue and the extent to which the testimony of the government agent is corroborated by nonagent witnesses internal quotation marks and citation omitted (D) holding that where an spa does not mention former employees but only current employees and a complaint only alleges that former employees were solicited there is no breach of a nonsolicitation clause (E) holding section 742031 unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibited attorneys fees to a father in a paternity action
answer:

(A)