instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
Erickson-Puttmann concedes that her Title VII claim against Gill fails because Gill was not her employer. See e.g., Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly Community Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th Cir.1997) (“Our Court quite recently has squarely held that supervisors may not be held individually liable under Title VII.” (citing Spencer v. Ripley County State Bank, 123 F.3d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir.1997) (per cu-riam))). Lenhardt v. Basic Inst, of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir.1995) (noting that “[e]very circuit that has considered the issue ultimately has concluded that an employee, even one possessing supervisory authority, is not an employer upon whom liability can be imposed under Title VII.”); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the court concludes that summary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii (B) holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii (C) holding individual employees may be liable under title vii (D) holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii (E) holding that there is no individual liability under title vii
answer:
holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii


question:
the instructions misstated the law or misled the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” United States v. Felts, 579 F.3d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir. 2009). We will not reverse a conviction because of an erroneous instruction unless we are “left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations.” Id. at 1342-43 (quotation marks omitted). We evaluate the instruction as a whole and in the context of the entire trial. United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 16, 2017) (No. 16-8072). Challenges to jury instructions that are raised for the first time on appeal, however, are reviewed for plain error only. United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 973 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise rule 11 error at trial has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule (C) holding that plainerror review applies where the defendant fails to object to a constructive amendment (D) holding that plainerror review applies when a defendant fails to make a specific rule 32i3b objection based on a district courts failure to resolve a factual dispute (E) holding that plain error review applies where the defendant fails to object to the lack of an opportunity to allocute
answer:
holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review


question:
Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 270 N.J.Super. 311, 637 A.2d 191, 193, aff'd, 138 N.J. 185, 649 A.2d 1243 (1994), we find no merit in Ford’s contention that the district court erred by relying on legislative history to expand the NJFPA beyond the scope of its plain statutory language. See br. at 16. The legislative history, however, clearly does support a statutory interpretation that prohibits spurious transactions which ultimately fail to result in reimbursement at the dealer’s retail rate. The New Jersey courts have held that the NJFPA is a remedial statute intended to equalize the disparity of bargaining power in franchisor-franchisee relations. See Kubis & Perszyk Assocs., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 146 N.J. 176, 680 A.2d 618, 626 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Tynan v. General Motors Corp., 127 N.J. 269, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child (B) holding that the duty of good faith and commercial reasonableness is used to define the franchisors power to terminate the franchise only when it is not explicitly described in the parties written agreements (C) recognizing njfpas basic legislative objectives of protecting franchisees from the superior bargaining power of franchisors (D) holding that under michigan franchise investment law franchisees failure to comply with lawful provisions in franchise agreements by failing to pay royalties and advertising fees and failing to file monthly sales reports constituted good cause for franchisors termination of agreements where franchisor gave notice of termination in writing and franchisees made no effort to cure (E) recognizing employers interest in protecting confidentiality of data bearing on employees basic competence
answer:

recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child