In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: until they were “in close proximity.” Lowe, 2014 WL 99452, at *3; see also Westport Ins. Corp. v. Bayer, 284 F.3d 489, 498 (3d Cir.2002) (according plain meaning to the district court’s choice of language in affirming its “implicit” findings of fact). These findings control because they are not clearly erroneous. Rather, they are suppo a- suspect takes action that clearly indicates that he “does not yield” to the officers’ show of authority. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547. Action— not passivity — has been the touchstone of our an h Cir.2010) (noting that, “for a person who is moving, to ‘yield’ most sensibly means to stop”), or when a suspect makes suspicious motions consistent with reaching for a weapon, see United States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (D.C.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the suspects in those cases, Lowe 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that i have a gun is sufficient to justify the sentencing enhancement because it merely requires a teller to make the reasonable inference that a robber would use the gun he claimed to have if he did not receive the money he demanded (B) holding that a suspect did not submit to a show of authority when he made continued furtive  gestures including shoving down motions that were suggestive of hiding or retrieving a gun (C) holding that a suspect who continued walking when approached by a police officer did not submit until physically restrained by the officer (D) holding that evidence of appellants prior gun possession was admissible in a homicide prosecution to show malice and intent possession of a gun without more is not wrongful conduct (E) holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept

Output: holding that i have a gun is sufficient to justify the sentencing enhancement because it merely requires a teller to make the reasonable inference that a robber would use the gun he claimed to have if he did not receive the money he demanded


Input: Consider Input: required expert testimony at trial. We agree with other appellate courts that the statute does not violate the open courts provision by requiring an expert report sooner rather than later in the litigation. See, e.g., Gill v. Russo, 39 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Knie v. Piskun, 23 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied). Mocega’s fifth point is overruled. Notice of Hearing Mocega’s final two points assert the trial court was required to grant her the grace period provided under art. 4590i, § 13.01(g). A motion under that section is timely if filed before “any hearing” on a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Urquhart’s motion was “heard” by submission on April 3rd. See Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>). Mocega’s motion was not filed until April 
 Holding statements: (A) holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation (B) holding that a hearing does not contemplate an oral presentation unless required by express language or context (C) holding that oral rendition of judgment supported by the courts docket sheet was insufficient express specific written order is required (D) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes (E) holding that express oral agreement with government agent was not binding because among other factors applicable regulations required contract to be in writing

Output: holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation


Input: Consider Input: claim was procedurally barred because the state court had rested its decision on an independent and adequate state ground— failure to comply with the contemporaneous objection rule—and because cause and prejudice were not shown. On appeal, Mercado challenges the district court’s finding. He concedes the procedural default, but asks this Court to find cause and prejudice. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (requiring a showing of “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law”). He identifies the court’s interference with his trial counsel’s efforts to make a contemporaneous objection as “cause” for the default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (<HOLDING>). We find no such interference, and no other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exclusion of defense witness does not violate sixth amendment where defendant failed to comply with discovery rule requiring that witnesses be identified before trial (B) holding that failure to comply with state contemporaneous objection rule bars federal review absent a showing of cause and prejudice (C) holding that consideration of a claim in a petition for habeas corpus can be barred by failure to comply with state procedural rules (D) holding that the district court properly allowed the defendant who asserted the disputed defense as a contested issue of law in the joint pretrial order to pursue the defense despite the defendants failure to comply with rule 8c (E) holding that cause exists where some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsels efforts to comply with the states procedural rule


Output: holding that exclusion of defense witness does not violate sixth amendment where defendant failed to comply with discovery rule requiring that witnesses be identified before trial