In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: his personal belief that the officer was not lying. The prosecutor stated: “He came in here and told you the truth about what happened” and later reiterated, “This officer didn’t commit perjury. He came in here and told you the truth about what happened.” This was improper vouching by “placing the prestige of the government behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness’s veracity ...” United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). Contrary to the government’s assertion, the prosecutor need not invoke the name of the federal government in offering his personal belief — it is sufficient that the personal statement of belief came from the government’s attorney. See, e.g., Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 482 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Second, the prosecutor vouched for Officer 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment (B) holding that it was improper for prosecutor to state he did not lie to you he is a lot of things but he is not a liar (C) holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present (D) holding that the defendant could not appeal a jury instruction where he did not object to the challenged instruction but in fact requested it and stated he was satisfied with it (E) holding there was enough evidence to find the defendant abandoned his child when he claimed to have knowledge of cpss involvement he admitted that for periods of two years and six months he did not attempt any contact with his child and from the date he canceled a home study until the petition was filed he did not attempt to contact the child or cps or provide support even when he was out of jail
Example Output: (B)

Example Input: if the terms of the health care plan specifically exclude from coverage the cost of an appendectomy, then any injuries caused by the refusal to cover the appendectomy are properly attributed to the terms of the plan itself, not the managed care entity that applied those terms. 4 Respondents also argue that ERISA § 502(a) completely pre-empts a state cause of action only if the cause of action would be pre-empted under ERISA § 514(a); respondents then argue that their causes of action do not fall under the terms of § 514(a). But a state cause of action that provides an alternative remedy to those provided by the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism conflicts with Congress’ clear intent to make the ERISA mechanism exclusive. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S.133, 142 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 5 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan (B) recognizing cause of action (C) holding that ejven if there were no express preemption under erisa  514a of the cause of action in that case it would be preempted because it conflicted directly with an erisa cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa (E) recognizing the cause of action
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: Clause even when a criminal conviction arises out of the same incident. Halper, supra, 490 U.S. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502. Furthermore, defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the domestic violence proceeding was between the victim and defendant and did not involve the State. Halper states that “[t]he protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by litigation between private parties.” Id. at 451, 109 S.Ct. at 1903, 104 L.Ed.2d at 503. Since the domestic violence action in this case did not involve the State, the Double Jeopardy Clause was not implicated. Ibid., see also Browning-Ferns Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 2912, 106 L.Ed.2d 219, 228 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the trial court properly denied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that forfeitures may violate the eighth amendment excessive fines clause (B) holding that the fines imposed by the challenged city ordinances are not excessive even if the excessive fines clause is applicable (C) holding that punitive damages are not fines (D) holding that excessive fines clause of eighth amendment does not apply to punitive damage awards between private parties (E) holding that excessive fines clause does not apply to civiljury award of punitive fines
Example Output:
(D)