In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

manual labor, as well as engaging in such activities as dancing, fighting, and being jailed for public intoxication. We stated that: [an i]njury aggravated or extended in time by the employee’s neglect or disobedience of his physician’s instructions is not com-pensable as to the additional period.... The proposition that one may continue, or even increase, his disability by his willful and unreasonable conduct, and then claim compensation from his employer for his disability so caused, is untenable. Id. at 410, 244 N.W. at 541 (citing Honnold, Workmen’s Compensation, vol.l, § 137, pp. 521, 523). [¶ 11] Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized the rule in Detling, albeit applying their own states’ standards. See Appleby v. Belden Corp., 22 Ark.App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Hill, 318 A.2d 614, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new statute which required proof that asbestos exposure was substantial contributing factor to claimants medical condition could be applied to pending cases and did not abrogate claimants vested right because she was still able to pursue her cause of action and recover for injury caused by her husbands exposure to asbestos statute merely affected methods and procedure by which that action was recognized protected and enforced not the cause of action itself (B) holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute (C) holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions (D) holding a claimants injury report to a fellow employee did not satisfy the act because the claimants supervisor did not learn of the injury until six months later (E) holding that claimants actions in heavy houseeleaning and house painting in contravention of medical restrictions was so unreasonable as to bar compensation for aggravation of her back injury
holding that new statute which required proof that asbestos exposure was substantial contributing factor to claimants medical condition could be applied to pending cases and did not abrogate claimants vested right because she was still able to pursue her cause of action and recover for injury caused by her husbands exposure to asbestos statute merely affected methods and procedure by which that action was recognized protected and enforced not the cause of action itself

v. Valenzuela, 722 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir.1983) (requiring the defendant to shave); United States v. Lamb, 575 F.2d 1310, 1316 (10th Cir.1978) (same); United States v. Murray, 523 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1975) (requiring the defendant to wear a wig); United States v. Roberts, 481 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir.1973) (requiring the defendant to put on a stocking mask worn during the robbery). If a defendant who is compelled to don clothing before the jury does not “testify” for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause, it would seem to follow, a fortiori,' that the Self-Incrimination Clause also provides that a defendant who voluntarily dons clothing before the jury may not be required to subject himself to cross-examination. See United States v. Bay, 762 F.2d 1314, 1315-16 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that a physical 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not err in concluding after an evidentiary hearing that the immunity agreement between defendant and the government did not extend to the charge being prosecuted (B) holding that the district court correctly declined to instruct the jury that the government was required to prove as an element of the offense that the defendant did not intend to establish a life with his wife (C) holding that a district court did not err in concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a downward departure due to his status as an alien subject to removal (D) holding that the district court erred in concluding that a defendant was required to take the stand to display his tattoos because the government may compel a defendant to display such physical characteristics (E) holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered
holding that district court did not err in concluding after an evidentiary hearing that the immunity agreement between defendant and the government did not extend to the charge being prosecuted

Street. As Ferguson turned onto Hulme, he observed Throneberry’s car “fishtail” out of the alley without stopping. Both Officer Ferguson and his passenger, who was a city councilman on a “ride-along,” testified that Throneberry’s headlights were not turned on when he exited the alley. Ferguson’s police report, however, indicated that Throneberry turned the lights off about 100 yards down the street after he exited the alley. Ferguson further testified that, when he observed Throneberry’s car fishtail out of the alley, he activated his emergency lights and siren in an attempt to stop Throneberry’s vehicle. According to these facts, the jury could reasonably have found that Throneberry violated section 545.256 of the transportation code, which prov Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). This same line of cases also holds that such 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a passenger in a stopped vehicle was seized when she was escorted from the car to the front of two police cars that had their overhead lights turned on separated from the driver by two officers and separated from her purse which remained in the car (B) holding a police officer who was pursuing a fleeing suspect was immune from his torts when he ran a red light and collided with plaintiffs vehicle (C) holding that accelerating a car so that it screeched and fishtailed a bit was sufficient for offense (D) holding that accelerating a car so that its tires spun when a light turned from red to green was sufficient (E) holding that accelerating a car so that it threw gravel on police car was enough to satisfy exhibition of speed violation

holding that a passenger in a stopped vehicle was seized when she was escorted from the car to the front of two police cars that had their overhead lights turned on separated from the driver by two officers and separated from her purse which remained in the car