In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: have been required to examine the entire public record and would have discovered the foreclosure judgment....”). These recorded instruments would charge any subsequent purchaser with the information contained in them. Fairmont Funding, 301 A.D.2d at 564, 754 N.Y.S.2d 54 (“The intended purchaser must be presumed to have investigated the title, and to have examined every deed or instrument properly recorded, and to have known every fact disclosed or to which an inquiry suggested by the record would have led.”). The Foreclosure Judgment provides a purchaser with notice that a foreclosure sale was authorized by the court, and at a minimum would require a purchaser to inquire whether a foreclosure sale had occurred. See In re Davidson Rehab Associates, 103 B.R. 440, 444 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, here the Referee’s Report of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien (B) holding that plaintiffmortgagor lacked standing to enforce the terms of a foreclosure sale since there was no statutory authority allowing a mortgagor to enforce the provisions of a sale agreement when a foreclosure purchaser is in default (C) holding that a properly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale quiets title in the purchaser (D) holding that a wouldbe bona fide purchaser could not simply ignore the recorded notices of an impending nonjudicial foreclosure sale and fail to make inquiry as to whether the announced sale had occurred (E) holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser
[EX A]: holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien

[EX Q]: proceeding”). Here, the only evidence that th .Crim.App.2000) (stating, in motion to suppress context, “[T]he judge may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony, even if that testimony is not controverted”). Appellant’s and Sanchez’s after-the-fact, out-of-court averrals about appellant’s ability to understand the proceedings and waivers he signed were untimely factual statements in appellant’s self-interest. Even though the State did not offer affidavits to controvert appellant’s and Sanchez’s affidavits, it was within the trial court’s discretion to disbelieve the assertions contained in those affidavits that appellant does not read or speak English. See Charles, 146 S.W.3d at 210; Shanklin, 190 S.W.3d at 167; see also Phuong Anh Thi Le, 300 S.W.3d at 327 (<HOLDING>). The trial court, and not this Court, is in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record (B) holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record (C) recognizing that the bia must defer to the factual findings of the ij unless they are clearly erroneous (D) holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts (E) holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record
[EX A]: holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record

[EX Q]: and Neglect Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-4-1 to-34 (1993, as amended through 2005), in using the wrong statutory standard. Grandmother asks that, based on this error, the case be remanded for a new hearing on the issues of placement and visitation. {11} Grandmother’s argument that the district court erred because it used an arbitrary and capricious standard in evaluating the placement of Child by CYFD fails. In reviewing whether CYFD properly placed Child, the district court stated that CYFD’s determination that Grandmother was not an appropriate adoptive placement for Child was not “arbitrary or capricious.” The district court did not err in using this standard because it was reviewing a discretionary act by CYFD. See In re Jacinta M., 107 N.M. 769, 771, 764 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>). CYFD has the discretion to place children 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the childrens services division decision to stop making child care payments for recipients of public assistance was not an internal management directive because the decision did not affect individuals solely in their capacities as members of the agency involved the plaintiff and others similarly situated were entitled to proper notice and an opportunity to be heard before childrens services division or the department of human resources could issue a rule terminating the program of direct childcare payments (B) holding that the trial court exceeded its power in ordering the department of mental retardation and developmental disabilities to provide daycare services when those services were being eliminated because of staff reductions because ordering the department to implement specific facilities and programs is beyond the judicial function and exceeds the power of the courts (C) holding that the childrens court exceeded its authority in prohibiting the human services department from placing a child with her brother (D) holding that the department of human services policy manual set forth ministerial duties to act to care for and protect children in its custody (E) holding that congress had exceeded its authority by using its section five power under the fourteenth amendment to enact the statute
[EX A]:
holding that the childrens services division decision to stop making child care payments for recipients of public assistance was not an internal management directive because the decision did not affect individuals solely in their capacities as members of the agency involved the plaintiff and others similarly situated were entitled to proper notice and an opportunity to be heard before childrens services division or the department of human resources could issue a rule terminating the program of direct childcare payments