instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
2. Although the substance of the inquiry remains the same, the Supreme Court has counseled that the question whether a defendant can show a violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights “is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). With that said, we do not quarrel with the district court’s analysis on this point. Several distinguished jurists continue to use the “standing” terminology as useful shorthand. See, e.g., United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir.2004) (Selya, J.) (acknowledging after Rakas that the term “standing” “is imprecise,” but adopting the usage “[f]or simplicity’s sake”). But, regardless of terminolo 1 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). As we observe below, the conclusion that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (B) holding a person who is present at anothers home with permission simply for the purpose of consummating a business transaction does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy there (C) holding that for purposes of federal constitutional law a person does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to trash discarded outside the home (D) holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business (E) holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence
answer:
holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells


question:
While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation — 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. § 1103) — which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (“An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal.”). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant’s release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc  1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest
answer:
holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute


question:
103-322, § 250002, 108 Stat. 2082, 2083 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2327(b)(3)). Contrary to Vicky’s assertion, the variation among these restitution statutes does not mean that Congress eliminated the proximate cause requirement for the specifically enumerated losses in subsections 2259(b)(3)(A) through (E). Rather, variances among these restitution statutes “demonstrate that Congress viewed particular offenses as causing foreseeable risks of certain losses [meriting enumeration] in the[se] [restitution] statutes.” Id. at 97 n. 13. The First Circuit concluded that, although Congress determined that restitution offenses foreseeably cause the losses in subsections (A) through (E), the defendant — to be liable — still must proximately cause the victim’s losses. See id. at 95-97, 99-100 (<HOLDING>). This court agrees. Congress determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proximate cause requirement was satisfied  because the defendants actions resulted in identifiable losses as outlined in the expert reports and vickys victim impact statements footnote and citation omitted (B) holding that the government may be an identifiable victim (C) holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate (D) holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized (E) holding that such reports fell within the core class of testimonial statements described in this courts leading confrontation clause decisions internal quotation marks and citation omitted
answer:

holding that the government may be an identifiable victim