In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir.2000). This decision strongly suggests that, in pertinent circumstances, conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment is, as Home Products suggests, “automatic.” However, it also suggests that the proper procedure is for the district court expressly to “convert” a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See id. (concluding that the district court had not followed the proper procedure, because it had not converted the motion). However, the decision also suggests that whether or not application of summary judgment standards is appropriate ultimately depends upon whether the parties were provided with adequate opportunity to address the merits of the motion according to summary judgment standards. See id. (<HOLDING>). A slightly earlier decision of the Eighth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them (B) holding that appellate review under summary judgment standards was appropriate where the district court despite its procedural error provided the parties with a full opportunity to present all pertinent materials outside the pleadings regarding the issue of response costs and the parties created a complete record on the issue (C) holding issue not properly before the appellate court where appellant fails to demonstrate where in the record an issue was raised in the district court (D) recognizing that the specific argument regarding an issue must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for appellate review (E) holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an issue not argued by the parties
holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them

abused its discretion by providing an unreasonable characterization of the record evidence. See McElwee, 896 A.2d at 18 & nn. 7-8. While SEPTA claims that this, too, necessarily entailed unwarranted fact-finding on the part of the Commonwealth Court, we believe that it aligns with the approach utilized in Sienkiewicz I, wherein this Court not only determined that no record evidence existed to support a particular factual finding central to the trial court’s decision to grant relief (i.e., that Penn-DOT had installed curbing along the “Stafford Straightaway”), but proceeded to delineate the essential facts that were proved by the uncontradicted record evidence in ultimately agreeing with Penn-DOT’s position that relief was unjustified. See Sienkiewicz I, 584 Pa. at 282, 883 A.2d at 502 (<HOLDING>). Under the circumstances of this case, then, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (B) holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property (C) recognizing distinction and allowing recovery for impairment of access and not obstructed flow of traffic (D) holding that the landownerlicensee relationship ceased when the licensee left the landowners property (E) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking
holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property

the information provided in the Unplanned Deviation Reports and investigation reports was an accurate depiction of the incidents occurred, and Acevedo has not shown otherwise. Lastly, this Court notes that Ceinos rated Acevedo in 2005 as “Fully Met Expectations,” which evinces a lack of animus towards Acevedo, insofar as he was accorded positive review by Ceinos despite previous performance issues. In essence, Plaintiffs ask us to excuse Acevedo’s performance by replacing Ceinos’ business judgment with his own absent proof that his employer’s findings were inaccurate or misleading, which is an untenable position in light of the applicable case law. Velazquez-Fernandez v. NCE Foods, Inc., 476 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir.2007) (citing Webber v. Int’l Paper Co., 417 F.3d 229, 238 (1st Cir.2005)) (<HOLDING>). Ex-Lax’s hiring practices, disciplinary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment (B) holding that an employees opinion of the efficacy of an employment decision standing alone cannot supplant the employers business judgment (C) holding that employers have standing to sue (D) holding employer cannot lawfully make the signing of an employment agreement which contains an unenforceable covenant not to compete a condition of continued employment an employers termination of an employee who refuses to sign such an agreement constitutes a wrongful termination in violation of public policy (E) holding that an employers sponsorship of an employees 01 visa does not establish an employment contract for a definite term

holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment