TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: 339 (2005)). As to appellant’s assertion of error by the court in permitting the cautionary instruction to include the additional language, appellant’s claim is not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 proceeding. Generally, a petition under Rule 37.1 does not provide a remedy when an issue could have been raised at trial or argued on appeal. Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006). To fall within the very limited exception to that rule, the ground must be one so basic that it renders the judgment a complete nullity, such as a lack of jurisdiction, a violation of double jeopardy, or the right to a twelve-member jury. Id. at 26-27, 238 S.W.3d at 32. Appellant did not raise an issue in this claim that falls within the exception. See Phavixay v. State, 373 Ark. 168, 282 S.W.3d 795 (2008) (<HOLDING>). In appellant’s fifth point on appeal, he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (B) holding that proponent of 404b evidence must identify a proper 404b purpose for admission  that is at issue in  the case (C) holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence (D) holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal (E) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: customs and practices of the trade could conclude that WQIS’s liability under Coverage C ceased once the Coverage A limit was reached. See Morgan Stanley, 225 F.3d at 275 (describing when a contract provision is ambiguous). First, the phrase “liabilities covered” in the Coverage C insuring provision could reasonably be read to refer only to liabilities that WQIS was required to cover under Coverage A, that is, up to $5 million per vessel. Under this interpretation, any liability above $5 million was not “covered,” and - therefore defense costs incurred with respect to liabilities above $5 million did not arise from “liabilities covered.” See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on other grounds by 85 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable person could conclude that once 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due (B) holding that allied may not be held liable for portion of attorneys fees paid pretender of defense due to policy provision precluding reimbursement for defense costs voluntarily incurred (C) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself (D) holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the  insurance policy (E) holding where an insurance policy indemnifies defense costs paid as a result of occurrences covered that the insurer need only reimburse defense costs for claims that are established to be covered through judgment and settlement and not for claims only potentially falling within the policys coverage

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988). 1. The Notice of Claim Rule The defendants’ contention that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs state law claims because the plaintiff failed to subject himself for the Rule 50-h examination is without merit because no such examination is required under the NYSHRL. Section 50-h states that an examination shall only be held “wherever a notice of claim is filed against a ... town-” N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-h(l). However, a notice of claim is not required under section 50-e(l) of the Municipal Law for claims of employment discrimination against a municipality such as the Town. Hamm v. NYC Office of the Comptroller Alan Hevesi, No. 95 Civ. 6367, 1998 WL 92395, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. March 4, 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Palmer v. City of New York, 215 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tort actions brought against a state actor must be brought in the illinois court of claims and the district courts dismissal of such claims was proper (B) holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement (C) holding section 101106f cannot be used by employees to obtain dismissal of common law intentional tort claims because those claims could not have been brought under the texas tort claims act (D) holding that the defense of good faith and probable cause is available to officers in common law actions for false arrest and imprisonment as well as in actions brought pursuant to section 1983 (E) holding that discrimination claims brought pursuant to executive law  296 are not tort actions and are thus not subject to section 50es notice of claim requirement

SOLUTION:
(E)