In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

limits in which the officer is empowered to act, when a report has previously been made that the vehicle has been stolen or a complaint has been filed and a warrant thereon issued charging that the vehicle has been embezzled.” Reading the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that there is a material issue of fact as to whether Officer Faulk possessed the authority to impound the motorcycle based on the stolen vehicle report. A stolen vehicle report was made, which may give Officer Faulk the authority to impound the motorcycle without a warrant. However, Officer Faulk’s declaration shows that he was aware that the allegedly stolen vehicle was part of a contract dispute between private parties. See Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 238 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The fact that Officer Faulk knew that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dispute regarding payment of a restaurant bill does not give rise to probable cause to arrest (B) holding that in the absence of a prior indictment probable cause for arrest is determined by the facts in the sworn complaint (C) holding that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff because the facts of the case amounted to a contract dispute (D) holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause (E) holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution
(C)

assumed the illegible stamp was the certification. We are not persuaded by Mr. Grynberg's argument that because the certification was illegible on the e-filed copy, L & R Venture's copy of the judgment did not comply with the Act. The flegibility created by the electronic filing process did not transform L & R Venture's properly authenticated judgment into an unauthenticated one. And, contrary to Mr. Grynberg's assertion, L & R Venture's counsel's presentation of the original copy at the hearing was not to correct an improper filing, but rather to prove that the original filing was properly authenticated. See C.R.C.P. 44(c) ("This Rule does not prevent the proof of official records or of entry or lack of entry therein by any method authorized by law."); cf. Griggs, 754 P.2d at 784-85 (<HOLDING>). It may be, however, as Mr. Grynberg contends, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court lacked authority to enforce a foreign judgment where the plaintiff filed only an affidavit describing the foreign judgment and not a certified copy of the judgment itself in the first instance (B) holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular (C) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that a foreign judgment filed under the montana uefja may not be subjected to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening or vacating as a domestic judgment and remain consistent with full faith and credit  the only defenses that may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a final judgment are those defenses directed at the validity of the foreign judgment
(A)

that there “might” be narcotics. It was entirely conjectural and conclusory. The government presented no evidence regarding the basis for the FBI’s third degree of speculation. For all we know, the FBI’s information was based on an anonymous tip providing the same speculative and unsupported assessment of the house. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, such a tip is insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. Florida v. J.L., — U.S. -, -, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 1378, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). Courts will uphold an investigatory stop based on a tip or other secondary information only when the information possesses sufficient indicia of reliability that are independently corroborated by the police. See Florida v. J.L., — U.S. at ---, 120 S.Ct. at 1378-79 (<HOLDING>); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an informants tip can establish reasonable suspicion without investigative confirmation if the tip is credible (B) holding that an anonymous tip must have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop and frisk (C) holding that anonymous call that gave police no predictive information to corroborate tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify stop and frisk (D) holding that an anonymous tip supported a terry stop where the informant provided several details but refused to give his name (E) holding stop invalid where anonymous tip provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informants knowledge and credibility

(E)