instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
ah officer may ask a question outside the scope of the initial justification for the stop so long as it does not further lengthen the time taken to process the initial justification for the stop. In other words, if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid. This reasoning is explained in both United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc), and United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5th Cir.1993). In both cases, the courts held that questions by police officers during a traffic stop are not seizures or searches proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and cited United States Supreme Court cases dealing with non-custodial police-citizen encounters for support. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent (B) holding that police may approach persons and ask questions or permission to search so long as police do not imply that answers or consent are required (C) holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car
answer:
(B)


question:
Parker, we vacate the sentence and remand for resen-tencing. Nearly a month before trial, Parker opted to waive his right to counsel and elected to represent himself. At that time, the trial court conducted a Faretta inquiry and allowed Parker to represent himself throughout the trial. However, when the jury returned with the guilty verdict, the trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing without renewing the offer of counsel. In doing so, the trial court erred. “Once a defendant waives the right to counsel in a criminal case, the court must renew the offer of counsel at each subsequent critical stage of the proceedings, one of which is sentencing.” Serrano v. State, 113 So.3d 895, 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see also Ingraham v. State, 32 So.3d 761, 768-69 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, vacate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage (B) holding postindictment lineup is critical stage of trial at which defendant is entitled to presence of counsel (C) holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel (D) recognizing that brooks protects against denial of counsel at a critical stage of his trial (E) holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver
answer:
(C)


question:
Rainer’s Rule 37 petition on ground one, which was an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and thus that was the claim before the Arkansas Supreme Court on appeal. Although Rain-er acknowledges in his Reply on this appeal, his “ineffective assistance and due process claims are separate but intertwined,” Reply 1, Rainer faults the Arkansas Supreme Court for considering this intertwined argument as it was presented on appeal. Whether or not Rainer maintained a due process claim entirely independent of his ineffective assistance claim, Rainer did not rebut the presumption that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision adjudicated his due process claim on the merits, and the decision is therefore entitled to deference. See § 2254(d)-(e); Nash v. Russell, 807 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). We further hold that the district court, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the rock solid basis for such a deferential standard of review (B) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (C) holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard (D) recognizing that the interaction of general constitutional rules governing pretrial identification procedures and the deferential standard of habeas review affords significant discretion to the state court (E) recognizing the deferential aedpa standard noting this court will take only a limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions  quoting worthington v roper 631 f3d 487 495 8th cir 2011
answer:

(E)