In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to those sentences because no error in the sentencing appears on the face of the record. Ninety-nine years is a “term of years not less than five years.” While Thomas’ sentences, under court interpretations of § 566.030.2, may not be authorized, we are not able to reach such issues where the sentencing defect is not so patent as to present a jurisdictional issue. This sentencing does not present a jurisdictional issue. Conclusion Thomas is ordered to be returned to the circuit court of the City of St. Louis for resentencing on the three first degree robbery counts within the limits authorized by the law. SO ORDERED. All concur. 1 . All sectional references are to Missouri Revised Statutes 1986, unless otherwise indicated. 2 . See, e.g., State v. Williams, 828 S.W.2d 894 (Mo.App.1992)(<HOLDING>); State v. Charron, 743 S.W.2d 436 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (B) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (C) holding sentence of thirtyfive years in prison with ten years probation for seconddegree murder is within the statutory maximum under 1997 statutes (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding sentence of 100 years for forcible rape was in excess of statutory maximum
[A]: holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum


[Q]: from California. A Michigan federal magistrate judge ordered his return to California. The following day, a criminal complaint based on the September 1995 heroin sales was filed against Jackson. Jackson was never served, did not appear, and the government subsequently dismissed the complaint without prejudice on November 20,1996. On January 6, 1998, Jackson was indicted for distribution of herom in the September 1995 transactions. Jackson eventually was returned to Michigan in November 1998, appeared before a magistrate judge on November 24, 1998, and was arraigned on December 1,1998. Trial was originally scheduled for March 25, 1999. On March 22, 1999, Jackson’s counsel, Stephen Rabaut, moved to dismiss the mdictment based on United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The district court dismissed the indictment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that eastern michigans federal grand jury system violated equal protection (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (D) holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial (E) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection
[A]: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection


[Q]: an untrue statement of material fact; (6) failed to state a material fact necessary to make other statements not misleading; and (7) made a statement in such a manner as to mislead a reasonably prudent person to a false conclusion of a material fact. (Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff bases these claims both on Walker’s alleged misrepresentations during the enrollment phase and on Walker’s or another Paychex employee’s alleged fraudulent alteration of Mr. Kersh’s enrollment form. (Id. ¶ 31.) Defendants argue that these claims, like all others in the Complaint, relate to the Salto Plan and are therefore subject to conflict preemption. (MTD at 19.) While some claims brought under the Texas Insurance Code are preempted by ERISA, see, e.g., Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), such preemption is not automatic. Instead, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding negligent misrepresentation claim was not preempted because it neither sought benefits under plan nor alleged improper processing of benefits (B) holding that erisa did not preempt hospitals claims against erisa plan administrator for misrepresentation under texas insurance code because hospitals claims were not dependent on or derived from the beneficiarys right to recover benefits under the plan (C) holding plaintiffs statelaw claims alleging common law misrepresentation and statutory misrepresentation under the texas insurance code art 2121 not preempted because they were not dependent on  the right to recover benefits under the erisa plan (D) holding that claims for misrepresentation under texas insurance code were preempted because the plaintiffs sought to recover benefits under an erisa plan (E) holding that claims for misrepresentation fraud and texas dtpa violations brought pursuant to article 2121 of the texas insurance code were completely preempted by erisa even if the result left the plaintiff with no adequate remedy for fraud
[A]:
holding negligent misrepresentation claim was not preempted because it neither sought benefits under plan nor alleged improper processing of benefits