In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: is narrowly crafted to get to the heart of the motion for summary judgment without allowing a lot of potentially unnecessary discovery. Montoya has said he did not show Wilks or Armijo his computer screen, or tell them Todd’s crimes; if Wilks says othexwise, there will likely be a genuine issue of fact requiring .the Court to deny the motions and allow the parties to proceed to trial. It seems fundamentally unfair to dismiss Todd’s case when a deposition of Wilks may make his case. Further, this deposition will not burden any government employees or entities. Accordingly, the Court finds that this limited discovery falls within the exceptions to disallowing discovery once the defense of qualified immunity has been raised. See Garrett v. C.A. Stratmen [Stratman], M.D., 254 F.3d at 953 (<HOLDING>). The Court does not believe this one 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine (B) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted (C) recognizing that a discovery order in the context of qualified immunity is not immediately appealable when the defendants immunity claim turns at least partially on a factual question when the district court is unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of the facts and which are narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim are neither avoidable or overly broad (D) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (E) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: added). Plaintiffs point out, correctly, that beneficial use is an evolving and dynamic requirement of federal and state law. See Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal.2d 132, 140, 60 Cal.Rptr. 377, 429 P.2d 889 (1967) (While “what is a reasonable use of water depends on the circumstances of each case, such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of transcendent importance.”). Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 requires that all water provided pursuant to the Act be put to “beneficial use,” as defined by state law. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383; California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 665-67, 98 S.Ct. 2985, 57 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1978); see also City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1242, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 294, 5 P.3d 853 (2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (B) holding that mandamus was appropriate to require the director to deliver the full decreed water rights of a water right holder (C) holding that the montana constitution protects water rights against unreasonable state action  (D) holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district (E) recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: credibility. The court also found that any error was harmless and any prejudice was de minimus. Trial Ct. Op. at 50. Respecting these claims, we are guided predominantly by our standard of review and our understanding that a proper purpose of cross-examination includes attempts to impeach a witness’s credibility. Chmiel, 889 A.2d at 527. It is well-settled that “[w]hatever tends to show the interest or feeling of a witness in a cause is competent by way of cross examination.” Grutski v. Kline, 352 Pa. 401, 43 A.2d 142, 144 (1945) (quoting Commonwealth v. Farrell, 187 Pa. 408, 41 A. 382 (1898)). Of course, the relevant dispute here involves the question of which kinds of facts “show the interest” of a witness. See generally Cooper v. Schoffstall, 588 Pa. 505, 905 A.2d 482, 494 (2006) (<HOLDING>). With regard to an expert witness’s testimony 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing general proposition that pattern of compensation in past cases raises inference that witness may slant testimony to ensure he is hired in future cases (B) holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotive theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination (C) holding abuse of discretion is the proper standard for reviewing award of attorney fees in patent cases although questions of law may in some cases be relevant (D) holding and citing cases standing for the proposition that rehabilitation plans may not be based on liquidation (E) recognizing that in exceptional cases the inference may be so strong as to require a directed verdict for plaintiff


Output: (A)