In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: note that, contrary to Kooby and EHI’s assertion, the trial court is not required to hold a hearing on this m 2d 814) (1991) (same). 10 Rogers v. Norris, 262 Ga. App. 857, 857 (1) (586 SE2d 747) (2003) (“Although we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, ‘the trial court must make findings on these issues before we may determine whether its discretion was abused.’ ” (quoting Ga. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Patillo, 194 Ga. App. 279, 279 (390 SE2d 431) (1990))); see also Wood v. Notte, 238 Ga. App. 748, 749 (1) (519 SE2d 923) (1999) (same); Crenshaw, 202 Ga. App. at 611 (1) (same). 11 See Rogers, 262 Ga. App. at 857 (1) (“Failure to make [findings of fact] mandates that we vacate the order dismissing the appeal and remand the case Ga. App. 40, 43 (555 SE2d 508) (2001) (<HOLDING>); A. Roberts Corp. v. Roberts, 207 Ga. App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it (B) holding that trial court made sufficient findings of fact when it dismissed appeal (C) holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case (D) holding that a reviewing court will only presume that the trial court made implicit factual findings when such findings were necessary to its ultimate conclusion (E) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact

Output: holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it


Input: Consider Input: task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] ... begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”). Section 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) states in part that “attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living ... justifies a higher fee.” (emphasis added). On its face, § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) generally references “the cost of living” not a local/regional cost-of-living. Id. (emphasis added). See Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (“[CJourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”) (citations omitted). Cf. Jones v. Espy, 10 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). This choice of language 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity (B) holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority (C) holding that the more general cpiu for all items applied because if congress had meant to permit upward adjustments based on the increased cost of legal services it would have done so with greater specificity and clarity (D) holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001 (E) holding that based on the statutes purpose and its legislative history the legislature would have included specific language regarding drug rehabilitation if it had meant to include it

Output: holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity


Input: Consider Input: Even so, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of “whether the evidentiary framework of [McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)] ... is appropriate in the ADEA context.” Gross, 557 U.S. at -, 129 S.Ct. at 2349 n. 2. We have used the analytical framework from McDonnell Douglas in ADEA cases where a plaintiff offers circumstantial evidence to prove a claim of discrimination. Cofield v. Goldkist, Inc., 267 F.3d 1264, 1268 n. 6 (11th Cir.2001) (noting that “[a]l-though the McDonnell Douglas framework originally applied to Title VII cases, it is now widely accepted that the framework applies to claims of discrimination under the ADEA as well”). Sinc ., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a 56year old employee was replaced by a 40year old employee this qualified as someone substantially younger for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case (B) holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination (C) holding that the fourth prong of a prima facie age discrimination case was satisfied where plaintiff was replaced by two individuals  one who was four years younger than plaintiff and the other who was ten years younger (D) holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case (E) holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive


Output: holding that when a 56year old employee was replaced by a 40year old employee this qualified as someone substantially younger for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case