In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions “could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited.” Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) (“We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse’s liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void.”). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years

A: holding that such provisions are valid
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Q: from the Fijian military,” was “robbed repeatedly,” had his temple burned by Fijian soldiers, and Fijian soldiers attacked his home and destroyed his property while his wife was home alone. See id. Significantly, the attacks were linked by the fact that they were all carried out by a common entity, as opposed to random acts of violence that this court has characterized as the “common byproduct of civil unrest and economic turmoil.” See Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir.2004). The acts described by Kumar are closer to those in Gormley. Therefore, the evidence does not compel a finding of persecution. Nor did Kumar present evidence that would compel “any reasonable adjudicator” to find that he demonstrated a likelihood of future persecution. See Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1061 (<HOLDING>). Because Kumar’s evidence did not compel a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals (B) holding that personal disputes do not constitute persecution (C) holding that evidence that  is consistent with acts of private violence  or that merely shows that a person has been the victim of criminal activity does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground (D) holding that while widespread violence against a protected group by private individuals and public officials may constitute persecution widespread discrimination that may include persecution of some individuals does not compel such a finding (E) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution

A: holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals
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Q: writ denied); see also Attorney General of Tex. v. Redding, 60 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001) (noting that defendant’s right to rely on statute of limitations vests when limitations period expires); Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R. & D., Inc., 12 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.1999) (same). Choice-of-law rules are alterable The majority suggests that chapter 149 disrupted Satterfield’s settled expectations in this case. It did not. Satterfield lacked any immediate entitlement or legally enforceable right to impose successor liability on Crown. Her successor-liability remedy depended entirely on the application of New York law through choice-of-law rules and those rules may be altered by statute in the same manner as other Texas law. See Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 574 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings (B) recognizing that police officers may use reasonable force to make a lawful arrest (C) holding that bpps may not engage in legal assistance make inquiries or answer legal questions (D) recognizing that courts may make reasoned adjustments in legal system (E) holding that a municipal sewer system is liable for the acts of a third party that discharged hazardous waste into the system

A:
recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings
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