In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Jones v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 72 B.R. 956 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1987); McCullough v. Suter (In re Suter), 59 B.R. 944 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986). Palmer argues that the BAP erred in distinguishing among the various subsections of section 523 on the issue of the discharge of punitive damages. He notes that courts have found that punitive damages are nondischargeable under section 523(a)(4), which bars discharge of debts “for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement or larceny,” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), and under section 523(a)(6), which bars discharge of debts “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity,” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). See, e.g., Klemens v. Wallace (In re Wallace), 840 F.2d 762 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Moraes v. Adams (In re Adams), 761 F.2d 1422, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that judgment for embezzlement which included actual and punitive damages was nondischargeable (B) holding that punitive damages are not fines (C) holding punitive damages nondischargeable under  523a6 when such damages are based on the same conduct as the underlying nondischargeable judgment (D) holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that both actual and punitive portions of judgment for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity were nondischargeable (E) holding a court may not award punitive damages
[A]: (A)


[Q]: time to the end of the videotape. III. Defendant moved, and the State cross-moved, for leave to appeal the Appellate Division’s judgment. We granted both motions, 205 N.J. 11, 11 A.3d 371 (2010), and we thereafter granted leave to the Attorney General to participate as an amicus curiae. Before this Court, defendant argues that the Appellate Division erred in rejecting the findings ajnd conclusions of the trial court that his initial request to speak with his mother was an invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent. First, he asserts that the panel was obligated to defer to the factual findings of the trial court and that its failure to do so yiolated the clear directives from this Court, requiring reversal. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 17, 974 A.2d 1057 (2009) (<HOLDING>); State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244, 927 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a factual question and should be accorded great deference and should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous (B) holding that trial courts determination of whether defendant accepted responsibility should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation (C) holding that a trial courts findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction (D) holding that this court will only set aside district courts factual findings when they are clearly erroneous (E) holding that the case should be reopened where the cause has not proceeded so far that the ends of justice would be defeated or the orderly process of the court disturbed
[A]: (C)


[Q]: In Granato v. City and County of Denver, No. CIV 11-0304 MSK/BNB, 2011 WL 3820730 (D.Colo. Aug. 20, 2011), the Honorable Marcia S. Krieger, now-Chief United States District Judge for the District of Colorado, ruled similarly: At a minimum, a party asserting a Mo-nell claim must plead sufficient facts to identify the unconstitutional custom or policy that was promulgated and the means by which that custom or policy caused the constitutional violation. Here, Ms. Granato’s allegations of an unconstitutional custom or policy maintained by Denver Health are entirely conclusory. She offers only the “formulaic recitation” of a Monell claim, alleging that Mr. Khazanov “act[ed] and/or fail[ed] to act pursuant to City or State policy, custom, decision, ordinance, re d 503, 506-07 (3d Cir.l985)(<HOLDING>). The Court does not believe a pre-determined 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts are to accept allegations in the complaint as being true including monell policies and writing that a federal court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint has a limited task (B) holding that for purposes of a class certification motion the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and may draw reasonable inferences therefrom (C) recognizing that the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true on a threshold motion to dismiss (D) holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint (E) holding that where the defendant was in default the district court correctly accepted the fact allegations of the complaint as true
[A]:
(A)