In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: to the “enforcement” of the reversal of the Bankruptcy Court’s Order allowing IMC an administrative expense. It would also be considered a core proceeding since it follows directly from a core proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). Basic principles of restitution and appellate procedure which dictate that a lower court always has the jurisdiction to order the restitution of an award overturned on appeal, even without a remand from the appellate court, also support our conclusion that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to rule on the Debtor’s Motion. See Caldwell v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship and Training Trust, 824 F.2d 765, 766-67 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. U.S., 279 U.S. 781, 786, 49 S.Ct. 492, 493, 73 L.Ed. 954 (1929)) (<HOLDING>). “The right to recover what one has lost by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial (B) holding that the court had appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of the case because only the collateral issue of attorneys fees remained to be decided on remand to the bankruptcy court (C) holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal (D) holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings (E) holding that the district court had jurisdiction to order restitution of award overturned on appeal even in the absence of a remand from the appellate court

Answer: holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial


Question: assault conviction. See Ohio Rev.Code § 3319.39(B). Further, Plaintiffs understanding of the nature of the choice he was required to make is demonstrated by the fact that he discussed the choices with his union representatives' — the President and Vice President of his local union and the President of the Central Ohio union — and discussed the choice with a teacher at Ft. Hayes High School. See Harris, 2008 WL 4186316, *8, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86385, at *20 (finding that the plaintiff “fully understood the options as he testified that he discussed them with his wife and union steward”). Also, Plaintiff was given a reasonable amount of time to choose between termination and resignation as he was given approximately twenty-four hours in which to decide. See Rhoads, 103 Fed.Appx. at 895 (<HOLDING>); Harris, 2008 WL 4186316, *8, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that extremely tight handcuffing for nearly fourteen hours that left indentations in plaintiffs arms for over six hours did not amount to excessive force (B) holding that a difference of opinion about the best course of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference (C) holding that a plan administrators decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious even though an attending physician had submitted a form stating the plaintiff could sit for six hours stand for two hours and walk for two hours (D) holding that seven hours was a reasonable amount of time to deliberate meaningfully about the choice (E) holding that delay of several hours after the vehicle was seized was reasonable

Answer: holding that extremely tight handcuffing for nearly fourteen hours that left indentations in plaintiffs arms for over six hours did not amount to excessive force


Question: venture” (FAC ¶ 39) are similarly insufficient. See Cannon v. Douglas Elliman, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-7092, 2007 WL 4358456, at *4 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007) (“[Pjleading a joint venture does not trigger joint employer status because it is possible for joint ventures to separately employ different people .... ”); Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Techs., L.L.C., No. 08-CV-5430, 2009 WL 513496, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) (“Plaintiff joint employer allegations are insufficient because they are legal conclusions, not factual allegations, .... While plaintiff is not required to conclusively establish that defendants were her joint employers at the pleading stage, plaintiff must at least allege some facts in support of this legal conclusion.”) cf. Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 635-36 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs arguments that these Defendants 
 Holding statements: (A) holding under flsa 29 usc  216c (B) holding that the authorization under 29 usc  1132a3 extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary party in interest to a transaction barred by 29 usc  1106a (C) holding under 29 usc  216c (D) holding that the finding that entities constitute a single enterprise under 29 usc  203r is separate and distinct from whether an entity is an employer under 29 usc  203d (E) holding that the defendant is in the best position to prove and should bear the burden of establishing its entitlement to an exemption under 29 usc  1108 from 29 usc  1106b erisas prohibited transactions provision

Answer:
holding under flsa 29 usc  216c