In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: of death which does not meet these requirements is voidable by the donor (if he recovers) or his personal representative. Hulley v. Chedic, 22 Nev. 127,146, 36 P. 783 (1894). In other words, a gift in contemplation of death'is presumptively voidable by the personal representative of the deceased, and the presumption may be rebutted by the donee with clear and convincing evidence of the six elements listed above. Although Goldsworthy and Hulley are the only Nevada cases ever to have examined the gift causa mortis doctrine, and they have never been overruled, at least one Nevada case has suggested (in a different context) that the burden of proof may not be on the donee. North Arlington Medical Building, Inc. v. Sanchez Construction Company, 86 Nev. 515, 521, 471 P.2d 240, 244 (Nev.1970) (<HOLDING>). North Arlington is not really on point, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable (B) holding that inter vivos gift to minor is presumptively effective under nrs 167040 (C) holding that the purpose of nrs 1760551 is to ensure that all time served is credited towards a defendants ultimate sentence (D) holding that belowguidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable (E) holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable
Example Output: (B)

Example Input: recipient venue because their lack of standing here means it is not a district “in which [the case] might have been brought,” according to the requirements of the transfer statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiffs suggest that this court should “sensibly confirm[] that inherent in any discretionary transfer here is the idea that jurisdiction cannot be destroyed.” PI. Resp. 25. The argument is artful but unpersuasive. “There is no valid reason for reading the words ‘where it might have been brought’ to narrow the range of permissible federal forums beyond those permitted by federal venue statutes.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 623, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); see also Carbonara v. Olmos, 1994 WL 61797, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1994) (<HOLDING>). B. Standing of SAF SAF asserts both 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (C) holding that transfer to a district in which circuit law likely precluded standing was proper because the language of  1404a refers only to whether venue is proper and not a plaintiffs capacity to sue (D) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (E) holding that venue is proper in any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: particular time charter does not act as a basis for the time charterer’s liability to injured longshoremen. See, e.g., Mallard v. Aluminum Co. of Canada, Ltd., 634 F.2d 236, 242 n. 5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816, 102 S.Ct. 93, 70 L.Ed.2d 85 (1981); Dougherty v. Navigazione San Paolo, S.P.A. Medafrica Line, 622 F.Supp. 1, 3-4 (E.D.Pa.1984). The reason most courts have held that a time charterer generally has no such liability is that a time charterer only rents space on a vessel; it exercises no control over vessel and makes no decisions about daily operation. Admittedly, authority exists for the proposition that Clause Eight imposes liability on the time charterer for injuries to persons unloading a ship. See Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300, 1306 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967, 103 S.Ct. 294, 74 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that clause eight requires time charterer to indemnify shipowner for any damages awarded because of injury to longshoreman (B) holding that clause 8 of the nype charter party expressly makes the time charterer hable for the vessels neghgence (C) holding that a charter party creates no contractual duty towards a longshoreman on the part of a time charterer (D) holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous (E) holding that clause eight imposes liability on time charterer for injuries to longshoremen
Example Output:
(E)