In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: of the original note because the endorsement on the note in evidence did not match the endorsements on the copy of the note attached to the complaint. As argued by OneWest, the Cummings presented no testimony or evidence to contradict Mr. Den-son’s testimony that the note in evidence was the original note acquired by OneWest in May 2010. Likewise, the Cummings’ argument regarding the validity of the assignment of mortgage from MERS to In-dyMac is not relevant to OneWest’s standing to foreclose. Because the evidence showed that OneWest possessed the original note endorsed in blank at the time it filed the complaint, its standing is established from its status as the note holder regardless of any recorded assignments. See Stone v. BankUnited, 115 So.3d 411, 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Mazine v. M & I Bank, 67 So.3d 1129, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no impermissible modification of the note because the very terms of the note allow for prepayment without a penalty (B) holding that the holder of the note must act in a manner that effectively provides notice that the holder has exercised his option (C) holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder (D) holding that where a mortgagee is acting on behalf of the note holder there is no disconnection between note and mortgage and the mortgagee may foreclose (E) holding that the note and the mortgage must coexist to give the mortgage validity

A: holding that there is no impermissible modification of the note because the very terms of the note allow for prepayment without a penalty
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Q: County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Ban zure beyond its lawful duration, such theft violates the Fourth Amendment. See Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 151 (7th Cir.1994). The remaining question is whether Colaprete’s Fourth Amendment right against having his property converted following a search was clearly established when the alleged conversion occurred. The Seventh Circuit has held that the existence of this right is “[s]o obvious ... that we do not think the absence of case law can establish a defense of immunity.” Id. We respectfully disagree. This court has never applied the Fourth Amendment in this manner, and Supreme Court precedent tilts slightly against the existence of any constitutional right against theft during the course of a search. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533(<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional (B) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (C) holding that theft by prison guards does not violate due process when postdeprivation remedy exists (D) holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies (E) holding that a prison guards intentional destruction of a prisoners possessions did not give rise to a federal due process claim because state law provided an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy

A: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional
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Q: of this case there is no substantive difference between the old rule and the new rule, which provides that two prior sentences count separately if the offenses were separated by an intervening arrest. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2). Thus, Huggins cannot be distinguished based merely on a nonpertinent change to the text of the applicable rule. The relevant distinction is that the defendant in Huggins received two separate sentences for his two prior offenses, notwithstanding the fact that the offenses were “consolidated for sentencing.” The prior offenses in Huggins occurred in 1987, six years before North Carolina enacted the consolidated sentence provision. See N.C. Gen. Ann. Laws 1993, c. 538, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1994; see also State v. Branch, 134 N.C.App. 637, 518 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Huggins is inapposite because it does 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (B) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective (C) holding that although probation statute was repealed by sentencing reform act old provision continued to apply to offenses which occurred before effective date of act nov 1 1987 (D) holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity (E) holding that as a matter of law offenses that were committed prior to 1 october 1994 the effective date of the structured sentencing act cannot be consolidated for judgment under the act

A:
holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act
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