In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

a “public official,” places a great emphasis on two of the elements: (1) the statutory powers and duties of a position, and (2) whether that position exercised sovereign power. See, e.g., Spaulding, 102 Iowa at 649, 72 N.W. at 291 (concluding that the treasurer of the commissioners of pharmacy was not a public officer because the position of treasurer “was a creation of the commission ... and at all times subject absolutely to their control”); McKinley, 228 Iowa at 1189-91, 293 N.W. at 451 (concluding that county engineer was an “official” because he furnished a bond and took an oath of office; but more importantly because several statutes defining the powers and duties of the county engineer delegated certain sovereign powers to that position); Whitney, 232 Iowa at 71, 4 N.W.2d at 398 (<HOLDING>); Hutton, 235 Iowa at 56, 16 N.W.2d at 20 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (C) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was an employee not an official and therefore entitled to benefits under the workers compensation act (D) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was not an official because she was not required to give bond or take an oath none of the statutes impose upon her the exercise of discretion in any way they delegate no sovereign power to her (E) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment
holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment

that any negligent infliction claim remains before us on this appeal (as none has been separately argued) that claim is preempted for the same reasons. III. Conclusion We hold that Humble’s intentional infliction/tort of outrage claim is preempted on the facts of this case, and her race and nationality discrimination claims have been abandoned. Humble’s reasonable accommodation claim under the WLAD is not preempted, and we remand that claim for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Humble requests that a remand to state court for the latter claim be ordered, but we leave it to the district court to make that discretionary determination. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 . 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 2 . Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 216, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Id. at 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904. Without 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 (B) holding that broad language releasing all claims whether in contract tort or otherwise necessarily included a bad faith claim (C) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (D) holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith (E) holding that a state law tort of bad faith was necessarily based on breach of duties contained in the cba and was therefore preempted
holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301

idea. 6 . As a preliminary matter, we note that counsel for Lower Merion has submitted a letter pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), in which he contends that the Supreme Court's decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) renders the ADEA inapplicable to Lower Merion. This contention is meritless. In Kimel, the Supreme Court held "only that, in the ADEA, Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity to suits by private individuals.” Lower Merion, however, is not a state or an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes and therefore is not entitled to sovereign immunity. See Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 870-71 (3d Cir.1990) cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 1317, 113 L.Ed.2d 250 (1991)(<HOLDING>)(citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts (B) holding that school districts do not share in the commonwealth of pennsylvanias eleventh amendment sovereign immunity because they are not alter egos of the commonwealth (C) holding that school boards in alabama counties were not arms or alter egos of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that pennsylvanias judicial districts are entitled to immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment (E) holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity

recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts