In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: 593, 598 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1, 135 L.Ed.2d 1098 (1996), and of mixed questions of law and fact, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). However, the state court’s factual findings underlying those determinations are presumed to be correct and binding, as long as they were made after a full, fair, and adequate hearing on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 1994) (pre-AED-PA); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of es ing that the findings of the trial court on discriminatory intent in Batson challenge are reviewed for clear error); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (B) holding that the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under general statutes  46a60 is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (C) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (D) holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard (E) holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard

Output: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard


Input: Consider Input: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals

Output: holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision


Input: Consider Input: creditor, whether or not' the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 1327(a). Thus, courts have ruled that “[t]he Order of Confirmation is res judicata as to all justiciable issues decided or which could have been decided at the hearing on confirmation.” In re Guilbeau, 74 B.R. 13, 14 (Bkrtcy.W.D.La.1987); In re Russell, 29 B.R. 332, 335 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1983); In re Lewis, 8 B.R. 132, 137 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1981); Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1327.01 (15th ed. 1991). It is clear that the IRS had ample opportunities to raise the eligibility issue, including before, during, and after confirmation. Therefore, the IRS is now barred from raising the issue unless i io 1983) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the IRS cannot rely upon section 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a request made within 180 days of a modified confirmation order  entered three months after the original confirmation order  but more than 180 days after the original confirmation order was timebarred (B) holding  1330a motion untimely when filed over 180 days from confirmation (C) holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days (D) holding  1330a motion not now justiciable because not raised within 180 days of confirmation (E) holding that a private right of action does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been filed


Output: holding that a request made within 180 days of a modified confirmation order  entered three months after the original confirmation order  but more than 180 days after the original confirmation order was timebarred