In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
as late as February 1994, although the wife stated that she did not think that she lived with them for longer than one year. The wife testified that, during the time that she lived with the husband’s parents, they helped her financially. It appears that the trial court may have considered the husband’s obligation to support the wife suspended during the time that she lived with his parents, as the order reflects that it calculated arrearage beginning in February 1994. Alimony arrearage is a final judgment as of the date due and is not subject to modification. Harris v. Harris, 553 So.2d 129 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). In some instances alimony obligations can be satisfied by means other than direct payment from the husband to the wife. See, Swindle v. Swindle, 429 So.2d 601 (Ala.Civ.App.1983) (<HOLDING>); Frazier v. Frazier, 455 So.2d 883 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate (B) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (C) holding that the standard fire policy and a broader homeowners policy were so intertwined that the prescriptive period in the standard fire policy applied to nonfire perils (D) holding that obligation to pay mortgage on home was satisfied by payment of fire insurance proceeds where husband maintained fire insurance policy (E) holding that when the house  is destroyed by fire and there exists thereon a policy by insurance the money arising therefrom stands in the place instead of such house  the proceeds of the policy therefore take the place of the property loss

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
relevant facts. See Mot. at 13-14. Defendant, too, claimed in its subsequent statement of the issues that this talk happened between April 1 and April 4 and cited the same supportive evidence to this effect. See SOF, ¶ 73 (citing Howe Dep. at 32:7-12, 34:12-19 and May 13, 2014, Howe Email). Because Marks never refuted this fact by offering his own statement of the issues, as required under Local Rule 7(h), the Court could thus consider WWL’s account admitted on this ground alone. See LCvR 7(h) (“[I]n determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to- the motion.”); Jackson, 101 F.3d at 153 (<HOLDING>). The Court, however, need not rest on this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion (B) holding district court has complete discretion whether to treat facts as conceded where local rule is violated (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that the predecessor to local rule 561b3 provides the only acceptable means of  presenting additional facts to the district court (E) holding a district court has discretion under rule 55b2 once a default is determined to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
parent’s assertion of a legal right to the child.” Id. Because the circuit court’s decision in this case was based upon a misapplication of the burden-of proof, which stemmed from the court’s incorrect finding that a temporary transfer of custody did not occur in this case, we must reverse the decision in this ease and remand for further proceedings. We also find that the circuit court erred in determining that incidents of domestic violence between the Respondent father and the child’s deceased mother were not relevant to its determination of the Respondent father’s parental fitness. We have corn sistently found that evidence of domestic violence is relevant to the determination of whether a parent is fit. See Syl. Pt. 1, Henry v. Johnson, 192 W.Va. 82, 86, 450 S.E.2d 779, 783 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Nancy Viola R. v. Randolph W., 177 W.Va. 710, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that children are often physically assaulted or witness violence against one of their parents and may suffer deep and lasting emotional harm from victimization and from exposure to family violence consequently a family law judge should take domestic violence into account when making an award of temporary eustodyt based upon a recognition that it is clear that where domestic violence is present it should be considered when determining parental fitness (B) holding as relevant in a murder case a history of domestic violence involving defendant and his victim (C) holding south carolina crime of criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature was categorically a crime of violence under ussg  4b121 because its lesserincluded offense criminal domestic violence fell entirely within  4b12ls force clause (D) holding that previous domestic violence finding did not have res judicata effect in proceeding to modify visitation because domestic violence and visitation modification proceedings are different causes of action (E) holding that theft from the person is not a crime of violence

Ex Output:

(A)