In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: we now reverse the decision of the trial court. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. 1 . We set forth additional facts in the companion case issued today, Dep't. of Revenue v. Adams, 762 N.E.2d 728 (Ind.2002). 2 . The CSET is a tax on the possession of certain narcotics. We discuss the tax and the procedures for collecting it in greater detail infra. 3 . All of the cocaine at issue in this case was discovered prior to the time the police served a valid search warrant. 4 . Ind.Code § 35-48-4-1 (1998). 5 . Id. § 35-48-4-6. 6 . United States Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the revenue officers' entry of Adam's home to collect the CSET assessment was a search. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Thomas v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (B) holding that revenue officers conducted a search when they entered a cottage and seized records when levying on delinquent tax (C) holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business (D) holding search unreasonable when conducted on the highway in broad day light (E) holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house
[A]: holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted


[Q]: to survive. See Plaintiffs’ Brief, 9-10 citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2) general notice pleadings standard remains intact after Twombly) Because this question goes to the very heart of the matter, it must be addressed first. To recapitulate, this Court’s April 2007 Opinion weighed the sufficiency of the “enterprise” allegations in accordance with the Third Circuit’s ruling in Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.1984). See 365 B.R. at 548. Seville stated that nothing more than general notice pleading was required for pleading a RICO enterprise. Seville relied, implicitly, on the long-standing rule regarding notice pleading first enunciated in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (<HOLDING>) But two months after this Court’s April 2007 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief  (B) holding that a pro se complaint  should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief (C) holding that dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (D) holding that a complaint will not be dismissed unless it appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim (E) recognizing the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief
[A]: holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief 


[Q]: not persuade this Court to apply Turner to the facts at bar. Ultimately, defendant’s Turner argument fails for the same reason that defendant’s Hudson argument failed. Like Hudson. Turner cited Bell with approval and did not at any point suggest that Bell’s approach to Fourth Amendment claims should no longer be controlling law. Turner, 482 U.S. at 87, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (citing to the portions of Bell which discussed petitioners’ First Amendment claims). This Court will not disregard controlling Supreme Court precedent that has not been specifically overruled by subsequent Supreme Court cases. See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground); cf. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-10, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Like the many courts that have addressed the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing in a  1983 case brought by a deathrow prisoner that the deferential turner standard differs from the strict standards of scrutiny applicable to the con stitutional rights of persons in free society (B) holding that strict scrutiny applies (C) holding that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for racial classifications even in the prison context (D) recognizing that strict scrutiny applies to facial discrimination against a suspect class (E) holding that turner did not cast doubt on the courts previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons
[A]:
recognizing in a  1983 case brought by a deathrow prisoner that the deferential turner standard differs from the strict standards of scrutiny applicable to the con stitutional rights of persons in free society