In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Ban zure beyond its lawful duration, such theft violates the Fourth Amendment. See Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 151 (7th Cir.1994). The remaining question is whether Colaprete’s Fourth Amendment right against having his property converted following a search was clearly established when the alleged conversion occurred. The Seventh Circuit has held that the existence of this right is “[s]o obvious ... that we do not think the absence of case law can establish a defense of immunity.” Id. We respectfully disagree. This court has never applied the Fourth Amendment in this manner, and Supreme Court precedent tilts slightly against the existence of any constitutional right against theft during the course of a search. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533(<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional (B) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (C) holding that theft by prison guards does not violate due process when postdeprivation remedy exists (D) holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies (E) holding that a prison guards intentional destruction of a prisoners possessions did not give rise to a federal due process claim because state law provided an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy

A: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional
****
Q: of the statute before many petitioners would be able to identify, with reasonable certainty, the nature of the injury. Brice v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 36 Fed.Cl. 474, 477 (1996), aff'd on other grounds, 240 F.3d 1367 (Fed.Cir.2001). In Brice, we held that equitable tolling is not available for claims arising under § 300-16(a)(2), reasoning that “the statute of limitations here begins to run upon the first symptom or manifestation of the onset of injury, even if the petitioner reasonably would not have known at that time that the vaccine had caused an injury.” 240 F.3d at 1373; see also Sharpnack v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-983V, 1992 WL 167255, at *2 (Cl.Ct. Special Master June 29, 1992), aff'd, 27 Fed.Cl. 457 (1993), aff'd, 17 F.3d 1442 (Fed.Cir.1994) (table) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court, in Whitecotton, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absolute immunity protects  judges  so long as their acts are judicial  in nature internal quotation omitted (B) holding substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance and consists of such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a eonclusion  (C) holding that in many vaccine program cases the injuries are first manifest ed as subtle signs and seizures of less complicated nature eg seizures lasting less than 30 minutes or seizure activity so subtle as to be unrecognized at their onset (D) holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service (E) holding that the united states is immune from monetary damages for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service

A: holding that absolute immunity protects  judges  so long as their acts are judicial  in nature internal quotation omitted
****
Q: that “N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.12 . . . specifically states that the expert must be familiar with the standard of care in the same or similar community ‘at the time of the alleged act giving rise to the cause of action.’ ” Id. at 480, 624 S.E.2d at 385 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.12). Although plaintiff’s expert did not wait four years before gathering information on Wake County, he still failed to comply with the statute insofar as it requires knowledge at the time of the injury. Dr. Frost even testified that the time between the injury and his research on the standard of care in Wake County that he “would expect that there were some ... changes” in the standard. Cf. Roush v. Kennon, 188 N.C. App. 570, 576, -S.E.2d. -, - (No. COA07-209 filed 5 February 2008) (<HOLDING>). I would therefore hold that plaintiff’s 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a defendant physicians own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiffs failure to call an independent expert on the standard of care (B) holding that an expert can comply with the timing requirement if an experts research even after his or her deposition revealed that the standard of care in his or her community was the same or similar to the standard of care in the community in which he or she is testifying when the injury occurred (C) holding that standard of care need not be listed separately in report when same standard applies to each health care provider (D) holding that once the defendant has submitted to the control of the officer and the process of taking him or her to the police station  has commenced his or her arrest is complete and he or she is in custody for the purposes of the escape statute (E) holding experts testimony was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the testimony at most showed the defendant deviated from the experts personal standard of care rather than the generally accepted standard of care

A:
recognizing that a defendant physicians own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiffs failure to call an independent expert on the standard of care
****