In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: states that a lack of due diligence should not prevent a party from presenting the new evidence. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 cmt. j (1982); see also Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J.Super. 558, 788 A.2d 834, 840 (2002) (“[T]he judge may consider diligence, or lack of diligence, ... [but] a lack of diligence does not require invocation of collateral estoppel particularly where, as here, plaintiff attempted to obtain Dr. Matthew’s evaluation prior to the arbitration proceeding.”). But see Klein v. Comm’r, 880 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir.1989) (“A party may not assert a change in controlling facts when the facts allegedly showing a change in circumstances could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence.”); Calcutt v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 14, 25, 1988 WL 71262 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the fairness 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial (B) holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel (C) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action
Example Output: holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial

Example Input: the rate must make a threshold showing that the rate at issue is unreasonable. Milne, 970 F.2d at 570; Covey, 763 F.Supp. at 482-83. Relevant factors in the determination include “relevant rate comparisons, a carrier’s proffer of a particular rate, and whether the rate would have moved the traffic had it been asserted at the time the shipments took place.” Matter of Brown Transport Truckload, Inc., 144 B.R. 183, 187 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1992). One common method of making a prima facie showing of unreasonableness is to provide affidavit testimony demonstrating a significant disparity between the rates sought to be charged by the carrier and the rates charged by competing carriers at the time in question. See, e.g., Vining v. The Eureka Co., 1992 WL 370520, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 8, 1992) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Brown, 144 B.R. at 187 (noting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo (B) holding eighty percent increase in demanded rates and showing that original rates were competitive with other carriers was prima facie unreasonable (C) holding prima facie showing of unreasonableness made by presenting evidence that tariff rates in effect at time of shipments were well above rates paid to other carriers for same service (D) holding that absence of competitive injury was not a defense to prima facie violation of  2e (E) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review
Example Output: holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo

Example Input: as here, the recalcitrant witness is at liberty pending appeal. In so holding, we join all of the circuits which have squarely addressed the issue. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 906 F.2d 78, 82-83 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom. Backiel v. United States, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990); In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 189 (D.C.Cir.1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 785 F.2d 629, 631 n. 4 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Johnson, 736 F.2d 358, 361-62 n. 5 (6th Cir.1984); In re Witness Before Special October 1981 Grand Jury, 722 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir.1983); In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir.1982); Brown v. United States, 465 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.1972). But see In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928, 96 S.Ct. 276, 46 L.Ed.2d 256 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The foregoing cases have noted that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the deadmans statute should not be extended by judicial construction to cases not clearly within its terms (B) recognizing that denying outofeell exercise for extended periods may constitute cruel and unusual punishment (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration (E) holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to guantanamo
Example Output:
holding that the deadmans statute should not be extended by judicial construction to cases not clearly within its terms