In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: (Black, J., concurring)). We are also troubled because, given that there was nothing about the officers’ appearance or conduct that revealed that they were engaged in the performance of their duties, Davis lacked fair notice that mere spoken words, which did not disturb the peace, could nonetheless constitute the crime of obstructing the officer’s performance of duty. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311, 60 S.Ct. at 906. “It is an elemental requirement of our constitutional jurisprudence that laws be reasonably intelligible, providing citizens with fair notice as to what conduct is legal and what conduct is illegal.” Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 6:13 (1996) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (<HOLDING>)). We reiterate that we recognize the need to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion (B) recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority (C) holding unconstitutional vagrancy statutes that were purposely designed to grant police broad discretion (D) holding unconstitutional ordinance that gave executive director excessive discretion in deciding whether the grant of a permit would be detrimental to the public (E) holding that district courts discretion is extremely broad

A: holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion
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Q: for these terms in the specifications or prosecution histories of the ’403-S or ’838 patents. Furthermore, the fact that the inventors removed the term “comprising” from Claim 1 of the ’403-S patent does not change the plain meaning of the term “composition,” which remains in the final version of the claim. Moreover, if the court were to adopt the construction of the ’403-S claims put forth by Glaxo, Claim 1 would contradict Claim 1 of the ’838 patent, which retains the term “comprising” and claims the process for producing the compositions described in ’403-S patent. Such a construction would be inconsistent. In light of these findings, the court concludes that the terms “comprising” and “composition” must be construed according to their plain meanings. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (<HOLDING>). As a result, the phrases “immunoglobulin 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that words in claims are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning unless the patentee clearly sets forth a different in the specification or file history (B) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (C) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning (D) recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning (E) holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning

A: holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning
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Q: in Palmieri v. State, 745 So.2d 425 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), which certified conflict with the opinions in McKnight v. State, 727 So.2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), approved, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla.2000), and Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), approved sub nom. State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Palmieri challenges his sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (“the Act”) on several grounds, all of which have been addressed by previous opinions of this Court. See Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor principles of equal protection); State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the decision in Palmieri is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved (B) holding that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law (C) holding that the act does not violate separation of powers is not void for vagueness and does not violate principles of due process by allowing a victim veto precluding application of the act (D) holding that the act violates neither separation of powers nor principles of due process by allowing a victim veto that precludes application of the act as well as holding that the act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment (E) holding that dna act violates neither substantive nor procedural due process under the fifth amendment

A:
holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved
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