In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: California state prisoner, Roy Lee Brown, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand. Brown contends that his § 2254 petition was timely filed because his state habeas petitions statutorilly tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Brown is entitled to tolling during the time he was seeking one full round of collateral review by the California courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Delhomme v. Ramirez, No. 00-56148, 2003 WL 21947183, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed (B) holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice (C) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (D) holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review (E) holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review

Output: holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed


Input: Consider Input: the necessity for government to be able to take private property for governmental purposes, see The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), that power could be exercised only by making the private property owner whole. Thus the distinction plaintiffs attempt to draw is unavailing. Analytically, whether common law-based tort and contract law is subject to statutes of limitations, with or without sovereign immunity in the case of suits against the government, is unrelated to the question of whether constitutionally based takings claims may be made subject to such statutes. Which leads to the question of the applicable law. This court hears a goodly number of takings cases. In some the plaintiff property owner prevails. See, e.g., Ciéne-ga Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unenforced tobacco regulations did not constitute a taking of vending machine owners contracts (B) holding that island owners had rights to the thread of the channel (C) holding housing statutes create no rights in tenants for purposes of section 1983 (D) holding that a cause of action for an unconstitutional taking accrues at the time the taking occurs (E) holding that statutory abrogation of lowincome housing owners contract rights was a taking

Output: holding that unenforced tobacco regulations did not constitute a taking of vending machine owners contracts


Input: Consider Input: case en banc, considered only the merits of the two attorney’s fees issues because Tucker waived his complaint on the modification requests. 405 S.W.3d at 711-14. The court of appeals held that the Family Code gives trial courts authority to order a parent to pay attorney’s fees for legal services benefit-ting the children — whether provided by the amicus attorney or the other parent— as additional child support in non-enforcement modification suits. Id. at 712. While acknowledging that other Texas courts of appeals have held that the Family Code does not expressly grant trial courts authority to assess attorney’s fees as additional child support when parties seek only modification of an order under Title 5 of the Family Code, the court reas ex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). II. Analysis In this issue of first 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees and costs may not be awarded as child support when they are incurred in a suit to modify the parentchild relationship that does not involve the enforcement of a child support obligation (B) holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation (C) holding that a judgment for attorneys fees may be rendered in the nature of child support regardless of whether the underlying action is one of enforcement or modification (D) holding that attorneys fees incurred in a nonenforcement modification suit can be awarded as additional child support under the family code (E) holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support


Output: holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation