In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
the sentencing information balancing test urged by the dissent. The ongoing confusion concerning the breach of Wisconsin plea agreements is further highlighted by this district's issuance of an unusual, three-legged opinion. ¶ 24. While I have some sympathy with the dissent's concern about the continued integrity of the plea bargaining process, I disagree that the facts in this case can result in an unwarranted sentencing "clam up" restriction. The prosecutor not only has a right but a duty to provide information to the sentencing court. Moreover, there is nothing wrong with the prosecutor providing his or her opinion of the defendant's character, even if negative, to the sentencing court so long as the opinion is used to support the recommendation. See Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 324-25 (<HOLDING>). But it makes no sense to allow the prosecutor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erroneous use of statutorily unqualified person to prepare posttrial recommendation requires new recommendation and action (B) recognizing the importance of congressional findings in determining the appropriateness of congresss remedial measures (C) recognizing prosecutors task to attempt to convince the court of the appropriateness of the recommendation (D) holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error (E) holding that if counsel raises an issue the failure to convince the court to rule in an appellants favor is not ineffective performance

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
Court of Utah, in applying the good-faith exception to a Belton search, recently cautioned: "If the case law had been ambiguous prior to the time the officers conducted a search later definitively declared unconstitutional, the good-faith exception would not apply and the evidence would be excluded.” Utah v. Baker, 229 P.3d 650, 664 (Utah 2010). 80 . See Belton, supra note 1, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860. 81 . Compare Thornton, supra note 59, 541 U.S. at 622, 124 S.Ct. 2127 (declining to address argument that Belton rule applies only to “recent occupants” of vehicle, while noting that petitioner had conceded "he was in ‘close proximity, both temporally and spatially,’ to his vehicle” when approached by police officer) with Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383, 388-89 (D.C.1993) (<HOLDING>). 82 . See Gant, supra note 2, 129 S.Ct. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer may search a suspects vehicle incident to a lawful arrest (B) holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key (C) holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle (D) holding belton did not extend to search of vehicle incident to arrest of individual who has parked locked and walked fifteen to twenty feet away from an automobile before being stopped and arrested (E) holding that belton permits the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile even when the defendant is arrested outside as long as the officer made initial contact while the defendant was inside the automobile

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
the Cabinet, and Yowell and Codell in their official capacities. Ordinarily, a federal appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review a decision of a state court. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). However, in cases involving removal, the district court is instructed to “take[ ] up the case where the State court left it off.” Duncan v. Gegan, 101 U.S. 810, 812, 25 L.Ed. 875 (1879). Further, although “[a]ny orders or rulings issued by the state court prior to removal are not conclusive in the federal action after removal ... it is well-settled that they do remain binding on the parties until formall S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945) (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state (B) holding that when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state the state is the real substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants (C) holding suits against state officials for monetary damages impermissible where the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state rather than against the officer in his individual capacity (D) holding suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permissible because they are in effect suits against the officials in their individual capacities (E) holding that suits which seek no recovery from state funds but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the states liability insurance coverage fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the state

Ex Output:

(C)