In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: defendant to trust the advice of his counsel in weighing the immigration consequences of his decision. Petitioner’s counsel advised him that he would “in all likelihood, receive a sentence of only one to three years’ imprisonment.” (Id.) The fact that this turned out to be true, buttresses the court’s conclusion that it was reasonable for Petitioner to rely on his counsel’s advice in making his immigration decisions. Second, and more importantly, however, case law before IIRIRA held that even an alien who received a sentence longer than five years might have maintained eligibility for § 212(c) relief, provided that the alien had not served five years of his sentence at the time of his removal hearing. See Matter of Ramirez-Somera, 1992 WL 301623, 20 I. & N. Dec. 564, 566 (BIA 1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the fact that Petitioner could have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony (B) holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss prison inmates action under 42 usc  1983 as frivolous without consent of defendants because defendants had not been served yet and therefore were not parties (C) holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious (D) holding the same where the term conviction refers to a defendant who has been found guilty of a listed offense but has not yet been sentenced (E) holding that an immigrant defendant is eligible for  212c relief despite having been sentenced to a fifteen year prison term because he had not yet served five years of the sentence

A: (E)
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Q: otherwise nonremovable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). While the amended third-party complaint alleges a claim involving a federal question against the Chase Defendants, the Circuits are split on whether section 1441(c) permits removal by a third-party defendant. Compare Lewis v. Windsor Door Co., 926 F.2d 729, 733 (8th Cir.1991) (‘We do not ... believe § 1441(c) was intended to effect removal of a suit, not otherwise within federal jurisdiction, because of the introduction of a third-party claim.” (internal quotations omitted)) and First Nat’l Bank of Pulaski v. Curry, 301 F.3d 456, 465 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) with Carl Heck Eng’rs, Inc. v. Lafourche 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct (B) holding that removal under section 1441c may only be done by the original defendant (C) holding that  1441c does not allow the remand of claims that are not separate and independent (D) recognizing that  1441c limits removal to situations in which a federal question is joined with a separate and independent claim of a nonfederal nature (E) holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand

A: (B)
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Q: ¶28 The majority’s refusal to apply the civil rules to a civil “special proceeding” where the civil rules conflict with ANY statute is certainly a novel application of CR 81. We have never held the civil rules inapplicable under CR 81 because of a conflict with an unrelated statute of general applicability. Instead, we have held the rules inapplicable only where the civil rules conflict with the procedures specifically outlined in the statute governing the special proceeding. f 29 This means “[t]he matters before us turn on whether [the civil rule] is inconsistent with provisions for special proceedings under chapter 71.09 RCW.” In re Det. of Williams, 147 Wn.2d 476, 489, 55 P.3d 597 (2002); see also In re Det. of Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 801, 42 P.3d 952 (2002) (comparin 1204 (1999) (<HOLDING>). ¶32 Even where the accused’s protections stem 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (B) holding because the svp is civil the accused has no constitutional right to counsel (C) holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection (D) holding because the svp statute is civil the accused has no right to confront witnesses (E) recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel

A:
(B)
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