In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: The State Defendants also cite to cases from other circuits refusing to apply Ex Parte Young in suits challenging statutorily-created private rights of action. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 416-24; Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1416-17 (6th Cir.1996); see also Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1342. Their holdings are unsurprising given that no state officials were charged with enforcing those laws. However, in the case before me, certain state officials are expressly charged with enforcing the law. Indeed, the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits distinguished the cases before them from cases challenging penal laws enforceable by state officials, finding the latter suitable for application of Ex Parte Young. See Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1337-41 (<HOLDING>); Deters, 92 F.3d at 1416 n. 10 (distinguishing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause (B) holding no error occurred in excluding portion of statement offered by defendant because the rejected portion of the conversation in no manner explains or modifies that portion of the conversation which came into evidence (C) holding that an offender convicted under the bestiality portion of the criminal sodomy statute does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of die portion of the statute that criminalizes homosexual conduct (D) holding that clear language in one portion of a later may cause ambiguity in another portion to dissipate (E) holding that ex parte young applied to plaintiffs claims against the criminal portion of the statute
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 1257, 10 L.Ed.2d 389 (1963). At the outset, we consider the effect of TAPAA’s introductory paragraph. Section 1653(c)(1) prescribes that, “Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law,” the owner of a vessel carrying trans-Alaska oil and the Fund “shall be strictly liable without regard to fault in accordance with the provisions of this subsection....” 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1). Section 1653(c)(1) is the general statement of liability, and as such it introduces the subsequent subsections which contain TAPAA’s operational details. While some courts have found “notwithstanding” phrases to preempt explicitly the application of other laws, see, e.g., Complaint of Hokkaido Fisheries Co., Ltd., 506 F.Supp. 631, 634 (D.Alaska 1981) (<HOLDING>), we do not find the phrase dispositive in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that denial of permit under section 404 of the clean water act was a taking (B) holding that district courts are without jurisdiction to review preenforcement orders issued under the clean water act (C) holding that adequate notice is a mandatory precondition of a clean water act citizen suit (D) holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act (E) holding that similar notwithstanding language in the clean water act preempted application of limitation act to limit owners liability for cleanup costs
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: state prosecutors would be able to usurp federal prosecutorial discretion. Nor did the state prosecutor in this case have any authority to bind the federal prosecutor. Under settled precedent, one federal prosecutor cannot bind his or her counterpart in another district unless he or she has been given the authority. See United States v.. D’Apice, 664 F.2d 75, 78 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec.1981). If federal prosecutors cannot bind other federal prosecutors with their unauthorized acts, a state prosecutor a fortiori should not be able to do so. Roberson, 872 F.2d at 611. Here, Kozak has not demonstrated that the state actors, Meyer and Moser, with whom her counsel conferred had been granted actual federal authority to negotiate a cooperation agreement. The absence of an agency re Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, because Kozak has failed to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a promise by fbi agents that defendant would serve no time on state charges if he cooperated in the federal investigation was unauthorized (B) holding that an fbi agents investigation of the written contents of a notebook that was lawfully in the possession of the fbi constituted a search that violated the defendants fourth amendment rights (C) holding that defendant was not entitled to specific performance of alleged cooperation agreement entered into with fbi agent who allegedly promised defendant he would not be prosecuted if he cooperated in making a statement where there was no evidence establishing that agent was authorized to make promises to obtain defendants cooperation (D) holding that the speedy trial clock for state charges did not begin to run when the defendant was taken into custody by federal authorities on federal charges but rather when he was indicted for the state charges (E) holding that fbi agents testimony regarding witnesss pri or identification was admissible where nothing in the record suggested that the declarant was unavailable for reexamination after the agents testimony
[EX A]:
(A)