In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: quantity function as elements by increasing the maximum penalty a defendant may receive, are they elements of an aggravated offense or are they sentencing factors with heightened due process requirements? See id. at 573, 575 (Hug, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s apparent conclusion that the penalty provisions of § 841(b) are not elements of the offense). The district court correctly interpreted Buckland as holding that drug type and quantity are not elements of the offense, but rather are material facts that must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Buckland opinion emphasized that the relevant inquiry is not whether a penalty provision is an element, but rather whether it exposes the defendant to a longer sentence than woul (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so (B) holding jury is entitled to accept the states version of the facts and reject appellants version or reject any of the witnesses testimony (C) holding that biased on buckland we must reject valensias contention that the sentencing provisions of  841 create separate crimes (D) holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes (E) holding the crimes merge where the jury was not asked to determine whether two assaults occurredeventhough the evidence may have been sufficient to support separate crimes
[A]: recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so


[Q]: two for support). The fallacy of this position is that it confuses and commingles two conflicting strands of case law which follow opposing judicial routes. As noted above, in every case cited by the majority in footnote two, the fruits of a search were deemed admissible only after the search was found to be constitutional, i.e., distinctions as to admissibility of the fruits of a particular search against the consenting occupant and the nonconsenting occupant were never drawn. There is no authority for the majority’s proposition that the fruits of an unconstitutional search should be admitted into evidence. Indeed such a proposition violates one of the founding principles of the Fourth Amendment. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Most commentators also agree failure to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible (B) holding that the physical fruits of a miranda violation must be suppressed (C) holding that evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed (D) holding that regardless of the applicable framework defendants statement must be suppressed (E) holding that the evidence obtained as part of an illegal stop should have been suppressed even where the defendants consented to the search
[A]: holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible


[Q]: to an in-state transaction, even if the claim did not “arise from” that transaction. See e.g., George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz, 363 N.E.2d 551, 554 (N.Y. 1977) (concluding there was jurisdiction over a Massachusetts resident for breach of an employment contract entered into in New York); Singer v. Walker, 209 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1965) (sustaining jurisdiction because plaintiffs personal injury claim resulting from the use of a defective hammer arose from “the purposeful activities engaged in by [defendant]” in New York “in connection with the sale of its products in the New York market”). On the other hand, New York courts have also held that jurisdiction is not justified where the relationship between the claim and the transaction is too attenuated. See e.g., Talbot, 522 N.E.2d at 1027 (<HOLDING>); Ward, 829 N.E.2d at 1203 (concluding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (B) holding that the nexus between a coachs defamation action and a former students pursuit of a college degree in new york was insufficient to support jurisdiction (C) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action (D) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (E) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york
[A]:
holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership