In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: with ever since his age of 13 and believes that this criminal record and his continued violation of the law does require a sentence at the top of the guideline range.” Id. at 8. I. A. Commerce Clause Challenge to Section 922(g)(1) Williams first challenges the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute as it applies to his possession of the Smith and Wesson revolver. Williams posits that because he possessed the gun solely within the State of Wisconsin, and because the record reveals no substantial connection between his possession of the gun and interstate commerce, Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to reach his possession of the gun. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Williams did not make this argument below, so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce (B) holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (C) holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that gunfree school zones act of 1990 which proscribed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school exceeded congressional authority under commerce clause because it reached conduct that did not substantially affect or have a meaningful connection with interstate commerce (E) holding that the gunfree school zones act exceeds congress power under the commerce clause
[A]: holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce


[Q]: citizens of Alabama for purposes of the diversity jurisdiction analysis. This narrow and specialized statute provides in pertinent part: In any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen. Andalusia and Hughes, who are insureds but not parties defendant, contend that a realignment of Lane will make the case into a direct action by Lane against the insurers, and because it is one in which the insureds are not joined as parties defendant, diversity would be destroyed by § 1332(a)(1). This contentio d.2d 73 (1974). But where the s 13 F.Supp. 367, 371 (D.Conn.1970) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 456 F.2d 282 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding action by insured against his own insurer under uninsured motorist provisions of policy not a direct action within section 1332c proviso (B) holding that insured cannot bring an action against its insurer for bad faith failure to settle a claim in the absence of an excess verdict (C) holding action by judgment creditor of insured against insurer for bad faith failure to settle claim against insured not a direct action within section 1332c proviso (D) holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith (E) holding that a negligence claim against an insured and a bad faith claim against the insurer are not separate as the first must be proved to prevail on the second
[A]: holding action by insured against his own insurer under uninsured motorist provisions of policy not a direct action within section 1332c proviso


[Q]: can serve to relieve a claimant of this requirement. Although the doctrine of substantial compliance has occasionally been applied in the tort claims context, it has been limited carefully to those situations in which the notice, although both timely and in writing, had technical deficiencies that did not deprive the public entity of the effective notice contemplated by the statute. See, e.g., Lebron v. Sanchez, 407 N.J.Super. 204, 214-15, 970 A.2d 399 (App.Div.2009) (concluding that notice that identified plaintiff and her attorney, set forth date and description of incident, listed injuries and demanded damages, but that did not specifically assert legal theory of negligent supervision substantially complied); Henderson v. Herman, 373 N.J.Super. 625, 633, 862 A.2d 1217 (App.Div.2004) (<HOLDING>); Tuckey v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 236 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs breach of contract claim was properly a statutory claim under the personnel management act (B) holding that notice of claim against police dispatch and emergency transport personnel that failed to include names of specific dispatchers substantially complied (C) holding that plaintiff complied with plain language of the notice requirement when notice was mailed within statutory period although it was not received until after (D) holding that records regarding complaints against state police officers which would be exempt from disclosure when unredacted where no longer exempt after the names of state police troopers the names of complainants and all identifying information were redacted (E) recognizing emergency exception
[A]:
holding that the plaintiffs breach of contract claim was properly a statutory claim under the personnel management act