instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
challenge to the amount of refund awarded by DOE to a third-party claimant even though they failed to intervene while DOE was deciding the third-party claimant’s award”). Persistent, the defendant analogizes the instant APA claim with that denied in Brooks v. Snow, 313 F.Supp.2d 654 (S.D.Tex.2004). There, the plaintiffs sought a declaration from the court that Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. § 301.722-1 (listing the grounds authorizing the IRS to settle a tax case) was inconsistent with congressional intent, because the regulation omitted delays caused by the IRS in determining tax liability. Id. at 658-59. The court dismissed their complaint, explaining that they had not “allege[d] they ever submitted any offers-in-compromise and, therefore, they have not upp. 239, 255 (Ct.Cl. 1947) (<HOLDING>). Second, and most crucially, this plaintiff 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a refund may include additional taxes paid after the filing of a refund claim so long as the total does not exceed the portion of tax paid prior to the administrative claim (B) holding under section 7422a that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a taxpayers refund claim because the taxpayer failed to file a refund claim before the statute of limitations had run (C) holding that because the amount of the debtors obligation to the government exceeded the amount of their income tax refund the refund did not become property of the estate and could not be exempted (D) holding that a taxpayer only has a refund right after the irs has credited the refund to other underpaid taxes therefore the refund was not part of the bankruptcy estate (E) holding that a subsequent refund request on reassessed taxes was unnecessary as the government already had notice of the plaintiffs claim
answer:
(E)


question:
an individual has adequately stated a pri-ma facie claim. Cf. Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir.1995) (“An inquiry into the reasonableness of procedures ... belies a claim that liability under [15 U.S.C.] § 1681e(b) must be predicated on the effect of that information once disseminated .... The district court was required to consider whether [the defendant] was liable under § 1681e(b) before it determined that [the plaintiff] had suffered no recoverable damages.”). Several courts have previously recognized the possibility that a claim for actual or compensatory damages under FCRA may include compensation for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury or out-of-pocket expenses. See, e.g., Bakker v. McKinnon, 152 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere  conclusory statements  rather they must  sufficiently articulate  true demonstrable emotional distress  including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any (B) holding that under privacy act federal government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actual damages but not with respect to damages for mental or emotional distress (C) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the incomplete and late submission of expert reports was not harmless (D) holding that under the first amendment where there is no proof of actual malice damages are limited to actual injury which excludes punitive damages but is not limited to outofpocket loss (E) holding that even in the absence of outofpocket expenses or costs incurred the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding actual and punitive damages when appellees testified about how they felt when appellant obtained their credit reports and violated their privacy thereby causing them some emotional distress
answer:
(E)


question:
we find that the district court erred by commencing its evaluation of the assignment by applying a presumption of collusion against Ambrosia. Hi. While other Circuits have reasoned that a presumption of collusion is appropriate when certain closely-related entities assign claims amongst themselves, there is no such binding precedent in this Circuit. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit has held that in cases where diversity jurisdiction is premised on the assignment of claims from a subsidiary to a parent corporation, a presumption of collusion is triggered. However, both the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have opined on the general topic of parties collusively obtaining federal diversity jurisdiction. As discusse dy Petersen Co., 546 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). However, in Kramer, the Court explicitly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the county was an indispensable party to an action between two private parties in which the public status of a roadway was in question (B) holding that jurisdiction was collusively obtained when the plaintiff made a private side agreement that promised a portion of the litigation proceeds to potential plaintiffs so long as they did not intervene and destroy diversity between the parties (C) recognizing that a narrow reading of missouri would suggest that the state is the real party in interest for diversity purposes only when the relief sought inures to the benefit of the state alone but noting that cases have only required a real interest pecuniary or otherwise in the outcome of the litigation (D) holding diversity jurisdiction was collusively obtained because the transferor retained a onehalf interest in the outcome of the litigation and was an indispensable party but for the assignment (E) holding that because there was complete diversity when the action commenced diversity jurisdiction was not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse plaintiff which was not indispensable
answer:

(D)