In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
would allow for the award of attorney fees whenever a statute or contract provides for one side to pay expenses, even when such attorney fees were not contemplated. The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent in this regard. Therefore, I do not join in the majority’s opinion that the term “expenses” as used in section 13-7-4(d) includes attorney fees, but would hold that because that section does not specifically provide for an award of attorney fees, such award was improper here. For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority’s determination that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. However, I dissent rs of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986); In re Olliff, 258 Ga. 157, 366 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Head v. Savage, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 32, 38 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan (D) holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs (E) holding that expenses refers to costs

Ex Output:
holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid


Ex Input:
complaint nor any facts relating to VBCJ’s General Order support an argument that Waters received less procedural due process than what is constitutionally required in the circumstances. Therefore, VBCJ’s fee program does not violate Waters’ right to procedural due process. C. Legitimate Penological Interest Finally, Waters’ complaint, broadly construed, alleges that Virginia’s one dollar per day room and board fee is not reasonably related to any legitimate penological interest. This claim also plainly fails, as there are several conceivable rationales to support the finding that VBCJ’s fee program is “ ‘reasonably related’ to promoting a legitimate penological interest.” Sample v. Angelone, 173 F.3d 425 (Table), 1999 WL 52347, *1 (4th Cir. Feb.5 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Section 53.1-131.3 provides as follows: 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a prisoners eighth amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need expert testimony is necessary when the seriousness of injury or illness would not be apparent to a lay person (B) holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs (C) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (D) holding that deliberate indifference standard for imposing supervisory liability based on an eighth amendment violation is consistent with iqbal and collecting cases (E) holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation

Ex Output:
holding that in a prisoners eighth amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need expert testimony is necessary when the seriousness of injury or illness would not be apparent to a lay person


Ex Input:
2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals

Ex Output:

holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision