In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071, 113 S.Ct. 1027, 122 L.Ed.2d 172 (1993). Moreover, after Lopez, courts have recognized that this de minimis standard continues in effect. United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1713, 137 L.Ed.2d 837 (1997); United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (10th Cir.1995). This is because § 1956 regulates activities that, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (stating that “where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence”); cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1361, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 463 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce (B) holding that commerce clause did not provide congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of violence against women act inasmuch as provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce (C) recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce (D) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce (E) holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce
holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce

hearing are binding on the appellate courts if supported by competent evidence. State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994). A trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Kincaid, 147 N.C. App. 94, 97, 555 S.E.2d 294, 297 (2001). In the present case, the trial court made the following relevant findings of fact: that on or about July 6, 2004 . . . Officer Henderson, a 27 year veteran of the Burlington Police Dept, had received a call of a suspicious activity at Coy’s Exxon on the comer of Graham-Hopedale Rd. and N. Church St. That location has had numerous calls for shopliftingy fights[,] and other activity. Also there is numerous gang and graffiti act S.E.2d 412, 418 (2004), disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 283, 610 S.E.2d 208 (2005) (<HOLDING>). The State argues “ [i]t is clear from the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to support an investigatory stop of a vehicle where the defendant and driver were observed loitering at a closed shopping center shortly before midnight no other vehicles were in the parking lot and the two men abruptly and hurriedly returned to their vehicle which was parked out of general public view (B) holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes (C) holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle when confidential informant personally observed the vehicle provided a description of the vehicle and its direction detailed the basis for her suspicion that the vehicle was engaged in illegal activity and had previously given reliable information that led to the successful apprehension of individuals engaged in various criminal activity (D) holding reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to support the investigatory stop of a vehicle in view of the time of day and the officers prior knowledge of reports of criminal activity in the area (E) holding that a mere parking violation justified the investigatory stop of choudrys vehicle
holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes

disclosure in any instance would pose the hazard that Congress foresaw.” Am. Jewish Cong. v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628-29 (D.C.Cir.1978). Therefore, “only explicit nondisclosure statutes that evidence a congressional determination that certain materials ought to be kept in confidence will be sufficient to qualify under the exemption.” Irons and Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C.Cir.1979). See generally Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 37 (D.C.Cir. 2002). In these cases, the DOC relies on several statutes that qualify as Exemption 3 nondisclosure statutes and thus permit its withholding of docume 35 U.S.C. § 122, prohibiting disclosure of patent applications and information pertaining to such applications. See Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215 (D.C.Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Sixth, the DOC properly invokes Federal Rule 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 6e qualifies as a statute for purposes of exemption 3 (B) holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes (C) holding that various versions of the statute qualify as an exemption 3 statute (D) holding that  6103 qualifies as an exemption statute (E) holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute

holding that rule 6e qualifies as a statute for purposes of exemption 3