In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Legislative acts are those which involve policy-making decision of a general scope or, to put it another way, legislation involves line-drawing. Where the decision affects a small number or a single individual, the legislative power is not implicated, and the act takes on the nature of administration. In addition, the act must be “procedurally” legislative, that is, passed by means of established legislative procedures. This principle requires that constitutionally accepted procedures of enacting the legislation must be followed in order to assure that the act is a legitimate, reasoned decision representing the will of the people which the governing body has been chosen to serve. E.g., Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the procedure the legislature follows 
 Holding statements: (A) holding on the merits that the existence of an unexercised legislative veto provision in a statute would render invalid actions taken under the statute unless the legislative veto provisions were severable from the portion of the statute pursuant to which the challenged actions were taken (B) holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission (C) holding onehouse legislative veto unconstitutional (D) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (E) holding acts of voting to be quintessentially legislative and the introduction of a budget to be formally legislative

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
include reasonable attorney’s fees for legal services benefitting the children. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 151.001(a), (c); In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d at 327, n. 55; Searcy, 17 S.W. at 373; Askey, 11 S.W. at 1101-02. In Hardin v. Hardin, this court cited section 154.001 but did not cite section 151.001 or section 156.401(a). See Hardin, 161 S.W.3d at 24-27. Nonetheless, the Hardin court noted that the duty of a parent to pay attorney’s fees as necessaries is based upon a parent’s duty to support his children. See id. at 25. In addition, the Hardin court cited non-enforcement cases that cited the statutory predecessor to section 151.001. See id. at 25-26 (citing Roosth v. Roosth and Daniels v. Allen); Roosth v. Roosth, 889 S.W.2d 445, 456-57 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Daniels v. Allen, 811 S.W.2d 278, 280 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that father pay attorneys fees to mother as necessaries for the benefit of the children in divorce decree and citing statutory predecessor to section 151001 (B) holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries (C) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay reasonable attorneys fees incurred by mother as necessaries for the children (D) holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule (E) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction may order one parent to pay the reasonable attorneys fees of the other parent as additional child support if the fees are necessaries for the benefit of the children

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
Civ. P. 329b. If within that time a party files a motion for a new trial or a motion to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment, then the trial court’s plenary power is'extended for thirty days after the last such motion is expressly or implicitly overruled. Id. The Manns contend that the sanctions order is void because the trial court signed it more than thirty days after it signed the final judgment even though no one filed a motion that extended the trial court’s plenary power. They acknowledge, however, that the Texas ■ Supreme Court has held that any timely filed motion for a substantive change in the existing judgment is a motion to modify that extends the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Manns attempt to distinguish Lane on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent a timely postjudgment motion the trial court has no jurisdiction to alter amend or vacate a final judgment (B) holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties (C) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  (D) holding that a postjudgment motion to incorporate a sanction as part of the final judgment is a motion to modify the judgment and extends the trial courts jurisdiction (E) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment

Ex Output:

(D)