In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

preventing employee from "working in any geographic space in which [employer] operates” where employer had interest in confidential information); Advanced Cable Ties, Inc. v. Hewes, No. 061995B, 2006 WL 3292810, at *1-2 (Mass.Super.Ct. Oct. 19, 2006) (lack of geographic scope restriction in non-compete not fatal to enforcement of restrictive covenant when employer was national company). 17 . See Miller Mech., Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So.2d 11, 12-13 (Fla.1974) (citing Kenco Chem. and Manufacturing Co. v. Railey, 286 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)); Flickenger v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., Inc., 732 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Balasco v. Gulf Holding, Inc., 707 So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also Health Care Financial Enterprises, Inc. v. Levy, 715 So.2d 341, 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). 18 .Under Florida law, courts are required to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract (B) holding that trial court is without authority to modify a settlement agreement but may enforce and interpret it (C) recognizing court has authority to modify agreement to cure any unreasonable provision as to duration or scope (D) holding that court may not refuse to enforce noncompete agreement solely because geographical area is unreasonable but rather must modify unreasonable restriction and enforce agreement as modified (E) holding an employer may partially enforce a noncompete agreement to the extent it is reasonable under the circumstances
holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract

Discipl. LEXIS 78, *9 (attorney disbursed all settlement proceeds to client less amount he retained for himself, after having been placed on notice that prior attorney claimed an in terest in any settlement funds in violation of Colo, RPC 1.15(b)). III. ANALYSIS OF SANCTION In both the Dunn and McCarthy matters, Rishel engaged in knowing conversion by obtaining funds from third parties for a stated purpose, failing to utilize the funds for that purpose, retaining the funds for an extended period of time after the third parties had withdrawn authorization, and failing to refund the amounts paid to the third parties despite their demand that he do so. The presumptive sanction for knowing conversion of the property of another is disbarment. People v. Dice, 947 P.2d 339, 340 (Colo.1997)(<HOLDING>); Motsenbocker; 926 P.2d at 577 (attorney 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause (B) holding that a lawyers knowing misappropriation of funds whether belonging to a client or third party warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation (C) holding that an attorney should not be disbarred for misappropriation of client funds where there were no aggravating factors the attorneys clients did not suffer actual harm and the attorney established several mitigating factors (D) holding that permanent disbarment was appropriate for failure to remit 2000 in settlement funds to client and failing to answer the charges (E) recognizing that a lawyer hired by a third person to represent a client should exercise judgment on behalf of the client independent from the interests of the third person
holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause

provided substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case that the primary significance of the applicant’s composite mark is geographic, namely that the mark primarily signifies Venice, Italy. In response to the examiner’s prima facie case, the applicant argues that the strongest part of the proposed mark is its previously registered and incontestable service mark, “SAVE VENICE.” Accordingly, Save Venice contends that consumers would associate the proposed mark with the fundraising activities of Save Venice, rather than with the city of Venice as a geographical origin for the goods. We disagree. A registered mark is incontestable only in the form registered and for the goods or services claimed. See In re Merrill Lynch, 828 F.2d 1567, 1568, 4 USPQ2d 1141, 1141 (Fed.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 873, 227 USPQ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding incontestable mark durango for cigars insufficient to establish distinctiveness of durango for chewing tobacco (B) holding that a failure to update sexoffender registration should not be considered a minor or technical offense when committed as part of a more general course of conduct that demonstrates a deliberate general unwillingness to comply with the sex offender registration requirements (C) holding evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction for violation of sex offender registration requirement (D) holding applicants incontestable registration of a service mark for cash management account did not automatically entitle applicant to registration of that mark for broader financial services (E) holding that sex offender registration and notification do not constitute punishment

holding incontestable mark durango for cigars insufficient to establish distinctiveness of durango for chewing tobacco