In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: of TILA;” (2) "The notes and security instruments signed by plaintiff and borrowers for the purchase of mobile homes were extensions of credit subject to TILA;” (3) "The requirement that insurance policies contain provisions covering Green Tree's possible repossession expenses are credit charges as defined by TILA and occur annually when each policy is renewed;” and (4) "No TILA disclosures are given by Green Tree.” (See Am.Compl. ¶¶ 21-23.) Green Tree does not rebut these contentions and instead only addresses the merits of the arbitration issue. In this Memorandum Opinion and Order, however, the court only addresses the question of whether Plaintiff may be compelled to arbitrate her claims, not the merits of the underlying claims themselves. 6 . See. also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480-83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration (B) holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration (C) holding that an agreement to submit age discrimination claims to arbitration does not constitute a waiver (D) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (E) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: in that the timely filing of such claims is both mandatory and jurisdictional. That limitation derives from the proposition of sovereign immunity. It is well established that a claim against the United States is barred absent waiver of sovereign immunity, “ ‘and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’ ” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)). A waiver of immunity cannot be implied; it must be “unequivocally expressed in the statutory text.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The United States has expressly consented to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal (B) holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity (C) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states (D) holding that federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against the united states or one of its agencies absent a clear waiver of sovereign immunity (E) holding that a lack of a waiver of sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: 207 S.W. at 516. Similarly, when a widow filed suit in her individual capacity and later amended her pleadings to assert her capacity as administratrix, we held “[t]hat this defect did not prevent her suit from being ‘properly commenced,’ ” prior to expiration of the statute of limitations. Davis, 16 S.W.2d at 118. We noted that: The defect in her petition was that she sued as an individual, instead of as ad-ministratrix. She was the real party at interest, no matter by whom the suit was prosecuted. This action was commenced before it was barred under the terms of any statute of limitations by the filing of the original petition and the service of citation on the Director General. Id.; see also Mo., Kans. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570, 575-78, 33 S.Ct. 135, 57 L.Ed. 355 (1913) (<HOLDING>); Flores, 92 F.3d at 272-73 (5th Cir.1996) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity (B) holding that a pension plan participants son not designated a beneficiary lacked standing to maintain an erisa action in both his individual capacity and his capacity as the representative of the deceased participants estate (C) holding ftca jurisdictional requirements satisfied in wrongful death action by substituting husband in his individual capacity who had filed timely administrative claim for husband in his capacity as personal representative of decedents estate who had not filed claim and could not bring wrongful death action under state law (D) holding that nonsignatory wife asserting in her individual capacity claims for damages such as her own mental anguish and loss of consortium earnings companionship society and inheritance lacked the type of privity contemplated for the contracting parties to bind her to a contract that she did not sign in her individual capacity (E) holding that an amendment by a plaintiff to allege a claim in her representative capacity as adminis trator of estate under federal law related back to claims brought in her individual capacity under state law such an amendment was not equivalent to the commencement of a new cause of action so as to subject the amendment to the statute of limitations
[EX A]:
(E)