In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: of benefits in 1989 established a "pattern” of benefit increases such that the Plan's later rescission of the 1999 Benefits Increase, which was adopted ten years after the 1989 increase, violated the anti-cutback rule. We find this argument to be without merit as a matter of law. 18 . Thornton also alleges that the Board breached its fiduciary duty by favoring one class of Plan participants over another class, specifically by eliminating the 1999 Benefits Increase for pre-February 1, 1999 retirees while maintaining it for Plan participants retiring on or after that date. Thornton waived this argument on appeal, however, by waiting until his reply brief to address the issue, rather than raising it first in his opening brief. United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1191 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 19 . 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) states in relevant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited (B) holding that an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived (C) holding that issue raised for the first time in reply brief was waived (D) holding issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before this court (E) holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court

A: holding that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited
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Q: 2 (emphasis added). In its Clarification, the FCC freed itself of this deadline, continuing to state that the order would last until the Fourth FNPRM but giving no time period in which that would occur. Clarification, 15 FCC Rcd 9587, at ¶ ¶ 1, 35. We hold that this extension newly aggrieved CompTel and thus made its petition timely. See Sam Rayburn Dam Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 515 F.2d 998, 1007 (D.C.Cir.1975) (stating that where a party was “aggrieved” by a later interpretation of a rule that it could not have reasonably anticipated, the time limit starts to run at the later event). Cases have held that extension of a temporary order may entitle the parties to seek judicial review of the order. See Public Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 901 F.2d 147, 151 (D.C.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Interstate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a temporary order is later made permanent the permanent order may be challenged (B) holding that the phrase permanent shutdown is unambiguous and can only mean a permanent cessation of plant operations rather than the uneventful transfer of ownership (C) holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction (D) holding that an alien who procured permanent resident status byconcealing his ineligibility had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence (E) holding an order that was interlocutory in form to be final in substance where the force and effect of the order was tantamount to a permanent injunction depriving complainant of a recognized property right

A: holding that the phrase permanent shutdown is unambiguous and can only mean a permanent cessation of plant operations rather than the uneventful transfer of ownership
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Q: for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.2004). Where the attack is facial, the court determines whether the complaint’s allegations are sufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction, accepting all material allegations as true and construing them in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Where the attack is factual, “the .court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiffs allegations.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving a factual dispute regarding subject matter jurisdiction, a court may review extrinsic evidence beyond the complaint without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See id.; McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Once a party has moved to dismiss for lack of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a court may resolve disputed factual issues by reference to evidence outside the pleadings including affidavits (B) recognizing that generally disputes between purchasers of a debtors assets and third parties are not within the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction but recognizing that disputes concerning the sale order itself may be sufficient for subject matter jurisdiction (C) holding that in ruling on a rule 12b1 motion the court may consider exhibits outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes regarding jurisdiction (D) holding that a court may review any evidence such as affidavits and testimony to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction (E) holding that under the advisory guidelines a district court should resolve factual disputes at sentencing by applying the preponderance of the evidence standard

A:
holding that in a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a court may resolve disputed factual issues by reference to evidence outside the pleadings including affidavits
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