TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: to those sentences because no error in the sentencing appears on the face of the record. Ninety-nine years is a “term of years not less than five years.” While Thomas’ sentences, under court interpretations of § 566.030.2, may not be authorized, we are not able to reach such issues where the sentencing defect is not so patent as to present a jurisdictional issue. This sentencing does not present a jurisdictional issue. Conclusion Thomas is ordered to be returned to the circuit court of the City of St. Louis for resentencing on the three first degree robbery counts within the limits authorized by the law. SO ORDERED. All concur. 1 . All sectional references are to Missouri Revised Statutes 1986, unless otherwise indicated. 2 . See, e.g., State v. Williams, 828 S.W.2d 894 (Mo.App.1992)(<HOLDING>); State v. Charron, 743 S.W.2d 436 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (B) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (C) holding sentence of thirtyfive years in prison with ten years probation for seconddegree murder is within the statutory maximum under 1997 statutes (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding sentence of 100 years for forcible rape was in excess of statutory maximum

SOLUTION: holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum

PROBLEM: 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther’s theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts “a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman.” White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther’s termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, § 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law

SOLUTION: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy

PROBLEM: them, sua sponte, on various grounds, including improper venue, untimeliness, and failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Logan appeals. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, the procedural history, and the scope of issues on appeal. We affirm on the opinion of the district court. We note that Logan stated at oral argument that the charges from her allegedly false 1996 arrest were dropped within twenty-four hours, removing any doubt that the corresponding § 1983 claim is time-barred, as the district court had concluded. See Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir.2004) (“The statute of limitations applicable to claims brought under ...[§] 1983 in New York is three years.”); Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 121-23 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We have considered all of Logan’s arguments, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unlike malicious prosecution claim false arrest claim accrues on the date of the arrest (B) holding that claims for false arrest and imprisonment under  1983 accrue at the time of the arrest (C) holding that a false arrest claim accrues at the latest when the criminal prosecution is dismissed (D) holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated (E) holding that false arrest and false imprisonment claim were not duplicative

SOLUTION:
holding that unlike malicious prosecution claim false arrest claim accrues on the date of the arrest