instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. However, courts faced with this issue have refused to apply this provision to government employees testifying in criminal trials based on the rationale that no individual can bind the sovereign. See United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1246 (7th Cir.1979) ("Because the agents of the Government are supposedly disinterested in the outcome of a trial and are traditionally unable to bind the sovereign, their statements seem less the product of the adversary process and hence less appropriately described as admissions of a party.” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954, 100 S.Ct. 2923, 64 L.Ed.2d 812 (1980); United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Durrani, 659 F.Supp. 1183 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible (B) holding inconsistent out of court statements otherwise admissible not admissible against government in criminal prosecution (C) holding in a criminal case that a statement by an unavailable declarant was not admissible as a declaration against his penal interest and was not admissible under rule 804b5 either (D) holding statements by coconspirator nontestimonial and thus admissible (E) holding alford plea admissible in burglary prosecution
answer:
(B)


question:
of serious physical harm,” Gamer, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. at 1701, to Ponseti, or to others if the suspects were allowed to flee. Because Pon-seti could have reasonably believed that the suspects posed an imminent, deadly threat, we conclude that he was justified in using deadly force. Conclusion We therefore conclude that the magistrate judge erred in denying Ponseti’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment below is REVERSED. 1 . The woman was struck once in the right side of her abdomen. 2 . Under the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, the terms "directed verdict” and "judgment notwithstanding the verdict” have been replaced by the single term “judgment as a matter of law.” 3 . But see Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Smith also observes: “Furthermore, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law (B) holding that a violation of the wellestablished rule of brignoniponce constituted an egregious violation of the fourth amendment (C) holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts (D) holding that the notice requirement found in rule 41d is not required by the fourth amendment (E) holding that the significant injury requirement of johnson v morel 876 f2d 477 5th cir1989 a case involving a fourth amendment violation is no longer valid in the wake of hudson v mcmillianus 112 sct 995 117 led2d 156 1992 in which the supreme court held that a showing of a significant injury was not required to prove an eighth amendment violation
answer:
(E)


question:
the Insureds paid their own defense counsel millions of dollars in attorneys’ fees prior to August 29, 2001, two years before the date on which the Insureds filed this suit. Despite the Insureds’ requests for reimbursement, Lexington reimbursed the Insureds less than $330,000 of their defense costs, and did not make any reimbursement payments until 1999. Because Lexington denied coverage and the Insureds allegedly incurred millions of dollars in damages, sufficient facts existed for the Insureds to seek a judicial remedy based on their claims for negligence and negligent-misrepresentation and their claims for violations of article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code. See Abe’s Colony Club, Inc. v. C & W Underwriters, Inc., 852 S.W.2d 86, 90-91 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Insureds’ second sub-issue 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cases in which only issue was liability above the policy limits were not on point in case in which insured sought damages for expenses it incurred in defending thirdparty claims and that such damages constitute legal injury resulting in accrual of claim and starting of limitations (B) holding that damages based on the abstract value or importance of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such cases (C) holding an order of default was not final where it resolved only the question of liability and the case was continued for proof on the issue of damages (D) holding that insured may recover legal fees incurred in defending itself in a declaratory judgment action brought by insurer but not for those incurred in prosecuting cross claims and counterclaims against insurers (E) holding that although some breach of contract damages were calculable specific damages for which grogan sought injunctive relief were intangibles incapable of being measured by damages
answer:

(A)