In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals
[EX A]: holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision

[EX Q]: consistent with the respective rights of the parties.” Sign and Pictorial Union Local 1175 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 726, 731 (D.C.Cir.1969). Section 8(d) provides, however, that the obligation to bargain in good faith “does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Thus, the Act does not require any party “to yield any position fairly maintained; ‘firmness of a bargaining position does not constitute bad faith.’ ” 419 F.2d at 731 (internal citation omitted). The Union argues that the Board’s finding of an impasse should nevertheless be reversed for four reasons. First, the Union alleges the Board did not conduct the sort of intensive factual inquiry it was obliged to make. See Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967) (<HOLDING>), enforced, American Fed’n of Television & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the excusable neglect inquiry is at bottom an equitable one that should be made by considering the danger of prejudice to the nonmoving party the length of the delay and its potential impact upon judicial proceedings the reason for the delay including whether it was in the reasonable control of the movant and whether the movant acted in good faith  (B) recognizing that the primary issue to be considered in whether the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class is a determination of whether any antagonism exists between the interests of the plaintiffs and those of the remainder of the class (C) recognizing that the law of the shop includes the understanding of the parties (D) holding that whether impasse exists rests upon factintensive inquiry into the bargaining history the good faith of the negotiating parties the length of negotiations the importance of the issues about which there is disagreement and the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations (E) holding that where the parties contemplate the formal execution of a final agreement there is a strong inference that the parties  do not intend to be bound by earlier negotiations or agreements until the final terms are settled 
[EX A]: holding that the excusable neglect inquiry is at bottom an equitable one that should be made by considering the danger of prejudice to the nonmoving party the length of the delay and its potential impact upon judicial proceedings the reason for the delay including whether it was in the reasonable control of the movant and whether the movant acted in good faith 

[EX Q]: entitled to relief from the stay under section 362(d)(1). 2. Section 862(d)(2) Colony also contends that it is entitled to relief from the stay under section 362(d)(2) because its collateral is not necessary for an effective reorganization. It argues that it is the only creditor of Mezz II and that a reorganization is not possible without its consent because Mezz II will have no accepting class of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). See also, In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 552, 568 (3d Cir.1994) (finding that the secured creditor’s assertion that it would oppose any proposed plan by debtor was “reason alone” to find that an effective reorganization was not realistically possible); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 87 Bus. Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154, 161 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); In re 6200 Ridge, Inc., 69 B.R. 837, 844 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a secured creditor is not entitled to receive any more than that to which it was entitled pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan (B) holding in the instant case although creditor obtained relief from the automatic stay it failed to object or appeal from the confirmation order accordingly creditor is bound by the confirmation order (C) holding that secured creditor was entitled to relief from the stay because the debtors proposed plan had no reasonable prospect of confirmation as a result of its improper classification scheme (D) holding that the secured creditor was only entitled to the amount of its claim as provided in the debtors chapter 13 plan when the destruction of the vehicle yielded insurance proceeds greater than the secured creditors claim (E) holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case
[EX A]:
holding that a secured creditor is not entitled to receive any more than that to which it was entitled pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan