In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: claims); see also Stewart, 104 N.M. at 748, 726 P.2d at 1378 (“An insurance policy is a contract and is generally governed by the law of contracts, and the rights and duties of the parties are to be determined by its terms.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, we held that 8.75% was the proper interest to be assessed on the contract damages. {40} Like the trial court in Teague-Strebeck, the trial court in our case awarded damages based on the insurance contract— $100,000 in UM coverage. See 1999-NMCA-109, ¶¶63-64, 127 N.M. 603, 985 P.2d 1183 (observing that the plaintiff “was awarded the benefit of its bargain, the extent of insurance coverage promised by [the defendant’s agent]”); cf. Ellis v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Cos., 1999-NMSC-034, ¶1, 128 N.M. 54, 989 P.2d 429 (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that 8.75% is the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sixyear contract statute of limitations did not apply reasoning that an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on breach of warranty is only nominally based on contract (B) holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional (C) holding that sixyear statute of limitations in  65314 is applicable to violations of  7202 (D) recognizing a sixyear statute of limitations on claims filed under the coal act (E) holding that the sixyear statute of limitations on a written contract is applicable to a cause of action based on a um policy

A: holding that sixyear contract statute of limitations did not apply reasoning that an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on breach of warranty is only nominally based on contract
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Q: strengthen, not displace, any existing remedies employees may. have at law.” Id. It is clear from these excerpts that the STAA was not enacted to completely preempt state law remedies for retaliation against an employee who refuses to violate safety provisions. See Todd v. Frank’s Tong Service, Inc., 784 P.2d 47, 49-50 (Okla.1989) (noting that Congressional intent surrounding enactment of the STAA demonstrates that state law claims are not preempted); see also Parten v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 923 F.2d 580, 583 (8th Cir.1991) (conclude ing that the Minnesota public policy statute was not an obstacle to the STAA and that Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field of interstate motor carriers); Whitworth v. TNT Bestway Transp., Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1434, 1436 (E.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>); Dobberowsky v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc., 989 
 Holding statements: (A) holding texas exemption law was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause (B) holding that texas whistleblowers act was not preempted by the staa (C) holding a claim of a violation of the texas dtpa is preempted by the carmack amendment (D) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra (E) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied

A: holding texas exemption law was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause
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Q: 544 U.S. 336, 346, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005); Lentell, 396 F.3d at 172). Accord Emer e.g., In re Nortel Networks, 238 F.Supp.2d at 629. 115 . Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167. 116 . See id. 117 . Compl. ¶ 15. 118 . See id. 119 . See, e.g., ¶¶ 80, 86, 99. 120 . Id. ¶¶ 82, 84, 88, 90. 121 . In re Par Pharm., 733 F.Supp. at 675. 122 . Compl. ¶ 58. 123 . See id. ¶ 59. 124 . See id. ¶¶ 44-45, 52-56. 125 . See id. ¶ 105. 126 . See id. ¶ 80. 127 . Id. 128 . See id. ¶ 81. 129 . See id. 130 . See In re Vivendi Universal, 381 F.Supp.2d at 182. 131 . Compl. ¶¶ 65-66. 132 . See id. ¶ 68. 133 . See id. ¶ 71. 134 . See id. 135 . Id. ¶ 101. 136 . Id. ¶ 69. 137 . See id. ¶ 72. 138 . See id. ¶ 70. 139 . See id. ¶¶ 73, 80-81, 101. 140 . See id. ¶¶ 73-74. 141 . See Pu o Instruments, 235 F.R.D. at 232 (<HOLDING>). 160 . In re Scottish Re Group, 524 F.Supp.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that scienter requirement was met where gaap violations led to restatement and individual defendants were aware of weak internal controls (B) holding that the failure to maintain the facility in a safe condition or to warn of hazards was an  operational failure following the planning decision to operate and maintain the public landing (C) holding that a failure to maintain sufficient internal controls to avoid fraud is  indicative of scienter (D) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud (E) holding that failure to follow gaap without more is insufficient to establish scienter

A:
holding that scienter requirement was met where gaap violations led to restatement and individual defendants were aware of weak internal controls
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