In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: and therefore, need only show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenges for cause. “[A] challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror’s responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied.” State v. Hallal, 557 So.2d 1388, 1389-90 (La.1990). The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (<HOLDING>); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (B) holding that an effective life sentence of fortyfive years for seconddegree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment (C) holding that a prospective juror who would vote automatically for a life sentence is properly excluded (D) holding life sentence mandatory under 21 usc  841b and district court could not depart from the mandatory life sentence unless government made a motion (E) holding that time excluded from a speedy trial clock for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excluded under  3161h1 but may only be excluded when a court makes appropriate reasonableness findings under  3161h7
[A]: holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence


[Q]: 39:4-88(b), the mandate to drive within a single lane to the extent practicable applies, whether or not a deviation from that lane imposes a risk to another driver. The statute’s second clause addresses a related, but discrete, mandate of the Code. It requires a driver to ascertain the safety of switching lanes before conducting a lane change. N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b). Unlike the violation described in the first clause of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b), the violation described in the second clause is avoided if a driver, in a roadway with multiple lanes traveling in the same direction, first determines that departure from a lane may be conducted safely. The Appellate Division’s limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b) to the violation identified in the statute’s second clause would render t .App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the courts of our sister states, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness (B) holding that tex transp code ann  545060a describes one offense (C) holding that no offense alleged where affidavit described offense as felony (D) holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense (E) holding that the statute describes but one offense which can be committed by either or both of two methods
[A]: holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness


[Q]: favorable decision.” Township of Piscataway v. Duke Energy, 488 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir.2007) (citing Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts v. Mirage Resorts, 140 F.3d 478, 484-85 (3d Cir.1998)). Turchi Qua Guarantor While it is alleged that Turchi was to sign the forbearance agreement, he was to do so as a guarantor. That capacity is not without significance. This lawsuit does not seek enforcement of the guarantee. Indeed, it is the Debtor as the primary borrower who has brought it against the lender, the primary obligee. The Court does not read the complaint to allege that Turchi qua guarantor personally suffered a concrete injury as a result of what the Bank is alleged to have done. See e.g., Borough of Berwick v. Quandel Group, Inc., 440 Pa.Super. 367, 371, 655 A.2d 606, 608 (Pa.Super.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Hufsmith v. Weaver, 285 Ark. 357, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (B) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (C) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract (D) holding that majority shareholder who guaranteed debt was not a third party beneficiary and thus lack standing to bring action for tortious interference of corporations contract with defendant (E) holding that borough that guaranteed debt owed by municipal sewage authority to engineering firm lacked standing because it was not party to the contract
[A]:
holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party