In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

appropriate relief for such a violation is for the habeas court to “vacate the judgment of conviction and enter a new judgment from which an appeal can be taken.” Id. Defendant argues that the Peak line of eases applies to his situation, and that his appellate rights should thus be reinstated. However, the Peak rule does not apply in defendant’s ease, as the appeal at issue is not an appeal from a conviction. A Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach to an appeal from a supervised release revocation hearing. Borrego v. United States, 975 F.Supp. 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y.1997). This follows logically from the fact that there is no guaranteed constitutional right to counsel at the supervised release revocation hearing itself. See United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel (D) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (E) holding that most of the fundamental constitutional procedural protections that are normally applicable to a criminal prosecution are not required for supervisedrelease proceedings as a matter of constitutional law including a right to counsel
(E)

the juror rather than leaving a doubt as to his or her impartiality.” Weinstein Design Group, Inc. v. Fielder, 884 So.2d 990, 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Bryant v. State, 765 So.2d 68, 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). We conclude that prospective jurors Forber and Spurlin’s responses were sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to their impartiality. Admittedly, the State attempted to rehabilitate these prospective jurors and they said they could follow the jury instructions and be fair and impartial. However, based on the totality of the answers given, we find a reasonable doubt as to the ability of these two prospective jurors to serve impartially in this case. Consequently, they should have been stricken for cause. See, e.g., Somerville v. Ahuja, 902 So.2d 930 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Bell v. Greissman, 902 So.2d 846 (Fla. 4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not err by allowing the prosecution to question prospective jurors regarding their ability to announce a death sentence in an appropriate case (B) holding that prospective jurors should have been excused for cause because they did not affirmatively state that their bias against the plaintiffs would not affect their ability to render an impartial verdict (C) holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict (D) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike for cause two potential jurors who had heard andor read about the case but indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented
(B)

an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (quotation omitted). In this case, however, the enforcement of the arbitration agreement would require Morrison to forego her substantive rights to the full panoply of remedies under Title VII and would thereby contravene Congress’s intent to utilize certain damages as a tool for compensating victims of discrimination and for deterring employment discrimination more broadly. The critical question is not whether a claimant may obtain some amount of the entire range of remedies under Title VII, but whether the limitation on remedies at issue undermines the rights protected by the statute. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27, 111 S.Ct. 1647. See also McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 285 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitration clause was unenforceable because it prohibited an award of punitive damages which was available to the plaintiff under title vii (B) holding that arbitration agreement that did not provide for award of attorney fees to successful title vii claimant was unenforceable because the right to attorneys fees  is central to the ability of persons to seek redress from violations of title vii (C) holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration (D) holding that title vii claim was subject to compulsory arbitration (E) holding that   19853 may not be invoked to redress violations of title vii

(B)