In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
case commences from the time the discriminatory conduct causes economic injury and ends upon the date of the judgment. In other words, back pay accrues from the date of the commencement of the discriminatory course of conduct causing financial loss until the date damages are “settled.” Palasota, 499 F.3d at 483 (internal citations omitted); see also Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.1999) (“A prevailing ADA claimant is presumptively entitled to all back pay which would have accrued from the termination date to the entry of judgment, provided it is made to appear that reasonable diligence was exercised in the effort to secure other suitable employment.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Sellers v. Delgado College, 781 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Back pay may be denied “only for reasons 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award of back pay under title vii remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion (B) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to require a defendant to pay all back taxes (C) holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment (D) holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court (E) holding there was no jury trial right where court ordered reinstatement and back pay to teachers fired after desegregation order in discrimination case back pay is equitable

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
other than delay. The same is true of Mr. Leland’s contention that he was not adequately kept informed by his attorney as the case progressed, that Mr. Largay failed to undertake requested actions, and that he relied too heavily on the prospect of a dramatic change in the legal landscape following Blakely up to Booker. But, there is no factual specificity to any of these arguments. Mr. Leland nowhere suggests what an evidentiary hearing would reveal to justify the relief he has requested. If the § 2255 petitioner wishes an evidentiary hearing, he must at a minimum present a plausible basis to conclude that the evidence would lead to a different result. Here, Mr. Leland has asserted no factual basis for such a conclusion. Cf. Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 61 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing based on  2255 petitioners mere eonclusory allegations in his affidavit (B) holding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing because the petitioners allegations were not implausible and a final determination of the merits of petitioners claim would be best served by greater development of the facts many of which the government disputes (C) holding that review under  2254d1 is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits rejecting the petitioners claim that the federal habeas court could consider evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing (D) holding that the state courts rejection of the petitioners ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the state court (E) holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the bia to fail to consider the merits of a petitioners claim

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
by sheer momentum. This is a danger independent of the materials used in the bike’s construction. To link a failure to warn of the potential of damaged carbon fiber to fail to Miguelez’s choice of bicycle, and, in turn, to an event that might occur to any bicyclist using the equipment as intended, is stretching the concept of proximate legal causation too far. See Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So.2d 1015, 1018 (Fla.1984) (“A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant” (quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 41 (4th ed. 1971))); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Jones, 138 Fla. 746, 190 So. 26, 27 (1939) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Mi-guelez failed to prove 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury (B) holding in the medical malpractice context that a plaintiff must prove that the alleged negligence more likely than not caused the victims death (C) holding that in negligence actions florida courts follow the more likely than not standard of causation ie they require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiffs injury (D) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence (E) holding that the intervening act breaks the chain of causation set in operation by a defendants negligence thereby insulating his negligence as a direct cause of the injury

Ex Output:

(C)