In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. In determining the purpose of section 13-21-101, it is appropriate to look to legislative history as indicative of the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Willer, 817 P.2d at 519-20. The 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101 created the distinction between judgments which the judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal. The General Assembly intended that the amendment, and its market-determined interest rate, apply only to judgments which the judgment debtor appeals. See Act of March 25, 1982, ch. 39, 1982 Colo. Laws 227 (entitled “An Act Concerning Interest Payable on Appealed Money Judgments in Civil Actions” (emphasis added)); see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The statements of the bill’s sponsors also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent (B) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (C) holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period (D) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent (E) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent
[EX A]: holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent

[EX Q]: 45 U.S.C. § 56, and 46 U.S.C. § 30106, are essentially identical, stating that the action must be “commenced” or “brought” within the three year period. The Supreme Court in Burnett specifically found that the state court suit had been properly “commenced” although it was filed in an improper venue. 380 U.S. at 426, 85 S.Ct. at 1053. Furthermore, because the principle of uniformity that drove the Burnett decision applies with equal force to a general maritime action, other courts have correctly held that Burnett applies in general maritime cases. See, e.g., Prejean, 721 So.2d at 1276 (citing 1 Martin J. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries § 5:10 (4th ed.1990)); Davis, 659 F.Supp. at 156-157; People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F.Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.La.1968) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s second argument for distinction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries (B) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (C) holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction (D) holding that burnett and its justification of uniformity is equally applicable to admiralty actions (E) holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures
[EX A]: holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries

[EX Q]: as provided in Rule 74.01(b). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction and dismiss father’s appeal. GRIMM, P.J., and PUDLOWSKI, J., concur. 1 . The docket sheets reflect service of process was issued on Lay on March 4, 1997, though the record does not indicate service of process was ever obtained. However, "[fjailure to have served process on [certain defendants] by any given time, without any action or disposition as to such defendants by the trial court, would not eliminate them as parties to this action at this time. A party to an action is a person whose name is designated on the record as plaintiff or defendant.” Cooper v. Barr, 413 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo.1967) (bracketed language in original; citation omitted); see State ex rel. Schweitzer v. Greene, 438 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Mo.banc 1969) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party loses its right to contest default final judgment on grounds of defective service of process by entering general appearance unless it also contests service of process or raises issue of personal jurisdiction (B) holding trial courts judgment dismissing petition as to one of two defendants not final despite lack of service or entry of appearance of second defendant (C) holding that one of the effects of submitting to the courts jurisdiction by making a general appearance is that a party waives any objection to service of process (D) holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment (E) holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment
[EX A]:
holding that a party loses its right to contest default final judgment on grounds of defective service of process by entering general appearance unless it also contests service of process or raises issue of personal jurisdiction