instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
judge is provided for in Ind. P-C.R. 1, § 4(b), it is not automatic as Barclay asserts. Instead, “the rule requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a rational inference of bias or prejudice.” Jackson v. State, 643 N.E.2d 905, 907 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied (citing State ex rel. Whitehead v. Madison County Circuit Court, 626 N.E.2d 802, 803 (Ind.1993)). Barclay’s affidavit presents the fact that the trial court judge accepted his guilty plea without an adequate factual basis as his evidence of bias. Even taking this assertion as true, it does not support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. See Smith v. State, 613 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ind.1993), reh’g denied, cert, denied (<HOLDING>); Jackson, 643 N.E.2d at 907 (holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced (B) holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion (C) holding that the fact that the judge received adverse publicity for granting postconviction relief in another case did not require the judge to recuse herself (D) holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith (E) holding that counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to recuse the judge who presided at trial when the judge had also prosecuted a prior case that was used to enhance the current case
answer:
(C)


question:
Dubuque’s “irrevocable” decision to relocate was not a vote to categorically refuse Dubuque’s overtures, but a vote to insist on financial disclosure as a prelude to bargaining. The Board’s finding that good-faith bargaining between Dubuque and the UFCW might not have been futile was substantially supported by the record. 3. Retroactivity Finally, Dubuque argues that the Board erred by “retroactively” employing its new test in this case. Again, we disagree. Our formulation of the standard for evaluating challenges to the retroactive application of a ruling from an agency adjudication has varied. Compare Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C.Cir.1972) (applying a five-factor test) with Consolidated Freightways v. NLRB, 892 F.2d 1052, 1058 (D.C.Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted) with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no retroactive application (B) recognizing a general principle that retroactive application of rules is permitted absent any manifest injustice (C) holding retroactive application (D) recognizing principle (E) holding that retroactive application of amendments will not result in manifest injustice
answer:
(B)


question:
the court explained: We note at the outset that § 724(b)(2) expressly limits the amount distributable to § 507(a) claimants to the “amount of such allowed tax claim that is secured by such tax lien.” In light of this qualification, it is clear that administrative and priority claimants are able to prime a tax lienholder under § 724(b)(2) only to the extent of the tax lien; if, as in this case, the sum of administrative and priority claims exceeds the amount of the tax lien, the excess amount is relegated to § 721(b)(6) status and paid in accordance with § 726. To hold otherwise would render meaningless the limiting language in § 724(b)(2). (Emphasis added.); see also King v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax County (In re A.G. Van Metre, Jr., Inc.), 155 B.R. 118, 123 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1993) (<HOLDING>); Hargrave v. Township of Pemberton (In re 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not the taxpayers responsibility to pursue the different tax units to which the illegally levied county tax was proportioned as the taxpayer was entitled to recover the full amount of the tax from the county the collecting entity (B) holding that state property tax liens are not entitled to the states statutory interest rate as a matter of law rather the appropriate rate of interest is determined by the equities of each case (C) holding that priority unsecured claimants are entitled to payment only to the extent of the amount of the tax hens then if such claims happen to equal or exceed the amount of statutory tax liens the statutory tax hens are paid behind the claims of junior consensual henholders (D) holding that a tax refund claim must be dismissed if the principal tax deficiency has not been paid in full (E) holding that two federal tax liens had priority as a matter of law over the competing claims for fees and costs of a stakeholderbank
answer:

(C)