In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 35 . Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 36 . Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 37 . Kimmelman v. Monison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 38 . Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 39 . The Court notes that the state standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel applied by the state parallels the federal standard as stated in Strickland. See Baker v. State, 243 Kan. 1, 755 P.2d 493 (1988); Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 694 P.2d 468 (1985). 40 . Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). 41 . Id. at 753, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 42 .Id. at 754, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 43 . Id. at 752, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (“Legal 2005) (<HOLDING>). 46 . Moreover, the Court finds no error in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel was not deficient for failing to make an objection that lacked merit (B) holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel (C) holding counsel deficient because she could have had no reasonable basis for not objecting to certain inadmissible evidence despite no evidence of counsels strategy (D) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument (E) holding counsel was not deficient in not objecting to testimony that was permissible within state rules of evidence
(E)

officer was not acting in the lawful discharge of his official duties when he commanded Green to come speak with him. See generally Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. 656, 658 (1) (727 SE2d 257) (2012) (describing circumstances in which a citizen may walk or even run from a law enforcement officer). By expressly challenging whether the officer was lawfully discharging his official duties in their encounter, Green implicitly challenged his own knowledge that the officer’s commands to him were lawful. Indeed, Green’s counsel argued at trial that, because the officer made no lawful commands to Green, the state could not show that Green had the knowledge required by the statute for the offense of misdemeanor obstruction. See Thomas v. State, 322 Ga. App. 734, 738 (2) (b) (746 SE2d 216) (2013) (<HOLDING>); Gibson v. State, 265 Ga. App. 325, 328 (593 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a capital defendant is mentally competent to abandon any and all challenges to his or her death sentence including appeals state postconviction collateral review and federal habeas corpus if he or she has the mental capacity to understand the choice between life and death and to make a knowing and intelligent decision not to pursue further remedies (B) holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right (C) holding that defendants disobedience cannot have been knowing and wilful if officer has not made clear to defendant that he or she was compelled to obey (D) holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority (E) holding that a person has standing to bring suit under the civil rights act if she or he can show that she or he was punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities
(C)

v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 328 (Iowa 2010) (concluding Commerce Clause is not offended based on Iowa income tax on royalties earned by allowing use of intangibles within the State of Iowa); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 453 Mass. 17, 899 N.E.2d 87, 92 (2009) (applying substantial nexus test and rejecting Commerce Clause challenge based on income earned through use of intangible property in state); Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 379 N.J.Super. 562, 879 A.2d 1234, 1242 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2005) (finding physical presence of Delaware holding company was not mandatory to impose income tax associated with licensing fees attributable to intellectual property targeting New Jersey consumers); Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d at 18-19 (<HOLDING>); A & F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 167 N.C.App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that by licensing intangibles for use in south carolina holding company had substantial nexus such that taxing royalties from intellectual property would not violate the dormant commerce clause (B) holding that state restrictions on electronic license plates might constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce so the claim fell within the zone of interests protected by the dormant commerce clause (C) holding that the dormant commerce clause applies to the notforprofit sector of the economy (D) holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant commerce clause (E) holding that dormant commerce clause complaint by instate resident against municipality failed on merits because challenged rule regulated evenhandedly and did not burden interstate commerce

(A)