In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: showing he was denied a constitutional right. Because Weaver’s application for a COA raises several claims, it is impossible to glean from the present record which issue(s) the district court thought worthy of appeal. Cf. Murray, 145 F.3d at 1250-51 (determining that while court of appeals could not decide issue not specified in COA, it could “construe the issue specification in light of the pleadings and other parts of the record”). Therefore we must remand the record for the district court to specify the issue or issues for appeal. See Muniz v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 43, 46 (5th Cir.1997); Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1076 (6th Cir.1997); Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1584 (11th Cir.1996); but cf. Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). It is so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding remand for specification of issues unnecessary where clear from briefing appellant had not made substantial showing he was denied any constitutional right (B) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (C) holding that appellant had waived any objection to an instruction that he had himself introduced and which was amended by the state without objection from appellant (D) holding that application of section 9711h as amended did not deprive appellant of any constitutional right (E) holding that where appellant acknowledged timely receiving notice by regular mail appellant appeared and fully participated at the trial and appellant made no claim that he was harmed in any way appellee had fulfilled the primary purposes of texrcivp 21a
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action. Id. (emphasis added). A defendant must also “file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” Id. § 1446(d). The removal statutes are construed narrowly. Pritchett v. Off its, including the District of Kansas, have also followed this approach. See, e.g., Berbig v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Inc., 568 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1039 n. 9 (D.Minn.2008) (stating that “a failure to comply with the requirements of [Section 1446(a) ] ordinarily is not grounds to deny removal”); Riggs v. Fling Irrigation, Inc., 535 F.Supp.2d 572, 579 (W.D.N.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Yellow, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1215; In re Methyl 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under alabama law the law of the forum applies to procedural matters and that in most instances the statute of limitations is considered to be a procedural rule (B) recognizing that the procedural defect could be corrected through a reinstatement of the termination proceedings (C) holding that if the states criminal complaint against defendant had a jurisdictional defect the prosecution had the right to attempt to correct the defect and a motion to dismiss is one method of doing this (D) holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect (E) holding while there may be some case law to support plaintiffs argument the majority approach is that the failure to attach process defect is merely procedural and that this particular procedural defect may be cured
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: documents consist of letters, memoranda or e-mail between in-house attorneys or between an in-house attorney and outside counsel concerning the patents at issue. Although communications between in-house counsel are not communications directly to or from the client, it appears implicit in present day litigation with multiple attorneys required for proper representation that attorneys must be allowed to confer with each other regarding the representation of a client on a privileged basis in the same way that clients must be able to discuss the advice of counsel amongst themselves on a privileged basis. Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d at 637 n. 3. See also Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 1996 WL 341537 at *4; Wilstein v. San Tropai Condominium Master Assoc., 189 F.R.D. 371 (N.D.Ill.1999) (<HOLDING>) To the extent that the communications are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneyclient privilege could apply to communications of legal advice between nonlawyer members of management and human resources department if the communication was made in confidence for the primary purpose of obtaining legal advice (B) holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client (C) holding that retention of an attorney to investigate an insurance claim and make a coverage determination under a policy is a classic example of a client seeking legal advice from an attorney (D) holding that if documents are privileged in the hands of the client they retain that privilege when given to an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice (E) holding that discussions between management personnel concerning legal advice given by attorney is privileged even when attorney is not physically present
[EX A]:
(E)