In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 2001) (describing the denial of a jury trial as a structural defect requiring automatic reversal). Similarly, every Florida district court of appeal has issued a decision reversing a conviction obtained without a valid waiver of a jury trial. See, e.g., Montero v. State, 780 So.2d 917, 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because the record failed to show that the defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial); Hyler v. State, 732 So.2d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (concluding that a conviction must be reversed where the record contained no written waiver and did not reflect an inquiry by the trial court that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial); Gamble v. State, 696 So.2d 420, 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); Sansom v. State, 642 So.2d 631, 631 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to inform the defendant of the minimum possible sentence meant that the defendant did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and his rights were therefore automatically substantially affected (B) holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to a sixperson jury and the failure to consult the defendant as to his wishes was an error for which a new trial was the only remedy (C) holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error (D) holding that failure to inform the defendant of the constitutionally mandated right to a sixperson jury when one juror became ill after the jury had been sworn but before trial had begun and the defendants attorney waived his rights without consulting defendant mandates a new trial (E) holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence
[A]: (B)


[Q]: we now reverse the decision of the trial court. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. 1 . We set forth additional facts in the companion case issued today, Dep't. of Revenue v. Adams, 762 N.E.2d 728 (Ind.2002). 2 . The CSET is a tax on the possession of certain narcotics. We discuss the tax and the procedures for collecting it in greater detail infra. 3 . All of the cocaine at issue in this case was discovered prior to the time the police served a valid search warrant. 4 . Ind.Code § 35-48-4-1 (1998). 5 . Id. § 35-48-4-6. 6 . United States Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the revenue officers' entry of Adam's home to collect the CSET assessment was a search. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Thomas v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (B) holding that revenue officers conducted a search when they entered a cottage and seized records when levying on delinquent tax (C) holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business (D) holding search unreasonable when conducted on the highway in broad day light (E) holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house
[A]: (B)


[Q]: doubt” submitted to the jury that convicted him may have been unconstitutional. Moreover, as discussed infra, because trial counsel manifestly intended, at the end of the trial, to defend Mercer based solely on an insanity defense, counsel was reasonably unconcerned about the reasonable doubt instruction as it had no relevance to such defense upon which Mercer as the defendant earned the burden. Indeed, as discussed, Discussion, infra, at 240-43, because trial counsel tactically chose to rely on a concession that Mercer had committed the crimes charged in order to sustain the insanity defense for Mercer, such indifference to the reasonable doubt charge as given by Judge Han-nigan was completely understandable. Because as of the date of Mercer’s trial, t 46, 150 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, insofar as Cage is, for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel (B) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (C) holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record (D) holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel (E) holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate
[A]:
(E)