In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
IV, V, VI and XIV. See Answee, Docket # 8, Exh. A, pp. 13-14. In order to allow the state courts the opportunity to act on or correct the violations alleged, the Applicant must do more than just invoke the magic words “fair trial,” or “due process,” or make only cursory citation to the appropriate constitutional amendments. He must provide legal theory explaining how the admission of the statements or testimony violated these particular federal constitutional rights. See, e.g., Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7-8, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982) (claim on direct appeal that jury instruction was reversible error did not fairly present due process challenge to instruction for habeas exhaustion purposes); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-77, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (<HOLDING>); see, also, Thomas v. Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in preaedpa case habeas applicant failed to fairly present federal claim to state court where despite presenting all necessary facts applicant failed to assert specific argument that he later tried to raise in federal court (B) holding that where defendant failed to raise defense of plaintiffs fraud in federal court defendant is barred from raising that issue in state court (C) holding that habeas petitioner scheduled to be executed in the state of virginia for capital murder could not raise claim of violation of his rights under the vienna convention on federal habeas review where he failed to preserve the claim by raising it in state court proceedings vienna convention does not trump subsequent federal statute requiring habeas petitioners who claim to be held in violation of treaties of the united states to develop factual bases for their claims in state court as a precondition of federal habeas review (D) holding applicants general state court claim was insufficient to exhaust his later more specific federal habeas claim (E) holding that a federal court may deny an unexhausted habeas petition on the merits when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
as an exhibit, he was able to make his argument that the victim was vindictive towards defendant. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in this respect, we are not persuaded that it is more probable than not that any such error was outcome determinative. (MCOA Op. at 5.) Petitioner contends that, by barring the introduction of the actual letters sent by Gordon and barring cross-examination that quoted those letters, the trial court prevented him from effectively cross-examining Gordon about her bias and motive for giving false evidence against him. I disagree. Unlike in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, the trial court did not “prohibit! ] all inquiry” into Gordon’s possible bias and motivation to lie. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Vasquez, 496 F.3d at 571 (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Petitioner’s representations, he 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this distinction (B) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel (C) recognizing distinction between barring all inquiry into a witness bias and barring a particular form of crossexamination (D) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (E) recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
of the [Hotel]”). It is also apparent from the Agreement that Lerfer and Calumet delegated the day-today management of Taber to Taber’s officers, Eugene and Linda Romano. Appel-lees have introduced no evidence to suggest that either Lerfer or Calumet ever usurped that role. In sum, the record reveals that Ler-fer and Calumet serve as holding companies which manage their assets in Taber, a separate, and legally distinct, partnership entity, and that all their “activities” as holding companies occur exclusively in New York. We need go no further. Under either the “nerve center” test or the “center of corporate activity” test, the principal place of business of both Lerfer and Calumet is New York. Cf. Vareka Invs., N.V. v. American Inv. Properties, Inc., 724 F.2d 907, 910 (11th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826, 105 S.Ct. 107, 83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham (B) holding that ecuador corporation which served as passive investment vehicle for florida real estate venture had principal place of business in ecuador where it maintained its corporate books and records made all corporate decisions held all corporate meetings hired its employees and obtained loans for the initial purchase of the venture (C) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (D) holding that grand jury testimony of officer and inhouse counsel for corporate defendant was properly admitted as admission against the corporate defendant (E) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter

Ex Output:

(B)