In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
and to seek collateral relief (except for ineffective assistance of counsel),” United States v. Arevalo-Juarez, 464 F.3d 1246, 1248 (11th Cir.2006) (citation omitted), but only in judicial districts that participate in a[n] "early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General of the United States and the United States attorney for the district in which the court resides.” U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1. This court has rejected Bravo’s argument that the “fast track” program creates a sentencing disparity, and we are bound by decisions of prior panels until overruled by this court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Anaya Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 1252-1253 (11th Cir.2006) (addressing fast-track programs); United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). 2 . This court has rejected the government's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a multipanel circuit prior panel decisions generally are binding upon newlyconstituted panels (B) holding that the panel is bound by decisions of prior panels (C) holding that decisions by prior panels are binding (D) recognizing that a prior panels holding is binding on all subsequent panels (E) holding that a prior panel decision is binding on subsequent panels

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
(citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). “The fundamental characteristic of a nonjusticiable ‘political question’ is that its adjudication would place a court in conflict with a coequal branch of government.” SCPIF, 369 S.C. at 142-43, 632 S.E.2d at 278 (citing U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393-94, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990)). Therefore, the courts will not rule on questions that are exclusively or predominantly political in nature rather than judicial. SCPIF, 369 S.C. at 143, 632 S.E.2d at 278 (citing Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948)). This Court, specifically, has declined to opine on issues where the constitution delegates authority to the Legislature. See SCPIF (<HOLDING>); cf. Stone v. Leatherman, 343 S.C. 484, 541 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question (B) holding in answer to the single question of whether power has been lawfully vested that municipal court clerks may issue warrants (C) holding that a challenge to the proper weight of the evidence is a question of fact outside this courts jurisdiction (D) holding the question of whether the jmsc properly determined residence of judicial candidate or gave proper weight to concerns regarding residency presented a nonjusticiable political question the court should decline to answer because the power to determine if a person is qualified to hold judicial office is vested with the legislature by the state constitution (E) holding the question of whether an accomplice is credible and the weight to be given to the testimony are issues for the jury to determine

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
bad faith may certainly compel an adverse infer ence, the absence of bad faith may not necessarily preclude one. “Destruction of potentially relevant evidence obviously occurs along a continuum of fault—ranging from innocence through the degrees of negligence to intentionality.” Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir.1988). Within the bounds of its discretion, the circuit court has the flexibility to fashion an appropriate sanction based on the facts of the case. In the present case, the missing evidence was the very object that plaintiffs alleged caused Stender’s injuries. Thus, although the circuit court found no bad faith or intentional misconduct on the plaintiffs’ part, we cannot say that it abused its discretion by giving the adverse infer 6, 79-80 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The instant case, however, raised complex 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs did not need to identify the specific defective lawn mower to sustain their claim of a design defect (B) recognizing that because plaintiff alleged a design defect the need for immediate access to the particular saw involved in the accident was greatly diminished (C) holding that complaint alleging design defect likely to cause damage failed to state a claim (D) holding that where the defendants expert described the product design using superlatives namely the safest design you could possibly put on the machine the plaintiff should have been permitted to impeach the expert by inquiring why the safest design possible was modified following the plaintiffs accident (E) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit a design defect products liability expert to submit an untimely addendum stating a new claim of failure to warn after defense expert refuted the basis of original design defect opinion

Ex Output:

(B)