In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. Capshaw cannot establish that his attorney’s performance was deficient for failing to object to the admission of cell phone records. His trial counsel would not have prevailed on such an objection under the governing law, and thus counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to object. It is undisputed that the government obtained a court order, under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, requiring Sprint Nextel to produce the cell phone records of Capshaw and three other people to show calls between them during the period of the murder-for-hire plot. Obtaining those telephone rec ords through a § 2703 court order did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v. Mainland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2582, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Capshaw had no reasonable expectation of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish at time warrant was issued the required nexus between the contraband to be seized which was mailed to defendants post office box and defendants home (B) holding that search warrant was constitutionally defective because it did not require notice (C) holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant (D) holding that telephone company records of calls made from a defendants home did not require the government to seek a search warrant (E) holding that consent searches do not require probable cause to justify the search of a home
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: that the State of Colorado is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the District Court properly dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claim against Colorado for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We next turn to the court’s decision to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claim against the University of Colorado Board of Regents for lack of standing. We need not address this issue, however, because the Colorado Board of Regents is, like the state itself, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 494 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e have no doubt that UNMSM, its Regents, and the Committee on Admissions are ‘arms of the state,’ entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Lujan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 69 F.3d 1511, 1522 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Hensel v. Office of Chief Admin. Hearing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment protects a state from suit by its own citizens (B) holding that the university of californias board of regents is shielded from suit under the eleventh amendment (C) holding that a debtors adversary proceeding against the university of virginia to determine the dischargeability of a debt is a suit for eleventh amendment purposes (D) holding that governors duty to nominate and appoint members of the board of regents of the university of hawaii is subject to a reasonable time standard judged by the totality of the circumstances (E) holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: substantial rights. Mares, 402 F.3d at 520. The district court made no comments suggesting it would have imposed a lesser sentence in the absence of mandatory guidelines. See United States v. Bringier, 405 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir.2005) (stating the issue as “whether [the defendant] has demonstrated that the sentencing judge would have reached a different result had it sentenced [the defendant] under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 264, 163 L.Ed.2d 238 (2005) (No. 05-5535). Therefore, Tovar fails to demonstrate plain error. Tovar contends for the first time on appeal that the statute under which he was convicted, 21 U.S.C. § 841, is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (<HOLDING>). As he concedes, however, this issue is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that ojther than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that any fact other than a prior conviction may not be used to enhance a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that other than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that other than fact of prior conviction any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt
[EX A]:
(C)