TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: (Tex.2010) (orig. proceeding). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies creates a jurisdictional bar to proceeding with the claim. See City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex.2008) (“[Njoncompliance [with Chapter 21’s administrative procedures] deprives courts of subject-matter, jurisdiction.”); Smith v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 101 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). A would-be Chapter 21 claimant must first file an administrative complaint with the civil rights division of the Texas Workforce Commission. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.201(a) .(stating that an aggrieved person “may file a complaint with the commission”); id. § 21.0015 (defining “commission” as “the Texas Workforce ■Commission civil rights division”); Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 486-88 (<HOLDING>). The complaint must be filed “not later than 
 Holding statements: (A) holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent (B) holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language (C) holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (D) holding that administrative exhaustion is mandatory despite legislatures use of the word may (E) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional

SOLUTION: holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent

PROBLEM: merits of a plaintiffs cause of action ... also implicate the class certification decision,” Jackson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth, 260 F.R.D. 168, 184 (E.D.Pa.2009), such an inquiry is merely preliminary. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 317. A plaintiff need not establish by a preponderance of the evidence the merits of its claims at the class certification stage, and any inquiry into the merits that is not necessary to a Rule 23 decision is precluded. Jackson, 260 F.R.D. at 184 (citing Newton, 259 F.3d at 166-67, and Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 317-18). However, the movant must do more than “assur[e] ... the court that it intends or plans to meet the requirements” of Rule 23. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318; see also Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 453 F.3d 179, 186 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). As with other matters relating to Rule 23 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right (B) holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity (C) holding that clearly established means the contours of the right were so clear at the time the officials acted that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right (D) holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he or she is doing violates that right (E) holding that there must be full and clear articulation of the litigations contours at the time of class certification

SOLUTION: holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right

PROBLEM: a mechanism for obtaining large attorney’s fee awards in cases with de minimis returns for the client and society in general. Furthermore, the prospect of a fee award can skew attorneys’ incentives when confronted with settlement offers that would more than compensate their clients, but that fall short of the large fees already incurred. These concerns are most prevalent in cases such as this, where recovery of private damages, rather than the vindication of constitutional rights, is the primary purpose. While it is Congress’ duty to re-shape fee-shifting provisions to alleviate these concerns, it is this Court’s duty to determine a reasonable fee in light of the de minimis victory achieved in this case. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (<HOLDING>). I. BACKGROUND After a jury trial before this 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important (B) holding that the most critical factor in the analysis of a reasonable fee is the degree of success obtained (C) holding that status as a prevailing party does not by itself entitle a plaintiff to attorneys fees rather the most critical factor in determining a fee awards reasonableness is the degree of success obtained emphasis added (D) holding that the quantity of relief obtained as compared to what the plaintiff sought to achieve are key elements in determining the degree of success (E) holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee 

SOLUTION:
recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important