In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

7, and 10), plaintiffs response thereto, and the reply brief of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center, Nora Marden, and Joan K. Richards, and for the reasons stated in the accompa nying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED; 2. Count I is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; 3. The Court having declined to exercise its jurisdiction as to the remaining Counts of the complaint, they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their reassertion in state court; 4. The petition of defendant James E. Clark to join in the motion of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center and Joan K. Richards to dismiss the complaint (docket entry #9) is GRANTED AS UNOPPOSED; 5. The petition of defendant Nora 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Even absent Dr. Klavan’s concession on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that amtrak was a state actor (B) holding that a privately owned nursing home that received ninety percent of its funding from the state and was subject to significant state regulation was nevertheless not a state actor (C) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (D) holding that such a physician was a state actor under  1983 (E) holding that a school was not a state actor even though it had to comply with many state regulations to be eligible for state funding and almost all of its students had been referred to it by the state
holding that amtrak was a state actor

employee.” Lenoir v. Roll Coater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir.1994) citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). In this case, the Defendants state that Turner was fired because management honestly believed that Turner had directed threats towards other employees. The testimony of Gibbons, Woodward and Overstreet supports that story. The Court finds that the Defendants’ explanation has a reasonable basis in fact. The Court also finds that Turner’s alleged conduct, if true, would be sufficient to warrant discharge. There is no question that if the Defendants honestly believed that Turner actually made threats of violence, that Turner could be rightfully discharged. See Lenoir v. Roll Coater, 13 F.3d 1130, 1133 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 3. Pretext. Because the Defendants’ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the employers failure to interact with the employee does not preclude the employee from losing on summary judgment because the employee must still prove that a reasonable accommodation could have been made (B) holding that if management honestly believed that the plaintiff employee possessed a weapon wielded at coworkers and made menacing comments then management had a reasonable explanation for discharging the plaintiff employee (C) holding that an employee could not establish pretext when the employer in good faith believed that the employee engaged in misconduct regardless whether the employee in fact engaged in the misconduct (D) holding that a partner in and accounting firm who brought an action under the age discrimination in employment act adea and the employee retirement income security act erisa was considered an employee because he was subject to the control of a management committee which acted in secrecy and had no bona fide ownership interest fiduciary relationship voting right or management control (E) holding that a plaintiff must comply with the notice of claim requirements in order to maintain an action against a government employee even if the plaintiff claims that the employee acted with fraud or malice
holding that the employers failure to interact with the employee does not preclude the employee from losing on summary judgment because the employee must still prove that a reasonable accommodation could have been made

conduct ‘shows a fixed intention to abandon, renounce, and refuse to perform the contract.’ ” Hunter, 339 S.W.3d at 802 (quoting SAVA gumarska in kemijska industria d.d. v. Advanced Polymer Sci, Inc., 128 S.W.3d 304, 315 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)). But such repudiation “must be absolute and unconditional.” Id. In other words, “[t]he declaration of intent to abandon the obligation must be in positive and unconditional terms.” Narvaez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 757 F.Supp.2d 621, 631 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (citing Preston v. Love, 240 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1951, no writ)). Thus, to show anticipatory repudiation, Texas courts have required that a party overtly communicate its intent not to perform under a valid and enforceable agreement. Compare Hunter, 339 S.W.3d at 803 (<HOLDING>), with Hauglum v. Durst, 769 S.W.2d 646, 649, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mere presentation of a settlement agreement absent direct language or conduct evincing intent not to perform did not constitute a fixed intention to abandon the original contract quoting sava 128 sw3d at 315 (B) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (C) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (D) holding that agreement did not constitute a binding preliminary agreement to negotiate in good faith a mortgage contract (E) holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt

holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement