In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Defendants contend that the amount awarded was excessive and shocking, such as to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice or other improper influence invaded the trial. Defendants initially make this argument on the grounds that the disparity between punitive damages assessed against the “passive wrongdoer” (AGF) is too large in contrast to the amount assessed against the “active wrongdoer” (Risser). We reject this argument for many reasons. First, it assumes that AGF should not have been found liable for negligent retention of an employee. Obviously, the jury disagreed with this assessment. Second, the legal basis for assessing punitive damages on respondeat superior grounds is well-established. Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 235 Kan. 580, 682 P.2d 653, 665 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent deci sion, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that restatement second of torts  323 and 324a correctly state pennsylvania law (B) recognizing kansas courts adoption of restatement second of torts  909 1977 (C) recognizing that restatement second of torts   416 to 429 are often overlapping (D) recognizing tentative draft of restatement second of torts  652e (E) recognizing that kansas supreme court would accept the final draft of the restatement second of torts  652e adopted in 1977

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Comm’n, 979 P.2d 346, 351 (Utah 1999) (ruling that continuing denial of a benefit to which a party is entitled provides a basis for standing to obtain judicial review of an administrative rule). The plaintiffs claim that he would be “directly and immediately better off — in the emphatically concrete sense that ... he would have more money in his pocket sooner — if he could obtain relief through the Notice procedure ... without sacrificing a major portion of his claim,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5, is “[n]o reasonable mind could doubt ... a judicially cognizable injury sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact test for Article III standing,” see Ontario Forest Industries Assoc. v. United States, 444 F.Supp.2d 1309, 1323-24 (CIT 2006) (<HOLDING>) (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that declaratory judgment requiring party to pay a specific sum of money is properly characterized as a money judgment (B) holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence viz the area within his control (C) recognizing that delay of refund deprives plaintiffs of the timevalue of money  and may  deprive plaintiffs of money (D) holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief (E) recognizing that an action will lie for conversion of money when its identification is possible and there is an obligation to deliver the specific money in question or otherwise particularly treat the specific money

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
lacks jurisdiction to review the order denying reconsideration. See Betty B Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 194 F.3d 491, 496 (4th Cir.1999) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction petition seeking review of order “summarily denying] reconsideration”). Turning to the underlying Board order, this court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders of the Board. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c); see Eggers v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 11 F.3d 35, 38 (4th Cir.1993) (“The finality requirement contained in § 921 encompasses the same concepts as finality in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 [ (2006) ].”)• Because the Board remanded the case for further proceedings, the Board’s order is not a final order. See Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 853 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award (B) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (C) holding that an order remanding  to an administrative law judge for further findings is not in general immediately appealable under 33 usc  921c (D) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order (E) holding that the issue of whether the attorney general was entitled to qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine

Ex Output:

(C)