In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word “claimant” in subsection four. Under the plurality’s view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word “claimant” in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of “prevailing party.” This is because, in order for the word “claimant” in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid
holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence

7, and 10), plaintiffs response thereto, and the reply brief of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center, Nora Marden, and Joan K. Richards, and for the reasons stated in the accompa nying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED; 2. Count I is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; 3. The Court having declined to exercise its jurisdiction as to the remaining Counts of the complaint, they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their reassertion in state court; 4. The petition of defendant James E. Clark to join in the motion of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center and Joan K. Richards to dismiss the complaint (docket entry #9) is GRANTED AS UNOPPOSED; 5. The petition of defendant Nora 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Even absent Dr. Klavan’s concession on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that amtrak was a state actor (B) holding that a privately owned nursing home that received ninety percent of its funding from the state and was subject to significant state regulation was nevertheless not a state actor (C) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (D) holding that such a physician was a state actor under  1983 (E) holding that a school was not a state actor even though it had to comply with many state regulations to be eligible for state funding and almost all of its students had been referred to it by the state
holding that amtrak was a state actor

to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Within 10 days after the return of a verdict, a party who has timely moved for a directed verdict may serve a motion to set aside the verdict and any judgment entered thereon and to enter judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict. (Emphasis added). Because the rule treats the denial of a motion for directed verdict at the close of the evidence as a reservation of ruling, in order to preserve the point for appellate review it is necessary to make an appropriate post-trial motion. See Indus. Affiliates, Ltd. v. Testa, 770 So.2d 202, 204 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); see also Williams v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach County, 770 So.2d 706, 707 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Brown moved for a directed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that objection made at directed verdict stage and in motion for new trial were timely (B) holding a directed verdict motion stating specific grounds is a prerequisite for a subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (C) holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict (D) holding defendants failure to file motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict did not prevent district court from granting motion for directed verdict for which court reserved decision (E) holding that a posttrial motion is not required after a grant of a directed verdict

holding that objection made at directed verdict stage and in motion for new trial were timely