In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 548 U.S. at 518, 126 S.Ct. at 2667 (Scalia, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that “compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act can be [a compelling state] interest ... [otherwise] a State could be placed in the impossible position of having to choose between compliance with § 5 and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause”). And we conclude that a plan will be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest when the race-based action taken was reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of the Act. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2490-91, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 1906, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (<HOLDING>); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (B) holding that where the claimed interest is avoidance of liability under section 2 the legislative action must at a minimum remedy the anticipated violation or achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored (C) holding that liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under  1983 where at best the plaintiff has merely claimed that the appellants were aware of alleged violation but did not take appropriate action (D) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (E) holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation
[A]: (B)


[Q]: carrying it during and in relation to such a crime, with additional penalties attaching if the firearm was brandished or discharged. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Whether the defendant was accountable for one firearm or ten, however, is completely irrelevant to the commission of the § 924(c) offense. Thus, because § 924(c) pertains to particular unlawful uses of a firearm while § 2K2.1(b)(l) pertains to the number of firearms involved, these two enhancements punish different types of conduct. We therefore conclude that enhancing a defendant’s offense level based on the number of weapons involved in the offense underlying his § 924(c) conviction does not constitute impermissible double counting under the Guidelines. Accord United States v. Terrell, 608 F.3d 679, 683-84 (10th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trading drugs for a gun violates the in furtherance of prong of  924c (B) holding that evidence is sufficient for  924c conviction where it shows weapons proximity to drugs and its accessibility (C) holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a  924c sentence for the same firearm (D) holding that because the number of weapons involved in the underlying offense to a  924c conviction is a separate type of offense conduct than that punished by  924c itself the district court did not engage in doublecounting  when it applied an  increase under  2k21bla in conjunction with the sentence for violating  924c (E) holding without discussion that the district court erred by applying the numberofweapons enhancement to an offense underlying the defendants  924c conviction
[A]: (D)


[Q]: were convicted of conspiring to use, carry, or possess a firearm in furtherance of, inter alia, a conspiracy to violate the Neutrality Act and a conspiracy to provide services to the Taliban. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c),(o); J.A. 3223. Both Count Five and Count Eleven, in other words, ■ expressly allow one conspiracy to serve as the predicate for another conspiracy. Nothing about this statutory framework is unconstitutional, improper, or even unusual. Courts have recognized that one conspiracy can serve as the predicate for another conspiracy when the “[overarching] conspiracy and the predicate conspiracy are distinct offenses with entirely different objectives.” United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1135 (3rd Cir.1990); see also United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 918 (2nd Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman (B) holding that congress intended to allow multiple punishments for rico conspiracies and conspiracies to commit the underlying predicate offense even though the offenses were the same under the blockburger test (C) holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy (D) holding that judge erred in not explaining to jury that it could consider predicate acts listed in relation to substantive rico count when deciding whether defendants had also conspired to violate rico (E) recognizing money laundering as a predicate act under rico
[A]:
(C)