In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: for a damages claim. See Williams, 216 S.W.3d at 828-29. Nor can Russell change the facts that render her remaining grounds not justiciable. As long as there is no dispute that the release between Metro and American Century is not binding on Russell, and Metro and its representatives have not been awarded and do not seek attorney fees based on section 417.003 of the Labor Code, there is no way in which Russell could re-plead her claims to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. See Bonham State Bank, 907 S.W.2d at 467; WesternGeco, L.L.C., 246 S.W.3d at 781. The trial court therefore did not err in refusing Russell an opportunity to further amend her pleadings. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 1 . S rters, Inc., 372 S.W.2d 525, 530-31 (Tex.1963) (<HOLDING>); Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 366, 190 
 Holding statements: (A) holding governmental immunity was not implicated in a declaratoryjudgment action seeking an interpretation of a competitive bidding statute as applied to the highway commissions policy of requiring all materials furnished under contracts be manufactured in the united states (B) holding that a declaratoryjudgment action seeking to compel officials to perform their legal duties was not barred by  14 however a portion of the action seeking compensatory damages could not be maintained (C) holding a declaratoryjudgment action was proper to construe compulsory school attendance law and did not implicate governmental immunity (D) holding governmental immunity not implicated and a declaratoryjudgment action proper to seek determination of whether plaintiffs were motor carriers for purposes of tax statute (E) recognizing the protection of preliminary governmental materials

Output: holding that a declaratoryjudgment action seeking to compel officials to perform their legal duties was not barred by  14 however a portion of the action seeking compensatory damages could not be maintained


Input: Consider Input: quantity function as elements by increasing the maximum penalty a defendant may receive, are they elements of an aggravated offense or are they sentencing factors with heightened due process requirements? See id. at 573, 575 (Hug, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s apparent conclusion that the penalty provisions of § 841(b) are not elements of the offense). The district court correctly interpreted Buckland as holding that drug type and quantity are not elements of the offense, but rather are material facts that must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Buckland opinion emphasized that the relevant inquiry is not whether a penalty provision is an element, but rather whether it exposes the defendant to a longer sentence than woul (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so (B) holding jury is entitled to accept the states version of the facts and reject appellants version or reject any of the witnesses testimony (C) holding that biased on buckland we must reject valensias contention that the sentencing provisions of  841 create separate crimes (D) holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes (E) holding the crimes merge where the jury was not asked to determine whether two assaults occurredeventhough the evidence may have been sufficient to support separate crimes

Output: recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so


Input: Consider Input: but data-gathering that preceded it. See Seamon, supra, at 735-36 (quoting Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286). In the latter case, a court need not second-guess the decision's wisdom; it need only examine the decisionmaking process to determine whether the negligently produced data affected it. See id. 16 . The Court here used the term in its common-law sense, which distinguishes "discretionary” from "ministerial” acts, and not in its distinct but related FTCA sense. 17 . The Court has limited Mitchell, allowing immediate appeal only of denials of immunity turning on questions of law, not sufficiency of evidence. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), lim'd in turn by Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 18 . As illustrated by the opinion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact (B) holding that the protection of the double jeopardy clause does not preclude a defendant from being charged under a statute  defining as the criminal offense a discrete act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a distinguishable discrete act that is a separate violation of the statute (C) holding that genuine factual dispute does not preclude appeal of discrete ruling on pure legal issue (D) recognizing that order denying confirmation of a plan does not resolve a discrete issue (E) recognizing that ruling of one trial judge does not preclude another trial judge reconsidering interlocutory ruling


Output: holding that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact