In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
--------
Question: 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier

Answer: (C)


Question: as an exhibit, he was able to make his argument that the victim was vindictive towards defendant. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in this respect, we are not persuaded that it is more probable than not that any such error was outcome determinative. (MCOA Op. at 5.) Petitioner contends that, by barring the introduction of the actual letters sent by Gordon and barring cross-examination that quoted those letters, the trial court prevented him from effectively cross-examining Gordon about her bias and motive for giving false evidence against him. I disagree. Unlike in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, the trial court did not “prohibit! ] all inquiry” into Gordon’s possible bias and motivation to lie. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Vasquez, 496 F.3d at 571 (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Petitioner’s representations, he 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this distinction (B) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel (C) recognizing distinction between barring all inquiry into a witness bias and barring a particular form of crossexamination (D) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (E) recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell

Answer: (C)


Question: Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). CLAY, Circuit Judge, concurring. Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I hesitate to concur in the reasoning of the majority opinion because of the possibility that the district court lacked the jurisdiction to impose a sentence below the applicable statutory minimum sentence. See Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 130-31, 116 S.Ct. 2057, 135 L.Ed.2d 427 (1996) (<HOLDING>). However, the jurisdictional issue, which was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when no statutory exception applies  the district court lacks the authority to impose a sentence less than the statutory mandatory minimum (B) holding that a district court is not authorized to sentence a defendant below the statutory minimum unless the government filed a substantial assistance motion pursuant to 18 usc  3553e and ussg  5k11 or the defendant falls within the safetyvalve of 18 usc  3553f (C) holding that a district court lacks authority to pierce a statutory minimum sentence under ussg  5k11 (D) holding that a motion under  5k11 permitted a downward departure from the guideline range but that the departure could not extend below the statutory minimum sentence absent an additional motion by the government under  3553e (E) holding that government waived right to challenge alleged error of district court in failing to impose statutory minimum sentence under  841b1b by failing to object to sentence announced by district court

Answer:
(C)