In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: trial court wide latitude in sentencing...." State v. Bluff 2002 UT 66, ¶ 66, 52 P.3d 1210. "Generally, we review sentencing decisions to determine whether the court exceeded its permitted range of discretion, and we will reverse only if we determine that the trial court has failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 108, 1 12, 182 P.3d 708 (quotations and citations omitted). ANALYSIS I. Admissibility of Evidence T9 Defendant asserts that the trial court committed plain error when it allowed two witnesses to testify as to the children's credibility in violation of State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), and rule 608(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Rim-masch, TIS P.2d at 392 (<HOLDING>); see also Utah R. Evid. 608(a)(1) ("The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 608a1 bars admission of an experts testimony as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion (B) holding rule applicable to witness (C) holding plaintiffs waived their right to appellate review of the admission of an experts testimony by failing to object to it at trial (D) holding that even if an experts testimony arguably embraced the ultimate issue such testimony is permissible as long as the experts testimony assists rather than supplants the jurys judgment (E) holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
[EX A]: holding rule applicable to witness

[EX Q]: issue in question.” Bradley Ventures, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., 371 Ark. 229, 264 S.W.3d 485, 490 (2007). UAMS maintains that collateral estoppel applies to Dodson I and II, barring both of Dodson’s pending claims, but our discussion is considerably narrower. First, I would set aside Dodson I because I am uncertain that the court’s relevant finding was “essential to the judgment.” Powell, 289 S.W.3d at 444. Second, I would set aside Count II, which is Dodson’s impliedeontract claim. Importantly, Count II is premised on UAMS’s conduct after Dodson II, i.e., sending Dodson bills for the embryo storage fees, and therefore cannot be precluded by the earlier chancery court decision. See Ripplin Shoals Land Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); cf. id. at 1042 (“[R]es judicata does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying contract (B) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment (C) holding that a prior judgment regarding a permit to modify an existing bridge does not preclude a plaintiff from challenging a decision on a new application describing and a different bridge design (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit a design defect products liability expert to submit an untimely addendum stating a new claim of failure to warn after defense expert refuted the basis of original design defect opinion (E) holding untimeliness of motion to modify medical insurance payment did not preclude motion to modify maintenance
[EX A]: holding that an assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying contract

[EX Q]: consenting to the exploratory laparotomy and the salpin-go oophorectomy. Based on these forms, the only conclusion that reasonable persons could have reached was that Ms. Church consented to these procedures. A patient’s consent may be express or implied. Express consent is permission given directly either by voice or in writing. A party seeking to prove express consent may do so by introducing the writing memorializing the consent. See, e.g., In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Litig., 533 F.Supp. 567, 574-76 (D.Colo.1980). When a patient has signed a written consent form expressly covering a particular procedure, the terms of the consent form will ordinarily control the question of whether the patient consented to the procedure. See Hudson v. Parvin, 582 So.2d 403, 411 (Miss.1991) (<HOLDING>). When a written consent form exists, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant medical center which allowed a patient who would likely cause bodily harm to his wife if he had the opportunity to leave the center for a weekend could be liable for the patients actions of killing his wife and her paramour during that weekend because inter alia when the course of treatment of a mental patient involves an exercise of control over him by a physician who knows or should know that the patient is likely to cause bodily harm to others an independent duty arises from that relationship and falls upon the physician to exercise that control with such reasonable care as to prevent harm to others at the hands of the patient punctuation omitted emphasis supplied (B) holding that no physicianpatient relationship between doctor who gave informal opinion over telephone at request of treating physician and minor patient whose case was discussed and thus doctor did not owe duty of care to patient (C) holding that the language of an executed consent form took precedence over the alleged prior conversations between the patient and the physician (D) holding that the conversations between a patient and her psychotherapist and the notes taken during their counseling sessions are protected by the privilege (E) holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave
[EX A]:
holding that defendant medical center which allowed a patient who would likely cause bodily harm to his wife if he had the opportunity to leave the center for a weekend could be liable for the patients actions of killing his wife and her paramour during that weekend because inter alia when the course of treatment of a mental patient involves an exercise of control over him by a physician who knows or should know that the patient is likely to cause bodily harm to others an independent duty arises from that relationship and falls upon the physician to exercise that control with such reasonable care as to prevent harm to others at the hands of the patient punctuation omitted emphasis supplied