In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: to the section 924(c) jury instruction, we review it for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d 1056, 1066 (8th Cir.1996). Although the pre-Bailey instruction was given to the jury (because Bailey had no rovide a defendant, upon their motion, any statement or report made by a government witness that relates to the subject matter of the direct testimony of that witness. 18 U.S.C. § 3500. The government need not provide the statement, however, until after the witness testifies on direct examination. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). 6 . The district court’s ruling was essentially a discovery matter, which we review for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Byrne, 83 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the fbi informants file contained no brady material not already provided to the defendant in a summary (B) holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation (C) holding that an fbi agents rough notes of an interview of the defendant were not brady material because there was no independent showing that they contained evidence that was material to the defendants guilt or innocence (D) holding a trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require disclosure of an informants name (E) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment

A: holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation
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Q: of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi appears to indicate that the assets must be blocked at the time judgment against the asset is finalized. See 556 U.S. 366, 369, 377-79, 129 S.Ct. 1732, 1735, 1739-40, 173 L.Ed.2d 511 (2009) (“We ultimately hold that the Cubic Judgment was not a ‘blocked asset’ at the time the Court of Appeals handed down its decision.... ”). The controlling determination in that case, though, was that the asset in question was never blocked because Iran’s interest in it arose after the Treasury Department unblocked all Iranian assets. Id. at 376, 129 S.Ct. at 1739. In Holy Land Foundation, the assets were unreachable because they were unblocked during the pendency of the original civil suit, prior to the commencement of any execution proceeding. 722 F.3d at 687 (<HOLDING>). This rule is not just prescribed by law; it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment (B) holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order (C) holding that the governments restraining order against a blocked asset obtained prior to the entry of a civil judgment unblocked it for tria purposes (D) recognizing that a stay contained in anex parte order did not serve to suspend the effectiveness of the restraining notice otherwise any judgment debtor could obtain such an order without notice to the court that a restraining notice had been served or to the judgment creditor and recover his property theretofore properly made the subject of the restraining notice (E) holding that the cubic judgment was not blocked

A: holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment
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Q: the sentencing information balancing test urged by the dissent. The ongoing confusion concerning the breach of Wisconsin plea agreements is further highlighted by this district's issuance of an unusual, three-legged opinion. ¶ 24. While I have some sympathy with the dissent's concern about the continued integrity of the plea bargaining process, I disagree that the facts in this case can result in an unwarranted sentencing "clam up" restriction. The prosecutor not only has a right but a duty to provide information to the sentencing court. Moreover, there is nothing wrong with the prosecutor providing his or her opinion of the defendant's character, even if negative, to the sentencing court so long as the opinion is used to support the recommendation. See Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 324-25 (<HOLDING>). But it makes no sense to allow the prosecutor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erroneous use of statutorily unqualified person to prepare posttrial recommendation requires new recommendation and action (B) recognizing the importance of congressional findings in determining the appropriateness of congresss remedial measures (C) recognizing prosecutors task to attempt to convince the court of the appropriateness of the recommendation (D) holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error (E) holding that if counsel raises an issue the failure to convince the court to rule in an appellants favor is not ineffective performance

A:
holding that erroneous use of statutorily unqualified person to prepare posttrial recommendation requires new recommendation and action
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