In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: appealed the judgment of the Court of Veterans Appeals to this court. On appeal the Secretary contends that the Court of Veterans Appeals erred by not deferring to the Department’s reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions governing claims for accrued benefits. The Secretary also disputes Mrs. Jones’s assertion that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. ANALYSIS I. Jurisdiction to hear appeals from final decisions of the Court of Veterans Appeals is conferred upon this court by 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (1994). Under the express terms of that statute, however, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U 625, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2663-64, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to hear 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district courts remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the secretary of health and human services was an immediately appealable order (B) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (E) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order
Example Output: holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable

Example Input: and Waste Control Specialists. LLC v. Sierra Club, appellate cause number. 03-12-00335-CV. 4 . See Sierra Club v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, cause number D-l-GN-12-001586. 5 .Despite this, the trial court issued a written order denying the motion twenty days after the deadline for ruling on the motion had passed. The order — though included in the record on appeal — is of no effect. Jain v. Cambridge Petroleum Grp., Inc., 395 S.W.3d 394, 396 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) ("The trial court's signing the order denying the motion [to dismiss pursuant to the Act] after it was already denied by operation of law is legally of no effect because the motion to dismiss was already denied.”); reran v. Fryer, 586 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Cor-pus Christi 1979, writ ref'd) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Appellees also insist that Sierra Club 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (B) holding court lost jurisdiction to enter its order after thirty days and the motion was denied by operation of law (C) holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed (D) holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction (E) holding that an order purporting to overrule a motion for new trial that had already been overruled by operation of law was a nullity
Example Output: holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions

Example Input: risk that the actor will intentionally use force in the furtherance of the offense.’ ” 493 F.3d at 307 (quoting Tran, 414 F.3d at 471). Likewise, Popal's discussion emphasizes that the focus of the § 16(b) analysis should be on whether the crime at issue "involves ‘a substantial risk that the actor will intentionally use ... force.’ ” 416 F.3d at 255 (citing Tran, 414 F.3d at 472). 16 . Citing to various cases from our sister circuits, Aguilar argues that reckless crimes cannot be crimes of violence under § 16(b). Those cases are inapposite because they either do not involve § 16(b), or a similarly worded statute, or they do not create the same inherent substantial risk that force will be used, as § 3124.1 does. See Jimenez-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the crime of rape involved a nonconsensual act there was a substantial risk that physical force may be used in committing the offense (B) holding that the mere fact that the fda does not require a warning on a product label does not necessarily create a conflict (C) holding that a felony of criminal recklessness was not a crime of violence under  16b because it does not require any purposeful conduct and does not necessarily create a risk that force may be used as a means to an end during the commission of the offense (D) holding that under iowa code  7098 the offense of lascivious acts with a child was a crime of violence because it involved a substantial risk that physical force would be used against the child victim in the course of committing the offense (E) holding that unlawful imprisonment of a minor or incompetent adult is not a crime of violence under  16b because the crime can be accomplished with the victims acquiescence
Example Output:
holding that because the crime of rape involved a nonconsensual act there was a substantial risk that physical force may be used in committing the offense