instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
statement during closing argument regarding his personal opinion of the defendant’s guilt was improper, but not reversible error). Where it appears that no other verdict could have been properly rendered, prosecutorial misconduct is not reversible error. Hillen v. People, 59 Colo. 280, 284, 149 P. 250, 252 (1915). In light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial against the defendant, we conclude that the prosecutor’s improper remark during closing argument was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 985 (emphasis added); see also Harris, 888 P.2d at 268 (stating that “the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial will be considered on appeal when evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct”); Grandbouche v. People, 104 Colo. 175, 185, 89 P.2d 577, 581 (1939) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. People, 70 Colo. 313, 317, 201 P. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment (B) holding the rule that the singular includes the plural obviously  is not one to be applied except where it is necessary to carry out the evident intent of the statute (C) holding that 1 usc  1 does not apply except where it is necessary to carry out the evident intent of the statute (D) holding that the rule is that where the guilt of an accused is evident incidental improper action upon the part of the prosecuting officer may be overlooked (E) holding that the prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment
answer:
holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment


question:
375 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004). Since, as we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we need not consider whether the District’s failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its own case (as opposed to at the close of Smith’s case) further limits our review “to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by the evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice,” Fredrick, 254 F.3d at 162. The District presents two fact-based challenges to the jury’s verdict. First, it argues that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the District had a deliberately indifferent policy or custom under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, it claims that even had such a policy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom (B) holding that county liability under  1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior (C) holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc  1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition (D) recognizing respondeat superior liability (E) holding that municipal liability for purposes of claims brought under 42 usc  1983 must stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom rather than simply from respondeat superior
answer:
holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom


question:
of attempted murder: 1) a person, 2) with the specific intent to cause the death of another, 3) does an act amounting to more than mere preparation, 4) but fails to effect the death of the other individual. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 15.01(a); 19.02(b); Jeffley, 938 S.W.2d at 517; Palomo, 925 S.W.2d at 332. The charge given to the jury did not expressly include the words “attempt to cause the death” of Williams. However, the word “attempt” was not required because the entire paragraph is a description of the elements of “attempt.” The language “with the intent to commit the murder of Alberta Williams” was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the charge include the culpable mental state of the attempted felony. See, e.g., Ex parte Bartmess, 739 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.Crim. App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, we find no error in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intent is a separate element and evidence relating to intent is irrelevant to determining whether an object is a criminal instrument (B) holding under section 1902a1 specific intent required as an element of section 1501 is the intent to cause the death of an individual (C) holding that specific intent is an element of attempted illegal reentry (D) holding defendant must act with specific intent to cause death of another in order to be convicted of attempted murder (E) holding intent as an essential element to an invasion of privacy by intrusion and not listing intent as a required element of invasion of privacy by publication
answer:

holding that intent is a separate element and evidence relating to intent is irrelevant to determining whether an object is a criminal instrument