In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: individual has breached a duty of reasonable care. Bolick v. Sunbird Airlines, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 443, 386 S.E.2d 76 (1989), aff'd, 327 N.C. 464, 396 S.E.2d 323 (1990). Sudden emergency does not change or reduce the standard of reasonable care. It is simply one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a person acted reasonably under the circumstances. Id. The sudden emergency doctrine permits the court to call to the attention of the jury that an emergency faced by the actor may influence its determination of whether specific conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. The doctrine of sudden emergency is not a legal defense which operates to bar an action. Id. But cf. Hinson v. Brown, 80 N.C. App. 661, 343 S.E.2d 284, rev. denied, 318 N.C. 282, 348 S.E.2d 138 (1986) (<HOLDING>). External forces that have been found to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency (B) holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead (C) recognizing that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense a party must plead and prove (D) holding that a claim of exemption is an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded (E) holding that to avoid an affirmative defense  a plaintiff must plead specifically matters of affirmative avoidance pursuant to rule 5508

A: holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency
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Q: intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions “could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited.” Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) (“We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse’s liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void.”). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years

A: holding that such provisions are valid
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Q: Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890))). The Eleventh Amendment protects un-consenting states from suits in federal court brought by citizens of other states, see U.S. Const. Amend. XI, and consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine of sovereign immunity additionally protects unconsenting states from suits brought by its own citizens in its own state courts, see Hans, 134 U.S. at 18-19, 10 S.Ct. 504; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that sovereign immunity, as an a priori concept, extends beyond the explicit language of the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan,, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Hans, 134 U.S. at 15, 10 S.Ct. 504 (<HOLDING>). Even so, sovereign immunity is not absolute. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment protects a state from suit by its own citizens (B) holding an exception to eleventh amendment immunity inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law (C) holding that sovereign immunity barred a federal question suit against a state brought by one of its own citizens even though the text of the eleventh amendment only addresses suits brought by citizens of another state (D) holding state immune from suit brought by its own citizens (E) holding that utah did not waive its eleventh amendment immunity with respect to a suit brought in federal court because state statute provided for exclusive original jurisdiction in its own courts

A:
holding an exception to eleventh amendment immunity inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law
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