In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for “anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,” because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for “wil-fully taking away her husband” and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability). But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute (B) holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses (C) recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that police officers were immune from liability for damages resulting from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress

Ex Output:
holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute


Ex Input:
the ISBE would terminate on August 1, 2011, and the consent decree for CPS on September 1, 2012. With the consent decrees terminated, the only remaining action is for the Monitor to file the final report detailing her findings of the agencies’ compliance with the decrees. Then, just a few months before the consent decree for CPS was set to terminate, CPS filed a motion with the district court to decertify the original “Corey H.” class and vacate the consent decree it had agreed to in 1998 and also in 2010. The district court denied the motion and CPS appealed to this court. On appeal, CPS contends that the district court erred by denying its motion on the ground that our decision in Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir.2012), mandates that we d th Cir.1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Even if this case were not moot, we would not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23 (B) holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (D) holding that consent decree could not preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims that could not have been brought at time consent decree was filed and to which they were legally and procedurally entitled (E) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated

Ex Output:
holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23


Ex Input:
determined that Salim lacked standing under the doctrine of third-party standing. See App. 19. It is true, as the bankruptcy court noted, that a plaintiff generally may not establish standing on ng does not undermine the Court’s conclusion that Salim has standing to bring this case. In sum, the Court concludes that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that Sal-im lacks standing. If Salim lacked standing, the Court would not have jurisdiction to reach the merits of the parties’ dispute. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003. Since it concludes that Salim does’ have standing to pursue his claims, however, the Court may now consider the bankruptcy court’s determination that Salim failed to state a claim. See, e.g., Gingery v. City of Glendale, 831 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Mera v. City of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice in deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (B) holding that because the state failed to properly file the complaint the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial (C) holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm (D) holding that district court may consider documents referred to in plaintiffs complaint and central to his claim (E) holding that although that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing the appellate court may nonetheless proceed to consider the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

Ex Output:

holding that a court may rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice in deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted