In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther’s theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts “a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman.” White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther’s termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, § 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law
[EX A]: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy

[EX Q]: for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V. 16 . Plaintiffs’ April 3, 2009 Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs never received a Notice of Deficiency for any of the tax years at issue. Compl. at 2. Plaintiffs, however, attached a copy of a Notice of Deficiency for 1997 and 1998 in their Petition to the Tax Court challenging the deficiency determinations for these years. Gov't Mot. Ex. C. Further, Plaintiffs did not dispute their receipt of a Notice of Deficiency at the November 15, 2002 CDP hearing. Gov’t Mot. Exs. E, G, H. Section 2514 of Title 28 of the United States Code requires forfeiture of a tax claim when a party attempts to establish its claim through fraud. 28 U.S.C. § 2514; see also Standard Oil v. United States, 98 Ct.Cl. 201, 246, 47 F.Supp. 120 (1942) (<HOLDING>); see also Kamen Soap Products v. United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs claim for refund of corporate income taxes was forfeited when plaintiff presented forged corporate minutes to the irs with the knowledge they were forged (B) holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors (C) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (D) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (E) holding that grand jury testimony of officer and inhouse counsel for corporate defendant was properly admitted as admission against the corporate defendant
[EX A]: holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors

[EX Q]: Child Hearsay Statute actually contemplates testimony from both the child and those witnessing the child’s later reaction, even if the hearsay may be ‘bolstering.’ ” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ledford v. State, 313 Ga. App. 389, 391-392 (2) (721 SE2d 585) (2011) (“Any ‘bolstering’ can be explored by defendant in cross-examination.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); see also Weathersby v. State, 262 Ga. 126, 128 (4) (a) (414 SE2d 200) (1992). Here, Laster does not assert that the statutory requirements were not met, and we have previously held that, under OCGA § 24-3-16 (2012), the order of witnesses is irrelevant to the question of the admissibility of child hearsay evidence. See OCGA § 24-3-16 (2012); Hilliard v. State, 298 Ga. App. 473, 477 (4) (a) (680 SE2d 541) (2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the confrontation clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination (B) holding that the trial court did not err in allowing a witness to testify regarding the child victims hearsay statements prior to the child testifying because ocga  24316 allows testimony about a childs outofcourt statements even in cases when the child does not appear as a witness as long as the child is available at the trial to testify (C) holding a social worker treating the child was permitted to testify to statements the child made about the abuse including the victims identification of the perpetrator because the statements were necessary to the treatment of ensuring the continued safety of the child (D) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (E) holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness
[EX A]:
holding that the confrontation clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination