In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

arrest for a misdemeanor is permitted only when one of the statutory exceptions is met. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-10-207© (2008). 5 . "According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a 0 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that the duration of the stop was unreasonably extended where the officer admitted that, for thirteen minutes of the sixteen minute stop, he asked the defendant questions that were unrelated to the traffic violation); Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1172— 73 (Del.2010) (concluding that the stop, during which the officer asked the defendant for identification and ran a background check, “did not exceed the permissible scope of a routine traffic stop”); Bucalo v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-CA-000176-MR, 2012 WL 246245, at *5-7 (Ky.Ct.App. Jan. 27, 2012) (<HOLDING>); State v. Mason, 173 Md.App. 414, 919 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a traffic stop which lasted 105 minutes from the time of the initial stop until the defendant was arrested on drugrelated charges was unreasonable because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for purposes of conducting a drug dog sniff because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant was engaged in drugrelated activity (B) holding circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion to make a stop included that the defendant was on a comer on which recent multiple drugrelated arrests had been made (C) holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished (D) holding that an officer does not need reasonable articulable suspicion of drugrelated criminal activity prior to subjecting defendants car to a dog sniff subsequent to a lawful traffic stop (E) holding duration of stop was reasonable as it lasted under thirty minutes
(A)

time to the end of the videotape. III. Defendant moved, and the State cross-moved, for leave to appeal the Appellate Division’s judgment. We granted both motions, 205 N.J. 11, 11 A.3d 371 (2010), and we thereafter granted leave to the Attorney General to participate as an amicus curiae. Before this Court, defendant argues that the Appellate Division erred in rejecting the findings ajnd conclusions of the trial court that his initial request to speak with his mother was an invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent. First, he asserts that the panel was obligated to defer to the factual findings of the trial court and that its failure to do so yiolated the clear directives from this Court, requiring reversal. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 17, 974 A.2d 1057 (2009) (<HOLDING>); State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244, 927 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a factual question and should be accorded great deference and should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous (B) holding that trial courts determination of whether defendant accepted responsibility should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation (C) holding that a trial courts findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction (D) holding that this court will only set aside district courts factual findings when they are clearly erroneous (E) holding that the case should be reopened where the cause has not proceeded so far that the ends of justice would be defeated or the orderly process of the court disturbed
(C)

employee welfare benefit programs that reimbursed subscribers who purchased Loestrin 24, but also include three individuals who purchased Loestrin 24 for their' own use. “In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court held that indirect purchasers of goods produced by firms engaged in anticompetitive conduct were too remote from that conduct to be regarded as injured” under federal antitrust law. Nexium I, 968 F.Supp.2d at 409 (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746-48, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977)). In response to Illinois Brick, “some states have passed laws ... which expressly grant end-payors the right to sue for antitrust violations.” Solodyn, 2015 WL 5458570 at *15; see generally California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Unable to bring claims under federal law, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subcontractor could recover damages from general contractor for delay in performance under state law (B) holding that a plaintiff may proceed with a claim against the state for breach of contract only where the state implicitly waives its sovereign immunity by expressly entering into a valid contract through an agent of the state expressly authorized by law to enter into such contract (C) holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law (D) holding that state liability only accrues as expressly authorized by law (E) holding that states may expressly grant indirect purchasers the right to recover under state law

(E)