In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: judgment of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the fac appealability on ineffective assistance of counsel, the “cause” Hernandez assigns for his procedural default, suggests that it intended to allow review of the procedural bar. However, even assuming that the district court wished this court to review its procedural bar finding or that we would grant a certificate of appealability on this issue, the correctness of the district court’s central holding — that there was no error, constitutional or otherwise — in the state trial court’s charge on intent is dispositive. The test for finding charge-based constitutional error is a strict one. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (<HOLDING>). We see no basis for finding a Fourteenth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error (B) holding that a trial court does not commit plain error unless the error is clear under current law (C) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (D) holding that constitutional error cannot be premised on error in a charge unless the error violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that when defendant properly objects to charge error reversal required unless error was harmless

Answer: (D)


Question: Salt Lake City Corp. v. Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Comm’n, 979 P.2d 346, 351 (Utah 1999) (ruling that continuing denial of a benefit to which a party is entitled provides a basis for standing to obtain judicial review of an administrative rule). The plaintiffs claim that he would be “directly and immediately better off — in the emphatically concrete sense that ... he would have more money in his pocket sooner — if he could obtain relief through the Notice procedure ... without sacrificing a major portion of his claim,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5, is “[n]o reasonable mind could doubt ... a judicially cognizable injury sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact test for Article III standing,” see Ontario Forest Industries Assoc. v. United States, 444 F.Supp.2d 1309, 1323-24 (CIT 2006) (<HOLDING>) (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that declaratory judgment requiring party to pay a specific sum of money is properly characterized as a money judgment (B) holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence viz the area within his control (C) recognizing that delay of refund deprives plaintiffs of the timevalue of money  and may  deprive plaintiffs of money (D) holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief (E) recognizing that an action will lie for conversion of money when its identification is possible and there is an obligation to deliver the specific money in question or otherwise particularly treat the specific money

Answer: (C)


Question: Plaintiff asserts that his right to the foreshore did not derive from a grant from the State, but instead from a colonial grant from Thomas Dongan, the Governor of Staten Island. Even if the court were to consider Plaintiffs post-trial submissions, including the Dongan grant and the Caleb Ward deeds, the court would find that Plaintiff did not own the foreshore. The Dongan Grant transferred to Christopher Billopp approximately 1600 acres of property on Staten Island and designated that the foreshore was included in the boundary of the property. Pl.Ex. Bl. New York courts have found, under the public trust doctrine, that large grants of land to private individuals are ultra vires and void. See Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 296, 5 N.E.2d 824 (1936) (<HOLDING>); Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 406, 39 N.E. 400 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion (B) holding that a state has subject matter jurisdiction to grant a divorce if one of the spouses is domiciled in the state (C) holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion (D) holding that a report relied upon by agency in determining whether or not to award a grant had not been adopted as there is no indication in the record that in funding the  grant the agency expressly adopted the reasoning of the report (E) holding in reference to an eleven mile grant of the foreshore that neither the king nor the state could grant away for private purposes so much of the publics rights in the lands under water

Answer:
(E)