TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: recipient venue because their lack of standing here means it is not a district “in which [the case] might have been brought,” according to the requirements of the transfer statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiffs suggest that this court should “sensibly confirm[] that inherent in any discretionary transfer here is the idea that jurisdiction cannot be destroyed.” PI. Resp. 25. The argument is artful but unpersuasive. “There is no valid reason for reading the words ‘where it might have been brought’ to narrow the range of permissible federal forums beyond those permitted by federal venue statutes.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 623, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); see also Carbonara v. Olmos, 1994 WL 61797, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1994) (<HOLDING>). B. Standing of SAF SAF asserts both 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (C) holding that transfer to a district in which circuit law likely precluded standing was proper because the language of  1404a refers only to whether venue is proper and not a plaintiffs capacity to sue (D) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (E) holding that venue is proper in any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: While R.E. concerned the use of retrospective testimony by DOE to support a finding that it provided a child a FAPE, the court’s rejection of E.Z.-L.’s substantive challenge introduced doubt about whether parents could prospectively challenge their child’s educational placement without first enrolling the child in the recommended placement school. DOE argued that R.E. foreclosed all such prospective challenges on the basis that they are inherently speculative. The argument found some acceptance. See, e.g., E.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 13 Civ. 6709, 2014 WL 4332092, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2014) (rejecting prospective challenge as “impermissibly speculative and premature”); P.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 13 Civ. 4772, 2014 WL 3673603, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (<HOLDING>). But most courts did not adopt this hardline 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student (B) holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement (C) holding that the sro correctly concluded that a challenge tothe does choice of school is improper where the student never attended the school (D) holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school (E) holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: the interpretation of the statute has clearly been vested by a provision of law in the agency’s discretion. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c), (l). If the agency has been clearly vested with interpretive authority, we generally defer to the agency’s interpretation, and may grant relief only if the agency’s interpretation is “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” Id. § 17A.19(10)(i). If the agency has not been clearly vested with discretion to interpret the statute, “we are free to substitute our judgment de novo for the agency’s interpretation and determine if the interpretation is erroneous.” Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 589-90 (Iowa 2004) (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(e)). The legislature has delegated broad authority to 643 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Iowa 2002) (<HOLDING>). Section 147.76 clearly'vests the board of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding board cannot ignore the rules it adopts under the delegation of authority to prescribe rules for its governance and the governance of the university because such rules have the force and effect of statute (B) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (C) holding that director of police department does not have final policymaking authority in miamidade county despite having some discretionary authority (D) holding statute providing the director shall have the power and authority to prescribe all rules not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter necessary and advisable for its detailed administration and to effectuate its purposes vested authority in the department of revenue and finance to interpret section 4224520 (E) holding that congress had exceeded its authority by using its section five power under the fourteenth amendment to enact the statute

SOLUTION:
(D)