In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: WL 687033, at *1 (D.Md. Feb. 29, 2008) (citing Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). Courts in the Fourth Circuit deny leave to amend a complaint past the deadline established by a scheduling order where the moving party has been careless in developing his claims or where he has failed to satisfactorily account for his failure to do so. Compare Whichard v. Specialty Restaurants Corp., 220 F.R.D. 439, 441 (D.Md.2004) (denying plaintiffs motion to join an additional defendant five months after the court imposed deadline because plaintiff had ample notice before the deadline that the original defendant might not be the right party) with Long v. Blair, No. 2:09-CV-00349, 2010 WL 1930220 (S.D.W.Va. May 12, 2010) (<HOLDING>). After a movant satisfies the good cause 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that good cause did not exist where counsel waited months after filing of the pleadings to propound written discovery and did not take oral depositions of known key individuals to their claims until after the deadline for amending the complaint (B) holding that a change in the theory of recovery and one prior amendment is not sufficient to deny a motion to amend the complaint where no evidence of bad faith existed (C) holding that denial of leave to amend was appropriate because the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint two years after filing his complaint  on the eve of trial when discovery was complete (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion where it determined that plaintiffs failed to show good cause to amend complaint after dispositive motion deadline (E) holding that good cause existed where the plaintiff did not establish a sufficient evidentiary basis to support new claims until after the deadline for amending his complaint and moved to amend immediately after the new evidence came to light
[EX A]: holding that good cause did not exist where counsel waited months after filing of the pleadings to propound written discovery and did not take oral depositions of known key individuals to their claims until after the deadline for amending the complaint

[EX Q]: interests that a lawful permanent resident or even an illegal entrant residing more than two weeks may have developed.... Diaz Rodriguez has not shown that he has been lawfully admitted, so the due process rights of a lawfully admitted citizen are not implicated here.”). Accordingly, Petitioner has no constitutional due process rights in relation to her admission beyond that authorized by Congress. The restricted habeas review provisions set forth in Section 1252 adequately protect Petitioner’s rights because she has a meaningful review of the cause for her exclusion and of the Executive’s power to exclude her. The writ therefore has not been suspended and the Court lacks jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s claims. See Garcia de Rincon, 539 F.3d at 1140-41; Lorenzo, 508 F.3d at 1281 (<HOLDING>); Vaupel, 244 Fed.Appx. at 895 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1252e2 clearly does not permit court to review whether expedited removal statute applies in first place (B) holding that court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review aliens habeas claims seeking review of expedited removal order including whether expedited removal statute was lawfully applied to alien and whether expedited removal procedures violated his right to due process because language of section 1252e5 clearly precludes review in habeas proceedings of whether alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal (C) holding that strict limitations set forth in section 1252e preclude judicial review of any constitutional or statutory claims related to the underlying expedited removal order (D) holding that  1252a2a barred review of petitioners claims including asapplied due process challenges to expedited removal order (E) holding prior to enactment of section 1326d that a person charged with illegal reentry has a constitutional right to collaterally attack the underlying removal order when a due process violation in a removal proceeding amounts to a complete deprivation of judicial review
[EX A]: holding that section 1252e2 clearly does not permit court to review whether expedited removal statute applies in first place

[EX Q]: role of an advocate in prosecuting Srivastava. Likewise, the doctrine of judicial immunity precludes Srivastava’s claims against the judge who presided over her criminal case. See Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir.2000) (judicial immunity shields judges from civil actions for their judicial acts unless they have acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction); John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir.1990) (mere allegations of conspiracy insufficient to overcome judicial immunity). Additionally, Srivastava cannot sue employees of the Marion County Public Defender’s Office under § 1983 because they are not acting under “color of state law,” a requisite element of any § 1983 claim. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317 n. 4, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (<HOLDING>). As for Srivastava’s claim against the officer 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a town manager did not act under color of state law when making allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff (B) holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee (C) holding that a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing the traditional functions of counsel to a criminal defendant (D) holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc  1983 (E) holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action
[EX A]:
holding that a town manager did not act under color of state law when making allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff