In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

District Attorney’s Office to discriminate in the jury selection process. On April 26, 2007, the PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant relief and the instant appeal followed. Appellant raises the following claim: The lower court erred by limiting Appellant’s hearing solely to proof of a policy or culture of discrimination by the Philadelphia District Attorney and further erred by denying Appellant the opportunity to develop and prove discrimination in his case. Before we proceed with a review of the merits of this issue, we must ascertain whether the PCRA court was correct in its conclusion that Appellant timely filed his fifth PCRA petition for, if he did not, we are without jurisdiction to address his claim. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 941 A.2d 1263 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), any PCRA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed (B) holding that the time requirements of the statute are as much a part of the jurisdictional threshold as the mandate to file for a rehearing and that the time limits must be strictly construed and may not be waived by ferc or evaded by the courts (C) holding pcra time limits are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed (D) holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign (E) holding  2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed
holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed

where the-plaintiff seeks to subject private parties to § 1983 liability by bestowing on them the title of state actors. The instant case does not involve a situation where the State has “ ‘so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private party] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.’ ” Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1131 (quoting NBC ¶. Communications Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir.1988) (citation omitted)). The Eleventh Circuit in Harvey, confronting facts similar to the case at bar and the issue of whether involuntary commitment by private parties may be considered state action, found an insufficient nexus between the defendants, a private hospital and private physicians, and the State. See id.; see also Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 258 (<HOLDING>). The court observed that “[b]oth the Supreme 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ccmc and its employees were not state actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus test (B) holding that massachusetts statute did not create a sufficiently close nexus between private hospital and the state to warrant labeling private actors state actors (C) holding that foster parents are not state actors (D) holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability (E) holding that private hospital and physicians who involuntarily committed plaintiff under massachusetts statute were not state actors noting that state regulation even if extensive and receipt of federal funds do not establish state action
holding that ccmc and its employees were not state actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus test

to Wil-loughby’s actual distribution of cocaine (taking place miles from where the gun was found) and no evidence indicated that any distribution occurred at the storage facility (packaging drugs for later distribution is not distribution — that is why possession with intent to distribute is such a popular drug charge) and because a hypothetical future distribution is not a legitimate basis for a current conviction, the weapons conviction could only have been based upon a possession-protection theory, a valid ground in this circuit but not when it falls outside the scope of the indictment. Willoughby’s motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted. Willoughby, 27 F.3d at 266-67 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111, 1114-15 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Here, HRS § 708-840 (1993) provides that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even when a jury instruction is defective such a defect is cured when the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that the trial court committed fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence when that element was in dispute at trial (C) holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury (D) holding that the trial court reversibly erred when it altered an essential element of the crime charged and broadened the language of the indictment by instructing the jury on the general definition of enterprise for rico conspiracy (E) holdingthat an error in instructing the jury that an offense could be committed by a statutory method not charged in the indictment is cured where  the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt  citation omitted

holding that even when a jury instruction is defective such a defect is cured when the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt