In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: of the documents. In his report, Gage stated only that the witnesses could not recall whether or not Peng raised his fist, but that they saw Peng grab the documents from Mei Hu. Peng has submitted a declaration by C. Peng that neither he nor Mr. Chi ever told anyone anything about what happened. As the district court noted, Peng has not cast doubt on the fact that, prior to Peng’s arrest, Jonathan Hu, acting as interpreter, told Gage that the two witnesses saw Peng grab the documents from Mei Hu. Peng has cast doubt on the identity of the witnesses and the veracity of Jonathan Hu, but Gage could not have known this at the time of the arrest. We are satisfied that Gage made a reasonable investigation under the circumstances before he arrested Peng. See Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1442-44 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the presence of a factual 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report (B) holding that because the court could not consider police reports it could not rely on an attorneys argument based on the police report as the basis for determining the statutory basis for a conviction (C) holding that error in excluding a police officers report was harmless where the same evidence was presented by another witness (D) holding that an insurer has a duty to conduct an investigation reasonably appropriate under the circumstances (E) holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: filed, is the verdict, and a showing that the writing is incorrect is not an impeachment of the verdict itself.” (punctuation omitted)). 19 See former OCGA § 17-9-41 (“The affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict.”); Fulton County v. Phillips, 91 Ga. 65, 65 (16 SE 260) (1892) (syllabus by the court) (“According to repeated rulings of this court, the affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain, but not to impeach, their verdict.”); see also former OCGA § 9-10-9 (providing the same rule in civil procedure). 20 See generally OCGA § 24-1-2 (e) (“Except as modified by statute, the common law as expounded b tate, 323 Ga. App. 15, 17 (2) (747 SE2d 99) (2013). 34 Freeman, 264 Ga. at 278; see Wade v. State, 261 Ga. 105, 107-08 (6) (401 SE2d 701) (1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Ingram v. State, 290 Ga. 500, 503 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err (B) holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating (C) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection (D) holding that upon objection to the form of the verdict trial court did not err in returning jury for further deliberations (E) holding that a district court did not err by submitting a special verdict form to the jury this particular verdict form did not specify a standard of proof
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: That case dealt with whether the deletion of certain details before disclosure was proper under the PDA’s “unreasonable invasion of personal privacy” exception, former ROW 42.17.260(1) (1975); it too does not alter our analysis here. 14 The Washington PDA closely parallels FOIA, and when construing similar provisions, judicial interpretations of that act are helpful in construing the PDA. Hearst Corp., 90 Wn.2d at 128. See also Dawson, 120 Wn.2d at 791. The Newspapers argue that, because the provisions of FOIA and the PDA do not differ as to the proposition that disclosure to some is the equivalent of disclosure to all, FOIA cases are helpful. But in fact, neither the PDA nor FOIA contains such a provision. 15 See, e.g. Naturalization Serv., 721 F. Supp. 552, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (<HOLDING>); Cooper v. Internal Revenue Serv., 450 F. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agency could not claim national security disclosure exemption where documents already released to the press (B) holding that documents concerning how to respond to ongoing inquiries from the press and congress about the entry of a government witness and mexican national into the united states fell under the deliberative process privilege (C) holding an agency need not demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist (D) holding that unauthorized disclosure of documents does not constitute a waiver of the applicable foia exemption (E) holding the governments prior disclosure of requested information could not waive individuals privacy interests under exemption 6 and collecting cases involving exemption 7c
[EX A]:
(A)