In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: reimbursement decisions to be made on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 549. Of note here, we explained that “even if the Commission had promulgated fee guidelines, the provider would not have a statutory right or privilege to be paid the amount set out in the guideline.” Id. According to East Side, Vista is, likewise, neither entitled to a fee guideline nor entitled to any set amount of reimbursement. See id. Given that no specific reimbursement amount is required, even where the Division has established fee guidelines, and that the Division can reason ng statute and rule as whole to find broad definition of “prohibited activities” and absence of definition for “market power” as providing constitutionally permissible notice of type of prohibited conduct contemplated); Tinning, 875 S.W.2d at 409 (<HOLDING>). The language in these cases, similar to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (B) holding term share legal fees although not expressly defined provides adequate notices of type of conduct it would include (C) holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment (D) holding that although term was not limited by the specification it was expressly defined in a narrow manner in the prosecution history (E) holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution

A: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance
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Q: to two judicially cognizable interests. Id. at 560. First, the partisan-elections regime makes the process of getting on the general-election ballot more costly and time consuming. As Nix argues, courts have recognized that “[s]uch ballot-access requirements impose an ‘injury-in-faet,’ not only because non-compliance prevents ‘candidates’ from ‘appearing] on the ... ballot,’ but also because even compliance requires ‘significant amounts of time, money, personnel, and energy,’ which are limited ‘campaign resources’ that could have been ‘allocate[d]’ elsewhere.” Appellants’ Opening Br. 19-20 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 856-58 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 n. 9, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Second, Nix alleges that Kinston’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search (B) holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance (C) holding that candidates had ample standing to challenge ballotaccess requirements (D) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract (E) holding that candidates had standing to challenge requirements for appearing on the generalelection ballot as independents even though they could have chosen to run in a party primary

A: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search
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Q: was first introduced prior to his taking the stand, Valentine took the stand and presented testimony that he was silent when told he was under arrest for murder. Because Valentine testified to his own silence, neither Doyle nor Fletcher clearly applies to these facts. We conclude that the state court decision is not contrary to Supreme Court law, and consider whether the state court’s application of clearly established law was objectively unreasonable. Circuit court precedent is relevant only to the extent that it “illuminates the application of clearly established law.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir.2004). In this case, circuit court precedent reveals a divergence of opinion in cases addressing this issue. Compare United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634, 638 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government may comment on a defendants prearrest premiranda silence as well as his postarrest pr emiranda silence (B) holding that the admission of a defendants postarrest premiranda silence in the prosecutions caseinchief violates the fifth amendment because the defendant was in custody (C) holding that substantive use of prearrest silence is contrary to fifth amendment (D) holding that introduction of defendants premiranda custodial silence is violation of fifth amendment (E) holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds silence during police custodial interrogation

A:
holding that the government may comment on a defendants prearrest premiranda silence as well as his postarrest pr emiranda silence
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