In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: of TILA;” (2) "The notes and security instruments signed by plaintiff and borrowers for the purchase of mobile homes were extensions of credit subject to TILA;” (3) "The requirement that insurance policies contain provisions covering Green Tree's possible repossession expenses are credit charges as defined by TILA and occur annually when each policy is renewed;” and (4) "No TILA disclosures are given by Green Tree.” (See Am.Compl. ¶¶ 21-23.) Green Tree does not rebut these contentions and instead only addresses the merits of the arbitration issue. In this Memorandum Opinion and Order, however, the court only addresses the question of whether Plaintiff may be compelled to arbitrate her claims, not the merits of the underlying claims themselves. 6 . See. also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480-83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration (B) holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration (C) holding that an agreement to submit age discrimination claims to arbitration does not constitute a waiver (D) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (E) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: Defendants’ Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 22 (“Plaintiffs appear to be claiming that they are entitled to ‘Class of One’ review[.]”)) Furthermore, County Defendants did not explicitly address the appeal issue anywhere in their motion. Given this background, it was not error for the Court to ascribe the “class of one” argument to Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge, nor was it error for the Court to find that County Defendants had not met their burden on the question of summary judgment. To the extent that County Defendants now contend that Plaintiffs “class of one” argument must fail because no other party has appealed for a waiver, this is a new argument that is not appropriate in a motion for reconsideration. See Haw. Stevedores, Inc. v. HT & T Co., 363 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1269 (D.Haw.2005) (<HOLDING>). Should County Defendants wish to re-visit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court will generally not consider arguments presented for the first time on appeal (B) holding that reconsideration pursuant to rule 59 cannot be premised on the same arguments presented in the complaint and motions (C) holding that motions for reconsideration are not appropriate if the movant asks the court to hear new arguments or supporting facts that could have been presented originally (D) holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision (E) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: 990 So.2d 578, 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Analyte Diagnostics, Inc. v. D’Angelo, 792 So.2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). Stated differently, the scope of the law of the case is “limited to rulings on questions of law actually presented and considered on a former appeal.” U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 487 So.2d 1061, 1068 (Fla. 1983); see also Gabor v. Gabor & Co., 599 So.2d 737, 738-39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Gibson v. Maloney, 263 So.2d 632, 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). The applicability of rule 3.212(d)’s conditions was neither raised nor addressed in Petition I. Thus, our disposition in McCray did not foreclose the State from raising the argument anew upon release of the opinion. See, e.g., Arch Se. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abraham Commc’ns, Inc., 702 So.2d 556, 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); Harbour Club Condo. No. Three, Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived (B) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (C) holding trial court must decide whether to compel arbitration of personal injury claim of party who was not signatory to arbitration agreement (D) holding that faa does not require appellate review of order interlocutory under state law denying motion to compel arbitration and overruling prior decision finding such a requirement (E) holding that prior per curiam affirmance of the trial courts decision denying motion to compel arbitration was not law of the case concerning whether buyer and seller entered into valid oral agreement settling disposition of escrowed money
[EX A]:
(E)