In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: the rate must make a threshold showing that the rate at issue is unreasonable. Milne, 970 F.2d at 570; Covey, 763 F.Supp. at 482-83. Relevant factors in the determination include “relevant rate comparisons, a carrier’s proffer of a particular rate, and whether the rate would have moved the traffic had it been asserted at the time the shipments took place.” Matter of Brown Transport Truckload, Inc., 144 B.R. 183, 187 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1992). One common method of making a prima facie showing of unreasonableness is to provide affidavit testimony demonstrating a significant disparity between the rates sought to be charged by the carrier and the rates charged by competing carriers at the time in question. See, e.g., Vining v. The Eureka Co., 1992 WL 370520, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 8, 1992) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Brown, 144 B.R. at 187 (noting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo (B) holding eighty percent increase in demanded rates and showing that original rates were competitive with other carriers was prima facie unreasonable (C) holding prima facie showing of unreasonableness made by presenting evidence that tariff rates in effect at time of shipments were well above rates paid to other carriers for same service (D) holding that absence of competitive injury was not a defense to prima facie violation of  2e (E) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review
[EX A]: holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo

[EX Q]: relevant facts. See Mot. at 13-14. Defendant, too, claimed in its subsequent statement of the issues that this talk happened between April 1 and April 4 and cited the same supportive evidence to this effect. See SOF, ¶ 73 (citing Howe Dep. at 32:7-12, 34:12-19 and May 13, 2014, Howe Email). Because Marks never refuted this fact by offering his own statement of the issues, as required under Local Rule 7(h), the Court could thus consider WWL’s account admitted on this ground alone. See LCvR 7(h) (“[I]n determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to- the motion.”); Jackson, 101 F.3d at 153 (<HOLDING>). The Court, however, need not rest on this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion (B) holding district court has complete discretion whether to treat facts as conceded where local rule is violated (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that the predecessor to local rule 561b3 provides the only acceptable means of  presenting additional facts to the district court (E) holding a district court has discretion under rule 55b2 once a default is determined to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action
[EX A]: holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion

[EX Q]: disciplinary warning he had issued to Mr. Avila, and he told a group of workers that Mr. Avila should get out of the country if he couldn’t speak English right about the time he fired Mr. Avila. Thus, the record contradicts the district court’s finding that Mr. Keeffe made only one isolated remark about Mr. Avila’s language, which was months before, and unrelated to, the termination decision. We conclude these remarks are circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus, and, given that two of the comments were made contemporaneous with Mr. Keeffe’s warning and termination decisions, a reasonable jury could conclude these remarks were related to those warning and termination decisions. Cf. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Hong v. Children’s Mem’l Hosp., 993 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an individual can be a final policymaker either by operation of state and local positive law or by custom or usage having the force of law (B) holding that use of potentially derogatory term may be evidence of racial animus which could potentially show pretext depending on various factors including context inflection tone of voice local custom and historical usage (C) holding that evidence of pretext may include the use of subjective criteria (D) holding that the employers routine use of racial slurs constitutes direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the contested disciplinary decisions (E) holding that a supervisors routine use of racial slurs constitutes direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the contested disciplinary decisions
[EX A]:
holding that an individual can be a final policymaker either by operation of state and local positive law or by custom or usage having the force of law