In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: in the petition no later than thirty days from the day on which the first defendant was served. Id. at 1262-63 (internal citations omitted). As a general premise, under the “first-served rule,” defendants who are properly served within thirty days of the first defendant’s service must join in the removal petition. The “failure to do so renders the petition defective.” Id. at 1262. Under the facts of Getty, however, the application of the first-served rule did not produce an inequitable result. Nonetheless, recognizing the potential for harsh results, other decisions provide that exceptional circumstances may sometimes require relief from strict application of the rule in order to achieve equitable results. See Milstead Supply Co. v. Cas. Ins. Co., 797 F.Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties (B) holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective (C) holding that dismissal of some but not all of the defendants who had been served with complaint is not a final order (D) holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served (E) holding that the defendants consent to search was voluntary although he had been served with a subpoena

Output: holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties


Input: Consider Input: opportunity to be heard on the issue ofrepayment of unemployment benefits. {32} The Minnesota Court of Appeals considered a due pr e Court of Appeals of Minnesota that distinguish Schulte where the Court ultimately held that there was no constitutional violation when the employee did participate in the hearing. See Comm ’r of Nat. Res. v. Nicollet Cty.Pub. Water/Wetlands Hearings Unit, 633 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming an appellate denial of the appellant’s due process claim based on constitutionally valid notice of the hearing because the appellant knew the potential consequences of a reversal of the initial decision and participated in the appeal with counsel); see also Aubin v. Family Dollar, Inc., No. A14-0483, 2014 WL 6724937, at *4-5 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2014) (<HOLDING>); Koch v. Sheldahl, No. A03-1562, 2004 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sentencing court did not violate defendants due process rights when it reasonably refused to recall a witness for crossexamination (B) holding that it is not (C) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (D) holding that online system of appeals did not violate due process rights because it was not affirmatively misleading and it adequately explained the potential consequences of failing to file a timely appeal citations omitted (E) holding that on summary judgment a court may not disregard evidence merely because it serves the interests of the party introducing it citations omitted

Output: holding that sentencing court did not violate defendants due process rights when it reasonably refused to recall a witness for crossexamination


Input: Consider Input: of the damages incurred by the insured. Ark. Code Ann. § 23-89-209(a)(3) (Repl. 1999). In Clampit v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 309 Ark. 107, 828 S.W.2d 593 (1992), this court stated that underinsured coverage applies when the tortfeasor has at least the amount of insurance required by law, but not enough to fully compensate the victim. Furthermore, the Underinsured motorist coverage statute estabhshes the public policy of the State of Arkansas with regard to UIM coverage. Majors v. American Premier Ins. Co., 334 Ark. 628, 977 S.W.2d 897 (1998). Although Underinsured motorist coverage is statutorily prescribed, this court has upheld prior exclusions under the current and prior versions of the statute. Chamberlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 343 Ark. 392, 36 S.W.3d 281 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Clampit v. State Farm, supra. Where an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding similar agreement void on public policy grounds (B) holding nearly identical exclusion did not violate public policy noting there is no clear legislative pronouncement of public policy requiring umuim coverage for a named driver exclusion (C) holding exhaustion clauses to be void as against hawaiis public policy (D) holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy (E) holding that state farms unambiguous ownedbutnotinsured exclusion was valid and not void as against public policy


Output: holding similar agreement void on public policy grounds