In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: been completed and 2) further investigation into issues such as whether there was hair in the shotgun hole was not necessary because, if used at trial, it would have been perceived as “tearing apart the victim.” Thus, Roark’s decision to not investigate was essentially a combination of acts within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and one that falls within the category of strategic or tactical decisions that should not be second guessed. Hollon does not present any persuasive argument that' the investigation was below an objective standard. Consequently, we uphold the district court’s determination that Hollon has not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard. D. Suppression of Hollon’s Confession Hollon argues that Roark rendered in ) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the district court determined 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed (B) holding that a petitioner must show  that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had counsel raised the issue (C) holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different (D) holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different (E) holding that where the record supported the district courts conclusion that statements would not have been suppressed and there had been nothing submitted on appeal to lead to a different conclusion the petitioner had not shown any resulting prejudice from the failure to file a motion to suppress and therefore had not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
[A]: (E)


[Q]: Id. The district court excluded this portion of the expert’s testimony. Id. at 1397. Relying on Downing, the Third Circuit reversed. Id. at 1401. We agree that expert testimony on eyewitness identification may properly be admitted under Daubert in certain circumstances, but Stevens simply does not persuade us that the district court abused its discretion in the instant case. We note that here there were five eyewitness identifica tions, not one. Likewise, as counsel for the government pointed out at argument, there was also testimony that Mr. Smith changed his alibi. In this admittedly close case, we hold only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony under the circumstances. See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification (B) holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification (C) holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider certain additional factors in evaluating the validity of eyewitness identification testimony (D) holding that a specific instruction was unnecessary because eyewitness was crossexamined and the eyewitness testimony was discussed in defense counsels opening statement (E) holding exclusion of expert eyewitness identification testimony harmless error where governments case included three separate eyewitnesses and a palm print that discredited the defendants alibi
[A]: (B)


[Q]: However, we find it difficult to draw that inference here. The key to our view of the facts is that the police knew all along that they were surveilling Ms. Lewis’ apartment. Hawes testified that he had been advised that Ms. Lewis resided there, and the officers had no reason to assume that she was not there on the day they arrested Colbert. In fact, it is altogether incredible that an officer would be surprised by the fact that a resident of a home would come out of his or her house upon seeing a large group of undercover police officers arresting an individual who just left that resident’s apartment. In addition, there is no indication that Ms. Lewis herself posed any kind of a threat to the officers, indeed she wasn’t searched or taken into custody at all. See United S 6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, this justification threatens to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a situation where the police have probable cause to arrest one party and reasonably mistake a second party for that first party the arrest of the second party is still a valid arrest (B) holding that the officers awareness that the defendant could be dangerous and that he had a previous weapons conviction was not enough to justify the sweep because once the defendant was in custody he no longer posed a threat to the police (C) holding that search of appellants suitcase found on the floor next to the couch on which he was sleeping was an unconstitutional search of his person and was not authorized by a search of the residence (D) holding unconstitutional a sweep of the second floor of a house after arrest occurred on first floor where officers could point to no specific basis for believing anyone posed a threat from the second floor (E) holding that the protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest in front of his house on suspicion of murder was not justified because the evidence that an accomplice was involved in the murder did not equate to evidence that someone would be hiding out in the defendants house a month after the crime occurred and at the time of the arrest the officers were not chasing the defendant from a crime scene
[A]:
(D)