In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: period under IAD never commenced); Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 489-90 (D.C. 1997) (rejecting prisoner’s substantial compliance argument and recognizing that court is bound by Fex); State v. Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d 579, 581-82 (Ind. 1996) (requiring strict compliance with IAD procedures and recognizing that procedures are "not mere technicalities”); Pinto v. Warden, C.A. No. 972412, 1999 WL 49378, at *7 (Conn. Super. Jan. 20, 1999) (stating that "[wjhile it is true that earlier decisions of courts were split on when the 180 day period begins, the majority of courts ... have held that the period begins to run once the request is actually received by the appropriate court and prosecutor”); Commonwealth v. Flores, C.A. No. 91-493, 1998 WL 792466, at *3 (Mass. Super. Nov. 6, 1998) (<HOLDING>). 48 . 1993 WL 138993, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court (B) holding that an noa filed by a pro se prisoner is deemed filed on the date that the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for mailing (C) holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing (D) holding that the iad as construed by fex requires that a prisoner must be tried within 180 days of the date when his request for disposition is actu ally received by the state in which the charges are pending not when the prisoner provides that request to his custodial authorities (E) holding time begins when the prisoner knows  the important facts not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance
[EX A]: holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court

[EX Q]: other court’s construal of the statute. See Thrivent, 251 S.W.3d at 622-23; J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co. v. Estes, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 836, 839-40 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied); Poole v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 14-99-00740-CV, No, 14-99-01056-CV, 2000 WL 1721150, at *1, 2000 Tex.App. LEXIS 6825, at *3-*4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 12, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication); Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d at 331. Finally, this argument is contrary to the prevailing view among state courts outside of Texas as well, which have held that an order vacating an award and directing a rehearing (without denying confirmation) is not final and appealable. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 31, 582 So.2d 162, 162-63 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Carner v. Freedman, 175 So.2d 70, 71 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable (B) holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable
[EX A]: holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable

[EX Q]: underlying claim arises. The Diehls argue that this exclusion does not apply for a number of reasons. First, the Diehls claim that the loans made to Hanft were a debt to be repaid, not a profit, and that Hanft did not profit because he was attempting to repay the loans, which were not due in full until a year after his death. The Diehls’ argument is belied by their own allegations in the underlying complaint that Hanft “never intended to repay” the loans. (TAC ¶ 41.) Further, the underlying complaint states that, over seven years, Hanft made only a single payment of $10,000 toward the almost $800,000 owed to the Diehls. (TAC ¶¶ 17-18.) The allegations of the underlying complaint show that Hanft took money for personal use with no i 5, 2005 WL 1220746 at *12 (Ohio Ct.App. May 24, 2005) (<HOLDING>); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Foster, 268 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact (B) holding that estoppel was a question of fact (C) holding that the fact that an investigatory stop took place in a high crime area is pertinent to a terry analysis (D) holding it is a question of fact (E) holding exclusion inapplicable because there remains a question of whether any conversion in fact took place
[EX A]:
holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact