In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: analysis and did not provide any guidance as to its future implications.... ”); Schafer, 598 N.E.2d at 553 (“Sturrup is out of the mainstream of caselaw on equal protection analysis_(citation omitted));. Robbins, 941 F.Supp. at 793 (“Federal equal protection ‘rational basis’ analysis does not contain an ‘overbroad’ component. Rather, high school transfer rules, like the rule in question, are valid and enforceable.” (citations omitted)); Jordan, 813 F.Supp. at 1381 (refusing to apply Sturrup overbreadth scrutiny and writing “Indiana’s practice of subjecting equal protection and procedural due process claims to ‘over 75 (N.D.Ill.1978) (finding Illinois version of Transfer Rule did not violate equal protection); Simkins v. S.D. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 434 N.W.2d 367 (S.D.1989) (<HOLDING>); Chabert v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 323 
 Holding statements: (A) holding illinois high school associations version of the transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding that the cap does not violate equal protection (D) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection (E) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection as rule was uniformly applied not arbitrary and rationally related to legitimate government interest
Example Output: (B)

Example Input: that is so related structurally to another substance as to be theoretically derivable from it even when not so obtainable in practice (the methoxy of naphthalene).” Webster’s Int’l 608. Thus, while some of the general purpose dictionaries provide support for Defendant’s suggested definition for derivative, others define the term as proposed by Plaintiffs. Technical dictionaries can also assist claim construction by showing how those skilled in the art define “derivatives.” Moba v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[A]s this court has repeatedly counseled, the best indicator of claim meaning is its usage in context as understood by one of skill in the art at the time of invention.”); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, again, the cited sources provide 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning (B) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (C) holding that the specifications reference to a selector sufficed as one skilled in the art would have understood the term (D) holding a technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention unless it is apparent from the patent and the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a different meaning (E) holding that courts may consult scientific dictionaries and technical treatises to deter mine the ordinary meaning of a technical term to persons skilled in the art
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: accident insurance” as a collateral source. Id. Respondent argues that UIM benefits are akin to payments from the tortfeasor’s liability insurance, which do not constitute collateral sources. Respondent relies on Do, a case in which the supreme court held that “a payment made by a tortfeasor’s automobile insurer is not a collateral source” under section 548.251. 779 N.W.2d at 855. The supreme court observed that the ordinary meaning of “collateral source” refers to a source “wholly independent of’ and unconnected with the tortfeasor, and held that payments made to an injured claimant by the tortfeasor’s liability insurer constitute a direct rather than a collateral source because they derive directly from the tortfeasor’s insurance. See id. at 859-60; see also Dean, 535 N.W.2d at 345 (<HOLDING>). As a result, they do not constitute 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that violence that does not stem from particularized animosity but rather from a financial incentive does not constitute persecution (B) holding hospital could not enforce ben directly against tortfeasors insurer because patient had no right to directly sue insurer (C) holding that an insurer can be estopped from denying coverage for failure to make payments where that insurer has established a course of conduct of accepting late payments (D) holding that payments from a tortfeasors insurer are not from a collateral source because they stem directly from the tortfeasor (E) holding that recovery from the tortfeasors insurer is a condition precedent to a claim for uim benefits
Example Output:
(D)