In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
inquiry — • whether New Provo Canyon’s treatment of one individual constituted state action — differs substantially from that in Milonas, irrespective of whether, for purposes of a class action suit, Old Provo Canyon’s treatment of its patients generally constituted state action. Thus, the question here does not present the necessary “like facts” to trigger the stare decisis doctrine. D. Collateral Estoppel For the very same reason, Taylor’s collateral estoppel argument fails. Collateral esto Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553; Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Logistics Control Group, 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.1985) (discussed below). 13 . Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553-54; Lib. Mut. Ins., 969 F.2d at 1388-89; Holloway, 813 F.2d at 878-79; see also Nipper v. Snipes, 1 F.3d 415, 415-417 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Id. at 1553; see also Lib. Mut. Ins., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (B) holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body (C) holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial (D) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (E) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact

Ex Output:
holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint


Ex Input:
with the court, that Mr. Peralta has been granted a labor certification pursuant to a subsequent application filed by his employer. He has been awarded all of the relief that he sought, and there is consequently no live controversy concerning the original denial of his application for the same position with the same employer. As to the appellants whose employers have re-filed new certification applications that are currently pending, we do not think their claims are mooted. In contrast to Mr. Peralta, these parties have not yet received the relief originally sought and thus their original claim that the denial of their first certification application was arbitrary remains a live controversy. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Actually, even after a certification is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending (B) holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided (C) holding that appeals are moot when appellate courts can provide no effective relief (D) holding that a case is not moot so long as the court can fashion some form of meaningful relief for the injured party (E) holding that a previously live case can become moot only if interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation

Ex Output:
holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending


Ex Input:
§ 507(a)(7)(E), even though the Bankruptcy Code itself provides no definition of ‘excise,’ ‘tax,’ or ‘excise tax.’ ” Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. at 220, 116 S.Ct. 2106. Even when the definition appears in a single statute, our sister circuits have also held that definitions limited to one section should not be applied to another section. Thus, for example, the Fourth Circuit held that, where Congress limited the definition of “investigative or law enforcement officer” to 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), “[t]o apply the § 2680(h) definition beyond that subsection would make meaningless the limitation that Congress placed on the definition.” Andrews v. United States, 441 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir.2006); see also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Amada, 200 F.3d 647, 650-51 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that § 1337 is not designed to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc  16 (B) holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract (C) holding that the definition of supplier under the ocspa is substantially broader than the definition of debt collector under the fdcpa (D) holding that for purposes of 18 usc  924e involuntary manslaughter in ohio is a violent felony the definition of which is identical for all relevant purposes to the definition of crime of violence in  4b12a (E) holding that where the definition of lottery is expressly limited to 18 usc  1307b the definition cannot be applied to a related civil statute

Ex Output:

holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc  16