In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: on the circuit court orders and the statements of defense counsel at the hearing. We hold that neither the doctors nor the trial court could rely on facts and legal conclusions within the circuit court orders. Thus, the doctors’ assertions at the hearing, which were based on facts within the orders, constituted factual statements of counsel. Moreover, the orders were, in effect, memoranda submitted by counsel. In any event, the trial court could not properly consider factual statements from either when deciding the motions, however they are characterized. Cf. Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 457 S.E.2d 601 (1995) (noting that the ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be based solely upon the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint); Gilmore, 290 S.C. 53, 348 S.E.2d 180 (<HOLDING>). This is not to say that circuit court orders 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the judge cannot consider factual statements of counsel in a motion for summary judgment (B) holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment (C) holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment (E) holding that conclusory statements without factual support are of no value to the court when deciding a summary judgment motion

Answer: holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment


Question: States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). The Supreme Court has recognized that “searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). However, the Supreme Court has permitted exceptions to the warrant requirement when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (allowing school officials to conduct warrantless searches of student property without probable cause); see also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable (B) holding neither the warrant requirement nor the probable cause requirement should apply to noninvestigatory workrelated purposes or for investigations of workrelated misconduct  (C) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (D) holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause (E) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause

Answer: holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable


Question: have expected that policyholders would assert claims and that some of the claims would be disputed. For some reason, EDS did not install a procedure for forwarding claims or notices served in its mail room. Nothing in the record excuses EDS’s misplacing of those claims and notices or its resulting failure to respond. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 67 comment b (1980) (“In the case of ... organizations that ought to expect to be sued from time to time, the question [in determining whether neglect is excusable] is whether their procedure for responding, particularly the procedure for putting the case in the hands of counsel, could be expected to function within the time al lowed.”); see also Secretary of State v. GPAK Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 82, 230 A.2d 146 (App.Div.1967) (<HOLDING>). EDS, therefore, is not entitled to relief 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that corporations neglect in receiving notice of entry of judgment against it and not forwarding notice to corporations registered agent was inexcusable (B) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (C) holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment (D) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (E) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner

Answer:
holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city