In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of Liability Provisions SBVS argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to lost rent or diminution in value damages because both of the Agreements contain provisions barring the award of consequential damages. The Court concludes that the enforceability of these provisions turns on disputed facts and, therefore, that summary judgment on this issue is improper. Generally, provisions limiting liability in construction contracts are enforceable under California law so long as the parties negotiated and expressly agreed to the limitations. See Cal. Civ.Code § 2782.5. However, such a provision is unenforceable if it is unconscionable or otherwise contrary to public policy. Markborough California, Inc. v. The Superior Court of Riverside County, 227 Cal.App.3d 705, 715, 277 Cal.Rptr. 919 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Under § 1668 of the California Civil Code, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs who had been served and received responses to interrogatories on personal jurisdiction had had such a fair opportunity (B) holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant (C) holding contract not unconscionable where parties were of equal bargaining power plaintiff had opportunity to have an attorney review the contract the contract was clear and easily read the plaintiff had been a party to similar contracts in the past and was under no financial pressure to sign the con tract (D) holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish procedural unconscionability since he had a reasonable opportunity to consider the agreement and the arbitration clause was clearly set forth in the contract (E) holding that limitation of liability clause in construction contract that is not unconscionable or in violation of public policy is valid so long as parties had a fair opportunity to accept reject or modify limitation and affirming summary judgment on basis that plaintiff had presented no evidence that it had had no such opportunity

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: expenses related to the children’s needs at the time of the hearing. The trial court made numerous, in-depth findings regarding the children’s accustomed standard of living, the needs of the children, and the variance between the expenses incurred by defendant on behalf of the children and expenses incurred by plaintiff on behalf of the children. These findings are sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that the Pataky presumption was rebutted. Although in most cases, the custodial parent obtains an increase in child support, a court has discretionary authority to enter an order establishing child support in an amount less than the amount established by a separation or child support agreement. See Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 234-35, 346 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1986) (<HOLDING>). We hold the trial court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter (B) holding that it was error for the trial court to determine the issue of child support without a child support guidelines worksheet (C) holding trial court had discretionary authority to enter order setting child support amount as less than that provided for in the parties separation agreement (D) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality (E) holding that an order that determines only the right to attorneys fees without setting the amount is a nonappealable nonfinal order

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: held that a prisoners liberty interest is implicated only when government action “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293. It was the First Circuit’s view that transfer to more restrictive conditions did not impose an “atypical” hardship: the conditions were “no different from those ordinarily experienced by large numbers of other inmates serving their sentences in customary fashion.” Id. at 1160; see also Lyle v. Sivley, 805 F.Supp. 755, 760 (D.Ariz.1992) (finding that notwithstanding the dictates of § 8624(c), an inmate had no constitutional liberty interest in transfer to a less restrictive environment) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (<HOLDING>)). A prisoner cannot level a due process 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prisoner has no constitutionallybased liberty interest in a particular prison classification  because an inmate is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison (B) recognizing the individuals interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters (C) holding that the inmate had no cognizable due process claim because he had no liberty interest in being free from disciplinary segregation (D) holding that vdocs interstate transfer regulations are routine and create no liberty interest in any transfer (E) holding that an inmate had no liberty interest in avoiding transfer to a more restrictive facility


Output: (E)