In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
to intervene” as a linguistic tool to highlight how little personal participation the defendant had in the arrest in that particular case. The passage shows how far below the required minimum level of involvement that particular defendant exhibited. Read in whole, Brown more accurately shows that personal participation in an arrest, or supervisory control over the arresting officer, is required in order to establish liability for unlawful arrest — mere presence is not enough. However, even assuming Plaintiffs are correct, and that law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene in other officer’s unlawful arrests, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers or Alma Officers violated clearly established law in this case. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Canine Handlers and Alma Officers were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search (C) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force (D) holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant (E) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied

Ex Output:
holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim


Ex Input:
If a statement does not contain any expressly exculpatory material, the Government need not produce that statement to the defense. To hold otherwise would impose an insuperable burden on the Government to determine what facially non-exculpatory evidence might possibly be favorable to the accused by inferential reasoning. We are confident that the Supreme Court did not intend the Brady holding to sweep so broadly. United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir.1988); see also Harris v. Kuba, 486 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir.2007) {“Brady does not require that police officers or prosecutors explore multiple potential inferences to discern whether evidence that is not favorable to a defendant could become favorable.”); United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that just such inferential 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b (B) holding that there is no constitutional duty to do a better investigation and that a decision not to conduct a more thorough investigation does not invade an accuseds rights (C) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (D) holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence (E) holding that brady does not place any burden upon the government to conduct a defendants investigation or assist in the presentation of the defenses case

Ex Output:
holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b


Ex Input:
Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 523-26 (6th Cir.2008). Here, the Plaintiff was terminated by the Defendants three weeks after the filing of the Complaint in this case. This close temporal proximity between the Plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse employment action is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for his engagement in pro tected activity. See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection (B) holding in a discrimination case that a close temporal proximity sufficient to survive summary judgment existed where the challenged employment action occurred one month after the protected activity (C) holding that intervening misconduct can sever the temporal proximity connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment (D) holding that temporal proximity between the alleged retaliators knowledge of a protected activity and an adverse employment action may be sufficient to establish causal connection or retaliatory motive in some cases (E) holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection

Ex Output:

holding in a discrimination case that a close temporal proximity sufficient to survive summary judgment existed where the challenged employment action occurred one month after the protected activity