In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Court would apply its own jurisprudence because Braun prescribes an objective just cause standard-the standard Jurgens requests. 65 . Cassel, 14 P.3d at 284 (quoting Univ. of Alaska v. Tovsen, 835 P.2d 445, 447 (Alaska 1992)). 66 . Id. at 284 (quoting Baldwin, 769 P.2d at 304). 67 . See NPMC 2.36.010(A) (stating that purpose of chapter is to "establish and operate a system of personnel administration based upon equitable merit principles and professional methods governing ... removal, [and] discipline ... of employees"), .310(A) (requiring system of "uniform and equitable administration of discipline"), .310(B) (requiring that "discipline [] be administered in increasingly progressive severity"), .321(F) (allowing board to impose "lesser disciplinary action"); Tovsenm, 835 P.2d at 447 (<HOLDING>). 68 . See Braun, 816 P.2d at 142. 69 . See 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a termination of a government contract does not constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property without just compensation or without due process of law (B) holding that words found evaluated and unsatisfactory in personnel regulation required an objective just cause termination (C) holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases (D) holding that termination is an adverse employment action (E) holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable
(B)

ah officer may ask a question outside the scope of the initial justification for the stop so long as it does not further lengthen the time taken to process the initial justification for the stop. In other words, if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid. This reasoning is explained in both United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc), and United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5th Cir.1993). In both cases, the courts held that questions by police officers during a traffic stop are not seizures or searches proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and cited United States Supreme Court cases dealing with non-custodial police-citizen encounters for support. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent (B) holding that police may approach persons and ask questions or permission to search so long as police do not imply that answers or consent are required (C) holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car
(B)

find that there occurred sexual conduct” constituting the single crime of engaging in a sexual act with a child. See Hartness, 326 N.C. at 565, 391 S.E.2d at 179. We note that our Supreme Court’s determination that first-degree sexual offense is a single wrong for unanimity purposes requires us to conclude that charging a defendant with a separate count of first-degree sexual offense for each alternative sexual act performed in a single transaction would result in a multiplicious indictment. If the defendant engages in alternative sexual acts in separate transactions, however, each separate transaction may properly form the basis for charging the defendant with a separate count of first-degree sexual offense. Compare State v. Smith, 323 N.C. 439, 444, 373 S.E.2d 435, 438 (1988) (<HOLDING>) and State v. Dilldine, 22 N.C. App. 229, 231, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state may charge a defendant with only one count of disseminating obscenity for each separate transaction even though several obscene magazines were disseminated during each transaction (B) recognizing step transaction doctrine whereby courts must consider all steps of transaction in light of entire transaction so that substance of transaction will control over form of each step (C) holding that each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice  for which an administrative charge must be filed (D) holding that a single transaction involving multiple obscene materials constitutes but one offense (E) holding that sale of two obscene magazines to one detective in one transaction and sale of two obscene films to another detective in another transaction could result in only one conviction for each separate transaction

(A)