In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: in the petition no later than thirty days from the day on which the first defendant was served. Id. at 1262-63 (internal citations omitted). As a general premise, under the “first-served rule,” defendants who are properly served within thirty days of the first defendant’s service must join in the removal petition. The “failure to do so renders the petition defective.” Id. at 1262. Under the facts of Getty, however, the application of the first-served rule did not produce an inequitable result. Nonetheless, recognizing the potential for harsh results, other decisions provide that exceptional circumstances may sometimes require relief from strict application of the rule in order to achieve equitable results. See Milstead Supply Co. v. Cas. Ins. Co., 797 F.Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties (B) holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective (C) holding that dismissal of some but not all of the defendants who had been served with complaint is not a final order (D) holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served (E) holding that the defendants consent to search was voluntary although he had been served with a subpoena

Output: holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties


Input: Consider Input: motions). The Second Circuit has not yet announced a specific standard for exercising the district court’s discretion in ruling on such a motion. The Second Circuit has, however, stated that: “[o]nly ‘reasonably genuine surprise’ on the part of the appellant, Moylan v. Siciliano, 292 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir.1961), combined with an assertion of the nature of the additional evidence, Berns v. Pan Am. World Airways, 667 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir.1982), would give us sufficient reason to remand for the taking of additional evidence.” Air et Chaleur, S.A. v. Janeway, 757 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir.1985); see also Matthew Bender & Co., 158 F.3d at 679 (upholding district court’s decision to permit party to re-open a hearing where (1) additional evidence was material, (2) opposing part (S.D.N.Y.1994) (<HOLDING>). I shall consider the issue of Plaintiff’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rules of procedure are structured to provide the nonmovant with substantially more time for filing affidavits than the moving party because the nonmoving party should have an opportunity to examine and reply to the moving partys papers before the court considers them (B) holding that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record with no guidance from the briefing party to determine if the record supports the partys argument (C) holding that the party moving for summary judgment waived its argument that the opposing partys affidavit should not be considered because the moving party never objected to the timeliness of the affidavit to the trial court (D) holding that when appraising a partys motion to reopen the record posttrial the court must consider 1 whether or not the moving partys failure to submit evidence was the result of its own lack of diligence 2 the extent to which reopening the record might prejudice the nonmovant and 3 where the interests of justice lie (E) holding the moving party must meet its burden by showing  that is pointing out to the trial court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case

Output: holding that the rules of procedure are structured to provide the nonmovant with substantially more time for filing affidavits than the moving party because the nonmoving party should have an opportunity to examine and reply to the moving partys papers before the court considers them


Input: Consider Input: it from regulatory jurisdiction, which “extends to the entire surface and bed of all waterbodies subject to tidal action ... even though portions of such waterbodies may be extremely shallow.” 33 C.F.R. § 329.12(b). Once made, a determination of navigability applies over the entire surface of the water and “is not extinguished by later actions or events which impede or destroy the navigable capacity.” 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(c). Under this broad definition, the waters in which Gateway’s piers stand are clearly navigable. There is ample authority that under the RHA the government can remove structures that were erected lawfully but subsequently found to be in navigable waters under the RHA. See, e.g., Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 35 S.Ct. 551, 59 L.Ed. 939 (1915) (<HOLDING>); Donnell v. U.S., 834 F.Supp. 19, 25-27 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that secretary of war could not be enjoined from redrawing harbor lines effectively forcing owner to remove 200 feet of lawfully constructed wharf that obstructed channel widening and deepening project (B) holding that a landowner whose property was taken in a highway widening project could recover only for the lost land and not for losses caused by traffic islands constructed as part of the same project (C) holding that loss of access resulting from a median strip constructed as part of a highway widening project was a proper consideration because any factor that has a present quantifiable effect on the market value of the property is proper as an element of damages (D) holding that corps may order wharf owners to remove portion of legally constructed wharf in navigable waters to allow for construction of dock (E) holding that even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties


Output: holding that a landowner whose property was taken in a highway widening project could recover only for the lost land and not for losses caused by traffic islands constructed as part of the same project