In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

five years. The issue is thus whether the time Hartman served in prison after the IJ’s improper decision should count toward the five-year bar. The Court holds that it should not count and thus, contrary to the BIA’s ruling in March 2002, the application for § 212(c) relief was not untimely when the IJ addressed the merits of that application on January 25, 2001. 1. The Statutory Five-Year Bar At the outset, the Court addresses Hartman’s argument that the five-year clock stops upon filing an application for § 212(c) relief, which, in this case, would be January 1997. The Court disagrees with that argument. The five-year clock of § 212(c) does not stop when an alien, such as Hartman, files an application for a discretionary waiver. See Gomes v. Ashcroft, 311 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Falconi v. INS, 240 F.Supp.2d 215, 218 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina  212c (B) holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a (C) holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for  212c relief (D) holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina  212c (E) holding that iiriras repeal of ina  212c was not impermissibly retroactive because unlike st cyr the petitioner chose to proceed to trial instead of agreeing to a plea and therefore did not detrimentally rely on the availability of  212c relief
(C)

or creating documents with mistakes on them and signing my name to them to make me appear as if I had been inaccurate .... ” Paragraph 25: The sentence “I confidentially complained about this behavior to Bruce Smith, who, instead of taking action to prevent Burchfield from continuing her pattern of behavior toward me, apparently told Burchfield to counsel me.” Paragraph 32: The sentence “I believe that this move was the beginning point of a concerted effort to remove me from the workplace based on my age.” Paragraph 36: The sentence “I believe that Albertson’s did not provide all of the time sheets from all vendors of temporary help.” Paragraph 37: The sentence “I believe that my combination of formal college education and experience, even though I did not obtain a co h Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). With respect to paragraphs 22, 28, 34, 39, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a single conversation to be sufficient evidence of dissolution to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that mere conclusion of affiant without some supporting facts are insufficient to raise fact issue necessary to preclude summary judgment (C) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (D) recognizing that the plaintiffs mere assertions that the defendant had a discriminatory intent were inadequate without substantial factual evidence to raise an issue to preclude summary judgment (E) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party
(D)

pregnant woman consists of a person other than the woman injuring a pregnant woman in the commission of a felony causing her to suffer a miscarriage or stillbirth as a result of that injury” (§ 30-3-7(A)), defining “miscarriage” as “the interruption of the normal development of the fetus, other than by a live birth” (§ 30-3-7(B)(1)), and defining “stillbirth” as “the death of a fetus prior to the complete expulsion or extraction from its mother” (§ 30-3-7(B)(2))); see also NMSA 1978, § 66-8-101.1 (1985) (injury to pregnant woman by vehicle). These provisions 'indicate that when the Legislature intends to include fetuses within the protection of a criminal statute, it does so specifically. {9} This Court may not expand the meaning of “human being” to include an unborn vi 0, 713 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Reinesto v. Superior Court of Ariz., 182 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mother could not be prosecuted under child abuse statute for prenatal use of heroin (B) holding a woman may be prosecuted for child neglect and endangering a child for prenatal substance abuse (C) holding a mother not criminally liable for child endangerment for ingesting heroin while pregnant (D) holding that mother may not be prosecuted criminally for child endangerment for prenatal substance abuse (E) holding a mother may not be held criminally liable under a reckless endangerment statute for the effect that prenatal ingestion of a controlled substance may have on her child pre or postbirth

(D)