In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 7, and 10), plaintiffs response thereto, and the reply brief of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center, Nora Marden, and Joan K. Richards, and for the reasons stated in the accompa nying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED; 2. Count I is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; 3. The Court having declined to exercise its jurisdiction as to the remaining Counts of the complaint, they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their reassertion in state court; 4. The petition of defendant James E. Clark to join in the motion of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center and Joan K. Richards to dismiss the complaint (docket entry #9) is GRANTED AS UNOPPOSED; 5. The petition of defendant Nora 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Even absent Dr. Klavan’s concession on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that amtrak was a state actor (B) holding that a privately owned nursing home that received ninety percent of its funding from the state and was subject to significant state regulation was nevertheless not a state actor (C) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (D) holding that such a physician was a state actor under  1983 (E) holding that a school was not a state actor even though it had to comply with many state regulations to be eligible for state funding and almost all of its students had been referred to it by the state
[A]: holding that amtrak was a state actor


[Q]: It is axiomatic, however, that states act through their officials and agencies. Thus, under Will, those state agencies and other political subdivisions which carry out the state’s business and have immunity from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment constitute “arms of the state.” Pursuant to Will, such entities would not be considered persons under § 1983. Those political subdivisions which are not provided immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, do not rise to the level of “arms of the state” and would, under Will, be considered to be persons for the purposes of § 1983. See Barket, Levy & Fine v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1086-88 (8th Cir.1991) (bi-state agency is a “person” under § 1983); Magula v. Broward Gen. Medical Ctr., 742 F.Supp. 645, 649 (S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Since the Will decision was handed down, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment (B) holding that an ohio school district is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the state and therefore it is not entitled to assert eleventh amendment immunity from suit (C) holding that the anne arundel board of education is an arm of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that the puc is not an arm of the state and rejecting claim of immunity (E) holding that because hospital district is more like a municipality than an arm of the state hospital district did not have eleventh amendment immunity
[A]: holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment


[Q]: Exclusive Jurisdiction Doctrines. Although this court declines to decide whether the state-action doctrine applies to state antitrust claims, it seems clear that it does apply, contrary to the district court’s holding. Aplt.App. 3942-43. Oklahoma’s antitrust law is to “be interpreted in a manner consistent with federal antitrust law ... and the case law applicable thereto.” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 79, § 212; see also Teleco, Inc. 587 P.2d at 1362; Oakridge Investments, Inc. v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 719 P.2d 848, 850 (Okla.Ct. App.1986). Nothing suggests that Oklahoma would reject the state-action doctrine which we have applied to federal antitrust claims in similar circumstances. See Trigen Oklahoma City Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d 1220, 1225-1226 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); S. Disposal, Inc. v. Tex. Waste Mgmt., 161 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interpretation of regulation by va that conflicted with plain meaning of regulation not entitled to deference (B) recognizing oklahomas policy of allowing regulation instead of competition in electricity sales (C) recognizing oklahomas policy of allowing regulation instead of competition in waste disposal services (D) holding that pma process is not specific regulation because the requirements are not contained in formal regulation (E) recognizing  1857a is a clear expression of oklahomas policy favoring arbitration agreements
[A]:
holding that interpretation of regulation by va that conflicted with plain meaning of regulation not entitled to deference