In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 1 . We do not reach the question of whether it was proper for a Minnesota peace officer to go outside Minnesota's borders and attempt to compel a blood sample under Minnesota law. In this case, the sample was obtained using Wisconsin's procedure inside Wisconsin's borders and our holding is limited to these facts. 2 . Both parties make arguments regarding Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68 (Minn.1978). These cases, due to the natural exigency involved in obtaining blood-alcohol evidence, recognize the power of a peace officer to compel a blood sample from a dri Tex. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party waives the attorneyclient privilege when it voluntarily consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the communication in issue (B) holding that the michigan usury act mcla  43831 a statute setting forth the legal interest rate in michigan is preempted according to the explicit terms of hola (C) holding that the law of michigan rather than the forum applied to manufacturers claim of attorneyclient privilege in a products liability suit because the communication took place in michigan and therefore michigan had most significant relationship to communication (D) holding that litigating franchise dispute in michigan does not require that michigan law govern dispute as michigan franchise investment law does not expressly void choice of law provisions in franchise agreement (E) holding michigan friend of the court employees absolutely immune from suit under  1983
(C)

enter a residence without a warrant if an objectively reasonable basis exists for the officer to believe that there is an immediate need for police assistance for the protection of life or substantial property interests.” Seibert v. State, 923 So.2d 460, 468 (Fla. 2006) (citing Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278, 293-94 (Fla. 1997)). Whether an emergency actually existed is immaterial “so long as the officer reasonably believes it to exist because of objectively reasonable facts. The officer’s conclusion then may be based on a combination of the ‘objective’ nature of the circumstances and the officer’s ‘subjective’ perception of those circumstances.” State v. Boyd, 615 So.2d 786, 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); see also Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1559, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (<HOLDING>). The record supports that law enforcement 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable (B) holding that in determining prejudice a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury (C) holding that the court must consider the totality of the circumstance when determining whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant (D) holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith (E) holding a search permissible where the officer reasonably believed he faced an emergency situation that would result in the destruction of evidence
(C)

of two dates between Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro in 1988. In its view, the evidence was irrelevant and inflammatory. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion in limine with respect to this evidence. The court believed that the evidence was relevant and ought to be before the jury because it had the task of evaluating the overall relationship of Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro. Evidence that is relevant to the background of the case is admissible for that purpose. At the very least, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court not to exclude this evidence in a motion in limine; the evidence was at least potentially relevant for the purpose the judge identified. See Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). LCFS did not object during the trial when Ms. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time (B) holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment (C) holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background (D) holding that section 102 of the civil rights act of 1991 does not apply to preenactment conduct (E) holding that the  1981 amendments contained in  101 of the civil rights act of 1991 do not apply retroactively

(C)