In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: was merely acting as Casey’s nominee by allowing him to park 28th Place in her name without relinquishing the benefits of ownership of the property. The district court agreed with the government and allowed forfeiture on this ground. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “nominee” (in the context of property law) as a “party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and distributes funds for the benefit of others.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1149 (9th ed.2009). Unlike a party with a cognizable property interest, a nominee cannot claim a viable third-party interest sufficient to render a forfeiture invalid. See People v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 75 Ill.2d 479, 27 Ill.Dec. 476, 389 N.E.2d 540, 544 (1979); United States v. Herrero, 893 F.2d 1512, 1542 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by United States 
 Holding statements: (A) holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state (B) recognizing that we held in tilley that the forfeiture of proceeds from illegal drug sales pursuant to 21 usc  881a6 does not constitute punishment (C) holding that drug quantity is an element of an offense under 21 usc  841 (D) holding that scope of property subject to forfeiture is defined by the instrument creating an interest in the property (E) holding that property held by another as nominal owner for benefit of a drug dealer subject to forfeiture under 21 usc  853

Output: holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state


Input: Consider Input: the public interest and ‘[considerations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system’ require that the district court defer to local government administrators.” Id. In Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1166, the Sixth Circuit was very clear that, where “decisional law has changed so that the enjoined behavior, which once might have been a violation of federal law, is no longer a matter of federal law at all” the injunction must be vacated. In light of the fact that no federal right underpins the 1974 decree — as well as the fact that the “local government administrators” in this case appear to favor vacating the decree — the court can identify no reason that the 1974 consent decree should remain in effect. Cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (<HOLDING>); Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act (B) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated (D) holding that a court errs when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of  changes in statutory or decisional law (E) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes

Output: holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act


Input: Consider Input: error. In Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 121 S.Ct. 1276, 149 L.Ed.2d 197 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the determination whether two crimes are functionally “ ‘consolidated for sentencing,’ and hence ‘related,’ ” id. at 61, 121 S.Ct. 1276, should be reviewed deferentially because the determination is “bounded by[ ] case-specific detailed factual circumstances,” id. at 65, 121 S.Ct. 1276. We have similarly held that “[w]e review a district court’s finding as to whether prior convictions are factually related for clear error.” United States v. Mapp, 170 F.3d 328, 338 & n. 15 (2d Cir.1999); see United States v. Patasnik, 89 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Gelzer, 50 F.3d 1133, 1143 (2d Cir.1995). But see United States v. Keller, 58 F.3d 884, 894 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lopez, 961 F.2d 384, 386 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that whether a statute has been properly construed is a question of law subject to de novo review (B) holding prior to having been superseded by mapp that the determination of factual relatedness is subject to de novo review (C) holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review (D) recognizing de novo standard of review (E) recognizing that the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review


Output: holding that whether a statute has been properly construed is a question of law subject to de novo review