In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier

A: holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language
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Q: CURIAM. Anthony McLemore was tried by jury and convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of cannabis. We agree with McLemore that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury his requested special instruction that an element of the crime is knowledge by the defendant that the substances possessed were marijuana and cocaine. See Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 746 (Fla.1996). Even though McLemore disavowed any connection whatsoever to the items, we find that the error was not harmless. See Scott v. State, 808 So.2d 166 (Fla.2002)(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse the convictions and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to give proper instruction regarding disputed element of crime charged was fundamental error requiring reversal and stating that fundamental error is not subject to harmless error review (B) holdingthat because the evidence of the defendants guilt was overwhelming the courts failure to give a requested charge on impeachment constituted harmless error (C) holding that a trial court errs when it fails to give a limiting instruction properly requested by a party (D) holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error (E) holding that failure to give a properly requested chicone instruction cannot be harmless error

A: holding that failure to give proper instruction regarding disputed element of crime charged was fundamental error requiring reversal and stating that fundamental error is not subject to harmless error review
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Q: Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 117 (quoting Landry v. State, 706 S.W.2d 105, 112 (Tex. Crim.App.1985)). A finding of inherent prejudice is reserved for extreme situations. Id. This determination is to be made on a case-by-case basis. Landry, 706 S.W.2d at 112. In none of the cases which discuss potential effects that external influences may have on a jury do the courts appear to enumerate which factors might be “impermissible,” or what degree of risk is “unacceptable.” See, e.g., Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 117; Landry, 706 S.W.2d at 112. In general, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion for mistrial if the trial court has instructed the jury to disregard the assault. See Williams v. State, 651 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] ur W. 852, 854 (1923) (<HOLDING>). “We will not lightly assume the jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding witnesss prior consistent statement admissible in part because defense counsel implied during opening statement that witness had fabricated her testimony (B) holding no injury to guse shown by statement from audience member that contradicted guses testimony because statement was irrelevant to defense presented (C) holding no injury to ashley shown by statement to widow of murder victim that was not in evidence because trial court gave sua sponte instruction to jury to disregard statement and statement did not contradict ashleys testimony (D) holding that anonymous statement was admissible as a statement by a partys agent under rule 801d2d and noting that a district court should be presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who is alleged to have made the damaging statement is in fact a party or an agent of that party (E) holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent

A:
holding witnesss prior consistent statement admissible in part because defense counsel implied during opening statement that witness had fabricated her testimony
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