In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
terms, “pending” refers to the status of an action before a final decision on the merits. Beetham v. Georgia-Pacific, 87 Or App 592, 743 P2d 755 (1987); see also Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, 1669 (unabridged ed 1993) (pending means “not yet decided”). Although that meaning is useful in determining whether an action remains pending, it does not fully resolve the problem before us, which is to determine when an action becomes pending. The solution to that problem, however, is readily apparent from relevant contextual sources. ORCP 3 provides that an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint rather than by service of summons. An action becomes pending when it is commenced. See Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Corbett, 66 Or App 668, 672, 675 P2d 1097, rev den 297 Or 340 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, after a complaint is filed, an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a complaint which will not support a claim against the specific property at issue cannot provide a basis for tying it up by a filing of notice of lis pendens (B) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (C) holding that under orcp 3 lis pendens attaches upon the filing of a complaint because the action is pending (D) holding that action of filing a complaint and notice of lis pendens based on a contract without simultaneously requesting a stay and an order compelling arbitration waives that partys contractual right to arbitrate (E) holding that filing of an administrative complaint did not meet the requirement that the employee seek counseling prior to filing

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
Statement. They were, however, obtained prior to this Court’s actual approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement, which occurred on December 19, 2008 (i.e. at the joint hearing on approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement and the Amended Plan). Although typically a disclosure statement should be approved before the proponent solicits votes for the plan, here the premature solicitation was harmless and, as noted by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia, a harmless failure to comply with § 1125’s solicitation requirements “is not necessarily fatal to the success of a Chapter 11 reorganization.” In re N.W. Recreational Activities, Inc., 8 B.R. 10, 12 (Bankr.D.Ga.1980); see also First Am. Bank of N.Y. v. Century Glove, Inc., 81 B.R. 274, 278-80 (D.Del.1988) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(d)(2)(B)(vi), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case (B) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding hearing in chambers was not per se a violation of due process (E) holding that a plan proponents failure to obtain court approval of solicitation materials is not per se fatal to the confirmation process

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
later, Bain filed the rule 3.853 motions that are the subject of this appeal. In summarily denying both motions, the postconviction court found that they were untimely, in part because Bain’s delay in refiling was an abuse of process. However, due to an amendment to section 925.11, Florida Statutes, enacted on June 23, 2006, no time limit applies to rule 3.853 motions for postconviction DNA testing filed on or after October 1, 2005. See Ch. 2006-292, §§ 1, 4, at 2204-7, Laws of Fla. (codified in § 925.11, Fla. Stat. (2006)). Moreover, in dismissing Bain’s 2003 rule 3.853 motion without prejudice, the postconviction court set no filing deadline. Consequently, the postconviction court erroneously denied the 2006 motions as untimely. See Jumper v. State, 903 So.2d 264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>) Because Bain timely filed his pro se motion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion (B) holding defendant was not barred from raising sentencing issue in rule 3850 motion by virtue of prior rule 3850 motion which did not raise any sentencing issues (C) holding that the remedy of habeas corpus is not available as a substitute for postconviction relief under rule 3850 (D) holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion (E) holding that postconviction court could not deny a refilled rule 3850 motion as untimely when postconviction court did not set a filing deadline in dismissing defendants first rule 3850 motion without prejudice to refiling

Ex Output:

(E)