In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: required expert testimony at trial. We agree with other appellate courts that the statute does not violate the open courts provision by requiring an expert report sooner rather than later in the litigation. See, e.g., Gill v. Russo, 39 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Knie v. Piskun, 23 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied). Mocega’s fifth point is overruled. Notice of Hearing Mocega’s final two points assert the trial court was required to grant her the grace period provided under art. 4590i, § 13.01(g). A motion under that section is timely if filed before “any hearing” on a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Urquhart’s motion was “heard” by submission on April 3rd. See Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>). Mocega’s motion was not filed until April 
 Holding statements: (A) holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation (B) holding that a hearing does not contemplate an oral presentation unless required by express language or context (C) holding that oral rendition of judgment supported by the courts docket sheet was insufficient express specific written order is required (D) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes (E) holding that express oral agreement with government agent was not binding because among other factors applicable regulations required contract to be in writing

A: holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation
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Q: 284 So.2d 905, 915-16 (La.1973); see Tesvich v. 3-A’s Towing Co., 547 So.2d 1106, 1111 (La.Ct.App.1989) (“[W]e have concluded on the basis of Lombard that the claim of each plaintiff with respect to his or her leases constitutes a separate occurrence.” (citation omitted)); see also Reynolds v. Transcon. Ins. Co., Civ. A. Nos. 94-1367, 94-1432, 1995 WL 16795, at *5-6 (E.D.La. Jan.17, 1995) (Duval, J.) (discussing and applying Lombard, Tesvich, and Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1359 (5th Cir.1994)). The property damage in the DuroSeal petitions allegedly arose because of several negligent and fraudulent acts on the part of Jotun and others. Each of these acts does not constitute a separate bes, Inc., 924 So.2d 1131, 1133 (La.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); Korossy v. Sunrise Homes, Inc., 653 So.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee (B) holding that property damage occurred when condominium owners received architects report detailing damage not during the four years of construction of the condos (C) holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed (D) holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations (E) holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did

A: holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee
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Q: or visit the child, and failure to participate in a reunification plan}. 11 . E.J.S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 754 P.2d 749, 751 (Alaska 1988). 12 . Id. (quoting D.M. v. State, 515 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Alaska 1973)). 13 . Id. See also Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436, 439 (Alaska 1983) (indicating that while involuntary incarceration might not suffice to establish abandonment, an eight-month voluntary absence prior to incarceration would) legislatively overruled on other grounds, § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998. 14 . 956 P.2d 477 (Alaska 1998). 15 . Id. at 482. See also E.J.S., 754 P.2d at 751 (affirming finding of abandonment based on father's failure to make reasonable efforts to locate and communicate with his daughter for five years); In re B.J., 530 P.2d 747, 750 (Alaska 1975) (<HOLDING>). 16 . AS 47.10.088(a)(2). 17 . AS 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the evidence was sufficient to support termination under subsection n when after release from prison the defendant was advised of visitation but only visited with his children twice and made no further efforts to be involved with them and a case worker testified that all reasonable efforts were made to return the children to the parents (B) holding that fathers failure to acquire suitable home for his children pay even nominal child support visit or correspond with his children or make efforts to secure permanent employment were sufficient to demonstrate conscious disregard of his parental obligations (C) holding that a parents responsibility to support his children is not suspended upon his incarceration and that imprisonment cannot be used as an excuse to escape parental obligations (D) holding that husbands knowledge of his obligation of support and his subsequent election to enter employment that would substantially reduce his income and make it impossible to meet his obligations would not justify reduction in support (E) recognizing that fathers parental rights were terminated based upon his incarceration and his behavior while in prison his history of substance abuse and the fact that his child support payments are in arrears

A:
holding the evidence was sufficient to support termination under subsection n when after release from prison the defendant was advised of visitation but only visited with his children twice and made no further efforts to be involved with them and a case worker testified that all reasonable efforts were made to return the children to the parents
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