In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: its discretion by modifying the timesharing agreement without evidence that the welfare of the minor child would be promoted by returning him to his former school in Lake County and changing the timesharing arrangement to have the father assume the primary timesharing responsibilities. See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2014); Holland v. Holland, 140 So.3d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 584 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new hearing. On remand, the court shall take evidence and use the best interests of the child standard to determine if modification is in the child’s best interests in light of the parties’ inability to agree which school the minor child will attend. See, e.g., Watt v. Watt, 966 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Once that determination is made, the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification (B) holding that a hearing is required when a modification of parenting time would change the established custodial environment (C) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (D) holding that a custodial parents move to a foreign state without more is not a substantial change of circumstances that would support a modification of custody (E) holding that parties inability to agree on which private high school child would attend constituted substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of parenting plan

Answer: holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification


Question: so complete a defense as he might reasonably have desired”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 820, 115 S.Ct. 81, 130 L.Ed.2d 34 (1994); 2d Cir.: United States v. Lawal, 736 F.2d 5, 9-10 (1984) (applying authorities for non-constitutional error to erroneous exclusion of hearsay); 3d Cir.: United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1498-1500 (3d Cir.1988) (making "non-constitutional 'harmless error' determination” for erroneous exclusion of hearsay), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 836, 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989); 4th Cir.: United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 184-85 (1992) (citing Kotteakos as authority for holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay was harmless), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 914, 113 S.Ct. 2351, 124 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993); 5th Cir.: United States v. Barnett, 945 F.2d 1296, 1301 n. 3 (1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1487, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a (B) holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion (C) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right (D) holdingthat erroneous admission of hearsay did not prejudiceresults of trial so as to require reversal (E) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay

Answer: holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a


Question: albeit not the one urged by the State. The statute expressly states that the court may not grant a further reduction in excess of “one-half of the remaining mandatory minimum sentence.” Iowa Code § 901.10(2). If, as the State suggests, it is the prosecutor who decides the maximum level of the reduction, it seems more logical that any limitations on the extent of the reduction would be placed on the prosecutor, not the court. Moreover, the fact that the legislature expressly limited the court’s discretion indicates that it gave consideration to the breadth of the court’s power. The legislature could also have expressly limited any reduction by the court to an amount that did not exceed the prosecutor’s request, but it did not do so. See State v. Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Iowa 1999) (<HOLDING>); Adams, 554 N.W.2d at 689 (“legislative intent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the guidelines did not strip the sentencing court of its discretion to impose a concurrent sentence (B) recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard (C) recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so (D) holding it was reasonable trial strategy for counsel to have determined that sentencing by the court was preferable to sentencing by a jury (E) holding that sentencing court had discretion under sentencing statute noting that the legislature has demonstrated its ability to use restrictive language when it desires to do so

Answer:
holding that the guidelines did not strip the sentencing court of its discretion to impose a concurrent sentence