In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
any physician that described her as obese, much less gave an opinion that her weight imposed additional limitations upon her or exacerbated her other conditions. Therefore, even if Reynolds’ silence on the issue of obesity is not deemed to waive consideration of that issue, it does not appear that evidence existed regarding her obesity that the ALJ should have considered. The ALJ also did not err in assessing Reynolds’ credibility. An ALJ is in the best position to observe witnesses’ de meanor and to make an appropriate evaluation as to their credibility. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir.1997). Therefore, an ALJ’s credibility assessment will not be disturbed “absent compelling reason.” Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir.2001); Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (<HOLDING>). In making a credibility determination, Social 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference (B) holding that the courts conclusion that transfer was appropriate is to be accorded great deference (C) holding that the district courts credibility assessments are entitled to deference and reviewed for clear error (D) recognizing aljs credibility assessment is entitled to great weight and deference (E) holding that an unambiguous plea agreement is entitled to great evidentiary weight

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
defendant to trust the advice of his counsel in weighing the immigration consequences of his decision. Petitioner’s counsel advised him that he would “in all likelihood, receive a sentence of only one to three years’ imprisonment.” (Id.) The fact that this turned out to be true, buttresses the court’s conclusion that it was reasonable for Petitioner to rely on his counsel’s advice in making his immigration decisions. Second, and more importantly, however, case law before IIRIRA held that even an alien who received a sentence longer than five years might have maintained eligibility for § 212(c) relief, provided that the alien had not served five years of his sentence at the time of his removal hearing. See Matter of Ramirez-Somera, 1992 WL 301623, 20 I. & N. Dec. 564, 566 (BIA 1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the fact that Petitioner could have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony (B) holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss prison inmates action under 42 usc  1983 as frivolous without consent of defendants because defendants had not been served yet and therefore were not parties (C) holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious (D) holding the same where the term conviction refers to a defendant who has been found guilty of a listed offense but has not yet been sentenced (E) holding that an immigrant defendant is eligible for  212c relief despite having been sentenced to a fifteen year prison term because he had not yet served five years of the sentence

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
that they were not. See Oates, 698 P.2d at 816 (government-installed beeper in a 110 Ib. drum of phenyl-acetic acid purchased from a chemical company was a search under Colorado Constitution); Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 139-40 (governmental installation of a pen register is a search under Colorado Constitution); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 98-99, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120-21 (1980)(governmental seizure of bank ree-ords violated the Colorado Constitution). Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution applies to the case before us. We therefore distinguish Place, and our recent ruling in People v. Ortega, 34 P.3d 986, 2001 Colo. LEXIS 783 (Colo.2001), both of which were decided under the Fourth Amendment and did not involve a prolonged traffic stop without reasonable suspicion (<HOLDING>); People v. Unruh, 713 P.2d 370, 377-78 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dog sniff of a federal express package was a search (B) holding that a dog sniff search of a safe taken by a burglar from the defendants home was a search (C) holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest (D) holding a dog sniff outside the defendants front door was not a fourth amendment search (E) holding that dog sniff of dryer vent of house was not a search

Ex Output:

(A)