In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals
[A]: holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision


[Q]: trial, arguing the court improperly excluded its sole expert witness, Bolt, from testifying at trial. The court denied the motion, stating that it did not completely exclude Bolt from testifying at trial, “but rather determ limine serve as the basis for the rule that “error claimed in a court’s ruling on a motion in limine is waived unless a timely objection is made when the evidence is offered at trial.” State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2006) (quoting State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Iowa 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Simkins v. City of Davenport, 232 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Iowa 1975). This is because the error only occurs, if at all, when the evidence is offered at trial and is either admitted or refused. State v. Langley, 265 N.W.2d 718, 720 (Iowa 1978) (<HOLDING>). There is, however, an exception to this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a sentence is imposed it is a valid final judgment until it is reversed or vacated (B) holding that it is not (C) holding that a bankruptcy order is not final unless it 1 (D) recognizing further normally the ruling is not a final one it is a red flag to counsel that the evidence is not to be brought before the jury unless and until it is separately taken up with the court  at trial (E) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence
[A]: holding that once a sentence is imposed it is a valid final judgment until it is reversed or vacated


[Q]: can be characterized as “new” or “future” as opposed to “continued” at-will employment. Jimenez, however, correctly responds that in Missouri, a promise of at-will employment does not qualify as consideration,- regardless of whether it is characterized as “new,” “future,” or “continued” at-will employment. Thus, it does not provide the consideration needed to support the arbitration agreement in this case. Defendants concede that Jimenez was an at-will employee. They also agree that under Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15 (Mo.App.W.D.2008), a promise of “continued” at-will employment will not constitute consideration for purposes of- enforcing an arbitration agreement. See also Clemmons v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Mo.App.W.D.2013) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue, however, that this line of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding offer of continued atwill employment did not constitute consideration for the arbitration agreement (B) holding that a postinjury arbitration agreement was not part of a employment contract when a seamans continued employment was not conditioned upon its execution (C) holding in an employment discrimination case that the continued employment of the plaintiffs rival in a position previously held by the plaintiff did not constitute a systemic violation (D) holding that an alleged oral modification of a written employment agreement was not enforceable because the employees action in remaining on the job did not constitute adequate consideration (E) holding that offer of atwill employment is valid consideration to support an arbitration agreement
[A]:
holding that a postinjury arbitration agreement was not part of a employment contract when a seamans continued employment was not conditioned upon its execution