In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: second and third elements under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), the existence of a sufficient interest, and whether disposition of that interest would effectively impede the putative intervenors’ ability to protect that interest. Among the interests that satisfy these criteria are injury to reputation, see Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 373, 392 (2d Cir.1981), need to protect the attorney-client privilege, see In re Katz (Jamil v. United States), 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.1980), and need to protect the attorney work-product privilege. See United States v. AT & T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1290-92 (D.C.Cir.1980), citing, Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445, 84 S.Ct. 508, 511-12, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 735 F.2d 1330, 1331 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a district court should allow intervention by a client in the first instance as soon as the attorneyclient privilege issue is raised (B) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (C) holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal (D) recognizing intervention to assert both the attorneyclient and work product privileges (E) holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: that, although the trial court was initially prepared to suppress based solely on the deputies’ conduct in providing Gomez’s name, the court ultimately applied the Neil factors and, finding that the identification was unreliable, ruled the state failed to establish that the witness’ recollection was independent of the suggestive identification. On these facts, the trial court could properly conclude that it was unnecessarily suggestive for the victims to be provided the defendant’s name and resulting access to his photo on the website before having any opportunity to identify him, thus giving rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See generally Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 518 (Fla.2005)(quoting Washington v. State, 653 So.2d 362, 365 (Fla.1994)) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. State, 566 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that showup identification proce dure was not unduly suggestive where officer said to eyewitness we got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about (B) holding that unprovoked flight is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such (C) holding showing of a single photo is unduly suggestive (D) holding that showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive where defendant was handcuffed and placed under police spotlight (E) holding due process requires suppression of testimony regarding pretrial identification when procedure employed is impermissibly suggestive
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: predecessor to § 183 as including only the “actively responsible vessel” and not other ships or barges attached thereto. As Quinn recognizes, however, this literal reading of vessel has not been uniformly applied through the years. In Sacramento Navigation Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 332, 47 S.Ct. 368, 370-71, 71 L.Ed. 663 (1927), the Court read Liverpool narrowly as applying only in “pure tort” situations where “no contractual obligations [are] involved.” Where the cause of action is for loss of cargo being transported pursuant to a shipping contract, the entire flotilla—in that case a tug and the barge, it was towing—engaged in the act of shipping can be regarded as the “vessel.” Id/, see also Patton-Tully Transportation Co. v. Ratliff, 715 F.2d 219, 222 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). This is what is commonly referred to as the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a shareholder lacks standing to bring a suit based on loss in value to his or her shares as this injury derives from and thus is not distinct from the injury to the corporation (B) holding the limitation fund liability of a defendant shipowner may be increased to include his interest in the value of all vessels engaged in a common enterprise or venture with the vessel aboard which the loss or injury was sustained (C) holding that a party who lends money to be used in the repairs of a vessel or to furnish the vessel with supplies does not have a privilege against the vessel (D) holding that where the real value of an anchoring system design is in the idea not in the physical plans that memorialize it any loss in value of the design represents a loss in the value of the idea which is not a loss of use of tangible property (E) holding a contract clause stating that the yard shall in no case be held responsible for the damages resulting from any loss of use or profit of the vessel to be unambiguous
[EX A]:
(B)