In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
other court’s construal of the statute. See Thrivent, 251 S.W.3d at 622-23; J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co. v. Estes, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 836, 839-40 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied); Poole v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 14-99-00740-CV, No, 14-99-01056-CV, 2000 WL 1721150, at *1, 2000 Tex.App. LEXIS 6825, at *3-*4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 12, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication); Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d at 331. Finally, this argument is contrary to the prevailing view among state courts outside of Texas as well, which have held that an order vacating an award and directing a rehearing (without denying confirmation) is not final and appealable. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 31, 582 So.2d 162, 162-63 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Carner v. Freedman, 175 So.2d 70, 71 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable (B) holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable

Ex Output:
holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable


Ex Input:
“multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn.2006) (citations omitted). Both requirements are met here. The district court convicted and sentenced Wallace for two distinct crimes committed upon two distinct victims: once for attempting to rape R.L. and once for stabbing and killing Kenneth Williams. And Wallace does not argue, nor have we found any legal basis to conclude, that the multiple sentences imposed by the district court in this case unfairly exaggerate the criminality of his conduct. See, e.g., State v. Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d 849, 850-51 (Minn.1980) (<HOLDING>). In fact, we squarely rejected the precise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts (B) holding that the district court did not err by sentencing a defendant to consecutive prison terms for seconddegree manslaughter and aggravated assault committed against two separate victims because the multiple sentences did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendants conduct (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding in assault and involun tary manslaughter case that district court has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences based on finding of whether multiple counts involved the same harm (E) holding that separate sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and with intent to rob were barred

Ex Output:
holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts


Ex Input:
664, 669 (Colo.1988), the exercise of such power must be guided so that any action taken by a city "in response to a land use proposal will be rational and consistent." Beaver Meadows v. Board of County Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928, 936 (Colo.1985). The Colorado Springs Zoning Code specifically allows the City to take into account the effect on the neighborhood. See § 4-6-602(C)(1) ("Will the project design be harmonious with surrounding land uses and neighborhood?") In my view, this standard is insufficient to provide "all users and potential users of land with notice of the particular standards and requirements" imposed by the City for plan approval. Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 790 P.2d 827, 832 (Colo.1990); see also Bauer, 182 Colo. at 327, 513 P.2d at 204 (<HOLDING>); Kosinski v. Lawlor, 177 Conn. 420, 418 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of requests to change zoning or comprehensive zoning plans (B) holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a trier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the towns zoning boards actions and that as a result the zoning board violated appellants rights to substantive due process (C) holding a zoning authority acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it denies a permit meeting the general zoning qualifications solely because of the type of building to be constructed (D) holding that in the limited circumstances when local zoning authorities actions prohibit personal wireless service the act preempts local zoning law (E) holding that a zoning commission was capable of being sued directly under section 1983 because zjoning commissions function legislatively when adopting zoning regulations and holding public hearings for the adjudication of individual petitions for zoning redress

Ex Output:

holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of requests to change zoning or comprehensive zoning plans