In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Majority Opinion in Ford, former Justice Newman authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Saylor joined, in which she specifically expressed her agreement “that appellate counsel acted ineffectively by neglecting to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to investigate and present evidence during the penalty phase of Appellant’s history of abuse and mental illness.” Ford, 809 A.2d at 336 (Newman, J., joined by Saylor, J., concurring). 5 . Although Teague's retroactivity analysis did not gamer five votes, a majority of the High Court soon thereafter reaffirmed the Teague plurality's rule and its two exceptions in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). 6 . Compare with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty (B) holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (C) holding that juveniles are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (D) holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing (E) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants

Ex Output:
holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty


Ex Input:
has recently held that a police officer may order passengers out of a vehicle during a traffic stop without violating the passengers’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). The Court reasoned that the public interest in protecting an officer’s safety outweighed the minimal intrusion involved in requiring passengers to exit the vehicle. See id. at 413-15, 117 S.Ct. 882. The same rationale applies here. An officer may reasonably conclude that his safety is best protected by having the passengers remain in the vehicle. Further, the intrusion involved with having passengers remain in their vehicle is de minimis — the officer is merely maintaining the status quo. See United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 11 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Defendant Garner refused to comply with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop (B) holding that passengers of a vehicle which they did not own had standing to challenge the validity of a traffic stop (C) holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop (D) holding police officers making a traffic stop could order passengers out of the stopped car (E) holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction

Ex Output:
holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop


Ex Input:
court may not impose multiple gun minimum sentences on convictions arising from the same criminal episode. To the extent that the state’s assignment of error implicitly raised that issue, I would hold that defendant is correct. See State v. Hardesty, 298 Or 616, 618-19, 695 P2d 569 (1985); see also State v. Wells, 82 Or App 283, 285-86, 728 P2d 533 (1986). I conclude, therefore, that the sentencing court did not err when it imposed a gun minimum sentence on only one count in this case. 2 The inclusion of the language “with a firearm” in the title of the offense for which defendant was sentenced in 1991 is and was sufficient under ORS 161.610(2) to allege use or threatened use of a firearm as an element in aggravation. But see State v. Pies, 104 Or App 646, 650-51, 802 P2d 702 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 3 The judgment in that case simply sentenced 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting (B) holding that to be guilty of aiding and abetting under  924c the defendant must have directly facilitated or encouraged use of the firearm mere presence at the scene of the crime and knowledge that the crime is being committed is not enough (C) holding that a defendant convicted of committing a felony with a firearm on an aiding and abetting theory might not personally have used or threatened to use the firearm and thus that the conviction might not count for purposes of imposing a gun minimum sentence under ors 161610 (D) holding that no active facilitation of the principals use of the firearm is necessary for an aiding and abetting conviction under  924c (E) holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used

Ex Output:

holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting