In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: v. Allen, 615 F.3d 1122, 1136 (9th Cir.2010) (emphasizing the parsimonious nature of an effective EA) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b)). The DOE has more than met its burden here. Accordingly, we find that the DOE’s discussion of the 2005 anthrax shipping incident in the DREA and the FREA satisfies NEPA. b. The “Restricted” Experiments We do not reach the issue of whether the DOE’s decision not to include information about “restricted” experiments in the FREA was arbitrary or capricious because the district court properly found that this argument was waived. Here, Tri-Valley CAREs did not address the district court’s ruling that the argument was deemed waived in its opening appellate bricf. Thus, the issue is not properly before us. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Claims not made in an opening brief in a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arguments not raised by a party in its open ing brief are deemed waived (B) holding that arguments not raised in district court are waived (C) holding that arguments not raised before the trial court are waived (D) holding that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived (E) holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: the sophisticated user defense, a supplier has no duty to warn the ultimate user if it has reason to believe that the user will realize its dangerous condition. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn.2004); see also Ritchie v. Glidden, 242 F.3d 713, 724 (7th Cir.2001) (stating, under Indiana law, that the sophisticated purchaser defense to a failure-to-warn claim brought under negligence or strict liability theories provides that product suppliers do not have a duty to warn employees or customers of knowledgeable industrial purchasers as to product-related hazards). In addition to limiting a supplier’s duty, the “sophisticated user” concept also affects the element of proximate cause. Crook v. Kaneb Pipe Line Operating P’ship, L.P., 231 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Strong, 667 F.2d at 688 (“Even if [the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury (B) holding in a negligence action that the air traffic controllers failure to warn of an impending danger cannot be the proximate cause of an injury after the pilot himself discovered its presence appreciated the danger and decided to fly ahead into it (C) holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible (D) holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury (E) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: until her date last insured, nor did it mention how frequently Claimant’s MS symptoms arise. (Id.) The fact that the ALJ indicated it was “difficult to determine the exact period of time covered by Dr. Russell’s opinion” reveals the presence of an ambiguity that the ALJ was required to resolve. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)(1) (2010). The time-frame the letter covers is especially important, as the record shows Claimant suffered a serious, five week long MS flare-up from February to March 2006 — mere weeks before her insured status lapsed. (R. at 14, 18); SSR 96-2p. Likewise, the ALJ made no effort to recontact Dr. TothRussell to explain the ambiguity surrounding the frequency and severity of Claimant’s MS flare-ups. (R. at 20); see Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Had the ALJ done so, Dr. Toth-Russell could 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a domestic plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to more deference than a foreign plaintiffs (B) holding that because the alj did not have the plaintiffs entire prior record he could not have constructively reopened the prior applications (C) holding that a plaintiffs belief that a product could fail in the future is not without more a legal injury sufficient to support plaintiffs claim (D) holding that plaintiffs are not required  to have asked for the precise form of relief that the district court may ultimately grant (E) holding that the alj should have contacted the plaintiffs doctor and asked for more detail regarding the fre quency of plaintiffs seizures
[EX A]:
(E)