In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: the common level ratio. The Board may hold a hearing to consider the objections, but it may also decide the objections have merit and adjust its calculations. If not satisfied with the outcome of the hearing, the taxpayer may “appeal de novo such ratio determination to the Commonwealth Court.” Id. It has long been established that “[wjhere a remedy is provided by an act of assembly, the directions of the legislation must be strictly pursued and such remedy is exclusive.” Lurie v. Republican Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 63, 192 A.2d 367, 369 (1963). This Court has explained that “where a statutory remedy exists, it is exclusive unless the jurisdiction of the courts is preserved thereby.” Lashe v. Northern York County School District, 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 541, 417 A.2d 260, 264 (1980) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>). Where the statutory remedy is an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa (B) holding that a litigant could not avoid the procedure prescribed by statute in favor of a class action in equity (C) holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action (D) recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice (E) holding that district court in making class certification decision should avoid focusing on merits of underlying class action

A: holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa
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Q: States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). By assenting to settlement in this action, Defendants waived, for example, the right to contest the EPA’s regulatory jurisdiction, which would have been an element of the EPA’s substantive claim. See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir.2000) (“[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were ‘waters of the United States,’ is merely an element of the United States’ Clean Water Act case under section 301.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 482, 148 L.Ed.2d 455 (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, a consent decree “is an agreement 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (B) recognizing the existence of the special relationship (C) recognizing existence of two tests (D) recognizing the existence of purely jurisdictional elements (E) holding that one of the essential elements of an abuse of process claim is the existence of an ulterior motive

A: recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional
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Q: has recently held that a police officer may order passengers out of a vehicle during a traffic stop without violating the passengers’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). The Court reasoned that the public interest in protecting an officer’s safety outweighed the minimal intrusion involved in requiring passengers to exit the vehicle. See id. at 413-15, 117 S.Ct. 882. The same rationale applies here. An officer may reasonably conclude that his safety is best protected by having the passengers remain in the vehicle. Further, the intrusion involved with having passengers remain in their vehicle is de minimis — the officer is merely maintaining the status quo. See United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 11 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Defendant Garner refused to comply with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop (B) holding that passengers of a vehicle which they did not own had standing to challenge the validity of a traffic stop (C) holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop (D) holding police officers making a traffic stop could order passengers out of the stopped car (E) holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction

A:
holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop
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