In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: (Black, J., concurring)). We are also troubled because, given that there was nothing about the officers’ appearance or conduct that revealed that they were engaged in the performance of their duties, Davis lacked fair notice that mere spoken words, which did not disturb the peace, could nonetheless constitute the crime of obstructing the officer’s performance of duty. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311, 60 S.Ct. at 906. “It is an elemental requirement of our constitutional jurisprudence that laws be reasonably intelligible, providing citizens with fair notice as to what conduct is legal and what conduct is illegal.” Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 6:13 (1996) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (<HOLDING>)). We reiterate that we recognize the need to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion (B) recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority (C) holding unconstitutional vagrancy statutes that were purposely designed to grant police broad discretion (D) holding unconstitutional ordinance that gave executive director excessive discretion in deciding whether the grant of a permit would be detrimental to the public (E) holding that district courts discretion is extremely broad
[EX A]: holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion

[EX Q]: were convicted of conspiring to use, carry, or possess a firearm in furtherance of, inter alia, a conspiracy to violate the Neutrality Act and a conspiracy to provide services to the Taliban. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c),(o); J.A. 3223. Both Count Five and Count Eleven, in other words, ■ expressly allow one conspiracy to serve as the predicate for another conspiracy. Nothing about this statutory framework is unconstitutional, improper, or even unusual. Courts have recognized that one conspiracy can serve as the predicate for another conspiracy when the “[overarching] conspiracy and the predicate conspiracy are distinct offenses with entirely different objectives.” United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1135 (3rd Cir.1990); see also United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 918 (2nd Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman (B) holding that congress intended to allow multiple punishments for rico conspiracies and conspiracies to commit the underlying predicate offense even though the offenses were the same under the blockburger test (C) holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy (D) holding that judge erred in not explaining to jury that it could consider predicate acts listed in relation to substantive rico count when deciding whether defendants had also conspired to violate rico (E) recognizing money laundering as a predicate act under rico
[EX A]: holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman

[EX Q]: or a well-founded fear of future persecution. As the BIA determined, Thang is not eligible, as a matter of law, for asylum based on his wife’s forced abortion. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir.2007) (en banc); see also Gui Yin Liu v. INS, 508 F.3d 716, 723 (2d Cir.2007). As Thang did not assert any other incidents of past persecution, he was not entitled to the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that Thang failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution because he and his wife wanted more children. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 158-68 (2d Cir.2008); see also Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the BIA reasonably found that whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable (B) holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal (C) holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals (D) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution (E) holding that to qualify for asylum the fear of future persecution must be based on reasonably specific information showing a real threat to individual persecution not mere assertions of fear of possible persecution or speculative conclusions quoting mapouya 487 f3d at 412
[EX A]:
holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal