instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav
answer:
(E)


question:
the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. Addressing the identical federal rule, the Supreme Court has stated that “[o]n its face, Rule 23.1 speaks only to the adequacy of the shareholder representatives pleadings.” Kamen, supra, 500 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 1711. The rule itself does not create a demand requirement. Id. “[T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance, not procedure.’ ” Id. at 96-97, 111 S.Ct. 1711 (quoting Daily Income Fund, supra, 464 U.S. at 543-44 & n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 831 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (other citations omitted)); see also Bazata, supra, 400 A.2d at 316 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the demand requirement or its futility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (B) holding that for purposes of super ct civ r 41b demand is not jurisdictional but an element of the shareholders claim (C) holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense (D) holding that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of super ct civ r 15a which permits a party to amend once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served (E) holding the connection is an element
answer:
(B)


question:
attorney’s fees as § 507(a)(2) expenses and General Order 2007-6 details debtors’ attorney’s fees as § 330(a) expenses. BAPCPA amended § 1326(b)(1) by replacing the reference to § 507(a)(1), with § 507(a)(2). [B]y striking out the reference to § 507(a)(1) and replacing it with a reference to § 507(a)(2), the subsection that now governs administrative claims, including attorney’s fees ... [t]he court can only conclude that Congress made the affirmative decision to maintain the pre-BAPCPA treatment of administrative claims in Chapter 13 plans. In re Reid, 2006 WL 2077572, at *2 (Bankr.M.D.N.C.2006). Based upon the plain language of § 1326(b)(1), § 507(a)(2) claims must be paid before, or concurrently with, payments to other creditors. See In re Boler, 2008 WL 205579, at *3 (M.D.Ala.2008) (<HOLDING>). Accord In re Brown, 2008 WL 205578, at *3 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that an agreement to pay sons college education expenses was nondischargeable support even though arkansas law does not require payment of such expenses (C) holding that quarterly fees are administrative expenses like  503b claims and must be subordinated to chapter 7 administrative expenses (D) holding plain language of  1326b1 requires administrative expenses to be paid before such domestic support obligations (E) holding that the plain language of the regulations requires a claimant to have an intent to file a claim for va benefits
answer:

(D)