TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: this petition for prohibition. Petitioner is mistaken in an essential respect. Although he characterizes his challenge as involving subject matter jurisdiction, he is mistaken. There can be no dispute that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving dissolution of marriage. See § 26.012(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006) (circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all actions at law not cognizable in the county courts). The fact that petitioner wishes to dispute in the pending dissolution action is whether there was any marriage at all to dissolve. An attack on the validity of an alleged marriage has nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction but is simply an issue to be determined in the dissolution action. See Marden v. Marden, 276 So.2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (<HOLDING>). It is true that a petition for a writ of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding that standing existed (C) holding that in an action brought by alleged wife for permanent alimony suit money attorneys fees and restraining order an issue of fact existed concerning whether a commonlaw marriage existed thus precluding summary judgment (D) holding that material issue of fact existed concerning whether employer orally promised to discharge employee only for cause (E) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife

SOLUTION: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment

PROBLEM: trial court wide latitude in sentencing...." State v. Bluff 2002 UT 66, ¶ 66, 52 P.3d 1210. "Generally, we review sentencing decisions to determine whether the court exceeded its permitted range of discretion, and we will reverse only if we determine that the trial court has failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 108, 1 12, 182 P.3d 708 (quotations and citations omitted). ANALYSIS I. Admissibility of Evidence T9 Defendant asserts that the trial court committed plain error when it allowed two witnesses to testify as to the children's credibility in violation of State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), and rule 608(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Rim-masch, TIS P.2d at 392 (<HOLDING>); see also Utah R. Evid. 608(a)(1) ("The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 608a1 bars admission of an experts testimony as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion (B) holding rule applicable to witness (C) holding plaintiffs waived their right to appellate review of the admission of an experts testimony by failing to object to it at trial (D) holding that even if an experts testimony arguably embraced the ultimate issue such testimony is permissible as long as the experts testimony assists rather than supplants the jurys judgment (E) holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion

SOLUTION: holding rule applicable to witness

PROBLEM: retroactive deadline by requiring hospitals to have appealed the exclusion of expansion waiver days before October 15, 1999 — two months prior to the PM’s issuance on December 15, 1999. Pl.’s SJM at 32-33. This argument assumes, however, that hospitals were entitled to include expansion waiver days in the DSH calculation prior to the PM’s issuance. Indeed, they were not. The Secretary’s policy prior to January 2000 was to exclude expansion waiver days from the DSH calculation. Cookeville, 531 F.3d 844, 848 (2008). Furthermore, hospitals— including those in Tennessee — were “on notice that the expansion population might not be included.” Id. PM A-99-62 merely clarified the Secretary’s existing policy. See United Hosp. v. Thompson, No. 02-3479, 2003 WL 21356086, *5 (D.Minn. June 9, 2003) (<HOLDING>). PM A-99-62 served a limited purpose— to hold 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an endorsement to an existing insurance policy which added a new vehicle did not create a new contract of insurance but was merged with and became a part of the original policy (B) holding that pm a9962 was not a policy change requiring notice to hospitals but a clarification of existing policy (C) holding that the plain meaning of the uim policy language was clear and not contrary to public policy (D) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (E) holding that absent follow form language provision that excess policy would continue as underlying policy did not impose coverage as provided in underlying policy

SOLUTION:
holding an endorsement to an existing insurance policy which added a new vehicle did not create a new contract of insurance but was merged with and became a part of the original policy