In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: no indication that Mexican law should govern the claims at issue. Thus, under Texas’s most significant relationship test, American law is likely to govern the merits issues, and this factor weighs against dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens. 4. Application of Foreign Law Although American law is likely to govern the merits, it appears that Mexican law will be relevant to collateral issues such as the nature of the property that is the subject of the contract. An American forum would nevertheless be capable of handling the difficulties posed by Mexican fideicomiso law should the court need to do so. Indeed, American forums have competently adjudicated matters involving Mexican fideicomiso property interests on other occasions. See Gale v. Camrite, 559 F.3d 359 (5th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810 (9th Cir.1995) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where there was a breach of contract accompanied by aggravating factors that it was proper to treble the breach of contract damages (B) holding that a seller did not breach its contract by averring that there would be no tax liability incurred by the sale of a baja california sur condominium owned pursuant to fideicomiso law (C) holding that breach occurred when seller told buyer that seller would do no more to rectify alleged warranty violation (D) holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action (E) holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: 677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir.2012). Under the specific circumstances presented in this case, Lewis did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation with White. Lewis knew where White was incarcerated when White called Lewis, as he had agreed to send Shavers and White mail there. Furthermore, Lewis was previously incarcerated at the same prison. Thus, he would have received a handbook alerting him that all telephone calls were recorded and been exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded. In these circumstances, Lewis should have known that all outgoing prisoner telephone calls were monitored and recorded. See United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1329 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Harrison, 986 F.Supp. 280, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells (B) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (E) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: does not directly address the question of an intervenor's standing to appeal because the United States brought the original action and the defendant city raised the federal government's standing as a ground to dismiss the action. See City of Tacoma, 332 F.3d at 578. 23 . See Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.1991). 24 . See State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep't of Natural Res., 130 Ohio St.3d 30, 955 N.E.2d 935 (2011). 25 . See SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 448, 60 S.Ct. 1044, 84 L.Ed. 1293 (1940) (permitting the SEC to intervene in and appeal bankruptcy proceedings because it is "specially charged by various statutes with the protection of the interests of the investing public"); Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp., 149 Cal.App.3d 308, 196 Cal.Rptr. 871, 875 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Schaghticoke Indians of Kent, Conn., Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that board had standing to collaterally attack gag order based on its interest in fulfilling its statutory obligations to supervise and regulate the practice of medicine in this state and to investigate allegations of physician misconduct (B) holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state (C) holding that the press lacks standing to assert the free speech rights of another when the person subject to the gag order has not challenged it (D) holding that appraisal district had standing based on its interest in the validity of the statute that it is charged with implementing (E) holding that under section 25303 the board of supervisors has a statutory duty to supervise the conduct of all county officers


Output: (A)