In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: (Black, J., concurring)). We are also troubled because, given that there was nothing about the officers’ appearance or conduct that revealed that they were engaged in the performance of their duties, Davis lacked fair notice that mere spoken words, which did not disturb the peace, could nonetheless constitute the crime of obstructing the officer’s performance of duty. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311, 60 S.Ct. at 906. “It is an elemental requirement of our constitutional jurisprudence that laws be reasonably intelligible, providing citizens with fair notice as to what conduct is legal and what conduct is illegal.” Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 6:13 (1996) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (<HOLDING>)). We reiterate that we recognize the need to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion (B) recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority (C) holding unconstitutional vagrancy statutes that were purposely designed to grant police broad discretion (D) holding unconstitutional ordinance that gave executive director excessive discretion in deciding whether the grant of a permit would be detrimental to the public (E) holding that district courts discretion is extremely broad

A: holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion
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Q: from California. A Michigan federal magistrate judge ordered his return to California. The following day, a criminal complaint based on the September 1995 heroin sales was filed against Jackson. Jackson was never served, did not appear, and the government subsequently dismissed the complaint without prejudice on November 20,1996. On January 6, 1998, Jackson was indicted for distribution of herom in the September 1995 transactions. Jackson eventually was returned to Michigan in November 1998, appeared before a magistrate judge on November 24, 1998, and was arraigned on December 1,1998. Trial was originally scheduled for March 25, 1999. On March 22, 1999, Jackson’s counsel, Stephen Rabaut, moved to dismiss the mdictment based on United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The district court dismissed the indictment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that eastern michigans federal grand jury system violated equal protection (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (D) holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial (E) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection

A: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection
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Q: to EDCR 1.48, which permits qualified judges to serve as masters and claims that the local rule does not unconstitutionally expand the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace. I disagree. Through EDCR 1.48, the district court allows a justice of the peace, by virtue of his or her status as a justice of the peace, to perform the duties granted to masters under NRS 3.245. In doing so, the court rule grants justices of the peace jurisdiction in felony cases that the Legislature has expressly denied them. To this extent, EDCR 1.48 expands the justice of the peace’s jurisdiction, and it is unconstitutional. As this court recently held in Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, only the Legislature can expand the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace. 128 Nev. 580, 596, 287 P.3d 305, 316 (2012) (<HOLDING>); see also Nev. Const. art. 6, § 8 (“The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the county attorney had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the county attorneys authority was first made on appeal (B) holding that by providing for the participation of justices of the peace in clark countys inquest proceedings  the clark county board of county commissioners has unconstitutionally impinged on the legislatures constitutionally delegated authority (C) holding that a forumselection clause was mandatory where it stated that for any action brought to enforce such terms and conditions venue shall lie exclusively in clark county washington (D) holding before the apa definition of person was amended to include county that the board of county commission ers of dolores county could not sue the state agency that had ordered reappraisals of real property in dolores county in connection with valuation for ad valorem taxation because the board of county commissioners was not a person under the apa and did not otherwise have authority to sue under statute or constitution (E) holding that notwithstanding language of statute authorizing appointment of a county architect by the board of commissioners of cook county such appointee is not an officer where he has no stated salary but is employed on a commission basis and where his work is generally casual and not continuous even though he is frequently referred to in the records of the county board as an officer

A:
holding that the county attorney had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the county attorneys authority was first made on appeal
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