In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: to be heard on the motion have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.” E.D. Mich. Local Rule 7.1(h)(3); see Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 385 (6th Cir.2004). Here, the district court found that Moniz “simply is attempting to re-argue [] issues which were already ruled upon by the Court when it dismissed his Complaint,” and thus denied the motion to reconsider. R. 14 (Dist. Ct. Order at 3) (Page ID # 129). This court has stated that a district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reconsider where the motion “merely raise[s] arguments that were already ruled upon.” Graham, 358 F.3d at 385; see also Lommen v. McIntyre, 125 Fed.Appx. 655, 659 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). There was no abuse of discretion in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (B) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for reconsideration where the motion presented nothing new and merely rephrased allegations in the complaint (E) holding under third circuit law that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion
[EX A]: holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing

[EX Q]: Discipl. LEXIS 78, *9 (attorney disbursed all settlement proceeds to client less amount he retained for himself, after having been placed on notice that prior attorney claimed an in terest in any settlement funds in violation of Colo, RPC 1.15(b)). III. ANALYSIS OF SANCTION In both the Dunn and McCarthy matters, Rishel engaged in knowing conversion by obtaining funds from third parties for a stated purpose, failing to utilize the funds for that purpose, retaining the funds for an extended period of time after the third parties had withdrawn authorization, and failing to refund the amounts paid to the third parties despite their demand that he do so. The presumptive sanction for knowing conversion of the property of another is disbarment. People v. Dice, 947 P.2d 339, 340 (Colo.1997)(<HOLDING>); Motsenbocker; 926 P.2d at 577 (attorney 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause (B) holding that a lawyers knowing misappropriation of funds whether belonging to a client or third party warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation (C) holding that an attorney should not be disbarred for misappropriation of client funds where there were no aggravating factors the attorneys clients did not suffer actual harm and the attorney established several mitigating factors (D) holding that permanent disbarment was appropriate for failure to remit 2000 in settlement funds to client and failing to answer the charges (E) recognizing that a lawyer hired by a third person to represent a client should exercise judgment on behalf of the client independent from the interests of the third person
[EX A]: holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause

[EX Q]: 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975)). 29 . 539 U.S. at 120, 123 S.Ct. 2191 (emphasis in original). 30 . id. 31 . See Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 175 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2010). 32 . 768 P.2d at 455-56 ("[T]he federal rules on standing ... are not binding on state courts, and the article III constitutional restrictions and federalistic prudential considerations that have guided the evolution of federal court standing law are not necessarily relevant to the development of the standing rules that apply to Utah’s state courts.”) 33 . See id. at 456-57 (remarking on the "rather narrow standing doctrines developed by the federal courts” and quoting the Suprem 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) (<HOLDING>). 43 .See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the application of overbreadth doctrine to state laws and explaining that because first amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity (B) holding that a claim under the first amendment overbreadth doctrine will not succeed unless  the challenged statute itself will significantly compromise recognized first amendment protections of parties not before the court (C) holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of the challenged statute against him is actual or imminent and quoting prime media v city of brentwood 485 f3d 343 350 6th cir 2007 because overbreadth creates an exception only to the prudential standing inquiry the supreme court has made clear that the injury in fact requirement still applies to overbreadth claims under the first amendment (D) recognizing in criminal case exception to standing rules where statute involving first amendment freedoms is challenged on vagueness grounds (E) holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case
[EX A]:
holding that a claim under the first amendment overbreadth doctrine will not succeed unless  the challenged statute itself will significantly compromise recognized first amendment protections of parties not before the court