In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
ah officer may ask a question outside the scope of the initial justification for the stop so long as it does not further lengthen the time taken to process the initial justification for the stop. In other words, if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid. This reasoning is explained in both United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc), and United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5th Cir.1993). In both cases, the courts held that questions by police officers during a traffic stop are not seizures or searches proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and cited United States Supreme Court cases dealing with non-custodial police-citizen encounters for support. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent (B) holding that police may approach persons and ask questions or permission to search so long as police do not imply that answers or consent are required (C) holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
until he received the order in March 2001. While in ordinary circumstances he likely would be faulted for not exercising due diligence to determine the disposition of his motions during the two year period contemplated by the rule, petitioner had no reason to make such an inquiry in this case because he believed that in accordance with the April 1999 order, he had been permitted to withdraw his motions to vacate sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that Snell has pled an adequate basis for avoiding the two year time limitation imposed by the rule. We further conclude that he otherwise timely sought relief to the extent his petition seeking belated appeal was filed within two years of his discovery of the existence of September 1998 order. Cf. Adams v. State, 543 So.2d 1244 (Fla.1989)(<HOLDING>). In response to our order to show cause why a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a rule 3850 motion based upon new facts or a significant change in the law must be filed within two years of the time such facts become known or such change is announced (B) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (C) holding that a subsequent petition may be filed upon a showing of a change in circumstances (D) holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms (E) holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
contractual obligation.” Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 123 F.Supp.2d at 65. See Belgrave v. City of N.Y., 1999 WL 692034, *45 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (Gleeson, J.)(dismissing the plaintiffs breach of contract claim where employee claimed that employer failed to follow its procedures for providing equal opportunity to employees); Mutua v. Tex. Roadhouse Mgmt. Corp., 753 F.Supp.2d 954, 968-69 (D.S.D.2010) (Schreier, J.Xgranting summary judgment on a breach-of-contract claim seeking to enforce the anti-discrimination provisions in the employer’s employee handbook, because the employer already must abide by Title VII and a promise to perform a legal duty is not consideration for a return promise); Byra-Grzegorczyk v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 572 F.Supp.2d 233, 254 (D.Conn.2008) (Kravitz, J.)(<HOLDING>); Gally v. Columbia Univ., 22 F.Supp.2d 199, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that idea is simply not an antidiscrimination statute so that pure discrimination claim was not barred by parents failure to exhaust remedies under idea (B) holding that an administrative agency or a state courts finding that an employer had just cause to terminate a plaintiff is not preclusive with regard to the plaintiffs discrimination claim against the employer (C) recognizing that an antidiscrimination policy does not indicate that an employer is undertaking any contractual obligations towards the employee rather it requires the employer to comply with federal and state antidiscrimination laws (D) holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration (E) holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work

Ex Output:

(C)