In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

testimony, which included not just the cooperators but also the undercover agent, the government also played for the jury the taped conversations from the wiretap. In a number of these conversations, Herrera specifically discussed the drug quantities involved. Furthermore, this case does not present a situation such as the one the Supreme Court considered in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), where a conviction was overturned because there was too great a risk of evidentiary spillover, in part because there were thirty-two named participants and eight separate conspiracies. In the present matter there were only six named participants, two conspiracies and two defendants on trial. See United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 433 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Given the strength of this evidence for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the conviction should be affirmed despite the existence of two conspiracies where the indictment charged only one because this variance did not prejudice the defendant (B) holding that only one offense should have been charged when four separate packages of the same drug were found (C) recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute (D) holding that the conviction should be upheld because there was no prejudice to the defendant even though the defendant had been charged with one conspiracy and the proof at trial showed two separate conspiracies (E) holding that the jury would have no problem separating the actions of the individual defendants where there were only four defendants and two separate conspiracies
holding that the conviction should be affirmed despite the existence of two conspiracies where the indictment charged only one because this variance did not prejudice the defendant

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071, 113 S.Ct. 1027, 122 L.Ed.2d 172 (1993). Moreover, after Lopez, courts have recognized that this de minimis standard continues in effect. United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1713, 137 L.Ed.2d 837 (1997); United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (10th Cir.1995). This is because § 1956 regulates activities that, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (stating that “where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence”); cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1361, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 463 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce (B) holding that commerce clause did not provide congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of violence against women act inasmuch as provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce (C) recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce (D) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce (E) holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce
holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. An Eighth Amendment violation may be found only “ ‘in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’ ” See Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 712 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (opinion of Kennedy, J.)); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (noting that the “gross disproportionality principle ... [is] applicable only in ... ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case[s].” (citation omitted)). This is not such a case. Because Whitehead had been convicted of five prior felony drug offenses, see Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276, 284-85, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (<HOLDING>), and because cocaine distribution represents a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencing judge sitting without a jury may not find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty (B) holding that restitution is a criminal penalty that negates the imposition of prejudgment interest (C) holding that the penalty is applicable (D) holding that recidivism may support the imposition of a severe penalty (E) recognizing the unique and irrevocable nature of the death penalty and    the consequently overarching need for reliability in the imposition of such a penalty

holding that a sentencing judge sitting without a jury may not find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty