In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: removal purposes. Instead, for complete preemption to apply, the cause of action not only must be preempted by ERISA but also must fall within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). See Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209, 124 S.Ct. 2488 (“[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore preempted. The preemptive force of ERISA § 502(a) is still stronger.... Hence, causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) [are] removable to federal court.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 62-63, 67, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (<HOLDING>); Da-Ponte v. Manfredi Motors Inc., 157 Fed. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under  1132a1b (B) holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself (C) holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under  502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan (D) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court (E) holding that suit by a beneficiary to recover benefits from a covered plan  falls directly under  502a1b of erisa and therefore was necessarily federal in character and subject to removal to federal court
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: purposes of nonclient standing] is a question of fact.”). Neither party argues that Mark and Marie share some type of legally recognizable confidential relationship, and Marie offered no evidence to the district court that Mark acquired any privileged, confidential information from Marie. In Brown, this court concluded that “disqualification is not warranted absent proof of a reasonable probability that counsel actually acquired privileged, confidential information.” 116 Nev. at 1202, 14 P.3d at 1267 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the context of familial relationships, other courts have declined to disqualify counsel absent proof that counsel actually acquired confidential information from a family member. See, e.g., Addam v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 42 (Ct. App. 2004) (<HOLDING>); DCH Health Services, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a marital dissolution action that a sibling relationship between a husbands attorney and a wifes former physician was insufficient to disqualify the attorney and explaining that the attorneys brother presumably possesses confidential information relating to the wife but there is no evidence that he disclosed any such information to his sister (B) holding that presumption of access to and knowledge of confidential information between attorney and former client notwithstanding attorneys declarations to the contrary may not be rebutted (C) holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney (D) holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts (E) holding that a corporate insider must abstain from trading in shares of his own corporation unless he has first disclosed the material information known to him not because of the relationship between the buyer and seller but because of the relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders and the insider who obtained the confidential information by reason of his position with that corporation that relationship gives rise to a duty to disclose because of the need to prevent the insider from taking unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: for municipal securities business by the issuer,” MSRB Rule Book Rule G-37(g)(vi), at 272 (July 1, 2016) (emphasis added); see also MSRB Rule Book Rule G-37(g)(xvi), at 271-72 (Apr. 1, 2017). Compare MSRB Rule Book Rule G-37(b)(i), at 269 (July 1, 2016), ivith MSRB Rule G-37(b)(i)(A), at 266 (Apr. 1, 2017). Therefore, Leather-wood’s affidavit sheds no light upon whether the 2016 Amendments in particular affect McManus. We are thus left with a record that does not identify a single individual whom the 2016 Amendments have prevented from donating to Petitioners or contributing to the Petitioners’ candidates. Without any further basis upon which we could assume that such an individual exists, we decline to hold that Petitioners’ injuries egan, 676 F.2d 715, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 461 U.S. 540, 103 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the standing of an organization whose fundraising efforts would be impaired by an irs taxdeductiblecontribution rule because the organization would be harmed if its contributors ceased giving it money (B) holding that an organization whose members are injured may represent those members even where the organization itself cannot show injury (C) holding that a nonprofit organization lacked standing under unruh because its civil rights had not been personally violated and it failed to show that any of its members would suffer injury (D) holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did (E) holding that an organization whose members were potential targets of future prosecutions had standing to seek injunctive relief
[EX A]:
(A)