TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: (citations omitted). Kaul believes that because the Court did not include seizing cigarettes fi*om Indians inside a reservation on this list, Stephan lacked jurisdiction to execute the search warrant at Kaul’s store. However, we do not read Oklahoma Tax Commission and Colville as necessarily prohibiting state officers from conducting search and seizure operations within a reservation’s borders under the authority of a federal grant of criminal jurisdiction to the state. Instead, these opinions merely offer several options that state officials may employ to enforce regulatory cigarette tax statutes. Here, Kaul waived the argument that the Kansas statute was regulatory in nature because she did not raise that issue below. Thus, for purposes of this appea 3, 2061, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction (B) recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes  to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians (C) holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation (D) holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians (E) holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization

SOLUTION: holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction

PROBLEM: “good cause for delay.” United States v. Occhipinti, 851 F.Supp. at 526; United States v. El-Gabrowny, 844 F.Supp. 955, 959 (S.D.N.Y.1994). Next, a “sufficient” affidavit must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the facts must be material and stated with particularity; (2) the facts must be such that if true they would convince a reasonable man that a bias exists; and (3) the facts must show the bias is personal, and not judicial, in nature. McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 942 F.Supp. 297, 300 (E.D.Tex.1996) (citation omitted). To be found sufficient as a matter of law, the affidavit must show “ ‘a true personal bias and allege specific facts’ as opposed to mere conclusions and generalizations.” United States v. Occhipinti, 851 F.Supp. at 525; see United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d at 1339 (<HOLDING>). This Circuit has observed that “judicial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unsupported affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusoiy facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment (B) recognizing that an implied contract must result from a meeting of the minds of the parties in mutual assent to the terms and must be based upon a sufficient consideration free from fraud or undue influence not against public policy and sufficiently definite to be enforced (C) holding that course of dealing may render uncertain terms sufficiently definite (D) holding that the facts averred must be sufficiently definite and particular to convince a reasonable person that bias exists simple conclusions opinions or rumors are insufficient (E) holding that unsupported affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment

SOLUTION: holding that unsupported affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusoiy facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment

PROBLEM: 418, 421 (Colo.2001) (concluding, after determining that the URA did not apply, that public entity could enforce a 30-day termination provision in a lease because the entity “possessed the same rights ... which any other market buyer would have”); Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Frankford 5206 Bar, Inc., 138 Pa.Cmwlth. 209, 587 A.2d 855, 857, 860 (1991) (concluding that when public entity acquired property and informed tenant that it would not renew tenant’s lease at the end of current lease term, tenant was not a “‘displaced person’ since the termination of its occupancy here resulted from the natural expiration of its then current lease term and not from [the public entity’s] acquisition of the [property]”); Hindsley v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 25 Pa.Cmwlth. 455, 360 A.2d 297, 298-99 (1976) (<HOLDING>). These cases are not persuasive in light of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that former employees of a brokerage firm who had a contractual right to a share of any commission received by the firm upon extension of a lease were not entitled to a share of the commission received when the landlord and tenant entered an amendment to the lease which extended the duration but also added new terms this was a new lease not an extension of the prior lease (B) holding that after township acquired property entered into lease with tenant that was renewable absent notice of termination and terminated lease tenant was not displaced person because tenant will be moving not as a result of the acquisition  of such real property but rather because township having already acquired the property has merely declined to renew the lease quotation omitted (C) holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant despite retaining keys because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property (D) recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the termination of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination but gave the lessee a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election (E) holding that when notice to vacate was insufficient to comply with the terms of the lease lease was not properly terminated before commencement of summary ejectment action

SOLUTION:
holding that former employees of a brokerage firm who had a contractual right to a share of any commission received by the firm upon extension of a lease were not entitled to a share of the commission received when the landlord and tenant entered an amendment to the lease which extended the duration but also added new terms this was a new lease not an extension of the prior lease