instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
of G.D.’s older sibling, C.D., based on the abuse of G.D. The court may not terminate parental rights based on the abuse of a sibling without a finding of a nexus between the abuse and the prospective abuse. O.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re G.C.A.), 863 So.2d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing R.F. v. Dep’t of Children & Families (In re M.F.), 770 So.2d 1189 (Fla.2000)); see also C.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families (In re C.M.), 844 So.2d 765, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“Children who have not been abused may be adjudicated dependent based on abuse inflicted upon their siblings; however, the evidence must demonstrate a nexus between the abuse and any prospective abuse to another sibling.”). But see T.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 860 So.2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). “Generally, this nexus is established when 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parental rights may be terminated based on the egregious abuse of a sibling without a showing of a nexus but providing that the parent should be afforded the opportunity to show a lack of a nexus (B) holding that in order to support a termination of parental rights based on prospective abuse it is necessary to show that the behavior of the parent was beyond the parents control likely to continue and placed the child at risk and citing as an example the parents mental illness (C) holding the parental rights of a child may not be terminated unless that parent has been represented by counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings (D) recognizing that a court is not limited in what it may consider in determining whether parental rights should be terminated (E) recognizing petitioners must be afforded the opportunity to show good cause for filing a longer petition
answer:
holding that in order to support a termination of parental rights based on prospective abuse it is necessary to show that the behavior of the parent was beyond the parents control likely to continue and placed the child at risk and citing as an example the parents mental illness


question:
California state prisoner, Roy Lee Brown, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand. Brown contends that his § 2254 petition was timely filed because his state habeas petitions statutorilly tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Brown is entitled to tolling during the time he was seeking one full round of collateral review by the California courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Delhomme v. Ramirez, No. 00-56148, 2003 WL 21947183, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed (B) holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice (C) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (D) holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review (E) holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review
answer:
holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed


question:
the substantive law’s identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs.”). The existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment^]” Id. Therefore, there is no issue for the court to adjudicate unless the nonmoving party puts forth evidence sufficient for a jury to return a verdict for that party; but “if the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact is on the party moving for summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Riley & Ephriam Constr. Co., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial (B) holding the moving party must meet its burden by showing  that is pointing out to the trial court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case (C) holding that once the moving party meets its burden the nonmoving party is obliged to produce evidence in response (D) holding due to the moving partys failure to meet its initial burden the onus never passed to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial  citation omitted (E) recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case
answer:

recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial