In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions “could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited.” Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) (“We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse’s liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void.”). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years

A: holding that such provisions are valid
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Q: for [her] employer! ] to operate efficiently and effectively.” Id. at 418-19, 126 S.Ct. 1951. The point of this inquiry, then, is “both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their im portant public functions.” Id. at 420, 126 S.Ct. 1951. With that premise as a backdrop, the Supreme Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951; see also Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 364-65 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Garcetti and its Sixth Circuit progeny 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern (B) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (C) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (D) holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless  related to his job duties (E) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected

A: holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern
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Q: contractual obligation.” Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 123 F.Supp.2d at 65. See Belgrave v. City of N.Y., 1999 WL 692034, *45 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (Gleeson, J.)(dismissing the plaintiffs breach of contract claim where employee claimed that employer failed to follow its procedures for providing equal opportunity to employees); Mutua v. Tex. Roadhouse Mgmt. Corp., 753 F.Supp.2d 954, 968-69 (D.S.D.2010) (Schreier, J.Xgranting summary judgment on a breach-of-contract claim seeking to enforce the anti-discrimination provisions in the employer’s employee handbook, because the employer already must abide by Title VII and a promise to perform a legal duty is not consideration for a return promise); Byra-Grzegorczyk v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 572 F.Supp.2d 233, 254 (D.Conn.2008) (Kravitz, J.)(<HOLDING>); Gally v. Columbia Univ., 22 F.Supp.2d 199, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that idea is simply not an antidiscrimination statute so that pure discrimination claim was not barred by parents failure to exhaust remedies under idea (B) holding that an administrative agency or a state courts finding that an employer had just cause to terminate a plaintiff is not preclusive with regard to the plaintiffs discrimination claim against the employer (C) recognizing that an antidiscrimination policy does not indicate that an employer is undertaking any contractual obligations towards the employee rather it requires the employer to comply with federal and state antidiscrimination laws (D) holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration (E) holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work

A:
recognizing that idea is simply not an antidiscrimination statute so that pure discrimination claim was not barred by parents failure to exhaust remedies under idea
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