In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990). Petitioner claims that Apprendi falls within the narrow scope of the second category of exceptions and is therefore applicable to his case retroactively. The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether Apprendi should be considered a “watershed rule,” falling within the Teague exceptions. However, every Circuit Court which has considered this question has held that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively on collateral review. United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir.2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir.2001); see, e.g., Abdullah v. United States, 240 F.3d 683, 687 (8th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>); Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review (B) holding apprendi is not retroactive (C) holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review (D) holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review  that was previously unavailable (E) holding that the apprendi decision is not applicable on collateral review

Ex Output:
holding apprendi is not retroactive


Ex Input:
because of [the dealer’s] precarious financial condition .... ... [W]e decline to hold BMW/NA negligent and liable for damages since it could not reasonably have anticipated the crimes committed by [the dealer’s] principal, Eichler. Although BMW/NA may have been aware of [the dealer’s] shaky financial condition, that knowledge alone gave BMW/NA no cause reasonably to anticipate that Eichler would either engage in any criminal activity or that he would abscond with customer funds. In fact, no amount of supervision by BMW/NA would have enabled it to foresee Eichler’s thievery. Id. In other cases involving the franchisors of automobile dealerships, the courts have reached similar results. See Colson v. Maghami, No. CV 08-2150-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 2744682, at *9-10 (D.Ariz. July 9, 2010) (<HOLDING>); DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Clemente, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer (B) holding that a franchisor had no duty to supervise its automobile dealership or to warn a customer of the dealership who paid a substantial deposit for a limited edition lamborghini reventon and who did not receive either the car or the return of his deposit (C) holding that an automobile dealership had no duty to prevent the misconduct of the executives of another company who misappropriated company funds to make the purchase of several automobiles from the dealership (D) holding that where no evidence was designated to show that a car buyer knew that a sale violated the rights of the dealership that owned the car the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of indcode  26112019 (E) holding that a car dealership could be held vicariously liable for the intentional tort of its employee who shot out the tires of the plaintiffs truck during a repossession attempt

Ex Output:
holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer


Ex Input:
that Section 31.03 primarily addresses the person getting the goods, and Section 31.16 targets the schemer. Additionally, the State raises a waiver contention, arguing that the pari materia argument was never made before the referee or the district court below. With this contention we must agree. To preserve error, a party must make a timely and specific objection. TEX.R.APP.P. 33.1(a); Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). The complaining party must also obtain an adverse ruling on the objection. Ramirez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 636, 643 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Specifically with reference to the pari materia issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals has focused on the adequacy and timing of the objection made at trial. Azeez v. State, 248 S.W.3d 182, 193-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2008)(<HOLDING>). The same is true for a number of court of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that objection made at directed verdict stage and in motion for new trial were timely (B) holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict (C) holding a directed verdict motion stating specific grounds is a prerequisite for a subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (D) holding that a party must have made a directed verdict motion at trial on the specific issue which is the basis of the jnov (E) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage

Ex Output:

holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict