In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: improperly determined that the “neither expected nor intended” language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an “occurrence.” ¶21 The CGL policy’s core provision defines “occurrence” by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was “neither expected nor intended.” This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured’s expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an “occurrence” and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). ¶22 Here the District Court found that Ribi 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: doing something that can be characterized as resistance—even when that resistance includes physically preventing an officer’s manipulations of his body.”). In addition, the black-and-white bus surveillance video fails to clearly show what occurred as the officers forcefully “escorted” Hulett off the bus, and leaves the viewer wondering whether, and to what extent, additional force may have been applied during those moments that might have contributed to plaintiffs broken hip. And even following plaintiffs removal from the bus, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Sergeant Galvin acted in an objectively reasonable manner by dragging plaintiff some distance across the pavement, since plaintiff did not appear to be offering any further resistance at that point. Tracy, 623 F.3d at 98 (<HOLDING>); Meyes v. Baltimore Cnty., 713 F.3d 723, 733 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that otherwise acceptable use of pepper spray became excessive when arrestee was offering no further active resistance (B) holding that bystander prisoners who were exposed to pepper spray when prison officials dispensed spray across their pod area to break up a fight were not subjected to excessive force (C) holding that no objectively reasonable police officer could believe that after vinyard was under arrest handcuffed behind her back secured in the back seat of a patrol car with a protective screen between the officer and the arrestee an officer could stop the car grab such arrestee by her hair and arm bruise her and apply pepper spray to try to stop the intoxicated arrestee from screaming and returning the officers exchange of obscenities and insults during a short fourmile jail ride (D) holding that the use of pepper spray on nonviolent protestors was excessive force (E) holding that two bursts of pepper spray to stop fighting in a cell was not considered excessive force and did not violate prisoners eighth amendment rights

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: satisfied the definition of “distribution” contained in § 2G2.2(b)(2). It is this finding that Hill challenges. In United States v. Canada, this court held that the term distribution was not limited to pecuniary gain and that it also included distribution based on non-monetary gains. See 110 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir.1997) (“[T]he intended definition of ‘distribution’ for the sake of the guideline is meant to be inclusive of pecuniary gain purposes, but not exclusive of all other purposes.”). Therefore, we held that because Canada’s distribution “was accompanied by an additional element,” namely the potential gain of enticing a minor to have sexual relations with him, the five-level enhancement was warranted. See id.; see also United States v. Fowler, 216 F.3d 459, 460 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, Canada and subsequent cases have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mailing child pornography to another in the expectation of receiving similar materials in return constituted distribution for purposes of  2g22b2 (B) holding that an enhancement for distribution of child pornography to a minor was improper because the pornographic materials at issue were transmitted to an undercover law enforcement officer who was not a minor (C) holding that trading of child pornography is distribution for purposes of  2g22b2 (D) holding that distribution of child pornography to encourage a meeting to engage in sex was sufficient to warrant enhancement (E) holding that trading tapes of child pornography in order to augment a defendants personal collection constitutes distribution 


Output: (D)