In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: clause. We conclude that reckless battery is a violent crime under the force clause, an issue not addressed by the Holloway opinion. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 20 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012). We further note that the Holloway court’s conclusion with respect to reckless battery accorded with then-binding instruction from the United States Supreme Court that the residual clause is limited to an offense that “typically involve[s] purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct.” United States v. Holloway, supra at 260, quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008). Last year, however, the Supreme Court retreated from this characterization of the residual clause. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270, 2277 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court iterated that “[t]he phrase 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally  (B) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (C) holding that burglary is violent felony (D) holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause (E) holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: party to file a protest with the contracting agency or to file an action in a district court of the United States or the United States Claims Court.” Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). STANDING The plaintiffs legal standing to appeal the GAO’s decision lies in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.. Section 702 provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review” thereof. The court finds that the plaintiff, as an unsuccessful bidder, has standing to challenge the agency’s decision to award the contract to a third party. See Choctaw Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 761 F.2d 609, 615-16 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). FINDINGS OF FACT The majority of facts are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the losing bidder has standing to challenge the award of a government procurement contract (B) holding that if the government is obligated to rebid the contract and the unsuccessful bidder could compete for the contract once again and therefore has an economic interest and standing to challenge the award (C) holding that without a valid reason for cancelling the procurement  the government violated its duty to conduct a fair procurement (D) holding that the definition of procurement under the tucker act is broader than the definition of procurement contract in the fgcaa such that an agency can engage in a procurement process for the purposes of the tucker act even though it is using a cooperative agreement instead of a procurement contract to memorialize the parties agreement (E) holding that city had implied contract with bidder to treat bidder fairly

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: to an in-state transaction, even if the claim did not “arise from” that transaction. See e.g., George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz, 363 N.E.2d 551, 554 (N.Y. 1977) (concluding there was jurisdiction over a Massachusetts resident for breach of an employment contract entered into in New York); Singer v. Walker, 209 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1965) (sustaining jurisdiction because plaintiffs personal injury claim resulting from the use of a defective hammer arose from “the purposeful activities engaged in by [defendant]” in New York “in connection with the sale of its products in the New York market”). On the other hand, New York courts have also held that jurisdiction is not justified where the relationship between the claim and the transaction is too attenuated. See e.g., Talbot, 522 N.E.2d at 1027 (<HOLDING>); Ward, 829 N.E.2d at 1203 (concluding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (B) holding that the nexus between a coachs defamation action and a former students pursuit of a college degree in new york was insufficient to support jurisdiction (C) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action (D) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (E) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york


Output: (B)