In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
. The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Iowa, to whom this case was referred with the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3). 3 . Montandon also alleged Title VII claims against Todd and Ehlers in their personal capacities, as well as constructive discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. His wife, Tish Walker Montandon, claimed loss of consortium. The district court dismissed these claims. Because they have not been raised on appeal, they are deemed abandoned. See Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 740-41 (8th Cir.1985). 4 . It remains to be seen whether our holding in Quick will remain the law. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), cert, granted, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2430, 138 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title vii does not address samesex harassment (B) holding that samesex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under title vii (C) holding that title vii does not protect employees from harassment based on sexual orientation (D) holding that samcscx sexual harassment claims are actionable under title vii (E) holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
improperly determined that the “neither expected nor intended” language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an “occurrence.” ¶21 The CGL policy’s core provision defines “occurrence” by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was “neither expected nor intended.” This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured’s expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an “occurrence” and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). ¶22 Here the District Court found that Ribi 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
and conclusions contained in the OIPs was in manifest disregard of the law and therefore requires that the award be vacated. It is incorrect. Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence where: 1) that evidence is of a specific character, namely “of furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount ... [or] of conduct or statements made in compromise ^negotiations;” and 2) if that evidence is offered “to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.” See Fed. R.Evid. 408; see also Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 170 F.3d 286, 293 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). First, the discussion and conclusions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (B) holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt (C) holding that if governmental entity agrees to settle lawsuit from which it is not immune it cannot claim immunity from suit for breach of settlement agreement (D) holding that rule 408 exclusion does not apply to evidence of a settlement agreement if it is offered for another purpose ie for a purpose other than to prove or disprove the validity of the claims that the agreement was meant to settle (E) holding that where one party had received a written agreement and conformed his conduct to that agreement for an extended period of time but failed to sign the agreement he was equitably estopped from denying the validity of the agreement

Ex Output:

(D)