In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: rights, it must be settled in court. The permit may thus be perfectly valid, so far as the conservation laws are concerned, and yet the permittee’s right to drill under it may depend upon his establishing title in a suit at law. Id. at 191. While we noted that the Railroad Commission “should not do the useless thing of granting a permit to one who does not claim the property in good faith,” the Railroad Commission’s determination of the propriety of the permit has no effect on the propriety of the permittee’s potentially tortious actions. Id. Of course, statutory remedies may preempt common law actions or other standards that may set the bar for liability in tort, but a permit is not a get out of tort free card. Cf. MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 494, 499 (Tex.2010) (<HOLDING>). But in this case, the statute authorizing the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state common law claim seeking to require automobile manufacturers to install airbags would frustrate the purposes of the federal safety standard regulations adopted under the federal motor vehicle safety act which did not require manufacturers to do so and therefore was preempted by conflict (B) holding design planning and enforcement of bus safety rules for school bus transportation were not operation of motor vehicle under section 4145 (C) holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  (D) holding the federal motor vehicle safety standards do not preempt jury findings that a bus manufacturers buses were defectively designed (E) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling

A: (D)
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Q: determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. Bridgewater, A.C.J., and Hunt, J., concur. 1 O’Connor later produced a valid concealed weapons permit. 2 Simple possession of a controlled substance is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to deliver. State v. Harris, 14 Wn. App. 414, 418, 542 P.2d 122 (1975); see State v. Sims, 119 Wn.2d 138, 142, 829 P.2d 1075 (1992) ("Where one merely possesses a controlled substance without the statutory element of intent, one is guilty of simple possession under RCW 69.50.401(d), absent unwitting possession.”); State v. Robbins, 68 Wn. App. 873, 877, 846 P.2d 585 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 3 It is not clear when he purchased the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant could only be sentenced to a single offense under section 1244011 not both conspiracy with intent to deliver and possession with intent to deliver (B) holding second simple possession conviction was not an aggravated felony because it was not prosecuted as recidivist possession (C) holding that possession with intent to distribute and simple possession are the same offense under blockburger (D) holding that trial court may arrest judgment on conviction for possession with intent to deliver and enter judgment of guilt on simple possession (E) holding that the defendants prior drug conviction for simple possession did not constitute a controlled substance offense because the plain language of  4b12b requires that the prior conviction involve possession with intent to distribute

A: (D)
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Q: area of successor liability — especially since state law will in many other instances determine whom the EPA may or may not look to for compensation. See, e.g., Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir.1987)(California law determines capacity of a dissolved corporation to be sued); Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1458-60 (state law determines validity of' contractual releases of CERCLA liability). If state law varied widely on the issue of successor liability, perhaps the need for a uniform federal rule would be more apparent. This is not the case, however, as “the law in the fifty states on corporate dissolution and successor liability is largely uniform.” Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir.1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (<HOLDING>). The argued “need” for uniformity thus stems 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state law determines successor liability under cercla (B) holding that  successor liability is not a tort it is an equitable tool used to transfer liability from a predecessor to a successor  quotation omitted (C) holding that apportionment of cercla liability is  a matter of federal common law (D) holding  substantial continuity is untenable as a basis for successor liability under cercla (E) holding that state law governs application of successor liability to cercla defendants

A:
(A)
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