instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
facts underlying the charges for which the defendant had been acquitted were an “integral and natural part of an account of the [defendant’s] crimef.]” The same cannot be said for the facts at issue here, which relate to a seizure that occurred on an entirely different occasion. For that reason, we do not find either Agee or Solomon directly relevant to the present controversy. As a result, we will first examine the challenged evidence in light of the principles traditionally employed in evaluating challenges to evidence admitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b), which focus on the similarity between the prior incident and the incident that underlies the current charges against the defendant. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708, 717 (1990) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the events of 10 February 2005 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case (B) holding that the estoppel doctrine did not apply because unlike the situation in ashe v swenson the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (C) holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because    the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (D) holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct (E) holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal
answer:
holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case


question:
of the evidence to have determined the outcome.” Id.; accord Snow v. State, 697 S.W.2d 663, 666-68 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985), pet. dism’d, 794 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). A “single egregious error” may constitute ineffective assistance. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. Frequently, it has. Texas Cases Reversing Without Evidence of Trial Strategy In at least 22 cases decided after the Court of Criminal Appeals decided Jackson v. State, Texas courts have reversed even though no evidence of trial counsel’s reasoning was presented. See Woods v. State, 59 S.W.3d 833, 835-38 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. filed); Mares v. State, 52 S.W.3d 886, 893 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. ref'd); Jaubert v. State, 65 S.W.3d 73 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. granted) (designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); Robison v. State, 35 S.W.3d 257, 265 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing rule (B) recognizing a limited exception to the eightcorners rule for a pure coverage question where the insurer is not questioning the merits of the underlying thirdparty claim and the extrinsic evidence goes strictly to an issue of coverage without contradicting any allegation in the thirdparty claimants pleadings material to the merits of that underlying claim (C) recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court (D) holding that procedural bar rule does not apply to ineffectiveness claims (E) recognizing the rule in robinson and reviewing the merits of ineffectiveness claim without evidence of trial counsels strategy
answer:
recognizing rule


question:
that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and should not be considered by the Court on a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs further contend that in Merck & Co., Inc. v. Merck, 559 U.S. 633, 130 S.Ct. 1784, 176 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010), the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for securities plaintiffs only begins to run once plaintiffs are on notice of the facts constituting each element of the alleged § [10(b) ] violation. Plaintiffs maintain that since scienter is one element of a § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim, before limitations could begin to run plaintiffs had to be on notice of specific facts evidencing Defendants’ scienter of the alleged misstatements. They cite City of Pontiac General Employees’ Retirement System v. MBIA, Inc., 637 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit remanded the suit to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under merck a fact is not deemed discovered until a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have sufficient information about that fact to adequately plead it in a complaint ie until he can plead that fact with sufficient detail and particularity to survive a 12b6 motion to dismiss (B) holding a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to establish that a plausible contract exists but need not plead every detail of the contract (C) holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case (D) holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant (E) holding that a title vii plaintiff need not plead the elements of a mcdonnell douglas prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss
answer:

holding a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to establish that a plausible contract exists but need not plead every detail of the contract