TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: also admitted he personally observed that Gretillat had trouble walking long distances. Indeed, Priske excused Gretillat from making rounds of the facility due to Gretillat’s difficulty walking long distances. In April of 2004, Priske admitted that Gretillat’s forced resignation arose out of Gretillat’s problems with standing and “ambulating.” See, e.g., Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir.1999) (finding “ample evidence” that employee alerted employer to the existence of disability where employee told employer about disability, gave employer information about the ADA, requested an unmonitored telephone line to talk with his “support network,” and displayed symptoms of the disability at work); see also Miller, 61 F.3d at 630 (quoting Hedberg, 47 F.3d at 934) (<HOLDING>). Because Care Initiatives was apprised of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada (B) holding that if all of an employees coworkers knew that he had a heart condition such knowledge would not amount to notice to the employer that the employee was so limited by a disability as to require special accommodations (C) holding that an employer cannot be held liable under the ada if it had no knowledge of the employees alleged disability (D) holding that an employee who claims to have been terminated by her employer for having exercised her right to disability benefits raised a cognizable claim under  510 of erisa notwithstanding the fact that she received the benefits from her employer prior to termination (E) recognizing that employer has notice of limitation when disability manifests itself to the extent that it would be reasonable to infer that her employer actually knew of the disability

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: voters of the political subdivision or subdivisions whose combined territory composes the territory of a district shall be qualified voters of the district. The nomination and election shall be by separate nonpartisan ballot. The term of each member of the board thus elected shall be six years and until his successor is elected and qualified. (Emphasis added.) No definition of a “qualified voter” is provided in SDCL Chapter 49-36. Thus, we must turn to the definition of “voter” as provided under SDCL Title 12, and the South Dakota Constitution as to what qualifies a person as a “voter” within the meaning of Chapter 49-36. See SDCL 12-1-1. [¶44.] Our state affords great protection to a citizen’s voting franchise. SD Const, art. 6, § 19; Duffy v. Mortenson, 497 N.W.2d 437, 439 (S.D.1993) (<HOLDING>). A court must strictly adhere to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a fair referendum assuring the equal right to vote under  101a1 includes the right of members to have the vote scheduled at a time when they can exercise their vote and the right to be free from intimidation or fear of reprisal (B) holding constitutional a tax on a private citizens interest in housing on government property received as part of the private citizens compensation (C) holding it is not the policy of the state of south dakota to disenfranchise its citizens of their constitutional right to vote (D) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (E) holding that the right to vote is fundamental

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: concurrence is not required.” Id. at 366; see Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 517 F.Supp. 390, 402 (S.D.W.Va.1981), aff'd, 674 F.2d 279, 283 (4th Cir.1982) (explaining that “courts ... [have] uniformly held that defendant need not have given personal consent to the motion terminating trial”); Jeffers v. United States, 461 F.Supp. 300, 305 (N.D.Ind.1978); State v. Engleman, 634 S.W.2d 466, 470 (Mo.1982); Poretta v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 763, 569 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1991) (“Following the [Supreme] Court’s ruling in Dinitz, there can be no doubt that the Federal Constitution does not condition the permissibility of retrial on the defendant’s personal, explicit assent to a mistrial motion brought by his attorney.”); People v. Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 494 N.E.2d 77, 80-82 (1986) (<HOLDING>); People v. Moore, 140 Cal.App.3d 508, 189 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defense counsel validly waived a double jeopardy claim by assenting to a mistrial when defendant was not consulted or present (B) holding that defense counsel validly waived a double jeopardy claim by assenting to a mistrial after defendant was found incompetent to stand trial in the midst of trial (C) holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds (D) holding that defendant waived double jeopardy claim by obtaining severance of charges at first trial (E) holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted

SOLUTION:
(A)