In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: CURIAM. Appellant, John Mark Vaughan, Jr., filed a Rule 3.800(a) motion, claiming that his sentence was illegal under Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines could have been imposed under the valid 1994 guidelines. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to attach the relevant portions of the record to support this finding, which ordinarily would require reversal. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 741 So.2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). However, appellant failed to allege that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a movant successfully challenges an illegal prr sentence in a rule 3800a motion at resentencing the movant is entitled to be present at sentencing represented by counsel with an opportunity to present mitigating evidence (B) holding that burden is on trial court denying a facially sufficient rule 3800a motion to attach record establishing movant is not entitled to relief (C) holding motion for substitution of judge properly denied where movant failed to attach affidavit (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding that a rule 3800a motion that does not allege that the court records show the defendants entitlement to additional jail credit is facially insufficient

A: (B)
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Q: 8 . See, e.g., Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 547 (6th Cir.2012); Pacific Dunlop Holdings v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir.1993); Adena Exploration, Inc. v. Sylvan, 860 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir.1988); Penturelli, 779 F.2d 160 at 166; Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 354 (10th Cir.1970); Shimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880, 883 (D.C.1967); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F.Supp. 1314, 1346 (S.D.N.Y.1982). 9 . Interpreting the same language, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois observed that Congress intended “to specifically include as securities 'only that form of splitting up of mineral interests which had been most utilized for speculative purposes.’ ” Fearneyhough v. McElvain, 598 F.Supp. 905, 907 (C.D.Ill.1984) (<HOLDING>). 1 The Lenau [Appellants] signed the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that it is an unusual challenge to a sale that does not distort the validity of the sale and that the exception likely has meaning only when collateral issues are challenged (B) holding that an assignment or sale of rights in the invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of the invention within the meaning of section 102b (C) holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument (D) holding that the sale of the entire leasehold interest in the oil and gas rights in plaintiffs land does not constitute the sale of a security within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 acts notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs retained an overriding oneeighth 18 royalty interest (E) holding that the amount of water rights appurtenant to the land is the amount that is being used thereon before and at the time of the sale

A: (D)
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Q: fall within the range of 216 to 240 months. The 240-month sentence is the statutory maximum for first-degree aggravated robbery, and the 216-month sentence is equivalent to a double departure of the 108-month presumptive sentence for the kidnapping. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 1 . This statute went into effect August 1, 1998, before Neal was sentenced, but after the date of his offense. The previous dangerous-offender statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.152, subd. 2, was repealed August 1, 1998. See Act effective August 1, 1998, ch. 367, art. 6, § 7, 1998 Minn. Laws 731, 735. The district court erred in using the 1998 dangerous-offender statute because it went into effect after the date of Neal's offense, July 14, 1998. See State v. Murray, 495 N.W.2d 412, 413 (Minn. 1993) (<HOLDING>). However, the criteria for sentencing a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding minnesotas patterned sex offender senfence enhancement statute unconstitutional as applied to one defendant and noting our doubts as to whether the statute could ever be constitutionally applied (B) holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction   (C) holding that some of the sex offender conditions imposed on defendant as part of his sentence for possessing a firearm were unreasonable where defendants sole sex offense was over a decade old at the time of sentencing (D) holding that the defendant could not be sentenced under the patterned sex offender statute if his offense occurred before the statute became effective (E) holding that while a defendant is not entitled to be sentenced as a youthful offender on any new offense he or she may have committed the trial court cannot revoke a defendants youthful offender status on offenses for which that defendant has already been sentenced citation omitted

A:
(D)
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