In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 55(c) motion on or before August 22, 2012, the 90th day after it was filed, that motion was denied by operation of law on that date, which denial terminated the trial court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v. Lenoir, 5 So.3d 1282, 1283 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (“The trial court loses jurisdiction to consider [a postjudgment] motion after the expiration of the 90-day period.”). Because its jurisdiction terminated on August 22, 2012, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the November 16, 2012, order purporting to set aside the default judgment against Thurmond; the March 16, 2013, order purporting to deny Thurmond’s summary-judgment motion; and the April 16, 2013, order purporting to enter a summary judgment in favor of Parrish. See Sibley v. Sibley, 90 So.3d 191, 193 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (<HOLDING>). A judgment entered by a trial court lacking 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void (B) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (C) holding trial court order which purportedly corrected divorce decree to alter marital property division was void because it was entered  after this court obtained jurisdiction (D) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (E) holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief

A: holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void
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Q: the ISBE would terminate on August 1, 2011, and the consent decree for CPS on September 1, 2012. With the consent decrees terminated, the only remaining action is for the Monitor to file the final report detailing her findings of the agencies’ compliance with the decrees. Then, just a few months before the consent decree for CPS was set to terminate, CPS filed a motion with the district court to decertify the original “Corey H.” class and vacate the consent decree it had agreed to in 1998 and also in 2010. The district court denied the motion and CPS appealed to this court. On appeal, CPS contends that the district court erred by denying its motion on the ground that our decision in Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir.2012), mandates that we d th Cir.1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Even if this case were not moot, we would not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23 (B) holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (D) holding that consent decree could not preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims that could not have been brought at time consent decree was filed and to which they were legally and procedurally entitled (E) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated

A: holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23
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Q: ”) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Applying this standard, the Court found that Nurriddin pled viable factual allegations of Title VII discrimination that should not be dismissed pre-discovery. Now, however, the parties have completed discovery and submitted motions for summary judgment, which are evaluated under an entirely different standard. See, e.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-55, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In conducting this evaluation, the Court finds it appropriate to use the expanded record in determining whether there are any genuine disputes of material fact, including whether Nurriddin meets his burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Murphy v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 580 F.Supp.2d 4, 9 n. 7 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Mazloum v. District of Columbia Metro. Police 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court had an adequate record to grant the defendants motion for summary judgment because the relevant evidence would have been in plaintiffs possession (B) holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived (C) holding that plaintiffs lawofthecase argument fails because the arguments presented in defendants motion for summary judgment were based at least in part on an expanded record (D) holding that a litigant who fails to raise an argument in opposition to a properly raised motion for summary judgment will not be permitted to raise that same argument later either in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal (E) holding that arguments not presented to the district court in response to a motion for summary judgment are waived

A:
holding that the court had an adequate record to grant the defendants motion for summary judgment because the relevant evidence would have been in plaintiffs possession
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