In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: of death which does not meet these requirements is voidable by the donor (if he recovers) or his personal representative. Hulley v. Chedic, 22 Nev. 127,146, 36 P. 783 (1894). In other words, a gift in contemplation of death'is presumptively voidable by the personal representative of the deceased, and the presumption may be rebutted by the donee with clear and convincing evidence of the six elements listed above. Although Goldsworthy and Hulley are the only Nevada cases ever to have examined the gift causa mortis doctrine, and they have never been overruled, at least one Nevada case has suggested (in a different context) that the burden of proof may not be on the donee. North Arlington Medical Building, Inc. v. Sanchez Construction Company, 86 Nev. 515, 521, 471 P.2d 240, 244 (Nev.1970) (<HOLDING>). North Arlington is not really on point, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable (B) holding that inter vivos gift to minor is presumptively effective under nrs 167040 (C) holding that the purpose of nrs 1760551 is to ensure that all time served is credited towards a defendants ultimate sentence (D) holding that belowguidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable (E) holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable

Answer: (B)


Question: fees, an award of reasonable fees is mandatory, as long as there is proof of reasonable fees ... and the plaintiff has been awarded damages.” Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 462 (5th Cir.2002), citing Tex. Civ. Peac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 38.001(8) (Vernon 2002). Accord Coffel v. Stryker Corp., 284 F.3d 625, 640 (5th Cir.2002) (“[t]he award of reasonable attorneys’ fees is mandatory under § 38.001 if the plaintiff prevails in his or her breach of contract claim and recovers damages”). The only discretion the Fifth Circuit permits is discretion to determine the amount of the attorney’s fees award. See id. The availability of a section 38.001 award is not conditioned on a contractual provision for attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. 1999) (<HOLDING>); Golden v. Murphy, 611 S.W.2d 914, 915 
 Holding statements: (A) holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees (B) holding that prevailing party to contract dispute may recover attorneys fees either pursuant to contract or pursuant to statute (C) holding that prevailing party was entitled to attorneys fees under an option contract which had expired prior to litigation because the parties were litigating their performance under the terms of the contract (D) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees (E) holding defendant waived request for fees pursuant to contract provision by only generally referring to fees in the answer and not citing the contract

Answer: (B)


Question: agreed not to introduce the testimony of DeFoy, a jailhouse informant who claimed that Pursell admitted to the killing. Today, Pursell claims that Krahe’s testimony violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment, and that his defense counsel was ineffective when he abandoned the motion for a mistrial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the merits of the ineffectiveness claim, and I will apply AEDPA’s deferential standard of review to that claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In all other respects, my review is de novo. There is little question that Krahe’s statement about Pursell’s prior record violated the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, any statements made by Pursell after he invoked his rights to counsel and silence were inadmissible under Miranda. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-75, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (<HOLDING>); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once miranda warnings have been given if the individual indicates in any manner  that he wishes to remain silent the interrogation must cease any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion subtle or otherwise (B) holding that the interrogation must cease once the suspect invokes his miranda right to counsel (C) holding that if a suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning (D) holding that a statement given after miranda warnings have been administered may be inadmissable when police have elicited a previous unwarned statement during a custodial interrogation (E) holding state did not impermissibly comment on defendants right to remain silent when it crossexamined him on the inconsistency of his testimony with the prior statement he made to the arresting officer after being given the miranda warnings

Answer:
(A)