In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 39:4-88(b), the mandate to drive within a single lane to the extent practicable applies, whether or not a deviation from that lane imposes a risk to another driver. The statute’s second clause addresses a related, but discrete, mandate of the Code. It requires a driver to ascertain the safety of switching lanes before conducting a lane change. N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b). Unlike the violation described in the first clause of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b), the violation described in the second clause is avoided if a driver, in a roadway with multiple lanes traveling in the same direction, first determines that departure from a lane may be conducted safely. The Appellate Division’s limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b) to the violation identified in the statute’s second clause would render t .App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the courts of our sister states, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness (B) holding that tex transp code ann  545060a describes one offense (C) holding that no offense alleged where affidavit described offense as felony (D) holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense (E) holding that the statute describes but one offense which can be committed by either or both of two methods
[A]: holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness


[Q]: “is one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’ ”. The constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not dependent on the subjective intent of the individual asserting the right but on whether the expectation is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Additionally, a determination of whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate or reasonable entails a balancing of interests. Id. 620 A.2d at 1118 (Citations omitted). Here, Mr. Cass obviously meant to keep the contents of his locker private from the public. Mr. Cass’ locker was locked, and this fact would indicate that he meant to keep the contents private. Simply because he did not own the locker does not preclude him from having an actual expectation of privacy. See, Bnmdidge supra (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 433 Pa.Super. 157, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest (B) holding that a hotel guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his room during the period of time for which the room is rented (C) holding that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his hosts home (D) holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room rented by relatives when he had a key to the room and permission to use the room at will (E) holding that a visitor to a hotel room for purposes of distributing drugs failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room
[A]: holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest


[Q]: postconvietion proceeding. Therefore, the narrower approach does not clearly establish judicial economy. T48 Hinojos-Mendoza does not require a different conclusion. There, the supreme court recognized judicial economy in taking up an unpreserved confrontation issue under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The court explained that the defendant could rely on Crawford because it had been decided during his direct appeal. But trial counsel could hardly have been expected to raise the issue the Crawford court decided, contrary to controlling Colorado precedent. See People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675, 680-81 (Colo.1983) (relying on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)), abrogated by People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo.2004) (<HOLDING>). 1 44 Here, in contrast, defendant does not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing same (B) recognizing crawford partially abrogated alacode  152532 (C) recognizing rule (D) recognizing general rule but treating as legal question because ohio statute set out qualifications for position that were not met by applicant (E) recognizing the rejection of ohio v roberts by crawford v washington
[A]:
recognizing same