In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
--------
Question: to that extent. Reed, supra, at 17, 104 S.Ct. 2901. The holding in Cage represents a degree of novelty sufficient to constitute cause. As such, Mercer has established cause to avoid otherwise procedurally defaulting on his claim challenging the reasonable doubt instruction. Sufficient prejudice to establish federal habeas jurisdiction also exists. In particular, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases is so intertwined with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury verdict that a constitutionally deficient jury instruction cannot produce a guilty verdict comporting with due process but, rather, requires reversal of a conviction. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-80, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (<HOLDING>). It follows that a claimed Cage violation 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding exclusion was harmless error (C) holding that when defendant properly objects to charge error reversal required unless error was harmless (D) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (E) holding a cage violation could never be held harmless error and thus not amenable to harmless error review but rather required outright reversal

Answer: (E)


Question: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals

Answer: (E)


Question: added)). 3 . The district court "preliminarily” found statutory jurisdiction to be proper. Because it believed statutory jurisdiction to be an element of an offense under United States v. Smith, 282 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.2002), the court then submitted the question of consent to the jury. The district court need not have taken this second step since consent was uncontested. 4 . We do not require nexus for stateless vessels. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1161; United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 829 (9th Cir.2003). 5 . The First and Fifth Circuits have rejected the position that nexus is required for foreign vessels when the flag nation has consented to the application of United States law to the defendants. See United States v. Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 627-28 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that by the introduction and admission of the delawares as part of the cherokee nation they became a part of the people of such nation and bound in common with the cherokees by the political power of the nation (B) holding that regulatory requirements are not jurisdictional in nature (C) holding gwaltney limited to jurisdictional question and does not prohibit recovery of past penalties in citizen suit if jurisdictional requirements met (D) holding that as a matter of law the embassy of a sovereign nation is a foreign state (E) holding that jurisdictional requirements were met because the flag nation consented to the enforcement of the mdlea over the foreign vessel

Answer:
(E)