In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.” Teffeteller v. State, 495 So.2d 744, 745 (Fla.1986). In noncapital cases, too, we have concluded that “resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights.” Trotter v. State, 825 So.2d 362, 367-68 (Fla.2002); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 525 (Fla.2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (“We have consistently held that resentencing proceedings must be a ‘clean slate,’ meaning that the defendant’s vacated sentence becomes a ‘nullity’ and his ‘resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.’ ” (citation omitted)); Walker, 988 So.2d at 8 (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially) (“Generally, courts have held that once a def A 1998) (<HOLDING>); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing (B) holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction (C) holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing (D) holding that even though the defendant did not challenge his prior convictions at the original sentencing lawofthecase principles do not insulate the state from proving them at resentencing (E) holding that at resentencing on violation of probation trial court may revise guidelines scoresheet to reflect prior convictions mistakenly omitted from the original through no fault of the defendant
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: recipient venue because their lack of standing here means it is not a district “in which [the case] might have been brought,” according to the requirements of the transfer statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiffs suggest that this court should “sensibly confirm[] that inherent in any discretionary transfer here is the idea that jurisdiction cannot be destroyed.” PI. Resp. 25. The argument is artful but unpersuasive. “There is no valid reason for reading the words ‘where it might have been brought’ to narrow the range of permissible federal forums beyond those permitted by federal venue statutes.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 623, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); see also Carbonara v. Olmos, 1994 WL 61797, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1994) (<HOLDING>). B. Standing of SAF SAF asserts both 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (C) holding that transfer to a district in which circuit law likely precluded standing was proper because the language of  1404a refers only to whether venue is proper and not a plaintiffs capacity to sue (D) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (E) holding that venue is proper in any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: while Deputy Sizemore had his driver’s license, appellant would have violated Code § 46.2-104, which prohibits a vehicle operator from driving without a license. See Brown, 17 Va.App. at 697, 440 S.E.2d at 621 (under circumstances where police observed the defendant operating a motor vehicle, when an officer asked the defendant for his operator’s license, the defendant “was no longer free to leave”). For these reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss appellant’s conviction. Reversed and dismissed. 1 . Police officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by approaching an individual in a public place and asking questions. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1323-24, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)(<HOLDING>); Richards v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 612, 615, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment was not implicated when an officer asked for passengers identification to see if he could drive a vehicle because the driver had a suspended license (B) holding that the defendant was not seized when two officers approached the defendant on a public street and asked him questions (C) holding that the defendant had been subjected to an illegal arrest when after detectives requested and did not return his airline ticket and drivers license he was asked to come with the officers from the concourse into an interrogation room approximately 40 feet away where his suitcases were searched (D) holding fourth amendment not implicated when police officers approached defendant who was standing outside of an airport terminal and asked to see his airline ticket and identification (E) holding fourth amendment not implicated when police officers asked defendant to see his airline ticket asked for identification and requested consent to search him
Example Output:
(E)