In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

that she disapproved of what she reasonably believed to be unlawful retaliation. B. Form and Context To the extent that Thomas’ conduct was expressive, the message was communicated to her immediate supervisor, Miller, and other court employees. She did not, however, attempt to inform the general public about the allegedly retaliatory practices. That Thomas chose to convey her views privately rather than publicly is not determinative of whether her expression is entitled to protection. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979). Because content is the most important factor, we have concluded that speech about a matter of public concern may be protected even when made in a private context. See, e.g., Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1174 (<HOLDING>); Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 979 (“[T]he public 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected (B) holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged (C) holding that a memorandum given to the employees supervisors was protected speech when the memorandum alleged criminal wrongdo ing (D) holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected (E) holding the separate document rule violated when the alleged judgment was included with the memorandum and order of the court
(C)

yet a third time under the discussion of ‘why.’ 934 S.W.2d at 457 (emphasis added). Finally, the court of appeals properly applied the Kraus factors and explained why the evidence supported the punitive damages award. Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals’ factual sufficiency review of the punitive damages award, despite the court’s occasional misleading language, was proper. IY. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD-RECALCULATION Mobil also argues that the court of appeals erred by including, sua sponte, the estate’s actual damages in its punitive damages calculation, thereby adding $91,555.58 to the punitive damages award. We agree. A court of appeals cannot modify a judgment without a point of error asking it to do so. See Texas Nat’l Bank v. Karnes, 717 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex.1986)(<HOLDING>). Here, the jury charge asked the jury to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees (B) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees (C) holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees (D) holding that oncors request for the trial judge rather than the jury to determine the reasonableness of its attorneys fees and the failure to submit the question of attorneys fees to the jury resulted in a waiver of oncors claim for the recovery of attorneys fees (E) holding that the court of appeals erred in modifying the judgment to include attorneys fees when the trial courts refusal to grant attorneys fees was not the subject of a point of error
(E)

(“In this instance, Cook’s filing of the petition 39 days after the Quitman County Democratic Executive Committee conducted the hearing on September 4, 2003 was not “forthwith” as required by the statute”) (emphasis added). ¶22. In Pearson, this Court deemed “forthwith” a petition filed thirteen days, nine working days, after the committee decision. 541 So.2d at 450. The committee never reached a decision in this case. Parker filed his petition for judicial review on June 22, 2005, fifteen days, eleven working days, after the last committee meeting on June 7, 2005, in which the contest was scheduled to be addressed. Filing within eleven working days is not a significant departure from the nine working days this Court found to be “forthwith” in Pearson. But see Turner, 193 So. at at 632 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the “forthwith” requirement is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of a petition twentysix days after the final executive committee action was stretching forthwith too far (B) holding that california supreme courts denial of habeas petition becomes final thirty days after filing (C) holding that utility customers mailing of a petition did not constitute the filing of the petition as filing was not effectuated until the petition was received by the clerk (D) holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional (E) holding that petitioner was dili gent for equitable tolling purposes where petitioner filed state petition two months after conviction was final and filed federal petition seven days after discovering state had denied petition on the merits

(A)