instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
we now reverse the decision of the trial court. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. 1 . We set forth additional facts in the companion case issued today, Dep't. of Revenue v. Adams, 762 N.E.2d 728 (Ind.2002). 2 . The CSET is a tax on the possession of certain narcotics. We discuss the tax and the procedures for collecting it in greater detail infra. 3 . All of the cocaine at issue in this case was discovered prior to the time the police served a valid search warrant. 4 . Ind.Code § 35-48-4-1 (1998). 5 . Id. § 35-48-4-6. 6 . United States Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the revenue officers' entry of Adam's home to collect the CSET assessment was a search. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Thomas v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (B) holding that revenue officers conducted a search when they entered a cottage and seized records when levying on delinquent tax (C) holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business (D) holding search unreasonable when conducted on the highway in broad day light (E) holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house
answer:
(B)


question:
lease, for the first time in his reply brief, thus, he has waived it. In most circumstances a litigant who fails to raise an argument until his reply brief wül be deemed to have waived that argument. Wilson v. O’Leary, 895 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1990). This case is before us, however, on a motion for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The inquiry we are faced with is whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support his allegation. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This court has held that when reviewing Rule 12(b)6) motions, we wül consider new factual allegations raised for the first time on appeal provided they are consistent with the complaint. See Hrubec v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 981 F.2d 962, 963-64 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Dawson v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 369, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint (B) holding that the essential inquiry in conversion of a rule 12b6 motion to a rule 56 motion is whether the appellant should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted into one for summary judgment or was taken by surprise and deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the pleadings (C) holding that a plaintiff may attempt to survive a rule 12b6 motion by adding essential new facts in a brief on appeal (D) holding that class claims that fail to meet the requirements of rule 23 may be properly dismissed by granting a rule 12b6 motion (E) holding that plaintiff cannot introduce new allegations or new facts in opposition to a motion to dismiss
answer:
(C)


question:
Ninth Circuit has extended this definition of "physical force” to other generic offense provisions (though not the Section 924(c)(3) force clause), including 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) and U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, both of which define “crime of violence” using language that is identical or essentially identical to the language used in the ACCA force clause and the Section 924(c)(3) force clause). The Court finds it appropriate to do the same here. 3 . The text of Section 924(c)(3)(A) does not explicitly require that there be an intentional use of physical force in order for a crime to constitute a "crime of violence.” Still, Wade cites Ninth Circuit authority holding that similar penalty-enhancing statutes implicitly require intent. See Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>), However, the Supreme Court recently held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that those crimes with a mens rea of negligence or recklessness do not trigger the enhanced penalties mandated by the acca (B) holding that one can be convicted of attempted manslaughter under the subsections of section 765205 that require intentional conduct but not under the subsection that only requires the mens rea of recklessness (C) holding that bank robbery is a crime of violence because a defendants knowledge that his behavior is intimidating satisfies 924cs mens rea requirement (D) holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea (E) holding that neither recklessness nor gross negligence is a sufficient mens rea to establish that a conviction is for a crime of violence under section 16
answer:

(E)