In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: a favorable decision, by which we mean that the “prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling” is not “too speculative.” In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1101 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The NMCGA contends that the provision for attorneys’ fees is an “egregious and illegal use of tax dollars.” NMCGA’s Response at 7. It is well established that a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge state and federal spending decisions. Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1399 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, Cl. 183, 184-85 (2006) (<HOLDING>). While NMCGA does not have standing to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties (B) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (C) holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment (D) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (E) holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim

Output: holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties


Input: Consider Input: for [her] employer! ] to operate efficiently and effectively.” Id. at 418-19, 126 S.Ct. 1951. The point of this inquiry, then, is “both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their im portant public functions.” Id. at 420, 126 S.Ct. 1951. With that premise as a backdrop, the Supreme Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951; see also Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 364-65 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Garcetti and its Sixth Circuit progeny 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern (B) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (C) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (D) holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless  related to his job duties (E) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected

Output: holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern


Input: Consider Input: Court in the intervening years. See Fairfield, 246 S.W.3d at 668 & n. 22 (citing with approval Milligan, Shaffer, Vanderlinden, and Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lichte, 792 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1990), writ denied per curiam, 825 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.1991)); see also id. at 683 (Hecht, J., concurring) (identifying Manriques v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 779 S.W.2d 482 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied), a case relied on by Laine, as one of only two courts that “have concluded that punitive damages are damages for bodily injury covered by automobile policies,” a position that “has been uniformly rejected in the context of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage”); Home Indem. Co. v. Tyler, 522 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>), overruled by Milligan, 940 S.W.2d 228 (citing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding business automobile policy issued to a corporation did not provide uninsured motorist coverage for owners son (B) holding that while the owner of several vehicles by paying a single premium for um coverage applicable to only one of them secures um coverage for himself and his family while occupying the uninsured vehicles as well as the insured vehicle the number of uninsured motorist coverages available to be stacked should be based upon the number of coverages for which uninsured motorist premiums were paid (C) holding that language requiring insurer to pay all sums which the insured  shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile includes recovery of exemplary damages under uninsured motorist provision of policy (D) holding that an insurer may  assert as defenses the nonnegligence of the uninsured the contributory negligence of the insured and the lack of resulting damage all being matters of substantive law and legal defenses of the uninsured but it does not  succeed  to the rights of the uninsured motorist to interpose the latters procedural defense of statute of limitations (E) holding that a hit and run or unknown driver is deemed to be uninsured for purposes of the uninsured motorist statute


Output: holding business automobile policy issued to a corporation did not provide uninsured motorist coverage for owners son