instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
Erickson-Puttmann concedes that her Title VII claim against Gill fails because Gill was not her employer. See e.g., Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly Community Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th Cir.1997) (“Our Court quite recently has squarely held that supervisors may not be held individually liable under Title VII.” (citing Spencer v. Ripley County State Bank, 123 F.3d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir.1997) (per cu-riam))). Lenhardt v. Basic Inst, of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir.1995) (noting that “[e]very circuit that has considered the issue ultimately has concluded that an employee, even one possessing supervisory authority, is not an employer upon whom liability can be imposed under Title VII.”); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the court concludes that summary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii (B) holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii (C) holding individual employees may be liable under title vii (D) holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii (E) holding that there is no individual liability under title vii
answer:
holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii


question:
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and part of the “unified judicial system,” is an arm of the state. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir.2000) (“All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system ... are part of ‘Commonwealth government’ and thus are state rather than local agencies.”). As a state agency, the Board has Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. Therefore, as an arm of the state, Lucas may not sue the Board unless one of the three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply. See MCI Telcomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503 (listing immunity exceptions). On appeal, Lucas argues that the Ex Parte Young exception precludes the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to the present action against the Board. Howe 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Neither of these exceptions are applicable in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action (B) holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action (C) holding that a remedial scheme created by congress even if incapable of addressing all of plaintiffs injuries precluded a bivens action (D) holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction (E) holding that young will not apply where congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state
answer:
holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action


question:
evidence of record, or it is inconsistent with the physician’s own medical records. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41; Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir.1991) (concluding that good cause existed not to rely on a treating physician’s findings when, inter alia, his treatment notes contained unexplained inconsistencies). The ALJ may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir.1985). Further, when a treating physician makes merely conclusory statements, the ALJ may afford them such weight as is supported by the clinical or laboratory findings and other consistent evidence of the claimant’s impairments. Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1986); see Vega, 265 F.3d at 1220 (<HOLDING>). When a treating physician’s opinion does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the alj had already  obtained and considered reports from treating physicians the alj had before him a complete medical history and the evidence received from the treating physicians was adequate for him to make a determination as to disability (B) holding that the alj erred in failing to give the findings and assessments of the treating physicians any weight when the medical evidence and claimants testimony supported a diagnosis of cfs (C) holding that the alj failed to analyze the effect of cfs on a claimants ability to do work meaningfully when he rejected cfs as a diagnosis for want of a definite test or specific laboratory findings to support the diagnosis (D) holding that the alj properly relied on the assessments of a nonexamining physician and not claimants treating physicians in determining the rfc at step four (E) holding that a treating physicians diagnosis could be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record
answer:

holding that where the alj had already  obtained and considered reports from treating physicians the alj had before him a complete medical history and the evidence received from the treating physicians was adequate for him to make a determination as to disability