In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: 1 We note that the Supreme Court of Georgia recently vacated portions of the trial court’s injunction order in Barham v. City of Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375 (738 SE2d 52) (2013). 2 Am. Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Mom & Pop Stores, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 1, 7 (3) (497 SE2d 616) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 3 Levine v. Sun Trust Robinson Humphrey, 321 Ga. App. 268, 275 (3) (740 SE2d 672) (2013) (punctuation omitted). 4 Am. Petroleum Prods., 231 G 215 SE2d 294) (1975) (“[When] the complaining party cannot legitimately claim surprise, either because he knew of the existence of the witness or had equal means of knowing, it is not error to fail to invoke the sanctions of postponement, mistrial, barring the witness, etc.”). Cf. Malley Motors, Inc. v. Davis, 183 Ga. App. 599, 600 (1) (359 SE2d 394) (1987) (<HOLDING>). 18 See Hunter v. Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (B) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (C) holding that trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of a witness who was not listed in the pretrial order and no reason was given for the failure to list the witness (D) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (E) holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: judgment of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the fac appealability on ineffective assistance of counsel, the “cause” Hernandez assigns for his procedural default, suggests that it intended to allow review of the procedural bar. However, even assuming that the district court wished this court to review its procedural bar finding or that we would grant a certificate of appealability on this issue, the correctness of the district court’s central holding — that there was no error, constitutional or otherwise — in the state trial court’s charge on intent is dispositive. The test for finding charge-based constitutional error is a strict one. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (<HOLDING>). We see no basis for finding a Fourteenth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error (B) holding that a trial court does not commit plain error unless the error is clear under current law (C) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (D) holding that constitutional error cannot be premised on error in a charge unless the error violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that when defendant properly objects to charge error reversal required unless error was harmless

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: of which are local and some out of State.” Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 585-86, 117 S.Ct. 1590, 137 L.Ed.2d 852 (1997). Thus, as the Court stated, “[f]or purposes of Commerce Clause analysis, any categorical distinction between the activities of profit-making enterprises and not-for-profit entities is ... wholly illusory.” Id. at 586, 117 S.Ct. 1590. Similarly, government institutions not only can affect interstate commerce but also can be direct participants in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has noted on several occasions the impact that certain federal, state, and local government institutions can have on interstate commerce. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537, 547-48, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Governments in general, and individual 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce (B) holding that the inability to proceed as a class does not deprive plaintiffs of substantive rights under the fair labor standards act flsa (C) holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration (D) holding that a religious foundation is an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the fair labor standards act (E) holding that application of fair labor standards act flsa to transportation employees employed by local government does not contravene the commerce clause because labor conditions of those employees affect interstate commerce


Output: (E)