In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
the question of competency of counsel. Balanced against this is the possibility, in most instances quite l’emote, that an experienced member of the public defender’s staff might labor under a conflict of interest because another member of the staff was so burdened. People v. Robinson, 79 Ill.2d 147, 37 Ill.Dec. 267, 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (1979). These two considerations outweigh any possible chilling effect on attorney client relationships at OPD. See also, Bolin v. State, 137 P.3d 136, 145 (Wyo.2006) (stating that, although conflicts involving associates at a private firm are imputed to entire firm, public defenders office “warrants slightly different treatment[,]” and adopting a ease by case analysis); cf. People v. Daniels, 52 Cal.3d 815, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906, 915 (1990) (<HOLDING>); People v. Banks, 121 Ill.2d 36, 117 Ill.Dec. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (B) holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice (C) holding designated counsel acting on behalf of the office of public defender in law guardian program to be public employees for purpose of the new jersey tort claims act njsa 5911 to 123 and therefore entitled to indemnification by the state (D) holding that public defender did not face conflict requiring withdrawal when bringing collateral attack of a defendants conviction public defender was required to attack competence of previous public defender and stating that automatic disqualification  would hamper the ability of public defenders offices to represent indigents in criminal cases (E) holding a federal public defender is not a federal officer for purposes of a bivenstype action

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
26-7A, 26-8A, and 26-8C or of Title 27A shall control, and the provisions of this chapter are in all respects to be supplementary thereto. (emphasis added). Thus, where allegations of abuse and neglect serve as the grounds for the guardianship petition, as was the case here, the statutory provisions specifically relating to abuse and neglect proceedings, as well as the provisions relating to juvenile court, must control. See Martinmaas, 2000 SD 85 at ¶ 49, 612 N.W.2d at 611. [¶ 10.] Adjudication of abuse or neglect is done in juvenile court pursuant to SDCL chapters 26-7A and 26-8A. SDCL 26-7A-2 provides for exclusive juri ’s interest, as parens patriae, in protecting the welfare of the child. SDCL 26-8A-1. See also Matter of N.J.W., N.G.B., and K.F.B., 273 N.W.2d 134, 137 (S.D.1978) (<HOLDING>). The State is the only party that may seek to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding care custody and control of children is a fundamental right (B) holding state as parens patriae takes strong interest in care and treatment of children within its borders (C) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (D) holding that missouri has interest in providing a forum for victims injured as a result of activities conducted within its borders (E) recognizing that with respect to regulating or affecting conduct within its borders the place of the wrong has the predominant interest

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
of this case there is no substantive difference between the old rule and the new rule, which provides that two prior sentences count separately if the offenses were separated by an intervening arrest. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2). Thus, Huggins cannot be distinguished based merely on a nonpertinent change to the text of the applicable rule. The relevant distinction is that the defendant in Huggins received two separate sentences for his two prior offenses, notwithstanding the fact that the offenses were “consolidated for sentencing.” The prior offenses in Huggins occurred in 1987, six years before North Carolina enacted the consolidated sentence provision. See N.C. Gen. Ann. Laws 1993, c. 538, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1994; see also State v. Branch, 134 N.C.App. 637, 518 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Huggins is inapposite because it does 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (B) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective (C) holding that although probation statute was repealed by sentencing reform act old provision continued to apply to offenses which occurred before effective date of act nov 1 1987 (D) holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity (E) holding that as a matter of law offenses that were committed prior to 1 october 1994 the effective date of the structured sentencing act cannot be consolidated for judgment under the act

Ex Output:

(E)