instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
that is presumptively constitutional). The only case of which I am aware construing DeFillippo and denying qualified immunity is Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board, 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002). But in that case “two Ninth Circuit cases [were] directly on point” because they had declared parallel statutes of other States — permitting an arrest for refusing to identify oneself — unconstitutional. Id. at 881. That of course does not remotely describe today’s case. Nor does Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250 (6th Cir.1997), offer any refuge to Leonard. It dealt not with the question whether an officer could be denied qualified immunity for failing to predict a judicial ruling declaring a statute unconstitutional but with whether the statute covered the plaintiffs conduct. See id. at 1256 (<HOLDING>). In the end, Leonard not only asks us to take 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arrest to retrieve car keys where ownership of the car was in dispute was not supported by probable cause (B) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (C) holding that shouting epithets from a moving car did not provide probable cause to arrest the plaintiff under a disorderlyconduct statute (D) holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest (E) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment
answer:
(C)


question:
includes a determination of the significance, if any, of the TNRC’s involvement. When the EPA in 1990 shifted from a “strict” to “substantial compliance” standard for private parties, it did so “to encourage private parties to perform voluntary cleanups of sites, and to remove unnecessary obstacles to their ability to recover their costs from the parties that are liable for the contamination.” 55 FecLReg. at 8792-93. The EPA expressly recognized that requiring private parties to adhere to a set of mechanical rules would impede this objective. Thus the list of public comment provisions identified in 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(6) is only a “universe of requirements which are potentially relevant,” and should “not be c Ry. Co. v. Gee Co., 2002 WL 31163777, at *30 (N.D.Ill. Sept.30, 2002) (<HOLDING>); AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Amcast Int’l Corp., 177 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that government involvement must be accompanied by public comment because a purpose of ncp is to ensure that those responsible for the cleanup receive citizens input regarding environmental conditions in the community (B) holding that public participation requirement was satisfied in part because the ncp policy is  to allow potentially responsible parties an opportunity to comment before costs are incurred and no prps were denied an opportunity to comment (C) holding five day public comment period on a portion of an ea insufficient remanding for further public comment (D) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail (E) holding that meetings with representatives of various affected parties were insufficient to meet public participation requirement because there was never an opportunity for the public at large to comment on the plan without explaining why such opportunity was necessary
answer:
(B)


question:
242 (Me.1991).) To the contrary, it is difficult to think of a claim that is more intrinsically work-related than sexual harassment alleged to have created a hostile work environment. Plaintiff also argues that the injury was not work-related because the “activity causing the injury” was not “implied into the contract of employment.” (Id. at 8 (citing Dorey, 591 A.2d at 242).) Plaintiff characterizes the “activity causing the injury” as “tolerance of sexual harassment and a hostile work environment.” (Id.) However, it is clear from the case law that the “activity” in question in this factor is not tortious conduct of the harasser or the attitude of the victim toward the harassment but the activity that the victim was engaged in when she suffered the injury. See Dorey, 591 A.2d at 242 (<HOLDING>). In this case, there is no indication that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employees stress injury solely due to disciplinary proceedings was not compensable under workers compensation (B) holding that an employees visit to the office solely to retrieve medical documents for a workers compensation claim was not an activity implied into the contract of employment (C) holding that an agencys determination on a workers compensation claim was entitled to deference (D) recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act (E) holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim
answer:

(B)