In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: CBL claim that if the merger is effected, the public will be harmed because Sparrow Hospital will no longer provide late re at the incipiency and block the merger. This court does not find irreparable injury will result from not enjoining the merger because this court sees a very minimal probability that a divestiture would ever be warranted in the future. For reasons that will be explained infra, this court is of the opinion that plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits. Also, plaintiffs claim that if the merger is not enjoined they may lose standing to challenge it, thereby suffering irreparable harm. This court finds no merit in this contention. In making this argument, plaintiffs rely on the case of Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric 477, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (<HOLDING>). For instance, as described above, GLASCCO and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (B) holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts (C) holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation (D) holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing (E) holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: rights, it must be settled in court. The permit may thus be perfectly valid, so far as the conservation laws are concerned, and yet the permittee’s right to drill under it may depend upon his establishing title in a suit at law. Id. at 191. While we noted that the Railroad Commission “should not do the useless thing of granting a permit to one who does not claim the property in good faith,” the Railroad Commission’s determination of the propriety of the permit has no effect on the propriety of the permittee’s potentially tortious actions. Id. Of course, statutory remedies may preempt common law actions or other standards that may set the bar for liability in tort, but a permit is not a get out of tort free card. Cf. MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 494, 499 (Tex.2010) (<HOLDING>). But in this case, the statute authorizing the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state common law claim seeking to require automobile manufacturers to install airbags would frustrate the purposes of the federal safety standard regulations adopted under the federal motor vehicle safety act which did not require manufacturers to do so and therefore was preempted by conflict (B) holding design planning and enforcement of bus safety rules for school bus transportation were not operation of motor vehicle under section 4145 (C) holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  (D) holding the federal motor vehicle safety standards do not preempt jury findings that a bus manufacturers buses were defectively designed (E) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: Ins. Co., 676 F.2d at 61 (“in this type of case the occurrence takes place when the injuries first manifest themselves”); see also Consulting Engineers, 710 A.2d 82 (applying the first manifestation rule as articulated in D'Auria); Keystone Automated Equipment Co., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 369 Pa.Super. 472, 535 A.2d 648 (1988) (same); Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 156 (same); Fletcher v. Pennsylvania Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 27 A.3d 299 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011) (same). The cases Appellants rely on where the first manifestation of injury coincides with the identification of the cause of injury are distinguishable, as the correlation in these cases between manifestation of injury and identification of its cause is merely incidental. See D'Auria, 352 Pa.Super. 231, 507 A.2d 857 (<HOLDING>); Consulting Engineers, 710 A.2d 82 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cause of action accrued no later than date plaintiffs physician advised her to switch from vinyl to latex gloves even though physician did not then discuss latex allergy with her (B) holding that patient suffering from the destruction of healthy lung tissue due to physicians failure to diagnose cancer was sufficient for negligent infliction of emotional distress (C) holding that the effects of injury caused by a doctors failure to diagnose manifested no later than the date renal failure was discovered by an alternative physician (D) holding that the patientphysician privilege does not prevent testimony by a physician as to the fact that he was consulted by a patient on a certain date (E) recognizing physician assistant as agent of the supervising physician
[EX A]:
(C)