In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: the ammunition charge from the gun charges. II. DISCUSSION A. Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Unregistered Firearm Count Under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), it is unlawful for any person to “possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.” For purposes of this provision, the definition of “firearm” includes a shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches in length or with an overall length less than twenty-six inches. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). In order to obtain a conviction under § 5861(d), the government must demonstrate that the defendant knew the barrel’s length was less than eighteen inches or the overall length was less than twenty-six inches. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government must prove the defendant knew of the features of the firearm that brought it within the scope of the act (B) holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered (C) holding that while the government was required to prove that the defendants phone call crossed a state line  the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew of the interstate nexus (D) holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation (E) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: not impliedly preempt the field of law related to the price, route, and service of motor carriers of property, and does not impliedly preempt by conflict her state-law claims. As stated above, in Kelley the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that § 14501(c) preempts the field of law regarding price, route, and service of motor carriers of property. See Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1509-10 (“Here, Congress has clearly chosen ... to preempt the entire field of price, service, and route regulation of intrastate motor carrier activities.”). Furthermore, other federal courts have held that § 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts state tort claims relating to price, route, or service against motor carriers of property. See, e.g., Data Mfg., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 557 F.3d 849 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs statelaw claims alleging common law misrepresentation and statutory misrepresentation under the texas insurance code art 2121 not preempted because they were not dependent on  the right to recover benefits under the erisa plan (B) holding fraudulent representations to the fda could not sustain statelaw claims (C) holding that  14501c1 preempted statelaw claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and money had and received related to billing practices of motor carrier of property (D) holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient (E) holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: 27 Cal.3d 741, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 734-35 (1980) (declining to extend holding in Tarasoff when neither a special relationship existed nor had a specific individual been threatened); Brenneman v. State, 208 Cal.App.3d 812, 256 Cal. Rptr. 363, 367 (following Thompson in holding that “public entities and employees have no affirmative duty to warn of the release of an inmate with a violent history who has made nonspecific threats of harm directed at nonspecific victims”); Leonard v. Latrobe Area Hospital, 425 Pa.Super. 540, 625 A.2d 1228, 1232 (1993) (following Thompson, finding "no common law rule that imposes a duty on a psychologist or psychiatrist to warn a non-patient of a patient’s dangerous propensities”). But see, e.g., Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Co. 1989) (<HOLDING>). 6 .Among those who have been held in certain 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties (B) holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence  that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions     and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise (C) holding courts have held that hospitals have a duty to protect its patients from the tortious or criminal actions of third parties due to the special relationship between the hospital and the patient (D) holding that when a psychiatrist determines or  should determine that a patient poses a serious threat of danger to a third party the psychiatrist has a duty of reasonable care to that party (E) holding that psychiatrist has duty to third parties to exercise due care in treatment and release of committed patients


Output: (E)