In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: that placed a forty-five day time limit on the administrator’s decision to grant or deny a license. See Redner, 29 F.3d at 1500. In the event the administrator exceeded the forty-five day time limit, the ordinance stated that “the applicant may be permitted to begin operating the establishment for which a license is sought," unless and until the County Administrator notifies the applicant of a denial of the application.” See id. at 1500-01 (citation omitted). We held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because its use of the word “may” rather than “shall” allowed the individuals responsible for enforcing the ordinance to suppress the protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on their part or any judicial determination. See id. at 1501 (<HOLDING>). In Lady J. Lingerie, we examined the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff (B) holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review (C) holding also that the ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review (D) holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record (E) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of a request to change a comprehensive zoning plan

A: (C)
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Q: campus is a limited public forum. Def. Br. 12. The Court agrees with the defendants’ assessment. The Court begins by recognizing that “the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum.” Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). Accordingly, the Second Circuit has noted, “[s]ome portions of a public college’s campus may be a public forum.” Davis v. Stratton, 360 FedAppx. 182, 184 (2d Cir.2010). Significant to the analysis, however, is that these areas may constitute a designated public forum only to the extent they are “intentionally openfed]” to First Amendment activities. Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir.2004); see also Ochshom, 645 F.3d at 540 (<HOLDING>); Hotel Emps., 311 F.3d at 545 (noting that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a high school is not a public forum thus precluding free airing of religious views (B) holding that a public high school newspaper was a limited public forum not a traditional or designated public forum because there was no evidence that the school permitted indiscriminate use by the general public quoting hazelwood sch dist v kuhlmeier 484 us 260 267 108 sct 562 98 led2d 592 1988 (C) holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence (D) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (E) recognizing that government is not required to retain open nature of designated public forum

A: (B)
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Q: two theories in support of his contention: a “temporary injury” theory and a “continuing contract” theory. First, Cline argues the gas company’s responses to his requests for free gas— namely its assertions he was required to pay a connection fee or deposit in order to receive the gas—constituted a series of temporary injuries, each of which gave rise to a new and independent cause of action. Kansas courts have recognized a temporary injury theory in nuisance actions, where a plaintiff suffers temporary, occasional, or recurrent physical damage to his real property. See, e.g., Dougan v. Rossville Drainage Dist., 270 Kan. 468, 15 P.3d 338, 346 (2000) (allowing independent causes of action for periodic episodes of flooding); Henderson v. Talbott, 175 Kan. 615, 266 P.2d 273, 281 (1954) (<HOLDING>). Cline has cited no case, however, in which a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action (B) holding the same for the other separate rate plaintiffs in this action (C) holding that although money had and received and unjust enrichment were pled as separate causes of action they are really the same cause of action (D) holding that a forest preserve will be liable for injuries only in the case of willful and wanton negligence that proximately causes such injuries (E) recognizing separate causes of action for injuries to plaintiffs land caused by occasional flooding

A:
(E)
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