In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: a favorable decision, by which we mean that the “prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling” is not “too speculative.” In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1101 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The NMCGA contends that the provision for attorneys’ fees is an “egregious and illegal use of tax dollars.” NMCGA’s Response at 7. It is well established that a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge state and federal spending decisions. Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1399 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, Cl. 183, 184-85 (2006) (<HOLDING>). While NMCGA does not have standing to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties (B) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (C) holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment (D) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (E) holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim

Output: holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties


Input: Consider Input: (“Due process requires that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his ‘day in court.’ ”). The 1992 statute, as applied in this case, provided State Farm no “fair opportunity” to be heard before it was called upon to divest itself of a significant property interest if it chose to preserve its long-recognized right of subrogation. Instead, the statute placed State Farm in the untenable position of being bound by law to the outcome of private settlement negotiations between the Hassens and UniSun that essentially determined its immediate liability for an award of damages, including noneconomic damages, even though it was not a party to the negotiations and had no available means to assert any legal defenses to the Hassens’ claim. Cf. Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So.2d 604 (Fla.1956) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the statute entitled State Farm 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not (B) holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it (E) holding that a corporation is entitled to due process of law insofar as property rights are concerned so that a money judgment may not be entered against it where it was not a party to a cause and was not served with process even though the principal stockholder was a party to the cause

Output: holding that it is not


Input: Consider Input: for playing the tapes were legitimate and the tapes would eliminate the need for T.S. to testify a second time. Defense counsel responded: “Right.” 3 Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides that a statement is not hearsay when the declarant testifies at trial, is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is “consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.” 4 For this reason, we need not address defendant’s argument that the recorded statements were inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). 5 Defendant does not claim that defense counsel did not have the power to waive his right to confront witnesses against him. See generally New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Many courts allow defense counsel to waive 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rights under vienna convention are not the equivalent of fundamental rights such as the right to counsel (B) recognizing a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver of constitutional rights by counsel although certain fundamental rights require personal waiver by defendant (C) recognizing conditions of release may curtail certain fundamental rights (D) holding that a plea agreement with a waiver of direct appeal rights does not include a waiver of collateral remedies because the government could have included a waiver of collateral rights in the plea agreement and chose not to do so (E) recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary


Output: holding that rights under vienna convention are not the equivalent of fundamental rights such as the right to counsel