In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: the sentencing information balancing test urged by the dissent. The ongoing confusion concerning the breach of Wisconsin plea agreements is further highlighted by this district's issuance of an unusual, three-legged opinion. ¶ 24. While I have some sympathy with the dissent's concern about the continued integrity of the plea bargaining process, I disagree that the facts in this case can result in an unwarranted sentencing "clam up" restriction. The prosecutor not only has a right but a duty to provide information to the sentencing court. Moreover, there is nothing wrong with the prosecutor providing his or her opinion of the defendant's character, even if negative, to the sentencing court so long as the opinion is used to support the recommendation. See Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 324-25 (<HOLDING>). But it makes no sense to allow the prosecutor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erroneous use of statutorily unqualified person to prepare posttrial recommendation requires new recommendation and action (B) recognizing the importance of congressional findings in determining the appropriateness of congresss remedial measures (C) recognizing prosecutors task to attempt to convince the court of the appropriateness of the recommendation (D) holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error (E) holding that if counsel raises an issue the failure to convince the court to rule in an appellants favor is not ineffective performance
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: 238 (2) (367 SE2d 786) (1988). 41 Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 302 Ga. App. 726, 730 (2) (b) (691 SE2d 633) (2010) (punctuation omitted). 42 Id. at 731 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted). 43 Fla. Int’l Indem. Co. v. Osgood, 233 Ga. App. 111, 115 (3) (503 SE2d 371) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 44 Griffin, 302 Ga. App. at 731 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted). 45 See Roland v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 265 Ga. 776, 778(2) (462 SE2d 623) (1995) (affirming trial court’s directed verdict in favor of insured on coverage claim but, nonetheless, also affirming court’s directed verdict in favor of insurer on insured’s bad-faith claim in light of the fact that insured’s coverage, despite ultimately succeeding, was based on a doubtful question of law); Griffin, 302 Ga.App. at 731 (2) (b) (<HOLDING>); Assurance Co. of Am. v. BBB Serv. Co., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because insurers nonpayment was based on contention that insured did not have a covered loss under the policy because the value of the property was the same regardless of whether it was serviced by an easement nonpayment was reasonable and not subject to a badfaith claim (B) holding that regardless of the subjective belief of the insured the record established a basis to believe that the insured had committed an act that could give rise to a claim under the policy (C) holding that an insurers obligation to defend an insured was a property interest subject to prejudgment attachment (D) holding in a case involving a multiplevehicle policy that a new offer of uninsured motorist coverage was not required for the addition of a new vehicle which was comparable to the renewal or supplementation of an existing policy events that did not trigger the statutory requirement of a new offer the courts holding was based in part upon the principle that an insurance contract is personal to the insured because it insures the risk of loss to the insured and does not attach to specific vehicles (E) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: that any negligent infliction claim remains before us on this appeal (as none has been separately argued) that claim is preempted for the same reasons. III. Conclusion We hold that Humble’s intentional infliction/tort of outrage claim is preempted on the facts of this case, and her race and nationality discrimination claims have been abandoned. Humble’s reasonable accommodation claim under the WLAD is not preempted, and we remand that claim for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Humble requests that a remand to state court for the latter claim be ordered, but we leave it to the district court to make that discretionary determination. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 . 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 2 . Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 216, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Id. at 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904. Without 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 (B) holding that broad language releasing all claims whether in contract tort or otherwise necessarily included a bad faith claim (C) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (D) holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith (E) holding that a state law tort of bad faith was necessarily based on breach of duties contained in the cba and was therefore preempted
[EX A]:
(E)