In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

26 Ariz.App. 265, 270-71, 547 P.2d 1065, 1070-71 (1976), which held that a party is precluded from raising for the first time on appeal the trial court’s failure to make findings when specifically required to do so by Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 179 Ariz. at 301, 878 P.2d at 657. Accordingly, I perceive that Trantor’s waiver rule applies with as much vigor to statutes or rules that specifically require findings as it does when the requirement is imposed by case law. Cf. Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252, 256, ¶ 17, 69 P.3d 23, 27 (2003) (“Once published, our interpretation [of a statute] becomes part of the statute.”); Local 266, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, A.F. of L. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 43, 275 P.2d 393, 402 (1954) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 31 One further point. Because my colleagues 
 Holding statements: (A) holding principle of statutory construction is to give effect to every clause and word of a statute (B) holding that the courts in the absence of ambiguity should as a general rule confine themselves to a construction of a statute as written and not attempt under the guise of construction to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute or to insert exceptions not made by the legislature (C) recognizing rule of statutory construction that statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect if it can be done by any reasonable construction (D) recognizing that unreversed statutory construction is to be held part of the statute as if originally so written (E) holding that the term shall is mandatory for purposes of statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous
(D)

discretion. Commonwealth v. Collins, 598 Pa. 397, 957 A.2d 237, 272 (2008). As noted, discovery in death penalty collateral proceedings is permissible only upon leave of court, and only for good cause shown. Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(2). “ ‘A showing of good cause requires more than just a generic demand for potentially exculpatory evidence.’ ” Collins, 957 A.2d at 272 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119, 855 A.2d 726, 750 (2004)). We agree with the Commonwealth that Elliott has failed to demonstrate that the PCRA court abused its discretion by denying Elliott’s request for additional discovery. Elliott has not identified any document that was withheld from him that would have been exculpatory, and his claims to the contrary constitute mere speculation. See Hanible, 30 A.3d at 484 (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Carson, 913 A.2d at 261 
 Holding statements: (A) holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause (B) holding that the government is not required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury (C) holding that record must show that evidence is exculpatory for defendant to establish brady violation (D) holding that speculation that production of requested documents might reveal exculpatory evidence is insufficient to establish good cause for discovery (E) holding that conjecture that opportunity to review homicide file might yield exculpatory evidence is inadequate to demonstrate good cause for discovery
(E)

contractual, measures of recovery. Id. 14 . In the Roberdeau case, the insurer paid for $575 of repairs to the insured's station wagon after it was damaged in a collision. See 231 S.W.2d at 949. The insurer then offered to pay $475 (the amount of repairs minus the $100 deductible). See id. The policy stated that the insurer’s limit of liability would not exceed the vehicle’s actual cash value nor the cost to repair or replace the vehicle with another of like kind and quality. As here, the policy also gave the insurer the option of paying for the loss in money or paying for repair or replacement. See id. at 950. The insured refused the offer and sued the insurer for the difference between the vehicle’s actual cash value before and afte d Cas. Co. v. Watson, 298 P.2d 762, 767 (Okla.1956) (<HOLDING>); Barton v. Fanners Ins. Exch., 255 S.W.2d 451, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to find the measure of damages as the difference in market value immediately before and after the collision would be arbitrarily reading out of the policy the right of defendant to make repairs or replace the damaged part with materials of like kind and quality (B) holding that if repairs to a firedamaged vehicle with parts of like kind and quality would not restore the vehicle to its former market value the proper measure of damages was the difference in market value before and after the loss (C) holding that unless the collision resulted in a total loss the measure of recovery is the difference between the fair market value of the vehicle in the condition in which it was immediately prior to the collision and its value thereafter (D) holding there cannot be a complete restoration of the property unless it can be said that there has been no diminution of value after repair of the car and adding that the appropriate and fair measure of damages could be achieved by awarding either the difference between the fair cash value of the car before and after the collision or similarly the cost of repairs plus any diminution in value (E) holding the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the automobile prior to the upset and its value when prepared and presented to the plaintiff for acceptance

(C)