In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. As a matter of first consideration, any court has the duty to determine, sua sponte, whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case. Welch v. McDougal, 876 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied). As material to this question, section 65.023(b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code requires that an application for an injunction to stay proceedings in a suit or execution on a judgment must be tried in the court in which the suit is pending or the judgment was rendered. This requirement is jurisdictional and does not relate merely to venue. See Butron v. Cantu, 960 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); Home Sav. Ass’n v. Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Because the Gard-ners seek to challenge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is  no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court (B) holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions (C) holding that a dis trict court has no authority to issue injunction restraining enforcement of judgment of the county court where as here the judgment solely resolves who is entitled to immediate possession (D) holding that motion to dismiss should not  be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law (E) holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state

Output: holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is  no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court


Input: Consider Input: 1024-25 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (J. Mark) (discussing the split of authority and explaining that Congress codified the result of In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d 797 (3d Cir.1985) which encouraged the use of debt repayment plans by ensuring that property acquired post-petition would not be subject to creditors’ claims if Chapter 13 proved unsuccessful). Courts which held that property acquired post-petition must be property of the Chapter 7 estate after conversion did so because they believed such policy was “necessary to discourage strategic, opportunistic behavior that hurts creditors without advancing any legitimate interests of the debtors.” In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 137 (7th Cir.1991). Lybrook, In re Colder, 973 F.2d 862 (10th Cir.1992), and In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>), base their results on policy concerns that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while state law determines the existence of a claim federal law determines when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes (B) holding for  1983 actions that although state law determines the limitations period federal law determines when the claim arises (C) holding that federal law determines definition of executory contract but that state law determines whether a material breach of the contract could occur (D) holding that date of conversion determines what exemptions apply (E) holding that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state law that determines the outcome of the case

Output: holding that while state law determines the existence of a claim federal law determines when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes


Input: Consider Input: of America or any State thereof relating to magnesite or magnesite products brokered by Possehl, and subsequently delivered to Resco during the period from 2000 through the present. Possehl, as Assignor, will make avail- . able for copying at the sole expense of Resco, as Assignee, records documenting the producing seller to Resco of products covered by this Assignment. Id. There is nothing wrong with the abstract legal basis of Resco’s theory of standing. It is well settled in the Third Circuit that “express assignments of antitrust claims from a direct purchaser to an indirect purchaser are permissible and do not run afoul of Illinois Brick’s standing requirements.” In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 338 F.Supp.2d at 539 (citing Gulf-stream, III Associates, Inc., 995 F.2d at 438-440 (<HOLDING>)); see also In re Wellbutrin Sr Direct 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in non 17200 case that common law claims duplicative of the flsa are preempted (B) holding that any assignment of antitrust claims as a matter of federal common law must be an express assignment  because an express assignment  entirely eliminates any problems of split recoveries or duplicative liability (C) holding that article 4a of the ucc preempts common law claims where they are inconsistent or duplicative (D) holding that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor lies in the common law and not under an express provision of the act (E) holding that ownership of vehicle later involved in accident passed to buyer even though assignment of title not completed


Output: holding in non 17200 case that common law claims duplicative of the flsa are preempted