In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: a “responsible person” under § 6672 in these circumstances. B. Willfulness 1. Standard of Review As with the previous issue, the government asserts that the determination of willfulness under § 6672 is a question of law subject to de novo review, while Bradshaw argues that it is a question of fact on which the district judge’s ruling can not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Some circuits have held that the ultimate issue of willfulness is subject to de novo review. United States v. McCombs, 30 F.3d at 320 (noting, however, that this is a difficult question that, in similar contexts, has divided the courts for over a century); Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d at 1505-07. Our prior decisions have, however, treated this as an issue of fact. See Taylor, 69 F.3d at 417-18 (<HOLDING>); Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033 (reviewing jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings (B) holding that the district court sitting in review of the decision of the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failure to pay over taxes was willful because the bankruptcy court had made no findings on willfulness we remanded for bankruptcy court findings (C) holding that 28 usc  1961a applies to bankruptcy court judgments because a bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court (D) holding that bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings and conclusions in a core proceeding over which the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority (E) holding that the bankruptcy court has the inherent power to award sanctions for badfaith conduct in a bankruptcy court proceeding

A: holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings
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Q: CURIAM: Michael Disch appeals his convictions for mailing threatening communication, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), and making false statements to an FBI agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Disch argues that the district court judge was required to recuse himself sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and § 455(b). Ordinarily, we review a judge’s decision not to recuse himself under § 455(a) and § 455(b) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir.1999); see also Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (11th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). However, when a defendant fails to seek 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error (B) holding that a  455b violation is subject to harmless error review (C) holding that violation of rule 16 in that case was not harmless error (D) holding that confrontation clause violations are subject to harmless error review (E) holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis

A: holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error
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Q: reach Plaintiffs and did reach Plaintiffs explaining that additional life insurance was available at $4.95 per $15,000 in coverage.” (Compl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that Walker did not exercise reasonable care or competence when he made these statements and that Plaintiff and Mr. Kersh “reasonably relied on these representations to their detriment....” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that if she and Mr. Kersh had been informed that they could not purchase $750,000 in life insurance from UHC, “they would have purchased the same through another company.” (Id.) For the reasons given in the preceding section, this state-law claim, which is brought against non-ERISA entities and does not seek benefits under an ERISA plan, is not subject to conflict preemption. See Access Mediquip, 662 F.3d at 385 (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Zoellner, 114 F.3d 713 (8th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insureds declaratory judgment class action claims seeking to retain tort settlements following their insurers claims for reimbursement were claims to enforce their rights under the terms of the plan and to clarify their rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan under erisa (B) holding that erisa did not preempt hospitals claims against erisa plan administrator for misrepresentation under texas insurance code because hospitals claims were not dependent on or derived from the beneficiarys right to recover benefits under the plan (C) holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant (D) holding that claims were preempted where the factual basis of the complaint was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits (E) holding that third partys suit against plan administrator for misrepresentation was not related to erisa plan because the finder of fact need only determine 1 the amount and terms of reimbursement that plaintiff could reasonably have expected given what could fairly be inferred from defendants statements and 2 whether defendants subsequent disposition of the reimbursement claims was consistent with that expectation

A:
holding that insureds declaratory judgment class action claims seeking to retain tort settlements following their insurers claims for reimbursement were claims to enforce their rights under the terms of the plan and to clarify their rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan under erisa
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