In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
take place in federal court. The Government maintains that a facially valid certification is not subject to review by this Court and must be held sufficient. It further contends that even if the certification can be reviewed by this Court, the certification at issue here was correct. “Whether the government complied with [the juvenile delinquency certification requirements of] 18 U.S.C. § 5032 is an issue of statutory interpretation which this court reviews de novo.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 241 F.3d 684, 686 (9th Cir.2001). A certification filed in the district court by a United States Attorney is presumed to be accurate, absent circumstances calling into question its accuracy or validity. See Pasadena Research Labs., Inc. v. United States, 169 F.2d 375, 381-82 (9th Cir.1948) (<HOLDING>). A Section 5032 provides in relevant part: A 
 Holding statements: (A) holding generally the law presumes that every man in his private and official character does his duty until the contrary is proved it will presume that all things are rightly done unless the circumstances of the case overturn this presumption (B) holding law court will not overturn conclusions supported by competent and substantial evidence (C) holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under  1346 (D) recognizing a presumption of regularity that undergirds the official acts of public officers causing courts to presume that they have properly discharged their official duties (E) holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation

Ex Output:
holding law court will not overturn conclusions supported by competent and substantial evidence


Ex Input:
income. As the majority notes, the Internal Revenue Code is not the standard for determining weekly gross income for child support purposes, see op. at ¶ 13 (quoting Child Supp. G. 3(A), cmt. 2(b) that the weekly gross income figure may not be the same as gross income for tax purposes). It may be unfair to exclude all of the settlement proceeds where they have inured to the family’s benefit in the past but it may also be unfair to include all of the proceeds where Scott has need of them for his own care. Commentary to Guideline 3(A) urges judges to “be innovative in finding ways to include income that would have benefited the family had it remained intact, but be receptive to deviations where reasons justify them.” Child Supp. G. 3(A), cmt. 2(b); see also Harris, 800 N.E.2d at 940-41 (<HOLDING>). [5] Because the trial court’s decision was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in including only the net amount of settlement proceeds from a wrongful termination lawsuit because that is the amount that would have ultimately benefited the children if the family had remained intact (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge (D) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount (E) holding prejudgment interest is to be determined on the entire amount of compensatory damages and then reduced by the amount of interest which would have accrued at present value on the settlement amount determined before trial

Ex Output:
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served


Ex Input:
include reasonable attorney’s fees for legal services benefitting the children. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 151.001(a), (c); In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d at 327, n. 55; Searcy, 17 S.W. at 373; Askey, 11 S.W. at 1101-02. In Hardin v. Hardin, this court cited section 154.001 but did not cite section 151.001 or section 156.401(a). See Hardin, 161 S.W.3d at 24-27. Nonetheless, the Hardin court noted that the duty of a parent to pay attorney’s fees as necessaries is based upon a parent’s duty to support his children. See id. at 25. In addition, the Hardin court cited non-enforcement cases that cited the statutory predecessor to section 151.001. See id. at 25-26 (citing Roosth v. Roosth and Daniels v. Allen); Roosth v. Roosth, 889 S.W.2d 445, 456-57 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Daniels v. Allen, 811 S.W.2d 278, 280 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that father pay attorneys fees to mother as necessaries for the benefit of the children in divorce decree and citing statutory predecessor to section 151001 (B) holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries (C) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay reasonable attorneys fees incurred by mother as necessaries for the children (D) holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule (E) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction may order one parent to pay the reasonable attorneys fees of the other parent as additional child support if the fees are necessaries for the benefit of the children

Ex Output:

holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries