In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: the ammunition charge from the gun charges. II. DISCUSSION A. Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Unregistered Firearm Count Under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), it is unlawful for any person to “possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.” For purposes of this provision, the definition of “firearm” includes a shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches in length or with an overall length less than twenty-six inches. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). In order to obtain a conviction under § 5861(d), the government must demonstrate that the defendant knew the barrel’s length was less than eighteen inches or the overall length was less than twenty-six inches. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government must prove the defendant knew of the features of the firearm that brought it within the scope of the act (B) holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered (C) holding that while the government was required to prove that the defendants phone call crossed a state line  the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew of the interstate nexus (D) holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation (E) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time

Answer: (A)


Question: Cote’s bias, Hayat alleges, first, that Cote made “several inappropriate racial and religious comments during deliberations.” Hayat presented evidence from Jurors L. and B., as well as from Juror H. via an affidavit by Ha-yat’s private investigator, that Cote made a “racial” comment during deliberations. B. declared that “[d]uring the deliberation process, ... Cote[ ] made the statement they all looked the same when wearing a costume or when put in a costume. I believe Mr. Cote made this statement in connection with a discussion of witness Naseem Khan’s claim that he had seen Ayman al-Zawahiri in Lodi.” Similarly, L. stated that “[djuring deliberations Mr. Cote made racial slurs. As an example, on one occasion ... he said in front of the entire group that they a 236-39 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Where, however, “a juror has been asked 
 Holding statements: (A) holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay (B) holding that rule 606b contains no exception for racially biased statements made during jury deliberations and expressing skepticism about whether constitutional concerns can ever override the rule (C) holding that federal rule of evidence 8034 the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not apply to statements made by doctors (D) recognizing rule (E) holding that the arkansas counterpart to cre 606b applies whether a verdict is reached or a mistrial declared and under the extraneous information exception allows jurors to testify about statements made during deliberations

Answer: (B)


Question: not be quashed in light of the fact that the order did not appear to be final or appealable. In response, Appellants argued that the trial court’s order was final and appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341, and, alternatively, that the order was a collateral order subject to an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 313. The Superior Court nevertheless quashed the appeal in a per curiam order dated April 10, 2015, concluding the trial court’s order denying the petition to intervene was “not a final order in the custody matter and thus not final or appealable.” K.C. and V.C. v. L.A., 499 EDA 2015, 1 (Pa.Super. filed 4/10/15) (order) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (“A final order is any order that: (1) dis poses of all claims and of all parties”); G.B. v. M.M.B., Pa.Super. 133, 670 A.2d 714 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Boise Cascade Corp. v. East Stroudsburg 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the uccja applied to a california child custody order granting temporary custody of two children to their father (B) holding that a temporary order granting emergency relief and temporary child custody under the domestic violence act is not immediately appealable (C) holding order awarding father temporary partial custody prior to custody hearing was not final and appealable under rule 341 (D) holding that temporary order amounted to order modifying custody of children because language changed custody for an indefinite period (E) holding that temporary order completely transferred custody without setting further hearing writ action was fully terminated and final adjudication of custody was affected

Answer:
(C)