In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts.” Mungin v. State, 982 So.2d 986, 998 (Fla.2006). A. Stipulating to Evidence for the Motion to Suppress Parker’s May 7, 1982, Statement In this claim, Parker contends that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the evidence used to decide whether his May 7, 1982, statement was admissible. Parker’s May 7 statement was admitted during the resentencing proceeding through the testimony of Detective Powers. Because Parker had invoked his right to counsel prior to making the May 7 statement, the admissibility of that statement under United States Supreme Court precedent turns on whether Parker initiated the May 7 contact with law enforcement. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The stipulated evidence included hearsay 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available  unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (B) holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (C) holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications (D) holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (E) holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police
[A]: holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police


[Q]: with intent to murder”; therefore, the two convictions did not violate double jeopardy. Id. In addition to comparing the statutory elements of an offense both in the abstract under Blockburger and as applied to the facts of the particular case under Duchac, courts consider other factors relevant to ascertaining legislative intent. These factors include the following: (1) whether there were multiple victims involved; (2) whether several discrete acts were involved; and (3) whether the evil at which each offense is directed is the same or different. As we noted in Goins, “generally, if a criminal episode involves several victims who have personally been victimized, the evidence could sustain multiple convictions.” Goins, 705 S.W.2d at 651 (citing State v. Irvin, 603 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn.1980)(<HOLDING>)). In Goins, however, we held that the multiple 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a single transaction involving multiple obscene materials constitutes but one offense (B) holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured (C) holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (D) holding that killing more than one person in a single automobile accident justified multiple homicide convictions (E) holding that a defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses under  922g on the basis that he belonged to more than one prohibited class or that he simultaneously possessed more than one firearm
[A]: holding that a single transaction involving multiple obscene materials constitutes but one offense


[Q]: who arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at the facility, and to transporters of hazardous wastes to the facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)-(4). 8 . The RAP for the site prepared by Neville also supplies indisputable evidence of the presence of hazardous substances at the Ne-ville facility. See Jeche Deck, Ex. A at 35-49. 9 . Neville also attempts to raise DTSC’s alleged arbitrary and capricious conduct as a defense to liability. However, this is a misapplication of the' arbitrary and capricious conduct standard, which is employed to measure the consistency of particular cleanup actions with the NCP, and therefore goes to the question of what costs the government is entitled to recover as damages rather than to the question of liability. See WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 798 (<HOLDING>). 10 . The evidence presented by the parties in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that wsdot was not entitled to recover response costs under cercla where its actions in connection with an environmental cleanup were inconsistent with the ncp to such a high degree as to be arbitrary and capricious but also stating that failure to comply with the ncp is not a defense to liability but rather a factual issue affecting damages (B) holding that plaintiffs failure to substantially comply with public participation requirement rendered cleanup inconsistent with ncp (C) holding the director of the united states environmental protection agency in contempt for failure to comply with court order (D) holding that in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages not only for his unlawful arrest and imprisonment but also for expenses of his defense (E) holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurers failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party
[A]:
holding that plaintiffs failure to substantially comply with public participation requirement rendered cleanup inconsistent with ncp