In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: magistrate judge denied the motion, explaining that Mr. Schueller’s subjective perceptions did not demonstrate judicial bias and his claims were not based on any extrajudicial source to support a bias or partiality challenge. We generally review the denial of a recusal motion for abuse of discretion. ClearOne Comm’cns, Inc. v. Bowers, 651 F.3d 1200, 1217 (10th Cir.2011). For the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s order denying recusal, we determine that recusal was not warranted and we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to recuse. To the extent Mr. Schueller now claims that the district judge was biased against him, he did not raise this issue to the district court, so we do not address it. See Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1239 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Wells Fargo’s motion for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs waived their bias argument on appeal because they failed to timely move for disqualification (B) holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument (C) holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal (D) holding argument not asserted before district court is waived on appeal (E) holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court
[A]: (A)


[Q]: of serious physical harm,” Gamer, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. at 1701, to Ponseti, or to others if the suspects were allowed to flee. Because Pon-seti could have reasonably believed that the suspects posed an imminent, deadly threat, we conclude that he was justified in using deadly force. Conclusion We therefore conclude that the magistrate judge erred in denying Ponseti’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment below is REVERSED. 1 . The woman was struck once in the right side of her abdomen. 2 . Under the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, the terms "directed verdict” and "judgment notwithstanding the verdict” have been replaced by the single term “judgment as a matter of law.” 3 . But see Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Smith also observes: “Furthermore, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law (B) holding that a violation of the wellestablished rule of brignoniponce constituted an egregious violation of the fourth amendment (C) holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts (D) holding that the notice requirement found in rule 41d is not required by the fourth amendment (E) holding that the significant injury requirement of johnson v morel 876 f2d 477 5th cir1989 a case involving a fourth amendment violation is no longer valid in the wake of hudson v mcmillianus 112 sct 995 117 led2d 156 1992 in which the supreme court held that a showing of a significant injury was not required to prove an eighth amendment violation
[A]: (E)


[Q]: 718, 725 (8th Cir.2001) (employer’s statement that “[t]wenty years is too long. You should have moved five years ago[,]” was not direct evidence of age discrimination absent showing that length of tenure was being used as a proxy to accomplish age discrimination). Rather, for the Board’s 2010 discussion to constitute direct evidence of age discrimination, Dunn would need to show that the Board used the term “retire” as a proxy for age to articulate a discriminatory attitude. Scott, 182 Fed.Appx. at 526; Erickson, 271 F.3d at 725. Dunn has made no such showing, but is asking for this Court to speculate and thereby to infer the existence of direct evidence based on the term “retire.” The Board’s discussion does not directly reflect a discriminatory attitude. Erickson, 271 F.3d at 725 (<HOLDING>). Even if the Board had expressed a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference (B) holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent (C) holding that employers statement was not direct evidence where accepting statement as evidence of age animus depended on an inference (D) holding that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible and the defendant failed to ask for a limiting instruction that the jury could not use the statement as substantive evidence (E) holding that the statement at your age i dont believe you could pass the test is not direct evidence of age discrimination
[A]:
(C)