In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: as Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, Holland had been given the authority to review the allegations against Vickers and make the ultimate decision to keep her or fire her. Without more than what Vickers has offered as evidence, we cannot- see how a reasonable jury might find a retaliatory motive at work in Holland’s decision. Vickers’ retaliation claim is further undermined by the fact that even though it was Holland who fired her, Bedwell was the focus of her discrimination claims. Vickers failed to put on any evidence to show that Holland’s decision was in any way influenced by Bedwell, who had retired before Vickers’ refusal to sign the releases in April 2001 that triggered her firing. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1311-12 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Nor can Vickers’ Title VII claims draw 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a common employer and administrator does not necessarily influence the administrators decision (B) holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision (C) holding that subordinates bias is only relevant where the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the subordinates influence (D) holding that it is the conduct required to obtain a conviction rather than the consequences resulting from the crime that is relevant (E) holding that the relevant question is whether the courts decision deprived the petitioner of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment
[EX A]: holding that a common employer and administrator does not necessarily influence the administrators decision

[EX Q]: (applying Tennessee law); see also Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1969). Most other courts, however, have set a lower bar. For example in Mondido v. Cory Corp., 483 F.Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the plaintiff was injured when the glass carafe from her coffee pot broke. The carafe itself was manufactured by Corning, but it was converted into a coffee decanter and sold by Cory, a separate company. Id. at 27. After both companies were found liable, Corning moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict arguing that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence sufficient to support the jury’s determination that the carafe was defective when it left Coming’s plant. Id. The court rejected the motion, noting the plaintiffs evidence that Cory converted the 1967) (<HOLDING>); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed (B) holding that plaintiff had successfully traced the defective condition to the manufacturer where there was no evidence of tampering by the retailer (C) holding that manufacturer had no duty to warn its purchasers retailer and transporter of gas of dangers where those purchasers had operated a gas business for years were familiar with the trade journals and already knew the dangers (D) holding that there was a triable issue of fact whether a defendant who applied a sprayon fireproofing material was an agent for the manufacturer of the material and thus whether plaintiff is in privity with the manufacturer (E) holding a manufacturer strictly liable in tort for injury to plaintiff caused by defective power tool
[EX A]: holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed

[EX Q]: Construction § 44.16, at 529 (4th ed. 1986) (citing cases). “[T]he general federal rule is that courts do not rewrite statutes to create constitutionality.” Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118, 1122 (6th Cir.1991); see generally id. at 1124-25 (canvassing relevant caselaw of the Supreme Court). Though severability may be achieved “by striking out or disregarding words that are in the [challenged] section,” it may not be achieved “by inserting [words] that are not now there.” United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 214, 221, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1875). Inserting into a statute words that Congress did not enact “would be to make a new law, not to enforce an old one,” which “is no part of our [judicial] duty.” Id.; see also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 82, 98, 25 L.Ed. 550 (1879) (<HOLDING>). Although the Supreme Court cases discussed 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning (B) recognizing that the court must give meaning to all the words in the claims (C) holding that it is not within the judicial province to give the words used by congress a narrower meaning than they were manifestly intended to bear in order that crimes may be punished which are not described in language that brings them within the constitutional power of that body (D) recognizing that we must give meaning to all the words in the claims (E) holding that courts give the words of a statute their ordinary contemporary common meaning absent an indication congress intended them to bear some different import
[EX A]:
recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning