In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: this case was scheduled for a date approximately six months after the permanent injunction had expired. The procedural posture of this case is comparable to that of Madonna, in which the plaintiffs challenged their confinements while awaiting a hearing to determine whether they should be committed to mental institutions. 295 N.W.2d at 358. The plaintiffs filed petitions for habeas corpus during their pre-hearing confinements, which lasted only a matter of weeks, but the petitions were not adjudicated before their pre-hearing confinements ended. Id. at 358-59. Approximately two and one-half years later, the supreme court held that the case was not moot, reasoning that “some method of review must exist.” Id. at 361; see also Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 208 n. 2 (Minn.2001) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 188 n. 1, 210 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that challenge to oneyear order for protection was not moot even though it had expired (B) holding that district court may award money due under a statute even though time for disbursement had expired (C) holding that challenge to oneyear residency requirement for divorce action was not moot even though plaintiff had since satisfied requirement (D) holding expired child abuse protective order not moot because of possible effect on future custody determinations (E) holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: before his heart attack and had been “asymptomatic” up until the day after his training. Dr. Sander viewed Bill’s physical activity during fire training as significantly higher than his usual physical activity during work. He testified there was a continuity of symptoms from the time that Bill left the fire training school until he had his heart attack and that he did not see any significance in the period of time from when he left the training to when he had his heart attack. Essentially, New Hampshire Insurance is asking us to presume that its expert’s theory is reliable in order to determine that Peggy Allison’s expert’s theory is unreliable. Conflicting theories between experts, however, do not automatically render one unreliable. See Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 695 (Tex.2012) (<HOLDING>). The trial court could rely on Dr. Sander’s 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the conflict (B) holding conflict between experts theories is matter to be resolved by jury (C) recognizing conflict between circuits (D) recognizing possible conflict between the cases (E) recognizing conflict
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 144,129 S.Ct. 695. Furthermore, the officials in this case, unlike those in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), did not take “every step that could reasonably be expected of them.” Id. at 989, 104 S.Ct. 3424. When the officials here rang the doorbells that morning at 2424 Cambreleng Avenue, and discovered that Voustianiouk lived on the second floor instead of the first, they could have obtained a warrant to search Voustianiouk’s second-floor home instead of deciding, without any judicial oversight, that the evidence in their possession provided probable cause to do so. Cf. Velardi, 40 F.3d at 576 (<HOLDING>). There is no question that the officers in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest in front of his house on suspicion of murder was not justified because the evidence that an accomplice was involved in the murder did not equate to evidence that someone would be hiding out in the defendants house a month after the crime occurred and at the time of the arrest the officers were not chasing the defendant from a crime scene (B) holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity when they conducted an entry and emergency sweep of the third house on a particular road even though the warrant specified the fourth house while noting that the warrant specifically mentioned the name of the houses occupant (C) holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house (D) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (E) holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises
[EX A]:
(C)