TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: comprehensive plan nor its land use regulations prohibited the development of so-called non-jurisdictional wetlands. On August 17 or 18, 2006, Rish began to clear and fill his property. The neighbors, including Johnson, protested to the County, but to no avail. On August 21, 2006, these parties filed a complaint seeking in-junctive relief alleging that the clearing violated Gulf County’s comprehensive plan because it failed to maintain a 50-foot buffer for the wetlands. The neighbors alleged standing under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2006). The trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that Johnson and the other neighbors did not possess standing to seek relief under section 163.3215. This court reversed. Johnson v. Gulf County et al., 965 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Throughout this litigation, Rish proceeded to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (B) holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention (C) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court (D) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (E) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case

SOLUTION: holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention

PROBLEM: to obtain the benefit of the bond, for which it paid a significant premium, only through legal action. Accordingly, Olympic Steamship applies here. Colorado Structures, 125 Wn. App. at 928 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We agree. ¶27 Lastly, in McGreevy, where this court awarded reasonable attorney fees in addition to the limits of the insurance policy, we reasoned, “when an insurer unsuccessfully contests coverage, it has placed its interests above the insured. Our decision in Olympic Steamship remedies this inequity by requiring that the insured be made whole.” McGreevy, 128 Wn.2d at 39-40. Likewise, West placed “its interests” above that of Structures. Id. Structures should be awarded attorney fees under Olympic Steamship, so as to be made “whole.” Dayton, 124 Wn.2d at 280 (<HOLDING>)- Without the application of Olympic Steamship 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the contract was not authorized by law (B) recognizing that under georgia law attorneys fees are allowed where authorized by statute or contract (C) holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case (D) holding that an award of attorney fees was authorized by ocga  13111 a 3 when the requirements of that statute were satisfied (E) holding that a court has power to award attorney fees when authorized by contract statute or recognized ground of equity

SOLUTION: holding the contract was not authorized by law

PROBLEM: who inspected the property for termites and provided a termite bond and report. This appeal, however, involves only the validity of the preliminary injunction against the Blaylocks' foreclosure. 3 . The sales contract provided: "9. NECESSITY OF INSPECTION: Purchaser acknowledges and agrees that Alabama law imposes a duty on Purchaser to thoroughly inspect a property, for defects or otherwise, in accordance with the terms of this contract and prior to the sale....” 4 . The narrow "health or safety" exception to the general no-duty-to-disclose rule is also inapplicable to this case because the Carys, failed to make a sufficient showing that the water damage to the house (i.e., wood rot and fungus growth) posed a direct threat to their health or safety. Cf. Fennell, 529 So.2d at 1004 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the other two narrow exceptions to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where no evidence was designated to show that a car buyer knew that a sale violated the rights of the dealership that owned the car the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of indcode  26112019 (B) holding that even though the contract limited the buyers remedies to specific performance or a refund of earnest money they were entitled to damages in the amount of the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property where the seller thwarted the buyers right to specific performance by selling the property to another at a higher price (C) holding that defendant staying in abandoned house had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key to the house and the ability to let people in and out of it (D) holding that the evidence was sufficient to preclude inference where he tried to enter the house drunk and was staying at the neighboring house (E) holding that a duty to disclose a health hazard arose where the buyers of a house made a sufficient showing that a defect in the furnace serving the house would have if not remedied caused the release of carbon monoxide resulting in the buyers possible injury or death

SOLUTION:
holding that where no evidence was designated to show that a car buyer knew that a sale violated the rights of the dealership that owned the car the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of indcode  26112019