In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: opens the door by suggesting the victim’s behavior is inconsistent with that of an abused child. As noted below, many other courts have allowed testimony that a child victim’s behavior or symptoms are “consistent with” child abuse trauma as rebuttal evidence. That is not what happened in this case. Just two years ago, in State v. Favoccia, the Supreme Court of Connecticut thor oughly reviewed the conflicting precedent and policy considerations in reaching the same conclusion we reach today. 306 Conn. 770, 51 A.3d 1002, 1012-22 (2012). The Favoccia court overturned its own precedent to hold that “the trial court abused its discretion in permitting [the expert] to testify about the complainant’s behaviors being consistent -with those generally characteristic 6, 671 N.E.2d 984, 985 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Chamberlain, 137 N.H. 414, 628 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (B) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (C) holding admission of expert testimony not erroneous where expert described typical traits and characteristics of sexually abused children (D) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case (E) holding that the testimony of an expert witness is admissible when the witness outlines the general characteristics of sexually abused children and then states that the victims symptoms are consistent with those characteristics

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: determination under the reasonableness test as clearly erroneous, we perceive no error. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. 1 . Appellees’ original complaint was filed before the bylaw amendment was passed. 2 . The lobby, which per Paragraph 7(c) of the Ridgely Declaration is explicitly characterized as a common element, was refurbished in 1990 out of common funds consisting of contributions from each unit owner. To deny the use of the lobby to clients of the commercial owners constitutes an ultra vires taking of a portion of their percentage interest in the common areas in derogation of the Ridgely Condominium declaration as well as certain provisions of the Maryland Condominium Act. Paragraph 8 of the Ridgely Declaration, in pertinent part, provid 495, 500 (1991) (<HOLDING>). See also Jarvis v. Stage Neck Owners Ass'n, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants presence in a dark alleyway at six oclock in the morning behind a closed business in an exclusively commercial area supported the investigative stop and explaining that knowledge of recent burglaries in an area is a relevant circumstance to be considered in determining the reasonableness of an officers suspicion because knowledge of the character of the area is part of an officers expertise (B) recognizing that unit owners own the common elements in fee as tenants in common (C) holding that the requirement of explicitly and prominently was intended by the legislature to ensure that the declaration give unequivocal notice to the project unit owners of the authorization for such use (D) holding that the grant of exclusive use to one unit owner of a common area is sufficient to change the relative interest of the unit owners in that common area (E) holding that the statute in question served to modify prior common law and that the legislature was empowered to make such changes in the common law based on the public interest

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav


Output: (E)