In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: the bankruptcy court’s power to control dissemination of information more broadly. Judge Steven Gerling, for example, observed in In re Bennett, that If the information [sought to be protected] does not represent trade secrets or confidential research, development or commercial information, then whether to permit access to the information is a matter left to the Court’s discretion. It requires the Court to examine the relevant facts and circumstances and then to balance the interests of the party opposing disclosure with that of the public. In re Bennett, 226 B.R. 331, 336 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1998); see also In re Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2nd Cir.1994) (discussing § 107 and use of records for improper purpose); In re Robert Landau Associates, 50 B.R. 670, 675-76 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>); but see In re Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. 675, 679 
 Holding statements: (A) holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter (B) holding that when the trial court signed an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint but refused to enter a final judgment on that order the order refusing to enter judgment was appealable under former ors 190102a (C) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality (D) recognizing inherent authority but vacating order not supported by necessary findings (E) holding that while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judges signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court the city waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the indiana supreme court has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection and more recently this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect

Output: holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter


Input: Consider Input: to establish eligibility-triggering factors: Though Ia-beled as "sentencing factors,” those factors are more appropriately considered as elements of a capital offense. This logic applies equally to the establishment of any sentencing factors necessary to expose a defendant to a higher maximum penalty in the noncapital context. As discussed supra, Fields’s Confrontation Clause challenge relates only to evidence that the government introduced relevant to the jury's ultimate selection decision. The applicability of the Confrontation Clause to the establishment of eligibility-triggering factors is therefore not a question squarely presented by this case, and we decline to resolve it definitively. 19 .See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385, 106 
 Holding statements: (A) holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment (B) holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing (C) holding that if a jury is to be provided the defendant at capital sentencing regardless of whether the sixth amendment requires it the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the sixth amendment (D) holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements (E) holding the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment

Output: holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment


Input: Consider Input: conviction constitutes a violent felony. See United States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199, 202 (4th Cir.1998) (en banc). The instructions underlying Wardrick’s 1983 assault conviction support the proposition that the district court did not err in characterizing that conviction as a violent felony. In Maryland, a common-law assault “presents the unusual situation in which an offense may be committed in one of two ways — one of which requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force and one of which does not.” Coleman, 158 F.3d at 202. Because of this ambiguity, we have been “unable to conclude that a Maryland conviction for common-law assault is per se a violent felony within the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).” Id. However, the jury instructions in Wardrick’ th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the district court accurately 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that necessity defense to escape did not require defendant to turn herself in and that escape is not a continuing offense (B) holding felony escape in north carolina to be crime of violence under acca because escape presents risk of injury to others (C) holding that an escape from custody under minnesota law is a crime of violence (D) holding attempt to rescue prisoner and assisting in escape to be crimes of violence because of inherent risk of force (E) holding that in light of our recognition that escape presents a continuing threat of violence until the escapee is safely returned to custody we hold that for purposes of  2k21b5 every escape is sufficiently continuing such that possession of a gun subsequent to the initial departure from custody can qualify as being in connection with the escape


Output: holding that necessity defense to escape did not require defendant to turn herself in and that escape is not a continuing offense