In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: induced his employer to terminate his at-will employment?” See Haddle, 119 S.Ct. at 491. The Supreme Court ruled only on that issue. See Haddle, 119 S.Ct. at 492. The Eleventh circuit had already previously rejected the intracorpo-rate conspiracy doctrine. Because the in-tracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not before the Supreme Court, it would be a mistake to draw any inference from the Court’s silence on the issue. See United States v. Stewart, 650 F.2d 178, 180 (9th Cir.1981); Sacramento Valley Chapter of National Electrical Contractors Association v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 632 F.Supp. 1403, 1414 (E.D.Cal.1986), aff'd, 888 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.1989). The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine first developed in the anti-trust context. See Nelson, 200 F.2d at 914 (<HOLDING>). The Seventh Circuit extended the doctrine to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as a general rule the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice (B) holding a corporation cannot conspire with its officers and agents to restrain trade in its own products (C) holding that a hospital can conspire with members of its medical staff (D) recognizing that agents of a corporation may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed in the name of the corporation (E) recognizing that representation of a corporation by its officers in administrative proceedings is allowed

A: holding that as a general rule the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice
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Q: the State argued that Wright and Jackson were the two shooters at the trials of Wright, Oglesby, and Jackson. The State denies that it presented mutually exclusive, false, or misleading evidence. It contends that the evidence permits two factual scenarios: the shooters were either Jackson and Wright or Jackson and defendant. This is not a case where the prosecutor destroyed the credibility of one witness to convict one defendant and then used that same witness to convict a co-defendant for the same crime. See, e.g., Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 738 (1986). Nor is this a case where the prosecutor improperly argued facts that were unsupported by the evidence. Nichols v. Collins, 802 F.Supp. 66, 75 (S.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), habeas corpus denied, sub nom, Nichols v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal (B) holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment (C) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (D) holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal (E) holding in case in which defendant challenged his murder conviction and death sentence on ground that states conflicting theories in the trial of his accomplice constituted a denial of due process that state may be constitutionally estopped from obtaining a fact finding in one trial and seeking and obtaining an inconsistent fact finding in another trial

A: holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal
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Q: Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1480 (7th Cir.1990), the City argues that a state court action for mandamus would provide all the relief that the plaintiffs seek, precluding their procedural due process claim. These cases rest on the principle that when a state officer acts in a “random and unauthorized” way—by unpredictably departing from state law, for example—the state has no opportunity to provide a pre-deprivation hearing and may instead satisfy due process by providing an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1402 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc). But mandamus would be an incomplete remedy here. Pro’s is asking for more than an injunction compelling the City to issue an unrestricted liquor license. Cf. Schwartz, 330 F.3d at 941 (<HOLDING>). The owners of Pro’s seek damages to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc  1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action (B) holding that 42 usc  1983 relief is available in some circumstances where state actions interfere with the bargaining process (C) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (D) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (E) recognizing right of prisoners to seek relief under 42 usc  1983 for denial of access to the courts

A:
holding that 42 usc  1983 relief is available in some circumstances where state actions interfere with the bargaining process
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