In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: a “responsible person” under § 6672 in these circumstances. B. Willfulness 1. Standard of Review As with the previous issue, the government asserts that the determination of willfulness under § 6672 is a question of law subject to de novo review, while Bradshaw argues that it is a question of fact on which the district judge’s ruling can not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Some circuits have held that the ultimate issue of willfulness is subject to de novo review. United States v. McCombs, 30 F.3d at 320 (noting, however, that this is a difficult question that, in similar contexts, has divided the courts for over a century); Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d at 1505-07. Our prior decisions have, however, treated this as an issue of fact. See Taylor, 69 F.3d at 417-18 (<HOLDING>); Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033 (reviewing jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings (B) holding that the district court sitting in review of the decision of the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failure to pay over taxes was willful because the bankruptcy court had made no findings on willfulness we remanded for bankruptcy court findings (C) holding that 28 usc  1961a applies to bankruptcy court judgments because a bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court (D) holding that bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings and conclusions in a core proceeding over which the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority (E) holding that the bankruptcy court has the inherent power to award sanctions for badfaith conduct in a bankruptcy court proceeding

A: holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings
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Q: 375 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004). Since, as we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we need not consider whether the District’s failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its own case (as opposed to at the close of Smith’s case) further limits our review “to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by the evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice,” Fredrick, 254 F.3d at 162. The District presents two fact-based challenges to the jury’s verdict. First, it argues that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the District had a deliberately indifferent policy or custom under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, it claims that even had such a policy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom (B) holding that county liability under  1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior (C) holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc  1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition (D) recognizing respondeat superior liability (E) holding that municipal liability for purposes of claims brought under 42 usc  1983 must stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom rather than simply from respondeat superior

A: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom
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Q: express an intention different from its clear meaning.”). No Exclusion from SPMS in Business Regulation § 11-207 The administrative law judge based his opposite conclusion on several factors. First, he compared BR §§ 11-206 and 11-207. He concluded that the “staff’ authorized by § 11-206, who were expressly included in the SPMS, were to be contrasted with the “additional employees,” who were not so included. We must reject this reasoning. SPP § 6-302 does not require that executive branch state employees be specifically included in the SPMS. The presumption is that they are so included. Rather, it requires that employees not to be included in the SPMS be explicitly excluded from the system. Cf. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Billhimer, 72 Md.App. 578, 586-87, 531 A.2d 1298 (1987) (<HOLDING>), rev’d, on other grounds, 314 Md. 46, 548 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (B) holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment (C) holding that under the old state employment merit system all employees of the state are deemed classified unless they have been specifically exempted form that category (D) holding that the statute plainly exempted  all employees who were covered by the flsa before january 1 2007 (E) holding that antecedent debts will not be deemed within a dragnet clause unless they are specifically identified in the instrument

A:
recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state
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