TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: likely causes of the engine failure are related to components of the oil delivery system, components of the cylinder assembly, cracked crankcase or an oil leak in general, etc.” As such, the Court finds that Mr. Klepacki’s opinion regarding the more likely causes of engine failure should be excluded. Plaintiffs Expert Donald Sommer Even assuming, without deciding, that Mr. Sommer is qualified to testify as an expert on piloting and accident reconstruction, including engine failure analysis, the Court must still find that the process he used in forming his expert opinion is suffi ciently reliable under Daubert and its progeny. See Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc., 326 F.3d at 1342 (stating that “one may be considered an expert but still offer unreliable testimony”); cf. McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1257 (<HOLDING>). The Court must also find that the testimony 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal rules of evidence require trial courts to hold hearingsreferred to as daubert hearingsto determine reliability of scientific expert testimony before admission at trial (B) holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility (C) holding that experts causation opinion based on statements made by plaintiff was not inherently unreliable (D) holding that daubert does not create a new framework for analyzing proffered expert testimony based upon technical or other specialized knowledge  (E) holding that rjulings on admissibility under daubert inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered experts methodology

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: irrelevant, a respondent’s awareness that his conduct will violate an ethical proscription is not itself material.”). Simply because an attorney’s conduct is intentional or dishonest does not by itself establish a dishonest or selfish motive. See In re Alcorn, 202 Ariz. 62, 74, ¶ 42, 41 P.3d 600, 612 (2002) (respondent violated his ethical duty of candor toward the tribunal, but selfish motive was not an aggravating factor). ¶ 43 In the past, we have held that dishonest or selfish motive is an aggravating factor when an attorney received some financial gain or made misrepresentations to cover his or her negligence. These previous holdings of dishonest or selfish motive involved private attorneys, not public sector lawyers. See, e.g., Arrick, 180 Ariz. at 143, 882 P.2d at 950 (<HOLDING>); Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 69, 876 P.2d at 565 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (B) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (C) holding that lawyer who made deliberate misrepresentations to his client to conceal his negligence and improperly retained a fee from that client had a dishonest or selfish motive (D) holding that an attorneys filing a notice of appearance on behalf of his or her client constitute a waiver of service of process by the client (E) holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation — 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. § 1103) — which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (“An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal.”). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant’s release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc  1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest

SOLUTION:
(D)