In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
residence. Upon arrival, the police recovered shell casings from a .40 caliber weapon. Robles told the police that he was not home when the shots were fired, and he denied-owning a .40 caliber weapon. Despite Robles’ denials, Detective Cabrera recovered a .40 caliber pistol that was registered to Robles. The police did not follow up with Robles or the witnesses. Once again, Robles was not charged. In August 2010, Johnson amended his pending PCRA petition to allege that the Commonwealth violated Brady by withholding the above-described police reports. The PCRA court dismissed Johnson’s amended petition as untimely. On appeal, however, this Court reversed and remanded for a merits review of Johnson’s Brady claim. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 619 Pa. 386, 64 A.3d 621 (2013) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). After remand, the PCRA court granted 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar (B) holding that coleman could use certain information to bring a new and separate suit even though that information was discovered subsequent to a violation of the courts protective order (C) holding that attorney abandonment constitutes an extraordinarycircumstance that allows a federal court to disregard the state procedural bar to hearing a habeas petition (D) holding that infirmities in state habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief (E) holding that the information discovered during the federal habeas proceedings constitutes newly discovered facts for pur poses of the b1ii exception to the pcras jurisdictional time bar

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
on CRiminal Justice, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). In 1997, the legislature amended the child pornography statute to eliminate a loophole in the existing statute that impeded prosecution of individuals for possession or promotion of child pornography depicted or distributed by computer. Id.; House Comm, on CRiminal JURISPRUDENCE, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). There is nothing in these materials to suggest that the legislature intended to prohibit anything other than pornography depicting actual children. Therefore, we conclude that the Texas child pornography statute prohibits only the possession of visual materials depicting real children. Because the Texas statute only prohibits pornography depicting actual children, the sta App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Appellant also contends that the statute is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding twentyeight charges against defendant for possession of child pornography were not multiplicious (B) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (C) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (D) holding that an overbreadth challenge to a child pornography law was rendered moot by amendment to the statute (E) recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
trial that he believed the behavior he personally observed did not warrant issuing a citation. Under Colin, these observations do not provide a basis for reasonable suspicion. Our precedent prior to Colin is clear that common, non-illegal motorist behavior does not give rise to reasonable suspicion. [BJecause most people are not such paragons of driving skill and virtue that they consistently adhere to each one of the complex laws relating to the operation of motor vehicles, there are many opportunities to stop targeted vehicles ... But those opportunities are not limitless. Suspicions must be reasonable, and they cannot be if they are not sufficient to cause an officer to believe that the driver has done something illegal. United States v. Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1130(9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). This circuit has repeatedly held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a police communique has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion any authorized officer may make an investigatory stop on the basis of that bulletin even though the officer making the stop is not aware of the underlying facts (B) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (C) holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle when confidential informant personally observed the vehicle provided a description of the vehicle and its direction detailed the basis for her suspicion that the vehicle was engaged in illegal activity and had previously given reliable information that led to the successful apprehension of individuals engaged in various criminal activity (D) holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop (E) holding that officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle that was under surveillance on the basis of its making a right turn without signaling

Ex Output:

(E)