In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: CURIAM: Carlo Junior Seneeharles appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). He raises three issues on appeal, which we address in turn. After review, we affirm Sen-echarles’s con earm and ammunition had traveled through interstate commerce before the offense was committed, the Government established a minimal nexus between Senecharles’s firearm and ammunition and interstate commerce, and the statute was constitutional as-applied to him. See United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). B. Armed Career Criminal Act Senecharles also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  922g is not unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who possessed a firearm only intrastate when the government demonstrated that the firearm moved in interstate commerce (B) recognizing scarborough holding that commerce nexus satisfied upon showing that possessed firearm had traveled at some time in interstate commerce (C) holding that a defendant possessed a firearm in connection with a crime when the firearm was kept in a car across the street from where the defendant was selling drugs (D) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time (E) holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: improperly determined that the “neither expected nor intended” language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an “occurrence.” ¶21 The CGL policy’s core provision defines “occurrence” by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was “neither expected nor intended.” This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured’s expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an “occurrence” and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). ¶22 Here the District Court found that Ribi 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: or in community control shall be considered as any part of the time that he shall be sentenced to serve.” We interpreted that provision (since renumbered as section 948.06(3), see ch. 97-299, § 13, Laws of Fla.) as establishing a general rule that “credit cannot be given for time served on community control.” Young, 697 So.2d at 77. Fraser, we explained, merely “recognized a limited exception to this general rule” for those unusual circumstances “when the original term of community control is revoked as illegal.” Id. at 77 n. 6. After Young, three district courts have held that the plain meaning of section 948.06(3) forbids jail-time credit for time spent in community control, with the limited exception adopted in Fraser. See Robinson v. State, 850 So.2d 658, 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. State, 838 So.2d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a sentence is not limited to period of incarceration (B) holding that credit cannot be awarded for time served on community control (C) holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs (D) holding that florida law dictates that credit cannot be given for time served on community control (E) holding that time served on community control may not be applied to a postrevocation sentence of incarceration


Output: (E)