In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: of the debtor. This distinction appears immaterial under the language of sec. 409.402(7), Stats. 7 In other contexts, a security interest properly perfected at one time may later become unperfected through creditor inaction. See, e.g. sec. 409.103(l)(d)l, (2)(b), (3)(e), Stats, (four month grace periods preserving perfection in collateral removed from jurisdic tion); sec. 409.403(2) (lapse of financing statements after 5 years unless continued). 8 Interestingly, the Ansley court held that a filing under "the name Ansley Farms instead of the debtor's true name — Emory Ansley — is seriously misleading, making [the]. . . security interest unperfected.. . ." Id,., 467 F.Supp. at 55. Other cases reaching similar results are In Re Wishart, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1296 (Bankr.W.D. Mich. 1972) (<HOLDING>); In Re Brawn, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 565 (D.C. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient (B) holding a filing under mccauleys reprographics and mapping insufficient to perfect a security interest in the assets of the debtor corporation (C) holding that the reservation of a claim need not name a defendant but only identify the type of claim the debtor seeks to retain (D) holding a filing under wishart equipment co insufficient to identify the debtor horace wishart (E) holding a filing under john and mayella lintz insufficient to identify the debtor corporation

A: holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient
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Q: abused its discretion by providing an unreasonable characterization of the record evidence. See McElwee, 896 A.2d at 18 & nn. 7-8. While SEPTA claims that this, too, necessarily entailed unwarranted fact-finding on the part of the Commonwealth Court, we believe that it aligns with the approach utilized in Sienkiewicz I, wherein this Court not only determined that no record evidence existed to support a particular factual finding central to the trial court’s decision to grant relief (i.e., that Penn-DOT had installed curbing along the “Stafford Straightaway”), but proceeded to delineate the essential facts that were proved by the uncontradicted record evidence in ultimately agreeing with Penn-DOT’s position that relief was unjustified. See Sienkiewicz I, 584 Pa. at 282, 883 A.2d at 502 (<HOLDING>). Under the circumstances of this case, then, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (B) holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property (C) recognizing distinction and allowing recovery for impairment of access and not obstructed flow of traffic (D) holding that the landownerlicensee relationship ceased when the licensee left the landowners property (E) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking

A: holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property
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Q: that the recipients of the devices used the devices for their intended purpose — to receive unauthorized cable service offered on the plaintiffs system. Id. at 460. Similarly, the district court in DIRECTV Inc. v. McCool, 339 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1033 (M.D.Tenn.2004), found that a factual dispute existed for trial where defendant denied that he purchased and used an un-looper device, and plaintiffs evidence of unlawful interception of DIRECTV’s satellite signal, “albeit circumstantial,” showed “that an order was placed for the unlooper by someone using Defendant’s credit card and e-mail address, and that the unlooper was shipped to Defendant’s residential address.” Id. at 1034; see also DirectTV, Inc. v. Griepsma, No. 03-CV-6243-CJS-JWF, 2005 WL 608250 at *7 (W.D.N.Y. March 11, 2005)(<HOLDING>). A genuine issue of material fact clearly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence (B) holding that although there was no direct evidence of use of an unlooper by the defendant use could be inferred from the purchase and delivery of the unlooper to the defendant (C) holding that the use of a corset spring device was public although the use was by its nature not visible to the general public (D) holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs (E) holding that direct proof of intent to defraud is unnecessary and that it may be inferred from the act of the parties and from all circumstances

A:
holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence
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