In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: venue, the propriety of venue is fixed in the county chosen by the plaintiff. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.063 (Vernon 1986); Tex.R.Civ.P. 86-1. If a defendant objects to the plaintiffs venue choice and properly challenges that choice through a motion to transfer venue, the question of proper venue is raised. Tex.R.Civ.P. 86. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that venue is maintainable in the county of suit. Id. 87-2(a). If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the trial court must transfer the lawsuit to another specified county of proper venue. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.063(1) (“The court ... shall transfer an action to another county of proper venue if ... the county in which the action is pending is not a proper county....”); Tieuel, 654 S.W.2d at 775 (<HOLDING>). If the plaintiff meets the burden, the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings (B) recognizing that the plaintiff has the right to file suit in any permissible county (C) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (D) holding that even if venue was improper the case should have been transferred not dismissed (E) recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue

Answer: holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings


Question: from disciplining him for absenteeism prior to May of 2007. Sánchez contends that AT & T’s offer of other positions was not reasonable because those positions offered lower compensation. He also contends that the offer of shift-swapping was not reasonable because AT & T did not provide the sched ules of other employees, as it had promised. However, we need not decide whether either of these accommodations was reasonable in isolation, because they were not offered in isolation — rather, they were offered as part of a series of attempts by AT & T to accommodate Sánchez. Many courts have found similar accommodations or combinations of accommodations to be reasonable under Title VII. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 77-78, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits (B) holding that employer reasonably accommodated seventh day adventist employee by inter alia agreeing to permit any shift exchanges that employee could arrange on his own (C) holding that employers must when appropriate accommodate a disabled employee by reassignment to a vacant position if employee cannot be accommodated in existing job (D) holding that a seniority and absenteeism system itself provided reasonable accommodation to a seventh day adventist employees religious needs (E) holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury

Answer: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits


Question: he or she was not legally entitled.” The term INSURED is defined in the Policy as the NAMED INSURED, and NAMED INSURED is further defined as “the person or entity listed in the Declarations.” The entity listed in the declarations section of this policy is “Brown & LaCounte, L.L.P.” Thus, the most natural and reasonable interpretation of the personal profit exclusion is that the entity of Brown & LaCounte, L.L.P. is included within the meaning of “any INSURED.” Additionally, other courts interpreting similar insurance policies, albeit without the “he or she” language, have held that the phrase “personal profit” in a policy exclusion should not be read as limiting the exclusion to only natural persons. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Auto Europe, L.L.C., 2002 WL 314380 *4 (N.D.Ill.2002) (<HOLDING>). See also Plainview Milk Products Coop. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding exclusion inapplicable because under the facts alleged in the underlying suit the insured could receive personal profits and be legally entitled to retain them and distinguishing cases where there was sufficient evidence in the underlying complaint to show the profits received were illegal or undeserved within the meaning of the exclusion (B) holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled (C) holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party (D) holding that an ownedproperty exclusion did not apply with respect to property that the insured bought only after the policy periods for which the insured sought coverage (E) holding that business use exclusion precluded coverage when insured was operating a taxicab whose purpose was to carry passengers for hire even though at the time of the accident insured did not have a passenger

Answer:
holding exclusion inapplicable because under the facts alleged in the underlying suit the insured could receive personal profits and be legally entitled to retain them and distinguishing cases where there was sufficient evidence in the underlying complaint to show the profits received were illegal or undeserved within the meaning of the exclusion