In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED 1 . In the original petition in the Sullivan Suit, Ms. Sullivan averred that she was represented by a power of attorney appointing Mr. Ban-daries as her attorney in fact and caregiver and granting him "full power and authority and in her name and behalf” to "conduct, man .2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair). But see Marleau v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 333 Or. 82, 37 P.3d 148, 156 (2001) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under south carolina law slander is actionable per se where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery (B) holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under missouri law (C) recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages (D) holding that statement made to plaintiffs neighbors that plaintiff committed adultery was not slander per se because adultery is no longer a crime under oregon law (E) holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under louisiana law
[A]: (D)


[Q]: background nor his current offense can support the conclusion that he is a worst offender. The maximum sentence was therefore not justified. In deciding to impose the maximum sentence, Judge Michalski relied primarily on his conclusion that Skrepich was incapable of rehabilitation and could not personally be deterred. The judge thus gave primary emphasis to the need to protect the public by isolating Skrepich from the community. While the judge also indicated that a lengthy sentence would serve the sentencing goals of general deterrence and community condemnation, it seems clear that these goals could not, in themselves, support the imposition of a maximum, ten-year term for a first offender convicted of a class B felony. See Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198, 1204-05 (Alaska 1985) (<HOLDING>). The appropriateness of the maximum term 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts failure to explain the effect of supervised release was harmless where the maximum term of incarceration under the actual sentence of imprisonment and supervised release less than six years as well as his worstcase scenario less than nine years was less than the maximum term of incarceration twenty years al lowed by law (B) holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony (C) holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder (D) holding that a term of substantially less than twenty years would serve the objectives of general deterrence and community condemnation in the case of a first offender convicted of seconddegree murder an unclassified felony (E) holding that twenty years was not excessive for second felony offender convicted of simple burglary
[A]: (D)


[Q]: wills. R. at 150. The affidavits from Messrs. Almazan and Pacquing, alleging that Carlos Pacquing died during World War II and thus could not have placed the veteran with the BC, are likewise not material given that the veteran admitted under oath to having served in the BC. R. at 110. See Blackburn, Villaruz, and Cox, all supra. The other evidence added to the record is similarly not new and material. The .service records submitted address the veteran’s dates of active and inactive duty with the Navy; most are duplicates of documents already of record, and are not material because they do not shed light on his activities with the BC between 1942 and 1944. Compare R. at 15, 17, 19, 28, 41, 44-45, 47 with R. at 160-61, 185, 195, 201, 203; see Rightly v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 200, 205 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Colvin, supra. The appellant asserts that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record (B) holding that evidence not submitted to the district court cannot be part of the record on appeal (C) holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative (D) holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence (E) holding that material submitted by appellant that is cumulative of evidence previously of record is not new
[A]:
(E)