In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: S. Sprouse Residuary Trust, which is a named defendant in this action. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer only to Mr. Sprouse in this opinion. 4 .Ms. Bagwell, who is not a lawyer, also testified that she thought that the original five-year lease was on "a year[-]to[-]year basis.” 5 . Mr. Sprouse did not take issue with the $534 award for the damage to Mr. Ellis's corn crop. 6 . See also 2 Friedman on Leases § 14.301, at 915 (noting that payment of increased rent under an option constitutes an acceptance of the option). 7 . Painter v. Town of Groveland, 79 So.2d 765, 767 (Fla.1955) (finding such a presumption contrary to statute); Branagen v. Winders & Alm, 194 Iowa 461, 187 N.W. 440, 440-41 (Iowa 1922); Schiltz v. Teledirect Int'l, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); Elec. Sales Eng’rs, Inc. v. Urban Renewal & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there was no renewal but finding estoppel on the part of the landlord (B) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (C) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (D) recognizing the abuse of discretion standard and the requirement of evidentiary support for a finding of estoppel (E) holding that estoppel was a question of fact

A: (A)
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Q: IV, V, VI and XIV. See Answee, Docket # 8, Exh. A, pp. 13-14. In order to allow the state courts the opportunity to act on or correct the violations alleged, the Applicant must do more than just invoke the magic words “fair trial,” or “due process,” or make only cursory citation to the appropriate constitutional amendments. He must provide legal theory explaining how the admission of the statements or testimony violated these particular federal constitutional rights. See, e.g., Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7-8, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982) (claim on direct appeal that jury instruction was reversible error did not fairly present due process challenge to instruction for habeas exhaustion purposes); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-77, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (<HOLDING>); see, also, Thomas v. Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in preaedpa case habeas applicant failed to fairly present federal claim to state court where despite presenting all necessary facts applicant failed to assert specific argument that he later tried to raise in federal court (B) holding that where defendant failed to raise defense of plaintiffs fraud in federal court defendant is barred from raising that issue in state court (C) holding that habeas petitioner scheduled to be executed in the state of virginia for capital murder could not raise claim of violation of his rights under the vienna convention on federal habeas review where he failed to preserve the claim by raising it in state court proceedings vienna convention does not trump subsequent federal statute requiring habeas petitioners who claim to be held in violation of treaties of the united states to develop factual bases for their claims in state court as a precondition of federal habeas review (D) holding applicants general state court claim was insufficient to exhaust his later more specific federal habeas claim (E) holding that a federal court may deny an unexhausted habeas petition on the merits when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim

A: (A)
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Q: of this exception and concluded that Apprendi does not impart a fundamental procedural right that is a necessary component of a fair trial. Id.; see also United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 670 (9th Cir.2002) (“Sending the drug quantity determination to the jury cannot be fundamental to the fairness of the proceeding if the judge is allowed to make such findings in some circumstances.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 939, 123 S.Ct. 48, 154 L.Ed.2d 243 (2002); United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.) (noting that Apprendi is “clearly not on the same level as a truly landmark decision such as Gideon [v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) ].”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 961, 123 S.Ct. 388, 154 L.Ed.2d 315 (2002); McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1258 (<HOLDING>); Sanders, 247 F.3d at 151 (same). Just 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively in florida in postconviction proceedings to cases that were final on direct review at the time of the apprendi decision (B) holding apprendi is not retroactive (C) holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively (D) holding apprendi does not satisfy second exception in teague (E) holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review

A:
(D)
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