In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: recipient venue because their lack of standing here means it is not a district “in which [the case] might have been brought,” according to the requirements of the transfer statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiffs suggest that this court should “sensibly confirm[] that inherent in any discretionary transfer here is the idea that jurisdiction cannot be destroyed.” PI. Resp. 25. The argument is artful but unpersuasive. “There is no valid reason for reading the words ‘where it might have been brought’ to narrow the range of permissible federal forums beyond those permitted by federal venue statutes.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 623, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); see also Carbonara v. Olmos, 1994 WL 61797, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1994) (<HOLDING>). B. Standing of SAF SAF asserts both 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (C) holding that transfer to a district in which circuit law likely precluded standing was proper because the language of  1404a refers only to whether venue is proper and not a plaintiffs capacity to sue (D) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (E) holding that venue is proper in any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business
[A]: (C)


[Q]: tam complaints, Relator Mayes and Relators Lutz and Webster have filed amended complaints. 2 . In briefing related to the multiple pending motions to dismiss, some Defendants argue that the 2010 amendment that made it clear that a claim resulting from an AKS violation was a false claim operated only in a prospective nature, (See, e.g,, Dkt. No. 146-1 at 17). However, this Court finds that the weight of authority supports the conclusion that the 2010 amendment adding 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(g) was merely a clarification of the law; claims tainted by AKS violations constitute false claims for the purposes of the FCA regardless of whether the violation occurred before or after the 2010 amendment. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 312 n.19 (3d Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>); U.S. ex rel. Westmoreland v. Amgen, Inc., 812 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a legislative amendment that appeared to approve the analysis of a recent indiana supreme court case was a clarification rather than an amendment (B) holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel (D) holding that federal rule of civil procedure 15c2 giving court discretion to permit amendment of complaint applies to  2255 petitions insofar as a district court may in its discretion permit an amendment to a petition to provide factual clarification or amplification after the expiration of the oneyear period of limitations as long as the petition itself was timely filed and the petitioner does not seek to add an entirely new claim or new theory of relief (E) holding that the 2010 amendment was a clarification
[A]: (E)


[Q]: unambiguous language of the Family Code and under precedent from the Supreme Court of Texas, the answer to this question is “yes.” “A parent of a child has ... the duty to support the child.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 151.001(a) (West 2008). In the Family Code, the Texas Legislature expressly states that “a parent who fails to discharge the duty of support is liable to a person who provides necessaries to those to whom support is owed.” Id. § 151.001(c). In this provision, the Legislature ha is a sound statutory basis for the holdings in cases in which courts have determined that the trial court in a non-enforcement modification suit has authority to order a parent to pay reasonable attorney’s fees as child support under the “necessaries rule.” See In re J.A.D., 2010 WL 2649961, at *1-4 (<HOLDING>); In re A.J.J., No. 2-04-265-CV, 2005 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule (B) holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries (C) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that father pay attorneys fees to mother as necessaries for the benefit of the children in divorce decree and citing statutory predecessor to section 151001 (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that father pay attorneys fees to mother as necessaries for the benefit of the children in paternity proceeding and citing statutory predecessor to section 151001 (E) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay reasonable attorneys fees incurred by mother as necessaries for the children
[A]:
(A)