TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions “could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited.” Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) (“We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse’s liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void.”). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years

SOLUTION: holding that such provisions are valid

PROBLEM: and to allow it to brief the issue of whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled as to potential opt-in plaintiffs in this action. ECF No. 14. The motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs response, and defendant’s reply amount to the' very briefing of the issue that the motion seeks. See ECF Nos. 14, 15 and 16. It boils down to a simple proposition, succinctly summarized by Judge Blackburn in a case cited by the defendant: “Tolling is available' only ‘when [a plaintiff] diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.’” Young v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 11-cv-REB-MJW, 2013 WL 1223613, R *2 (D. Colo. March 25, 2013). Cf. Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Here, we have a district court order in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that equitable tolling is available when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence (B) holding that  2244d is subject to equitable tolling if ae petitioner demonstrates  1 that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and 2 that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filling quoting pace v diguglielmo 544 us 408 418 125 sct 1807 161 led2d 669 2005 (C) holding that extraordinary circumstances did not include the mere neglect of the professional who was in a position to file a timely application (D) holding in a habeas case that tolling is available when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control (E) holding that ejquitable tolling is appropriate when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence

SOLUTION: holding that equitable tolling is available when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence

PROBLEM: supervising, or otherwise controlling the agent” in addition to any vicarious liability that may be imposed via the agent’s actions. We hold that plaintiffs under the ICRA may proceed against the employer on either a direct negligence or vicarious liability theory for supervisor harassment in a hostile-work-environment case. The Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense, with the burden of proof on the employer, applies only to claims of vicarious liability. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764, 118 S.Ct. at 2270 (adopting affirmative defense “in order to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority” (emphasis added)); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. at 2292; see also Johnson v. Shinseki, 811 F.Supp.2d 336, 348 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct (B) holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied (C) holding because the court applied the negligence standard the faragher defense is inapplicable (D) holding that equitable defense of laches is inapplicable to claims of fraud (E) holding that even though the court does not usually apply the clearly erroneous standard to mixed questions of fact and law this standard is properly applied to the materiality issue

SOLUTION:
holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct