In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

ah officer may ask a question outside the scope of the initial justification for the stop so long as it does not further lengthen the time taken to process the initial justification for the stop. In other words, if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid. This reasoning is explained in both United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc), and United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5th Cir.1993). In both cases, the courts held that questions by police officers during a traffic stop are not seizures or searches proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and cited United States Supreme Court cases dealing with non-custodial police-citizen encounters for support. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent (B) holding that police may approach persons and ask questions or permission to search so long as police do not imply that answers or consent are required (C) holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car
(B)

pre-estimate may in fact operate as a penalty and become unenforceable is shown by the fact that even though the sum fixed as compensation for each day’s delay ... is held to be a reasonable provision for liquidated damages and to be enforceable, no court will permit it to go on operating forever. 11 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 58:21 at 523. That treatise then observes that there is “some lack of uniformity in the method of determining this time limit.” Id. In general, there are two rules that courts have applied to this predicament. Some courts have held that a liquidated damages clause is inapplicable when a contractor has completely abandoned a project. See, e.g., City of Elmira v. Larry Walter, Inc., 76 N.Y.2d 912, 563 N.Y.S.2d 45, 564 N.E.2d 655, 656 (1990) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Others have held that, when a contractor has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudgment interest should not be added to damages awarded for misrepresentation because the amount of damages were not liquidated or ascertainable before the verdict (B) holding that language of contract did not limit plaintiffs recovery to liquidated damages (C) holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the fsla (D) holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award (E) holding that in the absence of clear and unambiguous language indicating that liquidated damages clause was intended to apply to contractors outright abandonment of the project no such damages should be awarded
(E)

in the most nefarious negotiating tactics possible, force a lockout to put pressure on the employees, and then attempt to clean up-fhe mess with good-faith, post-lockout bargaining. Horsehead cannot retroactively “cure” its prior negotiating tactics with post-lockout bargaining, and evidence regarding these activities has no relevance to pre-lockout activities. B. Lockout Because the majority determined that Horsehead did not bargain in bad faith, it found that the lockout was lawful. I contend that there was substantial evidence to support a finding that Horsehead engaged in bad-faith bargaining, and I believe the lockout was an outgrowth of this activity. Lockouts are. not per se unlawful. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318, 85 S.Ct. 955, 13 L.Ed.2d 855 (1965) (<HOLDING>). A lockout can, however, be unlawful if it is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent the successor employer must bargain with the incumbent union (B) holding a lockout unlawful when utilized to enable the employer to implement its own bargaining position without  genuine impasse (C) holding that employer violates neither  8a1 nor  8a3 when after a bargaining impasse has been reached he temporarily shuts down his plant and lays off his employees for the sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining position (D) holding that an employee is guilty of misconduct connected with his work when he deliberately violates a company rule reasonably designed to protect the legitimate business interests of his employer or when his acts or omissions are of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of those interests and the duties and obligations he owes his employer (E) holding that petitioners remedy under title vii of the civil rights act was in addition to remedies available under the collective bargaining agreement in force between his employer and his union

(C)