In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
first time a party must specify the statute authorizing attorney’s fees is in the Rule 54 motion (unless otherwise provided by statute or court order). In Missouri, attorney’s fees are not recoverable from another party, except when a contract or statute allows it. Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. banc 2009). The second sentence of the Missouri commissions statute is such an exception to the general Missouri rule. Kraft v. Edwards, 946 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Mo.App.1997). The district judge’s ruling that there was no statutory basis for an award of attorney’s fees is erroneous as a matter of law. On remand, the district court should consider whether to award attorney’s fees. See Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 631 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because this case as tried addressed only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award (B) holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained (C) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence (D) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (E) holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances

Ex Output:
holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained


Ex Input:
” Boone v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 130, 133, 415 S.E.2d 250, 251 (1992). “A battery is an unlawful touching of another.... Whether a touching is a battery depends on the intent of the actor, not on the force applied.” Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 463, 468-69, 534 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2000) (citation omitted). “ ‘[T]he slightest touching of another ... if done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, constitutes a battery for which the law affords redress.’ ” Id. at 469, 534 S.E.2d at 350 (citation omitted). Accordingly, where Vaughn claims he only intended to scare Robinson and did not intend to shoot or wound him, Vaughn would not be entitled, in my opinion, to have the jury instructed on assault and battery. See Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987) (<HOLDING>). A second theory supported by the evidence is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that shooting at a person intending only to scare the person where no touching or wounding occurs supports instructing the jury on simple assault (B) holding that simple assault includes urinating on another (C) holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident   4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor (D) holding that punching another person is a statutory assault (E) holding simple assault is a lesser included offense of recklessly endangering another person

Ex Output:
holding that simple assault includes urinating on another


Ex Input:
the state could have elected to charge Reynolds with both burglary and theft and, upon conviction, would have been entitled to a separate sentence on both charges. Reynolds cannot complain that it was improper to deny an instruction on theft that would have permitted the jury to consider the offense only as a lesser alternative to burglary. Reynolds’ conviction is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for a retrial in conformity with the views expressed herein. 1 . See Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 306-314 (Alaska 1970). 2 . See abo Catlett v. State, 585 P.2d 553, 558 (Alaska 1978) (citing Mead with approval in holding that offenses of grand larceny and theft from an airplane do not merge and are subject to separate punishment). 3 . Cf. State v. Occhipinti, 562 P.2d 348 (Alaska 1977) (<HOLDING>). 4 .Here, as in Mead, "we are presented with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as a matter of state law nonmutual offensive issue preclusion does not apply against the state (B) holding that when the state prosecutes and obtains a conviction on separate charges as to which the rule of merger does not apply the state is entitled as a matter of law to a conviction and a separate sentence on each charge (C) holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case (D) holding the petitioners challenge of his conviction is not rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence because collateral consequences flowing from the conviction give the petitioner a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him (E) holding defendant who voluntarily dismissed his appeal of one conviction based on plea agreement for separate charges was not entitled to outoftime appeal

Ex Output:

holding that as a matter of state law nonmutual offensive issue preclusion does not apply against the state