In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 35 . Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 36 . Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 37 . Kimmelman v. Monison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 38 . Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 39 . The Court notes that the state standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel applied by the state parallels the federal standard as stated in Strickland. See Baker v. State, 243 Kan. 1, 755 P.2d 493 (1988); Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 694 P.2d 468 (1985). 40 . Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). 41 . Id. at 753, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 42 .Id. at 754, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 43 . Id. at 752, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (“Legal 2005) (<HOLDING>). 46 . Moreover, the Court finds no error in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel was not deficient for failing to make an objection that lacked merit (B) holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel (C) holding counsel deficient because she could have had no reasonable basis for not objecting to certain inadmissible evidence despite no evidence of counsels strategy (D) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument (E) holding counsel was not deficient in not objecting to testimony that was permissible within state rules of evidence

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: omitted)). This is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires a finder of fact to consider numerous relevant factors, including “substantially identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership.” Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Rabine, 161 F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir.1998). Intent to evade union obligations, though not the keystone to proving alter ego in some other circuits, is the most critical factor in the Seventh Circuit. Compare Trs. of Pension, Welfare & Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Favia Elec. Co., 995 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Centor Contractors, 831 F.2d at 1312), with Rd. Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, U.A., AFL-CIO v. Dorn Sprinkler Co., 669 F.3d 790, 794 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). 1. Ownership, management, operation, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights (B) holding that intent to evade collective bargaining obligations is merely one factor among many that must be considered (C) holding that exercising control over other participants is one factor among many that should be considered not a requirement for applying the adjustment (D) holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement (E) holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: should "cease this activity asap!!!” 6 . As one basis for its motion to dismiss, the Board asserted that it, its members, its staff, and the administrative prosecutor had absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit under Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245 (4th Cir.1999). Because the court regarded the record as inadequate to evaluate the applicability of any immunities at that early stage of the proceedings, it rejected the immunity argument without prejudice to the Board’s right to reassert it on summary judgment. At present, the Maryland appellate cases do not unequivocally resolve the question of whether the Board had the right to an immediate appeal of an interlocutory order rejecting a claim of quasi-judicial immunity. See State v. Keller-Bee, 224 Md.App. 1, 3-5, 119 A.3d 80 (2015) (<HOLDING>). In any event, the Board did not appeal. 7 . 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court lacked jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of denial of motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity by defendants who were not public officials (B) holding that erroneously admitted evidence may be considered when ruling on a motion to dismiss (C) holding that immediate right to appeal lies from denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (D) holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity (E) holding that court clerk had right to take immediate appeal of ruling denying motion to dismiss based on absolute judicial immunity


Output: (E)