In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: factors to the State’s requested accommodation. The use of two-way video conferencing can satisfy a defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation in certain limited circumstances like those present here. ¶ 20 Applying Craig, we conclude that the strong preference for face-to-face confrontation must give way in the special circumstances of this ease to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case. The State’s requested accommodation is necessary to further two important public policies: protecting the rights of a vulnerable alleged sexual assault victim who has been ruled to be outside Arizona’s subpoena power and preserving society’s interest in prosecuting accused sexual offenders. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court properly refused to permit the defendant to question the nineyearold victim as to whether he had been sexually abused in the past because indianas rape shield statute shields the victim of a sex crime from a general inquiry into the history of past sexual conduct (B) recognizing michigans rape shield law furthers the legitimate state interests of protecting a sexual assault victim from surprise harassment and unnecessary invasions of privacy (C) holding that a prosecutors questions eliciting testimony from a victim as to issue of virginity prior to the assault did not violate colorados rape shield statute because that statute does not specifically prohibit a victim from testifying as to a lack of prior sexual activity id at 1020 (D) holding that application of the rape shield law to a case in which the underlying events occurred prior to the enactment of the rape shield law was not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws (E) holding that a public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality
[EX A]: holding that the trial court properly refused to permit the defendant to question the nineyearold victim as to whether he had been sexually abused in the past because indianas rape shield statute shields the victim of a sex crime from a general inquiry into the history of past sexual conduct

[EX Q]: controversy turns, in part, on a categorization of the loss at issue; an inherently factual determination requiring the testimony of Penn and NBC staff juxtaposed against Gioia’s onsite analysis. Thus, Gioia is a material witness and his convenience weighs in favor of transfer. B. Locus of the Operative Facts “Where there is no material connection between the district and’the operative facts, ... the interests of justice require the transfer of [the] action.” Manao Invests., 1997 WL 53200, at *2 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). ‘When determining the locus of operative facts in a declaratory judgment action concerning the interpretation of an insurance policy contract, this Court has considered where the insurance contract was made.” Royal Ins., 2002 WL 31385815, at *3-4 (<HOLDING>). Here, while it is unclear whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution (B) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (C) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (D) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york (E) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action
[EX A]: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership

[EX Q]: available only to that party; or (2) has such a relationship with one party as to effectively make him unavailable to the opposing party, regardless of actual physical availability. Tavarez, 626 F.3d at 905 (citing United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 926 (7th Cir.1976)). The latter prong is also referred to as “pragmatic unavailability.” See United States v. Christ, 513 F.3d 762, 773 (7th Cir.2008); Yumich v. Cotter, 452 F.2d 59, 64 (7th Cir.1971) (finding that the employment by the city of uncalled police officers who witnessed an altercation between officers and the plaintiff, as well as the officers’ “strong personal interest in the success of the city’s defense of their conduct ...” rendered them pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff); see also Mahone, 537 F.2d at 926-27 (<HOLDING>). In this case, Garibay was unquestionably 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction (B) holding that the same hearing officer as in this case erred in substituting his judgment for that of the pertinent school board in that case (C) holding that an officer who was involved in the arrest initiating case was pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff because of his association with the united states in building its case as well as his interest in seeing his police work vindicated by a conviction of the defendant (D) holding that where the court records in the present case and the records in a previous conviction reflected the same name and date of birth as well as a signature and the defendant did not object that he was not the same person as had been previously convicted the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction (E) holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on his presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking and his flight upon seeing police officers
[EX A]:
holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction