In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Dr. Brewer’s reports addressed the conduct of OGA’s employees, Drs. Jacobs and Gunn, the reports identified Dr. Gunn as OGA’s employee, and McCoy’s original petition alleged that OGA was vicariously liable for the conduct of Jacobs and Gunn under the doctrine of respondeat superior and the requirements of the Texas Professional Association Act. See Troeger v. Myklebust, 274 S.W.3d 104, 110 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (rejecting claim that conduct of dentist, who was sole defendant, was not implicated because her name was omitted from expert report and holding that dentist waived challenges to expert report by failing to raise objections within twenty-one days after service); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Dale, 188 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet) (<HOLDING>). In response, OGA disputes that its conduct 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that medical center was not required to be named in expert report addressing its residents conduct because plaintiffs alleged no directliability claims against it and noting that medical center was implicated in report and so waived all its objections when it failed to object to sufficiency of report within twentyone days after service (B) holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report (C) holding expert report requirement fulfilled in claim against nurse by providing expert report of nurse as to standard of care and expert report of medical doctor as to causation (D) holding that expert report addressing hospitals conduct was not required when plaintiffs sole theory against hospital was vicarious liability based on ostensible agency and explaining that the conduct by the hospital on which the agency relationship depends is not measured by a medical standard of care these are principles of agency law on which no expert report is required (E) holding that a complaint that a report was not timely served was not subject to the twentyone day deadline to object to the sufficiency of a report under former section 74351a

Ex Output:
holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report


Ex Input:
issue in question.” Bradley Ventures, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., 371 Ark. 229, 264 S.W.3d 485, 490 (2007). UAMS maintains that collateral estoppel applies to Dodson I and II, barring both of Dodson’s pending claims, but our discussion is considerably narrower. First, I would set aside Dodson I because I am uncertain that the court’s relevant finding was “essential to the judgment.” Powell, 289 S.W.3d at 444. Second, I would set aside Count II, which is Dodson’s impliedeontract claim. Importantly, Count II is premised on UAMS’s conduct after Dodson II, i.e., sending Dodson bills for the embryo storage fees, and therefore cannot be precluded by the earlier chancery court decision. See Ripplin Shoals Land Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); cf. id. at 1042 (“[R]es judicata does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying contract (B) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment (C) holding that a prior judgment regarding a permit to modify an existing bridge does not preclude a plaintiff from challenging a decision on a new application describing and a different bridge design (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit a design defect products liability expert to submit an untimely addendum stating a new claim of failure to warn after defense expert refuted the basis of original design defect opinion (E) holding untimeliness of motion to modify medical insurance payment did not preclude motion to modify maintenance

Ex Output:
holding that an assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying contract


Ex Input:
needed to fund the health premium obligations” and that “establishment and modification of such an employee benefit has traditionally been within the scope of legislative discretion.”); Unterschuetz v. City of Chicago, 346 Ill.App.3d 65, 281 Ill.Dec. 367, 803 N.E.2d 988, 994 (2004) (observing that, even within context of actual ordinance declaring policy, “the function of a legislative body is to make laws that declare the policy of a governmental body, which laws are subject to repeal when a subsequent legislature decides to alter that policy” and that City had “simply announced] various policies that the City intends to carry out until such time as the city council wishes to change those policies.”); Chicago Patrolmen’s Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 56 Ill.2d 503, 309 N.E.2d 3, 6 (1974) (<HOLDING>); Foley v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 421 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that longevity pay enhanced the regular periodic salaries paid to firefighters and police officers (B) holding that in reviewing the petition the court is to weigh the policy of public access to records against the longstanding public policy of providing a second chance to criminal defendants who have not been adjudicated guilty (C) holding that police officials did not have property interest in continuation of longstanding policy of providing officers with step and longevity salary increases (D) holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records (E) holding that a townships unilateral termination of a longstanding policy of permitting police officers to take police vehicles home at the end of their shifts was a mandatory subject of bargaining

Ex Output:

holding that longevity pay enhanced the regular periodic salaries paid to firefighters and police officers