In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
“multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn.2006) (citations omitted). Both requirements are met here. The district court convicted and sentenced Wallace for two distinct crimes committed upon two distinct victims: once for attempting to rape R.L. and once for stabbing and killing Kenneth Williams. And Wallace does not argue, nor have we found any legal basis to conclude, that the multiple sentences imposed by the district court in this case unfairly exaggerate the criminality of his conduct. See, e.g., State v. Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d 849, 850-51 (Minn.1980) (<HOLDING>). In fact, we squarely rejected the precise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts (B) holding that the district court did not err by sentencing a defendant to consecutive prison terms for seconddegree manslaughter and aggravated assault committed against two separate victims because the multiple sentences did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendants conduct (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding in assault and involun tary manslaughter case that district court has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences based on finding of whether multiple counts involved the same harm (E) holding that separate sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and with intent to rob were barred

Ex Output:
holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts


Ex Input:
as Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, Holland had been given the authority to review the allegations against Vickers and make the ultimate decision to keep her or fire her. Without more than what Vickers has offered as evidence, we cannot- see how a reasonable jury might find a retaliatory motive at work in Holland’s decision. Vickers’ retaliation claim is further undermined by the fact that even though it was Holland who fired her, Bedwell was the focus of her discrimination claims. Vickers failed to put on any evidence to show that Holland’s decision was in any way influenced by Bedwell, who had retired before Vickers’ refusal to sign the releases in April 2001 that triggered her firing. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1311-12 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Nor can Vickers’ Title VII claims draw 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a common employer and administrator does not necessarily influence the administrators decision (B) holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision (C) holding that subordinates bias is only relevant where the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the subordinates influence (D) holding that it is the conduct required to obtain a conviction rather than the consequences resulting from the crime that is relevant (E) holding that the relevant question is whether the courts decision deprived the petitioner of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment

Ex Output:
holding that a common employer and administrator does not necessarily influence the administrators decision


Ex Input:
“does not constitute a [constructively] fraudulent conveyance” under New York law); DCL § 272 (stating that the repayment of an antecedent debt may constitute fair consideration). But there is a significant exception to that rule: the repayment of an antecedent debt is never made for fair consideration where the transferee is a “corporate insider,” Frank, 48 F.3d at 635, including “an officer, director, or major shareholder of the trans-feror,” In re Sharp Int’l Corp., 403 F.3d 43, 54 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). That exception applies only to payments that satisfy preexisting obligations. Thus, a debtor may receive fair consideration if it makes a payment to a corporate insider in exchange for new value contemporaneously provided. See Frank, 48 F.3d at 635 (<HOLDING>); see also Cilco Cement Corp. v. White, 55 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a preexisting or antecedent debt may constitute sufficient consideration to support a mortgage (B) holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or (C) holding that the exception for repayment of an insiders antecedent debt did not apply to a debtors conveyance of two mortgages to a former officer regardless of whether she was a corporate insider because each of her mortgages secured a contemporaneous advance of funds not a preexisting debt (D) holding that the repayment of an antecedent debt constitutes fair consideration (E) holding that a debt incurred for a personal family or household purpose is a consumer debt even though it is secured by the debtors real property

Ex Output:

holding that a preexisting or antecedent debt may constitute sufficient consideration to support a mortgage