In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: statute and provides for a specific penalty of a fine of $1250. Id. § 321 J.2(2)(a)(2); see State v. Daniel, 574 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Iowa 1998) (“[T]he district court may not use the penalty provisions provided in section 903.1(1) if a specific penalty is provided in another statute.”). Because section 903.1 is only applicable “if a specific penalty is not provided fo'd’ and section 321J.2 does provide for a specific penalty, section 903.1 is not applicable as to the fine portion of the sentence. Iowa Code § 903.1(1) (emphasis added). Furthermore, as we noted above, we read general and specific statutes together, but if an irreconcilable conflict exists between the general and specific statutes, then the specific statute prevails. Lutgen, 606 N.W.2d at 314; see Lee, 561 N.W.2d at 354-55 (<HOLDING>); Sandifer, 570 N.W.2d at 257 (same). In this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1001 controls over the limitations provision of the wrongful death statute (B) holding a specific sentencing statute controls over the general sentencing provisions of section 9031 (C) recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one (D) holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions (E) holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls
[A]: (B)


[Q]: may grant preliminary injunctive relief in any civil action if the granting of such relief is appropriate under the facts upon which the action is based.” 16 U.S.C. § 3117(a). 3 . As used in ANILCA, (1) The term "land” means lands, waters, and interests therein. (2) The term “Federal land” means lands the title to which is in the United States after December 2, 1980. (3)The term "public lands” means land situated in Alaska which ... are Federal lands.... 16 U.S.C. § 3102(1) — (3). 4 . Although navigability determinations have not yet been made on most of Alaska’s waterways, it is likely that few waterways of significance to fisheries will be classified as non-navigable due to the expansive definition of navigable. See, e.g., Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401, 1402-08 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919, 110 S.Ct. 1949, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that river with depths of 1 to 3 feet and usable by inflatable rafts and small motorboats was navigable (B) holding lake on private land was not navigable in fact and there was no right of public use and enjoyment as lake was not fed by or part of a navigable stream (C) holding that riparians owners have the right of access to the navigable part of the river  the right to make a landing wharf or pier  subject to such general rules and regulations of the legislature (D) holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states (E) holding that congress had the authority under the commerce clause to require private riparian land owners to obtain a license prior to construction of dams even where the river in question was not navigable but could potentially have been made navigable
[A]: (A)


[Q]: it is possible that those persons the legislature intended to protect from unlawful discrimination under the chapter could themselves be liable for unlawful retaliation. However, an employee who otherwise enjoys the protection of the statute is not, for that reason, shielded from liability for retaliatory conduct prohibited by the statute. Cf. Martin v. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 862 F. Supp. 2d 37, 38, 38-40 (D. Mass. 2012) (rejecting co-worker defendant’s argument that retaliation provision in Massachusetts’ anti-discrimination law applied only to “employers and those ‘persons’ who exercise similar degrees of authority” and finding that statutory language allowed for a co-employee to be held liable); Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Associates, 738 N.E.2d 753, 764, 764-67 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note that, if the legislature 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plain language of act provides cause of action only against participating hospitals (B) holding that although a statute regarding sentencing for firsttime drug offenders was plain obvious and unambiguous in its terms construing the statute by its plain language would be inconsistent with contrary to and illogical in light of the legislatures intent in enacting the statute (C) holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language (D) recognizing that plain language of retaliation provision in massachusetts antidiscrimination statute provides on its face for individual personal liability and upholding jury verdict against employee under statute (E) recognizing validity of state antidiscrimination provisions
[A]:
(D)