In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: v. Jones, 993 P.2d 424, 427-28 (Alaska 1999) (construing a statute to give rise to an equitable lien because it established "an interest in and a right to seek reimbursement from" a particular source). 13 . Cf. AS 09.35.160 (giving a judgment creditor and the process server who levies on property under a writ of execution full control over the timing of a sale in satisfaction of the judgment). 14 . See Alaska R. Civ. P. 89(a). 15 . AS 13.16.505. 16 . AS 13.06.050(39). This definition comports with the definition set out in Uniform Probate Code section 1-201(33), which states: " 'Property' includes both real and personal property or any interest therein and means anything that 'may be the subject of ownership." 17 . Cf. Goldstein v. Prien, 143 Cal.App.2d 123, 299 P.2d 344, 346 (1956) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Since AS 13.16.505 prohibits liens from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is improper for a trustee to liquidate claims that benefit only select creditors with the only benefit to the estate being the recoupment of administrative costs (B) holding that there is a difference between a debtor attempting to pursue an action for his own benefit and a trustee pursuing an action for the benefit of the creditors (C) recognizing under analogous section of california code that the right to recover property conveyed by a decedent in fraud of creditors is an asset of his insolvent estate and that the executor or administrator is a trustee thereof for the benefit of creditors (D) holding that directors of an insolvent corporation are trustees for the creditors (E) recognizing that the bangor punta doctrine was not applicable to suit brought by receiver of insolvent insurance company for the benefit of creditors

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: Court of Utah, in applying the good-faith exception to a Belton search, recently cautioned: "If the case law had been ambiguous prior to the time the officers conducted a search later definitively declared unconstitutional, the good-faith exception would not apply and the evidence would be excluded.” Utah v. Baker, 229 P.3d 650, 664 (Utah 2010). 80 . See Belton, supra note 1, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860. 81 . Compare Thornton, supra note 59, 541 U.S. at 622, 124 S.Ct. 2127 (declining to address argument that Belton rule applies only to “recent occupants” of vehicle, while noting that petitioner had conceded "he was in ‘close proximity, both temporally and spatially,’ to his vehicle” when approached by police officer) with Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383, 388-89 (D.C.1993) (<HOLDING>). 82 . See Gant, supra note 2, 129 S.Ct. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer may search a suspects vehicle incident to a lawful arrest (B) holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key (C) holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle (D) holding belton did not extend to search of vehicle incident to arrest of individual who has parked locked and walked fifteen to twenty feet away from an automobile before being stopped and arrested (E) holding that belton permits the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile even when the defendant is arrested outside as long as the officer made initial contact while the defendant was inside the automobile

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: truthful. Assuming for the sake of argument that the defendant’s contention is correct, we nevertheless observe that the trial court found in the four factors noted above ample particularized guarantees of trustworthiness of Bryar’s statements to Trottier and Bollerud, and we conclude that this finding was not clearly erroneous. See Cook, 135 N.H. at 662, 610 A.2d at 805. For this reason, we hold that the admission of Bryar’s statements incriminating the defendant did not violate the defendant’s right of confrontation under part I, article 15 of the State Constitution. Because part I, article 15 affords this defendant at least as much protection from an unconstitutional admission of hearsay as the sixth amendment, cf. White v. Illinois, — U.S. —, — n.8, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 n.8 (1992) (<HOLDING>), we need not embark on an independent federal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no independent inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception like that for coconspirators under rule 801d2e internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that statements within a firmly rooted hearsay exception do not violate the confrontation clause (C) holding that rule 8034 hearsay exception is firmly rooted for sixth amendment purposes (D) holding codefendants confession incriminating defendant was not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule under roberts standard (E) holding that the exception is not firmly rooted


Output: (C)