In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

prolonged; and (4) the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. Alpert, 816 F.2d at 964, citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). DiGiovanni’s continued investigation after issuing the warning was entirely reasonable in light of these factors. First, any detention incident to that investigation was of limited duration. The encounter between Rodriguez and law enforcement personnel, from the moment he was pulled over until the currency’s discovery, lasted approximately forty minutes. Under these circumstances, even if Rodriguez’s detention occupied that entire time interval, it might not suggest a Terry Stop of unreasonable scope. See United States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188, 1194 (4th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). However, the alleged detention here only 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where officers had reasonable suspicion of a drug offense seizing defendants luggage for 38 minutes under terry did not mature into an unlawful arrest (B) holding suspect for 20 minutes constituted an arrest (C) holding that a defendants response to even an invalid arrest or terry stop may constitute independent grounds for arrest (D) holding that a seizure was unlawful because certain facts had dispelled the officers reasonable suspicion (E) holding that totality of circumstances supported reasonable suspicion that defendant was transporting drugs and therefore officer was justified in seizing truck
(A)

ah officer may ask a question outside the scope of the initial justification for the stop so long as it does not further lengthen the time taken to process the initial justification for the stop. In other words, if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid. This reasoning is explained in both United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc), and United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5th Cir.1993). In both cases, the courts held that questions by police officers during a traffic stop are not seizures or searches proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and cited United States Supreme Court cases dealing with non-custodial police-citizen encounters for support. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent (B) holding that police may approach persons and ask questions or permission to search so long as police do not imply that answers or consent are required (C) holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car
(B)

participation a controverted issue — • one that the jury resolved against him — he never controverted drug quantity, either at trial or during sentencing. Thus, we conclude that the Apprendi error claimed by Carrington “did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings” because the evidence that the conspiracy— indeed Carrington’s personal involvement in the conspiracy — involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base was “overwhelming” and “essentially uncontroverted.” Cotton, — U.S. at -, 122 S.Ct. at 1786. “Surely the ... jury, having found that the conspiracy existed, would have also found that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base.” Cotton, — U.S. at -, 122 S.Ct. at 1786; see also Strickland, 245 F.3d at 379 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, we note, as did the Court in Cotton, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding factual finding authorizing death penalty must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that there was no error at all much less plain error in failing to instruct the jury that it was required to find drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that defendants who do not object to jury instructions at trial are subject to a plain error standard of review on appeal (D) holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction (E) holding that on plain error review the defendants must  demonstrate that the jury would not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants conspired to traffic in at least  50 grams of crack

(E)