In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Defendants contend that the amount awarded was excessive and shocking, such as to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice or other improper influence invaded the trial. Defendants initially make this argument on the grounds that the disparity between punitive damages assessed against the “passive wrongdoer” (AGF) is too large in contrast to the amount assessed against the “active wrongdoer” (Risser). We reject this argument for many reasons. First, it assumes that AGF should not have been found liable for negligent retention of an employee. Obviously, the jury disagreed with this assessment. Second, the legal basis for assessing punitive damages on respondeat superior grounds is well-established. Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 235 Kan. 580, 682 P.2d 653, 665 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent deci sion, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that restatement second of torts  323 and 324a correctly state pennsylvania law (B) recognizing kansas courts adoption of restatement second of torts  909 1977 (C) recognizing that restatement second of torts   416 to 429 are often overlapping (D) recognizing tentative draft of restatement second of torts  652e (E) recognizing that kansas supreme court would accept the final draft of the restatement second of torts  652e adopted in 1977
[A]: (B)


[Q]: recipient venue because their lack of standing here means it is not a district “in which [the case] might have been brought,” according to the requirements of the transfer statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiffs suggest that this court should “sensibly confirm[] that inherent in any discretionary transfer here is the idea that jurisdiction cannot be destroyed.” PI. Resp. 25. The argument is artful but unpersuasive. “There is no valid reason for reading the words ‘where it might have been brought’ to narrow the range of permissible federal forums beyond those permitted by federal venue statutes.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 623, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); see also Carbonara v. Olmos, 1994 WL 61797, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1994) (<HOLDING>). B. Standing of SAF SAF asserts both 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (C) holding that transfer to a district in which circuit law likely precluded standing was proper because the language of  1404a refers only to whether venue is proper and not a plaintiffs capacity to sue (D) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (E) holding that venue is proper in any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business
[A]: (C)


[Q]: the restitution at the rate of [$50.00] per month.” However, despite Yamamoto’s full compliance with these conditions, the sentencing court in 1992 revoked his probation on the grounds that Yamamoto had inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial condition of his probation, ie., had failed to pay the entire $118,000.00 in restitution during his five-year term of probation. In revoking Yamamoto’s probation, the sentencing court in the instant case erroneously assumed that the order to pay $118,-000.00 in restitution was a condition of his probation. In actuality, the restitution order was an authorized free-standing sanction imposed in combination with Yamamoto’s sentence of probation. See HRS § 706-605(1)(d) (1993); State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 154, 890 P.2d 1167, 1194 (1995) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks, internal brackets, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the stated purposes of a contempt sanction alone cannot be determinative (B) holding that the suspension or revocation of a drivers license is not a sanction which once imposed precludes the application of criminal sanctions (C) recognizing that an order of restitution  is available as a freestanding sanction to be imposed alone or in combination with other sanctions (D) holding that where no discovery order was violated sanctions could not imposed pursuant to rule 37 but nevertheless upholding the sanction order under the courts inherent power (E) holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not
[A]:
(C)