instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
case. In light of our decision that the parties’ dispute will not be resolved by an appraisal proceeding, we need not decide, as appellants assert, whether the district court erred by observing that the appraisal process would be subject to the statutes governing confirmation or vacation of an arbitration award. Nonetheless, pertinent to our holding in this case, we take the opportunity to acknowledge that although some arbitration standards apply in processing appraisal results, Minnesota recognizes a distinction between appraisal and arbitration. Compare QBE, 778 N.W.2d at 398 (stating that “[ajppraisal decisions are subject to Minn.Stat. § [§ ] 572.08-.30 (2008), the arbitration statute”) and David A. Brooks Enters., Inc. v. First Sys. Agencies, 370 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Minn.App.1985) (<HOLDING>) with Johnson, 732 N.W.2d at 346 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that explanations of arbitration awards are not required (B) holding that because appraisal is analogous to arbitration the court would apply principles of arbitration law to this dispute regarding an insurance policy appraisal clause (C) recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit (D) holding that minnesotas arbitration statutes govern appraiser decisions and appraisal awards are to be treated as arbitration awards (E) holding that judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow in scope
answer:
(D)


question:
opens the door by suggesting the victim’s behavior is inconsistent with that of an abused child. As noted below, many other courts have allowed testimony that a child victim’s behavior or symptoms are “consistent with” child abuse trauma as rebuttal evidence. That is not what happened in this case. Just two years ago, in State v. Favoccia, the Supreme Court of Connecticut thor oughly reviewed the conflicting precedent and policy considerations in reaching the same conclusion we reach today. 306 Conn. 770, 51 A.3d 1002, 1012-22 (2012). The Favoccia court overturned its own precedent to hold that “the trial court abused its discretion in permitting [the expert] to testify about the complainant’s behaviors being consistent -with those generally characteristic 6, 671 N.E.2d 984, 985 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Chamberlain, 137 N.H. 414, 628 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (B) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (C) holding admission of expert testimony not erroneous where expert described typical traits and characteristics of sexually abused children (D) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case (E) holding that the testimony of an expert witness is admissible when the witness outlines the general characteristics of sexually abused children and then states that the victims symptoms are consistent with those characteristics
answer:
(D)


question:
§ 952(a) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2. 2 . Compare United States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1276 (8th Cir.1990) (excluding from speedy trial clock all time from district court’s grant of stay to obtain permission to file an interlocutory appeal through the date “the [appellate court's] mandate was received by the district court”) and Tyler, 878 F.2d at 759 (excluding from speedy trial clock "the 140 days that elapsed between the filing of the mandamus petition and the notification to the district court of the disposition of that petition”) and Speedy Trial Guidelines, infra pp. 1231-1232 (providing that delays due to extraordinary writs are excluded until the ”[d]ate the mandate of the court of appeals is filed in the district court”) with United States v. Felton, 811 F.2d 190, 198 (3d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). 3 . We do not comment on whether the time 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due (B) holding that the excludable period for an interlocutory appeal ends upon the date of issuance of the appellate courts mandate and expressly rejecting extending the exclusion until the date the district court receives the mandate (C) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (D) holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment (E) holding that the statute does not begin to run until at least a demand has been made upon the government but determining that the facts of that case made it unnecessary to choose between the date of demand and the date of actual payment as the triggering date for the running of the statute of limitations
answer:

(B)