In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

2 (emphasis added). In its Clarification, the FCC freed itself of this deadline, continuing to state that the order would last until the Fourth FNPRM but giving no time period in which that would occur. Clarification, 15 FCC Rcd 9587, at ¶ ¶ 1, 35. We hold that this extension newly aggrieved CompTel and thus made its petition timely. See Sam Rayburn Dam Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 515 F.2d 998, 1007 (D.C.Cir.1975) (stating that where a party was “aggrieved” by a later interpretation of a rule that it could not have reasonably anticipated, the time limit starts to run at the later event). Cases have held that extension of a temporary order may entitle the parties to seek judicial review of the order. See Public Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 901 F.2d 147, 151 (D.C.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Interstate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a temporary order is later made permanent the permanent order may be challenged (B) holding that the phrase permanent shutdown is unambiguous and can only mean a permanent cessation of plant operations rather than the uneventful transfer of ownership (C) holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction (D) holding that an alien who procured permanent resident status byconcealing his ineligibility had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence (E) holding an order that was interlocutory in form to be final in substance where the force and effect of the order was tantamount to a permanent injunction depriving complainant of a recognized property right
holding that the phrase permanent shutdown is unambiguous and can only mean a permanent cessation of plant operations rather than the uneventful transfer of ownership

act, 1976 PA 267, MCL 15.261 to 15.275. (3) If the board arbitrarily and capriciously violates section 7(9), the board shall he subject to the penalties prescribed in the freedom of information act, 1976 PA 442, MCL 15.231 to 15.246. B If “a statute gives new rights and prescribes new remedies, such remedies must be strictly pursued; and a party seeking a remedy under the act is confined to the remedy conferred thereby and to that only.” Monroe Beverage Co, Inc v Stroh Brewery Co, 454 Mich 41, 45; 559 NW2d 297 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “[w]hen a statute provides a remedy for enforcement of a common-law right, the statutory scheme is merely cumulative and not exclusive.” Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc, 273 Mich App 187, 201; 729 NW2d 898 (2006) (<HOLDING>). At common law there has always been a remedy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration (B) holding that the plaintiffs claims for unjust enrichment were not barred by the availability of relief under the public works bonding act mcl 129201 et seq because a plaintiff enjoyed the right at common law to recover in quantum meruit from a defendant who had been unjustly enriched (C) recognizing that action for quantum meruit relief exists to avoid unjust enrichment (D) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed
holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration

for postconviction relief actions. At the time Harrington filed the present action, this provision required that PCR applications “be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of proceden-do is issued.” Iowa Code § 822.3. This statute was enacted in 1984, several years after Harrington’s conviction and appeal became final. See 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1193, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code section 663A.3 (1985)). In Brewer v. Iowa District Court, 395 N.W.2d 841 (Iowa 1986), we held “that all potential postconviction applicants whose convictions became final prior to July 1, 1984, must file their applications' for postconviction relief on or before June 30, 1987, or be barred from relief” 395 N.W.2d at 844 (<HOLDING>). Thus,- Harrington’s present action is time 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that coram nobis was abolished by pcr statute (B) holding that postjudgment application for intervention was timely (C) holding that notice of appeal was not effectively taken where appeal was filed simultaneously with timely motion for reconsideration because when timely motion for reconsideration is filed a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of the motion to reconsider has no effect (D) holding that a california habeas petition is timely if filed within a reasonable time (E) holding harringtons first pcr application was timely filed

holding that coram nobis was abolished by pcr statute