In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: complaint’s allegations are sufficient if they put a reasonable person on notice as to why a plaintiff sues.” Id. Here, a reasonable person would be put on notice that Weatherford’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not solely based on the false arrest or false imprisonment claims. Weatherford’s claim is premised on the officers’ alleged intentional retaliation and abuse of power and process when they violated standard police procedure, disregarded Chief Leonard’s instructions and conspired to intentionally and publicly humiliate Weatherford. Furthermore, we note that Indiana now recognizes a separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, without the need for an accompanying tort. See Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 30-31 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that Weatherford 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotion distress for the first time in indiana (B) recognizing that the indiana tort claims act grants broad immunity to governmental employees from suit for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress (C) holding that claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress fail as matter of law where challenged arrest is supported by probable cause (D) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort

A: (A)
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Q: any evidence that Qualex’s action had any reason to perceive plaintiff as being disabled, any claim that the withdrawal of the offer of employment was motivated by such a perception is purely speculative. As such, plaintiffs claim that defendant Qualex violated the ADA by withdrawing its offer of employment fails as a matter of law. See Hoffman at 1 (“Unsupported speculation does not satisfy a party’s burden to produce some evidence in resisting a summary judgment motion.”). B. The Drug-free Workplace policy. Plaintiffs second claim is that the “Drug-free Workplace” policy maintained by defendant Qualex is a blanket exclusionary policy, leaving no allowance for the legal use of controlled substances. See Rowles v. Automated Production Systems, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 424, 430 (M.D.Pa.2000) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff further argues that defendant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers drug policy violated the ada to the extent that it prohibits the use of all legally prescribed controlled substances without a determination that such prohibition is jobrelated and consistent with business necessity (B) holding highest and best use is to be considered to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value (C) holding that the 60day rule under the wisconsin controlled substances act is mandatory and that failure to set the hearing within that period deprived the trial court of jurisdiction (D) holding that the ada exceeds the  5 power  at least to the extent it extends beyond remedies for irrational discrimination (E) recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public

A: (A)
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Q: than English, “also has in his or her immediate possession a valid international driving permit.” Appellant does not claim that he has a valid license from any state or country or that he was otherwise exempt from the licensing requirement when he was cited. 5 Although Appellant stipulated that he has been living in this state for over ten years, he is not a Georgia “resident” for purposes of the drivers’ licenses chapter of the Georgia Code. See OCGA §§ 40-1-1 (35) (“ ‘Nonresident’ means every person who is not a resident of this state.”), 40-5-1 (15) (“[N]o person shall he considered a resident for purposes of this chapter unless such person is either a United States citizen or an alien with legal authorization____”). See also Diaz v. State, 245 Ga.App. 380, 383 (537 SE2d 784) (2000) (<HOLDING>); John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dept. of Public Safety, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3 (B) holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right (C) holding that an illegal immigrants status as a nonresident does not create an exemption allowing him to drive without a valid georgia license (D) holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes (E) holding that an slc members status as a defendant does not create a lack of independence

A:
(C)
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