In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: campus is a limited public forum. Def. Br. 12. The Court agrees with the defendants’ assessment. The Court begins by recognizing that “the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum.” Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). Accordingly, the Second Circuit has noted, “[s]ome portions of a public college’s campus may be a public forum.” Davis v. Stratton, 360 FedAppx. 182, 184 (2d Cir.2010). Significant to the analysis, however, is that these areas may constitute a designated public forum only to the extent they are “intentionally openfed]” to First Amendment activities. Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir.2004); see also Ochshom, 645 F.3d at 540 (<HOLDING>); Hotel Emps., 311 F.3d at 545 (noting that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a high school is not a public forum thus precluding free airing of religious views (B) holding that a public high school newspaper was a limited public forum not a traditional or designated public forum because there was no evidence that the school permitted indiscriminate use by the general public quoting hazelwood sch dist v kuhlmeier 484 us 260 267 108 sct 562 98 led2d 592 1988 (C) holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence (D) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (E) recognizing that government is not required to retain open nature of designated public forum
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: was allegedly violated on each date, despite the fact that the EOP contained several different provisions referring to various types of acts. Be cause the Counts in the Complaint merely alleged that Corder “did intentionally or knowingly violate the [EOP] issued in FC-DA No. 05-1-1551 on August 2, 2006[,]” without designating which conduct and sections within the EOP were violated, “the nature and cause of the accusation [could not] be understood by a person of common understanding from a reading of the Complaint itself.” Israel, 78 Hawai'i at 71, 890 P.2d at 308 (internal quotations marks omitted). The Complaint did reference in its caption (as opposed to in the charges) Police Report No. 07-016631 with respect to Count I, Police Report No. 07-021001 with respect t 1078, 1081 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Complaint was defective. II. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the hrpp does not permit a broad and freeranging discovery in criminal cases (B) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (C) holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted (D) recognizing that the facts that a bill of particulars is discretionary with the judge pursuant to hrpp rule 7a and that other discovery rules are limited in scope might prevent a defendant from discovering the states position (E) recognizing the fact that a bill of particulars is discretionary with the judge pursuant to hawaii rules of penal procedure hrpp rule 7a and the fact that other discovery rules given to the defendant are limited might prevent a defendant from discovering the states position
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: in a single limits policy covering multiple vehicles as to sums required to be provided by statute. Id. at 431, 475 S.E.2d at 775. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and held that a policy provision prohibiting stacking of liability coverage is valid because “[liability coverage, ... while statutorily required, is limited to the particular vehicle for which it is purchased.” Ruppe v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 329 S.C. 402, 406, 496 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1998). The Ruppe case is not dispositive in this case, however, because we determined that no Class I insured was involved in the accident. Inasmuch as the appellants were Class II insureds under the garage policy, none were entitled to stack. Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 295 S.C. 538, 370 S.E.2d 85 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Therefore the order of the circuit court is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no class member may opt out of a rule 23b1 class action (B) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (C) holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent (D) holding that although class i insureds may stack coverage class ii insureds may not (E) holding that no subsequent class actions may benefit from tolling when class certification has been denied
[EX A]:
(D)