instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
omitted). Even if we were to do so, it would not change the outcome, since we see no error in the district court’s ruling regardless of whether the robbery and drug conspiracy were related. 3 . This course of action is permissible, though "we have repeatedly mentioned 'our strong preference for James proceedings.' ” United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1273 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir.1995)). 4 . The conspiracy supporting the introduction of the out-of-court statement need not be the same as the conspiracy charged in the indictment, so long as the statement was in furtherance of the uncharged conspiracy. United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 82 (2d. Cir.1999); see also United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 675 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 5 .Burnett testified at one point that he had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to instruct the jury on additional uncharged conspiracies is not reversible error so long as the jury is instructed that the government has the burden to prove the charged conspiracy (B) holding that although it is proper to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown it is error to instruct the jury on the mcdonnell douglas burden shifting scheme (C) holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error (D) holding failure to instruct jury on requirement of corroboration of informants testimony is error (E) holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial
answer:
(A)


question:
case because in Revenue Cabinet, as here, the sales tax statute did not impose a test for passage of title, and an administrative rule did impose a test for passage of title. Id. at 738-39. Here, Hales makes no claim that the impermanence of its materials results in a generally understood, implicit agreement to pass title at some point before delivery. Moreover, our statute requires an explicit agreement on passage of title before the statutory presumption can be rebutted; there is no obvious provision in this statute for an implicit understanding, which the Kentucky court thought sufficient. Consequently, the facts of Revenue Cabinet aré inapposite and its result is inapplicable to the case at bar. See also Kurtz Concrete, Inc. v. Spradling, 560 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo.1978) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the Commission applied the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title insurer not in business of supplying information in issuing either title commitment or policy of title insurance for purposes of exception to moorman prohi bition against recovery of economic losses in tort further holding that contract defines title insurers liability (B) holding that title passes on mixture of readymix concrete because of usage of trade (C) recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim (D) holding in a slander of title action that attorneys fees are recoverable as part of the costs of removing the cloud from the title (E) holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title
answer:
(B)


question:
“rightful tax revenue” or to avoid paying state taxes, both of which would reduce the flow of tax revenue. Levy v. Pappas, 510 F.3d 755, 760-62 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172 (2004). Although the TIA applies only to suits seeking injunctive relief, suits for damages that seek to reduce state tax revenue are barred “by the free-standing principle of comity.” Wright v. Pappas, 256 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). Mr. Johnson does not seek to tie up the County’s tax revenue or to avoid paying taxes. The taxes originally, but erroneously, assessed on the property were paid at the tax sale. The ultimate relief Mr. Johnson seeks — a tax deed— would not deprive the County of tax revenue. Cf. Levy, 510 F.3d at 762 (<HOLDING>); Wright, 256 F.3d at 637 (holding that the TIA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue (B) holding that suit by taxpayers alleging that they fell outside statutorily defined class subject to occupation tax so that states attempt to collect such tax from them was illegal was not suit against state (C) holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts (D) holding tia inapplicable to suit challenging the constitutionality of state tax credits where the relief sought would increase not decrease states revenue (E) holding that the tia barred suit alleging loss of and delay in receiving tax refunds because relief sought would operate to reduce the flow of tax revenue to the state
answer:

(E)