TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir.1996)). We conclude that, although the district court erroneously determined that the principles of Daubert did not apply to the re-creation and Agent Constantino’s testimony, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence. Under Daubert, the district court conducts a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2796; see Fed.R.Evid. 702 . This “gate-keeping” obligation on the part of the district court applies to all types of expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Many factors may bear on this inquiry, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dauberts basic gatekeeping obligation  applies to all expert testimony (B) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (C) recognizing the basic principle of contract law that the obligation of good faith is an implied condition in every contract (D) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (E) holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions

SOLUTION: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive

PROBLEM: potentially to have lost contact with family, friends, or each other. But that consequence is not “serious harm” — and warning of such a consequence is not a “threat” — under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. In applying the Act, we must distinguish between “Dimproper threats or coercion and permissible warnings of adverse but legitimate consequences.” United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir.2004), judgment vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1101, 125 S.Ct. 2543, 162 L.Ed.2d 271 (2005); cf. Dann, 652 F.3d at 1170 (Act aims at serious trafficking and threats of dire consequences). This case involves the latter. A church is entitled to stop associating with someone who abandons it. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). A church may also warn that it will stop 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause (B) holding that the free exercise clause protects the practice of shunning explaining that when the members of a cjhurch no longer want to associate with someone who has abandoned them those members are free under the first amendment to make that choice (C) holding that shortterm and sporadic interference with free exercise rights does not violate the first amendment (D) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (E) recognizing serious harm results when members of the legal profession engage in criminal acts which give rise to a lack of confidence by members of the public in those who are officers of the court

SOLUTION: holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause

PROBLEM: supply coverage were not existed. Mgmt. Specialists, Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 117 P.3d 32, 37 (Colo.App.2004). 3. Common Law Duty to Mitigate In addition to the contractual language, RK argues that it had a common law duty to mitigate because “[i]t is well-settled law in Colorado that an injured party may not recover damages for injuries which could reasonably have been avoided.” (RK Mot. at 10 (citing Fair v. Red Lion Inn, 943 P.2d 431, 437 (Colo.1997)).) RK asserts that the corollary to this rule is that a plaintiff is entitled to compensation for expenditures made in attempting to mitigate damages. (Id. (citing Tull v. Gundersons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940, 946 (Colo.1985)).) In Colorado, the common law duty to mitigate damages arises from a breach. See Fair, 943 P.2d at 437 (<HOLDING>); Tull, 709 P.2d at 946 (holding that plaintiff 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action (B) holding that employee had duty to mitigate damages following breach of employment contract by accepting offer of reinstatement (C) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (D) holding that where there was a breach of contract accompanied by aggravating factors that it was proper to treble the breach of contract damages (E) holding that no reporters record was required in suit to recover damages for breach of employment contract because the claim for damages was liquidated and proved by the employment contract attached to the petition

SOLUTION:
holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action