In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

stored on a BBS pending delivery). Because subsection (A) applies only to messages in “temporary, intermediate storage,” however, these courts have limited that subsection’s coverage to messages not yet delivered to their intended recipient. See DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 512; Fraser, 135 F.Supp.2d at 636. Defendants point to these cases and argue that messages remaining on an ISP’s server after delivery no longer fall within the Act’s coverage. But, even if such messages are not within the purview of subsection (A), they do fit comfortably within subsection (B). There is no dispute that messages remaining on NetGate’s server after delivery are stored “by an electronic communication service” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B). Cf. DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 511 (<HOLDING>). The only issue, then, is whether the messages 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca (B) holding that email messages stored on a computer but not yet read were in electronic storage (C) holding that an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of email communications is not vitiated by an understanding that the thirdparty service provider will maintain independent access to them noting that electronic communication is as important to fourth amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the past (D) holding that defendants communications sent into tennessee did not constitute purposeful availment because all were in response to communications initiated by the plaintiff (E) holding that subsection b did not apply because the communications at issue were not being stored by an electronic communication service
holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca

in which this Court's authority to review criminal convictions was greatly circumscribed.” Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629, 122 S.Ct. 1781. It could examine constitutional errors in a criminal trial only on a writ of habeas corpus, and only then if it deemed the error "jurisdictional.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "The Court’s desire to correct obvious constitutional violations led to a 'somewhat expansive notion of jurisdiction.Id. (quoting Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 494, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 25 . A charging instrument may be so deficient that a court does not have jurisdiction over the case; for instance, if the charging document was never filed. See State v. Kaulia, 128 Hawai'i 479, 491, 291 P.3d 377, 389 (2013) (<HOLDING>). Without deciding the matter, a charge that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing the appellate court may nonetheless proceed to consider the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (B) holding that an action brought against the state officials in their official capacities was not properly removed to federal court because the district court lacked jurisdiction (C) holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial (D) holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review state disciplinary proceedings against attorney (E) holding that because the state failed to properly file the complaint the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial
holding that although that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing the appellate court may nonetheless proceed to consider the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

of this[,] verbalizing her understanding and agreement”); id. at 133 (setting forth the testimony of the attending anesthesiologist, Dr. William Shepard, who stated that there was “a period of deliberati 3 A. 341, 342 (1932)). Similarly well-established is the proposition that claims alleging a lack of consent for a surgical procedure constitute a battery committed upon a patient by a physician. Montgomery, 798 A.2d at 749 (providing that “a claim involving a surgical procedure performed without any consent at all by the patient ... sounds in battery”); Morgan v. MacPhail, 550 Pa. 202, 704 A.2d 617, 620 (1997) (acknowledging that the performance of a surgical procedure upon a patient without his consent constitutes a battery); Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663, 669 (1966) (<HOLDING>). The tort of battery has been described as an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a jury question existed as to whether a patient consented to an operation and whether the operation received was substantially similar to the operation to which the patient consented so as to be within the scope of the consent (B) holding that a patient who endures an operation without his consent may base his action on a tortious battery (C) holding that in pennsylvania lack of informed consent claims utilize a battery standard that is a physician commits battery where the patient does not consent to the procedure on his person thus constituting a harmful or offensive contact (D) holding that an operation without the patients consent sounds in battery (E) holding medical practices patient base is not protectable interest

holding a jury question existed as to whether a patient consented to an operation and whether the operation received was substantially similar to the operation to which the patient consented so as to be within the scope of the consent