In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir.1996)). We conclude that, although the district court erroneously determined that the principles of Daubert did not apply to the re-creation and Agent Constantino’s testimony, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence. Under Daubert, the district court conducts a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2796; see Fed.R.Evid. 702 . This “gate-keeping” obligation on the part of the district court applies to all types of expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Many factors may bear on this inquiry, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dauberts basic gatekeeping obligation  applies to all expert testimony (B) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (C) recognizing the basic principle of contract law that the obligation of good faith is an implied condition in every contract (D) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (E) holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions

A: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive
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Q: this petition for prohibition. Petitioner is mistaken in an essential respect. Although he characterizes his challenge as involving subject matter jurisdiction, he is mistaken. There can be no dispute that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving dissolution of marriage. See § 26.012(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006) (circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all actions at law not cognizable in the county courts). The fact that petitioner wishes to dispute in the pending dissolution action is whether there was any marriage at all to dissolve. An attack on the validity of an alleged marriage has nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction but is simply an issue to be determined in the dissolution action. See Marden v. Marden, 276 So.2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (<HOLDING>). It is true that a petition for a writ of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding that standing existed (C) holding that in an action brought by alleged wife for permanent alimony suit money attorneys fees and restraining order an issue of fact existed concerning whether a commonlaw marriage existed thus precluding summary judgment (D) holding that material issue of fact existed concerning whether employer orally promised to discharge employee only for cause (E) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife

A: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment
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Q: Roscitis cannot recover anything above that amount from ICSOP. This frustrates the Legislature’s purpose in passing § 27-2-2.4, which was to “give an aggrieved and injured party the right to proceed directly against an insurer in those circumstances in which the tortfeasor has sought protection under the applicable provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code.” D'Amico v. Johnston Partners, 866 A.2d 1222, 1229 (R.I.2005). ICSOP counters, however, by noting that the Rhode Island Legislature limited recovery under § 27-7-2.4 to “insurance coverage available for the tort complained of’ (emphasis added). Thus, ICSOP argues, it was clearly not the Legislature’s intent to expand the scope of coverage available under an insurance policy. Cf. Barber v. Canela, 570 A.2d 670, 671 (R.I. 1990) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Yet IC-SOP contends that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a related direct action statute ri gen laws  2772 is designed only to provide a remedy to the injured party and not to enlarge the liability of the insurer beyond the limits stated in the policy (B) holding that an injured third party does not have the right to bring a direct action against a tortfeasors liability insurer (C) holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue (D) holding that an insurer which insures a tortfeasor under a liability policy has no obligation of good faith and fair dealing to an injured third party even where the injured third party also carries a separate policy with the insurer (E) holding assignable to injured party insureds claim against insurer for judgment in excess of policy limits

A:
holding that an injured third party does not have the right to bring a direct action against a tortfeasors liability insurer
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