instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
the terms of the agreement as to the status of the donor in writing. After the mother and her partner ended their relationship, the sperm donor filed suit to adjudicate his parental rights. The court looked to the plain language of the Texas statute and determined that the sperm donor lacked standing to pursue the paternity action. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 160.702 (Vernon Supp.2006) (“A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”). The “do-it-yóurself” manner in which the artificial insemination was conducted does not alter the fact that B.O.C. was a sperm donor under section 742.14. The statute does not require that the artificial insemination be performed in a clinical setting to apply. Compare McIntyre v. Crouch, 98 Or.App. 462, 780 P.2d 239 (1989) (<HOLDING>), with C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc.2d 9, 639 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the donor nonpaternity statute did not explicitly reference physician involvement the statute applied even though the sperm was not provided to a physician (B) holding that writ was explicitly abolished by statute (C) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (D) holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case (E) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause
answer:
(A)


question:
position and whether the party would receive “an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.” Id. at 751, 121 S.Ct. 1808. The doctrine is designed to prevent “intentional self-contradiction” and is improperly applied “when the former position was the result of inadvertence or mistake.” Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prod., 228 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2000). Thus, the court does no disservice to the important purposes underlying holding parties to judicial admissions by acknowledging that a response to an injunctive action is an evolving position, and the facts and legal positions should be taken in view of the emerging facts as they become known to the litigating parties. See SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prod., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). It is also necessary to note that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous (B) holding that a transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit (C) holding that courts should not use doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent evolution of arguments but should permit preliminary constructions made without full development of the record or issues to remain open to revision (D) holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact (E) holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent
answer:
(C)


question:
of status, positing that we need not address this question because the BIA, in the alternative, considered and denied Petitioner’s second application on the merits. However, because we must ensure that we review the correct BIA opinion, which turns on which adjustment application the IJ had jurisdiction to adjudicate, see Cadapan v. Att’y Gen., 749 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2014), we i pause to clarify the IJ's jurisdiction. We have held that when the BIA does not expressly retain jurisdiction over a petitioner’s case and issues a remand order unlimited in scope and purpose, an IJ has jurisdiction to consider any matters pertinent to that case under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and its implementing regulations. Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 702-03 (3d Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Matter of Patel, 16 I. & N. Dec. 600, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in exercising its discretion in choosing the appropriate sanction the trial court is not limited to considering only the specific violation committed but is entitled to consider other matters which have occurred during the litigation (B) holding that a remand unless qualified or limited for a specific purpose is effective for the stated purpose and for consideration of any and all matters that the ij deems appropriate (C) holding that unless remand from the bia is qualified or limited to a specific purpose an ij may consider any and all matters he  deems appropriate in the exercise of his administrative discretion or which are brought to his attention in compliance with the appropriate regulations (D) holding that where issues were not considered by the bia remand is appropriate (E) holding that any inherent power to remand to the bia for the consideration of additional evidence should not be exercised where i the basis for the remand is an instruction to consider documentary evidence that was not in the record before the bia and ii the agency regulations set forth procedures to reopen a case before the bia for the taking of additional evidence
answer:

(C)