In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: essential element of an elevated breath alcohol level. Consequently, he contends that the judge’s ruling was essentially a determination that the exclusion of the BAT results left the State without sufficient proof to convict Defendant of the DWI charge, and that this constituted an adjudication of his innocence. Defendant also asserts that the judge’s oral comments that he had “reasonable doubt” and that he found Defendant “not guilty” further indicate that the judge deliberated on the merits of the case and acquitted Defendant of the DWI charge. Defendant does not, however, argue that the judge expressly ruled that Defendant was acquitted of the charges, nor would the record support such an assertion. See County of Los Alamos v. Tapia, 109 N.M. 736, 741, 790 P.2d 1017, 1022 (1990) (<HOLDING>). {20} The State concedes that jeopardy 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that when a cause of action is reduced to a judgment the cause of action is merged into the judgment and thereafter only an action on the judgment exists (B) recognizing that an actual express judgment of acquittal precludes retrial regardless of any defects in the process leading to the judgment (C) holding that defects in service of process must be raised in preliminary objections (D) holding on summary judgment that an attorney who failed to timely file an answer leading to a default judgment was on notice that a malpractice claim might be filed against him (E) recognizing that an appeal from a final judgment permits an attack against any nonfinal order or ruling leading up to it
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: (second factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the [private] insurer and the insured”). Finally, despite the MSP provision that the United States can pursue "any entity” for reimbursement, see id. (third factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry''), the MSP provision limits reimbursement to recoveries from "primary plans,” whose definition lists only entities which are clearly "within” the insurance industry. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) ("primary plan" means “a group health plan or large group health plan, ... a workmen's compensation law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan ... or no-fault insurance”); cf. Kachanis, 844 F.Supp. 877 (D.R.I.1994) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Finally, the Fund raises a puzzling 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  1012 applicable to feca provision allowing united states to recover from any third party (B) holding that the secretary of the interior breached the united states duty of loyalty despite the absence of any applicable treaty or statutory provision (C) holding that a states entitlement to indemnification from a third party does not vitiate the states sovereign immunity against a money judgment (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding that an ancillary forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 usc  853n is a civil action for the purpose of allowing a third party to recover attorneys fees
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: conviction constitutes a violent felony. See United States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199, 202 (4th Cir.1998) (en banc). The instructions underlying Wardrick’s 1983 assault conviction support the proposition that the district court did not err in characterizing that conviction as a violent felony. In Maryland, a common-law assault “presents the unusual situation in which an offense may be committed in one of two ways — one of which requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force and one of which does not.” Coleman, 158 F.3d at 202. Because of this ambiguity, we have been “unable to conclude that a Maryland conviction for common-law assault is per se a violent felony within the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).” Id. However, the jury instructions in Wardrick’ th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the district court accurately 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that necessity defense to escape did not require defendant to turn herself in and that escape is not a continuing offense (B) holding felony escape in north carolina to be crime of violence under acca because escape presents risk of injury to others (C) holding that an escape from custody under minnesota law is a crime of violence (D) holding attempt to rescue prisoner and assisting in escape to be crimes of violence because of inherent risk of force (E) holding that in light of our recognition that escape presents a continuing threat of violence until the escapee is safely returned to custody we hold that for purposes of  2k21b5 every escape is sufficiently continuing such that possession of a gun subsequent to the initial departure from custody can qualify as being in connection with the escape
[EX A]:
(D)