TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury * * Black’s Law Dictionary 390 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Second) Torts § 903 (defining compensatory damages as “damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by him”); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 463 (3rd ed. 1961) (defining compensatory damages as “damages awarded to make good or compensate for an injury sus tained — distinguished from punitive damages ”). When civil rights plaintiffs seek “damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts.” Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2542, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (<HOLDING>). “Punitive damages aside, damages in tort 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are available in an intentional discrimination action even if the jury does not assess compensatory damages (B) holding that punitive damages which are based on the same underlying action justifying nondischargeability of compensatory damages are likewise nondischargeable (C) holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated (D) holding that damages based on the abstract value of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in action under civil rights act of 1871 (E) holding that damages based on the abstract value or importance of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such cases

SOLUTION: holding that punitive damages are available in an intentional discrimination action even if the jury does not assess compensatory damages

PROBLEM: was merely acting as Casey’s nominee by allowing him to park 28th Place in her name without relinquishing the benefits of ownership of the property. The district court agreed with the government and allowed forfeiture on this ground. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “nominee” (in the context of property law) as a “party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and distributes funds for the benefit of others.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1149 (9th ed.2009). Unlike a party with a cognizable property interest, a nominee cannot claim a viable third-party interest sufficient to render a forfeiture invalid. See People v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 75 Ill.2d 479, 27 Ill.Dec. 476, 389 N.E.2d 540, 544 (1979); United States v. Herrero, 893 F.2d 1512, 1542 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by United States 
 Holding statements: (A) holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state (B) recognizing that we held in tilley that the forfeiture of proceeds from illegal drug sales pursuant to 21 usc  881a6 does not constitute punishment (C) holding that drug quantity is an element of an offense under 21 usc  841 (D) holding that scope of property subject to forfeiture is defined by the instrument creating an interest in the property (E) holding that property held by another as nominal owner for benefit of a drug dealer subject to forfeiture under 21 usc  853

SOLUTION: holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state

PROBLEM: he would have requested, and the trial court would have granted, a mistrial. In this situation, then, “the denial of a significant procedural right ... is sufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.” Ramsey, 323 F.Supp.2d at 39. Because the trial court has already made the requisite findings entitling Middleton to relief, we REVERSE and REMAND for a new trial. DAVIS, J., concurs, and THOMAS, J., concurs with opinion. THOMAS, J., concurring. I concur in the majority opinion, but write to explain that while we cannot determine whether Appellant will again be tried for first-degree murder, the possibility is not foreclosed by the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. If Appellant is tried for first-degree murder, he wil , 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The Florida Supreme Court noted in State v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to seconddegree murder and agreed to testify against codefendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for firstdegree murder (B) holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law but conviction was later reversed neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty (C) holding on habeas corpus that claims regarding sentencing phase jury charges in a death penalty case are never barred by procedural default (D) holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error (E) holding that the defendants due process rights to notice were violated when a judge imposed a capital sentence even though the state took the position that it would not seek the death penalty

SOLUTION:
holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to seconddegree murder and agreed to testify against codefendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for firstdegree murder