In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
918 F.2d 154, 159 (11th Cir.1990). A district court should grant a preliminary injunction only if the movant clearly shows: 1. a substantial likelihood that the mov-ant will prevail on the merits; 2. that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is, not issued; 3. that the potential injury to the mov-ant outweighs the possible harm to the nonmovant; and 4. that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id. This Court will address each element in turn. 1. SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS To begin, the instant ease is controlled by this Court’s decision in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116 (M.D.Fla.1991). In Luckie, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with AAA pursuant to the AMEX Window. Id. The defendants argued th 2nd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Also, in Merrill Lynch v. Noonan, [Current] 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (C) holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision (D) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (E) holding that a specific customer agreement can supersede the amex constitution and requiring arbitration before one of the fora named in the agreement

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
matter, Moton requested that the trial court poll the jury, and the court agreed to do so. The first four jurors questioned all indicated that they freely and voluntarily agreed with the guilty verdict. The court ing that evidence showed that trial court’s refusal to afford defendant first offender treatment was based on deliberate consideration of the case and sentencing options and, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion); Graydon, 313 Ga. App. at 581 (same). 15 Geiger v. State, 295 Ga. 648, 651 (3) (763 SE2d 453) (2014). 16 Graham v. State, 107 Ga. App. 332, 333 (1) (130 SE2d 166) (1963); see generally Boatwright v. State, 91 Ga. 13, 13 (16 SE 101) (1892). 17 Geiger, 295 Ga. at 651 (3) (punctuation omitted). 18 See Columbus v. State, 270 Ga. 658, 664-65 (4) (513 SE2d 498) (1999) (<HOLDING>). 19 Benefield v. State, 278 Ga. 464, 466 (602 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for a continuance when record showed that contrary to defendants contention state did not fail to comply with discovery duties and that defendant failed to show that denial resulted in harm to his case (B) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (C) holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion (D) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
Zillgitt was sentenced principally to 109 months’ imprisonment. In a separate appeal docketed as No. 00-1421, Zillgitt challenges the legality, of his sentence, arguing that the jury’s general verdict, made without findings as to the type and amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy,, required that he be sentenced under 21 U .S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), which provides the penalties for conspiring to distribute an unspecified amount of marijuana. The maximum period of imprisonment for violation of that subsection is 5 years, which is substantially less than the sentence imposed on defendant, nearly 7 years of which he has already served. In his motion for bail pending appeal, Zillgitt argues that, both under our decision in United States v. Barnes, 158 F.3d 662, 667-72 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), and under the principles recently articulated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant can only be sentenced for misprision of felony based on drug quantities that he knew or should have known or foreseen  were involved in the conspiracy (B) holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy (C) holding a fiveyear old drug conviction is probative of a defendants state of mind in a drug conspiracy case (D) holding that when a district court determines drug quantity for the purpose of sentencing a defendant convicted of participating in a drugtrafficking conspiracy the court is required to make an individualized finding as to drug amounts attributable to or foreseeable by that defendant (E) holding that in certain circumstances where a defendant is convicted of a charge alleging a conspiracy to distribute one drug or another he must be sentenced as if the conviction were only for a conspiracy involving the drug that triggers the lowest statutory sentencing range

Ex Output:

(E)