In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: by Ankeny should arise rarely and therefore would be unlikely to produce a swarm of cases involving excessive force searches. Also, officials and courts are far more competent to discern which extraordinary tactics constitute excessive force than to determine in the heat of the moment “what constituted] a reasonable wait time in a particular case” before entering' — usually a matter of calculating, wholly subjectively the appropriate number of seconds. Id. at 2166 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In fact, without any difficulty, we have in the past in a case remarkably similar to the one before us struck down, as constituting excessive force, specific tactics such as the ones used in the case before us. See, e.g., Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on the cost side, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding officers punch of an inmate was not excessive force (C) holding that ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing a lawyer into court was a judicial act (D) recognizing that the fourth amendment protects against the use of excessive force by police officers in carrying out an arrest (E) holding that officers had employed constitutionally excessive force by blindly throwing a flash bang grenade into an apartment occupied by five to eight individuals
[A]: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim


[Q]: venture as contrasted with a governmental function.’ ” Hoffer v. State, 110 Wn.2d 415, 422, 755 P.2d 781 (1988) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1097 (5th ed. 1979)), adhered to on recons., 113 Wn.2d 148, 776 P.2d 963 (1989). 5 Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 118 Wn.2d at 645. 6 Id. at 646 (quoting City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d 679, 695, 743 P.2d 793 (1987)). 7 Id. 8 RCW 57.08.081(1). 9 These factors include the difference in cost to various customers, the location of customers within and without the district, the achievement of water conservation goals and discouragement of wasteful practices, and “any other matters which present a reasonable difference as a ground for distinction.” RCW 57-.08.081(2). 10 See City of Tacoma v. Welcker, 65 Wn.2d 677, 685, 399 P.2d 330 (1965) (<HOLDING>). 11 See Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 118 Wn.2d at 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that coverage could be triggered by need to prevent imminent contamination of groundwater (B) recognizing that watershed isolation or acquisition serves to prevent and control water contamination (C) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (D) recognizing that water retained within a watershed is susceptible to multiple use because all water uses are not consumptive uses (E) holding authority to control limits duty to control
[A]: recognizing that coverage could be triggered by need to prevent imminent contamination of groundwater


[Q]: federal statutory right. There is no dispute that the officers were acting under color of state law. The dispute in this ease was whether the officers unreasonably searched [Henderson’s] house in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). [1] It is axiomatic that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” United States v. S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (concluding that state’s operation of a probation system “presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements”); Ca-mara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (<HOLDING>). However, the special needs doctrine applies 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that  exigent circumstances do not excuse the failure to secure a warrant when those circumstances are created by government officials who unreasonably and deliberately delay or avoid obtaining the warrant (B) holding that in criminal case a continuous chain of custody need not be proven as long as the evidence as a whole establishes that it is more probable than not that the object introduced is the same as that seized (C) holding telephonic search warrant as reasonable in certain circumstances (D) holding that a contract need not have mutuality of obligation as long as it is supported by consideration (E) holding that in certain circumstances government investigators need not adhere to the usual warrant requirement as long as their searches meet reasonable legislative or administrative standards
[A]:
recognizing that  exigent circumstances do not excuse the failure to secure a warrant when those circumstances are created by government officials who unreasonably and deliberately delay or avoid obtaining the warrant