In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
testified that he examined bullets and casings found at both S & A Food Store and Fast Freddy’s. He concluded that the .9 millimeter used in the S & A offense was also fired during the Fast Freddy’s offense. Therefore, the State’s evidence showed a strong correlation between the S & A offense and the Fast Freddy’s offense, providing both intent and identity evidence in the Fast Freddy’s offense and eliminating the need for the Vogt Street offense. c. No Need for Vogt Street Offense The evidence outlined above shows that the State’s evidence of Russell’s intent in the Fast Freddy’s offense was strong; therefore, the need for the extraneous Vogt Street offense was minimal at best. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 390; Graff v. State, 65 S.W.3d 730, 740 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet ref'd) (<HOLDING>). The State’s evidence showing Russell’s intent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant constructively possessed the methamphetamine laboratory discovered in a bedroom she shared with a renter (B) holding that methamphetamine retained for personal use by the defendant who had been convicted of conspiracy to distribute the substance and never argued any of the methamphetamine was lawfully obtained was properly considered contraband with which he was directly involved and therefore relevant conduct (C) holding that the enhancement applied where the defendant possessed a firearm in connection with possessing methamphetamine (D) holding the state did not need this evidence of possession of 147 boxes of cold pills used to manufacture methamphetamine because the state had other convincing evidence to establish the defendants intent to deliver methamphetamine (E) holding that the state is not allowed to suppress evidence but it need not collect evidence for the defendant

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
strengthen, not displace, any existing remedies employees may. have at law.” Id. It is clear from these excerpts that the STAA was not enacted to completely preempt state law remedies for retaliation against an employee who refuses to violate safety provisions. See Todd v. Frank’s Tong Service, Inc., 784 P.2d 47, 49-50 (Okla.1989) (noting that Congressional intent surrounding enactment of the STAA demonstrates that state law claims are not preempted); see also Parten v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 923 F.2d 580, 583 (8th Cir.1991) (conclude ing that the Minnesota public policy statute was not an obstacle to the STAA and that Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field of interstate motor carriers); Whitworth v. TNT Bestway Transp., Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1434, 1436 (E.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>); Dobberowsky v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc., 989 
 Holding statements: (A) holding texas exemption law was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause (B) holding that texas whistleblowers act was not preempted by the staa (C) holding a claim of a violation of the texas dtpa is preempted by the carmack amendment (D) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra (E) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
a limited right in the secured creditor to the sale proceeds of the licenses. Id. at 380. Her decision not to recognize even such a circumscribed right, therefore, was based upon an implicit assumption — and in the bankruptcy court’s view, an erroneous one — that broadcasting licenses do not qualify as property of the estate. Id. We decline to adopt the rationale of Ridgely for two reasons. First, contrary to Ridgely’s interpretation, Judge Crabb did not reject the notion that a broadcasting license may fall within the broad range of assets that qualify as property of the estate. Indeed, she expressly assumed that it did constitute property of the estate. See 138 B.R. at 576 (citing In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 114 B.R. 865 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1990), aff'd, 124 B.R. 426 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a professionals license is a protected property interest (B) holding that a debtors interest in a tenancy by the entirety is property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 because of debtors undivided present interests in the use possession income and right of survivorship of the property (C) holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property (D) holding that the debtors interest in a broadcasting license constitutes property of the estate (E) holding that a broadcasting license was property of the estate but not subject to a security interest

Ex Output:

(D)