In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

all of the requested documents meet that definition however. That is an issue for the trial court to resolve when it reconsiders Gulfcoast’s objections. We next address the issue of the trial court’s failure to perform a balancing test or conduct an in camera review. “When a party asserts the need for protection against disclosure of a trade secret, the court must first determine whether, in fact, the disputed information is a trade secret [which] usually requires the court to conduct an in camera review.” Summitbridge Nat’l Invs. v. 1221 Palm Harbor, L.L.C., 67 So.3d 448, 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (citing Ameritrust Ins. v. O’Donnell Landscapes, 899 So.2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)); see also Westco, Inc. v. Scott Lewis’ Gardening & Trimming, 26 So.3d 620, 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). This court has previously held that internal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a party claims a document is privileged and the trial court fails to conduct an in camera review or balancing test the trial court has departed from the essential requirements of the law (B) holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial (C) holding that the proper test for balancing national security interests with a persons due process rights is the mathews balancing test (D) recognizing that a party cannot complain on appeal that the trial court considered an issue that that party consented to submit to the trial court (E) holding that in eases where the state fails to disclose to the defendant prior to trial the substance of any oral statement allegedly made by the defendant then the state has committed a discovery violation and the trial court must conduct a richardson hearing upon learning of the possible violation
(A)

677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir.2012). Under the specific circumstances presented in this case, Lewis did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation with White. Lewis knew where White was incarcerated when White called Lewis, as he had agreed to send Shavers and White mail there. Furthermore, Lewis was previously incarcerated at the same prison. Thus, he would have received a handbook alerting him that all telephone calls were recorded and been exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded. In these circumstances, Lewis should have known that all outgoing prisoner telephone calls were monitored and recorded. See United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1329 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Harrison, 986 F.Supp. 280, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells (B) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (E) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials
(C)

to have prevailed in 1997, when this Court suspended numerous provisions of prior medical malpractice reform legislation as intruding on the Court’s exclusive powers under Section 10(c). See, e.g., 40 P.S. § 1301.813-A (Dilatory or frivolous motions, claims and defenses) (suspended). However, the Court’s efforts to define the limits of exclusivity of its procedural rulemaking powers solely in terms of the nebulous line between substance and procedure have yielded a number of facially implausible holdings. See, e.g., Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 66-67, 436 A.2d 147, 155 (1981) (treating the promulgation of a rule awarding monetary damages for delay in civil cases as procedural rulemaking); Commonwealth v. Morris, 565 Pa. 1, 30, 771 A.2d 721, 738 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In the face of such decisions, one jurist has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the carrying out of an execution after the first execution attempt had failed did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment (B) holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed (C) holding that execution of a defendant who commits a capital crime while under the age of eighteen is prohibited by the eighth amendment (D) holding that substantive review is adequate (E) holding that a stay of a capital prisoners execution is substantive

(E)