In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
this petition for prohibition. Petitioner is mistaken in an essential respect. Although he characterizes his challenge as involving subject matter jurisdiction, he is mistaken. There can be no dispute that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving dissolution of marriage. See § 26.012(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006) (circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all actions at law not cognizable in the county courts). The fact that petitioner wishes to dispute in the pending dissolution action is whether there was any marriage at all to dissolve. An attack on the validity of an alleged marriage has nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction but is simply an issue to be determined in the dissolution action. See Marden v. Marden, 276 So.2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (<HOLDING>). It is true that a petition for a writ of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding that standing existed (C) holding that in an action brought by alleged wife for permanent alimony suit money attorneys fees and restraining order an issue of fact existed concerning whether a commonlaw marriage existed thus precluding summary judgment (D) holding that material issue of fact existed concerning whether employer orally promised to discharge employee only for cause (E) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife

Ex Output:
holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment


Ex Input:
appealed the judgment of the Court of Veterans Appeals to this court. On appeal the Secretary contends that the Court of Veterans Appeals erred by not deferring to the Department’s reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions governing claims for accrued benefits. The Secretary also disputes Mrs. Jones’s assertion that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. ANALYSIS I. Jurisdiction to hear appeals from final decisions of the Court of Veterans Appeals is conferred upon this court by 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (1994). Under the express terms of that statute, however, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U 625, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2663-64, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to hear 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district courts remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the secretary of health and human services was an immediately appealable order (B) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (E) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order

Ex Output:
holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable


Ex Input:
Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir.1996); Oliven, 849 F.2d at 745. Although the testimony of a damages expert should be excluded as unduly speculative if it is based on "assumptions that are so unrealistic and contradictoiy as to suggest bad faith or to be in essence an apples and oranges comparison," "other contentions that the assumptions are unfounded go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony.” Boucher, 73 F.3d at 22 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Projections of future earnings are admissible where, as here, they are supported by evidence such as wage scales or contracts, and where the juiy is charged with determining the likelihood of the plaintiff’s progress and is given sufficient information to enable it to do so. Oliveri, 849 F.2d at 745 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the Court instructed the jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (B) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (C) holding the excluded testimony was relevant to whether a signature was that of a deceased party and since a statement regarding the issue was the only testimony that could be given by the witness no offer to prove was necessary because the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context of the question asked (D) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (E) holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion by admitting expert testimony on future compensation rates for marine engineer positions where it was based on a meba union officials testimony regarding promotion the jury was given information to assess the plaintiffs chances of promotion and the juiy was clearly instructed that the testimony was only relevant if they found that the plaintiff would have been promoted

Ex Output:

holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care