In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Majority Opinion in Ford, former Justice Newman authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Saylor joined, in which she specifically expressed her agreement “that appellate counsel acted ineffectively by neglecting to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to investigate and present evidence during the penalty phase of Appellant’s history of abuse and mental illness.” Ford, 809 A.2d at 336 (Newman, J., joined by Saylor, J., concurring). 5 . Although Teague's retroactivity analysis did not gamer five votes, a majority of the High Court soon thereafter reaffirmed the Teague plurality's rule and its two exceptions in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). 6 . Compare with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty (B) holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (C) holding that juveniles are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (D) holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing (E) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants
[EX A]: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty

[EX Q]: or require the information it did. In light of the information possessed by the District as of June 2, 2011, the District’s interference with Rutherford’s right to return began then, and continued until the District ultimately terminated him. Once a technical violation of the FMLA has been established—and here, the undisputed facts show that a violation occurred—the interference inquiry turns to whether the plaintiff experienced prejudice resulting from the violation. Ridings v. Riverside Medical Center, 537 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2008). The District arg e his fitness to return to work, he had such proof—a note from his doctor stating that he was fit to work—and attempted to present it on June 2, 2011. See Vannoy v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). Instead of reinstating him, the District kept 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave (B) holding a plaintiff to be ineligible for fmla leave wherein the plaintiff had not accumulated enough work hours (C) holding that a plaintiff who was unable to return to work before his fmla leave expired did not allege any denial of an fmla right but noting that ragsdale left open the possibility that employees could recover for notice violations on a casebycase basis if there was actual harm resulting from the violations (D) holding that both the cfra and the fmla require the employee to provide notice to the employer of the employees intent to take leave (E) holding that sufficient evidence of prejudice existed where plaintiff would have structured leave differently but employer had not provided notice of fmla right to reinstatement
[EX A]: holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave

[EX Q]: II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to ... a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed ...” (Emphasis added.) In Montana, it is firmly established that venue, although not an element of the crime, is a “jurisdictional fact” that must be established at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Price, 2002 MT 229, ¶ 11, 311 Mont. 439, ¶ 11, 57 P.3d 42, ¶ 11; State v. Johnson (1993), 257 Mont. 157, 161, 848 P.2d 496, 498. However, this Court has recognized that direct evidence that an offense was committed in a particular county is not required to prove venue. State v. Keeland (1909), 39 Mont. 506, 513, 104 P. 513, 516 (<HOLDING>); Johnson, 257 Mont. at 161, 848 P.2d at 498 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence which suggests but does not prove a discriminatory motive is circumstantial evidence by definition (B) holding testimony that defendant delivered cocaine maybe 20 or 30 times was sufficient to support conviction (C) holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction (D) holding that circumstantial evidence maybe sufficient to prove venue (E) holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination
[EX A]:
holding that evidence which suggests but does not prove a discriminatory motive is circumstantial evidence by definition