In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. As a matter of first consideration, any court has the duty to determine, sua sponte, whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case. Welch v. McDougal, 876 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied). As material to this question, section 65.023(b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code requires that an application for an injunction to stay proceedings in a suit or execution on a judgment must be tried in the court in which the suit is pending or the judgment was rendered. This requirement is jurisdictional and does not relate merely to venue. See Butron v. Cantu, 960 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); Home Sav. Ass’n v. Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Because the Gard-ners seek to challenge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is  no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court (B) holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions (C) holding that a dis trict court has no authority to issue injunction restraining enforcement of judgment of the county court where as here the judgment solely resolves who is entitled to immediate possession (D) holding that motion to dismiss should not  be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law (E) holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state

Answer: holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is  no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court


Question: contractor’s work is accepted and end day it is accepted and that, while one “who assumes control over a dangerous condition left by a contractor may be liable,” it “does not necessarily mean that he who creates the danger should escape liability”). Third, the defect in Preston— the design and construction of the pool— was “a patent one as a matter of law.” 227 Cal.Rptr. 817, 720 P.2d at 485. Moreover, other jurisdictions have faced more factually analogous circumstances and have rejected arguments similar to Occidental’s. These cases have imposed liability on former plant owners whose negligent design work resulted in an injury to a third-party after the sale of the plant to a new owner. See Stone v. United Eng’g, a Div. of Wean, Inc., 197 W.Va. 347, 475 S.E.2d 439, 443-44 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Dorman v. Swift & Co., 162 Ariz. 228, 782 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor (B) holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner (C) holding that section 150002 was satisfied with respect to hotel owners claims against former owners architect for negligent design of foundation and drainage (D) holding former plant owner liable for its negligent design of conveyor belt (E) holding that in the context of construction litigation regarding the alleged negligence of design professionals a tort action for negligent misrepresentation alleging damages based purely on economic loss is not available to a party in privity of contract with a design professional

Answer: recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor


Question: concluded that this regulation does not require a bus operator under contract to provide insurance coverage for a bus that it does not own and did not register. The court reasoned that under Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, only the vehicle’s owner or registrant is responsible for maintaining financial responsibility. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1786. This responsibility, the court concluded, belonged to COLT. (Trial Court Opinion at 15). We agree. Moreover, we decline to impose the requirement of maintaining coverage for every vehicle driven by Lebanon Coach on its insurer when the regulation clearly imposes that duty on the common or contract carrier of passengers. See 52 Pa.Code § 32.11; Czarnecki v. Delco Cab, Inc., 276 Pa.Super. 148, 152, 419 A.2d 139, 141 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Although the Lehmans strenuously argue that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage (B) holding evidence including that insurer only charged life insurance premium that would ordinarily apply to onehalf the amount of coverage actually permitted by policy as written did not warrant retroactive reformation of policy to reduce coverage amount because it did not demonstrate mistake on insureds part and insurance company did not present evidence on what parties agreed to before the policy was issued (C) recognizing that a material misrepresentation or omission of fact in an insurance application relied on by the insurer in issuing a policy renders the coverage voidable at the insurance companys option (D) holding that absent follow form language provision that excess policy would continue as underlying policy did not impose coverage as provided in underlying policy (E) holding predecessor regulation likewise did not impose coverage requirement on taxicab companys insurer for cab not listed as scheduled vehicle in policy

Answer:
holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage