In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: Plaintiff did not meet the notice requirements of the CFRA and the FMLA. Plaintiff did not notify Defendant in advance that Plaintiff would be absent from March 31, 2014 through April 3, 2014. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo., Exhs. Vol. II. Additionally, Plaintiff did not call in sick or ask someone to call Defendant on his behalf on any of those four days of absence, even though Plaintiff made 26 phone calls to individuals or entities other than McCale or Defendant. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo,, Exhs. Vol. II. Thus, unlike in Avila, upon which Plaintiff relies, Plaintiff did not call in sick during his absence from March 31, 2014 through April 3,2014. See Avila, 165 Cal.App.4th at 1258, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, two weeks prior to Plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party (B) holding that absence from prior state was temporary during the time it was contemplated that the parent and child would return to the other state (C) holding that spouse was not required to return to work immediately upon divorce to avoid judicial imputation of income (D) holding that calling in sick during an absence and providing hospital forms describing the illness upon return to work is sufficient notice (E) holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights

Answer: (D)


Question: Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); Hagemeister v. Vanity Fair Properties, 508 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1973, writ dism’d). Thus, collateral estoppel dictates that venue of any subsequent suit involving the same subject matter and the same parties as the initial suit be governed by the venue determination in the initial suit. See Orozco, 681 S.W.2d at 245-46; Pinney, 558 S.W.2d at 36. First, Miller II involves the same parties as the Windsor suit. Both State & County and Windsor were parties to the Windsor suit. Although Ledbetter and Curtiss were not named in the Windsor suit, as officers of State & County, they were in privity with a party; thus, collateral estoppel would apply to them as well. Cf. Getty Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Youell & Cos. v. Getty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant in second suit was in privity for res judicata purposes because his interests were aligned with those of defendant in first suit which concerned same facts (B) holding that res judicata applies when the question of jurisdiction is raised and determined (C) holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings (D) holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings (E) holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties

Answer: (E)


Question: ordinance] authorizes the Authority to shed its immunity ‘by contract,’ and these words would be utter surplusage, if the enactment of the ordinance itself served to perfect the waiver.”). Therefore, we conclude that the charter does not contain an express waiver of tribal-sovereign immunity. In addition to the tribal charter, an agreement can validly waive tribal-sovereign immunity. Here, the parties agree that the board of directors did not pass a resolution waiving sove 282, 1288 (11th Cir.2001) (rejecting argument that tribal representative had actual or apparent authority to waive immunity because “[s]uch a finding would be directly contrary to the explicit provisions of the Tribal Constitution”); World Touch Gaming, Inc. v. Massena Mgmt, LLC, 117 F.Supp.2d 271, 276 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (<HOLDING>); Danka Funding Co. v. Sky City Casino, 329 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity (B) holding that a controllers signature on a contract containing a forum selection clause was insufficient to waive sovereign immunity in part because the right to waive immunity was reserved to the tribal council (C) holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity (D) holding that an act of legislature may be required to waive sovereign immunity (E) holding that a senior vice presidents signature to an agreement with an express waiver of sovereign immunity provision did not waive sovereign immunity because that right was reserved exclusively to the tribal council

Answer:
(E)