TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: previously discussed Wilson’s subjective complaints, then identified specific discrepancies between those complaints and the medical evidence. He noted that though she claimed back pain since 2000, she continued working till November 2002, when her company merged and she lost her job. He also noted that the record established that she walked with a normal unassisted gait, in contrast with her complaints about her problems walking. Additionally, he indicated that the record showed she had never been hospitalized for any orthopedic reason and had never taken any potent pain medication, though she claimed severely debilitating pain. The ALJ’s credibility finding was fully explained and is supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Wilson also contends, given her inability to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the alj did not err in discounting a claimants reports of pain where they were not supported by the medical record (B) holding that alj may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimants pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimants pain (C) holding that alj properly evaluated credibility where he cited specific instances where claimants complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record (D) holding that the alj properly relied on medical evidence undermining claimants subjective assessment of limitations (E) holding that an alj is entitled to make a credibility determination regarding the claimants subjective complaints after specifically addressing these complaints and reviewing the medical evidence in the record

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 207-08 (2d Cir.2007); see also United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir.2008). In fact we identify no error in this case, plain or otherwise, because the district court’s statement that it had “look[ed] at the relevant conduct, what happened with the fellow you got $250,000 from,” and its statement that it had reviewed the Pre-sentence Report (“PSR”) and “adopt[ed] the factual information that’s contained” therein, are reasonably construed as an explicit adoption of the PSR’s detailed explanation for why Patterson’s conduct causing a $250,000 loss to a California victim was fraudulent and qualified as relevant to the crime of conviction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3(a)(2). See generally United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 539 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). We further conclude that the adopted PSR 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts adoption of the presentence report constitutes sufficient findings (B) holding that factual findings set forth in the psi not objected to by a defendant are deemed admitted (C) holding that a district court satisfies its obligation to make factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report (D) holding that express adoption of factual findings in presentence report is sufficient (E) holding that this court will only set aside district courts factual findings when they are clearly erroneous

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: prejudice ... would strip [the defendants] of an absolute defense. [Mrs. Smith] cannot prove her medical malpractice claims without expert medical proof.” But Mrs. Smith contends that Dr. Markowitz’s exclusion did not dictate a result for the defendants because at the time she “still had the option of filing a motion for late disclosure of an expert.” Mrs. Smith reasons that the possibility she might file (and the district court might grant) a motion to extend the expert-disclosure deadline rendered the above defense less than absolute. Notwithstanding Mrs. Smith’s hypothetical avenue for relief, the substantive law applied to the facts of her case at the time of denial dictated a result for the defendants. See Phillips v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 987-88 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). As matters stood, Mrs. Smith lacked an expert 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiff could withdraw admissions despite pending motion by defendants for summary judgment (B) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (C) holding that the lower court was not required to hold a hearing on a motion to transfer (D) recognizing familiarity with governing law as reason to grant motion to transfer (E) holding that statuteoflimitations defense was absolute despite possibility that court might grant plaintiffs pending motion to transfer

SOLUTION:
(E)