In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: with ever since his age of 13 and believes that this criminal record and his continued violation of the law does require a sentence at the top of the guideline range.” Id. at 8. I. A. Commerce Clause Challenge to Section 922(g)(1) Williams first challenges the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute as it applies to his possession of the Smith and Wesson revolver. Williams posits that because he possessed the gun solely within the State of Wisconsin, and because the record reveals no substantial connection between his possession of the gun and interstate commerce, Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to reach his possession of the gun. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Williams did not make this argument below, so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce (B) holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (C) holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that gunfree school zones act of 1990 which proscribed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school exceeded congressional authority under commerce clause because it reached conduct that did not substantially affect or have a meaningful connection with interstate commerce (E) holding that the gunfree school zones act exceeds congress power under the commerce clause

A: holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce
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Q: clause could be vitiated based on evidence of fraud “relating to the merger clause or fraud that invalidates the entire contract including the merger clause.” 228 Mich.App. 486, 498, 579 N.W.2d 411, 417 (1998). The plaintiffs have not alleged fraud in the merger clause itself. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants fraudulently induced them to buy investment properties in Detroit. The plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud in the inducement do not save their breach of contract claim because the remedy for fraud in the inducement is to void the contract, not reform it. See UAW-GM, 228 Mich.App. at 508, 579 N.W.2d at 418 (“Fraud ... makes a contract voidable at the instance of the innocent party.”) (quoting 3 Corbin, Contracts, § 580, p. 431); Star Ins. Co., 392 F.Supp.2d at 929 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs’ argument conflates their tort 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable (B) holding that irss failure to comply with seizure and sale provisions of section 6335 renders tax sales voidable at taxpayers option rather than void as matter of law (C) holding that the filed rate doctrine precludes insureds fraudulent inducement claim (D) holding that making of agreement to arbitrate was not called into question by general allegation that entire contract was void because of fraudulent inducement (E) holding that fraudulent inducement renders a contract void or voidable

A: holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable
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Q: 1148, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 443, 253 P.3d 535, 544 (2011) (reaffirming Armenta, 42 Cal.2d 448, 267 P.2d 303, after the adoption of comparative negligence) (“[T]he objective of comparative fault is to achieve an equitable allocation of loss. That objective is not served by subjecting the employer to a second share of fault in addition to that assigned to the employee and for which the employer has accepted liability.”); Loom Craft Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Gorrell, 823 S.W.2d 431, 432 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (retaining the McHaffie rule after the adoption of comparative negligence) (“We believe the better rule is to apportion fault only among those directly involved in the accident, and to hold the entrustor liable for the percentage of fault apportioned to the driver.”); McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826 (<HOLDING>); Gant, 331 Ill.App.3d 924, 264 Ill.Dec. 459, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rule applies regardless of the comparative fault of the employer versus the employee (B) holding that the donovan rule applies regardless of whether the injunction is issued before or after the federal court filing (C) holding that inferred intent rule applies regardless of the age of the actor (D) holding that with respect to noneconomic damages section 768813 requires that an employers comparative fault must be considered by the jury in a negligence suit by an employee against a manufacturer even though the employer is immune from liability under the workers compensation law (E) holding that an employee could not establish pretext when the employer in good faith believed that the employee engaged in misconduct regardless whether the employee in fact engaged in the misconduct

A:
holding that the donovan rule applies regardless of whether the injunction is issued before or after the federal court filing
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