In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
[EX A]: holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language

[EX Q]: stored on a BBS pending delivery). Because subsection (A) applies only to messages in “temporary, intermediate storage,” however, these courts have limited that subsection’s coverage to messages not yet delivered to their intended recipient. See DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 512; Fraser, 135 F.Supp.2d at 636. Defendants point to these cases and argue that messages remaining on an ISP’s server after delivery no longer fall within the Act’s coverage. But, even if such messages are not within the purview of subsection (A), they do fit comfortably within subsection (B). There is no dispute that messages remaining on NetGate’s server after delivery are stored “by an electronic communication service” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B). Cf. DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 511 (<HOLDING>). The only issue, then, is whether the messages 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca (B) holding that email messages stored on a computer but not yet read were in electronic storage (C) holding that an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of email communications is not vitiated by an understanding that the thirdparty service provider will maintain independent access to them noting that electronic communication is as important to fourth amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the past (D) holding that defendants communications sent into tennessee did not constitute purposeful availment because all were in response to communications initiated by the plaintiff (E) holding that subsection b did not apply because the communications at issue were not being stored by an electronic communication service
[EX A]: holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca

[EX Q]: Elan snowmobile 700 700 Morgan promissory note (4/14/98) 10,000 10,000 Power tools 7,000 7,000 Violin and home furnishings 3,000 3,000 IRA account no. 1 5,200 5,200 IRA account no. 2 3,400 3,400 Reimburse Katie’s Galaxy fund (5,700) (5,700) Home equity loan (29,810) (29,810) Condominium fees (3,660) (3,660) Personal loan (5.500) (5.500) VISA credit card debt (Í, 500) (4.500) Loan from Andre Drouin (1.500) (1.500) TOTAL MARITAL NET WORTH 53,078 [¶ 37] A court must take into account “[t]he value of the property set apart to each spouse” as part of its disposition of the property. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 953(1)(B) (1998). Here, the overall distribution of the assets is unbalanced, which in some circumstances amounts to an abuse of discretion. See Beattie v. Beattie, 650 A.2d 950, 952 (Me.1994) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). The court’s judgment does 
 Holding statements: (A) holding property settlement to be contractual obligation from date of final judgment of divorce (B) holding that while certain elements of the divorce judgment may be supportable independently the evidence did not support the cumulative effect of the judgment (C) holding that because judgment of youngs guilt was not rendered independently of trial courts ruling on motion to suppress evidence of offense and judgment would not be supported without that evidence error not waived by plea of guilty (D) holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular (E) holding that the apparent denial of the husbands request for an order compelling the wife to deliver to him the personal property he had been awarded in their divorce judgment did not constitute a modification of the original divorce judgment
[EX A]:
holding property settlement to be contractual obligation from date of final judgment of divorce