In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: of two dates between Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro in 1988. In its view, the evidence was irrelevant and inflammatory. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion in limine with respect to this evidence. The court believed that the evidence was relevant and ought to be before the jury because it had the task of evaluating the overall relationship of Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro. Evidence that is relevant to the background of the case is admissible for that purpose. At the very least, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court not to exclude this evidence in a motion in limine; the evidence was at least potentially relevant for the purpose the judge identified. See Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). LCFS did not object during the trial when Ms. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time (B) holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment (C) holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background (D) holding that section 102 of the civil rights act of 1991 does not apply to preenactment conduct (E) holding that the  1981 amendments contained in  101 of the civil rights act of 1991 do not apply retroactively

A: holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time
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Q: rights by initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt without probable cause. After trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on these claims. The court held that it is not “clearly established” that malicious prosecution is a violation of constitutional rights, and. thus the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm. Section 1983 creates a cause of action to remedy certain deprivations of federal rights, but it is not a source of substantive rights. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (noting that “[section 1983] is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United State 16 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution (B) holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person (C) holding sbm is not a violation of the defendants fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures (D) holding that there is no fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution and suggesting that such a cause of action might lie under the fourth amendment (E) recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment

A: holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution
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Q: Substantial compliance with the requirements for immigrant status as a conditional permanent resident, even if true, cannot excuse plaintiffs failure to maintain a full course of study pursuant to his student status. The intent for status as a conditional permanent resident and as a non-immigrant student are mutually exclusive; the former encompasses a desire to permanently remain in the United States while the latter does not. Moreover, the two sets of requirements are separate and independent. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 245 with 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f). Compliance with the requirements for being a conditional permanent resident does not constitute substantial compliance with the requirements for being a non-immigrant student. See, e.g., Ghajar v. I.N.S., 652 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiff violated specific regulations 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that substantial compliance with the requirements for maintaining nonimmigrant student status under 8 cfr  2142f does not constitute substantial compliance with the requirements for obtaining an extension of stay under 8 cfr  2141c (B) recognizing that when the employer had failed to comply with the reporting requirements of 29 cfr  5162 an order requiring prospective compliance was proper but that additional sanctions for the past violation were not necessary (C) holding that substantial compliance is sufficient to satisfy the notice requirements of sdcl 3212 and 3 (D) holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient (E) holding that substantial compliance with the requirements for exempting a lessors personal property from a lien is not enough

A:
recognizing that when the employer had failed to comply with the reporting requirements of 29 cfr  5162 an order requiring prospective compliance was proper but that additional sanctions for the past violation were not necessary
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