In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: township in the RLCWA’s district took on a different status simply by virtue of its annexation by another township in the RLCWA’s district. Second, the federal anti-curtailment statute specifically anticipates that a city will use its annexation of property located within the service area of a rural water association as a basis to provide service to that property, and expressly prohibits such provision of service while the water district is indebted to the federal government. See 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b). Third, case law shows that a municipality’s annexation of property located within a rural water association does not, of itself, remove it from the water district for § 1926(b) purposes. See, e.g., Glenpool Util. Serv. Auth. v. Creek County Rural Water Disk, 861 F.2d 1211 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Bell Arthur Water Corp. v. Greenville Util. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (B) holding that  1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents (C) holding municipal condemnation of water associations facilities and certificate violative of  1926b (D) holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district (E) holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted

A: holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially
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Q: as this is circumscribed but critical. For the Supreme Court has made plain that qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability” and “is effectively lost if a ease is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (emphasis in original). IV. We thus turn to the sole question over which we have jurisdiction: whether the district court properly concluded that the officers were not entitled to summary judgment under Norman. The officers contend that Ussery suffered only de minimis injuries and so cannot satisfy the requirements for an excessive force claim under Norman. Blue Br. 8, 16-21. We disagree. During the decade when Norman was good law, we never articulated a precise definition of what c 270 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note the telling fact that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where law enforcement officers restrained and abandoned an arrestee for ten minutes causing him to feel frightened vulnerable and humiliated when left alone and immobile in the dark parking lot such that in the months following the incident he had trouble sleeping and was scared to leave his home  the resulting injury was more than de minimis (B) holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him (C) holding that a reasonable officer could not have been expected to anticipate that ten to fifteen minutes of unauthorized detention would amount to a greater than de minimis injury (D) holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody (E) holding that an individuals liberty is restrained only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave

A: holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him
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Q: the dismissal would be without prejudice). See also Dunham v. Fullerton, 258 P.3d 701, 704 (Wyo. 2011) (affirming Rule 25 dismissal for untimely substitution: “dismissal without prejudice was proper—it was not an adjudication on the merits, and the statute of limitations has not run”). Still other courts have reasoned that a trial judge dismissing an action per Rule 25 is invested with the same level of discretion as one acting pursuant to Rule 41. Therefore, a court may properly dismiss claims without prejudice under Rule 25 if it finds that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff has not acted with extreme dereliction and the defendant has not suffered acute prejudice by reason of the delay. See, e.g., Keating v. Levitan Mfg. Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6839 at n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Bessent v. Nat’l Housing Partnership, 2008 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the circumstances presented viz plaintiffs failure to prosecute for months following suggestion of death but with no discernible prejudice to defendant dismissal without prejudice was appropriate sanction (B) holding that plaintiffs failure to respond to argument warranted dismissal with prejudice (C) holding that de facto dismissal without prejudice was appropriate where a plaintiffs certificate failed to state with specificity that a defendant was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury (D) holding that absent extraordinary circumstances a failure to comply with the statute requires a dismissal with prejudice (E) holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice

A:
holding that plaintiffs failure to respond to argument warranted dismissal with prejudice
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