In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

would allow for the award of attorney fees whenever a statute or contract provides for one side to pay expenses, even when such attorney fees were not contemplated. The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent in this regard. Therefore, I do not join in the majority’s opinion that the term “expenses” as used in section 13-7-4(d) includes attorney fees, but would hold that because that section does not specifically provide for an award of attorney fees, such award was improper here. For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority’s determination that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. However, I dissent rs of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986); In re Olliff, 258 Ga. 157, 366 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Head v. Savage, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 32, 38 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan (D) holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs (E) holding that expenses refers to costs
holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid

the in-state banking activities of these French and Japanese banks and Plaintiffs’ claims arising from a terrorist attack that occurred in Israel with the support of the Iranian government. It certainly cannot be said that Plaintiffs’ claims “directly arise” out of the banking activities of these local branches. See GCIU, 565 F.3d at 1024. Thus, under traditional legal principles, specific jurisdiction is lacking. Although the Seventh Circuit • has not addressed this issue, two Circuits have reformulated the minimum-contacts inquiry in cases involving third-party discovery, focusing more narrowly “on the connection between the nonparty’s contacts with the forum and the discovery order at issue.” Gucci, 768 F.3d at 137; see also S.E.C. v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 418 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>)., It is unclear whether this test is proper, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that standing alone defendants 4 million in sales in the forum state over a sevenyear period may not have been sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction but that the numerous other contacts with the forum in the case including advertising relationships with dealers and more than 150 visits tipped the balance and led the court to conclude that there were sufficient contacts to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction (B) holding that specific jurisdiction requires plaintiff to show that defendants forum contacts be related directly to the subject of the lawsuit (C) holding no specific jurisdiction where alleged tortious conduct was not related to defendants contacts with texas (D) holding that courts exercise of specific jurisdiction was proper where subpoena enforcement action arose out of nonpartys contacts with the forum (E) holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
holding that standing alone defendants 4 million in sales in the forum state over a sevenyear period may not have been sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction but that the numerous other contacts with the forum in the case including advertising relationships with dealers and more than 150 visits tipped the balance and led the court to conclude that there were sufficient contacts to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction

F.2d at 890. The more recent case of Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1999), also discusses the requirements of these types of agreements. There, the court stated: “A settled-but-not-paid requirement, finally, also accords with the long-established rule that a contractor need not pay its sub before making a claim on its behalf. See George Leary Constr. Co. v. United States, 63 Ct.Cl. 206, 223, 1927 WL 2960 (1927) (Tt is easy to forecast the financial ruin of a Government contractor if the rule is to be established that he may not receive amounts due from the Government under his contract until he establishes . . . that he has paid his subcontractor all he owes him.’); see also Severin v. United States, 99 Ct.Cl. 435, 443, 1943 WL 4198 (1943) (<HOLDING>).” 175 F.3d at 1250. The Morrison court went on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bankruptcy trustee for contractor could not avoid prepetition payment of funds from contractor to subcontractors (B) holding that where contract between contractor and subcontractor allowed subcontractor to recover if contractor recovered contractor was not barred from bringing suit on behalf of subcontractor (C) holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate (D) holding that if contractor is hable to sub that liability though not yet satisfied by payment might well constitute actual damages to the contractor and sustain their suit under rule that contractor may only sue to recover its own damages (E) holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor

holding that bankruptcy trustee for contractor could not avoid prepetition payment of funds from contractor to subcontractors