In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: (applying Tennessee law); see also Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1969). Most other courts, however, have set a lower bar. For example in Mondido v. Cory Corp., 483 F.Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the plaintiff was injured when the glass carafe from her coffee pot broke. The carafe itself was manufactured by Corning, but it was converted into a coffee decanter and sold by Cory, a separate company. Id. at 27. After both companies were found liable, Corning moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict arguing that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence sufficient to support the jury’s determination that the carafe was defective when it left Coming’s plant. Id. The court rejected the motion, noting the plaintiffs evidence that Cory converted the 1967) (<HOLDING>); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed (B) holding that plaintiff had successfully traced the defective condition to the manufacturer where there was no evidence of tampering by the retailer (C) holding that manufacturer had no duty to warn its purchasers retailer and transporter of gas of dangers where those purchasers had operated a gas business for years were familiar with the trade journals and already knew the dangers (D) holding that there was a triable issue of fact whether a defendant who applied a sprayon fireproofing material was an agent for the manufacturer of the material and thus whether plaintiff is in privity with the manufacturer (E) holding a manufacturer strictly liable in tort for injury to plaintiff caused by defective power tool

A: holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed
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Q: be dismissed even if a minute entry is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 4(c), because the trial court judge did not sign the minutes as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-106. We disagree. The only page from the trial court minutes for August 28, 2006, that was filed with this Court was the page that included the entry regarding the defendant’s case. While it is true that the particular page of the minutes extracted to supplement the appellate record does not bear the signature of the trial court judge, there is no proof that the judge did not sign the minutes on a subsequent page not included in the record before us, and we presume that the minutes were signed as required by section 16-1-106. See Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1937) (<HOLDING>) There is no proof in the record that rebuts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body (B) holding that although a corporate officer is not presumed to be personally liable for corporate debts the officer may expressly bind himself or herself to be answerable for such debts (C) holding that even in absence of proof that chancellor signed court minutes it must be presumed that he did so and noting that ejvery officer is presumed to have performed his duty (D) holding it immaterial that one charged with willfully selling unregistered securities had no actual knowledge that he was violating the law because he was presumed to have and is chargeable with knowledge of the laws under which he was undertaking to do business (E) holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it

A: holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body
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Q: to saddle the client with the mistakes of its attorney. The Court today properly rejects that rationale.” Id. at 405-06, 113 S.Ct. 1489. There is a small measure of inconsistency between the D.C. Circuit’s use of equitable principles in not holding a purely innocent and misled client liable for the neglect of counsel and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Link and Pioneer. But this court need not address this inconsistency any further. Even under the slightly more relaxed standard that the D.C. Circuit used in two deei-sions, which allow a client to avoid the consequences of his counsel’s malpractice, Moving Plaintiffs still fail to show circumstances that will allow this court to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C.Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>), and Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co., et 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court erred when it sanctioned client where the evidence showed that the attorney filed frivolous pleadings on behalf of the client but the client did nothing more than rely on her attorneys advice (B) holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case (C) holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client (D) holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm (E) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client

A:
holding trial court erred when it sanctioned client where the evidence showed that the attorney filed frivolous pleadings on behalf of the client but the client did nothing more than rely on her attorneys advice
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