In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: to allege damages through June 30, 2006 is the focus of their motion.”). Because the Government does not oppose Plaintiff supplementing the September 4, 2009 Complaint to seek damages through the end of 2009, the issue before the court is whether Plaintiff may supplement to allege a claim for damages incurred through December 31, 2009, or through December 31, 2010. See System Fuels, 73 Fed.Cl. at 211 (“Supplementation may be limited or curtailed to avoid prejudice.” (citation omitted)). Although Plaintiff may have given the Government an estimate of 2010 damages as early as July 2010, Plaintiff did not identify the specific 2010 damages claimed or provide the Government with supporting documentation of those damages until April 20, 2011 — t 4 Fed.Cl. 727 (2006) (“SMUD III") (<HOLDING>), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 293 Fed.Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that smud is entitled to 53159863 in mitigation costs but staying entry of judgment pending the outcome of this proceeding (B) holding that smud was entitled to 39796234 in damages (C) holding that a plaintiff is entitled to either statutory treble damages or punitive damages whichever is the greater (D) holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of nominal damages when she had failed to request them (E) holding that smud was entitled to mitigation damages for costs incurred from may 15 1997 to december 31 2003

A: holding that smud is entitled to 53159863 in mitigation costs but staying entry of judgment pending the outcome of this proceeding
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Q: to her or to the government, and some of which may be quite different than either thought possible. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21; see also Sotirion v. United States, 617 F.3d 27, 38 (1st Cir. 2010). At the time of sentencing there was no “sentencing error”. Petitioner made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights, choosing the certainty of a binding plea agreement over the uncertainty of a jury trial. He cannot accept the benefit of that agreement and then repudiate it when a change in circumstances later arises. See Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21. A retroactive determination that an advisory guideline range may have been ■ miscalculated does not overcome petitioner’s appellate waiver; See Sotirion, 617 F.3d at 38; see also United States v. Calderon-Pacheco, 564 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). In view of the circumstances, the Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver (B) holding a showing of egregious facts required to vault the hurdle erected by the waiver (C) holding that the failure to provide a person with all of the information required by ors 4261001 constitutes an egregious error that justifies plain error review (D) recognizing waiver by acquiescence as a possible defense to an action for past due alimony but finding no waiver under the facts presented (E) holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case

A: holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver
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Q: agree. Because Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to actual cases and controversies, we do not have jurisdiction where “the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980) (quotation omitted); see also McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir.1997) (en banc). As Buntin is no longer employed by the Board, the injunction enjoining the Board from assigning her duties not prescribed by Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 159.140 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) no longer affects her legal interests. We therefore conclude that Buntin’s request for injunctive relief is moot. Cf. Ahmed v. University of Toledo, 822 F.2d 26, 27 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION Because we conclude that 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right of students to challenge on first amendment grounds actions of school officials which circumscribe the range of ideas to which students are exposed (B) holding that the defendant school officials did not create the students danger or increase their risk of harm where female students were physically verbally and sexually molested by male students in a unisex bathroom and in a darkroom (C) holding moot the plaintiffs challenge to a universitys requirement that foreign students carry health insurance where named plaintiffs were no longer students at the university (D) holding that female students claim was moot because the university they were suing had already established a womens lacrosse team which was the relief the students originally sought (E) holding that universitys amendment of regulation made moot a challenge to regulations

A:
recognizing the right of students to challenge on first amendment grounds actions of school officials which circumscribe the range of ideas to which students are exposed
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