In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,-, 117 S.Ct. 832, 838, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that ERISA preempts state common law tort and contract causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured employee benefit plan. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57. The detailed provisions of ERISA § 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that “would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.” Id. at 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549. Similarly, we have held that state law tort and contract claims as well as violations of a state insurance statute are preempted by ERISA. Tingey, 953 F.2d at 1131 (<HOLDING>). In a factually similar case, we held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and negligent misrepresentations (B) holding plaintiffs causes of action for breach of contract breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the arizona insurance code were preempted by erisa (C) holding that erisa  514a preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it was based on the same conduct as a preempted claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (E) holding that the plaintiffs state common law causes of actions for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as well as a statutory cause of action for unfair insurance practices under the california insurance code were preempted by erisa
[EX A]: holding that erisa preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and negligent misrepresentations

[EX Q]: District Attorney’s Office to discriminate in the jury selection process. On April 26, 2007, the PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant relief and the instant appeal followed. Appellant raises the following claim: The lower court erred by limiting Appellant’s hearing solely to proof of a policy or culture of discrimination by the Philadelphia District Attorney and further erred by denying Appellant the opportunity to develop and prove discrimination in his case. Before we proceed with a review of the merits of this issue, we must ascertain whether the PCRA court was correct in its conclusion that Appellant timely filed his fifth PCRA petition for, if he did not, we are without jurisdiction to address his claim. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 941 A.2d 1263 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), any PCRA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed (B) holding that the time requirements of the statute are as much a part of the jurisdictional threshold as the mandate to file for a rehearing and that the time limits must be strictly construed and may not be waived by ferc or evaded by the courts (C) holding pcra time limits are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed (D) holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign (E) holding  2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed
[EX A]: holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed

[EX Q]: of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261, et seq. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that the summary judgment for Ronson “must be sustained because the FHSA preempts any state law warning requirements other than those imposed by the FHSA and its implementing regulations.” Id. Similar to Comeaux, the Court must inquire whether any of Plaintiffs’ claims are based on the theory that Mattel’s warning was inadequate. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524, 112 S.Ct. at 2621 (explaining that claims based upon a failure-to-warn theory which require a showing that “advertising or promotions should have included additional, or more clearly stated warnings” different from federal regulatory requirements are preempted); Netland v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 284 F.3d 895, 900 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 739-40 
 Holding statements: (A) holding state failuretowarn claims were preempted because any warning label linking said drugs to suicide would have been false and misleading (B) holding in a comparable case that statelaw claims premised upon failuretowarn or inadequate warning theories that would result in the imposition of additional or different labeling requirements are nonetheless preempted regardless of the guise under which the claim is presented (C) holding that failuretowarn claims based on theory that faarequired warnings are insufficient are preempted (D) holding that a failuretowarn claim against a pharmaceutical company was not impliedly preempted (E) holding that all claims premised upon a failure to warn after 1969 are preempted
[EX A]:
holding state failuretowarn claims were preempted because any warning label linking said drugs to suicide would have been false and misleading