In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Majority Opinion in Ford, former Justice Newman authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Saylor joined, in which she specifically expressed her agreement “that appellate counsel acted ineffectively by neglecting to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to investigate and present evidence during the penalty phase of Appellant’s history of abuse and mental illness.” Ford, 809 A.2d at 336 (Newman, J., joined by Saylor, J., concurring). 5 . Although Teague's retroactivity analysis did not gamer five votes, a majority of the High Court soon thereafter reaffirmed the Teague plurality's rule and its two exceptions in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). 6 . Compare with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty (B) holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (C) holding that juveniles are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (D) holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing (E) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants

A: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty
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Q: the only issues to be determined by the reviewing court were whether the Commission acted within the scope of its authority and whether the order complained of is reasonable and not arbitrarily made. See, In re Proposed Amend. to Title 291, 264 Neb. 298, 646 N.W.2d 650 (2002); In re Application of E. Neb. Non-stock Trucking Coop, 243 Neb. 662, 501 N.W.2d 712 (1993). The district court should have addressed those issues in this case. We do so here. The fact that § 75-110 gives the Commission authority to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations which it “deems necessary to regulate persons within the commission’s jurisdiction” does not require the Commission to exercise such authority in any given instance. See In re Application No. C-1889, 264 Neb. 167, 647 N.W.2d 45 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Under § 84-907.08, the Commission could 
 Holding statements: (A) holding some competitive rules clearly related to ratemaking power and thus within commissions constitutional authority to promulgate (B) recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure (C) holding statutory authority of commission to promulgate rules to interpret law does not impose affirmative rulemaking requirement (D) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (E) recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence

A: holding some competitive rules clearly related to ratemaking power and thus within commissions constitutional authority to promulgate
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Q: distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops. Carty, supra, 170 N.J. at 641, 644, 646, 790 A.2d 903. That is not to say that a person will not feel some degree of compulsion whenever a police officer makes a request. See State v. McCloskey, 90 N.J. 18, 24, 446 A.2d 1201 (1982); State v. Hickman, 335 N.J.Super. 623, 633, 763 A.2d 330 (App.Div.2000). Surely, during a field inquiry, when a police officer asks a question of a person on the street, although that person is lawfully free to leave, he may feel some compulsion to respond. Nonetheless, we do not mandate that police officers have reasonable suspicion before making an inquiry. See State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. , 934 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Detective Peacock did in this case what 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent (B) holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent (C) holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that the mere assertion of constitutional right to refuse consent to search does not supply probable cause to search

A:
holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent
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