In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: 669 (1971). Although Plaintiff requests resolution of seemingly unsettled State law questions, the issues at bar fall squarely within the Burford parameters: Plaintiff has presented difficult issues of state law, gaming is arguably an area of important state policy in Texas, and the Texas Lottery Commission (TLC) provides the unified State enforcement mechanism for some aspects of gaming law in Texas. Moreover, both the TLC and Office of the Attorney General provide an administrative procedure for organizations and individuals to request advisory opinions regarding the legality of proposed gaming actions. Certification to the Texas Supreme Court to answer the state law question at issue here would be ideal. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974)(<HOLDING>). However, under the Texas Constitution, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court (B) holding that certification of a remand order divests federal court jurisdiction (C) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the court (D) holding that it was proper in determining certification to consider whether certification would foster the settlement of the case with advantage to the parties and with great savings in judicial time and services (E) holding that certification to the state supreme court rests in the sound discretion of the federal court and that certification in the long run saves time energy and resources as well as helps to build a cooperative judicial federalism
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: and misunderstanding of the local rules involving summar he district court abused its discretion in denying their Rule 60(b)(3) motion for relief from judgment. See Hesling v. CSX Tramp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir.2005). The Sangis did not provide the district court with clear and convincing evidence that FCC engaged in fraud or other misconduct or that any misconduct prevented them from fully and fairly presenting their case. See Gov’t Fin. Servs. v. Peyton Place, Inc., 62 F.3d 767, 772 (5th Cir.1995). Rather the Sangis offered only allegations of fraud and misconduct. Nor have the Sangis shown exceptional circumstances to merit relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general rule that issues not raised in the lower court may not be addressed on appeal applies only to appellants (B) holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances (C) holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant (D) holding that cjredibility determinations are questions of fact and should only be overturned in extraordinary circumstances (E) holding that rule 60b6 only applies in extraordinary circumstances suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: the genus of goods or services for which it seeks protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2), (b)(2); 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.32(a)(6), 2.71(a); TMEP § 1402.01; see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2014) (“Parties that choose to recite services in their trademark application that exceed their actual services will be held to the broader scope of the application.”); Octocom Sys., 918 F.2d at 942 (“[R]egistrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application.... ”). The PTO will generally accept any identification of goods or services so long as it is “specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise.” TMEP § 1402.01; see also In re Omega SA 494 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity (B) holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action (C) holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant (D) holding that it is within the discretion of the pto to require that ones goods be identified with particularity in a trademark application (E) holding that a rule 10b5 claim must be stated with particularity
Example Output:
(D)