In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
918 F.2d 154, 159 (11th Cir.1990). A district court should grant a preliminary injunction only if the movant clearly shows: 1. a substantial likelihood that the mov-ant will prevail on the merits; 2. that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is, not issued; 3. that the potential injury to the mov-ant outweighs the possible harm to the nonmovant; and 4. that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id. This Court will address each element in turn. 1. SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS To begin, the instant ease is controlled by this Court’s decision in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116 (M.D.Fla.1991). In Luckie, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with AAA pursuant to the AMEX Window. Id. The defendants argued th 2nd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Also, in Merrill Lynch v. Noonan, [Current] 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (C) holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision (D) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (E) holding that a specific customer agreement can supersede the amex constitution and requiring arbitration before one of the fora named in the agreement

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
26-7A, 26-8A, and 26-8C or of Title 27A shall control, and the provisions of this chapter are in all respects to be supplementary thereto. (emphasis added). Thus, where allegations of abuse and neglect serve as the grounds for the guardianship petition, as was the case here, the statutory provisions specifically relating to abuse and neglect proceedings, as well as the provisions relating to juvenile court, must control. See Martinmaas, 2000 SD 85 at ¶ 49, 612 N.W.2d at 611. [¶ 10.] Adjudication of abuse or neglect is done in juvenile court pursuant to SDCL chapters 26-7A and 26-8A. SDCL 26-7A-2 provides for exclusive juri ’s interest, as parens patriae, in protecting the welfare of the child. SDCL 26-8A-1. See also Matter of N.J.W., N.G.B., and K.F.B., 273 N.W.2d 134, 137 (S.D.1978) (<HOLDING>). The State is the only party that may seek to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding care custody and control of children is a fundamental right (B) holding state as parens patriae takes strong interest in care and treatment of children within its borders (C) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (D) holding that missouri has interest in providing a forum for victims injured as a result of activities conducted within its borders (E) recognizing that with respect to regulating or affecting conduct within its borders the place of the wrong has the predominant interest

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
1402, 1405, (11th Cir.1996), that it was not clearly established under Branti that the dismissal of clerical employees of a county tax collector’s office for political reasons violated their First Amendment rights. Beauregard controls the qualified immunity analysis in this ease. Moreover, it is not entirely without significance that the district court, with full briefing and two years after Nikolits’s actions, concluded that those actions did not violate the law. Finally, we note that plaintiffs’ argument that the law was clearly established by Elrod and Branti is further undermined by the split of the circuits concerning what those two decisions mean. See supra our discussion at 2510; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 533-36, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2819-20, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (<HOLDING>). While we have endeavored in this opinion to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity (B) holding that attorney who was retained by city to assist in conducting official investigation into firefighters potential wrongdoing was entitled to qualified immunity in firefighters  1983 claim because official investigation of state employee was activity of the type entitled to qualified immunity (C) holding that official defendant was entitled to qualified immunity and noting that legal uncertainty about the meaning of a supreme court decision was reflected in the decisions of the lower federal courts (D) recognizing that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts (E) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity

Ex Output:

(C)