In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: magistrate judge denied the motion, explaining that Mr. Schueller’s subjective perceptions did not demonstrate judicial bias and his claims were not based on any extrajudicial source to support a bias or partiality challenge. We generally review the denial of a recusal motion for abuse of discretion. ClearOne Comm’cns, Inc. v. Bowers, 651 F.3d 1200, 1217 (10th Cir.2011). For the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s order denying recusal, we determine that recusal was not warranted and we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to recuse. To the extent Mr. Schueller now claims that the district judge was biased against him, he did not raise this issue to the district court, so we do not address it. See Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1239 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Wells Fargo’s motion for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs waived their bias argument on appeal because they failed to timely move for disqualification (B) holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument (C) holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal (D) holding argument not asserted before district court is waived on appeal (E) holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court
[A]: (A)


[Q]: that on her return a company manager told Watson in a four-hour meeting in which she cried constantly that she was a poor and incompetent supervisor; that a manager transferred supervisory duties away from her and told her to go home; and that a personnel manager told her that she was considered a bitch and that she could either resign or be demoted to a position in which she would be supervised by her subordinate trainees. We believe that these facts, though covering a shorter period than that in Nolan, could constitute the necessary aggravating factors such that a trier of fact could (but not necessarily would) conclude that a reasonable person would find the conditions so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify resigning. See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration (B) holding in a fair labor standards act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion harassed over the next two weeks and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job (C) holding right to liquidated damages under fair labor standards act nonwaivable (D) holding that discriminatory pay reduction under fair labor standards act does not constitute continuing violation (E) holding that the otca limitations period applied to a claim alleging a breach of the fair labor standards act by the state
[A]: (B)


[Q]: and Plummer brought the present lawsuit asserting various federal and state constitutional claims. In due course, Quinn filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part, but denied as to Plummer’s First Amendment claim and with regards to qualified immunity. It is that denial of qualified immunity that we address in this appeal. “Qualified immunity protects officials from liability for civil damages as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir.2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). This inquiry normally proceeds in two steps. See Pearson v. Callahan, — U.S. —, —, 129 S.Ct. 808, 813, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we first decide whether the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sequence of the saucier inquiry is not mandatory (B) holding that recklessness even for fiduciaries is no longer sufficient (C) holding that sauciers twostep sequence is not mandatory (D) holding that twostep sequence is no longer an inflexible requirement (E) holding the lilly analysis is not a sequential twostep process but rather one broad inquiry
[A]:
(D)