TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: That decision will not be disturbed on appeal even in cases in which the record does not reflect that the issue was ever considered by the parties or the trial court. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 671. As appellee points out, Wilson was a case in which the defendant appealed after the trial court denied his motion to suppress, and did not involve a State’s appeal. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress); Flores, 871 S.W.2d at 720. Although distinguishable in this respect, the reasoning of Wilson is still applicable to the instant case and the observations made in Wilson remain true regardless of which party originally initiates the appellate process. Cf. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (<HOLDING>); State v. Brady, 763 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex.App. — 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing though not relying upon the line of cases which hold the government may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the motion to suppress was granted or denied (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (C) holding that standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised for the first time on appeal (D) holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal (E) holding defendants argument the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress was reviewable as a constitutional issue even though defendant failed to raise the issue in a written posttrial motion

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: 676 F.2d 969, 975 (3d Cir. 1982); Carty v. Schneider, 986 F. Supp. 933, 38 V.I. 213 (D.V.I. 1997). In contrast, a fine is a criminal contempt sanction if the amount of the fine is fixed and imposed unconditionally as a punishment for past disobedience. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632-33 (“An unconditional penalty is criminal in nature because it is solely and exclusively punitive in character.” (citations and quotations omitted)); see also Latrobe Steel Co., 545 F.2d at 1343 (“[T]he penalties arising out of adjudications of criminal contempt are generally an absolute fine of a specific amount . . . .”). Criminal fines are retroactive, and may not be avoided by purging the contemptuous conduct. See Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590, 67 S. Ct. 918, 921, 91 L. Ed. 1117 (1947) (<HOLDING>). Here, the June 13, 2006, order was phrased in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error (B) holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it (C) holding that a flat unconditional fine for 50 was a criminal sanction because the contemnor had no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance (D) holding that a fiftytwo million dollar fine could not be imposed as a sanction for criminal contempt except through a jury trial (E) holding that the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for imposition of that fine

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: CLC received was not reasonably equivalent to the value of the dividend, 740 ILCS 160(5)(b)(8) (2002); and (3) CLC was insolvent when the dividend was paid, 740 ILCS 160(5)(b)(9) (2002). The Trust contends fraud can be inferred from these three badges. But in fact only two of the badges are present. First, no reasonably equivalent value was given for the dividend. There is no “reasonably equivalent value” when the consideration for a transfer is either inadequate or nonexistent. Leibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. (In re Image Worldwide, Ltd.), 139 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir.1998). The dividend here was a unilateral transfer of $30,748, and no evidence has been offered that anything was given in return. See Fisher v. Hamilton (In re Teknek, LLC), 343 B.R. 850, 861 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2006) (<HOLDING>). Second, it is undisputed that CLC was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dividend paid to llc members was not a transfer for reasonably equivalent value (B) holding transfer of capital accounts from a limited partnership to a llc was valuable consideration for purposes of imposing state real estate transfer fee because the members received new rights and privileges (C) holding that it is not a collusive transaction when valuable consideration is paid to transfer a debt to a bona fide purchaser even if the transfer was for the purpose of invoking diversity jurisdiction (D) holding that transfer of property to llc involved no consideration for state conveyance tax purposes because it was a unilateral act and not the result of a bargainedfor exchange (E) holding transfer of legal title to property as a capital contribution to llc was in exchange for valuable consideration and constituted a sale of the property

SOLUTION:
(A)