In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: needlessly leave out of our decisions an important source of information about the child, and in the end, it is the dependent child who suffers. After all, the children count here, not the agency. I believe that we gain nothing, and lose precious information by refusing foster parents standing. Standing to sue simply ensures that a particular party has a sufficient stake in a controversy before the court to obtain a judicial resolution. It should not be a doctrine to close the court house doors on parties who have a real interest in the matter at hand. I believe that the Juvenile Act confers “standing,” subject to traditional jurisprudential limits, for the agency, the grandparent, and the foster parents to file these petitions. See also Silfies v. Webster, 713 A.2d 639 (Pa.Super.1998)(<HOLDING>); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 654 F.Supp. 1567 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party standing in loco parentis has standing to seek custody of child (B) holding that a grandmother who frequently babysat her granddaughter was not in loco parentis and thus lacked standing to seek custody of her granddaughter (C) holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal (D) holding that grandmother in loco parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody (E) holding that domestic partner who assumed a parental status over her partners child and performed parental duties with the partners permission stood in loco parentis to the child and had standing to seek partial custody and visitation
[EX A]: holding that a grandmother who frequently babysat her granddaughter was not in loco parentis and thus lacked standing to seek custody of her granddaughter

[EX Q]: than the Confrontation Clause, we review for plain error. See United States v. Acosta, 475 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir.2007); United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir.2003). Our consideration of the district court’s decision begins and ends with the first element of plain error review because we conclude that the district court did not err in limiting the scope of Rios’s cross-examination. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (explaining that the first element of plain error review requires that “there must be an error or defect”). A defendant’s right to cross-examination is not unlimited. United States v. Bernegger, 661 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir.2011). The Sixth Amendment confrontation right is satisfied in this regard so Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In sum, establishing a Confrontation Clause 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (B) holding that the district court satisfied the confrontation clause by permitting the defendant to present facts concerning the adverse witnesss plea agreement and incentives to cooperate (C) holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment (D) holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing (E) holding that if a plea agreement is breached the district court may either grant specific performance or allow the defendant to withdraw the plea
[EX A]: holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement

[EX Q]: evidence working against him, Defendant cannot establish a reasonable probability that the district court’s explanatory error caused him prejudice. See Cook, 550 F.3d at 1298-99. B. Defendant also challenges the district court’s factual finding that the $8,450.00 found on his person on June 30, 2007 represented the fruits of the drug trade. We review a district court’s factual finding at sentencing for clear error, reversing only if that finding is “wholly without factual support in the record.” United States v. Ivory, 532 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir.2008). The record in this case, as described above, clearly supports the district court’s conclusion that Defendant obtained the $8,450.00 in question through drug trafficking. See United States v. Brown, 556 F.3d 1108, 1110 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). For many of the same reasons we rejected 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government must prove the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence (B) holding that under the advisory guidelines a district court should resolve factual disputes at sentencing by applying the preponderance of the evidence standard (C) holding that the preponderance standard is generally appropriate in guidelines sentencing (D) recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard (E) holding that in order to satisfy due process findings made at sentencing need only be based upon a preponderance of the evidence
[EX A]:
holding that the government must prove the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence