In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: customs and practices of the trade could conclude that WQIS’s liability under Coverage C ceased once the Coverage A limit was reached. See Morgan Stanley, 225 F.3d at 275 (describing when a contract provision is ambiguous). First, the phrase “liabilities covered” in the Coverage C insuring provision could reasonably be read to refer only to liabilities that WQIS was required to cover under Coverage A, that is, up to $5 million per vessel. Under this interpretation, any liability above $5 million was not “covered,” and - therefore defense costs incurred with respect to liabilities above $5 million did not arise from “liabilities covered.” See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on other grounds by 85 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable person could conclude that once 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due (B) holding that allied may not be held liable for portion of attorneys fees paid pretender of defense due to policy provision precluding reimbursement for defense costs voluntarily incurred (C) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself (D) holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the  insurance policy (E) holding where an insurance policy indemnifies defense costs paid as a result of occurrences covered that the insurer need only reimburse defense costs for claims that are established to be covered through judgment and settlement and not for claims only potentially falling within the policys coverage
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s detention.” Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381, 97 S.Ct. 1224, 51 L.Ed.2d 411 (1977); see also St 06 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (same). Whether RIDA created an adequate substitute for habeas corpus for those aliens to whom a petition for review is available, however, is different from whether RIDA created any adequate substitute for those aliens for whom it is no longer available. Unlike in previous cases where we have upheld RIDA against Suspension Clause challenges, Singh never had the ability to obtain judicial review of the merits of his removal through a petition for review filed within 30 days of his removal order. Cf. Puri, 464 F.3d at 1043; Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). By the time RIDA created jurisdiction in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law (B) holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (C) holding that  109g2 does not apply when the creditor seeking relief in the first case received the requested relief (D) holding that a rule 60b motion that presents grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief or seeks to add a new ground for relief requires authorization (E) holding that ridas elimination of habeas corpus does not violate the suspension clause where the petitioner had a means for seeking relief direct review  and simply failed to pursue the relief that the statutory scheme allows
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: trial that the State’s timeline was very improbable, if not impossible. Serrano has not demonstrated that this investigation and strategy regarding the travel timeline was unreasonable. See generally Atkins v. Dugger, 541 So.2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1989) (“One tactic available to counsel is to present expert testimony. However, it is by no means the only tactic, nor is it required.”). Second, Serrano has failed to demonstrate prejudice. During the post-conviction proceedings, Serrano never introduced any evidence indicating that a more complete investigation into the time-line or hiring an individual to reenact the timeline would have changed Serrano’s defense at trial or would have further called the State’s timeline into question. Cf. Conahan v. State, 118 So.3d 718, 727-28 (Fla. 2013) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Serrano has failed to establish a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial counsels performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony (B) holding that defense counsels failure to object to testimony did not warrant a new trial because there was no prejudice from admission of the testimony (C) holding that the defendant could not establish prejudice for trial counsels failure to hire an expert when the experts testimony would not have changed the nature of the states evidence (D) holding that the prejudice prong in strickland was not satisfied because counsels failure to raise an evidentiary issue would not have altered the result of the proceedings because the erroneous admission of the evidence would have constituted harmless error (E) holding that the states failure to designate its expert witnesses was not harmless in trial for sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation where it was reasonably possible that defendant would have altered his trial preparation or strategy and that defendant would have deposed experts and possibly procured his own expert
Example Output:
(C)