In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: doing something that can be characterized as resistance—even when that resistance includes physically preventing an officer’s manipulations of his body.”). In addition, the black-and-white bus surveillance video fails to clearly show what occurred as the officers forcefully “escorted” Hulett off the bus, and leaves the viewer wondering whether, and to what extent, additional force may have been applied during those moments that might have contributed to plaintiffs broken hip. And even following plaintiffs removal from the bus, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Sergeant Galvin acted in an objectively reasonable manner by dragging plaintiff some distance across the pavement, since plaintiff did not appear to be offering any further resistance at that point. Tracy, 623 F.3d at 98 (<HOLDING>); Meyes v. Baltimore Cnty., 713 F.3d 723, 733 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that otherwise acceptable use of pepper spray became excessive when arrestee was offering no further active resistance (B) holding that bystander prisoners who were exposed to pepper spray when prison officials dispensed spray across their pod area to break up a fight were not subjected to excessive force (C) holding that no objectively reasonable police officer could believe that after vinyard was under arrest handcuffed behind her back secured in the back seat of a patrol car with a protective screen between the officer and the arrestee an officer could stop the car grab such arrestee by her hair and arm bruise her and apply pepper spray to try to stop the intoxicated arrestee from screaming and returning the officers exchange of obscenities and insults during a short fourmile jail ride (D) holding that the use of pepper spray on nonviolent protestors was excessive force (E) holding that two bursts of pepper spray to stop fighting in a cell was not considered excessive force and did not violate prisoners eighth amendment rights

Answer: (A)


Question: 540 U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 1019, 157 L.Ed.2d 1016 (2004) (citing United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980) and Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986)). 20 . See United States v. Cuong Gia Le, et al., Criminal No. 03-48-A (E.D.Va. December 9, 2003) (Ex Parte Order). 21 . Only one of the six charged defendants — • Cuong Gia Le — had been charged prior to the return of the Superseding Indictment. 22 . See Schwartz, 372 F.2d at 682 (citing Mallory, 354 U.S. at 454, 77 S.Ct. 1356). 23 . The statute also provides a limited "safe harbor" for a voluntary confession made after arrest, but before arraignment, "if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 534 n. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding texas law governs the procedural matter of preservationoferror requirements even if another jurisdictions law governs substantive issues (B) holding that  3501 not mcnabbmallory governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court (C) holding that federal law governs remedies available under title ix (D) holding that federal law governs res judicata effect of an earlier federal judgment based on federal law (E) holding that federal common law governs equitable remedies available under erisa

Answer: (B)


Question: because federal law requires federal approval of Indian wills, 25 U.S.C. § 373, and gives BIA probate judges the authority to approve settlement agreements resolving contested Indian probate proceedings, 43 C.F.R. § 30.150. However, this conclusion cannot be squared with controlling precedent. The Supreme Court has expressly declined to recognize any “inherent power” on the part of a federal court to enforce a settlement agreement simply because the agreement resolved a federal proceeding. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377-378, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Rather, enforcement of such a settlement agreement “requires its own basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at 378, 114 S.Ct. 1673; see also Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); id. at 951 (“[Wjhere the validity of a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general federal regulatory scheme governing indian mineral leases did not establish federal jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement made under such a lease when the plaintiffs claim sounded only in general contract law (B) holding in action involving single claim that if claim sounded only in admiralty there would be no right to a jury trial but if federal question was present as a separate and independent basis for federal jurisdiction then the jury demand must be honored (C) holding that reasonableness analysis applies in general jurisdiction case under federal circuit law (D) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates (E) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added

Answer:
(A)