In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals
[A]: holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision


[Q]: Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir.2000). This decision strongly suggests that, in pertinent circumstances, conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment is, as Home Products suggests, “automatic.” However, it also suggests that the proper procedure is for the district court expressly to “convert” a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See id. (concluding that the district court had not followed the proper procedure, because it had not converted the motion). However, the decision also suggests that whether or not application of summary judgment standards is appropriate ultimately depends upon whether the parties were provided with adequate opportunity to address the merits of the motion according to summary judgment standards. See id. (<HOLDING>). A slightly earlier decision of the Eighth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them (B) holding that appellate review under summary judgment standards was appropriate where the district court despite its procedural error provided the parties with a full opportunity to present all pertinent materials outside the pleadings regarding the issue of response costs and the parties created a complete record on the issue (C) holding issue not properly before the appellate court where appellant fails to demonstrate where in the record an issue was raised in the district court (D) recognizing that the specific argument regarding an issue must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for appellate review (E) holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an issue not argued by the parties
[A]: holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them


[Q]: so complete a defense as he might reasonably have desired”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 820, 115 S.Ct. 81, 130 L.Ed.2d 34 (1994); 2d Cir.: United States v. Lawal, 736 F.2d 5, 9-10 (1984) (applying authorities for non-constitutional error to erroneous exclusion of hearsay); 3d Cir.: United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1498-1500 (3d Cir.1988) (making "non-constitutional 'harmless error' determination” for erroneous exclusion of hearsay), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 836, 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989); 4th Cir.: United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 184-85 (1992) (citing Kotteakos as authority for holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay was harmless), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 914, 113 S.Ct. 2351, 124 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993); 5th Cir.: United States v. Barnett, 945 F.2d 1296, 1301 n. 3 (1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1487, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a (B) holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion (C) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right (D) holdingthat erroneous admission of hearsay did not prejudiceresults of trial so as to require reversal (E) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay
[A]:
holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a