In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: Ill 1997). AirTouch alleges that the City’s denial will in effect prohibit it from providing personal wireless services because alternative sites leave “gaps” in its service or will be too costly to provide. a. Gap In Coverage AirTouch has presented evidence of a gap in coverage in its wireless services on the Fanita Drive-Highway 125 corridor from Navajo Drive to the Highway 52 Connector. (Tifft Decl. at ¶ 11.) Air-Touch argues that if a decision leaves “significant gaps” in wireless services, § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) has been violated. The City argues that a mere gap is not sufficient; there must be a general ban for that provision to apply. AirTouch is supported by recent decisions of the Second and Third Circuit. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 640-41 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 70 (3rd Cir.) (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  332c7biii applies only to blanket prohibitions and general bans or policies and not to individual zoning decisions (B) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law (C) holding that  332c7b iii does not apply only to general bans and stating that prohibiting only general bans would 1 require a court to wait for a series of denied applications and 2 lead to the untenable result that once personal wire services are available within the jurisdiction of a state or local government  the state or local government could deny any further applications with impunity (D) holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional (E) holding that a district court cannot require a unit of state or local government to abide by a consent decree that does not serve any federal interest
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: on the basis of an otherwise constitutional statutory aggravator. ¶ 32 Even if we assume Graham supplies the proper analysis for challenging an aggravator, such a challenge fails here. Under Graham, a court “considers ‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice’ to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.” 130 S.Ct. at 2022 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)). In the past decade, the Supreme Court has used this approach in three death penalty eases. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (concluding the death penalty cannot be imposed for rape); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (<HOLDING>); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the death penalty unconstitutional for defendants under age eighteen at the time of the crime (B) holding that the execution of individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time they committed capital crimes violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution (C) recognizing that within the world community the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved (D) holding that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes violates eighth amendment (E) holding the eighth and fourteenth amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: § 1102(b)(4)). 45 . Id. (citing ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8)). 46 . Id.; Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). 47 . Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148-50, 121 S.Ct. 1322. 48 . Id. at 147, 121 S.Ct. 1322 (citing ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8)). 49 . Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 9, 107 S.Ct. 2211; see also Davila, 542 U.S. at 208, 124 S.Ct. 2488 ("The purpose of ERISA is to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.”); Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142-45, 111 S.Ct. 478; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64-66, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). 50 . Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 150, 121 S.Ct. 1322; see also Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365, 122 S.Ct. 2151, 153 L.Ed.2d 375 (<HOLDING>). 51 . See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 22:213(A)(14) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state law requiring benefit plans to include minimum benefits related to erisa plans (B) holding employee benefit plans that are insured are subject to indirect state insurance regulation (C) holding that a georgia garnishment statute that solely applied to erisa employee benefit plans was preempted (D) recognizing that it was beyond dispute that a state statute that required all insured benefit plans to submit to an extra layer of review for certain benefit denials had a substantial effect on erisa plans (E) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans
Example Output:
(D)