In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir.1997). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quotation omitted). We may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.1991). Plaintiff argues that (1) the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ ignored medical evidence of her disability; (2) the ALJ failed to analyze plaintiffs pain properly under Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 162-64 (10th Cir.19 95) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, plaintiff has not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding aljs listing of factors he considered was inadequate when court was left to speculate what specific evidence led the alj to his conclusion (B) holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion (C) holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion and thus the aljs unexplained conclusion was beyond meaningful review (D) holding the record must demonstrate that the alj considered all of the evidence and the alj must discuss  the evidence supporting his decision  the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon and significantly probative evidence he rejects (E) holding an aljs failure to adequately explain the weight given to treating sources opinions not harmless because the aljs reasoning was not sufficiently specific to make clear that the alj recognized and evaluated the treating relationships

Output: holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion


Input: Consider Input: stored on a BBS pending delivery). Because subsection (A) applies only to messages in “temporary, intermediate storage,” however, these courts have limited that subsection’s coverage to messages not yet delivered to their intended recipient. See DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 512; Fraser, 135 F.Supp.2d at 636. Defendants point to these cases and argue that messages remaining on an ISP’s server after delivery no longer fall within the Act’s coverage. But, even if such messages are not within the purview of subsection (A), they do fit comfortably within subsection (B). There is no dispute that messages remaining on NetGate’s server after delivery are stored “by an electronic communication service” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B). Cf. DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 511 (<HOLDING>). The only issue, then, is whether the messages 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca (B) holding that email messages stored on a computer but not yet read were in electronic storage (C) holding that an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of email communications is not vitiated by an understanding that the thirdparty service provider will maintain independent access to them noting that electronic communication is as important to fourth amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the past (D) holding that defendants communications sent into tennessee did not constitute purposeful availment because all were in response to communications initiated by the plaintiff (E) holding that subsection b did not apply because the communications at issue were not being stored by an electronic communication service

Output: holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca


Input: Consider Input: issues are whether under the UCCJA the New Jersey courts should enforce the California judgment and whether under the UCCJA the New Jersey courts may properly modify the custody judgment of the California court. Because the principal issue involved custody of a minor and the attendant urgency due to the need of the child to begin school, we issued an order without opinion 93 N.J. 15. Our order reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstated the judgment of the Superior Court, Chancery Division. This opinion now follows. The United States Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1, on custody adjudications. See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947) (<HOLDING>); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that another states reservation of personal jurisdiction over a florida resident for the purpose of modifying its decree may last as long as the effectiveness of the decree and that no dueprocess violation occurs by the entry of a default modification against the florida resident if the florida resident was afforded proper notice (B) holding new york could lawfully modify a florida custody decree because florida court had right under florida law to change the decree (C) holding that florida courts would apply florida law to contracts insuring real property located within the state (D) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (E) holding north carolina had authority to modify new york custody decree if the north carolina court found changed circumstances because new york decree was modifiable under new york law on showing of changed circumstances


Output: holding that another states reservation of personal jurisdiction over a florida resident for the purpose of modifying its decree may last as long as the effectiveness of the decree and that no dueprocess violation occurs by the entry of a default modification against the florida resident if the florida resident was afforded proper notice