In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

for ‘non-generic burglary’ does not.” United States v. Rainer, 616 F.3d 1212, 1213 (11th Cir.2010). A “generic” burglary is “any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). A “non-generic” burglary is one that “do[es] not include all of the elements essential to generic burglaries,” including burglaries of boats, automobiles, and other non-buildings. Rainer, 616 F.3d at 1214. The government has a legitimate interest in “prevent[ing] repeat offenders from continuing to victimize society.” See United States v. Johns, 984 F.2d 1162, 1164 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court in Taylor determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding substantive due process not violated when licensing decisions are based on scheme rationally related to a governmental interest (B) holding that the particular method is not rationally related to legitimate government interest if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable (C) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection as rule was uniformly applied not arbitrary and rationally related to legitimate government interest (D) recognizing due process concerns inherent in sentencing based on false criminal history (E) holding that sentencing criminals in part based on criminal history is rationally related to a legitimate government interest
(E)

the Title VII limitations period is an affirmative defense; rather, it referred to the filing period as something "like a statute of limitations” which "generally create affirmative defenses.” See Gordon, 675 F.2d at 360. Furthermore, Gordon's discussion came in response to the defendant’s (rejected) claim that the filing period was jurisdictional and did not purport to address, let alone decide, whether compliance with the filing deadline was condition precedent or an affirmative defense. 13 . Plaintiffs have not argued waiver, estoppel, or that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply to cure their tardy filings, and based on the facts before us, we see nothing demanding their application. See, e.g., Biester v. Midwest Health Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Rather, each housekeeper who was told to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that equitable tolling of a statute of limitations may be triggered 1 where a plaintiff has actively pursued his judicial remedies by a filing a defective pleading during the statutory period or 2 where a plaintiff was induced or tricked by his adversarys misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass (B) holding that equitable tolling applied where insurance company statements and conduct lulled plaintiff and his attorney into believing that plaintiffs uninsured motorist claim was properly filed (C) recognizing equitable tolling in the title vii context where the plaintiff has been deceived lulled into inaction actively misled or has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her rights quotations and citations omitted (D) holding equitable tolling appropriate where a party is prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights (E) holding title vii subject to equitable tolling
(C)

part: "If no objections have been timely filed, the court shall forthwith enter judgment on the referee’s report.” 2 . An amended order was entered on December 22, 2009, to correct a typographical error. 3 . Prejudgment interest awarded to a successful defendant on a counterclaim accrues from the date the counterclaim, not the plaintiff's complaint, is filed. Uncle Henry’s, Inc. v. Plaut Consulting, Inc., 382 F.Supp.2d 150, 154 (D.Me.2005) (interpreting 14 M.R.S. § 1602-B(5) (2009)). 4 . We recognized an exception to this general rule with respect to post-judgment interest on certain child support arrearage claims, which were deemed to be a "unique area of the law.” Walsh v. Cusack, 2008 ME 74, ¶ 9, 946 A.2d 414, 417. 5 . See also Walsh, 2008 ME 74, ¶¶ 10-11, 946 A.2d at 417-18 (<HOLDING>); Tarbuck v. Jaeckel, 2000 ME 105, ¶ 25 n. 5, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1961 applied where the parties agreement failed to specify that the selected interest rate applied to either judgements or judgment debts (B) holding that walsh was entitled to postjudgment interest on child support arrearage but vacating and remanding the arrearage judgment because the judgment did not state the interest rate or specify that the interest was fully or partially waived as required by section 1602c (C) holding that the insured was entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney fees as found by the jury (D) holding that state property tax liens are not entitled to the states statutory interest rate as a matter of law rather the appropriate rate of interest is determined by the equities of each case (E) holding as a mutter of law that divorce actions are civil actions within the meaning of the postjudgment interest statute and that the wife was entitled to postjudgment interest under the statute with respect to unpaid spousal support payments ordered under a divorce judgment

(B)