In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: amount and terms of the deductions ...” In case of any failure to pay wages due to an employee as required by Section 41-10-40 or 41-10-50 the employee may recover in a civil action an amount equal to three times the full amount of the unpaid wages, plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as the court may allow. § 41-10-80(C). The South Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted this treble damages provision to mean that the decision to award the penalty of treble damages is discretionary, and the penalty should not be imposed “if there is a good faith dispute over wages allegedly due.” Rice, 456 S.E.2d at 383. Fruehauf asks us to extend the requirement that there be a bona fide, good faith wage dispute to require that Wall show that Fruehauf willf 335 S.C. 598, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) (<HOLDING>); O’Neal v. Intermedical Hospital of South 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client (B) holding that the lack of a confidentiality agreement does not necessarily defeat an argument that information is a trade secret because where an employee acquires during the course of his employment a special technique or process developed by his employer he is under a duty not to use it to the detriment of his employer (C) holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm (D) holding that an employee who breaches the duty of loyalty to his employer forfeits his right to compensation and creates a good faith dispute over the payment of his wages by virtue of his bad behavior (E) holding that when an employee is injured by his employers tortious conduct his employer owes him damages and compensation under the act
[A]: recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client


[Q]: it was given voluntarily. If these questions are resolved in favor of the State, then, without being advised of the court’s decision, the jury shall be instructed that they should decide whether in view of all the same circumstances the defendant’s confession is true. If they find that it is not true, then they must treat it as inadmissible and disregard it for purposes of discharging them function as fact finders on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. [Id. at 272, 294 A.2d 23.] See also State v. Thomas, 76 N.J. 344, 366, 387 A.2d 1187 (1978) (reaffirming Hampton principle that trial court is sole arbiter of voluntariness of defendant’s statements and rejecting defendant’s invitation to overrule decision); State v. Bowman, 165 N.J.Super. 531, 537-39, 398 A.2d 908 (App.Div.1979) (<HOLDING>). The New Jersey Rules of Evidence codified the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prosecutors statement to jury on summation that trial court had previously found defendants two confessions voluntary constituted reversible error even though trial court gave hampton charge because it failed to instruct jury to disregard prosecutors statement (B) holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge (C) holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection  and admonished the jury to disregard the statement (D) holding no injury to ashley shown by statement to widow of murder victim that was not in evidence because trial court gave sua sponte instruction to jury to disregard statement and statement did not contradict ashleys testimony (E) holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error
[A]: holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge


[Q]: powers of a President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas; it relied instead on the general language of the portion of the Pennsylvania Constitution which provides that these powers are only available “[ujntil otherwise provided by law,” and that “[t]he exercise of all supervisory and administrative powers detailed in this section sixteen [of Schedule to Article 5, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania] shall be subject to the supervisory and administrative control of the Supreme Court.” Pa. Const, sched. art. 5, § 16(j). Both the supervisory and administrative powers of the President Judge of the Traffic Court and the supervisory and administrative powers of the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas are detailed in section sixteen of the Schedule to Art 3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The cases cited by plaintiff are not to the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing similar duties (B) recognizing that illinois prison regulations for minor disciplinary infractions create  discretion in a number of waysneither the drafting of regulations nor their interpretation can be reduced to an exact science our past decisions suggest however that the most common manner in which a state creates a liberty interest is by establishing substantive predicates to govern official decisionmaking and further by mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been metthompson 490 us at 462 109 sct at 1909 citations omitted if however the ultimate resolution is left to the discretion of the prison officials then no protectible liberty interest is created pardo 946 f2d at 1284 moreover thompson required that the state law include  explicitly mandatory language ie specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the regulations substantive predicates are present a particular outcome must follow in order to create a liberty interest id at 1281 quoting thompson 490 us at 463 109 sct at 1910 when a state chooses to establish procedural guidelines it does not create an independent substantive right id at 1282 in williams for instance the seventh circuit court of appeals cited a number of cases which held that there is no liberty interest in the following areas no liberty interest in a particular wing of a prison no liberty interest in remaining in the prisons general population no liberty interest in remaining in a certain state institution and no liberty interest in remaining in the state prison system rather than the federal system williams 837 f2d at 309 only statutes or rules attaching consequences to particular circumstances give prisoners liberty or property interests wallace v robinson 940 f2d 243 246 7th cir1991the sixth circuit court of appeals found that a liberty interest was created by a tennessee regulation long v norris 929 f2d 1111 1117 6th cir1991 the long court found that the regulation contained mandatory language sufficient to give rise to a liberty interest citing to the word shall as the regulation used it also the ninth circuit court of appeals ruled that a washington prison regulation created a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment mendoza v blodgett 960 f2d 1425 1431 9th cir1992 but see caraballosandoval v honsted 35 f3d 521 11th cir1994 finding that no liberty interest was created by a regulation that gave the warden discretion to restrict visitation for reasons such as securitythe illinois statute in question that might give rise to liberty interest is illinois revised statute chapter 38 paragraph 100372 subsection f subsection  provides in pertinent part as followsall of the institutions and facilities of the department shall permit every committed person to receive visitors except in ease of abuse of the visiting privilege or when the chief administrative officer determines that such visiting would be harmful or dangerous to the security safety or morale of the institution or facility clergy religious chaplain and attorney visiting privileges shall be as broad as the security of the institution or facility will allowillrevstat ch 38 para 100372 district courts in this circuit have addressed subsection f and found that a liberty interest was created see jenkins v lane no 86 c 0059 1989 wl 84474 ndill july 20 1989 logan v lane 83 c 2504 1989 wl 112726 ndill sept 15 1989 in 1987 judge shadur addressed the language of subsection  united states ex rel adams v oleary 659 fsupp 736 739 ndill 1987 in adams judge shadur held that subsection  certainly creates a liberty interest in receiving visitors that case cited olim v wa  sufficiently definite to constitute objective criteria as defined by olimin addition the seventh circuit acknowledged the adams holding and the possibility that subsection  created a liberty interest but the appellate court found that the issue remained open for the seventh circuit see mayo v lane 867 f2d 374 376 7th cir1989 similarly the illinois appellate court interpreted subsection  as creating a right for inmates to receive visitors swope v northern illinois gas co 251 illapp3d 850 191 illdee 251 623 ne2d 841 1993 in view of these decisions this court is persuaded that subsection  contains language which is sufficiently m h cir 1988 (C) holding that the inmate had no cognizable due process claim because he had no liberty interest in being free from disciplinary segregation (D) holding that when an employee had his duties changed but had no interest created or protected by the constitution or state law in those duties then no liberty interest claim was stated (E) holding that one claim was not preempted because it did not allege the violation of duties created by any welfare plan but a violation of duties as a past employer
[A]:
recognizing similar duties