In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: in the record of any possible medical treatment that Monroe County or the individual defendants could have provided to save the life of the Decedent. Phillips argues in her brief that it is not necessary for her to prove chemotherapy would have saved the Decedent’s life. First, she refers to the fright and anxiety both she and the Decedent suffered because of the delay in chemotherapy. In this regard, Phillips confuses the causation issue. In a survival action, damages for the Decedent’s physical suffering and mental anxiety as a result of the alleged deprivation of medical care would have been appropriate. In a wrongful death context, however, no damages are available until the plaintiff has cleared the causation hurdle. See Wilks v. Am. Tobacco Co., 680 So.2d 839, 842 (Miss.1996) (<HOLDING>). Second, Phillips suggests that she need only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (B) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (C) holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother (D) holding that a failure to include a beneficiary in a wrongful death action is a defect because the wrongful death act restricts plaintiffs to a single action (E) holding that mississippis wrongful death statute creates an independent cause of action
[A]: recognizing cause of action for wrongful death


[Q]: Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word “claimant” in subsection four. Under the plurality’s view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word “claimant” in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of “prevailing party.” This is because, in order for the word “claimant” in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid
[A]: holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence


[Q]: 462 F.Sd 237 (3d Cir.2006), for support. We review the District Court’s interpretation of its legal authority at sentencing de novo. United States v. Pojilenko, 416 F.3d 243, 246 (3d Cir.2005). We note, at the outset, that the District Court imposed a sentence below the Advisory Guidelines, albeit for reasons other than the crack/powder cbcaine differential. The recerd demonstrates the District Court clearly understood the mandate of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and recognized its discretion with respect to the guidelines. The District Court properly considered' and then declined Edge’s request to vary from the guidelines based on the differential. See Kimbrough v. United States, 522 U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 558, 563-65, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Gunter, 462 F.3d at 249 (“[T]he District 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the cocaine guidelines  are advisory only (B) holding that even though the guidelines are advisory a district court must accurately calculate and consult the defendants guidelines range (C) recognizing that under the booker remedial regime  the guidelines are no longer mandatory but are only advisory (D) holding that the pennsylvania sentencing guidelines are purely advisory in nature (E) recognizing only that the guidelines must be advisory not that judges may find no facts
[A]:
holding that even though the guidelines are advisory a district court must accurately calculate and consult the defendants guidelines range