In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: venue, the propriety of venue is fixed in the county chosen by the plaintiff. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.063 (Vernon 1986); Tex.R.Civ.P. 86-1. If a defendant objects to the plaintiffs venue choice and properly challenges that choice through a motion to transfer venue, the question of proper venue is raised. Tex.R.Civ.P. 86. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that venue is maintainable in the county of suit. Id. 87-2(a). If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the trial court must transfer the lawsuit to another specified county of proper venue. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.063(1) (“The court ... shall transfer an action to another county of proper venue if ... the county in which the action is pending is not a proper county....”); Tieuel, 654 S.W.2d at 775 (<HOLDING>). If the plaintiff meets the burden, the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings (B) recognizing that the plaintiff has the right to file suit in any permissible county (C) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (D) holding that even if venue was improper the case should have been transferred not dismissed (E) recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue

A: holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings
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Q: claim because "she was not diligent in preserving her legal rights”); Felty, 818 F.2d at 1129 ("One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.”) (quoting Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)); United States ex rel. Cogifer, S.A. v. Ins. Co. of North Am., Civ. A. No. 86-183-NN, 1987 WL 19932, at *4 (E.D.Va. Oct. 15, 1987) (unpublished). 11 . See, e.g., Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir. 1990). 12 . See, e.g., Humble Oil, 402 F.2d at 896 (finding equitable estoppel where surety reneged on promise to pay after statute of limitations had run). 13 . See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nelson v. Reliance Ins. Co., 436 F.2d 1366, 1371 (10th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Atlas Erection Co. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation (B) holding that an agreement which required the submission of an affidavit of payment to subcontractors or lien waivers before payment was made by the general contractor was for the direct benefit of the subcontractors (C) holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors (D) holding that estoppel applied where surety repeatedly responded to subcontractors threats to sue with answers which assured them that amicable settlement was just around the corner (E) holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety

A: holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation
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Q: two challenging the summary judgment in favor of Savannah on its release affirmative defense. Because we have concluded the trial court properly granted Savannah’s motion for summary judgment on Savannah’s release defense, which is dispositive of this appeal, we need not address the remainder of sub-issues two and three. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1. VI. Conclusion We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not continuing the submission date of Savannah’s summary judgment motions, and therefore, we overrule D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s first sub-issue. We also hold the trial court did t, to preserve error, trial court must have expressly or implicitly ruled on request, objection, or motion), and Williams v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 15 S.W.3d 110, 114-15 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 5 . D.R. Horton and DRHI also complain on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was error for trial court not to grant a continuance when appellant moved in open court to disqualify judge or in the alternative for a continuance to file a proper motion (B) holding that trial court did not err in ruling on appellees motion for summary judgment before appellees complied with appellants discovery request when the record reflected that appellant filed a motion to compel three days before the hearing and the record did not reveal any effort on the part of appellant to secure a ruling from the trial court on its motion to compel or object at the trial court hearing the motion for summary judgment prior to ruling on the motion to compel (C) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment (D) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (E) holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing

A:
holding it was error for trial court not to grant a continuance when appellant moved in open court to disqualify judge or in the alternative for a continuance to file a proper motion
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