instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
judicial review of an arbitration award. See UHC Management Co., 148 F.3d at 998 (“ “We may not set an award aside simply because ... the arbitrators erred in interpreting the law or in determining the facts.’ ”) (quoting Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 751). This third challenge is nonetheless partially cognizable, but only to the extent it can be read as an assertion that there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, a statutory ground under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2), as a claim of misconduct by the arbitrators in refusing to hear evidence or to provide a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, another statutory ground under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3), or as an extra-statutory challenge to the “fundamental fairness” of the proceedings. See P & P Indus., Inc., 179 F.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>). Hoffman’s fourth challenge is to the denial 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit (B) holding right to be fundamental (C) holding that section 34810 is an adequate and independent state ground (D) recognizing plain or fundamental error (E) recognizing review for fundamental unfairness of the proceedings as an independent extrastatutory ground
answer:
recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit


question:
a threat to water quality because they do not introduce any invasive species from outside the Great Lakes. EPA has properly rejected this argument, noting that Lakers can spread or more rapidly distribute invasive species already present, in the Great Lakes. Id. at 501. 16 . Federal regulation permits such limits to be expressed narratively if the calculation of numeric limits is "infeasible.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(k)(3). 17 . EPA also claims general prohibitions can be BMPs, citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, but does not offer an example of something as general as the WQBEL standard being found to be a BMP. As discussed herein, the EPA’s charac-terizationis inconsistent with regulations that require WQBELs to "ensure compliance.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d); see Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (<HOLDING>). 18 . EPA’s response is that petitioners’ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation (B) holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation (C) holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (D) holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (E) holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation
answer:
holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation


question:
guilty. [¶ 8] Rule 11(a)(1) establishes that a defendant must be treated as having pled not guilty if the court has refused to accept a guilty or nolo contendere plea. If the court does not affirmatively accept the plea and decides instead to reserve its decision, such action constitutes a refusal, at least temporarily, to accept the plea. See 1 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 11.2 at IV-27 (1992) (“If the court decides to accept the plea, it does so affirmatively on the record.”). By operation of Rule 11(a)(1), therefore, Willis’s decision to retract his nolo contendere pleas, communicated to the court prior to its acceptance of the pleas, required the court to enter pleas of not guilty on Willis’s behalf. Accord North Dakota v. Welch, 356 N.W.2d 147, 149 (N.D.1984) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 9] We hasten to add that if the court had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant who is allowed to withdraw his plea must either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the state (B) holding jeopardy attaches when the guilty plea is accepted (C) holding criminal defendant does not have constitutional right to have guilty plea accepted by court (D) holding that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea as a matter of right before it is accepted by the court based on ndr crim p 32d3 which states that a defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty as a matter of right once the plea has been accepted by the court  alteration in original (E) holding that a criminal defendant must provide a fair and just reason to support withdrawal of his guilty plea even when that plea has not yet been accepted by the district court
answer:

holding that a defendant who is allowed to withdraw his plea must either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the state