instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
indorsers, and other persons conditionally liable also receive benefits from payment of the debt. If called on to pay, guarantors and the like would have been creditors; the “benefit” to them is that extinguishing the primary debt means that they receive a larger percentage of their claim than they would have had they paid and been converted to general creditors of the bankrupt. Cases under the 1898 Act routinely held that unless a person escapes an obligation to pay and so reaps a larger portion of his claim than do other creditors, he has not received a statutory “benefit”. E.g., Mayes v. Palmer, 208 F. 97 (8th Cir.1913); Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 F. 850 (5th Cir.1924); Mansfield Lumber Co. v. Sternberg, 38 F.2d 614 (8th Cir.1930). See also Bonded Financial, 838 F.2d at 895-96 (<HOLDING>). The Liquidator has not identified, and we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subparagraphs a and b are mutually exclusive and thus any travel between work and home even if it is also for a dual purpose must be analyzed exclusively under paragraph a (B) holding that transferee and beneficiary are mutually exclusive categories (C) holding trial court is sole and exclusive judge of witnesses credibility (D) holding that the remedies are exclusive (E) recognizing that  1983 and  2254 proceedings are mutually exclusive so that if a claim can be properly raised in one of those proceedings it cannot be raised in the other type of proceeding
answer:
holding that subparagraphs a and b are mutually exclusive and thus any travel between work and home even if it is also for a dual purpose must be analyzed exclusively under paragraph a


question:
are reasonably susceptible to two different interpretations, and therefore are ambiguous. See Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Keller Transp., Inc., 382 Mont. 72, 365 P.3d 465, 470 (Mont. 2016). Montana law construes ambiguous provisions “against the insurer and in favor of extending coverage.” Id. We therefore reject United Fire’s argument that the Premises Endorsements limit coverage to incidents that occurred on the St. George premises. Because the Premises Endorsements purport to cover claims “arising out of ... the use of’ the St. George premises, they are sufficiently capacious to include coverage for bodily injury in Montana that flows from or grows out of the use of the St. George premises. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ferrin, 311 Mont. 155, 54 P.3d 21, 23 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Thus, United Fire had a duty to defend 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arising out of exclusion applies to claims flowing from or growing out of the excluded activity (B) holding that the phrase arising out of the use is ambiguous and interpreting it as originating from or growing out of or flowing from (C) holding that insurance provisions excluding damage arising out of the use of land motor vehicles subject to registration and damage arising out of the use of land motor vehicles if the injury or damage occurs away from the insured premises were ambiguous because together they could be read in four different ways (D) holding claim for injuries arising out of use of truck and not from negligent supervision excluded from coverage by auto exclusion in commercial general liability policy no claim that language in policy was ambiguous or unclear (E) holding phrase arising out of the ownership maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as contained in um policy should be given same interpretation as in automobile liability policies
answer:
holding that an arising out of exclusion applies to claims flowing from or growing out of the excluded activity


question:
does not justify a warrant-less blood draw from a driver who refuses to consent... or objects to the blood draw .... Consent to a search must be voluntary."); State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 (Idaho 2014) (same); Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939, 946 (Nev. 2014) ("The implied consent provision . . . does not allow a driver to withdraw consent, thus a driver's so-called consent cannot be considered voluntary. Accordingly, we conclude that [the implied consent provision] is unconstitutional."); State v. Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 243 (S.D. 2014) (ruling that a Fourth Amendment totality of the circumstances analysis must be performed to determine whether consent to a blood draw taken pursuant to state implied consent law was voluntary); Aviles v. State, 443 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) (<HOLDING>). 5 People v. Hyde, 393 P.3d 962, 966 (Colo. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required (B) holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test (C) holding that implied consent and blood draw statutes are not permissible exceptions to the warrant requirement and stating that to hold otherwise flies in the face of mcneelys repeated mandate that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances of each case (D) recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances (E) holding that independent of the implied consent law the fourth amendment requires an arrestees consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw
answer:

holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required