instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
enter a residence without a warrant if an objectively reasonable basis exists for the officer to believe that there is an immediate need for police assistance for the protection of life or substantial property interests.” Seibert v. State, 923 So.2d 460, 468 (Fla. 2006) (citing Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278, 293-94 (Fla. 1997)). Whether an emergency actually existed is immaterial “so long as the officer reasonably believes it to exist because of objectively reasonable facts. The officer’s conclusion then may be based on a combination of the ‘objective’ nature of the circumstances and the officer’s ‘subjective’ perception of those circumstances.” State v. Boyd, 615 So.2d 786, 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); see also Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1559, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (<HOLDING>). The record supports that law enforcement 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable (B) holding that in determining prejudice a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury (C) holding that the court must consider the totality of the circumstance when determining whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant (D) holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith (E) holding a search permissible where the officer reasonably believed he faced an emergency situation that would result in the destruction of evidence
answer:
(C)


question:
was safe to operate, afforded discretion to the FAA to “make its own findings” whether the submitted documentation satisfied that requirement. Id. Likewise, as the district court noted, 49 C.F.R. § 385.17(f) is not a “check list.” J.A. at 105. It leaves it to the FMCSA to determine whether a carrier’s submission provides evidence that corrective action has been taken, and whether the agency has the resources to reach a final decision within 45 days. Such decisions, which relate to a regulatory agency’s “implementation of a mechanism for compliance review” and necessarily require “balancing the objectives sought to be obtained against such practical considerations as staffing and funding,” constitute discretionary functions themselves. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 819-20, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (<HOLDING>). Discretion thus suffuses 49 C.F.R. § 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver (B) holding that the faas alleged negligence in failing to check certain specific items in the course of certificating a specific aircraft as part of a spotcheck program involved calculated risks but fell squarely within the discretionary function exception (C) holding that actions against the faa for its alleged negligence in certificating aircraft for use in commercial aviation are barred by the discretionary function exception of the federal tort claims act id at 821 104 sct 2755 because the faas decisions as to the manner of enforcing regulations is plainly a discretionary activity id at 819 21 104 sct 2755 (D) holding that the faas application of a spotcheck system to a particular aircraft was a discretionary function (E) holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision 
answer:
(D)


question:
fears that are chimerical and those that are realistic. The best that we have been able to do is to insist that, in these purlieus, standing requires an “objectively reasonable” fear of prosecution. Id.; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972) (stating that “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ [produced by government intelligence-gathering] are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm”). Determining objective reasonableness demands a frank consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the conduct that a particular statute proscribes. See New Hampshire Right to Life, 99 F.3d at 16; cf. Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 43 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Association intends to solicit new 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable (B) holding that the qualified immunity determination does not entail an inquiry into the officers subjective intentions merely his knowledge (C) holding that reasonableness for qualified immunity purposes requires an objective inquiry into the totality of the circumstances (D) holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances (E) holding that the courts inquiry into the reasonableness of the governments proposed corrective action was proper
answer:

(C)