In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. 6 . The Supreme Court of Connecticut has already rejected the ¡ex loci delicti rule in workers’ compensation actions in favor of “interest analysis” and the Restatement (Second) “most significant relationship” approach. See Simaitis v. Flood, 182 Conn. 24, 29-33, 437 A.2d 828, 831-32 (1980); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 181 (1971). 7 . See Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-555 (1977) (measure of wrongful death recovery equal to value of decedent’s life and expenses); Marko v. Stop and Shop, Inc., 169 Conn. 550, 553, 364 A.2d 217, 219 (1975) (<HOLDING>); see also Halstead II, supra, 535 F.Supp. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective (B) holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control (C) recognizing that a violation of the mbta is a strict liability offense (D) recognizing the significance of control in strict products liability (E) recognizing strict product liability actions

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: opens the door by suggesting the victim’s behavior is inconsistent with that of an abused child. As noted below, many other courts have allowed testimony that a child victim’s behavior or symptoms are “consistent with” child abuse trauma as rebuttal evidence. That is not what happened in this case. Just two years ago, in State v. Favoccia, the Supreme Court of Connecticut thor oughly reviewed the conflicting precedent and policy considerations in reaching the same conclusion we reach today. 306 Conn. 770, 51 A.3d 1002, 1012-22 (2012). The Favoccia court overturned its own precedent to hold that “the trial court abused its discretion in permitting [the expert] to testify about the complainant’s behaviors being consistent -with those generally characteristic 6, 671 N.E.2d 984, 985 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Chamberlain, 137 N.H. 414, 628 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (B) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (C) holding admission of expert testimony not erroneous where expert described typical traits and characteristics of sexually abused children (D) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case (E) holding that the testimony of an expert witness is admissible when the witness outlines the general characteristics of sexually abused children and then states that the victims symptoms are consistent with those characteristics

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: 286 (1996). Instead, “[a]pportionment of a fee award between fees incurred on a contract cause of action and those incurred on other causes of action is within the trial court’s discretion.” Id. In this case, appellants do not challenge the district court’s conclusion that Datacom’s tort and contract claims were inextricably intertwined. Therefore, we affirm the attorney’s fee award against Datacom. However, Moore was not a party to the Charter contract, or to Datacom’s causes of action based on contract. As a result, Moore would not have been entitled to fees against Charter had Moore prevailed on his tort claims. We therefore hold Charter is not entitled to fees from Moore by prevailing on contract claims against Datacom. See Abdallah, 43 Cal.App.4th at 1111, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 286 (<HOLDING>); Hsu v. Abbara, 9 Cal.4th 863, 870, 39 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees (B) holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed (C) holding that the plaintiff who prevailed in an ipra enforcement action was entitled to an award of damages fees and costs (D) holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 usc  1983 claim was entitled to an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal (E) holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees


Output: (B)