In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court’s order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants’ arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: policy becomes a composite of factors that bear on a better answer to the question, ‘How shall the losses be distributed?’ ”). Slain and Kripke argued that “[t]he situation with which we are concerned involves two risks: (1) the risk of business insolvency from whatever cause; and (2) the risk of illegality in securities issuance.” Slain & Kripke, supra, at 286. Analyzing the first risk — that of business insolvency-Slain and Kripke observed that the absolute priority rule allocates this risk to shareholders. Under the absolute priority rule, “stockholders seeking to recover their investments cannot be paid before provable creditor claims have been satisfied in full.” Id. at 261; see generally Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 520-21, 61 S.Ct. 675, 85 L.Ed. 982 (1941) (<HOLDING>); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims raised in later litigation were barred because they could have been fully litigated in chapter 11 reorganization process (B) holding that stockholders cannot participate in a plan of reorganization unless creditors claims have been satisfied in full (C) holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions (D) holding that remedies provided in the bankruptcy code for enforcing a chapter 11 plan of reorganization are not exclusive (E) holding that debtor whose plan of reorganization had been confirmed by bankruptcy court could not later bring lender liability claims against creditors where those claims could have been raised in bankruptcy proceeding

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: While R.E. concerned the use of retrospective testimony by DOE to support a finding that it provided a child a FAPE, the court’s rejection of E.Z.-L.’s substantive challenge introduced doubt about whether parents could prospectively challenge their child’s educational placement without first enrolling the child in the recommended placement school. DOE argued that R.E. foreclosed all such prospective challenges on the basis that they are inherently speculative. The argument found some acceptance. See, e.g., E.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 13 Civ. 6709, 2014 WL 4332092, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2014) (rejecting prospective challenge as “impermissibly speculative and premature”); P.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 13 Civ. 4772, 2014 WL 3673603, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (<HOLDING>). But most courts did not adopt this hardline 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student (B) holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement (C) holding that the sro correctly concluded that a challenge tothe does choice of school is improper where the student never attended the school (D) holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school (E) holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver


Output: (C)