In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: justification was pretextual.” Smith v. District of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C.Cir.2005) (quoting Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C.Cir.2005)). The court should assess the plaintiffs challenge to the employer’s explanation in light of the totality of the circumstances of the case. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1291. The strength of the plaintiffs prima fa-cie case, especially the existence of a causal connection, can be a significant factor in his attempt to rebut the defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289 n. 4 (stating that “a prima facie case that strongly suggests intentional discrimination may be enough by itself to survive summary judgment”); Laurent v. Bureau of Rehab., Inc., 544 F.Supp.2d 17, 23 n. 5 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Meadows v. Mukasey, 555 F.Supp.2d 205, 211-13 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position (B) holding that the plaintiff demonstrated pretext in part by establishing a causal connection (C) holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity (D) holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury (E) holding that the plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word “claimant” in subsection four. Under the plurality’s view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word “claimant” in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of “prevailing party.” This is because, in order for the word “claimant” in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: Inc., No. 02-0260 at 6-7 (BRB Dec. 17, 2002). We agree with the Board that we need not read the phrase “customarily used” as modifying “pier” in order to arrive at the conclusion that the term “pier” in § 903(a) does not include every conceivable structure built on pilings over land and water, but rather only those serving some maritime purpose. The maritime nature of the LHWCA imparts a meaning to § 903(a)’s enumerat ed terms that goes beyond their use in ordinary language. Congress enacted the LHWCA pursuant to its maritime jurisdiction, having been twice rebuffed by the Supreme Court in its initial attempts to use state workers’ compensation laws to cover injuries occurring in navigable waters. Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 117, 82 S.Ct. 1196, 8 L.Ed.2d 368 (1962) (<HOLDING>); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in enacting title vii congress abrogated eleventh amendment immunity (B) holding that congress acted within constitutionally conferred authority in enacting mdlea (C) holding congress did not exceed its authority in enacting the mdlea (D) holding that congress invoked its constitutional maritime power in enacting the lhwca in 1927 (E) holding generally that congress validly abrogated state immunity in enacting title vii


Output: (D)