In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

Output: holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241


Input: Consider Input: evaluate each piece of evidence according to its independent worth. B. The Copyright Act of 1909 The plaintiff renewed its copyright in The URANTIA Book in 1983, by which time the Copyright Act of 1976 had become effective. However, the renewal section under which the book falls, Section 304, is identical to that of Section 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909. Furthermore, as the plaintiff correctly states, “[t]he passage of the [1976 Act] did not alter the definition of a Svork for hire’ for the purpose of renewing a copyright originally registered under the [1909 Act].... Thus, whether The URANTIA Book is a ‘eommis-sioned work’ must be decided under the Copyright Act of 1909.” (Pl.’s Br. at 5 n. 4.) See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 217, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 1758, 109 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 606 n. 2 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court (B) holding renewal rights in pre1978 works require court to look to the language of and case law interpreting  24 (C) recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result (D) holding that if statutory language is plain and unambiguous this court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent (E) holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language

Output: holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court


Input: Consider Input: at 267. More importantly, even if an offer of judgment to a plaintiff is comprehensive and undisputed, courts will not dismiss the case as moot if there is a pending motion for conditional certification and additional individuals have opted in the litigation. See, e.g., Velasquez, 842 F.Supp.2d at 488 (“In view of the facts that an opt-in plaintiff has been identified and a motion for conditional collective action certification has been made, the court holds that this matter is not moot.”) Rubery, 494 F.Supp.2d at 181 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss as premature in light of plaintiffs pending motion for collective action certification and the joinder of putative class members); Bah v. Shoe Mania, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 9380(LTS)(AJP), 2009 WL 1357223, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2009) (<HOLDING>). In general, “courts are wary of attempts by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members (B) holding that even if the offer of judgment was undisputed the case could not be dismissed in light of plaintiffs pending motion for conditional certification including authorization to issue optin notice to putative class members  and the fact that one additional plaintiff had already joined the action (C) holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action (D) recognizing that in appropriate circumstances the court may limit the parties communications with putative class members prior to decision on conditional certification question in a  216b action (E) holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification


Output: holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members