In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: (Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974), 416 U.S. 663, 40 L. Ed. 2d 452, 94 S. Ct. 2080.) Although Calero-Toledo did not involve the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, the Court in that case emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding is brought against the instrumentality of a crime, rather than against the offender himself. The Calero-Toledo Court noted that the object of the forfeiture is “ ‘primarily considered as the offender ***. [T]he practice has been, and so this Court understand^] the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam.’ ” (Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684, 40 L. Ed. 2d at 468, 94 S. Ct. at 2092, quoting The Palmyra (1827), 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-16, 6 L. Ed. 531, 535-36 (<HOLDING>).) The Calero-Toledo Court also noted, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding claim that prior conviction was not serious felony under californias sentencing law not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding (B) holding that a judgment set forth in a separate document is not a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction where the parties assumed that there was a final judgment (C) holding that a conviction for piracy was not a prerequisite to a proceeding to forfeit a ship allegedly engaged in piratical aggression (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding jeopardy had not attached because the district court was without power to enter a judgment of conviction in a pretrial proceeding
[A]: holding claim that prior conviction was not serious felony under californias sentencing law not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding


[Q]: by the parties. These considerations are consistent with the principle [sic] legislative purpose behind enactment of the Uniform Arbitration Act: to provide and encourage an expedited, efficient, relatively uncomplicated, alternative means of dispute resolution, with limited judicial intervention or participation, and without the primary expense of litigation— attorneys’ fees. Id. at 153-54, 423 S.E.2d at 750. The court concluded that “in arbitration proceedings, both the arbitrator or arbitration panel and the superior courts upon confirmation are limited to applying only [our AR.S. § 12-1510] in determining whether attorneys’ fees should be or were properly awarded.” Id. at 155, 423 S.E. at 751; see also Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis, Inc., 380 Mass. 91, 97, 401 N.E.2d 839, 843 (1980) (<HOLDING>). In our view, to permit a trial court to award 
 Holding statements: (A) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees (B) holding that attorneys fee statute does not overpower the policy expressed in our ars  121510 against the award of attorneys fees in arbitration proceedings (C) holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency (D) holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees (E) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees
[A]: holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees


[Q]: 53 S.W.3d 368, 52 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (recognizing that “[t]he measure of damages to [personal] property that is totally destroyed [by another’s negligence] is its reasonable market value when destroyed”); Shaw Tank Cleaning Co. v. Tex. Pipeline Co., 442 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex.Civ.App.-AmariIlo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (upholding replacement damages awarded by jury for destruction of crude oil storage tank by fire negligently caused by defendant). When the damaged property “has neither a market value nor a real value, but it is shown what it would cost to replace or reproduce the article, then such cost is the measure of recovery.” Int'l-Great N. R.R. Co., 46 S.W.2d at 670; Pringle v. Nowlin, 629 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). It is the plaintiffs burden to show which 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because plaintiffs speech occurred in the reception area of the judge executives office it was only the nature of that limited area and not the general public nature of fiscal court budding within which the office was located that was determinative of the forum (B) holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer (C) holding plaintiff entitled to replace ment value of gold leaf professional sign located in the window of his leased law office when defendants intentionally destroyed it (D) holding that a plaintiff who did not replace a destroyed tractortrailer due to lack of funds and failure to find a suitable replacement could recover for loss of use of the vehicle limited to a reasonable time (E) holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire
[A]:
holding that because plaintiffs speech occurred in the reception area of the judge executives office it was only the nature of that limited area and not the general public nature of fiscal court budding within which the office was located that was determinative of the forum