In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

and sold it to nonre-latives. We conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the property is marital. The form of the transaction, while not dispositive, is compelling in the instant case because of Klem’s knowledge of, and experience with, joint tenancies. Klem was fully aware of how joint tenancies operated. As the husband of Hazel, he became the sole owner of Hazel’s family property as a surviving joint tenant, a fact he acknowledged during his deposition. Subsequent to his sole ownership of the property, he knowingly deeded the property to Larry and Colleen as joint tenants. In so doing, he gave both parties an interest in the property. See Melina v. Melina, 411 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Minn.App.1987); Erdahl v. Erdahl, 384 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Finally, also indicative of the donor’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that devise of real estate to one spouse was nonmarital and noting that had testator intended such property to be devised as marital property he could have designated appellant as a joint tenant (C) holding money received from inheritance as nonmarital property presumptively became marital property when placed in joint account under arkansas law (D) holding that transferring joint property into one partys name for estate planning purposes does not convert marital property into nonmarital property (E) holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property
holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate

by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir.1997). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quotation omitted). We may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.1991). Plaintiff argues that (1) the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ ignored medical evidence of her disability; (2) the ALJ failed to analyze plaintiffs pain properly under Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 162-64 (10th Cir.19 95) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, plaintiff has not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding aljs listing of factors he considered was inadequate when court was left to speculate what specific evidence led the alj to his conclusion (B) holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion (C) holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion and thus the aljs unexplained conclusion was beyond meaningful review (D) holding the record must demonstrate that the alj considered all of the evidence and the alj must discuss  the evidence supporting his decision  the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon and significantly probative evidence he rejects (E) holding an aljs failure to adequately explain the weight given to treating sources opinions not harmless because the aljs reasoning was not sufficiently specific to make clear that the alj recognized and evaluated the treating relationships
holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion

or indirectly by publication, dissemination, solicitation, indorsement or circulation or in any other way to induce directly or indirectly any person to enter or not enter into any obligation or acquire any title or interest in any merchandise or to increase the consumption thereof or to make any loan.... [N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(a).] In light of the language of the CFA, which demonstrates “a clear legislative intent that its provisions be applied broadly in order to accomplish its remedial purpose, namely, to root out consumer fraud,” Lemelledo, supra, 150 N.J. at 264, 696 A.2d 546, these prohibitions and definitions have been found to encompass lenders engaged in alleged loan packing, consisting of force placing insurance at the expense of one taking out a loan. Id. at 266, 696 A.2d 546 (<HOLDING>). As the Court stated: By its terms, the CFA is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that class action was not superior to individual tila rescission action because under truth in lending act a prevailing debtor with a typical loan can expect to receive over 50000 plus attorneys fees and costs in a rescission action and many debtors do in fact bring rescission claims (B) holding that the plain language of the act appears to permit private actions by corporations both in permitting any persondefined to include corporations  to bring an action and in its broad definition of the unlawful acts and practices including any unfair or deceptive act in the conduct of any trade or commerce within new hampshire (C) holding that because the broad language of the cfa appears to include both lending and insurancesales practices we conclude that its terms also include the sale of insurance in conjunction with lending that is loan packing (D) holding failure to allege defendant is a debt collector defeats a fdcpa claim and further holding that nonjudicial foreclosure is not a collection of debt within the meaning of the fdcpa citing citing hulse v ocwen fed bank fsb 195 fsupp2d 1188 1204 dor2002 and ines v countrywide home loans no 08cvl267 2008 wl 4791863 2 sdcal nov 3 2008 this claim is dismissed without prejudicee claim under cal b  pc 17200 et seqplaintiffs claim under california business  professions code 17200 et seq is dismissed without prejudice this claim is premised on viola tions of tila see fac  80 98100 103 the fdcpa see fac 80 98 respa see fac  80 california civil code  19167b see fac  90 california civil code  191610cii see fac  91 california civil code section 1918519211920 and california civil code  1916710c see fac  93 defendant argues at least with regard to the state statutory allegations that this claim is preempted by the home owners loan act 12 usc  1461 et seq hola and its implementing regulations defendant further argues that plaintiffs claims are preempted by tila motion at 92728 n 1california business and professions code  17200 prohibits acts of unfair competition including any 1 unlawful 2 unfair or 3 fraudulent business practice unlawful practices are any activities that are forbidden by law samura v kaiser foundation health plan inc 17 calapp4th 1284 1292 22 cal rptr2d 20 1993 unfair acts are those that offend  an established public policy or are immoral unethical oppressive unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers podolsky v first healthcare corp 50 calapp4th 632 647 58 cal rptr2d 89 1996 internal quotations and citations omitted virtually any state federal or local law can serve as the predicate for an action under  17200 idfirst it must be noted as a matter of bookkeeping that to the extent plaintiffs predicate federal statutory claims under tila respa and fdcpa are time barred andor otherwise dismissed as analyzed above plaintiffs state statutory section 17200 claim predicated on these federal statutory violations likewise must necessarily fail and must also be dismissed without prejudice because they do not state an unlawful ucl claim see eg chabner v united of omaha life ins co 225 f3d 1042 1048 9th cir2000 a court may not allow plaintiff to plead around an absolute bar to relief simply by recasting the cause of action as one for unfair competition internal quotation marks omitted rubio v capital one bank usa 572 fsupp2d 1157 1168 cdcal2008 finding that since plaintiffs tila claim failed plaintiffs ucl claim predicated on tila likewise failed see also smith v state farm mutual automobile ins co 93 calapp4th 700 718 113 calrptr2d 399 2001 celtech commcns inc v los angeles cellular telephone co 20 cal4th 163 180 83 calrptr2d 548 973 p2d 527 1999 stating by proscribing any unlawful business practice section 17200 borrows violations of other law and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable citation omitted thus the court need not address defendants argument that tila preempts a ucl claim that is based on failure to disclose information or materials required by tilathe remainder of defendants preemption argument is focused on the state law claims which defendant argues are preempted by hola hola was enacted by congress to charter savings associations under federal law bank of america v city and county of sf 309 f3d 551 559 9th cir2002 cert denied 538 us 1069 123 sct 2220 155 led2d 1127 2003 and to restore public confidence by creating a nationwide system of federal savings and loan associations to be centrally regulated according to nationwide best practices fid fed sav  loan assn v de la cuesta 458 us 141 160161 102 sct 3014 73 led2d 664 1982 hola and its regulations are a radical and comprehensive response to the inadequacies of the existing state system and so pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory control conference of fed sav  loan assns v stein 604 f2d 1256 1257 1260 9th cir1979 affd 445 us 921 100 sct 1304 63 led2d 754 citations omitted because there has been a history of significant federal presence in national banking the presumption against preemption of state law is inapplicable bank of america 309 f3d at 559 internal quotation marks omittedmoreover through hola congress gave the office of thrift supervision ots broad authority to issue regulations governing thrifts silvas v etrade mortg corp 514 f3d 1001 1005 9th cir2008 citing 12 usc  1464 ots promulgated 12 cfr  5602 section 5602 as a preemption regulation which  has no less preemptive effect than federal statutes  silvas 514 f3d at 1005 quoting de la cuesta 458 us at 153 102 sct 3014 section 5602a provides in pertinent part ots hereby occupies the entire field of lending regulation for federal savings associations ots intends to give federal savings associations maximum flexibility to exercise their lending powers in accordance with a uniform federal scheme of regulation accordingly federal savings associations may extend credit as authorized under federal law including this part without regard to state laws purporting to regulate or otherwise affect their credit activities except to the extent provided in paragraph c of this section section 5602b provides the types of state laws preempted by section 5602a include4 the terms of credit including amortization of loans and the deferral and capitalization of interest and adjustments to the interest rate balance payments due or term to maturity of the loan including the circumstances under which a loan may be called due and payable upon the passage of time or a specified event external to the loan5 loanrelated fees including without limitation initial charges late charges prepayment penalties servicing fees and overlimit fees 9 disclosure and advertising including laws requiring specific statements information or other content to be included in credit application forms credit solicitations billing statements credit contracts or other creditrelated documents and laws requiring creditors to supply copies of credit reports to borrowers or applicants10 processing origination servicing sale or purchase of or investment or participation in mortgagesas noted by the ninth circuit court of appeals in silvas 514 f3d at 1005 and 1005 n 1 the ots has described the correct analysis when evaluating whether a state law is preempted under this regulationwhen analyzing the status of state laws under  5602 the first step will be to determine whether the type of law in question is listed in paragraph b if so the analysis ends there the law is preempted if the law is not covered by paragraph b the next question is whether the law affects lending if it does then in accordance with paragraph a the presumption arises that the law is preempted this presumption can be reversed only if the law can clearly be shown to fit within the confines of paragraph c for these purposes paragraph c is intended to be interpreted narrowly any doubt should be resolved in favor of preemptionots final rule 61 fedreg 50951 5096667 sept 301996section 5602c provides that the types of state laws not preempted to the extent that they only ineidently affect the lending operations of federal savings associations include contract commercial real property and tort lawhere as argued by defendant the claims relating to the loans negative amortization features and teaser rates and failure to provide adjustable rate mortgage disclosure notice brought pursuant to california civil code  19167 andor 1916710c are preempted by 12 cfr  5602b4 and b9 the claim pursuant to california civil code  191610 for improper failure to downwardly adjust a mortgage is rate is preempted by 12 cfr  5602b4 as well the claims relating to notification of changes in interest rate brought pursuant to california civil code  1918519211920 are preempted by 12 cfr  5602b4 as well to the extent plaintiff makes claims relating to inability to qualify for the loan she was given these are preempted by 12 cfr  5602b10 the court can identify no state law claims alleged within the ucl claim that are not preempted by some portion of 12 cfr  5602b see eg coyotzi v countrywide financial corp no cv f 091036 2009 wl 2985497 14 edcal sept 16 2009 as plaintiff may or may not be able to amend subject to rule 11 to allege defendant is not regulated by hola see footnote 12 plaintiffs claims herein based on these state statutory provisions are dismissed without prejudice for the above reasons plaintiffs claim for relief under section 17200 et seq is dismissed without prejudicef claim for quiet titlefinally plaintiff alleges a quiet title claim plaintiff does not cite any statutory or other basis for this claim either in her fac or in her opposition to the motion to dismiss however defendant cites california code of civil procedure  762010 et seq as the relevant statutory hook construing the fac to benefit plaintiff based on the allegations of this claim the court concludes plaintiff intends to bring this claim under the above statutory provision this claim is dismissed without prejudice as plaintiff has alleged no ability to tenderthe purpose of a quiet title action is to determine all conflicting claims to the property in controversy and to decree to each such interest or estate therein as he may be entitled to newman v cornelius 3 calapp3d 279 284 83 calrptr 435 1970 citation omitted california code of civil procedure  760010 pro vides for an action to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property or any interest therein and section 761020 mandates a verified complaint that includes 1 a legal description and street address of the subject real property 2 the title of plaintiff as to which determination is sought and the basis of the title 3 the adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought 4 the date as of which the determination is sought and 5 a prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims calcode civ proc  761020in order to allege a claim to quiet title plaintiff must allege ability to tender the amounts admittedly borrowed arnolds mgmt corp v eischen 158 cal app3d 575 578 205 calrptr 15 1984 miller v provost 26 calapp4th 1703 1707 33 calrptr2d 288 1994 citations omitted a mortgagor of real property cannot without paying his debt quiet his title against the mortgagee citations omitted see also connors v home loan corp 2009 us dist lexis 48638 2009 wl 1615989 at 7 sdcal2009 in the absence of allegations of ability to tender indebtedness and foreclosure irregularities plaintiffs quiet title claim fails pesayco v world savings inc cv 093926 2009 us dist lexis 73299 35 cdcal july 29 2009 as previously discussed plaintiff has failed to allege an ability to tender thus plaintiffs quiet title claim is dismissed without prejudice to plaintiffs right to amendv conclusiontherefore motion to dismiss docket no 12 is denied as moot the motion to dismiss docket no 24 is granted infull and plaintiffs claims are dismissed without prejudice plaintiff shall have twenty 20 days in which to file a second amended complaint sac failure to timely file a sac within 20 days will result in the sua sponte dismissal of this action with prejudiceit is so ordered1 the court advised plaintiff on september 1 2009 that further failure to comply with the local rules may lead to penalties pursuant to local rule 837 the court did not at that time deny the pending motion to dismiss docket no 12 which pertained to the complaint that has now been superseded by the fac the court now looks to the fac and to the motion to dismiss and other papers filed in connection with the fac accordingly the previous motion to dismiss docket no 12 is denied as moot2 this threeday period may be extended as long as the lender fails to provide material disclosures a point validly made by plaintiff but unnecessary to the decision here see lagrone v johnson 534 f2d 1360 1362 9th cir1976 we agree with the district court that the three omissions were material the threeday period for rescission therefore did not run and the notice of rescission filed by mrs lagrone was timely citing ljepava v mlsc properties inc 511 f2d 935 944 9th cir1975 sosa v fite 498 f2d 114 118 5th cir1974 see 12 cfr  22623a3 n 48 as amended effective date october 1 2009 as to what constitutes material disclosures defendant does not argue in the motion to dismiss that the tila rescission claim is time barred and the court makes no holding on the issue3 see eg lagrone v johnson 534 f2d 1360 1362 9th cir1976 powers v sims  levin 542 f2d 1216 1222 4th cir1976 what we do hold is that when rescission is attempted under circumstances which would deprive the lender of its legal due the attempted rescission will not be judicially enforced unless it is so conditioned that the lender will be assured of receiving its legal due rudisell v fifth third bank 622 f2d 243 254 6th cir1980 tila clearly does not require the debtor to tender first it contemplates the creditor tendering first but upon the creditor fulfilling its obligations under the statute the debtor then must tender since rescission is an equitable remedy the court may condition the return of monies to the debtor upon the return of property to the creditor citations omitted emphasis added fdic v dev co 938 f2d 889 890 8th cir1991 tila generally provides that the creditor shall perform first ie return monies paid by the debtor and release its security interest however the act gives courts discretion to devise other procedures 15 usc  1635b including conditioning rescissions upon the debtors prior return of the principal defendant also cites to luciano v weyerhaeuser mortg co 200 fedappx 628 630 9th cir2006 however that opinion is not citable in this context pursuant to ninth circuit rule 3634 the fac alleges that the tender demand requested an itemization of the loan disbursements the loan charges the current principal balance and all payments received  so that we may determine the exact amount needed for tender see fac  52 ex 7 and that because wachovia did not respond plaintiff was not able to tender the exact and definite amount even though the court chooses to assume on this motion that such information would not also be in the hands of a typical reasonable borrower there is still no allegation in the fac of any ability to tender any amount whatsoever5 the full relevant paragraph of the yamamoto opinion statesas rescission under  1635b is an ongoing process consisting of a number of steps there is no reason why a court that may alter the sequence of procedures after deciding that rescission is warranted may not do so before deciding that rescission is warranted when it finds that assuming grounds for rescission exist rescission still could not be enforced because the borrower cannot comply with the borrowers rescission obligations no matter what such a decision lies within the courts equitable discretion taking into consideration all the circumstances including the nature of the violations and the borrowers ability to repay the proceeds if as was the case here it is clear from the evidence that the borrower lacks capacity to pay back what she has received less interest finance charges etc the court does not lack discretion to do before trial what it could do afteryamamoto 329 f3d at 11736 see also in re wepsic 231 br 768 776 sdcal 1998 the court finds that wepsics proposal of treating josephsons claim as unsecured and paying her over the course of three or more years cuts against the purpose of rescission which is to return both parties to the status quo ante quenzer v advanta mortgage corp usa 288 br 884 888 dkan2003 within the meaning of tila rescission does not mean an annulment that is definitively accomplished by unilateral pronouncement but rather a remedy that restores the status quo ante7 of course that does not mean that we limit ourselves to the provision in perfect isolation we must instead construe that provision with the statutory scheme in which it is embedded in re bce west lp 319 f3d at 11708the court notes that language in a great many cases appears garbled admittedly because cases speak of equitably conditioning the rescission even though what they really are talking about is equitably modifying the conditioned procedural order in which tila says a rescission will place see eg fdic v hughes development co inc 938 f2d 889 890 8th cir1991 but as previously discussed while not a model of clarity in some respects the statutory and regulatory language at issue do seem to state fairly clearly irrespective of whether or not a security interest is terminated before or after a tender that money received by borrowers shall be tendered back at some procedural point9 one allegation by plaintiff deserves a more detailed response in this regard first plaintiff makes a serious allegation that the promissory note and the deed of trust for the mortgage transaction listed different amounts see fac  21 stating the amount of the loan in the note dated february 21 2008 was 44000000 the amount secured by the deed of trust dated february 21 2008 was 55000000 see also fac  19 62 this might appear to rise to the level of fraudulence required for equitable tolling though it is unclear whether it would represent a tila violation still plaintiff calls this the most glaring tila violation of defendants october 5 opposition 615 even to the extent such a discrepancy would relate to a tila violation and even to the extent if so that it would not have been apparent at the consummation of the transaction hubbard 91 f3d at 79 plaintiff has attached the purported note exhibit 2 and the purported deed of trust exhibit 3 to her fac and these documents controvert the alleged facts in the fac a court may disregard allegations in the complaint if contradicted by facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint see eg sumner peck ranch 823 fsupp at 720 the attached deed of trust in fact shows an original principal amount of us 44000000 plus accrued and deferred interest and such other amounts as stated in the note fac exhibit 3 deed of trust part 1d the note likewise is a promise to pay us 44000000 called principal plus interest and any other charges incurred during the course of the loan fac exhibit 2 page 1 the 55000000 referenced by the deed of trust is the maximum aggregate principal balance secured by this deed of trust which is 125 of the original principal note amount fac exhibit 3 deed of trust p 1 this is the analogue provision to paragraph 3f of the note which provides my unpaid principal balance can never exceed 125 of the principal i originally borrowed fac exhibit 2 p 3 paragraph 3f consequently even to the extent a plaintiff would not notice such a discrepancy at the time of consummation of the transaction the facs allegations thus contradicted do not give rise to the sort of fraud that might toll the limitations period10 plaintiff also cites nonbinding outofstate and outofcircuit authority in the fac rather than in her opposition for the proposition that the oneyear statute of limitations does not apply when tila claims are asserted as a defense to a nonjudicial foreclosure claim at least one district court in this circuit has recently reached the opposite conclusion see ortiz v accredited home lenders inc 639 fsupp2d 1159 116465 sdcal200911 there is no 15 usc  1692a6fiii and the court assumes generously to the plaintiff that she meant to make allegations relating to 15 usc  1692a6fiii12 defendant has asked the court to take judicial notice 1 of other cases that treated wachovia mortgage fsb as a federal savings bank regulated by the office of thrift supervision and subject to hola 2 (E) holding that the judicial admission exception did not apply to prove the existence of an oral agreement for the sale of stock where the defendant offered his deposition testimony acknowledging that the parties agreed to have a document transferring the stocks drafted by an attorney because the defendants references to the agreement were in terms of a tentative or incomplete agreement and because any admission of such a contract would necessarily have to include a statement of the price and quantity terms

holding that class action was not superior to individual tila rescission action because under truth in lending act a prevailing debtor with a typical loan can expect to receive over 50000 plus attorneys fees and costs in a rescission action and many debtors do in fact bring rescission claims