instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
that she disapproved of what she reasonably believed to be unlawful retaliation. B. Form and Context To the extent that Thomas’ conduct was expressive, the message was communicated to her immediate supervisor, Miller, and other court employees. She did not, however, attempt to inform the general public about the allegedly retaliatory practices. That Thomas chose to convey her views privately rather than publicly is not determinative of whether her expression is entitled to protection. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979). Because content is the most important factor, we have concluded that speech about a matter of public concern may be protected even when made in a private context. See, e.g., Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1174 (<HOLDING>); Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 979 (“[T]he public 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected (B) holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged (C) holding that a memorandum given to the employees supervisors was protected speech when the memorandum alleged criminal wrongdo ing (D) holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected (E) holding the separate document rule violated when the alleged judgment was included with the memorandum and order of the court
answer:
(C)


question:
this authority explicitly by statute in 11 U.S.C. § 362. Nor is there any danger of the bankruptcy court having prejudiced Appellant’s rights under Puerto Rico common law. As the bankruptcy court itself stated, the Appellant remains free to present her arguments under Puerto Rico law at the appropriate time, during the foreclosure proceedings in Puerto Rico’s commonwealth courts. (See Hearing Tr., Docket No. 1-7 at 11.) Therefore, any attempts to link this case to the holding in Stem are mistaken. We reject Appellant’s attempt to challenge this routine and plainly constitutional exercise of the bankruptcy court’s authority. This case, thus, fits squarely with several other cases that have been resolved in the wake of Stem. See In Re DiVittorio, 670 F.3d 273, 282 n. 4 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); In Re Garcia, 471 B.R. 324, 329 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that stem did not change a bankruptcy courts authority to decide questions impacting whether to grant relief from automatic stay (B) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay (C) holding that the bankruptcy court relinquishes jurisdiction over estate property when it grants relief from the automatic stay (D) recognizing district courts authority to dispose of contempt action for violation of automatic stay of bankruptcy (E) holding that bankruptcy court order that a stay applied to a particular party was a final order and noting that bankruptcy court orders lifting or denying relief from an automatic stay are final for purposes of appeal
answer:
(A)


question:
discretion to revisit Judge Johnson’s order, but this is not to say that district courts should take lightly reconsideration of the orders of their colleagues. As the D.C. Circuit has stated, “[i]nconsis-tency is the antithesis of the rule of law. For judges, the most basic principle of jurisprudence is that we must act alike in all ease of like nature.” LaShaum v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C.Cir.1996) (noting that the law of the case doctrine helps implement this principle). Thus, although Judge Johnson’s order is not “subject to” the law of the case doctrine, Langevine, 106 F.3d at 1020, nothing prevents the court from applying the rationales of that doctrine to guide a Rule 54(b) decision. Virgin Atlantic Airways v. National Mediation Board, 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); c†. Lan-gevine, 106 F.3d at 1023-24 (quoting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if rule 54b allows parties to request district courts to revisit earlier rulings the moving party must do so within the strictures of the law of the case doctrine (B) holding that a court may deny leave to amend when the moving party had the opportunity to amend earlier but waited after judgment to do so (C) recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case (D) holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the commonwealth resulted from a mistaken view of the law by earlier courts (E) recognizing that an appellant seeking to establish that the district court abused its discretion must do so by a discussion of facts arguments and rulings that appear in the record
answer:

(A)