Your task is to extract the thesis of an opinionated news article by selecting some of its text segments. The thesis is a summarization of what the author wants to persuade the reader of. Your answer should consist of segments of the given text. Note that you are not allowed to combine different sentences.

[Q]: The dawn of Kim Jong-un's rule. It has been a few years since the sudden death of the Sun of the Nation, Marshal Kim Jong-il which made his third son, Kim Jong-un, then in his late 20s, the supreme leader of North Korea . Three years is the length of the traditional mourning period that Koreans are supposed to observe after the death of their father or sovereign . Thus ,  now is the time to make some observations about Kim's North Korea . What has remained the same, and what has changed since December 2011? The dawn of Kim's rule was marked by intense purges of his father's top dignitaries . In December 2011, during his father's funeral, Kim walked next to his father's hearse in the company of three top generals and four top civilian officials . Three years on, none of these people have their jobs : At least one of them was executed , while all but one have disappeared without a trace . Kim's decision to arrest and execute Chang Song-taek, his aunt's husband, long the "grey eminence" of Pyongyang politics, was a dramatic signal to the elite . The sorry fate of Chang was meant to show that nobody is immune from the wrath of the supreme leader . These purges were obviously necessary to start changing the country , since Kim's policies will be very different from those of his father and grandfather . So far, the most important changes can be seen in the field of economic management . From late 2012, the North Korean government began to implement reforms which are remarkably similar to what China did in the early days of Deng Xiaoping, around 1980 . Farmers, who were hitherto government employees with a fixed salary, are now given a certain percentage of the harvest, and have predictably started to feel motivated . As a result, the food situation has improved markedly . In industry, a slow-motion switch from a Leninist, centrally planned economy to markets has been initiated as well . The unofficial private economy, far more advanced in North Korea than most imagine, is now quietly encouraged . There is no sign of relaxation in the political sphere, however . Kim has launched a massive crackdown on illegal border movements, effectively closing North Korea's border with China  - which had remained porous for decades . He has also done much to root out the penchant that many North Koreans have recently developed for smuggled foreign TV shows, especially South Korean soap operas and films . Such concerns are not merely motivated by paranoia, regardless of what the international media says . The supreme leader knows that his position is precarious, and that tightening the screws of social control and surveillance may help him prolong his rule . North Korea under Kim remains as stubborn in its nuclear ambitions as it was under his father . Having seen the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the popular rebellion against Libya's Gaddafi that was indirectly assisted by western might, North Korean decision-makers have every reason to want to continue to advance their nuclear weapons potential . At the same time ,  there has also been a truly unprecedented crisis in Sino- North Korean relations . In the last years of Kim Jong-il, China was North Korea's major sponsor and trade partner . Now things are different . The Chinese and North Korean media (strictly controlled by the government in both countries) have exchanged thinly veiled verbal attacks , while the Chinese government has frozen all Beijing-sponsored infrastructure projects in North Korea - including, for example, a new bridge over the Yalu River . The North Korean government under Kim has shown hitherto unprecedented interest in foreign investment, as long as this investment comes from sources other than China . At present, the young marshal has pinned his hopes on Russia - currently itself on a collision course with the West . North Korean leaders obviously believe that Russia under Vladimir Putin will behave like the Soviet Union once did and shower North Korea with aid grants as a reward for Pyongyang's militant anti-Americanism . Such hopes are misplaced , but it will take some time before Pyongyang's decision-makers realise the sad truth . There is little doubt that Kim wants to be popular and loved by his people, and perhaps sincerely cares about the wellbeing of the North Korean populace , though he might have rather eccentric ideas on what constitutes such wellbeing . Under his watch, the North Korean government has spent a significant part of its meagre resources on building all kinds of entertainment facilities, including an elite ski resort, a number of water parks and even a dolphinarium . Kim's North Korea is increasingly a place quite different from the North Korea of his father . It is moving towards a more efficient economy, but also towards more internal repression . It is more prone to erratic changes in domestic policy and more eccentric in many regards . But ,  of course , for the foreseeable future it is going to remain a nuclear and authoritarian regime, run by the Kim family and a small hereditary elite : This is not negotiable, irrespectively of what the outside world thinks and does .
[A]: What has remained the same, and what has changed since December 2011? It has been a few years since the sudden death of the Sun of the Nation, Marshal Kim Jong-il which made his third son, Kim Jong-un, then in his late 20s, the supreme leader of North Korea


[Q]: Diversity among police officers is key, but it won't solve the problems with policing. In Ferguson, Missouri, 50 of the 53 police officers are white in a city that is two-thirds African American . In Connecticut's state capital, Hartford, 66% of the police department is white but only 16% of the residents are . And these are just two examples: despite progress over the past 50 years, many police departments remain predominantly white in cities and towns where the majority of the population is nonwhite . There are some important exceptions to the disparity pattern . Several big city police departments are majority-black or majority-Hispanic (Atlanta, Birmingham, Detroit, Washington, Miami, Santa Fe and El Paso, for instance) , while others (such as Chicago) are so diverse that no single group comprises the majority . Yet for many other cities, the gap between the complexion of the police department and the local population is huge . Why does this matter? Do police officers of different racial and ethnic backgrounds act differently while on the job? Do they have different kinds of relationships with minority communities? Aren't all officers trained to do their jobs similarly and to treat all civilians the same regardless of race? Research shows that, in general in the US, there is not a strong correlation, let alone a causal relationship, between an officer's race and how officers treat members of the public when they respond to calls from civilians or stop and question them on the streets Statistics are, of course, not predictive of individual behavior , and studies of specific departments or communities vary . A 2004 study in Indianapolis (Indiana) and St  Petersburg (Florida) by Ivan Sun and Brian Payne, for example, found that black officers were more likely than white officers working in black neighborhoods to provide information, referrals to other agencies, and to treat residents respectfully , although the black officers were also more likely to use physical force against citizens in conflict situations . But ,  again, most studies find similarities overall in police behavior irrespective of officers' racial background . Shared training in the academy, as well as on-the-job socialization by fellow officers, results in more similarities than differences among officers when it comes to their policing activities, including similarities in how officers of all races treat white versus non-white citizens . So we should not view racial diversification on the force as a panacea for improving police treatment of minorities : instead if minority officers adopt majority attitudes about those they serve and protect , it might hardly help at all . A 2008 study in Baltimore, Maryland by Peter Moskos documented precisely this shared mentality among both white and black officers . But it can pay major dividends in other ways . In one poll of 1,791 Americans that I and a colleague conducted for our book, Race and Policing in America, more than 70% of blacks, Hispanics and whites in the United States believed that a city's police department should have a similar racial composition to the city . The same study found that very few blacks and Hispanics (only 5%) want most officers who work in their neighborhoods to be exclusively of the same race as the residents , and instead most people prefer to see racially- mixed teams of officers patrolling their streets . . Importantly, such diversity can help to build trust and confidence in the police : the more a police department reflects the composition of the local population, the higher the department's reputation among residents , which can provide a foundation to build further trust, coupled with other needed reforms . It also helps, in majority-black or majority-Hispanic cities, if the chief of police comes from that community as well because, as the public face of the department, he or she can allay suspicions when controversial incidents occur in a way that white police chiefs may not be able to do . A diverse police force can also help to decrease the sense that individuals are being stopped and questioned solely because of their race . This clearly applies when the officers and citizens are of the same race , but even encounters between white officers and minority citizens may be perceived as less racialized when the department has a critical mass of minority officers . A representative police force can, in other words, have symbolic benefits that enhance the overall status of a police department and also reduce the perception that actions, such as stops or searches, are based on racial profiling . Most police chiefs realize the advantages of a department that represents the local community , but there are big challenges in recruiting more minority officers . Many Hispanics and African Americans are reluctant to consider a career in law enforcement - not surprising, given the history of policing in America coupled with more recent events . Highly-publicized incidents like the killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson and Eric Garner in New York only make it more difficult for police departments to recruit minority officers . Recruiters can have some success, however, if they broaden their outreach efforts to include churches and community centers - and if there are pre- existing positive relationships between the police and residents in those minority neighborhoods where community policing has already taken root , which can be built on . Although troubled interactions between minorities and police garner most of the headlines, there are neighborhoods in American cities where working-class and middle-class black and Hispanic residents - including youths - have better relationships with the authorities than on average, as I found in a study of Washington DC neighborhoods . It is in these communities that the police can enhance their recruitment efforts and achieve at least some success . Racial diversification is one crucial ingredient in a larger program of reform that is required to improve police departments throughout the country . A representative police force is not a panacea - but it is a positive reform, and an achievable one .
[A]: So we should not view racial diversification on the force as a panacea for improving police treatment of minorities


[Q]: Iran Sanctions Fight: Three myths no lawmaker should believe. The expected congressional vote on a new sanctions bill against the Iranian regime has rekindled debate over Tehran's nuclear defiance and the best way to confront it . Congress has misgivings about a rogue regime intent on obtaining nuclear capability, and understandably wants to ensure that Washington does not strike a bad deal . Some argue that a decisive approach toward Tehran will be counterproductive . But their position ignores historical lessons and stands on a number of myths that need to be debunked . Myth #1 : More sanctions on Iran will prompt the regime to unilaterally walk away from the talks . Iran cannot afford to walk away because it is desperate and vulnerable . It has a genuine interest to secure the lifting of existing sanctions , which provided the initial impetus for the regime to talk . Then ,  too, cynics argued that sanctions would prompt Tehran to accelerate its nuclear activities . The regime is playing a game of attrition, aiming to weaken U.S  resolve, win more concessions, and maintain its nuclear infrastructure . The bipartisan sanctions bill will force Tehran to consider speedy compliance . This month, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani reiterated,"Breaking the anti- Iran sanctions is the only way to achieve national progress," acknowledging that Iran's devastated economy cannot endure the weight of further sanctions, especially after the recent decline in oil prices . The mullahs are paranoid of a disenchanted population already on edge . With rampant unemployment, inflation, and loss of oil revenues, walking away from the talks is not an option , especially if a sanctions-in-waiting bill is hovering over their head . Myth #2 : With more sanctions, Tehran will blame Washington for sabotaging diplomacy, and start on the path towards war . Even with slumping oil revenues - slashed by at least 45%- the official defense budget has jumped 30%, mostly allocated to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) . And , more money is being funneled into Syria and Iraq to execute Tehran's designs - a budget that is twice that of all the country's publically funded universities combined . If sanctions fail to force Tehran to abandon key parts of its nuclear program after over a year of negotiations , then continued talks with no additional leverage will fail as well . The IAEA still has no access to suspect nuclear sites and its questions remain unanswered . IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said in November 2014, "Iran has not provided any explanations that enable the Agency to clarify the outstanding practical measures, nor has it proposed any new practical measures in the next step of the Framework for Cooperation, despite several requests from the Agency." Senior U.S  officials have repeatedly stated that even without additional sanctions the chances for reaching an agreement with Iran is less that 50 percent . So , as Iran tries to wear out western negotiators , clearly, additional leverage from Congress is necessary, not counterproductive . Myth #3 : New sanctions will strengthen "hardliners" in Iran who want to sabotage a prospective deal . This is perhaps the most enduring myth in Washington that has dangerously infected Iran policy . The idea that there are moderate elements in Iran's body politic, and the U.S  needs to reach out to them by making more concessions is ludicrous . The oft-cited dichotomy between "hardliners" and "moderates" in Iran badly misrepresents a system whose elements are united in their strategic objectives . Rouhani, himself a longtime confidant of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, was instructed by the latter to sign onto the Joint Plan of Action in November 2013 . Foreign Minister Zarif told the Iranian Parliament earlier this month that he has the full trust of Khamenei to continue the negotiations . Experience has shown that diplomacy without leverage has never worked with dictators, especially in Tehran . This puts Congress on the right path . The sanctions bill can be a game- changer . It will strengthen Washington's hand while helping to peacefully arrest Tehran's advance towards the bomb . One thing is for certain : Tehran's nuclear objective is anything but a myth .
[A]:
The expected congressional vote on a new sanctions bill against the Iranian regime has rekindled debate over Tehran's nuclear defiance and the best way to confront it This is perhaps the most enduring myth in Washington that has dangerously infected Iran policy