instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
from the OSHA inspection after this incident were for repeat offenses, the repeat offense that appears pertinent to this ease was the failure to mark a container of hazardous chemicals so as to identify the chemical. The prior citation for such an offense is not in the record, and we are unable to determine whether the “repeat” aspect of the citation pertains only to the type of citation or to the particular location of the offending container. In any event, our supreme court has not yet held that OSHA citations are evidence that compels the conclusion that a coemployee was substantially certain that injury or death would occur. In fact, in two cases involving OSHA citations, the court has held that such citations would not support that finding. See Ex parte Martin, 733 So.2d at 396 (<HOLDING>), and Harris v. Simmons, 585 So.2d 906, 908 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that witnesss testimony was sufficient to support the trial courts finding that defendant committed battery that resulted in bodily injury (B) holding postaccident citation not sufficient to support finding that coemployee was substantially certain that injury or death would occur (C) holding that preaccident citation would not support a finding that coemployees were substantially certain that injury or death would occur (D) holding evidence sufficient to support trial courts finding in aggravation that the offense was planned (E) holding governments position substantially justified where sufficient support existed in precedent
answer:
holding that witnesss testimony was sufficient to support the trial courts finding that defendant committed battery that resulted in bodily injury


question:
face,” id. at 61, 90 S.Ct. 1555, it held that the exception for any portrayal that “does not tend to discredit [the] armed force[s]” impermissibly restricted expression on the basis of viewpoint. See id. at 62-63, 90 S.Ct. 1555. Here, as in Schacht, defendants may be constitutionally permitted to prohibit all fraternal organizations from marching in uniform. But it does not follow from this premise that defendants have the seemingly lesser included authority to ban only some organizations from marching in uniform. Under Schacht, and under other Supreme Court cases involving selective prohibitions on expression, defendants’ selectivity must itself pass constitutional muster. Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 425-28, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465, 100 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cincinnati could not ban commercial newsracks from public property while allowing noncommercial newsracks even if  the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property (B) holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content (C) holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property (D) holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence (E) holding not only does cincinnatis categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech but in this case the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted
answer:
holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content


question:
irom May 5, 2003 through May 10, 2005.” Kensmoe argues on appeal that the time period to renew the judgment by affidavit under N.D.C.C. § 28-20-21 was not tolled and the “Georgia rulings should not be used in the decision of a North Dakota judgment.” In her reply brief, Kensmoe also distinguishes F/S Manufacturing’s reliance on In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. 912 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.2002). Kensmoe’s argument necessarily includes whether the district court erred in deciding the time period in N.D.C.C. § 28-20-21 was tolled by her prior bankruptcy proceedings, and we reject F/S Manufacturing’s claim about waiver. [¶ 14] We approach with caution the complexity of interpreting the Bankruptcy Code and its interplay with state law. See, e.g., Production Credit Ass’n v. Burk, 427 N.W.2d 108 (N.D.1988) (<HOLDING>), disagreed with by In re Hoffinger Indus., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  108c2 applied to extend the deadline to file a notice of appeal in state court until at least 30 days after notice of the stays termination or expiration (B) holding  108b2 extended unexpired period for filing appeal but holding appeal was untimely (C) holding 11 usc  108b2 applied to extend unexpired 60day period to file notice of appeal to 60 days after order for relief but that appeal was untimely (D) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after an untimely filing of a notice of appeal (E) holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal
answer:

holding  108c2 applied to extend the deadline to file a notice of appeal in state court until at least 30 days after notice of the stays termination or expiration