In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: would allow for the award of attorney fees whenever a statute or contract provides for one side to pay expenses, even when such attorney fees were not contemplated. The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent in this regard. Therefore, I do not join in the majority’s opinion that the term “expenses” as used in section 13-7-4(d) includes attorney fees, but would hold that because that section does not specifically provide for an award of attorney fees, such award was improper here. For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority’s determination that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. However, I dissent rs of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986); In re Olliff, 258 Ga. 157, 366 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Head v. Savage, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 32, 38 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan (D) holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs (E) holding that expenses refers to costs

A: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid
****
Q: in some respect. To me, such an approach invites municipal officials to substitute rank speculation and conjectural claptrap for genuine engineering expertise and constitutes an open invitation for local planners to engage in incompetent fear-mongering about perceived or imagined development risks, no matter how unfounded, unlikely, or controllable such risks may be. Such an open-textured standard for upholding the denial of subdivision applications will all too easily be converted into an impermeable cloak to cover confiscatory regulatory takings, official pandering to neighbors’ antidevelopment biases, political shenanigans, and other such local governmental capriciousness of the sort that we recently condemned in L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202 (R.I.1997) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the mere fact that the municipality 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (B) holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states (C) holding that 42 usc  1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations (D) holding that the petitioner property owners had established 42 usc  1983 substantive and procedural dueprocess violations against town officials who arbitrarily denied the plaintiffs request for subdivision approval (E) holding that plaintiffs had claim under 42 usc  1983 against state where state had created an intermediate care facility but placed plaintiffs on waiting list

A: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983
****
Q: 1144, 1146 (8th Cir.1989), which is to be determined on the circumstances of each case, United States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1289 (8th Cir.1986). In general, however, the' binding Eighth Circuit precedent requires the proponent of the plan to identify a rate of interest that could be earned on a risk-free investment, such as that currently paid on a United States treasury bond of like term, and then to augment that rate by an increment that is sufficient to compensate the secured creditor for the risk it will bear over the term of the reamortization, as a result of the reorganized debtor’s retention of the possession of the collateral. United States v. Doud, 869 F.2d at 1146; In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d at 1339. See also In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In the second step of this process, [t]he 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this as the general rule (B) recognizing doud as applying just this methodology (C) recognizing and applying the stream of commerce theory (D) recognizing this rule (E) recognizing this presumption

A:
recognizing this as the general rule
****