In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: it may not be a room that is “used for detentions other than detentions under this section.” Tex. Fam.Code. Ann. § 52.025(a); Baptist Vie Le, 993 S.W.2d at 653-54 (taking juvenile arrested for murder to homicide division of police department violated Family Code requirements for handling child taken into custody). If, after taking a juvenile into custody, authorities do not take him to either a juvenile processing office or a statutorily designated alternative for questioning, but rather obtain a statement from the juvenile in an area used to interview adult suspects, that statement is inadmissible. Baptist Vie Le, 993 S.W.2d at 654-56; In re U.G., 128 S.W.3d at 799; see Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 52.02(a); Salas v. State, 756 S.W.2d 832, 834-35 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); see also Roquemore, 60 S.W.3d at 868; Marsh, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statement inadmissible when instead of following section 5202 officers took juvenile first to police station where they obtained signed written statement from him before taking him to appropriate juvenile detention center (B) holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles (C) holding that defendant was arrested  when the police officer took physical custody of him by grabbing his arm and returned him to the hotel for detention there (D) holding witnesss formal signed written statement given at the police station one hour after the crime following structured police questioning was testimonial (E) holding that police executed an illegal arrest when they took a teenage suspect from his home and brought him in handcuffs to the police station for questioning
[A]: (A)


[Q]: background nor his current offense can support the conclusion that he is a worst offender. The maximum sentence was therefore not justified. In deciding to impose the maximum sentence, Judge Michalski relied primarily on his conclusion that Skrepich was incapable of rehabilitation and could not personally be deterred. The judge thus gave primary emphasis to the need to protect the public by isolating Skrepich from the community. While the judge also indicated that a lengthy sentence would serve the sentencing goals of general deterrence and community condemnation, it seems clear that these goals could not, in themselves, support the imposition of a maximum, ten-year term for a first offender convicted of a class B felony. See Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198, 1204-05 (Alaska 1985) (<HOLDING>). The appropriateness of the maximum term 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts failure to explain the effect of supervised release was harmless where the maximum term of incarceration under the actual sentence of imprisonment and supervised release less than six years as well as his worstcase scenario less than nine years was less than the maximum term of incarceration twenty years al lowed by law (B) holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony (C) holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder (D) holding that a term of substantially less than twenty years would serve the objectives of general deterrence and community condemnation in the case of a first offender convicted of seconddegree murder an unclassified felony (E) holding that twenty years was not excessive for second felony offender convicted of simple burglary
[A]: (D)


[Q]: discs to also take a license to Lagadec, an allegedly-nonessential Sony patent. Tying arrangements have a long history in both the patent misuse and antitrust contexts. Much of the Supreme Court’s early patent misuse doctrine was developed in cases involving a challenge to some form of tying arrangement. In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490-91, 62 S.Ct. 402, 86 L.Ed. 363 (1942), for example, the Court held that a tying arrangement where the patent license was conditioned upon the purchase of a separate, staple product amounted to patent misuse, because in such a case “the patent is used as a means of restraining competition with the patentee’s sale of an unpatented product.” Id. at 493, 62 S.Ct. 402; see also III. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 45-46, 126 S.Ct. 1281 (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the early antitrust cases found 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorneys negligence alone does not qualify for such relief (B) holding that a patent alone does not confer market power necessary to show unlawful tying (C) holding that the mere delivery of documents  does not confer jurisdiction (D) holding that the flsa does not confer jurisdiction over ambulance services (E) holding that the due process clause does not generally confer affirmative rights to governmental aid even where such aid may be necessary to secure life
[A]:
(B)