In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Defendants contend that the amount awarded was excessive and shocking, such as to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice or other improper influence invaded the trial. Defendants initially make this argument on the grounds that the disparity between punitive damages assessed against the “passive wrongdoer” (AGF) is too large in contrast to the amount assessed against the “active wrongdoer” (Risser). We reject this argument for many reasons. First, it assumes that AGF should not have been found liable for negligent retention of an employee. Obviously, the jury disagreed with this assessment. Second, the legal basis for assessing punitive damages on respondeat superior grounds is well-established. Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 235 Kan. 580, 682 P.2d 653, 665 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent deci sion, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that restatement second of torts  323 and 324a correctly state pennsylvania law (B) recognizing kansas courts adoption of restatement second of torts  909 1977 (C) recognizing that restatement second of torts   416 to 429 are often overlapping (D) recognizing tentative draft of restatement second of torts  652e (E) recognizing that kansas supreme court would accept the final draft of the restatement second of torts  652e adopted in 1977
[A]: (B)


[Q]: 238 (2) (367 SE2d 786) (1988). 41 Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 302 Ga. App. 726, 730 (2) (b) (691 SE2d 633) (2010) (punctuation omitted). 42 Id. at 731 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted). 43 Fla. Int’l Indem. Co. v. Osgood, 233 Ga. App. 111, 115 (3) (503 SE2d 371) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 44 Griffin, 302 Ga. App. at 731 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted). 45 See Roland v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 265 Ga. 776, 778(2) (462 SE2d 623) (1995) (affirming trial court’s directed verdict in favor of insured on coverage claim but, nonetheless, also affirming court’s directed verdict in favor of insurer on insured’s bad-faith claim in light of the fact that insured’s coverage, despite ultimately succeeding, was based on a doubtful question of law); Griffin, 302 Ga.App. at 731 (2) (b) (<HOLDING>); Assurance Co. of Am. v. BBB Serv. Co., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because insurers nonpayment was based on contention that insured did not have a covered loss under the policy because the value of the property was the same regardless of whether it was serviced by an easement nonpayment was reasonable and not subject to a badfaith claim (B) holding that regardless of the subjective belief of the insured the record established a basis to believe that the insured had committed an act that could give rise to a claim under the policy (C) holding that an insurers obligation to defend an insured was a property interest subject to prejudgment attachment (D) holding in a case involving a multiplevehicle policy that a new offer of uninsured motorist coverage was not required for the addition of a new vehicle which was comparable to the renewal or supplementation of an existing policy events that did not trigger the statutory requirement of a new offer the courts holding was based in part upon the principle that an insurance contract is personal to the insured because it insures the risk of loss to the insured and does not attach to specific vehicles (E) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent
[A]: (A)


[Q]: relation to the grant of relief from the automatic stay. 28 . In following the analytic framework of Hernandez, I recognize that the case may hold implicitly that the fact that a debt is nondis-chargeable under § 523(a)(8) and that, outside the ba (concluding that a plan to fully pay a student loan obligation while paying all other unsecured claims a dividend of 3% unfairly discriminated against the class of other unsecured creditors) and In re Thibodeau, 248 B.R. 699 (Bankr.D.Mass.2000) (applying four-prong test of In re Leser, 939 F.2d 669 (8th Cir.1991) to conclude that a 36-month plan unfairly discriminated where it proposed to fully pay student loan debt while providing only a 27% dividend on other general unsecured claims) with In re Dodds, 140 B.R. 542 (Bankr.D.Mont.1992) (<HOLDING>) and In re Boggan, 125 B.R. 533 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unsecured creditor could not appeal decision determining priority among secured creditors because it would not affect the payment of his claims (B) holding that plan proposing and payment of nondischargeable student loan in full outside plan according to its terms for 54 months and 79 payment to unsecured creditors over 36 months did not discriminate unfairly among unsecured class (C) holding that plan did not unfairly discriminate against unsecured noteholder class receiving 327 percent recovery while awarding general unsecured creditors a 100 percent recovery because differing treatment was justified (D) holding that the fresh start was a legitimate interest to discriminate in a plan whereby the debtor proposed to pay the student loan in full while paying 15 of the other unsecured claims (E) holding that a 56month chapter 13 plan that proposed to pay 17 of the anticipated dividend to student loan creditors while making no distribution to other unsecured creditors unfairly discriminates and could not be confirmed
[A]:
(B)