In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action. Id. (emphasis added). A defendant must also “file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” Id. § 1446(d). The removal statutes are construed narrowly. Pritchett v. Off its, including the District of Kansas, have also followed this approach. See, e.g., Berbig v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Inc., 568 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1039 n. 9 (D.Minn.2008) (stating that “a failure to comply with the requirements of [Section 1446(a) ] ordinarily is not grounds to deny removal”); Riggs v. Fling Irrigation, Inc., 535 F.Supp.2d 572, 579 (W.D.N.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Yellow, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1215; In re Methyl 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under alabama law the law of the forum applies to procedural matters and that in most instances the statute of limitations is considered to be a procedural rule (B) recognizing that the procedural defect could be corrected through a reinstatement of the termination proceedings (C) holding that if the states criminal complaint against defendant had a jurisdictional defect the prosecution had the right to attempt to correct the defect and a motion to dismiss is one method of doing this (D) holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect (E) holding while there may be some case law to support plaintiffs argument the majority approach is that the failure to attach process defect is merely procedural and that this particular procedural defect may be cured
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: between cases brought under the federal law and those brought under Maine law. While the First Circuit does make a distinction, it ultimately holds that the negligence per se doctrine of Pratico is strictly limited to cases brought under FELA, and it strongly implies that the doctrine will not be expanded. Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998). 4 . Castine argues that the trooper testified at trial to matters that he had not previously indicated he would address, and therefore, it was unfairly surprised at trial. Generally, a continuance is the appropriate remedy when a party seeks to admit “surprise" evidence at trial. Because Castine did not seek a continuance, however, it may not now claim unfair surprise. See Pettitt v. Lizotte, 454 A.2d 329, 332-33 (Me.1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Because violation of a safety regulation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify (C) holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify (E) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing a defendants surprise fact witness to testify because the plaintiff did not request a continuance
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: decision, when the parties agreed to transition Z.S. back to public school with a plan approved by all parties and supported with a transition plan from CCCD. Contrary to Carmel’s assertions, the IHO decision declaring the 2007-2008 IEP inadequate effected a material change between the parties in connection with the subsequent negotiations. Our Court recognizes a distinction between claims for tuition reimbursement pursuant to the pendency provision and claims for tuition reimbursement pursuant to an administrative determination that a school district has failed to provide a FAPE. See Mackey ex rel. Thomas M. v. Bd. of Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 158, 160-61, supplemented sub nom. Mackey v. Bd. of Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 112 Fed.Appx. 89 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Carmel claims that the IHO decision did not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that either a fouryear or a twoyear limitations period applies to claims under the idea in ohio for tuition reimbursement either way the claims were timebarred (B) recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts (C) holding that the unilateral placement of a student by the parents in an unapproved school is not by itself a bar to tuition reimbursement but public schools may not place students in unapproved schools (D) holding that though the school districts plan was adequate the parents were still entitled to tuition reimbursement under the pendency provision (E) holding that court may order reimbursement of private school expenses incurred by parents of handicapped child in successful challenge to iep brought under eha predecessor to idea stating that it is beyond cavil that appropriate relief would include a prospective injunction directing the school official to develop and implement at public expense an iep placing the child in a private school and affirming reimbursement award against petitioner local school district 
[EX A]:
(D)