In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

the defendant’s applicable guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).” Id., app. note 1(A). In November 2007, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 706, which reduced the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses under § 2Dl.l(c) by two levels. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). The Commission later made the amendment retroactively applicable. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. May 1, 2008). As indicated, Jefferson sought to have his sentence reduced as result of those amendments. However, they do not apply here because Jefferson was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence required by statute. See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because the District Court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based (B) holding that a defendant whose original sentence was based upon the careeroffender guideline and not  2d11 could not receive a sentence reduction based on amendment 706 because it did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range (C) holding that while amendment 706 was applicable to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (D) holding that amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range where the defendants received statutory mandatory minimum sentences and thus the defendants were not eligible for relief under  3582 (E) holding that while amendment 706 was applica ble to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline
(D)

Attorney General, Mary Jo Volkert, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daniel M. King, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Judgment affirmed. Ray and Self, JJ., concur. 1 U. S. Const, amend. V; see also Ga. Const. Art. 1, § 3, ¶1 (a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph, private property shall not be taken or damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid.”); Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., _ U. S. _, _ (II) (A) (1) (135 SCt 2419,192 LE2d388) (2015) (“The principle reflected in the [Takings] Clause goes back at least 800 years to the Magna Carta . . . .”). 2 See, e.g., Wood v. B & S Enters., 314 Ga. App. 128, 128 (723 SE2d 443) (2012). 3 See Kellett v. Dep’t of Transp., 174 Ga.App. 214, 21 .App. 622, 624-25 (6) (522 SE2d 661) (1999) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge (B) holding that although portion of trial courts jury charge was inapplicable any error in providing it was harmless in light of the fact that charge considered as a whole was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury (C) holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole (D) holding that because trial court actually gave part of a jury charge that appellant claimed was improperly omitted and because remainder of courts charge adequately defined one of the legal terms at issue the courts jury charge taken as a whole was not misleading and did not constitute reversible error (E) holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence
(A)

bar, of rule 32:1.3 for dilatory handling of estates despite notices and inquiries from beneficiaries). Johnson’s failure to respond to Neefs phone calls and requests for information, failure to notify Neef of what progress had or had not been made on the case, and failure to provide notice of termination, contact information, return of paperwork, or a return of unearned fees violated rules 32:1.4 (duty to keep client informed) and 32:1.16(d) (duty to protect client’s interests upon termination of representation). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 263, 268 (Iowa 2010) (finding attorney’s neglect of client’s legal matters and failure to keep clients informed about their cases violated rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4, and 32:1.16(d)); Earley, 774 N.W.2d at 307-08 (<HOLDING>). Johnson also violated rule 32:8.4(c) (duty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the attorney violated mlrpc 13 when he did not prosecute his clients claim after filing a complaint or protect against expiration of the statute of limitation for his clients complaint and caused discovery sanctions to be filed for his failure to respond to discovery requests (B) holding an attorney violated his duty of candor to the tribunal by changing his clients interrogatory answers without the clients knowledge (C) holding attorney violated rules 3214 and 32116d when he failed to keep his clients informed about the status of their cases failed to communicate with his clients after their repeated requests for information and failed to  account for or return client money from retainer fees (D) holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan (E) holding that equitable tolling applied when the attorney informed his client there was no such thing as a oneyear filing deadline and consistently lied to his client and the clients wife

(C)