In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: re Haddad), 68 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr.D.Mass.1987); Williams v. Clark (In re Clark), 91 B.R. 324, 332-34 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988). And, although § 105 “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law,” Pertuso, 233 F.3d at 423, n. 1; “[b]ankruptcy courts ... enjoy inherent power to sanction parties for improper conduct.” Mapother & Mapother v. Cooper (In re Downs), 103 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir.1996). This inherent power authorizes federal courts “to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities.” Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996). See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)(<HOLDING>); Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it (B) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals (C) recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process (D) recognizing inherent power of federal district court to sanction conduct abusive of judicial process (E) recognizing courts inherent power to impose sanctions including attorneys fees for conduct that abuses the judicial process
[A]: recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it


[Q]: of class members with only Purchase Claims are represented by class representatives with Purchase Claims, and the settlement provides up to $250,000 for these claims. Moreover, class members with only Purchase Claims do not receive less value for identical claims asserted by other class members. Objectors contend inadequate representation is demonstrated in the settlement’s allocation terms, which designate the vast majority of the fund to Injury Claims, while Purchase Claims are capped at $250,OOO. But varied relief among class members with differing claims in class settlements is not unusual. See Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir.1999) (“[Ajlmost every settlement will involve different awards for various class members.”); see also Prudential, 148 F.3d at 289-90 (<HOLDING>). Such differences in settlement value do not, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (B) holding the court was not required to decide the issue of whether the district court properly certified a rule 23b2 class because the court already concluded that the district court appropriately certified the class under rule 23b3 citing authority for the proposition that a court need only find that a class action may be maintained under any of the three subdivisions (C) holding that once district court entered order approving the settlement of class claims it could not alter the class in the absence of egregious error (D) holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed (E) holding the district court properly certified a national settlement class in a circumstance in which the class was comprised of policyholders who allegedly were the victims of several different types of fraudulent and misleading sales practices and the settlement created an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to determine the kind and amount of relief to be granted
[A]: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members


[Q]: or deny relief. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the absence of power to make any ruling at all.”); Knowles v. Knowles, 811 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1991, no writ) (in dicta, stating, "... if the 1975 divorce decree is construed, albeit erroneously, to award her separate property interest in the military benefits to the appel-lee, the trial court’s judgment must be affirmed under the doctrine of res judica-ta. ..."). 10 . Accord Wilson v. Uzzel, 953 S.W.2d 384, 390-91 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, no writ); Echols v. Echols, 900 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1995, writ denied); Barnard v. Barnard, 863 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, no writ); see also Hardin v. Hardin, 597 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex.1980) (dicta). Cf. Berry v. Berry, 786 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>); Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d 610, 612 
 Holding statements: (A) holding res judicata applied to unappealed division of military retirement benefits when that division was not preempted at time of divorce but would have been preempted by later federal act had that act applied retroactively which it did not (B) holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce (C) holding that a transfer was a demotion where there was testimony that few people transferred voluntarily from jobs in the plaintiffs prior division to jobs in the plaintiffs new division  everybody viewed a transfer from the plaintiffs new division to the prior division as a promotion and the two departments had different seniority systems (D) holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division (E) holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement
[A]:
holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce