In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: be dismissed even if a minute entry is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 4(c), because the trial court judge did not sign the minutes as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-106. We disagree. The only page from the trial court minutes for August 28, 2006, that was filed with this Court was the page that included the entry regarding the defendant’s case. While it is true that the particular page of the minutes extracted to supplement the appellate record does not bear the signature of the trial court judge, there is no proof that the judge did not sign the minutes on a subsequent page not included in the record before us, and we presume that the minutes were signed as required by section 16-1-106. See Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1937) (<HOLDING>) There is no proof in the record that rebuts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body (B) holding that although a corporate officer is not presumed to be personally liable for corporate debts the officer may expressly bind himself or herself to be answerable for such debts (C) holding that even in absence of proof that chancellor signed court minutes it must be presumed that he did so and noting that ejvery officer is presumed to have performed his duty (D) holding it immaterial that one charged with willfully selling unregistered securities had no actual knowledge that he was violating the law because he was presumed to have and is chargeable with knowledge of the laws under which he was undertaking to do business (E) holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it

Answer: holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body


Question: United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d 865, 880 (6th Cir.1994). B. Sufficiency of the evidence K. Kennedy and Scarborough moved for judgments of acquittal at the close of the government’s proof, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain their convictions. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 29(a). The district court considered and denied the motions, and neither defendant renewed his or her respective motion at the close of all the evidence, see Swidan, 888 F.2d at 1080, or within 14 days after their guilty verdicts,' see Fed. R.Crim.P. 29(c)(1). They have thus failed to preserve their rights to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in the absence of a miscarriage of justice. See Swidan, 888 F.2d at 1080; see also United States v. Faymore, 736 F.2d 328, 334 (6th Cir.1984) '(<HOLDING>).' Both K. Kennedy and Scarborough conceded at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice (B) holding that the defendants insufficientevidence claim was barred by his failure to renew his rule 29 motion at the close of all the evidence because there was no manifest miscarriage of justice (C) holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence (D) holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial (E) holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence

Answer: holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice


Question: could not rely upon such hearsay statements absent some minimal indicia of reliability. See United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 2005). The argument fails because the requisite minimal indicia of reliability were provided by the specificity of the statements, the fact that those statements were sworn under penalty of perjury, and, more generally, by the evidence of Kinney’s extensive embezzlement throughout the accounts of the Border Lodge Credit Union. See United States v. Ibanez, 924 F.2d 427, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1991) (observing that, where “sufficient indicia of reliability” are required to corroborate information presented at sentencing, affidavits “[may] themselves” be sufficient' to resolve disputes); United States v. Schwamborn, 542 Fed.Appx. 87, 88 (2d Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>). Although Kinney argues that, insofar as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where defendant failed to object to the procedure utilized by the court in determining the amount of restitution at sentencing his challenge on appeal was unpreserved for appellate review (B) holding that trial court did not err (C) holding that because the rules of evidence including the rule against hearsay do not apply to sentencing hearings the district court did not err in relying on hearsay in ordering restitution (D) holding that under ibanez district court did not plainly err in relying on sworn affidavits alone for determining amount of claimants restitution (E) holding that the district court did not err in determining that inadvertent disclosure did not result in waiver

Answer:
holding that where defendant failed to object to the procedure utilized by the court in determining the amount of restitution at sentencing his challenge on appeal was unpreserved for appellate review