instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
omitted). Even if we were to do so, it would not change the outcome, since we see no error in the district court’s ruling regardless of whether the robbery and drug conspiracy were related. 3 . This course of action is permissible, though "we have repeatedly mentioned 'our strong preference for James proceedings.' ” United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1273 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir.1995)). 4 . The conspiracy supporting the introduction of the out-of-court statement need not be the same as the conspiracy charged in the indictment, so long as the statement was in furtherance of the uncharged conspiracy. United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 82 (2d. Cir.1999); see also United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 675 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 5 .Burnett testified at one point that he had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to instruct the jury on additional uncharged conspiracies is not reversible error so long as the jury is instructed that the government has the burden to prove the charged conspiracy (B) holding that although it is proper to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown it is error to instruct the jury on the mcdonnell douglas burden shifting scheme (C) holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error (D) holding failure to instruct jury on requirement of corroboration of informants testimony is error (E) holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial
answer:
(A)


question:
period under IAD never commenced); Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 489-90 (D.C. 1997) (rejecting prisoner’s substantial compliance argument and recognizing that court is bound by Fex); State v. Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d 579, 581-82 (Ind. 1996) (requiring strict compliance with IAD procedures and recognizing that procedures are "not mere technicalities”); Pinto v. Warden, C.A. No. 972412, 1999 WL 49378, at *7 (Conn. Super. Jan. 20, 1999) (stating that "[wjhile it is true that earlier decisions of courts were split on when the 180 day period begins, the majority of courts ... have held that the period begins to run once the request is actually received by the appropriate court and prosecutor”); Commonwealth v. Flores, C.A. No. 91-493, 1998 WL 792466, at *3 (Mass. Super. Nov. 6, 1998) (<HOLDING>). 48 . 1993 WL 138993, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court (B) holding that an noa filed by a pro se prisoner is deemed filed on the date that the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for mailing (C) holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing (D) holding that the iad as construed by fex requires that a prisoner must be tried within 180 days of the date when his request for disposition is actu ally received by the state in which the charges are pending not when the prisoner provides that request to his custodial authorities (E) holding time begins when the prisoner knows  the important facts not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance
answer:
(D)


question:
that strict scrutiny apply. The question is “whether the [government action] imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). We need not ask whether Bronx Household is “substantially burdened” because the government action here, in specifically targeting religious conduct, is not neutral and not generally applicable. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, 83 S.Ct. 1790; Tenafly Eruv Assoc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 170 (3d Cir.2002) (“[T]here is no substantial burden requirement when government discriminates against religious conduct.”); Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849-50 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). As the district court found, “the unopposed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an individual is immune from antitrust liability for exercising first amendment right to petition the government (B) holding that requiring plaintiffs to show a substantial burden from nonneutral government actions would make petty harassment of religious institutions and exercise immune from the protection of the first amendment (C) holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise (D) holding that the defendant countys two denials of variance permits under the circumstances had to a significantly great extent lessened the prospect of the religious institution being able to construct a temple in the future thus imposing a substantial burden on the religious institutions religious exercise (E) recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion
answer:

(B)