In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: be dismissed even if a minute entry is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 4(c), because the trial court judge did not sign the minutes as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-106. We disagree. The only page from the trial court minutes for August 28, 2006, that was filed with this Court was the page that included the entry regarding the defendant’s case. While it is true that the particular page of the minutes extracted to supplement the appellate record does not bear the signature of the trial court judge, there is no proof that the judge did not sign the minutes on a subsequent page not included in the record before us, and we presume that the minutes were signed as required by section 16-1-106. See Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1937) (<HOLDING>) There is no proof in the record that rebuts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body (B) holding that although a corporate officer is not presumed to be personally liable for corporate debts the officer may expressly bind himself or herself to be answerable for such debts (C) holding that even in absence of proof that chancellor signed court minutes it must be presumed that he did so and noting that ejvery officer is presumed to have performed his duty (D) holding it immaterial that one charged with willfully selling unregistered securities had no actual knowledge that he was violating the law because he was presumed to have and is chargeable with knowledge of the laws under which he was undertaking to do business (E) holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it

A: holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body
****
Q: See Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 627, 651 A.2d 92, 95 (1995). However, apart from any persuasive weight afforded the Ninth Circuit’s decision in C’Est Moi, NHIC proffers no case law specifically suggesting that common law doctrines such as uberrimae fidei and equitable fraud may not be modified or superseded by a contractual agreement between the insurer and the insured. On the contrary, as we have noted, a number of courts have embraced the ability of parties to contract around common law. See, e.g., King, 906 F.2d at 1540-41; Conn. Indem. Co., 390 F.Supp.2d at 166-67; Progressive N. Ins. Co., 314 F.Supp.2d at 829-30; see also, e.g., McBride v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2007 WL 5185293, at *18, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16917, at **64-65 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 29, 2007) (<HOLDING>). 19 . NHIC points out that during a telephone 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application (B) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (C) holding that insurance application clause modified federal common law governing misrepresentations because  once an insurer has entered into a policy by using an application form more favorable to the insured than the law provides it may not rely on a rule of law which is more stringent than the application form  quoting espinosa v guardian life ins 856 fsupp 711 717 dmass1994 (D) holding that the mccarranferguson act which bars application of a federal law in the face of a state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance did not preclude the concurrent assertion of the federal rico statute and nevada insurance law (E) recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous

A: holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application
****
Q: felt compelled, at the very least, to guess why the prosecutor behaved as he did. But the Batson framework was designed to avoid such “needless and imperfect speculation,” by asking prosecutors to perform the “simple” task of placing race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes on the record. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172, 125 S.Ct. 2410. As a result, this Court must conclude that the Appellate Division applied Batson and its progeny in an unreasonable manner. The Court appreciates the gravity of this holding, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s admonition that AEDPA creates a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388. Even in the Batson context, however, AEDPA deference has its limits. See, e.g., Jones, 555 F.3d at 101 (<HOLDING>). Enforcing those limits is the only way to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new york courts unreasonably applied batson (B) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (C) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (D) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action (E) holding that new york law applies to this matter

A:
holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york
****