instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
that subsequent extraneous offenses are admissible to show a defendant’s intent as to an earlier offense. See U.S. v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 128 (2nd Cir.1998) (upholding admission of subsequent act under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show intent regarding charged offense and holding, “[t]he fact that the evidence involved a subsequent rather than prior act is of no moment”); U.S. v. Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1449 (D.C.Cir.) (construing Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and holding that it “draws no distinction b Austin 1990, no pet.) (same). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Russell’s contention that the Vogt Street offense was not admissible simply because it occurred after the Fast Freddy’s offense. Cf. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 380 (<HOLDING>). Although, based on the authorities cited by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court (B) recognizing that an appellate court reviews a trial courts decision whether or not to grant equitable relief only for an abuse of discretion (C) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (D) holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (E) recognizing that an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court acts without reference to any guiding principles or rules
answer:
holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court


question:
are reversed with instructions that he be re-sentenced under a correctly calculated score sheet. Cooper also asserts the same argument for his 41.712-month sentence on the delivery of cocaine charge. The question, however, is whether this error is harmless because Cooper was sentenced as a habitual felony offender. While the 41.712-month sentence happened to be equal to the minimum guidelines sentence under the incorrectly calculated score sheet, the guidelines scoresheet is legally irrelevant because Cooper was habitualized. See § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2002)(“A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002 [The Criminal Punishment Code].”); Tannihill v. State, 848 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); LaFleur v. State, 812 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(<HOLDING>); Kenon v. State, 780 So.2d 258, 261 (Fla. 5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding habitual sentence rendered guidelines scoresheet irrelevant (B) holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal (C) holding if the plea agreement was not conditioned on the sentencing guidelines an appellant is not entitled to relief because his sentence is not illegal (D) holding that defendant entitled to resentencing if the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines would constitute an impermissible departure sentence under the 1994 guidelines (E) holding that defendant should be resentenced where district court imposed a sentence under an erroneously calculated guidelines range  even where the sentence imposed fell within the correct range
answer:
holding habitual sentence rendered guidelines scoresheet irrelevant


question:
in any case,” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. This unambiguous statutory language necessarily excludes the complaint that gives birth to the proceedings, as it is not possible to multiply proceedings until after those proceedings have begun. To the extent that the Seventh Circuit held otherwise in In re TCI, Ltd,., 769 F.2d at 448, we find the court’s reasoning questionable. There, the Seventh Circuit looked beyond § 1927’s language to (1) a failed amendment that would have required a warning prior to sanctions; and (2) the “new” Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. which, the court observed, “requires the attorney to take care before filing a complaint.” Id. We see no reason to look past § 1927’s clear language. See BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 187 n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 388 (2004) (<HOLDING>). [14] Because Gage acquiesced in Winn’s first 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing longstanding precedents that permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text (B) holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear (C) recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous (D) holding that we may consult legislative history as an aid to the interpretation of ambiguous text (E) holding that unless a statute is ambiguous on the point at issue a court should not resort to legislative history in interpreting it
answer:

holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear