In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence.” Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 417, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964) (“established rule” is that “recognition operates retroactively to validate past acts”); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942) (recognition is retroactive in effect); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328-330, 57 S.Ct. 758, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937) (recognition is retroactive). Further, the FSIA itself is retroactive in application and applies to actions of foreign sovereigns prior to the passage of the FSIA. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 124 S.Ct. 2240, 159 L.Ed.2d 1, (2004) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the FSIA would apply to all 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fsia applied retroactively to actions of the austrian government in 1948 (B) holding that kotecki limit applied retroactively (C) holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government (D) holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review (E) recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: as defined by Section 30-31-2(M), his acts of cultivating or growing mushrooms, even if by artificial means, are not prohibited by Section 30-31-20(A)(1). To interpret Section 30-31-20(A)(1) otherwise, as the State suggests, would require us to read language into the statute that is not there. See Marshall, 2004-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 10, 13, 136 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801 (refusing to read a personal use exception into the CSA, reasoning that to do so “would impermissibly read language into a statute that makes sense as written”). {11} Our holding is also supported by an analysis of the federal counterpart to Section 30-31-20(A)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000) of the Federal Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (federal act). See State v. Carr, 95 N.M. 755, 760, 626 P.2d 292, 297 (Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the presumptions applicability to federal statutes (B) holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction   (C) recognizing a reliance on federal jurisprudence for the interpretation of louisianas arbitration statutes (D) holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes (E) recognizing that the csa is patterned after the federal act and relying on federal interpretation to the extent that the statutes are similar

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: not be expected to endure it. Finally, this Court has also held that mere termination of employment will not support an emotional distress claim, but if “the manner of termination evinces circumstances of oppressive conduct and abuse of a position of authority vis-a-vis plaintiff, it may provide grounds for the tort action.” Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 154 Vt. 284, 296, 576 A.2d 441, 448 (1990); see also Goosens v. AT&T Corp., No. EP-00-CA-002-DB, 2000 WL 33348222, at *3 (W.D.Tex. April 3, 2000) (simply terminating an employee without more cannot amount to IIED). Dulude’s allegations, taken as true, fail to demonstrate that FAHC’s actions during the actual grievance procedure and termination process were extreme and outrageous. See Crump, 154 Vt. at 296-97, 576 A.2d at 449 (<HOLDING>). This Court has held that absent at least one 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident (B) holding that there was sufficient evidence to go to a jury on an iied claim when an employee with eighteen years of service was summarily fired after being falsely accused of theft kept in a three hour meeting with no opportunity to leave or eat lunch and badgered to sign a confession (C) holding that there was no question that the full and fair opportunity element was met where there was no indication that such an opportunity was unavailable (D) holding that a confession was voluntary despite the fact that an officer falsely told the defendant that physical evidence connected him to the crime (E) holding that the jury should determine whether an employee eating lunch in a hospital cafeteria was within the course and scope of employment where factual disputes arose as to whether he was eating lunch in a place required or encouraged by his employer whether other employees regularly ate there and whether the employee had a choice in where to eat lunch


Output: (B)