TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: child abuse or neglect or who testifies or otherwise participates in a judicial proceeding arising from a report, petition, or investigation of alleged child abuse or neglect is immune from civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Id. § 261.106(a) (emphasis added). The dissent also correctly points out that “Immunity from liability and immunity from suit are two distinct principles.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). Finally, the dissent even recognizes that “[ijmmunity from liability is an affirmative defense, while immunity from suit deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex.2004); see also City of Hous. v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>); Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar (B) holding bjecause immunity from liability constitutes an affirmative defense not a jurisdictional bar only immunity from suit is properly before us today (C) recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit (D) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (E) holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: CURIAM: Carlo Junior Seneeharles appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). He raises three issues on appeal, which we address in turn. After review, we affirm Sen-echarles’s con earm and ammunition had traveled through interstate commerce before the offense was committed, the Government established a minimal nexus between Senecharles’s firearm and ammunition and interstate commerce, and the statute was constitutional as-applied to him. See United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). B. Armed Career Criminal Act Senecharles also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  922g is not unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who possessed a firearm only intrastate when the government demonstrated that the firearm moved in interstate commerce (B) recognizing scarborough holding that commerce nexus satisfied upon showing that possessed firearm had traveled at some time in interstate commerce (C) holding that a defendant possessed a firearm in connection with a crime when the firearm was kept in a car across the street from where the defendant was selling drugs (D) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time (E) holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: support, we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Holtzleiter v. Holtzleiter, 944 N.E.2d 502, 505 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, including any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Id. This Court has acknowledged that “the importance of first-person observation and preventing disruption to the family setting justifies deference to the trial court.” Id. In relevant part, Indiana Code section 31-16-8-1(1) provides that a child support order may be modified only “upon a showing of changed circumstances so substan tial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable[.]” See also Vagenas v. Vagenas, 879 N.E.2d 1155, 1159 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (<HOLDING>). The party seeking the modification bears the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was error for the trial court to determine the issue of child support without a child support guidelines worksheet (B) holding that postsecondary education support orders are modified pursuant to the statute governing child support modification (C) holding that where payments are made on past due support they must first be applied to  current child support installments due then to accrued and outstanding interest on  delinquent child support obligations and finally to the principal amount due on unpaid child support (D) holding that pursuant to prwora and iirira congress had evinced its intention to occupy the field of alien eligibility for postsecondary education and invalidating on federal preemption grounds section 8 of californias proposition 187 which denied public postsecondary education to immigrants not lawfully present (E) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the increased child support retroactive to the date of the petition for modification because the childs increased need for support and the former husbands ability to pay the increased child support existed at the time the former wifes petition for modification was filed

SOLUTION:
(B)