instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
objectively by a reasonable person. Cooper v. Albacore Holdings, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 238, 244-45 (Mo.App.E.D.2006). Here, the trial court found that the Employer’s alleged conduct was not sufficient as a matter of law to objectively establish severe or pervasive hostility based on a disability. Whether “a reasonable person would objectively consider [an employer’s] behavior towards [a claimant] severe enough to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment” is a question of fact. Cooper, 204 S.W.3d at 245; see also Howard, 149 F.3d at 840; 37 William C established, whether a reasonable person would similarly find the conduct offensive will generally be a question of fact for the jury. Cf. Meyerkord v. Zipatoni Co., 276 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Mo.App.E.D.2008) (<HOLDING>); Y.G. v. Jewish Hasp, of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave (B) holding that whether misrepresentations would be highly offensive to a reasonable person are questions for a jury (C) holding that questions of proximate cause are within the exclusive domain for the jury and may only be removed when reasonable minds cannot differ (D) holding in determining whether driver was insured under terms of policy exclusion of person using vehicle without a reasonable belief person was entitled to do so must be considered (E) holding that whether an encounter is consensual hinges on whether a reasonable person would have felt free to disregard the police and go about his business
answer:
holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave


question:
of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990). Petitioner claims that Apprendi falls within the narrow scope of the second category of exceptions and is therefore applicable to his case retroactively. The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether Apprendi should be considered a “watershed rule,” falling within the Teague exceptions. However, every Circuit Court which has considered this question has held that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively on collateral review. United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir.2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir.2001); see, e.g., Abdullah v. United States, 240 F.3d 683, 687 (8th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>); Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review (B) holding apprendi is not retroactive (C) holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review (D) holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review  that was previously unavailable (E) holding that the apprendi decision is not applicable on collateral review
answer:
holding apprendi is not retroactive


question:
defendants); accord People v. Carrington, 47 Cal.4th 145, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 211 P.3d 617, 647 (2009) (“An indictment and an information initiate ‘separate proceedings.’ ”); State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 115, 125 (Mo.1981) (“The second indictment began a new and separate criminal proceeding... .”). In fact, the circumstances of this case illustrate the independent nature of the grand jury as a separate charging body. Under Rule 17.01, only a grand jury indictment could have charged Hohenwald with first-degree murder because a conviction for that offense is punishable by life imprisonment. Minn. R.Crim. P. 17.01, subd. 1 (“An offense punishable by life imprisonment must be prosecuted by indictment.”) (emphasis added); see also State v. Kivimaki, 345 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn.1984) (<HOLDING>). The indictment, therefore, necessarily 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not error to allow the penalty phase jury to hear evidence that the defendants previous conviction of seconddegree murder was obtained pursuant to an indictment for firstdegree murder (B) recognizing that rule 1701 required an indictment to proceed on charges of firstdegree murder (C) holding that indictment for murder in the first degree charges murder by whatever means it may have been committed regardless of the theory of murder presented to the grand jury (D) holding that conspiracy to commit murder is not lesserincluded offense of firstdegree murder (E) holding that conviction for seconddegree murder operates as implied acquittal on firstdegree murder count
answer:

holding that it was not error to allow the penalty phase jury to hear evidence that the defendants previous conviction of seconddegree murder was obtained pursuant to an indictment for firstdegree murder