TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: plenary determination of jurisdiction over five landlocked canals); Weiszmann v. District Engineers, U.S. Army Corp, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir.1976) (same outcome as in Sexton Cove in action brought by landowner); U.S. v. St. Bernard Parish, 589 F.Supp. 617 (E.D.La.1984) (plenary trial determining jurisdictional issue); U.S. v. Lambert 589 F.Supp. 366 (M.D.Fla.1984) (plenary trial determining property was a wetland; proof by preponderance of evidence was measure of government’s burden of persuasion); U.S. v. Ciampitti, 583 F.Supp. 483 (D.N.J.1984) (in action for preliminary injunction, court made own determination that property was a wetland); U.S. v. City of Fort Pierre, 580 F.Supp. 1036 (D.S.D.1983) (plenary trial determining property was a wetland) rev'd, 747 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Parkview Corp. v. Department of Army Corp of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (B) holding property not a wetland (C) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (D) recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate (E) holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover

SOLUTION: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property

PROBLEM: was safe to operate, afforded discretion to the FAA to “make its own findings” whether the submitted documentation satisfied that requirement. Id. Likewise, as the district court noted, 49 C.F.R. § 385.17(f) is not a “check list.” J.A. at 105. It leaves it to the FMCSA to determine whether a carrier’s submission provides evidence that corrective action has been taken, and whether the agency has the resources to reach a final decision within 45 days. Such decisions, which relate to a regulatory agency’s “implementation of a mechanism for compliance review” and necessarily require “balancing the objectives sought to be obtained against such practical considerations as staffing and funding,” constitute discretionary functions themselves. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 819-20, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (<HOLDING>). Discretion thus suffuses 49 C.F.R. § 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver (B) holding that the faas alleged negligence in failing to check certain specific items in the course of certificating a specific aircraft as part of a spotcheck program involved calculated risks but fell squarely within the discretionary function exception (C) holding that actions against the faa for its alleged negligence in certificating aircraft for use in commercial aviation are barred by the discretionary function exception of the federal tort claims act id at 821 104 sct 2755 because the faas decisions as to the manner of enforcing regulations is plainly a discretionary activity id at 819 21 104 sct 2755 (D) holding that the faas application of a spotcheck system to a particular aircraft was a discretionary function (E) holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision 

SOLUTION: recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver

PROBLEM: tax annual exclusion under section 2503(b) are regarded as taxable transfers_” Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(3). Clearly, the sentence upon which the Eleventh Circuit and now our Court mistakenly rely is concerned with the $10,000 annual exclusion on gifts and has absolutely nothing to do with pre-Act transfers. There is a definitive difference between a taxable transfer that qualifies for the annual exclusion and on which a gift tax therefore is not imposed, such as an annual $10,000 check to a favorite nephew, and a transfer as to which the gift tax is not even applicable, such as a transfer pursuant to an obligation created in an antenuptial agreement executed in 1931 between a man and woman married later that year. See Commissioner v. Copley’s Estate, 194 F.2d 364, 367 (7th Cir.1952) (<HOLDING>). The creation of the Ordway trust in 1917 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is not retroactive (B) holding that the act is retroactive (C) holding that transfers made in 1936 and 1944 pursuant to the 1931 agreement were not taxable because to hold as the commissioner would have us do  would require a retroactive application of the gift tax which we think is not permissible see sec 501b of the revenue act of 1932 (D) holding retroactive application (E) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective

SOLUTION:
holding that the act is not retroactive