In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

the evidence of rape discussed above in Division 1, we conclude that the evidence at Martin’s trial was sufficient to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found as to both murders. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (2) (requiring a review of the statutory aggravating circumstances foundby the jury);UAP Rule IV (B) (2) (providing that, in all death penalty cases, this Court will determine whether the verdicts are supported by the evidence). See also Ring, 536 U. S. 584; Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. 20. Considering both the murders for which Martin has been sentenced to death and Martin as a defendant, we find that the death sentences imposed in his case were not disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Georgia law. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3); Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716-717 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited in the Appendix support this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts statutorily mandated proportionality review concerns whether a particular death sentence is excessive per se or is substantially out of line (B) holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable
holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial

bar, of rule 32:1.3 for dilatory handling of estates despite notices and inquiries from beneficiaries). Johnson’s failure to respond to Neefs phone calls and requests for information, failure to notify Neef of what progress had or had not been made on the case, and failure to provide notice of termination, contact information, return of paperwork, or a return of unearned fees violated rules 32:1.4 (duty to keep client informed) and 32:1.16(d) (duty to protect client’s interests upon termination of representation). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 263, 268 (Iowa 2010) (finding attorney’s neglect of client’s legal matters and failure to keep clients informed about their cases violated rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4, and 32:1.16(d)); Earley, 774 N.W.2d at 307-08 (<HOLDING>). Johnson also violated rule 32:8.4(c) (duty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the attorney violated mlrpc 13 when he did not prosecute his clients claim after filing a complaint or protect against expiration of the statute of limitation for his clients complaint and caused discovery sanctions to be filed for his failure to respond to discovery requests (B) holding an attorney violated his duty of candor to the tribunal by changing his clients interrogatory answers without the clients knowledge (C) holding attorney violated rules 3214 and 32116d when he failed to keep his clients informed about the status of their cases failed to communicate with his clients after their repeated requests for information and failed to  account for or return client money from retainer fees (D) holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan (E) holding that equitable tolling applied when the attorney informed his client there was no such thing as a oneyear filing deadline and consistently lied to his client and the clients wife
holding that the attorney violated mlrpc 13 when he did not prosecute his clients claim after filing a complaint or protect against expiration of the statute of limitation for his clients complaint and caused discovery sanctions to be filed for his failure to respond to discovery requests

cannot be controlled by mandamus.” Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 218-19, 50 S.Ct. 320, 324-25, 74 L.Ed. 809 (1929). We agree with the district court that Edison’s showing falls far short of this high standard. To begin with, the Attorney General obtained the surcharge and now retains it pursuant to a federal court order. He is thus complying with — not violating — his legal obligations. Resisting this obvious proposition, Edison argues that the Attorney General’s possession of the surcharge is so plainly wrong that it amounts to a violation of a ministerial duty. In our view, however, this argument amounts to a completely inappropriate collateral attack on the Alabama court’s judgment. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26, 63 S.Ct. 938, 941, 87 L.Ed. 1185 (1946) (<HOLDING>). Although Edison never formally asked the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is improper to exercise general jurisdiction when defendants purchases combined with its sales in the forum yielded 129 of its total income (B) holding that mandamus is only available to confine an inferior comt to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so (C) holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the ability to present the transcript to the jury (D) holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (E) recognizing the supreme courts longstanding jurisdiction over writs of prohibition and mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction

holding that it is improper to exercise general jurisdiction when defendants purchases combined with its sales in the forum yielded 129 of its total income