In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: See Lorber 675 F.2d at 1067. The court noted that the classification of the surcharge as a non-tax fee was “a close question,” but concluded that because the surcharge was triggered by “voluntary” choice, the surcharge was possessed more of the character of a service fee than that of a tax. See id. The Lorber court also held that extending priority status to the surcharge was contrary to the trend of then-recent amendments to § 64 of the old Bankruptcy Act, which tended toward the erosion of the preferred status of taxes. See id., 675 F.2d at 1067-68. The court explained that, following the grant by Congress of priority status to claims for taxes, the federal government and its state and local counterparts began to increase the types and levels of taxation. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. (<HOLDING>). Even courts in the Ninth Circuit, purporting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber (B) holding that ohios reimbursement claims met the lorber criteria but were not excise taxes because they were not universally applicable to similarly situated entities and in addition disadvantaged private creditors with like claims (C) holding west virginias reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber suburban ii and the chateaugay district court decision (D) holding reimbursement claims were excise taxes under the lorber test without addressing the bankruptcy codes central policy of equal distribution (E) holding that michigan reimbursement claims were excise taxes under both lorber and suburban ii

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: magistrate judge denied the motion, explaining that Mr. Schueller’s subjective perceptions did not demonstrate judicial bias and his claims were not based on any extrajudicial source to support a bias or partiality challenge. We generally review the denial of a recusal motion for abuse of discretion. ClearOne Comm’cns, Inc. v. Bowers, 651 F.3d 1200, 1217 (10th Cir.2011). For the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s order denying recusal, we determine that recusal was not warranted and we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to recuse. To the extent Mr. Schueller now claims that the district judge was biased against him, he did not raise this issue to the district court, so we do not address it. See Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1239 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Wells Fargo’s motion for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs waived their bias argument on appeal because they failed to timely move for disqualification (B) holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument (C) holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal (D) holding argument not asserted before district court is waived on appeal (E) holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: ones in the present case, are capable of sustaining “direct physical loss or damage.” The definition of “physical,” as provided in the Oxford English Dictionary, is “[o]f or relating to natural phenomena perceived through the senses (as opposed to the mind); of or relating to matter or the material world; natural; tangible, conCrete.” Oxford English Dictionary, Ohio courts have recognized that “[m]oney deposited in a fund is intangible property,” Walther v. Central Trust Co., N.A., 70 Ohio App.3d 26, 32, 590 N.E.2d 375 (Ohio Ct.App.1990), and that “[i]ntangible personal property, by its very nature, is not capable of being physically possessed.” Denezza v. Denezza, 1996 WL 111812, *2, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 935, at *5 (Ct.App. Mar. 15, 1996) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); see also Falck v. United States, 2005 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing limited partnership interest as intangible personal property (B) recognizing that property not subject to physical seizure such as mutual fund shares are intangible property (C) recognizing that the government may seek a personal judgment specific property or substitute property (D) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (E) recognizing that partnership property is a type of ownership


Output: (A)