In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: resource. Power that is not exercised is not management or control even though in a legal sense the resource may belong in part or appertain to that party. While the Government is correct in their argument that there is not a double recovery until the total value of the damaged or injured resource has been recovered, a given trustee cannot recover more than what its stewardship is determined to be. To allow otherwise would create the undesirable situation of a race to the courthouse between co-trustees with the first in time being the first in right. Moreover, once a state, federal or other public trustee recovers such damages, res judicata would prevent a second trustee from recovering the same public losses. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, settlement would be discouraged by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims to the vsf benefits under various theories were barred by the res judicata effect of the state court judgment in castellano iii (B) holding that the plaintiffs earlier claims of infringement by possession and its later claims of infringement by use of its source code arose from the same nucleus of operative facts and therefore the later claims were barred by res judicata (C) holding that a trustees claim was barred by res judicata and stating that the trustee could have asked the bankruptcy court to reserve his fraud claims for later adjudication which would have avoided his claims being barred (D) holding that the plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata when the federal courts judgment was finalized by denial of his petition for certiorari (E) holding that the united states and the state of alaska as public trustees under the cwa and cercla could recover all lost use damages caused by the spill and that private claims for lost recreational use were barred under res judicata
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: improperly determined that the “neither expected nor intended” language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an “occurrence.” ¶21 The CGL policy’s core provision defines “occurrence” by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was “neither expected nor intended.” This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured’s expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an “occurrence” and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). ¶22 Here the District Court found that Ribi 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: “must make findings adequate to support the closure,” Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210; accord Gibbons, 555 F.3d at 116; Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir.1997) (in banc). In other words, if a court intends to exclude the public from a criminal proceeding, it must first analyze the Waller factors and make specific findings with regard to those factors. If a trial court fails to adhere to this procedure, any intentional closure is unjustified and will, in all but the rarest of cases, require reversal. E.g., Presley, 130 S.Ct. at 725. Here, despite not making any Waller findings, the district court intentionally excluded the public from the courtroom for the entirety of voir dire. On these facts alone, the closure was unjustified. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, even if we accept Delaney’s 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings (B) holding the trial court must make findings adequate to support a closure (C) holding that trial court must make findings of fact on all material factual issues that involve ultimate issues in divorce and must make findings that characterize and value each asset or liability on which disputed evidence was presented (D) holding that carter mandates that where the trial court failed to make the requisite casespecific findings of fact closure of the courtroom violated the defendants right to a public trial (E) holding that the fourth waller factor was satisfied despite the lack of specific findings of fact where the information gleaned from the record was  sufficient to support the partial temporary closure of petitioners trial
Example Output:
(B)