TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: in favor of William Spencer, et al., (Spencer) and setting the penalties for violation of the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Spencer cross-appeals the denial of post-trial motions and refusal to award attorney’s fees. We affirm on all grounds. I BART’s unjust enrichment claim fads for want of a loss. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 881 (2000) (noting that the elements of unjust enrichment are “receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.”). Even assuming that County of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 158 Cal.App.4th 533, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 (2008), recognized an exception to this rule, BART’s claim does not fall into that exception. See Peterson v. Cellico P’ship, 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1594, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Concrete financial loss is required for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (B) holding that walsh does not support plaintiffs assertion that they need not allege any actual injury to bring an unjust enrichment claim (C) holding that where plaintiffs filed a complaint for conversion unjust enrichment and injunctive relief they had an adequate remedy at law (D) holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed

SOLUTION: holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement

PROBLEM: of attorney-client privilege, nor could they. There was thus no error in admitting the bill. J. The Apportionment of Damages Defendants Ashton and Short contend that the Court erred in refusing to apportion damages among the Defendants. This issue as such was first raised in Defendants’ Amended Motion and would not need to be considered by the Court. Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., supra. Prior to the charge of the Court, the parties were advised of the charge and Ash-ton and Short vaguely objected because of the potential for joint and several liability; however they did not propose any points for charge with respect to the apportionment of damages. See Frankel v. Burke’s Excavating, Inc., 269 F.Supp. 1007 (E.D.Pa.1967), aff’d 397 F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. 1968) (<HOLDING>). In any event, under Section 433(b), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that alleged defects in special interrogatories could not be the basis for a new trial when counsel had not pointed out the alleged defect to the court (B) holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment (C) holding that the court had no jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a plea agreement (D) holding because plaintiff had not alleged defendant made a misrepresentation or that the alleged defect posed a safety risk the district court  properly dismissed plaintiffs  fraudulent concealment claim (E) holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect

SOLUTION: holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment

PROBLEM: amounts in the budget process that were insufficient to fund payments due local governments as stated in the Act. This failure to request sufficient funds was a breach of the alleged implied contract, plaintiff believes, citing the General Accounting Office on the issue of statutory formulae: ‘Where allocation of funds is based on a statutory formula, the formula itself establishes the obligation to each recipient and the obligation occurs by operation of law.” GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (“GAO Redbook”) at 7-34. Greenlee also points to eases in which the full appropriation for a government obligation was not available, yet the obligation itself remained. The plaintiff had recourse to the courts for the difference. See, e.g., New York Airways, 369 F.2d at 748 (<HOLDING>). The elements of an implied-in-fact contract 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the 2005 amendment was a substantive change (B) recognizing that four reasons for granting a rule 59e motion are manifest errors of law or fact newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence manifest injustice and an intervening change in controlling law (C) holding that change in state substantive case law does not constitute the removal of an impediment (D) holding that a subsequent petition may be filed upon a showing of a change in circumstances (E) holding that congress had the power to amend an obligation but any intent to change substantive law in a subsequent appropriation must be clearly manifest

SOLUTION:
holding that the 2005 amendment was a substantive change