In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: paid with Vested Funds and Seized Funds. And while the majority of the ICE contract price was paid with DFI money, approximately $12 million, the record reflects that $8 million of the contract price was paid with Seized Funds. Thus, defendants have failed, with respect to either contract, to demonstrate that no “claim” was submitted within the meaning of the-FCA. And, accordingly, they are not entitled to summary judgment on this issue. B. Presentment Before FCA liability will attach to a “claim” for payment under § 3729(a)(1), the false or fraudulent “claim” must be “knowingly presented], or caus[ed] to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United Government or a member of the Armed Services of the United States.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1); see also Totten II, 380 F.3d at 491 (<HOLDING>). This requirement ultimately presents no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a statement in the motion for new trial entitled certificate of presentment in which appellate counsel stated the motion was handdelivered to the trial court insufficient to establish presentment (B) holding that presentment is a requirement of the fca (C) holding that the fca includes a materiality requirement (D) recognizing that criminal contempt is not initiated by an indictment or presentment (E) holding that certificate of presentment and docket entry noting filing of motion were insufficient evidence of presentment

A: (B)
****
Q: the action should pro ceed among the existing parties or be dismissed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b). Defendant neglected to offer any explanation for how and why Mr. Stroud is essential, other than that he was named in the underlying state court case. That is not enough. Mr. Stroud is not a necessary or indispensable party under Rule 19 because this Court can administer complete relief — an order compelling arbitration— among the existing parties and Mr. Stroud himself is not claiming an interest in this arbitration action that will be impaired by his absence. Although failing to dismiss this case may result in piecemeal litigation, that factor alone is not compelling enough to find Mr. Stroud to be an indispensable party. Cf. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). This Court therefore properly limits its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (B) holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived (C) holding that district courts are required to compel arbitration of claims subject to arbitration clause even if the result is piecemeal litigation (D) holding that faa was inapplicable where parties involved in action are not parties to an arbitration agreement under which issues are referable to arbitration (E) holding that in determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists in petition to compel arbitration district court was correct in looking only to citizenship of parties in action before it  parties who signed arbitration agreement  and that nondiverse agents in underlying state case were not indispensable parties as any potential prejudice resulting from piecemeal litigation is overcome by faas strong bias in favor of arbitration

A: (E)
****
Q: fees, which the government opposed. The government contended that Wagner was not a prevailing party, and even if she were, the government was substantially justified in its position throughout the litigation; in either case, Wagner would not be awarded the fees she sought. We denied Wagner’s motion. In our Order, filed on August 26, 2008, we stated that in order to be a “prevailing party” under the EAJA, a party must establish that a federal court’s actions resulted in a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” and that the alteration was “judicially sanctioned.” See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604-05, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 794 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We determined that the Court’s actions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the buckhannon rule governs an application for fees under the eaja (B) holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea (C) holding that under the eaja a litigant did not incur fees when his former employer agreed to pay his legal fees and expenses (D) holding that payment of eaja fees directly to the attorney also is consistent with the broad purpose for enacting the eaja  if the commissioners narrow position was adopted there would be a substantial risk that counsel for a successful plaintiff might not be paid which would have a chilling effect on the willingness of attorneys to represent indigent claimants in social security cases thus thwarting the primary purpose the eaja was enacted (E) holding that the eaja application satisfied the eaja content requirements because it contained among other things an itemized statement of the fees sought  supported by an affidavit from the appellants counsel

A:
(A)
****