instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir.1993) (“The purpose of NEPA is to protect the environment, not the economic interests of those adversely affected by agency decisions.”); Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 475 (9th Cir.1979) (purely financial interests are outside of NEPA’s zone of interests). Accordingly, we have consistently held that purely economic interests do not fall within NEPA’s zone of interests: “[A] plaintiff who asserts purely economic injuries does not have standing to challenge an agency action under NEPA.” Nevada Land Action Ass’n, 8 F.3d at 716; see also Ranchers Cattleman v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1102 (9th Cir.2005) (an economic injury alone will not support a claim under NEPA); Western Radio Servs. Co. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 903 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Port of Astoria, 595 F.2d at 475 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the cause of action (B) holding that a plaintiff whose only complaint was that agency action would cause economic harm asserted an interest outside nepas zone of interests (C) holding that the plaintiff did not have standing because it was not able to demonstrate how its economic interests fell within the zone of interests protected by the nhpa (D) recognizing cause of action (E) holding that the public interest in expression must be weighed against the plaintiffs economic and noneconomic interests
answer:
(B)


question:
this case was scheduled for a date approximately six months after the permanent injunction had expired. The procedural posture of this case is comparable to that of Madonna, in which the plaintiffs challenged their confinements while awaiting a hearing to determine whether they should be committed to mental institutions. 295 N.W.2d at 358. The plaintiffs filed petitions for habeas corpus during their pre-hearing confinements, which lasted only a matter of weeks, but the petitions were not adjudicated before their pre-hearing confinements ended. Id. at 358-59. Approximately two and one-half years later, the supreme court held that the case was not moot, reasoning that “some method of review must exist.” Id. at 361; see also Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 208 n. 2 (Minn.2001) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 188 n. 1, 210 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that challenge to oneyear order for protection was not moot even though it had expired (B) holding that district court may award money due under a statute even though time for disbursement had expired (C) holding that challenge to oneyear residency requirement for divorce action was not moot even though plaintiff had since satisfied requirement (D) holding expired child abuse protective order not moot because of possible effect on future custody determinations (E) holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot
answer:
(A)


question:
of the property. See C.R.E. 602; C.R.E. 701. However, there is no evidence in the record which establishes that Pomeranz ever paid a bill relating to the maintenance of the property or that he was personally responsible for any aspect of the maintenance because McDonald’s had been responsible for the payments for the past fifteen years. Because no adequate evidentiary foundation was laid for Pomeranz’s estimation of maintenance expenses on the property, it is impossible, absent pure speculation, to ascertain from the record how Pomeranz obtained the $4,800 estimation. The trial court's factual findings relating to future maintenance expenses are not sustained by either competent or adequate evidence and are therefore clearly erroneous. See Anderson, 170 Colo. at 13, 458 P.2d at 758 (<HOLDING>). The evidence presented by the petitioners on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact (B) holding that a reviewing court will only presume that the trial court made implicit factual findings when such findings were necessary to its ultimate conclusion (C) holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings (D) holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence (E) holding that where the original drug quantity determination is not specific enough for the district court to determine whether it has the authority to reduce a defendants sentence under  3582c2 that court may make new findings of fact that are supported by the record and are not inconsistent with the findings made in the original sentencing proceedings
answer:

(D)