instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 23 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (same). Essentially, the Court determined that the prejudicial quality of testimony regarding an actually coerced confession is, like all other improperly introduced testimony at trial, capable of review. At this point in time, the Fulminante decision stands as the sole, albeit the dispositive, case on this point. In contrast, cases applying the harmless error analysis to the introduction of presumptively coerced statements are legion. See e.g. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 & n. 22, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2652 & n. 22, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 555 & n. 22 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443, 104 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion  (B) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence (D) holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights (E) holding that although miranda required the suppression of testimonial statements made before defendant was advised of his constitutional rights the state court is free of course to consider this harmless error question upon remand
answer:
holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion 


question:
supervising, or otherwise controlling the agent” in addition to any vicarious liability that may be imposed via the agent’s actions. We hold that plaintiffs under the ICRA may proceed against the employer on either a direct negligence or vicarious liability theory for supervisor harassment in a hostile-work-environment case. The Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense, with the burden of proof on the employer, applies only to claims of vicarious liability. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764, 118 S.Ct. at 2270 (adopting affirmative defense “in order to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority” (emphasis added)); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. at 2292; see also Johnson v. Shinseki, 811 F.Supp.2d 336, 348 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct (B) holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied (C) holding because the court applied the negligence standard the faragher defense is inapplicable (D) holding that equitable defense of laches is inapplicable to claims of fraud (E) holding that even though the court does not usually apply the clearly erroneous standard to mixed questions of fact and law this standard is properly applied to the materiality issue
answer:
holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct


question:
spouse. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). A majority of courts, including this one, have concluded that the burden of proof for section 523(a)(15) is initially with the non-debtor spouse who must first establish that the debt, which arose from a divorce or support agreement, is not in the nature of alimony or support. The burden then shifts to the debtor to prove either an inability to pay or that the benefit to the debtor outweighs the detriment to the non-debtor spouse. See Craig v. Craig (In re Craig), 196 B.R. 305, 308 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1996); McGinnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis), 194 B.R. 917, 920 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1996); Collins v. Florez (In re Florez), 191 B.R. 112, 115 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995). But see Greenwalt v. Greenwalt (In re Greenwalt), 200 B.R. 909, 913 (Bankr.W.D.Wash.1996) (<HOLDING>); Morris v. Morris (In re Morris), 197 B.R. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff bears the burden when relying on the discovery rule (B) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (C) holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof for all elements of section 523a15 (D) holding that the government bears the burden of proof with respect to the issue of whether termination for default was justified (E) holding that the defendant bears the burden of proof and that such a disposition does not violate the due process clause
answer:

holding that the plaintiff bears the burden when relying on the discovery rule