In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: an alcohol concentration of .22. The Commissioner of Public Safety revoked Gergen’s driving privileges, and the district court affirmed. ISSUES 1. Where a district court determines that a person arrested for driving while intoxicated did not make a good faith effort to contact an attorney, is the driver’s right to counsel vindicated even though the telephone provided by the arresting officer is blocked from dialing 800-numbers? 2. Did the police officer violate Minn.Stat. § 481.10? ANALYSIS I. A person arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) has a limited right to consult an attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing, provided the consultation does not unreasonably delay the testing. Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn.1991) (<HOLDING>); see Minn. Const. art. I, § 6 (“In all 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no constitutional right to refuse chemical testing under the implied consent law (B) holding that the implied consent warning given to the defendant was not misleading or coercive because the validity of the implied consent notice is not contingent upon other administrative aspects of ocga  405671 (C) holding that officers not required to give implied consent warnings where statute did not apply (D) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (E) holding that right to counsel under implied consent statute is limited because of the evanescent nature of alcohol

A: (E)
****
Q: interest of safety and security at the institution. Accordingly, the order of the district court denying Hyde’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Chief Judge LANSING and Judge PERRY concur. 1 . Roles was addressed in the context of FERPA. However, as we discuss below, there is no distinction between FERPA’s compelling govern mental interest standard and that embodied in RLUIPA. 2 .Some states along with the Federal Bureau of Prisons allow sweat lodges and other Native American religious practices at maximum security prisons. See Pounders v. Kempker, 79 Fed. Appx. 941, 943 n. 2 (8th Cir.2003) (noting that Missouri eventually built a sweat lodge at its maximum security Potosi Correctional Center); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Morrison v. Cook, 1999 WL 717218, *4 (D.Or. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that removal from house arrest and return to general prison population was a matter of inmate classification (B) holding that africanamerican plaintiffs claims that defendants should have known that placing him in a jail with a large population of white inmates put him at risk of being attacked were without merit because the plaintiff had not alleged any specific facts which would show that he was in danger of being assaulted by the other inmates (C) holding that prison conditions are those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population (D) recognizing general rule (E) recognizing that general population inmates at oregon maximum security prison were allowed to participate in weekly sweat lodge ceremonies

A: (E)
****
Q: Fernandez v. Farmers Ins. Co., 115 N.M. 622, 627, 857 P.2d 22, 27 (1993). {53} Other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have unequivocally held that for purposes of personal jurisdiction, it is not sufficient to establish only instrumentality, and instead a plaintiff must also establish that the corporation that is 960 F.2d 1080, 1091-93 (1st Cir.1992) (deciding the question of personal jurisdiction using federal veil piercing standard for ERISA cases and holding that fraudulent intent and injustice are elements of the standard), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Cent. States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 940 (7th Cir. 2000); ACE & Co. v. Balfour Beatty PLC, 148 F.Supp.2d 418, 425 (D.Del.2001) (<HOLDING>); Medina v. Four Winds Int’l Corp., 111 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the alter ego doctrine is an equitable doctrine which should be used to prevent inequitable results (B) holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law (C) holding that delaware law requires fraud injustice or inequity to be shown before the alter ego doctrine can be used to find personal jurisdiction over a parent corporation (D) holding that alter ego is shown from the total dealings of the corporation (E) recognizing that the corporate entity is disregarded to prevent fraud or an injustice not to inflict an obligation on an innocent corporation and that the fraud or inequity sought to be eliminated must be that of the party against whom the alter ego doctrine is invoked

A:
(C)
****