TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: 548 U.S. at 518, 126 S.Ct. at 2667 (Scalia, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that “compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act can be [a compelling state] interest ... [otherwise] a State could be placed in the impossible position of having to choose between compliance with § 5 and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause”). And we conclude that a plan will be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest when the race-based action taken was reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of the Act. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2490-91, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 1906, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (<HOLDING>); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (B) holding that where the claimed interest is avoidance of liability under section 2 the legislative action must at a minimum remedy the anticipated violation or achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored (C) holding that liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under  1983 where at best the plaintiff has merely claimed that the appellants were aware of alleged violation but did not take appropriate action (D) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (E) holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: Eighth Circuit and a pair of nonprece-dential decisions from this court, all of which assume that lying to a supervising probation officer is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), a felony. See United States v. Wagner, 573 Fed.Appx. 598, 598-99 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Quillman, 409 Fed.Appx. 18, 21 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Grimes, 54 F.3d 489, 491-92 (8th Cir. 1995). But Grimes was decided before Congress amended § 1001 to exempt from its coverage any false statement made to a “judge or magistrate” by a party in a “judicial proceeding,” 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b), and we haven’t yet considered whether, or to what extent, that exemption covers lies made to a probation officer by a person under supervision, compare United States v. Horvath, 492 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Vreeland, 684 F.3d 653, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probation is not a sentence (B) holding that defendants lies to probation officer preparing presentence report fall within  1001b exception if probation officer must include particular statement in report (C) holding defendants statement that presentence report was correct did not constitute admission to the nature and cireumstances of the crime reflected in the report (D) holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error (E) holding that the defendants statements to the probation officer were insufficient to satisfy the safety valves fifth requirement the probation officer is for purposes of  5c12 not the government

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: filed an Anders brief that did not mention the U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) sentencing issue, Defendant did not have the assistance of counsel in raising this claim or obtaining access to the information needed to challenge this particular aspect of his sentencing. This claim was therefore rejected on direct appeal because the evidence refuting the PSR’s erroneous information was not brought to t of sentencing error does- not rise to the level of “a miscarriage of justice” and thus is not cognizable under § 2255. See United States v. Talk, 158 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir.1998) (“[N]umerous cases have held that sentencing errors typically do not give rise to a miscarriage of justice sufficient to excuse procedural default.”); cf. Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Talk, 158 F.3d at 1070 (assuming without 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice (B) holding that error in classifying defendant as a violent offender caused a miscarriage of justice (C) holding that courts of appeal should only correct a forfeited error at the trial level in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result (D) holding that courts may only review claims for fundamental miscarriage of justice (E) holding some evidence standard applicable to cdoc decision classifying inmate who had not been convicted of a sexual offense as a sex offender

SOLUTION:
(B)