In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir.1978); Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 n. 3 (2d Cir.1977). 7 .The rationale for this rule, as Judge Aldrich stated, is that "to permit copyrighting [in that case] would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms [of expression], could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance ... [and thus] the subject matter would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression. We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated.” Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.1967). 8 . As an example of where dissection was improperly used, see Apple Barrel Productions Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 387-88 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 9 .For example, the court may find that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consideration supports the agreement as a whole (B) holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm (C) holding district court erroneously failed to consider copyrighted show as a whole (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
the juror rather than leaving a doubt as to his or her impartiality.” Weinstein Design Group, Inc. v. Fielder, 884 So.2d 990, 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Bryant v. State, 765 So.2d 68, 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). We conclude that prospective jurors Forber and Spurlin’s responses were sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to their impartiality. Admittedly, the State attempted to rehabilitate these prospective jurors and they said they could follow the jury instructions and be fair and impartial. However, based on the totality of the answers given, we find a reasonable doubt as to the ability of these two prospective jurors to serve impartially in this case. Consequently, they should have been stricken for cause. See, e.g., Somerville v. Ahuja, 902 So.2d 930 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Bell v. Greissman, 902 So.2d 846 (Fla. 4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not err by allowing the prosecution to question prospective jurors regarding their ability to announce a death sentence in an appropriate case (B) holding that prospective jurors should have been excused for cause because they did not affirmatively state that their bias against the plaintiffs would not affect their ability to render an impartial verdict (C) holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict (D) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike for cause two potential jurors who had heard andor read about the case but indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
but execution of the sentence was stayed until August 6, 1996, then again until September 16, 1996, in order to afford Appellant the opportunity to pay the $360 purge amount. Appellant failed to purge herself of contempt and ultimately served thirty days in jail. No appeal was taken from that order. Appellant was again held in civil contempt on May 20, 1997, for failing to make any payments towards the court-ordered restitution. This second contempt proceeding is the subject of- the instant appeal. The trial court sentenced Appellant to thirty days in jail with a purge provision in the amount of $320, but failed to make a finding that Appellant had the present ability to pay the purge amount. This, as the State concedes, was error. See Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274, 1277 (Fla.1985)(<HOLDING>). Although the record supports the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that incarceration for civil contempt cannot be imposed absent a finding by the trial court that the eontemnor has the present ability to purge himself of contempt (B) holding that father being held in jail based on presumption of ability to comply could not have been incarcerated for civil contempt of child support order after failing to appear at contempt hearing without affirmative finding based on evidence that he had present ability to pay purge amount (C) holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive (D) recognizing that no warning to a contemnor is necessary when contempt is flagrant the aoc also argues that williamss use of the term bullshit justifies a separate contempt finding particularly in light of the warning provided by the initial contempt citation17 assuming without deciding that certain forms of contempt are so selfevident that they excuse a court from complying with the plain terms of the statute we disagree that the record before us presents such circumstances regarding the trial courts initial contempt finding we decline the aocs invitation to speculate that williamss inaudible comment to the court was contemptuous on its face williamss comment may have been a patent obscenity or an innocuous comment taken out of context by the court or anything in between further the trial courts failure to make findings deprives us of any other relevant cireumstances not apparent in the bare transcript such circumstances might include williamss body language gestures or even a general air of defiance while these circumstances when combined with williamss actual comment may well have supported a contempt citation we cannot uphold the contempt finding based on mere conjecture therefore we conclude that the first finding of contempt is insupportable on the facts present in the recordt18 whether williamss use of the term bullshit independently supports a contempt finding presents a closer question the record reveals that williams used that term to describe either the sentence the trial court had just imposed or the trial courts initial contempt citation more troubling however than the language itself is the apparent challenge to the courts authority and decorum see utah code ann  783211 defining contempt as inter alia dlisorderly contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding see also haton v tulsa 415 us 697 698 94 sct 1228 39 led2d 693 1974 a single isolated usage of street vernacular not directed at the judge or any officer of the court cannot constitutionally support the conviction of criminal contempt emphasis added (E) holding that because civil contempt is only to obtain compliance it must be used only where the contemnor has the present ability to comply with the court order and the trial court specifically finds that the contemnor has that ability

Ex Output:

(A)