In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav
[EX A]: holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241

[EX Q]: conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and § 1981 the exclusive remedies for employment discrimination by a municipality and its employees, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under § 1983. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss Johnson’s § 1983 claims. AFFIRMED. 1 . Count Eight asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim against the individual defendants for alleged conspiracy to violate Johnson's § 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment rights. This count is not at issue on this appeal. 2 . The defendants also moved to dismiss the § 1981 claim. The district court granted dismissal against the City only, citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2722, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (<HOLDING>). 3 .We review de novo a question of law 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in  1981 by state governmental units (B) holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment (C) holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies (D) holding that where it is alleged that state has violated rights conferred by constitution governmental immunity is not available in state court action but declining to infer a right to sue the state for damages on the basis of a violation of the michigan constitution (E) holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law
[EX A]: holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment

[EX Q]: of production. We conclude he did not. Of course, whether a defendant’s use of force was reasonable is a fact question and, like all factual disputes, should be decided by the fact-finder. But when the evidence in the record is undisputed and leads a rational fact-finder to a single conclusion, the issue becomes a question of law. Jack Frost, Inc. v. Engineered Bldg. Components Co., 304 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 1981); Costilla v. State, 571 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn.App.1997) (“[fjacts may be undisputed even though the parties disagree on the inferences or legal conclusions drawn from the facts”), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 1998). Here, a reasonable fact-finder could reach only one conclusion, that appellant’s use of force was unjustified and unreasonable. Glowacki II, 630 N.W.2d at 403 (<HOLDING>). The uncontroverted testimony establishes 
 Holding statements: (A) holding as matter of law no reasonable juror could find defendants use of force reasonable even assuming defendants version of events was true (B) holding that evidence of misconduct or a deficient work performance record precluded the plaintiff from establishing a genuine issue of material fact such that a reasonable juror could find for the plaintiff (C) holding that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendants acted with malice (D) holding in affirming denial of judgment as matter of law for defendants that jury was entitled to credit plaintiffs testimony over defendants and to draw reasonable inferences therefrom (E) holding at summary judgment that the plaintiff had to show a reasonable jury could find the defendants allegedly anticompetitive conduct was a material cause of plaintiffs injury
[EX A]:
holding that evidence of misconduct or a deficient work performance record precluded the plaintiff from establishing a genuine issue of material fact such that a reasonable juror could find for the plaintiff