TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: the evidence of rape discussed above in Division 1, we conclude that the evidence at Martin’s trial was sufficient to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found as to both murders. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (2) (requiring a review of the statutory aggravating circumstances foundby the jury);UAP Rule IV (B) (2) (providing that, in all death penalty cases, this Court will determine whether the verdicts are supported by the evidence). See also Ring, 536 U. S. 584; Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. 20. Considering both the murders for which Martin has been sentenced to death and Martin as a defendant, we find that the death sentences imposed in his case were not disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Georgia law. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3); Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716-717 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited in the Appendix support this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts statutorily mandated proportionality review concerns whether a particular death sentence is excessive per se or is substantially out of line (B) holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable

SOLUTION: holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial

PROBLEM: are differences between sanctions under Rule 37(a) and substitution of counsel conditioned on payment of fees, the parallel considerations convince us that the Cunningham rationale applies here. Like Rule 37(a) sanctions, the present situation invokes concerns regarding finality, avoiding piecemeal appeals, and availability of effective appellate review.” Id. Cases from the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits further support interpreting Cunningham as applying more broadly than to Rule 37(a) sanctions alone. The First Circuit recognized in Empresas Omajede, Inc. v. Bennazar-Zequeira, 213 F.3d 6, 9 n. 4 (1st Cir.2000), that Cunningham affirmed its precedents denying interlocutory appeals in the sanctions area. See, e.g., United States v. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Appeal of Licht & Semonoff 796 F.2d 564, 573 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable (B) holding sanctions pursuant to rule 26g not immediately appealable (C) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (D) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order (E) holding an order of rule 37a sanctions against an attorney is immediately appealable under  1291

SOLUTION: holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable

PROBLEM: to have been rejected solely on the ground that this amount had not been tendered within the time period prescribed by appellant’s counsel. (emphasis added). In State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Marcum, Ky., 420 S.W.2d 113 (1967), (overruled on other grounds, 531 S.W.2d 493, 500 (1976)) the Court of Appeals again addressed the issue of bad faith in the context of a failure to settle a claim for policy limits. The court, in affirming a judgment against an insurer for bad faith, noted that (a) clear liability, (b) the seriousness of the injuries sustained and (c) the failure to seize the opportunity to settle the case for the policy limits of $20,000 resulted in sufficient evidence of bad faith. Compare Harvin v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Ky., 428 S.W.2d 213 (1968) (<HOLDING>). For several years the law of Kentucky on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there can be no claim for bad faith when an insurer has promptly denied a claim that is in fact not covered (B) holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith (C) holding insurer not liable for bad faith when it denied insureds claim based on a good faith dispute regarding the interpretation of a rule (D) holding that no cause of action for bad faith exists when insurer has reasonable grounds to contest liability (E) holding that although courts have inherent power to dismiss bad faith litigant  707a does not provide basis for dismissal on grounds of bad faith filing

SOLUTION:
holding there can be no claim for bad faith when an insurer has promptly denied a claim that is in fact not covered