In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: 20 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 24(b) ("Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.... In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."). [ 21] 21. State v. Weidner, 684 P.2d 103, 113 (Alaska 1984) (adopting four-part test from Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1324-25 (D.C.Cir.1981)). 22 . Harvey v. Cook, 172 P.3d 794, 799 (Alaska 2007). [23] 23. Scammon Bay Ass'n v. Ulak, 126 P.3d 138, 143 (Alaska 2005) (citing Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227, 1231 (Ist Cir.1992)); see also Kirk v. Demientieff, 145 P.3d 512, 520 (Alaska 2006) (<HOLDING>). 24 . Ulak, 126 P.3d at 143. 25 . AOIC's May 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (B) holding that a law firm could intervene in a former clients action to protect its interest in its contingency fee (C) holding attorneys motion to intervene in former clients tort suit untimely because attorney had clear and early notice that former client would not adequately represent his interests (D) holding that ambiguous agreement between attorney and client must be construed in the clients favor (E) holding that presumption of access to and knowledge of confidential information between attorney and former client notwithstanding attorneys declarations to the contrary may not be rebutted

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: also have not obtained approval from any federal, state, or local government agency, which is a prerequisite for doing business in the heavily regulated alcohol industry. See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355, 356 (10th Cir.1993) (citing 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-11); Fedway Assocs., Inc. v. United States Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 976 F.2d 1416, 1418 (D.C.Cir.1992) (citing same); Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Wholesalers, Inc. v. Ayers, 504 A.2d 1077, 1078-80 (Del.1986) (citing Del.Code Ann. tit. 4, § 101 et seq. (1984)). In the face of these multiple contingencies, the court cannot conclude that this case is ripe for decision. See Kiser v. Johnson, 404 F.Supp. 879, 886 (M.D.Pa.1975); cf. Abbott Labs. v. Zenith Labs., Inc., 934 F.Supp. 925, 938 (N.D.Ill.1995) (<HOLDING>). To paraphrase the Polaroid court, if this 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that although the fourth circuit has not yet addressed the issue partial discharge may be granted to the extent that it would be an undue hardship for the debtor to have to pay that portion of the loan that is to be discharged (B) recognizing that even if approval by the food and drug administration could be obtained within three months this approval had yet to be granted at the time of the courts decision and there was no guarantee that the  approval would be forthcoming on any particular date in the future (C) holding that the date of the offense was material to the defense where defendant could not have anticipated from the date specified in the indictment that the state would present evidence that the crime occurred nearly two months later (D) holding that decision of this court unless or until overturned by this court en banc the  federal circuit or the supreme court is a decision of the court on the date it is issued any rulings interpretations or conclusions of law contained in such a decision are authoritative and binding as of the date the decision is issued and are to be considered and when applicable are to be followed by va agencies of original jurisdiction the board and the secretary in adjudicating and resolving claims (E) holding that where approval of the board of directors was not formally requested a demand would have been futile for it could hardly be expected that if approval of the board of directors were sought defendant who controlled 50 of the board would have authorized the action against himself

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: states to provide worker compensation protection to maritime workers. See, e.g., Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 44 S.Ct. 302, 68 L.Ed. 646 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S.Ct. 438, 64 L.Ed. 834 (1920); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917). The Act created a worker compensation Scheme that provided coverage to injured employees with out regard to employer liability, see 33 U.S.C. § 904, but that also was apparently intended to be an exclusive remedy, see 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1988) (stating that “[t]he liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive”). But see Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 530-31, 103 S.Ct. 2541, 2546, 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In 1972, Congress substantially amended the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employer who commits an intentional tort against his employee cannot claim that the act was accidental so that workers compensation is the employees exclusive remedy (B) holding that title vii did not provide exclusive remedy for sex discrimination in public employment claim could also be brought under equal protection clause (C) holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation (D) holding that under 1972 amendments  904 worker compensation is not exclusive remedy under lhwca where employer also happens to be vesselowner (E) holding that once the workers compensation act provides a remedy it is exclusive and the employee has no right to bring an action in commonlaw negligence against his employer


Output: (D)