TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: ” Boone v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 130, 133, 415 S.E.2d 250, 251 (1992). “A battery is an unlawful touching of another.... Whether a touching is a battery depends on the intent of the actor, not on the force applied.” Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 463, 468-69, 534 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2000) (citation omitted). “ ‘[T]he slightest touching of another ... if done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, constitutes a battery for which the law affords redress.’ ” Id. at 469, 534 S.E.2d at 350 (citation omitted). Accordingly, where Vaughn claims he only intended to scare Robinson and did not intend to shoot or wound him, Vaughn would not be entitled, in my opinion, to have the jury instructed on assault and battery. See Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987) (<HOLDING>). A second theory supported by the evidence is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that shooting at a person intending only to scare the person where no touching or wounding occurs supports instructing the jury on simple assault (B) holding that simple assault includes urinating on another (C) holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident   4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor (D) holding that punching another person is a statutory assault (E) holding simple assault is a lesser included offense of recklessly endangering another person

SOLUTION: holding that simple assault includes urinating on another

PROBLEM: before section 362(b)(3) can come into play. An act that both creates and perfects a lien postpetition cannot so qualify. See, e.g., Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Excel Eng’g, Inc. (In re Excel Eng’g, Inc.), 224 B.R. 582, 589-90 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1998) (refusing to recognize validity of postpetition creation and perfection of mechanic’s hen because creditor had no lien at the time debtor filed for bankruptcy); Water-vliet Paper Co. v. City of Watervliet (In re Shoreham Paper Co.), 117 B.R. 274, 281-83 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1990) (finding postpe-tition creation and perfection of property tax lien barred by automatic stay because no prepetition interest existed); Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y v. Ballentine Bros. (In re Ballentine Bros.), 86 B.R. 198, 201 (Bankr. D.Neb.1988) (<HOLDING>); North Side Lumber Co. v. Indus. Indem. Co. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations (B) holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor (C) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (D) holding that creditors failure to voluntarily turn over property lawfully seized prepetition constituted violation of automatic stay (E) holding that creation of a postpetition tax levy based on a prepetition assessment was barred by the automatic stay

SOLUTION: holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations

PROBLEM: and decisions that such a party believed adversely affected his position. Because the premise for seeking removal is presumably a product of a lack of understanding of the process required by the Decree, it is best characterized as baseless. Accordingly, the request for removal will be denied. B. Plaintiffs’ Right to a Jury Trial and the Special Master Process As an initial matter, Paragraph 11(2) of the Stage II Consent Decree provides in relevant part that: This Decree settles in full all class-claims for monetary relief of whatever kind for members of the plaintiff class against Local 542 ... which have been, are, or could have been raised in this litigation. This Decree is not intended, however, to affect, limit or in any way resolve any , 79 F.R.D. 98, 105-06 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (<HOLDING>). The court notes that Local 542 does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (B) holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23 (C) holding that consent decree could not preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims that could not have been brought at time consent decree was filed and to which they were legally and procedurally entitled (D) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated (E) holding a motion to revise an enrolled divorce decree because of a discrepancy between the separation agreement and the decree filed more than 5 years after entry of the enrolled decree was properly denied

SOLUTION:
holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired