In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Center. v. National League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 974-75 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that Cedars-Sinai’s claims were not preempted because they were “predicated not on the [service benefits] plan” but on a separate contract between the carrier and the medical services provider). Plaintiffs claim that Plaintiff never received compensation for the emergency care of B.G. directly relates to the processing and administration of the enrollee’s covered claims which is governed by the Service Benefits Plan and the Contract between Blue Shield and OPM. Any obligation that Blue Shield could have to pay Plaintiff stems directly from the B.G.’s enrollment in the Service Benefit Plan and directly relates to the payment of B.G.’s benefits under the plan. See Hayes, 819 F.2d at 926 (<HOLDING>); Botsford, 314 F.3d at 396 (“Because the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tort claims arising out of the manner in which a benefit claim is handled are preempted by fehba (B) holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba (C) holding state law claims arising out of unions refusal to readmit union members preempted by  301 (D) holding that fehba does not completely preempt state law (E) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law
holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba

The Court is not at liberty to follow the law of other Circuits if it contradicts -the law of this Circuit. Plaintiffs’ other argument relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Delta Coal Program v. Libman, 743 F.2d 852 (11th Cir. 1984) which stated that Summit Office Park applies only when a Plaintiff without standing adds a new party and a new cause of action. Delta Coal Program, 743 F.2d at-857, n.6. (“Here, by contrast, the operative facts and the cause of action are not changed, but only the formally named plaintiff.”). Delta Coal Program, however, does not apply to the present case. First, the district court there permitted the substitution of new plaintiffs, and it was within the court’s discretion to do so. Delta Coal Program v. Libman, 743 F.2d 852, 856 (11th Cir. 1984) (<HOLDING>). Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs did not ask 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties (B) holding that when district court has continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over sapcr matter judge of another district court in same county may rule in matter so long as record is clear that judge is acting on behalf of court with continuing and exclusive jurisdiction (C) holding that the district court has broad authority to take jurisdiction over a matter even when that matter is not brought by a real party in interest (D) holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court (E) holding that the state law of preclusion must be followed even when federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim is exclusive
holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties

again, and KEB confirmed that it had, in fact, conveyed KLI’s notice to Morgan, but that Morgan had stated that it would not execute KLI’s demand to unwind. Kim called Morgan, and Morgan stated that it would not execute KLI’s demand because KEB did not want the transaction to be unwound. Morgan does not dispute these facts, and must concede, therefore, that it knew, by reason of both KLI’s written and oral notices, that KLI wanted its baht position unwound, and that it was Morgan’s decision not to comply with the demand. Clearly, Morgan had actual knowledge, and therefore is deemed to have notice that KLI made demand pursuant to the unwind provision, section 2(e) of the Morning Glory/KEB swap agreement. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Diamond Timber, Inc., 559 F.Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). Morgan’s position 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice (B) holding that constructive knowledge satisfies the reason to know standard (C) holding that  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (D) holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (E) holding that notice occurs when party charged with having notice has actual knowledge or when from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists

holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice