In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: arbitrators, Eventys argues, the circuit court could have assured that both parties would have an opportunity to make their arguments to that forum. Alternatively, Eventys maintains, the circuit court should have considered and expressly ruled upon Eventys’s arguments that the provision purporting to waive class action claims was unconscionable and unenforceable. Eventys further argues that, because the “terms and conditions” did not include a severability provision, the circuit court’s necessary determination that FDUTPA’s remedial purposes are frustrated by the class action waiver provision would then invalidate the entire arbitration provision. For this argument, Eventys relies principally on the analysis in S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski, 976 So.2d 600, 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>), and a group of federal cases holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contractual provisions in an arbitration agreement purporting to prohibit consumers from prosecuting class actions for small sums of money per consumer but for a substantial number of consumers are irreconcilably at odds with the remedial purposes of fdutpa contrary to the public policy of this state and unenforceable for that reason (B) holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute  the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable (C) holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable (D) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (E) holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: UCL and CLRA. In considering whether the plaintiff in Bruno had standing to bring claims arising from the defendants’ gelcap product, when the plaintiff had only purchased the defendants’ liquid product, the court noted that “treatises and the vast majority of persuasive authority indicate that ... the issue of whether a class representative may be allowed to present claims on behalf of others who have similar, but not identical, interests depends not on standing, but on an assessment of typicality and adequacy of representation.” Id. at 530 (citing Greenwood v. Compucredit Corp., No. 4:08-cv-04878, 2010 WL 4807095, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2010); Arevalo v. Bank of Am. Corp., 850 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1017 (N.D.Cal.2011); Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); 7AA Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers have standing to sue (B) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (C) recognizing associational standing when members would have standing in own right (D) holding that because plaintiff had standing to sue for injury arising from his own benefit plan his ability to represent class members with different benefit plans should be analyzed under rule 23 not standing (E) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: The Court will therefore reduce Defendant’s Bill of Costs by the entire $128.68 that Defendant attributed to necessary travel expenses for Ms. Burkhart, Ms. Hunt, and Ms. Smith. D. Westlaw Expenses Plaintiffs also object to Defendant’s inclusion of $164.45 on its Bill of Costs that it attributed to “compensation for Westlaw usage.” (Def.’s Application of Costs at 1.) In reviewing Plaintiffs’ objection, the Court first notes that the cost of legal research services is not listed as an allowable expense in either the Local Rules or 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Furthermore, the Court finds that the cost of legal research is more properly characterized as a component of attorneys’ fees, not as a taxable cost of litigation. United States v. Merritt Meridian Constr. Corp., 95 F.3d 153 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees would include expenses for computerized legal research and thus not allowing computerized legal research as a separate taxable cost (B) holding that computeraided research like any other form of legal research is a component of attorneys fees and cannot be independently taxed as an item of cost in addition to the attorneys fee award (C) holding that the costs of computerized research was a component of attorneys fees that cannot be independently taxed as an item of cost (D) holding that based on leftwich the law of this circuit is that computerbased legal research must be factored into the attorneys hourly rate hence the cost of the computer time may not be added to the fee award (E) holding that the costs of computerized research should be characterized not as taxable costs but as attorneys fees


Output: (A)