In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to that extent. Reed, supra, at 17, 104 S.Ct. 2901. The holding in Cage represents a degree of novelty sufficient to constitute cause. As such, Mercer has established cause to avoid otherwise procedurally defaulting on his claim challenging the reasonable doubt instruction. Sufficient prejudice to establish federal habeas jurisdiction also exists. In particular, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases is so intertwined with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury verdict that a constitutionally deficient jury instruction cannot produce a guilty verdict comporting with due process but, rather, requires reversal of a conviction. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-80, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (<HOLDING>). It follows that a claimed Cage violation 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding exclusion was harmless error (C) holding that when defendant properly objects to charge error reversal required unless error was harmless (D) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (E) holding a cage violation could never be held harmless error and thus not amenable to harmless error review but rather required outright reversal
[A]: (E)


[Q]: or even every valid governmental purpose, is an appropriate reason for breaching grand jury secrecy.” Id. at 480, 103 S.Ct. 3164. It goes without saying that the district court’s inherent authority does not include the power to contravene or circumvent an “express grant of or limitation on the ... court’s power contained in a rule or statute.” Dietz v. Bouldin, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 1885, 1892, 195 L.Ed.2d 161 (2016); see also Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426, 116 S.Ct. 1460, 134 L.Ed.2d 613 (1996) (“Whatever the scope of [the court’s] ‘inherent power,’ ,,. it does not include the power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Rule 6(e) is an express limitation on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the substantial rights inquiry of federal rule of criminal procedure 52b mirrors rule 52as harmless error inquiry except that the burden in the former falls on the defendant to show prejudice (B) holding that a district court cannot invoke its inherent authority to circumvent the harmlesserror inquiry required by rule 52a of the federal rules of criminal procedure (C) holding that a shotgun pleading is in no sense the short and plain statement of a claim required by rule 8 of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that rule 33 of the federal rules of criminal procedure is an inflexible claimprocessing rule that may be waived if not raised (E) recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure
[A]: (B)


[Q]: small pieces of the Walkway, or access to the Walkway, built upon it. See Def.-Int. Reply at p. 14 (noting that the second of two issues remaining for the Court to decide, given that the public trust doctrine gov erns a large portion of the land at issue, is “whether the state acted rationally in determining that access across the perpendicular paths and scattered small portions of the Walkway constructed on uplands is ‘reasonably necessary’ to protect that public’s right of access to the remaining 88.7 percent of the Walkway that is situated on tidelands”). Plaintiffs’ taking claims with respect to this small portion of the property at issue are governed by the reasonableness test enunciated in Matthews. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 95 N.J. 306, 326, 471 A.2d 355 (1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 93, 83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (B) holding that in order to exercise its rights under the public trust doctrine the public must be given both access to and use of privatelyowned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary (C) holding that the borough of deals dedication of a portion of a beach for use by its residents only was immaterial given the public trust doctrines requirement that the public be afforded the right to enjoy all dry sand beaches owned by a municipality (D) holding that under the public standing doctrine it is only necessary that the relator shall be a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws (E) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public
[A]:
(B)