In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: the sufficiency of the evidence,” we “must affirm the verdict ‘if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the evidence that the elements of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1218, 117 S.Ct. 1709, 137 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997)). hi. A. The principal issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in admitting the text messages obtained from Govan’s cell phone. First, Govan argues that the district court erred by applying the good-faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Govan argues that for the good-faith 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required (B) holding that because evidence supporting search warrant was illegally obtained evidence recovered by executing warrant was fruit of the illegal search (C) holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not bar the use of evidence obtained by police officers acting in good faith and with reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant (D) holding that evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is not barred by the exclusionary rule (E) holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to evidence obtained by police officers acting in reasonable reliance on search warrant later held invalid

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: the Court considered the facts surrounding his attempted burglary conviction. In United States v. Telesco, 962 F.2d 165 (2d Cir.1992) the Second Circuit held that “[w]hen prior convictions are for crimes designated as ‘crimes of violence’ by the Sentencing Commission, the sentencing court is not permitted to examine the actual conduct underlying the convictions. The Sentencing Commission has thus determined that certain crimes — regardless of the precise conduct — are inherently violent.” Id. at 166. As stated above, it has already been decided that attempted burglary is a “violent felony.” See Andrello, 9 F.3d at 249. Thus, for purposes of determining career offender status under the Guidelines, there is no such thing as a non-violent attempted burglary. See Telesco, 962 F.2d at 166 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Hathaway, 949 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary (B) holding that burglary is violent felony (C) holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary (D) holding there is no such thing as a nonviolent burglary (E) holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary


Output: (D)