In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: and so require an interpretive step to determine the expressive elements of these processes. However, neither the Supreme Court nor our court has ever drawn a distinction between the process of creating a form of pure speech (such as writing or painting) and the product of these processes (the essay or the artwork) in terms of the First Amendment protection afforded. Although writing and painting can be reduced to their constituent acts, and thus described as conduct, we have not attempted to disconnect the end product from the act of creation. Thus, we have not drawn a hard line between the essays John Peter Zenger published and the act of setting the type. Cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983) (<HOLDING>). The process of expression through a medium 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dating is a type of association protected by the first amendment (B) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (C) holding first amendment claim requires actual protected conduct (D) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (E) holding that a tax on ink and paper burdens rights protected by the first amendment
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: erred by failing to instruct the jury that a confidential informant’s testimony must be corroborated, in conformity with article 38.141. We agree. Our holding that there was some “other evidence” to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement does not eliminate the need for an instruction. See Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (noting court “might disagree” with court of appeals’s holding that there was no evidence ten o the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the requirements of article 38.141 here, but asserts that the trial court’s error resulted in harm under the “egregious harm standard” of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (applying egregious harm analysis to unobjected-to charge error). See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632 (<HOLDING>); Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 692 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding egregious harm standard applied where appellant failed to object to lack of instruction on accomplice witness testimony (B) holding egregious harm resulted from erroneous jury instruction authorizing conviction based on legally inadequate theory (C) holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated (D) holding that where appellant failed to present either expert or lay testimony as to the appropriate standard of care to be used appellant failed to present any evidence indicating the existence of an issue of fact thus summary judgment was proper (E) holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: by California Code of Civil Procedure § 356. [Doc. No. 10 at 4-5.] However, this contention is inconsistent with the plain language of section 3439.09(c). “The phrase ‘notwithstanding any other provision of law’ is a ‘term of art’ that ‘expresses a legislative intent to have the specific statute control despite the existence of other law which might otherwise govern.’ ” Roach v. Lee, 369 F.Supp.2d 1194, 1199 (C.D.Cal.2005) (quoting People v. Franklin, 57 Cal.App.4th 68, 73-74, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 742 (1997)). Therefore, 3439.09(c)’s seven-year backstop “is absolute,” and “it cannot be tolled or otherwise extended.” Internet Direct Response, Inc. v. Buckley, 2011 WL 835607, at *6, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28344, at *21 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 7, 2011); see, e.g., Roach, 369 F.Supp.2d at 1199-1200 (<HOLDING>); cf Inco Development Corp. v. Sup. Ch, 131 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim was barred by section 343909c (B) holding that the statute of repose for latent construction defects cannot be tolled by california code of civil procedure  356 (C) holding trial court erred by imposing sanctions under section 9 of civil practice and remedies code because claim for sanctions was based solely on section 10 of code and rule 13 of rules of civil procedure (D) holding that section 343909c cannot be tolled by california code of civil procedure  351 (E) recognizing distinction between findings of fact under section 6711 of the family code and findings of fact under rules of civil procedure
[EX A]:
(D)