instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
case. In light of our decision that the parties’ dispute will not be resolved by an appraisal proceeding, we need not decide, as appellants assert, whether the district court erred by observing that the appraisal process would be subject to the statutes governing confirmation or vacation of an arbitration award. Nonetheless, pertinent to our holding in this case, we take the opportunity to acknowledge that although some arbitration standards apply in processing appraisal results, Minnesota recognizes a distinction between appraisal and arbitration. Compare QBE, 778 N.W.2d at 398 (stating that “[ajppraisal decisions are subject to Minn.Stat. § [§ ] 572.08-.30 (2008), the arbitration statute”) and David A. Brooks Enters., Inc. v. First Sys. Agencies, 370 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Minn.App.1985) (<HOLDING>) with Johnson, 732 N.W.2d at 346 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that explanations of arbitration awards are not required (B) holding that because appraisal is analogous to arbitration the court would apply principles of arbitration law to this dispute regarding an insurance policy appraisal clause (C) recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit (D) holding that minnesotas arbitration statutes govern appraiser decisions and appraisal awards are to be treated as arbitration awards (E) holding that judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow in scope
answer:
(D)


question:
may grant preliminary injunctive relief in any civil action if the granting of such relief is appropriate under the facts upon which the action is based.” 16 U.S.C. § 3117(a). 3 . As used in ANILCA, (1) The term "land” means lands, waters, and interests therein. (2) The term “Federal land” means lands the title to which is in the United States after December 2, 1980. (3)The term "public lands” means land situated in Alaska which ... are Federal lands.... 16 U.S.C. § 3102(1) — (3). 4 . Although navigability determinations have not yet been made on most of Alaska’s waterways, it is likely that few waterways of significance to fisheries will be classified as non-navigable due to the expansive definition of navigable. See, e.g., Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401, 1402-08 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919, 110 S.Ct. 1949, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that river with depths of 1 to 3 feet and usable by inflatable rafts and small motorboats was navigable (B) holding lake on private land was not navigable in fact and there was no right of public use and enjoyment as lake was not fed by or part of a navigable stream (C) holding that riparians owners have the right of access to the navigable part of the river  the right to make a landing wharf or pier  subject to such general rules and regulations of the legislature (D) holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states (E) holding that congress had the authority under the commerce clause to require private riparian land owners to obtain a license prior to construction of dams even where the river in question was not navigable but could potentially have been made navigable
answer:
(A)


question:
with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (<HOLDING>). Acknowledging that “[wjhile the principle of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between eeoc and employer employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree (B) holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury (C) holding that notwithstanding fact that employer brought suit in its own name pursuant to ocga  349111 c only for the liquidated amount that had been paid to the employee in workers compensation benefits after employee failed to file his own tort action within one year of injury employee was not precluded from bringing his own separate action to recover for personal injuries and loss of consortium but noting that employee received notice of employers suit only after filing his own action suggesting that court in which employers action was pending had wrongly denied the employees motion to intervene to which motion employer had objected noting that if employee had not moved to intervene in other action employees separate action would have been barred by laches and holding that thirdparty tortfeasor could move for mandatory joinder of the employer in the employees action (D) holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness (E) holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits
answer:

(A)