In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: required expert testimony at trial. We agree with other appellate courts that the statute does not violate the open courts provision by requiring an expert report sooner rather than later in the litigation. See, e.g., Gill v. Russo, 39 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Knie v. Piskun, 23 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied). Mocega’s fifth point is overruled. Notice of Hearing Mocega’s final two points assert the trial court was required to grant her the grace period provided under art. 4590i, § 13.01(g). A motion under that section is timely if filed before “any hearing” on a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Urquhart’s motion was “heard” by submission on April 3rd. See Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>). Mocega’s motion was not filed until April 
 Holding statements: (A) holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation (B) holding that a hearing does not contemplate an oral presentation unless required by express language or context (C) holding that oral rendition of judgment supported by the courts docket sheet was insufficient express specific written order is required (D) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes (E) holding that express oral agreement with government agent was not binding because among other factors applicable regulations required contract to be in writing

Output: holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation


Input: Consider Input: effect of an admission by a defendant against a codefendant. {10} Although Rule 1-036 does not address whether a defendant’s deemed admissions can be used against a codefendant, this Court has held that such admissions may not be used against a codefendant. See Wilson v. Galt, 100 N.M. 227, 236, 668 P.2d 1104, 1113 (Ct.App.1983) (stating that Rule 1-036 admissions apply to and bind the party making the admissions, not codefendants). Moreover, other courts that have addressed this issue have likewise concluded that the admissions of a defendant cannot be used against a codefendant. See, e.g., Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1048 (5th Cir.1997) (“Deemed admissions by a party opponent cannot be used against a co-party.”); United States v. Wheeler, 161 F.Supp. 193, 198 (W.D.Ark.1958) (<HOLDING>); Darnall v. Petersen, 8 Neb.App. 185, 592 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies when his claim is deemed denied because of failure of administrator to respond in a timely manner (B) holding that failure to file timely responses to a request for admissions renders them admitted (C) holding that plaintiffs failure to respond to argument warranted dismissal with prejudice (D) holding that facts deemed admitted as to one defendant because of his failure to respond to the plaintiffs request for admissions are not binding on a codefendant (E) holding that requests for admissions seeking purely legal conclusions are inappropriate and the failure to respond to such a request may not be the basis for a summaiy judgment

Output: holding that a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies when his claim is deemed denied because of failure of administrator to respond in a timely manner


Input: Consider Input: v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1967), stated that section 2(d) shows that the legislature contemplated multiplicity of actions and provides a court with two options: stay the entire proceeding pending arbitration, or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be granted with respect to that issue only. 710 ILCS 5/2(d) (West 1994). The Galt court explained: “In enacting the Uniform Arbitration Act, the [Illinois] Legislature has not eradicated a chancellor’s inherent powers, but the legislature has determined in Section 2 that it is no longer equitable to enjoin arbitration to prevent multiplicity of actions.” Galt, 376 F.2d at 716. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765, 782, 103 S. Ct. 927, 939 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Accord Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs (B) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (C) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (D) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (E) holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed


Output: holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs