TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: of not more than 15 years, and it similarly concluded as follows: If a sentence under this paragraph provides for imprisonment, the sentence shall include a special parole term of not less than three years in addition to such term of imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1). The language of §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 960(b)(1) thus squarely contradicts Walberg’s contention, for each stated that the special parole term shall be a minimum of a certain number of “years in addition to [the] term of imprisonment.” Accord United States v. Mack, 509 F.2d 615, 616 (9th Cir.1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916, 95 S.Ct. 1578, 43 L.Ed.2d 783 (1975); Llerena v. United States, 508 F.2d 78, 82 (5th Cir.1975). Cf. Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 388, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The legislative history of the Act and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding conviction for cce murder 21 usc  848e1 is a separate offense from a cce 21 usc  848c (B) holding that no special parole term was authorized for a conviction for conspiracy in violation of 21 usc  846 which mentioned only fine and imprisonment and not special parole and emphazing the in addition to language of 21 usc  841b1b (C) holding that in order for a trial court to determine which of the three graduated penalty subsections of 21 usc  841b applies to defendants convicted of a  846 drug conspiracy the jury must be instructed to determine the threshold quantity of drugs attributable to each conspiracy defendant on trial (D) holding that the elements of a drug conspiracy under 21 usc  846 do include an overt act requirement (E) holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state

SOLUTION: holding conviction for cce murder 21 usc  848e1 is a separate offense from a cce 21 usc  848c

PROBLEM: the public interest and ‘[considerations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system’ require that the district court defer to local government administrators.” Id. In Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1166, the Sixth Circuit was very clear that, where “decisional law has changed so that the enjoined behavior, which once might have been a violation of federal law, is no longer a matter of federal law at all” the injunction must be vacated. In light of the fact that no federal right underpins the 1974 decree — as well as the fact that the “local government administrators” in this case appear to favor vacating the decree — the court can identify no reason that the 1974 consent decree should remain in effect. Cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (<HOLDING>); Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act (B) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated (D) holding that a court errs when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of  changes in statutory or decisional law (E) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes

SOLUTION: holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act

PROBLEM: Jan. 5, 2011); Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., Inc., 686 F.Supp.2d 942, 945-46 (E.D.Mo.2010); Illinois v. SDS W. Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d 1047, 1052 (C.D.Ill.2009). But see West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Comcast Corp., 705 F.Supp.2d 441, 449-50 (E.D.Penn.2010) (concluding that Caldwell's framework is consistent with CAFA’s goals). 5 . I have previously expressed that I generally eschew the use of legislative history to determine a statute's intent. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Tex., 675 F.3d 802, 829 n. 4 (5th Cir.2012) reh'g en banc granted, 688 F.3d 801 (5th Cir.2012). 6 . I note some commentary consistent with this concern. See Dwight R. Carswell, Comment, CAFA and Parens Patriae Actions, 78 U. Chi. L.Rev. 345, 370 (2011) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The majority opinion also suggests that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action against an officer was not an action against the state because the relief sought would not take away any property of the state or fasten a lien on it or interfere with the disposition of funds in the treasury (B) holding that prospective injunctive relief is appropriate in a federal civil rights action only if a reasonable likelihood exists the plaintiff will again be subjected to the unconstitutional actions (C) recognizing that civil rights lawsuits are private only in form (D) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (E) recognizing that lawsuits that seek only injunctive relief or money that will go to the state treasury rather than to state citizens are not mass actions as defined by cafa thus it does not make sense to argue that these are the only lawsuits that will fall within the mass action exception

SOLUTION:
holding that an action against an officer was not an action against the state because the relief sought would not take away any property of the state or fasten a lien on it or interfere with the disposition of funds in the treasury