In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
efforts to persuade an Immigration Judge to exercise her discretion to grant him a deportation waiver — the removal of that discretion would constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Furthermore, given that parole eligibility is “considered an integral part of any sentence,” Shepard, 556 F.2d at 654; see also Warden, 417 U.S. at 658, 94 S.Ct. at 2535-36, I think that the availability and likelihood of a deportation waiver should also be so considered. In explaining the basis for its con- elusion that parole eligibility or gain time should be considered part of 86, 68 L.Ed. 549 (1924) (“It is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment.”); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S.Ct. 607, 608, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913) (<HOLDING>) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the amount of sanctions is appropriate only when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior (B) holding that the determination that an alien is an undesirable person is not a conviction of crime nor is the deportation a punishment it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want (C) holding that it is not (D) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (E) holding that habeas review is  for any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
existence of the marketing agreement or the fact that the agreement covered revenues recorded and recognized prior to the end of the fiscal year. Complaint, ¶ 53. As a result, defendants’ disclosure of the agreement does not support the conclusion that they intended to dispel the allegedly misleading effect of the financial statements. It also, therefore, does not negate the inference that defendants made the material misstatements with either a specific or reckless intent to defraud. As stated above, the complaint alleges that Chantal’s method of revenue recognition was inconsistent with SFAS 48. Premature accounting recognition of this kind by corporate defendants, where a right of return is clearly capable of exercise, permits an inference of scienter. See Malone, 26 F.3d at 478-480 (<HOLDING>). When considered in light of the other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that misleading newspaper ads and letters which were mailed need not be false or fraudulent on their face and the accused need not misrepresent any fact since it is just as unlawful to speak half truths or to omit to state facts necessary to make the statements made in light of the circumstances under which they were made not misleading (B) holding that there was no inference of scienter based on defendants knowledge of facts or failure to monitor information because plaintiffs did not specifically identified any reports or statements that existed or would have come to light in a reasonable investigation that would have demonstrated the falsity of the allegedly misleading statements (C) holding that even if defendants knew that the company had inventory problems  that fact standing alone does not show that defendants knew that the statements in their prospectus or other representations were materially false or misleading at the time the material statements were made (D) holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading (E) holding that jury could make inference that corporate defendants false or misleading statements regarding sales which violated sfas 48 were made with an intent to deceive manipulate or defraud investors based on evidence that defendants were aware of the right of return and approved it

Ex Output:

(E)