TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: doing something that can be characterized as resistance—even when that resistance includes physically preventing an officer’s manipulations of his body.”). In addition, the black-and-white bus surveillance video fails to clearly show what occurred as the officers forcefully “escorted” Hulett off the bus, and leaves the viewer wondering whether, and to what extent, additional force may have been applied during those moments that might have contributed to plaintiffs broken hip. And even following plaintiffs removal from the bus, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Sergeant Galvin acted in an objectively reasonable manner by dragging plaintiff some distance across the pavement, since plaintiff did not appear to be offering any further resistance at that point. Tracy, 623 F.3d at 98 (<HOLDING>); Meyes v. Baltimore Cnty., 713 F.3d 723, 733 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that otherwise acceptable use of pepper spray became excessive when arrestee was offering no further active resistance (B) holding that bystander prisoners who were exposed to pepper spray when prison officials dispensed spray across their pod area to break up a fight were not subjected to excessive force (C) holding that no objectively reasonable police officer could believe that after vinyard was under arrest handcuffed behind her back secured in the back seat of a patrol car with a protective screen between the officer and the arrestee an officer could stop the car grab such arrestee by her hair and arm bruise her and apply pepper spray to try to stop the intoxicated arrestee from screaming and returning the officers exchange of obscenities and insults during a short fourmile jail ride (D) holding that the use of pepper spray on nonviolent protestors was excessive force (E) holding that two bursts of pepper spray to stop fighting in a cell was not considered excessive force and did not violate prisoners eighth amendment rights

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: or even every valid governmental purpose, is an appropriate reason for breaching grand jury secrecy.” Id. at 480, 103 S.Ct. 3164. It goes without saying that the district court’s inherent authority does not include the power to contravene or circumvent an “express grant of or limitation on the ... court’s power contained in a rule or statute.” Dietz v. Bouldin, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 1885, 1892, 195 L.Ed.2d 161 (2016); see also Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426, 116 S.Ct. 1460, 134 L.Ed.2d 613 (1996) (“Whatever the scope of [the court’s] ‘inherent power,’ ,,. it does not include the power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Rule 6(e) is an express limitation on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the substantial rights inquiry of federal rule of criminal procedure 52b mirrors rule 52as harmless error inquiry except that the burden in the former falls on the defendant to show prejudice (B) holding that a district court cannot invoke its inherent authority to circumvent the harmlesserror inquiry required by rule 52a of the federal rules of criminal procedure (C) holding that a shotgun pleading is in no sense the short and plain statement of a claim required by rule 8 of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that rule 33 of the federal rules of criminal procedure is an inflexible claimprocessing rule that may be waived if not raised (E) recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: evidence that appellant was sometimes delusional, spat on the floor, was angry and irritable toward the hospital staff, had disorganized thought patterns, exhibited rap id mood swings, and that, on the day after she was admitted, appellant wore wet clothes and attempted to disrobe in a common area of the hospital. We have previously held that an expert diagnosis of mental illness, standing alone, is not sufficient to confine a patient for treatment. K.T., 68 S.W.3d at 892; Mezick v. State, 920 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). Additionally, evidence that merely reflects a patient’s mental illness and need for hospitalization is not sufficient to meet the State’s burden under section 574.034 of the Mental Health Code. See, e.g., K.T., 68 S.W.3d at 892 (<HOLDING>); D.J. v. State, 59 S.W.3d 352, 357 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of patients delusion that she was in military and that mail carrier was responsible for her welfare not sufficient to meet required statutory burden (B) holding evidence of patients psychotic behavior delusions that she had undergone surgery by satellite and had electronics implanted in her not sufficient to meet required statutory burden (C) holding evidence of patients schizophrenia auditory hallucinations paranoia irritability and refusal to take medication not sufficient to meet required statutory burden (D) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (E) holding evidence of patients delusion that she was pregnant and had sutures in her vagina not sufficient to meet required statutory burden

SOLUTION:
(E)