In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Jones v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 72 B.R. 956 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1987); McCullough v. Suter (In re Suter), 59 B.R. 944 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986). Palmer argues that the BAP erred in distinguishing among the various subsections of section 523 on the issue of the discharge of punitive damages. He notes that courts have found that punitive damages are nondischargeable under section 523(a)(4), which bars discharge of debts “for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement or larceny,” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), and under section 523(a)(6), which bars discharge of debts “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity,” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). See, e.g., Klemens v. Wallace (In re Wallace), 840 F.2d 762 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Moraes v. Adams (In re Adams), 761 F.2d 1422, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that judgment for embezzlement which included actual and punitive damages was nondischargeable (B) holding that punitive damages are not fines (C) holding punitive damages nondischargeable under  523a6 when such damages are based on the same conduct as the underlying nondischargeable judgment (D) holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that both actual and punitive portions of judgment for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity were nondischargeable (E) holding a court may not award punitive damages
[A]: (A)


[Q]: the key elements required to satisfy the discovery rule are injury (we use “damage” interchangeably with “injury”) and fault. Legally-cognizable damages occur when a plaintiff detrimentally relies on the negligent advice of an attorney. Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 374, 460 A.2d 172. Actual damages are those that are real and substantial as opposed to speculative. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617, 621 (1937). In the legal-malpractice context, actual damages may exist in the form of an adverse judgment. Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 373, 460 A.2d 172. However, a client may suffer damages, in the form of attorney’s fees, before a court has announced its decision in the underlying action. See, e.g., Knight, supra, 553 A.2d at 1235 (<HOLDING>); Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 374, 460 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal (B) holding that debtors have no right to jury trial on malpractice claims against their attorneys (C) holding that although attorneys fees are usually not recoverable unless permitted by statute or contract contractual or statutory authorization was not necessary in a malpractice claim to recover attorneys fees and costs as damages (D) holding that statute of limitations for malpractice begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged malpractice (E) holding that attorneys fees and costs expended as a result of an attorneys alleged malpractice constitute legallycognizable damages for purposes of stating a claim for such malpractice
[A]: (E)


[Q]: of the implied covenant in employment contracts. In the insurance cases, the courts look to whether the insurance company, with malice, fraud or oppression, abused its duty to act in good faith. The “bad faith” employment cases maintain a higher standard, in that the courts generally look for a violation of public policy on the part of the employer. See discussion in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1980), 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505, 12 A.L.R.4th 520, and Annot. 12 A.L.R.4th 544, (1982). Most courts recognizing a cause of action based on a discharge that offends public policy have grounded that action in tort, while only a few have relied on an implied contract theory of recovery. Compare Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980), 27 Cal.3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, (<HOLDING>); Nees v. Hocks (1975), 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that liability for the tort of wrongful discharge based on refusal to commit an unlawful act can extend to the corporate officers who authorized or directed the discharge (B) recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge (C) recognizing a tort action for wrongful discharge when employee was terminated because he refused to commit a criminal act (D) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge (E) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
[A]:
(C)