In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
evidence to conclude that the government’s conduct in this case amounted to a material breach, it denied Malone’s appeal. 87-2 BCA 1119,758, at 99,966. In our view, the government materially breached this contract. According to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241(e) (1981), “the extent to which the behavior of [a] party failing to perform ... comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing” is a significant factor in determining whether that party’s breach is material. The Restatement also states that “[sjubter-fuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith,” as does lack of diligence and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance. Id. § 205 comment d; cf. Lewis-Nicholson, Inc. v. United States, 550 F.2d 26, 32, 213 Ct.Cl. 192 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. United States, 151 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subcontractor could recover damages from general contractor for delay in performance under state law (B) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (C) holding that governmentcaused delay in contractor performance violated implied duty not to hinder performance of other party (D) holding that performance may be valid acceptance (E) holding that prior positive performance evaluations are not dispositive as to whether the employer was satisfied with the employees performance by the time of the termination

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
removal purposes. Instead, for complete preemption to apply, the cause of action not only must be preempted by ERISA but also must fall within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). See Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209, 124 S.Ct. 2488 (“[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore preempted. The preemptive force of ERISA § 502(a) is still stronger.... Hence, causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) [are] removable to federal court.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 62-63, 67, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (<HOLDING>); Da-Ponte v. Manfredi Motors Inc., 157 Fed. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under  1132a1b (B) holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself (C) holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under  502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan (D) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court (E) holding that suit by a beneficiary to recover benefits from a covered plan  falls directly under  502a1b of erisa and therefore was necessarily federal in character and subject to removal to federal court

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
of Congress.” Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 823 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)). That is so because the authority to preempt state law is “an extraordinary power ... that we must assume Congress does not exercise lightly.” Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991)). According to the First Circuit ruling on the parallel FAAAA preemption question for air transport, there is a presumption against preemption when Congress legislates in a field that has traditionally been regulated by the states. Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d at 336 (internal citations omitted). See also Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the 48hour standard as a department of health regulation (B) recognizing this presumption (C) recognizing presumption that state and local regulation of matters related to health and safety is not invalidated under the supremacy clause (D) holding city may enact reasonable regulation to promote health safety and welfare of its people (E) recognizing presumption

Ex Output:

(C)