instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
of the [Marion County] small claims court shall be taken to the superior court of the county and tried de novo." Retaining the identical language, the Legislature re-codified the statute in 2004 as Indiana Code section 33-34-3-15(a). 2 . Atlantic Coast sought interlocutory review of the trial court's order, which the Court of Appeals accepted. The Court of Appeals addressed this claim in the instant appeal. 3 . Atlantic Coast does not challenge the Court of Appeals' determination regarding the discovery order, and the Cooks do not challenge the determination that they waived appellate review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Delta Airlines on the Cooks' negligence claim. 4 . Compare, for example, Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), and O'Carroll v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding federal law preempts state regulation of voip provider but expressing no opinion on applicability of state laws generally governing such companies including laws concerning taxation (B) holding that general maritime law preempts state law (C) holding that the flsa preempts certain state law claims (D) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans (E) holding that federal law establishes the applicable standards of care in the field of aviation safety generally and thus preempts the entire field from state regulation
answer:
holding federal law preempts state regulation of voip provider but expressing no opinion on applicability of state laws generally governing such companies including laws concerning taxation


question:
2. Although the substance of the inquiry remains the same, the Supreme Court has counseled that the question whether a defendant can show a violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights “is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). With that said, we do not quarrel with the district court’s analysis on this point. Several distinguished jurists continue to use the “standing” terminology as useful shorthand. See, e.g., United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir.2004) (Selya, J.) (acknowledging after Rakas that the term “standing” “is imprecise,” but adopting the usage “[f]or simplicity’s sake”). But, regardless of terminolo 1 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). As we observe below, the conclusion that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (B) holding a person who is present at anothers home with permission simply for the purpose of consummating a business transaction does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy there (C) holding that for purposes of federal constitutional law a person does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to trash discarded outside the home (D) holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business (E) holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence
answer:
holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells


question:
matter should be reopened because his first attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Kirlew also sought reconsideration of the BIA’s previous decision because he claimed that it “failed to articulate any legal standard, statutory, case law or regulation in support of its legal conclusion” (A.R. 7) (emphasis in original) and improperly discounted his claims of bias regarding the IJ. Because the BIA properly affirmed the IJ’s denial of recusal, we will affirm the BIA’s decision not to reopen the matter on that ground. Furthermore, while the record validates Kirlew’s claim that his Marijuana Conviction was subsequently vacated, he would still be unable to obtain Section 212(c) relief because of the Firearms Conviction. See Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158, 165 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (citing Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 212c relief is unavailable to a lawful permanent resident convicted of a firearms offense qualifying under 8 usc  1227a2c (B) holding that adjustment of status was permitted even if deportable alien had entered the country as a lawful permanent resident (C) holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for  212c relief (D) holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina  212c (E) holding that an alien is only lawfully admitted for permanent residence for purposes of the ina if his or her adjustment to lawful permanent resident complied with substantive legal requirements and that because the alien failed to show that she had complied with the relevant substantive legal requirements the ij correctly determined that she had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence and was not entitled to  212c relief
answer:

holding that adjustment of status was permitted even if deportable alien had entered the country as a lawful permanent resident