TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: manual labor, as well as engaging in such activities as dancing, fighting, and being jailed for public intoxication. We stated that: [an i]njury aggravated or extended in time by the employee’s neglect or disobedience of his physician’s instructions is not com-pensable as to the additional period.... The proposition that one may continue, or even increase, his disability by his willful and unreasonable conduct, and then claim compensation from his employer for his disability so caused, is untenable. Id. at 410, 244 N.W. at 541 (citing Honnold, Workmen’s Compensation, vol.l, § 137, pp. 521, 523). [¶ 11] Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized the rule in Detling, albeit applying their own states’ standards. See Appleby v. Belden Corp., 22 Ark.App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Hill, 318 A.2d 614, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new statute which required proof that asbestos exposure was substantial contributing factor to claimants medical condition could be applied to pending cases and did not abrogate claimants vested right because she was still able to pursue her cause of action and recover for injury caused by her husbands exposure to asbestos statute merely affected methods and procedure by which that action was recognized protected and enforced not the cause of action itself (B) holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute (C) holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions (D) holding a claimants injury report to a fellow employee did not satisfy the act because the claimants supervisor did not learn of the injury until six months later (E) holding that claimants actions in heavy houseeleaning and house painting in contravention of medical restrictions was so unreasonable as to bar compensation for aggravation of her back injury

SOLUTION: holding that new statute which required proof that asbestos exposure was substantial contributing factor to claimants medical condition could be applied to pending cases and did not abrogate claimants vested right because she was still able to pursue her cause of action and recover for injury caused by her husbands exposure to asbestos statute merely affected methods and procedure by which that action was recognized protected and enforced not the cause of action itself

PROBLEM: the Department must make in order to obtain the order it seeks in this action, as well as certain other issues that are likely to arise on remand. We conclude the Department's petition adequately sets forth the necessary elements it must prove in order to involuntarily treat Saenz: (1) that he has refused to consume food and fluids sufficient to maintain his health for an extended period; (2) that, as a result, he has been diagnosed by a physician as suffering from moderate to severe malnutrition, dehydration or other deleterious condition; and (3) that, pursuant to reliable medical opinion, Saenz is in imminent danger of suffering serious harm or death unless he is given medical treatment, including, if necessary, forced hydration and/or forced feeding. Cf. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. We next consider the Department's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest (B) holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate (C) holding that a detention officers alleged negligent conduct of failing to medically screen an inmate who later committed suicide in a holding cell  in violation of the police departments policies  was not the proximate cause of the inmates death when there was no evidence that the inmate would have been unable to kill himself if he had been medically screened and any claim that the inmate would have presented as suicidal in such screening was purely speculative (D) holding that the due process clause permits the state to involuntarily treat a prison inmate who is seriously mentally ill if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest (E) holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate  with antipsychotic drugs against his will under certain circumstances while not limiting treatment to those circumstances

SOLUTION: holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest

PROBLEM: jurisdictional rule is ciarity.”). By making all actions for the charges on transportation-services contracts subject to the TCA’s three-year filing period, common carriers doing business with the government need not specplate about (among other things) the jurisdictional time frame in which they must file a complaint in federal court. Carriers in Inter-Coastal’s shoes, for example, will know that the ICA’s three-year filing period applies, no.t the filing period governed by the CDA. Our holding today thus has the benefit of establishing the bright-line rule that the Court of Federal Claims itself had established before dicta in Dalton may have cast some uncertainty upon it. See Northeastern Penn., 32 Fed.Cl. at 74-75 & n. 8; see also Scott v. United States, 27 Fed.Cl. 829, 831 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Stapp Towing Co., Inc., 96-2 BCA ¶ 28,293, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one year limitations period in insurance policy was reasonable and therefore enforceable to shorten the fifteen year statute of limitations for breach of contract (B) holding statute of limitations period defined in 28 usc  2244d is subject to equitable tolling (C) holding that the ica threeyear limitations period governs and unequivocally  supersedes the six year limitations period in 28 usc  2501 in cases involving claims for transportation charges (D) holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under  1983 (E) holding that in connecticut the general threeyear personal injury statute of limitations period set forth in connecticut general statutes  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions asserted under 42 usc  1983

SOLUTION:
holding that one year limitations period in insurance policy was reasonable and therefore enforceable to shorten the fifteen year statute of limitations for breach of contract