In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: preventing employee from "working in any geographic space in which [employer] operates” where employer had interest in confidential information); Advanced Cable Ties, Inc. v. Hewes, No. 061995B, 2006 WL 3292810, at *1-2 (Mass.Super.Ct. Oct. 19, 2006) (lack of geographic scope restriction in non-compete not fatal to enforcement of restrictive covenant when employer was national company). 17 . See Miller Mech., Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So.2d 11, 12-13 (Fla.1974) (citing Kenco Chem. and Manufacturing Co. v. Railey, 286 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)); Flickenger v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., Inc., 732 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Balasco v. Gulf Holding, Inc., 707 So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also Health Care Financial Enterprises, Inc. v. Levy, 715 So.2d 341, 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). 18 .Under Florida law, courts are required to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract (B) holding that trial court is without authority to modify a settlement agreement but may enforce and interpret it (C) recognizing court has authority to modify agreement to cure any unreasonable provision as to duration or scope (D) holding that court may not refuse to enforce noncompete agreement solely because geographical area is unreasonable but rather must modify unreasonable restriction and enforce agreement as modified (E) holding an employer may partially enforce a noncompete agreement to the extent it is reasonable under the circumstances

Output: holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract


Input: Consider Input: in cases decided under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Meyers, 616 F.3d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (characterizing the Segal standard as a "background rule under the old Bankruptcy Act, to which courts still refer in the era of the Bankruptcy Code”); Andrews, 80 F.3d at 910-11 (applying the Segal standard to determine whether post-petition payments under a pre-petition non-compete agreement were property of the debtor’s estate); Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1423 (concluding the Bankruptcy Code "follows Segal insofar as it includes after-acquired property 'sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past’ but eliminates the requirement that it not be entangled with the debtor’s ability to make a fresh start”). But see Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir.2006) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Although the parties frame the issue as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code (B) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (C) holding that the question of whether an interest is a claim for bankruptcy purposes is to be resolved by reference to the text history and purpose of the bankruptcy code (D) holding although congress has specifically approved of segals result segals sufficiently rooted test did not survive the enactment of the bankruptcy code footnote omitted (E) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate

Output: holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code


Input: Consider Input: reference to representation before the Court that could reasonably be said to have induced the appellant to miss the filing deadline. See Butler v. Derwinski, 960 F.2d 139, 141 (Fed.Cir.1992) (“[although often effecting a seemingly harsh result, courts cannot disregard jurisdictional requirements[,] established by Congress[,] out of sympathy for particular litigants”), overruled in part on other grounds by Bailey, 160 F.3d at 1368; see also Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (per curiam) (“[procedural requirements established by Congress for gaming access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants”); cf. Gilbert v. Secretary of HHS, 51 F.3d 254, 257 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The appellant further asserts that errors 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing doctrine (B) holding that equitabletolling doctrine cannot apply where attorney misread statute (C) holding that even if the court were to apply the apex doctrine the doctrine would not preclude the deposition of two corporate executives in that case (D) holding that the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not apply where promise was supported by bargained for consideration (E) holding that the doctrine does not apply in such circumstancesi


Output: recognizing doctrine