In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Specifically, the EEOC regulations interpreting the Act provide that, in determining whether a claimant is disabled because he is significantly restricted in his ability to perform “either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes,” a court may consider: The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs). 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(ii)(B) (emphasis added). In making this determination, the reviewing court must decide whether the plaintiff is restricted in his or her ability to perform ei stems, Inc., 101 F.3d 346, (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). KCC argues on appeal that Burns’s lifting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lifting restriction of ten pounds did not constitute a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity (B) holding as a matter of law that a twentyfive pound lifting limitation particularly when compared to an average persons abilities  does not constitute a significant restriction on ones ability to lift work or perform any other major life activity (C) holding that a lifting restriction did not substantially limit a computer technicians ability to engage in the major life activity of working (D) holding plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who could not perform heavy lifting failed to meet burden of establishing substantial limitation in major life activity of work (E) holding that a twentyfive pounds lifting restriction did not substantially limit any major life activities

A: holding that a lifting restriction of ten pounds did not constitute a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity
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Q: was pending on, AEDPA’s effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); United States v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178 (3d Cir.1997). “Because the District Court relied entirely upon the state court record and did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review [of the District Court’s decision] is plenary.” Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 947 (3d Cir.1998) (citing Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir.1997)). Like the District Court, we must presume all state court factual findings tó be correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), but we “exercise plenary review over state court conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact and pure issues of law.” Hassine, 160 F.3d at 947; see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 105, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985)(<HOLDING>); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (B) holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (C) holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction (D) holding that petitions for confirmation or vacatur must show how the ultimate disposition of the matter by the federal court necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law (E) holding that while subsidiary factual questions are subject to  2254ds presumption the ultimate legal question of confessions constitutional voluntariness is a matter for independent federal determination

A: holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review
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Q: the contract is of a type usually put in writing, whether it needs a formal writing for its full expression, whether it has few or many details, whether the amount involved is large or small, whether it is a common or unusual contract, whether a standard form of contract is widely used in similar transactions, and whether either party takes any action in preparation for performance during the negotiations.” Horsfield Const., Inc. v. Dubuque County, Iowa, 653 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Restatement (Seoond) op CONTRACTS § 27 cmt. c). b. Analysis of letter of intent The court first notes that the language of the letter of intent clearly contemplates a subsequent, final contract. Paragraph 9 of the letter of intent reads as follows: 9. Form of lting Group, Inc., 494 N.W.2d at 444-45 (<HOLDING>); Air Host Cedar Rapids, Inc. v. Cedar Rapids 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no enforceable contract where letter specified it was a letter of interest only and is subject to the negotiation and execution of a definitive agreement  (B) holding that issuing a letter of counseling and a letter of reprimand was not a materially adverse employment action for purposes of a retaliation claim because the letter contained no abusive language andinstead contained jobrelated constructive criticism which can prompt an employee to improve her performance (C) holding that a loi that is subject to the negotiation and execution of a definitive agreement was nothing more than an invitation to attempt to reach an agreement of sale and not an enforceable contract based on offer and acceptance (D) holding that  1823e does not apply to a claim relating to a letter of credit a letter of credit is a liability not an asset (E) holding that an addendum letter was a new contract because it modified a prior lease agreement

A:
holding that issuing a letter of counseling and a letter of reprimand was not a materially adverse employment action for purposes of a retaliation claim because the letter contained no abusive language andinstead contained jobrelated constructive criticism which can prompt an employee to improve her performance
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