In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: a right to enjoy over the land of another for the benefit of the easement holder’s land, but it does not create an interest in the land itself." (footnote omitted; emphasis added)). 2 . 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 100 (2004) (footnotes omitted); see Cameron v. Barton, Ky., 272 S.W.2d 40, 42 (1954) ("Appellant finally contends that the easement in controversy was extinguished by merger when a former owner of the dominant estate bought an adjoining lot which offered a means of ingress and egress to and from the Highway Department’s property. The answer to this contention is that the doctrine of merger could not apply because the former owner of the dominant estate did not acquire the ser-vient estate." (emphasis added)); Sievers v. Flynn, 305 Ky. 325, 204 S.W.2d 364 (1947) (<HOLDING>); City of Franklin v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that owners of a dominant estate had a duty to keep the easement in a proper state of repair to avoid damaging the servient estate through erosion (B) holding that the burden on the servient estate cannot be increased without the consent of the owners of the servient estate and that the owner of the dominant estate to which the appurtenant easement is attached has no power to convey or expand use of that easement in connection with a tract of land owned by another (C) holding that an easement is not a separate estate when dominant and servient tracts are under the same ownership (D) holding that an express easement ran with the dominant estate (E) recognizing that the dominant easement owner not the servient estate owner bears responsibility for maintaining an easement
[A]: (C)


[Q]: Id. The district court excluded this portion of the expert’s testimony. Id. at 1397. Relying on Downing, the Third Circuit reversed. Id. at 1401. We agree that expert testimony on eyewitness identification may properly be admitted under Daubert in certain circumstances, but Stevens simply does not persuade us that the district court abused its discretion in the instant case. We note that here there were five eyewitness identifica tions, not one. Likewise, as counsel for the government pointed out at argument, there was also testimony that Mr. Smith changed his alibi. In this admittedly close case, we hold only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony under the circumstances. See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification (B) holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification (C) holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider certain additional factors in evaluating the validity of eyewitness identification testimony (D) holding that a specific instruction was unnecessary because eyewitness was crossexamined and the eyewitness testimony was discussed in defense counsels opening statement (E) holding exclusion of expert eyewitness identification testimony harmless error where governments case included three separate eyewitnesses and a palm print that discredited the defendants alibi
[A]: (B)


[Q]: impact’ upon the duration of his custody.” Bourke v. Hawk-Sawyer, 269 F.3d 1072, 1074 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting Razzoli v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 230 F.3d 371, 373 (D.C.Cir.2000)) (“habeas is indeed exclusive even when a non-habeas claim would have a merely probabilistic impact on the duration of custody.”). In Razzoli, the Circuit Court held that a prisoner could not assert a claim under the Privacy Act because his only recourse was to seek relief through a habeas petition. 230 F.3d at 376. As in this case, the prisoner’s Privacy Act claim in Razzoli alleged that the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission had “violated 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) by maintaining in their files and using a false record, [a] report of [a] drug possession incident, even though the .C.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). In this case, as in Razzoli and Bourke, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that where the capital defendants future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits the defendants release on parole due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible (C) holding that federal prisoners claim was properly filed as an action for habeas although he was not laying claim to an immediate release or release in the near future he is however maintaining that he is being deprived of the chance to secure his release  by unlawfully being declared ineligible for parole consideration (D) holding that habeas petition challenging the state boards decision to defer his scheduled parole release date was rendered moot by prisoners release from custody on parole and subsequent incarceration for violating his parole (E) holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release
[A]:
(C)