In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: include the element that elevates the crime to a higher level.” As we noted in State v. Bean, 153 N.H. 380 (2006), “[i]n Glanville, the State, although not required to do so under Johnson, attempted to charge the defendant with a specific variant of the crime allegedly attempted, but failed to accurately set forth that variant in the indictment.” Bean, 153 N.H. at 384; see Johnson, 144 N.H. at 178. Indeed, Glanville recognized that all that was required “[t]o charge the defendant with attempted armed robbery, class A felony, [was for] the indictment ... to allege that the defendant (1) with a purpose to commit armed robbery, (2) committed acts constituting a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” Glanville, 145 N.H. at 634 (emphasis added); cf. Casanova, 164 N.H. at 566 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the indictment in this case 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because statutory variants of an underlying crime are not elements of an attempt to commit the underlying crime jurors are not required to unanimously find which specific statutory variant the defendant intended to commit it is sufficient that they unanimously conclude that the defendant intended to commit any of the applicable statutory variants (B) holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred (C) holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways (D) recognizing that entrapment is a statutory defense rooted in the notion that congress could not have intended to criminally punish those who commit elements of crime but are induced by the government to commit the acts and that outrageous conduct defense is rooted in constitutional law (E) holding that an individual cannot attempt to commit murder of the second or third degree because the crime of attempt is a specific intent crime and an attempt to commit second or third degree murder would require proof that the individual intended to perpetrate an unintentional killing which is logically impossible
[A]: holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred


[Q]: for [her] employer! ] to operate efficiently and effectively.” Id. at 418-19, 126 S.Ct. 1951. The point of this inquiry, then, is “both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their im portant public functions.” Id. at 420, 126 S.Ct. 1951. With that premise as a backdrop, the Supreme Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951; see also Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 364-65 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Garcetti and its Sixth Circuit progeny 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern (B) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (C) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (D) holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless  related to his job duties (E) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected
[A]: holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern


[Q]: to the State and beneficial to the accused." Nettles, 565 N.E.2d at 1066-1067, 1069. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in refusing to give his tendered instruction. Id. at 1068. The Indiana Supreme Court found "nothing in [the] record to justify the conclusion that the police engaged in any willful conduct in destroying evidence." Id. at 1069. The Indiana Supreme Court also held that "negligent handling of evidence will not be grounds for reversal unless it can be demonstrated that police acted deliberately" and conelud- ed that the trial court was correct in refusing to give the tendered instruction. Id. Here, the dura from the left side is potentially useful evidence because it had not been tested but could have been subjected to tests. See id. at 1067 (<HOLDING>). Ray does not argue that the State acted in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that film negatives and master recordings were tangible personal property even though they were valued in part for their intellectual content because they were also physically useful in the manufacturing process (B) holding in securities fraud case that defendants who were the subject of criminal investigation were not bound to predict the likelihood that they would be indicted but were required to disclose material facts that would potentially endanger the companys future financial performance (C) holding the state law claims were not preempted (D) holding that repeated remarks about need to bring in new blood or young blood by one of the decisionmakers were not stray remarks and may permit inference of discrimination (E) holding that blood samples that were not preserved by the state were potentially useful evidence
[A]:
holding that film negatives and master recordings were tangible personal property even though they were valued in part for their intellectual content because they were also physically useful in the manufacturing process