In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 238 (2) (367 SE2d 786) (1988). 41 Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 302 Ga. App. 726, 730 (2) (b) (691 SE2d 633) (2010) (punctuation omitted). 42 Id. at 731 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted). 43 Fla. Int’l Indem. Co. v. Osgood, 233 Ga. App. 111, 115 (3) (503 SE2d 371) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 44 Griffin, 302 Ga. App. at 731 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted). 45 See Roland v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 265 Ga. 776, 778(2) (462 SE2d 623) (1995) (affirming trial court’s directed verdict in favor of insured on coverage claim but, nonetheless, also affirming court’s directed verdict in favor of insurer on insured’s bad-faith claim in light of the fact that insured’s coverage, despite ultimately succeeding, was based on a doubtful question of law); Griffin, 302 Ga.App. at 731 (2) (b) (<HOLDING>); Assurance Co. of Am. v. BBB Serv. Co., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because insurers nonpayment was based on contention that insured did not have a covered loss under the policy because the value of the property was the same regardless of whether it was serviced by an easement nonpayment was reasonable and not subject to a badfaith claim (B) holding that regardless of the subjective belief of the insured the record established a basis to believe that the insured had committed an act that could give rise to a claim under the policy (C) holding that an insurers obligation to defend an insured was a property interest subject to prejudgment attachment (D) holding in a case involving a multiplevehicle policy that a new offer of uninsured motorist coverage was not required for the addition of a new vehicle which was comparable to the renewal or supplementation of an existing policy events that did not trigger the statutory requirement of a new offer the courts holding was based in part upon the principle that an insurance contract is personal to the insured because it insures the risk of loss to the insured and does not attach to specific vehicles (E) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent
[A]: (A)


[Q]: period under IAD never commenced); Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 489-90 (D.C. 1997) (rejecting prisoner’s substantial compliance argument and recognizing that court is bound by Fex); State v. Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d 579, 581-82 (Ind. 1996) (requiring strict compliance with IAD procedures and recognizing that procedures are "not mere technicalities”); Pinto v. Warden, C.A. No. 972412, 1999 WL 49378, at *7 (Conn. Super. Jan. 20, 1999) (stating that "[wjhile it is true that earlier decisions of courts were split on when the 180 day period begins, the majority of courts ... have held that the period begins to run once the request is actually received by the appropriate court and prosecutor”); Commonwealth v. Flores, C.A. No. 91-493, 1998 WL 792466, at *3 (Mass. Super. Nov. 6, 1998) (<HOLDING>). 48 . 1993 WL 138993, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court (B) holding that an noa filed by a pro se prisoner is deemed filed on the date that the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for mailing (C) holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing (D) holding that the iad as construed by fex requires that a prisoner must be tried within 180 days of the date when his request for disposition is actu ally received by the state in which the charges are pending not when the prisoner provides that request to his custodial authorities (E) holding time begins when the prisoner knows  the important facts not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance
[A]: (D)


[Q]: appellant’s interpretation of the policy. Section B states that appellees will pay, when due, the benefits required. Section C gives appellees the right to investigate and settle all claims, proceedings, or suits. The actions taken by appellees pursuant to section C will determine if appellees are required to pay the benefits discussed in section B. If appellees exercise their rights under the policy in section C to settle a claim, then payment will be required of appellees under section B. There is .no requirement in the policy that appellees obtain the consent of appellant when settling a claim or investigating the merits of a claim, and we are not permitted to write such a clause into the policy. Dear v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 947 S.W.2d 908, 913-14 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Apex Towing Co. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (B) holding that thirdparty indemnity claims are not premature (C) holding that when policy gives absolute right to settle thirdparty claims courts are not permitted to engraft any consent requirement onto the policy (D) holding that injured employee has right to settle with thirdparty tortfeasor claims not covered by minnesota workers compensation act (E) holding insured relinquished right to sue general liability insurer for breach of contract relative to insurers allegedly improper handling and payment of thirdparty claim by purchasing policy which gave insurer right to settle
[A]:
(C)