In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: are complete and present within the proscribed state statute of limitations. Id. at 393-94, 127 S.Ct. 1091. Plaintiff argues that because Wallace dealt with a false arrest and not a search and seizure, its analysis is inapplicable. (D.E. 8, Plaintiffs Response). However, the general rule of Wallace soundly applies to a search and seizure scenario, as noted by the Sixth Circuit and several Kentucky district courts. See Harper, 293 Fed. Appx. at 391 n. 1 (“Wallace also clarified that Heck does not delay the accrual of an otherwise complete and present cause of action when judgment in the plaintiffs favor ‘would impugn an anticipated future conviction .... ’ Harper’s claims thus accrued on July 31, 2003, the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure.”); Kenney, 2011 WL 1582125 at *6 (<HOLDING>); Lovins v. Hurt, No. 11-216-JBC, 2011 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiffs  1983 claim accrued on the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure (B) holding that a ruling on preindictment motion that search and seizure were legal collaterally estopped defendant from later moving to suppress evidence claiming that search and seizure were illegal (C) holding that section 1983 action for unlawful search and seizure accrued on dates of seizures rather than date on which state court declared the acts illegal (D) holding that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of the repealer statute not on the date the wrong occurred despite the federal courts ruling as to the statutes unconstitutionality (E) holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale

A: (A)
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Q: removal purposes. Instead, for complete preemption to apply, the cause of action not only must be preempted by ERISA but also must fall within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). See Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209, 124 S.Ct. 2488 (“[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore preempted. The preemptive force of ERISA § 502(a) is still stronger.... Hence, causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) [are] removable to federal court.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 62-63, 67, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (<HOLDING>); Da-Ponte v. Manfredi Motors Inc., 157 Fed. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under  1132a1b (B) holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself (C) holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under  502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan (D) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court (E) holding that suit by a beneficiary to recover benefits from a covered plan  falls directly under  502a1b of erisa and therefore was necessarily federal in character and subject to removal to federal court

A: (E)
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Q: the owner has no duty to warn an invitee”). But, if the obviousness is not sufficiently great, “the possessor is not relieved of the duty of reasonable care which he owes to the invitee for his protection.” Id. “This duty may require him to warn the invitee, or to take other reasonable steps to protect him, against the known or obvious condition.” Id. The facts in Peterson did not require consideration of whether a possessor has a duty to reasonably anticipate that an invitee may be distracted when he encounters the known or obvious condition. Id. at 497-98, 144 N.W.2d at 558. But other Minnesota cases establish that the potential for distraction should factor into the reasonable-care analysis. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Cambridge-Radisson Co., 235 Minn. 20, 23, 49 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1951) (<HOLDING>); Ober v. The Golden Rule, 146 Minn. 347, 348, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sufficient evidence supported jurys finding of negligence when invitee had tripped on frame in department store because she was distracted by displayed goods (B) holding that jury returning verdict 45 minutes after informed would be sequestered in hotel was not coerced into verdict (C) holding that it would not be unreasonable to find condition in hotel lunchroom unsafe because invitee would be distracted (D) recognizing that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures  would disappear if it were left to depend upon the unfettered discretion of an employee of the hotel (E) holding that no closure occurred where judge locked doors to ensure jury would not be distracted

A:
(C)
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