instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
on the conditions stated in the publicly-filed limited partnership certificate. We affirm the appellants’ liability under § 106(l)(b). The certificates of limited partnership for TSG, TMG, and TSG 80 all state that, if necessary to satisfy the partnership’s recourse obligations, each limited partner has agreed, upon demand, to make an additional capital contribution of up to three times the limited partner’s original investment. These certificates were recorded publicly in New York County. Accordingly, the capital of the Limited Partnerships upon which creditors properly could rely included the limited partners’ stated ob ligation to make additional capital contributions. See Arno Management Corp. v. 115 East 69th Assocs., 173 A.D.2d 258, 260, 569 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (1st Dept.1991) (<HOLDING>). Section 106(l)(b) explicitly provides a means 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that limited partner does not have standing to sue for injuries to partnership that merely diminish value of that partners interest (B) holding that appellate jurisdiction is limited to the issues contained in the certificate of appealability (C) recognizing partnership by estoppel only with respect to claims by persons who have reasonably relied upon outward representations of partnership (D) recognizing that same principle applies where defendant is general partner of limited partnership which in turn is general partner of limited partnership with contacts with state (E) holding that the information contained in the certificate of limited partnership binds the partnership and the partners with respect to third parties
answer:
holding that limited partner does not have standing to sue for injuries to partnership that merely diminish value of that partners interest


question:
but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 23 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (same). Essentially, the Court determined that the prejudicial quality of testimony regarding an actually coerced confession is, like all other improperly introduced testimony at trial, capable of review. At this point in time, the Fulminante decision stands as the sole, albeit the dispositive, case on this point. In contrast, cases applying the harmless error analysis to the introduction of presumptively coerced statements are legion. See e.g. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 & n. 22, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2652 & n. 22, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 555 & n. 22 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443, 104 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion  (B) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence (D) holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights (E) holding that although miranda required the suppression of testimonial statements made before defendant was advised of his constitutional rights the state court is free of course to consider this harmless error question upon remand
answer:
holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion 


question:
concluding “the clarity of the exclusions in question” supported the conclusion “a reasonable person could not have understood coverage would exist”). Goodwin does not identify in his affidavit any way in which he misunderstood the policy exclusion. He merely quotes the insuring clause from the policy and then states that he “expect[ed] that this language means just what it says.” But insurance policy provisions are not interpreted in isolation. See Thomas, 749 N.W.2d at 682; Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 494 N.W.2d 690, 692 (Iowa 1993), called into doubt on other grounds by Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d at 113 n. 1. The insuring clause must be read in conjunction with the policy exclusions. Cf. Harlan v. Valley Ins. Co., 128 Or.App. 128, 875 P.2d 471, 472-73 (1994) (<HOLDING>). If the policy is not considered as a whole, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave (B) holding in determining whether driver was insured under terms of policy exclusion of person using vehicle without a reasonable belief person was entitled to do so must be considered (C) holding that to be convicted under dwi statute a person must be driving or in actual physical control of the vehicle but motion of the vehicle is not necessary (D) holding that a lookout is not using a vehicle entitled to liability coverage under an insurance policy (E) holding that unlicensed driver who was driving vehicle with permission of owners permittee could reasonably believe that permittee had authority to permit him to drive vehicle and thus driv er was entitled to liability coverage notwithstanding auto policy exclusion for any person using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that person is entitled to do so driver could have reasonable belief that he was entitled to use vehicle even though he was unlicensed where he was doing so at specific request of permittee and actual owner never instructed driver not to drive vehicle nor instructed permittee not to allow others to drive vehicle
answer:

holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave