In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: of his experience’ in detecting criminal activity”) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). Based on the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that the officers possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to effect an investigative detention of Mr. Hishaw as he left the apartment in the pickup. Even though the initial stop was justified, we must still assess the reasonableness of the subsequent pat-down search. In order to comport with the Fourth Amendment, that search must have been “reasonably related in scope” to the basis for the stop (i.e., the officers’ suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs). See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In that regard, this circuit has concluded that an 169 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop (B) holding that like burglary car theft is a crime that often involves the use of weapons and other instruments of assault that could jeopardize police officer safety and thus justifies a protective frisk under terry to ensure officer safety (C) holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes (D) holding that when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle the officer may in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officers safety and the safety of others (E) holding that the officer had reasonable belief that the occupants of the vehicle were armed where the officer knew that drug dealers are frequently armed and therefore frisk of the vehicle was permissible
[A]: (D)


[Q]: is limited in applicability to only cases, like this one, in which the total noneconomic damages awarded by the jury were in excess of both of the $250,000 caps and in excess of the $500,000 combined total of both applicable caps; the jury here awarded $1,725,000 in noneconomic damages. 29 . Chesser argues that because a jointly and severally liable defendant possesses a right of contribution, the statutory provisions at issue do not conflict. A right of contribution, however, presupposes that the defendant has actually paid the damages — that is, has already been civilly liable — for noneconomic damages in excess of the $250,000 cap applicable to that defendant, in violation of the express language of section 74.301(b). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.015(a), (b) (West 2008) (<HOLDING>). 30 . Appellees concede that Hospital remains 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a right to contribution (B) recognizing that prior to 1949 when the statute permitting contribution among joint tortfeasors was enacted no right of contribution existed between jointtortfeasors in delaware (C) recognizing contribution in the appropriate case (D) recognizing in both subsections a right of contribution when a defendant has paid a percentage of damages greater than his percentage of responsibility (E) recognizing right of contribution against joint tortfeasor where release is obtained on his behalf
[A]: (D)


[Q]: of the settlement offer within sixty (60) days after the offer is accepted; or (3) the amount of the offer exceeds one and one-third (1 1/3) of the amount of the judgment awarded.” I.C. § 34-4-37-8. Cahoon specifically asserts that while Wife made several offers of settlement to Cahoon and Kohne together, each of the offers failed to comply with the statutory requirement that the terms of the offer must provide for payment of the settlement within sixty days of acceptance of the offer. Our review of the record confirms this omission in each of the offers. As this statutory prerequisite was not met, we conclude that the trial court erroneously awarded Wife prejudgment interest with respect to Dr. Cahoon. See Indiana Dept. of Human Services v. Firth, 590 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. However, for the same reasons, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language (B) recognizing that we must give meaning to all the words in the claims (C) holding that statutes must be read so as to give effect to all statutory language (D) holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning (E) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect
[A]:
(A)