TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: S. Sprouse Residuary Trust, which is a named defendant in this action. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer only to Mr. Sprouse in this opinion. 4 .Ms. Bagwell, who is not a lawyer, also testified that she thought that the original five-year lease was on "a year[-]to[-]year basis.” 5 . Mr. Sprouse did not take issue with the $534 award for the damage to Mr. Ellis's corn crop. 6 . See also 2 Friedman on Leases § 14.301, at 915 (noting that payment of increased rent under an option constitutes an acceptance of the option). 7 . Painter v. Town of Groveland, 79 So.2d 765, 767 (Fla.1955) (finding such a presumption contrary to statute); Branagen v. Winders & Alm, 194 Iowa 461, 187 N.W. 440, 440-41 (Iowa 1922); Schiltz v. Teledirect Int'l, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); Elec. Sales Eng’rs, Inc. v. Urban Renewal & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there was no renewal but finding estoppel on the part of the landlord (B) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (C) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (D) recognizing the abuse of discretion standard and the requirement of evidentiary support for a finding of estoppel (E) holding that estoppel was a question of fact

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: See Lorber 675 F.2d at 1067. The court noted that the classification of the surcharge as a non-tax fee was “a close question,” but concluded that because the surcharge was triggered by “voluntary” choice, the surcharge was possessed more of the character of a service fee than that of a tax. See id. The Lorber court also held that extending priority status to the surcharge was contrary to the trend of then-recent amendments to § 64 of the old Bankruptcy Act, which tended toward the erosion of the preferred status of taxes. See id., 675 F.2d at 1067-68. The court explained that, following the grant by Congress of priority status to claims for taxes, the federal government and its state and local counterparts began to increase the types and levels of taxation. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. (<HOLDING>). Even courts in the Ninth Circuit, purporting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber (B) holding that ohios reimbursement claims met the lorber criteria but were not excise taxes because they were not universally applicable to similarly situated entities and in addition disadvantaged private creditors with like claims (C) holding west virginias reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber suburban ii and the chateaugay district court decision (D) holding reimbursement claims were excise taxes under the lorber test without addressing the bankruptcy codes central policy of equal distribution (E) holding that michigan reimbursement claims were excise taxes under both lorber and suburban ii

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: In United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 442 Fed.Appx. 136, 137 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), the district court found the defendant had not given truthful testimony at the sentencing hearing and had, therefore, obstructed justice. As a result, he was not entitled to a reduction of his sentence for acceptance of responsibility. We agreed, reasoning that “[b]ecause Hernandez did not accept responsibility under the Guidelines, the condition triggering the Government’s obligation not to oppose Hernandez’ request for an adjustment was not fulfilled; the Government was, therefore, not in breach of the agreement by opposing his request for an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment.” Id. (emphasis omitted); cf. United States v. Bell, 417 Fed.Appx. 420, 422 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). A contrary unpublished opinion, United States 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant was denied wrongfully his right to crossexamine on the issue of whether the device was designed as a pipe bomb or as a firecracker and that the jury may have found reasonable doubt if that right was not denied (B) holding that under  111 the defendants knowledge of the official status of the victim is generally irrelevant (C) holding that where the proffered hearsay statement of the victim pertained to a memory of the previous days events and was offered solely for the purpose of proving such events such statement was not admissible under rule 8033 (D) holding the same where the defendant offered exculpatory and irrelevant interpretations of transactions and events deflected responsibility denied or discounted relevant conduct portrayed himself as a victim of unfair government treatment and generally denied or minimized his culpability at the sentencing hearing (E) holding that where the defendant pleaded guilty subsequently denied his guilt and attempted to withdraw his plea and then attempted to minimize the significance of his statements at sentencing by averring that he accepted responsibility for the amount that me and the government have agreed to and offering a statement accepting responsibility  were insufficient to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility

SOLUTION:
(D)