In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
in Germantown and Eastern Montgomery County, which the County determined is causing the need to expand the highway system. In Gaithersburg East, the fact that programmed highways are expected to relieve the traffic congestion and there is no need to build unprogrammed highways provides a rational basis to treat the new development in this area differently than the new development in the existing impact districts, where unprogrammed highwa e sub judice is Chapter 808, which gives Montgomery County broad taxing authority, authority that was lacking in those other jurisdictions. See also Home Builders v. Board of Palm Beach County Comm’rs, 446 So.2d 140 (Fla.App. 4th Dist.1983), cert. denied, 451 So.2d 848 (Fla.1984), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 976, 105 S.Ct. 376, 83 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (<HOLDING>). We likewise hold that the impact tax imposed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection (B) holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution (C) holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court (D) holding that the impact fee there imposed did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment using the rational basis test we discuss here (E) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
defendant to trust the advice of his counsel in weighing the immigration consequences of his decision. Petitioner’s counsel advised him that he would “in all likelihood, receive a sentence of only one to three years’ imprisonment.” (Id.) The fact that this turned out to be true, buttresses the court’s conclusion that it was reasonable for Petitioner to rely on his counsel’s advice in making his immigration decisions. Second, and more importantly, however, case law before IIRIRA held that even an alien who received a sentence longer than five years might have maintained eligibility for § 212(c) relief, provided that the alien had not served five years of his sentence at the time of his removal hearing. See Matter of Ramirez-Somera, 1992 WL 301623, 20 I. & N. Dec. 564, 566 (BIA 1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the fact that Petitioner could have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony (B) holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss prison inmates action under 42 usc  1983 as frivolous without consent of defendants because defendants had not been served yet and therefore were not parties (C) holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious (D) holding the same where the term conviction refers to a defendant who has been found guilty of a listed offense but has not yet been sentenced (E) holding that an immigrant defendant is eligible for  212c relief despite having been sentenced to a fifteen year prison term because he had not yet served five years of the sentence

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
the district court’s instruction to the jury, that New York law as to a gratuitous licensee might have operated as a bar to recovery, was in error, and that the admiralty rule as to damages should have applied. Notably, it stated that prejudicial error would have occurred “if the maritime law imposed upon the shipowner a standard of care higher than” that which existed under New York law. 358 U.S. at 629, 79 S.Ct. at 409. Thus,- state law is not permitted to significantly change the maritime law applicable in such cases. The inferior federal courts in numbers of cases have also refused to apply state laws to actions governed by federal maritime tort law where to do so would alter the rights and liabilities of the parties. See, e.g., Preston v. Frantz, 11 F.3d 357, 358 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 31, 129 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law (B) holding that general maritime law preempts state law (C) holding that application of connecticut wrongfuldeath law is precluded by general federal maritime wrongfuldeath law (D) holding that the general rule of maritime law that parties bear their own costs coupled with the need for uniformity in federal maritime law precludes the application of state attorneys fee statutes such as texas civ prac  remcode  38001 to maritime contract disputes (E) recognizing products liability concepts as part of general maritime law

Ex Output:

(C)