In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: initially stopping the truck for failing to illuminate the rear license plate in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1706(e). See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998) (“An initial traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment ... if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” (citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc))). Wilson also does not dispute that the smell of alcohol on VanHouden together with VanHouden’s admission that he had been drinking justified the further detention of the truck and its occupants in order for Deputy Watkins to conduct field sobriety tests on VanHouden. See United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops (B) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (C) holding that the discovery of 2000 in cash during a traffic stop supported a finding of reasonable suspicion (D) holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment (E) holding detection of alcohol on a drivers breath during a routine traffic stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion
[EX A]: holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops

[EX Q]: — cannot alone support guilty verdicts. There must be some further evidence adduced indicating the defendant’s commission of the charged criminal acts. See United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d at 69; United States v. Scheibel, 870 F.2d 818, 822 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Johnson, 513 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir.1975). True enough. But these cases do not hold that, if such actus reus evidence is adduced, there is some temporal limit on the jury’s consideration of consciousness-of-guilt evidence to establish mens rea. Indeed, if flight or false exculpatory statements were indicative only of a defendant’s knowledge and intent at the time of those actions, the evidence would be irrelevant to the charged crime and properly excluded. Instead, the law admits consciousness-of-gui 209 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). (4) The Admissions to Goldsmith Still further 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendants false exculpatory statements admissible to show consciousness of guilt (B) recognizing that evidence of government knowledge of the defendants conduct could be part of a defendants argument that it did not knowingly submit false claims (C) holding parties to an exculpatory clause where the parties intent is clear (D) recognizing that defendants attempt to persuade a witness to make false exculpatory statements is probative of guilty knowledge and intent (E) holding that defendants attempt to mislead a client by providing it with false information was illegal witness tampering because defendant was trying to corruptly persuade or mislead the client with the intent of influencing its potential testimony before the grand jury
[EX A]: holding defendants false exculpatory statements admissible to show consciousness of guilt

[EX Q]: in Dow-rick, referring to Restatement, supra, Section 762, said: “The rationale for this rule ‘rests upon fundamental assumptions in free business enterprise. Each business enterprise must be free to select its business relations in its own interest.’ Id., comment a. The Restatement also recognizes that the rule covers a situation involving a lender and borrower. Id., comment d.” Id., 144 Vt. at 512, 481 A.2d at 400-401. The Bank’s privilege to refuse to do business with plaintiffs existed regardless of the motive for its decision. The fact that the Bank may have denied consent because of the earlier lawsuit is immaterial. See Turner Constr. Co. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 98 A.D.2d 88, 469 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1983); see also Posa, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 642 F.Supp. 1198 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Bank was privileged to decide not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that woman has constitutionally protected right to determine for any reason or no reason to terminate her pregnancy (B) holding that there is no right to a setoff against a lawfully imposed condominium charge (C) holding that an atwill employee can be discharged for any reason or no reason unless employee is discharged for reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy (D) holding that refusal to maintain trade relations is an inherent right that every person may exercise lawfully for reasons he deems sufficient or for no reason whatever (E) holding that no person can commence or maintain an action in a court of record as agent for another unless he is a regularly licensed attorney
[EX A]:
holding that woman has constitutionally protected right to determine for any reason or no reason to terminate her pregnancy