In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: (Tex.2010) (orig. proceeding). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies creates a jurisdictional bar to proceeding with the claim. See City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex.2008) (“[Njoncompliance [with Chapter 21’s administrative procedures] deprives courts of subject-matter, jurisdiction.”); Smith v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 101 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). A would-be Chapter 21 claimant must first file an administrative complaint with the civil rights division of the Texas Workforce Commission. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.201(a) .(stating that an aggrieved person “may file a complaint with the commission”); id. § 21.0015 (defining “commission” as “the Texas Workforce ■Commission civil rights division”); Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 486-88 (<HOLDING>). The complaint must be filed “not later than 
 Holding statements: (A) holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent (B) holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language (C) holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (D) holding that administrative exhaustion is mandatory despite legislatures use of the word may (E) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional
Example Output: holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent

Example Input: where he admitted that other Dunkin’ Donuts shops do sell soft drinks such as milk, juice or soda. See Trpko Taseski Depo., attached as Exh. 3B to plaintiffs motion, p. 61. Defendants’ only response to plaintiffs argument regarding the inapplicability of the rider are these two brief sentences: “Plaintiffs cases are inappositive. The controlling principle of law is that money paid under a mistake of fact can be recouped in an action assumpsit.” However, defendants’ claim of a “mistake of fact” is unsupported by the record. To the contrary, the facts presented confirm that no mistake was made because defendants’ were correct in voluntarily paying fees on the sales of such products. There is therefore no ground for an actio ranchise Guide (CCH) ¶ 11,290 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 30, 1997) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue that the Michigan Franchise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under michigan franchise investment law franchisees failure to comply with lawful provisions in franchise agreements by failing to pay royalties and advertising fees and failing to file monthly sales reports constituted good cause for franchisors termination of agreements where franchisor gave notice of termination in writing and franchisees made no effort to cure (B) holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable (C) holding that franchisees tax evasion scheme provided cause for termination (D) holding that franchisees illegal sale of cigarettes to minors provided cause for termination (E) holding that traditional commercial contract provided for termination at will under arkansas law
Example Output: holding that under michigan franchise investment law franchisees failure to comply with lawful provisions in franchise agreements by failing to pay royalties and advertising fees and failing to file monthly sales reports constituted good cause for franchisors termination of agreements where franchisor gave notice of termination in writing and franchisees made no effort to cure

Example Input: court of competent jurisdiction to command the performance of a specified official duty issued by law. See Sutton v. Figgatt, 280 N.C. 89, 92, 185 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1971). The writ may therefore still be issued by our courts, “and the substantive grounds for granting the remedy as developed under our former practice still control.” Fleming, 23 N.C. App. at 420, 209 S.E.2d at 368. The purpose of a writ of mandamus remains, however, a limited and extraordinary remedy to provide a swift enforcement of a party’s already established legal rights. “Mandamus will not lie unless the party seeking the writ has a clea o damages on any grounds since the repeal of the statutory authority for the writ. As our own Rules of Appellate Procedure indicate, mandamus is intended as a swift remedy, “file 917) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that the trial court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action to clear title of a false or fraudulent document that asserts an interest in real property may be joined with an action for damages under  33420a (B) holding that the offense requires that the return be false as to a material matter (C) holding that in an action for breach of contract only nominal damages can be recovered if there is no evidence produced from which the facts necessary to determine damages under the proper rule can be determined (D) holding that district court erred in awarding attorneys fees in civil rights action where plaintiff only recovered 1 in nominal damages (E) holding that absent a false return no damages could be recovered in an action for mandamus
Example Output:
holding that an action to clear title of a false or fraudulent document that asserts an interest in real property may be joined with an action for damages under  33420a