TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: was pending on, AEDPA’s effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); United States v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178 (3d Cir.1997). “Because the District Court relied entirely upon the state court record and did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review [of the District Court’s decision] is plenary.” Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 947 (3d Cir.1998) (citing Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir.1997)). Like the District Court, we must presume all state court factual findings tó be correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), but we “exercise plenary review over state court conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact and pure issues of law.” Hassine, 160 F.3d at 947; see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 105, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985)(<HOLDING>); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (B) holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (C) holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction (D) holding that petitions for confirmation or vacatur must show how the ultimate disposition of the matter by the federal court necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law (E) holding that while subsidiary factual questions are subject to  2254ds presumption the ultimate legal question of confessions constitutional voluntariness is a matter for independent federal determination

SOLUTION: holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review

PROBLEM: a “public official,” places a great emphasis on two of the elements: (1) the statutory powers and duties of a position, and (2) whether that position exercised sovereign power. See, e.g., Spaulding, 102 Iowa at 649, 72 N.W. at 291 (concluding that the treasurer of the commissioners of pharmacy was not a public officer because the position of treasurer “was a creation of the commission ... and at all times subject absolutely to their control”); McKinley, 228 Iowa at 1189-91, 293 N.W. at 451 (concluding that county engineer was an “official” because he furnished a bond and took an oath of office; but more importantly because several statutes defining the powers and duties of the county engineer delegated certain sovereign powers to that position); Whitney, 232 Iowa at 71, 4 N.W.2d at 398 (<HOLDING>); Hutton, 235 Iowa at 56, 16 N.W.2d at 20 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (C) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was an employee not an official and therefore entitled to benefits under the workers compensation act (D) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was not an official because she was not required to give bond or take an oath none of the statutes impose upon her the exercise of discretion in any way they delegate no sovereign power to her (E) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment

SOLUTION: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment

PROBLEM: 1213 (Fla.1990) (“ ‘[0]nce damages are liquidated, prejudgment interest is considered an element of those damages as a matter of law, and the plaintiff is to be made whole from the date of the loss.’ ’’)(quoting Kissimmee Util. Auth. v. Better Plastics, Inc., 526 So.2d 46, 47 (Fla.1988)). The trial court should not view Section XXI of the lease as operating to limit the Department’s liability to an amount equal to six months’ rent. The Department did not assert Section XXI as a defense and, thus, its applicability was never argued below. While Section XXI of the lease may have been applicable under the facts of this case, it was not for the trial court to invoke a defense the Department failed to raise. See Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Blocker, 728 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). Also, we direct the trial court to carefully 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is error to grant relief that was not requested noticed nor litigated by any party (B) holding because the district court refused to grant plaintiff reinstatement or any other injunctive relief the damage award was neither incidental to nor intertwined with any other relief (C) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (D) holding that where the final judgment provided relief that was not requested  its entry constituted reversible error (E) holding that it is not

SOLUTION:
holding because the district court refused to grant plaintiff reinstatement or any other injunctive relief the damage award was neither incidental to nor intertwined with any other relief