In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: voters of the political subdivision or subdivisions whose combined territory composes the territory of a district shall be qualified voters of the district. The nomination and election shall be by separate nonpartisan ballot. The term of each member of the board thus elected shall be six years and until his successor is elected and qualified. (Emphasis added.) No definition of a “qualified voter” is provided in SDCL Chapter 49-36. Thus, we must turn to the definition of “voter” as provided under SDCL Title 12, and the South Dakota Constitution as to what qualifies a person as a “voter” within the meaning of Chapter 49-36. See SDCL 12-1-1. [¶44.] Our state affords great protection to a citizen’s voting franchise. SD Const, art. 6, § 19; Duffy v. Mortenson, 497 N.W.2d 437, 439 (S.D.1993) (<HOLDING>). A court must strictly adhere to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a fair referendum assuring the equal right to vote under  101a1 includes the right of members to have the vote scheduled at a time when they can exercise their vote and the right to be free from intimidation or fear of reprisal (B) holding constitutional a tax on a private citizens interest in housing on government property received as part of the private citizens compensation (C) holding it is not the policy of the state of south dakota to disenfranchise its citizens of their constitutional right to vote (D) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (E) holding that the right to vote is fundamental
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: those same arguments. Like the majority of the appellate panel that first reviewed this appeal, we are not persuaded to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this evidential ruling. It was for the trial court to assess defendant’s prior conviction’s probative value in light of its remoteness, and we cannot say that the trial court erred in that judgment. The question is not whether we would have made a different determination in the first instance. Rather, we apply the normal, deferential standard and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the use of the prior conviction for impeachment purposes. The conviction was not stale by the standard in use for assessing remoteness. See Harris, supra, 209 N.J. at 436, 444-45, 38 A.3d 559 (<HOLDING>). And, we cannot say that the trial court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible (B) holding two prior convictions more than ten years old admissible where disorderlypersons offenses bridged the gap (C) holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand (D) holding that evidence of two intervening felony convictions removed taint of remoteness from convictions more than 10 years prior permitting analysis under rule 609a (E) holding that prior distribution and possession convictions that were eight and ten years before the charged conduct occurred were not too remote
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: advertised and conducted the sale). Moore’s action is not moot. 7 . When consideration is so inadequate that it shocks the conscience of the court, the sale is void and will be set aside. See Hamilton v. Patterson, 236 S.C. 487, 494, 115 S.E.2d 68, 71 (1960) ("It is well settled in this State ‘that inadequacy of price, unless so gross as to shock the conscience of the court or accompanied by circumstances from which fraud may be clearly inferred, will not justify the overthrow of a judicial sale.’ ”) (citation omitted); Hughes v. Wilburn, 156 S.C. 443, 153 S.E. 487 (1930) (ruling a bid one-eightieth of the inventoried value of the property was so grossly inadequate as to be shocking to the court); Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Graham, 291 S.C. 178, 352 S.E.2d 511 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). 8 . In limited circumstances, however, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the analogous context of choiceoflaw in relation to the sale of personal property that compensation for arranging the sale is assessed apart from underlying sale (B) holding sale price of 48100 received for mortgaged property subsequently appraised at 73000 was not so inadequate as to shock the conscience or to give rise to inference of fraud so as to require that judicial sale be set aside (C) holding that the court should in the absence of fraud or improper dealing or clear inadequacy of price as of the time the sale is made or some valid legal objection sustain the trustee and ratify the sale (D) holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser (E) holding that plaintiff lacked standing after foreclosure sale to set aside the sale arid reinstate her right to redeem property based upon arguments that events surrounding the closing of the sale were improper
[EX A]:
(B)