In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: jurisdiction to exercise its discretion to treat the matter before it as a petition for a writ of certiorari. See, e.g., In re Temporary Custody of Five Minors, 105 Nev. 441, 777 P.2d 901 (1989). In light of the far reaching consequences of the issues presented, we are confident the district court would have exercised that discretion for the same reasons we have exercised our discretion to review the instant original petition. 3 Nev. Const, art. 6, § 8. 4 NRS 4.370(3). 5 State of Nevada v. Justice Court, 112 Nev 803, 919 P.2d 401 (1996). 6 See generally NCJC Canon 2. 7 Nev. Const, art. 6, § 8; NRS 4.370(3). 8 NRS 189.120; State v. Shade, 110 Nev. 57, 867 P.2d 393 (1994). 9 See Parsons v. State, 116 Nev. 928, 937, n.8, 10 P.3d 836, 841-42 n.8 (2000). 10 40 Nev. 228, 161 P. 737 (1916) (<HOLDING>). 11 106 Nev. 203, 789 P.2d 584 (1990) (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a city liable for the unconstitutional firing of two clerks by a municipal judge when it was clear the city had delegated to him final administrative authority over employment matters (B) holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court (C) holding that the city had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute allowing certain communities within the same county as the city to incorporate as towns without the citys consent (D) holding that a municipal court had no constitutional or statutory authority to rule on the legality and constitutionality of a tax imposed on attorneys practicing within the city limits (E) holding that a blakely challenge fell within the defendants waiver of his right to appeal the constitutionality or legality of the guidelines

A: (D)
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Q: matter, Moton requested that the trial court poll the jury, and the court agreed to do so. The first four jurors questioned all indicated that they freely and voluntarily agreed with the guilty verdict. The court ing that evidence showed that trial court’s refusal to afford defendant first offender treatment was based on deliberate consideration of the case and sentencing options and, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion); Graydon, 313 Ga. App. at 581 (same). 15 Geiger v. State, 295 Ga. 648, 651 (3) (763 SE2d 453) (2014). 16 Graham v. State, 107 Ga. App. 332, 333 (1) (130 SE2d 166) (1963); see generally Boatwright v. State, 91 Ga. 13, 13 (16 SE 101) (1892). 17 Geiger, 295 Ga. at 651 (3) (punctuation omitted). 18 See Columbus v. State, 270 Ga. 658, 664-65 (4) (513 SE2d 498) (1999) (<HOLDING>). 19 Benefield v. State, 278 Ga. 464, 466 (602 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for a continuance when record showed that contrary to defendants contention state did not fail to comply with discovery duties and that defendant failed to show that denial resulted in harm to his case (B) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (C) holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion (D) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form

A: (A)
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Q: Split-second absurdities are not justified by the actualities of working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is only when an employee is required to give up a substantial measure of his time and effort that com-pensable working time is involved. Id. at 692, 66 S.Ct. at 1195. More recently, in Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir.1984), the Ninth Circuit explained that three factors should be examined to assess whether otherwise compensable time should be considered de minimis, and therefore not compensable: (1) the practical administrative difficulty of recording the additional time; (2) the size of the claim in the aggregate; and (3) whether “the claimants performed the work on a regular basis.” Id. at 1062-63. See also Hill, 751 F.2d at 815 (<HOLDING>). Applying these factors, the Ninth Circuit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to demonstrate retaliation complainedof action must be more than de minimis  (B) holding that fiveday suspension was not a de minimis deprivation (C) holding that district court properlydiscounted four calls as de minimis (D) holding that interruption of postal worker during lunch was de minimis requiring no compensation under the flsa (E) holding that a robbery of 40 to 50 satisfied the de minimis standard

A:
(D)
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