In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: purpose, we would have some authority to solve taxpayer’s problem. See Rhodes, 166 Vt. at 157, 688 A.2d at 1311 (noting that, to invoke impossibility rule, party “must dem onstrate why this Court should not construe the statute in its ordinary sense or why the consequences of such construction will cause hardship or constitute impossibility”). But our standard under this prudential rule is very limited and does not ordinarily extend to making choices, among many available, to solve the problem. There is simply no way to construe the statute to allow a transfer that occurred 319 days after an LLC’s articles of organization were filed without reading the words “at the time of formation” out of the statute. See Colwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 VT 5, ¶ 15, 175 Vt. 61, 819 A.2d 727 (<HOLDING>). ¶23. It is true that the Department’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (B) recognizing that though statute at hand does not fully address the problem legislature intended to address in view of the number of choices available to solve the problem    this is an inappropriate case for the court to fashion the particular remedy appellants seek because to do so would place court in the position of making policy choices best left to legislature (C) holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature (D) holding that considering an amendment is not the time to address the merits of a case (E) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language
[A]: holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case


[Q]: the jury during final jury instructions not to consider any testimony it had stricken or ordered the jury to disregard during trial. See United States v. Liburd, 607 F.3d 339, 344, 53 V.I. 890 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]hile curative instructions cannot repair every error, we do generally presume that juries follow their instructions.”). Finally, as discussed above in section B, the People presented overwhelming evidence that Augustine was the individual who pulled a gun and started shooting at Officers Greaves, Wharton, and Allen. Based on these factors, Officer Wharton’s statement — given in response to a question — would not have been sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial even if Augustine’s attorney had requested one at trial. See Ethridge v. State, 418 P.2d 95, 100 (1966) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we conclude that the Superior Court did 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt (B) holding mistrial not warranted for improper statement by police officer where court sustained defendants objection and admonished jury to disregard statement and where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for mistrial where the trial court sustained defendants objections to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information and instructed the jury to disregard the question (D) holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection  and admonished the jury to disregard the statement (E) holding that while the prosecutors question was improper in light of the overwhelming evidence there was no reversible error in the denial of defendants motion for mistrial
[A]: holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt


[Q]: of the collateral caused by market forces. Second, Onua argues that various mortgage payments made by him to the banks in furtherance of the scheme, as well as certain other “credits and offsets,” were not properly deducted from the overall amount of restitution. We hold that Onua forfeited this argument, by failing to object to either the District Court’s calculation of restitution at sentencing or to the Government’s proposed Final Order of Restitution, which adopted the District Court’s calculation. Because the District Court’s calculation of restitution did not constitute plain error, see United States v. Miller, 263 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir.2001), we affirm the District Court’s judgment as to the amount of restitution. See also United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that Onua’s objections 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented  to the district court (B) holding that the district court properly considered the moisture content in the calculation of the weight of the marijuana for sentencing purposes (C) holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error (D) holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding (E) holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not
[A]:
holding that the district court properly considered the moisture content in the calculation of the weight of the marijuana for sentencing purposes