In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: before it was in assumpsit for attorney fees purposes. See Schulz, 67 Haw. at 436, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Higa is not directly on point, its reasoning is a compelling indication of how the Hawaii Supreme Court would rule on the attorney fee question before us. The plaintiffs also seek to distinguish Higa because it involved a client suing his own attorney, and thus in that case there was privity of contract between the two parties. In the present case, Mrs. Helfand was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the defendants and Mr. Helfand. This distinction is irrelevant. Courts have extended the right to sue for breach of contract to intended third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12, 883 P.2d 38, 48 n. 12 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 82 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies (B) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (C) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (D) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract (E) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status
[A]: (D)


[Q]: 918 F.2d 154, 159 (11th Cir.1990). A district court should grant a preliminary injunction only if the movant clearly shows: 1. a substantial likelihood that the mov-ant will prevail on the merits; 2. that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is, not issued; 3. that the potential injury to the mov-ant outweighs the possible harm to the nonmovant; and 4. that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id. This Court will address each element in turn. 1. SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS To begin, the instant ease is controlled by this Court’s decision in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116 (M.D.Fla.1991). In Luckie, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with AAA pursuant to the AMEX Window. Id. The defendants argued th 2nd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Also, in Merrill Lynch v. Noonan, [Current] 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (C) holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision (D) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (E) holding that a specific customer agreement can supersede the amex constitution and requiring arbitration before one of the fora named in the agreement
[A]: (E)


[Q]: by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process if the evidence is material to guilt or punishment.” Syvertson v. State, 2005 ND 128, ¶ 6, 699 N.W.2d 855 (quoting City of Grand Forks v. Ramstad, 2003 ND 41, ¶ 9, 658 N.W.2d 731). To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must prove: “ ‘(1) the government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) the defendant did not possess the evidence and could not have obtained it with reasonable diligence; (3) the prosecution suppressed the evidence; and (4) a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed.’ ” Syvert-son, at ¶ 6 (quoting State v. Goulet, 1999 ND 80, ¶ 15, 593 N.W.2d tute, 194 F.3d 547, 556 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, “[s]uch evidence is material ‘if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible and the defendant failed to ask for a limiting instruction that the jury could not use the statement as substantive evidence (B) holding witnesss prior consistent statement admissible where defense counsel implied in his opening statement that witness should not be believed because of the favorable consideration he received from the government in his plea bargaining agreement (C) holding that a specific instruction was unnecessary because eyewitness was crossexamined and the eyewitness testimony was discussed in defense counsels opening statement (D) holding witnesss prior inconsistent statement about whether he was an eyewitness was evidence favorable to the defendant establishing brady violations first requirement (E) holding that a witnesss prior inconsistent statement to an officer could be used to impeach her
[A]:
(D)