In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: involvement with five or more kilograms of cocaine, arguing that he had withdrawn before El Don organized the delivery of the intercepted 7.2 kilograms of cocaine on March 25, 2011. Ortega argues that the sole evidence of a conspiracy existing at the time of the seizure of 7.2 kilograms of cocaine on March 25, 2011 was the April 17, 2011 phone calls between Ortega and El Don. In that call Ortega had arranged for El Don to buy five kilograms of cocaine. Ortega’s argument is unavailing. A conspiracy between Ortega and El Don having been established by the government, the burden rested with Ortega to prove that he affirmatively withdrew from it, not with the government to prove the nonexistence of withdrawal. See Smith v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 714, 720, 184 L.Ed.2d 570 (2013) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Ortega has not met his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in passing 21 usc  846 congress left the common law burden of proving the affirmative defense of withdrawal on the defendant rather than requiring the government to prove nonexistence of withdrawal (B) holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea (C) holding that the defendant has the burden of proving a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea (D) holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea (E) holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence
[A]: (A)


[Q]: that Nusspickel was guilty of the aggravated battery charges even though the jury convicted her on each charge of the lesser-included offense of simple battery and (2) misconduct that had not been charged and proved relating to her alleged contact with one of the victims after the charged incidents. She also asserts that the State cannot carry its burden to show that the judge did not rely on these impermissible considerations. Generally, the trial court’s imposition of a sentence that is within the minimum and maximum limits set by the legislature “is a matter for the trial Court in the exercise of its discretion, which cannot be inquired into upon the appellate level.” Shellman v. State, 222 So.2d 789, 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); see also Booker v. State, 514 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Fla.1987) (<HOLDING>); Darby v. State, 216 So.2d 29, 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard (B) holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable (C) recognizing that this court and the united states supreme court have embraced the notion that so long as the sentence imposed is within the maximum limit set by the legislature an appellate court is without power to review the sentence (D) holding that an appellate court has no jurisdiction to review a sentence imposed by the trial court that is within the limits prescribed by statute which is not the result of oppression prejudice or corrupt motive (E) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines
[A]: (C)


[Q]: found that there was sufficient evidence to show that the conspiracy began in 1992. Accordingly, the district court included 1992 and 1993 in its calculation of McGuire’s sentence, adopted the reasoning of the PSR, and set McGuire’s offense level at 28, which put McGuire in a sentencing range of 78 to 97 months. The district court sentenced McGuire to 78 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. On October 13, 1999, the court entered final judgment. McGuire argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction to change his sentence, asserting that the sentence was “imposed” under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(c) when the district co (2d Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Townsend, 33 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Clay, 37 F.3d 338, 340 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 869 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment (B) holding that imposition occurs at time of entry of judgment (C) holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact (D) recognizing difference in elements between offense of actual entry and attempted entry (E) holding that imposition occurs at time of oral pronouncement
[A]:
(B)