In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. Addressing the identical federal rule, the Supreme Court has stated that “[o]n its face, Rule 23.1 speaks only to the adequacy of the shareholder representatives pleadings.” Kamen, supra, 500 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 1711. The rule itself does not create a demand requirement. Id. “[T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance, not procedure.’ ” Id. at 96-97, 111 S.Ct. 1711 (quoting Daily Income Fund, supra, 464 U.S. at 543-44 & n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 831 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (other citations omitted)); see also Bazata, supra, 400 A.2d at 316 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the demand requirement or its futility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (B) holding that for purposes of super ct civ r 41b demand is not jurisdictional but an element of the shareholders claim (C) holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense (D) holding that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of super ct civ r 15a which permits a party to amend once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served (E) holding the connection is an element
Example Output: (B)

Example Input: did not expressly note the officers’ purpose in knocking on the defendant’s door, but it is fairly clear from our description of the facts that they intended to arrest him. Although the defendant was standing inside the doorway of his room, we held that the officers lawfully arrested him because he “ ‘voluntarily exposed himself to warrantless arrest’ by freely opening the door of his motel room to the police.” Id. at 1426 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir.1980)). Unlike the officers in Jardines and in this case, the officers in Vaneaton were standing in the common space of a motel when they knocked, rather than in the curtilage of a home. We therefore have no need to overrule Vaneaton. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899-900 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Whether Vaneaton remains good law after 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a three judge panel is free to reexamine the holding of a prior panel when the supreme court has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable (B) holding that a threejudge panel may depart from circuit precedent that has not been expressly overruled when an intervening en banc or supreme court decision has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable (C) holding that where the relevant court of last resort has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable then a threejudge panel of this court and district courts should consider themselves bound by the intervening higher authority and reject the prior opinion of this court as having been effectively overruled (D) holding that a three judge panel is not bound by prior circuit precedent if an intervening decision of a higher authority undercuts the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable (E) holding a threejudge panel may not reexamine normally controlling circuit precedent in the face of an intervening united states supreme court decision unless the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: of leaving the license at home.” Id. It also considered the scant risk of erroneous conviction, remarking that: “We find it nearly impossible to believe that [the accused] had such a license but withheld it, subjecting himself to the risk of a mandatory term of imprisonment” — “ ‘[s]uch an absurd game.does not contribute to a search for truth....’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970)). In the end, the Jones court found “no unfairness in [its] traditional rule.” Id. Given that the section 10 firearms offense remains a general prohibition crime in the Commonwealth, it comes as no surprise to us that the SJC in Powell’s direct appeal decided to abide by the due process analysis in Jones. Cf. Morrison, 291 U.S. at 91-93, 54 S.Ct. 281 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, between the time of Jones and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when determining prejudice under the objective test relevant considerations include 1 whether the extrinsic evidence was received by the jury and the manner in which it was received 2 whether it was available to the jury for a lengthy period of time 3 whether it was discussed and considered extensively by the jury 4 whether it was introduced before a jury verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations and 5 whether it was reasonably likely to affect the verdict considering the strength of the governments case and whether the governments case outweighed any possible prejudice caused by the extrinsic evidence (B) holding the standard of review in juvenile adjudication is whether after viewing evidence in light most favorable to the state any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that state courts determination that the petitioner was competent to waive his right to pursue further postconviction review of his claims was a factual one and therefore presumed correct under the federal habeas corpus statute (D) holding that when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a state criminal conviction the relevant question under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that the state crime under review was not one of general prohibition before considering whether the evidence had any sinister significance in relation to the presumed culpability component
Example Output:
(E)