In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. In determining the purpose of section 13-21-101, it is appropriate to look to legislative history as indicative of the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Willer, 817 P.2d at 519-20. The 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101 created the distinction between judgments which the judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal. The General Assembly intended that the amendment, and its market-determined interest rate, apply only to judgments which the judgment debtor appeals. See Act of March 25, 1982, ch. 39, 1982 Colo. Laws 227 (entitled “An Act Concerning Interest Payable on Appealed Money Judgments in Civil Actions” (emphasis added)); see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The statements of the bill’s sponsors also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent (B) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (C) holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period (D) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent (E) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent
[EX A]: holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent

[EX Q]: of the evidence. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. In interpreting Hicks, supra, the Second Circuit has stated definitively as follows: [Defendant] misreads the Supreme Court’s statement in Hicks that once a defendant produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his or her action, the plaintiff must then establish that the defendant’s actions were intentionally discriminatory. [Defendant] takes this statement as requiring the plaintiff to adduce additional evidence after the defendant’s production — evidence beyond that presented in the plaintiffs prima facie case. Justice Scalia took pains to preclude such an interpretation of the Court’s decision when he observed that, upon rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons for its action , 142 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1189, 127 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (B) holding that former employer met its burden of proof that ubc exception applied (C) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (D) holding plaintiffs ultimate burden of proof can be met by combining proof submitted in its prima facie case with evidence that defendants proffered reasons for its acts were false (E) recognizing that a plaintiffs burden in establishing a prima facie case is not onerous
[EX A]: holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence

[EX Q]: as McColman argues. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b)(2) provides: When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings. A party may move — at any time, even after judgment — to amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise an unpleaded issue. But failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of that issue. By its plain terms, Rule 15(b)(2) only applies to claims that are tried, and this case was disposed of on summary judgment. Further, Doan did not consent to trying the handcuffing claim — he objected to the claim in both his motion for summary judgment and at oral argument on that motion. Cf. Siler v. Webber, 448 Fed.Appx. 50, 58 (6th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). The fact that Doan would not have been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them (B) holding unpleaded claims or defenses that are tried by express or implied consent of parties are treated as if they had been raised by pleadings even in summary judgment proceedings (C) holding an issue not raised in the pleadings is tried by implied consent where the issue is presented considered and ruled upon by the trial court without objection (D) holding that an issue cannot be tried by the parties consent pursuant to rule 15b2 where one of the parties opposes trial by moving for summary judgment (E) holding order nonfinal where parties agreed to reserva tion on issue ripe for adjudication and tried by parties
[EX A]:
holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them