In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Clause. ¶ 13. Respondent’s main interest in this case is his right to run for elected office. In general, the federal courts have declined to hold that the right to run for elective office is “fundamental,” a position that was applied in the seminal Clements decision. There, a plurality of the high court held that “[f]ar from recognizing candidacy as a fundamental right, we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate’s access to the ballot does not of itself compel close scrutiny.” 457 U.S. at 963 405, 420 (W. Va. 2000) (concluding that constitutional provision forcing judges to vacate office before running for nonjudicial office was supported by “State’s compelling and permissible interest”); Wagner v. Milwaukee County Election Comm’n, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 78, 666 N.W.2d 816 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 16. Respondent’s constitutional arguments 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (B) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (C) holding that states legitimate interests in enacting constitutional provision prohibiting judges from holding other public office far outweigh the burdens put upon the petitioners right to be a candidate for office (D) holding that a school superintendent does not have a constitutional right to actually hold his position and execute the duties of the office (E) holding constitutional provision selfexecuting if it grants right that can be put into operation without further legislative action

A: recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights
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Q: of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and part of the “unified judicial system,” is an arm of the state. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir.2000) (“All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system ... are part of ‘Commonwealth government’ and thus are state rather than local agencies.”). As a state agency, the Board has Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. Therefore, as an arm of the state, Lucas may not sue the Board unless one of the three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply. See MCI Telcomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503 (listing immunity exceptions). On appeal, Lucas argues that the Ex Parte Young exception precludes the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to the present action against the Board. Howe 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Neither of these exceptions are applicable in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action (B) holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action (C) holding that a remedial scheme created by congress even if incapable of addressing all of plaintiffs injuries precluded a bivens action (D) holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction (E) holding that young will not apply where congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state

A: holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action
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Q: see Danden Petroleum, Inc. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 615 F.Supp. 1093, 1099 (N.D.Tex.1985) (“Injuries which can be compensated by money damages at a later time are not irreparable and do not warrant the extraordinary remedy of an injunction.”). In analyzing the evidence in this case, the Court revisits Robert Perkins’s testimony that PEI’s reputation would be damaged by-continued display of PEI images in close conjunction with “hard-core pornography.” Although the Court did not find the past harm to have risen to the level of tarnishment required for dilution of trademark under all the circumstances, the evidence is at least probative on the issue of potential harm for which legal remedy is inadequate. See Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1053-56 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the Court finds a strong 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that potential loss of a contract constitutes irreparable injury (B) holding that monetary damages do not generally constitute irreparable harm (C) holding potential damage to reputation to constitute irreparable harm (D) holding that the lack of control over ones mark creates the potential for damage to  reputation which constitutes irreparable injury for the purpose of granting a preliminary injunction in a trademark case (E) holding that the potential loss of valuable business may constitute irreparable harm

A:
holding that potential loss of a contract constitutes irreparable injury
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