In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: is minimized if officers exercise unquestioned command of the situation. Id., 129 S.Ct. at 786-87. Here, evidence supports the district court’s finding that Hollins’s behavior gave the police reasonable suspicion to believe that Hollins was armed and dangerous when they searched him. First, Hollins repeatedly refused to follow instructions to keep his hands in plain view, and he would slide his hands toward his waist while he was seated in the vehicle. Nervous, evasive behavior, which Hollins exhibited, is one of several factors which may be pertinent in determining reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 756 (11th Cir.2000). Second, Hollins repeatedly refused to obey an officer’s instruction to exit the vehicle. See Maryland, 519 U.S. at 410, 117 S.Ct. at 884 (<HOLDING>). Third, Hollins repeatedly disregarded an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop (B) holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop (C) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous (D) holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction (E) holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred

Answer: holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop


Question: Brown’s argument that she was speaking as a citizen is supported by the fact that ordinary citizens may similarly report public misconduct to the Auditors. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-61dd (conferring right to file reports with Auditors on “any person”). The existence of a civilian analogue to Brown’s conduct strengthens her allegations that her speech was as a citizen and thus protected by the First Amendment. See Matthews I, 779 F.3d at 176. The instant case is not similar to other cases of its type that were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage. In many of those cases, the plaintiff-employee had made an admission that the alleged speech was made, at least in part, pursuant to his or her official duties. See Matthews v. Lynch, 483 Fed.Appx. 624, 626 (2d Cir. 2012) (Matthews III) (<HOLDING>); Anemone, 629 F.3d at 116. Here, there is no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel (B) holding that a plaintiff did not complain to the eeoc pursuant to official duties but rather as a citizen (C) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (D) holding that speech was pursuant to official duties because plaintiff conceded at oral argument that as an internal affairs officer he had a broad responsibility to investigate and report police misconduct (E) holding police officer is a public official

Answer: holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel


Question: Quinn would have standing under Washington law, we need not decide this issue. The continuous ownership requirement imposed by Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is procedural and therefore applies in diversity actions such as this one. Kona, 179 F.3d at 769. 6 . Quinn attempts to distinguish Lewis, arguing that, unlike in Lewis, 719 F.2d at 1048, here there was inadequate disclosure concerning the Board members' purported conflicts and Quinn's allegations. Even assuming that Anvil’s disclosure to shareholders was less extensive than that in Lewis, that alone is not enough for us to conclude that equity warrants a different result here. 7 .The state cases cited by Quinn likewise involved challenges to mergers. See Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1046 n. 10 (Del. 1984) (<HOLDING>); Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21 A.D.2d 116, 124, 249 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing first two exceptions (B) recognizing the efficiencies defense in merger cases (C) recognizing that the federal litigant has a personal right subject to exceptions in certain classes of cases to demand article iii adjudication of a civil suit (D) recognizing exceptions to immunity (E) recognizing exceptions to the continuous ownership requirement in certain merger cases

Answer:
recognizing first two exceptions