In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation — 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. § 1103) — which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (“An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal.”). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant’s release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc  1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest
[A]: holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute


[Q]: in calculating the reduction of state workers’ compensation benefits advances the legislature’s intent to reduce the state’s compensation burden by taking advantage of the workers’ compensation government benefits offset to its fullest extent. Accordingly, we hold that SSDI child’s benefits are to be included when calculating the amount of the reduction in an employer’s payment of workers’ compensation benefits under Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4. II. The Fund makes the argument that the WCCA exceeded its authority in examining the Social Security Act. The WCCA’s jurisdiction does not extend to interpreting or applying legislation designed specially for the handling of claims outside the workers’ compensation system. Taft v. Advance United Expressways, 464 N.W.2d 725, 727 (Minn.1991) (<HOLDING>). In that Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4, is a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the primary goal when interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the specific insurance policy (B) holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable (C) holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law (D) holding that the tucker acts waiver does not extend to statutory claims (E) holding that the jurisdiction of the wcca did not extend to interpreting or applying the law related to claims against the minnesota insurance guaranty association
[A]: holding that the primary goal when interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the specific insurance policy


[Q]: no recovery is possible” Id. Jones reasserts her claim that Nationwide’s practice of reimbursing the insured’s deductible from the insurer’s subrogation only on a pro rata basis calculated upon the percent of the insurer’s recovery from a third party violates the common law made whole doctrine. Relying on Superior Court and federal court cases applying Pennsylvania law, Jones asserts, “Pennsylvania law provides that an insurance company cannot exercise its right of subrogation until the insured has been fully compensated or ‘made whole.’ ” Brief at 6 (citing inter alia, Gallop v. Rose, 420 Pa.Super. 388, 616 A.2d 1027, 1031 (1992); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. DiTomo, 330 Pa.Super. 117, 478 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1984); Walls v. City of Pittsburgh, 292 Pa.Super. 18, 436 A.2d 698, 701 (1981) (<HOLDING>)). She observes that in Valora v. Pa. Employees 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the language of  9133 applies only to insurers and not to the insurers employees (B) holding that insureds criminal convictions were sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issue of the insureds subjective intent for purposes of evaluating the insurers duty to defend (C) holding that a jury question as to an insurers bad faith arises when facts permit differing inferences as to the reasonableness of the insurers conduct (D) holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss (E) holding that an insurers duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint against the insured
[A]:
holding that the language of  9133 applies only to insurers and not to the insurers employees