In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

the statute.” 167 F.3d at 992 (citing Haun, 90 F.3d at 1100; United States v. Cavalier, 17 F.3d 90, 93 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1217-18 (3d Cir.1993)). See also United States v. Valuck, 286 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir.2002) (reaffirming the holding in Cavalier that “the cashing of an illegally obtained check can promote the completion of an underlying unlawful act”). The Federal Express packages at issue in the money laundering counts contained checks fraudulently obtained by IDM. A rational trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the transfer of the checks from Barbados to New York and the negotiation of those checks promoted the underlying mail fraud scheme, and that by facilitating the negotiation of the checks Bo 88831, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing exception to application requirement when employer does not notify employees of available promotion and does not provide formal mechanism for expressing interest in promotion (B) holding no offense of attempted seconddegree murder where statute allows conviction without proof of intent to kill (C) holding that promotion and concealment are alternative bases for a money laundering conviction proof of intent to accomplish either will suffice (D) holding that it is the fact of concealment and not the intent to conceal that is prohibited under 49 usc  1472f (E) holding that concealment is just one factor to consider and is not a mandatory element
recognizing exception to application requirement when employer does not notify employees of available promotion and does not provide formal mechanism for expressing interest in promotion

1 We note that the Supreme Court of Georgia recently vacated portions of the trial court’s injunction order in Barham v. City of Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375 (738 SE2d 52) (2013). 2 Am. Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Mom & Pop Stores, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 1, 7 (3) (497 SE2d 616) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 3 Levine v. Sun Trust Robinson Humphrey, 321 Ga. App. 268, 275 (3) (740 SE2d 672) (2013) (punctuation omitted). 4 Am. Petroleum Prods., 231 G 215 SE2d 294) (1975) (“[When] the complaining party cannot legitimately claim surprise, either because he knew of the existence of the witness or had equal means of knowing, it is not error to fail to invoke the sanctions of postponement, mistrial, barring the witness, etc.”). Cf. Malley Motors, Inc. v. Davis, 183 Ga. App. 599, 600 (1) (359 SE2d 394) (1987) (<HOLDING>). 18 See Hunter v. Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (B) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (C) holding that trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of a witness who was not listed in the pretrial order and no reason was given for the failure to list the witness (D) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (E) holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony
holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness

reached, two were struck for cause, and two were seated on the jury. The prosecutor then argued that defense counsel had not shown a prima facie case of discrimination. The trial court overruled appellant’s motion. After the jury was sworn and dismissed for the day, the prosecutor asked that she be allowed to explain on the record why she struck the contested jurors. Following the prosecutor’s presentation, defense counsel stated why she thought the State’s reasons were merely pretextual. Appellant claims the State waived its right to maintain that no prima facie showing of discrimination was made when it chose to give its reasons for striking jurors Delaney and Jones. See Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 297, 121 L.Ed.2d 221 (1992) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. The record shows that the State 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review (B) recognizing that whether the employee uses the mcdonnell douglas framework or other evidence to create a prima facie case when the employer offers a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its adverse action the question is whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that the employers action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons (C) holding that once prosecutor makes raceneutral explanation for peremptory challenge and trial court rules on question of intentional discrimination issue of prima facie case becomes moot (D) holding that without more the mere fact that the prosecutor used a high number of strikes to remove women from the venire is insufficient to establish a prima facie case (E) holding that when the prosecutor articulates reasons for strikes and the trial court makes a ruling on discriminatory intent the question of whether a prima facie case was made is moot

holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review