In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: CURIAM: Carlo Junior Seneeharles appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). He raises three issues on appeal, which we address in turn. After review, we affirm Sen-echarles’s con earm and ammunition had traveled through interstate commerce before the offense was committed, the Government established a minimal nexus between Senecharles’s firearm and ammunition and interstate commerce, and the statute was constitutional as-applied to him. See United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). B. Armed Career Criminal Act Senecharles also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  922g is not unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who possessed a firearm only intrastate when the government demonstrated that the firearm moved in interstate commerce (B) recognizing scarborough holding that commerce nexus satisfied upon showing that possessed firearm had traveled at some time in interstate commerce (C) holding that a defendant possessed a firearm in connection with a crime when the firearm was kept in a car across the street from where the defendant was selling drugs (D) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time (E) holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: complaint’s allegations are sufficient if they put a reasonable person on notice as to why a plaintiff sues.” Id. Here, a reasonable person would be put on notice that Weatherford’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not solely based on the false arrest or false imprisonment claims. Weatherford’s claim is premised on the officers’ alleged intentional retaliation and abuse of power and process when they violated standard police procedure, disregarded Chief Leonard’s instructions and conspired to intentionally and publicly humiliate Weatherford. Furthermore, we note that Indiana now recognizes a separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, without the need for an accompanying tort. See Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 30-31 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that Weatherford 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotion distress for the first time in indiana (B) recognizing that the indiana tort claims act grants broad immunity to governmental employees from suit for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress (C) holding that claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress fail as matter of law where challenged arrest is supported by probable cause (D) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: a hearing before the Industrial Commissioner on his application for alternate medical care and not for the legal process’s (i.e., the answer’s) intended use; (3) ITT’s use of the legal process for the improper purpose was a proximate cause of Gibson’s damage; and (4) the amount of damage. ITT challenges various aspects of the abuse-of-process claim. For example, it argues that (1) the answer was not filed (or not withdrawn) in order to refuse to pay for psychiatric care, (2) this action was not unreasonable, and (3) Gibson cannot show damage from ITT’s failure to pay the psychiatric bills. Because ITT has not appealed from the judgment in favor of Gibson on this claim, it cannot now challenge the judgment. See Johnson Equip. Corp. v. Indus. Indem., 489 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Iowa 1992) (<HOLDING>). We reject ITT’s contention that it was a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to preserve an issue a party must object with sufficient specificity to allow the trial court to address it (B) holding that a party need not crossappeal a trial courts rejection of a ground urged in the trial court to preserve error on a claim decided in the partys favor but must still crossappeal to preserve an issue on a claim decided adversely to the party (C) holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal (D) holding neither party was prevailing party where appeal and crossappeal were dismissed (E) holding that in order to preserve an issue for review a party must make a timely and specific objection at trial
[EX A]:
(B)