TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: rights by initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt without probable cause. After trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on these claims. The court held that it is not “clearly established” that malicious prosecution is a violation of constitutional rights, and. thus the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm. Section 1983 creates a cause of action to remedy certain deprivations of federal rights, but it is not a source of substantive rights. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (noting that “[section 1983] is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United State 16 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution (B) holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person (C) holding sbm is not a violation of the defendants fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures (D) holding that there is no fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution and suggesting that such a cause of action might lie under the fourth amendment (E) recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment

SOLUTION: holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution

PROBLEM: was merely acting as Casey’s nominee by allowing him to park 28th Place in her name without relinquishing the benefits of ownership of the property. The district court agreed with the government and allowed forfeiture on this ground. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “nominee” (in the context of property law) as a “party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and distributes funds for the benefit of others.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1149 (9th ed.2009). Unlike a party with a cognizable property interest, a nominee cannot claim a viable third-party interest sufficient to render a forfeiture invalid. See People v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 75 Ill.2d 479, 27 Ill.Dec. 476, 389 N.E.2d 540, 544 (1979); United States v. Herrero, 893 F.2d 1512, 1542 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by United States 
 Holding statements: (A) holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state (B) recognizing that we held in tilley that the forfeiture of proceeds from illegal drug sales pursuant to 21 usc  881a6 does not constitute punishment (C) holding that drug quantity is an element of an offense under 21 usc  841 (D) holding that scope of property subject to forfeiture is defined by the instrument creating an interest in the property (E) holding that property held by another as nominal owner for benefit of a drug dealer subject to forfeiture under 21 usc  853

SOLUTION: holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state

PROBLEM: its scope to reach the facts before us, particularly since doing so would read a key element out of the text of Rule 19(a)(2)®. Visa also relies on several cases that recite the general proposition that a party who claims title to a piece of property that is the subject of an action has sufficient interest in the action to justify compulsory joinder, and urges us to follow that reasoning here. Visa attempts to characterize this case as if it were a proceeding to determine the rightful owner of a piece of property to which MasterCard and Visa have competing claims. While we have held in cases involving this factual scenario that all claimants to the property at issue are necessary parties to the action, see, e.g., Brody v. Village of Port Chester, 345 F.3d 103, 117-19 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Kulawy v. United States, 917 F.2d 729, 736 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land (B) holding that in action by property owner to recover land taken by eminent domain current titleholder to land might be necessary party if district court were to restore land to plaintiff (C) holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93a action against a prior owner of the land who was not the seller because there was no business connection between the two parties (D) holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages (E) recognizing general proposition that if land is artificially submerged for the statutory period necessary to change ownership of the land title to the submerged land is passed to the state in trust for the public

SOLUTION:
holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land