In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: the genus of goods or services for which it seeks protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2), (b)(2); 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.32(a)(6), 2.71(a); TMEP § 1402.01; see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2014) (“Parties that choose to recite services in their trademark application that exceed their actual services will be held to the broader scope of the application.”); Octocom Sys., 918 F.2d at 942 (“[R]egistrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application.... ”). The PTO will generally accept any identification of goods or services so long as it is “specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise.” TMEP § 1402.01; see also In re Omega SA 494 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity (B) holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action (C) holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant (D) holding that it is within the discretion of the pto to require that ones goods be identified with particularity in a trademark application (E) holding that a rule 10b5 claim must be stated with particularity
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: detention of the van, its driver, and its passenger exceeded the valid reason for the initial stop and violated the Fourth Amendment. The subsequent search of the vehicle was an unconstitutional search, and the drugs and drug paraphernaha discovered were fruit of the poisonous tree. The trial court’s denial of appellants’ motions to suppress should have been granted. In light of this holding, we need not address the third point, that omissions of facts in Ramsey’s affidavit for search warrant undermined the drug dog’s reliability and amounted to a Franks violation; or the fourth point, that the search warrant was objectively unreasonable and that there was no basis for a nighttime search. Reversed and remanded. Hart, Robbins, and Neal, JJ. te, 84 Md. App. 243, 578 A.2d 816 (1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, after Ramsey determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that coming from the wrong neighborhood does not give rise to reasonable suspicion (B) holding innocent facts when considered together can give rise to reasonable suspicion (C) holding that the fact that defendant granted consent to police to search some items and then refused to give consent to additional searches cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion (D) holding the drivers refusal to consent to search of automobile did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that vehicle contained narcotics (E) holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: State of Georgia under USERRA is only permissible to the extent the state has explicitly waived its sovereign immunity. Having considered the applicable US-ERRA principles, we turn our attention to Tennessee’s sovereign immunity. II. Tennessee’s SOVEREIGN Immunity Tennessee’s sovereign immunity arises from its constitution. Article I, section 17, of the Tennessee Constitution provides that “suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct.” Based upon this constitutional provision, no civil action against the State may be sustained absent express authorization from the Tennessee General Assembly. Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tenn.Ct.App.1986); see also Chumbley v. State, 183 Tenn. 467, 192 S.W.2d 1007 (1946) (<HOLDING>). This principle of law has also been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the test of admissibility of an incriminating statement under article i section 9 of the tennessee constitution is whether it was freely and voluntarily made (B) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state (C) holding that the tennessee plan as it relates to state appellatecourt judges does not violate the state constitution (D) holding execution of mentally retarded individuals fails to achieve legitimate penalogical objectives for punishment as required by the eighth amendment to the united states constitution and article i  16 of the tennessee constitution (E) holding that a suit against the state of tennessee is barred by tennessee constitution article i section 17 when it is not brought in such manner as the legislature has directed
Example Output:
(E)