In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: unpublished decisions, “[njoticeably absent from the list of factors Pruitt instructs district courts to consider are the merits and substance of the pro se plaintiffs claim.” Rivera v. Kettle Moraine Correctional Inst., No. 14-C-6, 2014 WL 2875897, at *4 (E.D. Wis. June 24, 2014); Kennedy v. Huibregtse, No. 13-C-4, 2014 WL 4924662, at *15 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 30, 2014). On appeal from an adverse judgment in a case where the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion to recruit; the Court of Appeals will consider whether “there is a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have made a difference in the outcome of the litigation” in assessing whether the district court’s abuse of its discretion was prejudicial. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 659 (italics original r. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Mars v. Hanberry, 752 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation (B) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (C) holding that prisoner must allege acts or omissions evidencing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (D) holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs (E) holding that plaintiffs claim must have arguable merit meaning that plaintiffs allegations clearly state a nonfrivolous prima facie case of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need and that the already established evidence indicates more than an extremely slim chance of success on the merits
Example Output: holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation

Example Input: for these terms in the specifications or prosecution histories of the ’403-S or ’838 patents. Furthermore, the fact that the inventors removed the term “comprising” from Claim 1 of the ’403-S patent does not change the plain meaning of the term “composition,” which remains in the final version of the claim. Moreover, if the court were to adopt the construction of the ’403-S claims put forth by Glaxo, Claim 1 would contradict Claim 1 of the ’838 patent, which retains the term “comprising” and claims the process for producing the compositions described in ’403-S patent. Such a construction would be inconsistent. In light of these findings, the court concludes that the terms “comprising” and “composition” must be construed according to their plain meanings. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (<HOLDING>). As a result, the phrases “immunoglobulin 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that words in claims are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning unless the patentee clearly sets forth a different in the specification or file history (B) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (C) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning (D) recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning (E) holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning
Example Output: holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning

Example Input: a parolee does not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only [] the conditional liberty properly dependant on observance of special parole restrictions.” Id. at 365, 118 S.Ct. 2014 (quotation omitted); accord Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (“[R]evocation[ ] is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, [even if it] does result in a loss of liberty.”); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (recognizing that a parolee does not have the full panoply of constitutional rights to which a criminal defendant is entitled). Relying on these cases, we have reached the same- conclusion in the supervised-release context. See United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788, 792 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The panel’s decision is thüs- contrary to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release (B) holding that  3605 authorizes a transferee court to revoke a term of a defendants supervised release for violations committed prior to the transfer of jurisdiction (C) holding that the fourth amendment does not require a warrant based on an oath or affirmation to revoke an individual on supervised release (D) holding that constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants through the sixth amendment apply in nonsummary criminal contempt prosecutions just as they do in other criminal prosecutions (E) holding that proceedings to revoke supervised release  need not comply with the procedural protections constitutionally guaranteed for criminal prosecutions
Example Output:
holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release