In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

so restricted. Rather, ... the doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system. One of those realities is that attorneys often must rely on the assistance of investigators and other agents in the compilation of materials in preparation for trial. It is therefore necessary that the doctrine protect materials prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney himself. Id. at 238-39, 95 S.Ct. 2170. Accordingly, federal courts have consistently ruled that the work product doctrine is not inapplicable merely because the material was prepared by or for a party’s insurer or agents of the insurer. See Railroad Salvage of Conn. Inc. v. Japan Freight Consolidators (U.S.A.), Inc., 97 F.R.D. 37, 41 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 779 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.1985); Home Ins. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that correspondence between defendant and its liability carriers was protected (B) holding that the prohibition of inmatetoinmate correspondence was not an unconstitutional infringement of prisoners first amendment rights (C) recognizing correspondence appeared to establish a settlement relationship between the parties given the letters presented an attempt to curb further litigation (D) recognizing first amendment and fourteenth amendment interests in inmate correspondence (E) holding that a sixmonth gap between the protected activity and the employees termination was insufficient to infer that the protected activity was a contributing factor
(A)

a sergeant entered the house with her. 2 . Harris testified that he opened the door for the police: "I saw them coming, so I just opened the door.” However, Officer Shepard testified that she knocked on the door and that after no one answered she entered the house through the door, which was unlocked. 3 . We decline to reach the question whether the warrantless entry and the search by the police officers were justified by exigent circumstances. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)(rejecting a "murder scene exception” created by the Supreme Court of Arizona to the requirement of obtaining a warrant). See also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984)(applying Mincey); Ex parte Usrey, 527 So.2d 732 (Ala.1987) (<HOLDING>); A.A.G. v. State, 668 So.2d 122, 128 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no liability existed under the circumstances (B) holding that once the scene was secure exigent circumstances no longer existed and the police were required to obtain a search warrant (C) holding that exigent circumstances were created by dissipation of bloodalcohol content in time needed to obtain a warrant (D) holding that exigent circumstances were present because evidence of bloodalcohol content could disappear during the time necessary to obtain a warrant (E) recognizing that  exigent circumstances do not excuse the failure to secure a warrant when those circumstances are created by government officials who unreasonably and deliberately delay or avoid obtaining the warrant
(B)

its life or limb is endangered, or its health is likely to be injured, or its morals likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both. The 1993 version did not contain subsection (2), which was part of the statute in effect in 1996 at the time of petitioner's crime. See Note 1, supra. To the extent that the Connecticut Supreme Court found the 1993 version of § 53-21 to have two distinct purposes, that finding would be even more pronounced under the 1996 version, which added the second subsection involving contact with the intimate parts of a child under the age of sixteen. 15 . See also State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 163, 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (<HOLDING>). 16 . In State v. Smith, 73 Conn.App. 809, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the florida offense of attempted lewd assault on a child under the age of sixteen is a crime of violence even though the offense might be accomplished without use of physical force (B) holding that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the physical endangerment portion of the statute when the defendant was charged only with the risk of injury to a child by doing an act likely to impair the morals of a child under the age of sixteen (C) holding that where defendant charged with wilfully or unlawfully committing certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child contrary to general statutes  5321    specific intent is not an element of the crime defined (D) holding that the deliberate touching of the private parts of a child under the age of sixteen in a sexual and indecent manner was conduct proscribed by the second prong of subsection 1 (E) holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child

(B)