In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: quantity function as elements by increasing the maximum penalty a defendant may receive, are they elements of an aggravated offense or are they sentencing factors with heightened due process requirements? See id. at 573, 575 (Hug, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s apparent conclusion that the penalty provisions of § 841(b) are not elements of the offense). The district court correctly interpreted Buckland as holding that drug type and quantity are not elements of the offense, but rather are material facts that must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Buckland opinion emphasized that the relevant inquiry is not whether a penalty provision is an element, but rather whether it exposes the defendant to a longer sentence than woul (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so (B) holding jury is entitled to accept the states version of the facts and reject appellants version or reject any of the witnesses testimony (C) holding that biased on buckland we must reject valensias contention that the sentencing provisions of  841 create separate crimes (D) holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes (E) holding the crimes merge where the jury was not asked to determine whether two assaults occurredeventhough the evidence may have been sufficient to support separate crimes
[A]: recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so


[Q]: issue, we need not consider the second argument raised. 7 . In a dissent to Smith, Judge Friedman, joined by Judges Pellegrini and Kelley, objected to following the Miller/Lewis/Selan line of cases which automatically equated the refusal to sign a hospital consent form with a refusal to submit to chemical testing. The dissenting judges expressed preference for the other line of caselaw, particularly Conrad, and noted that because Smith orally agreed to the blood test and only refused to sign the hospital consent form, which was a pre-test procedure linked to the test, although not required by section 1547, Smith did not make a knowing and conscious refusal to submit to chemical testing. 8 . Wheatley v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 104 Pa.Cmwlth. 171, 521 A.2d 507 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 9 Although Renwick does not expressly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547 (B) holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion (C) holding that refusal to submit to breathalyzer test did not result from custodial interrogation (D) holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 (E) holding that a district court did not clearly err in crediting agents testimony that a defendant had orally consented despite his refusal to sign consent form
[A]: holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547


[Q]: provider in the course of treatment. In cases involving successive tortfeasors whose separate causal contributions to the plaintiff’s harm can be measured, the doctrine of joint and several liability applies only to the enhanced portion of the injury. See Keeton et al. § 52, at 352 (discussing distinction between original tortfeasor’s liability, which encompasses entire injury, and treating physician’s liability, which extends only to negligent treatment); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. c. 17. Even though the original tortfeasor may be held hable for both the original and the enhanced injury, the imposition of entire liability is only temporary. The original tortfeasor, whose duty is of a different character and who is not in pari delicto with a successive 35, 42 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Thus liability for the enhanced injury may be 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor (B) holding that contribution will lie where no statute precludes recovery from the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought (C) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because it was not an innocent party (D) recognizing a right to contribution (E) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because claim properly was for contribution
[A]:
recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor