TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: federal courts intervene in the matter. The argument is unavailing, however, where the pending question is whether the Board’s proceedings constitute an effort by the state to impose its regulatory authority in a field preempted by Congress. See Association of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 208 F.3d 1, 2000 WL 298563, at *3 (1st Cir. March 27, 2000)(finding that the court’s initial invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was unwise where “the ultimate legal determination of whether the Massachusetts regulations are preempted by the [federal Clean Air Act] is a question of federal preemption law for the courts alone to decide”); Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 41 (1st Cir.1972)(<HOLDING>). The state defendants also move to dismiss 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and it does not matter that the plaintiff was using state law as the vehicle to press her assertion (B) holding that plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before the puerto rico labor relations board before invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine whether the boards assertion of jurisdiction was proper (C) recognizing the general rule that parties must exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from federal courts  (D) holding that plaintiff could not present his erisa estoppel claim to the district court because he did not properly exhaust it before the administrative review board (E) holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: and, therefore, uninformed. We cannot agree. There is no statement of personal knowledge by the executrix stating whether Burnett consulted with legal counsel prior to executing the CSA or Guaranty. Plaintiff certified JTB, Inc. defaulted under the CSA and provided the documents supporting entry of judgment against it. JTB, Inc. never challenged the action or the relief sought. Proof of the Guaranty and its execution by Burnett was also provided to support judgment under the cognovit provision. Moreover, the Guaranty is clearly written and its waiver provisions are boldly identified, as is the confession of judgment clause. Importantly, plaintiffs action was based on the Guaranty, not the terms of its CSA with JTB, Inc. See Tam Enters., supra, 369 N.J.Super. at 59, 848 A.2d 27 (<HOLDING>). Further, the provision contains a succinct 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that selfserving deposition testimony standing alone is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment (B) holding a guarantee of a note that contains a cognovit provision alone is insufficient to permit confession of judgment against the guarantors (C) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (D) holding that a confessed judgment was not enforceable against a corporate president who individually guaranteed payment of corporate note signed by him in his capacity as president and which authorized confession of judgment (E) holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: this may be the case, the fact that Plaintiff Berrios knew about his rights under COBRA does not relieve Defendants from their obligations under the statute. Neither a plaintiffs actual knowledge of his rights under COBRA nor his prior COBRA-related job responsibilities, dispenses with a plan administrator’s obligation to give the employee the notifications enumerated in 29 U.S.C. Section 1166(a). Rodríguez v. Int'l College of Bus. & Tech., Inc., 364 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.P.R.2005); Torres-Negrón v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, 203 F.Supp.2d 120, 124-25 (D.P.R.2002) (stating that even where the former employee’s duties during employment included the distribution of COBRA notices, the plan administrator must provide COBRA notice); see Mlsna v. Unitel Communs., 41 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, on the record before the Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions (B) holding that an employees claim against plan administrator for denied benefits is preempted (C) holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant (D) holding an employees knowledge of his cobra rights does not relieve the plan administrator of its notification duties (E) holding that because no plan document granted discretion to the plan administrator and because the fiduciaries had not expressly delegated their discretionary authority to the plan administrator the district court properly employed the de novo standard of review

SOLUTION:
(D)