In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: states that a lack of due diligence should not prevent a party from presenting the new evidence. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 cmt. j (1982); see also Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J.Super. 558, 788 A.2d 834, 840 (2002) (“[T]he judge may consider diligence, or lack of diligence, ... [but] a lack of diligence does not require invocation of collateral estoppel particularly where, as here, plaintiff attempted to obtain Dr. Matthew’s evaluation prior to the arbitration proceeding.”). But see Klein v. Comm’r, 880 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir.1989) (“A party may not assert a change in controlling facts when the facts allegedly showing a change in circumstances could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence.”); Calcutt v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 14, 25, 1988 WL 71262 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the fairness 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial (B) holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel (C) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action

Answer: holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial


Question: first time a party must specify the statute authorizing attorney’s fees is in the Rule 54 motion (unless otherwise provided by statute or court order). In Missouri, attorney’s fees are not recoverable from another party, except when a contract or statute allows it. Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. banc 2009). The second sentence of the Missouri commissions statute is such an exception to the general Missouri rule. Kraft v. Edwards, 946 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Mo.App.1997). The district judge’s ruling that there was no statutory basis for an award of attorney’s fees is erroneous as a matter of law. On remand, the district court should consider whether to award attorney’s fees. See Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 631 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because this case as tried addressed only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award (B) holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained (C) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence (D) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (E) holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances

Answer: holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained


Question: B’s definition of “applicant” excluded guarantors. Douglas County Nat’l Bank v. Pfeiff, 809 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Colo.Ct.App.1991); Kevin A. Palmer & Michael H. Malin, Jr., ECOA, Regulation B, and the Spousal Guaranty: Recent Developments, 115 Banking L.J. 357, 359 (1998). The primary purpose of the 1986 amendment was “ ‘to give guarantors and similar parties standing to seek legal remedies when a violation occurs under § 202.7(d).’ ” Pfeiff, 809 P.2d at 1103 (quoting Final Rule Revising Regulation B, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,018, 48,020 (Nov. 20, 1985) (Official Staff Commentary)); see also Joel D. Stafford, Consumer Protection: The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: Guarantors as Applicants' — :Did the Cost of a Violation Go Up?, 40 Okla. L.Rev. 431, 442-43 (1987) [hereinafter “Stafford Article ”] (<HOLDING>). Consequently, for purposes of § 202.7(d), a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the amendment provides regulatory standing to a guarantor to sue for violations of regulation bs cosignature rules (B) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (C) holding that employers have standing to sue (D) recognizing right of guarantor to contribution against coguarantors (E) holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment

Answer:
holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue