In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

preventing employee from "working in any geographic space in which [employer] operates” where employer had interest in confidential information); Advanced Cable Ties, Inc. v. Hewes, No. 061995B, 2006 WL 3292810, at *1-2 (Mass.Super.Ct. Oct. 19, 2006) (lack of geographic scope restriction in non-compete not fatal to enforcement of restrictive covenant when employer was national company). 17 . See Miller Mech., Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So.2d 11, 12-13 (Fla.1974) (citing Kenco Chem. and Manufacturing Co. v. Railey, 286 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)); Flickenger v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., Inc., 732 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Balasco v. Gulf Holding, Inc., 707 So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also Health Care Financial Enterprises, Inc. v. Levy, 715 So.2d 341, 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). 18 .Under Florida law, courts are required to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract (B) holding that trial court is without authority to modify a settlement agreement but may enforce and interpret it (C) recognizing court has authority to modify agreement to cure any unreasonable provision as to duration or scope (D) holding that court may not refuse to enforce noncompete agreement solely because geographical area is unreasonable but rather must modify unreasonable restriction and enforce agreement as modified (E) holding an employer may partially enforce a noncompete agreement to the extent it is reasonable under the circumstances
holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract

needlessly leave out of our decisions an important source of information about the child, and in the end, it is the dependent child who suffers. After all, the children count here, not the agency. I believe that we gain nothing, and lose precious information by refusing foster parents standing. Standing to sue simply ensures that a particular party has a sufficient stake in a controversy before the court to obtain a judicial resolution. It should not be a doctrine to close the court house doors on parties who have a real interest in the matter at hand. I believe that the Juvenile Act confers “standing,” subject to traditional jurisprudential limits, for the agency, the grandparent, and the foster parents to file these petitions. See also Silfies v. Webster, 713 A.2d 639 (Pa.Super.1998)(<HOLDING>); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 654 F.Supp. 1567 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party standing in loco parentis has standing to seek custody of child (B) holding that a grandmother who frequently babysat her granddaughter was not in loco parentis and thus lacked standing to seek custody of her granddaughter (C) holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal (D) holding that grandmother in loco parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody (E) holding that domestic partner who assumed a parental status over her partners child and performed parental duties with the partners permission stood in loco parentis to the child and had standing to seek partial custody and visitation
holding that a grandmother who frequently babysat her granddaughter was not in loco parentis and thus lacked standing to seek custody of her granddaughter

(“A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm.”); HuntGolliday v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 104 F.3d 1004, 1014-15 (7th Cir.1997) (suspension and suspension pending termination); Hunt v. City of Markham, Illinois, 219 F.3d 649, 654-55 (7th Cir.2000) (denial of a raise); Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 511 (7th Cir.1999) (denial of a promotion). Markel could be considered to have been constructively discharged, though not in the traditional sense, or suspended pending termination. See Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc./CBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir.2000) (a constructive discharge normally occurs where an employer drives the employee to quit by making working conditions miserable); Hunt-Golliday, 104 F.3d 7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Murray v. Chicago Transit Authority, 252 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that denial of a request for reimbursement for travel expenses did not constitute an adverse employment action (B) holding that termination is an adverse employment action (C) holding that a transfer to a worksite 180 miles away from plaintiffs home did not necessarily constitute an adverse employment action while noting that such a transfer could under some circumstances constitute an adverse employment action (D) holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action (E) holding that denial of a bonus was not an adverse employment action

holding that termination is an adverse employment action