In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: initially stopping the truck for failing to illuminate the rear license plate in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1706(e). See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998) (“An initial traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment ... if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” (citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc))). Wilson also does not dispute that the smell of alcohol on VanHouden together with VanHouden’s admission that he had been drinking justified the further detention of the truck and its occupants in order for Deputy Watkins to conduct field sobriety tests on VanHouden. See United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops (B) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (C) holding that the discovery of 2000 in cash during a traffic stop supported a finding of reasonable suspicion (D) holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment (E) holding detection of alcohol on a drivers breath during a routine traffic stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion
[A]: holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops


[Q]: to the “enforcement” of the reversal of the Bankruptcy Court’s Order allowing IMC an administrative expense. It would also be considered a core proceeding since it follows directly from a core proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). Basic principles of restitution and appellate procedure which dictate that a lower court always has the jurisdiction to order the restitution of an award overturned on appeal, even without a remand from the appellate court, also support our conclusion that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to rule on the Debtor’s Motion. See Caldwell v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship and Training Trust, 824 F.2d 765, 766-67 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. U.S., 279 U.S. 781, 786, 49 S.Ct. 492, 493, 73 L.Ed. 954 (1929)) (<HOLDING>). “The right to recover what one has lost by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial (B) holding that the court had appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of the case because only the collateral issue of attorneys fees remained to be decided on remand to the bankruptcy court (C) holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal (D) holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings (E) holding that the district court had jurisdiction to order restitution of award overturned on appeal even in the absence of a remand from the appellate court
[A]: holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial


[Q]: raised before the district court. Under Fed. R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3), a suppression issue must be raised before trial, and the failure to raise the issue in a timely pretrial motion results in “waiver” of the matter under Rule 12(f). Frazier, Sr. concedes he was late in raising the issue but contends we may still review the alleged Franks violation for plain error under Rule 52(b). His argument raises the interesting question of whether a court of appeals is barred altogether from reviewing an issue that has been “waived” under Rule 12(f). Compare United States v. Weathers, 186 F.3d 948, 955 (D.C.Cir.1999) (concluding that plain error review under Rule 52(b) of a “waived” issue would render Rule 12(f) meaningless), and United States v. Chavez-Valencia, 116 F.3d 127, 129-30 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Buchanon, 72 F.3d 1217, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal (B) holding that the plaintiff was precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal (C) holding that rules 12b3 and 12f along with circuit precedent barred defendant who failed to raise a suppression issue before the district court from raising the issue for the first time on appeal (D) holding that where defendant failed to raise defense of plaintiffs fraud in federal court defendant is barred from raising that issue in state court (E) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal
[A]:
holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal