TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: personally waive the rights to testify at trial, to have the prosecution witnesses testify in defend other settings. One such case arose when a defendant charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct stipulated to the element that he was more than 36 months older than the victim without waiving his right to a jury trial on that element. State v. Wright, 679 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn.App.2004), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2004). In Wright, we applied a harmless-error analysis to the district court’s failure to obtain appellant’s personal waiver. Id. at 191. In part, we reasoned that proving the age element to the jury would have had “a more prejudicial effect than- the stipulation” because appellant was significantly older than the victim. Id.; see also Hinton, 702 N.W.2d at 281-82 (<HOLDING>). Also, both Wright and Hinton involved 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that stipulation of the appellants undisputed prior convictions was harmless error and reasoning that blakely v washington which does not require a jury determination of prior convictions provides implicit support for the conclusion that a harmless error analysis is appropriate (B) recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding blakely errors are subject to harmless error analysis (D) holding that the trial courts error in not allowing defendant to testify on direct examination as to nature and circumstances of prior convictions was not harmless error where credibility of the defendant was critical to the deliberations of the jury (E) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: Attorney General, Mary Jo Volkert, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daniel M. King, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Judgment affirmed. Ray and Self, JJ., concur. 1 U. S. Const, amend. V; see also Ga. Const. Art. 1, § 3, ¶1 (a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph, private property shall not be taken or damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid.”); Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., _ U. S. _, _ (II) (A) (1) (135 SCt 2419,192 LE2d388) (2015) (“The principle reflected in the [Takings] Clause goes back at least 800 years to the Magna Carta . . . .”). 2 See, e.g., Wood v. B & S Enters., 314 Ga. App. 128, 128 (723 SE2d 443) (2012). 3 See Kellett v. Dep’t of Transp., 174 Ga.App. 214, 21 .App. 622, 624-25 (6) (522 SE2d 661) (1999) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge (B) holding that although portion of trial courts jury charge was inapplicable any error in providing it was harmless in light of the fact that charge considered as a whole was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury (C) holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole (D) holding that because trial court actually gave part of a jury charge that appellant claimed was improperly omitted and because remainder of courts charge adequately defined one of the legal terms at issue the courts jury charge taken as a whole was not misleading and did not constitute reversible error (E) holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: have contributed to Farmland’s damages. This argument is insufficient to withstand Mid-America’s motion to dismiss for a number of reasons. First, neither Farmland’s complaint nor the KCC Order suggests that Mid-America’s violation of a tariff provision forms the basis of Farmland’s negligence per se claim. Additionally, Farmland has not cited any authority or presented any meaningful argument to support the proposition that a tariff violation can satisfy the “statute, ordinance, or regulation” element of a negligence per se claim. And, perhaps most importantly, the record of the KCC proceedings does not reveal that Farmland has exhausted its administrative remedies on this issue. See generally Grindsted Prods., Inc. v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 21 Kan.App.2d 435, 901 P.2d 20 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court will grant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff who proves a cause of action under  1981 may recover punitive damages where the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages even if nominal (B) holding plaintiff must move before public interests are involved to bring suit for ejectment but allowing single action for past present and future damages (C) holding the kcc must first interpret a tariff before a plaintiff can bring an action in court seeking damages under  66176 (D) holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages (E) holding that the plaintiff could bring an action for negligent misrepresentation although the plaintiff could not sue on the contract because the contract was void

SOLUTION:
(C)