In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
would allow for the award of attorney fees whenever a statute or contract provides for one side to pay expenses, even when such attorney fees were not contemplated. The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent in this regard. Therefore, I do not join in the majority’s opinion that the term “expenses” as used in section 13-7-4(d) includes attorney fees, but would hold that because that section does not specifically provide for an award of attorney fees, such award was improper here. For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority’s determination that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. However, I dissent rs of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986); In re Olliff, 258 Ga. 157, 366 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Head v. Savage, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 32, 38 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan (D) holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs (E) holding that expenses refers to costs

Ex Output:
holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid


Ex Input:
to pay the purchase price. 3.Pursuant to the Securities Purchase Agreement, dated September 2, 2004, Mer-vyn's Holdings purchased 100% of the interests in Holdings I and Holdings II for $429,746,414,84. At the closing, Mervyn’s Holdings used these funds to pay the purchase price. (Am.Compl.$ 58). 5 . Brandt v. Trivest II, Inc. (In re Plassein Int’l Corp.), 352 B.R. 36, (Bankr.D.Del.2006) ("Accordingly, the Court joins with those decisions that have (either implicitly or explicitly) evaluated fraudulent transfer complaints using Rule 8(a)(2)’s notice pleading standard”) Id. at 40-41. See. e.g., Giuliano v. U.S. Nursing Corp. (In re Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc.), 339 B.R. 570, 574-75 (Bankr.D.Del.2006) (applying "liberal notice pleading standard”); AstroPower, 335 B.R. at 333 (<HOLDING>); Official Comm, of Unsecured Creditors v. DVI 
 Holding statements: (A) holding despite collective allegations in complaint the complaint was not deficient under rule 8a because it stated with sufficient particularity facts establishing a causal connection between the defendants actions and the constitutional deprivation (B) holding that a fraudulent transfer complaint need only set forth the facts with sufficient particularity to apprise the defendant fairly of the charges made against him (C) holding that the fraud claims against the defendant should not have been dismissed as the complaint provided him with fair notice of the claims made against her (D) holding that the information must set forth each element of the crime that it charges as well as fairly inform a defendant of the charge against which he must defend (E) holding that a criminal defendant is entitled to know the charges against him and to be tried solely upon the charges against him internal quotation marks and citation omitted

Ex Output:
holding despite collective allegations in complaint the complaint was not deficient under rule 8a because it stated with sufficient particularity facts establishing a causal connection between the defendants actions and the constitutional deprivation


Ex Input:
Parker, we vacate the sentence and remand for resen-tencing. Nearly a month before trial, Parker opted to waive his right to counsel and elected to represent himself. At that time, the trial court conducted a Faretta inquiry and allowed Parker to represent himself throughout the trial. However, when the jury returned with the guilty verdict, the trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing without renewing the offer of counsel. In doing so, the trial court erred. “Once a defendant waives the right to counsel in a criminal case, the court must renew the offer of counsel at each subsequent critical stage of the proceedings, one of which is sentencing.” Serrano v. State, 113 So.3d 895, 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see also Ingraham v. State, 32 So.3d 761, 768-69 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, vacate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage (B) holding postindictment lineup is critical stage of trial at which defendant is entitled to presence of counsel (C) holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel (D) recognizing that brooks protects against denial of counsel at a critical stage of his trial (E) holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver

Ex Output:

holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage