In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

perform work for Kiwi. Synergy alleges that Ms. Willis knew these statements were false when she spoke them. Synergy contends that her intent to induce Synergy to rely on these statements can be inferred by the benefit LHC stood to receive. Finally, Synergy offers documentation of advertising run on behalf of Kiwi as evidence of its damages. Assuming for purposes of this motion that Ms. Willis made the alleged statements, Synergy’s fraud claim fails as a matter of law. First, statements by Ms. Willis as to Kiwi’s financial condition constitute an opinion. In Georgia, statements of opinion will not support a claim for fraud. Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays Bank, PLC, 227 Ga.App. 648, 650, 490 S.E.2d 184 (1997); See also Miller v. Clabby, 178 Ga.App. 821, 822, 344 S.E.2d 751 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Synergy also alleges that Ms. Willis stated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding agency may not rely on expert opinion without disclosing hard data supporting opinion to the public (B) holding that sellers failure to disclose known soil conditions was not a scheme to defraud where seller did not affirmatively lie to buyer (C) recognizing that an expression of opinion about monetary value is not a representation of fact which gives rise to an action for fraud (D) holding that a buyer could not rely on a sellers mere expression of opinion (E) recognizing that a common illustration of an admissible opinion under rule 701 is an expression of opinion by a lay observer of a cars speed
(D)

of a class consisting of all African-American plant employees. Accordingly, the district court acted within its discretion to deny class certification on the basis of the appellants’ direct evidence. B. Statistical Evidence Nucor provided the appellants with actual promotion-related job posting and applicant data from January 2001 to February 2006. According to the appellants’ own expert, statistical analysis of this data resulted in a standard deviation of - .84, a result indicating no statistically significant disparity in the actual versus expected percentage of African-American employees successfully bidding on jobs. J.A. 5872-73. The appellants, however, objected to use of the 2001 to 2006 time period because it included job posting and bidding 759 n. 17 (4th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Since the appellants could not prevail based 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard (B) recognizing that differences between the expected value and the observed number greater than two or three standard deviations are significant (C) recognizing the cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action (E) recognizing that a standard deviation greater than two or three excludes chance as the cause of underrepresentation
(E)

egregious harm from the trial court’s error in submitting the lesser-included-offense charge. V. Conclusion We sustain appellant’s third issue to the extent that it concerns whether the State was entitled to the lesser-included-offense charge under the first step of the Rousseau lesser-included-offense test. Given our disposition, we need not consider the remainder of appellant’s third issue (concerning whether the State was entitled to the lesser-included-offense charge under the second step of the Rousseau lesser-included-offense test) or appellant’s second issue (concerning the factual sufficiency of the evidence). We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause with instructions to dismiss the indictment. See Hampton v. State, 165 S.W.3d 691, 694 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (<HOLDING>) (footnotes omitted); Konchar v. State, 938 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the greater offense is  by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it (B) holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense (C) holding that court of appealss remedy on remand from reversal for harmful charge error based on failure to meet second step of rousseau lesserincludedoffense test was to remand for a retrial for the lesser offense  because the jurys verdict that the appellant was guilty of the lesserincluded offense  operates as an acquittal of the greater offense  to which jeopardy had attached this prevents a retrial for the greater offense but not for the lesser offense (D) holding that where jury was instructed on both a greater offense and lesserincluded offense and the jury convicted on the lesserincluded offense the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense (E) recognizing that it is within  our power to direct entry of judgment on a lesser included offense when vacating a greater offense if the commission of the lesser offense can be established from facts that the jury actually found citations omitted

(C)