In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 565 F.Supp. 663, 667 n. 10, 669 (N.D.Ill.1983)). However, in all the cases on this issue, the courts made it clear that the client must have made disclosures to the attorney after manifesting an intent to seek legal advice. Herbes, 180 Ill.App.3d at 698-99, 129 Ill.Dec. 480, 536 N.E.2d 164 (finding that counsel for the plaintiff, who was suing a township over its open-space acquisition program, was ineligible to conduct said representation because he had previously engaged in an attorney-client relationship with the township when it interviewed only him for a possible position representing the township in the same program, evidencing the township’s intent to hire him and therefore speak freely regarding the program), Hughes, 565 F.Supp. at 670 (<HOLDING>), Int’l. Paper Co. v. Lloyd Manufacturing Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (B) holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney (C) holding that attorneys should be disqualified where the substantial relationship test is met in order to assure that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship and the loyalty between attorney and client are preserved (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in drawing an adverse inference where the relief defendant refused to give information necessary to determine whether he still possessed any of the funds or whether he had a legitimate claim to them (E) holding that normal attorneyclient relationship does not bar rule 60b relief when the evidence is clear that the attorney and his client were not acting as one

A: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client
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Q: as this is circumscribed but critical. For the Supreme Court has made plain that qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability” and “is effectively lost if a ease is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (emphasis in original). IV. We thus turn to the sole question over which we have jurisdiction: whether the district court properly concluded that the officers were not entitled to summary judgment under Norman. The officers contend that Ussery suffered only de minimis injuries and so cannot satisfy the requirements for an excessive force claim under Norman. Blue Br. 8, 16-21. We disagree. During the decade when Norman was good law, we never articulated a precise definition of what c 270 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note the telling fact that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where law enforcement officers restrained and abandoned an arrestee for ten minutes causing him to feel frightened vulnerable and humiliated when left alone and immobile in the dark parking lot such that in the months following the incident he had trouble sleeping and was scared to leave his home  the resulting injury was more than de minimis (B) holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him (C) holding that a reasonable officer could not have been expected to anticipate that ten to fifteen minutes of unauthorized detention would amount to a greater than de minimis injury (D) holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody (E) holding that an individuals liberty is restrained only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave

A: holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him
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Q: the search and seizure. We determined that they failed to prove “that the property or possessions seized and searched were owned, leased, controlled or rightfully possessed by them or that they had any interest in them,” and so lacked “a valid claim of lawful occupancy” in order to challenge the search warrant. Id. at 18, 36 A.2d at 348. In Lambert v. State, 196 Md. 57, 75 A.2d 327 (1950), we explained that one must “lawfully occupy” the premises; mere presence is not sufficient: [O]ne cannot complain of an illegal search and seizure of premises or property which he neither owns, nor leases, nor controls, nor lawfully occupies, nor rightfully possesses, or in which he has no interest 10. Only recently we cited the cases which followed that formula, and re-affirmed i d 758, 763 (1964) (<HOLDING>); Rizzo v. State, 201 Md. 206, 209, 93 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause (B) holding that ferguson had no right to complain of search because he was not in lawful possession of the property (C) holding that defendant could not complain of search and seizure of bags in which he disclaimed any ownership (D) holding that invited error does not entitle the defendant to any relief and of which he will not be heard to complain on appeal (E) holding where the commonwealth is not in possession of property in question petition for return of property is moot

A:
holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause
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