In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
witness testifying against him was in custody). This right is not subject to the trial court’s discretion; however, the court may preclude repetitive or unduly harassing interrogation. Ramey,. 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68; Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475. Thus: “[A] defendant need not show interest or motive in that any promises of leniency have, in fact, been made to the witness by the State or that any expectations of special favor exist in the mind of the witness, before cross-examining a witness as to possible bias. Further, the defense is entitled to inquire into such promises or expectations whether they are based on fact or are simply imaginary.” Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68, citing Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475-76. See also People v. Tomes, 284 Ill. App. 3d 514, 520, 672 N.E.2d 289 (1996) (<HOLDING>). “To this end a defendant has the right to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required (B) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (C) holding that limitation on scope and breadth of crossexamination did not significantly curtail effectiveness of witness crossexamination because crossexamination was lengthy and extensive (D) holding it is well established that crossexamination to show that a witness might be vulnerable to pressure whether real or imagined from the state regarding a pending charge is a matter of right (E) holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination

Ex Output:
recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required


Ex Input:
Center. v. National League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 974-75 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that Cedars-Sinai’s claims were not preempted because they were “predicated not on the [service benefits] plan” but on a separate contract between the carrier and the medical services provider). Plaintiffs claim that Plaintiff never received compensation for the emergency care of B.G. directly relates to the processing and administration of the enrollee’s covered claims which is governed by the Service Benefits Plan and the Contract between Blue Shield and OPM. Any obligation that Blue Shield could have to pay Plaintiff stems directly from the B.G.’s enrollment in the Service Benefit Plan and directly relates to the payment of B.G.’s benefits under the plan. See Hayes, 819 F.2d at 926 (<HOLDING>); Botsford, 314 F.3d at 396 (“Because the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tort claims arising out of the manner in which a benefit claim is handled are preempted by fehba (B) holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba (C) holding state law claims arising out of unions refusal to readmit union members preempted by  301 (D) holding that fehba does not completely preempt state law (E) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law

Ex Output:
holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba


Ex Input:
2052. B. Prejudice The prejudice prong requires Mr. Mooneyham to demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. A “‘reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. That requires a ‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.’ ” Heard v. Addison, 728 F.3d 1170, 1176 (10th Cir.2013) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011)). Mr. Mooneyham asserted in the district court that he would have rejected the plea offer “but for counsel’s error.” R. vol. 1, at 267. This assertion is inadequate under the circumstances. See Heard, 728 F.3d at 1184 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to satisfy the prejudice prong a petitioner must establish that but for counsels errors there is a reasonable probabil ity the result of the proceeding would have been different (B) holding in the context of a plea that the strickland prejudice prong requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial (C) holding that a  mere allegation that the petitioner would have insisted on trial but for his counsels errors  is ultimately insufficient to justify relief (D) holding that the defendant could not prove prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance because he has never claimed that but for counsels errors he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted upon going to trial (E) holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different

Ex Output:

holding that to satisfy the prejudice prong a petitioner must establish that but for counsels errors there is a reasonable probabil ity the result of the proceeding would have been different