In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: defendant to trust the advice of his counsel in weighing the immigration consequences of his decision. Petitioner’s counsel advised him that he would “in all likelihood, receive a sentence of only one to three years’ imprisonment.” (Id.) The fact that this turned out to be true, buttresses the court’s conclusion that it was reasonable for Petitioner to rely on his counsel’s advice in making his immigration decisions. Second, and more importantly, however, case law before IIRIRA held that even an alien who received a sentence longer than five years might have maintained eligibility for § 212(c) relief, provided that the alien had not served five years of his sentence at the time of his removal hearing. See Matter of Ramirez-Somera, 1992 WL 301623, 20 I. & N. Dec. 564, 566 (BIA 1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the fact that Petitioner could have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony (B) holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss prison inmates action under 42 usc  1983 as frivolous without consent of defendants because defendants had not been served yet and therefore were not parties (C) holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious (D) holding the same where the term conviction refers to a defendant who has been found guilty of a listed offense but has not yet been sentenced (E) holding that an immigrant defendant is eligible for  212c relief despite having been sentenced to a fifteen year prison term because he had not yet served five years of the sentence

A: (E)
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Q: hostile work environment claims from the general Ricks rule because such claims “ ‘cannot be said to occur on any particular day,’ and instead usually involve a pattern of acts that aren’t ‘actionable on [their] own’ but give rise to a legal violation only when assessed in their totality.” Almond, 665 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115-16, 122 S.Ct. 2061). Here, the Court does not construe Plaintiffs pleadings to allege a hostile work environment claim. Even construing Plaintiffs pleadings liberally, his generic assertions that Defendant Beilis treated him in a hostile manner toward the end of his employment and sent him hostile emails fall far short of asserting a claim for age-based hostile work environment. See Phillips v. Moore, 164 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1254 (D.Kan.2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, despite Plaintiffs averment that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supervisors routine vulgar references to plaintiff could not support a hostile work environment claim because plaintiff was unaware of the comments and to show that he or she perceived the environment as hostile a title vii plaintiff must at least have been aware of those comments (B) holding that the plaintiff failed to state an agebased hostile work environment claim where the plaintiffs proffered evidence was nothing more than a collection of unrelated and infrequent incidents of conduct by the defendants that the plaintiff subjectively construe as acts motived by agerelated animus and which was devoid of the agerelated comments or ridicule that are hallmarks of hostile work environment claims (C) holding that certain conduct was irrelevant to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim absent evidence that plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of it (D) recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 (E) holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive

A: (B)
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Q: that Chapter Thirteen plans may “modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added). Defendants concede that plaintiffs’ claims are secured by liens on their principal residences. Therefore, the key issue is whether those hens constitute “security interests” for purposes of the antimodification provision of § 1322(b)(2). The ich.1992) (finding antimodification provision of § 1322(b)(2) inapplicable because creditor’s interest in the principal residence of the debtor was a “hen,” rather than a “security interest,” based on the fact that it arose nonconsensually under state tax act); In re Venable, 48 B.R. 853, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Mitchell, 39 B.R. 696, 700 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1322b2 prohibits modification of the interest rate on the loan on the debtors principal residence (B) holding that citys tax hen on debtors principal residence was modifiable despite  1322b2 because not consensual and thus not a security interest (C) holding that the determination of whether the debtor is using real property as his principal residence is made as of the petition date for the purposes of section 1322b2 (D) holding alternatively that rights of undersecured claimant could be modified notwithstanding  1322b2 because mortgagees security interest which attached to appliances machinery furniture and equipment whether fixtures or not was not secured only by a security interest in real property (E) holding modifiable a mechanics hen on debtors principal residence because it was a statutory hen

A:
(B)
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