In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. Bridgewater, A.C.J., and Hunt, J., concur. 1 O’Connor later produced a valid concealed weapons permit. 2 Simple possession of a controlled substance is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to deliver. State v. Harris, 14 Wn. App. 414, 418, 542 P.2d 122 (1975); see State v. Sims, 119 Wn.2d 138, 142, 829 P.2d 1075 (1992) ("Where one merely possesses a controlled substance without the statutory element of intent, one is guilty of simple possession under RCW 69.50.401(d), absent unwitting possession.”); State v. Robbins, 68 Wn. App. 873, 877, 846 P.2d 585 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 3 It is not clear when he purchased the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant could only be sentenced to a single offense under section 1244011 not both conspiracy with intent to deliver and possession with intent to deliver (B) holding second simple possession conviction was not an aggravated felony because it was not prosecuted as recidivist possession (C) holding that possession with intent to distribute and simple possession are the same offense under blockburger (D) holding that trial court may arrest judgment on conviction for possession with intent to deliver and enter judgment of guilt on simple possession (E) holding that the defendants prior drug conviction for simple possession did not constitute a controlled substance offense because the plain language of  4b12b requires that the prior conviction involve possession with intent to distribute

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
guidelines; and (4) that the special conditions of Neffs supervised release were beyond the limits described in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied in all respects. I. BACKGROUND On April 29, 1992, Anthony Neff was arrested on charges of driving while intoxicated by Nassau County Police who found in his possession a receipt from a licensed firearms dealership. The receipt indicated that on April 23, 1992, he had purchased a 12 gauge shotgun. Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”) interviewed the owner of the firearms dealership and discovered that Neff, who was then on parole for a 1989 attempted burglary conviction, had not revealed that he was a convicted felon when he executed ATF form 4473, a necessar 3 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Although this language appears broad in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (B) holding that for purposes of apprendi the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence that may be imposed based solely on the jurys findings (C) holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
court denied the petition based on its conclusion that Boles had procedurally defaulted his claims by not raising them properly in the state court. Boles contends that appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to preserve his claims for review is cause for his procedural default and resulted in prejudice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000). This contention was raised for the first time in Boles’s response to the order to show cause issued by the magistrate judge and was never presented in his habeas petition or in any appeal to the Arizona state courts. Consequently, Boles has not exhausted this claim in state court and the petition should have been dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c); Edwards, 429 U.S. at 451, 453 (<HOLDING>). VACATED and REMANDED with instructions to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (B) holding that the novelty of a petitioners claim can constitute cause for a procedural default (C) holding that ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for procedural default only if counsels performance was constitutionally ineffective (D) holding that each subcategory of ineffective assistance of counsel is an independent claim that must be sufficiently plead (E) holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged to be cause for the procedural default of other claims is itself an independent claim subject to the procedural requirements of exhaustion

Ex Output:

(E)