In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence.” Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 417, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964) (“established rule” is that “recognition operates retroactively to validate past acts”); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942) (recognition is retroactive in effect); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328-330, 57 S.Ct. 758, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937) (recognition is retroactive). Further, the FSIA itself is retroactive in application and applies to actions of foreign sovereigns prior to the passage of the FSIA. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 124 S.Ct. 2240, 159 L.Ed.2d 1, (2004) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the FSIA would apply to all 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fsia applied retroactively to actions of the austrian government in 1948 (B) holding that kotecki limit applied retroactively (C) holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government (D) holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review (E) recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: previously discussed Wilson’s subjective complaints, then identified specific discrepancies between those complaints and the medical evidence. He noted that though she claimed back pain since 2000, she continued working till November 2002, when her company merged and she lost her job. He also noted that the record established that she walked with a normal unassisted gait, in contrast with her complaints about her problems walking. Additionally, he indicated that the record showed she had never been hospitalized for any orthopedic reason and had never taken any potent pain medication, though she claimed severely debilitating pain. The ALJ’s credibility finding was fully explained and is supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Wilson also contends, given her inability to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the alj did not err in discounting a claimants reports of pain where they were not supported by the medical record (B) holding that alj may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimants pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimants pain (C) holding that alj properly evaluated credibility where he cited specific instances where claimants complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record (D) holding that the alj properly relied on medical evidence undermining claimants subjective assessment of limitations (E) holding that an alj is entitled to make a credibility determination regarding the claimants subjective complaints after specifically addressing these complaints and reviewing the medical evidence in the record
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 28 P.3d 589, 547 (Okla.2001) (same); see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1228-30 (10th Cir.2008) (discussing rationale for American Pipe rule). A claim accruing after the filing of a class action but before denial of class certification is subject to tolling, see Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 905 A.2d 340, 363 (2006), and the statute of limitations remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class certification has been denied. Rosenthal, 883 P.2d at 531. However, the filing of successive class actions cannot serve to perpetually toll the running of the statute of limitations. See id. (<HOLDING>). In Korwek v. Hunt, 827 F.2d 874, 879 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case (B) recognizing rule (C) recognizing but not ruling on basis of federal rule prohibiting tolling during a successive class action (D) holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when the prior denial of class certification was based solely on rule 23 deficiencies of the putative representative (E) holding that tolling does not apply to additional defendants who were not named in the class action
Example Output:
(C)