In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
that in December 1995, his wage was $8.67 per hour. Lewis stated that a Caucasian employee, who misrepresented his knowledge of desktop publishing, was hired at a rate of $9.00 per hour in his department. This employee ultimately was “[p]ushed out the door.” Supp.App. at 354. Lewis also stated that another Caucasian employee received a pay increase from $7.50 to $8.25 per hour after he went from part-time to full-time status, and that a third Caucasian employee told him that he received a raise after his father called the store manager. The District Court held that Lewis failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he had not shown that the employees he identified were similarly situated to him. See Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 857-58 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on his wrongful termination claim, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated (B) holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment (C) holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim (D) holding that employees of differing seniority levels were not similarly situated (E) holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. Bridgewater, A.C.J., and Hunt, J., concur. 1 O’Connor later produced a valid concealed weapons permit. 2 Simple possession of a controlled substance is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to deliver. State v. Harris, 14 Wn. App. 414, 418, 542 P.2d 122 (1975); see State v. Sims, 119 Wn.2d 138, 142, 829 P.2d 1075 (1992) ("Where one merely possesses a controlled substance without the statutory element of intent, one is guilty of simple possession under RCW 69.50.401(d), absent unwitting possession.”); State v. Robbins, 68 Wn. App. 873, 877, 846 P.2d 585 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 3 It is not clear when he purchased the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant could only be sentenced to a single offense under section 1244011 not both conspiracy with intent to deliver and possession with intent to deliver (B) holding second simple possession conviction was not an aggravated felony because it was not prosecuted as recidivist possession (C) holding that possession with intent to distribute and simple possession are the same offense under blockburger (D) holding that trial court may arrest judgment on conviction for possession with intent to deliver and enter judgment of guilt on simple possession (E) holding that the defendants prior drug conviction for simple possession did not constitute a controlled substance offense because the plain language of  4b12b requires that the prior conviction involve possession with intent to distribute

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
father of that child. Given that holding, Longoria’s summary judgment motion in this case was in substance merely a motion to abate, see Carter v. Brady, 423 S.W.2d 946, 951 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the granting of which would merely give Valadez a reasonable opportunity to amend her suit to remove the obstacle to its prosecution. See Texas Highway Dept. v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex.1967). See also, M & M Const. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 747 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no writ). A summary judgment should not be based on a pleading deficiency that could be cured by amendment. See Dowler v. Delta Inv. Housing, Inc., 834 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1992, no writ). Cf. Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.1983) (<HOLDING>), citing, Texas Department of Corrections v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issue of whether death was proximately caused by intervenihg and superseding cause was not appropriately resolved by summary judgment (B) holding that protective features of special exception procedure should not be circumvented by a motion for summary judgment on the pleadings where plaintiffs pleadings fail to state a cause of action (C) holding that whether pleadings fail to state a cause of action may not be resolved by summary judgment (D) holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage (E) holding that pleadings cannot be regarded as summary judgment evidence

Ex Output:

(C)