In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: it was minor and that Zhang only had five years of education. The IJ reasonably found these explanations insufficient. Zhang also testified inconsistently regarding whether he was fired from his job after authorities arrested him in 2010, or simply did not return to work. Zhang argues that this inconsistency was “nonexistent” because there was more than one reason why he did not return to work. Zhang does not explain, however, why he did not state that he was terminated when he was first asked why he did not- return to work. The agency reasonably found that Zhang’s failure to mention his termination until prompted by the IJ undermined his credibility, and that his explanation that he “did not listen clearly” was unpersuasive. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the agency reasonably found that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences (B) holding that district court need not accept the governments recommendation of a minor role reduction (C) holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief (D) holding that a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to conclude that the petitioner would more likely than not be subjected to torture if removed to china based solely on the fact that she had illegally departed china without more particularized evidence (E) holding that ij need not accept plausible explanation for inconsistency unless reasonable factfinder would be compelled to do so

A: holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences
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Q: of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and part of the “unified judicial system,” is an arm of the state. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir.2000) (“All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system ... are part of ‘Commonwealth government’ and thus are state rather than local agencies.”). As a state agency, the Board has Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. Therefore, as an arm of the state, Lucas may not sue the Board unless one of the three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply. See MCI Telcomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503 (listing immunity exceptions). On appeal, Lucas argues that the Ex Parte Young exception precludes the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to the present action against the Board. Howe 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Neither of these exceptions are applicable in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action (B) holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action (C) holding that a remedial scheme created by congress even if incapable of addressing all of plaintiffs injuries precluded a bivens action (D) holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction (E) holding that young will not apply where congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state

A: holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action
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Q: apply to off-reservation conduct, however, is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity from suit.... There is a difference between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce them.”). Congress can impose substantive constraints upon a tribe without subjecting the tribe to suit in federal court to enforce those constraints, as the Supreme Court made clear in Santa Clara Pueblo. In that case, an individual Indian sued her tribe in federal court, alleging gender dis crimination in violation of the equal protection guarantee of the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 1302. Despite the ICRA’s imposition of substantive constraints upon the tribe, the Supreme Court held the suit barred by tribal sovere F.3d 1126, 1131 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the context of an adea claim that an indian tribes sovereign immunity had not been abrogated by congress and subject matter jurisdiction did not exist (B) holding that tribal entity was not equitably estopped from asserting immunity because misrepresentations of the tribes officials or employees cannot affect its immunity from suit (C) holding the copyright act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity where nothing on the statutes face could be so construed (D) recognizing that tribes have an interest in a uniform body of federal law in the area of tribal immunity (E) holding the americans with disabilities act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and declaring congress abrogates tribal immunity only where the definitive language of the statute itself states an intent either to abolish indian tribes common law immunity or to subject tribes to suit under the act

A:
holding in the context of an adea claim that an indian tribes sovereign immunity had not been abrogated by congress and subject matter jurisdiction did not exist
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