In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

any meaning at all, I do not think that [the defendant’s statement that he had a .357 magnum and that no one would get hurt if she put the money in the bag] can reasonably be said to constitute an ‘express threat of death,’ U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). What was conveyed here was, at most, an implicit threat of serious bodily injury or death.”). We agree with the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit, and views of Judges Easterbrook and Arnold that to satisfy the qualifier “express,” a defendant’s statement must distinctly and directly indicate that the defendant intends to kill or otherwise cause the death of the victim. Because four of the five examples in Application Note 6 do not, they are not controlling. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993)(<HOLDING>). Similarly, reliance on the commentary’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that commentary in sentencing guidelines that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guideline it interprets (B) recognizing the guidelines commentary is authoritative (C) holding that sentencing guidelines commentary must be given controlling weight unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or is plainly inconsistent with the guidelines itself (D) holding that guidelines commentary is generally authoritative (E) holding that where the commentary to a guideline is at odds with another provision of the guidelines the guideline prevails
(A)

requirements under UFTA, Gulf and Security nevertheless contend that as a matter of law and of public policy the statute of limitations should not have commenced in this action until they obtained the default judgment against Clark in August of 1997 in California. ¶24 As far as the law is concerned, Gulf and Security vigorously argue under the mistaken assumption that a creditor may not assert an UFTA claim until after the underlying judgment is entered. This persistent assumption represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law under UFTA. ¶25 Gulf and Security base their theory on our decision in Murphy v. Atkinson (1993), 262 Mont. 164, 864 P.2d 273, as well as a recent appellate court decision from California, Cortez v. Vogt (Cal.Ct.App. 1997), 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 853-54 (<HOLDING>). In Murphy, we determined that a cause of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the twoyear time limitation of rule 3850 does not commence until the sentence becomes final (B) holding that statements and charges by municipality may not be amended in light of legislative purpose of shielding police and similar employees from harassment (C) holding that in view of legislative statements of policy and purpose of the ufta as a cumulative and additional remedy limitation period did not commence until debtorcreditor relationship existed after judgment was made final (D) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence (E) holding that statements made in the course of negotiation were not contracts and such statements were merged into the final written agreement
(C)

State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143, 146-47 (Me.1985); Miller v. State, 373 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Miss.1979); State v. Shankle, 58 Or.App. 134, 137-38, 647 P.2d 959, 961-62 (1982). Furthermore, the arrest rates for the Taylor roadblock indicate that it was sufficiently productive of the licensing and registration interest. Sergeant Canty testified that forty-two cars were stopped at the Taylor roadblock over the ninety minute period, and two arrests were made for unauthorized use of an automobile (namely, appellant Taylor and his passenger), meaning that arrests occurred involving approximately 2.4 percent of the stopped vehicles. This would appear to satisfy the requirement that there be something more than “a complete absence of data” indicating effectiveness. Sitz, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2487 (<HOLDING>); Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 659, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sobriety checkpoints at which approximately 15 percent of the drivers passing through the checkpoint were arrested were sufficiently productive (B) holding that a drivers knowledge that there are concealable weapons in the car available for the drivers use is evidence of possession (C) holding that the seizure of motorists who were stopped at a sobriety checkpoint at which all vehicles were stopped was reasonable without individualized suspicion in light of the magnitude of the drunkdriving problem and the determination of law enforcement officials that such checkpoints were necessary to apprehend such individuals before tragedy strikes (D) holding that issue is preserved if the objections at the trial were sufficiently specific to notify the trial court at the time of the nature and character of the objections and the reasons for them (E) holding that ready mobility existed when a car was capable of being driven even after the driver was arrested and despite the absence of other potential drivers

(A)