In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir.2005). The First Amendment guarantees a prisoner a right to seek redress of grievances from prison authorities and as well as a right of meaningful access to the courts. Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.1995); see also Hasan v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 400 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir.2005) (“Prisoners’ grievances, unless frivolous ..., concerning the conditions in which they are being confined are deemed petitions for redress of grievances and thus are protected by the First Amendment.”); Wolfel v. Bates, 707 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Jones’s complaints of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing first amendment retaliation right (B) holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners grievances (C) recognizing that prisoners undoubtedly exercise first amendment petition right when filing grievances and stating that prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for filing grievances (D) holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials (E) recognizing prisoners first amendment right to eom plain to prison officials about discrimination

Ex Output:
recognizing first amendment retaliation right


Ex Input:
pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for “anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,” because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for “wil-fully taking away her husband” and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability). But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute (B) holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses (C) recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that police officers were immune from liability for damages resulting from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress

Ex Output:
holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute


Ex Input:
of waiver of the right to a jury trial is governed by federal, not state, law. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755-56 (6th Cir. 1985). The right to a jury trial may be waived “by prior written agreement” by “the parties to a contract.” Id. at 755. In support of their contention that a contractual waiver of the right to a jury trial must be knowing and voluntary, plaintiffs cite to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in K.M.C. K.M.C. involved a contractual provision in which the plaintiff .agreed to “waive all right to a trial by jury”, and did not involve an arbitration provision or the FAA. Id. at 755. While the Sixth Circuit stated in K.M.C. that the knowing and voluntary standard was, appropriate “in this instance,” it did not base its holding on that standard. Id. at 757 (<HOLDING>). In addition, since its holding in K.M.G., the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied (B) holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard (C) holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met (D) holding that a bad faith claim must be met through the clear and convincing evidence standard (E) holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss

Ex Output:

holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied