In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for “anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,” because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for “wil-fully taking away her husband” and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability). But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute (B) holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses (C) recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that police officers were immune from liability for damages resulting from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress

Output: holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute


Input: Consider Input: If a statement does not contain any expressly exculpatory material, the Government need not produce that statement to the defense. To hold otherwise would impose an insuperable burden on the Government to determine what facially non-exculpatory evidence might possibly be favorable to the accused by inferential reasoning. We are confident that the Supreme Court did not intend the Brady holding to sweep so broadly. United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir.1988); see also Harris v. Kuba, 486 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir.2007) {“Brady does not require that police officers or prosecutors explore multiple potential inferences to discern whether evidence that is not favorable to a defendant could become favorable.”); United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that just such inferential 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b (B) holding that there is no constitutional duty to do a better investigation and that a decision not to conduct a more thorough investigation does not invade an accuseds rights (C) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (D) holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence (E) holding that brady does not place any burden upon the government to conduct a defendants investigation or assist in the presentation of the defenses case

Output: holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b


Input: Consider Input: district court on remand from this court; (2) Wayt is was not entitled to relief under Rule 35(b) because, inter alia, the government has not moved for a sentence reduction; and (3) Wayt is not entitled to relief under Rule 35(c) both because the motion was not filed within seven days of the imposition of sentence and because the motion failed to identify any arithmetical or technical error in the sentence. In fact, it is clear that the proper vehicle for seeking the type of relief sought by Wayt is a motion to correct or vacate illegal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Accordingly, this court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and AFFIRMS the district court’s denial of Wayt’s Rule 35 motion. See United States v. McMillan, 106 F.3d 322, 324 n. 4 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). * This order and judgment is not binding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pursuant to the collateral order doctrine and 28 usc  1291 a state may appeal from a district court order denying it eleventh amendment immunity (B) holding that jurisdiction to hear appeal from resolution of a rule 35 motion arises under 18 usc  3742 rather than 28 usc  1291 (C) holding that a nonparty may appeal an order of criminal contempt arising out of a pending action under 28 usc  1291 (D) holding that order denying motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition is final under 28 usc  1291 (E) holding that the rule 21 severance rendered the district court verdict a final and appealable judgment under 28 usc  1291


Output: holding that pursuant to the collateral order doctrine and 28 usc  1291 a state may appeal from a district court order denying it eleventh amendment immunity