In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: their quest had generally confirmed their suspicion. Thereafter it was incumbent upon them to make a decision as to their course of action with “reasonable dispatch.” Occidental Life Ins. Co. of North Carolina v. Pat Ryan & Associates, Inc., supra, 496 F.2d at 1268; Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, supra, 488 F.2d at 917; Baumel v. Rosen, supra, 412 F.2d at 574. The question, therefore, is whether plaintiffs were guilty of unreasonable delay during the period from May 20, 1969 to August 27, 1969. Considering the number of plaintiffs involved and the time necessary for counsel to research legal authorities and draft and prepare the original complaint, this Court concludes that there was no unreasonable delay. Cf. Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 343 F.Supp. 245, 255-56 (D.Md.1972) (<HOLDING>), rev’d, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973) (in jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal (B) holding inter alia that 130 days was reasonable period for researching and drafting of complaint (C) holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay (D) holding that delays of 115 days and 101 days were both substantial (E) holding that a difference between 384 days prepreference average number of days to payment and 547 days preference average number of days to payment did not make the payments out of the ordinary course of business

Answer: holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal


Question: how much more of a connection to interstate commerce, if any, must be shown under a substantial rather than a de minimis standard. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 859-60 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 2455 (suggesting in a pre-Lopez opinion that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress could only reach criminal activity “ ‘substantially affecting interstate commerce.’ ”). It is clear, however, that the direct interstate connection required by Instruction 10 is much more substantial than the indirect interstate connection articulated by the government and disapproved of by the Court in Lopez. In Lopez, the connections articulated by the government between the possession of a firearm in a local school zone and interstate commerce were, to say the least, attenuated. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (<HOLDING>); see also Hicks, 106 F.3d at 189 (describing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference (B) holding that adverse inference rule is permissive (C) recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference (D) holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference (E) recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference

Answer: holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference


Question: Inc., 117 Misc.2d 960, 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 976 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1983) (emphasis supplied). However, New York’s First Department has cautioned that courts are not to lay aside traditional notions of remoteness, proximate cause, and duty when evaluating public nuisance claims. People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 309 A.D.2d 91, 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 199, 200-02 (1st Dep’t 2003); see also id. at 198 n. 2 (explaining that public nuisance claims generally may proceed where they “involve specific harm directly attributable to defendant or defendant’s activity”). Thus, the question here is whether UCC played a sufficiently direct role in causing the hazardous wastes to seep into the ground to be held liable. Cf. State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We conclude, substantially for the reasons 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (B) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (C) holding a corporate officer individually liable without piercing the corporate veil because he specifically directed sanctioned and actively participate in the maintenance of the nuisance (D) holding corporate officers and board members liable where they were actively engaged in the management supervision and oversight of the corporations affairs (E) holding that grand jury testimony of officer and inhouse counsel for corporate defendant was properly admitted as admission against the corporate defendant

Answer:
holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract