TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

SOLUTION: holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241

PROBLEM: v. Conlee, 370 Ark. 89, 257 S.W.3d 543 (2007). Kyler Road Home Charles first argues on appeal that the circuit court erred by not awarding him an interest in the home on Kyler Road. Although he acknowledges that Myra had acquired this property prior to the marriage, he asserts that he is entitled to an interest in the home because | ^marital funds were used to reduce the debt on the properly and to make improvements. Our definition of marital properly excludes property acquired before the marriage. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b)(1) (Repl.2009). However, we have long held that a non-owning spouse is entitled to some benefit when marital funds have been expended to improve or reduce the debt on the other spouse’s nonmarital property. See Box v. Box, 312 Ark. 550, 851 S.W.2d 437 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Bagwell v. Bagwell, 282 Ark. 403, 668 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property (B) holding that assets acquired subsequent to separation are not considered marital property absent evidence that spouse used marital property to obtain them (C) holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital (D) holding that the trial court erred in finding that marital property was the former wifes separate property based on a nonseparation agreement in which the former husband purported to relinquish any interest in the marital property (E) holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property

SOLUTION: holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property

PROBLEM: seeking treatment elsewhere. Id. at 567, 167 S.E.2d at 567. In this case, Dr. Epstein indicated Clark was not a suitable candidate for treatment and referred him for pain management. That treatment was unsuccessful, however. Because Clark related the continuing symptoms to the treating physicians and was unable to obtain relief, he was justified in seeking treatment elsewhere. Although the more appropriate procedure would have been for Clark to seek an order from the full commission before engaging Dr. Greenberg for treatment and surgery, we find that under Ford the full commission was not outside its discretion in ordering the County to pay for the surgery and continuing treatment, once it determined the treatment was medically necessary. See Gattis, 353 S.C. at 111, 576 S.E.2d at 197 (<HOLDING>). We find no merit to the County’s argument 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed (B) holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage (C) holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed (D) holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed in the employees favor and any doubt in its construction is thus resolved in favor of the employee (E) holding that statutes and ordinances are presumed to be constitutional and all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of constitutionality

SOLUTION:
holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed