In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: has recently held that a police officer may order passengers out of a vehicle during a traffic stop without violating the passengers’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). The Court reasoned that the public interest in protecting an officer’s safety outweighed the minimal intrusion involved in requiring passengers to exit the vehicle. See id. at 413-15, 117 S.Ct. 882. The same rationale applies here. An officer may reasonably conclude that his safety is best protected by having the passengers remain in the vehicle. Further, the intrusion involved with having passengers remain in their vehicle is de minimis — the officer is merely maintaining the status quo. See United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 11 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Defendant Garner refused to comply with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop (B) holding that passengers of a vehicle which they did not own had standing to challenge the validity of a traffic stop (C) holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop (D) holding police officers making a traffic stop could order passengers out of the stopped car (E) holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction

Answer: holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop


Question: face,” id. at 61, 90 S.Ct. 1555, it held that the exception for any portrayal that “does not tend to discredit [the] armed force[s]” impermissibly restricted expression on the basis of viewpoint. See id. at 62-63, 90 S.Ct. 1555. Here, as in Schacht, defendants may be constitutionally permitted to prohibit all fraternal organizations from marching in uniform. But it does not follow from this premise that defendants have the seemingly lesser included authority to ban only some organizations from marching in uniform. Under Schacht, and under other Supreme Court cases involving selective prohibitions on expression, defendants’ selectivity must itself pass constitutional muster. Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 425-28, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465, 100 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cincinnati could not ban commercial newsracks from public property while allowing noncommercial newsracks even if  the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property (B) holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content (C) holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property (D) holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence (E) holding not only does cincinnatis categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech but in this case the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted

Answer: holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content


Question: Although the Providers concede that they have no property interest in remaining part of the state Medicaid program, they assert “a right to due process regarding any submitted claims that are denied by FSSA,” and “[a]t a minimum, this requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (Pis.’ Mot. TRO & Prelim. Inj. 15.) This appears to be a valid distinction between property rights. Compare Grason v. State of Ill. Inspector Gen., 559 Fed.Appx. 573, 574 (7th Cir.2014) (“I[t] is doubtful that current Medicaid providers even have a protected interest in continuing in the program.”)(citing Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d 941, 953 (9th Cir.2009)); see also Senape v. Constantino, 936 F.2d 687, 690-91 (2d Cir.1991), with Pers. Care Prods., Inc. v. Hawkins, 635 F.3d 155, 159 & n. 20 (5th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Tekkno Labs., Inc. v. Perales, 933 F.2d 1093, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state police is a state agency (B) holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review (C) holding that when a state agency is investigating a providers past payments for fraud neither federal or texas law gives a provider a property right in reimbursements withheld on claims not within the investigations scope but acknowledging that the agency may only refuse to pay for cause and claims may not be withheld indefinitely quoting yorktown med lab inc v perales 948 f2d 84 89 2d cir1991 (D) holding that such claims however cannot be brought directly against the state or a state agency but only against state officials in their official capacities (E) holding that court may not accept claims of fraud based on speculation

Answer:
holding that the state police is a state agency