In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judg ment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “In deciding a Rule 60(b) motion, a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigant’s claims on the merits against the policy in favor of finality.” Kotlicky v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 817 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir.1987) (citation omitted). Moreover, Rule 60(b) motions are left to the sound discretion of the district judge. See Nat’l Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 930 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). “To prevail on a motion for relief pursuant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that motions to vacate a judgment are addressed to the sound discretion of trial justice (B) holding that a motion to vacate a judgment under fedrcivp 60b is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court   citations omitted (C) holding that fedrcivp 60b motion premised on fraud on the court is available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice (D) holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive  2255 motion (E) holding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and grant trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the supreme court will not upset the courts ruling unless there is a sufficient showing of abuse of discretion
[A]: holding that motions to vacate a judgment are addressed to the sound discretion of trial justice


[Q]: but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 23 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (same). Essentially, the Court determined that the prejudicial quality of testimony regarding an actually coerced confession is, like all other improperly introduced testimony at trial, capable of review. At this point in time, the Fulminante decision stands as the sole, albeit the dispositive, case on this point. In contrast, cases applying the harmless error analysis to the introduction of presumptively coerced statements are legion. See e.g. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 & n. 22, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2652 & n. 22, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 555 & n. 22 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443, 104 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion  (B) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence (D) holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights (E) holding that although miranda required the suppression of testimonial statements made before defendant was advised of his constitutional rights the state court is free of course to consider this harmless error question upon remand
[A]: holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion 


[Q]: Vachon was the true owner should have been known to him and/or his counsel, and certainly was a matter of public record. See Thurlough v. Dresser, 98 Me. 161, 163-64, 56 A. 654 (1903) (“The mere record of a valid mortgage gives constructive notice to all. All are presumed to know its contents, for any one interested can obtain knowledge by examining the record.”). 8 . We are not persuaded by Oceanic’s assertion, on appeal, that the sale notice was not sent by registered mail. Oceanic failed to deny — and therefore admitted — this fact in its opposition to Sloan's Cove's motion for summary judgment. See M.R.' Civ. P. 56(h)(4). 9 . Courts in other jurisdictions have decided differently. See, e.g., Pentad Joint Venture v. First Nat’l Bank of La Grange, 797 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Tex.App.1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Pemstein v. Stimpson, 36 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale (B) holding that in contrast to foreclosure of a mortgage secured by personal property foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need hot be at a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable (C) holding that buyer who purchased property at foreclosure sale took title free from easement granted after deed of trust (D) holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final (E) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property
[A]:
holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale