In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Cote’s bias, Hayat alleges, first, that Cote made “several inappropriate racial and religious comments during deliberations.” Hayat presented evidence from Jurors L. and B., as well as from Juror H. via an affidavit by Ha-yat’s private investigator, that Cote made a “racial” comment during deliberations. B. declared that “[d]uring the deliberation process, ... Cote[ ] made the statement they all looked the same when wearing a costume or when put in a costume. I believe Mr. Cote made this statement in connection with a discussion of witness Naseem Khan’s claim that he had seen Ayman al-Zawahiri in Lodi.” Similarly, L. stated that “[djuring deliberations Mr. Cote made racial slurs. As an example, on one occasion ... he said in front of the entire group that they a 236-39 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Where, however, “a juror has been asked 
 Holding statements: (A) holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay (B) holding that rule 606b contains no exception for racially biased statements made during jury deliberations and expressing skepticism about whether constitutional concerns can ever override the rule (C) holding that federal rule of evidence 8034 the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not apply to statements made by doctors (D) recognizing rule (E) holding that the arkansas counterpart to cre 606b applies whether a verdict is reached or a mistrial declared and under the extraneous information exception allows jurors to testify about statements made during deliberations

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
in that the timely filing of such claims is both mandatory and jurisdictional. That limitation derives from the proposition of sovereign immunity. It is well established that a claim against the United States is barred absent waiver of sovereign immunity, “ ‘and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’ ” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)). A waiver of immunity cannot be implied; it must be “unequivocally expressed in the statutory text.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The United States has expressly consented to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal (B) holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity (C) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states (D) holding that federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against the united states or one of its agencies absent a clear waiver of sovereign immunity (E) holding that a lack of a waiver of sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
terms” as existed prepetition meant that the Credit Union would continue to apply the funds received by it pursuant to the automatic deduction to the outstanding balances on both the secured and unsecured loans. In defense of the Credit Union’s policy, it can be argued that a debtor who fails to respond to a creditor’s invitation to terminate automatic loan payments on a prepetition debt has established a willingness to repay such a debt. Because these postpetition payments are (by negative inference) voluntary in nature, the argument goes, they are expressly permitted by § 524(f), and the creditor is therefore not in violation of § 362(a). Arguments to that effect have been consistently rejected by the courts. See In re Hellums, 772 F.2d 379, 381-82 (7th Cir.1985) (collecting cases) (<HOLDING>). But since Heliums ruled that a creditor who 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that creditors cannot allow postpetition funds to be automatically applied to a prepetition indebtedness absent some positive indication that debtors indeed intend to voluntarily assume their prepetition debts (B) holding that provision in prepetition agreement which precluded sale of assets by debtor was not a bar to a sale under section 363 because prepetition agreements purporting to in terfere with a debtors rights under the bankruptcy code are not enforceable (C) holding that creditors failure to voluntarily turn over property lawfully seized prepetition constituted violation of automatic stay (D) holding that a prepetition equitable distribution right to equalization relief constitutes a discharged prepetition claim and distinguishing while agreeing with in re marriage of seligman 14 calapp4th 300 18 calrptr2d 209 214215 1993 wherein it was held that a prepetition equitable distribution right to in kind relief does not constitute a prepetition claim (E) holding that debtors could not exempt under  522d1 proceeds from the prepetition sale of their home

Ex Output:

(A)