In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

While R.E. concerned the use of retrospective testimony by DOE to support a finding that it provided a child a FAPE, the court’s rejection of E.Z.-L.’s substantive challenge introduced doubt about whether parents could prospectively challenge their child’s educational placement without first enrolling the child in the recommended placement school. DOE argued that R.E. foreclosed all such prospective challenges on the basis that they are inherently speculative. The argument found some acceptance. See, e.g., E.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 13 Civ. 6709, 2014 WL 4332092, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2014) (rejecting prospective challenge as “impermissibly speculative and premature”); P.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 13 Civ. 4772, 2014 WL 3673603, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (<HOLDING>). But most courts did not adopt this hardline 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student (B) holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement (C) holding that the sro correctly concluded that a challenge tothe does choice of school is improper where the student never attended the school (D) holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school (E) holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver
(C)

then the trial court erred in allowing prejudgment interest to accrue on that sum at 10% per annum “[bjecause no prejudgment interest statute applies to this case.” Assuming arguendo that their argument was true, then the answer to the problem is found in their own brief. They acknowledge that the prejudgment interest scheme established under § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code applied if no other statute did. See Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 530-31 (Tex.1998) (dealing with Texas Revised Civil Statute art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a), the predecessor to § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code). And, at the time of judgment, see Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy, Co., 113 S.W.3d 400, 414 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), prejudgment interest accrued at the rate of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate (B) holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment (C) holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment (D) holding that the penalty is applicable (E) holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract
(B)

had reached age 55, in order to make them eligible for benefits (Katz Aff. Ex. 45), establishes that Pan Am in fact interpreted its Plan as requiring employees to have reached the age of 55 to receive subsidized benefits, regardless of how their employment ended. If the Plan provided the subsidized benefit to employees involuntarily terminated before age 55, there would have been no need to re-hire laid-off employees after that age to qualify them for benefits. Pan Am’s generosity in accommodating laid-off employees to allow them to receive higher benefits was completely gratuitous, and could not have resulted in an obligation on Pan Am’s part to employ this practice with every employee, or in a modification of the Plan’s terms. See Perreca v. Gluck, 295 F.3d 215, 224-25 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Thus, PBGC’s interpretation of the Plan’s 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that pension plan administrators have the ability to fashion their own plan formulas (B) holding that employer may not orally modify a pension plan and citing 29 usc  1102a1 which provides that all plan terms must be in writing (C) holding that plan participants in a defined benefit pension plan have no claim to the plans surplus assets (D) holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions (E) holding that the defendant withheld pension benefits in breach of the plan

(B)