In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury * * Black’s Law Dictionary 390 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Second) Torts § 903 (defining compensatory damages as “damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by him”); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 463 (3rd ed. 1961) (defining compensatory damages as “damages awarded to make good or compensate for an injury sus tained — distinguished from punitive damages ”). When civil rights plaintiffs seek “damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts.” Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2542, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (<HOLDING>). “Punitive damages aside, damages in tort 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are available in an intentional discrimination action even if the jury does not assess compensatory damages (B) holding that punitive damages which are based on the same underlying action justifying nondischargeability of compensatory damages are likewise nondischargeable (C) holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated (D) holding that damages based on the abstract value of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in action under civil rights act of 1871 (E) holding that damages based on the abstract value or importance of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such cases

Output: holding that punitive damages are available in an intentional discrimination action even if the jury does not assess compensatory damages


Input: Consider Input: to survive. See Plaintiffs’ Brief, 9-10 citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2) general notice pleadings standard remains intact after Twombly) Because this question goes to the very heart of the matter, it must be addressed first. To recapitulate, this Court’s April 2007 Opinion weighed the sufficiency of the “enterprise” allegations in accordance with the Third Circuit’s ruling in Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.1984). See 365 B.R. at 548. Seville stated that nothing more than general notice pleading was required for pleading a RICO enterprise. Seville relied, implicitly, on the long-standing rule regarding notice pleading first enunciated in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (<HOLDING>) But two months after this Court’s April 2007 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief  (B) holding that a pro se complaint  should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief (C) holding that dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (D) holding that a complaint will not be dismissed unless it appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim (E) recognizing the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief

Output: holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief 


Input: Consider Input: dismissed by the district court as alleging only one cognizable federal cause of action, that is, for arrest without probable cause. We also hold that the defendants sufficiently pleaded qualified immunity with respect to count one. 8 . The insufficiency of counts two and three, which were dismissed for reasons other than qualified immunity, is not before us under the collateral order doctrine which permits us to consider the immunity issue. See Schmelz v. Monroe County, 954 F.2d 1540, 1542-43 (11th Cir.1992). Nor does this case present us with an opportunity to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to pass on the propriety of the district court's disposition with respect to these counts. See Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, —U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 1211-12, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The district court's dismissal of these two 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pendent jurisdiction allows review of an unappealable order if it is inextricably intertwined with an appealable one  (B) recognizing the rulings in cook and weinberg and holding that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review an order that was not a preliminary ruling upon which the appealed order was predicated (C) holding that an appellate court may not exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal district court order where the merits of the nonfinal order are not inextricably intertwined with the properly appealed collateral order or where review of the former is not necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter (D) holding that certiorari petition is appropriate to review nonfinal pretrial evidentiary order in criminal case (E) holding that an order requiring an employercarrier to provide an ime is a nonfinal order for purposes of invoking appellate jurisdiction


Output: holding that pendent jurisdiction allows review of an unappealable order if it is inextricably intertwined with an appealable one