In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: we now reverse the decision of the trial court. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. 1 . We set forth additional facts in the companion case issued today, Dep't. of Revenue v. Adams, 762 N.E.2d 728 (Ind.2002). 2 . The CSET is a tax on the possession of certain narcotics. We discuss the tax and the procedures for collecting it in greater detail infra. 3 . All of the cocaine at issue in this case was discovered prior to the time the police served a valid search warrant. 4 . Ind.Code § 35-48-4-1 (1998). 5 . Id. § 35-48-4-6. 6 . United States Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the revenue officers' entry of Adam's home to collect the CSET assessment was a search. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Thomas v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (B) holding that revenue officers conducted a search when they entered a cottage and seized records when levying on delinquent tax (C) holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business (D) holding search unreasonable when conducted on the highway in broad day light (E) holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house
[EX A]: holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted

[EX Q]: potentially to have lost contact with family, friends, or each other. But that consequence is not “serious harm” — and warning of such a consequence is not a “threat” — under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. In applying the Act, we must distinguish between “Dimproper threats or coercion and permissible warnings of adverse but legitimate consequences.” United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir.2004), judgment vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1101, 125 S.Ct. 2543, 162 L.Ed.2d 271 (2005); cf. Dann, 652 F.3d at 1170 (Act aims at serious trafficking and threats of dire consequences). This case involves the latter. A church is entitled to stop associating with someone who abandons it. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). A church may also warn that it will stop 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause (B) holding that the free exercise clause protects the practice of shunning explaining that when the members of a cjhurch no longer want to associate with someone who has abandoned them those members are free under the first amendment to make that choice (C) holding that shortterm and sporadic interference with free exercise rights does not violate the first amendment (D) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (E) recognizing serious harm results when members of the legal profession engage in criminal acts which give rise to a lack of confidence by members of the public in those who are officers of the court
[EX A]: holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause

[EX Q]: for determining what constitutes a comment on post-arrest silence is fairly liberal. “If the comment is fairly susceptible of being construed by the jury as a comment on the defendant’s exercise of his or her right to remain silent, it violates the defendant’s right to silence.” Id. at 769; see also State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986). Thus, “Evidence or argument that is fairly susceptible of being deemed a comment on the right of silence should be excluded.” Giorgetti v. State, 821 So.2d 417, 422 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); see also State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306, 317 (Fla.1990) (“[Cjourts must prohibit all evidence or argument that is fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a comment on the right of silence.”); Dixon v. State, 627 So.2d 19, 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>). Here, Detective Kent’s response that Green 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that com ments that are fairly susceptible to being interpreted as comments on the defendants silence are generally reversible error (B) holding that if comment is fairly susceptible of being construed by the jury as a comment on the defendants exercise of his or her right to remain silent it violates the defendants state constitutional right to silence whether comment was introduced in states caseinchief or for impeachment purposes holding that the state may not impeach a defendant with his postarrest or postmiranda silence (C) holding that constructive amendments which are per se reversible under harmless error analysis are also per se reversible under plain error analysis (D) holding that comment on defendants silence was not reversible error because inter alia it did not have the effect of being probative on guilt or innocence (E) holding under plain error review that prosecutions repeated references to defendants silence in a one day trial were not harmless despite defendants responsive comments on silence
[EX A]:
holding that if comment is fairly susceptible of being construed by the jury as a comment on the defendants exercise of his or her right to remain silent it violates the defendants state constitutional right to silence whether comment was introduced in states caseinchief or for impeachment purposes holding that the state may not impeach a defendant with his postarrest or postmiranda silence