In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 375 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004). Since, as we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we need not consider whether the District’s failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its own case (as opposed to at the close of Smith’s case) further limits our review “to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by the evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice,” Fredrick, 254 F.3d at 162. The District presents two fact-based challenges to the jury’s verdict. First, it argues that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the District had a deliberately indifferent policy or custom under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, it claims that even had such a policy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom (B) holding that county liability under  1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior (C) holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc  1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition (D) recognizing respondeat superior liability (E) holding that municipal liability for purposes of claims brought under 42 usc  1983 must stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom rather than simply from respondeat superior
[A]: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom


[Q]: clause could be vitiated based on evidence of fraud “relating to the merger clause or fraud that invalidates the entire contract including the merger clause.” 228 Mich.App. 486, 498, 579 N.W.2d 411, 417 (1998). The plaintiffs have not alleged fraud in the merger clause itself. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants fraudulently induced them to buy investment properties in Detroit. The plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud in the inducement do not save their breach of contract claim because the remedy for fraud in the inducement is to void the contract, not reform it. See UAW-GM, 228 Mich.App. at 508, 579 N.W.2d at 418 (“Fraud ... makes a contract voidable at the instance of the innocent party.”) (quoting 3 Corbin, Contracts, § 580, p. 431); Star Ins. Co., 392 F.Supp.2d at 929 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs’ argument conflates their tort 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable (B) holding that irss failure to comply with seizure and sale provisions of section 6335 renders tax sales voidable at taxpayers option rather than void as matter of law (C) holding that the filed rate doctrine precludes insureds fraudulent inducement claim (D) holding that making of agreement to arbitrate was not called into question by general allegation that entire contract was void because of fraudulent inducement (E) holding that fraudulent inducement renders a contract void or voidable
[A]: holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable


[Q]: such as the instant case, federal courts must apply the substantive law of the forum state. Id. at 1515 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) and Keller v. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 778 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.1985)). This principle extends to the forum state’s choice of law rules. LaFarge, 118 F.3d at 1515 (citations omitted). We are thus bound to apply Florida’s choice of law rules in determining which state’s law governs this case. The district court held that Florida’s choice of law rules mandate the application of Florida law to a dispute over a contract to insure real property located within the state. The Sadikis concede, as they must, that the district court’s holding is entirely consistent with two prior opinions of this court. Id. at 1516 (<HOLDING>); Shapiro v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 899 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that by selling approximately eighteen percent of its product to florida importers moving nearly all of its product through the state purchasing equipment and supplies from florida suppliers utilizing storage facilities in florida and establishing essential business relationships in this state all within its ongoing commercial relationship with florida defendant engaged  in substantial and not isolated activity within the state  (B) holding that where florida state court had not addressed choiceoflaw issues with regard to directors liability federal court could presume that florida court would follow the restatement second of conflict of laws based on the florida courts past reliance on the treatise (C) holding that florida courts would apply florida law to contracts insuring real property located within the state (D) holding that when an accident occurs outside florida workers compensation benefits are payable only if the contract of employment was made in florida or if the employees employment is principally located in florida (E) holding new york could lawfully modify a florida custody decree because florida court had right under florida law to change the decree
[A]:
holding that by selling approximately eighteen percent of its product to florida importers moving nearly all of its product through the state purchasing equipment and supplies from florida suppliers utilizing storage facilities in florida and establishing essential business relationships in this state all within its ongoing commercial relationship with florida defendant engaged  in substantial and not isolated activity within the state