In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: the defendant’s applicable guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).” Id., app. note 1(A). In November 2007, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 706, which reduced the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses under § 2Dl.l(c) by two levels. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). The Commission later made the amendment retroactively applicable. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. May 1, 2008). As indicated, Jefferson sought to have his sentence reduced as result of those amendments. However, they do not apply here because Jefferson was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence required by statute. See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because the District Court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based (B) holding that a defendant whose original sentence was based upon the careeroffender guideline and not  2d11 could not receive a sentence reduction based on amendment 706 because it did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range (C) holding that while amendment 706 was applicable to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (D) holding that amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range where the defendants received statutory mandatory minimum sentences and thus the defendants were not eligible for relief under  3582 (E) holding that while amendment 706 was applica ble to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline

Answer: holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based


Question: until they were “in close proximity.” Lowe, 2014 WL 99452, at *3; see also Westport Ins. Corp. v. Bayer, 284 F.3d 489, 498 (3d Cir.2002) (according plain meaning to the district court’s choice of language in affirming its “implicit” findings of fact). These findings control because they are not clearly erroneous. Rather, they are suppo a- suspect takes action that clearly indicates that he “does not yield” to the officers’ show of authority. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547. Action— not passivity — has been the touchstone of our an h Cir.2010) (noting that, “for a person who is moving, to ‘yield’ most sensibly means to stop”), or when a suspect makes suspicious motions consistent with reaching for a weapon, see United States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (D.C.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the suspects in those cases, Lowe 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that i have a gun is sufficient to justify the sentencing enhancement because it merely requires a teller to make the reasonable inference that a robber would use the gun he claimed to have if he did not receive the money he demanded (B) holding that a suspect did not submit to a show of authority when he made continued furtive  gestures including shoving down motions that were suggestive of hiding or retrieving a gun (C) holding that a suspect who continued walking when approached by a police officer did not submit until physically restrained by the officer (D) holding that evidence of appellants prior gun possession was admissible in a homicide prosecution to show malice and intent possession of a gun without more is not wrongful conduct (E) holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept

Answer: holding that i have a gun is sufficient to justify the sentencing enhancement because it merely requires a teller to make the reasonable inference that a robber would use the gun he claimed to have if he did not receive the money he demanded


Question: the NFA Bylaw and Interpretive Notice relied upon by the plaintiffs in this case do not indicate that non-parties have the right to seek private judicial remedies to enforce the agreement. Without such language, the plaintiffs cannot claim third-party beneficiary status. See O’Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., 965 F.2d 893, 902 (10th Cir.1992) (concluding that introducing broker could not enforce arbitration agreement between investor and clearing broker); Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, 748 F.2d 774, 781 (2d Cir.1984) (suggesting that customer did not have third-party beneficiary rights under membership agreement of New York Mercantile Exchange); Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 153 Ill.App.3d 108, 106 Ill.Dec. 323, 325, 505 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, as the plaintiffs may not bring 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agreement between chicago mercantile exchange and its members did not impart direct benefit to nonparty clearing member of exchange (B) holding that a remote tippee must know that original exchange was given in exchange for benefit (C) holding that the plaintiff was required to arbitrate his claim which accrued before he became bound by the arbitration rules of the new york stock exchange because he was fully aware of the existing claim at the time he became a member of the exchange and became bound by its arbitration rules (D) holding exchange of information unnecessary due to changes in the agencys requirements and passage of time (E) holding that the witness had accepted immunity in exchange for no prosecution

Answer:
holding that a remote tippee must know that original exchange was given in exchange for benefit