In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] ... begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”). Section 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) states in part that “attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living ... justifies a higher fee.” (emphasis added). On its face, § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) generally references “the cost of living” not a local/regional cost-of-living. Id. (emphasis added). See Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (“[CJourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”) (citations omitted). Cf. Jones v. Espy, 10 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). This choice of language 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity (B) holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority (C) holding that the more general cpiu for all items applied because if congress had meant to permit upward adjustments based on the increased cost of legal services it would have done so with greater specificity and clarity (D) holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001 (E) holding that based on the statutes purpose and its legislative history the legislature would have included specific language regarding drug rehabilitation if it had meant to include it
[EX A]: holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity

[EX Q]: CURIAM. Anthony McLemore was tried by jury and convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of cannabis. We agree with McLemore that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury his requested special instruction that an element of the crime is knowledge by the defendant that the substances possessed were marijuana and cocaine. See Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 746 (Fla.1996). Even though McLemore disavowed any connection whatsoever to the items, we find that the error was not harmless. See Scott v. State, 808 So.2d 166 (Fla.2002)(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse the convictions and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to give proper instruction regarding disputed element of crime charged was fundamental error requiring reversal and stating that fundamental error is not subject to harmless error review (B) holdingthat because the evidence of the defendants guilt was overwhelming the courts failure to give a requested charge on impeachment constituted harmless error (C) holding that a trial court errs when it fails to give a limiting instruction properly requested by a party (D) holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error (E) holding that failure to give a properly requested chicone instruction cannot be harmless error
[EX A]: holding that failure to give proper instruction regarding disputed element of crime charged was fundamental error requiring reversal and stating that fundamental error is not subject to harmless error review

[EX Q]: which this insurance may apply.” (Def. Mot. Summ. J. App. 70). Plaintiff acknowledges this in its Response to Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum, page 1. 3 . The parties do not dispute that the incident in question occurred within the policy period, within the policy's coverage territory, and without any prior knowledge by any employee of the insured before the policy period. The main argument centers around whether the action was an "occurrence” under the policy. 4 . The Intervenors' Amended Petition incorporates the facts as alleged in the underlying plaintiffs petition; therefore, the Court examines only the Plaintiff’s (D-S-B’s) Original Petition. 5 . But see Southwest Tank and Treater Manufacturing Company v. Mid-Continent Casualty Company, 243 F.Supp.2d 597, 603 (E.D.Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>). The district court held that using the word 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in favor of insurer that a steel storage tank on which the insured was working was a selfcontained collective unit which constituted a single item of property when the insured was hired to install heating tubes to be used in the whole tank (B) holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party (C) holding that if the insured is only partially compensated by the insurer both the insurer and the insured are real partiesininterest (D) holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer (E) holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled
[EX A]:
holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party