In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: CURIAM. Appellant, John Mark Vaughan, Jr., filed a Rule 3.800(a) motion, claiming that his sentence was illegal under Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines could have been imposed under the valid 1994 guidelines. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to attach the relevant portions of the record to support this finding, which ordinarily would require reversal. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 741 So.2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). However, appellant failed to allege that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a movant successfully challenges an illegal prr sentence in a rule 3800a motion at resentencing the movant is entitled to be present at sentencing represented by counsel with an opportunity to present mitigating evidence (B) holding that burden is on trial court denying a facially sufficient rule 3800a motion to attach record establishing movant is not entitled to relief (C) holding motion for substitution of judge properly denied where movant failed to attach affidavit (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding that a rule 3800a motion that does not allege that the court records show the defendants entitlement to additional jail credit is facially insufficient

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: put forth anything to convince the Court that further discovery could rectify this issue. Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to deny or defer Defendant’s Motion as premature. 4. Contractual Limitations on Time to Bring Suit A. How does KRS § 304.14-370 affect contractual limitation provisions? Kentucky law has long recognized “the validity of insurance contract provisions requiring as a condition to sue that the action must be ‘commenced within the time specified by the policy.’ ” Edmondson v. Penn. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 781 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Ky.1989) (internal citations omitted). Courts typically enforced such provisions unless they unreasonably limited the time in which parties could sue. See Ashland Finance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 474 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Ky. 1971) (<HOLDING>). However, KRS § 304.14-370 does place 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable (B) holding that discovery was appropriately tailored as it limited the request to information within a six year time period relating to one specific contract and the deposition of a person most knowledgeable (C) holding that section 10b and rule 10b5 suits must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation (D) holding that cogsa claims must be brought within one year from the time at which the loss occurred (E) holding that a blanket bond contract provision requiring a party to bring suit within one year after discovery of the loss was not unreasonable

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: 1179 n. 7 (8th Cir.1990) (“While [the McBroom factors cited in Baer] may have been relevant and sufficient in Baer to require the state to permit party designation, the same factors might not be relevant in a different context.... We too [having just cited this Court’s subsequent decision in Rainbow Coalition ] reject these factors as the exclusive or even necessarily the most reliable, indicators of the state registration procedure's constitutionality.”), with Atherton v. Ward, 22 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1267-68 (W.D.Okla.1998) (noting that it was "bound by ... Baer" and concluding that there was "no difference in a constitutional sense between Oldahoma law and the Colorado law at issue in Baer"). See also Green Party of N.Y. v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 389 F.3d 411, 422 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Our decision in Rainbow Coalition of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the states interest in preventing deception of consumers (B) holding that the governor did not have to obtain the consent of the senate for the appointment of a candidate when the first candidate had been rejected by the senate the senate was not in session at the time that the second candidate was appointed and because the legislature which created and therefore controlled the office did not require by statute that the governor seek the senates approval in those circumstances (C) recognizing that baer did not state a universal brightline rule for drawing the line with frivolous party registration but like baer holding that the ability to meet the requirements for placing a candidate on the statewide ballot is enough of an indication of support to overcome the states interest in preventing voter confusion (D) holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling (E) holding that an oklahoma law placing democratic party candidates in the highest ballot positions violated the equal protection clause


Output: (C)