instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
omitted)). This is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires a finder of fact to consider numerous relevant factors, including “substantially identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership.” Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Rabine, 161 F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir.1998). Intent to evade union obligations, though not the keystone to proving alter ego in some other circuits, is the most critical factor in the Seventh Circuit. Compare Trs. of Pension, Welfare & Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Favia Elec. Co., 995 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Centor Contractors, 831 F.2d at 1312), with Rd. Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, U.A., AFL-CIO v. Dorn Sprinkler Co., 669 F.3d 790, 794 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). 1. Ownership, management, operation, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights (B) holding that intent to evade collective bargaining obligations is merely one factor among many that must be considered (C) holding that exercising control over other participants is one factor among many that should be considered not a requirement for applying the adjustment (D) holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement (E) holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation
answer:
(B)


question:
... clearly does not rise to the level of constitutional error when the failure was correct as a matter of state law.” 593 F.2d at 267. He noted also that “the highest court of Kentucky expressly held that the state trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested lesser included offense instruction.” I do not find any error in this conclusion. Shortly after this court decided Pilón, however, the Supreme Court invalidated on due process grounds an Alabama law which forbade the jury to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included offense in a capital case when the evidence would have supported such a verdict. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). See also Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2052, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Beck was concerned with imposition of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction (B) holding that beck requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction as a matter of due process in a capital case (C) holding that due process does not require a lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter where not requested (D) holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given (E) holding that a lesser included offense instruction might be constitutionally required in capital cases because of their unique nature
answer:
(B)


question:
idea. 6 . As a preliminary matter, we note that counsel for Lower Merion has submitted a letter pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), in which he contends that the Supreme Court's decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) renders the ADEA inapplicable to Lower Merion. This contention is meritless. In Kimel, the Supreme Court held "only that, in the ADEA, Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity to suits by private individuals.” Lower Merion, however, is not a state or an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes and therefore is not entitled to sovereign immunity. See Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 870-71 (3d Cir.1990) cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 1317, 113 L.Ed.2d 250 (1991)(<HOLDING>)(citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts (B) holding that school districts do not share in the commonwealth of pennsylvanias eleventh amendment sovereign immunity because they are not alter egos of the commonwealth (C) holding that school boards in alabama counties were not arms or alter egos of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that pennsylvanias judicial districts are entitled to immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment (E) holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity
answer:

(B)