instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
case. In light of our decision that the parties’ dispute will not be resolved by an appraisal proceeding, we need not decide, as appellants assert, whether the district court erred by observing that the appraisal process would be subject to the statutes governing confirmation or vacation of an arbitration award. Nonetheless, pertinent to our holding in this case, we take the opportunity to acknowledge that although some arbitration standards apply in processing appraisal results, Minnesota recognizes a distinction between appraisal and arbitration. Compare QBE, 778 N.W.2d at 398 (stating that “[ajppraisal decisions are subject to Minn.Stat. § [§ ] 572.08-.30 (2008), the arbitration statute”) and David A. Brooks Enters., Inc. v. First Sys. Agencies, 370 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Minn.App.1985) (<HOLDING>) with Johnson, 732 N.W.2d at 346 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that explanations of arbitration awards are not required (B) holding that because appraisal is analogous to arbitration the court would apply principles of arbitration law to this dispute regarding an insurance policy appraisal clause (C) recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit (D) holding that minnesotas arbitration statutes govern appraiser decisions and appraisal awards are to be treated as arbitration awards (E) holding that judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow in scope
answer:
(D)


question:
entered an order finding probable‘cause that the property was used to facilitate the commission of a felony. Although Flagg’s atto ation of a discovery order will constitute an abuse of discretion where the trial court fails to make express written findings of fact supporting the . conclusion that the failure to obey the court order demonstrated willful or deliberate disregard. Express findings are required to ensure that the trial judge has consciously determined that the failure was more than a mistake, neglect, or inadvertence, and to assist the reviewing court to the extent the record is susceptible to more than one interpretation. Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 495-96 (Fla.2004) (citing Tubero, 569 So.2d at 1273); cf. Ledo v. Seavie Resources, LLC, 149 So.Sd 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Flagg filed a motion to set 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (B) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact (C) holding that where the record plainly reflected ledos willful and deliberate disregard of the courts repeated orders to respond to interrogatory requests the trial courts failure to provide written findings of fact in its order striking ledos pleadings did not require reversal (D) holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment (E) holding that erroneous findings of fact not necessary to support the judgment of the court are not grounds for reversal
answer:
(C)


question:
an agency should receive for its interpretation of a statute in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). If the “intent of the Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. When the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court must determine whether the agency’s interpretation is grounded in a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782. In interpreting § 401, the Forest Service is not entitled to any agency deference because the EPA, not the Forest Service, administers the CWA. Baptist Hosp. East. v. Sullivan, 823 F.Supp. 424, 427 (W.D.Ky.1993) (<HOLDING>). An agency that interprets a statute other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding regulations entitled to chevron deference (B) holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority (C) holding that a precondition to chevron deference is congressional delegation of administrative authority (D) holding that with respect to domestic bridges the general bridge authority act was clearly intended to end piecemeal congressional supervision of bridge construction by delegation of congressional authority to an expert administrative agency (E) recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys
answer:

(C)