In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: time to the end of the videotape. III. Defendant moved, and the State cross-moved, for leave to appeal the Appellate Division’s judgment. We granted both motions, 205 N.J. 11, 11 A.3d 371 (2010), and we thereafter granted leave to the Attorney General to participate as an amicus curiae. Before this Court, defendant argues that the Appellate Division erred in rejecting the findings ajnd conclusions of the trial court that his initial request to speak with his mother was an invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent. First, he asserts that the panel was obligated to defer to the factual findings of the trial court and that its failure to do so yiolated the clear directives from this Court, requiring reversal. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 17, 974 A.2d 1057 (2009) (<HOLDING>); State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244, 927 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a factual question and should be accorded great deference and should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous (B) holding that trial courts determination of whether defendant accepted responsibility should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation (C) holding that a trial courts findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction (D) holding that this court will only set aside district courts factual findings when they are clearly erroneous (E) holding that the case should be reopened where the cause has not proceeded so far that the ends of justice would be defeated or the orderly process of the court disturbed

A: (C)
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Q: to preserve evidence exists between a third party and another in the absence of a special relationship, such as one created by contract or statute. Id. Under that analysis, this court will need to consider the primary purpose of the third-party here, Giant Eagle. (2) “Duty” of a third-party employer to its employee Pennsylvania courts have not directly considered whether the existence of an employer/employee relationship creates a duty on the part of a third-party employer to preserve evidence of a work-related accident for a potential products liability suit by an employee. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is no such duty. See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F.Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D.Ark.1989); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 179 Mich.App. 136, 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither common law nor workers disability compensation act imposed affirmative duty on employer to preserve evidence which might be used in employees thirdparty liability action (B) holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme (C) holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability (D) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (E) holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties

A: (A)
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Q: to the military magistrate to search the appellee's buccal cells, contained significantly more information than what the military judge adopted in his reconsideration ruling. Compare AE CXIX at 9 with AE CXX at 6-7. Because this is an Article 62, UCMJ, appeal, we may not consider facts from SA H’s affidavit as we are bound by the military judge’s findings. Cossio, 64 M.J. at 256. Additionally, we note that the military judge did not sever the information that he believed to be problematic from SA H’s affidavit and then examine "the remainder [of the information] to determine if probable cause still exist[ed]” to execute the search of the appellee’s buccal cells. United States v. Gallo, 55 M.J. 418, 421 (C.A.A.F.2001); see United States v. Cowgill, 68 M.J. 388, 393 (C.A.A.F.2010) (<HOLDING>). 24 . Because Edwards is a prophylactic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial courts finding omission of information was not intentional or with reckless disregard for truth was not clearly erroneous (B) holding that affidavit is inadequate if it fails to disclose facts which would enable the magistrate to ascertain from the affidavit that the event upon which the probable cause was founded was not so remote as to render it ineffective (C) holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontradicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit (D) holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause (E) holding that information from confidential informant was reliable and credible where affidavit referred to previous instances in which informant provided correct information to police affiants own investigation and controlled buy of contraband confirmed information and second informant supplied same information to police

A:
(D)
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