TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: so complete a defense as he might reasonably have desired”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 820, 115 S.Ct. 81, 130 L.Ed.2d 34 (1994); 2d Cir.: United States v. Lawal, 736 F.2d 5, 9-10 (1984) (applying authorities for non-constitutional error to erroneous exclusion of hearsay); 3d Cir.: United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1498-1500 (3d Cir.1988) (making "non-constitutional 'harmless error' determination” for erroneous exclusion of hearsay), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 836, 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989); 4th Cir.: United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 184-85 (1992) (citing Kotteakos as authority for holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay was harmless), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 914, 113 S.Ct. 2351, 124 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993); 5th Cir.: United States v. Barnett, 945 F.2d 1296, 1301 n. 3 (1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1487, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a (B) holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion (C) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right (D) holdingthat erroneous admission of hearsay did not prejudiceresults of trial so as to require reversal (E) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay

SOLUTION: holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a

PROBLEM: the defendants conceded that, as a general rule, homogenous precinct analysis may be more reliable than ecological regression, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in accepting Mag-giotto's numbers and treating the election as arguably split-preference. 5 . The defendants also argue that, even if there is a statutory violation, Section 2 should not be enforced because it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, principles of federalism, and' the "congruence and proportionality” test established by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). We need not address this argument in light of our holding that Section 2 has not been violated. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district courts ruling may be upheld on an alternative ground supported by the record (B) holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record (C) holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses but can resolve such issues  upon evidence which is not materially in conflict (D) holding that to preserve an issue for appellate review the specific legal argument or ground upon which it is based must be presented to the trial court (E) recognizing that courts should not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of

SOLUTION: holding that a district courts ruling may be upheld on an alternative ground supported by the record

PROBLEM: on James’ EEO complaint. James’ EEO complaint was filed on April 2, 1986. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1613.281(b), James was authorized to file suit in federal district court “[a]fter one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days from the date of filing a complaint with the agency if there has been no decision.” Thus, his original complaint was filed prior to the time of authorization. However, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on March 2,1987. More than 180 days had elapsed by this time. The court concludes that the 180-day requirement in 29 C.F.R. § 1613.281(b) is better viewed as a condition precedent rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Cf Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983) (<HOLDING>); see also Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding exhaustion of regulatory administrative process is jurisdictional prerequisite to district court hearing discrimination claim (B) holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling (C) holding that the receipt of a righttosue letter in a title vii claim is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite (D) holding that the requirement of an actual case or controversy is a jurisdictional prerequisite under the constitution (E) holding that a coa is a jurisdictional prerequisite

SOLUTION:
holding exhaustion of regulatory administrative process is jurisdictional prerequisite to district court hearing discrimination claim