In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

for the district court to grant his motion to withdraw his plea. But Harvey has not challenged the district court's ultimate finding that he was competent to stand trial based on the court's consideration of the opinions of all three psychiatrists. In light of the district court's unchallenged and supported determination that Harvey was competent to stand trial (and therefore competent to plead), Harvey cannot argue that the court committed obvious error in failing to sua sponte permit him to withdraw his plea on the basis of his "marginal competence." Nor can he claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue Harvey's marginal competency as a reason for withdrawing the plea. Harvey's claims related to his competency therefore fail. { 18 We affirm. 1 . The court stat Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 940-42 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel (B) holding an attorneys mistaken prediction about a possible sentence does not render a defendants plea unknowing and involuntary (C) holding that a defense attorneys failure to uncover a defendants prior felony convictions and the attorneys inaccurate sentencing prediction did not render the defendants plea unknowing and involuntary because the defendant knew at the time he pleaded guilty what his sentence might be (D) holding that ineffective assistance can render a guilty plea involuntary (E) holding that an inaccurate sentencing estimate did not render a plea unknowing unintelligent or involuntary because the defendant was informed of the statutory maximum
holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel

controversy turns, in part, on a categorization of the loss at issue; an inherently factual determination requiring the testimony of Penn and NBC staff juxtaposed against Gioia’s onsite analysis. Thus, Gioia is a material witness and his convenience weighs in favor of transfer. B. Locus of the Operative Facts “Where there is no material connection between the district and’the operative facts, ... the interests of justice require the transfer of [the] action.” Manao Invests., 1997 WL 53200, at *2 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). ‘When determining the locus of operative facts in a declaratory judgment action concerning the interpretation of an insurance policy contract, this Court has considered where the insurance contract was made.” Royal Ins., 2002 WL 31385815, at *3-4 (<HOLDING>). Here, while it is unclear whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution (B) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (C) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (D) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york (E) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action
holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership

experts. 5. Applying the Balancing Standard Assuming, arguendo, the balancing standard applies to this case, BNSF’s showing is still inadequate to permit it access to FMC’s experts. “The claimed importance of expert testimony underscores the need for [BNSF] to have timely designated [its] expert witness so that [opposing counsel] could prepare for trial. The importance of such proposed testimony cannot singularly override the enforcement of local rules and scheduling orders.” Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 792 (footnote omitted). BNSF created the situation in which it finds itself by not cross-designating FMC’s experts to give notice it intended to rely on FMC’s witnesses without a formal agreement as to their shared use. See State ex rel. Ward v. Hill, 200 W.Va. 270, 278, 489 S.E.2d 24 (1997) (<HOLDING>). BNSF has not been diligent so as to entitle 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants had received sufficient notice where the original defendants and the newly added defendants shared an identity of interests and were represented by attorneys who were involved in the litigation from its inception (B) recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify (C) holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt (D) holding that absent a formal agreement among defendants in a litigation proceeding involving multiple defendants the circuit court should not generally permit a settling defendants expert witnesses to testify for the remaining defendants especially where doing so would violate the settlement agreement (E) holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify

holding that the defendants had received sufficient notice where the original defendants and the newly added defendants shared an identity of interests and were represented by attorneys who were involved in the litigation from its inception