In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: is “doubtful that the judicial interpretation of advisory Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by an independent commission implicates either of the twin concerns that motivate the rule of lenity.,” United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 719 (11th Cir. 2010) (William Pryor, J., concurring). And in any event, the text of the guideline is clear—“ ‘prior sentence’ means a sentence imposed prior to sentencing on the instant Qffense,” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. 1. ' Burke’s alternative'ground for appeal— that the district court erred in calculating his sentence because his 1999 Florida conviction for armed robbery is not a “crime of violence” as that term is used in section 2K2.1(4)(A) of the Guidelines—is foreclosed by binding precedent. United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 938 (11th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>); Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1246 (holding that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that armed robbery suspect was entitled to bail hearing even though armed robbery was considered capital offense under mississippi law because maximum sentence was life imprisonment (B) holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act (C) holding that the illinois crime of failure to report for imprisonment is not a violent felony for purposes of the armed career criminal act (D) holding that violence is synonymous with force in affirming armed robbery conviction (E) holding that attempted burglary under florida law qualified as a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 18 usc  924e2biihereinafter acca because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another

A: (B)
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Q: an interpretation of section 85.321 that would make any party who holds a mineral interest indefinitely liable to all subsequent interest holders for prior alleged damage to the land. The consequences of such an interpretation run contrary to the legislative intent to protect and encourage the development of Texas natural resources. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59. We are mindful of the consequences of a particular construction. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.023(5); McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 745. Absent a legislative enactment clearly abrogating the common law, we conclude that Emerald does not have standing as a subsequent lessee to pursue a claim under section 85.321 for Exxon’s alleged wrongful actions as a prior lessee. See, e.g., Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 342-43 (Tex.2006) (<HOLDING>). C. Negligence Per Se Because our holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law (B) holding that tex loc govt code  51075 abrogated city of texarkana v city of new boston 141 sw3d 778 texapptexarkana 2004 (C) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract (D) holding that the city of boston was acting as a market participant when it contracted for public works construction (E) holding that distribution of catalogs to city addresses constituted use within city subject to taxation under municipal code provision

A: (B)
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Q: is no dispute that Lin’s second motion to reopen, filed in 2012, was untimely and number-barred because her removal order became final in 2003. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i). Lin contends that the Chinese government’s awareness of her religious activities in the United States, and changed conditions for Christians in China, constitute a material change in country conditions excusing her motion from the applicable time and number limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). We do not reach that issue, however, because we hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion based on her failure to demonstrate her prima facie eligibility for the underlying substantive relief. See Jian Hui Shoo v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Lin’s assertions, the BIA did not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to establish a violation of due process an alien must show that she was denied a full and fair opportunity to present her claims internal quotation marks omitted (B) recognizing that an aliens ability to secure reopening depends on a demonstration of prima facie eligibility for relief which means she must show a realistic chance that she will be able to obtain such relief internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that the act of slamming  is objectively sufficiently serious to state a claim for relief under the eighth amendment alterations and some internal quotation marks omitted (D) recognizing that to survive dismissal a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter accepted as true to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that remand is not required where there is no realistic possibility that absent the errors the ij or bia would have reached a different conclusion internal quotation marks omitted

A:
(B)
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