In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

rules or orders.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 382.113(a). The legislature imposed only the two restrictions previously mentioned: an ordinance must be consistent with the Act and the commission’s rules and orders and may not make unlawful a condition or act approved or authorized under the Act or the commission’s rules or orders. Id. § 382.113(b). If the ordinance violates one of these restrictions, however, then its preemption is implied with unmistakable clarity. We therefore turn next to the first of these restrictions and address the question of whether the Act and the ordinance are consistent. 3. The Clean Air Act and the tent with state legislation, we begin by comparing the purpose of each. See City of Weslaco v. Melton, 158 Tex. 61, 63-64, 308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1958) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute (B) holding state and federal actions not parallel for colorado river purposes because the remedies were different  one was equitable and the other compensatory  and the sources of law came from different states (C) holding that an implied warranty of merchantability does not create a labeling requirement different from or in addition to those mandated by fifra because the implied warranty of merchantability arises from the sale itself not from a state labeling regulation citation omitted (D) holding that completing sixth grade and a limited ability to read were not inconsistent with a valid iq score of 68 (E) holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade a raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes
recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute

commencing an action will be assumed to have waived its right to arbitration when its use of the judicial process is clearly inconsistent with seeking arbitration at a later date.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying this law, Judge Weinstein' concluded that choosing to file a claim in court rather than arbitrate constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate. Id. (citing Digitronics Inventioneering Corp. v. Jameson, 52 A.D.3d 1099, 860 N.Y.S.2d 303 (3d Dep’t 2008)). I agree with Judge Weinstein’s well-reasoned decision that, if New York law applies, the decision to litigate disputes over unpaid claims in state court precludes Defendants from now seeking to compel arbitration with respect to those same claims. But see Grand Med. Supply, 2012 WL 2577577, at *2 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, I would reach the same result even 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context fall under the faa (B) holding that the framework for determining any disputed issues concerning arbitration must be determined in the context of the faa (C) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (D) holding that faa was inapplicable where parties involved in action are not parties to an arbitration agreement under which issues are referable to arbitration (E) holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed
holding that mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context fall under the faa

to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. Davis, 66 Ill.2d at 89-90, 360 N.E.2d at 767, 4 Ill.Dec. at 654, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment d (1965). Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants’ conduct rose to such a level. Accordingly, the probable cause existed to support an officer’s actions, the case should not be permitted to go to trial if there is any reasonable basis to conclude that probable cause existed.” Biddle v. Martin, 992 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir.1993), quoting Cross v. City of Des Moines, 965 F.2d 629, 632 (8th Cir.1992). 10 . See Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv. Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 200 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitations on the treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant up until the time such arrestee is released or found to be legally in custody based upon probable cause for arrest (B) holding neither a phone call by the police requesting an arrestee to come to the station for questioning nor the questioning of an arrestee at the station was a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment (C) holding that where an individual voluntarily goes to the police station to discuss the commission of a crime that person has not been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment (D) holding that transportation of arrestee to police station is service of police under the ada (E) holding that accused was not in custody when asked to go to the police station and left the station freely

holding that the fourth amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitations on the treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant up until the time such arrestee is released or found to be legally in custody based upon probable cause for arrest