instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
of the debtor. This distinction appears immaterial under the language of sec. 409.402(7), Stats. 7 In other contexts, a security interest properly perfected at one time may later become unperfected through creditor inaction. See, e.g. sec. 409.103(l)(d)l, (2)(b), (3)(e), Stats, (four month grace periods preserving perfection in collateral removed from jurisdic tion); sec. 409.403(2) (lapse of financing statements after 5 years unless continued). 8 Interestingly, the Ansley court held that a filing under "the name Ansley Farms instead of the debtor's true name — Emory Ansley — is seriously misleading, making [the]. . . security interest unperfected.. . ." Id,., 467 F.Supp. at 55. Other cases reaching similar results are In Re Wishart, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1296 (Bankr.W.D. Mich. 1972) (<HOLDING>); In Re Brawn, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 565 (D.C. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient (B) holding a filing under mccauleys reprographics and mapping insufficient to perfect a security interest in the assets of the debtor corporation (C) holding that the reservation of a claim need not name a defendant but only identify the type of claim the debtor seeks to retain (D) holding a filing under wishart equipment co insufficient to identify the debtor horace wishart (E) holding a filing under john and mayella lintz insufficient to identify the debtor corporation
answer:
holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient


question:
v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 116 F.Supp.2d 937, 950-51 (M.D.Tenn.2000). As other circuits have recognized, the treating physician rule is a standard that was developed in the Social Security context requiring the administrative law judge to give deference to the opinions of a claimant’s treating physician when determining the claimant’s eligibility for benefits. See, e.g., Regula, 266 F.3d at 1139; see also Peabody Coal Co. v. Groves, 277 F.3d 829, 833-35 (6th Cir.2002) (applying the “treating physician presumption” in a Black Lungs Benefit case holding that an AL J may place greater weight on the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician than those of non-treating physicians). Several circuits have adopted the treating physician rule in an ERISA context. Regula, 266 F.3d at 1139 (<HOLDING>); Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 901 (8th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that vicarious liability claim against union based on medical malpractice of treating physician is not preempted by erisa (B) holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate (C) holding that an erisa plan administrator is not bound by an ssa disability determination when reviewing a claim for benefits (D) holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician (E) holding as a matter of first impression that the treating physician rule is applicable in the context of a disability benefits determination under erisa
answer:
holding that vicarious liability claim against union based on medical malpractice of treating physician is not preempted by erisa


question:
See Lorber 675 F.2d at 1067. The court noted that the classification of the surcharge as a non-tax fee was “a close question,” but concluded that because the surcharge was triggered by “voluntary” choice, the surcharge was possessed more of the character of a service fee than that of a tax. See id. The Lorber court also held that extending priority status to the surcharge was contrary to the trend of then-recent amendments to § 64 of the old Bankruptcy Act, which tended toward the erosion of the preferred status of taxes. See id., 675 F.2d at 1067-68. The court explained that, following the grant by Congress of priority status to claims for taxes, the federal government and its state and local counterparts began to increase the types and levels of taxation. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. (<HOLDING>). Even courts in the Ninth Circuit, purporting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber (B) holding that ohios reimbursement claims met the lorber criteria but were not excise taxes because they were not universally applicable to similarly situated entities and in addition disadvantaged private creditors with like claims (C) holding west virginias reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber suburban ii and the chateaugay district court decision (D) holding reimbursement claims were excise taxes under the lorber test without addressing the bankruptcy codes central policy of equal distribution (E) holding that michigan reimbursement claims were excise taxes under both lorber and suburban ii
answer:

holding that reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber