TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: the I.C. court — perhaps Plaintiffs’ strongest case — determined that “the juvenile court can act to protect children within its jurisdiction.” I.C., 742 So.2d at 404. The I.C. court looked to § 39.453(8)(g), which holds: The court may issue a protective order in assistance, or as a condition, of any other order made under this part. In addition to the requirements included in the case plan, the protective order may set forth requirements relating to reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed for a specified period of time by a person or agency who is before the court; and such order may require any such person or agency to make periodic reports to the court containing such information as the court in its discretion may prescribe. See also Henry & Rilla, 720 So.2d at 573 (<HOLDING>). Although Plaintiffs and their counsel, if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the juvenile restitution statute does not expressly require the juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to pay the restitution ordered as a condition of probation the policies underlying the adult restitutions command that a trial court make such an inquiry applies with equal force to juvenile courts (B) holding that jeopardy attaches in juvenile adjudication that determines whether juvenile violated criminal law (C) holding that chapter 39 provides the juvenile judge the flexibility to factor a childs safety into a custody decision at all stages of a juvenile proceeding (D) holding that the defendant is entitled to be present at all stages of his trial  and a judges response to a note from the jury is one of those stages (E) holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles

SOLUTION: holding that although the juvenile restitution statute does not expressly require the juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to pay the restitution ordered as a condition of probation the policies underlying the adult restitutions command that a trial court make such an inquiry applies with equal force to juvenile courts

PROBLEM: the evidence of rape discussed above in Division 1, we conclude that the evidence at Martin’s trial was sufficient to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found as to both murders. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (2) (requiring a review of the statutory aggravating circumstances foundby the jury);UAP Rule IV (B) (2) (providing that, in all death penalty cases, this Court will determine whether the verdicts are supported by the evidence). See also Ring, 536 U. S. 584; Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. 20. Considering both the murders for which Martin has been sentenced to death and Martin as a defendant, we find that the death sentences imposed in his case were not disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Georgia law. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3); Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716-717 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited in the Appendix support this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts statutorily mandated proportionality review concerns whether a particular death sentence is excessive per se or is substantially out of line (B) holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable

SOLUTION: holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial

PROBLEM: (1989). A reasonable attorneys fee should be “consistent with market rates and practices” in the community. Id. at 287, 109 S.Ct. 2463. Such a fee, of course, must include “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of the kind normally charged to clients by attorneys.” Pinkham, 84 F.3d at 294-95 (characterizing the inclusion of charges for long distance telephone calls, facsimile transmissions, messenger services, and express mail as taxable costs under § 1920(4) as harmless error “because such costs were reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of the kind normally charged to clients by, attorneys, and thus should have been included as part of the reasonable attorneys fees awarded”) (citing WVUH, 499 U.S. at 87 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 1138); Neufeld v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 335, 342 (8th Cir.1989). (<HOLDING>). Thus, even though plaintiffs improperly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to award attorneys fees based on the objective unreasonableness of plaintiffs complaint (B) holding that district court abused its discretion in refusing to include in its attorneys fees award the depositionrelated travel expenses incurred by prevailing plaintiffs counsel in an adea case (C) holding that the district court abused its discretion by telling the jury about the right of a prevailing plaintiff to attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 (D) recognizing that a court can exercise its discretion not to award costs to a prevailing party as long as the court states its reasons for refusing to permit the award (E) holding that by choosing the words any actual expenses including attorneys fees incurred congress did not intend to remove the discretion of the district court to award fees in cases such as contingent fee or pro bono cases where the client has not actually incurred the obligation to pay her attorneys fees

SOLUTION:
holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to award attorneys fees based on the objective unreasonableness of plaintiffs complaint