In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: between cases brought under the federal law and those brought under Maine law. While the First Circuit does make a distinction, it ultimately holds that the negligence per se doctrine of Pratico is strictly limited to cases brought under FELA, and it strongly implies that the doctrine will not be expanded. Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998). 4 . Castine argues that the trooper testified at trial to matters that he had not previously indicated he would address, and therefore, it was unfairly surprised at trial. Generally, a continuance is the appropriate remedy when a party seeks to admit “surprise" evidence at trial. Because Castine did not seek a continuance, however, it may not now claim unfair surprise. See Pettitt v. Lizotte, 454 A.2d 329, 332-33 (Me.1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Because violation of a safety regulation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify (C) holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify (E) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing a defendants surprise fact witness to testify because the plaintiff did not request a continuance

Answer: (E)


Question: testified that he examined bullets and casings found at both S & A Food Store and Fast Freddy’s. He concluded that the .9 millimeter used in the S & A offense was also fired during the Fast Freddy’s offense. Therefore, the State’s evidence showed a strong correlation between the S & A offense and the Fast Freddy’s offense, providing both intent and identity evidence in the Fast Freddy’s offense and eliminating the need for the Vogt Street offense. c. No Need for Vogt Street Offense The evidence outlined above shows that the State’s evidence of Russell’s intent in the Fast Freddy’s offense was strong; therefore, the need for the extraneous Vogt Street offense was minimal at best. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 390; Graff v. State, 65 S.W.3d 730, 740 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet ref'd) (<HOLDING>). The State’s evidence showing Russell’s intent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant constructively possessed the methamphetamine laboratory discovered in a bedroom she shared with a renter (B) holding that methamphetamine retained for personal use by the defendant who had been convicted of conspiracy to distribute the substance and never argued any of the methamphetamine was lawfully obtained was properly considered contraband with which he was directly involved and therefore relevant conduct (C) holding that the enhancement applied where the defendant possessed a firearm in connection with possessing methamphetamine (D) holding the state did not need this evidence of possession of 147 boxes of cold pills used to manufacture methamphetamine because the state had other convincing evidence to establish the defendants intent to deliver methamphetamine (E) holding that the state is not allowed to suppress evidence but it need not collect evidence for the defendant

Answer: (D)


Question: theoretical underpinnings of the Act, we can discern why retroactive application is not only counter-intuitive, but legally improper. Landgraf again provides the analytical framework. Landgraf identified three examples of laws which generally do not have retroactive effect: (1) those which authorize or affect the propriety of prospective relief; (2) those which confer or oust jurisdiction and (3) those which make changes to procedural rules. 511 U.S. at 273-75, 114 S.Ct. at 1501-02. Legislation which operates in futuro by definition generally does not have retroactive implications. The classic example' is injunctive relief which proscribes present and fu ture conduct. See, e.g., American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 S.Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189 (1921) (<HOLDING>). However, habeas corpus relief involves 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 11 applied to a letter sent with the intent to influence the court with respect to injunctive relief (B) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (C) holding that the tucker act does not provide independent jurisdiction over claims for injunctive relief in contractual dispute cases (D) holding that tillman applied to cases then pending on direct appeal ie in the pipeline (E) holding that the clayton acts provisions on injunctive relief applied to pending cases

Answer:
(E)