In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: prolonged; and (4) the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. Alpert, 816 F.2d at 964, citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). DiGiovanni’s continued investigation after issuing the warning was entirely reasonable in light of these factors. First, any detention incident to that investigation was of limited duration. The encounter between Rodriguez and law enforcement personnel, from the moment he was pulled over until the currency’s discovery, lasted approximately forty minutes. Under these circumstances, even if Rodriguez’s detention occupied that entire time interval, it might not suggest a Terry Stop of unreasonable scope. See United States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188, 1194 (4th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). However, the alleged detention here only 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where officers had reasonable suspicion of a drug offense seizing defendants luggage for 38 minutes under terry did not mature into an unlawful arrest (B) holding suspect for 20 minutes constituted an arrest (C) holding that a defendants response to even an invalid arrest or terry stop may constitute independent grounds for arrest (D) holding that a seizure was unlawful because certain facts had dispelled the officers reasonable suspicion (E) holding that totality of circumstances supported reasonable suspicion that defendant was transporting drugs and therefore officer was justified in seizing truck
[A]: (A)


[Q]: a habeas petition, and since his administrative remedies are now exhausted, this claim can proceed. B. Fox’s Notification Challenge is Properly Before The Court The second half of Fox’s claim relating to the notification requirement of the statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c)(2), is properly brought by him as a petition for a declaratory judgment. Notification claims do not relate to the fact or duration of confinement, therefore challenge to a notification requirement is not properly brought as a habeas petition. See Bunn v. Conley, 309 F.3d 1002, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The notification scheme [under 18 U.S.C § 4042(b) governing violent offender notification] in no way affects the duration, much less the fact, of confinement.”); Henrikson v. Guzik, 249 F.3d 395, 397 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (B) holding that because henrikson is not challenging the fact or duration of his confinement subject matter jurisdiction is not present under 28 us  2241 (C) holding that subject matter jurisdiction under  2241 is present in the custodial court when the petition challenges the manner location or condition of a sentences execution (D) holding that under the fsia personal jurisdiction   depends upon the district court finding subject matter jurisdiction under 28 usc  1330a and proper service under 28 usc  1608 (E) holding that district courts have jurisdiction under 28 usc  2241 to review cat claims for errors of law including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes
[A]: (B)


[Q]: proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 848, as opposed to the civil forfeiture proceeding at issue in this case. See Oberlin, 718 F.2d at 896. Furthermore, Oberlin recognized this distinction, noting that the defendant’s criminal conviction and the criminal forfeiture were intended as a penalty, and thus abated. Id. Potter also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), eliminates the distinction between in rem and in personam proceedings such that those labels can no longer be the basis for distinguishing civil and criminal forfeiture proceedings. Thus, she contends, Shaffer calls into question the validity of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 676-79, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 2088-90, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Shaffer is distinguishable from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 18month delay in filing forfeiture action did not violate due process (B) holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment (C) holding that the defendants property interest requires a preseizure hearing (D) holding a puerto rican forfeiture statute modeled after  881a which did not provide for preseizure notice and hearing did not deny appellant due process (E) recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process
[A]:
(D)