TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: before section 362(b)(3) can come into play. An act that both creates and perfects a lien postpetition cannot so qualify. See, e.g., Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Excel Eng’g, Inc. (In re Excel Eng’g, Inc.), 224 B.R. 582, 589-90 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1998) (refusing to recognize validity of postpetition creation and perfection of mechanic’s hen because creditor had no lien at the time debtor filed for bankruptcy); Water-vliet Paper Co. v. City of Watervliet (In re Shoreham Paper Co.), 117 B.R. 274, 281-83 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1990) (finding postpe-tition creation and perfection of property tax lien barred by automatic stay because no prepetition interest existed); Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y v. Ballentine Bros. (In re Ballentine Bros.), 86 B.R. 198, 201 (Bankr. D.Neb.1988) (<HOLDING>); North Side Lumber Co. v. Indus. Indem. Co. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations (B) holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor (C) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (D) holding that creditors failure to voluntarily turn over property lawfully seized prepetition constituted violation of automatic stay (E) holding that creation of a postpetition tax levy based on a prepetition assessment was barred by the automatic stay

SOLUTION: holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations

PROBLEM: is minimized if officers exercise unquestioned command of the situation. Id., 129 S.Ct. at 786-87. Here, evidence supports the district court’s finding that Hollins’s behavior gave the police reasonable suspicion to believe that Hollins was armed and dangerous when they searched him. First, Hollins repeatedly refused to follow instructions to keep his hands in plain view, and he would slide his hands toward his waist while he was seated in the vehicle. Nervous, evasive behavior, which Hollins exhibited, is one of several factors which may be pertinent in determining reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 756 (11th Cir.2000). Second, Hollins repeatedly refused to obey an officer’s instruction to exit the vehicle. See Maryland, 519 U.S. at 410, 117 S.Ct. at 884 (<HOLDING>). Third, Hollins repeatedly disregarded an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop (B) holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop (C) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous (D) holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction (E) holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred

SOLUTION: holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop

PROBLEM: public official or employee must breach a ministerial duty imposed by statute or by regulation.” Norton does not cite to any authority or provide any rationale for that statement; moreover, NoHon made that comment solely in the context of the public duty doctrine. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court has declared that, absent allegations that a state official violated “either a statutory or departmentally-mandated duty,” a petition’s pleadings “are insufficient to state a claim which is not barred by the doctrine of official immunity as a matter of law.” State ex rel Twiehaus v. Adolf, 706 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Mo.1986). But a “departmentally-mandated duty” may clearly arise from sources other than statutes or regulations. Such a duty can arise from departmental rules, the orders of a s E.D.2010) (<HOLDING>); Geiger v. Boiversox, 974 S.W.2d 513, 517 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that emergency medical technicians and paramedics were not entitled to official immunity for their actions related to the treatment of patients in nonemergency situations (B) holding that defendants were entitled to official immunity and not addressing the merits (C) holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity (D) holding that patients who were denied medical treatment on nonemergency basis had standing to bring antitrust action against medical center (E) holding nurses were not entitled to official immunity where it was alleged that they failed to follow orders for a patients care given to them by a doctor

SOLUTION:
holding that defendants were entitled to official immunity and not addressing the merits