In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

that it can be restored, as when a house suffers smoke and water damage in a fire, the tort-feasor is liable for the costs of restoring the property to its former condition, up to the total value of the property. Applying these rules to fire-damaged trees is problematic. Is it the loss of the tree that is permanent, or the loss to the real estate? A tree that has burned and is dead is permanently destroyed, but the land on which the tree was located can be restored, either immediately by bringing in a fully grown tree or by planting a sapling. The question of “permanent” versus “temporary” damage is ultimately less helpful than the question of how the trees were used and their intrinsic value to the property. See, e.g., Mosteller v. Naiman, 416 N.J. Super. 632, 638, 7 A.3d 803 (2010) (<HOLDING>). One legal encyclopedia explains the use-value 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that quantifying damages for trees is a  complex subject  that depends upon the evidence in the particular case  (B) holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality (C) recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law (D) holding that the question whether section 3553b permits departure in some particular case is subject to plenary review (E) holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis
holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality

In my judgment, it is extremely doubtful that the obviously dispensable involvement of the judiciary in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins and ends in the Executive Branch is a proper exercise of judicial power. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. Appx. 697, 702-703 (1864) (opinion of Taney, C. J.); United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48 (1852). It may well follow that the misguided opinion of today’s majority has nothing more than an advisory character. Whether or not that be so, the better rea soning in Justice Souter’s far wiser and far more scholarly opinion will surely be the law one day. For these reasons, as well as those set forth in Justice Souter’s opinion, I respectfully dissent. 1 See, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F. 3d 630 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution (B) holding that a federal court may order a state to pay cleanup costs pursuant to the comprehensive environmental response compensation and liability act of 1980 (C) holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken (D) holding that bankruptcy court may enjoin state environmental reclamation order (E) holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs
holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution

for kidnapping, and to a concurrent twenty-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault into which it merged the remaining convictions. During the course of trial on Indictment I, defendant was arrested at the courthouse for the Lakewood rape on charges that would form the basis of Ocean County Indictment Number 90-04-0519 (Indictment II). He was convicted by a jury of kidnapping and two counts of criminal sexual contact on Indictment II in 1993 and sentenced to another discretionary extended term of life imprisonment with a twenty-five-year period of parole ineligibility on the kidnapping count consecutive to the sentence he was then serving arising out of Indictment I. In 2011, following our decision in State v. Pennington, 418 N.J.Super. 548, 557-58, 14 A.3d 790 (App.Div.2011) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 209 N.J. 595 (2012), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that minnesota stay of imposition is sentence for purposes of federal sentencing guidelines even if no term of probation was imposed (B) holding that an additional term did not materially alter the contract because the plaintiff cannot profess to be surprised by an additional term in an invoice when the price quotation contained the identical term (C) holding that district judge was laboring under the misapprehension that in his words a term of supervised release can be reduced but cant be extended thats wrong it can be extended (D) holding that a second extended term cannot be imposed on an offense occurring before the imposition of the first extended term under njsa 2c445b1 (E) holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract

holding that minnesota stay of imposition is sentence for purposes of federal sentencing guidelines even if no term of probation was imposed