In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: Dr. Proctor testified about the 2014 Report’s conclusion that filtered cigarettes increased the risk of adenocarci-noma (a type of lung cancer) by causing smokers to inhale more deeply, and by ventilating in a way‘that “increases certain poisonous compounds.” On appeal, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not have been permitted to use the 2014 Report to bolster the testimony of her expert witness. On this point, we also agree with Defendants. It is well established that “experts cannot bolster or corroborate their opinions with the opinions of other experts who do not testify,” as -“[s]ueh testimony improperly permits one expert to become a conduit for the opinion of another expert who is not subject to cross-examination.” Schwarz v. State, 695 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); accord Tolbert v. State, 114 So.3d 291, 294 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion (B) holding that any probative value of bolstered testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of issues or misleading the jury quoting  90403 fla stat (C) holding that the probative value of contested evidence far outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice where any potential unfair prejudice was cured by a limiting jury instruction (D) holding in a criminal context that the probative value of evidence of other crimes is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice where the court will give a limiting jury charge (E) holding that witness testimony about prior drug purchases from defendant was highly probative of brookins guilt and was not outweighed by any danger of undue prejudice

Output: holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion


Input: Consider Input: 64 L.Ed.2d 795 (1980). We are faced with precisely such circumstances here. In their July 30 telephone conversation, Garcia negotiated with Papo for the purchase of heroin. He also instructed Papo to deliver the heroin to DeJe-sus, a direction that Papo clearly intended to carry out. Garcia’s instructions to Papo and Papo’s evident assent are independently admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 803(3). Under that rule, hearsay statements reflecting a declarant’s intentions or future plans are admissible to prove subsequent acts. Fed.R.Evid. 803 advisory committee note. Accordingly, the July 30 Garcia-Papo conversation is admissible to prove that Papo and Garcia intended to carry out a narcotics transaction in which DeJesus would serve as a middleman. See United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d at 104 (<HOLDING>). The July 30 conversation also is arguably 
 Holding statements: (A) holding coconspirators hearsay statements independently admissible under fedrevid 8033 to show declarants intent to engage in illicit drug transaction (B) holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care (C) holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay (D) holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators (E) holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy

Output: holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care


Input: Consider Input: Prema Mathai-Davis, Lewis Pennock, Ruth Quigley, Loius Sklar, Robert Graham, and Mark Williamson — are the trustees of the three nomi nal defendants: AIM Sector Funds, AIM Combination Stock & Bond Funds, and AIM Stock Funds (“Nominal Defendants”). See Document No. 8 ¶¶ 13-16. 4 . It is undisputed that the Funds qualify as registered investment companies under the ICA. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(8); 80a-3. 5 . This fiduciary duty is breached when the investment advisor, or an affiliated person, charges "a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.” Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir.1982). 6 . See Green, 147 F.Supp.2d at 330 (<HOLDING>); Halligan v. Standard & Poor's/Intercapital, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though attorneys fees were not properly awardable under rule 68 costs excluding fees were mandatory (B) holding that awarded fees were reasonable and that proof that attorneys fees are necessary apart from testimony as to the reasonableness of the fee is not required (C) holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed (D) holding that investment advisors officers whose salaries came from fees paid to the investment advisor were not liable under  36b even though they may have indirectly received fees (E) holding that a wife was able to pay her own attorneys fees because she had an investment account of 16000 which could be liquidated to pay the fees


Output: holding that even though attorneys fees were not properly awardable under rule 68 costs excluding fees were mandatory