In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: clause. We conclude that reckless battery is a violent crime under the force clause, an issue not addressed by the Holloway opinion. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 20 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012). We further note that the Holloway court’s conclusion with respect to reckless battery accorded with then-binding instruction from the United States Supreme Court that the residual clause is limited to an offense that “typically involve[s] purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct.” United States v. Holloway, supra at 260, quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008). Last year, however, the Supreme Court retreated from this characterization of the residual clause. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270, 2277 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court iterated that “[t]he phrase 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally  (B) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (C) holding that burglary is violent felony (D) holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause (E) holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: S.E.2d at 629 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Sparks v. Peacock, plaintiff husband filed an action in superior court seeking contributions for payments on promissory notes executed by both he and his wife. Unlike the Garrison litigants, however, the parties in Sparks had not brought an action for equitable distribution in district court. Based on the wife’s motion, the superior court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, this Court acknowledged the jurisdictional nature of section 7A-244, stating that if the parties had indeed brought an equitable distribution action and such action was pending pursuant to section 7A-244, the superior court would not have jurisdiction over the propriety of payments on the promissory note. Id. at 641, 500 S.E.2d at 118 (<HOLDING>); see also Ward v. Ward, 116 N.C. App. 643, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that defendant correctly stated that the district court has jurisdiction over equitable distribution actions and citing section 7a244 (B) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties (C) holding that personal jurisdiction over partner did not follow from jurisdiction over partnership citing sher (D) holding that court of claims has jurisdiction over actions for breach of standard contract (E) recognizing the difference between jurisdiction over an action and jurisdiction over an issue and holding that although section 2074207 vests the family court with exclusive jurisdiction over actions to determine paternity under section 621302a1 the probate court has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of paternity when the issue is essential to the probate courts determination of heirs
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: denial of the conversation with Fultz appears for the first time in the form of an affidavit, completed one day before her response to Lockheed’s motion for summary judgment and four months after the deposition. In evaluating whether an employee has been disciplined or terminated “because of’ a protected trait, we must “look at the facts as. they appear to the person making the decision.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1231; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that “[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether [the employer’s] proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether [the employer] honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.”); see also McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Before issuing the reprimand, Dixon informed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false (B) holding that where the employer fired the plaintiff upon a good faith belief that he sexually harassed coworkers the plaintiff could not prove pretext by challenging the harassment allegations (C) holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment (D) holding that a plaintiff failed to state a claim based on conclusory allegations that a locality failed to adequately supervise officers in the proper use of force where the complaint provided no factual allegations of known widespread conduct by the localitys employees comparable to that alleged as to the plaintiff (E) holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was inadmissible in part because it was not similar to the allegations made by defendant
[EX A]:
(A)