In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Accordingly, the second Olano prong is satisfied: the error, both as to the absence of a jury determination on an essential element of the offense and the failure to include that element in the indictment, was indeed “plain.” c. Did the plain error affect Thomas’s substantial rights? An error affects a defendant’s “substantial rights” if it is “prejudicial” and it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Gore, 154 F.3d at 47. “Though ‘prejudice’ is also required to show that an error is not ‘harmless,’ pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a), the important difference of plain error prejudice [in most cases] is that ‘[i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of pers , 2001), with United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 100-01 3d Cir. (2001) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (B) holding that constitutional error cannot be premised on error in a charge unless the error violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed (D) holding at the governments urging that a similar error was an error in both the trial and sentencing (E) holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
industry is constitutional.” Reply [# 29] at 3. Defendants maintain that “the Court may not rely on a federal regulation (9 C.F.R. § 2.126) or on the Guide to conclude that the Fourth Amendment right at issue is clearly established.” Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Defendants further argue that even if the Court considered the regulation and the Guide, they do not limit the APHIS’ powers of inspection or set policy. Id. at 5. As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that they are not challenging the statutory scheme governing the USDA’s warrantless searches, but rather are challenging the application of that statutory scheme by the Inspector Defendants on May 7, 2013 at Big Cats. See, e.g., LeSueur-Richmond Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261, 268-69 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). In LeSueur, the Fourth Circuit closely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy (B) holding that under the fourth amendment a party may challenge both the constitutionality of the act permitting warrantless searches as well as the conduct of the government officials in a particular case (C) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause (D) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (E) holding there is no requirement that the government obtains a warrant at the first moment probable cause exists  the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of warrantless searches is one of reasonableness under the circumstances

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
both SORNA was enacted, and the Interim Order was promulgated. As a result, this case is distinguishable from those cases in which Courts have found that the Ex Post Facto Clause was violated, which are limited to circumstances in which the offender failed to register after the passage of SORNA, but prior to the date of the Interim Order. See, e.g., United States v. Gillette, supra at 533 (finding that SORNA was ex post facto as to the defendant whose failure to register as a sex offender predated both the passage of SORNA, and the promulgation of the Interim Order); United States v. Aldrich, 2008 WL 427483 at *5 (D.Neb., February 14, 2008); United States v. Kent, 2008 WL 360624 at *10 (S.DAla., February 8, 2008); United States v. Muzio, 2007 WL 2159462 at *5 (E.D.Mo., July 26, 2007)(<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we find that SORNA is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the attorney generals decision as to timeliness of an asylum request pursuant to 8 usc  1158a3 the attorney generals decision regarding whether an alien complied with the oneyear time limit or established extraordinary circumstances such that the time limit should be waived is not reviewable by any court (B) holding that sorna is only unconstitutional when applied to those previouslyconvicted persons who traveled before the attorney generals rule (C) holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term (D) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants (E) holding that sorna was made retroactive by the attorney generals february 28 2007 interim rule

Ex Output:

(B)