In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: we held that, The penetration offense alleged in the first indictment clearly required a separate and distinct act (involving appellee’s sexual organ with the child’s female sexual organ) from the act alleged in the second indictment (which involved appel-lee’s mouth with the child’s sexual organ). In this case the second indictment alleged that appellee caused the child’s sexual organ to contact his mouth ency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct. Appellant concedes to this view, the plain language of the statute supports it, and so does our caselaw. See Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630 (stating that a grammatical analysis suggests that the unit of prosecution for indecency with a child by exposure is the exposure and, ultimately, adopting that viewpoint); Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. State, 550 S.W.2d 89, 91 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive (B) holding that a similar statute created separate offenses (C) holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation (D) holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive (E) holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity

Answer: (A)


Question: constitutionally obstruct despite the provision of counsel. Indeed, in Benjamin v. Fraser, when considering impediments to pre-trial detainees’ ability to visit with counsel, we recognized that a state could not “ ‘unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts.’ ” Benjamin 264 F.3d at 187, 188 (emphasis added) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) and determining that “both the due process right of access to the courts and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are implicated,” and that there was no error in measures ordered to remedy undue delays associated with attorney visits). See also Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-81, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Nor can I agree with the majority’s holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding same for writ of error coram nobis (B) holding that rule 4as time limits govern an appeal from a district court order granting or denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis (C) holding that the state could not deny an indigent criminal appellant a transcript to appeal pro se from the denial of a writ of error coram nobis or permit that the appellant at the will of the public defender be entirely cut off from any appeal at all (D) holding that federal court may not issue writ of coram nobis for state prisoner (E) holding that in the absence of a valid excuse for delay a coram nobis petition is subject to denial

Answer: (C)


Question: b. C.A.’s Claim is not Moot The defendants argue that C.A.’s claim is moot because they have submitted the requisite payment authorization to enroll C.A. at Cabin John Middle School. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 1. The plaintiffs, in their reply, point out that DCPS has not submitted any documentary evidence, other than a declaration, to prove that it submitted the required paperwork. Pis.’ Reply at 4. The plaintiffs further allege that while the defendants may have submitted the payment authorization for C.A.’s enrollment at Cabin John, the defendants recently “rescinded funding authorization for [C.A.]’s Grafton School placement.” Id. at 5. A failure to fund a student’s placement constitutes a unilateral change in the placement, Petties v. Dist. of Columbia, 881 F.Supp. 63, 66 (D.D.C.1995) (<HOLDING>). DCPS’ failure to fund C.A.’s placement, in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a city or town a sidewalk is that part of a street or highway that is intended or used by pedestrians (B) holding that failure to make payments in whole or in part or cutting off funds for special education programs amounts to a unilateral change in students placements which is prohibited by the idea (C) holding that in order to constitute a materially adverse change in the terms of plaintiffs employment a transfer must include either diminished responsibilities a demotion evidenced by a change in salary title or benefits or other indices unique to the particular situation (D) holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child (E) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody

Answer:
(B)