In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: is outside the ambit of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 891. Specifically, we held: Recall that in the majority of those cases, the court specifically considered whether the defendant invoked the right to remain silent and concluded that the defendant's statement or action was an invocation of the right. See Combs [v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 286 (6th Cir.2000), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 623, 148 L.Ed.2d 533 (2000)]; [United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997, 112 S.Ct. 1702, 118 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992)]; Coppola [v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1567 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 418, 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989)]; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (<HOLDING>)[, reh'g denied ]. Based on these cases and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously (B) holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer (C) holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously (D) holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent (E) holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent
Example Output: holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer

Example Input: F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir.1996)). We conclude that, although the district court erroneously determined that the principles of Daubert did not apply to the re-creation and Agent Constantino’s testimony, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence. Under Daubert, the district court conducts a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2796; see Fed.R.Evid. 702 . This “gate-keeping” obligation on the part of the district court applies to all types of expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Many factors may bear on this inquiry, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dauberts basic gatekeeping obligation  applies to all expert testimony (B) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (C) recognizing the basic principle of contract law that the obligation of good faith is an implied condition in every contract (D) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (E) holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions
Example Output: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive

Example Input: than 100 kilograms of marijuana, it must indict him appropriately and then prove the elements of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the government may indict a defendant under the provision with the lowest statutory maximum sentence and then, as in this ease, rely on relevant conduct findings to achieve what it otherwise might not if held to a higher burden of proof, namely a sentence under a separate offense’s enhanced penalty provision. Of course, it is clearly permissible “for judges to exercise discretion-taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender-in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute.” Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2358; see also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the government may still rely upon a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentencing courts may consider evidence of conduct or charges of which a defendant was acquitted (B) holding that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct or uncharged criminal conduct (C) holding that criminal conduct of which defendant is acquitted may be used as sentencing factor if proved by preponderance of the evidence (D) holding that a district court may find acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence (E) holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant
Example Output:
holding sentencing courts may consider evidence of conduct or charges of which a defendant was acquitted