In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: (1986) (relying on section 45(1) and comment a). 24 . See e.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980) (“railroad [retirement] benefits are not contractual and may be altered or even eliminated at any time”); Devlin v. Transportation Communications Int’l Union, 173 F.3d 94, 103 (2nd Cir. 1999) (a claim to vested welfare benefits is contradicted by the ... unambiguous reservation in the plan documents of its right to amend the plan”); International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Amer. v. BVR Liquidating Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1999) (“the inclusion of a ‘reservation of rights’ provision establishes that there was no intent for benefits to vest”); McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>); In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that performance of employment services constituted acceptance of the offer of participation in bonus plan and a binding unilateral contract was thereby formed (B) recognizing that generally    with supposed unilateral contracts  if the offeror expressly reserves the power to revoke the offer until the offerees performance is complete then the offer is illusory and cannot give rise to a unilateral contract but noting exceptions (C) holding that the offerors signature on the offerees conditional acceptance bound the offeror to all the terms therein (D) holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell (E) holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged

Output: holding that performance of employment services constituted acceptance of the offer of participation in bonus plan and a binding unilateral contract was thereby formed


Input: Consider Input: induced his employer to terminate his at-will employment?” See Haddle, 119 S.Ct. at 491. The Supreme Court ruled only on that issue. See Haddle, 119 S.Ct. at 492. The Eleventh circuit had already previously rejected the intracorpo-rate conspiracy doctrine. Because the in-tracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not before the Supreme Court, it would be a mistake to draw any inference from the Court’s silence on the issue. See United States v. Stewart, 650 F.2d 178, 180 (9th Cir.1981); Sacramento Valley Chapter of National Electrical Contractors Association v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 632 F.Supp. 1403, 1414 (E.D.Cal.1986), aff'd, 888 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.1989). The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine first developed in the anti-trust context. See Nelson, 200 F.2d at 914 (<HOLDING>). The Seventh Circuit extended the doctrine to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as a general rule the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice (B) holding a corporation cannot conspire with its officers and agents to restrain trade in its own products (C) holding that a hospital can conspire with members of its medical staff (D) recognizing that agents of a corporation may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed in the name of the corporation (E) recognizing that representation of a corporation by its officers in administrative proceedings is allowed

Output: holding that as a general rule the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice


Input: Consider Input: created doctrine of issue exhaustion. See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (<HOLDING>). To the extent that AFRC is arguing that it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding exhaustion requirement inapplicable when requiring exhaustion would be futile (B) holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement (C) recognizing that issue exhaustion is a mandatory although not jurisdictional requirement (D) recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different (E) holding that issue exhaustion is mandatory even if not a statutory jurisdictional requirement


Output: holding exhaustion requirement inapplicable when requiring exhaustion would be futile