In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: removed. Section 141(b) does not contemplate that a director’s term could end through board shrinkage. A bylaw that seeks to achieve this result conflicts with Section 141(b) and is void. This interpretation of Section 141(b) comports with how our law has developed. Under the common law, “the voluntary assumption of management responsibility by the directors carried with it a concomitant vested right to serve out the full term for which they were elected unless there was cause for removal....” Drexler, supra, § 13.01, at 13-2; see Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del.Ch.1988) (“At common law a director had a vested right in his position arising from his duties and responsibilities to the corporation.”); see also Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857 (Del.Ch.1957) (Seitz, C.) (<HOLDING>). “Prior to 1967, the [DGCL] was silent as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders (B) recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause (C) recognizing common law privileges (D) recognizing the presidents authority to remove sec members for good cause despite governing statutes silence (E) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary
[A]: holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders


[Q]: as well as recent country reports and his own affidavit, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that he failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegation that conditions in China have materially changed. We have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no abuse of discretion in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish changed conditions in China. Id. at 275 (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as “the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] ... it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion”); Jian Huan Guan, v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In addition, we find that the BIA did not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bia did not abuse its discretion in denying a petitioners untimely motion to reopen where she submitted proof of the birth of her two sons a letter from her parents warning of the danger of forced sterilization and a purported sterilization certificate for her cousin who also had two children (B) holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen (C) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (D) holding that the bia correctly imputed a parents knowledge that she and her children were not eligible for entry to the united states to her children (E) holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it
[A]: holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen


[Q]: are deemed removable because they were convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. See INA § 242(a)(2)(C) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) ] (precluding jurisdiction where alien is removable pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)). In addition, we lack jurisdiction to review purely discretionary decisions, see INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) ], such as the “manner in which the BIA balanced the various positive and negative factors which typically inform the exercise of its discretion under” INA § 240A. Cruz-Camey v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 28, 29 (1st Cir.2007). Despite these jurisdiction-stripping provisions, we may review “constitutional claims and questions of law presented in petitions for review of fin scretion. See Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all convictions remain valid for immigration purposes (B) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of petition for certiorari to the united states supreme court seeking review of denial of state postconviction relief (C) holding pendency of postconviction judicial proceedings relevant to immunity determination (D) holding that regulations that permitted an immigration official to reinstate removal orders violated the immigration and nationality act (E) holding that the pendency of postconviction motion does not negate the finality of convictions for immigration removal purposes
[A]:
holding that all convictions remain valid for immigration purposes