In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

” Boone v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 130, 133, 415 S.E.2d 250, 251 (1992). “A battery is an unlawful touching of another.... Whether a touching is a battery depends on the intent of the actor, not on the force applied.” Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 463, 468-69, 534 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2000) (citation omitted). “ ‘[T]he slightest touching of another ... if done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, constitutes a battery for which the law affords redress.’ ” Id. at 469, 534 S.E.2d at 350 (citation omitted). Accordingly, where Vaughn claims he only intended to scare Robinson and did not intend to shoot or wound him, Vaughn would not be entitled, in my opinion, to have the jury instructed on assault and battery. See Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987) (<HOLDING>). A second theory supported by the evidence is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that shooting at a person intending only to scare the person where no touching or wounding occurs supports instructing the jury on simple assault (B) holding that simple assault includes urinating on another (C) holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident   4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor (D) holding that punching another person is a statutory assault (E) holding simple assault is a lesser included offense of recklessly endangering another person
holding that simple assault includes urinating on another

this Opinion. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Trustee’s Objection to the Debtor’s Claim of exemption in her Toledo, Ohio house, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), be, and is hereby, SUSTAINED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Trustee’s Objection to the Debtor’s claim of exemption in past due rents, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5), be, and is hereby, DISMISSED without prejudice. 1 . As a resident of Michigan, the Debtor along with her bankruptcy petition also filed a contemporaneous motion for a change of venue to the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, which this Court granted. 2 . Pursuant to § 522(b), a debtor's right to claim an exemption in bankruptcy is determined by the state in which the debtor is domiciled. See In re Vaughan, 188 B.R. 234, 237 (Bankr.E.D.K.y.1995) (<HOLDING>). Some states like Michigan permit their 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that the terms residence and domicile are not the same thing but that a debtor may only claim an exemption in property where he is domiciled (C) holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a selfsettled revocable trust even though the settlor and the beneficiary as well as the bankruptcy debtor were the same person (D) holding that the objector must not only show that the facts do not support the exemption but must also prove that the debtor knowingly deceived the trustee and the creditors at the time the exemption was made (E) holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other
holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate

Education. In Peoria and Parsons, the plaintiffs made the eligibility for federal aid argument and added the argument that state action existed because the accreditation agency was incorporated, and thus a creature of state law. The arguments asserted in those cases were easily disposed of under traditional state action doctrine. Collateral consequences of eligibility for federal aid is not enough for state action under Blum v. Yaretsky, U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982); a company is not a state actor merely because it is itself regulated, see Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352-55, 95 S.Ct. at 454-55; and a corporate charter cannot create “state action” because such a rule would transform nearly every business entity into a state actor, cf. Burton, 365 U.S. at 726, 81 S.Ct. at 862 (<HOLDING>). In this case, by contrast, McKeesport can 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the need to avoid a rule that creates universal application of state actor status (B) holding that amtrak was a state actor (C) recognizing district court application of the same rule (D) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (E) holding that fraud creates an exception to the rule

holding that amtrak was a state actor