In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Ban zure beyond its lawful duration, such theft violates the Fourth Amendment. See Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 151 (7th Cir.1994). The remaining question is whether Colaprete’s Fourth Amendment right against having his property converted following a search was clearly established when the alleged conversion occurred. The Seventh Circuit has held that the existence of this right is “[s]o obvious ... that we do not think the absence of case law can establish a defense of immunity.” Id. We respectfully disagree. This court has never applied the Fourth Amendment in this manner, and Supreme Court precedent tilts slightly against the existence of any constitutional right against theft during the course of a search. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533(<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional (B) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (C) holding that theft by prison guards does not violate due process when postdeprivation remedy exists (D) holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies (E) holding that a prison guards intentional destruction of a prisoners possessions did not give rise to a federal due process claim because state law provided an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy
holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional

in favor of William Spencer, et al., (Spencer) and setting the penalties for violation of the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Spencer cross-appeals the denial of post-trial motions and refusal to award attorney’s fees. We affirm on all grounds. I BART’s unjust enrichment claim fads for want of a loss. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 881 (2000) (noting that the elements of unjust enrichment are “receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.”). Even assuming that County of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 158 Cal.App.4th 533, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 (2008), recognized an exception to this rule, BART’s claim does not fall into that exception. See Peterson v. Cellico P’ship, 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1594, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Concrete financial loss is required for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (B) holding that walsh does not support plaintiffs assertion that they need not allege any actual injury to bring an unjust enrichment claim (C) holding that where plaintiffs filed a complaint for conversion unjust enrichment and injunctive relief they had an adequate remedy at law (D) holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed
holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement

This holding, however, not only fails to dispose of Reyes’s first complaint, it fails to consider Rule 13.1(a)’s history in addressing his second complaint. However, since Reyes’s second issue can (and should) be disposed of without doing violence to the mandatory nature of the court reporter’s duty, I concur in the court’s judgment. When the trial court renders a judgment for the recovery of real property, the amount of “security must be at least ... the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue.” Tex.R.App. P. 24.2(a)(2)(A). Therefore, to determine the proper amount t did not hold an evidentiary hearing on Reyes’s motion to set superse-deas, a reporter’s record of the hearing was not required. Cf. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex.2005) (<HOLDING>). The majority holds, however, that Reyes 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the only record of grand jury testimony is the court reporters certified transcript not her tape recording of the proceeding (B) holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of trial by failing to object (C) holding in the pretrial context that a reporters record is required only if evidence is introduced in open court for nonevidentiary hearings it is superfluous (D) holding that if no countervailing evidence is introduced the trial court is  justified in fact required to enter summary judgment for the government the amount of the taxes proved to be due (E) holding that it is not

recognizing that the only record of grand jury testimony is the court reporters certified transcript not her tape recording of the proceeding