In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

and reimbursement claim based on the plan. Looking to FEHBA’s legislative history, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the purpose of FEHBA was to establish health insurance for federal employees and that insurance carriers “help the government fulfill the basic task of establishing a health benefits program for federal employees.” Id. at 1233. The Jacks court concluded that OPM “has direct and extensive control over these benefit contracts under the FEHBA.” The court determined that even though the plan “allows the carrier the discretion to pursue subrogation,” that “does not foreclose the application of the federal officer removal statute” because “the subrogation provision is necessarily a product of the benefit payment pro F.Supp.2d 848 (W.D.Mo.2011) (<HOLDING>); Van Horn v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that health insurer contracted with fehba was not acting under a federal agency within the meaning of the federal officer removal statute (B) holding that the fact that the insurance carrier voluntarily entered into a mutually agreed upon contract with the opm to administer healthcare benefits to federally employed enrollees does not rise to the level of a relationship defined as acting under a federal officer  (C) holding that a health plan insurer contracting with a government agency under a federal benefits program is considered a person acting under a federal officer (D) holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school (E) holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract
(B)

matter. When it is clear, however, from the relevant parts of the contract taken together and considered with the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement, that the obligation in question was within the contemplation of the parties or was necessary to effect their intention, then such obligation may be implied and enforced. But when the contract between the parties speaks to the obligation sought to be implied, the courts will not write that implied obligation into the contract. Stated conversely, there may be an implied covenant on the part of the lessee (in the absence of any expressed on the subject as in the lease).[ ] Id. (citations, alterations, and quotation omitted). See also Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 123 N.M. 526, 943 P.2d 560, 569 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in accordance with New Mexico law, any 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that endorsement would prevail if inconsistent with policy provisions (B) holding that courts cannot imply covenants which are inconsistent with express provisions (C) holding that state courts may not enforce racially restrictive covenants (D) holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy (E) holding that the law will not imply a contract where there is an existing express contract covering the same subject matter
(B)

the public interest and ‘[considerations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system’ require that the district court defer to local government administrators.” Id. In Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1166, the Sixth Circuit was very clear that, where “decisional law has changed so that the enjoined behavior, which once might have been a violation of federal law, is no longer a matter of federal law at all” the injunction must be vacated. In light of the fact that no federal right underpins the 1974 decree — as well as the fact that the “local government administrators” in this case appear to favor vacating the decree — the court can identify no reason that the 1974 consent decree should remain in effect. Cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (<HOLDING>); Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act (B) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated (D) holding that a court errs when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of  changes in statutory or decisional law (E) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes

(D)