In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
facts underlying the charges for which the defendant had been acquitted were an “integral and natural part of an account of the [defendant’s] crimef.]” The same cannot be said for the facts at issue here, which relate to a seizure that occurred on an entirely different occasion. For that reason, we do not find either Agee or Solomon directly relevant to the present controversy. As a result, we will first examine the challenged evidence in light of the principles traditionally employed in evaluating challenges to evidence admitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b), which focus on the similarity between the prior incident and the incident that underlies the current charges against the defendant. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708, 717 (1990) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the events of 10 February 2005 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case (B) holding that the estoppel doctrine did not apply because unlike the situation in ashe v swenson the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (C) holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because    the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (D) holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct (E) holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal

Ex Output:
holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case


Ex Input:
on the circuit court orders and the statements of defense counsel at the hearing. We hold that neither the doctors nor the trial court could rely on facts and legal conclusions within the circuit court orders. Thus, the doctors’ assertions at the hearing, which were based on facts within the orders, constituted factual statements of counsel. Moreover, the orders were, in effect, memoranda submitted by counsel. In any event, the trial court could not properly consider factual statements from either when deciding the motions, however they are characterized. Cf. Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 457 S.E.2d 601 (1995) (noting that the ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be based solely upon the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint); Gilmore, 290 S.C. 53, 348 S.E.2d 180 (<HOLDING>). This is not to say that circuit court orders 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the judge cannot consider factual statements of counsel in a motion for summary judgment (B) holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment (C) holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment (E) holding that conclusory statements without factual support are of no value to the court when deciding a summary judgment motion

Ex Output:
holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment


Ex Input:
11, 2006, which appear to be duplicates. 7 . See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 320, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976) (finding adverse inference acceptable based on an inmate’s silence during disciplinary proceedings); SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir.1998) (finding adverse inference and other penalties appropriate where plaintiff invokes privilege); Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir.1979) (permitting three-year stay of discovery where plaintiff invoked Fifth Amendment privilege); Steiner v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 85 P.3d 135, 136 (Colo.2004) (propounding factors for consideration before dismissing the case where a plaintiff invokes Fifth Amendment privilege prior to trial); Chaffin, Inc. v. Wallain, 689 P.2d 684, 688-89 (Colo.Ct.App. 1984) (<HOLDING>). Especially surprising is Plaintiff's heavy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an adverse inference cannot be drawn from a defendants failure to call a witness if the states evidence establishes that the witness is an accomplice who would be entitled to assert a fifth amendment privilege (B) holding adverse inference permissible in the face of defendants repeated invocation of fifth amendment privilege in discovery responses (C) holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege (D) holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights (E) holding that trial court may draw adverse inference from habeas petitioners silence as result of fifth amendment invocation during deposition

Ex Output:

holding that an adverse inference cannot be drawn from a defendants failure to call a witness if the states evidence establishes that the witness is an accomplice who would be entitled to assert a fifth amendment privilege