TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: not impliedly preempt the field of law related to the price, route, and service of motor carriers of property, and does not impliedly preempt by conflict her state-law claims. As stated above, in Kelley the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that § 14501(c) preempts the field of law regarding price, route, and service of motor carriers of property. See Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1509-10 (“Here, Congress has clearly chosen ... to preempt the entire field of price, service, and route regulation of intrastate motor carrier activities.”). Furthermore, other federal courts have held that § 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts state tort claims relating to price, route, or service against motor carriers of property. See, e.g., Data Mfg., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 557 F.3d 849 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs statelaw claims alleging common law misrepresentation and statutory misrepresentation under the texas insurance code art 2121 not preempted because they were not dependent on  the right to recover benefits under the erisa plan (B) holding fraudulent representations to the fda could not sustain statelaw claims (C) holding that  14501c1 preempted statelaw claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and money had and received related to billing practices of motor carrier of property (D) holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient (E) holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: dominion and control over” the weapon. Id. at 126 (quoting Evans, 888 F.2d at 895). The case law in this circuit, then, clearly recognizes that under the statute an individual “carries” a firearm when it is within an accessible distance from that individual. Although this circuit has not addressed the definition of “carry” since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey, other circuits nave addressed the issue and continue to define “carry” broadly. Most circuits agree that a weapon must be accessible to the defendant in order to meet the definition of “carry.” In United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667 (2nd Cir.1996), a firearm located in a secret compa 4 (4th Cir.1997) (finding that firearm need not be accessible to be “carried”); United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where drugs cash and drug scales were found in defendants parlor and a gun was found in a secret compartment in defendants bathroom vanity (B) holding that use of gun was attributable to defendant who aided and abetted armed robbery but never personally carried gun (C) holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle (D) holding that gun found in unreachable secret compartment in vehicle was carried (E) holding that a defendant may not be charged with two separate offenses premised on two amounts of cocaine one found in a box and one found in a bag located in the passenger compartment of the defendants vehicle

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: 13 case, the starting point for determining the cram-down rate is the treasury rate, not the prime rate. 7 . Bankruptcy Judge Letitia Z. Paul, who is now retired, also issued an opinion that although not expressly holding that Till requires use of the Prime Plus Approach, nevertheless used this approach in determining the cramdown rate in a Chapter 13 case. In re Tirey, 350 B.R. 62, 69 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). 8 . In Montemayor, the real estate securing the claim was the debtors' homestead. [Case No. 10-36990, Doc, No. 1, p. 14 of 49], Because this property was the debtors’ principal residence, § 1322(b)(2) prevents modifying the rights of the lien holder—including changing the interest rate. See Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 331, 113 S.Ct. 2106, 124 L.Ed.2d 228 (1993) (<HOLDING>). However, § 1322(b)(5) provides an exception 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1322b2 prohibits modification of the interest rate on the loan on the debtors principal residence (B) holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract (C) holding that the determination of whether the debtor is using real property as his principal residence is made as of the petition date for the purposes of section 1322b2 (D) holding that citys tax hen on debtors principal residence was modifiable despite  1322b2 because not consensual and thus not a security interest (E) holding that modifying an interest rate in a bankruptcy plan constitutes an impermissible modification under  1322b2

SOLUTION:
(A)