In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: guidelines; and (4) that the special conditions of Neffs supervised release were beyond the limits described in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied in all respects. I. BACKGROUND On April 29, 1992, Anthony Neff was arrested on charges of driving while intoxicated by Nassau County Police who found in his possession a receipt from a licensed firearms dealership. The receipt indicated that on April 23, 1992, he had purchased a 12 gauge shotgun. Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”) interviewed the owner of the firearms dealership and discovered that Neff, who was then on parole for a 1989 attempted burglary conviction, had not revealed that he was a convicted felon when he executed ATF form 4473, a necessar 3 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Although this language appears broad in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (B) holding that for purposes of apprendi the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence that may be imposed based solely on the jurys findings (C) holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: . . . there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision[s].” Murray v. St. Michael’s Coll., 164 Vt. 205, 210, 667 A.2d 294, 299 (1995). In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under Title VII need show only that “a reasonable employee [in the employee’s situation] would have found the challenged action materially adverse,” meaning that it well might have dissuaded a reasonable employee from engaging in the protected activity. 548 U.S. at 68. ¶ 34. Assuming, without deciding, that this is the standard to apply with respect to retaliation claims brought under 21 V.S.A. § 710(b), we conclude that the limited video surveillance in this case in connectio v., 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 35. But in this case, if the release 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney (B) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (C) holding that because a claimant testified that she had no insurance and could not afford treatment her failure to take medication for her symptoms is not a clear and convincing reason for discrediting her symptom testimony (D) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (E) holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: or subject that person to a sexual offense; [or] (e) Terrorize that person or a third person[.] (Emphasis added.) Petitioner stated that “[i]n his case, for both trials, the court gave the following definition of kidnapping, which covered only [HRS § 707-720(d) and HRS § 707-720(e)]: “ ‘A person commits kidnapping if he intentionally or knowingly restrains another person with intent to inflict bodily injury upon that person or terrorize that person.’ ocedure Rule 28(d) (2005) (providing that “[t]he reply brief shall be confined to matters presented in the answering brief’). However, because Petitioner’s assertion relates to jury instructions, whether the court’s instruction was plain error is briefly discussed. See State v. Nichols, 111 Hawai'i 327, 335, 141 P.3d 974, 982 (2006) (<HOLDING>)” and, thus, “the same standard of review is to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants who do not object to jury instructions at trial are subject to a plain error standard of review on appeal (B) holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error (C) holding that the plain error and harmless error standards of review merge in the ease of jury instructions because the duty to properly instruct the jury lies with the trial court (D) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (E) holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial
[EX A]:
(C)