In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: been completed and 2) further investigation into issues such as whether there was hair in the shotgun hole was not necessary because, if used at trial, it would have been perceived as “tearing apart the victim.” Thus, Roark’s decision to not investigate was essentially a combination of acts within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and one that falls within the category of strategic or tactical decisions that should not be second guessed. Hollon does not present any persuasive argument that' the investigation was below an objective standard. Consequently, we uphold the district court’s determination that Hollon has not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard. D. Suppression of Hollon’s Confession Hollon argues that Roark rendered in ) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the district court determined 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed (B) holding that a petitioner must show  that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had counsel raised the issue (C) holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different (D) holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different (E) holding that where the record supported the district courts conclusion that statements would not have been suppressed and there had been nothing submitted on appeal to lead to a different conclusion the petitioner had not shown any resulting prejudice from the failure to file a motion to suppress and therefore had not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 142 (1st Cir.2006). Moreover, the broad scope of the Copyright Act definitions may be of limited assistance as the court applies a “common sense” analysis of whether a particular unfinished work may be covered by VARA. One of the co-sponsors of VARA observed that “we have gone to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the works of art that will be covered.... The definition is not synonymous with any other definition in the Copyright Act....” H.R.Rep. No. 101-514, at 11. In Lilley v. Stout, 384 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C.2005), the district judge noted that “VARA established a new and distinct genus of art: ‘works of visual art,’ which differs in many respects from the pre-existing categories in Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act.” Id. at 86 (<HOLDING>). While this overview leaves much that is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a set of photographs taken to be used as studies for a painting did not qualify for vara protection (B) holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence (C) holding negligence on the part of the attorney does not qualify for such relief (D) holding that use of a pretext phone call did not qualify for protection because the technique is generally known to the public (E) holding that purely reputational damage does not qualify for dueprocess protection
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: FELA applicable to Jones Act cases. See Harrington v. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 120 n. 2 (2d Cir.2010). We rejected this contention in Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1286-87 (11th Cir.2011), and held that the 2008 amendment did not change the law. Thus, under our prior panel precedent rule, we must conclude that § 6 of the FELA does not apply to Jones Act claims. See United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Fla. League of Prof'l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir.1996)). Finally, Escobal invites us to revisit Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.2005) and Lindo, 652 F.3d 1257, arguing that these decisions conflict with Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 90 S.Ct. 1731, 26 L.Ed.2d 252 (1970) (<HOLDING>). We find no conflict between Bautista or Lindo 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (B) holding that injured seamans loss of consortium claim under state law was preempted by jones act (C) holding that the jones act did not operate to make negligent crew members liable to their employers for damages paid to other seamen under the jones act because crew members cannot sue each other for negligence (D) holding that a usbased company was an employer under the jones act (E) holding that jones act claimant against the government must comply with the terms of  2675
Example Output:
(D)