In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the State argued that Wright and Jackson were the two shooters at the trials of Wright, Oglesby, and Jackson. The State denies that it presented mutually exclusive, false, or misleading evidence. It contends that the evidence permits two factual scenarios: the shooters were either Jackson and Wright or Jackson and defendant. This is not a case where the prosecutor destroyed the credibility of one witness to convict one defendant and then used that same witness to convict a co-defendant for the same crime. See, e.g., Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 738 (1986). Nor is this a case where the prosecutor improperly argued facts that were unsupported by the evidence. Nichols v. Collins, 802 F.Supp. 66, 75 (S.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), habeas corpus denied, sub nom, Nichols v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal (B) holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment (C) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (D) holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal (E) holding in case in which defendant challenged his murder conviction and death sentence on ground that states conflicting theories in the trial of his accomplice constituted a denial of due process that state may be constitutionally estopped from obtaining a fact finding in one trial and seeking and obtaining an inconsistent fact finding in another trial
[A]: holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal


[Q]: the common level ratio. The Board may hold a hearing to consider the objections, but it may also decide the objections have merit and adjust its calculations. If not satisfied with the outcome of the hearing, the taxpayer may “appeal de novo such ratio determination to the Commonwealth Court.” Id. It has long been established that “[wjhere a remedy is provided by an act of assembly, the directions of the legislation must be strictly pursued and such remedy is exclusive.” Lurie v. Republican Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 63, 192 A.2d 367, 369 (1963). This Court has explained that “where a statutory remedy exists, it is exclusive unless the jurisdiction of the courts is preserved thereby.” Lashe v. Northern York County School District, 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 541, 417 A.2d 260, 264 (1980) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>). Where the statutory remedy is an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa (B) holding that a litigant could not avoid the procedure prescribed by statute in favor of a class action in equity (C) holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action (D) recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice (E) holding that district court in making class certification decision should avoid focusing on merits of underlying class action
[A]: holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa


[Q]: proceeding against him. 65 . 221 B.R. 49 (Bankr.D.Conn.1998). 66 . Id. at 51. 67 . Bassett, 221 B.R. at 55. 68 . Id. 69 . 11 U.S.C. § 550(a). 70 . Id. at 1322. 71 . Id. 72 .The “mere conduit” exception is “an equitable exception to the literal statutory language of ‘initial transferee,' ... for initial recipients who are ‘mere conduits’ with no control over the fraudulently-transferred funds.” Harwell, 628 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir.2010). Because SunTrust was the end recipient of the Transfers, it certainly was not a mere conduit. 73 . 446 B.R. 564 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2011). 74 . ATM Financial, 446 B.R. at 566. 75 . Id. 76 . Id. 77 . Id. at 568-71. 78 . Id. at 570-71. 79 . 11 U.S.C. § 101(54); Fla. Stat. § 726.102(12). 80 . See In re Wayne, 237 B.R. 506, 508-09 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1999) (<HOLDING>). See also Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred (B) recognizing potential for fraudulent transfer in foreclosure context if debtor enjoyed significant equity in property but received little or no value from the transfer (C) holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred the claims in the case were still ripe for review (D) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (E) holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default
[A]:
recognizing potential for fraudulent transfer in foreclosure context if debtor enjoyed significant equity in property but received little or no value from the transfer