In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: CURIAM. Appellant, Roberto Trejo, was indicted for racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering. His predicate offenses included attempted first degree murder, shooting into a building, and three armed robberies with a firearm. He was also charged on substantive counts for the same five offenses. Trejo was acquitted on the racketeering, conspiracy, and shooting into a building charges, but convicted of attempted second degree murder with a firearm and the three armed robberies. We affirm on all issues raised in this appeal, including his fifty-year sentence. The United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) does not apply to appellant’s sentence. See Guzman v. State, 110 So.3d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>). As we did in Guzman, we certify conflict with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham (B) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (C) holding that the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile does not violate the holding of roper (D) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (E) holding that double jeopardy clause does not prohibit imposition of death sentence in alabama despite life sentence in georgia in murdertrial arising from same homicide

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: tam complaints, Relator Mayes and Relators Lutz and Webster have filed amended complaints. 2 . In briefing related to the multiple pending motions to dismiss, some Defendants argue that the 2010 amendment that made it clear that a claim resulting from an AKS violation was a false claim operated only in a prospective nature, (See, e.g,, Dkt. No. 146-1 at 17). However, this Court finds that the weight of authority supports the conclusion that the 2010 amendment adding 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(g) was merely a clarification of the law; claims tainted by AKS violations constitute false claims for the purposes of the FCA regardless of whether the violation occurred before or after the 2010 amendment. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 312 n.19 (3d Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>); U.S. ex rel. Westmoreland v. Amgen, Inc., 812 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a legislative amendment that appeared to approve the analysis of a recent indiana supreme court case was a clarification rather than an amendment (B) holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel (D) holding that federal rule of civil procedure 15c2 giving court discretion to permit amendment of complaint applies to  2255 petitions insofar as a district court may in its discretion permit an amendment to a petition to provide factual clarification or amplification after the expiration of the oneyear period of limitations as long as the petition itself was timely filed and the petitioner does not seek to add an entirely new claim or new theory of relief (E) holding that the 2010 amendment was a clarification

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: in digging a ditch, guiding a barge, or programming a computer. The plaintiffs in this case already are employees of the PCC, and most have worked there since before 1976, -all the while doing work that otherwise would “qualify” for the preference. The PCC has never suggested, let alone shown, that plaintiffs’ job performance has suffered in any way because of their citizenship status. Indeed, the PCC’s own policies make clear that the timing of citizenship is not a work-related qualification. As noted in Part I, from 1984 to 1989 four plaintiffs received the PCC’s equity adjustment package; yet there is no claim that their work was less acceptable than that of employees with earlier citizenship who also received the package during the same time period. See Berger, 843 F.2d at 1421 (<HOLDING>); cf. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32, 91 S.Ct. 849 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the intentional tort exception to employer immunity includes an objective standard to measure whether the employer engaged in conduct which was substantially certain to result in injury (B) holding that an employer in an employment discrimination case may not justify its conduct based on evidence that did not motivate it at the time of the employment decision (C) holding that a promissory estoppel claim failed where the plaintiff provided no evidence that the employer defendant did not follow the employment manuals requirements (D) holding that it is not (E) holding that fivemonth period in which employer did not insist on employment qualification precluded claim that it was a minimum objective qualification and noting that employer could not rely on a qualification unless it satisfies the bedrock requirements of jobrelatedness


Output: (E)