In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

was merely a voidable act. They rely on Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.1989), rehearing denied by 888 F.2d 1388 (5th Cir.1989), in which the Fifth Circuit found that the filing of a complaint in violation of the stay was voidable but not void. Id. at 178-79. The court reasoned that provisions of the Bankruptcy Code such as section 362(d), by giving courts the power to grant retroactive relief from a stay, indicated Congressional intent that acts in violation of a stay be simply voidable. Id. Spring Meadows, however, urges us to adopt the rule of the Ninth Circuit that any act committed in violation of an automatic stay is void. Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 997 F.2d 581, 586 (9th Cir.1993); In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 571-72 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The circuit court found such acts void even 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that any action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void and without effect (B) holding that violations of the automatic stay are void and rejecting the reasoning of sikes (C) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (D) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay (E) holding that an action taken in violation of the automatic stay is void ab initio
recognizing that any action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void and without effect

comprehensive plan nor its land use regulations prohibited the development of so-called non-jurisdictional wetlands. On August 17 or 18, 2006, Rish began to clear and fill his property. The neighbors, including Johnson, protested to the County, but to no avail. On August 21, 2006, these parties filed a complaint seeking in-junctive relief alleging that the clearing violated Gulf County’s comprehensive plan because it failed to maintain a 50-foot buffer for the wetlands. The neighbors alleged standing under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2006). The trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that Johnson and the other neighbors did not possess standing to seek relief under section 163.3215. This court reversed. Johnson v. Gulf County et al., 965 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Throughout this litigation, Rish proceeded to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (B) holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention (C) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court (D) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (E) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case
holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention

evidence sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute.” Sweats Fashions, 833 F.2d at 1562. Plaintiff has neither submitted materials of his own, nor shown how the materials already in the record create a genuine issue of material fact. He has done nothing more than rest on an ambiguous “general denial”: that he has either “refused to accept” his severance pay, or that such pay was never “conveyed” to him.” Pl.’s Opp. at 4. This is not enough to survive a summary judgment motion. Put simply, while defendant has met its burden under Celotex properly to support Cl. 736, 756 (2011) (declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); Michels v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Defendant cannot be faulted for failing to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff may attempt to survive a rule 12b6 motion by adding essential new facts in a brief on appeal (B) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under rcfc 12b6 by asserting a new claim (C) holding that a respondent cannot avoid the initial pleading element by obtaining a dismissal and filing her own suit (D) recognizing that a rule 12b6 motion is an appropriate vehicle on which to seek dismissal of a claim barred by a prescription statute (E) holding that dismissal pursuant to rule 12b6 is appropriate if the plaintiff is unable to articulate enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face

holding that a plaintiff may attempt to survive a rule 12b6 motion by adding essential new facts in a brief on appeal