In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: ah officer may ask a question outside the scope of the initial justification for the stop so long as it does not further lengthen the time taken to process the initial justification for the stop. In other words, if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid. This reasoning is explained in both United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc), and United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5th Cir.1993). In both cases, the courts held that questions by police officers during a traffic stop are not seizures or searches proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and cited United States Supreme Court cases dealing with non-custodial police-citizen encounters for support. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent (B) holding that police may approach persons and ask questions or permission to search so long as police do not imply that answers or consent are required (C) holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car

A: (B)
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Q: The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey that Ms. Toomer offers, no evidence of Ms. Stiger’s threat other than her own self-serving assertions and that such unsupported, self-serving assertions do not give rise to a triable issue of fact. See, e.g., Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (when scrutinizing motions for summary judgment courts “examine the facts in the record and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but do not accept bare conclusory allegations, as fact”) (internal citations omitted); Ward v. District of Columbia, 950 F.Supp.2d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[S]elf-serving assertions are not sufficient to create an issue of material fact.”); Musgrove v. Gov’t of the District of Columbia, 775 F.Supp.2d 158, 170 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>). Even if unsupported, self-serving assertions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony standing alone are insufficient to withstand a properlysupported motion for summary judgment (B) holding that evidence of alleged limitations obtained soon after accident was without more insufficient to survive summary judgment (C) holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that a plaintiffs selfserving deposition testimony was not enough for her fdcpa claim to survive summary judgment but that a consumer survey may have been sufficient (E) holding that selfserving deposition testimony standing alone is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment

A: (E)
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Q: the “quick intervention” of Dr. Kasozi, “most probably [he] would not be here today.” Id. An IJ’s credibility finding is a finding of fact. Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1150. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” We interpret this statute to call for review under the substantial evidence test, under which the IJ’s finding will be upheld if “supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence considering the record as a whole.” Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1150. To reverse, the evidence must not only support the conclusion that the IJ erred, but compel it. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); accord Batalova, 355 F.3d at 1254 (<HOLDING>). This court has, however, joined “other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that credibility determinations are for the jury (B) holding that the ijs or bias credibility determinations are not questioned if they are substantially reasonable (C) holding that the credibility determinations by the board are virtually unreviewable (D) holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence (E) holding that ijs and bias finding of applicants lack of credibility was substantially supported by the inconsistencies regarding the date of spouses alleged sterilization

A:
(B)
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