In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: we now reverse the decision of the trial court. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. 1 . We set forth additional facts in the companion case issued today, Dep't. of Revenue v. Adams, 762 N.E.2d 728 (Ind.2002). 2 . The CSET is a tax on the possession of certain narcotics. We discuss the tax and the procedures for collecting it in greater detail infra. 3 . All of the cocaine at issue in this case was discovered prior to the time the police served a valid search warrant. 4 . Ind.Code § 35-48-4-1 (1998). 5 . Id. § 35-48-4-6. 6 . United States Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the revenue officers' entry of Adam's home to collect the CSET assessment was a search. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Thomas v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (B) holding that revenue officers conducted a search when they entered a cottage and seized records when levying on delinquent tax (C) holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business (D) holding search unreasonable when conducted on the highway in broad day light (E) holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house
[A]: (B)


[Q]: 8 . See, e.g., Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 547 (6th Cir.2012); Pacific Dunlop Holdings v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir.1993); Adena Exploration, Inc. v. Sylvan, 860 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir.1988); Penturelli, 779 F.2d 160 at 166; Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 354 (10th Cir.1970); Shimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880, 883 (D.C.1967); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F.Supp. 1314, 1346 (S.D.N.Y.1982). 9 . Interpreting the same language, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois observed that Congress intended “to specifically include as securities 'only that form of splitting up of mineral interests which had been most utilized for speculative purposes.’ ” Fearneyhough v. McElvain, 598 F.Supp. 905, 907 (C.D.Ill.1984) (<HOLDING>). 1 The Lenau [Appellants] signed the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that it is an unusual challenge to a sale that does not distort the validity of the sale and that the exception likely has meaning only when collateral issues are challenged (B) holding that an assignment or sale of rights in the invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of the invention within the meaning of section 102b (C) holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument (D) holding that the sale of the entire leasehold interest in the oil and gas rights in plaintiffs land does not constitute the sale of a security within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 acts notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs retained an overriding oneeighth 18 royalty interest (E) holding that the amount of water rights appurtenant to the land is the amount that is being used thereon before and at the time of the sale
[A]: (D)


[Q]: includes a determination of the significance, if any, of the TNRC’s involvement. When the EPA in 1990 shifted from a “strict” to “substantial compliance” standard for private parties, it did so “to encourage private parties to perform voluntary cleanups of sites, and to remove unnecessary obstacles to their ability to recover their costs from the parties that are liable for the contamination.” 55 FecLReg. at 8792-93. The EPA expressly recognized that requiring private parties to adhere to a set of mechanical rules would impede this objective. Thus the list of public comment provisions identified in 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(6) is only a “universe of requirements which are potentially relevant,” and should “not be c Ry. Co. v. Gee Co., 2002 WL 31163777, at *30 (N.D.Ill. Sept.30, 2002) (<HOLDING>); AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Amcast Int’l Corp., 177 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that government involvement must be accompanied by public comment because a purpose of ncp is to ensure that those responsible for the cleanup receive citizens input regarding environmental conditions in the community (B) holding that public participation requirement was satisfied in part because the ncp policy is  to allow potentially responsible parties an opportunity to comment before costs are incurred and no prps were denied an opportunity to comment (C) holding five day public comment period on a portion of an ea insufficient remanding for further public comment (D) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail (E) holding that meetings with representatives of various affected parties were insufficient to meet public participation requirement because there was never an opportunity for the public at large to comment on the plan without explaining why such opportunity was necessary
[A]:
(B)