In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: ” Boone v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 130, 133, 415 S.E.2d 250, 251 (1992). “A battery is an unlawful touching of another.... Whether a touching is a battery depends on the intent of the actor, not on the force applied.” Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 463, 468-69, 534 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2000) (citation omitted). “ ‘[T]he slightest touching of another ... if done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, constitutes a battery for which the law affords redress.’ ” Id. at 469, 534 S.E.2d at 350 (citation omitted). Accordingly, where Vaughn claims he only intended to scare Robinson and did not intend to shoot or wound him, Vaughn would not be entitled, in my opinion, to have the jury instructed on assault and battery. See Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987) (<HOLDING>). A second theory supported by the evidence is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that shooting at a person intending only to scare the person where no touching or wounding occurs supports instructing the jury on simple assault (B) holding that simple assault includes urinating on another (C) holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident   4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor (D) holding that punching another person is a statutory assault (E) holding simple assault is a lesser included offense of recklessly endangering another person

A: holding that simple assault includes urinating on another
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Q: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

A: holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241
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Q: and that the relevant statements were made in furtherance of it.” Id. The Court denies Huber’s argument that Rose’s co-conspirator statements were inadmissable, and the motion for a judgment of acquittal on this basis is denied. E. Evidence of Guilt Huber argues that the finding of guilty was inconsistent with the evidence. As support for this argument, Huber spends a considerable amount of effort attacking the credibility of the government witnesses. Because the determination of witness credibility is within the province of the jury, “[a] trial court has neither the duty nor the authority to grant a motion for acquittal based on the credibility of a witness.” United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 768 (8th Cir.2001); accord United States v. Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Court rejects Huber’s request to enter a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a failure to object to a witnesses testimony while the witness was on the stand justified overruling a motion for a mistrial made several witnesses later (B) holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial (C) holding that district court had no authority to grant motion for judgment of acquittal based on defendants claim that witnesses had improper interests in testifying gave testimony that conflicted with that of other witnesses or were categorically untrustworthy (D) holding that selfinterested witnesses can be reliable when they provide detailed testimony that is corroborated by other witnesses or facts (E) holding that a district court was entitled to accept or reject testimony on the basis of the witnesses demeanor and candor or lack thereof and contradictions in the witnesses testimony

A:
holding a failure to object to a witnesses testimony while the witness was on the stand justified overruling a motion for a mistrial made several witnesses later
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