In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 540 U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 1019, 157 L.Ed.2d 1016 (2004) (citing United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980) and Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986)). 20 . See United States v. Cuong Gia Le, et al., Criminal No. 03-48-A (E.D.Va. December 9, 2003) (Ex Parte Order). 21 . Only one of the six charged defendants — • Cuong Gia Le — had been charged prior to the return of the Superseding Indictment. 22 . See Schwartz, 372 F.2d at 682 (citing Mallory, 354 U.S. at 454, 77 S.Ct. 1356). 23 . The statute also provides a limited "safe harbor" for a voluntary confession made after arrest, but before arraignment, "if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 534 n. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding texas law governs the procedural matter of preservationoferror requirements even if another jurisdictions law governs substantive issues (B) holding that  3501 not mcnabbmallory governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court (C) holding that federal law governs remedies available under title ix (D) holding that federal law governs res judicata effect of an earlier federal judgment based on federal law (E) holding that federal common law governs equitable remedies available under erisa
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: we held that, The penetration offense alleged in the first indictment clearly required a separate and distinct act (involving appellee’s sexual organ with the child’s female sexual organ) from the act alleged in the second indictment (which involved appel-lee’s mouth with the child’s sexual organ). In this case the second indictment alleged that appellee caused the child’s sexual organ to contact his mouth ency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct. Appellant concedes to this view, the plain language of the statute supports it, and so does our caselaw. See Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630 (stating that a grammatical analysis suggests that the unit of prosecution for indecency with a child by exposure is the exposure and, ultimately, adopting that viewpoint); Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. State, 550 S.W.2d 89, 91 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive (B) holding that a similar statute created separate offenses (C) holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation (D) holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive (E) holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: Law §§ 70.00, 70.70. Therefore, even after Simmons, Foreman’s conviction may qualify as a predicate offense. We note, however, that the information in the PSR is very limited about the conviction. Nonetheless, we conclude, that even if the conviction no longer qualifies under § 851, there is no indication in the record that the district court’s sentencing decision was affected by the enhanced statutory minimum sentence of 120 months. The lowest end of the Guidelines range exceeded the statutory minimum and the court expressed its desire to sentence Foreman in the mid-range, and subsequently did so. Therefore, any procedural sentencing error would be harmless. See United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 454, 181 L.Ed.2d 297 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, on the record before the Court, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional questions will not be decided if case can be decided on other grounds (B) holding statutory booker error was not harmless where district court imposed sentence in middle of guidelines range and there were no statements in the record reflecting that the court would have imposed the same or greater sentence under advisory guidelines (C) recognizing our authority to affirm sentence despite procedural error where record clearly reveals that court would have reached same result and sentence is substantively reasonable (D) holding that apprendi error is harmless if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error internal quotation marks and citation omitted (E) holding procedural error is harmless where the court would have reached the same result had the guidelines issue been decided the other way and the sentence imposed would be reasonable even if contested issue decided in defendants favor
[EX A]:
(E)