In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: CURIAM. Anthony McLemore was tried by jury and convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of cannabis. We agree with McLemore that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury his requested special instruction that an element of the crime is knowledge by the defendant that the substances possessed were marijuana and cocaine. See Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 746 (Fla.1996). Even though McLemore disavowed any connection whatsoever to the items, we find that the error was not harmless. See Scott v. State, 808 So.2d 166 (Fla.2002)(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse the convictions and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to give proper instruction regarding disputed element of crime charged was fundamental error requiring reversal and stating that fundamental error is not subject to harmless error review (B) holdingthat because the evidence of the defendants guilt was overwhelming the courts failure to give a requested charge on impeachment constituted harmless error (C) holding that a trial court errs when it fails to give a limiting instruction properly requested by a party (D) holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error (E) holding that failure to give a properly requested chicone instruction cannot be harmless error

A: holding that failure to give proper instruction regarding disputed element of crime charged was fundamental error requiring reversal and stating that fundamental error is not subject to harmless error review
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Q: § 42-217. If, based on the proof submitted by the applicant and the field examination, the Department “is satisfied that the law has been fully complied with and that the water is being used at the place claimed and for the purpose for which it was originally intended, the [Department shall issue to such user or users a license confirming such use.” I.C. § 42-219(1). On the other hand, “[i]n the event that the [Department shall find that the applicant has not fully complied with the law and the conditions of permit, it may issue a license f ls Ground Water Dist., 141 Idaho 746, 753, 118 P.3d 78, 85 (2005) (finding that “a party is not entitled to vested rights in a water right by virtue of filing a permit application”); Hardy v. Higginson, 123 Idaho 485, 491, 849 P.2d 946, 952 (1993) (<HOLDING>). However, this Court has never considered the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate (B) holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use (C) holding that the legislative assembly intended the water right certificate not the permit even when followed by a beneficial use to mark the point at which a water right becomes vested (D) holding that permits only give the applicant an inchoate or contingent right to put the water to a beneficial use (E) holding that a water right is a property right created by a person appropriating unappropriated water and applying it to a beneficial use

A: holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate
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Q: in a single limits policy covering multiple vehicles as to sums required to be provided by statute. Id. at 431, 475 S.E.2d at 775. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and held that a policy provision prohibiting stacking of liability coverage is valid because “[liability coverage, ... while statutorily required, is limited to the particular vehicle for which it is purchased.” Ruppe v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 329 S.C. 402, 406, 496 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1998). The Ruppe case is not dispositive in this case, however, because we determined that no Class I insured was involved in the accident. Inasmuch as the appellants were Class II insureds under the garage policy, none were entitled to stack. Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 295 S.C. 538, 370 S.E.2d 85 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Therefore the order of the circuit court is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no class member may opt out of a rule 23b1 class action (B) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (C) holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent (D) holding that although class i insureds may stack coverage class ii insureds may not (E) holding that no subsequent class actions may benefit from tolling when class certification has been denied

A:
holding that no class member may opt out of a rule 23b1 class action
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