In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

WTT Project area as defined by the Corps. NEF contends that we need not consider the State’s argument because the State failed to raise this argument in its initial motion to clarify, instead raising it for the first time in its Rule 59(e) motion. “Rule 59(e) motions are ‘aimed at reconsideration, not initial consideration.’ ” FDIC v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Bank of New England, 897 F.2d 611, 616 (1st Cir.1990)). In World University, this Court held that the defendant’s argument, which it raised for the first time in a Rule 59(e) motion, was barred where there was no reason why the defendant could not have presented its argument prior to its motion to alter or amend the judgment. Id.; see also Engler, 146 F.3d at 374 (<HOLDING>). This rule, however, does not cover the facts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument (B) holding that a party in a habeas case waives an argument by failing to raise it before the district court (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that an argument was barred where the movant could have but did not raise its argument before the district court ruled in the original motion (E) holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court
(D)

Id. The district court excluded this portion of the expert’s testimony. Id. at 1397. Relying on Downing, the Third Circuit reversed. Id. at 1401. We agree that expert testimony on eyewitness identification may properly be admitted under Daubert in certain circumstances, but Stevens simply does not persuade us that the district court abused its discretion in the instant case. We note that here there were five eyewitness identifica tions, not one. Likewise, as counsel for the government pointed out at argument, there was also testimony that Mr. Smith changed his alibi. In this admittedly close case, we hold only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony under the circumstances. See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification (B) holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification (C) holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider certain additional factors in evaluating the validity of eyewitness identification testimony (D) holding that a specific instruction was unnecessary because eyewitness was crossexamined and the eyewitness testimony was discussed in defense counsels opening statement (E) holding exclusion of expert eyewitness identification testimony harmless error where governments case included three separate eyewitnesses and a palm print that discredited the defendants alibi
(B)

704(a); see also United States v. Wantuch, 525 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir.2008). But this rule “does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions.” Fed.R.Evid. 704 advisory committee’s note. The evidence must be otherwise admissible as lay testimony under Rule 701, United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471, 478-79 (7th Cir.1980), or expert testimony under Rule 702, United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir.1979). Most importantly for our purposes, the testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact under either rule. Fed.R.Evid. 704 advisory committee’s note; see also Fed.R.Evid. 701(b), 702. We have held repeatedly that lay testimony offering a legal conclusion is inadmissible because it is not helpful to the jury, as required by Rule 701(b). See, e.g., Wantuch, 525 F.3d at 514 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Espino, 32 F.3d 253, 257 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the timing of the alleged actions of the prosecutor supported the courts conclusion that the prosecutors actions were associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process instead of the investigatory phase because the conduct occurred one month before plaintiffs trial and more than five years after the grand jury indicted plaintiff (B) holding that the question of whether the defendant knew his actions were legal demanded a conclusion as to the legality of the defendants conduct which is unhelpful to the jury under rule 701 (C) holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the mvra is whether the loss is caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction (D) holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury (E) holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant

(B)