In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: act, 1976 PA 267, MCL 15.261 to 15.275. (3) If the board arbitrarily and capriciously violates section 7(9), the board shall he subject to the penalties prescribed in the freedom of information act, 1976 PA 442, MCL 15.231 to 15.246. B If “a statute gives new rights and prescribes new remedies, such remedies must be strictly pursued; and a party seeking a remedy under the act is confined to the remedy conferred thereby and to that only.” Monroe Beverage Co, Inc v Stroh Brewery Co, 454 Mich 41, 45; 559 NW2d 297 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “[w]hen a statute provides a remedy for enforcement of a common-law right, the statutory scheme is merely cumulative and not exclusive.” Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc, 273 Mich App 187, 201; 729 NW2d 898 (2006) (<HOLDING>). At common law there has always been a remedy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration (B) holding that the plaintiffs claims for unjust enrichment were not barred by the availability of relief under the public works bonding act mcl 129201 et seq because a plaintiff enjoyed the right at common law to recover in quantum meruit from a defendant who had been unjustly enriched (C) recognizing that action for quantum meruit relief exists to avoid unjust enrichment (D) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed
[A]: holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration


[Q]: are reasonably susceptible to two different interpretations, and therefore are ambiguous. See Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Keller Transp., Inc., 382 Mont. 72, 365 P.3d 465, 470 (Mont. 2016). Montana law construes ambiguous provisions “against the insurer and in favor of extending coverage.” Id. We therefore reject United Fire’s argument that the Premises Endorsements limit coverage to incidents that occurred on the St. George premises. Because the Premises Endorsements purport to cover claims “arising out of ... the use of’ the St. George premises, they are sufficiently capacious to include coverage for bodily injury in Montana that flows from or grows out of the use of the St. George premises. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ferrin, 311 Mont. 155, 54 P.3d 21, 23 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Thus, United Fire had a duty to defend 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arising out of exclusion applies to claims flowing from or growing out of the excluded activity (B) holding that the phrase arising out of the use is ambiguous and interpreting it as originating from or growing out of or flowing from (C) holding that insurance provisions excluding damage arising out of the use of land motor vehicles subject to registration and damage arising out of the use of land motor vehicles if the injury or damage occurs away from the insured premises were ambiguous because together they could be read in four different ways (D) holding claim for injuries arising out of use of truck and not from negligent supervision excluded from coverage by auto exclusion in commercial general liability policy no claim that language in policy was ambiguous or unclear (E) holding phrase arising out of the ownership maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as contained in um policy should be given same interpretation as in automobile liability policies
[A]: holding that an arising out of exclusion applies to claims flowing from or growing out of the excluded activity


[Q]: a noninvasive procedure which posed little risk of harm. He had done similar tests many times on, in his view, similarly rusty boilers without cooling them down first. And nothing in his observations or discussions with Mr. Nelson suggested that this particular boiler posed a heightened risk of danger. Mr. Reimer’s version of events will, of course, be subject to challenge by defendants, but, at this stage, these facts create a genuine issue as to Mr. Reimer’s actual knowledge of the risk in this case. See Kraft, 136 F.3d at 586 (reversing summary judgment to defendant and finding significant to appreciation of risk element that plaintiff “had placed her hands and feet into this gap before without incident.”); Piotrowski v. Southworbh Prods. Corp., 15 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. S. Minn. Mach. Sales, Inc., 442 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a genuine substantial risk that he could be injured or could injure others and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk (B) holding that plaintiff who was injured in fall from table did not have actual knowledge of a known risk and he did not make the choice to chance the risk rather than avoid it where he and other employees had similarly stood or stomped on the lift table without incident for seven months (C) holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment (D) holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it (E) holding that the government must prove actual subjective knowledge and that a defendant may not be convicted on just what he should have known
[A]:
holding that an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a genuine substantial risk that he could be injured or could injure others and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk