instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
a right to enjoy over the land of another for the benefit of the easement holder’s land, but it does not create an interest in the land itself." (footnote omitted; emphasis added)). 2 . 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 100 (2004) (footnotes omitted); see Cameron v. Barton, Ky., 272 S.W.2d 40, 42 (1954) ("Appellant finally contends that the easement in controversy was extinguished by merger when a former owner of the dominant estate bought an adjoining lot which offered a means of ingress and egress to and from the Highway Department’s property. The answer to this contention is that the doctrine of merger could not apply because the former owner of the dominant estate did not acquire the ser-vient estate." (emphasis added)); Sievers v. Flynn, 305 Ky. 325, 204 S.W.2d 364 (1947) (<HOLDING>); City of Franklin v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that owners of a dominant estate had a duty to keep the easement in a proper state of repair to avoid damaging the servient estate through erosion (B) holding that the burden on the servient estate cannot be increased without the consent of the owners of the servient estate and that the owner of the dominant estate to which the appurtenant easement is attached has no power to convey or expand use of that easement in connection with a tract of land owned by another (C) holding that an easement is not a separate estate when dominant and servient tracts are under the same ownership (D) holding that an express easement ran with the dominant estate (E) recognizing that the dominant easement owner not the servient estate owner bears responsibility for maintaining an easement
answer:
(C)


question:
not impliedly preempt the field of law related to the price, route, and service of motor carriers of property, and does not impliedly preempt by conflict her state-law claims. As stated above, in Kelley the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that § 14501(c) preempts the field of law regarding price, route, and service of motor carriers of property. See Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1509-10 (“Here, Congress has clearly chosen ... to preempt the entire field of price, service, and route regulation of intrastate motor carrier activities.”). Furthermore, other federal courts have held that § 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts state tort claims relating to price, route, or service against motor carriers of property. See, e.g., Data Mfg., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 557 F.3d 849 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs statelaw claims alleging common law misrepresentation and statutory misrepresentation under the texas insurance code art 2121 not preempted because they were not dependent on  the right to recover benefits under the erisa plan (B) holding fraudulent representations to the fda could not sustain statelaw claims (C) holding that  14501c1 preempted statelaw claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and money had and received related to billing practices of motor carrier of property (D) holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient (E) holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted
answer:
(C)


question:
tribal court jurisdiction.” We have been unable to locate, however, any authorities that support the distinction drawn by the district court. It is well recognized that “[f]ederal question jurisdiction ... extends to ... claims that the exercise of tribal authority impermissibly exceeds the federal common-law limits imposed by the Supreme Court.” Cohen 3 F.3d 1412, 1421-22 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that among the “aspects of the dispute” that raised a federal question was the fact that “this case is being directed to the Tribal Court and exhaustion within that system” and further observing that “[t]he existence of tribal court jurisdiction itself presents a federal question within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1331”); cf. Arizona Publ. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Following the lead of our sister circuits, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state has no jurisdiction over civil suit by nonindian against indian where cause of action arises on indian reservation (B) holding states in exercising the federal trust power over indian tribes pursuant to a federal statute authorizing them to do so may enact legislation that would be an otherwise unconstitutional exercise of state power (C) holding that federal court has neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction over civil action by nonindian against indian for events occurring on the reservation (D) holding that in context of a challenge to a tribes legislative authority over a nonindian that was allegedly limited by contract a nonindian challenging an exercise of tribal adjudicatory or legislative power states a claim that arises under federal law (E) recognizing that tribes have an interest in a uniform body of federal law in the area of tribal immunity
answer:

(D)