In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Majority Opinion in Ford, former Justice Newman authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Saylor joined, in which she specifically expressed her agreement “that appellate counsel acted ineffectively by neglecting to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to investigate and present evidence during the penalty phase of Appellant’s history of abuse and mental illness.” Ford, 809 A.2d at 336 (Newman, J., joined by Saylor, J., concurring). 5 . Although Teague's retroactivity analysis did not gamer five votes, a majority of the High Court soon thereafter reaffirmed the Teague plurality's rule and its two exceptions in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). 6 . Compare with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty (B) holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (C) holding that juveniles are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (D) holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing (E) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants

A: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty
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Q: required expert testimony at trial. We agree with other appellate courts that the statute does not violate the open courts provision by requiring an expert report sooner rather than later in the litigation. See, e.g., Gill v. Russo, 39 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Knie v. Piskun, 23 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied). Mocega’s fifth point is overruled. Notice of Hearing Mocega’s final two points assert the trial court was required to grant her the grace period provided under art. 4590i, § 13.01(g). A motion under that section is timely if filed before “any hearing” on a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Urquhart’s motion was “heard” by submission on April 3rd. See Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>). Mocega’s motion was not filed until April 
 Holding statements: (A) holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation (B) holding that a hearing does not contemplate an oral presentation unless required by express language or context (C) holding that oral rendition of judgment supported by the courts docket sheet was insufficient express specific written order is required (D) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes (E) holding that express oral agreement with government agent was not binding because among other factors applicable regulations required contract to be in writing

A: holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation
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Q: and that it thus erred in relying on that factor in exercising its discretion to deny his application. First, Rendon argues that, because Ramos was already married when he married her, his marriage was void ab initio and had no legal effect. Thus, he reasons, he cannot be found to have entered into a fraudulent marriage if he cannot legally be deemed to have entered into a marriage at all. We are not persuaded. The IJ rejected this argument on the grounds that Rendon could still be deemed to have committed fraud whether his marriage turned out to be legally valid or not (IJ Dec. at 4), and we agree. The legally relevant factor in this case is the fraud, not the validity of the marriage that was the subject of the fraud. Cf. Onyeme v. INS, 146 F.3d 227, 230, 234-35 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Second, Rendon argues that the IJ deprived 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the common enterprise theory of marriage (B) holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage (C) recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage (D) holding that where the petitioners prior marriage was dissolved after the subsequent marriage the subsequent marriages validity should be analyzed under the law of the place where it was celebrated (E) holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of  an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred

A:
recognizing the common enterprise theory of marriage
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