In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: motions). The Second Circuit has not yet announced a specific standard for exercising the district court’s discretion in ruling on such a motion. The Second Circuit has, however, stated that: “[o]nly ‘reasonably genuine surprise’ on the part of the appellant, Moylan v. Siciliano, 292 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir.1961), combined with an assertion of the nature of the additional evidence, Berns v. Pan Am. World Airways, 667 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir.1982), would give us sufficient reason to remand for the taking of additional evidence.” Air et Chaleur, S.A. v. Janeway, 757 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir.1985); see also Matthew Bender & Co., 158 F.3d at 679 (upholding district court’s decision to permit party to re-open a hearing where (1) additional evidence was material, (2) opposing part (S.D.N.Y.1994) (<HOLDING>). I shall consider the issue of Plaintiff’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rules of procedure are structured to provide the nonmovant with substantially more time for filing affidavits than the moving party because the nonmoving party should have an opportunity to examine and reply to the moving partys papers before the court considers them (B) holding that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record with no guidance from the briefing party to determine if the record supports the partys argument (C) holding that the party moving for summary judgment waived its argument that the opposing partys affidavit should not be considered because the moving party never objected to the timeliness of the affidavit to the trial court (D) holding that when appraising a partys motion to reopen the record posttrial the court must consider 1 whether or not the moving partys failure to submit evidence was the result of its own lack of diligence 2 the extent to which reopening the record might prejudice the nonmovant and 3 where the interests of justice lie (E) holding the moving party must meet its burden by showing  that is pointing out to the trial court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case

Answer: holding that the rules of procedure are structured to provide the nonmovant with substantially more time for filing affidavits than the moving party because the nonmoving party should have an opportunity to examine and reply to the moving partys papers before the court considers them


Question: states that a lack of due diligence should not prevent a party from presenting the new evidence. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 cmt. j (1982); see also Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J.Super. 558, 788 A.2d 834, 840 (2002) (“[T]he judge may consider diligence, or lack of diligence, ... [but] a lack of diligence does not require invocation of collateral estoppel particularly where, as here, plaintiff attempted to obtain Dr. Matthew’s evaluation prior to the arbitration proceeding.”). But see Klein v. Comm’r, 880 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir.1989) (“A party may not assert a change in controlling facts when the facts allegedly showing a change in circumstances could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence.”); Calcutt v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 14, 25, 1988 WL 71262 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the fairness 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial (B) holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel (C) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action

Answer: holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial


Question: extending [the] plaintiff every reasonable inference in his favor.” Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 442-43 (1st Cir.1992); see also Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 200 (1st Cir.1999). Plaintiffs may not, however, rely upon “unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law.” Murphy, 45 F.3d at 522 (citation omitted). IV. DISCUSSION A. Legislative Immunity Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against Speaker Finneran and President Birmingham (the “legislator defendants”) based on the legislators’ absolute immunity from legal claims for their legislative acts. “Absolute legislative immunity attaches to all actions taken in the sphere of legislative activity.” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54, 118 S.Ct. 966, 140 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998) (quotation omitted) (<HOLDING>). As plaintiffs accuse the legislator 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legislative immunity does not depend on motivation for legislative action even if the motive was to impinge on plaintiffs free speech rights (B) holding that legislative immunity shields an official from liability if the act in question was undertaken in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity (C) holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity (D) holding that vulnerability to legislative alteration would seem to depend on the character of the compliance called for (E) holding that legislative immunity is not forfeited simply because the activities if unprotected might violate a plaintiffs first amendment rights

Answer:
holding that legislative immunity shields an official from liability if the act in question was undertaken in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity