In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: pre-estimate may in fact operate as a penalty and become unenforceable is shown by the fact that even though the sum fixed as compensation for each day’s delay ... is held to be a reasonable provision for liquidated damages and to be enforceable, no court will permit it to go on operating forever. 11 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 58:21 at 523. That treatise then observes that there is “some lack of uniformity in the method of determining this time limit.” Id. In general, there are two rules that courts have applied to this predicament. Some courts have held that a liquidated damages clause is inapplicable when a contractor has completely abandoned a project. See, e.g., City of Elmira v. Larry Walter, Inc., 76 N.Y.2d 912, 563 N.Y.S.2d 45, 564 N.E.2d 655, 656 (1990) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Others have held that, when a contractor has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudgment interest should not be added to damages awarded for misrepresentation because the amount of damages were not liquidated or ascertainable before the verdict (B) holding that language of contract did not limit plaintiffs recovery to liquidated damages (C) holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the fsla (D) holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award (E) holding that in the absence of clear and unambiguous language indicating that liquidated damages clause was intended to apply to contractors outright abandonment of the project no such damages should be awarded

A: (E)
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Q: this case was scheduled for a date approximately six months after the permanent injunction had expired. The procedural posture of this case is comparable to that of Madonna, in which the plaintiffs challenged their confinements while awaiting a hearing to determine whether they should be committed to mental institutions. 295 N.W.2d at 358. The plaintiffs filed petitions for habeas corpus during their pre-hearing confinements, which lasted only a matter of weeks, but the petitions were not adjudicated before their pre-hearing confinements ended. Id. at 358-59. Approximately two and one-half years later, the supreme court held that the case was not moot, reasoning that “some method of review must exist.” Id. at 361; see also Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 208 n. 2 (Minn.2001) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 188 n. 1, 210 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that challenge to oneyear order for protection was not moot even though it had expired (B) holding that district court may award money due under a statute even though time for disbursement had expired (C) holding that challenge to oneyear residency requirement for divorce action was not moot even though plaintiff had since satisfied requirement (D) holding expired child abuse protective order not moot because of possible effect on future custody determinations (E) holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot

A: (A)
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Q: in advance). We have considered time an important factor in distinguishing between a legitimate investigative stop and a de facto arrest, United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc), but we recognize that there is “no rigid time limitation on [investigative] stops.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); see also Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10 n. 10, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (“[W]e question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation. Such a limit would undermine the ... important need to allow authorities to graduate then-responses to the demands of any particular situation.”). Accordingly, under the proper circumstances, we have considered delays for dog-sniffs far in excess of 90 minutes reasonable. See Maltais, 403 F.3d at 557-58 (<HOLDING>). Nothing in the record suggests that Fitzer 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a threehour delayallowing a drug dog to reach the remote location of the investigation was acceptable because the officers acted with diligence and pursued the quickest and least intrusive means of investigation reasonably available to confirm or dispel their  suspicions that the defendant was engaged in drug trafficking (B) holding that a state conviction is a drug trafficking offense because the trafficked drug is listed in a csa schedule (C) recognizing the connection between guns and drug trafficking (D) holding district courts finding of consent was not clearly erroneous when the defendant consented after officers told him they could get a drug dog even though the defendant knew the dog would alert (E) holding defendant made motive issue in drug conspiracy prosecution by advancing theory he was conducting investigation of drug dealing

A:
(A)
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