In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: constructive, or judicially imposed lien, or (4) asserted against real or personal property. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.903; Cardenas v. Wilson, 428 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (noting that 51.903 inquiry into mechanic’s lien determines only that mechanic’s lien is provided by Texas law, not whether the underlying mechanic’s lien was valid). If the motion requires greater inquiry, then it is a motion for declaratory judgment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a) (West 2015); State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) (“We look to the substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of title given to it.”); Nguyen, 2016 WL 2343893, at *2 (citing Becker, 2010 WL 877569, at *2-3 (<HOLDING>)). A motion for declaratory judgment must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (B) holding motion requesting more relief than section 51903 provides was motion for declaratory judgment (C) holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment (D) holding that substance of motion to extend time was a section 1301f motion rather than a section 1301g motion and that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the section 1301f motion (E) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable 
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: hostile work environment claims from the general Ricks rule because such claims “ ‘cannot be said to occur on any particular day,’ and instead usually involve a pattern of acts that aren’t ‘actionable on [their] own’ but give rise to a legal violation only when assessed in their totality.” Almond, 665 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115-16, 122 S.Ct. 2061). Here, the Court does not construe Plaintiffs pleadings to allege a hostile work environment claim. Even construing Plaintiffs pleadings liberally, his generic assertions that Defendant Beilis treated him in a hostile manner toward the end of his employment and sent him hostile emails fall far short of asserting a claim for age-based hostile work environment. See Phillips v. Moore, 164 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1254 (D.Kan.2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, despite Plaintiffs averment that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supervisors routine vulgar references to plaintiff could not support a hostile work environment claim because plaintiff was unaware of the comments and to show that he or she perceived the environment as hostile a title vii plaintiff must at least have been aware of those comments (B) holding that the plaintiff failed to state an agebased hostile work environment claim where the plaintiffs proffered evidence was nothing more than a collection of unrelated and infrequent incidents of conduct by the defendants that the plaintiff subjectively construe as acts motived by agerelated animus and which was devoid of the agerelated comments or ridicule that are hallmarks of hostile work environment claims (C) holding that certain conduct was irrelevant to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim absent evidence that plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of it (D) recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 (E) holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: for a mistrial. See Van Alstine v. State, 263 Ga. 1, 2-3 (426 SE2d 360) (1993) (noting that the decision over “what trial motions should be made[ ] and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with his client”) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). Nevertheless, the ultimate decision over whether to move for a mistrial is a strategic one made by the lawyer, not the client. See id.; Fortson v. State, 240 Ga. 5 (1) (239 SE2d 335) (1977); Berry v. State, 262 Ga. App. 375, 377 (2) (c) (585 SE2d 679) (2003) (noting that “counsel’s decision whether to move for a mistrial generally falls within the ambit of trial strategy”) (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Burke, 257 F3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). And, the fact that defense counsel and his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decision whether to seek a mistrial is a tactical decision entrusted to defense counsel binding the defendant even when the defendant expressed a contrary wish to his lawyer (B) holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision (C) holding that there is an inference from the existence of a blank for the name of defendants lawyer and from the absence of any evidence to the contrary that defendant was not represented by counsel (D) holding that defense counsel gathered sufficient evidence to make a reasonable tactical decision not to conduct further investigations into his clients mental health when psychiatric experts interviewed the defendant for more than twenty hours and informed defense counsel that they could not find any basis for a mental defense (E) holding that defense counsels decision not to call defendant to the stand despite defendants repeatedly expressed desire to testify on his own behalf was not ineffective assistance of counsel but was a reasonable tactical decision by counsel not to subject defendant to all of the risk attendant on crossexamination
[EX A]:
(A)