In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: with the court, that Mr. Peralta has been granted a labor certification pursuant to a subsequent application filed by his employer. He has been awarded all of the relief that he sought, and there is consequently no live controversy concerning the original denial of his application for the same position with the same employer. As to the appellants whose employers have re-filed new certification applications that are currently pending, we do not think their claims are mooted. In contrast to Mr. Peralta, these parties have not yet received the relief originally sought and thus their original claim that the denial of their first certification application was arbitrary remains a live controversy. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Actually, even after a certification is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending (B) holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided (C) holding that appeals are moot when appellate courts can provide no effective relief (D) holding that a case is not moot so long as the court can fashion some form of meaningful relief for the injured party (E) holding that a previously live case can become moot only if interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation

A: holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending
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Q: types of property which do not pass to the trustee under Section 70 of the Act. See, Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a “Specialized Type of Property” ... in our Economic System, 66 N.W.U.L.Rev. 502, 525-532 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, 395 U.S. at 340, 89 S.Ct. 1820; Lines v. Frederick, supra, 400 U.S. at 19, 91 S.Ct. 113. The Supreme Court has recently held, in what is a logical corollary to the notion of specialized property, that at times a trustee has too tenuous a relationship to a given claim to have standing to assert that claim on behalf of the bankrupt estate. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 92 S.Ct. 1678, 32 L.Ed.2d 195 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In view of these evolving federal policies of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses (B) holding that the relevant indenture agreement allowed the trustee to bring tort and fraud claims on behalf of the bondholders (C) holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee (D) holding that a trustee does not have standing to sue a thirdparty on behalf of debenture holders (E) holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee

A: holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses
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Q: Typically, the following four policy considerations are cited: First, the potential of a claim interferes with a lawyer’s obligation of undivided loyalty. Second, allowing a claim creates a conflict of interest with the client and potential problems for the lawyer as a witness, which may require withdrawal or disqualification. Third, the lawyer’s independent judgment is adversely influenced by the risk of a claim, interfering with the lawyer’s counseling role. Fourth, the lawyer’s need to defend a contribution or indemnity claim may imperil the client’s confidences. MALLEN & SMITH, supra, at 898. Nonetheless, a significant number of well-reasoned decisions concur with the Supreme Judicial Court’s holding in Maddocks. See, e.g., Goran v. Glieberman, 659 N.E.2d 56, 61 (Ill.App.Ct. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Strockbridge, 756 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plain meaning of the uim policy language was clear and not contrary to public policy (B) holding contribution claim against attorney not contrary to illinois public policy (C) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (D) holding that for public policy reasons the mere filing of a bar complaint by a defendant against his attorney does not mandate removal of the attorney (E) recognizing a right to contribution

A:
holding that the plain meaning of the uim policy language was clear and not contrary to public policy
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