In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: interests inferior to the unsecured creditors [and, t]hus there should be little difficulty with the absolute priority rule____”). Sweetwater does not dispute that general proposition, but argues that the insider claims in this case should be subordinated to it, and not receive or retain any property since Sweetwater’s claim is not being paid in full. The Court disagrees. Several courts have expressed the opinion that the claim of an insider or equity holder may not be treated unequally unless the insider or equity holder used superior knowledge concerning the debtor’s affairs in an unfair manner or equitable subordination principles otherwise apply. See e.g., In re ARN LTD. Ltd. P’ship, 140 B.R. 5, 13 (Bankr.D.D.C.1992), citing In re Ho-lywell Corp., 913 F.2d 873, 880 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Heritage Org., 375 B.R. at 301 (agreeing that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the mere fact that relevant evidence is shocking to the sensibilities does not make the admission of that evidence a violation of due process (B) holding that the mere fact that a claim is held by an equity security holder does not justify its subordination and insider claims may be equitably subordinated only based on evidence of unfair conduct (C) holding that direct evidence of a fact is not necessary and that circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient but may also be more certain satisfying and persuasive (D) holding that an employer in an employment discrimination case may not justify its conduct based on evidence that did not motivate it at the time of the employment decision (E) recognizing that mere passage of time does not make evidence irrelevant as it will also depend on the nature of the evidence and its relation to what is to be proven
[A]: (B)


[Q]: the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. Addressing the identical federal rule, the Supreme Court has stated that “[o]n its face, Rule 23.1 speaks only to the adequacy of the shareholder representatives pleadings.” Kamen, supra, 500 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 1711. The rule itself does not create a demand requirement. Id. “[T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance, not procedure.’ ” Id. at 96-97, 111 S.Ct. 1711 (quoting Daily Income Fund, supra, 464 U.S. at 543-44 & n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 831 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (other citations omitted)); see also Bazata, supra, 400 A.2d at 316 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the demand requirement or its futility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (B) holding that for purposes of super ct civ r 41b demand is not jurisdictional but an element of the shareholders claim (C) holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense (D) holding that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of super ct civ r 15a which permits a party to amend once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served (E) holding the connection is an element
[A]: (B)


[Q]: were similar in their overall purpose — trafficking in cocaine). After a defendant puts his intent at issue by pleading not guilty, the strength of the government’s case on intent must be “overwhelming” in order to render extrinsic evidence on intent unnecessary. See United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir.1987) (“Moreover, the government’s proof of intent at trial was not so overwhelming as to render the extrinsic offense evidence merely cumulative.”); United States v. Hicks, 798 F.2d 446, 451-52 (11th Cir.1986). We have found that an intervening period of as much as fifteen years did not render evidence of prior convictions inadmissible. United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir.1995); cf. United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>)- A defendant’s incarceration for a substantial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense (B) holding that defendants have a federal constitutional right to make a collateral attack on a prior conviction only when that conviction was obtained without the assistance of counsel (C) holding that uncounseled conviction could not be considered by court in sentencing defendant after subsequent conviction (D) holding the district court abused its discretion in admitting a 22yearold conviction involving 14 grams of marijuana and recognizing that although we have declined to establish a brightline rule for when a prior conviction is too old to be admissible the conviction at issue was nearly fifty percent older than the oldest conviction we have previously allowed in lampley (E) holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury
[A]:
(D)