In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: (second factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the [private] insurer and the insured”). Finally, despite the MSP provision that the United States can pursue "any entity” for reimbursement, see id. (third factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry''), the MSP provision limits reimbursement to recoveries from "primary plans,” whose definition lists only entities which are clearly "within” the insurance industry. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) ("primary plan" means “a group health plan or large group health plan, ... a workmen's compensation law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan ... or no-fault insurance”); cf. Kachanis, 844 F.Supp. 877 (D.R.I.1994) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Finally, the Fund raises a puzzling 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  1012 applicable to feca provision allowing united states to recover from any third party (B) holding that the secretary of the interior breached the united states duty of loyalty despite the absence of any applicable treaty or statutory provision (C) holding that a states entitlement to indemnification from a third party does not vitiate the states sovereign immunity against a money judgment (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding that an ancillary forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 usc  853n is a civil action for the purpose of allowing a third party to recover attorneys fees
[A]: (A)


[Q]: because it was made by physicians and nursing home administrators who are private parties. The Supreme Court explained its rationale: “Those decisions ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the State.” Id. at 1008, 102 S.Ct. 2777. The Court distinguished situations where the state “affirmatively command[ed]” the discharge or transfer of Medicaid patients, id. at 1005, 102 S.Ct. 2777, or where medical judgments were made by utilization review committees mandated by federal regulation. See id. at 1008, 102 S.Ct. 2777. A key inquiry under Blum and its progeny is which entity made the decision being challenged. See id. at 1005, 102 S.Ct. 2777; see also Kraemer v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 214, 220 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113, 117 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision (B) holding  2254d authorizes federal court to review state courts decision only and not explanation of decision (C) holding that state courts failure to discuss or even to be aware of federal precedent does not in itself render the decision contrary to federal law (D) holding that a party losing in state court may not seek what would amount to appellate review of that decision in federal court based on the claim that the decision violates the losers federal rights (E) holding that the decision of a utilization review committee may well constitute state action where the decisionmaking process itself appears to be governed largely by federal guidelines
[A]: (E)


[Q]: duty of loyalty. Only the second subparagraph of that Rule specifically deals with confidentiality. The Second Circuit made clear in In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liability Litig., 800 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.1986), that “an attorney owes a duty of loyalty to his client” and that “[tjhese obligations do not necessarily end when the attorney-client relationship ends.” Id. at 17. See also Arifi v. de Transport du Cocher, Inc., 290 F.Supp.2d 344, 348 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (“The duty of loyalty that runs from an attorney to a client does not necessarily end when the formal attorney-client relationship ends because the attorney owes a ‘duty of continuing loyalty’ to his former client.” (internal citations omitted)); Schwed v. General Electric Co., 990 F.Sup t’l Inc.), 222 B.R. 401, 408 (Bankr.D.Conn.1998) (<HOLDING>); Kassis v. Teacher’s Ins. and Annuity Assoc., 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client (B) holding that attorneys should be disqualified where the substantial relationship test is met in order to assure that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship and the loyalty between attorney and client are preserved (C) holding that the substantial relationship test also concerns the duty of loyalty to a former client (D) holding that the substantial relationship test embodies a broader concept than the rule of confidentiality  that of continuing fidelity to a former client  a duty of loyalty (E) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client
[A]:
(D)