In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

venture” (FAC ¶ 39) are similarly insufficient. See Cannon v. Douglas Elliman, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-7092, 2007 WL 4358456, at *4 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007) (“[Pjleading a joint venture does not trigger joint employer status because it is possible for joint ventures to separately employ different people .... ”); Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Techs., L.L.C., No. 08-CV-5430, 2009 WL 513496, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) (“Plaintiff joint employer allegations are insufficient because they are legal conclusions, not factual allegations, .... While plaintiff is not required to conclusively establish that defendants were her joint employers at the pleading stage, plaintiff must at least allege some facts in support of this legal conclusion.”) cf. Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 635-36 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs arguments that these Defendants 
 Holding statements: (A) holding under flsa 29 usc  216c (B) holding that the authorization under 29 usc  1132a3 extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary party in interest to a transaction barred by 29 usc  1106a (C) holding under 29 usc  216c (D) holding that the finding that entities constitute a single enterprise under 29 usc  203r is separate and distinct from whether an entity is an employer under 29 usc  203d (E) holding that the defendant is in the best position to prove and should bear the burden of establishing its entitlement to an exemption under 29 usc  1108 from 29 usc  1106b erisas prohibited transactions provision
holding under flsa 29 usc  216c

agreements and do not own their software outright under Regime 1. 19 . Though this court reviews orders imposing Rule 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion, “[a] district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law_" Giebelhaus, 938 F.2d at 964 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990)). 20 . The Court extended this reasoning in Business Guides to apply the certification requirement of Rule 11 to represented parties who sign court papers, even where they are not required to do so. 498 U.S. at 543, 546-47, 111 S.Ct. at 930-31. 21 . Giebelhaus, 938 F.2d at 965; see also Pony Express Courier Corp. of Am. v. Pony Express Delivery Serv., 872 F.2d 317, 319 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Southeastern’s argument that Lederman and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction (B) holding that a city could not be held vicariously liable for the act of a magistrate who was immune from liability (C) holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii (D) holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable (E) holding that cocounsel who did not sign the answer could not be held liable under rule 11 for its contents
holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction

proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 848, as opposed to the civil forfeiture proceeding at issue in this case. See Oberlin, 718 F.2d at 896. Furthermore, Oberlin recognized this distinction, noting that the defendant’s criminal conviction and the criminal forfeiture were intended as a penalty, and thus abated. Id. Potter also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), eliminates the distinction between in rem and in personam proceedings such that those labels can no longer be the basis for distinguishing civil and criminal forfeiture proceedings. Thus, she contends, Shaffer calls into question the validity of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 676-79, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 2088-90, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Shaffer is distinguishable from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 18month delay in filing forfeiture action did not violate due process (B) holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment (C) holding that the defendants property interest requires a preseizure hearing (D) holding a puerto rican forfeiture statute modeled after  881a which did not provide for preseizure notice and hearing did not deny appellant due process (E) recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process

holding that 18month delay in filing forfeiture action did not violate due process