In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir.1996)). We conclude that, although the district court erroneously determined that the principles of Daubert did not apply to the re-creation and Agent Constantino’s testimony, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence. Under Daubert, the district court conducts a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2796; see Fed.R.Evid. 702 . This “gate-keeping” obligation on the part of the district court applies to all types of expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Many factors may bear on this inquiry, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dauberts basic gatekeeping obligation  applies to all expert testimony (B) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (C) recognizing the basic principle of contract law that the obligation of good faith is an implied condition in every contract (D) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (E) holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions

A: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive
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Q: contractor’s work is accepted and end day it is accepted and that, while one “who assumes control over a dangerous condition left by a contractor may be liable,” it “does not necessarily mean that he who creates the danger should escape liability”). Third, the defect in Preston— the design and construction of the pool— was “a patent one as a matter of law.” 227 Cal.Rptr. 817, 720 P.2d at 485. Moreover, other jurisdictions have faced more factually analogous circumstances and have rejected arguments similar to Occidental’s. These cases have imposed liability on former plant owners whose negligent design work resulted in an injury to a third-party after the sale of the plant to a new owner. See Stone v. United Eng’g, a Div. of Wean, Inc., 197 W.Va. 347, 475 S.E.2d 439, 443-44 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Dorman v. Swift & Co., 162 Ariz. 228, 782 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor (B) holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner (C) holding that section 150002 was satisfied with respect to hotel owners claims against former owners architect for negligent design of foundation and drainage (D) holding former plant owner liable for its negligent design of conveyor belt (E) holding that in the context of construction litigation regarding the alleged negligence of design professionals a tort action for negligent misrepresentation alleging damages based purely on economic loss is not available to a party in privity of contract with a design professional

A: recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor
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Q: and “the failure to provide a child with food, clothing, or shelter necessary to sustain the life or health of the child, excluding failure caused primarily by financial inability unless relief services had been offered and refused.” Id. § 261.001(4)(A), (B)(iii). These definitions are not exhaustive. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.005(13) (Vernon 2005) (stating that term “includes” is term of enlargement and not of exclusive enumeration); C.B., 376 S.W.3d at 249 & n. 10 (citing Government Code section 311.005(13) and concluding enumerated acts and omissions are not exhaustive). In addition, Texas Supreme Court case law, through its definition of child endangerment, is instructive on what constitutes abuse or neglect under Chapters 262 and 161 of the Code. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533 (<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted); see also In re 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible (B) holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing (C) holding due process does not require jury unanimity on particular act or omission submitted as alternate means of committing the conduct element of the offense of injury to a child (D) holding that injury to broker through loss of commission was not antitrust injury (E) holding that endanger means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a lessthanideal family environment but it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury rather endanger means to expose to loss or injury to jeopardize

A:
holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible
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