In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: have pleaded that the 2007 Agreement was terminated, and the Court is required to accept that fact as true at this stage of the litigation. Therefore the continued use of Plaintiffs’ trademarks by Defendant as alleged would be without the benefit of a license. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the trademark infringement claim is DENIED. C. Breach of Contract Plaintiffs claim that Big Time Toys breached the parties’ contracts when it failed to cure its default on the royalty payments. Am. Compl. ¶ 88. As an initial matter, the continued use of a licensed trademark after termination of a license agreement can be actionable as both breach of contract and trademark infringement. See, e.g., Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. v. D & L Ice Cream Co., 576 F.Supp. 1055, 1060 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>); Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co., 107 F.Supp.2d 369, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contributory trademark infringement requires some predicate act of infringement (B) holding that although the underlying action is one for trademark infringement the infringement occurred as a result of the underlying defendants use of the trademark in their advertising (C) holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong (D) holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract (E) holding that continued use of trademark after termination of franchise for nonpayment of royalties constitutes lanham act violation
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: strengthen, not displace, any existing remedies employees may. have at law.” Id. It is clear from these excerpts that the STAA was not enacted to completely preempt state law remedies for retaliation against an employee who refuses to violate safety provisions. See Todd v. Frank’s Tong Service, Inc., 784 P.2d 47, 49-50 (Okla.1989) (noting that Congressional intent surrounding enactment of the STAA demonstrates that state law claims are not preempted); see also Parten v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 923 F.2d 580, 583 (8th Cir.1991) (conclude ing that the Minnesota public policy statute was not an obstacle to the STAA and that Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field of interstate motor carriers); Whitworth v. TNT Bestway Transp., Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1434, 1436 (E.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>); Dobberowsky v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc., 989 
 Holding statements: (A) holding texas exemption law was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause (B) holding that texas whistleblowers act was not preempted by the staa (C) holding a claim of a violation of the texas dtpa is preempted by the carmack amendment (D) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra (E) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied
Example Output: (B)

Example Input: of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). A commonsense reading of this statement strongly suggests that the statute includes a requirement of intentional discrimination. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir.1996) (“It would be a stretch to read the phrase ‘because of such individual’s age’ to prohibit incidental and unintentional discrimination that resulted because of employment decisions which were made for reasons other than age.”) (emphasis in original). However, Title VII contains parallel language, and the Supreme Court concluded almost three decades ago that such language encompassed a theory of liability based on disparate impact. See Chiggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (<HOLDING>). The question, then, is whether the ADEA, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii (B) holding that employment practices which are neutral in form but which result in discriminatory effects are prohibited unless justified by business necessity (C) holding that title vii proscribes racial discrimination against whites upon the same standards as racial discrimination against nonwhites (D) holding that title vii proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation (E) holding that discriminatory employment practices are cognizable under title ix
Example Output:
(D)