In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 558, 563, 564 S.E.2d 94, 96 (2002). DISCUSSION Moody argues the circuit court erred in granting Dairy-land’s motion for summary judgment, asserting Dairyland did not make a meaningful offer of UIM coverage because it failed to offer coverage in amounts less than the statutory minimum limits. We disagree. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Hawkins v. Bruno Yacht Sales, 353 S.C. 31, 40, 577 S.E.2d 202, 207 (2003).. Moreover, “[w]here the terms of the statute are clear, [this Court] must apply those terms according to their literal meaning.” Brown v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 515, 560 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2002); see also Rowe v. Hyatt, 321 S.C. 366, 369, 468 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In relevant part, section 38-73-470 provides 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning (B) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (C) holding when interpreting a statute words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statutes operation (D) holding that where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation (E) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning
[A]: holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning


[Q]: the Bond offering because they underwrote the transaction and sold the Bonds to investors, either directly or through their brokers. Indeed, given the role of underwriters generally, Baird, Jones, and Stern “had a duty to make an to speak, they knew investors might rely on the statements made. The law firms’ duty, however, must also be considered in light of the services they were retained to perform. Because Kutak and Stinson were not hired to opine on the feasibility of the Event Center, they cannot have been held to a duty to investigate or determine whether the financial projections were realistic unless these firms otherwise became involved in the making, preparing, or drafting of those projections. See N.Y. City Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Berry, 616 F.Supp.2d 987, 994 (N.D.Cal.2009) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, to the extent the law firms 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors (B) holding that substantial participation requires particular facts relating to each djefendants specific role in the preparation of each of the allegedly misleading statements (C) recognizing that questions of changed conditions and the amount of child support must be resolved on the particular facts of each case (D) holding that district court must conduct individualized assessment based on particular facts of each case (E) holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case
[A]: holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors


[Q]: with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). After the July 2006 merits hearing, the IJ found that the Petitioner had failed to establish his Congolese identity, which defeated prima facie eligibility for relief. See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.2006) (“[A] petitioner’s nationality, or lack of nationality, is a threshold question in determining his eligibility for asylum.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the motion for rehearing, the BAD did not err in declining to consider Petitioner’s newly submitted identity documents. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (<HOLDING>). As the BIA found, and Mudiangomba conceded 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that bia may deny motion to reopen where movant has not established prima facie eligibility for relief sought (B) recognizing that failure to offer new previously unavailable evidence establishing a prima facie case for the underlying relief sought is a proper ground on which the bia may deny a motion to reopen (C) recognizing that in an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions the movant must submit previously unavailable evidence demonstrating his prima facie eligibility for relief (D) holding that the bia may deny a motion to reopen on the ground that the movant has not established prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought (E) holding that the bia may deny a motion to reopen based on its finding that the movant has not established his prima facie eligibility for relief
[A]:
recognizing that bia may deny motion to reopen where movant has not established prima facie eligibility for relief sought