TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] ... begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”). Section 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) states in part that “attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living ... justifies a higher fee.” (emphasis added). On its face, § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) generally references “the cost of living” not a local/regional cost-of-living. Id. (emphasis added). See Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (“[CJourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”) (citations omitted). Cf. Jones v. Espy, 10 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). This choice of language 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity (B) holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority (C) holding that the more general cpiu for all items applied because if congress had meant to permit upward adjustments based on the increased cost of legal services it would have done so with greater specificity and clarity (D) holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001 (E) holding that based on the statutes purpose and its legislative history the legislature would have included specific language regarding drug rehabilitation if it had meant to include it

SOLUTION: holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity

PROBLEM: documents that may be exempt from disclosure under the Sunshine Law. See Chasnoff v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 334 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Mo.App. E.D.2011) (noting trial court reviewed investigative file log of 59 documents in camera to determine disclosure under Sunshine Law); Bill, 935 S.W.2d at 663 (noting trial court granted in camera review of retirement benefit records of government employees; subsequently finding records exempt from disclosure under Sunshine Law); accord State ex rel. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr. v. Keet, 678 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Mo. banc 1984) (in discovery context, trial court has discretion to examine privileged documents in camera to determine whether redaction and production of documents is appropriate); State ex rel. Fusselman v. Belt. 893 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Mo.App. W.D.1995) (<HOLDING>). In light of the Sunshine Law and the Missouri 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense (B) holding that where a party claims a document is privileged and the trial court fails to conduct an in camera review or balancing test the trial court has departed from the essential requirements of the law (C) holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant (D) holding in camera review by trial court to determine whether crime stoppers information contained brady information would meet the balance of defendants constitutional rights against the states interest in fostering law enforcement (E) holding trial court should have reviewed records requested by criminal defendant in camera to determine whether they contained exculpatory evidence while protecting against unnecessary publication of privileged information

SOLUTION: holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense

PROBLEM: failed to complete the assignment and warranty of title to H & L on the same certificate. See Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 40-3-32(a) (Supp. 1988). Winn is still listed on the certificate as the registered owner, and under Georgia law, the certificate is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it. Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 40-3-25(c) (1985). Although our reading of the Georgia statutes yields the conclusion that ownership of the Buick did not pass to the dealership or to H & L since the certificate of title was not properly assigned, it appears that Georgia courts interpreting the same statutes would reach a different conclusion. See, e.g., American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 280, 253 S.E.2d 825 (1979); Mote v. Mote, 134 Ga. App. 668, 215 S.E.2d 487 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Winn’s evidence regarding the sale of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision (B) holding that ownership of vehicle later involved in accident passed to buyer even though assignment of title not completed (C) holding that in pennsylvania there is a rule that proof of the ownership of a business vehicle involved in an accident raises a presumption that the operation of the automobile was for the owners business purposes (D) holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale (E) holding that delivery of possession of vehicle without delivery of certificate of title did not transfer ownership even though full payment had been received

SOLUTION:
holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision