In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 55(c) motion on or before August 22, 2012, the 90th day after it was filed, that motion was denied by operation of law on that date, which denial terminated the trial court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v. Lenoir, 5 So.3d 1282, 1283 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (“The trial court loses jurisdiction to consider [a postjudgment] motion after the expiration of the 90-day period.”). Because its jurisdiction terminated on August 22, 2012, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the November 16, 2012, order purporting to set aside the default judgment against Thurmond; the March 16, 2013, order purporting to deny Thurmond’s summary-judgment motion; and the April 16, 2013, order purporting to enter a summary judgment in favor of Parrish. See Sibley v. Sibley, 90 So.3d 191, 193 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (<HOLDING>). A judgment entered by a trial court lacking 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void (B) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (C) holding trial court order which purportedly corrected divorce decree to alter marital property division was void because it was entered  after this court obtained jurisdiction (D) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (E) holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief
[EX A]: holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void

[EX Q]: S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975).” Peters v. Narick, 165 W.Va. 622, 628 n. 13, 270 S.E.2d 760, 768 n. 13 (1980). This Court has determined repeatedly that the West Virginia Constitution may be more protective of individual rights than its federal counterpart. See, e.g., State v. Bonham, 173 W.Va. 416, 317 S.E.2d 5 Daley, 174 W.Va. 299, 324 S.E.2d 713 (1984) (state constitution compels striking limitation on soliciting after sunset even if federal constitution does not); Woodruff v. Board of Trustees of Cabell Huntington Hospital, 173 W.Va. 604, 611, 319 S.E.2d 372, 379 (1984) (Article III, § 1 "more stringent in its limitation on waiver [of fundamental rights] than is the federal constitution”); Pushinsky v. West Virginia Board of Law Examiners, 164 W.Va. 736, 266 S.E.2d 444 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 707, 255 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution (B) recognizing that state constitution imposes more stringent limitations on power of state to inquire into lawful associations and speech than those imposed by federal constitution (C) recognizing exception under state constitution (D) holding that appellate court assumes appellant claims no greater protection under state constitution than that provided by federal constitution when state and federal claims not briefed separately (E) holding missouri constitution requires stricter separation of church and state than does federal constitution
[EX A]: recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution

[EX Q]: federal maritime law to the effect that the show-tag of profits and losses and the right to joint control are merely important indicators of a joint venture relationship rather than essential elements of such a relationship. Fulcher’s Point deals with maritime liens, not with employment status or tort liability under The Jones Act. 935 F.2d at 209. The emphasis of Fulcher was on nondilution of the credit of the vessel and the maintenance of this security for suppliers who are strangers to ownership of the vessel. See id. at 211, 213. Davidson involved the application of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901. 848 F.2d at 575. 11 .But cf. Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256, 257-58 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914, 108 S.Ct. 261, 98 L.Ed.2d 218 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 12 . As Taiyo points out, a substantial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general rule of maritime law that parties bear their own costs coupled with the need for uniformity in federal maritime law precludes the application of state attorneys fee statutes such as texas civ prac  remcode  38001 to maritime contract disputes (B) holding punitive damages unavailable for survival claims under general maritime law (C) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (D) holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law (E) holding that federal maritime law and not state law applies to all actions for wrongful death in navigable state waters
[EX A]:
holding that the general rule of maritime law that parties bear their own costs coupled with the need for uniformity in federal maritime law precludes the application of state attorneys fee statutes such as texas civ prac  remcode  38001 to maritime contract disputes