TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: for relief under § 3582(c). Nor is Brown entitled to pursue his claims through § 2241. A prisoner may proceed under § 2241 if § 2255 would be “inadequate of ineffective.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir.2002) (per curiam). We have held that § 2255’s “safety valve” applies only in rare circumstances, such as when an intervening change in the statute under which the petitioner was convicted renders the petitioner’s conduct non-criminal. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Brown has not satisfied that standard here, as he makes no allegation that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, but instead asserts only that he is “innocent” of being a career offender. See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120-21 (<HOLDING>). Brown must obtain a certificate of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under  841 and 846 was not cognizable under  2241 (B) holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor (C) holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (D) holding that dorsainvil did not permit petitioner to challenge sentence via  2241 based on intervening change in sentencing law (E) holding challenge to armedcareercriminal enhancement improper under  2241

SOLUTION: holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under  841 and 846 was not cognizable under  2241

PROBLEM: two separate legal insufficiency claims. When the party without the burden of proof suffers an unfavorable finding, the challenge is one of “no evidence to support the finding.” See Creative Manufacturing, Inc. v. Unik, 726 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.). Where the party having the burden of proof suffers an unfavorable finding (failure to find), the proper complaint is that the fact was established as “a matter of law.” See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Company, 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989). Here, Tech filed a verified special denial that it received timely notice. Consequently, Lucero had the burden to plead and secure a finding on notice. See Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center v. Apodaca, 876 S.W.2d 402, 410-11 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied)(<HOLDING>); see also Harrison v. Texas Department of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice (B) holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner (C) holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice (D) holding that where the governmental unit filed a verified special denial that it received timely actual notice the plaintiff had the burden to prove and secure a finding on actual notice at trial (E) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice

SOLUTION: holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice

PROBLEM: harm. Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373; see United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1989) (defining “threat” as an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on another), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990). The Edwards court specifically held that RCW 9.61.160 does not require proof of a true threat. Edwards, 84 Wn. App. at 12. Rather, the court indicated that the statute prohibited fighting words. In its analysis, the court noted that RCW 9.61.160 proscribes some protected speech, stating that threats are protected by the First Amendment “unless they are likely to cause an immediate breach of the peace.” Edwards, 84 Wn. App. at 17. But the court concluded, without elaboration, that the majority of threats proscribed under RCW 9.61.160 are likely t 276 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats (B) holding that there can be only one final appealable order (C) holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final (D) holding that it is not (E) holding the court should only apply the doctrine narrowly and only under exceptional circumstances

SOLUTION:
holding that there can be only one final appealable order