In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: that the people in the venire do not represent a fair and reasonable cross-section of the District of New Mexico. See United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 & n. 4 (1st Cir.1979)(stating that residents of counties, cities, and towns do not constitute a distinct, cognizable group for purposes of Sixth Amendment cross-section analysis); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 582 (10th Cir.1976)(“Mere geographical imbalance, absent evidence that an identifiable and cognizable segment of the community has been systemically excluded or underrepresented by reason of such imbalance, does not violate the statutory and constitutional requirement that the jury panel represent a ‘fair cross section’ of the community.”); United States v. Traficant, 209 F.Supp.2d 764, 780-81 (N.D.Ohio 2002)(<HOLDING>). Considering the foregoing, the Court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant did not prove that italianamericans are a cognizable group (B) holding that residents of a geograph ic area are not a distinct cognizable group and citing united states v test which made clear that a geographic area is not a distinct group for support (C) holding same and citing physicians multispecialty group (D) recognizing women as a distinct group (E) recognizing native americans as a distinct group
Example Output: holding that the defendant did not prove that italianamericans are a cognizable group

Example Input: without including a message of their own. “[T]here are commonsense differences between speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction and other varieties.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (quotations and citation omitted). Common sense dictates that the use of images of Plaintiff Bosley to sell video tapes, website memberships, or defendants’ other wares, at most, constitute commercial speech. The Supreme Court has noted that “advertising which ‘links a product to a cur rent public debate’ is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (<HOLDING>) “Thus, it seems that the Supreme Court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute reaching beyond purely commercial speech to chill fully protected speech can merit application of the overbreadth doctrine (B) holding that information pamphlets are properly characterized as commercial speech (C) holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech (D) recognizing that noncommercial speech is accorded greater protection under the first amendment than is commercial speech and striking down ordinance that imposed a greater restriction on political than on commercial billboards (E) recognizing that code is speech
Example Output: holding that statute reaching beyond purely commercial speech to chill fully protected speech can merit application of the overbreadth doctrine

Example Input: MCI's third-party action against Marcopolo. In MCI’s appeal of the special appearance ruling, we affirmed the trial court’s decision. See Motor Coach Indus., Inc. v. Marcopolo, S.A., 2007 WL 4157241 (Tex.App.-Waco Nov.21, 2007, no pet.). MCI's eighth issue contends that, if the trial court erred by granting Marcopolo's special appearance, its severance of MCI’s third-party action against Mar-copolo would have been erroneous and the judgment should be reversed. Because we affirmed the trial court's decision on Marco-polo's special appearance, we overrule MCI's eighth issue. 2 . Two Texas Supreme Court decisions have addressed the implied preemption of state common-law tort claims by federal motor vehicle safety standards: Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 974 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>); and Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Estate of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state common law claim seeking to require automobile manufacturers to install airbags would frustrate the purposes of the federal safety standard regulations adopted under the federal motor vehicle safety act which did not require manufacturers to do so and therefore was preempted by conflict (B) holding that the safety act and fmvss 108 did not impliedly preempt commonlaw conspicuity tort based on inadequate lighting and reflectors on truck trailer (C) holding that the coast guards decision not to regulate propeller guards did not impliedly preempt petitioners tort claims (D) holding that the safety act and fmvss 208 did not expressly or impliedly preempt a tort claim based on the manufacturers failure to install lap belts (E) holding that claims were nothing more than a backdoor attempt to attack once again the manufacturers exercise of one of the restraint options under fmvss 208  it therefore frustrates the purpose and objective of the federal regulation and invokes implied preemption under the holding in geier 
Example Output:
holding that a state common law claim seeking to require automobile manufacturers to install airbags would frustrate the purposes of the federal safety standard regulations adopted under the federal motor vehicle safety act which did not require manufacturers to do so and therefore was preempted by conflict