In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: as here, the recalcitrant witness is at liberty pending appeal. In so holding, we join all of the circuits which have squarely addressed the issue. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 906 F.2d 78, 82-83 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom. Backiel v. United States, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990); In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 189 (D.C.Cir.1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 785 F.2d 629, 631 n. 4 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Johnson, 736 F.2d 358, 361-62 n. 5 (6th Cir.1984); In re Witness Before Special October 1981 Grand Jury, 722 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir.1983); In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir.1982); Brown v. United States, 465 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.1972). But see In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928, 96 S.Ct. 276, 46 L.Ed.2d 256 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The foregoing cases have noted that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the deadmans statute should not be extended by judicial construction to cases not clearly within its terms (B) recognizing that denying outofeell exercise for extended periods may constitute cruel and unusual punishment (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration (E) holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to guantanamo
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: or property on which it is found, is insufficient to support a finding of possession.” Murray v. United States, 403 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir.1969) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, there must be additional proof of knowledge and control to sustain a conviction for possession. Although control of marijuana may be established by evidence that a person smoked marijuana, the smoke in the hotel room does not provide the additional proof necessary to sustain Petitioner’s conviction. As discussed above, the record in this case supports merely an inference that someone smoked marijuana in the room, not that Petitioner, one of five occupants of the room, smoked marijuana. In Garrison, 272 Md. 123, 321 A.2d 767, Judge O’Donnell, writing for t .2d 252, 254 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. State, 9 Md.App. 48, 55, 262 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of presence of marijuana plants on property puckett jointly owned with his wife was not sufficient to create rational inference that puckett was in possession of the marijuana (B) holding that a defendants conviction for two possession of marijuana counts could not be supported by his possession of two marijuana cigarettes dropped from his hand and again for his possession of several packets of marijuana found in a nearby jacket during the same search (C) holding evidence of marijuana plants on premises defendant owned with his wife insufficient where marijuana plants were grown in an uncultivated area and there was a total absence of evidence of the defendants involvement (D) holding that jurys failure to find the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana could not be reconciled with a verdict of guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to purchase (E) holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: provision, its application to plaintiff, or the governmental interests it serves. Without such evidence, there is no showing at this juncture that plaintiff, or anyone else, is likely to be harmed by its continued enforcement. The City ordinances that prohibit “sales or exchanges,” § 62 — 5(b)(9), and establishment or acceptance of “a price or fee ... for observing or participating in a display or performance, other than ... a tip the amount of which is not solicited,” § 62-5(b)(10), along with the categorical ban on commercial activity, § 62-4, present thornier questions. I now turn to those provisions. B. Restrictions on Commercial Expression and Activity Section 62 — 5(b)(10), quoted above, plainly regulates speech. See Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>) (quoting regulation; emphasis in original). 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the need to balance the states interest in fulfilling its responsibilities to the public the extent to which the speech in question involves a matter of public concern and the manner time place and context of the speech (B) holding that campaign money laundering was in furtherance of political speech but an invalid exercise of free speech rights because it was illegal (C) holding that restriction on government employee speech was unconstitutionally vague (D) recognizing that code is speech (E) holding that a regulation forbidding street performers to  solicit donations  except by  passively  informing the public that such donations are sought  with written signs constituted a restriction on speech because it allows the conduct exchange of money but regulates only the speech by specifying the manner of requesting money  only  passively
[EX A]:
(E)