In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981))); State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996) (listing the four factors discussed above) (citations omitted). Finally, if the proponent provides a sufficient explanation for the peremptory challenges, the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the peremptory challenges has proven purposeful discrimination. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769; Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2416; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. ¶ 16 Since deciding Batson, the Supreme Court has continually increased the scope of the Batson test. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409-10, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that batson applies to a prosecutors use of peremptory challenges regardless of whether the stricken juror is of the same race as the defendant (B) holding that the constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges (C) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (D) holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause (E) holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race

A: holding that the constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges
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Q: as independent entities that solicited and accepted customer orders but used the services of FCMs for clearing, record keeping and retaining customer funds. See id. at 41. To guarantee the accountability of introducing brokers, the Commission was authorized to require them to meet “minimum financial requirements.” See id. First American Discount Corp. v. CFTC, 222 F.3d 1008, 1012 (D.C.Cir.2000). Thus, the legislative history behind the creation of IBs demonstrates Congressional intent not to render IBs agents of FCMs merely because of their status as IBs. Where, as here, the IB is engaged in non-CEA regulated activity, the court concludes that an IB of an FCM is not rendered an agent of the FCM by its mere IB status. See Cunningham v. Waters Tan & Co., 65 F.3d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); cf. Tatum v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing (B) holding that the sixth amendments guarantee of the assistance of counsel is made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment (C) recognizing that a broad definition of stolen is consistent with the guidelines purposes and finding that the enhancement was properly applied where a defendant found a gun that was lost or mislaid by its owner who never authorized anyone to take the gun never sold it and never gave it away as a gift (D) holding that an fcm by entering into a guarantee agreement with ib as an individual never agreed to guarantee ibs other venture as a commodity pool operator  an activity of which fcm was never made aware (E) holding an attorney does not have a duty to insure or guarantee that the most favorable outcome possible and because no amount of work can guarantee a favorable result attorneys would never know when the work they do is sufficiently more than adequate to be enough to protect not only their clients from error but themselves from liability

A: holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing
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Q: put forth anything to convince the Court that further discovery could rectify this issue. Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to deny or defer Defendant’s Motion as premature. 4. Contractual Limitations on Time to Bring Suit A. How does KRS § 304.14-370 affect contractual limitation provisions? Kentucky law has long recognized “the validity of insurance contract provisions requiring as a condition to sue that the action must be ‘commenced within the time specified by the policy.’ ” Edmondson v. Penn. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 781 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Ky.1989) (internal citations omitted). Courts typically enforced such provisions unless they unreasonably limited the time in which parties could sue. See Ashland Finance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 474 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Ky. 1971) (<HOLDING>). However, KRS § 304.14-370 does place 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable (B) holding that discovery was appropriately tailored as it limited the request to information within a six year time period relating to one specific contract and the deposition of a person most knowledgeable (C) holding that section 10b and rule 10b5 suits must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation (D) holding that cogsa claims must be brought within one year from the time at which the loss occurred (E) holding that a blanket bond contract provision requiring a party to bring suit within one year after discovery of the loss was not unreasonable

A:
holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable
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