In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
defense, or a development in the controlling law that foreclosed the claim. The record here betrays no significant change in circumstances prior to trial that reasonably should have caused the plaintiffs to conclude that their claims were no longer viable. In fact, the most notable development in the case prior to trial sent a contrary signal: the court denied the Mayor’s post-discovery summary judgment motion as to the plaintiffs’ central political discrimination claim. While the fact that a claim has survived summary judgment is not, on its own, “entitled to decretory significance,” Foster, 943 F.2d at 144, it has some value in determining whether a claim was or became unreasonable or without foundation. See id.; Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1559 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Jensen v. Stangel, 762 F.2d 815, 818 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court abused its discretion in finding suit unreasonable and groundless where inter alia the court had denied two prior summary judgment motions (B) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact (C) holding that the trial court grants or denies motions for summary judgment on the basis of what is contained in the motions for summary judgment and the responses thereto (D) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (E) holding district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on summary judgment motion where inter alia plaintiff had been given repeated notices court intended to rule on motion and it was plaintiffs burden to rebut defendants evidence

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
27 . State v. Davenport, 510 P.2d 78, 82 n. 8 (Alaska 1973), quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). 28 . Williams v. State, 737 P.2d 360, 362 (Alaska App.1987). 29 . Davenport, 510 P.2d at 80. 30 . Id. at 82 & n. 8. 31 . - See Landon v. State, 941 P.2d 186, 190 (Alaska App.1997); Stam v. State, 925 P.2d 668, 670 (Alaska App.1996) (when assessing the trustworthiness of hearsay information contained in a search warrant application, courts presume that police officers and citizen informants are credible sources of information}. 32 . Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 322-25 (Alaska 1985) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible (B) holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause (C) holding that the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is subject to a harmlesserror analysis (D) holding as a matter of law that adaptations of subject matter or expressions in the public domain cannot support a finding of copyright infringement (E) holding that as a matter of state law the aguilarspinelli test continues to govern the evaluation of hearsay information offered to support a search or seizure

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
the doctrine was extended to include automobiles. See S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). In doing so, the court reasoned: The principles of common law do not permit the owner of an instrumentality that is not dangerous per se, but is peculiarly dangerous in its operation, to authorize another to use such instrumentality on the public highways without imposing upon such owner liability for negligent use. The liability grows out of the obligation of the owner to have the vehicle, that is not inherently dangerous per se, but peculiarly dangerous in its use, properly operated when it is by his authority on the public highway. Anderson v. S. Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975, 978 (1917). Therefore, the doctrine “imposes strict vicariou (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>); Harding v. Allen-Laux, Inc., 559 So.2d 107, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trailer is not a dangerous instrumentality notwithstanding the fact that it meets the statutory definition of a motor vehicle (B) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling (C) holding that although it does not meet the statutory definition of a motor vehicle a forklift is a dangerous instrumentality (D) holding that a collision with the loading ramp of a trailer was not actual physical contact with a motor vehicle (E) holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle 

Ex Output:

(A)