TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: of two dates between Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro in 1988. In its view, the evidence was irrelevant and inflammatory. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion in limine with respect to this evidence. The court believed that the evidence was relevant and ought to be before the jury because it had the task of evaluating the overall relationship of Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro. Evidence that is relevant to the background of the case is admissible for that purpose. At the very least, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court not to exclude this evidence in a motion in limine; the evidence was at least potentially relevant for the purpose the judge identified. See Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). LCFS did not object during the trial when Ms. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time (B) holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment (C) holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background (D) holding that section 102 of the civil rights act of 1991 does not apply to preenactment conduct (E) holding that the  1981 amendments contained in  101 of the civil rights act of 1991 do not apply retroactively

SOLUTION: holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time

PROBLEM: WL 687033, at *1 (D.Md. Feb. 29, 2008) (citing Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). Courts in the Fourth Circuit deny leave to amend a complaint past the deadline established by a scheduling order where the moving party has been careless in developing his claims or where he has failed to satisfactorily account for his failure to do so. Compare Whichard v. Specialty Restaurants Corp., 220 F.R.D. 439, 441 (D.Md.2004) (denying plaintiffs motion to join an additional defendant five months after the court imposed deadline because plaintiff had ample notice before the deadline that the original defendant might not be the right party) with Long v. Blair, No. 2:09-CV-00349, 2010 WL 1930220 (S.D.W.Va. May 12, 2010) (<HOLDING>). After a movant satisfies the good cause 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that good cause did not exist where counsel waited months after filing of the pleadings to propound written discovery and did not take oral depositions of known key individuals to their claims until after the deadline for amending the complaint (B) holding that a change in the theory of recovery and one prior amendment is not sufficient to deny a motion to amend the complaint where no evidence of bad faith existed (C) holding that denial of leave to amend was appropriate because the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint two years after filing his complaint  on the eve of trial when discovery was complete (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion where it determined that plaintiffs failed to show good cause to amend complaint after dispositive motion deadline (E) holding that good cause existed where the plaintiff did not establish a sufficient evidentiary basis to support new claims until after the deadline for amending his complaint and moved to amend immediately after the new evidence came to light

SOLUTION: holding that good cause did not exist where counsel waited months after filing of the pleadings to propound written discovery and did not take oral depositions of known key individuals to their claims until after the deadline for amending the complaint

PROBLEM: the postcard. As a factual matter, whether Mitchell proves that Hood made defamatory statements in the postcard does not govern Hood’s claims against Judge Anderson-Trahan. Hood’s claims against Judge Anderson-Trahan for putting Hood’s name on the postcard may succeed or fail in a scenario where Mitchell’s claims against Hood succeed or a scenario where Mitchell’s claims against Hood fail. Judge Anderson-Trahan is no more or less liable to Hood based upon Hood’s liability to Mitchell. Furthermore, Hood has not asserted that his claims against Judge Anderson-Trahan are derivative of Mitchell’s claims against Hood. Hood does not seek damages from Judge Anderson-Trahan contingent upon his liability on Mitchell’s claims. In fact, Hood specifically alleges that he has been harmed by Jud 0) (<HOLDING>) (alteration in original). Because we decide 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dismissal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 56 did not violate the seventh amendment (B) holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted (C) holding that californias antislapp statute is applicable in federal court (D) holding that maines antislapp statute could be applied in the district court because federal rules of civil procedure 12 and 56 are not so broad as to attempt  to answer the same question as the statute (E) holding that the district of columbias antislapp law could not be applied in federal court in a diversity case because it conflicted with federal rules of civil procedure 12 and 56

SOLUTION:
holding that dismissal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 56 did not violate the seventh amendment