instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
9006(b)(3). There is no excusable neglect basis for enlarging the claims bar date included in Rule 3002(c). Accordingly, the excusable neglect standard found in Rule 9006(b)(1) does not authorize extensions of the claims deadline imposed in chapter 13 cases. In re Oscar, 2005 WL 6522763 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Apr. 14, 2005). “[S]ince 1994, the courts have almost uniformly ruled that proofs of claim that are untimely filed in a Chapter 13 case may not be deemed timely filed, and that the claimants thereunder should not take from, or be permitted to recover from, the debtor’s estate under the Chapter 13 plan.” Daniels, 466 B.R. at 217 (listing examples). This Court has consistently held that late claims are not permitted in chapter 13 cases. In re Dumain, 492 B.R. 140, 148 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2013) (<HOLDING>). As such, the Court will not allow Ocwen’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding impairment of secured creditors foreclosure remedy permissible (B) holding that failure to comply with bankruptcy rule 4004 may be waived (C) holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added (D) holding that secured creditors must comply with the bar date imposed by bankruptcy rule 3002c (E) holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor
answer:
holding impairment of secured creditors foreclosure remedy permissible


question:
only as part of the presentations to a group, or whether appellees had any conversations with Hoagland, and, if so, the content of those conversations. Appellees merely stated they did not make misrepresentations to Hoagland in Texas regarding the business transaction made the basis of the captioned case. We conclude these statements are unsupported factual and legal conclusions. See Ennis, 164 S.W.3d at 703-04 (affirming trial court’s exclusion of nonresident’s statements that he did not have a substantial connection with Texas, plaintiffs’ claims did not result from and were not related to any of affiant’s activities in Texas, affiant did not have any continuing or systematic contacts with Texas, and affiant did not commit any tort in Texas); see also Wright, 137 S.W.3d at 250 n. 8 (<HOLDING>). Kassoffs affidavit is similarly concluso-ry. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute (B) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied (C) holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in houston texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute for plaintiffs claims of various forms of fraud and negligent misrepresentation (D) recognizing strong interest in protecting texas citizens where tort was committed in whole or in part in texas (E) holding nonresidents statement that he had committed no torts in texas was properly excluded as conclusory
answer:
holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute


question:
to the defense of Poole. 6 . Moreover, not only did Poole's unilateral decision to have the school’s interior remedi-ated violate the terms of the policy, (see ECF No. 1-2 at 19), and impair Nautilus’s ability to protect its interests, which included mounting a litigation strategy to determine fault, see W. Bend Co. v. Chiaphua Indus., Inc., 112 F.Supp.2d 816, 824 (E.D.Wis.2000) (explaining that prohibitions against voluntarily assuming obligations “exist to give the insurer — which is being asked to foot the bill — an opportunity to protect its interests”), but the late tender to Nautilus appears to have- deprived it of the opportunity to control the defense of Poole in the state action. See Wm. C. Vick Constr. Co. v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 52 F.Supp.2d 569, 596 (E.D.N.C.1999) (<HOLDING>). To hold, as Westfield urges, that Nautilus 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the insurers failure to pay even what it had considered to be a reasonable sum for defense costs despite having nominally accepted the tender of defense constitutes a breach of the duty to defend (B) holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer (C) holding that insurer must pay for defense after it declined to provide a defense and coverage was found to exist (D) holding that delayed notice relieves insurer of obligation to pay defense costs if it was actually prejudiced by delay (E) recognizing that an insurers obligation to pay for prenotification legal expenses is concomitant with its right to control the defense and that a contrary result would require the insurer to pay for those defense costs which it had no opportunity to control
answer:

holding that the insurers failure to pay even what it had considered to be a reasonable sum for defense costs despite having nominally accepted the tender of defense constitutes a breach of the duty to defend