In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED 1 . In the original petition in the Sullivan Suit, Ms. Sullivan averred that she was represented by a power of attorney appointing Mr. Ban-daries as her attorney in fact and caregiver and granting him "full power and authority and in her name and behalf” to "conduct, man .2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair). But see Marleau v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 333 Or. 82, 37 P.3d 148, 156 (2001) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under south carolina law slander is actionable per se where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery (B) holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under missouri law (C) recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages (D) holding that statement made to plaintiffs neighbors that plaintiff committed adultery was not slander per se because adultery is no longer a crime under oregon law (E) holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under louisiana law

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. Addressing the identical federal rule, the Supreme Court has stated that “[o]n its face, Rule 23.1 speaks only to the adequacy of the shareholder representatives pleadings.” Kamen, supra, 500 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 1711. The rule itself does not create a demand requirement. Id. “[T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance, not procedure.’ ” Id. at 96-97, 111 S.Ct. 1711 (quoting Daily Income Fund, supra, 464 U.S. at 543-44 & n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 831 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (other citations omitted)); see also Bazata, supra, 400 A.2d at 316 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the demand requirement or its futility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (B) holding that for purposes of super ct civ r 41b demand is not jurisdictional but an element of the shareholders claim (C) holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense (D) holding that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of super ct civ r 15a which permits a party to amend once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served (E) holding the connection is an element

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
38 Ill.App.3d 616, 348 N.E.2d 277 (1976) (noting that a co-occupant of premises in which contraband is kept runs a significant risk of facing criminal charges and can, therefore, act in his own interest in the Matlock sense). 27 . Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). 28 . Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793; Malone v. State, 163 S.W.3d 785, 797-98 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d). 29 . Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281. Under the Texas Constitution, the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that consent was validly given. Id. 30 . State’s Brief on the Merits, at 4. 31 . State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856, n. 22 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). 32 . Hubert, 286 S.W.3d at 489. 33 . See Sorensen v. State, 478 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (<HOLDING>); Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while a mother could consent to a search of her sons room she did not have authority to consent to a search of a locked footlocker within the room (B) holding that appellants mother had the authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom defendant lived with parents rentfree for four years mother owned the house appellants bedroom door was open mother knocked whenever appellants door was locked and there were no restrictions placed on mothers right to enter bedroom (C) holding that twentyyearold appellants mother had authority to consent to a search of sons bedroom where appellant had agreed to pay 10 per week as rent he had not instructed mother to stay out of his room and mother infrequently entered appellants room to pick up after him (D) holding that although son was eighteen years old and paid rent mother could consent to search of sons bedroom where nothing suggested mother lacked access to room (E) holding that officers had a reasonable belief that defendants father had authority to consent to the search of his sons room and computer because he owned the home and had access to the room and computer at will

Ex Output:

(C)