In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
hold that a court of appeals may not award a new trial on the basis of an erroneous eviden-tiary decision” in the absence of a post-verdict motion. Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 448 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir.2006). Likewise, in Metcalf v. Bochco, 200 Fed.Appx. 635, 637 n. 1 (9th Cir.2006), the Ninth Circuit stated that Unitheim "deals with the specific situation of a party’s failure to renew, post-verdict, a Rule 50 motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a civil jury trial” and reasoned that "Unitherm is inapposite” to Metcalf's case because the appellants did not "challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.” 3 . Our circuit has repeatedly accepted such claims of retaliation for taking FMLA leave. See, e.g., Arban v. West Publ’g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 403 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Wysong v. Dow Chemical Co., 503 F.3d 441, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers oral denial of plaintiffs request for fmla leave showed interference (B) holding that  825220c is a reasonable interpretation of the statutes prohibition on interference with and restraint of employees rights under the fmla  2615a1  and that the labor departments conclusion that employer use of the taking of fmla leave as a negative factor in employment actions  violates  the act is  a reasonable one (C) holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave (D) holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jurys conclusion that west retaliated against arban for taking leave under the fmla (E) holding that employee who exceeded fmla leave was subject to immediate discharge on the very first workday that he was both absent from work and no longer protected by the fmla

Ex Output:
holding that employers oral denial of plaintiffs request for fmla leave showed interference


Ex Input:
N.E.2d 968, 973 (Ind.1999). However, when the landowner is a lessor and the lessee is in operational control of the premises, such duty rarely exists. “[A] landlord under many circumstances has no liability to tenants or others for injuries on the property when the tenant is in full control of the leased premises.” Dutchmen Mfg., Inc. v. Reynolds, 849 N.E.2d 516, 525 (Ind.2006). “[I]n the absence of statute, covenant, fraud or concealment, a landlord who gives a tenant full control and possession of the leased property will not be liable for personal injuries sustained by the tenant or other persons lawfully' upon the leased property.” Olds v. Noel, 857 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (citation omitted), tram, not' sought; cf. Rossow v. Jones, 404 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (<HOLDING>), trans. not sought. Yost v. Wabash College, 3 
 Holding statements: (A) holding over (B) holding that captain has reasonable expectation of privacy in all areas of his ship (C) holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building (D) holding that a landlord has a duty of reasonable care over common areas or other areas over which the landlord has retained control (E) holding that a landlord may have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its tenants in common areas

Ex Output:
holding over


Ex Input:
his failure to appear personally at the hearing. This distinguishes this case from cases where a party never appears in an action, and a default judgment is granted at trial. See, e.g., Ladson v. BPM Corp., 2004 S.D. 74, ¶¶ 22-25, 681 N.W.2d 863, 869 (upholding a default judgment granted to the plaintiff at trial where the defendant corporation never answered the complaint or otherwise appeared in the action by counsel as required by law and as repeatedly instructed by the circuit court). 6 . Accord Bloch v. Bentfield, 1 Ariz.App. 412, 403 P.2d 559, 564 (1965) ("When a case is regularly called for trial, the trial may proceed although one party does not appear and this is not a hearing as by default.”); Heidary v. Yadollahi, 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 695, 699 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Ohio Valley Radiology Assocs., Inc. v. Ohio 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that despite failure to appear for trial default could not be entered without notice to defendant (B) holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact (C) holding that default judgment was not warranted where the defendant answered late but answered (D) holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment (E) holding 1 that where a defendant who previously answered does not appear for trial a plaintiffs only remedy is to make a motion with the court to continue with that trial 2 that entry of default is not authorized and 3 that the hearing held under such circumstances is uncontested as distinguished from a default hearing 1 quoting warden v lamb 98 calapp 738 277 p 867 868 1929

Ex Output:

holding that despite failure to appear for trial default could not be entered without notice to defendant