In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: ” Boone v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 130, 133, 415 S.E.2d 250, 251 (1992). “A battery is an unlawful touching of another.... Whether a touching is a battery depends on the intent of the actor, not on the force applied.” Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 463, 468-69, 534 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2000) (citation omitted). “ ‘[T]he slightest touching of another ... if done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, constitutes a battery for which the law affords redress.’ ” Id. at 469, 534 S.E.2d at 350 (citation omitted). Accordingly, where Vaughn claims he only intended to scare Robinson and did not intend to shoot or wound him, Vaughn would not be entitled, in my opinion, to have the jury instructed on assault and battery. See Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987) (<HOLDING>). A second theory supported by the evidence is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that shooting at a person intending only to scare the person where no touching or wounding occurs supports instructing the jury on simple assault (B) holding that simple assault includes urinating on another (C) holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident   4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor (D) holding that punching another person is a statutory assault (E) holding simple assault is a lesser included offense of recklessly endangering another person

Answer: holding that simple assault includes urinating on another


Question: California state prisoner, Roy Lee Brown, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand. Brown contends that his § 2254 petition was timely filed because his state habeas petitions statutorilly tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Brown is entitled to tolling during the time he was seeking one full round of collateral review by the California courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Delhomme v. Ramirez, No. 00-56148, 2003 WL 21947183, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed (B) holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice (C) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (D) holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review (E) holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review

Answer: holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed


Question: issued a press release when this occurred, claiming that “[t]aken as a whole — and not selectively out of context — these documents more than demonstrate that our company responsibly researched, manufactures and markets its products to adult smokers.” Ex. to Def.’s Mem. of Law, Tab F. In May 1998, State v. Philip Morris settled. Incorporated in the consent judgment was a provision permitting the plaintiffs to seek court approval for public disclosure of those documents that were subject to a protective order, over which the defendants had asserted a privilege but for which no privilege was found to exist. The plaintiffs sought said approval, and the court initially granted it. * The defendants opposed the order, and subsequently secured a stay . of Am., 91 F.R.D. 84, 90 (E.D.N.Y.1981) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, nothing in New York case law 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial because it is settled that a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs (B) holding that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting the protection of the work product doctrine (C) holding that disclosure to outside accountants did not waive the work product privilege since the accountants are not considered a conduit to a potential adversary (D) holding that when a party discloses an item to an adversary even in the context of settlement a waiver of the work product privilege is effected (E) holding declaration or affidavit must support work product claim for documents listed solely as work product on privilege log

Answer:
holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial because it is settled that a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs