In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978);, 5 LaFave, Israel, & King, Criminal Procedure § 25.3(c) (West 1999). A finding of insufficient evidence is equivalent to an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325-26, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984). 3 . An exception to this bar is when the conviction is overturned on appeal. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964). 4 . The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to both individuals and corporations. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). 5 . Compare Brown, 432 U.S. at 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (<HOLDING>) with Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 78 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bargainedfor plea waives the right to attack multiple convictions on double jeopardy grounds (B) holding that the prosecution cannot divide a single crime into multiple units to avoid double jeopardy (C) holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (D) holding that a defendant and his attorney are a single entity with respect to double jeopardy waiver (E) holding the first question for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis is whether congress expressed its intent concerning multiple convictions at a single trial for different statutory violations arising from the same act or transaction

A: (B)
****
Q: any meaning at all, I do not think that [the defendant’s statement that he had a .357 magnum and that no one would get hurt if she put the money in the bag] can reasonably be said to constitute an ‘express threat of death,’ U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). What was conveyed here was, at most, an implicit threat of serious bodily injury or death.”). We agree with the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit, and views of Judges Easterbrook and Arnold that to satisfy the qualifier “express,” a defendant’s statement must distinctly and directly indicate that the defendant intends to kill or otherwise cause the death of the victim. Because four of the five examples in Application Note 6 do not, they are not controlling. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993)(<HOLDING>). Similarly, reliance on the commentary’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that commentary in sentencing guidelines that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guideline it interprets (B) recognizing the guidelines commentary is authoritative (C) holding that sentencing guidelines commentary must be given controlling weight unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or is plainly inconsistent with the guidelines itself (D) holding that guidelines commentary is generally authoritative (E) holding that where the commentary to a guideline is at odds with another provision of the guidelines the guideline prevails

A: (A)
****
Q: I as against the Corporate Defendants. 67 . This definition also contains numerous exceptions not applicable to this case. 68 . The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has observed that "any general definition [of ‘agency’] can be of only limited utility to a court confronted with one of the myriad organizational arrangements for getting the business of government done.” Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 245-46 (D.C.Cir.1974). Thus, "[t]he unavoidable fact is that each new arrangement mu iew Organization ("PSRO”) at issue in Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 449 F.Supp. 937 (D.D.C.1978), none of the Corporate Defendants "has any authority in law to make decisions.” Id. at 941 (<HOLDING>). Finally, unlike the Property Review Board 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state medicaid agency can review the medical necessity of treatment prescribed by a doctor on a casebycase basis (B) holding that the psro was an agency under the apa where in practically all cases medicare or medicaid benefits are not paid unless the psro makes its conclusive affirmative determinations of medical necessity (C) holding that the knowing submission of medicare claims for services that were not covered and payable under the medicare act was an fca violation (D) holding that patient could sue state agency under  1983 for breaching its obligation under the balance billing provision of the medicaid statute (E) holding that knowing submission of medicare claims for services that are not covered and payable under the medicare act is a violation of the fca

A:
(B)
****