instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
before section 362(b)(3) can come into play. An act that both creates and perfects a lien postpetition cannot so qualify. See, e.g., Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Excel Eng’g, Inc. (In re Excel Eng’g, Inc.), 224 B.R. 582, 589-90 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1998) (refusing to recognize validity of postpetition creation and perfection of mechanic’s hen because creditor had no lien at the time debtor filed for bankruptcy); Water-vliet Paper Co. v. City of Watervliet (In re Shoreham Paper Co.), 117 B.R. 274, 281-83 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1990) (finding postpe-tition creation and perfection of property tax lien barred by automatic stay because no prepetition interest existed); Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y v. Ballentine Bros. (In re Ballentine Bros.), 86 B.R. 198, 201 (Bankr. D.Neb.1988) (<HOLDING>); North Side Lumber Co. v. Indus. Indem. Co. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations (B) holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor (C) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (D) holding that creditors failure to voluntarily turn over property lawfully seized prepetition constituted violation of automatic stay (E) holding that creation of a postpetition tax levy based on a prepetition assessment was barred by the automatic stay
answer:
holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations


question:
with a total of 8.3 grams of cocaine in them was consistent with both an intent to sell and with personal use. Id. at 631. We noted that the police did not find any money or drug paraphernalia on the defendant and there were “no other facts which would suggest an intent to sell.” Id. The packaging and weight of the drugs in this case is similar to that in Valentin, giving rise to similar conclusions about Alleyne’s intent. The state attempts to distinguish Valentin in two ways. First, there was no money found on Valentin, while Alleyne had $36 in his pocket and another $20 found in the paper bag with the marijuana. However, neither the amount of money found, nor the denominations of it were inconsistent with personal use. See Williams v. State, 569 So.2d 1376, 1377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). Second, while the arresting officer in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell (B) holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine (C) holding that evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of front seat passenger of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in paper bag in foot well of volkswagen on passengers side near gearshift in presence of marijuana smoke (D) holding that evidence consisting of 10 pieces of cocaine marijuana rolling paper 72 and a weapon was not sufficient to prove intent to sell (E) holding that there was sufficient evidence of intent to sell or deliver where the defendant was in possession of one large cocaine rock and eight smaller rocks
answer:
recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell


question:
L.Ed.2d 604 (2007). 50 . See In re Rivastigmine Patent Litig., 246 F.R.D. 428, 432 (S.D.N.Y.2007). 51 . See DCL §§ 270-281. See also Drenis, 452 F.Supp.2d at 428. 52 . 452 F.Supp.2d at 428 (quoting Shelly v. Doe, 249 A.D.2d 756, 671 N.Y.S.2d 803, 805 (3rd Dep’t 1998)). 53 . See Club Protector, Inc. v. Peta, No. 01 Civ. 0337, 2002 WL 1020782, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2002). 54 . See BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 10 Civ. 8630, 2011 WL 3847376, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011). 55 . See Countered. § 38 ("Coleman is the inventor and true owner of United States Patent Number D616-635 as well as trademark rights related to the subject matter of the '635 patent”). 56 . See, e.g., Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 8 N.Y.3d 283, 292, 832 N.Y.S.2d 873, 864 N.E.2d 1272 (2007) (<HOLDING>). 57 . In re Chateaugay Corp., 156 B.R. 391, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that electronic records may be subject to a claim for conversion (B) holding that plaintiff could state a claim for conversion of confidential information (C) recognizing that refinement of rule governing confidential court records was a necessary step in providing the public electronic access to court records (D) holding that where defendant retained possession of and deprived plaintiff access to business records a claim for conversion was properly stated (E) holding complaint was not based on a conversion claim but was a declaratory judgment action thus not governed by conversion statute of limitations
answer:

holding that plaintiff could state a claim for conversion of confidential information