In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: of serious physical harm,” Gamer, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. at 1701, to Ponseti, or to others if the suspects were allowed to flee. Because Pon-seti could have reasonably believed that the suspects posed an imminent, deadly threat, we conclude that he was justified in using deadly force. Conclusion We therefore conclude that the magistrate judge erred in denying Ponseti’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment below is REVERSED. 1 . The woman was struck once in the right side of her abdomen. 2 . Under the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, the terms "directed verdict” and "judgment notwithstanding the verdict” have been replaced by the single term “judgment as a matter of law.” 3 . But see Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Smith also observes: “Furthermore, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law (B) holding that a violation of the wellestablished rule of brignoniponce constituted an egregious violation of the fourth amendment (C) holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts (D) holding that the notice requirement found in rule 41d is not required by the fourth amendment (E) holding that the significant injury requirement of johnson v morel 876 f2d 477 5th cir1989 a case involving a fourth amendment violation is no longer valid in the wake of hudson v mcmillianus 112 sct 995 117 led2d 156 1992 in which the supreme court held that a showing of a significant injury was not required to prove an eighth amendment violation
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: June 1993 was being denied. Katz asserts that he never received the letter and, therefore, until March 27, 1995, when he received the notice of the denial of coverage, Colonial had led him to believe that his policy covered registered nursing care provided at a general hospital. As the dispute as to whether Katz actually received the letter cannot be resolved at this juncture, I now consider whether, if he did not receive the letter, Colonial should be estopped from denying coverage for the October/November private nursing care. In order to prevail under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Katz must show (1) a material representation, (2) reasonable reliance upon that representation, and (3) damage resulting from that representation. Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1009 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Katz asserts that Colonial’s failure to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing difference between tolling and equitable estoppel (B) recognizing cause of action (C) holding that ejven if there were no express preemption under erisa  514a of the cause of action in that case it would be preempted because it conflicted directly with an erisa cause of action (D) recognizing the cause of action (E) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: federal courts intervene in the matter. The argument is unavailing, however, where the pending question is whether the Board’s proceedings constitute an effort by the state to impose its regulatory authority in a field preempted by Congress. See Association of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 208 F.3d 1, 2000 WL 298563, at *3 (1st Cir. March 27, 2000)(finding that the court’s initial invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was unwise where “the ultimate legal determination of whether the Massachusetts regulations are preempted by the [federal Clean Air Act] is a question of federal preemption law for the courts alone to decide”); Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 41 (1st Cir.1972)(<HOLDING>). The state defendants also move to dismiss 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and it does not matter that the plaintiff was using state law as the vehicle to press her assertion (B) holding that plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before the puerto rico labor relations board before invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine whether the boards assertion of jurisdiction was proper (C) recognizing the general rule that parties must exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from federal courts  (D) holding that plaintiff could not present his erisa estoppel claim to the district court because he did not properly exhaust it before the administrative review board (E) holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court
[EX A]:
(B)