TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: relevant facts. See Mot. at 13-14. Defendant, too, claimed in its subsequent statement of the issues that this talk happened between April 1 and April 4 and cited the same supportive evidence to this effect. See SOF, ¶ 73 (citing Howe Dep. at 32:7-12, 34:12-19 and May 13, 2014, Howe Email). Because Marks never refuted this fact by offering his own statement of the issues, as required under Local Rule 7(h), the Court could thus consider WWL’s account admitted on this ground alone. See LCvR 7(h) (“[I]n determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to- the motion.”); Jackson, 101 F.3d at 153 (<HOLDING>). The Court, however, need not rest on this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion (B) holding district court has complete discretion whether to treat facts as conceded where local rule is violated (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that the predecessor to local rule 561b3 provides the only acceptable means of  presenting additional facts to the district court (E) holding a district court has discretion under rule 55b2 once a default is determined to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: that placed a forty-five day time limit on the administrator’s decision to grant or deny a license. See Redner, 29 F.3d at 1500. In the event the administrator exceeded the forty-five day time limit, the ordinance stated that “the applicant may be permitted to begin operating the establishment for which a license is sought," unless and until the County Administrator notifies the applicant of a denial of the application.” See id. at 1500-01 (citation omitted). We held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because its use of the word “may” rather than “shall” allowed the individuals responsible for enforcing the ordinance to suppress the protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on their part or any judicial determination. See id. at 1501 (<HOLDING>). In Lady J. Lingerie, we examined the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff (B) holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review (C) holding also that the ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review (D) holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record (E) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of a request to change a comprehensive zoning plan

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: (2012) (punctuation omitted); accord Custer, 293 Ga. App. at 319 (2). 8 Stennette v. Miller, 316 Ga. App. 425, 428 (1) (b) (729 SE2d 559) (2012) (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied); accord Kringle v. Elliott, 301 Ga. App. 1, 2 (686 SE2d 665) (2009); Durham v. Mooney, 234 Ga. App. 772, 773 (1) (507 SE2d 877) (1998). 9 Durham, 234 Ga. App. at 773 (1); accord Torrance v. Brennan, 209 Ga. App. 65, 67 (2) (432 SE2d 658) (1993). 10 See Kringle, 301 Ga. App. at 2 (“[I]n order to infer the requisite knowledge!,] there must be at least one incident that would cause a prudent person to anticipate the actual incident that caused the injury.” (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied)); Durham, 234 Ga. App. at 773 (1) ( ng that there was a jury question regarding whether the dog owne 96 (1) (<HOLDING>); Huff v. Dyer, 297 Ga. App. 761, 763 (1) (678 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an animal clinic was entitled to summary judgment in a personalinjury action in which the plaintiff was bitten by one of its dogs when it was undisputed that the dog had never bitten or harmed anyone before the relevant incident (B) holding that a county was entitled to summary judgment where the claims against the individual defendants had failed (C) holding that dog owners were entitled to summary judgment either under the premisesliability or dangerousanimalliability theories when the dog that bit the plaintiff had never previously attacked or bitten a human and the owners had no superior knowledge of the dogs propensity to bite (D) holding that the owner of a dog who bit the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment when although the dog had previously jumped on the plaintiff in an aggressive manner the dog did not attempt to bite or scratch and the plaintiff conceded that she was unaware of any prior instance when the dog had bitten a person (E) holding that when there was no surprise and no prejudice defendant was entitled to rely on defense of accord and satisfaction in its summary judgment motion even though it was not included in the pleadings

SOLUTION:
(A)