In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: use of low-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. While we recognize that drivers may be accustomed to quickly flashing their high-beam headlights at an oncoming vehicle as a signal to dim headlights, there is no evidence in this case that the officer was driving with his high-beam headlights. Furthermore, the statute does not provide any exceptions for the momentary flashing of high-beam headlights. Thus, we must conclude the statute prohibits the use of high-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle, for any length of time and for any purpose. [¶ 12] We recognize that at least one other appellate court has interpreted similar statutory language and reached the opposite conclusion. See Waukesha County v. Meinhardt, 2001 WI App 146, ¶¶ 9-10, 630 N.W.2d 277 (<HOLDING>). In another case involving a similar statute, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that meinhardt did not commit a violation by flashing his highbeam headlights two times at an oncoming vehicle because the plain language of the statute did not prohibit the quick flashing of highbeam headlights (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute (D) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (E) holding the trial judge did not commit reversible error through the chosen method of remedying the batson violation

A: (A)
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Q: 339 (2005)). As to appellant’s assertion of error by the court in permitting the cautionary instruction to include the additional language, appellant’s claim is not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 proceeding. Generally, a petition under Rule 37.1 does not provide a remedy when an issue could have been raised at trial or argued on appeal. Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006). To fall within the very limited exception to that rule, the ground must be one so basic that it renders the judgment a complete nullity, such as a lack of jurisdiction, a violation of double jeopardy, or the right to a twelve-member jury. Id. at 26-27, 238 S.W.3d at 32. Appellant did not raise an issue in this claim that falls within the exception. See Phavixay v. State, 373 Ark. 168, 282 S.W.3d 795 (2008) (<HOLDING>). In appellant’s fifth point on appeal, he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (B) holding that proponent of 404b evidence must identify a proper 404b purpose for admission  that is at issue in  the case (C) holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence (D) holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal (E) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper

A: (C)
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Q: actions or otherwise) to award a share of retired pay.”). Further, the federal regulations implementing the 1990 Amendment confirm Congress’ intent to prohibit dividing military benefits that were not expressly treated in a pre-1981 divorce decree. See 32 C.F.R. § 63.6(c)(7) (1998) (“For court orders issued before June 26, 1981, subsequent amendments [to property division] after that date to provide for a division of retired pay as property are unenforceable under this part.”). Although McDougall may have had a right to part of Havlen’s military retirement pay before the 1990 Amendment, her failure to exercise this right at the time the Act specified has foreclosed her ability to partition Havlen’s retirement benefits now. Accord Delrie v. Harris, 962 F.Supp. 931, 935 (W.D.La.1997) (<HOLDING>). Because McDougall did not assert her right to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce (B) holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits (C) holding that although disability benefits cannot be included as part of the marital estate a court may consider the waiver of retirement pension benefits in favor of disability benefits in determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances which would justify modification of an alimony award to a former spouse who was previously awarded a fixed percentage of the retirement pension benefits (D) holding that although a spouse may have had a right to apportion military retirement benefits at one time the act requires the spouse to assert that right before entry of a finalized divorce decree or waive the right to the benefits (E) recognizing the right of a former spouse to seek contribution for payment of community debts not allocated by the divorce decree

A:
(D)
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