In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: is outside the ambit of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 891. Specifically, we held: Recall that in the majority of those cases, the court specifically considered whether the defendant invoked the right to remain silent and concluded that the defendant's statement or action was an invocation of the right. See Combs [v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 286 (6th Cir.2000), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 623, 148 L.Ed.2d 533 (2000)]; [United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997, 112 S.Ct. 1702, 118 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992)]; Coppola [v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1567 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 418, 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989)]; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (<HOLDING>)[, reh'g denied ]. Based on these cases and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously (B) holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer (C) holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously (D) holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent (E) holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent

A: (A)
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Q: not impliedly preempt the field of law related to the price, route, and service of motor carriers of property, and does not impliedly preempt by conflict her state-law claims. As stated above, in Kelley the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that § 14501(c) preempts the field of law regarding price, route, and service of motor carriers of property. See Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1509-10 (“Here, Congress has clearly chosen ... to preempt the entire field of price, service, and route regulation of intrastate motor carrier activities.”). Furthermore, other federal courts have held that § 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts state tort claims relating to price, route, or service against motor carriers of property. See, e.g., Data Mfg., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 557 F.3d 849 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs statelaw claims alleging common law misrepresentation and statutory misrepresentation under the texas insurance code art 2121 not preempted because they were not dependent on  the right to recover benefits under the erisa plan (B) holding fraudulent representations to the fda could not sustain statelaw claims (C) holding that  14501c1 preempted statelaw claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and money had and received related to billing practices of motor carrier of property (D) holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient (E) holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted

A: (C)
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Q: 125 S.Ct. 1561, 161 L.Ed.2d 563 (2005). The homestead exemption is not, however, the exclusive remedy for a debtor facing the loss of his or her residence. An alternative remedy is for the debtor to seek abandonment by the trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) if the property is “of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.” If Jahn could extinguish the abandonment remedy by simply tendering the homestead exemption, then he could effectively nullify 11 U.S.C. § 554(b). Such an argument overlooks relevant caselaw and the text of the abandonment statute. Jahn’s second argument is that the Burkes lacked Article III standing to proceed on their motion to compel abandonment. To ha uest for the abandonment of another’s property. See In re Miller, 302 B.R. 705, 711 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 2003) (<HOLDING>). In such a case, the debtor has suffered no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the debtor had no standing to compel the trustee to abandon production equipment and other property that concededly belonged to third parties (B) holding that in chapter 7 context the debtors had no power to transfer the property without the approval of the trustee (C) holding that a trustee lacked standing to sue a third party for damages incurred by debenture holders of the corporate debtor (D) holding that claims for alleged legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against attorneys that represented the chapter 11 debtor in possession belonged to the bankruptcy estate and upon conversion of the case to chapter 7 such claims belonged to the chapter 7 trustee as successor to the debtor in possession (E) holding that for purpose of the means test debtor can deduct mortgage payment even though debtor will abandon property

A:
(A)
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