In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: first, that under New Jersey law a plaintiff assumes the risk of voluntarily participating in a sporting activities, citing Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959) and Pona v. Blvd. Arena, 35 N.J.Super. 148, 113 A.2d 529 (App.Div.1955), and that Buglioli voluntarily participated in a “cat and mouse game.” These cases provide no defense. First, the court knows of no decision after New Jersey adopted its comparative negligence statute interposing “assumption of risk” as a complete defense in a negligence action. To the contrary, a recent case arising from a contact sport accident formulated an appropriate rule by adjusting the standard of care, not by finding “assumption of risk.” See, e.g., Crawn v. Campo, 257 N.J.Super. 374, 608 A.2d 465 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Second, the court finds no New Jersey case 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety (B) holding no evidence of reckless disregard for safety of others when officer entered intersection without stopping and witness did not hear brakes being applied (C) holding that an unlawful act committed with the intent to injure or in a grossly negligent manner that proximately causes death is involuntary manslaughter and that criminal liability is imposed in the latter instance because although the defendants acts are not inherently wrong the defendant has acted or failed to act with awareness of the risk to safety and in wilful disregard of the safety of others (D) holding in actions arising from a contact sport accident plaintiff must show defendant acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others or intentionally (E) holding that cjulpable negligence is negligence of a gross and flagrant character which evinces a reckless disregard for the safety of others

Output: holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety


Input: Consider Input: facts underlying the charges for which the defendant had been acquitted were an “integral and natural part of an account of the [defendant’s] crimef.]” The same cannot be said for the facts at issue here, which relate to a seizure that occurred on an entirely different occasion. For that reason, we do not find either Agee or Solomon directly relevant to the present controversy. As a result, we will first examine the challenged evidence in light of the principles traditionally employed in evaluating challenges to evidence admitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b), which focus on the similarity between the prior incident and the incident that underlies the current charges against the defendant. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708, 717 (1990) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the events of 10 February 2005 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case (B) holding that the estoppel doctrine did not apply because unlike the situation in ashe v swenson the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (C) holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because    the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (D) holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct (E) holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal

Output: holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case


Input: Consider Input: motion or for any other calendar setting, shall promptly give no tice advising all other parties who have appeared in the action so that cross motions may, insofar as possible, be heard on a single hearing date. (Emphasis added.) Application of this rule would appear to require that appellant move for a hearing. Additionally, in State v. Due, which also involved the forfeiture of a bail bond, this court noted that no evidentiary hearing was requested, which implied that the appellant was not automatically entitled to a hearing. 427 N.W.2d 276, 277 (Minn.App.1988), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28,1988). Moreover, the phrase “shall be heard” does not necessarily mean that a party is entitled to an oral hearing. See, e.g., Sweet v. Comm’r of Human Servs., 702 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). And the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure do 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is filed is entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard (B) holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard (C) holding that an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard (D) holding that counselors opportunity to submit his written case to the commissioner along with any supporting documents satisfied his right to be heard (E) holding that a predeprivation opportunity to be heard satisfies the due process clause


Output: holding that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is filed is entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard