In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
not explicitly mentioning the prior art problem of having to store complete copies of the web site’s content on multiple servers, claim 6 contains provisions that refer to the solution to this problem: the preamble language indicating that the nodes (servers) contain different resources, and the steps relating to the delayed resource-binding aspect of the invention. The claim does not, however, make any reference to the bottleneck problem or to the bypass solution of that problem. Therefore, without explicit claim language relating to the bottleneck problem, we see no reason why the invention as recited in claim 6 must include the bypass feature described in the written description as a solution to that problem. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 298 F.3d 1817 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Alteon also relies on the “Detailed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the computer readable code claimed in claim 6 the product claim was a part or component of that invention (B) holding that claimed invention did not need to solve both problems in the prior art when claim included language addressing only one problem (C) recognizing that courts must be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the claimed invention without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention (D) holding that the moving party must show prior art references which alone or combined with other references would have rendered the invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (E) holding that the one challenging the patent must in part show that the subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered it obvious by its addition to the prior art

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
of his experience’ in detecting criminal activity”) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). Based on the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that the officers possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to effect an investigative detention of Mr. Hishaw as he left the apartment in the pickup. Even though the initial stop was justified, we must still assess the reasonableness of the subsequent pat-down search. In order to comport with the Fourth Amendment, that search must have been “reasonably related in scope” to the basis for the stop (i.e., the officers’ suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs). See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In that regard, this circuit has concluded that an 169 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop (B) holding that like burglary car theft is a crime that often involves the use of weapons and other instruments of assault that could jeopardize police officer safety and thus justifies a protective frisk under terry to ensure officer safety (C) holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes (D) holding that when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle the officer may in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officers safety and the safety of others (E) holding that the officer had reasonable belief that the occupants of the vehicle were armed where the officer knew that drug dealers are frequently armed and therefore frisk of the vehicle was permissible

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
of Law We have already determined that the activity causing Kenneth’s injury and death is significantly related to traditional maritime activity — commercial and/or pleasure boating in navigable waters — and that admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate in the present case. It is well established that maritime law applies in “those cases where the subject matter of the controversy bears the type of significant relationship to traditional maritime activities necessary to invoke admiralty jurisdiction.” Laredo Offshore Constructors, Inc. v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d 1223, 1231 (5th Cir.1985) (relying upon Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 736-38, 81 S.Ct. 886, 890-92, 6 L.Ed.2d 56, (1961)); see Watson on Behalf of Watson v. Massman Const. Co., 850 F.2d 219, 220-21 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). “With admiralty jurisdiction comes the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admiralty jurisdiction extends to maritime insurance contracts (B) holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law (C) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (D) holding that admiralty jurisdiction applies to a tort dispute if either the in jured party or the alleged tortfeasor is a traditional maritime actor or at least if either of those parties is performing a traditional maritime activity (E) holding that the general rule of maritime law that parties bear their own costs coupled with the need for uniformity in federal maritime law precludes the application of state attorneys fee statutes such as texas civ prac  remcode  38001 to maritime contract disputes

Ex Output:

(D)