In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: and Defendants, therefore, terminated her employment without notice and an opportunity to be heard. A § 1983 claim for deprivation of procedural due process has three elements: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.2003). Thus, the Due Process Clause protects one’s job only where one has a property right in that job. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was a non-probationary employee in Alabama’s classified service and, therefore, had a property interest in her position. See Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.3d 1119, 1133-35 (Ala.2013) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution (B) holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state (C) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (D) holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law (E) holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: filed, is the verdict, and a showing that the writing is incorrect is not an impeachment of the verdict itself.” (punctuation omitted)). 19 See former OCGA § 17-9-41 (“The affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict.”); Fulton County v. Phillips, 91 Ga. 65, 65 (16 SE 260) (1892) (syllabus by the court) (“According to repeated rulings of this court, the affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain, but not to impeach, their verdict.”); see also former OCGA § 9-10-9 (providing the same rule in civil procedure). 20 See generally OCGA § 24-1-2 (e) (“Except as modified by statute, the common law as expounded b tate, 323 Ga. App. 15, 17 (2) (747 SE2d 99) (2013). 34 Freeman, 264 Ga. at 278; see Wade v. State, 261 Ga. 105, 107-08 (6) (401 SE2d 701) (1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Ingram v. State, 290 Ga. 500, 503 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err (B) holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating (C) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection (D) holding that upon objection to the form of the verdict trial court did not err in returning jury for further deliberations (E) holding that a district court did not err by submitting a special verdict form to the jury this particular verdict form did not specify a standard of proof
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: as the trial court determined, Appellant’s trial did not commence until the parties were present and voir dire occurred on February 8, 2016, which was three days after the mechanical run date. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 cmt. (“A trial commences when the trial judge determines that the parties are present and directs them to proceed to voir dire or to opening argument, or to the hearing of any motions that had been reserved for the time of trial, or to the taking of testimony, or to some other such first step in the trial.”) (citations omitted)); Commonwealth v. Brock, 619 Pa. 278, 61 A.3d 1015, 1020-21 (2013) (“It is not intended that preliminary calendar calls should constitute commencement of a trial.”) (quotation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Lamonna, 473 Pa. 248, 373 A.2d 1355 (1977) (<HOLDING>). This does not end our inquiry, however, as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if the calculation commenced on the date of the first indictment the defendants right to a speedy trial was not violated (B) holding that trial court erred in denying defendants request to allow standby counsel to conduct voir dire where there was no indication that the trial court considered the koehler factors or that granting the request would have disrupted or delayed the trial (C) holding that even where the case has been called for trial the trial is not deemed to have commenced for speedy trial purposes until the jury is empaneled voir dire has occurred or some other substantial step of trial begins (D) holding a selfrepresentation request untimely where made after voir dire had begun but before the jury had been empaneled (E) holding no violation of substantial rights occurred during voir dire where record did not show that defendant was denied fair and impartial trial
[EX A]:
(C)