In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: for relief under § 3582(c). Nor is Brown entitled to pursue his claims through § 2241. A prisoner may proceed under § 2241 if § 2255 would be “inadequate of ineffective.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir.2002) (per curiam). We have held that § 2255’s “safety valve” applies only in rare circumstances, such as when an intervening change in the statute under which the petitioner was convicted renders the petitioner’s conduct non-criminal. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Brown has not satisfied that standard here, as he makes no allegation that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, but instead asserts only that he is “innocent” of being a career offender. See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120-21 (<HOLDING>). Brown must obtain a certificate of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under  841 and 846 was not cognizable under  2241 (B) holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor (C) holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (D) holding that dorsainvil did not permit petitioner to challenge sentence via  2241 based on intervening change in sentencing law (E) holding challenge to armedcareercriminal enhancement improper under  2241

A: holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under  841 and 846 was not cognizable under  2241
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Q: but clear, as a matter of law, that the “military exception” applies only to the person who served in the armed forces — not his or her children. As I read Cuevas-Gaspar, no one in that case, much less the mother whose residency status was imputed, served in the United States military. The principle behind the Cuevas-Gaspar imputation rule is to avoid separating children from their permanent resident parents with whom they have resided for a significant period of time in the United States. See Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1024 (“[W]e are instructed ... that our immigration statutes and regulations are replete with provisions ‘giving a high priority to the relation between permanent resident parents and their children.’ ”); see also Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The so-called “military exception” of 8 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child (B) recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children (C) recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children (D) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (E) holding in the primary case on which cuevasgaspar relied imputation of a parents residency status to a child may be justified where deportation would sever the bonds between parents and their children who had resided legally in the united states for the better part of their lives

A: holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child
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Q: may be claimed as exempt in any proceeding brought by any person to recover the whole or part of the purchase price of the property or against the claim or interest of a holder of a security interest, land contract, condominium or homeowners association assessment or maintenance lien or both, mortgage or any consensual or statutory lien. If this statute “prohibits avoidance of a consensual lien on property otherwise eligible to be claimed as exempt property” as required under § 522(f)(3)(B), then the monetary cap in § 522(f)(3) applies and the bankruptcy court should have limited the debtors’ lien avoidance to $10,000. Aside from Judge Utschig’s decision in this case and an opinion from the bankruptcy court for the District of Minnesota, In re Zimmel, 185 B.R. 786 (Bankr.D.Minn.1995) (<HOLDING>), the only other published opinion addressing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  522f3 inapplicable under minnesota exemption law (B) holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes (C) holding that there is no need to consider exemption 6 separately if information was compiled for law enforcement purposes because exemption 7c constitutes broader protection so any information falling under exemption 6 is covered by exemption 7c (D) holding one who claims tax exemption has burden of showing entitlement to exemption (E) holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3

A:
holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes
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