In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: “the evidence in the record compels a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the [BIA’s] decision is incorrect.” Id. Purely legal questions, including jurisdictional questions, are reviewed de novo. See Taslimi v. Holder, 590 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir.2010). III. ASYLUM To qualify for asylum, an applicant must file her application within one year after arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). The limitations period will be tolled if the applicant can establish changed circumstances that materially affect her eligibility for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D); 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i). Contrary to the government’s argument, we have jurisdiction to review an agency’s changed circumstances determination. See Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 648 (9th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Petitioners argue that Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 
 Holding statements: (A) holding question of law applied to undisputed facts reviewed de novo (B) recognizing that this court reviews de novo the trial courts interpretation and application of a statute to undisputed facts (C) recognizing the issue may be decided as a question of law if the facts are undisputed and support only one inference (D) holding that when the facts of a robbery are undisputed the imposition of the enhancement is a question of the application of the guidelines to be reviewed de novo (E) holding that the real id act restored jurisdiction over the changed circumstances question because this question involved the application of a statutory standard to undisputed facts
[A]: holding question of law applied to undisputed facts reviewed de novo


[Q]: subpoena does not fit within the statutory language. The question surrounding the subpoena’s validity in no way relates to any information that Star Bank would be required to disclose under FCRA, even assuming that FCRA’s requirements apply to Star Bank. {See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) for the definition of a “consumer reporting agency.”) The Hahns’ claimed reliance on whatever Bonynge said regarding the subpoena therefore provides them with no basis to toll the two year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Hahns have failed to demonstrate that the wilful misrepresentation tolling exception applies to their case. We therefore hold that all of their claims raised under FCRA are barred by the statute of limitations. See Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We find no inequity in reaching this result. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim (B) holding that equitable tolling is available to avoid time limitations in the statutory provisions governing veterans benefits (C) holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims (D) holding that an ohio tolling statute violated the commerce clause because it gave nonresident corporations the choice between being subject to general jurisdiction in the state by appointing an instate agent for service of process or being subject to a tolling of the statute of limitations on claims against them (E) holding that a plaintiff must fit within the precise wording of the tolling exception to avoid being barred by fcras statute of limitations provision
[A]: holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim


[Q]: might have arisen from his father’s actions in response to the MIP ticket and did not seek to influence the resolution of any public questions arising from any such controversy; the only actions Wade took after the MIP ticket that related in any way to such “controversy” were actions to defend himself in court at the trial on the ticket and to petition for, and receive, an expunction. However, Wade’s use of judicial processes did not “thrust” him to the “forefront” or “inject” him into the “vortex” of “a public controversy” or “public issue” in order to “influence the resolution” of “public questions,” nor did it constitute a “voluntary engagement” in activities that involved the risk of increased exposure and injury to reputation. See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454-55, 96 S.Ct. 965-66 (<HOLDING>). Appellants invite us to create a new category 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that use of judicial process to litigate divorce did not make plaintiff a public figure and noting that such action was no more voluntary than that of defendant called upon to defend his interest in court (B) holding that more than notice to a defendant is required (C) holding that former state transportation department employee who brought allegations of departmental corruption to public attention was public figure (D) recognizing the prejudice of an extension to a defendant who would be required to litigate events that occurred more than eight years earlier (E) holding that the petitioner who was denied further appellate review by the supreme judicial court had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim in the state trial court and appeals court and thus stone precluded federal habeas relief
[A]:
holding that more than notice to a defendant is required