TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: by Ankeny should arise rarely and therefore would be unlikely to produce a swarm of cases involving excessive force searches. Also, officials and courts are far more competent to discern which extraordinary tactics constitute excessive force than to determine in the heat of the moment “what constituted] a reasonable wait time in a particular case” before entering' — usually a matter of calculating, wholly subjectively the appropriate number of seconds. Id. at 2166 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In fact, without any difficulty, we have in the past in a case remarkably similar to the one before us struck down, as constituting excessive force, specific tactics such as the ones used in the case before us. See, e.g., Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on the cost side, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding officers punch of an inmate was not excessive force (C) holding that ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing a lawyer into court was a judicial act (D) recognizing that the fourth amendment protects against the use of excessive force by police officers in carrying out an arrest (E) holding that officers had employed constitutionally excessive force by blindly throwing a flash bang grenade into an apartment occupied by five to eight individuals

SOLUTION: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim

PROBLEM: but clear, as a matter of law, that the “military exception” applies only to the person who served in the armed forces — not his or her children. As I read Cuevas-Gaspar, no one in that case, much less the mother whose residency status was imputed, served in the United States military. The principle behind the Cuevas-Gaspar imputation rule is to avoid separating children from their permanent resident parents with whom they have resided for a significant period of time in the United States. See Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1024 (“[W]e are instructed ... that our immigration statutes and regulations are replete with provisions ‘giving a high priority to the relation between permanent resident parents and their children.’ ”); see also Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The so-called “military exception” of 8 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child (B) recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children (C) recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children (D) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (E) holding in the primary case on which cuevasgaspar relied imputation of a parents residency status to a child may be justified where deportation would sever the bonds between parents and their children who had resided legally in the united states for the better part of their lives

SOLUTION: holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child

PROBLEM: claim. Hall avers that the review procedures only allow United to consult with a health care professional. Thus, he concludes that the structure and organization of the plan prove that United did not have the right to demand an IME when reviewing an appeal after termination of benefits. The Court rejects Hall’s suggested interpretation of the plan. When interpreting the plan at issue, the Court is to “tak[e] all the provisions as a part of an integrated Agreement and view[ ] the provisions in the light of ERISA’s integrated statutory scheme.” Bickley, 461 F.3d at 1329. Thus, Hall’s suggestion that the Court should only look to one part of the plan is unreasonable, as the Court must look at the entire plan. See also Babikian v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 63 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Looking at the language addressing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an erisa insurance policy is governed by a uniform body of federal common law which requires policy language to be interpreted in an ordinary and popular sense as would a person of average intelligence and experience (B) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (C) holding that policy terms must be read in their ordinary and popular sense (D) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans (E) holding that absent follow form language provision that excess policy would continue as underlying policy did not impose coverage as provided in underlying policy

SOLUTION:
holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth