In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

If a statement does not contain any expressly exculpatory material, the Government need not produce that statement to the defense. To hold otherwise would impose an insuperable burden on the Government to determine what facially non-exculpatory evidence might possibly be favorable to the accused by inferential reasoning. We are confident that the Supreme Court did not intend the Brady holding to sweep so broadly. United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir.1988); see also Harris v. Kuba, 486 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir.2007) {“Brady does not require that police officers or prosecutors explore multiple potential inferences to discern whether evidence that is not favorable to a defendant could become favorable.”); United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that just such inferential 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b (B) holding that there is no constitutional duty to do a better investigation and that a decision not to conduct a more thorough investigation does not invade an accuseds rights (C) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (D) holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence (E) holding that brady does not place any burden upon the government to conduct a defendants investigation or assist in the presentation of the defenses case
holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b

reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts.” Mungin v. State, 982 So.2d 986, 998 (Fla.2006). A. Stipulating to Evidence for the Motion to Suppress Parker’s May 7, 1982, Statement In this claim, Parker contends that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the evidence used to decide whether his May 7, 1982, statement was admissible. Parker’s May 7 statement was admitted during the resentencing proceeding through the testimony of Detective Powers. Because Parker had invoked his right to counsel prior to making the May 7 statement, the admissibility of that statement under United States Supreme Court precedent turns on whether Parker initiated the May 7 contact with law enforcement. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The stipulated evidence included hearsay 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available  unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (B) holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (C) holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications (D) holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (E) holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police
holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police

favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Johnson was not just associated with coconspirators or merely present in an area where a drug transaction occurred, but instead was a knowing and voluntary participant in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. See Reeves, 742 F.3d at 497; Hansen, 262 F.3d at 1236. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Johnson’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the sufficiency of the evidence for her conspiracy conviction. B. Blanchard and Johnson argue that their mere presence in the back seat of a car that contained contraband was insufficient to support a conviction for the substantive offense of possession with intent to distribute. See United States v. Stanley, 24 F.3d 1314, 1319-20 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The government, they assert, did not present 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that something more than mere presence in the car in which drugs are found is required to sustain a conviction for the substantive offense of possession with intent to distribute (B) holding that evidence of a 10yearold drug conviction was properly admitted to show intent in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute (C) holding that the presence of firearms may go toward proving that a defendant possessed drugs with the intent to distribute (D) holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine (E) holding that possession with intent to distribute and simple possession are the same offense under blockburger

holding that evidence of a 10yearold drug conviction was properly admitted to show intent in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute