In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: party to file a protest with the contracting agency or to file an action in a district court of the United States or the United States Claims Court.” Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). STANDING The plaintiffs legal standing to appeal the GAO’s decision lies in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.. Section 702 provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review” thereof. The court finds that the plaintiff, as an unsuccessful bidder, has standing to challenge the agency’s decision to award the contract to a third party. See Choctaw Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 761 F.2d 609, 615-16 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). FINDINGS OF FACT The majority of facts are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the losing bidder has standing to challenge the award of a government procurement contract (B) holding that if the government is obligated to rebid the contract and the unsuccessful bidder could compete for the contract once again and therefore has an economic interest and standing to challenge the award (C) holding that without a valid reason for cancelling the procurement  the government violated its duty to conduct a fair procurement (D) holding that the definition of procurement under the tucker act is broader than the definition of procurement contract in the fgcaa such that an agency can engage in a procurement process for the purposes of the tucker act even though it is using a cooperative agreement instead of a procurement contract to memorialize the parties agreement (E) holding that city had implied contract with bidder to treat bidder fairly
[A]: (A)


[Q]: that Nusspickel was guilty of the aggravated battery charges even though the jury convicted her on each charge of the lesser-included offense of simple battery and (2) misconduct that had not been charged and proved relating to her alleged contact with one of the victims after the charged incidents. She also asserts that the State cannot carry its burden to show that the judge did not rely on these impermissible considerations. Generally, the trial court’s imposition of a sentence that is within the minimum and maximum limits set by the legislature “is a matter for the trial Court in the exercise of its discretion, which cannot be inquired into upon the appellate level.” Shellman v. State, 222 So.2d 789, 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); see also Booker v. State, 514 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Fla.1987) (<HOLDING>); Darby v. State, 216 So.2d 29, 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard (B) holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable (C) recognizing that this court and the united states supreme court have embraced the notion that so long as the sentence imposed is within the maximum limit set by the legislature an appellate court is without power to review the sentence (D) holding that an appellate court has no jurisdiction to review a sentence imposed by the trial court that is within the limits prescribed by statute which is not the result of oppression prejudice or corrupt motive (E) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines
[A]: (C)


[Q]: where the petitioner is in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed). In addition, we agree with the Commonwealth that to the extent that due process guarantees an opportunity to be heard on her ineffectiveness claim, Petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard within the limitations imposed by the PCRA under the facts of this case: she was sentenced January 14, 2008; declined to raise her ineffectiveness claims on direc't appeal pursuant to Bomar; filed a PCRA petition on January 12, 2009; and raised the claim on which the PCRA court ultimately granted relief a mere eleven days prior to the expiration of her two-year probationary sentence. During the two years of her sentence, PCRA relief was available. See Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 720 (<HOLDING>). Yet Petitioner neither requested expedited 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of pcra relief cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel (B) holding that under section 9543a1 a pcra petitioner is not eligible for relief where the petitioner has completed serving the sentence before final adjudication on the petition (C) holding pcra statute requires that petitioner must be currently serving sentence of imprisonment parole or probation on underlying crime not only when petition is filed but also when decision on petition is rendered (D) holding that the plain language of this section requires the denial of relief for a petitioner who has finished serving his sentence (E) holding the bia did not abuse its discretion in finding petitioner did not satisfy the procedural requirements for his motion in part because petitioner failed to submit a completed application for relief
[A]:
(B)