In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of two dates between Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro in 1988. In its view, the evidence was irrelevant and inflammatory. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion in limine with respect to this evidence. The court believed that the evidence was relevant and ought to be before the jury because it had the task of evaluating the overall relationship of Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro. Evidence that is relevant to the background of the case is admissible for that purpose. At the very least, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court not to exclude this evidence in a motion in limine; the evidence was at least potentially relevant for the purpose the judge identified. See Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). LCFS did not object during the trial when Ms. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time (B) holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment (C) holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background (D) holding that section 102 of the civil rights act of 1991 does not apply to preenactment conduct (E) holding that the  1981 amendments contained in  101 of the civil rights act of 1991 do not apply retroactively

Output: holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time


Input: Consider Input: and Waste Control Specialists. LLC v. Sierra Club, appellate cause number. 03-12-00335-CV. 4 . See Sierra Club v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, cause number D-l-GN-12-001586. 5 .Despite this, the trial court issued a written order denying the motion twenty days after the deadline for ruling on the motion had passed. The order — though included in the record on appeal — is of no effect. Jain v. Cambridge Petroleum Grp., Inc., 395 S.W.3d 394, 396 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) ("The trial court's signing the order denying the motion [to dismiss pursuant to the Act] after it was already denied by operation of law is legally of no effect because the motion to dismiss was already denied.”); reran v. Fryer, 586 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Cor-pus Christi 1979, writ ref'd) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Appellees also insist that Sierra Club 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (B) holding court lost jurisdiction to enter its order after thirty days and the motion was denied by operation of law (C) holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed (D) holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction (E) holding that an order purporting to overrule a motion for new trial that had already been overruled by operation of law was a nullity

Output: holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions


Input: Consider Input: to the purposes for which it was conferred by the Constitution.”). Thus in Raftdain II we held that a “waiver by a foreign state [of sovereign immunity], rendering it a party to an action, is broad enough to sustain the court’s jurisdiction through proceedings to aid collection of a money judgment rendered in the case, including discovery pertaining to the judgment debtor’s assets.” 281 F.3d at 53-54; Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 297 (2d Cir.2011); see also FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C.Cir.2011) (upholding contempt sanctions against foreign sovereign for failing to comply with general asset discovery order); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1477-78 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Whether a particular sovereign asset is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court must find a total failure to respond to the discovery requested (B) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to extend discovery where no effort was made to explain why the requested discovery could not have taken place within the original discovery period (C) holding that an instrumentality of a foreign nation must respond to discovery about its worldwide assets and that it could not use the fsia to conceal its assets from the district court (D) recognizing the need for limited jurisdictional discovery to establish exception to the fsia (E) holding that a pro se party must be advised of consequences of failing to respond to a dispositive motion including an explanation that the failure to respond  may result in the district court granting the motion and dismissing the case


Output: holding that the district court must find a total failure to respond to the discovery requested