In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: trial court’s judgment wherein the appellant was sentenced to a loss of liberty”).’ ““““Berry v. State, 630 So.2d 127, 130 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (footnote omitted). See also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 494, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (‘ “If the accused ... is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.... The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus.” ’) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); Weakley v. State, 721 So.2d 235, 236 (Ala.1998) (<HOLDING>).” “““Thus it is the lack of counsel, coupled 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (B) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (C) recognizing the right to counsel on appeal (D) holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel (E) holding that the right to counsel at arraignment is a jurisdictional matter
[A]: (E)


[Q]: the question of competency of counsel. Balanced against this is the possibility, in most instances quite l’emote, that an experienced member of the public defender’s staff might labor under a conflict of interest because another member of the staff was so burdened. People v. Robinson, 79 Ill.2d 147, 37 Ill.Dec. 267, 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (1979). These two considerations outweigh any possible chilling effect on attorney client relationships at OPD. See also, Bolin v. State, 137 P.3d 136, 145 (Wyo.2006) (stating that, although conflicts involving associates at a private firm are imputed to entire firm, public defenders office “warrants slightly different treatment[,]” and adopting a ease by case analysis); cf. People v. Daniels, 52 Cal.3d 815, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906, 915 (1990) (<HOLDING>); People v. Banks, 121 Ill.2d 36, 117 Ill.Dec. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (B) holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice (C) holding designated counsel acting on behalf of the office of public defender in law guardian program to be public employees for purpose of the new jersey tort claims act njsa 5911 to 123 and therefore entitled to indemnification by the state (D) holding that public defender did not face conflict requiring withdrawal when bringing collateral attack of a defendants conviction public defender was required to attack competence of previous public defender and stating that automatic disqualification  would hamper the ability of public defenders offices to represent indigents in criminal cases (E) holding a federal public defender is not a federal officer for purposes of a bivenstype action
[A]: (D)


[Q]: Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 261, 92 S.Ct. 885, some of these factors are "not relevant” in suits for injunctive relief, Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 484, 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986). But suits for injunctive relief, no less than suits for damages, require a plaintiff to demonstrate an "injury in fact.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Moreover, an antitrust plaintiff — whether seeking relief in law or equity — must demonstrate "antitrust injury,” the more subtle details of which are not relevant here. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. at 113, 107 S.Ct. 484; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. Mastercard 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff need only demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an impending violation of the antitrust laws (B) holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit (C) holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts (D) holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation (E) holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing
[A]:
(A)