In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. 6 . The Supreme Court of Connecticut has already rejected the ¡ex loci delicti rule in workers’ compensation actions in favor of “interest analysis” and the Restatement (Second) “most significant relationship” approach. See Simaitis v. Flood, 182 Conn. 24, 29-33, 437 A.2d 828, 831-32 (1980); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 181 (1971). 7 . See Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-555 (1977) (measure of wrongful death recovery equal to value of decedent’s life and expenses); Marko v. Stop and Shop, Inc., 169 Conn. 550, 553, 364 A.2d 217, 219 (1975) (<HOLDING>); see also Halstead II, supra, 535 F.Supp. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective (B) holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control (C) recognizing that a violation of the mbta is a strict liability offense (D) recognizing the significance of control in strict products liability (E) recognizing strict product liability actions
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: the action should pro ceed among the existing parties or be dismissed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b). Defendant neglected to offer any explanation for how and why Mr. Stroud is essential, other than that he was named in the underlying state court case. That is not enough. Mr. Stroud is not a necessary or indispensable party under Rule 19 because this Court can administer complete relief — an order compelling arbitration— among the existing parties and Mr. Stroud himself is not claiming an interest in this arbitration action that will be impaired by his absence. Although failing to dismiss this case may result in piecemeal litigation, that factor alone is not compelling enough to find Mr. Stroud to be an indispensable party. Cf. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). This Court therefore properly limits its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (B) holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived (C) holding that district courts are required to compel arbitration of claims subject to arbitration clause even if the result is piecemeal litigation (D) holding that faa was inapplicable where parties involved in action are not parties to an arbitration agreement under which issues are referable to arbitration (E) holding that in determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists in petition to compel arbitration district court was correct in looking only to citizenship of parties in action before it  parties who signed arbitration agreement  and that nondiverse agents in underlying state case were not indispensable parties as any potential prejudice resulting from piecemeal litigation is overcome by faas strong bias in favor of arbitration
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: not only is the mens rea lacking, but the actual ability to cause death or bodily harm has not been demonstrated. It is well established that there can be no conviction for reckless endangerment without a present ability to inflict harm. See Commonwealth v. Gouse, 287 Pa. Super. 120, 429 A.2d 1129 (1981). “In construing the Crimes Code section on recklessly endangering, this court has recently determined that the common-law assault requirement of actual present ability to inflict harm must be shown in order to support a conviction under the statute.” Gouse at 124, 429 A.2d at 1131. Further, “the mere apparent ability to inflict harm is not sufficient. Danger, and not merely the apprehension of danger, must be created.” Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 728 (Pa. Super. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Without evidence that the defendant was, in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence was sufficient to establish aggravated assault where appellant was seen pointing and firing a gun at two women (B) holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept (C) holding that although pointing an unloaded gun would generally not be sufficient to support a conviction for recklessly endangering another person where the commonwealth presented evidence that there was at least one bullet in the gun a conviction could stand (D) holding that evidence was sufficient to prove defendant constructively possessed the gun where although defendant denied ownership of the gun it was found near a knife of which defendant claimed ownership and where defendant was aware of the presence of the gun (E) holding that an unloaded gun used in the commission of an aggravated assault is a deadly weapon
[EX A]:
(C)