In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and the defendant subsequently gave a statement. Id. 476. The court held that the detective’s statements at the jail cell did not constitute interrogation. Id. at 479-480. The court further determined that the defendant, by stating that he wanted to tell his side of the story, “ ‘initiated’ further conversation in the ordinary dictionary sense of that word.” Id. at 480. Similarly, in Bunch v Thompson, 949 F2d 1354, 1361 (CA 4, 1991), the court held that a defendant’s statement was not the product of “police-initiated interrogation” where it followed an inquiry that “amounted to nothing more than an effort to ascertain if Bunch had changed his mind about wanting an attorney.” See also McCall v State, 501 So 2d 496, 500 (Ala Crim App, 1986) (<HOLDING>); State v Acquin, 187 Conn 647, 669-670; 448 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime (B) holding that although interrogation may not continue after a suspect has requested counsel the police legitimately may inquire whether the suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney (C) holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation (D) holding that prosecutors who soon after arrest of suspect allegedly directed police to coerce confession from suspect were not entitled to absolute immunity because interrogation is ordinarily a police activity (E) holding that once a suspect has requested counsel interrogators may not reinitiate questioning unless the attorney is present regardless of whether or not there has been an outside consultation
holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime

unpublished decisions, “[njoticeably absent from the list of factors Pruitt instructs district courts to consider are the merits and substance of the pro se plaintiffs claim.” Rivera v. Kettle Moraine Correctional Inst., No. 14-C-6, 2014 WL 2875897, at *4 (E.D. Wis. June 24, 2014); Kennedy v. Huibregtse, No. 13-C-4, 2014 WL 4924662, at *15 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 30, 2014). On appeal from an adverse judgment in a case where the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion to recruit; the Court of Appeals will consider whether “there is a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have made a difference in the outcome of the litigation” in assessing whether the district court’s abuse of its discretion was prejudicial. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 659 (italics original r. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Mars v. Hanberry, 752 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation (B) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (C) holding that prisoner must allege acts or omissions evidencing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (D) holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs (E) holding that plaintiffs claim must have arguable merit meaning that plaintiffs allegations clearly state a nonfrivolous prima facie case of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need and that the already established evidence indicates more than an extremely slim chance of success on the merits
holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation

action under the Donnelly Act (General Business Law § 340) because the treble damages remedy provided for in subsection 5 constitutes a ‘penalty’ within the meaning of CPLR 901(b).” Cox v. Microsoft Corp., 290 A.D.2d 206, 737 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y.App.Div.2002). See also Paltre v. Gen. Motors Corp., 26 A.D.3d 481, 483, 810 N.Y.S.2d 496 (N.Y.App.Div. 2006) (“The treble damages provision [in New York’s Donnelly Act] is a penalty within the meaning of § 901(b). The plaintiffs’ Donnelly Act class action may not be maintained because the Donnelly Act does not specifically authorize the recovery of this penalty in a class action[.]”) (citations omitted); Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 26 A.D.3d 488, 489, 810 N.Y.S.2d 498 (N.Y.App.Div.2006), aff'd, 8 N.Y.3d 204, 831 N.Y.S.2d 760, 863 N.E.2d 1012 (2007) (<HOLDING>). As was discussed in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court properly dismissed as barred by res judicata an independent action for rescission of a prior judgment on the basis of fraud where the plaintiff failed to mount a viable direct attack on the earlier judgment (B) holding where plaintiffs stake in controversy disappears before there has been effort to certify class action the action must be dismissed (C) holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed (D) holding that the court below had properly dismissed the plaintiffs donnelly act class action as barred by cplr  901b (E) holding that district court properly dismissed claims in  2241 petition that had been decided in previous habeas action

holding that a district court properly dismissed as barred by res judicata an independent action for rescission of a prior judgment on the basis of fraud where the plaintiff failed to mount a viable direct attack on the earlier judgment