In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: § 924(c) conviction is invalid after Bailey and Bousley, it argues we are prohibited from reaching the merits of his claim because Abdullah did not present his Bailey/Bousley challenge on direct appeal or in the § 2255 proceedings below. Alternatively, the government argues the claim is barred by AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. We assume for purposes of this appeal that Abdullah did not procedurally default his Bailey claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. Notwithstanding such an assumption, we conclude the claim is barred because Abdullah failed to adequately raise the issue before the district court in this § 2255 proceeding. Generally, a habeas claim cannot be raised by a petitioner for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Petty v. Card, 195 F.3d 399, 400 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 78, 148 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court (B) holding that the convention claim was procedurally defaulted (C) holding that court may address procedurally defaulted claim on the merits where it is more efficient to do so (D) holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted (E) holding that an argument not raised before the district court is procedurally defaulted

Output: holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court


Input: Consider Input: 45 U.S.C. § 56, and 46 U.S.C. § 30106, are essentially identical, stating that the action must be “commenced” or “brought” within the three year period. The Supreme Court in Burnett specifically found that the state court suit had been properly “commenced” although it was filed in an improper venue. 380 U.S. at 426, 85 S.Ct. at 1053. Furthermore, because the principle of uniformity that drove the Burnett decision applies with equal force to a general maritime action, other courts have correctly held that Burnett applies in general maritime cases. See, e.g., Prejean, 721 So.2d at 1276 (citing 1 Martin J. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries § 5:10 (4th ed.1990)); Davis, 659 F.Supp. at 156-157; People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F.Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.La.1968) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s second argument for distinction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries (B) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (C) holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction (D) holding that burnett and its justification of uniformity is equally applicable to admiralty actions (E) holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures

Output: holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries


Input: Consider Input: medical opinions need not “be expressed in terms of certainty in order to serve as the basis for a well[-]grounded claim”), and Molloy v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 513, 516 (1996) (distinguishing Tirpak and stating in dictum that medical evidence as to nexus to service expressed as “could” suffices for requirement of well-grounded claim, with Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1996) (ignoring Tirpak and holding that medical evidence as to nexus to service expressed as “possible” suffices for requirement of well-grounded claim), and Watai v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 441, 443 (1996) (ignoring Tirpak and holding that medical evidence as to nexus to service expressed as “very well might have been” suffices for requirement of well-grounded claim); cf. Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 398, 403, 406 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Godfrey v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 398, 406 (1995) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a defendant attempts to explain his actions and reveals his parolee status on direct examination the specific reason for his parole could not have been enlightening to the jury and therefore was not relevant (B) holding that there was a sufficiently direct relationship between restricting the defendants selfemployment as a roofer and his bank fraud conviction when the defendant used his roofing business to facilitate the fraud and after his initial sentence he failed to provide information about his business activities to his probation officer (C) holding appellants flatfeet claim to be well grounded based on his statements regarding continuity of symptomatology inservice notation indicating worsening of his pes planus and confirmed existence of current condition on va examination his statements as to continuity of symptomatology provide a direct link between the appellants active service and the current state of his condition (D) holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendants credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt (E) holding plaintiff had sufficiently stated such a claim of deliberate indifference to his medical needs with regard to his hepatitis c condition his pancreatic condition and the gout in his hand


Output: holding that where a defendant attempts to explain his actions and reveals his parolee status on direct examination the specific reason for his parole could not have been enlightening to the jury and therefore was not relevant