TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: if a defendant’s will has been overborne, we must assess “the conduct of the law enforcement officials in creating pressure and the suspect’s capacity to resist that pressure”; “[t]he defendant’s personal characteristics as well as his prior experience with the criminal justice system are factors to be considered in determining [the defendant’s] susceptibility to police pressures.” Jackson, 562 So.2d at 1380-81 (citations omitted). The evidence does not indicate that McLeod was threatened with physical intimidation or psychological pressure. The evidence does not show that the interrogation lasted for an extraordinary length of time or that he was deprived of either food or sleep for an unexplained and prolonged time. See, e.g., Pardue v. State, 695 So.2d 199 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). Further, the evidence does not show that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a confession obtained by interrogating the defendant for approximately 78 hours was involuntary (B) holding involuntary a confession obtained by prison psychologist because the defendant reasonably understood that his communications would remain confidential (C) holding that mental coercion led to an involuntary confession (D) holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  (E) holding that impermissible police procedures rendered confession involuntary

SOLUTION: holding involuntary a confession obtained by prison psychologist because the defendant reasonably understood that his communications would remain confidential

PROBLEM: the State argued that Wright and Jackson were the two shooters at the trials of Wright, Oglesby, and Jackson. The State denies that it presented mutually exclusive, false, or misleading evidence. It contends that the evidence permits two factual scenarios: the shooters were either Jackson and Wright or Jackson and defendant. This is not a case where the prosecutor destroyed the credibility of one witness to convict one defendant and then used that same witness to convict a co-defendant for the same crime. See, e.g., Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 738 (1986). Nor is this a case where the prosecutor improperly argued facts that were unsupported by the evidence. Nichols v. Collins, 802 F.Supp. 66, 75 (S.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), habeas corpus denied, sub nom, Nichols v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal (B) holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment (C) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (D) holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal (E) holding in case in which defendant challenged his murder conviction and death sentence on ground that states conflicting theories in the trial of his accomplice constituted a denial of due process that state may be constitutionally estopped from obtaining a fact finding in one trial and seeking and obtaining an inconsistent fact finding in another trial

SOLUTION: holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal

PROBLEM: an explosive in terms of its primary or common purpose, we hold that the Government need not show that a device is actually able to explode to prove that a defendant knowingly possessed an explosive under § 842(i)(l); it need only prove that the defendant knew he possessed dynamite or other chemical compound, mixture, or device that was primarily designed to function by explosion. Finally, Mr. Markey argues that because he believed in good faith that the dynamite could not explode, he should be exonerated. This contention appears to be one of ignorance of the law — “I thought the law applied differently than it does.” See United States v. Capps, 77 F.3d 350, 353 (10th Cir.1996). This type of argument is “easily rejected.” See United States v. Reed, 114 F.3d 1053, 1057 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, evidence concerning Mr. Markey’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claim is not moot where there is a viable damages claim (B) holding that a good faith belief that a firearm is inoperable is not a viable defense to 18 usc  922g (C) holding that good faith is a defense to the willful filing of false statements under 18 usc  1001 (D) holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b (E) holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief

SOLUTION:
holding that a claim is not moot where there is a viable damages claim