TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: and therefore, need only show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenges for cause. “[A] challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror’s responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied.” State v. Hallal, 557 So.2d 1388, 1389-90 (La.1990). The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (<HOLDING>); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (B) holding that an effective life sentence of fortyfive years for seconddegree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment (C) holding that a prospective juror who would vote automatically for a life sentence is properly excluded (D) holding life sentence mandatory under 21 usc  841b and district court could not depart from the mandatory life sentence unless government made a motion (E) holding that time excluded from a speedy trial clock for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excluded under  3161h1 but may only be excluded when a court makes appropriate reasonableness findings under  3161h7

SOLUTION: holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence

PROBLEM: than the Confrontation Clause, we review for plain error. See United States v. Acosta, 475 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir.2007); United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir.2003). Our consideration of the district court’s decision begins and ends with the first element of plain error review because we conclude that the district court did not err in limiting the scope of Rios’s cross-examination. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (explaining that the first element of plain error review requires that “there must be an error or defect”). A defendant’s right to cross-examination is not unlimited. United States v. Bernegger, 661 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir.2011). The Sixth Amendment confrontation right is satisfied in this regard so Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In sum, establishing a Confrontation Clause 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (B) holding that the district court satisfied the confrontation clause by permitting the defendant to present facts concerning the adverse witnesss plea agreement and incentives to cooperate (C) holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment (D) holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing (E) holding that if a plea agreement is breached the district court may either grant specific performance or allow the defendant to withdraw the plea

SOLUTION: holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement

PROBLEM: support a suppression court’s finding that an officer possessed reasonable suspicion to believe that a violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(c) has occurred, the officer must articulate at least some fact or facts to support his inference or conclusion that the object materially impaired the driver’s view. Our consideration of other sections of the Motor Vehicle Code informs our conclusion. For example, in order to independently assess whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to suspect a violation of Section 3361 (Driving vehicle at a safe speed), a suppression court would require more than a single statement from an officer that a motorist was driving “at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361; see Commonwealth v. Perry, 982 A.2d 1009 (Pa.Super.2009) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, we question how a suppression 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court properly determined that police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop appellants vehicle based on suspected violation of section 3361 where officer testified that appellant was driving fifteen miles over the 25 mph speed limit and the road was wet and slushy (B) holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop (C) holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation (D) holding that notwithstanding the officers testimony that he had no suspicion of criminality the officer was aware of facts that would give rise to reasonable suspicion in the mind of a reasonable officer (E) holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation

SOLUTION:
holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop