In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: defendant’s activities fall outside the FDCPA’s general provisions); Overton v. Foutty & Foutty, LLP, No. 1:07-cv0274-DFHTAB, 2007 WL 2413026, at *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 21, 2007) (recognizing majority position that party whose activities are limited to enforcement of security interests is not subject to all FDCPA requirements, and stating, ”[i]f a person invokes judicial remedies only to enforce the security interest in property, then the effort is not subject to the FDCPA (other than § 1692f(6) and § 1692i(a))[,] [b]ut if the person is also seeking additional relief, such as a personal judgment against the borrower, then the FDCPA applies.”) (collecting cases); Chomilo v. Shapiro, Nordmeyer & Zielke, LLP, Civ. No. 06-3103 (RHK/AJB), 2007 WL 2695795, at *6 (D.Minn. Sept. 12, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Acosta v. Campbell, No. 6:04CV761 ORL28DAB, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that law firm executing nonjudicial foreclosure pro ceeding was enforcing a security interest rather than collecting a debt and hence fell outside the ambit of the fdcpa except for the provisions of section 1692f6 (B) recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of  1692a6   a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to  1692f6 (C) holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt (D) holding that the defendants actions in filing judicial foreclosure proceeding against mortgagor amounted to debt collection activity under the fdcpa and distinguishing decisions involving pursuit of nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under a deed of trust from those in which a defendant has pursued judicial foreclosure proceedings which included seeking judgment on a note  by filing a lawsuit in state court (E) holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: evidence sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute.” Sweats Fashions, 833 F.2d at 1562. Plaintiff has neither submitted materials of his own, nor shown how the materials already in the record create a genuine issue of material fact. He has done nothing more than rest on an ambiguous “general denial”: that he has either “refused to accept” his severance pay, or that such pay was never “conveyed” to him.” Pl.’s Opp. at 4. This is not enough to survive a summary judgment motion. Put simply, while defendant has met its burden under Celotex properly to support Cl. 736, 756 (2011) (declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); Michels v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Defendant cannot be faulted for failing to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff may attempt to survive a rule 12b6 motion by adding essential new facts in a brief on appeal (B) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under rcfc 12b6 by asserting a new claim (C) holding that a respondent cannot avoid the initial pleading element by obtaining a dismissal and filing her own suit (D) recognizing that a rule 12b6 motion is an appropriate vehicle on which to seek dismissal of a claim barred by a prescription statute (E) holding that dismissal pursuant to rule 12b6 is appropriate if the plaintiff is unable to articulate enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: strips circuit courts of the authority to impose sanctions against parties filing frivolous lawsuits. I do not take this position lightly. Prior to this decision, our law was clear. Sanctions may be imposed against a party “as the result of his or her vexatious, wanton, or oppressive assertion of a claim or defense that cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the application, extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Syl., in part, Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. Canady, 175 W.Va. 249, 332 S.E.2d 262 (1985). See, e.g., Pritt v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 204 W.Va. 388, 513 S.E.2d 161 (1998) (per curiam) (affirming sanctions against plaintiff for filing a baseless lawsuit); Syl. pt. 4, in part, State ex rel. Roy Allen S. v. Stone, 196 W.Va. 624, 474 S.E.2d 554 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, this Court has held that “[t]he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a circuit court has discretion under rule 11 to impose attorneys fees on litigants who bring vexatious and groundless lawsuits (B) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (C) holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion (D) holding that rule 11 does not authorize a district court to award appellate attorneys fees due to similar concerns (E) holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions


Output: (A)