In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: other court’s construal of the statute. See Thrivent, 251 S.W.3d at 622-23; J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co. v. Estes, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 836, 839-40 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied); Poole v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 14-99-00740-CV, No, 14-99-01056-CV, 2000 WL 1721150, at *1, 2000 Tex.App. LEXIS 6825, at *3-*4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 12, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication); Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d at 331. Finally, this argument is contrary to the prevailing view among state courts outside of Texas as well, which have held that an order vacating an award and directing a rehearing (without denying confirmation) is not final and appealable. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 31, 582 So.2d 162, 162-63 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Carner v. Freedman, 175 So.2d 70, 71 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable (B) holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable
[EX A]: holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable

[EX Q]: The Washington Supreme Court upheld its similar statute against a special legislation challenge in Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P. 2d 108 (1972). The court found persuasive the fact that “the scope of the Washington provision is not limited as to vocation. The subject statute bars actions against any person having constructed, altered or repaired any improvement upon real property.” Id. at 532, 503 P. 2d at 111 (emphasis original) ; see also Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N. J. 190, 293 A. 2d 662 (1972). We cannot conclude that the 1965 Act is a special law coming within the constitutional proscription. See Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, supra; contra, Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N. E. 2d 588 (1967) (<HOLDING>). II Similarly, we find no violation of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statute authorizing creation of community councils in certain counties was unconstitutional special law (B) holding there was no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor of equipment lease although payments were made to illinois bank the guaranty was accepted in illinois and it provided that it would be gov erned by illinois law (C) holding  122604a companion legislation to  122603 unconstitutional (D) holding the illinois statute unconstitutional as violating a special legislation proscription (E) holding that illinois public policy did not require the application of illinois law to an illinois accident involving only indiana residents insured in indiana
[EX A]: holding statute authorizing creation of community councils in certain counties was unconstitutional special law

[EX Q]: regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing in the taken area because the relevant statutes did not affirmatively abrogate either the tribe’s treaty rights or inherent tribal sovereignty. Id. at 700-04, 113 S.Ct. at 2323-24. EXHAUSTION OF TRIBAL REMEDIES Next, National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985) (National Farmers Union), and Iowa Mutual do not establish only a rule of exhaustion requiring tribal courts to determine their jurisdiction in the first instance. The rule of exhaustion established in National Farmers Union is premised upon the Court’s decision that tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians is not automatically foreclosed by Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978) (<HOLDING>). National Farmers Union recognized that an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that states taxing jurisdiction over nonmember indians is equivalent to states taxing jurisdiction over nonindians (B) holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization (C) holding federal legislation conferring jurisdiction on federal courts to try nonindians for offenses committed in indian country had implicitly preempted tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonindians (D) holding that state of south dakota does not have criminal jurisdiction over indians in indian country (E) holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret a tribal constitution or tribal laws
[EX A]:
holding that states taxing jurisdiction over nonmember indians is equivalent to states taxing jurisdiction over nonindians