In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: are reversed with instructions that he be re-sentenced under a correctly calculated score sheet. Cooper also asserts the same argument for his 41.712-month sentence on the delivery of cocaine charge. The question, however, is whether this error is harmless because Cooper was sentenced as a habitual felony offender. While the 41.712-month sentence happened to be equal to the minimum guidelines sentence under the incorrectly calculated score sheet, the guidelines scoresheet is legally irrelevant because Cooper was habitualized. See § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2002)(“A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002 [The Criminal Punishment Code].”); Tannihill v. State, 848 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); LaFleur v. State, 812 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(<HOLDING>); Kenon v. State, 780 So.2d 258, 261 (Fla. 5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding habitual sentence rendered guidelines scoresheet irrelevant (B) holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal (C) holding if the plea agreement was not conditioned on the sentencing guidelines an appellant is not entitled to relief because his sentence is not illegal (D) holding that defendant entitled to resentencing if the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines would constitute an impermissible departure sentence under the 1994 guidelines (E) holding that defendant should be resentenced where district court imposed a sentence under an erroneously calculated guidelines range  even where the sentence imposed fell within the correct range

A: holding habitual sentence rendered guidelines scoresheet irrelevant
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Q: by jury is a fundamental guaranty of the rights and liberties of the people. C Prudential that the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right means that the starting point of our analysis is a presumption against the waiver of this constitutional right. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co., 301 U.S. at 393, 57 S.Ct. at 811-12; In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132 (giving right to trial by jury “same protections as other constitutional rights”); accord Ex parte Cupps, 782 So.2d 772, 775 (Ala.2000) (construing scope of contractual jury waiver strictly and narrowly “in deference to the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial”); see also Note, 58 Baylor L.Rev. at 259. But see Lowe Enters. Residential Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 92, 40 P.3d 405, 410 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Despite the existence of a presumption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy (B) holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts (C) holding that german law presumptively confers joint custody upon both parents until a court enters a contrary order (D) holding  without reference to supreme court case law to the contrary  that in nevada contractual jury waivers are presumptively valid (E) holding appellate waivers are enforceable if invoked by the government

A: holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy
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Q: of a memorandum filed by a defendant in anticipation of sentencing in a public-corruption case. See Huntley, 943 F.Supp.2d at 384-85. The letter argued for a lower sentence because of the defendant’s cooperation, and listed the state legislators and other elected officials who were recorded by the defendant as part of her cooperation. Id. In granting the media’s request for access to the letter, the court noted that the privacy interests of the elected officials were at their “lowest,” because these officials were “well-equipped” to “respond to any accusations of wrongdoing.” Id. at 387; see also Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787 (noting that “privacy interests are diminished when the party seeking protection is a public person subject to legitimate public scrutiny”); White, 2004 WL 2399731, at *5 (<HOLDING>). Huntley, however, provides limited support to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that provisions protecting classified service employees from administrative demotion or discipline did not preclude reclassification of employees and warning against misinterpretation of scope of protections afforded to employees where protections apply only to administrative actions such as the promotion or discipline of employees they do not limit or preclude the city councils legislative authority to make necessary policy and budget decisions they do not somehow override the express authority for the city councils actions  and thus they do not create a constitutionallyprotected property interest that prohibits the city council from passing the ordinance at issue in this case (B) holding that a city cannot be required to enter into collective bargaining sessions with an association of its employees (C) holding a city liable for personal injuries caused by a driver colliding with a girder in the center of a city street where the city did not give a warning (D) holding that disclosure of grandjury testimony of city employees was proper because they cannot be expected to have any personal privacy interest in their duties as city employees (E) recognizing as a privacy right the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters

A:
holding that provisions protecting classified service employees from administrative demotion or discipline did not preclude reclassification of employees and warning against misinterpretation of scope of protections afforded to employees where protections apply only to administrative actions such as the promotion or discipline of employees they do not limit or preclude the city councils legislative authority to make necessary policy and budget decisions they do not somehow override the express authority for the city councils actions  and thus they do not create a constitutionallyprotected property interest that prohibits the city council from passing the ordinance at issue in this case
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