In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

charge for each item or items. The Trial Court, however, refused to admit the last page of the bill that contained only a description of miscellaneous and a corresponding charge. Plaintiff had no testimony or other evidence to explain to the jury anything about the charge listed on the last page of the bill. The Trial Court stated such a description would force the jury to speculate regarding what supplies were encompassed within the charge for these miscellaneous items. A jury may not engage in speculation. Stringer v. Cooper, 486 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tenn.Ct.App.1972) (stating “we understand the holding in those cases and many more like them to be that a jury may not speculate as to cause when one is not shown.... ”); Moon v. Johnston, 47 Tenn.App. 208, 337 S.W.2d 464, 469 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Without any testimony or other evidence to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the defendants act was the or a proximate cause of the injury the matter is for the jury to decide (B) holding a jury is not permitted to speculate or guess as to proximate cause (C) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury (D) holding proximate cause almost always a question solely for the jury (E) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury
(B)

relevant facts. See Mot. at 13-14. Defendant, too, claimed in its subsequent statement of the issues that this talk happened between April 1 and April 4 and cited the same supportive evidence to this effect. See SOF, ¶ 73 (citing Howe Dep. at 32:7-12, 34:12-19 and May 13, 2014, Howe Email). Because Marks never refuted this fact by offering his own statement of the issues, as required under Local Rule 7(h), the Court could thus consider WWL’s account admitted on this ground alone. See LCvR 7(h) (“[I]n determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to- the motion.”); Jackson, 101 F.3d at 153 (<HOLDING>). The Court, however, need not rest on this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion (B) holding district court has complete discretion whether to treat facts as conceded where local rule is violated (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that the predecessor to local rule 561b3 provides the only acceptable means of  presenting additional facts to the district court (E) holding a district court has discretion under rule 55b2 once a default is determined to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action
(B)

for the proposition that “a plaintiff is not required to produce evidence of emotional distress beyond his own testimony.” King, 452 F.Supp.2d at 1281. Two other courts faced with the same question since Moore was decided, however, have come out the other way and required more than an FCRA plaintiffs own testimony to support a claim for emotional distress damages. See Sampson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. CV204-187, 2005 WL 2095092, at *5 (S.D.Ga. Aug. 29, 2005) (collecting cases and concluding that an FCRA plaintiff “must produce some form of independent, corroborating evidence of her humiliation and embarrassment at trial to recover compensatory damages for emotional distress”); Jordan v. Trans Union LLC, No. 1:05 CV 305 GET, 2006 WL 1663324, at *7-8 (N.D.Ga. June 12, 2006) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Moore provides dubious support 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs proof that she became depressed and was prescribed depression medication by her family physician was insufficient to support claim and stating evidence that randolph is very depressed and very upset is insufficient to sustain damages for mental anguish (B) holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment (C) holding the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that the plaintiff could be awarded damages for anxiety mental anguish and loss of consortium for a violation of the kentucky act (D) holding that a complaints bare assertions alone were insufficient for certification (E) holding in a case arising under the fcra that the remainder of plaintiffs complaints such as feeling frustrated and degraded are insufficient standing alone to support damages for mental anguish

(E)