In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: witness testifying against him was in custody). This right is not subject to the trial court’s discretion; however, the court may preclude repetitive or unduly harassing interrogation. Ramey,. 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68; Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475. Thus: “[A] defendant need not show interest or motive in that any promises of leniency have, in fact, been made to the witness by the State or that any expectations of special favor exist in the mind of the witness, before cross-examining a witness as to possible bias. Further, the defense is entitled to inquire into such promises or expectations whether they are based on fact or are simply imaginary.” Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68, citing Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475-76. See also People v. Tomes, 284 Ill. App. 3d 514, 520, 672 N.E.2d 289 (1996) (<HOLDING>). “To this end a defendant has the right to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required (B) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (C) holding that limitation on scope and breadth of crossexamination did not significantly curtail effectiveness of witness crossexamination because crossexamination was lengthy and extensive (D) holding it is well established that crossexamination to show that a witness might be vulnerable to pressure whether real or imagined from the state regarding a pending charge is a matter of right (E) holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination

Output: recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required


Input: Consider Input: Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir.1994))). 17 . See Executone, 26 F.3d at 1320 ("We must sustain an arbitration award even if we disagree with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the underlying contract as long as the arbitrator’s decision 'draws its essence' from the contract.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 18 . See also Parsons & Whittemore, 744 F.2d at 1483-84 (recounting that the arbitration panel awarded postjudgment interest at state statutory rate). 19 . We construe the parties’ intentions "generously” to determine whether they agreed to arbitrate a particular issue. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). 20 . Cf. Newmont, 615 F.3d at 1272, 1276 (<HOLDING>). 21 . Riebesell, 586 F.3d at 794; 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court should consider issues relating to making and performance of agreement to arbitrate (B) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator (C) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate the particular issue any doubt about who should decide the consolidation issue was resolved in favor of the arbitrator (D) holding that companys contention that union repudiated the agreement to arbitrate a particular dispute was a matter for the arbitrator and not the court to decide (E) holding that agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising out of contract authorized arbitrator to decide postjudgment interest issues

Output: holding that court should consider issues relating to making and performance of agreement to arbitrate


Input: Consider Input: retaliate against him for filing a lawsuit. In the instant civil action, Plaintiff alleged in his original complaint that “Nurse Janet” mentally and emotionally abused him, denied him medical treatment, and retaliated against him for filing a lawsuit; but in his answers to the questionnaire, Plaintiff stated that Nurse Janet no longer “bothered” him. Clearly, Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Dieken, Burns, Seevers, Franklin, and “Nurse Janet” in the instant civil action are duplicative of claims raised in his earlier Civil Action Nos. 1:03-CV-075-C and 1:03-CV-123-C, and should be dismissed with prejudice as malicious. Mayfield v. Collins, 918 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir.1990); Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir.1988). See Marts v. Hines, 117 F.3d 1504, 1506 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). (b) Frivolous Claims The “mere threatening 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well (B) holding that when a lanham act claim is dismissable upon motion state law claims should be dismissed without prejudice (C) holding that the trial court should have dismissed the employees breach of contract claim (D) holding that a claim dismissed as malicious under the ifp statute should be with prejudice (E) holding that action could not form the basis of a malicious prosecution claim where criminal information was dismissed as insufficient to support the charges without prejudice and the prosecutors did not amend or refile


Output: holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well