In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith,” though it may be admissible for other purposes. If a trial judge overrules a Rule 404(b) objection, finding the evidence of another crime or wrong admissible for one of these other purposes, the trial judge must also conduct a Rule 403 balancing test. This filtering analysis requires assessing whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of undue prejudice before evidence may be admitted. Watts v. State, 635 So.2d 1364, 1368 (Miss.1994). ¶ 56. Once again, Grindle did not object or in any way argue that the evidence of his subsequent arrest was being elicited in violation of Rule 404(b). So his Rule 404(b) argument is waived. See Ruben-stein v. State, 941 So.2d 735, 760 (¶ 87) (Miss.2006) (<HOLDING>). And by not objecting under Rule 404(b), his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plainerror review applies where the defendant fails to object to a constructive amendment (B) holding that to admit evidence of prior bad acts under rule 404b ala r evid the state must demonstrate that the evidence was reasonably necessary to its case (C) holding rule 16 does not apply to oral statements other than statements of the defendant (D) holding admission of prior bad acts of child abuse was reversible error when the defendant did not have exclusive control over the children during the period when the prior bad acts occurred (E) holding that failure to object to statements of prior bad acts barred argument on appeal that statements violated rules 404b and 403 without conducting any plainerror analysis
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: as an entity wholly owned by the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Raccoon relies on that portion of § 1603(b) which states that “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” does not include an entity created under the laws of a third country. Raccoon’s argument is without merit. Navoi has presented credible evidence showing that in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Republic of Uzbekistan’s declaration of independence, ownership and control of Navoi passed to the Uzbek Government by decree of the Cabinet of Ministers. At all times relevant to the instant litigation, Navoi was an Uzbek entity created by the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers under the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan. See Gould v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Raccoon challenges Navoi’s prima 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statutory good time credits must be calculated under the law in effect at the time of resentencing after an appeal of the sentence is determined (B) holding that for purpose of the fsia a foreign entitys status is determined based upon the jurisdictional facts existing at the time the act complained of occurred (C) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action (D) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (E) holding that clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court under aedpa is the law at the time of the statecourt adjudication on the merits not at the time the conviction becomes final
Example Output: (B)

Example Input: 464 U.S. 826, 104 S.Ct. 97, 78 L.Ed.2d 102 (1983). This line of cases also answers the possible contention that Title VII awards, because authorized by statute, are somehow different than back pay awards. The constitutional question does not change because Congress has created the right. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194, 94 S.Ct. at 1008. Although it has not confronted the Seventh Amendment question directly, this Circuit has endorsed the proposition that in a Title VII action “back pay is not in the nature of a claim for damages, but rather an integral part of the statutory equitable remedy.” Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 186 (D.C.Cir.1974) (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d at 1125). See also Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 3009, 120 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award of damages specifically allocated to back pay as a result of a wrongful discharge in violation of first amendment rights under  1983 was nontaxable under  104a2 (B) holding that an award of back pay under title vii remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion (C) holding that punitive damages are excludable from gross income under 26 usc  104a2 (D) holding that back pay awards are not excludable from gross income under 26 usc  104a2 1988 because the overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that an award of back pay under title vii does not constitute the legal remedy of damages (E) holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court
Example Output:
(D)