In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the harassment,” Murray, 57 F.3d at 250. As the Second Circuit has recognized, “not every response to a complaint should take the form of discharge;” even a mere written warning can be an appropriate response if it conveys the message that further harassment will not be tolerated. Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 63; see also Torres, 116 F.3d at 639 (“[R]esolution will vary from case to case.”). By far the best evidence that Metro-North’s response was effective is that plaintiff has not been sexually harassed by Chapman or any other Metro-North employee since meeting with Ms. Gormley-O’Connor, see Wahlstrom Dep. at 30, 248, nor has Chapman been accused of accosting any other employees since returning from his suspension, see Chapman Dep. at 64, 279; Sinigiani Dep. at 49; cf. Murray, 57 F.3d at 251 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, while factual issues exist as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination (B) holding that where the plaintiffs allegations concerning a hostile work environment consist of facts that occurred more than one year before the filing of the complaint such a claim is timebarred (C) holding that allegations of failure to remedy a hostile work environment provided no basis for relief where the evidence demonstrated that the harassment had ended by the time plaintiffs complaint was filed (D) holding that the allegations of plaintiffs coemployees of sexual harassment by manager were irrelevant to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim absent evidence that plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of the alleged harassment (E) holding that a charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of sex did not support a complaint for hostile environment sexual harassment
[A]: holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination


[Q]: marks and citations omitted). {12} We are unconvinced that application of Texas law to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate would violate any fundamental principle, or public policy of New Mexico, nor are we convinced that the outcome of this determination would differ, depending upon whether we applied the law of Texas or New Mexico. Under Texas law, any doubts about whether there is an agreement to arbitrate must be resolved in favor of arbitration. See Dell, Inc. v. Muniz, 163 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Tex.App.2005); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 195 (Tex.App.2003). It is not clear that New Mexico has applied the same presumption to this initial determination of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. See DeArmond, 2003-NMCA-148, ¶ 8, 134 N.M. 630, 81 P.3d 573 (<HOLDING>). {13} Even though the presumption in favor of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (C) recognizing that a legally enforceable contract is still a prerequisite for arbitration and characterizing the holding in first options of chicago inc v kaplan 514 us 938 94445 115 sct 1920 131 led2d 985 1995 as stating that the presumption in favor of arbitration is reversed when there is a dispute as to the existence of an agreement (D) recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement (E) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added
[A]: holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement


[Q]: its own reasons, we review both decisions.” Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.2000). Petitioners’ primary contention is that the IJ deprived them of due process by prejudging the case and preventing them from fully developing the record. Petitioners, however, did not raise a due process argument before the BIA. Because the due process claims made here are in the nature of procedural errors that the BIA could have remedied, they are subject to the exhaustion requirement. Because these claims were not exhausted before the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to review them. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir.2004). On this record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, see Lopez-Reyes v. INS, 79 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), and that petitioners did not suffer past 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that substantial evidence supports an adverse credibility finding if it is supported by specific cogent reasons (B) holding that we review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence (C) holding an ijs credibility findings are entitled to deference if supported by specific cogent reasons (D) holding that explicit credibility finding must be more than passing remark of disbelief and must be supported by specific cogent reasons (E) holding that an ijs credibility determinations enjoy highly deferential review when supported by specific cogent reasons that bear a legitimate nexus to the findings
[A]:
holding that we review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence