TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: a habeas petition, and since his administrative remedies are now exhausted, this claim can proceed. B. Fox’s Notification Challenge is Properly Before The Court The second half of Fox’s claim relating to the notification requirement of the statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c)(2), is properly brought by him as a petition for a declaratory judgment. Notification claims do not relate to the fact or duration of confinement, therefore challenge to a notification requirement is not properly brought as a habeas petition. See Bunn v. Conley, 309 F.3d 1002, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The notification scheme [under 18 U.S.C § 4042(b) governing violent offender notification] in no way affects the duration, much less the fact, of confinement.”); Henrikson v. Guzik, 249 F.3d 395, 397 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (B) holding that because henrikson is not challenging the fact or duration of his confinement subject matter jurisdiction is not present under 28 us  2241 (C) holding that subject matter jurisdiction under  2241 is present in the custodial court when the petition challenges the manner location or condition of a sentences execution (D) holding that under the fsia personal jurisdiction   depends upon the district court finding subject matter jurisdiction under 28 usc  1330a and proper service under 28 usc  1608 (E) holding that district courts have jurisdiction under 28 usc  2241 to review cat claims for errors of law including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: 548 U.S. at 518, 126 S.Ct. at 2667 (Scalia, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that “compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act can be [a compelling state] interest ... [otherwise] a State could be placed in the impossible position of having to choose between compliance with § 5 and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause”). And we conclude that a plan will be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest when the race-based action taken was reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of the Act. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2490-91, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 1906, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (<HOLDING>); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (B) holding that where the claimed interest is avoidance of liability under section 2 the legislative action must at a minimum remedy the anticipated violation or achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored (C) holding that liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under  1983 where at best the plaintiff has merely claimed that the appellants were aware of alleged violation but did not take appropriate action (D) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (E) holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). Arrington asserts that he meets either definition (A) or definition (B) because he suffers from diabetes. Specifically, he argues that this circuit held, in Gonzales v. City of New Braunfels, 176 F.3d 834, 837 (5th Cir.1999), that insulin-dependent diabetes is a “disability” as that term is defined in the ADA. SW Bell disagrees, and contends that Arrington must produce evidence suggesting that his diabetic condition “substantially limits” at least one of his “major life activities.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 655 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). SW Bell correctly identifies the flaws in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiffs ability to work is substantially limited when his impairment foreclosed him generally from obtaining jobs doing the type of work plaintiff has chosen as his field (B) holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment (C) holding that 42 usc  405g may be equitably tolled based on a plaintiffs mental impairment (D) holding that impairment has not substantially limited the major life activity of lifting where an individual could clean his dishes clean the yard bathe his dog do the groceries take out the garbage and prepare his own meals (E) holding that for a plaintiff to prove that he has a record of impairment under 42 usc  121022b there must be a record of an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities

SOLUTION:
(E)