instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
of other courts have concluded, outside the RICO and Clayton Act context, that "by reason of" should be read to require only "but for” rather than proximate causation. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) ("The words ‘because of' mean ‘by reason of: on account of.’ Thus, the ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took adverse action ‘because of age is that age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act. To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); Robinson Knife Mfg. Co. v. C.I.R., 600 F.3d 121, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Spirtas Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 555 F.3d 647, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in 26 cfr  1263ale3i the language  directly benefit or are incurred by reason of boils down to a butfor causation test (B) holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support (C) holding in an appeal from a postanswer default judgment that third prong of craddock test required appellant to offer to reimburse appellee for legal expenses he incurred in obtaining default judgment even though most of the fees incurred had not been paid (D) holding that pursuant to the eaja courts may not award expenses of an attorney that are not incurred or expended solely or exclusively in connection with the case before the court (E) holding a tribe subject to 1 a tax on the use of certain highway motor vehicles 26 usc  4481a 2 a tax on diesel fuel used in highway vehicles 26 usc  4041a 3 a tax on special fuels used in motor vehicles 26 usc  4041b and 4 a tax on manufacturing in this case a truck chassis assembled by the tribe 26 usc  4061a 4218a
answer:
holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support


question:
Commission, and appellants, yet the County Commissioners did not require any of them to face cross-examination before submitting those documents. Appellants maintain that all of this documentary evidence should have been placed before the County Commissioners by sworn witnesses who faced cross-examination, and, therefore, it should not have been considered by them. We disagree. “A zoning board, along with other administrative agencies, is generally not bound by the technical rules of evidence although it must observe fundamental fairness in dealing with the parties who appear before it.” Ginn v. Farley, 43 Md.App. 229, 236, 403 A.2d 858, cert. denied, sub nom. Engel v. Farley, 286 Md. 747 (1979). See also Entzian v. Prince George’s County, 32 Md.App. 256, 262, 360 A.2d 6 (1976) (<HOLDING>). The documents properly could be considered by 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence (B) holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound (C) holding that agency is bound by its regulations (D) recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence (E) recognizing that zoning agency bodies   are not bound by strict rules of evidence
answer:
recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence


question:
special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment. State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 277, 694 P.2d 922, 925 (1985) (quoting State v. Lujan, 76 N.M. 111, 117, 412 P.2d 405, 408 (1966) (in turn quoting Blevins, 40 N.M. at 368, 60 P.2d at 209)). 27. Other jurisdictions have held that the enactment of a comprehensive motor vehicle code shows a legislative intent to preempt the field. In State v. Davidson, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that with the passage of the motor vehicle code, the legislature “intended to cover the whole field and subject matter of the operation of motor vehicles, including definitions of the several offenses growing out 215 (1960) (<HOLDING>). 28. In addition to the case law from this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that vehicular homicide involving criminal negligence is not a crime of violence under begay (B) holding that the older more general manslaughter statute is preempted by the vehicular homicide statute (C) holding that under the particular facts alleged in the indictment vehicular homicide was a lesser offense included in the murder charge (D) holding that the state must prove criminal negligence for its homicide by vehicle statute even though the statute specifically states that any traffic violation is sufficient (E) holding that dwi manslaughter and vehicular homicide are different forms of the same offense
answer:

holding that vehicular homicide involving criminal negligence is not a crime of violence under begay