In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: Jones v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 72 B.R. 956 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1987); McCullough v. Suter (In re Suter), 59 B.R. 944 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986). Palmer argues that the BAP erred in distinguishing among the various subsections of section 523 on the issue of the discharge of punitive damages. He notes that courts have found that punitive damages are nondischargeable under section 523(a)(4), which bars discharge of debts “for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement or larceny,” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), and under section 523(a)(6), which bars discharge of debts “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity,” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). See, e.g., Klemens v. Wallace (In re Wallace), 840 F.2d 762 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Moraes v. Adams (In re Adams), 761 F.2d 1422, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that judgment for embezzlement which included actual and punitive damages was nondischargeable (B) holding that punitive damages are not fines (C) holding punitive damages nondischargeable under  523a6 when such damages are based on the same conduct as the underlying nondischargeable judgment (D) holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that both actual and punitive portions of judgment for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity were nondischargeable (E) holding a court may not award punitive damages

Answer: (A)


Question: partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court’s order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants’ arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment

Answer: (C)


Question: College to now come forward within the next ten (10) days with full payment of the unpaid principal, $862,-396.39, and unpaid and accrued interest of $38,793.70 as of this day, 05/14/91. Interest is accruing at a rate of $283,528 per day. FBIT’s Ex. #K. FBIT argues that this letter had the effect of accelerating the debt evidenced by the Note and triggering the Post Maturity Rate of sixteen percent provided for by the Note. A debtor’s failure to pay an obligation on the due date does not automatically mature the entire debt, despite the presence of an acceleration clause in the agreement. Capital City Motors, Inc. v. Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 363 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Mo.1962) (citations omitted). See also Josephson v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Group, Inc., 810 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Mo.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). An acceleration clause does no more than give 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that more than notice to a defendant is required (B) holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action (C) holding that the obligation does not terminate upon death (D) holding that an automatic forfeitureupondefault clause does not mean a notice of forfeiture is not required in order to terminate a lease (E) holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court

Answer:
(D)