In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: defendant’s conversion by wrongful act inconsistent with the property rights of the plaintiff; and (3) damages.” In re Emery, 317 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Burlesci v. Petersen, 68 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1065, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 704 (1998)). One partner can be liable to another for conversion of partnership property. Oakdale Vill. Grp. v. Fong, 43 Cal.App.4th 539, 546, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 810 (1996), as modified on denial of reh’g, (Apr. 10, 1996). Further, intangible property such as corporate shares and bonds may be the proper subject of a conversion claim. See Am. Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1411 (9th Cir.1996) (collecting California cases); see also Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 125, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 621 (2007) (<HOLDING>). However, more abstract intangible property, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding (B) holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss (C) holding that it is not (D) holding insufficiently definite bonus agreement that did not establish amount or method for determining amount of payment (E) holding that a businesss net operating loss is the proper subject of conversion because it is a definite recordable amount
[EX A]: holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding

[EX Q]: reasoning of these cases. Moreover, we believe that declaratory relief is also moot when the challenged acts have already “irretrievably occurred.” Accordingly, we apply the teachings of N.J. Tpk. Auth., that the claim for injunctive relief had become “academic by reason of these changed circumstances .... ” Id. at 27. Here, as in N.J. Tpk. Auth., the challenged action awarding the contracts has already occurred, and the work required by them has already been performed. There is no longer a “ ‘subject matter upon which the judgment of the court can operate’ to make a substantive determination on the merits.” Id. at 30 (quoting Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390, 20 S.Ct. 673, 44 L.Ed. 813 (1900)); see also Jersey Cent. Power and Light Co. v. State of N.J., 772 F.2d 35, 36 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). II. For Appellants to be prevailing parties 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot (B) holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc  1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action (C) holding that a challenge to a mining plan was moot where the action sought to be enjoined hadbeen completed (D) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (E) holding that injunctive claim was rendered meaningless since the state action sought to be enjoined has irretrievably occurred
[EX A]: holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot

[EX Q]: setting forth only the BAP’s judgment. Accordingly, by operation of our rules of appellate procedure, the Tau-moepeaus had 180 days within which to file their notice of appeal and their notice, received by the BAP clerk on October 2, 2006, fell well within this period. To be sure, the separate document rule is a technical one. But, as its name implies, it generally requires that judgment be entered in a separate document, one that is “not made part of the opinion and order” of the court. Mondragon v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir.2008). A combined document denominated an “Order and Judgment,” containing factual background, legal reasoning, as well as a judgment, generally will not satisfy the rule’s prescription. See, e.g., Clough v. Rush, 959 F.2d 182, 185 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Allison v. Bank One-Denver, 289 F.3d 1223, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees (B) holding that a district courts combined order and judgment did not satisfy the rule on account of being fifteen pages long and containing detailed legal analysis along with citations in addition to providing for entry of judgment (C) holding that a district courts summary judgment order did not meet rule 58s requirements because it was fifteen pages long and it contained detailed legal analysis and reasoning (D) holding that a district courts marginal order granting summary judgment did not meet the strict requirements of rule 58 because a party may reasonably be confused as to the standing of its ease when a decision is rendered in such an informal manner (E) holding that the rule 12b6 ruling was not a final judgment and did not bind the district court at summary judgment
[EX A]:
holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees