instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
pre-estimate may in fact operate as a penalty and become unenforceable is shown by the fact that even though the sum fixed as compensation for each day’s delay ... is held to be a reasonable provision for liquidated damages and to be enforceable, no court will permit it to go on operating forever. 11 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 58:21 at 523. That treatise then observes that there is “some lack of uniformity in the method of determining this time limit.” Id. In general, there are two rules that courts have applied to this predicament. Some courts have held that a liquidated damages clause is inapplicable when a contractor has completely abandoned a project. See, e.g., City of Elmira v. Larry Walter, Inc., 76 N.Y.2d 912, 563 N.Y.S.2d 45, 564 N.E.2d 655, 656 (1990) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Others have held that, when a contractor has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudgment interest should not be added to damages awarded for misrepresentation because the amount of damages were not liquidated or ascertainable before the verdict (B) holding that language of contract did not limit plaintiffs recovery to liquidated damages (C) holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the fsla (D) holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award (E) holding that in the absence of clear and unambiguous language indicating that liquidated damages clause was intended to apply to contractors outright abandonment of the project no such damages should be awarded
answer:
(E)


question:
UCL and CLRA. In considering whether the plaintiff in Bruno had standing to bring claims arising from the defendants’ gelcap product, when the plaintiff had only purchased the defendants’ liquid product, the court noted that “treatises and the vast majority of persuasive authority indicate that ... the issue of whether a class representative may be allowed to present claims on behalf of others who have similar, but not identical, interests depends not on standing, but on an assessment of typicality and adequacy of representation.” Id. at 530 (citing Greenwood v. Compucredit Corp., No. 4:08-cv-04878, 2010 WL 4807095, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2010); Arevalo v. Bank of Am. Corp., 850 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1017 (N.D.Cal.2011); Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); 7AA Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers have standing to sue (B) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (C) recognizing associational standing when members would have standing in own right (D) holding that because plaintiff had standing to sue for injury arising from his own benefit plan his ability to represent class members with different benefit plans should be analyzed under rule 23 not standing (E) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
answer:
(D)


question:
ability to avail itself of the court system to enforce its private restrictions and regulations is state action. In support of this position, Mr. Westphal cites Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948). In contrast to Mr. Westphal’s claim, the Supreme Court in Shelley did not hold that the ability of a private entity to avail itself of the court system to enforce any private restriction is state action. Rather, the Court, held that the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants by state courts was a state action and, by granting judicial enforcement of the racially restrictive covenants, the state violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 18-20, 68 S.Ct. at 844-45. See Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428, 437 (Mo. banc 1975) (<HOLDING>) Here, there was no judicial enforcement of a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the question of whether the defendant knew his actions were legal demanded a conclusion as to the legality of the defendants conduct which is unhelpful to the jury under rule 701 (B) holding that the state attorney generals duty to support the constitutionality of challenged state statutes and his duty to defend actions in which the state is interested do not constitute enforcement of the statute in question (C) holding that the timing of the alleged actions of the prosecutor supported the courts conclusion that the prosecutors actions were associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process instead of the investigatory phase because the conduct occurred one month before plaintiffs trial and more than five years after the grand jury indicted plaintiff (D) holding that shelley does not support the conclusion that mere availability of the courts means that the actions of the individuals with respect to the contract in question involve state action (E) holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury
answer:

(D)