In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: officer was not acting in the lawful discharge of his official duties when he commanded Green to come speak with him. See generally Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. 656, 658 (1) (727 SE2d 257) (2012) (describing circumstances in which a citizen may walk or even run from a law enforcement officer). By expressly challenging whether the officer was lawfully discharging his official duties in their encounter, Green implicitly challenged his own knowledge that the officer’s commands to him were lawful. Indeed, Green’s counsel argued at trial that, because the officer made no lawful commands to Green, the state could not show that Green had the knowledge required by the statute for the offense of misdemeanor obstruction. See Thomas v. State, 322 Ga. App. 734, 738 (2) (b) (746 SE2d 216) (2013) (<HOLDING>); Gibson v. State, 265 Ga. App. 325, 328 (593 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a capital defendant is mentally competent to abandon any and all challenges to his or her death sentence including appeals state postconviction collateral review and federal habeas corpus if he or she has the mental capacity to understand the choice between life and death and to make a knowing and intelligent decision not to pursue further remedies (B) holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right (C) holding that defendants disobedience cannot have been knowing and wilful if officer has not made clear to defendant that he or she was compelled to obey (D) holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority (E) holding that a person has standing to bring suit under the civil rights act if she or he can show that she or he was punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: (3) the de fendant’s culpability in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled person. See Securities & Exchange Com’n v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir.1996). First, as the Court has found, plaintiffs have failed properly to plead a violation of the 1934 Act. Second, as we also have noted, plaintiffs have failed properly to allege scienter and/or culpability on the part of “Merrill Lynch.” Even had we found a properly pled violation of the 1934 Act, we would not automatically impute this violation to “Merrill Lynch” as a controlling entity. See Baesa, 969 F.Supp. at 242 (“[T]he law in this circuit is clear that a subsidiary’s fraud cannot be automatically imputed to its corporate parent.”). See also Chill v. General Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Novak, 997 F.Supp. at 435. Finally the Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper (B) holding that district court has the power to decide what portion of subsidiarys income should be reallocated to its parent (C) holding that a parent company would at the very least have to have been deliberately blind to its subsidiarys fraud in order to have the requisite scienter (D) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible (E) holding that a subsidiarys contacts can be imputed for purposes of service of process where a parent uses the subsidiary to do what it otherwise would have done itself 

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: clauses resulted in actual prejudice. 463 N.E.2d 257, 265-66 (Ind.1984). When an insured fails to provide its insurer with timely notice of an occurrence, we apply a two-part test. First, we inquire whether the insured notified the insurer within a reasonable amount of timé. Second, we determine whether the insurer suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. If notice was not tendered in a reasonable amount of time, there is a rebuttable presumption that the insurer was prejudiced. Id. at 266. Other jurisdictions have held that an insured can rebut this presumption of prejudice regarding late notice by showing that the insurance company would have denied coverage on unrelated grounds even if the notice had been timely. In Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Bradley C d 842, 851 (N.D.Ill.2000) (<HOLDING>); Strickler v. Huffine, 421 Pa.Super. 463, 618 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage (B) holding that when an insurer denies coverage on grounds unrelated to late notice a strong presumption arises that the insurer has not suffered prejudice from the late notice (C) holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage (D) holding that in light of evidence that the insurer would have denied coverage even if it had received suit papers on a timely basis the insurer could not show prejudice (E) holding that an insurer will not be estopped from denying coverage merely because the underlying case proceeds to judgment before the declaratory judgment action is resolved


Output: (A)