instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
include the element that elevates the crime to a higher level.” As we noted in State v. Bean, 153 N.H. 380 (2006), “[i]n Glanville, the State, although not required to do so under Johnson, attempted to charge the defendant with a specific variant of the crime allegedly attempted, but failed to accurately set forth that variant in the indictment.” Bean, 153 N.H. at 384; see Johnson, 144 N.H. at 178. Indeed, Glanville recognized that all that was required “[t]o charge the defendant with attempted armed robbery, class A felony, [was for] the indictment ... to allege that the defendant (1) with a purpose to commit armed robbery, (2) committed acts constituting a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” Glanville, 145 N.H. at 634 (emphasis added); cf. Casanova, 164 N.H. at 566 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the indictment in this case 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because statutory variants of an underlying crime are not elements of an attempt to commit the underlying crime jurors are not required to unanimously find which specific statutory variant the defendant intended to commit it is sufficient that they unanimously conclude that the defendant intended to commit any of the applicable statutory variants (B) holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred (C) holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways (D) recognizing that entrapment is a statutory defense rooted in the notion that congress could not have intended to criminally punish those who commit elements of crime but are induced by the government to commit the acts and that outrageous conduct defense is rooted in constitutional law (E) holding that an individual cannot attempt to commit murder of the second or third degree because the crime of attempt is a specific intent crime and an attempt to commit second or third degree murder would require proof that the individual intended to perpetrate an unintentional killing which is logically impossible
answer:
holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred


question:
55(c) motion on or before August 22, 2012, the 90th day after it was filed, that motion was denied by operation of law on that date, which denial terminated the trial court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v. Lenoir, 5 So.3d 1282, 1283 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (“The trial court loses jurisdiction to consider [a postjudgment] motion after the expiration of the 90-day period.”). Because its jurisdiction terminated on August 22, 2012, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the November 16, 2012, order purporting to set aside the default judgment against Thurmond; the March 16, 2013, order purporting to deny Thurmond’s summary-judgment motion; and the April 16, 2013, order purporting to enter a summary judgment in favor of Parrish. See Sibley v. Sibley, 90 So.3d 191, 193 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (<HOLDING>). A judgment entered by a trial court lacking 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void (B) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (C) holding trial court order which purportedly corrected divorce decree to alter marital property division was void because it was entered  after this court obtained jurisdiction (D) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (E) holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief
answer:
holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void


question:
Dismissal of Ogden Teck’s potentially meritorious cross-claim against Terrazzo serves no one’s interest but Terrazzo’s. Terrazzo’s discovery rights are simply not the discovery rights that the trial court was properly protecting by imposing the sanction in this case, and it was an abuse of the court’s discretion to attempt to do so in this instance. In essence, Terrazzo received a windfall due to the over-breadth of the trial court’s sanction, because Terrazzo was wholly removed from the instant discovery dispute. The trial court failed to aim its sanction at the specific misconduct of Ogden Teck, and in so doing, ran afoul of the requirement that the sanction imposed be reasonable — comprehensive, yet not overly broad. See Downey v. Dixon, 294 S.C. 42, 362 S.E.2d 317 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the sanction imposed in this case is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court erred by giving a misleading instruction (B) holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim (C) holding that the trial court erred by imposing a sanction that was too lenient to adequately serve to protect the rules (D) holding that trial court erred by imposing sanctions against attorney without notice and hearing but error was cured by attorneys subsequent challenge to sanctions (E) holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss
answer:

holding that the trial court erred by giving a misleading instruction