In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 26 Ariz.App. 265, 270-71, 547 P.2d 1065, 1070-71 (1976), which held that a party is precluded from raising for the first time on appeal the trial court’s failure to make findings when specifically required to do so by Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 179 Ariz. at 301, 878 P.2d at 657. Accordingly, I perceive that Trantor’s waiver rule applies with as much vigor to statutes or rules that specifically require findings as it does when the requirement is imposed by case law. Cf. Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252, 256, ¶ 17, 69 P.3d 23, 27 (2003) (“Once published, our interpretation [of a statute] becomes part of the statute.”); Local 266, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, A.F. of L. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 43, 275 P.2d 393, 402 (1954) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 31 One further point. Because my colleagues 
 Holding statements: (A) holding principle of statutory construction is to give effect to every clause and word of a statute (B) holding that the courts in the absence of ambiguity should as a general rule confine themselves to a construction of a statute as written and not attempt under the guise of construction to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute or to insert exceptions not made by the legislature (C) recognizing rule of statutory construction that statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect if it can be done by any reasonable construction (D) recognizing that unreversed statutory construction is to be held part of the statute as if originally so written (E) holding that the term shall is mandatory for purposes of statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous

A: (D)
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Q: evidence suggesting that each of the hotel stays involved the same individual, (e.g., the perpetrator gave the same fictitious address and/or fictitious telephone number; tips on credit card vouchers were in such amounts that the totals rounded off to even dollar amounts, the perpetrator departed prior to the scheduled end of his stay without checking out). “Evidence of this kind may be sufficient alone to establish a perpetrator’s identity. See United States v. Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518, 524-25 (3d Cir.1979) (finding similar modus operandi evidence probative of identity); 2 Jack B. Wein-stein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 404[16] (1992) (discussing "signature” evidence in context of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)).” See also Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Evidence of individual modus operandi may be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of testimony which denominated appellants modus operandi in previously uncharged and charged crimes was not clearly erroneous (B) holding that rule 404b evidence is probative of intent only when the prior acts were part of the same scheme or involved a similar modus operandi as the present offense (C) holding that prior con victions are not related simply because the crimes used the same modus operandi were part of a crime spree or shared the same motive (D) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (E) holding other crimes evidence was properly admitted to establish modus operandi when the defendant attacked older women as they exited their garages in the same area of chicago

A: (A)
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Q: and after the transfer between the sons. The transfer-of-shares agreement cannot be considered a contract by Joe Sr. to transfer four shares of stock to Joe Jr. because it does not meet the basic requirements for a contract: it states no action or forbearance by Joe Sr. in return for an action or forbearance by Joe Jr. Compare § 7-8-319, Ala. Code 1975, the former “Statute of Frauds” for securities transactions, that, at the time relevant here, required, in a contract for the sale of securities, a writing “signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought ... sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price.” (Emphasis added.) See DeVito v. Sheeran, 165 N.J. 167, 189, 755 A.2d 1147, 1160 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Although Joe Sr.’s signature on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unconscionable a disclaimer of warranties under the uniform commercial code where there was allocation of commercial risks in a socially or economically unreasonable manner (B) recognizing the purpose of a uniform statewide building code (C) holding that a memorandum referring to the allocation of stock ownership did not satisfy  8319 of the uniform commercial code (D) holding that the uniform commercial code specifically encompassed a software licensing agreement (E) holding that the hospital was fraudulently joined because it did not meet the definition of seller as defined by mississippis product liability statute or under the uniform commercial code

A:
(C)
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