In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

20 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 24(b) ("Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.... In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."). [ 21] 21. State v. Weidner, 684 P.2d 103, 113 (Alaska 1984) (adopting four-part test from Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1324-25 (D.C.Cir.1981)). 22 . Harvey v. Cook, 172 P.3d 794, 799 (Alaska 2007). [23] 23. Scammon Bay Ass'n v. Ulak, 126 P.3d 138, 143 (Alaska 2005) (citing Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227, 1231 (Ist Cir.1992)); see also Kirk v. Demientieff, 145 P.3d 512, 520 (Alaska 2006) (<HOLDING>). 24 . Ulak, 126 P.3d at 143. 25 . AOIC's May 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (B) holding that a law firm could intervene in a former clients action to protect its interest in its contingency fee (C) holding attorneys motion to intervene in former clients tort suit untimely because attorney had clear and early notice that former client would not adequately represent his interests (D) holding that ambiguous agreement between attorney and client must be construed in the clients favor (E) holding that presumption of access to and knowledge of confidential information between attorney and former client notwithstanding attorneys declarations to the contrary may not be rebutted
(C)

appropriate relief for such a violation is for the habeas court to “vacate the judgment of conviction and enter a new judgment from which an appeal can be taken.” Id. Defendant argues that the Peak line of eases applies to his situation, and that his appellate rights should thus be reinstated. However, the Peak rule does not apply in defendant’s ease, as the appeal at issue is not an appeal from a conviction. A Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach to an appeal from a supervised release revocation hearing. Borrego v. United States, 975 F.Supp. 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y.1997). This follows logically from the fact that there is no guaranteed constitutional right to counsel at the supervised release revocation hearing itself. See United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel (D) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (E) holding that most of the fundamental constitutional procedural protections that are normally applicable to a criminal prosecution are not required for supervisedrelease proceedings as a matter of constitutional law including a right to counsel
(E)

special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment. State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 277, 694 P.2d 922, 925 (1985) (quoting State v. Lujan, 76 N.M. 111, 117, 412 P.2d 405, 408 (1966) (in turn quoting Blevins, 40 N.M. at 368, 60 P.2d at 209)). 27. Other jurisdictions have held that the enactment of a comprehensive motor vehicle code shows a legislative intent to preempt the field. In State v. Davidson, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that with the passage of the motor vehicle code, the legislature “intended to cover the whole field and subject matter of the operation of motor vehicles, including definitions of the several offenses growing out 215 (1960) (<HOLDING>). 28. In addition to the case law from this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that vehicular homicide involving criminal negligence is not a crime of violence under begay (B) holding that the older more general manslaughter statute is preempted by the vehicular homicide statute (C) holding that under the particular facts alleged in the indictment vehicular homicide was a lesser offense included in the murder charge (D) holding that the state must prove criminal negligence for its homicide by vehicle statute even though the statute specifically states that any traffic violation is sufficient (E) holding that dwi manslaughter and vehicular homicide are different forms of the same offense

(B)