In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 207-08 (2d Cir.2007); see also United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir.2008). In fact we identify no error in this case, plain or otherwise, because the district court’s statement that it had “look[ed] at the relevant conduct, what happened with the fellow you got $250,000 from,” and its statement that it had reviewed the Pre-sentence Report (“PSR”) and “adopt[ed] the factual information that’s contained” therein, are reasonably construed as an explicit adoption of the PSR’s detailed explanation for why Patterson’s conduct causing a $250,000 loss to a California victim was fraudulent and qualified as relevant to the crime of conviction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3(a)(2). See generally United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 539 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). We further conclude that the adopted PSR 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts adoption of the presentence report constitutes sufficient findings (B) holding that factual findings set forth in the psi not objected to by a defendant are deemed admitted (C) holding that a district court satisfies its obligation to make factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report (D) holding that express adoption of factual findings in presentence report is sufficient (E) holding that this court will only set aside district courts factual findings when they are clearly erroneous
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: includes a determination of the significance, if any, of the TNRC’s involvement. When the EPA in 1990 shifted from a “strict” to “substantial compliance” standard for private parties, it did so “to encourage private parties to perform voluntary cleanups of sites, and to remove unnecessary obstacles to their ability to recover their costs from the parties that are liable for the contamination.” 55 FecLReg. at 8792-93. The EPA expressly recognized that requiring private parties to adhere to a set of mechanical rules would impede this objective. Thus the list of public comment provisions identified in 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(6) is only a “universe of requirements which are potentially relevant,” and should “not be c Ry. Co. v. Gee Co., 2002 WL 31163777, at *30 (N.D.Ill. Sept.30, 2002) (<HOLDING>); AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Amcast Int’l Corp., 177 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that government involvement must be accompanied by public comment because a purpose of ncp is to ensure that those responsible for the cleanup receive citizens input regarding environmental conditions in the community (B) holding that public participation requirement was satisfied in part because the ncp policy is  to allow potentially responsible parties an opportunity to comment before costs are incurred and no prps were denied an opportunity to comment (C) holding five day public comment period on a portion of an ea insufficient remanding for further public comment (D) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail (E) holding that meetings with representatives of various affected parties were insufficient to meet public participation requirement because there was never an opportunity for the public at large to comment on the plan without explaining why such opportunity was necessary
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: 863 (Alaska App.2006). [34] 34. Crawford, 100 P.3d at 441 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11, 105 S.Ct. at 1294) (alteration in. Crawford). 35 . Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311, 105 S.Ct. at 1294 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)). 36 . 903 P.2d 1090 (Alaska App.1995). [37] 37. Id. at 1098 (citations omitted). 38 . Id. at 1099 n. 4 (citing United States v. Knight, 395 F.2d 971, 975 (2nd Cir.1968)). 39 . Id. at 1098. 40 . See Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275, 279-80 & n. 13 (Alaska 1978); Longley v. State, 776 P.2d 339, 343-44 (Alaska App.1989). 41 . See Munson v. State, 123 P.3d 1042, 1048 (Alaska 2005) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994)). 42 . See Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2259-60 (<HOLDING>); State v. Bailey, 714 S.W.2d 590, 593 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that davis was concerned only with the right to counsel and not the right to remain silent (B) holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously (C) holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously (D) holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent (E) holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent
[EX A]:
(E)