In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: rule may be outdated, we have also recognized that “it is uniquely a province of the legislature to change it.” Reiter v. Yellowstone County (1981), Mont., 627 P.2d 845, 849, 38 St.Rep. 686, 690. In Reiter, we noted that because of the operation of section 39-2-503, MCA, the at-will employee was not employed on a “discharge for cause only” basis. We stated, “assuming arguendo that appellant had an implied contract with an implied covenant of good faith, the employer did not act in bad faith because its conduct was statutorily permissible.” 627 P.2d at 849-850, 38 St.Rep. at 690. In other words, under section 39-2-503, MCA, an employer or employee could terminate employment for any or all reasons, provided the reasons or manner of termination did not 7), 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (<HOLDING>); and Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. (1974), 114 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a contract action when employee terminated in order not to receive earned bonuses or commissions (B) holding employee not terminated in bad faith because no evidence suggested that employer discharged employee in order to retain em ployees previously earned sales commissions (C) recognizing contract action and limiting damages to those for breach of contract when employee terminated for refusal to date foreman (D) holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee (E) recognizing a tort action for wrongful discharge when employee was terminated because he refused to commit a criminal act
[EX A]: holding employee not terminated in bad faith because no evidence suggested that employer discharged employee in order to retain em ployees previously earned sales commissions

[EX Q]: protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir.2005). The First Amendment guarantees a prisoner a right to seek redress of grievances from prison authorities and as well as a right of meaningful access to the courts. Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.1995); see also Hasan v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 400 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir.2005) (“Prisoners’ grievances, unless frivolous ..., concerning the conditions in which they are being confined are deemed petitions for redress of grievances and thus are protected by the First Amendment.”); Wolfel v. Bates, 707 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Jones’s complaints of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing first amendment retaliation right (B) holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners grievances (C) recognizing that prisoners undoubtedly exercise first amendment petition right when filing grievances and stating that prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for filing grievances (D) holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials (E) recognizing prisoners first amendment right to eom plain to prison officials about discrimination
[EX A]: recognizing first amendment retaliation right

[EX Q]: meaning of our statute! ] is a question of fact which must be proved or disproved by the evidence in each case.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Clark v. State, 169 Ga. App. (4) (61 SE 917) (1908) (analyzing the nature of “public places” and holding that “while a town guardhouse may be made a public place by an assemblage of persons there, it is not primarily nor per se such a place” in context of prohibited liquor sales). 8 OCGA § 16-6-8 (d) (emphasis supplied); see Ga. L. 1996, pp. 312-13, § 1; see also Minor v. State, 232 Ga. App. 246, 246 (1) (501 SE2d 576) (1998) (“Correctional institutions are public places within the meaning of the public indecency statute.” (citing OCGA § 16-6-8 (d))). 9 See Berry v. City of East Point, 277 Ga. App. 649, 654 (6) (c) (627 SE2d 391) (2006) (<HOLDING>); see also United Savings Ass’n of Tex. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that laterenacted provision governed over earlierenacted provision and that a specific statute will prevail over a general statute absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent to resolve any inconsistency between them citation and punctuation omitted (B) holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision (C) holding that a specific statutory provision prevails over a more general one (D) recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one (E) holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter
[EX A]:
holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision