In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: in a 3-2 decision does not settle the intent issue, because Honkanen did not consider the difference between intent to injure or inflict pain and intent to correct. Additionally, Honkanen’s rationale may be outdated in light of the 2001 amendments to NRS 48.061, which expand the use of bad-act evidence in domestic violence cases, 2001 Nev. Stat., ch. 360, § 1, at 169; see NRS 33.018(1)(a) (defining “domestic violence” to include battery on an accused’s minor child), and Bigpond, which recognizes that character evidence can be admissible so long as it has a credible, non- propensity purpose, such as explaining the relationship dynamics between a domestic-violence victim and the accused. 128 Nev. at 111, 270 P.3d at 1246; see also Harris v. State, 195 P.3d 161, 182 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Cherry, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper (B) holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence (C) recognizing that the holding in harvey v state 604 p2d 586 590 alaska 1979 a case similar to honkanen had been abrogated by the amendment of alaskas rule 404b to allow admission of prior incidents of domestic violence as an exception to the general rule against admitting such evidence (D) recognizing general rule (E) recognizing this as the general rule
Example Output: holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper

Example Input: and sold it to nonre-latives. We conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the property is marital. The form of the transaction, while not dispositive, is compelling in the instant case because of Klem’s knowledge of, and experience with, joint tenancies. Klem was fully aware of how joint tenancies operated. As the husband of Hazel, he became the sole owner of Hazel’s family property as a surviving joint tenant, a fact he acknowledged during his deposition. Subsequent to his sole ownership of the property, he knowingly deeded the property to Larry and Colleen as joint tenants. In so doing, he gave both parties an interest in the property. See Melina v. Melina, 411 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Minn.App.1987); Erdahl v. Erdahl, 384 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Finally, also indicative of the donor’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that devise of real estate to one spouse was nonmarital and noting that had testator intended such property to be devised as marital property he could have designated appellant as a joint tenant (C) holding money received from inheritance as nonmarital property presumptively became marital property when placed in joint account under arkansas law (D) holding that transferring joint property into one partys name for estate planning purposes does not convert marital property into nonmarital property (E) holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property
Example Output: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate

Example Input: differs. This is contrary to the TAA’s plain language as well as its mandate — that we construe it “to effect its purpose and make uniform the construction of other states’ law applicable to an arbitration.” Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code § 171.003 (emphasis added); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.028 (“A uniform act included in a code shall be construed to effect its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it.”). Texas, not federal, law governs this case, and that law is clear: a party may not appeal an order that grants rehearing. V. Section 171.098(a)(5) is uniformly interpreted to prohibit appeals when a rehearing is granted. The concurrence also argues that “subsection (5) allows an appeal when a re ., P.A., 34 Kan.App.2d 340, 118 P.3d 704, 706-08 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Crack Team, 128 S.W.3d at 583 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable (B) holding that there can be only one final appealable order (C) holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable (D) holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action (E) holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable
Example Output:
holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable