In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: and so require an interpretive step to determine the expressive elements of these processes. However, neither the Supreme Court nor our court has ever drawn a distinction between the process of creating a form of pure speech (such as writing or painting) and the product of these processes (the essay or the artwork) in terms of the First Amendment protection afforded. Although writing and painting can be reduced to their constituent acts, and thus described as conduct, we have not attempted to disconnect the end product from the act of creation. Thus, we have not drawn a hard line between the essays John Peter Zenger published and the act of setting the type. Cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983) (<HOLDING>). The process of expression through a medium 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dating is a type of association protected by the first amendment (B) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (C) holding first amendment claim requires actual protected conduct (D) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (E) holding that a tax on ink and paper burdens rights protected by the first amendment
[A]: (E)


[Q]: right to additional BLM permits or approvals. See, e.g., Lewis v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 673, 676-77 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992, 91 S.Ct. 456, 27 L.Ed. 2d 440 (1971); Angelina Holly Corp. v. Clark, 587 F.Supp. 1152, 1156 (D.D.C.1984). They hold no more than an expectancy, the loss of which does not constitute a deprivation of property within the meaning of the due process clause of the Constitution. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161, 101 S.Ct. 446, 451, 66 L.Ed.2d 358 (1980); National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 549 F.2d 822, 828 (D.C.Cir.1977). Their absence from the lawsuit does not preclude the district court from issuing the preliminary injunction. Compare Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). C. Exhaustion Mountain States asserts that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction (B) holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) recognizing the inappropriateness of a preliminary injunction where credibility determinations must be made but granting a preliminary injunction because the legal and factual issues have been sufficiently illuminated (E) holding that contract with construction company rendered inequitable a preliminary injunction restraining the contractors from performing the contractual obligations
[A]: (E)


[Q]: in its wake that have essentially obliterated the mandatory minimum sentencing framework in our Commonwealth. In Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held that any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime must be regarded as an element of the offense, and found beyond a reasonable doubt by the fact-finder. See Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2163. After Alleyne, various mandatory minimum sentencing statutes have been held by this Court to be unconstitutional because they contain a non-severable, ‘proof at sentencing1 subsection stating that the “[t]he provisions of [the statute] shall not be an element of the crime[,]” and that “the applicability of [the statute] shall be determined at sentencing ... by a preponderance of the evidence.” See, e.g., Newman, 99 A,3d at 90, 101-102 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, in Hopkins, our Supreme Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 42 pacs  9712 and 9713 are unconstitutional (B) holding that the proof at sentencing1 provision contained in 42 pacs  97121 is unconstitutional in light of alleyne and is not severable from the remainder of the statute (C) holding boards unconstitutional regulations severable from remainder (D) holding that 18 pacs  6317b is unconstitutional (E) holding that an arbitration provision that waived class actions and thus required the consumer to pay a 125 fee to vindicate a 150 claim was substantively unconscionable but also holding that the waiver provision was severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision which would be enforced
[A]:
(B)