In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: California state prisoner, Roy Lee Brown, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand. Brown contends that his § 2254 petition was timely filed because his state habeas petitions statutorilly tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Brown is entitled to tolling during the time he was seeking one full round of collateral review by the California courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Delhomme v. Ramirez, No. 00-56148, 2003 WL 21947183, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed (B) holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice (C) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (D) holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review (E) holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review

Output: holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed


Input: Consider Input: removed. Section 141(b) does not contemplate that a director’s term could end through board shrinkage. A bylaw that seeks to achieve this result conflicts with Section 141(b) and is void. This interpretation of Section 141(b) comports with how our law has developed. Under the common law, “the voluntary assumption of management responsibility by the directors carried with it a concomitant vested right to serve out the full term for which they were elected unless there was cause for removal....” Drexler, supra, § 13.01, at 13-2; see Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del.Ch.1988) (“At common law a director had a vested right in his position arising from his duties and responsibilities to the corporation.”); see also Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857 (Del.Ch.1957) (Seitz, C.) (<HOLDING>). “Prior to 1967, the [DGCL] was silent as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders (B) recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause (C) recognizing common law privileges (D) recognizing the presidents authority to remove sec members for good cause despite governing statutes silence (E) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary

Output: holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders


Input: Consider Input: 334 F.3d 528, 538-39 (6th Cir.2003) (also noting that “[t]he wholly irrational standard is described in terms of extreme arbitrariness”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To show “discriminatory” conduct sufficient to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation, a plaintiff must present “substantial evidence of ... intentional, severe” discrimination that is “unrelated to legitimate union objectives.” Amalgamated Ass’n of Street Elec. Ry , 457 (2d Cir.1979) (noting that “it was almost inevitable that the union’s drawing of a line would hurt someone” and “although it is unfortunate that ... the ultimate harm fell on appellants, drawing the line elsewhere would ... have caused harm to others”); Forte v. Warehouse Employees Local 169, 2000 WL 377698, *3 (E.D.Pa.) (<HOLDING>); see also Ratkosky, supra, 843 F.2d at 878-79 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sixmonth limitations period established in delcostello applies to a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation brought only against a union (B) holding that sixmonth duty of fair representation statute of limitations applicable to claim alleging breach of union contract (C) holding that union did not breach its duty of fair representation when it accepted a contract that provided severance pay for some active workers but not for laid off workers who were recalled (D) holding that unions interpretation of a contractual provision necessarily favorfing some workers over others did not violate the duty of fair representation (E) holding that severance pay policy was part of employment contract


Output: holding that sixmonth limitations period established in delcostello applies to a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation brought only against a union