In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

subpoena does not fit within the statutory language. The question surrounding the subpoena’s validity in no way relates to any information that Star Bank would be required to disclose under FCRA, even assuming that FCRA’s requirements apply to Star Bank. {See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) for the definition of a “consumer reporting agency.”) The Hahns’ claimed reliance on whatever Bonynge said regarding the subpoena therefore provides them with no basis to toll the two year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Hahns have failed to demonstrate that the wilful misrepresentation tolling exception applies to their case. We therefore hold that all of their claims raised under FCRA are barred by the statute of limitations. See Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We find no inequity in reaching this result. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim (B) holding that equitable tolling is available to avoid time limitations in the statutory provisions governing veterans benefits (C) holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims (D) holding that an ohio tolling statute violated the commerce clause because it gave nonresident corporations the choice between being subject to general jurisdiction in the state by appointing an instate agent for service of process or being subject to a tolling of the statute of limitations on claims against them (E) holding that a plaintiff must fit within the precise wording of the tolling exception to avoid being barred by fcras statute of limitations provision
holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim

be dismissed even if a minute entry is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 4(c), because the trial court judge did not sign the minutes as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-106. We disagree. The only page from the trial court minutes for August 28, 2006, that was filed with this Court was the page that included the entry regarding the defendant’s case. While it is true that the particular page of the minutes extracted to supplement the appellate record does not bear the signature of the trial court judge, there is no proof that the judge did not sign the minutes on a subsequent page not included in the record before us, and we presume that the minutes were signed as required by section 16-1-106. See Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1937) (<HOLDING>) There is no proof in the record that rebuts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body (B) holding that although a corporate officer is not presumed to be personally liable for corporate debts the officer may expressly bind himself or herself to be answerable for such debts (C) holding that even in absence of proof that chancellor signed court minutes it must be presumed that he did so and noting that ejvery officer is presumed to have performed his duty (D) holding it immaterial that one charged with willfully selling unregistered securities had no actual knowledge that he was violating the law because he was presumed to have and is chargeable with knowledge of the laws under which he was undertaking to do business (E) holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it
holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body

removed. Section 141(b) does not contemplate that a director’s term could end through board shrinkage. A bylaw that seeks to achieve this result conflicts with Section 141(b) and is void. This interpretation of Section 141(b) comports with how our law has developed. Under the common law, “the voluntary assumption of management responsibility by the directors carried with it a concomitant vested right to serve out the full term for which they were elected unless there was cause for removal....” Drexler, supra, § 13.01, at 13-2; see Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del.Ch.1988) (“At common law a director had a vested right in his position arising from his duties and responsibilities to the corporation.”); see also Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857 (Del.Ch.1957) (Seitz, C.) (<HOLDING>). “Prior to 1967, the [DGCL] was silent as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders (B) recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause (C) recognizing common law privileges (D) recognizing the presidents authority to remove sec members for good cause despite governing statutes silence (E) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary

holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders