In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

commencing an action will be assumed to have waived its right to arbitration when its use of the judicial process is clearly inconsistent with seeking arbitration at a later date.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying this law, Judge Weinstein' concluded that choosing to file a claim in court rather than arbitrate constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate. Id. (citing Digitronics Inventioneering Corp. v. Jameson, 52 A.D.3d 1099, 860 N.Y.S.2d 303 (3d Dep’t 2008)). I agree with Judge Weinstein’s well-reasoned decision that, if New York law applies, the decision to litigate disputes over unpaid claims in state court precludes Defendants from now seeking to compel arbitration with respect to those same claims. But see Grand Med. Supply, 2012 WL 2577577, at *2 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, I would reach the same result even 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context fall under the faa (B) holding that the framework for determining any disputed issues concerning arbitration must be determined in the context of the faa (C) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (D) holding that faa was inapplicable where parties involved in action are not parties to an arbitration agreement under which issues are referable to arbitration (E) holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed
holding that mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context fall under the faa

This Court has reviewed these decisions and is in agreement with their reasoning and conclusions that the public policy exception does not give rise to a protected property interest in continued employment in this case. Likewise, the implied covenant is not the source of a protected property interest. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to at-will employment and affords an employee the right to be dealt with fairly and in good faith. See Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 191 P.3d 205, 213-14 (2008). Breach of the covenant may give rise to an action for wrongful termination but it does not convert at-will employment to term employment nor form the basis for a protected property interest. See Hollister v. Forsythe, 22 F.3d 950, 952-52 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate (B) recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract (C) holding an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was insufficient to create a property interest in continued employment under montanas statutory scheme for at will employment (D) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (E) recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages
recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate

at 1560 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Wise relies on Marttila v. City of Lynchburg, 33 Va.App. 592, 535 S.E.2d 693 (2000), in support of his assertion. In Marttila, the appellant challenged his conviction under Code § 18.2-16, Virginia’s breach of peace statute, which criminalizes “fighting words.” 33 Va.App. at 598, 535 S.E.2d at 698. We recognized that when confronted with an individual’s use of “fighting words,” police officers were required to exercise “greater restraint in their responses than the average citizen.” Id. at 600, 535 S.E.2d at 697. Code § 18.2-460(C) aims, however, to protect the integrity of the legal process, not any individual personally. Whether a speaker’s words would provoke a law enfo , 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1104, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3, 69 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a georgia statute that criminalized using opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of peace unconstitutional because first amendment protections forbid the states to punish the use of words or language not within narrowly limited classes of speech  (B) holding that under chaplinsky any statute punishing or regulating the use of abusive language must be limited to fighting words (C) holding unconstitutional a statute barring the use of opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace (D) holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language (E) holding unconstitutionally broad a statute prohibiting the use of opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty

holding a georgia statute that criminalized using opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of peace unconstitutional because first amendment protections forbid the states to punish the use of words or language not within narrowly limited classes of speech