In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: [u]nder [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(l)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, ... a federal habeas [corpus] court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Applying these standards to the present case, the court’s inquiry must be whether the uit Court of Appeals case for the proposition that the application of a statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does not violate the ex post facto clause because it is a protective measure and does not impose any new or different punishment. See United States v. O’Neal (“O’Neal”), 180 F.3d 115, 124-25 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (criticizing Davis). Additionally, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding north carolina felony firearms act did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was a measured public safety provision and its applicability to previously convicted felons was eminently reasonable (D) holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive (E) holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause
[A]: holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause


[Q]: on the conditions stated in the publicly-filed limited partnership certificate. We affirm the appellants’ liability under § 106(l)(b). The certificates of limited partnership for TSG, TMG, and TSG 80 all state that, if necessary to satisfy the partnership’s recourse obligations, each limited partner has agreed, upon demand, to make an additional capital contribution of up to three times the limited partner’s original investment. These certificates were recorded publicly in New York County. Accordingly, the capital of the Limited Partnerships upon which creditors properly could rely included the limited partners’ stated ob ligation to make additional capital contributions. See Arno Management Corp. v. 115 East 69th Assocs., 173 A.D.2d 258, 260, 569 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (1st Dept.1991) (<HOLDING>). Section 106(l)(b) explicitly provides a means 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that limited partner does not have standing to sue for injuries to partnership that merely diminish value of that partners interest (B) holding that appellate jurisdiction is limited to the issues contained in the certificate of appealability (C) recognizing partnership by estoppel only with respect to claims by persons who have reasonably relied upon outward representations of partnership (D) recognizing that same principle applies where defendant is general partner of limited partnership which in turn is general partner of limited partnership with contacts with state (E) holding that the information contained in the certificate of limited partnership binds the partnership and the partners with respect to third parties
[A]: holding that limited partner does not have standing to sue for injuries to partnership that merely diminish value of that partners interest


[Q]: Nogueira’s own testimony, that, as required under § 3B1.4, Gerald took multiple affirmative acts to involve No-gueira in the crime, such that Nogueira’s involvement was directly foreseeable to Gerald. See id. at 1288 (emphasizing foreseeability). Specifically, Gerald used and directed Nogueira to schedule the meetings at the church, pass out information to the applicants, translate for her during multiple meetings at Bethel Christian Church, complete falsified residency letters (including translated letters), and arrange meetings. Gerald also paid No-gueira $100 to create a flyer that promoted Gerald’s “immigration consulting” services and provided Gerald’s contact information. Nogueira helped Gerald in her scheme and was not merely present during the offense. Taber, 497 F.3d at 1181 (<HOLDING>). Certainly, Nogueira’s actions furthered 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants affirmative acts of driving minor to robbery helping minor enter the building and serving as a lookout for the minor warranted sentencing enhancement (B) holding that the new york misdemeanor offense of sexual abuse of a minor constitutes an aggravated felony under ina  101a43asexual abuse of a minor (C) holding that reasonable attorneys fees for the benefit of a minor in defending the minor against a criminal charge were necessaries (D) holding that because minor defendant was mandatorily sentenced to life imprisonment without parole and because his case was still pending on direct appeal when miller was released the minor defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing (E) holding that an enhancement for distribution of child pornography to a minor was improper because the pornographic materials at issue were transmitted to an undercover law enforcement officer who was not a minor
[A]:
holding that the new york misdemeanor offense of sexual abuse of a minor constitutes an aggravated felony under ina  101a43asexual abuse of a minor