In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. Addressing the identical federal rule, the Supreme Court has stated that “[o]n its face, Rule 23.1 speaks only to the adequacy of the shareholder representatives pleadings.” Kamen, supra, 500 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 1711. The rule itself does not create a demand requirement. Id. “[T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance, not procedure.’ ” Id. at 96-97, 111 S.Ct. 1711 (quoting Daily Income Fund, supra, 464 U.S. at 543-44 & n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 831 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (other citations omitted)); see also Bazata, supra, 400 A.2d at 316 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the demand requirement or its futility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (B) holding that for purposes of super ct civ r 41b demand is not jurisdictional but an element of the shareholders claim (C) holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense (D) holding that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of super ct civ r 15a which permits a party to amend once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served (E) holding the connection is an element
[A]: (B)


[Q]: carrying it during and in relation to such a crime, with additional penalties attaching if the firearm was brandished or discharged. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Whether the defendant was accountable for one firearm or ten, however, is completely irrelevant to the commission of the § 924(c) offense. Thus, because § 924(c) pertains to particular unlawful uses of a firearm while § 2K2.1(b)(l) pertains to the number of firearms involved, these two enhancements punish different types of conduct. We therefore conclude that enhancing a defendant’s offense level based on the number of weapons involved in the offense underlying his § 924(c) conviction does not constitute impermissible double counting under the Guidelines. Accord United States v. Terrell, 608 F.3d 679, 683-84 (10th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trading drugs for a gun violates the in furtherance of prong of  924c (B) holding that evidence is sufficient for  924c conviction where it shows weapons proximity to drugs and its accessibility (C) holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a  924c sentence for the same firearm (D) holding that because the number of weapons involved in the underlying offense to a  924c conviction is a separate type of offense conduct than that punished by  924c itself the district court did not engage in doublecounting  when it applied an  increase under  2k21bla in conjunction with the sentence for violating  924c (E) holding without discussion that the district court erred by applying the numberofweapons enhancement to an offense underlying the defendants  924c conviction
[A]: (D)


[Q]: to arbitrate is not as broad and expansive as defendants contend. Although I recognize that generally agreements to arbitrate should be broadly construed to effectuate the purpose behind the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., nevertheless, the parties can only be compelled to arbitrate a dispute if in fact they agreed to do so. The necessary inquiry then is whether in fact the parties before the court agreed to arbitrate the dispute contained in this lawsuit. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (“the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so”); State of N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 90 F.3d 58, 62 (2d. Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Oldroyd v. Elmira Savings Bank, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claim was not subject to mandatory arbi tration because the parties specifically excluded it from the general arbitration clause (B) holding that whether in federal or state court a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole and not specifically to the arbitration clause within it must go to the arbitrator and not the court (C) holding that because a valid arbitration clause existed the parties had to arbitrate all disputes when the subject matter of the dispute has a reasonable relationship to the subject matter of the contract (D) holding that a mandatory arbitration clause does not preclude litigating a federal statutory claim (E) holding that the analogy to arbi tration agreement is not persuasive in part because the principal feature of an arbitration agreement is that the contracting parties agree they will not submit their controversy to a court of law in the first instance
[A]:
(A)