In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: (2013) (ex plaining the FDA’s view that “promoting a drug for an off-label use is a violation” of the FDCA’s misbranding provisions). Based on this view, the FDA has recovered millions of dollars in settlements from drug manufacturers that have engaged in off-label promotion. See, e.g., id. at 232 (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History, (Sept. 2, 2009) (trumpeting a mul-ti-billion dollar fine imposed against a drug company that promoted its drugs for uses and dosages that the FDA specifically declined to approve)). The FDA’s informal interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to some deference from courts. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944) (<HOLDING>). But courts have not always agreed with the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation (B) holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference (C) holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law (D) holding that an agencys informal interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference to the extent it has the power to persuade (E) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference
Example Output: holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation

Example Input: 2. Although the substance of the inquiry remains the same, the Supreme Court has counseled that the question whether a defendant can show a violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights “is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). With that said, we do not quarrel with the district court’s analysis on this point. Several distinguished jurists continue to use the “standing” terminology as useful shorthand. See, e.g., United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir.2004) (Selya, J.) (acknowledging after Rakas that the term “standing” “is imprecise,” but adopting the usage “[f]or simplicity’s sake”). But, regardless of terminolo 1 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). As we observe below, the conclusion that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (B) holding a person who is present at anothers home with permission simply for the purpose of consummating a business transaction does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy there (C) holding that for purposes of federal constitutional law a person does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to trash discarded outside the home (D) holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business (E) holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence
Example Output: holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells

Example Input: who agreed to purchase the property “as is” and assumed the risk of properly determining the property’s value); Isaacs v. Bishop, 249 S.W.3d 100, 110 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. denied) (suggesting the appellee was negligent for failing to read a promissory note, but still upholding rescission based on fraud by the appellant). Contrary to the Commission’s argument, the proportional responsibility of the parties to investigate does not negate a finding of misrepresentation. See Pleasant v. Bradford, 260 S.W.3d 546, 555 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. denied) (concluding that “[t]he opportunity to conduct an independent investigation of a representation, without more,” does not negate a finding of fraud); Barber v. Keeling, 204 S.W. 139, 140 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1918, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion On the record before us, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding majority shareholder liable when he used his control of the board for the malicious purpose of  preventing dividends and otherwise lowering the value  of the stock of the minority shareholders (B) holding that the director of a bank and friend of the appellee was liable for misrepresentations about the value of stock despite evidence tending to show that appellee could by an investigation have ascertained the falsity of the representations (C) holding that if the market value of an asset can be ascertained the decree should account for the change in value between the date of the decree and the timely execution of the distribution plan in the decree the distribution based on value at the distribution date (D) holding when defendant raised affirmative defense of total failure of consideration that even assuming the acquired stock became worthless the worthlessness of the stock did not constitute a failure of consideration when in exchange for note defendant received 2500 shares of stock   as well as all the rights privileges and benefits of a shareholder director and officer emphasis supplied punctuation omitted (E) holding in action for breach of contract caused by wrongful foreclosure and sale of shares of stock plaintiff was entitled to recover the fair market value of the stock at the time of its sale
Example Output:
holding majority shareholder liable when he used his control of the board for the malicious purpose of  preventing dividends and otherwise lowering the value  of the stock of the minority shareholders