In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: the necessity for government to be able to take private property for governmental purposes, see The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), that power could be exercised only by making the private property owner whole. Thus the distinction plaintiffs attempt to draw is unavailing. Analytically, whether common law-based tort and contract law is subject to statutes of limitations, with or without sovereign immunity in the case of suits against the government, is unrelated to the question of whether constitutionally based takings claims may be made subject to such statutes. Which leads to the question of the applicable law. This court hears a goodly number of takings cases. In some the plaintiff property owner prevails. See, e.g., Ciéne-ga Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unenforced tobacco regulations did not constitute a taking of vending machine owners contracts (B) holding that island owners had rights to the thread of the channel (C) holding housing statutes create no rights in tenants for purposes of section 1983 (D) holding that a cause of action for an unconstitutional taking accrues at the time the taking occurs (E) holding that statutory abrogation of lowincome housing owners contract rights was a taking

Output: holding that unenforced tobacco regulations did not constitute a taking of vending machine owners contracts


Input: Consider Input: or inferences ... based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed.R.Evid. 701(c). In other words, lay testimony must "result[] from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life” and not “from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.” Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee's note (internal quotation marks omitted). "Testimony based solely on a person’s special training or experience is properly classified as expert testimony, and therefore it is not admissible under Rule 701.” Compania Administradora v. Titan Intern’l, Inc., 533 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.2008). This includes testimony about an opinion reached during a parole officer’s investigation. See U.S. v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 216 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Cue’s testimony here does not ”result[] from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding officer could testify based on his training and experience that a defendants actions were consistent with selling cocaine (B) holding that a witness may testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue (C) holding that a law enforcement agent may not testify about an opinion reached during his investigation if the agents reasoning process depended in whole or in part on his specialized training and experience (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying an expert witness in the area of gang identity and investigation based on his training and experience (E) holding an agent from the drug enforcement agency could testify regarding the street value of cocaine where the agent was testifying regarding matters within his personal knowledge and experience as a narcotics officer

Output: holding officer could testify based on his training and experience that a defendants actions were consistent with selling cocaine


Input: Consider Input: preempts the Lacey Act to that extent. Contrary to appellants’ assertion, nothing in the Lacey Act suggests that the Magnuson Act preempts 18 U.S.C. § Cir.1983) (stating that the rule of lenity has no application to defendant’s preemption claim where “the elements required to prove the respective statutes differ so unambiguously”). IV. Accordingly, we hold that 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(I), the Magnuson Act’s criminal false statement provision, does not preempt 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the general federal criminal false statement provision. Appellants’ convictions therefore are AFFIRMED. 1 . Stated another way, appellants claim that 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(I), as applied to the facts of this case, implicitly repealed 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Cf. United States v. Herring, 916 F.2d 1543, 1547 (llth Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The interim rule originally was effective 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 18 usc  1920 the misdemeanor false statement provision of the federal employees compensation act feca preempted 18 usc  1001 because  41 of feca expressly repealed all inconsistent statutes (B) holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b (C) holding that where defendant lied to a federal magistrate performing an administrative function there was a violation of 18 usc  1001 (D) holding that good faith is a defense to the willful filing of false statements under 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001


Output: holding that 18 usc  1920 the misdemeanor false statement provision of the federal employees compensation act feca preempted 18 usc  1001 because  41 of feca expressly repealed all inconsistent statutes