In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: an insurer to await the filing of a complaint against its insured will force insurers to defend claims that are unlikely to result in a duty to indemnify. We recognize the reality of Patrons’s concerns. We conclude, however, that the rationale supporting the comparison test outweighs those concerns. See Dingwell, 414 A.2d at 227. “We have always recognized that the application of the comparison test will occasionally requ dgment action before the injured claimant filed an action against the insured. Dolley, 669 A.2d at 1321. Rather than rejecting the action on ripeness grounds, we determined the insurer’s duly to defend vel non on the basis of what the corn-plaint might have alleged, in view of the parties' stipulation. Id. at 1323. 5 . See State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d at 38 (<HOLDING>); Perreault v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 568 
 Holding statements: (A) holding insurers duty to defend is determined by allegations in the petition (B) holding that insurance company could sue in insureds name following assignment of insureds interest against tortfeasor (C) holding that an insurers duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint against the insured (D) holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss (E) holding that insureds criminal convictions were sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issue of the insureds subjective intent for purposes of evaluating the insurers duty to defend

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: claimant was injured while exiting an elevator in a parking garage which was not owned or maintained by her employer. However, the claimant’s employer instructed her to park in certain designated spaces which it leased in the garage. Because the employer leased the parking spaces from the garage operator and presumably could pressure the garage operator to keep the facility in a safe condition, Pierson held that there was “sufficient indicia of em ployer control to support the ... conclusion that the [employer] should be responsible for the effects of an injury to an employee which occurred in the garage.” 987 S.W.2d at 318. Since the claimant was utilizing a reasonable means to walk from her parking space to her employer when she fell, she zona, 142 Ariz. 501, 690 P.2d 802 (App.1984)(<HOLDING>); Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees (B) holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs (C) holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer (D) holding that an injury occurring in a parking lot which was leased but not controlled by an employer was compensable because the employer instructed its employees to park in that lot (E) holding landowner had duty to provide security in parking lot to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: to any genuine issue of material fact, and do not challenge the defendants’ exhibits and affidavits in the manner required by Rule 74.03(e). Their, quarrel is with the trial court’s application of the law. Their sole Point Relied On reads as follows: The trial court erred in summarily finding that defendants could unilaterally alter the character of the road easement from a gravel road to a concrete roadway without the consent of plaintiffs, who were co-owners of the easement, because such alteration was in violation of the road maintenance agreement, a 983) (specifically holding that the owner of a dominant estate was not precluded from subdividing property, even though the volume of traffic might increase substantially); Heigert v. Londell Manor, 834 S.W.2d 858, 868 (Mo.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). Copanas v. Loehr, 876 S.W.2d 691, 696 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that increase in vehicular traffic arising out of the subdivision of the dominant estate was reasonably foreseeable and so did not restrict the rights of the dominant owner (B) holding that an easement is not a separate estate when dominant and servient tracts are under the same ownership (C) holding that an express easement ran with the dominant estate (D) recognizing that the dominant easement owner not the servient estate owner bears responsibility for maintaining an easement (E) holding that the owner of the dominant tenement may extinguish an easement appurtenant by specifically excluding it from a conveyance of the dominant estate


Output: (A)