TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther’s theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts “a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman.” White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther’s termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, § 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law

SOLUTION: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy

PROBLEM: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

SOLUTION: holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241

PROBLEM: Lamarre challenges a judgment entered by the court ('Warren, J.) denying him post-conviction relief from his conviction of two counts of aggravated trafficking of a schedule W drug within one thousand feet of a school (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(E)(1) (2012), and two counts of violating a condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (2012). Lamarre contends that the court erred in finding that Lamarre’s trial attorney provided effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment. I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2] The facts from Lamarre’s underlying trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, may no longer be disputed. See State v. Lamarre, Mem-11-16 (Feb. 8, 2011); see also State v. Carey, 2013 ME 88, ¶ 3, 77 A.3d 471; State v. Larrivee, 481 A.2d 782, 783 (Me.1984) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 3] Gina Clark was an opiate addict with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a ruling from a prior decision of this court becomes the law of the case that cannot be challenged in a later proceeding quotation marks omitted (B) holding that a ruling of the trial court to which no error has been assigned becomes the law of the case and is not subject to review by the court of appeals (C) holding an unappealed ruling is the law of the case and cannot be later challenged (D) holding that where a ruling on a demurrer to complaint is not appealed from it becomes the law of the case (E) holding an appellate decision becomes the law of the case and is controlling on both the trial court and on any further appeals in the same case

SOLUTION:
holding that a ruling of the trial court to which no error has been assigned becomes the law of the case and is not subject to review by the court of appeals