In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. Capshaw cannot establish that his attorney’s performance was deficient for failing to object to the admission of cell phone records. His trial counsel would not have prevailed on such an objection under the governing law, and thus counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to object. It is undisputed that the government obtained a court order, under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, requiring Sprint Nextel to produce the cell phone records of Capshaw and three other people to show calls between them during the period of the murder-for-hire plot. Obtaining those telephone rec ords through a § 2703 court order did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v. Mainland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2582, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Capshaw had no reasonable expectation of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish at time warrant was issued the required nexus between the contraband to be seized which was mailed to defendants post office box and defendants home (B) holding that search warrant was constitutionally defective because it did not require notice (C) holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant (D) holding that telephone company records of calls made from a defendants home did not require the government to seek a search warrant (E) holding that consent searches do not require probable cause to justify the search of a home

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: 548 U.S. at 518, 126 S.Ct. at 2667 (Scalia, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that “compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act can be [a compelling state] interest ... [otherwise] a State could be placed in the impossible position of having to choose between compliance with § 5 and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause”). And we conclude that a plan will be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest when the race-based action taken was reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of the Act. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2490-91, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 1906, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (<HOLDING>); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (B) holding that where the claimed interest is avoidance of liability under section 2 the legislative action must at a minimum remedy the anticipated violation or achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored (C) holding that liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under  1983 where at best the plaintiff has merely claimed that the appellants were aware of alleged violation but did not take appropriate action (D) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (E) holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: we find that there is a reasonable interpretation of the statutes involved that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes. Plaintiffs cause of action is based on the Act. As such, the only limitations period applicable to her claim is the two-year statute of limitations period found in section 2 of the Act. Thus, plaintiff had two years from the date of her husband’s death to file a wrongful death action provided that plaintiffs decedent had a claim that was not time-barred at the time of his death. For purposes of determining whether plaintiffs decedent had a claim that was time-barred at the time of his death, we use the limitations period found in section 13 — 214(a), which applies to construction d 621, 628 (1989), aff’d on other grounds, 146 Ill. 2d 477 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff also finds support for her position 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute of limitations for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code applies over limitations period for malpractice actions found in section 13  212 of the code where the plaintiffs complaint was based solely on contribution act ill rev stat 1985 ch 70 par 301 et seq section 13  204 is more specific than section 13  212 (B) holding that the limitations period in section 13  214a takes precedence over the limitations period for personal injuries found in section 13  202 of the code (C) holding that limitations period in section 13  214a of the code applies over limitations period for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code because former provision is more specific (D) holding that the then twoyear statute of limitations for constructionrelated actions found in section 13  214a of the code applies over the fiveyear statute of limitations period for certain actions found in section 13  205 of the code (E) holding merck applies to section 13 of the securities act


Output: (A)