In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: erred by failing to instruct the jury that a confidential informant’s testimony must be corroborated, in conformity with article 38.141. We agree. Our holding that there was some “other evidence” to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement does not eliminate the need for an instruction. See Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (noting court “might disagree” with court of appeals’s holding that there was no evidence ten o the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the requirements of article 38.141 here, but asserts that the trial court’s error resulted in harm under the “egregious harm standard” of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (applying egregious harm analysis to unobjected-to charge error). See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632 (<HOLDING>); Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 692 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding egregious harm standard applied where appellant failed to object to lack of instruction on accomplice witness testimony (B) holding egregious harm resulted from erroneous jury instruction authorizing conviction based on legally inadequate theory (C) holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated (D) holding that where appellant failed to present either expert or lay testimony as to the appropriate standard of care to be used appellant failed to present any evidence indicating the existence of an issue of fact thus summary judgment was proper (E) holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). “The fundamental characteristic of a nonjusticiable ‘political question’ is that its adjudication would place a court in conflict with a coequal branch of government.” SCPIF, 369 S.C. at 142-43, 632 S.E.2d at 278 (citing U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393-94, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990)). Therefore, the courts will not rule on questions that are exclusively or predominantly political in nature rather than judicial. SCPIF, 369 S.C. at 143, 632 S.E.2d at 278 (citing Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948)). This Court, specifically, has declined to opine on issues where the constitution delegates authority to the Legislature. See SCPIF (<HOLDING>); cf. Stone v. Leatherman, 343 S.C. 484, 541 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question (B) holding in answer to the single question of whether power has been lawfully vested that municipal court clerks may issue warrants (C) holding that a challenge to the proper weight of the evidence is a question of fact outside this courts jurisdiction (D) holding the question of whether the jmsc properly determined residence of judicial candidate or gave proper weight to concerns regarding residency presented a nonjusticiable political question the court should decline to answer because the power to determine if a person is qualified to hold judicial office is vested with the legislature by the state constitution (E) holding the question of whether an accomplice is credible and the weight to be given to the testimony are issues for the jury to determine
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: to eehive before the administrative law judge was permissible and did not violate due process. ¶ 36 Having determined that no notice violations occurred during the Commission proceedings below, we next examine Beehive’s contention that the Commission violated separation of powers principles. 2. Separation of Powers ¶ 37 Beehive appears to argue that the Commission’s general ability as an administrative agency to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers at various stages of these proceedings violates separation of powers and due process principles. We do not address this argument in any great detail because such a combination of functions has long been upheld as consistent with due process. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975) (<HOLDING>); see also Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Pub. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deference to an agency interpretation is not appropriate where a statute is administered by more than one agency (B) recognizing the combination of functions within an agency such as prosecutorial and adjudicative without more does not violate due process by virtue of being exercised by the same agency (C) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (D) holding that administrative agency may adjudicate appeals by panels composed of other persons within the same agency who did not participate in investigative or prosecutorial capacities (E) holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process
[EX A]:
(B)