In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
hard at Whirlpool, that is not a mitigating factor. Those are things that we are expected to do, all of us. We are expected to work hard at our jobs. We are expected to be involved in our children’s lives. We are expected to be civil to the people that we work and live around. Those aren’t mitigating factor[s]. Those are what every single human being should do. The Defendant is asking for extra credit because he did it sometimes. Appellant argues that these statements misled the jury because Arkansas neither defines nor limits mitigation by statute. And, in fact, he points to decisions by this court wherein the court has held that there is no requirement that the mitigating circumstances reduce culpability for the offense. See Pickens v. State, 292 Ark. 362, 730 S.W.2d 230 (1987) (<HOLDING>). He asserts that the prosecutor’s remarks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence (B) holding that sentencing scheme that permitted a limited range of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional because the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer  not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death (C) holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded (D) holding that relevant evidence supporting a defendants theory of defense should not be excluded unless no other remedy suffices (E) holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor

Ex Output:
holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence


Ex Input:
in some respect. To me, such an approach invites municipal officials to substitute rank speculation and conjectural claptrap for genuine engineering expertise and constitutes an open invitation for local planners to engage in incompetent fear-mongering about perceived or imagined development risks, no matter how unfounded, unlikely, or controllable such risks may be. Such an open-textured standard for upholding the denial of subdivision applications will all too easily be converted into an impermeable cloak to cover confiscatory regulatory takings, official pandering to neighbors’ antidevelopment biases, political shenanigans, and other such local governmental capriciousness of the sort that we recently condemned in L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202 (R.I.1997) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the mere fact that the municipality 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (B) holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states (C) holding that 42 usc  1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations (D) holding that the petitioner property owners had established 42 usc  1983 substantive and procedural dueprocess violations against town officials who arbitrarily denied the plaintiffs request for subdivision approval (E) holding that plaintiffs had claim under 42 usc  1983 against state where state had created an intermediate care facility but placed plaintiffs on waiting list

Ex Output:
holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983


Ex Input:
brief investigatory stops. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 903-05 (1968). “An investigatory stop must be justified by ‘a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.’ ” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979)). Whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. Id. (citing U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)). The stop must be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as vie 410 S.E.2d 504, 506-08 (1991), disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 119, 414 S.E.2d 762 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Rather, the dispatch specified only that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer can stop an individual if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underfoot (B) holding officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to support traffic stop where officer received dispatch that defendant committed disorderly conduct and record check showed parked truck was registered to defendant (C) holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of an automobile where the officer received a dispatch that a black male in a black bmw with a temporary license tag was selling controlled substances and the officer observed a person in an automobile fitting that description less than one minute later (D) holding that a tip may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop (E) holding that taillight and license plate violations justify investigatory stop of automobile

Ex Output:

holding that an officer can stop an individual if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underfoot