instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. In determining the purpose of section 13-21-101, it is appropriate to look to legislative history as indicative of the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Willer, 817 P.2d at 519-20. The 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101 created the distinction between judgments which the judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal. The General Assembly intended that the amendment, and its market-determined interest rate, apply only to judgments which the judgment debtor appeals. See Act of March 25, 1982, ch. 39, 1982 Colo. Laws 227 (entitled “An Act Concerning Interest Payable on Appealed Money Judgments in Civil Actions” (emphasis added)); see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The statements of the bill’s sponsors also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent (B) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (C) holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period (D) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent (E) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent
answer:
holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent


question:
with ever since his age of 13 and believes that this criminal record and his continued violation of the law does require a sentence at the top of the guideline range.” Id. at 8. I. A. Commerce Clause Challenge to Section 922(g)(1) Williams first challenges the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute as it applies to his possession of the Smith and Wesson revolver. Williams posits that because he possessed the gun solely within the State of Wisconsin, and because the record reveals no substantial connection between his possession of the gun and interstate commerce, Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to reach his possession of the gun. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Williams did not make this argument below, so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce (B) holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (C) holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that gunfree school zones act of 1990 which proscribed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school exceeded congressional authority under commerce clause because it reached conduct that did not substantially affect or have a meaningful connection with interstate commerce (E) holding that the gunfree school zones act exceeds congress power under the commerce clause
answer:
holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce


question:
meets the statutory requirements for restitution is a question of law that is fully reviewable by the appellate court.” State v. Nelson, 796 N.W.2d 343, 346-47 (Minn.App.2011) (quotation omitted). A victim may request restitution if the defendant is convicted of a crime. Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). When considering restitution requests, courts look at, among other factors, “the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense.” Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1) (2012). This court has interpreted the statute to require that the claimed loss be “directly caused by the conduct, for which the defendant was convicted.” State v. Latimer, 604 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Minn.App.1999) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Olson, 381 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Willis does not dispute that P.H. should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted (B) holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted (C) holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses  (D) holding that restitution is proper under  2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses (E) holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction
answer:

holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted