In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 879 (citations omitted). We think there is a reasonable fit here between the State’s purpose of protecting society from persons who have been determined to be likely to reoffend if not placed in a secure facility and their placement in such a facility. Therefore, Garren has failed to show a substantive due process violation. VII. Vagueness. Although Garren states in a division heading in his brief that chapter 229A is vague as applied and on its face, he makes no argument in his brief in support of the contention that the statute is vague as applied to him. We deem this issue waived. See Iowa R.App.P. 14(a)(3) (“Failure in the brief to state, to argue or to cite to authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”); State v. Cooley, 608 N.W.2d 9, 13-14 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Garren is precluded from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief (B) holding issue waived where matter not addressed beyond reference in heading in brief (C) holding that an issue mentioned in a brief but not addressed is waived (D) holding issues argued orally but not addressed in brief were waived (E) holding an issue listed in statement of issues on appeal but not addressed in brief is abandoned

A: holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief
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Q: of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990). Petitioner claims that Apprendi falls within the narrow scope of the second category of exceptions and is therefore applicable to his case retroactively. The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether Apprendi should be considered a “watershed rule,” falling within the Teague exceptions. However, every Circuit Court which has considered this question has held that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively on collateral review. United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir.2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir.2001); see, e.g., Abdullah v. United States, 240 F.3d 683, 687 (8th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>); Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review (B) holding apprendi is not retroactive (C) holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review (D) holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review  that was previously unavailable (E) holding that the apprendi decision is not applicable on collateral review

A: holding apprendi is not retroactive
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Q: be brought by means of a motion for post-conviction relief. In doing so, the state acknowledges the court departed from the essential requirements of law and requests we reverse the portion of the appealed order which dismissed the mandamus petition. Massey has exhausted his administrative remedies with the DOC. He correctly sought mandamus relief in the circuit court. See Taylor v. State, 780 So.2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(affirming trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief motion filed to challenge DOC’s reduction of his gain time because it had to first be entertained in the DOC; if defendant was not satisfied with the DOC’s ruling, then he could file a petition for writ of mandamus with the appropriate circuit court); see also Bedford v. State, 775 So.2d 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(<HOLDING>). We, therefore, quash the order and remand for 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that this court may issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to compel the doc to comply with a district court order directing the doc to grant a prisoner credit for time spent in presentence confinement (B) holding that a mandamus petition rather than motion for postconviction relief was appropriate remedy to have doc honor amount of jail credit awarded in each of defendants sentences (C) holding that circuit court should have treated the habeas petition as a motion for postconviction relief (D) holding that a claim is proeedurally barred where it was not raised in the defendants motion for postconviction relief (E) holding statute of limitations for filing petition for postconviction relief not tolled by general savings statute tolling limited to reasons enumerated in state postconviction relief act

A:
recognizing that this court may issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to compel the doc to comply with a district court order directing the doc to grant a prisoner credit for time spent in presentence confinement
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