In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: by jury is a fundamental guaranty of the rights and liberties of the people. C Prudential that the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right means that the starting point of our analysis is a presumption against the waiver of this constitutional right. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co., 301 U.S. at 393, 57 S.Ct. at 811-12; In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132 (giving right to trial by jury “same protections as other constitutional rights”); accord Ex parte Cupps, 782 So.2d 772, 775 (Ala.2000) (construing scope of contractual jury waiver strictly and narrowly “in deference to the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial”); see also Note, 58 Baylor L.Rev. at 259. But see Lowe Enters. Residential Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 92, 40 P.3d 405, 410 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Despite the existence of a presumption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy (B) holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts (C) holding that german law presumptively confers joint custody upon both parents until a court enters a contrary order (D) holding  without reference to supreme court case law to the contrary  that in nevada contractual jury waivers are presumptively valid (E) holding appellate waivers are enforceable if invoked by the government

Output: holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy


Input: Consider Input: 393 N.W.2d 286, 290-91 (S.D.1986). • GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, (dissenting).. [¶ 26.] I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the lower court on Issue 2. I would hold the trial court erred when it granted partial summary judgment to 01-esens, holding City’s operation of food service at the municipal bar was an ultra vires act. [¶27.] An express grant of authority from the legislature “includes those incidental or implied powers that are necessary to enable a municipality to perform the function authorized.” City of Rapid City v. Rensch, 77 S.D. 242, 246, 90 N.W.2d 380, 383 (1958) (citation omitted). A municipality is vested with discretion as to how it exercises specific powers conferred upon it by the legislature, as long as the methods employed are n , 59 N.W.2d 732, 734 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Actions taken under a municipality’s implied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding municipality had implied authority to enter into a long term contract to establish a golf course although state statute did not specifically grant authority to establish golf courses as public parks (B) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (C) holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority (D) holding that plaintiff had no authority or statutory right for actions proper course was to report actions to proper legal authority (E) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality

Output: holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute


Input: Consider Input: dangerousness is nowhere mentioned in the list of sixteen statutory aggravating factors for homicide. See FDPA, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (1994 and Supp. II 1996). Second, given the broad language of the FDPA as to the allowance of nonstatutory aggravating factors, there is no reason under the FDPA why future dangerousness cannot be presented to the jury. See id. § 3592(c) (“the jury ... may consider whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists”). Furthermore, we have little doubt that future dangerousness to society and to prison officials and other inmates during incarceration is relevant to the jury’s final determination of whether a death sentence should be imposed. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1002-03, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Holder’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state may consider and rely upon a defendants future dangerousness in its decision to seek a death sentence (B) holding that when a state asserts future dangerousness as grounds for imposing a death sentence due process requires that a defendant be entitled to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible (C) holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available  life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole (D) holding that where the capital defendants future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits the defendants release on parole due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible (E) holding state court improperly refused to admit evidence of defendants adaptation to prison because it was clearly relevant to future dangerousness


Output: holding that when a state asserts future dangerousness as grounds for imposing a death sentence due process requires that a defendant be entitled to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible