In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: do not apply in ... [piroceedings relating to probation." - Ind. Evidence Rule 101(c)(@2). A probation revocation hearing is not to be equated with an adversarial criminal proceeding. Cox v. State 706 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind.1999) (citing Isaac v. State, 605 N.E2d 144, 149 (Ind.1992)). Rather, a revocation hearing is a narrow inquiry, and its procedures are more flexible than those of a criminal proceeding. Id. In revocation hearings, judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability, including expert testimony and scientific evidence. Carter v. State, 706 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind.1999) (noting that it is beyond doubt that urinalysis has achieved a sufficient level of scientific reliability to be accepted into evidence); see also Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 550 (<HOLDING>); of - Pitman v. State, 749 N.E.2d 557, 559 
 Holding statements: (A) holding hearsay admissible in revocation hearings (B) holding that certified charging informations and police reports are deemed admissible in revocation hearings (C) holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress (D) holding that neither rule 11 nor the protections of boykin apply to probation revocation hearings and observing that less process is due in prison disciplinary proceedings than in probation revocation hearings (E) holding that because the rules of evidence including the rule against hearsay do not apply to sentencing hearings the district court did not err in relying on hearsay in ordering restitution
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: right to additional BLM permits or approvals. See, e.g., Lewis v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 673, 676-77 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992, 91 S.Ct. 456, 27 L.Ed. 2d 440 (1971); Angelina Holly Corp. v. Clark, 587 F.Supp. 1152, 1156 (D.D.C.1984). They hold no more than an expectancy, the loss of which does not constitute a deprivation of property within the meaning of the due process clause of the Constitution. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161, 101 S.Ct. 446, 451, 66 L.Ed.2d 358 (1980); National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 549 F.2d 822, 828 (D.C.Cir.1977). Their absence from the lawsuit does not preclude the district court from issuing the preliminary injunction. Compare Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). C. Exhaustion Mountain States asserts that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction (B) holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) recognizing the inappropriateness of a preliminary injunction where credibility determinations must be made but granting a preliminary injunction because the legal and factual issues have been sufficiently illuminated (E) holding that contract with construction company rendered inequitable a preliminary injunction restraining the contractors from performing the contractual obligations
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: fraud. See Grageda v. U.S. INS, 12 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir.1993); Goldeshtein, 8 F.3d at 647. However, we have included in this category acts “of baseness or depravity contrary to accepted moral standards,” Grageda, 12 F.3d at 921 (quotation omitted), such as spousal abuse, child abuse, and statutory rape which involve moral turpitude “by their very nature.” See id. at 922 (spousal abuse); Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, 407 F.2d 1405, 1406-07 (9th Cir.1969) (child abuse); Bendel v. Nagle, 17 F.2d 719, 720 (9th Cir.1927) (statutory rape). Incest also involves an act of baseness or depravity contrary to accepted moral standards, and we hold that it too is a “crime involving moral turpitude.” See also II American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 230.2 cmt. 2(d), 406-07 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Gonzalez-Alvarado, 39 F.3d at 246. Taking a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although a state may be free to develop its own laws of search and seizure to meet law enforcement needs such laws may not authorize police conduct which trenches upon fourth amendment rights regardless of the labels which it attaches to such conduct (B) recognizing general rule (C) holding the statutory scheme of two federal laws was not void for vagueness and did not violate equal protection or due process even though the defendants conduct violated both laws (D) recognizing that laws against incest reinforce a community norm of general and intense hostility toward such conduct (E) recognizing this as the general rule
[EX A]:
(D)