In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the bankruptcy court’s power to control dissemination of information more broadly. Judge Steven Gerling, for example, observed in In re Bennett, that If the information [sought to be protected] does not represent trade secrets or confidential research, development or commercial information, then whether to permit access to the information is a matter left to the Court’s discretion. It requires the Court to examine the relevant facts and circumstances and then to balance the interests of the party opposing disclosure with that of the public. In re Bennett, 226 B.R. 331, 336 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1998); see also In re Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2nd Cir.1994) (discussing § 107 and use of records for improper purpose); In re Robert Landau Associates, 50 B.R. 670, 675-76 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>); but see In re Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. 675, 679 
 Holding statements: (A) holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter (B) holding that when the trial court signed an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint but refused to enter a final judgment on that order the order refusing to enter judgment was appealable under former ors 190102a (C) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality (D) recognizing inherent authority but vacating order not supported by necessary findings (E) holding that while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judges signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court the city waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the indiana supreme court has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection and more recently this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect
[A]: holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter


[Q]: a factor listed in this subpart, departure from the applicable guideline range is warranted only if the factor is present to a degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the offense. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. Indeed, we have recognized the possibility of departure beyond the adjustments made available by U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.1 (aggravating role) and 3B1.2 (mitigating role), based upon a defendant’s extraordinary role with respect to the offense of conviction. See United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454, 461 (2d Cir.1991) (acknowledging possibility of role “so extraordinarily minute that [defendants] deserved a departure beyond the four-level maximum reduction available for ‘minimal’ participation”); United States v. Colon, 905 F.2d 580, 585-86 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that where there are other persons who are criminally responsible for the offense who have not been apprehended or have not been charged due to cooperation a sole defendant may be eligible for an upward or downward adjustment for role in the offense (B) holding that within these parameters apprendi permits an upward adjustment for a defendants role in a drugtrafficking conspiracy (C) recognizing potential upward adjustment beyond that provided by guidelines for aggravating role in the offense (D) holding that role in the offense is a factual determination albeit complex a district courts decision not to apply an adjustment based on such a determination is reversed only for clear error (E) holding that a defendant convicted of a soleparticipant offense may nonetheless be entitled to a mitigating role adjustment
[A]: recognizing that where there are other persons who are criminally responsible for the offense who have not been apprehended or have not been charged due to cooperation a sole defendant may be eligible for an upward or downward adjustment for role in the offense


[Q]: 38 Ill.App.3d 616, 348 N.E.2d 277 (1976) (noting that a co-occupant of premises in which contraband is kept runs a significant risk of facing criminal charges and can, therefore, act in his own interest in the Matlock sense). 27 . Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). 28 . Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793; Malone v. State, 163 S.W.3d 785, 797-98 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d). 29 . Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281. Under the Texas Constitution, the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that consent was validly given. Id. 30 . State’s Brief on the Merits, at 4. 31 . State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856, n. 22 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). 32 . Hubert, 286 S.W.3d at 489. 33 . See Sorensen v. State, 478 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (<HOLDING>); Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while a mother could consent to a search of her sons room she did not have authority to consent to a search of a locked footlocker within the room (B) holding that appellants mother had the authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom defendant lived with parents rentfree for four years mother owned the house appellants bedroom door was open mother knocked whenever appellants door was locked and there were no restrictions placed on mothers right to enter bedroom (C) holding that twentyyearold appellants mother had authority to consent to a search of sons bedroom where appellant had agreed to pay 10 per week as rent he had not instructed mother to stay out of his room and mother infrequently entered appellants room to pick up after him (D) holding that although son was eighteen years old and paid rent mother could consent to search of sons bedroom where nothing suggested mother lacked access to room (E) holding that officers had a reasonable belief that defendants father had authority to consent to the search of his sons room and computer because he owned the home and had access to the room and computer at will
[A]:
holding that while a mother could consent to a search of her sons room she did not have authority to consent to a search of a locked footlocker within the room