In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: use of low-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. While we recognize that drivers may be accustomed to quickly flashing their high-beam headlights at an oncoming vehicle as a signal to dim headlights, there is no evidence in this case that the officer was driving with his high-beam headlights. Furthermore, the statute does not provide any exceptions for the momentary flashing of high-beam headlights. Thus, we must conclude the statute prohibits the use of high-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle, for any length of time and for any purpose. [¶ 12] We recognize that at least one other appellate court has interpreted similar statutory language and reached the opposite conclusion. See Waukesha County v. Meinhardt, 2001 WI App 146, ¶¶ 9-10, 630 N.W.2d 277 (<HOLDING>). In another case involving a similar statute, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that meinhardt did not commit a violation by flashing his highbeam headlights two times at an oncoming vehicle because the plain language of the statute did not prohibit the quick flashing of highbeam headlights (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute (D) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (E) holding the trial judge did not commit reversible error through the chosen method of remedying the batson violation

A: (A)
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Q: evidence to conclude that the government’s conduct in this case amounted to a material breach, it denied Malone’s appeal. 87-2 BCA 1119,758, at 99,966. In our view, the government materially breached this contract. According to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241(e) (1981), “the extent to which the behavior of [a] party failing to perform ... comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing” is a significant factor in determining whether that party’s breach is material. The Restatement also states that “[sjubter-fuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith,” as does lack of diligence and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance. Id. § 205 comment d; cf. Lewis-Nicholson, Inc. v. United States, 550 F.2d 26, 32, 213 Ct.Cl. 192 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. United States, 151 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subcontractor could recover damages from general contractor for delay in performance under state law (B) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (C) holding that governmentcaused delay in contractor performance violated implied duty not to hinder performance of other party (D) holding that performance may be valid acceptance (E) holding that prior positive performance evaluations are not dispositive as to whether the employer was satisfied with the employees performance by the time of the termination

A: (C)
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Q: police tactics that may burden the public — for all suspects (even the guilty ones) may protect themselves fully by declining to answer. Nor do the questions forcibly invade any privacy interest or extract information without the suspects’ consent. United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 829, 123 S.Ct. 126, 154 L.Ed.2d 43 (2002). In this case, after Burton gave Officer Davidson a valid driver’s license, he was asked only a handful of questions, including whether he would consent to a search of the automobile. The record pro vides no reason to suspect either that these questions were unusually intrusive or that asking them made this traffic stop any more coercive than a typical traffic stop. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39, 117 S.Ct. 417 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818, 822-23 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant gave a valid and knowing consent to a search of his dwelling and automobile when he agreed to the terms of probation (B) holding that a reasonable investigation of a traffic stop typically includes asking for a license and registration asking the driver to sit in the patrol car and asking about destination and purpose of travel (C) holding that a detained defendants consent to search his car was voluntary even though the police did not tell him he was free to leave (D) holding that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered  stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his drivers license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the fourth amendment (E) holding that asking a detained motorist whether he would consent to a search of his automobile for contraband even after he had produced a valid drivers license did not necessarily make the traffic stop unreasonable in scope or duration

A:
(E)
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