TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: that any negligent infliction claim remains before us on this appeal (as none has been separately argued) that claim is preempted for the same reasons. III. Conclusion We hold that Humble’s intentional infliction/tort of outrage claim is preempted on the facts of this case, and her race and nationality discrimination claims have been abandoned. Humble’s reasonable accommodation claim under the WLAD is not preempted, and we remand that claim for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Humble requests that a remand to state court for the latter claim be ordered, but we leave it to the district court to make that discretionary determination. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 . 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 2 . Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 216, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Id. at 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904. Without 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 (B) holding that broad language releasing all claims whether in contract tort or otherwise necessarily included a bad faith claim (C) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (D) holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith (E) holding that a state law tort of bad faith was necessarily based on breach of duties contained in the cba and was therefore preempted

SOLUTION: holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301

PROBLEM: however, had received the full procedural due process to which he was entitled for the 1996 events to which the court was referring. The events, in fact, culminated in a decision and order of the Lincoln County Appeal Board calling for Pratt’s reinstatement. Defendants, therefore, are entitled to a summary judgment on this issue. Furthermore, because the LCPO has been dissolved, the issue of Pratt’s employment status, particularly after he was reinstated, is now moot. B. Constitutionally Protectable Property Interest Neither Exists In Pratt’s Job Duties Nor In Pratt’s Suspension When Such Suspension Is With Pay. [¶ 19] Pratt argues the defendants are not entitled to a qualified immunity because the defendants obstructed the reinstatement order of the Appeal Board -42 (4th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Fields v. Durham, 909 F.2d 94, 98 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under article i section 9 a person has no constitutionally protected privacy interest in abandoned property (B) holding inmates possess a constitutionally cognizable property interest in the interest earned on money held in their prison accounts (C) holding that sovereign immunity does not protect the state from claims for statutory employment benefits that constitute a protected property interest (D) holding that constitutionally protected property interest in employment does not extend to right to possess and retain particular job or to perform particular services (E) holding parental rights are constitutionally protected fundamental interest

SOLUTION: holding that under article i section 9 a person has no constitutionally protected privacy interest in abandoned property

PROBLEM: Granite thus assumed "an advocacy role" "almost akin to Granite entering a general appearance for the trial court." This "desperate act," they contend, "constitutes nothing but a transparent effort to curry favor with the trial court." Granite's filing, they conclude, "has denied [the Spaffords] any meaningful opportunity to try their case, upon remand, before an impartial and disinterested tribunal within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." A due process challenge is a question of law, which we review for correctness. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶ 25, 100 P.3d 1177. 1 36 To begin with, this case presents nothing remotely approaching a violation of the Due Process Clause. Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2256-57, 178 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009) (<HOLDING>). But see id. at 2272-74 (Roberts, C.J., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion (B) holding that no federal court other than the supreme court may entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a judgment of a state court (C) holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction (D) holding that due process required disqualification of a state supreme court justice from an appeal where the appellants chairman and president contributed 8 million to that supreme court justices election campaign after a 50 million verdiet was entered in the trial court (E) holding that the question of recusal of a supreme court justice is to be left to the individual justice

SOLUTION:
holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion