In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: of the evidence. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. In interpreting Hicks, supra, the Second Circuit has stated definitively as follows: [Defendant] misreads the Supreme Court’s statement in Hicks that once a defendant produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his or her action, the plaintiff must then establish that the defendant’s actions were intentionally discriminatory. [Defendant] takes this statement as requiring the plaintiff to adduce additional evidence after the defendant’s production — evidence beyond that presented in the plaintiffs prima facie case. Justice Scalia took pains to preclude such an interpretation of the Court’s decision when he observed that, upon rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons for its action , 142 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1189, 127 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (B) holding that former employer met its burden of proof that ubc exception applied (C) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (D) holding plaintiffs ultimate burden of proof can be met by combining proof submitted in its prima facie case with evidence that defendants proffered reasons for its acts were false (E) recognizing that a plaintiffs burden in establishing a prima facie case is not onerous
[EX A]: holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence

[EX Q]: the I.C. court — perhaps Plaintiffs’ strongest case — determined that “the juvenile court can act to protect children within its jurisdiction.” I.C., 742 So.2d at 404. The I.C. court looked to § 39.453(8)(g), which holds: The court may issue a protective order in assistance, or as a condition, of any other order made under this part. In addition to the requirements included in the case plan, the protective order may set forth requirements relating to reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed for a specified period of time by a person or agency who is before the court; and such order may require any such person or agency to make periodic reports to the court containing such information as the court in its discretion may prescribe. See also Henry & Rilla, 720 So.2d at 573 (<HOLDING>). Although Plaintiffs and their counsel, if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the juvenile restitution statute does not expressly require the juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to pay the restitution ordered as a condition of probation the policies underlying the adult restitutions command that a trial court make such an inquiry applies with equal force to juvenile courts (B) holding that jeopardy attaches in juvenile adjudication that determines whether juvenile violated criminal law (C) holding that chapter 39 provides the juvenile judge the flexibility to factor a childs safety into a custody decision at all stages of a juvenile proceeding (D) holding that the defendant is entitled to be present at all stages of his trial  and a judges response to a note from the jury is one of those stages (E) holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles
[EX A]: holding that although the juvenile restitution statute does not expressly require the juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to pay the restitution ordered as a condition of probation the policies underlying the adult restitutions command that a trial court make such an inquiry applies with equal force to juvenile courts

[EX Q]: 215. As the modified categorical approach is “merely a ‘tool for implementing the categorical approach,’ ” we concluded that it too did not apply. Id. at 216 (quoting Descamps v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2284, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013)). Contrary to Baboolall’s assertions, Rojas did not discard the modified categorical approach in drug possession and distribution cases. Rather, we held that neither the categorical nor the modified categorical approach was in play because there was no comparable federal statute and the record was silent as to the precise drug involved. Rojas, 728 F.3d at 215-16. In this case, N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39 is analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See Pascual v. Holder, 707 F.3d 403, 405 (2d Cir.2013) adhered to on reh’g, 723 F.3d 156 (2d Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). As the IJ recognized, because there are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law (B) holding that a conviction under  22039 for attempted sale of cocaine qualifies as an aggravated felony (C) holding second simple possession conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony regardless of whether it was actually prosecuted as recidivist possession (D) holding that a conviction under  22039 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach (E) holding that conviction under  2702a3 or 4 is an aggravated felony under  101a43f
[EX A]:
holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law