In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: as she has failed to show that a majority of the arbitrators deliberately disregarded the law. (See id.) Although the award in this case is general, it does not appear that the panel deliberately disregarded the law. Both parties made viable legal arguments to the arbitration panel regarding equitable remedies and defenses including the voluntary payment doctrine, which the panel says it considered. Although the voluntary payment doctrine could preclude Olde’s recovery, it is not applicable in all situations and there are exceptions to the doctrine. For example, courts have found that if a mistake of fact is alleged, then the voluntary payment doctrine does not apply. See Kane-Miller Corp. v. Lakeview Trust & Sav. Bank, No. 88 C 7561, 1989 WL 13295, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb.13, 1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Best Buy Co. v. Harlem-Irving Cos., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees under adea may not be recovered against a defendant who was not an employer of the plaintiff (B) recognizing that a mistake of fact may constitute a valid defense (C) holding that applicability of the voluntary payment doctrine and the mistake of fact exception raises questions of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss (D) holding that money paid under mistake of fact may be recovered regardless of the negligence of the payor (E) holding the general rule is that money paid to another under a mistake of fact may be recovered because the money belongs in equity and good conscience to the person who paid it

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: before it was in assumpsit for attorney fees purposes. See Schulz, 67 Haw. at 436, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Higa is not directly on point, its reasoning is a compelling indication of how the Hawaii Supreme Court would rule on the attorney fee question before us. The plaintiffs also seek to distinguish Higa because it involved a client suing his own attorney, and thus in that case there was privity of contract between the two parties. In the present case, Mrs. Helfand was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the defendants and Mr. Helfand. This distinction is irrelevant. Courts have extended the right to sue for breach of contract to intended third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12, 883 P.2d 38, 48 n. 12 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 82 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies (B) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (C) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (D) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract (E) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: v. Gray, 726 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CHOOSE COUNSEL The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be represented by the retained counsel he prefers. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 158-60, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). An accused is, in fact, entitled to “counsel of his own selection, and as many as he may see proper to employ, to defend him.” Jackson v. State, 55 Tex.Crim. 79, 115 S.W. 262, 264 (1908). This right is not absolute, however, but can be overridden by important considerations relating to the integrity of the judicial process and the fair and orderly administration of justice. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 158-60, 108 S.Ct. at 1697; Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (<HOLDING>). However, the court must indulge a presumption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the case should be reopened where the cause has not proceeded so far that the ends of justice would be defeated or the orderly process of the court disturbed (B) holding that the right to choose counsel cannot be manipulated so as to obstruct the orderly procedure in the courts or to interfere with the fair administration of justice (C) holding court may raise procedural default sua sponte if doing so will further the interests of judicial efficiency conservation of scarce judicial resources and orderly and prompt administration of justice (D) recognizing the courts inherent sua sponte powers in certain circumstances to allow it to manage its own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases in the furtherance of justice quotation marks omitted (E) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel


Output: (B)