In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: by jury is a fundamental guaranty of the rights and liberties of the people. C Prudential that the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right means that the starting point of our analysis is a presumption against the waiver of this constitutional right. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co., 301 U.S. at 393, 57 S.Ct. at 811-12; In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132 (giving right to trial by jury “same protections as other constitutional rights”); accord Ex parte Cupps, 782 So.2d 772, 775 (Ala.2000) (construing scope of contractual jury waiver strictly and narrowly “in deference to the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial”); see also Note, 58 Baylor L.Rev. at 259. But see Lowe Enters. Residential Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 92, 40 P.3d 405, 410 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Despite the existence of a presumption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy (B) holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts (C) holding that german law presumptively confers joint custody upon both parents until a court enters a contrary order (D) holding  without reference to supreme court case law to the contrary  that in nevada contractual jury waivers are presumptively valid (E) holding appellate waivers are enforceable if invoked by the government

Answer: holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy


Question: of the statute before many petitioners would be able to identify, with reasonable certainty, the nature of the injury. Brice v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 36 Fed.Cl. 474, 477 (1996), aff'd on other grounds, 240 F.3d 1367 (Fed.Cir.2001). In Brice, we held that equitable tolling is not available for claims arising under § 300-16(a)(2), reasoning that “the statute of limitations here begins to run upon the first symptom or manifestation of the onset of injury, even if the petitioner reasonably would not have known at that time that the vaccine had caused an injury.” 240 F.3d at 1373; see also Sharpnack v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-983V, 1992 WL 167255, at *2 (Cl.Ct. Special Master June 29, 1992), aff'd, 27 Fed.Cl. 457 (1993), aff'd, 17 F.3d 1442 (Fed.Cir.1994) (table) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court, in Whitecotton, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absolute immunity protects  judges  so long as their acts are judicial  in nature internal quotation omitted (B) holding substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance and consists of such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a eonclusion  (C) holding that in many vaccine program cases the injuries are first manifest ed as subtle signs and seizures of less complicated nature eg seizures lasting less than 30 minutes or seizure activity so subtle as to be unrecognized at their onset (D) holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service (E) holding that the united states is immune from monetary damages for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service

Answer: holding that absolute immunity protects  judges  so long as their acts are judicial  in nature internal quotation omitted


Question: (9th Cir. 2000)). This conclusion is fully consistent with general principles of California contract law. See Faigin v. Signature Grp. Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (“There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.”) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (“Express covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.”); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (<HOLDING>). “The reason for the rule is simply that where 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employment manuals express disclaimer superseded alleged implied contractual term (B) holding that under georgia law the duty of good faith cannot be breached apart from an express contractual term (C) holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract (D) holding that plaintiffs express contract with the surety company precludes an implied contract with defendant (E) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance

Answer:
holding that employment manuals express disclaimer superseded alleged implied contractual term