instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
the defendant’s applicable guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).” Id., app. note 1(A). In November 2007, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 706, which reduced the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses under § 2Dl.l(c) by two levels. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). The Commission later made the amendment retroactively applicable. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. May 1, 2008). As indicated, Jefferson sought to have his sentence reduced as result of those amendments. However, they do not apply here because Jefferson was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence required by statute. See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because the District Court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based (B) holding that a defendant whose original sentence was based upon the careeroffender guideline and not  2d11 could not receive a sentence reduction based on amendment 706 because it did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range (C) holding that while amendment 706 was applicable to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (D) holding that amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range where the defendants received statutory mandatory minimum sentences and thus the defendants were not eligible for relief under  3582 (E) holding that while amendment 706 was applica ble to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline
answer:
holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based


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or require the information it did. In light of the information possessed by the District as of June 2, 2011, the District’s interference with Rutherford’s right to return began then, and continued until the District ultimately terminated him. Once a technical violation of the FMLA has been established—and here, the undisputed facts show that a violation occurred—the interference inquiry turns to whether the plaintiff experienced prejudice resulting from the violation. Ridings v. Riverside Medical Center, 537 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2008). The District arg e his fitness to return to work, he had such proof—a note from his doctor stating that he was fit to work—and attempted to present it on June 2, 2011. See Vannoy v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). Instead of reinstating him, the District kept 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave (B) holding a plaintiff to be ineligible for fmla leave wherein the plaintiff had not accumulated enough work hours (C) holding that a plaintiff who was unable to return to work before his fmla leave expired did not allege any denial of an fmla right but noting that ragsdale left open the possibility that employees could recover for notice violations on a casebycase basis if there was actual harm resulting from the violations (D) holding that both the cfra and the fmla require the employee to provide notice to the employer of the employees intent to take leave (E) holding that sufficient evidence of prejudice existed where plaintiff would have structured leave differently but employer had not provided notice of fmla right to reinstatement
answer:
holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave


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that “discriminating among religions” in the workplace is “subject to strict scrutiny”)(citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982)). Because the right here is to be free from an alleged discriminatory conspiracy to demote employees based on their religion, the particular adverse employment action does not appear important to the analysis whether the right to be free from workplace discrimination based on religion is clearly established. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit in August, 2010, found a reassignment, with significantly less monetary loss, and less of a demotion in job title and responsibilities, qualified as an adverse employment action for disparate-treatment discrimination purposes. See Jones v. Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 617 F.3d at 1279-80 (<HOLDING>). Thus,, notwithstanding that the right to be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a materially adverse action is of the magnitude of a termination of employment or a decrease in salary or a material loss in benefits (B) holding that potentially indefinite suspension of employee from work without pay could constitute materially adverse employment action even where employer awards full backpay for the entire period and that reassignment of responsibilities could constitute materially adverse employment action even absent demotion (C) holding a transfer or reassignment may rise to the level of an adverse employment condition if it is a significant change in working conditions (D) recognizing possible adverse action where reassignment left plaintiff with significantly different  and diminished  supervisory and programmatic responsibilities (E) holding that a teachers reassignment with a 17000 decrease in salary to take place one year following a teachers reassignment constituted an adverse employment action notwithstanding that the teacher was not demoted
answer:

holding that a materially adverse action is of the magnitude of a termination of employment or a decrease in salary or a material loss in benefits