In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: box, .was too small to fit an assault rifle. 2. The package was not immediately recognizable as contraband, preventing seizure under the plain-view doctrine. 3. Deputy Barker could discover whatever lay in the back of the trunk by leaning over the speaker box and searching with his hands. 4. The compartment behind the armrest (where the cocaine was found) was'too small to contain an assault rifle. 5. Deputy Barker did not know whether the car had a trunk-access panel. We reject Mr. Mirabais first argument. Deputy Barker testified based on his mili tary experience and familiarity with assault rifles. In light -of this experience, he testified that a rifle could have fit behind the speaker box. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (<HOLDING>). The district court had little reason to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that police officers can draw inferences from prior experience (B) holding courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor (C) holding court obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor (D) holding that triers of fact may draw only reasonable inferences (E) holding that courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor
[A]: (A)


[Q]: as late as February 1994, although the wife stated that she did not think that she lived with them for longer than one year. The wife testified that, during the time that she lived with the husband’s parents, they helped her financially. It appears that the trial court may have considered the husband’s obligation to support the wife suspended during the time that she lived with his parents, as the order reflects that it calculated arrearage beginning in February 1994. Alimony arrearage is a final judgment as of the date due and is not subject to modification. Harris v. Harris, 553 So.2d 129 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). In some instances alimony obligations can be satisfied by means other than direct payment from the husband to the wife. See, Swindle v. Swindle, 429 So.2d 601 (Ala.Civ.App.1983) (<HOLDING>); Frazier v. Frazier, 455 So.2d 883 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate (B) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (C) holding that the standard fire policy and a broader homeowners policy were so intertwined that the prescriptive period in the standard fire policy applied to nonfire perils (D) holding that obligation to pay mortgage on home was satisfied by payment of fire insurance proceeds where husband maintained fire insurance policy (E) holding that when the house  is destroyed by fire and there exists thereon a policy by insurance the money arising therefrom stands in the place instead of such house  the proceeds of the policy therefore take the place of the property loss
[A]: (D)


[Q]: becoming final, and the filing of his first state habeas petition. Ramos offered no justification for this 240-day delay, which is substantially longer than the 90-day period in which the courts presume timeliness under California law. See In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311, 317 (1998) (“[A] habeas corpus petition is not entitled to a presumption of timeliness if it is filed more than 90 days after the final due date for the filing of appellant’s reply brief on the direct appeal.”). Without the required justification for his delay, Ramos’s state petitions were not “properly filed,” making the time they were pending before the California courts ineligible for statutory tolling. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir.2010) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Without statutory tolling of the time his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an unexplained gap of 101  days between filing of state habeas petitions made petition untimely under california law and not subject to statutory tolling (B) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (C) holding that a california habeas petition is timely if filed within a reasonable time (D) holding that california supreme courts denial of habeas petition becomes final thirty days after filing (E) holding that the filing of a first federal habeas petition is not an application for other collateral review under the tolling provision of  2244d
[A]:
(A)