In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

court’s description of the panel’s rationale as “one over which reasonable jurists may differ” can hardly be construed as a ringing endorsement of Bush v. Gore’s precedential value or its application to the issue of variations in voting technology. Shelley II, 344 F.3d at 918. At the very least, the Ninth Circuit’s unanimous decision in Shelley II divested the panel decision of whatever precedential value it otherwise would have had. Undeterred, the majority struggles to accord such value to Shelley I because the rationale adopted by the majority is virtually identical to the one provided by the Shelley I panel — namely, that the plaintiffs’ novel equal protection claims are controlled by Supreme Court precedents that mandate the equal weighting of votes. Compare Maj. Op. at 870-71 (<HOLDING>), with Shelley I, 344 F.3d at 894-95 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error (B) holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional (C) holding that the counties use of outdated technology results in the weighting of votes differently (D) holding that a plaintiff need only show that the results of a polygraph examination were a factor in the termination of employment and rejecting requirement that results be the sole factor for employees discharge (E) holding that in a statutory fee case the results obtained factor was already subsumed in the lodestar and that results multipliers should be awarded only in some cases of exceptional success
holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error

court’s conclusion that the Jarvisons had a traditional ceremonial marriage under the Navajo Code. Moreover, because the Jarvi-sons had not completed the procedure under Navajo law to validate a traditional or common law marriage, the government argues that their marriage was invalid. In evaluating the government’s contentions, we observe that the district court could have produced a more robust order detailing its findings of fact and evidentia-ry basis similar to the detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in Beller v. United States, 221 F.R.D. 679 (D.N.M.2003). Nonetheless, on our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence in the record is sufficient to establish a valid marriage between the Jarvisons. See United States v. Taylor, 97 F.3d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Esther testified to having 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that despite a trial courts failure to make specific factual findings an appellate court is free to affirm on any grounds for which there is sufficient record to permit conclusions of law (B) holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required (C) holding that an appellate court can affirm a district courts order on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law including grounds upon which the district court did not rely (D) holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds (E) holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact
holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required

and honor, and integrity, and I resent this very much.!! You are In Contempt of EVERYTHING that I represent, and standby, and believe. OFFICIALLY: you were NEVER the “president” of anything.!! In an non-jury trial in November 1990, the district court found the defendant guilty of violating section 871 under an objective reasonable person standard for having made the above and other similar comments. The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction. After adopting the objective reasonable person standard already used by this Circuit, the Third Circuit analyzed a number of factors to reach its conclusion that the defendant’s comments were not protected political hyperbole like the comments made in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (<HOLDING>). These factors are helpful to this Court in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding utterance that if they ever make me carry a rifle upon being drafted into the us military the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj was merely a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the president and was thus protected by the first amendment (B) holding that 18year old vietnam protestor who stated if they ever make me carry a rifle the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj did not violate  871 because the comment constituted political hyperbole protected by the first amendment (C) holding that with the commands of the first amendment clearly in mind a comment that the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj was political hyperbole which did not constitute a willful threat against the president (D) holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of political affiliation not protected by first amendment (E) holding that the following statement conditional in nature and made at a political rally was not a true threat if they ever make me carry a rifle the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj

holding utterance that if they ever make me carry a rifle upon being drafted into the us military the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj was merely a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the president and was thus protected by the first amendment