In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: who are undeniably state actors, colluded with her in her actions. When all intendments are taken in the Plaintiffs’ favor, therefore, their allegations indicate both that Malac infringed their substantive due process rights and that she can be considered a state actor. Accordingly, Malac’s motion to dismiss is denied. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Barbara Malac’s motion to dismiss [Docket No. 47] is DENIED. The motion of Defendant Agent Cynthia Preston and Defendant Agent Nancy Gingras [Docket No. 50] to dismiss is DENIED with respect to Agent Preston, but GRANTED with respect to Agent Gingras. SO ORDERED. 1 . For the propriety of citing this unpublished Second Circuit opinion, see Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-905 (8th Cir.2000) (Arnold, J.) (<HOLDING>), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.2000) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unpublished opinions are of persuasive value at best and not precedential (B) holding that opinions accompanying the denial of certiorari cannot have the same effect as decisions on the merits (C) holding that even district court cases decided by panels of three have no precedential value (D) holding that unpublished opinions have precedential effect (E) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: only as part of the presentations to a group, or whether appellees had any conversations with Hoagland, and, if so, the content of those conversations. Appellees merely stated they did not make misrepresentations to Hoagland in Texas regarding the business transaction made the basis of the captioned case. We conclude these statements are unsupported factual and legal conclusions. See Ennis, 164 S.W.3d at 703-04 (affirming trial court’s exclusion of nonresident’s statements that he did not have a substantial connection with Texas, plaintiffs’ claims did not result from and were not related to any of affiant’s activities in Texas, affiant did not have any continuing or systematic contacts with Texas, and affiant did not commit any tort in Texas); see also Wright, 137 S.W.3d at 250 n. 8 (<HOLDING>). Kassoffs affidavit is similarly concluso-ry. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute (B) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied (C) holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in houston texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute for plaintiffs claims of various forms of fraud and negligent misrepresentation (D) recognizing strong interest in protecting texas citizens where tort was committed in whole or in part in texas (E) holding nonresidents statement that he had committed no torts in texas was properly excluded as conclusory

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: for [her] employer! ] to operate efficiently and effectively.” Id. at 418-19, 126 S.Ct. 1951. The point of this inquiry, then, is “both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their im portant public functions.” Id. at 420, 126 S.Ct. 1951. With that premise as a backdrop, the Supreme Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951; see also Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 364-65 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Garcetti and its Sixth Circuit progeny 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern (B) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (C) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (D) holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless  related to his job duties (E) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected


Output: (B)