In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
induced his employer to terminate his at-will employment?” See Haddle, 119 S.Ct. at 491. The Supreme Court ruled only on that issue. See Haddle, 119 S.Ct. at 492. The Eleventh circuit had already previously rejected the intracorpo-rate conspiracy doctrine. Because the in-tracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not before the Supreme Court, it would be a mistake to draw any inference from the Court’s silence on the issue. See United States v. Stewart, 650 F.2d 178, 180 (9th Cir.1981); Sacramento Valley Chapter of National Electrical Contractors Association v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 632 F.Supp. 1403, 1414 (E.D.Cal.1986), aff'd, 888 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.1989). The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine first developed in the anti-trust context. See Nelson, 200 F.2d at 914 (<HOLDING>). The Seventh Circuit extended the doctrine to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as a general rule the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice (B) holding a corporation cannot conspire with its officers and agents to restrain trade in its own products (C) holding that a hospital can conspire with members of its medical staff (D) recognizing that agents of a corporation may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed in the name of the corporation (E) recognizing that representation of a corporation by its officers in administrative proceedings is allowed

Ex Output:
holding that as a general rule the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice


Ex Input:
speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

Ex Output:
holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241


Ex Input:
description provided were ample, particularly given the fact that the executing officers had previously monitored the mobile home to be searched, assuring that the warrant would not be executed upon the wrong home. Id. at 495. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, relying on its holding in Durk, and emphasizing once again that where a description of the house to be searched is given, specific reference is made to the house’s occupant, and the warrant is executed by an officer already familiar with the location, due to prior surveillance, inaccuracies in the description of the street address will not render a warrant unconstitutional. Id. at 497. Durk and Pelayo-Landero control in this case. See also United States v. Lemmons, 527 F.2d 662, 665-66 (6th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 60, 50 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a city may not be held liable under  1983 where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers (B) holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on warrant (C) holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on the warrant (D) holding that there was no constitutional violation where a warrant was issued for a shop at 9300 woodward but where once inside the executing officers also searched 9304 woodward which was connected by an internal archway and used as an extra space by the shopkeeper (E) holding anticipatory warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause because at time warrant was issued the contraband was not on a sure course to the place to be searched and there was no assurance defendant would take contraband to that place

Ex Output:

holding that a city may not be held liable under  1983 where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers