In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: when there has been neither agreement nor adjudication of the fact. In that situation, the question is one of historical fact, which, until decided, cannot have anything to do with the child’s best interest. A different situation is presented, however, after paternity has been determined, whether by agreement or adjudication. Then, the best interest of the child necessarily is involved. The historical fact of parentage no longer stands alone; now it is intertwined with the interests of the child and no longer is capable of separation. Once paternity is established, § 5-1029 has no further role to play in that arena. The amendment to § 5-1038 does not change that, in my view, without, as there is not in this case, an amendment making it so. Contrary to the majorit , 1083 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted (B) holding the best interest of the child standard does not violate federal constitutional principles (C) holding that the best interest of the child standard should be used in deciding whether to grant a paternity petition (D) holding that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in determining whether to order blood tests to determine paternity (E) holding court properly applied best interest of child standard when determining whether placement goal should be changed
[A]: holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted


[Q]: that the people in the venire do not represent a fair and reasonable cross-section of the District of New Mexico. See United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 & n. 4 (1st Cir.1979)(stating that residents of counties, cities, and towns do not constitute a distinct, cognizable group for purposes of Sixth Amendment cross-section analysis); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 582 (10th Cir.1976)(“Mere geographical imbalance, absent evidence that an identifiable and cognizable segment of the community has been systemically excluded or underrepresented by reason of such imbalance, does not violate the statutory and constitutional requirement that the jury panel represent a ‘fair cross section’ of the community.”); United States v. Traficant, 209 F.Supp.2d 764, 780-81 (N.D.Ohio 2002)(<HOLDING>). Considering the foregoing, the Court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant did not prove that italianamericans are a cognizable group (B) holding that residents of a geograph ic area are not a distinct cognizable group and citing united states v test which made clear that a geographic area is not a distinct group for support (C) holding same and citing physicians multispecialty group (D) recognizing women as a distinct group (E) recognizing native americans as a distinct group
[A]: holding that the defendant did not prove that italianamericans are a cognizable group


[Q]: Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); Hagemeister v. Vanity Fair Properties, 508 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1973, writ dism’d). Thus, collateral estoppel dictates that venue of any subsequent suit involving the same subject matter and the same parties as the initial suit be governed by the venue determination in the initial suit. See Orozco, 681 S.W.2d at 245-46; Pinney, 558 S.W.2d at 36. First, Miller II involves the same parties as the Windsor suit. Both State & County and Windsor were parties to the Windsor suit. Although Ledbetter and Curtiss were not named in the Windsor suit, as officers of State & County, they were in privity with a party; thus, collateral estoppel would apply to them as well. Cf. Getty Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Youell & Cos. v. Getty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant in second suit was in privity for res judicata purposes because his interests were aligned with those of defendant in first suit which concerned same facts (B) holding that res judicata applies when the question of jurisdiction is raised and determined (C) holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings (D) holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings (E) holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties
[A]:
holding that defendant in second suit was in privity for res judicata purposes because his interests were aligned with those of defendant in first suit which concerned same facts