In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: who have not returned their consents 30 days from the date notice is mailed as unnecessary. Plaintiff replies that reminder notice is necessary because potential class members work in remote locations far away from their homes for long periods of time. Plaintiff argues that reminder notice affects the broad remedial purposes of the FLSA and ensures that potential class members receive notice of their rights and potential claims. District courts are split as to whether reminder notices to potential class members are proper in FLSA actions. See Santinac v. Worldwide Labor Support of Illinois, Inc., 107 F.Supp.3d 610, 618-19, 2015 WL 3486971, *6 (S.D.Miss. June 2, 2015) (citing Garcia v. TWC Administration, LLC, Civil Action No. SA: 14-CV-985-DAE, 2015 WL 1737932 (W.D.Tex, April 16, 2015) (<HOLDING>)). Courts that have denied requests for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts (B) recognizing that uniformity has at its heart the equalization of the ratio among all properties in the district (C) holding that a district courts findings under rule 52a are to be liberally construed in support of the district courts judgment (D) recognizing split among district courts (E) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence

Output: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts


Input: Consider Input: (“Due process requires that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his ‘day in court.’ ”). The 1992 statute, as applied in this case, provided State Farm no “fair opportunity” to be heard before it was called upon to divest itself of a significant property interest if it chose to preserve its long-recognized right of subrogation. Instead, the statute placed State Farm in the untenable position of being bound by law to the outcome of private settlement negotiations between the Hassens and UniSun that essentially determined its immediate liability for an award of damages, including noneconomic damages, even though it was not a party to the negotiations and had no available means to assert any legal defenses to the Hassens’ claim. Cf. Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So.2d 604 (Fla.1956) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the statute entitled State Farm 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not (B) holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it (E) holding that a corporation is entitled to due process of law insofar as property rights are concerned so that a money judgment may not be entered against it where it was not a party to a cause and was not served with process even though the principal stockholder was a party to the cause

Output: holding that it is not


Input: Consider Input: that strict scrutiny apply. The question is “whether the [government action] imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). We need not ask whether Bronx Household is “substantially burdened” because the government action here, in specifically targeting religious conduct, is not neutral and not generally applicable. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, 83 S.Ct. 1790; Tenafly Eruv Assoc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 170 (3d Cir.2002) (“[T]here is no substantial burden requirement when government discriminates against religious conduct.”); Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849-50 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). As the district court found, “the unopposed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an individual is immune from antitrust liability for exercising first amendment right to petition the government (B) holding that requiring plaintiffs to show a substantial burden from nonneutral government actions would make petty harassment of religious institutions and exercise immune from the protection of the first amendment (C) holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise (D) holding that the defendant countys two denials of variance permits under the circumstances had to a significantly great extent lessened the prospect of the religious institution being able to construct a temple in the future thus imposing a substantial burden on the religious institutions religious exercise (E) recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion


Output: holding that an individual is immune from antitrust liability for exercising first amendment right to petition the government