In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

been completed and 2) further investigation into issues such as whether there was hair in the shotgun hole was not necessary because, if used at trial, it would have been perceived as “tearing apart the victim.” Thus, Roark’s decision to not investigate was essentially a combination of acts within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and one that falls within the category of strategic or tactical decisions that should not be second guessed. Hollon does not present any persuasive argument that' the investigation was below an objective standard. Consequently, we uphold the district court’s determination that Hollon has not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard. D. Suppression of Hollon’s Confession Hollon argues that Roark rendered in ) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the district court determined 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed (B) holding that a petitioner must show  that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had counsel raised the issue (C) holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different (D) holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different (E) holding that where the record supported the district courts conclusion that statements would not have been suppressed and there had been nothing submitted on appeal to lead to a different conclusion the petitioner had not shown any resulting prejudice from the failure to file a motion to suppress and therefore had not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
(E)

those same arguments. Like the majority of the appellate panel that first reviewed this appeal, we are not persuaded to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this evidential ruling. It was for the trial court to assess defendant’s prior conviction’s probative value in light of its remoteness, and we cannot say that the trial court erred in that judgment. The question is not whether we would have made a different determination in the first instance. Rather, we apply the normal, deferential standard and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the use of the prior conviction for impeachment purposes. The conviction was not stale by the standard in use for assessing remoteness. See Harris, supra, 209 N.J. at 436, 444-45, 38 A.3d 559 (<HOLDING>). And, we cannot say that the trial court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible (B) holding two prior convictions more than ten years old admissible where disorderlypersons offenses bridged the gap (C) holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand (D) holding that evidence of two intervening felony convictions removed taint of remoteness from convictions more than 10 years prior permitting analysis under rule 609a (E) holding that prior distribution and possession convictions that were eight and ten years before the charged conduct occurred were not too remote
(B)

substantially less than that amount. Having reviewed Zee Medical’s complaint, we are satisfied that federal jurisdiction is proper. Given the extensive claims made by Zee Medical in its complaint and the remedies available under those claims, it cannot be said with legal certainty that Zee Medical would recover less than $75,000 if it prevails in this matter. See Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society v. Manganaro, 342 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2003). B. Denial of Preliminary Injunction Ordinarily, this court reviews the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir.2003). Zee Medical, however, argues that the district court applied the wrong standard when it ruled on the motion. See id. at 1188-89 (<HOLDING>). Even if we assume for purposes of this appeal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that regardless of other factors as to harms a movants likelihood of success must carry at least a fair chance of success on the merits in order to warrant interim relief internal quotation omitted (B) holding that under the sliding scale approach a petitioner had made a sufficiently strong showing of likely success on the merits where he presented a case which raises serious legal questions or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of success (C) holding the interests of justice require that in a doubtful case  any error if there is to be one should be committed in favor of allowing a class action citations omitted (D) holding that when the three harm factors tip decidedly in the movants favor the probability of success requirement is somewhat relaxed and the movant need only show questions going to the merits so serious substantial difficult and doubtful as to make them a fair ground for litigation citations and quotations omitted (E) holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest

(D)