instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
omitted)). This is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires a finder of fact to consider numerous relevant factors, including “substantially identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership.” Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Rabine, 161 F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir.1998). Intent to evade union obligations, though not the keystone to proving alter ego in some other circuits, is the most critical factor in the Seventh Circuit. Compare Trs. of Pension, Welfare & Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Favia Elec. Co., 995 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Centor Contractors, 831 F.2d at 1312), with Rd. Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, U.A., AFL-CIO v. Dorn Sprinkler Co., 669 F.3d 790, 794 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). 1. Ownership, management, operation, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights (B) holding that intent to evade collective bargaining obligations is merely one factor among many that must be considered (C) holding that exercising control over other participants is one factor among many that should be considered not a requirement for applying the adjustment (D) holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement (E) holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation
answer:
(B)


question:
those same arguments. Like the majority of the appellate panel that first reviewed this appeal, we are not persuaded to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this evidential ruling. It was for the trial court to assess defendant’s prior conviction’s probative value in light of its remoteness, and we cannot say that the trial court erred in that judgment. The question is not whether we would have made a different determination in the first instance. Rather, we apply the normal, deferential standard and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the use of the prior conviction for impeachment purposes. The conviction was not stale by the standard in use for assessing remoteness. See Harris, supra, 209 N.J. at 436, 444-45, 38 A.3d 559 (<HOLDING>). And, we cannot say that the trial court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible (B) holding two prior convictions more than ten years old admissible where disorderlypersons offenses bridged the gap (C) holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand (D) holding that evidence of two intervening felony convictions removed taint of remoteness from convictions more than 10 years prior permitting analysis under rule 609a (E) holding that prior distribution and possession convictions that were eight and ten years before the charged conduct occurred were not too remote
answer:
(B)


question:
that Edmonds waived his objections to the striking of Ashe and Smith by requesting the trial court to reseat only juror Nelson. On the merits, the State does not dispute the trial court’s finding as to Nelson but argues that the trial court implicitly found that Ashe and Smith were struck for race-neutral, non-pretextual reasons, that the court’s finding was not clearly erroneous, and that the trial court appropriately remedied any harm by seating Nelson. III. We turn to the State’s argument that petitioner waived his Batson argument. The State contends that because petitioner asked for one remedy and received the relief he requested—the reseating of Nelson—he cannot now challenge the court’s remedial actions. See Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 545, 735 A.2d 1061, 1070 (1999)(<HOLDING>). We hold that petitioner did not waive 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal (B) holding that the defendant who was indicted for first degree rape and convicted of sexual battery had no remedy on appeal when he requested that the erroneous lesser nonincluded charge be submitted to the jury (C) holding there are no grounds to appeal when defendant receives the remedy he requested from the trial court (D) holding there is no right to a specific dollar remedy (E) holding mandamus will lie to prevent trial court from exercising jurisdiction it does not have even if there is adequate remedy by appeal
answer:

(C)