In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
--------
Question: Court procedures or under G.L.1956 §§ 16-19-1 and 16-19-6 as to the number of absences from school that were necessary to incur possible liability as a truant. However, the administrative order specifies a threshold number of ten days of absence before a child may be referred either to the Diversion Program or to the formal juvenile calendar. Indeed, administrative order 2010-2 states that “[t]he Intake Department may refer cases to the Truancy calendar if the petition: * * * [h]as at least 10 days of absences and/or states that a student is habitually late or absent from school.” We are confident that a person of average intelligence need neither guess nor speculate about the number of absences that will result in a referral to the Truancy Diversion Program. See Moreau, 15 A.3d at 583 (<HOLDING>). Administrative order 2010-2 also details how 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute defining drug paraphernalia and  564403cl were not unconstitutionally vague for want of certainty and definiteness because they give a person of ordinary intelligence notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden (B) holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague (C) holding that a statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it gives a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly (D) holding flag contempt statute unconstitutionally vague (E) holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague

Answer: (C)


Question: 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir.1993) (“The purpose of NEPA is to protect the environment, not the economic interests of those adversely affected by agency decisions.”); Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 475 (9th Cir.1979) (purely financial interests are outside of NEPA’s zone of interests). Accordingly, we have consistently held that purely economic interests do not fall within NEPA’s zone of interests: “[A] plaintiff who asserts purely economic injuries does not have standing to challenge an agency action under NEPA.” Nevada Land Action Ass’n, 8 F.3d at 716; see also Ranchers Cattleman v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1102 (9th Cir.2005) (an economic injury alone will not support a claim under NEPA); Western Radio Servs. Co. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 903 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Port of Astoria, 595 F.2d at 475 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the cause of action (B) holding that a plaintiff whose only complaint was that agency action would cause economic harm asserted an interest outside nepas zone of interests (C) holding that the plaintiff did not have standing because it was not able to demonstrate how its economic interests fell within the zone of interests protected by the nhpa (D) recognizing cause of action (E) holding that the public interest in expression must be weighed against the plaintiffs economic and noneconomic interests

Answer: (B)


Question: 731, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-199, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004). This inquiry involves evaluating whether a reasonably competent public official would have known that his actions were prohibited by the law at the time he engaged in the conduct in question. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. The standard is one of objective reasonableness. We find that the plain language of the statute and the case law gave clear notice to Defendants that releasing the informa tion in question violated federal law. The words of the DPPA alone are “specific enough to establish clearly the law applicable to particular conduct and circumstances and to overcome qualified immunity.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the case law defining the reach of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statutory language alone even in the total absence of case law can be sufficient to provide fair notice (B) holding statutory violation sufficient cause (C) recognizing that circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to demonstrate a defendants guilt (D) holding that an error can be plain even in the absence of binding case law where it violates an absolutely clear legal norm (E) holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages

Answer:
(A)