In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: UCL and CLRA. In considering whether the plaintiff in Bruno had standing to bring claims arising from the defendants’ gelcap product, when the plaintiff had only purchased the defendants’ liquid product, the court noted that “treatises and the vast majority of persuasive authority indicate that ... the issue of whether a class representative may be allowed to present claims on behalf of others who have similar, but not identical, interests depends not on standing, but on an assessment of typicality and adequacy of representation.” Id. at 530 (citing Greenwood v. Compucredit Corp., No. 4:08-cv-04878, 2010 WL 4807095, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2010); Arevalo v. Bank of Am. Corp., 850 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1017 (N.D.Cal.2011); Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); 7AA Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers have standing to sue (B) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (C) recognizing associational standing when members would have standing in own right (D) holding that because plaintiff had standing to sue for injury arising from his own benefit plan his ability to represent class members with different benefit plans should be analyzed under rule 23 not standing (E) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
[A]: (D)


[Q]: a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, id., and “the court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations.” Warren v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C.Cir.2004). 1. Equal protection “Unless a classification ... is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage,” statutory distinctions are presumed constitutional, and will survive a challenge if the classification is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). Although not every non-suspect legislative classification passes muster under rational basis review, see, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 84 L.Ed.2d 751 (1985) (<HOLDING>), “the judiciary may not sit as a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts (B) holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others (C) holding that a preferential state tax rate for domestic businesses violated the equal protection clause because the states justifications  that the tax promoted domestic industry and encouraged investment in domestic assets  were not legitimate government interests since if they were any discriminatory tax would be valid if the state could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business (D) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety (E) holding that if federal income tax statutes are intended to benefit anyone it is the federal government to whom the withheld tax is to be remitted there is no indication anywhere in the language of the statutes that congress intended to confer rights on employees with respect to the withholding of tax
[A]: (C)


[Q]: no interest in the subject matter litigated” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although the paradigmatic example of a nominal defendant is “a bank or trustee [that] has only a custodial claim to the property,” Colello, 139 F.3d at 677, the term is broad enough to encompass persons who are in possession of funds to which they have no rightful claim, such as money that has been fraudulently transferred by the defendant in the underlying securities enforcement action. See id. at 675; SEC v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 1130-32 (9th Cir.2003) (upholding the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a corporation nominally owned by the defendant’s mother and into which the defendant had channeled proceeds of his securities law violations); SEC v. Wencke, 783 F.2d 829, 838 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Cherif, 933 F.2d at 414. Bustos, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property (B) holding that the court of federal claims had pendant jurisdiction over a state law contract claim that was part of the same case as a claim over which the court of federal claims had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc  1498b (C) holding that court had no supplemental jurisdiction over claim by shareholder for breach of merger agreement that was the subject of the dispute between the merger partners over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction (D) holding that a district court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent permissible under the law of the state in which the district court sits (E) holding that the district court had jurisdiction over the assets of a corporation into which the defendant in the underlying enforcement action had tunneled proceeds of his securities law violations
[A]:
(E)