In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: 918 F.2d 154, 159 (11th Cir.1990). A district court should grant a preliminary injunction only if the movant clearly shows: 1. a substantial likelihood that the mov-ant will prevail on the merits; 2. that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is, not issued; 3. that the potential injury to the mov-ant outweighs the possible harm to the nonmovant; and 4. that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id. This Court will address each element in turn. 1. SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS To begin, the instant ease is controlled by this Court’s decision in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116 (M.D.Fla.1991). In Luckie, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with AAA pursuant to the AMEX Window. Id. The defendants argued th 2nd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Also, in Merrill Lynch v. Noonan, [Current] 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (C) holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision (D) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (E) holding that a specific customer agreement can supersede the amex constitution and requiring arbitration before one of the fora named in the agreement

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: before it was in assumpsit for attorney fees purposes. See Schulz, 67 Haw. at 436, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Higa is not directly on point, its reasoning is a compelling indication of how the Hawaii Supreme Court would rule on the attorney fee question before us. The plaintiffs also seek to distinguish Higa because it involved a client suing his own attorney, and thus in that case there was privity of contract between the two parties. In the present case, Mrs. Helfand was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the defendants and Mr. Helfand. This distinction is irrelevant. Courts have extended the right to sue for breach of contract to intended third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12, 883 P.2d 38, 48 n. 12 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 82 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies (B) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (C) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (D) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract (E) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: a threat to life or freedom.’” Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993)). The incidents of which Petitioner complains simply do not rise to this level. As a child Tjandra witnessed the burning of a church and the destruction of his father’s business. As an adult he lived with the fear that soccer hooligans would hurt his family. Tjandra, however, was never harmed. While we are troubled by the actions of Muslim extremists in Indonesia, this Court does not recognize “isolated incidents that do not result in serious injury” as persecution. Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir.2005). Accordingly, we determine that Tjandra has not been the victim of persecution. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We also determine that Tjandra failed to show 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that isolated criminal acts by unknown assailants resulting in theft of personal property and minor injury were not sufficiently severe to constitute persecution (B) holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants against ethnic chinese indonesians which resulted only in the theft of some personal property and a minor injury is not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution (C) holding that petitioner an ethnic chinese christian from indonesia did not establish a wellfounded fear of future persecution in indonesia because she failed to demonstrate that she would be individually targeted for persecution and country reports indicate that religious discrimination and harassment of ethnic chinese have declined in previous years (D) holding that isolated physical violence and unfulfilled threats perpetrated by serbian citizens against an ethnic albanian in kosovo constituted harassment not persecution (E) holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants  are not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution


Output: (B)