In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

(citations omitted). Kaul believes that because the Court did not include seizing cigarettes fi*om Indians inside a reservation on this list, Stephan lacked jurisdiction to execute the search warrant at Kaul’s store. However, we do not read Oklahoma Tax Commission and Colville as necessarily prohibiting state officers from conducting search and seizure operations within a reservation’s borders under the authority of a federal grant of criminal jurisdiction to the state. Instead, these opinions merely offer several options that state officials may employ to enforce regulatory cigarette tax statutes. Here, Kaul waived the argument that the Kansas statute was regulatory in nature because she did not raise that issue below. Thus, for purposes of this appea 3, 2061, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction (B) recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes  to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians (C) holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation (D) holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians (E) holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization
holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction

commercial, including ... [any maritime contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce], falls under the Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of business in the United States. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 and 202; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2. A seaman’s contract that contains an agreement to arbitrate generally falls under the convention. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1299 (<HOLDING>) (citing Francisco v. STOLT ACHIEVEMENT MT, 293 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous (B) holding implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in some commercial contracts does not extend to atwill employment contracts (C) holding that contracts for an indefinite period are excluded from the statutes coverage (D) holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims (E) holding that the convention and us implementing statutes do not recognize an exception for seaman employment contracts and concluding that such contracts are commercial for purposes of same
holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous

Split-second absurdities are not justified by the actualities of working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is only when an employee is required to give up a substantial measure of his time and effort that com-pensable working time is involved. Id. at 692, 66 S.Ct. at 1195. More recently, in Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir.1984), the Ninth Circuit explained that three factors should be examined to assess whether otherwise compensable time should be considered de minimis, and therefore not compensable: (1) the practical administrative difficulty of recording the additional time; (2) the size of the claim in the aggregate; and (3) whether “the claimants performed the work on a regular basis.” Id. at 1062-63. See also Hill, 751 F.2d at 815 (<HOLDING>). Applying these factors, the Ninth Circuit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to demonstrate retaliation complainedof action must be more than de minimis  (B) holding that fiveday suspension was not a de minimis deprivation (C) holding that district court properlydiscounted four calls as de minimis (D) holding that interruption of postal worker during lunch was de minimis requiring no compensation under the flsa (E) holding that a robbery of 40 to 50 satisfied the de minimis standard

holding that to demonstrate retaliation complainedof action must be more than de minimis