instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
are differences between sanctions under Rule 37(a) and substitution of counsel conditioned on payment of fees, the parallel considerations convince us that the Cunningham rationale applies here. Like Rule 37(a) sanctions, the present situation invokes concerns regarding finality, avoiding piecemeal appeals, and availability of effective appellate review.” Id. Cases from the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits further support interpreting Cunningham as applying more broadly than to Rule 37(a) sanctions alone. The First Circuit recognized in Empresas Omajede, Inc. v. Bennazar-Zequeira, 213 F.3d 6, 9 n. 4 (1st Cir.2000), that Cunningham affirmed its precedents denying interlocutory appeals in the sanctions area. See, e.g., United States v. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Appeal of Licht & Semonoff 796 F.2d 564, 573 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable (B) holding sanctions pursuant to rule 26g not immediately appealable (C) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (D) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order (E) holding an order of rule 37a sanctions against an attorney is immediately appealable under  1291
answer:
holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable


question:
the evidence presented by the summary judgment record in a light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex.2006) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005)). When both sides move for summary judgment, and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court considers both sides’ summary judgment evidence and determines all issues presented. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex.2005). Where the trial court does not specify the g rv., Inc., 798 S.W.2d 606, 615 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the absence of a causal connection 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract (B) holding that erisa provides relief only for clearly ascertainable damages with the intent to make plaintiffs whole which precludes recovery for speculative future harm (C) holding that no recovery exists for speculative damages (D) holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative (E) holding such damages available where local law silent on issue speculative nature of damages does not preclude recovery
answer:
holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract


question:
valid time, place, manner restrictions. New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison Township, 797 F.2d 1250, 1256 (3d Cir.1986). This Circuit has held that “regulations of door-to-door canvassing must be precisely drawn to serve the interests they are designed to further.” Id. at 1255 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)(emphasis in original). In other words, the restriction must be tailored so as not to “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interest.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746. Courts have not been hesitant to find that purported governmental interests, although compelling, do not justify sweeping bans on speech. E.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 424, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original); Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that noncommercial speech is accorded greater protection under the first amendment than is commercial speech and striking down ordinance that imposed a greater restriction on political than on commercial billboards (B) holding that cincinnati could not ban commercial newsracks from public property while allowing noncommercial newsracks even if  the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property (C) holding not only does cincinnatis categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech but in this case the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted (D) recognizing a traditional distinction between the public and governmental acts of sovereign states on the one hand and their private and commercial acts on the other (E) recognizing this distinction
answer:

recognizing that noncommercial speech is accorded greater protection under the first amendment than is commercial speech and striking down ordinance that imposed a greater restriction on political than on commercial billboards