In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

of the statute, the FDA’s regulations, the FDA’s internal interpretation, and precedent all demonstrate that a sterilizer for dental hand-pieces is a “device” as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(h). That being so, both SteriSafe and its accessory SteriDot are within the jurisdiction of the FFDCA. Defendant nevertheless posits three reasons why SteriSafe and SteriDot are not devices. First, defendant argues that the government failed to prove that dental handpieces transmit disease and, thus, that SteriSafe actually prevents disease. Such proof is not required. Congress had two purposes in enacting' the FFDCA: (1) to regulate products that actually prevent disease, and (2) to regulate products that falsely claim that they prevent disease. Because of those d 1006 (9th Cir.1952) (<HOLDING>). Defendant next argues that the Steri-Safe is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the doctor who submitted an expert report did not demonstrate knowledge of cancer treatment he was not qualified to offer an opinion that an earlier diagnosis could have produced a better outcome for the plaintiff (B) holding that a machine that allegedly eliminated lumps from womens breasts was governed by the ffdca even though expert witnesses expressed the unanimous belief that appellants instruments are useless for diagnosis or treatment of any human ailment (C) holding the expert witnesses were protected by witness immunity to ensure expert objectivity (D) holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for  trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis (E) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law
(B)

and the prosecutor, the Court finds, one, there is a factual basis for the entry of the plea[.]” We conclude that the summary of the facts presented by the prosecutor and Defendant’s stipulations are sufficient to establish a factual basis for Defendant’s guilty plea. Specifically, the prosecutor’s statements that the victim “is 80 years of age” and “is crippled in her knees with arthritis and requires a crutch to walk” and that Defendant “told his mother that he would kill her and cut her heart out[,]” “grabbed the victim[,]” and “slung her across the room twice and then hit her with her crutch” provided a sufficient factual basis to support Defendant’s guilty plea. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.1(a) & (e); see also State v. May, 159 N.C. App. 159, 166, 583 S.E.2d 302, 306 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude this argument has no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea (B) holding that district court abused discretion in denying motion to withdraw plea based on intervening supreme court decision that may have rendered factual basis of plea insufficient (C) holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed (D) holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari (E) holding that district court properly considered a police report that the defendant had stipulated contained a factual basis for his plea
(C)

employees. In support of his claim, Gross suggests that our reading of “any benefit of employment” fails to account for the fact that as an anti-discrimination provision, § 4311 protects a broader category of rights than those outlined in § 4316 applicable to service members on leave. In Crews, we first considered the plaintiffs claim under § 4316 and concluded that because subsection (b)(1) requires ‘“only equal but not preferential’ ” treatment for military employees the police department had no obligation under § 4316 to afford preferential scheduling benefits to its Guard employees. Crews, 567 F.3d at 865 (quoting Rogers v. City of San Antonio, 392 F.3d 758, 769 (5th Cir.2004)); see also Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 561, 101 S.Ct. 2510, 69 L.Ed.2d 226 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Despite Gross’s insistence that the language 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that userras predecessor statute did not require employers to provide special benefits unavailable to other employees to military reservists (B) holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed (C) holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits (D) holding that an employers knowledge that an employee was diabetic did not equate to notice that the employees diabetes was so limiting as to be disabling and to require special accommodations (E) holding that a civilian employee injured when her automobile was hit by a military vehicle while she was driving on a road on the employers premises the military base to report to work sustained a compensable injury under the federal employees compensation act

(A)