In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: (emphasis added) (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720). 27 . Faust, 337 S.W.3d at 335 (emphasis added). 28 . Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex.1995). 29 . See Crump, 330 S.W.3d at 218. 30 . Synar v. Union Pac. R. Co., No. 12—99— 00428-CV, 2001 WL 1263573, at *6 (Tex.App.-Tyler Oct. 17, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication). 31 . See id. 32 . See Tex.R. Evid. 803(18); Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556. 33 . C 545 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g). 55 . See id. 56 . See Tex.R. Evid. 401; Nichols, 379 S.W.3d at 387-89. 57 . See Sw. Country Enters., Inc., 991 S.W.2d at 493-94; see also Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(B), 33.2; Tex.R. Evid. 103(a)(2). 58 . See Barraza v. Eureka Co., Inc., 25 S.W.3d 225, 232 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). 59 . See Charter Oak Fire Ins. v. Perez, 446 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed (B) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (C) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (D) holding that testimony of plaintiff and her coworkers regarding cause of her injury was pure conjecture (E) holding that plaintiffs allegations that her supervisor was a lesbian and that she made improper remarks to her including telling the plaintiff to invite her to lunch and making comments about plaintiffs coworkers private lives and sexual preferences   and on one occasion approaching the plaintiff from behind hugging her and whispering in her ear a request for a cookie from another table did not suffice to establish a hostile working environment
[A]: holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed


[Q]: reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts.” Mungin v. State, 982 So.2d 986, 998 (Fla.2006). A. Stipulating to Evidence for the Motion to Suppress Parker’s May 7, 1982, Statement In this claim, Parker contends that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the evidence used to decide whether his May 7, 1982, statement was admissible. Parker’s May 7 statement was admitted during the resentencing proceeding through the testimony of Detective Powers. Because Parker had invoked his right to counsel prior to making the May 7 statement, the admissibility of that statement under United States Supreme Court precedent turns on whether Parker initiated the May 7 contact with law enforcement. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The stipulated evidence included hearsay 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available  unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (B) holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (C) holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications (D) holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (E) holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police
[A]: holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police


[Q]: conflict with the long-term interests of the league as a whole. That is, the policy avoids a detrimental conflict of interests between team shareholders and the league. We disagree, however, that these factors are sufficient to establish as a matter of law that the NFL’s ownership policy does not unreasonably restrain trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The holdings in Broadcast Music, Rothery Storage, and Northwest Stationers, do not throw the “rule of reason” out the window merely because one establishes that a given practice among joint venture participants is ancillary to legitimate and efficient activity — the injury to competition must still be weighed against the purported benefits under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24, 99 S.Ct. at 1565 (<HOLDING>); Northwest Stationers, 472 U.S. at 293-98, 105 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation (B) holding a concerted boycott to be a per se violation of  1 of the sherman act (C) holding that a state as a purchaser of asphalt was a person when suing under the sherman act for restraint of trade (D) holding only that a particular ancillary restraint did not constitute a per se violation of the sherman act and remanding for a determination  of the case under a rule of reason analysis (E) holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se
[A]:
holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation