In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ms. Goren bases her statement of facts on her second amended complaint. That complaint, however, is not before this court. On September 3, 1997, the district court entered a judgment dismissing Ms. Goren’s complaint. Ms. Goren subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to alter or amend judgment to permit filing of a second amended complaint. Ms. Goren attached her proposed second amended complaint to that motion. On October 23, 1998, the court entered an order denying Ms. Goren’s motion. In her opening brief, Ms. Goren devoted nearly her en tire argument to the district court’s decision dismissing her amended complaint. Indeed, there is no “Issue Presented" or meaningful argument regarding the district court’s denial of Ms. Goren’s 93) (<HOLDING>). 5 . At oral argument, Ms. Goren’s counsel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prisoner did not engage in protected conduct when he threatened to file a frivolous grievance (B) holding that attorney who allegedly prepared false private placement memoranda regarding limited partnership did not conduct affairs of enterprise because he did not direct  the legal entities he represented to engage in particular transactions (C) holding that appellant forfeited his complaint regarding his sentence because he did not object at trial (D) holding that the defendant had abandoned any possessory or privacy interest in bags found in the truck he was driving where he stated that he did not own the bags did not know who did and did not know what was in them (E) holding that harold fine did not have direct and independent knowledge because he did not personally conduct the audits that led to the public disclosures
(B)

interim orders issued by arbitration panel were resolution of separate and independent claim and subject to confirmation even though the orders did not dispose of all claims submitted to arbitration); The Home Insurance Company v. RHA/Pennsylvania Nursing Homes, Inc., 127 F.Supp.2d 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (an interim award which adjudicated a portion of a damages claim and ordered the payment of that sum is final even though liability and potential damages issues remained to be resolved with respect to the remainder of the same claim; court held that an arbitration award that fully disposes of a separate and independent claim is final for purposes of confirmation under the FAA even if other claims remain pending); Hart Surgical, Inc. v. Ultracision, Inc., 244 F.3d 231 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Publicis Communication v. True North 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award (B) holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants (C) holding that an award which finally and definitely disposes of a separate independent claim may be confirmed although it does not dispose of all the claims that were submitted to arbitration (D) holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 (E) holding that section nine does not limit confirmation of an award to the district court in the district of arbitration and confirmed a new york arbitration over whose parties the court had personal jurisdiction
(C)

opposing party access to the terms of the agreement between the paying party and the compensated witness. Many courts, including courts in this Circuit, have found that a compensated fact witness is competent to testify as long as the fact that payments were made to that witness is disclosed to the trier of fact. See Jamaica Time Petroleum, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 366 F.2d 156, 158 (10th Cir.1966) (finding that an agreement to pay a reward or “[t]he payment of the reward affects the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given his testimony. These factors are not determinative of competence to testify.”); Goldstein v. Exxon Research and Eng’g Co., No. 95 Civ. 2410, 1997 WL 580599, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 1997); New York v. Solvent Chem. Co., 166 F.R.D. 284, 291 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the “newly discovered evidence” put 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence that the defendant and a witness sold drugs together was relevant to prove how the witness knew the defendant (B) holding that the constitution does not require the government to disclose impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant (C) holding that the appropriate sanction was to require the defendant to disclose the nature of the agreement with the witness (D) recognizing that informing the jury that testifying witness has agreed to cooperate with the government is a doubleedged sword as the existence of such agreement may suggest either that the witness will testify in accordance with the governments wishes regardless of the truth or that the witness will not he under threat of revocation of the agreement should the witness commit perjury (E) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case

(C)