In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

first time a party must specify the statute authorizing attorney’s fees is in the Rule 54 motion (unless otherwise provided by statute or court order). In Missouri, attorney’s fees are not recoverable from another party, except when a contract or statute allows it. Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. banc 2009). The second sentence of the Missouri commissions statute is such an exception to the general Missouri rule. Kraft v. Edwards, 946 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Mo.App.1997). The district judge’s ruling that there was no statutory basis for an award of attorney’s fees is erroneous as a matter of law. On remand, the district court should consider whether to award attorney’s fees. See Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 631 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because this case as tried addressed only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award (B) holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained (C) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence (D) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (E) holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances
holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained

law. Courts were unwilling to recognize a common law cause of action against purveyors of intoxicating beverages because, as a matter of law, consumption, rather than the furnishing of alcohol, was considered the proximate cause of the ultimate damages. See Haafke, 347 N.W.2d at 384; Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Iowa 1982). Thus, dram shop statutes were enacted to enable tort plaintiffs to bridge the proximate cause gap between the sale of an intoxicating beverage and the subsequent injury or damage caused by the intoxicated patron. In exchange for this new claim, the legislature mandated that liquor purveyors were strictly liable and carefully prescribed the means by which liability may be ascertained. Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 227. The statute limits recovery for injuri 984) (<HOLDING>); Bauer v. Dann, 428 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa 
 Holding statements: (A) holding tavern employees could be held liable for negligently furnishing alcohol to a patron in violation of a criminal statute or ordinance (B) holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest (C) holding that employer who failed to take remedial action could be held liable for sexual harassment of employee by subcontractors employees (D) holding that tavern will be held liable for serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated patron who then foreseeably becomes involved in a motor vehicle accident (E) holding tavern owner not liable for injuries sustained when intoxicated patron assaulted a police officer
holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest

n. 7, 713 P.2d at 960 n. 7 (1986) (“Counsel has no right to cast upon the court the burden of searching through a voluminous record to find the ground of an objection. It is counsel’s duty to cite accurately the portions of the record supporting counsel’s position.” (Internal citation omitted.)); Hoang, 93 Hawaii at 336, 3 P.3d at 602 (2000) (“Because the factual basis of [appellant’s] alleged point of error is not part of the record on appeal, this court has no basis upon which to rule on the merits of his claim.” (Citation omitted.)) Even if Appellants’ allegations of fraudulent inducement are taken at face value, they fall short of “clear and convincing” evidence of fraudulent inducement. Honolulu Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Murphy, 7 Haw. App. 196, 202, 753 P.2d 807, 812 (1988) (<HOLDING>). At a more fundamental level, they do not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error but that the finding must be judged in view of the clear and convincing burden of proof (B) holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied (C) holding that the standard of proving fraudulent inducement with respect to written contracts is extremely high and a written contract will be cancelled only in a clear ease of fraud supported by clear and convincing evidence citations omitted (D) holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence (E) holding clear and convincing standard to prove fraud or fraudulent intent and preponderance of the evidence to prove other elements under  727

holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error but that the finding must be judged in view of the clear and convincing burden of proof