In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to support the jury’s verdict. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court to consider the appellant’s remaining point of error. WOMACK, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLER, P.J., and MEYERS, J., joined. COCHRAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which JOHNSON and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined. 1 . Nicotinamide is a substance commonly used as a controlled substance additive. 2 . We have held that the State is no longer required to show what amount of a controlled substance and what amount of an adulterant or dilutant make up a mixture for purposes of possession of a controlled substance. Melton v. State, 120 S.W.3d 339, 344 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). 3 . See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Seals v. State, No. 05-03-01105-CR, slip 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a reviewing court must determine whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime charged (B) holding that when conducting a legal sufficiency review the reviewing court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a state criminal conviction the relevant question under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that in evaluating sufficiency of the evidence in habeas corpus petitions we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that on a review of the sufficiency of the evidence the court determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt
[A]: holding that a reviewing court must determine whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime charged


[Q]: Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word “claimant” in subsection four. Under the plurality’s view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word “claimant” in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of “prevailing party.” This is because, in order for the word “claimant” in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid
[A]: holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence


[Q]: force to effectuate that arrest. Appellant’s claim, however, is not that the officers used excessive force after he stopped resisting or to stop his resistance; his claim is based solely on his assertions that he did not resist arrest, did nothing wrong, and was attacked by the Appellee officers for no reason. Thus, Appellant’s suit “squarely challenges the factual determination that underlies his conviction for resisting an officer,” and if he prevails, “he will have established that his criminal conviction lacks any basis.” Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, 100 Fed. Appx. 321, 324-25 (5th Cir.2004). This type of excessive force claim is, therefore, the type of claim that is barred by Heck in our circuit. Id.-, see also DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 656-57 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Third, Appellant argues that Heck does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that group pleading did not render complaint infirm where complaint provided fair notice of claims (B) holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory (C) holding that arrest made with probable cause and without excessive force does not give rise to iied claim (D) holding that a change in the theory of recovery and one prior amendment is not sufficient to deny a motion to amend the complaint where no evidence of bad faith existed (E) holding that heck barred appellants excessive force claim where his complaint maintained that he did not resist arrest and did nothing wrong and provided no alternative pleading or theory of recovery
[A]:
holding that group pleading did not render complaint infirm where complaint provided fair notice of claims