In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 563 U.S. 421, 438, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 179 L.Ed.2d 843 (2011). Nonetheless, the District Court and the Plan have cited to the language in the Summary Plan Description (“SPD”) as the language of the Plan. We, too, adopt this approach. See US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 133 S.Ct. 1537, 1543 n.1, 185 L.Ed.2d 654 (2013) ("Because everyone in this case has treated the language from the summary description as though it came from the plan, we do so as well.”). Moreover, insofar as McLaughlin and J.J.M. now contend that the SPD was not "designated a plan document” and so cannot control here, McLaughlin Reply Br. 1, we deem this argument forfeited because it is raised solely in the reply brief. See Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . We have considered McLaughlin's and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an argument not raised in opening brief is waived (B) holding that a party waives an argument that it raises in the background section of its brief but not in the argument section (C) holding argument waived for failure to raise it in opening brief (D) holding that argument not raised in opening brief is waived (E) holding that an argument is not preserved unless a party raises it in its opening brief

A: (E)
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Q: Plaintiff did not meet the notice requirements of the CFRA and the FMLA. Plaintiff did not notify Defendant in advance that Plaintiff would be absent from March 31, 2014 through April 3, 2014. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo., Exhs. Vol. II. Additionally, Plaintiff did not call in sick or ask someone to call Defendant on his behalf on any of those four days of absence, even though Plaintiff made 26 phone calls to individuals or entities other than McCale or Defendant. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo,, Exhs. Vol. II. Thus, unlike in Avila, upon which Plaintiff relies, Plaintiff did not call in sick during his absence from March 31, 2014 through April 3,2014. See Avila, 165 Cal.App.4th at 1258, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, two weeks prior to Plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party (B) holding that absence from prior state was temporary during the time it was contemplated that the parent and child would return to the other state (C) holding that spouse was not required to return to work immediately upon divorce to avoid judicial imputation of income (D) holding that calling in sick during an absence and providing hospital forms describing the illness upon return to work is sufficient notice (E) holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights

A: (D)
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Q: proceeding against him. 65 . 221 B.R. 49 (Bankr.D.Conn.1998). 66 . Id. at 51. 67 . Bassett, 221 B.R. at 55. 68 . Id. 69 . 11 U.S.C. § 550(a). 70 . Id. at 1322. 71 . Id. 72 .The “mere conduit” exception is “an equitable exception to the literal statutory language of ‘initial transferee,' ... for initial recipients who are ‘mere conduits’ with no control over the fraudulently-transferred funds.” Harwell, 628 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir.2010). Because SunTrust was the end recipient of the Transfers, it certainly was not a mere conduit. 73 . 446 B.R. 564 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2011). 74 . ATM Financial, 446 B.R. at 566. 75 . Id. 76 . Id. 77 . Id. at 568-71. 78 . Id. at 570-71. 79 . 11 U.S.C. § 101(54); Fla. Stat. § 726.102(12). 80 . See In re Wayne, 237 B.R. 506, 508-09 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1999) (<HOLDING>). See also Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred (B) recognizing potential for fraudulent transfer in foreclosure context if debtor enjoyed significant equity in property but received little or no value from the transfer (C) holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred the claims in the case were still ripe for review (D) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (E) holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default

A:
(A)
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