In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals
[A]: holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision


[Q]: by jury is a fundamental guaranty of the rights and liberties of the people. C Prudential that the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right means that the starting point of our analysis is a presumption against the waiver of this constitutional right. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co., 301 U.S. at 393, 57 S.Ct. at 811-12; In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132 (giving right to trial by jury “same protections as other constitutional rights”); accord Ex parte Cupps, 782 So.2d 772, 775 (Ala.2000) (construing scope of contractual jury waiver strictly and narrowly “in deference to the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial”); see also Note, 58 Baylor L.Rev. at 259. But see Lowe Enters. Residential Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 92, 40 P.3d 405, 410 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Despite the existence of a presumption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy (B) holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts (C) holding that german law presumptively confers joint custody upon both parents until a court enters a contrary order (D) holding  without reference to supreme court case law to the contrary  that in nevada contractual jury waivers are presumptively valid (E) holding appellate waivers are enforceable if invoked by the government
[A]: holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy


[Q]: work-related limitation of function” .... 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00A; see Markle, 324 F.3d at 188 (discussing the revised regulations); see also Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders and Traumatic Brain Injury, 65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 50772 (Aug. 21, 2000). The ALJ found that plaintiff had severe physical and mental impairments consisting of diabetes mellitus with retinopathy and an affective mood disorder. [AR 21-22], Therefore, under both Ninth Circuit law and the Commissioner’s newer, more demanding regulatory standard, plaintiff has “a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function” within the meaning of section 12.05. See Fanning, 827 F.2d at 633 n. 3; see also Markle, 324 F.3d at 188 (<HOLDING>); Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 973 (6th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a city which was sued by an electrical contractor for breach of contract following a dispute regarding additional costs necessary to complete electrical work could maintain a common law indemnity claim against a design professional to the extent the city is found to be without fault for the conduct which forms the basis of the indemnity claim (B) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (C) holding that because defendants made the statements in the press release and signed the sec disclosure forms in light of a preliminary finding of a primary violation it could not dismiss the  20a action (D) holding that even absent the commissioners clarifying regulation the severity of the claimants other impairments obstructive pulmonary disease hypertension obesity and gout which limit him to some forms of light work constitute impairments imposing additional and significant workrelated limitations of function  (E) holding neither the warrant requirement nor the probable cause requirement should apply to noninvestigatory workrelated purposes or for investigations of workrelated misconduct 
[A]:
holding that a city which was sued by an electrical contractor for breach of contract following a dispute regarding additional costs necessary to complete electrical work could maintain a common law indemnity claim against a design professional to the extent the city is found to be without fault for the conduct which forms the basis of the indemnity claim