instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
ones in the present case, are capable of sustaining “direct physical loss or damage.” The definition of “physical,” as provided in the Oxford English Dictionary, is “[o]f or relating to natural phenomena perceived through the senses (as opposed to the mind); of or relating to matter or the material world; natural; tangible, conCrete.” Oxford English Dictionary, Ohio courts have recognized that “[m]oney deposited in a fund is intangible property,” Walther v. Central Trust Co., N.A., 70 Ohio App.3d 26, 32, 590 N.E.2d 375 (Ohio Ct.App.1990), and that “[i]ntangible personal property, by its very nature, is not capable of being physically possessed.” Denezza v. Denezza, 1996 WL 111812, *2, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 935, at *5 (Ct.App. Mar. 15, 1996) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); see also Falck v. United States, 2005 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing limited partnership interest as intangible personal property (B) recognizing that property not subject to physical seizure such as mutual fund shares are intangible property (C) recognizing that the government may seek a personal judgment specific property or substitute property (D) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (E) recognizing that partnership property is a type of ownership
answer:
(A)


question:
for a rational jury to find that Defendant Cloud was a member of the conspiracy for which he was indicted. The evidence demonstrated that Defendant Cloud combined his money together with Hall to purchase large quantities of drugs on repeated occasions. Defendant Hall testified that they would pool their money together and buy an eighth or a quarter of a kilogram of crack cocaine “every day almost.” In addition, Defendant Cloud sold drugs on repeated occasions to Collier, Felix, Wilson, Ralph Jones, Jermaine Jones, and Walker. Notably, Defendant Cloud’s distribution to Jermaine Jones occurred two to three times per week over the period in question. This evidence clearly can establish more than a buyer/seller relationship; it suffices to establish a conspiracy. See Brown, 332 F.3d at 373 (<HOLDING>). 2. Defendant Abdullah The evidence is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a close relationship between alleged conspirators and repeated large volume transactions were sufficient to establish a conspiracy (B) holding that the defendants purchase or sale of a large volume of narcoticsin that case one kilogram of cocainecreates an inference that he is a willful member of the conspiracy (C) holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators (D) holding that while a simple buy and sell transaction is not sufficient for proof of a conspiracy repeated transactions for large quantities are sufficient to support an inference that the buyer and seller were engaged in a conspiracy (E) holding that evidence of specific uncharged drug trafficking offenses were not extrinsic to prosecution for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine where the events occurred within the time period of the alleged conspiracy and were demonstrative of the conspirators conduct
answer:
(A)


question:
the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law in requiring production of the document covered by item (2) because the document is not privileged. The only document covered by item (2) is the employment agreement between Jenney and Airdata. Jenney cannot seriously contend that the employment agreement is protected by the attorney-client privilege be- ■ cause both he and Airdata had copies of the agreement before Jenney retained his former attorney to negotiate the retirement agreement. The fact that Jenney may have given a copy of the employment agreement to the attorney negotiating the retirement agreement does not convert the nonprivileged employment agreement into a privileged document. See Tober v. Sanchez, 417 So.2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>); cf. Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So.2d 263, 266 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a judgment debtors trust fund records are not protected by the attorneyclient privilege because djocuments which are not privileged in the hands of the client cannot be shielded by transferring them to the attorney (B) holding that if documents are privileged in the hands of the client they retain that privilege when given to an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice (C) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense (D) holding that discussions between management personnel concerning legal advice given by attorney is privileged even when attorney is not physically present (E) holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client
answer:

(E)