TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: The State, by contrast, argues that because the court’s summary denial of Pinholster’s claim was an adjudication on the merits, we apply the usual deference required by AEDPA. Under our precedent, the California Supreme Court’s denial of Pinholster’s petition for writ of habeas corpus “on the substantive ground that it is without merit,” Pinholster II, 525 F.3d at 754, constitutes a decision on the merits of his federal claim. See Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that “the California Supreme Court’s denial of a habeas petition without comment or citation constituted a decision on the merits of the federal claims” (citing Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc))); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has not addressed the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted (B) holding that we must first determine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal (C) holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred (D) recognizing that we construe postcard denials such as these to be decisions on the merits citing hunter 982 f2d at 348 (E) recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: basis in which defendants are considered. I question whether that concern for individuality exists under a system which not only admits expert testimony deduced without examining the subject but also, as in this case, accepts the possibility that jurors will allow that evidence, rather than factors more personal to a defendant’s crime and character, to effectively condemn that individual to death. 1 . As the Court of Criminal Appeals admitted, "the State’s case at [Flores’] punishment [hearing], to some extent, rested upon Dr. Griffith's testimony.” Flores v. State, 871 S.W.2d 83, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983) (allowing the use of psychological testimony on a defendant’s alleged "future dangerousness”); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence (B) recognizing that texas courts have adopted the aamr definition of mental retardation providing that mental retardation must manifest before age of 18 years (C) holding that the sentencing structure allowed the jury to give mitigating effect to petitioners prison record (D) holding that the key under pewy i  is that the jury be able to consider and give effect to a defendants mitigating evidence in imposing sentence (E) holding that the sentencing procedure was inadequate in failing to allow jury to give mitigating effect to defendants mental retardation and abusive background

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: the automatic stay exists to give debtors the time necessary to develop a successful reorganization plan. See Shugrue v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 922 F.2d 984, 989 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 50,116 L.Ed.2d 28 (1991); Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir.1984). Once the bankruptcy proceeding is dismissed, neither the goal of a successful reorganization nor the debtor’s right to the automatic stay continues to exist. Accordingly, it no longer serves any purpose to determine whether the bankruptcy court properly lifted the automatic stay; the appeal has become moot. See Armel Laminates, Inc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Income Property Builders, Inc.), 699 F.2d 963, 964 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); cf. Omoto v. Ruggera (In re Omoto), 85 B.R. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appeal challenging a bankruptcy court order lifting the automatic stay became moot when the underlying bankruptcy case was dismissed (B) holding that the otherwise harmless violation of the automatic stay did not suffice to deprive the irs of the postpetition interest setoff to which  it would have been entitled had it first sought a lifting of the stay from the bankruptcy court (C) holding that bankruptcy court order that a stay applied to a particular party was a final order and noting that bankruptcy court orders lifting or denying relief from an automatic stay are final for purposes of appeal (D) holding that bankruptcy court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over related case after dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case (E) holding that an appeal challenging a bankruptcy court order approving a foreclosure sale became moot upon dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case

SOLUTION:
(A)