TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: do not apply in ... [piroceedings relating to probation." - Ind. Evidence Rule 101(c)(@2). A probation revocation hearing is not to be equated with an adversarial criminal proceeding. Cox v. State 706 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind.1999) (citing Isaac v. State, 605 N.E2d 144, 149 (Ind.1992)). Rather, a revocation hearing is a narrow inquiry, and its procedures are more flexible than those of a criminal proceeding. Id. In revocation hearings, judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability, including expert testimony and scientific evidence. Carter v. State, 706 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind.1999) (noting that it is beyond doubt that urinalysis has achieved a sufficient level of scientific reliability to be accepted into evidence); see also Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 550 (<HOLDING>); of - Pitman v. State, 749 N.E.2d 557, 559 
 Holding statements: (A) holding hearsay admissible in revocation hearings (B) holding that certified charging informations and police reports are deemed admissible in revocation hearings (C) holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress (D) holding that neither rule 11 nor the protections of boykin apply to probation revocation hearings and observing that less process is due in prison disciplinary proceedings than in probation revocation hearings (E) holding that because the rules of evidence including the rule against hearsay do not apply to sentencing hearings the district court did not err in relying on hearsay in ordering restitution

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: a right to enjoy over the land of another for the benefit of the easement holder’s land, but it does not create an interest in the land itself." (footnote omitted; emphasis added)). 2 . 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 100 (2004) (footnotes omitted); see Cameron v. Barton, Ky., 272 S.W.2d 40, 42 (1954) ("Appellant finally contends that the easement in controversy was extinguished by merger when a former owner of the dominant estate bought an adjoining lot which offered a means of ingress and egress to and from the Highway Department’s property. The answer to this contention is that the doctrine of merger could not apply because the former owner of the dominant estate did not acquire the ser-vient estate." (emphasis added)); Sievers v. Flynn, 305 Ky. 325, 204 S.W.2d 364 (1947) (<HOLDING>); City of Franklin v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that owners of a dominant estate had a duty to keep the easement in a proper state of repair to avoid damaging the servient estate through erosion (B) holding that the burden on the servient estate cannot be increased without the consent of the owners of the servient estate and that the owner of the dominant estate to which the appurtenant easement is attached has no power to convey or expand use of that easement in connection with a tract of land owned by another (C) holding that an easement is not a separate estate when dominant and servient tracts are under the same ownership (D) holding that an express easement ran with the dominant estate (E) recognizing that the dominant easement owner not the servient estate owner bears responsibility for maintaining an easement

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: tow-truck operators intended by Congress. On the other hand, some federal and state courts that have considered the towing industry, and in particular the preservation or storage of a vehicle after it has been towed, have held that state causes of action relating to storage and disposition of towed vehicles are not preempted by the Act. See, e.g., Rhode Island Public Towing Ass’n, Inc. v. State, (No. CV-96-454 ML, Feb. 28, 1997) (D.R.I.1997) (not published in F.Supp.) (concluding “that the regulation of storage rates is not sufficiently related to a price, route, or service of a tow truck” and therefore the state regulation of those rates was not preempted by § 14501(c) (emphasis added)); CPF Agency Corp. v. Sevel’s 24. Hour Towing Serv., 132 Cal.App.4th 1034, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 120 (2005) (<HOLDING>). See also Ware v. Tow Pro Custom Towing & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fehbas complete preemption provision closely resembles erisas express preemption provision and precedent interpreting the erisa provision thus provides authority for cases involving the fehba provision (B) holding that the courts statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature and is thus not subject to waiver or estoppel (C) holding trial court abused its discretion by not extending the time for service where the statute of limitations had run and where service had been achieved at the time of the hearing on the motion to dismiss (D) holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations (E) holding that state statute imposing limitations on liensalepreparation fees had only a remote relationship to towing companys price route or service and thus did not come within the purview of the preemption provision of  14501c

SOLUTION:
(E)