instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
contract claims under general liability policies. See Keystone Filler & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. American Mining Ins. Co., 179 F.Supp.2d 432 (M.D.Pa.2002); Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria County v. Int’l Ins. Co., 454 Pa.Super. 374, 685 A.2d 581 (1996) (en banc); see also Augenblick v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 99-3419, 1999 WL 975118 (E.D.Pa. Oct.8, 1999). General liability policies provide the insured coverage for personal injury or property damage resulting from an “occurrence,” and are intended “to protect the insured from liability fo e in Redevelopment Authority — that there is no ‘occurrence’ if the underlying claim is one merely for breach-of-contract — has been followed by numerous state and federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania.”) (citing cases); Augenblick, 1999 WL 975118, at *2, 5 (<HOLDING>). In contrast to those cases, U.S. Specialty’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer (B) holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract (C) holding that insureds breach of contract suit against insurer raised a coverage issue which was not settled by insurers payment of only part of what insured was claiming in breach of contract action (D) holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract (E) holding insurer did not have to cover insured for a breach of contract because it was not an accident
answer:
holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer


question:
language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability “from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik’s] attendance” it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik’s attendance at the gym — in essence all of Sydlik’s claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release
answer:
holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release


question:
was involved.” Finally, we are not persuaded by Quin-tana’s argument that the government’s presentation of evidence that might have indicated Quintana was a manager necessarily demonstrated that the government was on notice regarding the managerial role criterion. In any drug conspiracy hearing, questions may be asked in an attempt to demonstrate the defendant’s involvement. Such questions do not mean that the government is attempting to prove the defendant served in a particular capacity. Based on the general nature of Quinta-na’s objections, and the course of the proceedings as just described, we are convinced that Quintana’s objections were not sufficiently specific to preclude the district court’s reliance on the PSR. See United, States v. Flores, 9 F.3d 54, 55-56 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also, United States v. Coleman, 132 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioners general objection to each and every recommendation was not specific enough to preserve an issue under section 10e (B) holding that a defendants general objection to his psrs recommendation of a sentence increase did not serve as an objection to specific factual allegations in the psr (C) holding that error was preserved by running objection because of defendants immediate objection to states specific question in combination with trial courts comments showing that it understood nature of defendants objection (D) holding that general objection did not preserve error on appeal (E) holding that an objection was adequate when the judge cut short the objection and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to explain his objection fully
answer:

holding that petitioners general objection to each and every recommendation was not specific enough to preserve an issue under section 10e