TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: to two judicially cognizable interests. Id. at 560. First, the partisan-elections regime makes the process of getting on the general-election ballot more costly and time consuming. As Nix argues, courts have recognized that “[s]uch ballot-access requirements impose an ‘injury-in-faet,’ not only because non-compliance prevents ‘candidates’ from ‘appearing] on the ... ballot,’ but also because even compliance requires ‘significant amounts of time, money, personnel, and energy,’ which are limited ‘campaign resources’ that could have been ‘allocate[d]’ elsewhere.” Appellants’ Opening Br. 19-20 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 856-58 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 n. 9, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Second, Nix alleges that Kinston’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search (B) holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance (C) holding that candidates had ample standing to challenge ballotaccess requirements (D) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract (E) holding that candidates had standing to challenge requirements for appearing on the generalelection ballot as independents even though they could have chosen to run in a party primary

SOLUTION: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search

PROBLEM: did not present any evidence before the district court to meet his burden of showing that the affidavit, which directly corroborates Johnson’s testimony before the magistrate judge, is false or unreliable. Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that the district court erred, we readily conclude that any error was harmless. B. Credibility of Witnesses The district court’s findings of fact at a revocation hearing are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316, 318 (11th Cir.1993). “The credibility of a witness is in the province of the factfinder and this court will not ordinarily review the factfinder’s determination of credibility.” United States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412, 413 (11th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We defer to the lower court’s credibility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony (B) holding jury is sole judge of witness credibility and may believe some witnesses and refuse to believe others (C) holding jury as judge of credibility may believe all some or none of the testimony (D) holding in the context of a criminal trial that a courts choice of who to believe is conclusive unless the judge credits exceedingly improbable testimony (E) holding that where testimony is inherently improbable the court may choose to disregard it

SOLUTION: holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony

PROBLEM: in her favor on her sleep apnea claim, and summary judgment was therefore appropriate on Counts 1 and 3 of plaintiffs first amended complaint. See Biester, 77 F.3d at 1266. D. Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in hiring Mullins and in entrusting a company truck to him because defendant knew or should have known that Mullins suffered from sleep apnea and was at an increased risk of falling asleep on the job while driving. As the district court noted, in order to survive summary judgment on either of these claims, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligent act of Mullins in falling asleep at the wheel. See DeMatteo v. Simon, 112 N.M. 112, 812 P.2d 361, 363 (Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Valdez v. Warner, 106 N.M. 305, 742 P.2d 517, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for a plaintiff to recover on claim of negligent hiring the negligent hiring of the employee must have been the proximate cause of the injury at issue (B) holding that claim that counsel was ineffective for allowing defendant to proceed while incompetent was facially insufficient where defendant did not allege he actually was incompetent to proceed to trial or insane at the time of his offense (C) holding that if plaintiffs could not establish that the particular agent orange causing injury to the plaintiff was manufactured by that defendant then the burden would shift to each defendant to establish that its product could not have caused the plaintiffs injury or alternatively that it should only be responsible for a proportion of the damage (D) holding that the statute of limitations begins to run under federal law when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims (E) holding that to recover on claim of negligent entrustment plaintiff must establish that 1 defendant entrusted its vehicle to the entrustee 2 defendant knew or should have known that the entrustee was an incompetent driver and 3 the entrustees incompetence caused the injury at issue

SOLUTION:
holding that for a plaintiff to recover on claim of negligent hiring the negligent hiring of the employee must have been the proximate cause of the injury at issue