In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: a “public official,” places a great emphasis on two of the elements: (1) the statutory powers and duties of a position, and (2) whether that position exercised sovereign power. See, e.g., Spaulding, 102 Iowa at 649, 72 N.W. at 291 (concluding that the treasurer of the commissioners of pharmacy was not a public officer because the position of treasurer “was a creation of the commission ... and at all times subject absolutely to their control”); McKinley, 228 Iowa at 1189-91, 293 N.W. at 451 (concluding that county engineer was an “official” because he furnished a bond and took an oath of office; but more importantly because several statutes defining the powers and duties of the county engineer delegated certain sovereign powers to that position); Whitney, 232 Iowa at 71, 4 N.W.2d at 398 (<HOLDING>); Hutton, 235 Iowa at 56, 16 N.W.2d at 20 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (C) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was an employee not an official and therefore entitled to benefits under the workers compensation act (D) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was not an official because she was not required to give bond or take an oath none of the statutes impose upon her the exercise of discretion in any way they delegate no sovereign power to her (E) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment

Answer: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment


Question: United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d 865, 880 (6th Cir.1994). B. Sufficiency of the evidence K. Kennedy and Scarborough moved for judgments of acquittal at the close of the government’s proof, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain their convictions. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 29(a). The district court considered and denied the motions, and neither defendant renewed his or her respective motion at the close of all the evidence, see Swidan, 888 F.2d at 1080, or within 14 days after their guilty verdicts,' see Fed. R.Crim.P. 29(c)(1). They have thus failed to preserve their rights to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in the absence of a miscarriage of justice. See Swidan, 888 F.2d at 1080; see also United States v. Faymore, 736 F.2d 328, 334 (6th Cir.1984) '(<HOLDING>).' Both K. Kennedy and Scarborough conceded at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice (B) holding that the defendants insufficientevidence claim was barred by his failure to renew his rule 29 motion at the close of all the evidence because there was no manifest miscarriage of justice (C) holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence (D) holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial (E) holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence

Answer: holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice


Question: Inc., 412 F.3d at 385. SPI contends that ELIT is a coined term without any English meaning and that the ELIT Marks are thus fanciful and entitled to maximum protection under the Lanham Act. But a coined term is not a “fanciful” one merely because it cannot be found in Webster’s Third. To the contrary, “[a] slight misspelling of a word will not generally turn a descriptive word into a nondescriptive mark.” 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition '§ 11:31 (4th ed.). “If the misspelling is so phonetically identical to the original descriptive term that buyers will recognize it as descriptive, then the misspelled mark is still ’descriptive.’ ” Id.; see also Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446, 455, 31 S.Ct. 456, 55 L.Ed. 536 (1911) (<HOLDING>). Thus, “C-Thru” has been held descriptive in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract (B) holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong (C) holding that the defendants reference to the plaintiffs trademark in the metatags of the defendants web page was a violation of trademark law (D) holding that a trademark in ruberoid  a misspelling of rubberoid  was descriptive and did not become  arbitrary by being misspelled (E) holding that irreparable injury exists in a trademark case when the party seeking the injunction shows that it will lose control over the reputation of its trademark pending trial

Answer:
holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract