In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: to survive. See Plaintiffs’ Brief, 9-10 citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2) general notice pleadings standard remains intact after Twombly) Because this question goes to the very heart of the matter, it must be addressed first. To recapitulate, this Court’s April 2007 Opinion weighed the sufficiency of the “enterprise” allegations in accordance with the Third Circuit’s ruling in Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.1984). See 365 B.R. at 548. Seville stated that nothing more than general notice pleading was required for pleading a RICO enterprise. Seville relied, implicitly, on the long-standing rule regarding notice pleading first enunciated in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (<HOLDING>) But two months after this Court’s April 2007 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief  (B) holding that a pro se complaint  should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief (C) holding that dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (D) holding that a complaint will not be dismissed unless it appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim (E) recognizing the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief

Answer: holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief 


Question: provider in the course of treatment. In cases involving successive tortfeasors whose separate causal contributions to the plaintiff’s harm can be measured, the doctrine of joint and several liability applies only to the enhanced portion of the injury. See Keeton et al. § 52, at 352 (discussing distinction between original tortfeasor’s liability, which encompasses entire injury, and treating physician’s liability, which extends only to negligent treatment); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. c. 17. Even though the original tortfeasor may be held hable for both the original and the enhanced injury, the imposition of entire liability is only temporary. The original tortfeasor, whose duty is of a different character and who is not in pari delicto with a successive 35, 42 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Thus liability for the enhanced injury may be 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor (B) holding that contribution will lie where no statute precludes recovery from the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought (C) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because it was not an innocent party (D) recognizing a right to contribution (E) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because claim properly was for contribution

Answer: recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor


Question: (3) Dr. Hickman’s observation that Seever’s surgeries, residual pain, and physical limitations “have taxed his psychological coping abilities,” ApltApp. at 372. But Dr. Hick man interpreted this information as presenting no more than a slight impairment—meaning that he could still function well—as to understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions, and he declined to identify any other mental capabilities affected by Seever’s depression. We will not fault the ALJ for failing to interpret Seever’s symptoms and test results differently than Dr. Hickman. See Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1022 (10th Cir.1996) (observing that an ALJ may not substitute his lay opinion for a medical opinion); Hamilton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1500 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Nor are we convinced that the ALJ should have 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that this court may not reweigh evidence (B) recognizing this method (C) recognizing this presumption (D) recognizing this distinction (E) recognizing this rule

Answer:
recognizing this method