In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the only issues to be determined by the reviewing court were whether the Commission acted within the scope of its authority and whether the order complained of is reasonable and not arbitrarily made. See, In re Proposed Amend. to Title 291, 264 Neb. 298, 646 N.W.2d 650 (2002); In re Application of E. Neb. Non-stock Trucking Coop, 243 Neb. 662, 501 N.W.2d 712 (1993). The district court should have addressed those issues in this case. We do so here. The fact that § 75-110 gives the Commission authority to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations which it “deems necessary to regulate persons within the commission’s jurisdiction” does not require the Commission to exercise such authority in any given instance. See In re Application No. C-1889, 264 Neb. 167, 647 N.W.2d 45 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Under § 84-907.08, the Commission could 
 Holding statements: (A) holding some competitive rules clearly related to ratemaking power and thus within commissions constitutional authority to promulgate (B) recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure (C) holding statutory authority of commission to promulgate rules to interpret law does not impose affirmative rulemaking requirement (D) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (E) recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence
[A]: holding some competitive rules clearly related to ratemaking power and thus within commissions constitutional authority to promulgate


[Q]: for the district court to grant his motion to withdraw his plea. But Harvey has not challenged the district court's ultimate finding that he was competent to stand trial based on the court's consideration of the opinions of all three psychiatrists. In light of the district court's unchallenged and supported determination that Harvey was competent to stand trial (and therefore competent to plead), Harvey cannot argue that the court committed obvious error in failing to sua sponte permit him to withdraw his plea on the basis of his "marginal competence." Nor can he claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue Harvey's marginal competency as a reason for withdrawing the plea. Harvey's claims related to his competency therefore fail. { 18 We affirm. 1 . The court stat Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 940-42 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel (B) holding an attorneys mistaken prediction about a possible sentence does not render a defendants plea unknowing and involuntary (C) holding that a defense attorneys failure to uncover a defendants prior felony convictions and the attorneys inaccurate sentencing prediction did not render the defendants plea unknowing and involuntary because the defendant knew at the time he pleaded guilty what his sentence might be (D) holding that ineffective assistance can render a guilty plea involuntary (E) holding that an inaccurate sentencing estimate did not render a plea unknowing unintelligent or involuntary because the defendant was informed of the statutory maximum
[A]: holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel


[Q]: case in a court of law. The court of law would then have to decide whether the entire contract is valid simply in order to determine whether the arbitration clause is valid such that the case may be submitted to arbitration. Obviously, however, at this point res judicata would render any action taken by an arbitrator superfluous and irrelevant, and thus defeat the entire purpose of the arbitration clause, since the court of law would have already decided the larger substantive issue of contractual validity. The law under the FAA and Buckeye, therefore, mandates a different result. In the wake of Buckeye, courts have ruled that challenges to the entire contract, such as this one, are subject to arbitration. See, e.g., Sleeper Farms v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.3d 98, 102-03 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Community State Bank v. Strong, 485 F.3d 597, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while the determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement is for the court the enforcement of pleading requirements before the arbitrator is a procedural matter for the arbitrator (B) holding that the arbitrator was without jurisdiction to consider an issue which was not included in the written notice of arbitration and was added on the first day of the arbitration hearing (C) holding if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself  an issue that goes to the making of the agreement to arbitrate  the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it otherwise claims involving the contract generally should be decided by the arbitrator (D) holding that the issue of whether contract which contained arbitration agreement was illegal should be properly decided by arbitrator not court (E) holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement
[A]:
holding that while the determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement is for the court the enforcement of pleading requirements before the arbitrator is a procedural matter for the arbitrator