In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: with ever since his age of 13 and believes that this criminal record and his continued violation of the law does require a sentence at the top of the guideline range.” Id. at 8. I. A. Commerce Clause Challenge to Section 922(g)(1) Williams first challenges the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute as it applies to his possession of the Smith and Wesson revolver. Williams posits that because he possessed the gun solely within the State of Wisconsin, and because the record reveals no substantial connection between his possession of the gun and interstate commerce, Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to reach his possession of the gun. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Williams did not make this argument below, so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce (B) holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (C) holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that gunfree school zones act of 1990 which proscribed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school exceeded congressional authority under commerce clause because it reached conduct that did not substantially affect or have a meaningful connection with interstate commerce (E) holding that the gunfree school zones act exceeds congress power under the commerce clause
[A]: holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce


[Q]: its discretion by modifying the timesharing agreement without evidence that the welfare of the minor child would be promoted by returning him to his former school in Lake County and changing the timesharing arrangement to have the father assume the primary timesharing responsibilities. See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2014); Holland v. Holland, 140 So.3d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 584 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new hearing. On remand, the court shall take evidence and use the best interests of the child standard to determine if modification is in the child’s best interests in light of the parties’ inability to agree which school the minor child will attend. See, e.g., Watt v. Watt, 966 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Once that determination is made, the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification (B) holding that a hearing is required when a modification of parenting time would change the established custodial environment (C) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (D) holding that a custodial parents move to a foreign state without more is not a substantial change of circumstances that would support a modification of custody (E) holding that parties inability to agree on which private high school child would attend constituted substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of parenting plan
[A]: holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification


[Q]: to those aggrieved employees if we did not discuss it. We have held that an EEOC civil suit may allege any discrimination “stated in the charge itself or discovered in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge, provided such additional discrimination was included in the EEOC ‘reasonable cause’ determination and was followed by compliance with the conciliation procedures I of the Act.” EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 553 F.2d 579, 580 (9th Cir.1976). Similarly, in EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir.1994), we held that the EEOC could assert an employee’s discriminatory layoff claim as it was “like and reasonably related to” her charge which alleged discriminatory failure to recall and rehire. See also Vasquez v. Cty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). We “consider [a] plaintiffs civil claims to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding individual employee may assert unexhausted retaliation claim if the later claim is reasonably related to the allegations in the employees timely filed charge (B) holding sexual harassment claim was not like or related to retaliation allegations and therefore was outside the scope of the administrative charge (C) recognizing that a claim is administratively exhausted if it is specifically stated in grows out of or is reasonably related to the substance of the allegations in an administrative charge or complaint (D) holding that regarded as claim is reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability alleged in eeoc charge (E) holding that retaliation claim was reasonably related to prior sex discrimination claim
[A]:
holding sexual harassment claim was not like or related to retaliation allegations and therefore was outside the scope of the administrative charge