In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

court failed to question any of the prospective jurors regarding their understanding and acceptance of the first Zehr principle, defendant is presumed innocent of the charges against him. With regard to the second Zehr principle, the State’s burden of proof, the circuit court questioned the prospective jurors as to whether they would sign the appropriate verdict form if the State had or had not met its burden of proof. This was a “general question concerning the juror’s willingness to follow the law” (177 Ill. 2d R. 431, Committee Comments, at lxxix) which did not comply with the 2007 amended rule’s requirement that the court question the prospective jurors regarding their understanding and acceptance of the State’s burden. See also People v. Anderson, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (2009) (<HOLDING>). The circuit court questioned the prospective 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plan did not comply (B) holding that such a general question regarding the prospective jurors willingness to follow the law did not comply with the 2007 amended version of rule 431b (C) recognizing general rule (D) holding that the february 28 2007 interim rule was invalid because it failed to comply with the administrative procedure act (E) recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions
(B)

assumed the illegible stamp was the certification. We are not persuaded by Mr. Grynberg's argument that because the certification was illegible on the e-filed copy, L & R Venture's copy of the judgment did not comply with the Act. The flegibility created by the electronic filing process did not transform L & R Venture's properly authenticated judgment into an unauthenticated one. And, contrary to Mr. Grynberg's assertion, L & R Venture's counsel's presentation of the original copy at the hearing was not to correct an improper filing, but rather to prove that the original filing was properly authenticated. See C.R.C.P. 44(c) ("This Rule does not prevent the proof of official records or of entry or lack of entry therein by any method authorized by law."); cf. Griggs, 754 P.2d at 784-85 (<HOLDING>). It may be, however, as Mr. Grynberg contends, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court lacked authority to enforce a foreign judgment where the plaintiff filed only an affidavit describing the foreign judgment and not a certified copy of the judgment itself in the first instance (B) holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular (C) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that a foreign judgment filed under the montana uefja may not be subjected to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening or vacating as a domestic judgment and remain consistent with full faith and credit  the only defenses that may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a final judgment are those defenses directed at the validity of the foreign judgment
(A)

when there is reason to believe that the individual subject to the gag order is willing to speak and is being-restrained from doing so. E.g., In re Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 607 (determining whether the recipients have standing required the court first to examine “[wjhether the [plaintiff] news agencies, are actually potential receivers of otherwise restrained speech”); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 787 n. 12 (1st Cir.1988) (emphasizing that the third party had standing to challenge a protective order because “far from agreeing to the protee-five order, the plaintiffs to this action have opposed the pi'oteetive order at every stage” and the speech, therefore, would be available); Radio & Television News Ass’n v. District Court, 781 F.2d 1443, 1448 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Id. 75 F.3d at 838-39. On March 27,1998, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that campaign money laundering was in furtherance of political speech but an invalid exercise of free speech rights because it was illegal (B) holding that the plaintiffs right to political speech is fully in accord with the publics interest in free speech and association (C) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave (D) holding that the press lacks standing to assert the free speech rights of another when the person subject to the gag order has not challenged it (E) holding that claim under connecticut law for employer discrimination based upon the employees exercise of privacy and free speech rights not preempted

(D)