In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: to overcome this presumption by persuading the finder of fact, by a prepon derance of the evidence, that the income tax assessments are erroneous. See Sullivan v. United States, 618 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir.1980). Klimek has failed to offer any evidence that the tax assessments are incorrect in the amount the Government claims. He has never challenged in the Tax Court the Notices of Deficiency or the Certificates of Assessments and Payments for tax years 1980 through 1988 and 1990 through 1992. Nor has Klimek ever rebutted or even responded to the Government’s requests for admissions regarding tax years 1980 through 1988 and 1990 through 1992, except to return them with the words “Refused for Fraud” scrawled across them. See Lane v. United States, 328 F.2d 602, 603 (5th Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>). Given the fact that Klimek bears the burden 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial court may enter summary judgment for a nonmoving party under appropriate circumstances (B) holding that a trial court is not required to convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment where external evidence is submitted if the external evidence is irrelevant to the issue (C) holding that if no countervailing evidence is introduced the trial court is  justified in fact required to enter summary judgment for the government the amount of the taxes proved to be due (D) holding that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the court is reviewing administrative record for sufficiency of evidence (E) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion
[EX A]: holding that a trial court may enter summary judgment for a nonmoving party under appropriate circumstances

[EX Q]: of the debt itself that is the key factor in determining dischargeability.” 21 B.R. at 912. Therefore, in determining whether a debt to a former spouse is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support, the court must look behind the designation assigned by a state court, or by the parties themselves, as to whether or not a particular obligation was in the nature of support or a property settlement, and to determine the true nature of the obligation. Parisi v. White, 26 B.R. 572, 574 (Bankr.R.I.1983). With this test in mind, we turn to the relevant factors in determining wheth er payments are m the nature of support. Whether the payments are made contingent upon conditions reflecting a need for support is one relevant factor. Cf. Warren v. Taff, 10 B.R. 101, 104 (Bankr.Conn.1981) (<HOLDING>). In the present case the child support 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding that the failure to condition a transfer on death or remarriage of the wife was a factor showing that the transfer was not in the nature of alimony (C) holding transfer restriction granted right of first refusal in event of voluntary or involuntary transfer of stock (D) holding that a denial of transfer was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff asserted only that the transfer would allow him to work closer to home (E) holding that oneyear period commences on date of discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer
[EX A]: holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court

[EX Q]: hospitals. 13 . Even assuming for the moment that decedent was in state custody at the time of his death, the complaint’s failure to allege private violence — a failure about which we will have more to say subsequently — would render the special relationship exception inapposite. In that case, the questions simply would be those posed by the complaint's first claim for relief, namely, whether Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to decedent’s serious medi cal needs and whether that indifference caused a constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-199 n. 5, 109 S.Ct. 998 (suggesting deliberate indifference is necessary to establish a substantive due process violation in a custodial setting); Sawyer v. County of Creek, 908 F.2d 663, 666 (10th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Leatherman v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs (B) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (C) recognizing a state doctor may violate a detainees right to substantive due process by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs (D) holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs (E) holding that pretrial detainees possess a constitutional right against deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs because the due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the eighth amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner
[EX A]:
holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs