In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: State, after expressing its clear and accurate understanding of the ... issue ..., deliberately steer[s] the District Court away from the question and towards the merits of [the] petition.” Wood v. Milyard, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (internal citation omitted). In Wood, the state had assured the district court that it was “not challenging, but d[id] not concede, the timeliness of the petition.” Id. at 1830. As in Wood, the state’s words and conduct cannot be described as an inadvertent mistake or forfeiture of the exhaustion defense, as was the case in Day, but instead they clearly evidence an express intention to waive the exhaustion requirement. As the First Circuit said, “[t]hat was game, set, and match.” Pike v. Guarino, 492 F.3d 61, 71-72 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits have also held this type of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal (B) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (C) holding that a waived issue ordinarily cannot be resurrected on appeal whereas a forfeited issue may be reviewed for plain error (D) holding statement that  petitioner is correct in her assertion that the claims presented  have been exhausted  was unmistakably clear and could not be resurrected on appeal alteration in original (E) holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court
[A]: holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal


[Q]: to intervene” as a linguistic tool to highlight how little personal participation the defendant had in the arrest in that particular case. The passage shows how far below the required minimum level of involvement that particular defendant exhibited. Read in whole, Brown more accurately shows that personal participation in an arrest, or supervisory control over the arresting officer, is required in order to establish liability for unlawful arrest — mere presence is not enough. However, even assuming Plaintiffs are correct, and that law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene in other officer’s unlawful arrests, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers or Alma Officers violated clearly established law in this case. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Canine Handlers and Alma Officers were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search (C) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force (D) holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant (E) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied
[A]: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim


[Q]: underlying action has determined “in fact” that Hanft personally profited. The Court rejects this interpretation of the exclusion. The Diehls cite to several, mostly unpublished, decisions from other jurisdictions in support of their argument (Doc. 64 at 22-23), but contrary to the Diehls’ contention, these cases do not hold that the “in fact” language requires a final adjudication in the underlying action. In each of these cases the court did not require a final adjudication by the underlying factfinder, but rather found that the allegations and evidence presented was not sufficient to support application of the exclusion without further underlying proceedings. See PMI Mortgage Ins. Co. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., No. C 02-1774, 2006 WL 825266 at *7 (N.D.Cal. Mar.29, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Federal Ins. Co. v. Cintas Corp., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the judgment or other final adjudication language of a dishonesty exclusion was satisfied by a criminal conviction (B) holding that the term in fact within the context of the exclusion here should be read to require either a final adjudication including a judicial adjudication or at a minimum at least some evidentiary proof (C) holding that guilty plea to crime of fraud satisfied judgment or final adjudication language of dishonesty exclusion (D) holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits (E) holding that case was justiciable when at least some of the appellants have a sufficient personal stake  in its adjudication
[A]:
holding that the judgment or other final adjudication language of a dishonesty exclusion was satisfied by a criminal conviction