In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 199 F.3d at 248 n. 6. Moreover, when the plaintiff declares the sufficiency of his pleadings and makes no attempt to amend his complaint in response to the defendant’s challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper when the plaintiffs allegations fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See Spiller v. City of Texas City, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir.1997). In addition, a plaintiff should not be granted leave to amend after being afforded repeated opportunities to do so. See Wilkins, 173 F.Supp.2d at 614; accord United States ex rel. Adrian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 363 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir.2004) (noting that “pleading review is not a game where the plaintiff is permitted to file serial amendments until he finally gets it right”); Willard, 336 F.3d at 387 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, “where a proposed amendment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding leave to amend was properly denied where the relator had previously filed two amended complaints (B) holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made (C) holding district court properly denied leave to amend where application was four months late and appeared to be futile (D) holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court (E) holding that the trial court properly refused to consider allegations in the disallowed amended complaints

A: (A)
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Q: is correct. We will also assume that the court’s erro umed error prejudiced him is that other evidence supports the finding that he was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy. In the district court, Vasquez did not object to the PSR’s statement that he “recruited Wornick and Sella” into the conspiracy. Although the district court did not explicitly find that Vasquez recruited two of his co-conspirators, “[i]t is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a[PSR] admits those facts for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.2006). And we have held many times that a defendant’s recruitment of co-conspirators supports a § 3B1.1 enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 n. 2 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1304 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer leader manager or supervisor under  3bllc in part because the defendant actively recruited two individuals to transport drugs (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was a manager or supervisor under  3bllb in part because he recruited accomplices (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer or leader under  3blla in part because he recruited coconspirators

A: (E)
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Q: the word "initially” is to be given effect. The court wrote: "[T]he crux of defendant’s oral argument was that it is illogical for the Immunity Act to absolutely immunize a public entity’s initial failure to erect a traffic warning device (see 745 ILCS 10/ 3—104 (West 1992); West[, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 588 N.E.2d 1104]), but fail to extend this absolute immunity once the traffic warning device is erected. What defendant and the appellate court failed to recognize, however, is that it is not for the courts to extend this statutory immunity or to fill the perceived interstices of the Immunity Act: that is strictly the province of the General Assembly.” Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 477, 657 N.E.2d at 994. See also Jefferson v. City of Chicago, 269 Ill. App. 3d 672, 678, 646 N.E.2d 1305, 1310 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Defendants cite Culver v. Velcor, 247 Ill. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nothing in the pslra has altered that doctrine (B) holding that appeal from a decision of the attorney general denying legal representation was before the appellate division as of right to review the final decision of a state officer (C) holding that there is nothing inherent in the phrase that requires the action working the deprivation to come from the state (D) holding that nothing in the west decision justifies gapinskes excision of the word initially from section 3104 (E) recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision

A:
(D)
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