In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Commission, and appellants, yet the County Commissioners did not require any of them to face cross-examination before submitting those documents. Appellants maintain that all of this documentary evidence should have been placed before the County Commissioners by sworn witnesses who faced cross-examination, and, therefore, it should not have been considered by them. We disagree. “A zoning board, along with other administrative agencies, is generally not bound by the technical rules of evidence although it must observe fundamental fairness in dealing with the parties who appear before it.” Ginn v. Farley, 43 Md.App. 229, 236, 403 A.2d 858, cert. denied, sub nom. Engel v. Farley, 286 Md. 747 (1979). See also Entzian v. Prince George’s County, 32 Md.App. 256, 262, 360 A.2d 6 (1976) (<HOLDING>). The documents properly could be considered by 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence (B) holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound (C) holding that agency is bound by its regulations (D) recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence (E) recognizing that zoning agency bodies   are not bound by strict rules of evidence

Ex Output:
recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence


Ex Input:
partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court’s order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants’ arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment

Ex Output:
holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied


Ex Input:
subject to forfeiture, without regard to the location of that property. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). The Williams action, also an in person-am suit, was filed in the District Court for the Southern District of New York pursuant to that court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1332 (2000). The Receiver for NHLIC brought suit against persons and entities, not property, seeking recovery of funds believed to have been stolen from NHLIC. The fact that the court in Williams is exercising control over the proceeds from the sale of the Center Mall property does not transform that suit into an in rem proceeding or alter the basis of the court’s jurisdiction. See United States v. $174,206.00 in United States Currency, 320 F.3d 658, 661 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Ill The Government contends that this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a criminal forfeiture action where a state court in a related state court forfeiture proceeding had in personam jurisdiction over the same currency subject to forfeiture (B) holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court (C) recognizing criminal forfeiture as an aspect of punishment (D) recognizing that the hallmark of an in personam forfeiture proceeding is one where the government proceeds directly against the person (E) holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property

Ex Output:

holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court