In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: showing he was denied a constitutional right. Because Weaver’s application for a COA raises several claims, it is impossible to glean from the present record which issue(s) the district court thought worthy of appeal. Cf. Murray, 145 F.3d at 1250-51 (determining that while court of appeals could not decide issue not specified in COA, it could “construe the issue specification in light of the pleadings and other parts of the record”). Therefore we must remand the record for the district court to specify the issue or issues for appeal. See Muniz v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 43, 46 (5th Cir.1997); Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1076 (6th Cir.1997); Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1584 (11th Cir.1996); but cf. Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). It is so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding remand for specification of issues unnecessary where clear from briefing appellant had not made substantial showing he was denied any constitutional right (B) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (C) holding that appellant had waived any objection to an instruction that he had himself introduced and which was amended by the state without objection from appellant (D) holding that application of section 9711h as amended did not deprive appellant of any constitutional right (E) holding that where appellant acknowledged timely receiving notice by regular mail appellant appeared and fully participated at the trial and appellant made no claim that he was harmed in any way appellee had fulfilled the primary purposes of texrcivp 21a

A: (A)
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Q: case because in Revenue Cabinet, as here, the sales tax statute did not impose a test for passage of title, and an administrative rule did impose a test for passage of title. Id. at 738-39. Here, Hales makes no claim that the impermanence of its materials results in a generally understood, implicit agreement to pass title at some point before delivery. Moreover, our statute requires an explicit agreement on passage of title before the statutory presumption can be rebutted; there is no obvious provision in this statute for an implicit understanding, which the Kentucky court thought sufficient. Consequently, the facts of Revenue Cabinet aré inapposite and its result is inapplicable to the case at bar. See also Kurtz Concrete, Inc. v. Spradling, 560 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo.1978) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the Commission applied the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title insurer not in business of supplying information in issuing either title commitment or policy of title insurance for purposes of exception to moorman prohi bition against recovery of economic losses in tort further holding that contract defines title insurers liability (B) holding that title passes on mixture of readymix concrete because of usage of trade (C) recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim (D) holding in a slander of title action that attorneys fees are recoverable as part of the costs of removing the cloud from the title (E) holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title

A: (B)
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Q: file were prepared in anticipation of litigation. The trial court should consider the nature of the requested documents, the reason the documents were prepared, the relationship between the preparer of the document and the party seeking its protection from discovery, the relationship between the litigating parties, and any other facts relevant to the issue. See Haynes, 597 So.2d at 619. The discoverability of such documents may differ depending on the circumstances of the case. Documents obtained by an insurer where its own insured is the claimant against it (first-party claim) may well be treated differently from documents obtained by an insurer from its insured where the potential claimant is a third party. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 n. 2, 799-800 (Utah 1985) (<HOLDING>); accord Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the governments cooperation with a thirdparty is not sufficient to establish a thirdparty beneficiary relationship (B) holding that a thirdparty providers claim against insurer for promissory estoppel was not preempted by erisa because the thirdparty provider was not bound by the terms of the erisa plan (C) recognizing fundamental distinction between firstparty and thirdparty situations and imposing fiduciary duty upon insurer to protect its insureds interest in thirdparty situations (D) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (E) holding that a plaintiff who had asserted no claim against a thirdparty defendant lacked standing to complain of the courts action with regard to the thirdparty defendant

A:
(C)
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