In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: witness testifying against him was in custody). This right is not subject to the trial court’s discretion; however, the court may preclude repetitive or unduly harassing interrogation. Ramey,. 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68; Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475. Thus: “[A] defendant need not show interest or motive in that any promises of leniency have, in fact, been made to the witness by the State or that any expectations of special favor exist in the mind of the witness, before cross-examining a witness as to possible bias. Further, the defense is entitled to inquire into such promises or expectations whether they are based on fact or are simply imaginary.” Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68, citing Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475-76. See also People v. Tomes, 284 Ill. App. 3d 514, 520, 672 N.E.2d 289 (1996) (<HOLDING>). “To this end a defendant has the right to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required (B) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (C) holding that limitation on scope and breadth of crossexamination did not significantly curtail effectiveness of witness crossexamination because crossexamination was lengthy and extensive (D) holding it is well established that crossexamination to show that a witness might be vulnerable to pressure whether real or imagined from the state regarding a pending charge is a matter of right (E) holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination

Output: recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required


Input: Consider Input: was merely a voidable act. They rely on Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.1989), rehearing denied by 888 F.2d 1388 (5th Cir.1989), in which the Fifth Circuit found that the filing of a complaint in violation of the stay was voidable but not void. Id. at 178-79. The court reasoned that provisions of the Bankruptcy Code such as section 362(d), by giving courts the power to grant retroactive relief from a stay, indicated Congressional intent that acts in violation of a stay be simply voidable. Id. Spring Meadows, however, urges us to adopt the rule of the Ninth Circuit that any act committed in violation of an automatic stay is void. Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 997 F.2d 581, 586 (9th Cir.1993); In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 571-72 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The circuit court found such acts void even 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that any action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void and without effect (B) holding that violations of the automatic stay are void and rejecting the reasoning of sikes (C) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (D) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay (E) holding that an action taken in violation of the automatic stay is void ab initio

Output: recognizing that any action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void and without effect


Input: Consider Input: of Plymouth, 945 F.2d 1416, 1420-21 (8th Cir.1991); Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 924 (1st Cir.1987)). Against this background, this Court must determine whether these findings must necessarily lead to the conclusion that qualified immunity is unavailable to Defendant Rogers. The Court concludes that they do not. Applying the Third Circuit’s observation that police officers generally have a duty to know the elements of the laws they enforce as a starting point, the Court acknowledges that there exist exceptions to this general rule. Indeed, in establishing the general rule that police officers are required to know clearly established law the United States Supreme Court noted that the rule is not absolute. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (<HOLDING>). In Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs assertion that he neither knew nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known about the governments possible liability for his injury was irrelevant to accrual of his ftca claim (B) holding that the destruction of documents which the party knew or should have known would be relevant to a pending or potential lawsuit is sanctionable (C) holding in review of a downward departure that an extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances (D) holding that in extraordinary circumstances where a police officer neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard qualified immunity may still be available (E) holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong


Output: holding that the plaintiffs assertion that he neither knew nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known about the governments possible liability for his injury was irrelevant to accrual of his ftca claim