In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: Rodrigues hit him in the head with a hand-held radio. Defendant Rodrigues ordered Barile to tell the doctors at the hospital that he injured himself in a “fall.” Subsequently, Barile made a complaint to the Internal Affairs Division and an investigator was assigned to verify Barile’s claim. On June 11, 1997, a private attorney informed Barile that the law firm had filed a Notice of Intent to sue the City of Hartford. On April 13, 2004, the cessive force against him on December 21, 1996. Thus, Barile had until December 21, 1999, to file his complaint. When considering a ease filed by a prisoner, the courts consider a complaint to have been filed as of the date the inmate gives the complaint to prison officials to be mailed to the court. See Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 682 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners notice of appeal is deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court (B) holding that an noa filed by a pro se prisoner is deemed filed on the date that the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for mailing (C) holding that prisoners notice of appeal deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court (D) holding that the date of filing is the time at which a pro se prisoner entrusts the document to prison officials for delivery (E) holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court

Output: holding that prisoners notice of appeal is deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court


Input: Consider Input: the Department must make in order to obtain the order it seeks in this action, as well as certain other issues that are likely to arise on remand. We conclude the Department's petition adequately sets forth the necessary elements it must prove in order to involuntarily treat Saenz: (1) that he has refused to consume food and fluids sufficient to maintain his health for an extended period; (2) that, as a result, he has been diagnosed by a physician as suffering from moderate to severe malnutrition, dehydration or other deleterious condition; and (3) that, pursuant to reliable medical opinion, Saenz is in imminent danger of suffering serious harm or death unless he is given medical treatment, including, if necessary, forced hydration and/or forced feeding. Cf. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. We next consider the Department's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest (B) holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate (C) holding that a detention officers alleged negligent conduct of failing to medically screen an inmate who later committed suicide in a holding cell  in violation of the police departments policies  was not the proximate cause of the inmates death when there was no evidence that the inmate would have been unable to kill himself if he had been medically screened and any claim that the inmate would have presented as suicidal in such screening was purely speculative (D) holding that the due process clause permits the state to involuntarily treat a prison inmate who is seriously mentally ill if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest (E) holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate  with antipsychotic drugs against his will under certain circumstances while not limiting treatment to those circumstances

Output: holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest


Input: Consider Input: the policy language at issue as a “choice of law” provision). Our Supreme Court has held “[a] difference of judicial opinion regarding proper construction of policy language is some evidence” that the policy language is ambiguous. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 326 N.C. 387, 392, 390 S.E.2d 150, 153 (1990) (citations omitted). I believe the language in General Casualty’s policy is ambiguous on the issue; and, accordingly, I would hold that the General Casualty policy does provide coverage for the claims sought in North Carolina by Plaintiffs to the extent that the benefits would be required under Virginia workers’ compensation law. See W&J Rives, Inc. v. Kemper Ins. Group, 92 N.C. App. 313, 316, 374 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1988), disc. review denied, 324 N.C. 342, 378 S.E.2d 809 (1989) (<HOLDING>). I believe that the word “require” in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured (B) holding that an exclusionary clause in an insurance contract that lends itself to different interpretations is ambiguous and must be construed in a manner most favorably to the insured (C) holding that contract language is ambiguous where it is in fact reasonably or fairly susceptible to the different constructions being advocated by the parties (D) recognizing that a clause in an insurance policy was susceptible to a construction in favor of the insured but that such a construction would be unreasonable absurd and produce results never intended or contemplated by the parties (E) holding that only if provisions in an insurance contract are open to more than one interpretation should it be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured


Output: holding that an exclusionary clause in an insurance contract that lends itself to different interpretations is ambiguous and must be construed in a manner most favorably to the insured