In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: removal of the access can result in a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, if the state’s use is for a purpose other than a road purpose. But, in Judge Armstrong’s view, any modification of a road for road purposes that denies a landowner’s access does not give rise to a compensable taking. In so concluding, Judge Armstrong discounts as “dictum” the Supreme Court rationale in Burk that an abutter’s right of access to a conventional Highway “can be divested only by condemnation of the easement appurtenant to the abutting property.” 200 Or at 231. Judge Armstrong explains that the court’s conclusion in Burk cannot be reconciled with the court’s analysis in more recent cases in the context of regulations that affect road access. See, e.g., Schrunk, 242 Or at 73 (<HOLDING>). If, Judge Armstrong’s concurrence reasons, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access (B) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking (C) holding ripe a claim for a pre1987 taking because prior to first english california law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an action in inverse condemnation (D) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (E) holding that regulatory restrictions on abutting landowners right of ingress and egress are not compensable when landowner has adequate alternative means to access property
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: fees for tax years 1995 through 1999, the parties stipulated that judgment was sought against Connie Ogg in rem only. 3 . Although it has been amended several times since its enactment in 1985, section 33.011 has always provided a process for a taxpayer to request a waiver of penalties and interest if the act or omission of an officer, employee, or agent of the appraisal district or taxing unit caused or resulted in the taxpayer’s failure to pay the tax before delinquency. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 33.011 (Vernon 2001). Here, the trial court stated in a finding of fact that the Oggs did not request a waiver of penalties or interest pursuant to section 33.011. The parties do not challenge that particular finding of fact. See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex.1986) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Act of May 24, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unchallenged findings of fact are binding unless contrary is established as matter of law or there is no evidence to support finding (B) holding that unless an affirmative defense is established as matter of law defendant bears burden of obtaining jury findings necessary to support defense (C) holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings (D) holding that judgment on the pleadings will not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes that there are no material issues of fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (E) holding that motion to dismiss should not  be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: prong). 57 .667 F.Supp. 1456, 1461 (S.D.Fla.1986), aff'd sub nom. Troedel v. Dugger, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir.1987). 58 . Id. at 1462. 59 . Id. 60 . 853 F.Supp. 1239, 1256 (W.D.Wash.1994) aff'd sub nom. Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1995) (noting that the state did not appeal the ballistics issue). 61 . Id. 62 . See id. 63 . Ploof III, 2012 WL 1413483, at *7 (Del.Super. Jan. 30, 2012). 64 . See J.W. Eisele et al., Sites of Suicidal Gunshot Wounds, 26 J. Forensic Sci. 480, 483 (1981) (stating that the study’s findings contradict another author’s statement that a woman who dies from a gunshot should be presumed to be a homicide victim until proven otherwise). 65 .426 F.3d 588, 608 (2d Cir.2005); see also Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 227-28 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1388 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the petitioner had established prejudice when his attorney could have found experts who would testify that the prosecutions evidence was inconsistent with the frequency of abuse the victims alleged (B) holding that the defendant could not establish prejudice for trial counsels failure to hire an expert when the experts testimony would not have changed the nature of the states evidence (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by letting a video technician who violated the rule testify when the record reflected sufficient evidence on which the jury could have found for appellees (D) holding that the state court ruling was objectively unreasonable where prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that the petitioner murdered a known drug dealer although the state established that the petitioner planned to rob drug dealers for drugs or money the victim was a known drug dealer who kept drugs in his freezer and that freezer was open and empty after the homicide the petitioner and the victim had engaged in drug transactions in the past the petitioner had a motive because he had seen the victim make a pass at the petitioners girlfriend and the petitioner had possessed and once purchased the murder weapon and a similar gun was seen in his home two weeks before the murder evidence placing the petitioner at the scene was conspicuously absent leaving only a reasonable speculation that the petitioner was present (E) holding the experts opinion testimony lacked a proper foundation when there was no physical evidence of sexual abuse and the experts admitted that their conclusions were based solely on the childrens statements that they had been abused
[EX A]:
(A)