In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 565 F.Supp. 663, 667 n. 10, 669 (N.D.Ill.1983)). However, in all the cases on this issue, the courts made it clear that the client must have made disclosures to the attorney after manifesting an intent to seek legal advice. Herbes, 180 Ill.App.3d at 698-99, 129 Ill.Dec. 480, 536 N.E.2d 164 (finding that counsel for the plaintiff, who was suing a township over its open-space acquisition program, was ineligible to conduct said representation because he had previously engaged in an attorney-client relationship with the township when it interviewed only him for a possible position representing the township in the same program, evidencing the township’s intent to hire him and therefore speak freely regarding the program), Hughes, 565 F.Supp. at 670 (<HOLDING>), Int’l. Paper Co. v. Lloyd Manufacturing Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (B) holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney (C) holding that attorneys should be disqualified where the substantial relationship test is met in order to assure that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship and the loyalty between attorney and client are preserved (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in drawing an adverse inference where the relief defendant refused to give information necessary to determine whether he still possessed any of the funds or whether he had a legitimate claim to them (E) holding that normal attorneyclient relationship does not bar rule 60b relief when the evidence is clear that the attorney and his client were not acting as one

Answer: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client


Question: the evidence of rape discussed above in Division 1, we conclude that the evidence at Martin’s trial was sufficient to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found as to both murders. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (2) (requiring a review of the statutory aggravating circumstances foundby the jury);UAP Rule IV (B) (2) (providing that, in all death penalty cases, this Court will determine whether the verdicts are supported by the evidence). See also Ring, 536 U. S. 584; Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. 20. Considering both the murders for which Martin has been sentenced to death and Martin as a defendant, we find that the death sentences imposed in his case were not disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Georgia law. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3); Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716-717 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited in the Appendix support this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts statutorily mandated proportionality review concerns whether a particular death sentence is excessive per se or is substantially out of line (B) holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable

Answer: holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial


Question: inquiry — • whether New Provo Canyon’s treatment of one individual constituted state action — differs substantially from that in Milonas, irrespective of whether, for purposes of a class action suit, Old Provo Canyon’s treatment of its patients generally constituted state action. Thus, the question here does not present the necessary “like facts” to trigger the stare decisis doctrine. D. Collateral Estoppel For the very same reason, Taylor’s collateral estoppel argument fails. Collateral esto Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553; Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Logistics Control Group, 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.1985) (discussed below). 13 . Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553-54; Lib. Mut. Ins., 969 F.2d at 1388-89; Holloway, 813 F.2d at 878-79; see also Nipper v. Snipes, 1 F.3d 415, 415-417 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Id. at 1553; see also Lib. Mut. Ins., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (B) holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body (C) holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial (D) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (E) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact

Answer:
holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint