In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: an intention that suits for pension benefits by disappointed applicants are equitable.”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112, 101 S.Ct. 922, 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981); see also Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace and Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1258-59 (2d Cir.1996); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir.985); Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058, 106 S.Ct. 800, 88 L.Ed.2d 776 (1986); In re Vorpahl, 695 F,2d 318, 321-22 (8th Cir.1982); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980). Some district courts have suggested that Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989), calls these holdings into doubt. See, e.g., Hulcher v. United Behavioral Sys., 919 F.Supp. 879, 885 (E.D.Va.1995) (<HOLDING>); Vaughn v. Owen Steel Co., 871 F.Supp. 247, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1132a1b affords the plaintiff adequate relief for her benefits claim and a cause of action under  1132a3 is thus not appropriate (B) holding plaintiff had no claim under  1132a3 because his grievance that benefits were denied is specifically addressed in  1132a1b (C) holding that plaintiff in erisa action was entitled to restitution under similar circumstances (D) holding that claims for misrepresentation under texas insurance code were preempted because the plaintiffs sought to recover benefits under an erisa plan (E) holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under  1132a1b
[A]: holding that  1132a1b affords the plaintiff adequate relief for her benefits claim and a cause of action under  1132a3 is thus not appropriate


[Q]: found it “difficult to maintain on a priori grounds that sex is physically dangerous” to every potential victim under the statute. Id. at 299. The First Circuit examined a similar statute-punishing a person over the age of 18 who engages in sexual intercourse with a person between 14 and 16-in United States v. Sacko, 178 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1999). The court determined that statutory rape crimes fall within the exception to the categorical approach because they “cover[ ] conduct both inside and outside the ‘violent felony’ sphere.” Id. at 4-5. We agree with the First and the Seventh Circuits that statutory rape statutes that include more mature victims and do not contain aggravating factors are not subject to the strict categorical approach articulated in Taylor. See Seaton, 45 F.3d at 111 (<HOLDING>). Thus, this case should be remanded for the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins (B) holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16 (C) holding that if a crime is broadly defined the court can look beyond the elements of the crime (D) holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction (E) holding that conviction of a crime requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
[A]: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins


[Q]: “involves challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular case.” Graham, 130 S.Ct. at Graham is limited to juveniles. See United States v. Banks, 679 F.3d 505, 507 (6th Cir.2012); Jones, 476 Fed.Appx. at 652; Moore, 643 F.3d at 457. Walker’s attempts to differentiate his case are unpersuasive. That Walker’s sentence may prove to be an “effective[ ] life sentence” does not create an Eighth Amendment violation. “[T]he Supreme Court has never held that a sentence to a specific term of years, even if it might turn out to be more than the reasonable life expectancy of the defendant, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 537 (6th Cir.2004); see also Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Walker’s categorical challenge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eighth amendment forbids life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile who commits a nonhomicide offense (B) holding that consecutive fixedterm sentences for juveniles who committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are not clearly unconstitutional under graham even when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole (C) holding that multiple sentences for offenses under 18 usc  924c are appropriate when multiple separate acts of firearm use have occurred even if they are related to the same underlying offense (D) holding that life without parole sentences for nonhomicide offenses violates the eighth amendment (E) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences
[A]:
holding that the eighth amendment forbids life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile who commits a nonhomicide offense