In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 23 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (same). Essentially, the Court determined that the prejudicial quality of testimony regarding an actually coerced confession is, like all other improperly introduced testimony at trial, capable of review. At this point in time, the Fulminante decision stands as the sole, albeit the dispositive, case on this point. In contrast, cases applying the harmless error analysis to the introduction of presumptively coerced statements are legion. See e.g. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 & n. 22, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2652 & n. 22, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 555 & n. 22 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443, 104 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion  (B) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence (D) holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights (E) holding that although miranda required the suppression of testimonial statements made before defendant was advised of his constitutional rights the state court is free of course to consider this harmless error question upon remand
holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion 

the jury during final jury instructions not to consider any testimony it had stricken or ordered the jury to disregard during trial. See United States v. Liburd, 607 F.3d 339, 344, 53 V.I. 890 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]hile curative instructions cannot repair every error, we do generally presume that juries follow their instructions.”). Finally, as discussed above in section B, the People presented overwhelming evidence that Augustine was the individual who pulled a gun and started shooting at Officers Greaves, Wharton, and Allen. Based on these factors, Officer Wharton’s statement — given in response to a question — would not have been sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial even if Augustine’s attorney had requested one at trial. See Ethridge v. State, 418 P.2d 95, 100 (1966) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we conclude that the Superior Court did 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt (B) holding mistrial not warranted for improper statement by police officer where court sustained defendants objection and admonished jury to disregard statement and where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for mistrial where the trial court sustained defendants objections to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information and instructed the jury to disregard the question (D) holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection  and admonished the jury to disregard the statement (E) holding that while the prosecutors question was improper in light of the overwhelming evidence there was no reversible error in the denial of defendants motion for mistrial
holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt

Division and New York Court of Appeals specifically declined to decide the issue of whether was properly precluded under C.P.L. § 250.10(2), the only court that adjudicated the claim on the merits was the County Court. Time has proven that the trial judge correctly construed C.P.L. § 250.10(2) as applying to lay evidence, such as a defendant’s own testimony, offered in support of an EED defense: Recently, the New York Court of Appeals answered in the affirmative the question it explicitly left open in Smith’s case— “whether a defendant seeking to raise an extreme emotional disturbance defense is required to provide notice pursuant to CPL 250.10 if the intent is to rely solely on lay testimony to prove the affirmative defense.” People v. Diaz, 904 N.Y.S.2d 343, 930 N.E.2d at 266 (<HOLDING>). Because the sanction of preclusion bears on a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that error in classifying agents testimony as lay opinion and failing to subject it to the disclosure requirements was harmless (B) holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted (C) holding that a defendant must demonstrate that the governments intrusion upon his relationship with his attorney created a possibility of either injury to his defense or benefit to the government in order to establish a violation of the right to counsel (D) holding that in a seconddegree murder prosecution defendant was required to provide statutory notice of his intent to rely upon the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance eed notwithstanding his stated intention to support that defense with lay testimony only the notice requirements goals of preventing unfair surprise and allowing the prosecution an opportunity to obtain evidence from any source were implicated whether defendant sought to establish mental infirmity through expert or lay testimony (E) holding that it was error to allow a police officer who was admitted as a lay witness after a prosecution motion to admit him as an expert was denied for lack of timeliness to give testimony as to a matter about which he had no personal knowledge

holding that error in classifying agents testimony as lay opinion and failing to subject it to the disclosure requirements was harmless