In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: first time a party must specify the statute authorizing attorney’s fees is in the Rule 54 motion (unless otherwise provided by statute or court order). In Missouri, attorney’s fees are not recoverable from another party, except when a contract or statute allows it. Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. banc 2009). The second sentence of the Missouri commissions statute is such an exception to the general Missouri rule. Kraft v. Edwards, 946 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Mo.App.1997). The district judge’s ruling that there was no statutory basis for an award of attorney’s fees is erroneous as a matter of law. On remand, the district court should consider whether to award attorney’s fees. See Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 631 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because this case as tried addressed only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award (B) holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained (C) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence (D) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (E) holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances

Answer: holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained


Question: the Bond offering because they underwrote the transaction and sold the Bonds to investors, either directly or through their brokers. Indeed, given the role of underwriters generally, Baird, Jones, and Stern “had a duty to make an to speak, they knew investors might rely on the statements made. The law firms’ duty, however, must also be considered in light of the services they were retained to perform. Because Kutak and Stinson were not hired to opine on the feasibility of the Event Center, they cannot have been held to a duty to investigate or determine whether the financial projections were realistic unless these firms otherwise became involved in the making, preparing, or drafting of those projections. See N.Y. City Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Berry, 616 F.Supp.2d 987, 994 (N.D.Cal.2009) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, to the extent the law firms 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors (B) holding that substantial participation requires particular facts relating to each djefendants specific role in the preparation of each of the allegedly misleading statements (C) recognizing that questions of changed conditions and the amount of child support must be resolved on the particular facts of each case (D) holding that district court must conduct individualized assessment based on particular facts of each case (E) holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case

Answer: holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors


Question: conclusion in entering judgment in favor of Debtor, it did not abuse its discretion. See Younie v. Gonya (In re Younie), 211 B.R. 367, 372 (9th Cir. BAP 1997) (evidentiary questions decided in the context of summary judgment are reviewed for an abuse of discretion), aff'd, 163 F.3d 609 (9th Cir.1998). 6 . Our decision today is narrow. We leave for another day the issue of whether a transcript of the bankruptcy court docket would also meet the requirements of MCA § 25-9-303. Furthermore, we offer no opinion as to whether Miller could also utilize the provi sions of the Montana Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, MCA §§ 25-9-501 to 25-9-508, as that issue was not raised in the proceedings. See Robinson v. First Wyo. Bank, N.A., 274 Mont. 307, 316-17, 909 P.2d 689, 695 (1995) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The editor's comment to paragraph (c) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state court judgment settling shareholders state and federal claims had preclusive effect in federal court even though shareholders could not have pressed their federal claims in state court (B) holding that after removal of diversity case to federal court the federal court may grant summary judgment notwithstanding earlier denial of summary judgment motion by state court (C) holding that a juvenile adjudicated as delinquent in federal court for violation of  2241c had a duty under state law to register as a sexual offender when present in montana (D) holding that a federal court litigant who is forced into state court under pullman may reserve a right to return to federal court in that the plaintiff can preserve the right to the federal forum for federal claims by informing the state court of his or her intention to return following litigation of the state claims in the state court (E) holding that the uniform act and mca  259303 are alternative methods for filing a judgment of a montana federal court in montana state court

Answer:
holding that state court judgment settling shareholders state and federal claims had preclusive effect in federal court even though shareholders could not have pressed their federal claims in state court