instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
the I.C. court — perhaps Plaintiffs’ strongest case — determined that “the juvenile court can act to protect children within its jurisdiction.” I.C., 742 So.2d at 404. The I.C. court looked to § 39.453(8)(g), which holds: The court may issue a protective order in assistance, or as a condition, of any other order made under this part. In addition to the requirements included in the case plan, the protective order may set forth requirements relating to reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed for a specified period of time by a person or agency who is before the court; and such order may require any such person or agency to make periodic reports to the court containing such information as the court in its discretion may prescribe. See also Henry & Rilla, 720 So.2d at 573 (<HOLDING>). Although Plaintiffs and their counsel, if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the juvenile restitution statute does not expressly require the juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to pay the restitution ordered as a condition of probation the policies underlying the adult restitutions command that a trial court make such an inquiry applies with equal force to juvenile courts (B) holding that jeopardy attaches in juvenile adjudication that determines whether juvenile violated criminal law (C) holding that chapter 39 provides the juvenile judge the flexibility to factor a childs safety into a custody decision at all stages of a juvenile proceeding (D) holding that the defendant is entitled to be present at all stages of his trial  and a judges response to a note from the jury is one of those stages (E) holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles
answer:
holding that although the juvenile restitution statute does not expressly require the juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to pay the restitution ordered as a condition of probation the policies underlying the adult restitutions command that a trial court make such an inquiry applies with equal force to juvenile courts


question:
Brown’s argument that she was speaking as a citizen is supported by the fact that ordinary citizens may similarly report public misconduct to the Auditors. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-61dd (conferring right to file reports with Auditors on “any person”). The existence of a civilian analogue to Brown’s conduct strengthens her allegations that her speech was as a citizen and thus protected by the First Amendment. See Matthews I, 779 F.3d at 176. The instant case is not similar to other cases of its type that were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage. In many of those cases, the plaintiff-employee had made an admission that the alleged speech was made, at least in part, pursuant to his or her official duties. See Matthews v. Lynch, 483 Fed.Appx. 624, 626 (2d Cir. 2012) (Matthews III) (<HOLDING>); Anemone, 629 F.3d at 116. Here, there is no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel (B) holding that a plaintiff did not complain to the eeoc pursuant to official duties but rather as a citizen (C) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (D) holding that speech was pursuant to official duties because plaintiff conceded at oral argument that as an internal affairs officer he had a broad responsibility to investigate and report police misconduct (E) holding police officer is a public official
answer:
holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel


question:
conducting a review for harm — even if the error is not preserved. See Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.1984). Second, we apply fundamental-error review when an important public interest or public policy is at stake. See, e.g., Ramsey, 205 S.W.2d at 983. “Pub . 1350, 25 L.Ed.2d 594, on remand, 457 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.1970). Substantively, public-interest-based fundamental error is rare, implicated only when our most significant state public interests are at stake. The meaning of the “public interest” that is adversely affected must be extremely circumscribed, or the exception would swallow the rule. Thus, it cannot be enough to allege that an error violates a party’s constitutional rights. See Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex.2001) (<HOLDING>) (citing Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that by fading to timely raise the issue before the trial court the defendant had waived the right to raise the issue on appeal that the trial court failed to consider less severe sanctions (B) holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue (C) holding that because appellant had waived review of constitutional challenge to sentencing statute by failing to raise it at the first opportunity the trial court correctly proceeded to examine whether the appellants trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise constitutional challenges to the sentencing statutes (D) holding that constitutional claim that paternity suit should not be barred by statute of limitations is waived by failing to raise the issue before the trial court (E) holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief
answer:

holding that by fading to timely raise the issue before the trial court the defendant had waived the right to raise the issue on appeal that the trial court failed to consider less severe sanctions