In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir.2000). This decision strongly suggests that, in pertinent circumstances, conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment is, as Home Products suggests, “automatic.” However, it also suggests that the proper procedure is for the district court expressly to “convert” a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See id. (concluding that the district court had not followed the proper procedure, because it had not converted the motion). However, the decision also suggests that whether or not application of summary judgment standards is appropriate ultimately depends upon whether the parties were provided with adequate opportunity to address the merits of the motion according to summary judgment standards. See id. (<HOLDING>). A slightly earlier decision of the Eighth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them (B) holding that appellate review under summary judgment standards was appropriate where the district court despite its procedural error provided the parties with a full opportunity to present all pertinent materials outside the pleadings regarding the issue of response costs and the parties created a complete record on the issue (C) holding issue not properly before the appellate court where appellant fails to demonstrate where in the record an issue was raised in the district court (D) recognizing that the specific argument regarding an issue must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for appellate review (E) holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an issue not argued by the parties
[EX A]: holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them

[EX Q]: (citations omitted). Kaul believes that because the Court did not include seizing cigarettes fi*om Indians inside a reservation on this list, Stephan lacked jurisdiction to execute the search warrant at Kaul’s store. However, we do not read Oklahoma Tax Commission and Colville as necessarily prohibiting state officers from conducting search and seizure operations within a reservation’s borders under the authority of a federal grant of criminal jurisdiction to the state. Instead, these opinions merely offer several options that state officials may employ to enforce regulatory cigarette tax statutes. Here, Kaul waived the argument that the Kansas statute was regulatory in nature because she did not raise that issue below. Thus, for purposes of this appea 3, 2061, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction (B) recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes  to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians (C) holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation (D) holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians (E) holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization
[EX A]: holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction

[EX Q]: the court house would be a profound miscarriage of justice. Id. Thus, in accordance with the legislative history, case law, and North Carolina public policy, the Court finds that the North Carolina Legislative did not intend the statute of repose clause in § 1-52(16) to refer to latent diseases. Instead, latent diseases are only governed by the statute of limitations in § 1-52(16), giving plaintiffs three years to file from when they should have reasonably have discovered the existence and cause of their illnesses. Constitutionality of § 1-52(16) To interpret § l-52(16)’s statute of repose as applying to latent diseases would likely render the statute unconstitutional under the North Carolina’s Constitution’s art. I, § 18, known as the “open courts” provision. Th 5, 464 A.2d 288 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the twoyear period for filing a particular tort action such as assault and battery controls over the more general threeyear statute of limitations for tort actions (B) holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under  1983 (C) holding 12year period of repose and threeyear period of limitations contained in statute operated to eliminate a cause of action before wrong could reasonably be discovered were unconstitutional in consolidated product liability actions (D) holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (E) holding that in connecticut the general threeyear personal injury statute of limitations period set forth in connecticut general statutes  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions asserted under 42 usc  1983
[EX A]:
holding the twoyear period for filing a particular tort action such as assault and battery controls over the more general threeyear statute of limitations for tort actions