In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: appropriate relief for such a violation is for the habeas court to “vacate the judgment of conviction and enter a new judgment from which an appeal can be taken.” Id. Defendant argues that the Peak line of eases applies to his situation, and that his appellate rights should thus be reinstated. However, the Peak rule does not apply in defendant’s ease, as the appeal at issue is not an appeal from a conviction. A Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach to an appeal from a supervised release revocation hearing. Borrego v. United States, 975 F.Supp. 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y.1997). This follows logically from the fact that there is no guaranteed constitutional right to counsel at the supervised release revocation hearing itself. See United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel (D) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (E) holding that most of the fundamental constitutional procedural protections that are normally applicable to a criminal prosecution are not required for supervisedrelease proceedings as a matter of constitutional law including a right to counsel

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: of discretion standard. See State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 603, 886 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1994). Statements stemming from a state actor’s custodial interrogation of a defendant are not admissible unless he is warned of his Fifth Amendment “right to remain silent” and that “anything said can and will be used against [him] in court.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). ¶ 19 The State concedes here that Appellant was in police custody when Nurse Geyer questioned him at the hospital. Even if a defendant is in custody, however, Miranda warnings are required when a med ical professional conducts an interrogation only if that medical professional is a state actor. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1876, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (<HOLDING>). See also State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 633 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a public safety exception to the requirement that miranda warnings be given in order to use a suspects statement as evidence against him at trial (B) holding that phrase i know i have the right to remain silent together with phrase and knowing that anything i say may be used against me substantially complied with article 3822 warnings even though warnings failed to advise accused that his statement could be used against him at his trial or in court because it advised him his statement could be used against him in any type of context not just those mentioned in article 3822 subsection 2a1 and 2 (C) holding that a defendants jailhouse statements to a courtappointed psychiatrist could not be used against him in the penalty phase of a murder trial because the psychiatrist failed to give the defendant miranda warnings (D) holding that the warnings in their totality satisfied miranda (E) holding that the government cannot use postarrest silence against a defendant because miranda warnings give implicit assurances that silence will not be used against a person and accordingly it would be fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process to allow a defendants silence to be used to impeach him at trial

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: First, the terms “indecent act” and “indecent purpose” require no further definition because they are terms that are well within the knowledge of the average person. Additionally, to the extent that Wheeler is reasserting his contention that the trial court erred in charging the jury on the full statutory definition of enticing a child for indecent purposes rather than narrowing the definition to match the allegations in the indictment, as we held in Division 3, supra, the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the State was required to prove the offense as charged in the indictment cured any potential problems with the enticing-a-child-for-indecent-purposes charge and did not constitute plain error. Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Miller, J., con (642 SE2d 361) (2007) (<HOLDING>). 8 Daniel, 296 Ga. App. at 522 (6). 9 Smith v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that jurors who expressed personal biases but stated they could be fair did not require dismissal (B) holding that jurors who expressed residual doubt about the defendants right to silence should have been dismissed for cause (C) holding that one jurors exposure to extraneous information concerning prior criminal acts of the defendant which she did not disclose to the other jurors before they rendered a verdict did not merit a new trial (D) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike for cause two potential jurors who had heard andor read about the case but indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented (E) holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias


Output: (A)