In this task, you are given text for US Congressional and California state bills, your task is to generate a summary for this bill.

Ex Input:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Family Telephone Connection 
Protection Act of 2005''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Congress finds that:
            (1) The telephone is the primary method by which 
        individuals correspond and maintain contact with family members 
        who are incarcerated in correctional institutions.
            (2) Except for emergency purposes, family members are not 
        allowed to call people incarcerated in correctional 
        institutions; incarcerated persons are typically allowed to 
        call family members and other pre-approved individuals only 
        through payphones physically located on the premises of 
        correctional institutions.
            (3) Inmate telephone service in correctional institutions 
        often is limited to collect calling.
            (4) Regardless of whether the prisoners' calls are placed 
        collect or through a debit account, the prisoners' family 
        members typically pay for the calls, either through their 
        telephone bills, in the case of collect calls received from 
        prisoners, or by making deposits directly into prisoners' debit 
        accounts.
            (5) Innocent citizens are paying excessive telephone 
        charges simply due to having a family member or loved one who 
        is incarcerated.
            (6) The rates for calls from correctional institutions are 
        some of the highest rates in the United States, with some per-
        minute charges reaching $1 and service or connection charges of 
        $3.95 per call.
            (7) Information compiled by the Congress and the Federal 
        Communications Commission shows that the high rates are due in 
        part to the lack of competition between telephone companies 
        that provide long distance inmate telephone service to 
        correctional institutions.
            (8) There are no competitive forces providing incentives 
        for those carriers to lower prices or operate efficiently 
        because, unlike the mass market, only one carrier is typically 
        permitted to provide long distance inmate telephone service 
        within each correctional institution.
            (9) High calling rates also are due in part to commissions 
        that carriers pay to correctional institution administrators 
        for the exclusive right to provide long distance inmate 
        telephone service in a correctional facility. In some cases, 
        such commissions account for 50 percent or more of the total 
        charges.
            (10) The collection of such commissions by correctional 
        institution administrators and state departments of correction 
        based upon interstate telecommunications revenues is a burden 
        on interstate commerce.
            (11) Due to the lack of competition for telephone services 
        within correctional institutions, families of people in prison, 
        many of whom have low incomes, cannot choose the long distance 
        carrier with the lowest calling rates and must pay the 
        excessive rates charged by the carrier having the exclusive 
        right to provide long distance service to the correctional 
        institution from which the call originates.
            (12) It is the policy of the United States to ensure that 
        all Americans are afforded just and reasonable communications 
        services, including those families that pay rates for inmate 
        telephone service.
            (13) It is clear from various studies that maintaining 
        frequent and meaningful communications between people who are 
        incarcerated and family members is key to the successful social 
        reintegration of formerly incarcerated individuals. Such 
        contact reduces recidivism and facilitates rehabilitation, 
        which in turn reduces crime and the future costs of 
        imprisonment.
            (14) Frequent communications between incarcerated persons 
        and family members is burdened, and in some cases, prevented, 
        by excessive inmate telephone service rates. Excessive inmate 
        telephone service rates thus weaken the family and community 
        ties that are necessary for successful reentry into society by 
        persons who were formerly incarcerated and the reduction in 
        crime resulting from successful reentry.
            (15) The Commission has the expertise and authority to 
        regulate inmate telephone service. Because parties to 
        Commission rulemaking proceedings have raised issues regarding 
        its authority to implement meaningful relief for excessive 
        inmate telephone service rates, Congress finds it necessary and 
        appropriate to reaffirm that the Commission has the authority 
        to implement the types of relief set forth in this Act.

SEC. 3. RESTRICTIONS ON THE PROVISION OF INMATE TELEPHONE SERVICE.

    (a) Definitions.--Section 226(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 
(47 U.S.C. 226(a)) is amended adding at the end the following new 
paragraphs:
            ``(10) The term `collect' or `collect call' refers to a 
        telephone call from a person incarcerated in a correctional 
        institution that is billed to the subscriber receiving the 
        call.
            ``(11) The term `commission' refers to a fee or other 
        payment by a provider of inmate telephone service to an 
        administrator of a correctional institution, department of 
        correction, or similar entity, based upon, or partly upon, 
        inmate telephone service revenue.
            ``(12) The term `debit account' refers to the payment of 
        inmate telephone service through a prisoner's prepaid card or 
        other account, which can be accessed only through an access 
        code, personal identification number, or similar identifier.
            ``(13) The term `inmate telephone service' includes the 
        provision of telephone service enabling persons incarcerated in 
        correctional institutions to originate interstate calls at 
        payphones or other telephones that are designated for 
        prisoners' personal use, regardless of whether the calls are 
        collect, paid through a debit account, or paid through any 
        other means.
            ``(14) The term `provider of inmate telephone service' 
        means any common carrier that provides inmate telephone service 
        or any other person determined by the Commission to be 
        providing inmate telephone service.''.
    (b) Regulations.--Section 226 is further amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (k); and
            (2) inserting after subsection (h) the following new 
        subsections:
    ``(i) Regulation of Inmate Telephone Service.--
            ``(1) Rates.--In order to ensure that charges for inmate 
        telephone service are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, 
        the Commission shall consider, either in a rulemaking 
        proceeding that is pending as of the date of enactment of the 
        Family Telephone Connection Protection Act of 2005 or in a new 
        rulemaking proceeding, the following types of regulation of 
        inmate telephone service, all of which are within the 
        Commission's jurisdiction and authority:
                    ``(A) prescribing a maximum uniform per-minute 
                compensation rate;
                    ``(B) prescribing a maximum uniform service 
                connection or other per-call compensation rate;
                    ``(C) prescribing variable maximum compensation 
                rates depending on such factors as carrier costs, the 
                size of the correctional facility served, and other 
                relevant factors identified by the Commission;
                    ``(D) requiring providers of inmate telephone 
                service to offer both collect calling and debit account 
                services;
                    ``(E) prohibiting the payment of commissions by 
                providers of inmate telephone service to administrators 
                of correctional institutions, departments of 
                correction, and similar entities; and
                    ``(F) requiring administrators of correctional 
                institutions, departments of correction, and similar 
                entities to allow more than one provider of inmate 
                telephone service to provide interstate inmate 
                telephone service at a correctional institution in 
                order that prisoners have a choice of such providers.
            ``(2) Scope.--The regulations adopted by the Commission 
        shall be technologically neutral and shall not jeopardize 
        legitimate security and penelogical interests. To the extent 
        the Commission regulations reduce or eliminate the revenue 
        derived by administrators of correctional institutions, 
        departments of correction, and similar entities from the 
        receipt of commissions, such effects of Commission regulations 
        shall not be considered as jeopardizing or otherwise affecting 
        legitimate security or penelogical interests.
            ``(3) Deadlines and periodic review.--The Commission shall 
        prescribe regulations to implement the provisions of this 
        subsection within one year after the date of enactment of the 
        Family Telephone Connection Protection Act of 2005. The 
        Commission shall review, on a triennial basis, the regulations 
        promulgated under this subsection, including whether any 
        Commission-established compensation rates should be modified.
            ``(4) State preemption.--To the extent that any State 
        requirements are inconsistent with the Commission's regulations 
        affecting or pertaining to interstate inmate telephone service, 
        including restrictions on the payment of commissions based upon 
        interstate inmate telephone service revenues or earnings, the 
        Commission's regulations on such matters shall preempt such 
        State requirements.
    ``(j) Inmate Telephone Service Fully Subject to Sections 251 and 
252.--
            ``(1) Inmate telephone service is fully subject to the 
        requirements of sections 251 and 252 of this Act.
            ``(2) No provider of inmate telephone service may block or 
        otherwise refuse to carry a call placed by an incarcerated 
        person on the grounds that the provider has no contractual or 
        other arrangement with the local exchange carrier serving the 
        intended recipient of the call or other common carrier involved 
        in any portion of the transmission of the call.''.

Ex Output:
Family Telephone Connection Protection Act of 2005 - Amends the Communications Act of 1934 to direct the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to consider the following types of regulation of inmate telephone service: (1) prescribing a maximum uniform per-minute rate (paid to telephone service providers); (2) prescribing a maximum uniform service connection or other per-call rate; (3) prescribing variable maximum rates depending on factors such as carrier costs or the size of the correctional facility; (4) requiring providers of inmate telephone service to offer both collect calling and debit account services; (5) prohibiting the payment of commissions by such providers to administrators of correctional facilities; and (6) requiring such administrators to allow more than one service provider at a facility so that prisoners have a choice.


Ex Input:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Secure Embassy Construction and 
Counterterrorism Act of 1999''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) On August 17, 1998, two United States embassies in 
        Nairobi, Kenya, and in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, were destroyed 
        by simultaneously exploding bombs. The resulting explosions 
        killed 220 persons and injured more than 4,000 others. Twelve 
        Americans and 40 Kenyan and Tanzanian employees of the United 
        States Foreign Service were killed in the attack.
            (2) The United States personnel in both Dar Es Salaam and 
        Nairobi showed leadership and personal courage in their 
        response to the attacks. Despite the havoc wrecked upon the 
        embassies, staff in both embassies provided rapid response in 
        locating and rescuing victims, providing emergency assistance, 
        and quickly restoring embassy operations during a crisis.
            (3) The bombs are believed to have been set by individuals 
        associated with Osama bin Laden, leader of a known 
        transnational terrorist organization. In February of 1998 Bin 
        Laden issued a directive to his followers that called for 
        attacks against American interests anywhere in the world.
            (4) Following the bombings, additional threats have been 
        made against United States diplomatic facilities.
            (5) A review board was convened following the bombings, as 
        required by Public Law 99-399. The panel was chaired by Admiral 
        William J. Crowe, United States Navy (Ret).
            (6) The conclusions of the Crowe panel are strikingly 
        similar to those stated by the Inman Commission, which issued 
        an extensive embassy security report more than 14 years ago.
            (7) Admiral Crowe's panel issued a report setting out the 
        following two striking problems:
                    (A) The United States has devoted inadequate 
                resources towards security against terrorist attacks.
                    (B) The United States Government places too low a 
                priority on security concerns. The result has been a 
                failure to take adequate steps to prevent tragedies 
                such as the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
            (8) The Crowe panel found that there was an institutional 
        failure on the part of the Department of State and embassies 
        under its direction, to recognize threats posed by 
        transnational terrorism and vehicular bombs.
            (9) Responsibility for obtaining adequate resources for 
        security programs is widely shared throughout the United States 
        Government, including Congress. Unless the vulnerabilities 
        identified in the Crowe report are addressed in a sustained and 
        financially realistic manner, the lives and safety of United 
        States employees in diplomatic facilities will continue to be 
        at risk from further terrorist attacks.
            (10) Although service in the Foreign Service or other 
        Government positions in foreign countries can never be 
        completely without risk, the United States must ensure that the 
        risks are kept to a minimum.

SEC. 3. UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC FACILITY DEFINED.

    In this Act, the term ``United States diplomatic facility'' means 
any embassy, chancery, legation, consulate or other office building or 
structure used by a United States diplomatic mission or consular post 
or by any agency of the United States.

SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) Authority.--The Secretary of State may use funds available 
under the account established in subsection (b) for the purposes of 
constructing, or providing security upgrades to, United States 
diplomatic facilities in order to meet the security requirements set 
forth in section 6.
    (b) Establishment of Account.--There is established in the general 
fund of the Treasury of the United States an appropriations account for 
the Department of State which shall be known as the ``Embassy 
Construction and Security'' account.
    (c) Certification.--Prior to obligation of any amount from the 
Embassy Construction and Security account, the Secretary of State shall 
certify to Congress, in classified form, that construction or upgrading 
of the United States diplomatic facility is necessary to bring the 
United States into compliance with all applicable security 
requirements, including those requirements set forth in section 6.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
            (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to 
        the Department of State under ``Embassy Construction and 
        Security''--
                    (A) for fiscal year 2000, $600,000,000;
                    (B) for fiscal year 2001, $600,000,000;
                    (C) for fiscal year 2002, $600,000,000;
                    (D) for fiscal year 2003, $600,000,000; and
                    (E) for fiscal year 2004, $600,000,000.
            (2) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
        to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until 
        expended.

SEC. 5. OBLIGATION OF FUNDS.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a classified report to 
Congress containing an identification of those United States diplomatic 
facilities that are most vulnerable to terrorist attack and setting 
out, in tiers of 20, those facilities from the most to the least 
vulnerable to such an attack.
    (b) Priority of Rebuilding Efforts.--Funds in the Embassy 
Construction and Security account allocated for construction of new 
embassies shall be used to rebuild only those embassies in the top 
three tiers, as designated by the Secretary of State.
    (c) Advanced Congressional Notifications.--Prior to obligation of 
funds in the Embassy Construction and Security account, or the 
reprogramming of funds out of that account, the Secretary of State 
shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives in 
accordance with section 34(a) of the State Department Basic Authorities 
Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2706(a)), of the Secretary's intent to obligate 
or reprogram the funds, as the case may be.

SEC. 6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES.

    (a) Description of Requirements.--The following security 
requirements shall apply with respect to United States diplomatic 
facilities:
            (1) Threat assessments.--
                    (A) The Emergency Action Plan (EAP) of each United 
                States mission shall address threats from large 
                vehicular bombs and transnational terrorism.
                    (B) The ``Composite Threat List'' shall contain a 
                section that addresses acts of international terrorism 
                against United States diplomatic facilities based on 
                criteria for identifying threats that emphasize the 
                threat of transnational terrorism and includes such 
                other criteria as the physical security environment, 
                host government support, and cultural realities.
            (2) Site selection.--
                    (A) In selecting sites for new United States 
                diplomatic facilities abroad, all United States 
                Government agencies (except military installations) 
                shall be located on the same compound.
                    (B) The Secretary of State and the relevant agency 
                head may waive subparagraph (A) if the Secretary and 
                the agency head jointly certify to Congress that 
                security requirements so permit.
                    (C) Any waiver under this paragraph shall be 
                exercised only in accordance with the procedures 
                applicable to reprogramming notifications under section 
                34 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 
                1956 (22 U.S.C. 2706).
            (3) Perimeter distance.--Each newly constructed or acquired 
        United States diplomatic facility shall be sited not less than 
        100 feet from the perimeter of the property on which the 
        facility is situated.
            (4) Crisis management training.--
                    (A) The appropriate personnel of the Department of 
                State shall undertake crisis management training for 
                mass casualty and mass destruction incidents relating 
                to diplomatic facilities which are designed to bring 
                about a rapid response to such incidents from 
                Department of State headquarters in Washington, D.C.
                    (B) A program of appropriate instruction in crisis 
                management shall be provided to personnel at United 
                States diplomatic facilities abroad.
            (5) Foreign emergency support team.--The Foreign Emergency 
        Support Team (FEST) of the Department of State shall receive 
        sufficient support from the Department, including--
                    (A) conducting routine training exercises through 
                the FEST;
                    (B) providing personnel identified to serve on the 
                FEST as a collateral duty;
                    (C) providing personnel to assist in medical 
                relief, public affairs, engineering, and building 
                safety; and
                    (D) providing such additional support as may be 
                necessary to enable the FEST to provide support in a 
                post-crisis environment involving mass casualties and 
                physical damage.
            (6) Rapid response procedures.--The Secretary of State 
        shall enter into a memorandum of understanding with the 
        Secretary of Defense setting out rapid response procedures for 
        mobilization of personnel and equipment of their respective 
        departments to provide more effective assistance in times of 
        emergency with respect to United States diplomatic facilities.
            (7) Storage of emergency equipment and records.--All United 
        States diplomatic missions shall have emergency equipment and 
        records stored at a secure off-site facility.
    (b) Review and Revision by the Secretary of State.--The Secretary 
of State shall review and revise security requirements in effect for 
United States diplomatic facilities as of the date of enactment of this 
Act to ensure their compliance with the security requirements described 
in subsection (a).

SEC. 7. CLOSURE OF VULNERABLE POSTS.

    (a) Review.--The Secretary of State shall review the findings of 
the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than January 1, 2000, the 
        Secretary of State shall submit a report to Congress in 
        classified form setting forth the results of the review 
        conducted under subsection (a).
            (2) Elements of the report.--The report shall--
                    (A) specify whether any United States diplomatic 
                facility should be closed because--
                            (i) the facility is high vulnerability and 
                        subject to threat of terrorist attack; and
                            (ii) adequate security enhancements cannot 
                        be provided to the facility; and
                    (B) identify plans to provide secure premises for 
                permanent use by the United States diplomatic mission, 
                whether in country or in a regional United States 
                diplomatic facility, or for temporary occupancy pending 
                construction of new buildings.

SEC. 8. CURRENT AND PROJECTED ROLE AND FUNCTION OF EACH UNITED STATES 
              DIPLOMATIC FACILITY.

    Not later than January 1, 2000, the Secretary of State shall submit 
a report to Congress, in classified and unclassified form, on the role 
and function of each United States diplomatic facility through 2010. 
The report shall describe--
            (1) the potential for reduction or transfer of personnel 
        and equipment if technology is adequately exploited for maximum 
        efficiencies;
            (2) the balance between the cost of maintaining a secure 
        United States diplomatic facility and the benefit of a United 
        States presence;
            (3) the potential for relying on regional United States 
        diplomatic facilities in certain parts of the world; and
            (4) necessary upgrades, in order of importance, for such 
        facilities.

SEC. 9. OVERSEAS SERVICE STAR.

    The State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 is amended by 
inserting after section 36 (22 U.S.C. 2708) the following new section:

``SEC. 36A. THE OVERSEAS SERVICE STAR.

    ``(a) Authority.--The President, upon the recommendation of the 
Secretary, may award an overseas service star to any member of the 
Foreign Service or any other civilian employee of the Government of the 
United States who, after August 1, 1998, while employed at, or assigned 
permanently or temporarily to, an official mission overseas or while 
traveling abroad on official business, incurred a wound or other injury 
or an illness (whether or not the wound, other injury, or illness 
resulted in death)--
            ``(1) as the person was performing official duties;
            ``(2) as the person was on the premises of a United States 
        mission abroad; or
            ``(3) by reason of the person's status as a United States 
        Government employee.
    ``(b) Cases Resulting From Unlawful Conduct.--Cases covered by 
subsection (a) include cases of wounds or other injuries incurred as a 
result of terrorist or military action, civil unrest, or criminal 
activities directed at any facility of the Government of the United 
States.
    ``(c) Selection Criteria.--The Secretary shall prescribe the 
procedures for identifying and considering persons eligible for award 
of an overseas service star and for selecting the persons to be 
recommended for the award.
    ``(d) Award in the Event of Death.--If a person selected for award 
of an overseas service star dies before being presented the award, the 
award may be made and the star presented to the person's family or to 
the person's representative, as designated by the President.
    ``(e) Form of Award.--The Secretary shall prescribe the design of 
the overseas service star. The award may not include a stipend or any 
other cash payment.
    ``(f) Funding.--
            ``(1) Any expenses incurred for awarding a person an 
        overseas service star may be paid out of appropriations 
        available at the time of the award for personnel of the 
        department or agency of the United States Government in which 
        the person was employed when the person incurred the wound, 
        injury, or illness upon which the award is based.
            ``(2) Limitation.--No funds may be made available under 
        this section for cash payments to recipients.''.

Ex Output:
Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 - Establishes within the Treasury an embassy construction and security account for the purpose of constructing, or providing security upgrades to, U.S. diplomatic facilities in order to meet specified security requirements, including that: (1) threat assessments such as the Emergency Action Plan and the Composite Threat List address threats to U.S. missions from large vehicular bombs and transnational terrorism; (2) in the selection of sites for new U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad, that all U.S. Government agencies (except military installations) be located on the same compound; (3) each newly constructed or acquired U.S. diplomatic facility be sited not less than 100 feet from the perimeter of the property on which the facility is situated; (4) appropriate Department of State and U.S. diplomatic personnel undertake crisis management training for mass casualty and mass destruction incidents relating to diplomatic facilities; (5) there is adequate Department of State support for the Foreign Emergency Support Team; (6) the Secretary of State enter into a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of Defense setting out rapid response procedures for mobilization of personnel and equipment of their respective departments to provide more effective assistance in times of emergency with respect to U.S.  diplomatic facilities; and (7) all U.S. diplomatic missions have emergency equipment and records stored at a secure off-site facility. Authorizes appropriations. 
(Sec. 5) Directs the Secretary of State to report to Congress an identification of U.S. diplomatic facilities that are most vulnerable to terrorist attack, setting out, in tiers of 20, those facilities from the most to the least vulnerable to such an attack. Requires account funds allocated for construction of new embassies to be used to rebuild only those embassies in the top three tiers. 
(Sec. 7) Directs the Secretary to review, and report to Congress on, the findings of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel with respect to the closure of vulnerable U.S. diplomatic missions overseas. 
(Sec. 8) Directs the Secretary to report to Congress on the role and function of each U.S. diplomatic facility through 2010. 
(Sec. 9) Amends the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to authorize the President to award an overseas service star to any member of the Foreign Service or any other civilian Government employee who while employed at, or assigned permanently or temporarily to, an official mission overseas, or while traveling abroad on official business, incurred a wound or other injury or an illness (whether or not resulting in death): (1) as the person was performing official duties; (2) as the person was on the premises of a U.S. mission abroad; or (3) by reason of the person's status as a U.S. Government employee.  Specifies award requirements.


Ex Input:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``United States Ports of Entry Threat 
and Operational Review Act''.

SEC. 2. PORTS OF ENTRY THREAT AND OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS.

    (a) In General.--
            (1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
        acting through the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border 
        Protection, shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security 
        and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
        Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Finance of the Senate 
        a threat and operational analysis of ports of entry.
            (2) Contents.--The threat and operational analysis required 
        under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of the 
        following:
                    (A) Current and potential threats posed by 
                individuals and organized groups seeking--
                            (i) to exploit security vulnerabilities at 
                        ports of entry; or
                            (ii) to unlawfully enter the United States 
                        through such ports of entry.
                    (B) Methods and pathways used to exploit security 
                vulnerabilities at ports of entry.
                    (C) Improvements needed at ports of entry to 
                prevent the unlawful movement of people, illicit drugs, 
                and other contraband across the borders of the United 
                States.
                    (D) Improvements needed to enhance travel and trade 
                facilitation and reduce wait times at ports of entry, 
                including--
                            (i) security vulnerabilities associated 
                        with prolonged wait times;
                            (ii) current technology at ports of entry 
                        that can be adapted to handle more volume, 
                        increase efficiency, and improve accuracy of 
                        detection efforts; and
                            (iii) infrastructure additions and 
                        upgrades.
                    (E) Processes conducted at ports of entry that do 
                not require law enforcement training and could be--
                            (i) filled with--
                                    (I) non-law enforcement staff; or
                                    (II) the private sector, for 
                                processes or activities determined to 
                                not be inherently governmental (as such 
                                term is defined in section 5 of the 
                                Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act 
                                of 1998 (Public Law 105-270)); or
                            (ii) automated.
                    (F) Improvements needed during secondary 
                inspections to meet food safety standards defined by 
                applicable statutes for the commodities being 
                inspected.
            (3) Analysis requirements.--In compiling the threat and 
        operational analysis required under paragraph (1), the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Commissioner 
        of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, shall consider and 
        examine the following:
                    (A) Personnel needs, including K-9 Units, and 
                estimated costs, at each port of entry, including such 
                needs and challenges associated with recruitment and 
                hiring.
                    (B) Technology needs, including radiation portal 
                monitors and non-intrusive inspection technology, and 
                estimated costs at each port of entry.
                    (C) Infrastructure needs and estimated costs at 
                each port of entry.
    (b) Ports of Entry Strategy and Implementation Plan.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 270 days after the 
        submission of the threat and operational analysis required 
        under subsection (a) and every 5 years thereafter for 10 years, 
        the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the 
        Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), shall 
        provide to the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee 
        on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the 
        Committee on Finance of the Senate a ports of entry strategy 
        and implementation plan.
            (2) Contents.--The ports of entry strategy and 
        implementation plan required under paragraph (1) shall include 
        a consideration of the following:
                    (A) The ports of entry threat and operational 
                analysis required under subsection (a), with an 
                emphasis on efforts to mitigate threats and challenges 
                identified in such analysis.
                    (B) Efforts to reduce wait times at ports of entry 
                and standards against which the effectiveness of such 
                efforts may be determined.
                    (C) Efforts to prevent the unlawful movement of 
                people, illicit drugs, and other contraband across the 
                borders of the United States at the earliest possible 
                point at ports of entry and standards against which the 
                effectiveness of such efforts may be determined.
                    (D) Efforts to focus intelligence collection and 
                information analysis to disrupt transnational criminal 
                organizations attempting to exploit vulnerabilities at 
                ports of entry and standards against which the 
                effectiveness of such efforts may be determined.
                    (E) Efforts to verify that any new port of entry 
                technology acquisition can be operationally integrated 
                with existing technologies in use by the Department of 
                Homeland Security.
                    (F) Lessons learned from reports on the business 
                transformation initiative under section 802(i)(1) of 
                the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 
                2015 (Public Law 114-125).
                    (G) CBP staffing requirements for all ports of 
                entry.
                    (H) Efforts to identify and detect fraudulent 
                documents at ports of entry and standards against which 
                the effectiveness of such efforts may be determined.
                    (I) Efforts to prevent, detect, investigate, and 
                mitigate corruption at ports of entry and standards 
                against which the effectiveness of such efforts may be 
                determined.
    (c) Ports of Entry Described.--In this section, the term ``ports of 
entry'' means United States air, land, and sea ports of entry.

Ex Output:

United States Ports of Entry Threat and Operational Review Act This bill directs U.S. Customs and Border Protection to submit to the congressional homeland security and tax committees a threat and operational analysis of U.S. air, land, and sea ports of entry.