In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: (9th Cir.1954) (concluding that expert opinions did not support jury verdict, in part because "[o]pinion evidence is only as good as the facts upon which it is based” and record did not support opinions). Here, for the reasons stated, the record demonstrates that the officers' percep tion of an immediate threat — whether correct or not — was clearly reasonable and therefore that their initial use of deadly force was justified. 9 . The situation Appellants faced here — having to determine in a split-second whether a suspect is using his vehicle as a weapon — is analogous to the scenario of an officer forced to make a split-second decision as to whether to use deadly force against a suspect who he believes has a firearm. See, e.g., McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 215-17 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that use of deadly force was justified when suspect in vehicle repeatedly refused orders to raise his hands and the officer perceived that he was holding something (B) holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger (C) holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon (D) holding that use of deadly force was justified against a suspect when officer forced to make a splitsecond decision relied on his reasonable belief that another officer had seen a gun in the suspects hands even though the suspects hands were handcuffed in front of him and the defendant officer never saw a weapon (E) holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station
[EX A]: holding that use of deadly force was justified when suspect in vehicle repeatedly refused orders to raise his hands and the officer perceived that he was holding something

[EX Q]: plenary determination of jurisdiction over five landlocked canals); Weiszmann v. District Engineers, U.S. Army Corp, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir.1976) (same outcome as in Sexton Cove in action brought by landowner); U.S. v. St. Bernard Parish, 589 F.Supp. 617 (E.D.La.1984) (plenary trial determining jurisdictional issue); U.S. v. Lambert 589 F.Supp. 366 (M.D.Fla.1984) (plenary trial determining property was a wetland; proof by preponderance of evidence was measure of government’s burden of persuasion); U.S. v. Ciampitti, 583 F.Supp. 483 (D.N.J.1984) (in action for preliminary injunction, court made own determination that property was a wetland); U.S. v. City of Fort Pierre, 580 F.Supp. 1036 (D.S.D.1983) (plenary trial determining property was a wetland) rev'd, 747 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Parkview Corp. v. Department of Army Corp of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (B) holding property not a wetland (C) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (D) recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate (E) holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover
[EX A]: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property

[EX Q]: so would not be appropriate in this case. Cf. Def.'s Corrected Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.'s Mot. for J. Upon the Agency R„ ECF No. 41 ("Def.'s Br.”) at 20-23 (arguing that the court should decline to reach the merits of AHSTAC's contention in this regard because AHSTAC failed to make this argument before the agency in the first instance); 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) (”[T]he Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”) (emphasis added); Blue Field (Sichuan) Food Indus. Co. v. United States, - CIT -, 949 F.Supp.2d 1311, 1321 (2013) (“This court has discretion to determine when it will require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d)); Itochu Bldg. Prods, v. United States, 733 F.3d 1140, 1145 (Fed.Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). 17 . Importantly, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a courts authority to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in actions brought under the apa is limited when neither the statute nor agency rules specifically mandate exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review (B) recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a  1983 action (C) holding that requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is appropriate where doing so can protect administrative agency authority and promote judicial efficiency (D) holding that courts have consistently required exhaustion of administrative remedies under foia (E) holding that proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary under section 1997ea
[EX A]:
holding that a courts authority to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in actions brought under the apa is limited when neither the statute nor agency rules specifically mandate exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review