In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: any evidence that Qualex’s action had any reason to perceive plaintiff as being disabled, any claim that the withdrawal of the offer of employment was motivated by such a perception is purely speculative. As such, plaintiffs claim that defendant Qualex violated the ADA by withdrawing its offer of employment fails as a matter of law. See Hoffman at 1 (“Unsupported speculation does not satisfy a party’s burden to produce some evidence in resisting a summary judgment motion.”). B. The Drug-free Workplace policy. Plaintiffs second claim is that the “Drug-free Workplace” policy maintained by defendant Qualex is a blanket exclusionary policy, leaving no allowance for the legal use of controlled substances. See Rowles v. Automated Production Systems, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 424, 430 (M.D.Pa.2000) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff further argues that defendant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers drug policy violated the ada to the extent that it prohibits the use of all legally prescribed controlled substances without a determination that such prohibition is jobrelated and consistent with business necessity (B) holding highest and best use is to be considered to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value (C) holding that the 60day rule under the wisconsin controlled substances act is mandatory and that failure to set the hearing within that period deprived the trial court of jurisdiction (D) holding that the ada exceeds the  5 power  at least to the extent it extends beyond remedies for irrational discrimination (E) recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: 38 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(3). 39 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(3). 40 Cowell also appears to argue that Russell was unaware of the second HC’s findings. But the second HC’s report was issued on December 29, 2006. Russell voted to terminate Cowell’s privileges at the MEC’s August 7, 2006, meeting. 41 See Morgan, 101 Wn. App at 773 (“[T]he fact that varying review committees differed on its conclusions does not undermine the fairness of the procedures.”); cf. Singh, 308 F.3d at 41 (“The reversal of a peer review committee’s recommendation of an adverse professional review action by a higher level peer review panel does not indicate that the initial recommendation was made without a reasonable belief that the recommendation would further quality health care.”); Austin, 979 F.2d at 735 (<HOLDING>). 42 See Morgan, 101 Wn. App. at 772 n.4 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing confidentiality essential to function of medical peer review committees and to improvement of health care and protecting the records of such committees from discovery (B) holding that the medical review panel is authorized to review the medical records and other submitted material pertaining to each defendants treatment of a patient and that while a medical malpractice plaintiff must as a prerequisite to filing suit present the  proposed complaint for review and expert opinion by a medical review panel there is no requirement for such plaintiff to fully explicate and provide the particulars or legal contentions regarding the claim (C) holding that reversal of a medical executive committees recommendation by a judicial review committee failed to establish that the defendants did not have a reasonable belief that the suspension was warranted (D) holding that malpractice was not a jury issue where there was a lack of medical evidence that the defendants alleged failure to correctly diagnose was due to the fact that he failed to use care skill and diligence ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the medical community cited in the committee comment for uji 131115 (E) holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error


Output: (C)