TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: on the circuit court orders and the statements of defense counsel at the hearing. We hold that neither the doctors nor the trial court could rely on facts and legal conclusions within the circuit court orders. Thus, the doctors’ assertions at the hearing, which were based on facts within the orders, constituted factual statements of counsel. Moreover, the orders were, in effect, memoranda submitted by counsel. In any event, the trial court could not properly consider factual statements from either when deciding the motions, however they are characterized. Cf. Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 457 S.E.2d 601 (1995) (noting that the ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be based solely upon the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint); Gilmore, 290 S.C. 53, 348 S.E.2d 180 (<HOLDING>). This is not to say that circuit court orders 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the judge cannot consider factual statements of counsel in a motion for summary judgment (B) holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment (C) holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment (E) holding that conclusory statements without factual support are of no value to the court when deciding a summary judgment motion

SOLUTION: holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment

PROBLEM: in cases decided under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Meyers, 616 F.3d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (characterizing the Segal standard as a "background rule under the old Bankruptcy Act, to which courts still refer in the era of the Bankruptcy Code”); Andrews, 80 F.3d at 910-11 (applying the Segal standard to determine whether post-petition payments under a pre-petition non-compete agreement were property of the debtor’s estate); Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1423 (concluding the Bankruptcy Code "follows Segal insofar as it includes after-acquired property 'sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past’ but eliminates the requirement that it not be entangled with the debtor’s ability to make a fresh start”). But see Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir.2006) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Although the parties frame the issue as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code (B) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (C) holding that the question of whether an interest is a claim for bankruptcy purposes is to be resolved by reference to the text history and purpose of the bankruptcy code (D) holding although congress has specifically approved of segals result segals sufficiently rooted test did not survive the enactment of the bankruptcy code footnote omitted (E) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate

SOLUTION: holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code

PROBLEM: the Constitution and laws of this state .... Any home rule charter proposed as herein provided, may provide for such county officers as may be deemed necessary to carry out and perform all county functions as provided by charter or by general law .... The terms of all elective officers ... who are in office at the time of the adoption of a Home Rule Charter shall terminate as provided in the charter. ¶22 It is well established that a home rule charter county has “the right to conduct their purely local affairs without supervision by the state, so long as they abided by the provisions of the constitution and did not run counter to considerations of public policy of broad concern, expressed in general laws.” State ex rel. Carroll v. King County, 78 Wn.2d 452, 457-58, 474 P.2d 877 (1970) (<HOLDING>). However, because the CRC and Proposition 1 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a home rule charter county could hold elections at a different time than specified by state statute (B) holding that a charter county may assess a fee pursuant to florida statute section 3374013 and is not expressly or impliedly preempted by federal or state law (C) recognizing that a board of elections is not a political subdivision and its members are not county officers (D) holding that a state may not condition voting in state elections on payment of a tax (E) holding that the lehigh county sheriff is a county officer rather than a state officer

SOLUTION:
holding that a charter county may assess a fee pursuant to florida statute section 3374013 and is not expressly or impliedly preempted by federal or state law