TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: seeking to invoke the exception must establish that they agreed to engage in a joint effort and to keep the shared information confidential from outsiders. See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243-44 (2d Cir.1989) (finding valid joint defense privilege where information was “imparted in confidence” between parties “who had agreed upon and undertaken a joint strategy”); United States v. Sawyer, 878 F.Supp. 295, 297 (D.Mass.1995) (despite similar interests between employer and employee, insufficient evidence that communications were made during the course of a joint defense effort; proponent could neither establish time frame of agreement nor acts creating and/or terminating the agreement); United States v. United Tech. Corp., 979 F.Supp. 108, 110, 112 (D.Conn.1997) (<HOLDING>); Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 197 
 Holding statements: (A) holding common interest doctrine shielded information consortium members shared pursuant to collaboration agreement (B) recognizing doctrine (C) recognizing that tribes and states understood that they shared the right to manage the exercise of in common hunting and fishing rights (D) recognizing a subset of the common interest privilege as parents and schools have a corresponding interest in the free flow of information about administrators and faculty members (E) holding that there was no waiver of the work product protection because the business and public relations firm specializing in litigationrelated crisis management shared a common interest

SOLUTION: recognizing doctrine

PROBLEM: witness testifying against him was in custody). This right is not subject to the trial court’s discretion; however, the court may preclude repetitive or unduly harassing interrogation. Ramey,. 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68; Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475. Thus: “[A] defendant need not show interest or motive in that any promises of leniency have, in fact, been made to the witness by the State or that any expectations of special favor exist in the mind of the witness, before cross-examining a witness as to possible bias. Further, the defense is entitled to inquire into such promises or expectations whether they are based on fact or are simply imaginary.” Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68, citing Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475-76. See also People v. Tomes, 284 Ill. App. 3d 514, 520, 672 N.E.2d 289 (1996) (<HOLDING>). “To this end a defendant has the right to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required (B) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (C) holding that limitation on scope and breadth of crossexamination did not significantly curtail effectiveness of witness crossexamination because crossexamination was lengthy and extensive (D) holding it is well established that crossexamination to show that a witness might be vulnerable to pressure whether real or imagined from the state regarding a pending charge is a matter of right (E) holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination

SOLUTION: recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required

PROBLEM: agreed with at least one other person to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and that the defendant and such other person or persons intended at the time the agreement was made that it would be carried out, then it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. Defense counsel points out that the jury instructions do not specifically name Jimon Dollard as the person with whom defendant conspired; rather, the trial court instructed that the jury could find defendant guilty of the conspiracy offense if it determined that defendant had conspired “with at least one other person to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon . . . .” Defense counsel did not object to the trial court’s instruction. Accordingly, we review the instruction for plain error. “In deciding whether .E.2d 146, 148 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 335 N.C. 241, 439 S.E.2d 158 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court correctly instructed the jury that there had to be a substantial similarity between the indictment and the proof in order to find the defendant guilty (B) holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge (D) holding the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that it may find the defendant guilty of conspiracy if the jury found the defendant agreed with at least one other person where the indictment charged the defendant with conspiring with a single named individual and the evidence tended to show the defendant may have conspired with a number of persons not just the named coconspirator to commit an unlawful act (E) holding the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it may find the defendant guilty if the jury found the defendant had conspired with the two coconspirators named in the indictment or both of them or others where evidence tended to show a conspiracy between the defendant and some person other than the named coconspirators

SOLUTION:
holding that the district court correctly instructed the jury that there had to be a substantial similarity between the indictment and the proof in order to find the defendant guilty