In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals
[A]: (E)


[Q]: Statement. They were, however, obtained prior to this Court’s actual approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement, which occurred on December 19, 2008 (i.e. at the joint hearing on approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement and the Amended Plan). Although typically a disclosure statement should be approved before the proponent solicits votes for the plan, here the premature solicitation was harmless and, as noted by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia, a harmless failure to comply with § 1125’s solicitation requirements “is not necessarily fatal to the success of a Chapter 11 reorganization.” In re N.W. Recreational Activities, Inc., 8 B.R. 10, 12 (Bankr.D.Ga.1980); see also First Am. Bank of N.Y. v. Century Glove, Inc., 81 B.R. 274, 278-80 (D.Del.1988) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(d)(2)(B)(vi), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case (B) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding hearing in chambers was not per se a violation of due process (E) holding that a plan proponents failure to obtain court approval of solicitation materials is not per se fatal to the confirmation process
[A]: (E)


[Q]: Seminatore, we find these references incidental to the propositions of law for which these cases stand. In reaching this conclusion, we take into consideration that the word “pending” is used once in the Seminatore opinion and, although “pending” is used four times in the Wilke opinion, it is not used at all in the court’s discussion of legal expenses under R.C. 305.14. Notably, neither case involved the reliance on assurances of reimbursement that we must consider here. {¶ 50} It is inconsistent for respondents to stand in the way of proper procedural performance under R.C. 305.14(A) while arguing that relators’ writ of mandamus must fail because the particulars of R.C. 305.14(A) were not followed. See Barrett v. Picker Internatl., Inc. (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 820, 826, 589 N.E.2d 1372 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 51} Thus, in conclusion, we hold that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs status as thirdparty beneficiaries cannot be used as both a sword to reap the benefits    and a shield to protect them (B) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status (C) holding that a firearm could be used both to protect the defendants spouse and to facilitate the defendants drug trafficking crimes (D) holding that beneficiaries of a trust that signed an agreement with the fhlbb were not in privity or have thirdparty beneficiary status because the government did not make any promises expressly intended to benefit them (E) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract
[A]:
(A)