In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: venture as contrasted with a governmental function.’ ” Hoffer v. State, 110 Wn.2d 415, 422, 755 P.2d 781 (1988) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1097 (5th ed. 1979)), adhered to on recons., 113 Wn.2d 148, 776 P.2d 963 (1989). 5 Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 118 Wn.2d at 645. 6 Id. at 646 (quoting City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d 679, 695, 743 P.2d 793 (1987)). 7 Id. 8 RCW 57.08.081(1). 9 These factors include the difference in cost to various customers, the location of customers within and without the district, the achievement of water conservation goals and discouragement of wasteful practices, and “any other matters which present a reasonable difference as a ground for distinction.” RCW 57-.08.081(2). 10 See City of Tacoma v. Welcker, 65 Wn.2d 677, 685, 399 P.2d 330 (1965) (<HOLDING>). 11 See Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 118 Wn.2d at 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that coverage could be triggered by need to prevent imminent contamination of groundwater (B) recognizing that watershed isolation or acquisition serves to prevent and control water contamination (C) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (D) recognizing that water retained within a watershed is susceptible to multiple use because all water uses are not consumptive uses (E) holding authority to control limits duty to control
Example Output: recognizing that coverage could be triggered by need to prevent imminent contamination of groundwater

Example Input: types of property which do not pass to the trustee under Section 70 of the Act. See, Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a “Specialized Type of Property” ... in our Economic System, 66 N.W.U.L.Rev. 502, 525-532 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, 395 U.S. at 340, 89 S.Ct. 1820; Lines v. Frederick, supra, 400 U.S. at 19, 91 S.Ct. 113. The Supreme Court has recently held, in what is a logical corollary to the notion of specialized property, that at times a trustee has too tenuous a relationship to a given claim to have standing to assert that claim on behalf of the bankrupt estate. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 92 S.Ct. 1678, 32 L.Ed.2d 195 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In view of these evolving federal policies of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses (B) holding that the relevant indenture agreement allowed the trustee to bring tort and fraud claims on behalf of the bondholders (C) holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee (D) holding that a trustee does not have standing to sue a thirdparty on behalf of debenture holders (E) holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee
Example Output: holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses

Example Input: State, 918 S.W.2d 511, 518 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (Baird, J., concurring), urged that McFarland should be overruled, the Court of Criminal Appeals has not done so. I would hold that we are not bound by the interpretation of the federal rule by the United States Supreme Court, based on the substantial differences in the respective evi-dentiary rules regarding statements against penal interest. Indeed, the approach of the United States Supreme Court in Williamson was to evaluate each statement within a confession as a separate statement for purposes of admissibility under the federal hearsay exception. Id. at 2434-35 This is antithetical to the general approach Texas has taken in evaluating admissibility of statements. See, e.g., Marini v. State, 593 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (<HOLDING>). The federal interpretation would lead to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed (B) holding that question is whether defendants will was overborne by police at the time of the confession (C) holding that rule of completeness did not apply where statements made at the scene and the statement made at the police station were  distinct and not part of one confession (D) holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given (E) holding that later declarations during defendants confession leading officers to evidence of the crime constituted part of one continuous confession that began at the police station
Example Output:
holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed