In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Third, the Kimmell court did not actually address whether future projections were actionable, but merely assumed that they were based on the procedural posture of the case and the issues addressed on appeal. Id. Finally, the Second Circuit noted that, “although the Appellate Division in Kimmell [implicitly] found that future prediction/projeetions could qualify as the basis for a negligent misrepresentation claim ..., that finding is contrary to the great weight of authority.” Id. The Court agrees with the Second Circuit’s analysis. The inquiry does not depend on whether the omission itself relates to a past or present fact. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the failure to disclose renders an existing statement of fact false or misleading. Cf. Metropolitan, 532 F.Supp.2d at 1290 (<HOLDING>). If this were not the case, almost any 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the cause of action (B) holding that an omission claim could not be maintained where plaintiff did not point to previous statements that were misleading without further disclosures (C) holding that a duty to disclose arises whenever secret information renders prior public statements materially misleading (D) holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading (E) holding that a cause of action based on an omission requires the plaintiff to show how an alleged omitted fact negates the truth of or renders misleading the statements actually made
[A]: (E)


[Q]: v. Jones, 993 P.2d 424, 427-28 (Alaska 1999) (construing a statute to give rise to an equitable lien because it established "an interest in and a right to seek reimbursement from" a particular source). 13 . Cf. AS 09.35.160 (giving a judgment creditor and the process server who levies on property under a writ of execution full control over the timing of a sale in satisfaction of the judgment). 14 . See Alaska R. Civ. P. 89(a). 15 . AS 13.16.505. 16 . AS 13.06.050(39). This definition comports with the definition set out in Uniform Probate Code section 1-201(33), which states: " 'Property' includes both real and personal property or any interest therein and means anything that 'may be the subject of ownership." 17 . Cf. Goldstein v. Prien, 143 Cal.App.2d 123, 299 P.2d 344, 346 (1956) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Since AS 13.16.505 prohibits liens from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is improper for a trustee to liquidate claims that benefit only select creditors with the only benefit to the estate being the recoupment of administrative costs (B) holding that there is a difference between a debtor attempting to pursue an action for his own benefit and a trustee pursuing an action for the benefit of the creditors (C) recognizing under analogous section of california code that the right to recover property conveyed by a decedent in fraud of creditors is an asset of his insolvent estate and that the executor or administrator is a trustee thereof for the benefit of creditors (D) holding that directors of an insolvent corporation are trustees for the creditors (E) recognizing that the bangor punta doctrine was not applicable to suit brought by receiver of insolvent insurance company for the benefit of creditors
[A]: (C)


[Q]: Id. Professor Larson notes that in addition to an employee’s failure to recognize the nature of his condition, a failure to recognize the seriousness of a condition is a second reason that may justify a delay in giving timely notice. Larson states that the “claimant must have had reason to be aware of the seriousness of the trouble. This feature is a salutary requirement, since any other rule would force employees to rush in with claims for every minor ache, pain, or symptom.” 7 Larson & Larson, supra, § 126.05[5] see also Rebiski v. Pioneer Tel. Co., 262 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Minn.1978) (noting evidence supported finding that employee reasonably believed that fall from telephone pole would not result in disability); Barcel v. Barrel Finish, 304 Minn. 536, 537-38, 232 N.W.2d 13, 15 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The third reason cited by Professor Larson 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employees injury while on college grounds to report for first day of work before he reached either the administration building where he was to complete payroll forms or the athletic field house where he was to do the work was an injury suffered in the course of the employment (B) holding that where symptoms of numbness in employees right hand and forearm were at first intermittent and did not interfere with his work the trivial injury rule applied to toll the statutory period for notice of injury to employer (C) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence (D) holding in an employees action to recover for injury sustained during work against the employer and other defendants did not state an intentional tort claim against contractor (E) holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury
[A]:
(B)