TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: protected activity for purposes of the first element of a prima facie case and the second element is not disputed. “To establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that ‘the decision-makers were aware of the protected conduct’ and ‘that the protected activity and the adverse employment action were not wholly unrelated.’ ” Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted). “[A]t a mini mum, [a plaintiff] must show that the adverse act followed the protected conduct.” Griffin v. GTE Fla., Inc., 182 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir.1999). In other words, the plaintiff must show a temporal link between a protected activity and an adverse employment action. See Sullivan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Griffin, 182 F.3d at 1281-82 (finding no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding causal link between alleged discriminatory remarks and adverse employment action insufficient (B) holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action (C) holding that an intervening act of misconduct by the plaintiff can break the causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action (D) holding that no causal link existed between protected activity in february 1994 and adverse employment actions in late 1994 and early 1995 (E) holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection

SOLUTION: holding causal link between alleged discriminatory remarks and adverse employment action insufficient

PROBLEM: 284 So.2d 905, 915-16 (La.1973); see Tesvich v. 3-A’s Towing Co., 547 So.2d 1106, 1111 (La.Ct.App.1989) (“[W]e have concluded on the basis of Lombard that the claim of each plaintiff with respect to his or her leases constitutes a separate occurrence.” (citation omitted)); see also Reynolds v. Transcon. Ins. Co., Civ. A. Nos. 94-1367, 94-1432, 1995 WL 16795, at *5-6 (E.D.La. Jan.17, 1995) (Duval, J.) (discussing and applying Lombard, Tesvich, and Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1359 (5th Cir.1994)). The property damage in the DuroSeal petitions allegedly arose because of several negligent and fraudulent acts on the part of Jotun and others. Each of these acts does not constitute a separate bes, Inc., 924 So.2d 1131, 1133 (La.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); Korossy v. Sunrise Homes, Inc., 653 So.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee (B) holding that property damage occurred when condominium owners received architects report detailing damage not during the four years of construction of the condos (C) holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed (D) holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations (E) holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did

SOLUTION: holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee

PROBLEM: 118 L.Ed.2d 543 (1992). Thus, § 1823(e) and the D’Oench doctrine encourage “banks and their customers [to] include the entire extent of their obligations in the bank’s records.” Id.; see also Bell & Murphy & Assoc. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, N.A., 894 F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir.) (“The D’Oench, Duhme doctrine ... favors the interests of depositors and creditors of a failed bank, who cannot protect themselves from secret agreements, over the interests of borrowers, who can.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895, 111 S.Ct. 244, 112 L.Ed.2d 203 (1990); In re NEW Commercial Paper Litigation, 826 F.Supp. 1448, 1461-62 (D.D.C.1992) (describing D’Oench and § 1823(e) as “a regime that places the risk on borrowers if they do not get all of .2d 206 (1994); Oliver v. RTC, 955 F.2d 583, 585-86 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, as originally enacted, § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that doench applies to secret side agreements made by subsidiaries and subsubsidiaries of the failed institution in receivership (B) holding that the doench doctrine extends to claims involving a wholly owned subsidiary of the failed financial institution in receivership (C) holding that the commonlaw doench doctrine applies to bar suit even when the rtc does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement (D) holding receipt of cab fare sufficient financial interest (E) holding that the doench doctrine extends broadly to cover any secret agreement adversely affecting the value of a financial interest that has come within the rtcs control as receiver of a failed financial institution including the financial interest of a whollyowned subsidiary

SOLUTION:
holding that doench applies to secret side agreements made by subsidiaries and subsubsidiaries of the failed institution in receivership