In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of TILA;” (2) "The notes and security instruments signed by plaintiff and borrowers for the purchase of mobile homes were extensions of credit subject to TILA;” (3) "The requirement that insurance policies contain provisions covering Green Tree's possible repossession expenses are credit charges as defined by TILA and occur annually when each policy is renewed;” and (4) "No TILA disclosures are given by Green Tree.” (See Am.Compl. ¶¶ 21-23.) Green Tree does not rebut these contentions and instead only addresses the merits of the arbitration issue. In this Memorandum Opinion and Order, however, the court only addresses the question of whether Plaintiff may be compelled to arbitrate her claims, not the merits of the underlying claims themselves. 6 . See. also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480-83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration (B) holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration (C) holding that an agreement to submit age discrimination claims to arbitration does not constitute a waiver (D) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (E) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: as she has failed to show that a majority of the arbitrators deliberately disregarded the law. (See id.) Although the award in this case is general, it does not appear that the panel deliberately disregarded the law. Both parties made viable legal arguments to the arbitration panel regarding equitable remedies and defenses including the voluntary payment doctrine, which the panel says it considered. Although the voluntary payment doctrine could preclude Olde’s recovery, it is not applicable in all situations and there are exceptions to the doctrine. For example, courts have found that if a mistake of fact is alleged, then the voluntary payment doctrine does not apply. See Kane-Miller Corp. v. Lakeview Trust & Sav. Bank, No. 88 C 7561, 1989 WL 13295, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb.13, 1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Best Buy Co. v. Harlem-Irving Cos., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees under adea may not be recovered against a defendant who was not an employer of the plaintiff (B) recognizing that a mistake of fact may constitute a valid defense (C) holding that applicability of the voluntary payment doctrine and the mistake of fact exception raises questions of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss (D) holding that money paid under mistake of fact may be recovered regardless of the negligence of the payor (E) holding the general rule is that money paid to another under a mistake of fact may be recovered because the money belongs in equity and good conscience to the person who paid it

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: payments not later than 30 days after the date of the filing of the plan or the order for relief, whichever is earlier....” 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). Although the bankruptcy court did not identify § 1326(a)(1)(A) or § 1307(c)(4) as the statutory basis for dismissal during the April 16, 2014 hearing or in the Dismissal Order, we can discern that the court was referring to those provisions when it stated: “This statute says once you file a plan, thirty days later you have to commence your payments.” Bankruptcy courts within this circuit have long held that a debtor’s failure to make payments to the chapter 13 trustee as required by § 1326, “by itself, is grounds for dismissal.” In re Jones, 174 B.R. 8, 12 (Bankr.D.N.H.1994); see also In re Kaspar, 60 B.R. 658, 659-60 (Bankr.D.R.I.1986) (<HOLDING>). Courts beyond this circuit agree. See, e.g., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a debtors obligation to repay a pension plan loan is a debt because the plans right to offset the obligation against future benefits constitutes a method of enforcement sufficient to create a right to payment (B) holding that debtors breach of his obligation to make payments to the trustee under his proposed plan without good cause independently   constitutes grounds for dismissal (C) holding that where plaintiffs alleged that the plan suffered significant losses and requested that fiduciaries make good to the plan the losses to the plan they need not seek to recover for all plan participants allegedly injured by the fiduciary breach (D) holding that debtors failure to pay postconfirmation taxes pursuant to terms of court order constituted cause for dismissal as a lack of good faith (E) holding on an objection to confirmation of plan that the debtors failure to file tax returns before filing the chapter 13 plan and debtors failure for six months to comply with federal law constituted a lack of good faith sufficient to warrant dismissal of the case


Output: (B)