instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
Inc., 299 F.Supp.2d 1307, 1321 (S.D.Fla.2004). First, the PSLRA altered Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement by mandating the following: [T]he complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l)(B). Thus, the PSLRA requires greater specificity than Rule 9(b). Druskin, 299 F.Supp.2d at 1321. Second, the PSLRA raised the standard for pleading scienter by making it clear that a plaintiff can no longer plead scienter generally. In order to properly allege scienter, the plaintiff m 2 n. 2 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing defense in securities case (B) recognizing doctrine (C) holding that morrison precludes securities claims brought by us investors who purchase securities on a foreign exchange even where those securities are also listed on a us exchange (D) holding the doctrine applied in a case of mistake (E) recognizing the incorporation by reference doctrine in a securities case
answer:
(E)


question:
business is a disputed question of fact which cannot be resolved on summary judgment. State Auto disputes Appellants’ arguments and also posits in the alternative that, even if Kraus was an “insured” at the time he committed the acts in question, Appellants’ false imprisonment claims were subsumed by their sexual assault claims. As discussed below, we conclude that the district court correctly found that the determination of whether Kraus was an “insured” under the policy is a question of law where the pertinent facts are undisputed, that the policy is not ambiguous, and that Kraus’s acts fall within the Criminal-Acts Exclusion. Because we affirm the district court on those grounds, we do not reach State Auto’s alternative argument in support 2d 349, 633 N.W.2d 707 (Wis.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Michelet v. Scheuring Sec. Servs. Inc., 680 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question (B) holding that the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment or while performing duties related to the conduct of the employers business for purposes of insurance coverage were questions of fact that precluded summary judgment particularly since there was a question regarding the employees intent in performing the act in question (C) holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred (D) holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury (E) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact
answer:
(B)


question:
a sufficient supporting brief for purposes of the Local Rules. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Whiting’s motion to sever Cable-La’s third-party complaint against Whiting and GAI from the Cable-La-Williams matter. This results in two separate act nge Corp., 840 F.2d 249 (4th Cir.1988), continues to govern the distinction between mandatory and permissive forum-selection clauses in this circuit, because the Supreme Court’s subsequent overruling of the case was limited to a holding on an unrelated issue. See Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 109 S.Ct. 1976, 104 L.Ed.2d 548 (1989). The language contained in the forum-selection clause in the contract between Cable-La and Williams is unquestionably mandatory under Sterling Forest. 840 F.2d at 251-52 (<HOLDING>). 4 . The court notés that, while the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a forumselection clause which stated that any dispute arising between the parties hereunder shall come within the jurisdiction of the competent greek courts was permissive rather than mandatory (B) holding that venue in the district identified in  9 was mandatory (C) holding clause reading the parties agree that in any dispute jurisdiction and venue shall be in california to be mandatory (D) holding that a forumselection clause was mandatory because it provided for exclusive jurisdiction and venue in a particular court (E) holding that the clause any dispute that shall arise between the parties  with reference to the interpretation of this agreement or their rights with respect to any transaction involved was broad
answer:

(C)