instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
of discretion standard. See State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 603, 886 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1994). Statements stemming from a state actor’s custodial interrogation of a defendant are not admissible unless he is warned of his Fifth Amendment “right to remain silent” and that “anything said can and will be used against [him] in court.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). ¶ 19 The State concedes here that Appellant was in police custody when Nurse Geyer questioned him at the hospital. Even if a defendant is in custody, however, Miranda warnings are required when a med ical professional conducts an interrogation only if that medical professional is a state actor. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1876, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (<HOLDING>). See also State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 633 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a public safety exception to the requirement that miranda warnings be given in order to use a suspects statement as evidence against him at trial (B) holding that phrase i know i have the right to remain silent together with phrase and knowing that anything i say may be used against me substantially complied with article 3822 warnings even though warnings failed to advise accused that his statement could be used against him at his trial or in court because it advised him his statement could be used against him in any type of context not just those mentioned in article 3822 subsection 2a1 and 2 (C) holding that a defendants jailhouse statements to a courtappointed psychiatrist could not be used against him in the penalty phase of a murder trial because the psychiatrist failed to give the defendant miranda warnings (D) holding that the warnings in their totality satisfied miranda (E) holding that the government cannot use postarrest silence against a defendant because miranda warnings give implicit assurances that silence will not be used against a person and accordingly it would be fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process to allow a defendants silence to be used to impeach him at trial
answer:
(C)


question:
Parker, we vacate the sentence and remand for resen-tencing. Nearly a month before trial, Parker opted to waive his right to counsel and elected to represent himself. At that time, the trial court conducted a Faretta inquiry and allowed Parker to represent himself throughout the trial. However, when the jury returned with the guilty verdict, the trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing without renewing the offer of counsel. In doing so, the trial court erred. “Once a defendant waives the right to counsel in a criminal case, the court must renew the offer of counsel at each subsequent critical stage of the proceedings, one of which is sentencing.” Serrano v. State, 113 So.3d 895, 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see also Ingraham v. State, 32 So.3d 761, 768-69 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, vacate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage (B) holding postindictment lineup is critical stage of trial at which defendant is entitled to presence of counsel (C) holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel (D) recognizing that brooks protects against denial of counsel at a critical stage of his trial (E) holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver
answer:
(C)


question:
the compressor station would be about [$]100,-000? A. I think so. Q. And that’s due — and then because of the compressor station- being there with the noise and the odors, do you agree with the figures she gave of [$]25,000 being the best that y’all might could get? A. I imagine that would be close to it. This was the Mashburn’s only reference to market value. We conclude that none of this testim ut even his testimony was insufficient. Although he demonstrated his familiarity with area market values, he- failed to explain the factual basis behind his determination that his property suffered a $400,000 decrease in value. His statement that it was “based on property sales around in the area” provides little more detail than using the words “market value.” Cf. Arkoma, 249 S.W.3d at 389 (<HOLDING>). In both' cases, the owners stated a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a conclusory opinion may be rejected (B) holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (C) holding that evidence that the petitioner had a political opinion that he expressed it to his persecutors and that they threatened him only after he expressed his opinion compelled the conclusion that the threats were connected to his political opinion and not only to his failure to provide money in response to demands from the persecutors that predated his expression of his political opinion (D) holding that the affidavit of an expert proffered in opposition to summary judgment motion was assertedly in conflict with the experts prior deposition testimony but the court found that the affidavit could generate genuine issues of material fact because the expert explained the basis for his apparently changed opinion (E) holding that experts cursory testimony did not make his opinion conclusory because accompanying exhibit explained the basis for his conclusion
answer:

(E)