In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 2 (emphasis added). In its Clarification, the FCC freed itself of this deadline, continuing to state that the order would last until the Fourth FNPRM but giving no time period in which that would occur. Clarification, 15 FCC Rcd 9587, at ¶ ¶ 1, 35. We hold that this extension newly aggrieved CompTel and thus made its petition timely. See Sam Rayburn Dam Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 515 F.2d 998, 1007 (D.C.Cir.1975) (stating that where a party was “aggrieved” by a later interpretation of a rule that it could not have reasonably anticipated, the time limit starts to run at the later event). Cases have held that extension of a temporary order may entitle the parties to seek judicial review of the order. See Public Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 901 F.2d 147, 151 (D.C.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Interstate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a temporary order is later made permanent the permanent order may be challenged (B) holding that the phrase permanent shutdown is unambiguous and can only mean a permanent cessation of plant operations rather than the uneventful transfer of ownership (C) holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction (D) holding that an alien who procured permanent resident status byconcealing his ineligibility had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence (E) holding an order that was interlocutory in form to be final in substance where the force and effect of the order was tantamount to a permanent injunction depriving complainant of a recognized property right
[EX A]: holding that the phrase permanent shutdown is unambiguous and can only mean a permanent cessation of plant operations rather than the uneventful transfer of ownership

[EX Q]: rule may be outdated, we have also recognized that “it is uniquely a province of the legislature to change it.” Reiter v. Yellowstone County (1981), Mont., 627 P.2d 845, 849, 38 St.Rep. 686, 690. In Reiter, we noted that because of the operation of section 39-2-503, MCA, the at-will employee was not employed on a “discharge for cause only” basis. We stated, “assuming arguendo that appellant had an implied contract with an implied covenant of good faith, the employer did not act in bad faith because its conduct was statutorily permissible.” 627 P.2d at 849-850, 38 St.Rep. at 690. In other words, under section 39-2-503, MCA, an employer or employee could terminate employment for any or all reasons, provided the reasons or manner of termination did not 7), 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (<HOLDING>); and Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. (1974), 114 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a contract action when employee terminated in order not to receive earned bonuses or commissions (B) holding employee not terminated in bad faith because no evidence suggested that employer discharged employee in order to retain em ployees previously earned sales commissions (C) recognizing contract action and limiting damages to those for breach of contract when employee terminated for refusal to date foreman (D) holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee (E) recognizing a tort action for wrongful discharge when employee was terminated because he refused to commit a criminal act
[EX A]: holding employee not terminated in bad faith because no evidence suggested that employer discharged employee in order to retain em ployees previously earned sales commissions

[EX Q]: and section 2 of the Act gives effect to the aim of both statutory provisions. It recognizes the legislature’s intent to protect persons involved in the design and construction of buildings from potentially unlimited liability (see La Salle National Bank v. Edward M. Cohon & Associates, Ltd., 177 Ill. App. 3d 464, 469 (1988)) while also allowing a reasonable time for a surviving spouse or next of kin to bring an action for the pecuniary losses sustained due to the decedent’s death (Mio, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 825). Nevertheless, in support of her position, plaintiff cites several cases in which courts have applied the construction statute of repose (735 ILCS 5/13 — 214(b) (West 1998)) to wrongful death actions. See, e.g., Herriott v. Allied Signal, Inc., 998 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>); Risch v. Paul J. Krez Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (B) holding 10year statute of repose violated state constitutional right to remedy in personal injury and wrongful death suits (C) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (D) holding 10year statute of repose violates state constitutions guarantee of open courts in case involving defective machine (E) holding wrongful death action barred by 10year construction statute of repose
[EX A]:
holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute