In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: enter a residence without a warrant if an objectively reasonable basis exists for the officer to believe that there is an immediate need for police assistance for the protection of life or substantial property interests.” Seibert v. State, 923 So.2d 460, 468 (Fla. 2006) (citing Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278, 293-94 (Fla. 1997)). Whether an emergency actually existed is immaterial “so long as the officer reasonably believes it to exist because of objectively reasonable facts. The officer’s conclusion then may be based on a combination of the ‘objective’ nature of the circumstances and the officer’s ‘subjective’ perception of those circumstances.” State v. Boyd, 615 So.2d 786, 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); see also Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1559, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (<HOLDING>). The record supports that law enforcement 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable (B) holding that in determining prejudice a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury (C) holding that the court must consider the totality of the circumstance when determining whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant (D) holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith (E) holding a search permissible where the officer reasonably believed he faced an emergency situation that would result in the destruction of evidence

Answer: (C)


Question: for a mitigating role adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Section 3B1.2 “authorizes a four-level reduction in offense level if the defendant is deemed a ‘minimal’ participant in the criminal activity! ] [and] a two-level reduction if he is deemed a ‘minor’ participant....” United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 783 (6th Cir. 2012). The difference between “minimal” and “minor” is “not just semantic,” United States v. Lopez, 937 F.2d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 1991), and the standards are not interchangeable. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n. 5 (defining a “minor participant” as “a defendant ... who is less culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as minimal”) (emphasis added); United States v. Friedman, 998 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). Both Griffith and the Government focus their 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this distinction (B) holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements (C) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (D) holding that the district court improperly used the two different standards under ussg  3b12 interchangeably thus blurring the distinction between section 3b12a and b (E) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel

Answer: (D)


Question: self-incrimination because the prosecutor might have moved to set aside Harley’s plea on the basis of false testimony and to file charges against him fo crime apart from perjury Harley might reasonably be charged with in a future prosecution. The State refers only to capital murder, which in this case would be precluded by the prior conviction for the lesser included offense of first degree murder. As to the risk of prosecution for perjury, we are likewise skeptical. A witness may not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to prevent himself from imminent commission of peijury. Although the reverse is possible, i.e., a witness may claim the privilege to prevent himself from revealing a previous peijury, see, e.g., United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), the State fails to detail such circumstances 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing privilege (B) holding that where a witness who testifies under oath and is subject to crossexamination in a prior state court proceeding explicitly refuses to answer the same questions at trial the refusal to answer is inconsistent with his prior testimony (C) recognizing that informing the jury that testifying witness has agreed to cooperate with the government is a doubleedged sword as the existence of such agreement may suggest either that the witness will testify in accordance with the governments wishes regardless of the truth or that the witness will not he under threat of revocation of the agreement should the witness commit perjury (D) recognizing that a witness may claim the privilege if his new testimony might suggest that he had perjured himself in testifying on the same subject at a prior proceeding (E) holding that a witness may invoke the privilege against selfincrimination at trial despite testifying previously before a grand jury in the same case

Answer:
(D)