In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
the justifiable use of deadly force to specific circumstances, such as when the actor “reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another.” Id. § 776.012(1). As discussed at length above, Lieutenant Weippert’s conduct was objectively reasonable and he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Penley posed a threat of great bodily harm to the lieutenant and others. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Penleys, the evidence reveals no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lieutenant Weippert’s use of force was reasonably necessary. Under Florida law, Lieutenant Weippert had no duty to retreat and his use of force was justifiable. See State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 337-38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle (B) holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded (C) holding that after being chased by a carfull of angry men it would have been reasonable for mr rivera a private citizen to believe that deadly force was necessary even if only a single unarmed pursuer had approached his nowstopped car because the pursuer and his friends had already threatened riveras life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a highspeed chase and throwing deadly missiles namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna (D) holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure (E) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car

Ex Output:
holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle


Ex Input:
2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals

Ex Output:
holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision


Ex Input:
Kompan’s trade dress contributes to a likelihood of confusion in the context of two lines of playground furniture which are very similar overall. Kompan has also established that the similarities contribute to a likelihood of confusion. Kompan argues that similarities in trade name — Karavan and Kompan — and in catalog format should also be weighed in assessing similarity. The Karavan catalog format does not by itself closely approximate Kom-pan’s catalog. Any confusion caused by the catalog can be attributed either to the similarities in the products themselves or to the similarities in trade names. The Kompan and Karavan trade names are similar in both configuration and sound. See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons., 523 F.2d 1331, 1340 (2d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>) PSI argues that these similarities are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trademarks like small children are not only seen but heard (B) holding that time limits in title vii are not jurisdictional but are instead like statutes of limitations (C) holding that the cumulative effect of the prosecutors comments which as seen above are welldocumented errors denied appellant a fair trial (D) holding wife unreasonably exposed neighbors children to danger because she invited the children over in spite of knowing her husband had molested children in the past (E) holding that the bia correctly imputed a parents knowledge that she and her children were not eligible for entry to the united states to her children

Ex Output:

holding that time limits in title vii are not jurisdictional but are instead like statutes of limitations