TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: the ammunition charge from the gun charges. II. DISCUSSION A. Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Unregistered Firearm Count Under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), it is unlawful for any person to “possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.” For purposes of this provision, the definition of “firearm” includes a shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches in length or with an overall length less than twenty-six inches. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). In order to obtain a conviction under § 5861(d), the government must demonstrate that the defendant knew the barrel’s length was less than eighteen inches or the overall length was less than twenty-six inches. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government must prove the defendant knew of the features of the firearm that brought it within the scope of the act (B) holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered (C) holding that while the government was required to prove that the defendants phone call crossed a state line  the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew of the interstate nexus (D) holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation (E) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 207-08 (2d Cir.2007); see also United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir.2008). In fact we identify no error in this case, plain or otherwise, because the district court’s statement that it had “look[ed] at the relevant conduct, what happened with the fellow you got $250,000 from,” and its statement that it had reviewed the Pre-sentence Report (“PSR”) and “adopt[ed] the factual information that’s contained” therein, are reasonably construed as an explicit adoption of the PSR’s detailed explanation for why Patterson’s conduct causing a $250,000 loss to a California victim was fraudulent and qualified as relevant to the crime of conviction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3(a)(2). See generally United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 539 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). We further conclude that the adopted PSR 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts adoption of the presentence report constitutes sufficient findings (B) holding that factual findings set forth in the psi not objected to by a defendant are deemed admitted (C) holding that a district court satisfies its obligation to make factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report (D) holding that express adoption of factual findings in presentence report is sufficient (E) holding that this court will only set aside district courts factual findings when they are clearly erroneous

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: available only to that party; or (2) has such a relationship with one party as to effectively make him unavailable to the opposing party, regardless of actual physical availability. Tavarez, 626 F.3d at 905 (citing United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 926 (7th Cir.1976)). The latter prong is also referred to as “pragmatic unavailability.” See United States v. Christ, 513 F.3d 762, 773 (7th Cir.2008); Yumich v. Cotter, 452 F.2d 59, 64 (7th Cir.1971) (finding that the employment by the city of uncalled police officers who witnessed an altercation between officers and the plaintiff, as well as the officers’ “strong personal interest in the success of the city’s defense of their conduct ...” rendered them pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff); see also Mahone, 537 F.2d at 926-27 (<HOLDING>). In this case, Garibay was unquestionably 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction (B) holding that the same hearing officer as in this case erred in substituting his judgment for that of the pertinent school board in that case (C) holding that an officer who was involved in the arrest initiating case was pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff because of his association with the united states in building its case as well as his interest in seeing his police work vindicated by a conviction of the defendant (D) holding that where the court records in the present case and the records in a previous conviction reflected the same name and date of birth as well as a signature and the defendant did not object that he was not the same person as had been previously convicted the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction (E) holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on his presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking and his flight upon seeing police officers

SOLUTION:
(C)