In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: 393 N.W.2d 286, 290-91 (S.D.1986). • GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, (dissenting).. [¶ 26.] I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the lower court on Issue 2. I would hold the trial court erred when it granted partial summary judgment to 01-esens, holding City’s operation of food service at the municipal bar was an ultra vires act. [¶27.] An express grant of authority from the legislature “includes those incidental or implied powers that are necessary to enable a municipality to perform the function authorized.” City of Rapid City v. Rensch, 77 S.D. 242, 246, 90 N.W.2d 380, 383 (1958) (citation omitted). A municipality is vested with discretion as to how it exercises specific powers conferred upon it by the legislature, as long as the methods employed are n , 59 N.W.2d 732, 734 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Actions taken under a municipality’s implied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding municipality had implied authority to enter into a long term contract to establish a golf course although state statute did not specifically grant authority to establish golf courses as public parks (B) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (C) holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority (D) holding that plaintiff had no authority or statutory right for actions proper course was to report actions to proper legal authority (E) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: relevant facts. See Mot. at 13-14. Defendant, too, claimed in its subsequent statement of the issues that this talk happened between April 1 and April 4 and cited the same supportive evidence to this effect. See SOF, ¶ 73 (citing Howe Dep. at 32:7-12, 34:12-19 and May 13, 2014, Howe Email). Because Marks never refuted this fact by offering his own statement of the issues, as required under Local Rule 7(h), the Court could thus consider WWL’s account admitted on this ground alone. See LCvR 7(h) (“[I]n determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to- the motion.”); Jackson, 101 F.3d at 153 (<HOLDING>). The Court, however, need not rest on this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion (B) holding district court has complete discretion whether to treat facts as conceded where local rule is violated (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that the predecessor to local rule 561b3 provides the only acceptable means of  presenting additional facts to the district court (E) holding a district court has discretion under rule 55b2 once a default is determined to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: and the State offered no other evidence that linked his house to a cocaine transaction. Id. No other witnesses testi fied that Farr entered Young’s house or that a cocaine transaction took place there. Id. at 452. As for the tape recording, the court concluded that without Farr’s testimony to identify Young’s voice, there was nothing to connect him to the voices on the tape, and the tape showed nothing more than the “commission of an offense.” Id. (citing Tex.Code Crim. Proo. Ann. art. 38.141). Noting that no other evidence in the record tended to connect Young to the offense, the court held the evidence to be legally insufficient to support the conviction and rendered a judgment of acquittal. Id.; see also Williams v. State, 864 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1993, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). When we eliminate Baccus’s testimony, we are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no seizure occurred where the defendant initially stopped in compliance with a police officers order but then drove off quickly before the police officer could reach the suspects car (B) holding that testimony by police officer to effect that informant told him that defendant and his accomplice had come to informants home and discussed purchase of five kilograms of cocaine was not hearsay because statement was made by informant who was authorized by defendant to communicate such information to police officer under rule 801e2c (C) holding corroborating evidence sufficient that officer drove informant to defendants house saw defendant admit informant and saw informant come out with drugs and defendants voice was identified on audio tape of transaction (D) holding enhancement applicable where the record supported conclusion that drugs were stored and cut in the same location as the guns even though a search of the location yielded no drugs (E) holding evidence that police officer drove informant to location and waited outside while transaction occurred insufficient to corroborate informants identification of defendant as person from whom he purchased drugs


Output: (E)