In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
comply with those conditions. See § 32A-2-13(G). In addition, Gerald received oral notification from the children’s court at his plea hearing that detention would result from failure to comply with certain grade court conditions. Gerald’s counsel and mother were present at the plea hearing. Gerald repeatedly told the court that he understood the conditions. {38} Furthermore, when Gerald signed the plea agreement and grade court order, he received the considerable benefit of being released into the community. Gerald now seeks to be relieved of the conditions of release while leaving the rest of the plea agreement intact. Having received the benefit of the plea, Gerald may not now complain that the conditions are invalid. Cf State v. Trujillo, 117 N.M. 769, 772, 877 P.2d 575, 578 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Herrera, 2001-NMCA-073, ¶25 (stating that 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that both parties to a plea bargain make various concessions and gain certain advantages during plea negotiations and underscoring that a criminal defendant having availed himself of the advantages of a plea agreement cannot welch on his part of the bargain internal quotation marks and citation omitted (B) holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense (C) recognizing that a voluntary and understanding guilty plea entered without the benefit of a plea bargain waives all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea (D) recognizing that a single guilty plea may embody a series of interrelated concessions between the parties and allows the defendant to withdraw the entire plea when one part of the agreement fails (E) holding defendant did not prove an enforceable agreement only that there was some discussion of a plea bargain

Ex Output:
holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense


Ex Input:
speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

Ex Output:
holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241


Ex Input:
August 2001. He then made a payment of $658.19 in October 2001 but did not make any other payments until a year later, on October 28, 2002, when he began making weekly payments of $155.48 through the first week of December 2002 (for a total of six payments). In addition, on December 5, 2002, Roberts made two payments in the amounts of $2,250.00 and $1,363.95. 10 . We do not address the remainder of the issue, in which Roberts asks the court to remand the case for consideration of his attorney’s fees, because he provides no discussion or citation to authority for this request and because he does not point us to anywhere in the record showing that he requested attorney’s fees from the trial court. See Hall v. Stephenson, 919 S.W.2d 454, 466-67 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appellate court may review the entire record to determine whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable (B) holding that appellate court will not consider an argument on appeal that is different from the specific argument presented to the trial court even if it relates to the same general issue (C) holding that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record with no guidance from the briefing party to determine if the record supports the partys argument (D) holding the appellate standard of review in fourth amendment search and seizure cases is limited to determining whether any evidence supports the trial courts finding and the appellate court may only reverse where there is clear error (E) holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error

Ex Output:

holding that an appellate court may review the entire record to determine whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable