In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: was satisfied that protocols were followed after examining their case notes and the data collected. Further, Quartaro testified to the various safeguards Cellmark employed to protect against the risk of errors and to detect any such errors, if made. Accordingly, Quartaro could have been meaningfully cross-examined on the general and specific risks of error in forensic testing, whether the result of carelessness, incompetence, or fraud. See Boyd, 686 F.Supp.2d at 385 (finding no constitutional violation when only the DNA analyst who wrote the report, and not the intervening-testing analysts, testified because “the testifying expert was himself familiar with the[ ] intervening procedures and could be fully cross-examined as to their efficacy, accuracy, etc.”); Munoz, 958 N.E.2d at 1174 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Quartaro certainly could have been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible (B) holding that a forensic accountant is an expert witness not a lay witness (C) holding that an expert who offers an independent opinion based on another analysts report can be meaningfully crossexamined on the general risk of error in forensic testing (D) recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue (E) holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: claimant was injured while exiting an elevator in a parking garage which was not owned or maintained by her employer. However, the claimant’s employer instructed her to park in certain designated spaces which it leased in the garage. Because the employer leased the parking spaces from the garage operator and presumably could pressure the garage operator to keep the facility in a safe condition, Pierson held that there was “sufficient indicia of em ployer control to support the ... conclusion that the [employer] should be responsible for the effects of an injury to an employee which occurred in the garage.” 987 S.W.2d at 318. Since the claimant was utilizing a reasonable means to walk from her parking space to her employer when she fell, she zona, 142 Ariz. 501, 690 P.2d 802 (App.1984)(<HOLDING>); Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees (B) holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs (C) holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer (D) holding that an injury occurring in a parking lot which was leased but not controlled by an employer was compensable because the employer instructed its employees to park in that lot (E) holding landowner had duty to provide security in parking lot to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: therein ...” 392 U.S., at 436, [88 S.Ct., at 2201]. One of the “rights enumerated” in § 1 is “the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens_” 14 Stat. 27. Id. As a result, the Court concluded: Just as in Jones a Negro’s § 1 right to purchase property on equal terms with whites was violated when a private person refused to sell to [him] solely because he was a Negro, so also a Negro’s § 1 right to “make and enforce contracts” is violated if a private offeror refuses to extend to [him], solely because he is a Negro, the same opportunity to enter into contracts as he extends to white offerees. Id. 427 U.S. at 170-71, 96 S.Ct. at 2594. See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1720, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding with little discussion that section 1981 applies to private racial discrimination (B) holding that section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private employment against whites as well as nonwhites (C) holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee (D) holding unequivocally that  1981 protects against racial discrimination in private employment (E) holding that conduct occurring after the formation of an employment contract could not be racial discrimination under  1981


Output: (A)