In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

ah officer may ask a question outside the scope of the initial justification for the stop so long as it does not further lengthen the time taken to process the initial justification for the stop. In other words, if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid. This reasoning is explained in both United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc), and United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5th Cir.1993). In both cases, the courts held that questions by police officers during a traffic stop are not seizures or searches proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and cited United States Supreme Court cases dealing with non-custodial police-citizen encounters for support. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent (B) holding that police may approach persons and ask questions or permission to search so long as police do not imply that answers or consent are required (C) holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car
(B)

of the offense charged but convict on the included offense. However, the mere chance that a jury may reject uncontroverted testimony and convict on the lesser charge does not require the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser charge." People v. Ramires, 18 P.3d 822, 827 (Colo.App.2000) (internal citations omitted). 184 The offense of patronizing a prostituted child requires, as relevant here, "knowingly engaging in an act" where "a child perform[s] or offer[s] or agree[s] to perform ... any [sexual] act ... in exchange for money." § 18-7-406(1)(a), 18-7-401(6). Based on the language of the statute, actual performance of a sexual act is not necessary; a mere offer or agreement to perform is sufficient, provided money has been promised. See supra Part V.A; Madden, 111 P.3d at 460 (<HOLDING>). 185 Here, because the uncontrovert-ed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage (B) holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition (C) holding that a party invoking a  547c1 defense must prove the specific measure of the new value given to the debtor in exchange for what was received (D) holding that patronizing a prostituted child requires some record evidence that the defendant attempted to give anything of value  in exchange for sex (E) holding that under 11 usc  547c4 a later payment in exchange for new value only deprives the defendant of the new value defense if the later payment is an otherwise unavoidable transfer
(D)

Maria de Jesus Romo Orozco, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Ordonez v. INS, 345 F.3d 777, 782 (9th Cir.2003). The BIA acted within its broad discretion in denying Romo Orozco’s motion to reopen because she failed to present evidence that she was eligible for relief, given that she has no qualifying relative. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Ordonez, 345 F.3d at 785 (<HOLDING>). Although the BIA construed her motion as both 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prima facie eligibility is demonstrated by a showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied (B) holding that the burden of establishing prima facie case of discriminatory treatment may be satisfied by minimal showing (C) holding that motion to reopen must establish prima facie case demon strating reasonable likelihood that requirements for relief have been satisfied (D) recognizing that bia may deny motion to reopen where movant has not established prima facie eligibility for relief sought (E) holding that the bia may deny a motion to reopen based on its finding that the movant has not established his prima facie eligibility for relief

(A)