TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: uncon-scionability.” Woebse, 977 So.2d at 632 (citing Bland ex rel. Coker v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 927 So.2d 252, 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). Procedural uncon-scionability necessarily takes into account the manner in which the agreement was made. Id. At the hearing, the Estate argued that the facts are identical, really, to the Woebse case, in that it was a five-minute process where she was told to sign here and here, that she didn’t read the agreement. It wasn’t explained as an arbitration agreement to her. It was not explained that it was a voluntary process. Thus, the Estate sufficiently demonstrated that a disputed issue exists as to the making of the agreement so as to require an evidentiary hearing. See Linden v. Auto Trend, Inc., 923 So.2d 1281, 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court should have held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that an evidentiary hearing is necessary only if the party requesting the hearing raises a significant disputed factual issue (C) holding university grievance committee hearing was not an arbitration proceeding even though hearing had significant characteristics of arbitration without substantial evidence to support an arbitration agreement (D) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (E) recognizing that a party may demonstrate that a disputed issue exists as to the making of an arbitration agreement through arguments of counsel at a hearing

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: the genus of goods or services for which it seeks protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2), (b)(2); 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.32(a)(6), 2.71(a); TMEP § 1402.01; see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2014) (“Parties that choose to recite services in their trademark application that exceed their actual services will be held to the broader scope of the application.”); Octocom Sys., 918 F.2d at 942 (“[R]egistrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application.... ”). The PTO will generally accept any identification of goods or services so long as it is “specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise.” TMEP § 1402.01; see also In re Omega SA 494 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity (B) holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action (C) holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant (D) holding that it is within the discretion of the pto to require that ones goods be identified with particularity in a trademark application (E) holding that a rule 10b5 claim must be stated with particularity

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: this represents a “very narrow exception,” AIU Ins. Co. v. Block Marina Inv., Inc., 544 So.2d 998, 1000 n. 1 (Fla.1989), to the general rule that “equitable estoppel may be used to prevent a forfeiture of insurance coverage but not to create coverage where none exists.” Cummins v. Allstate Indem. Co., 732 So.2d 380, 382 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Regarding the representation element, courts have required that the promise be definite, and when the promise is “ ‘entirely indefinite as to terms and time,”’ this is insufficient to support an estoppel claim. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Geodata Servs., Inc., 547 So.2d 919, 924 (Fla.1989) (quoting Hygema v. Markley, 137 Fla. 1, 187 So. 373, 380 (1939)). See also Prof'l Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Freytes & Sons Corp., 565 So.2d 900, 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). Here, Tome’s only basis for the assertion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a representation was that the insured had what coverage it needed  such a statement does not rise to the level of specificity required to be a representation of liquor liability coverage (B) holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy (C) holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage (D) holding that a representation which is merely a statement of intent to perform under the contract cannot constitute fraud (E) holding that when the insured brings an action for a declaration of coverage and prevails absent a bad faith denial of coverage by the insurer attorneys fees incurred by the insured in the prosecution of that action are not incurred at the request of the insurer

SOLUTION:
(A)