In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: 879 (citations omitted). We think there is a reasonable fit here between the State’s purpose of protecting society from persons who have been determined to be likely to reoffend if not placed in a secure facility and their placement in such a facility. Therefore, Garren has failed to show a substantive due process violation. VII. Vagueness. Although Garren states in a division heading in his brief that chapter 229A is vague as applied and on its face, he makes no argument in his brief in support of the contention that the statute is vague as applied to him. We deem this issue waived. See Iowa R.App.P. 14(a)(3) (“Failure in the brief to state, to argue or to cite to authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”); State v. Cooley, 608 N.W.2d 9, 13-14 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Garren is precluded from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief (B) holding issue waived where matter not addressed beyond reference in heading in brief (C) holding that an issue mentioned in a brief but not addressed is waived (D) holding issues argued orally but not addressed in brief were waived (E) holding an issue listed in statement of issues on appeal but not addressed in brief is abandoned

Output: holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief


Input: Consider Input: preventing employee from "working in any geographic space in which [employer] operates” where employer had interest in confidential information); Advanced Cable Ties, Inc. v. Hewes, No. 061995B, 2006 WL 3292810, at *1-2 (Mass.Super.Ct. Oct. 19, 2006) (lack of geographic scope restriction in non-compete not fatal to enforcement of restrictive covenant when employer was national company). 17 . See Miller Mech., Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So.2d 11, 12-13 (Fla.1974) (citing Kenco Chem. and Manufacturing Co. v. Railey, 286 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)); Flickenger v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., Inc., 732 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Balasco v. Gulf Holding, Inc., 707 So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also Health Care Financial Enterprises, Inc. v. Levy, 715 So.2d 341, 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). 18 .Under Florida law, courts are required to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract (B) holding that trial court is without authority to modify a settlement agreement but may enforce and interpret it (C) recognizing court has authority to modify agreement to cure any unreasonable provision as to duration or scope (D) holding that court may not refuse to enforce noncompete agreement solely because geographical area is unreasonable but rather must modify unreasonable restriction and enforce agreement as modified (E) holding an employer may partially enforce a noncompete agreement to the extent it is reasonable under the circumstances

Output: holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract


Input: Consider Input: California state prisoner, Roy Lee Brown, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand. Brown contends that his § 2254 petition was timely filed because his state habeas petitions statutorilly tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Brown is entitled to tolling during the time he was seeking one full round of collateral review by the California courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Delhomme v. Ramirez, No. 00-56148, 2003 WL 21947183, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed (B) holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice (C) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (D) holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review (E) holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review


Output: holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed