In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: of the contract, the plaintiffs claim will only sound in contract. Id. In operation, the rale restricts contracting parties to contractual remedies for those economic losses associated with the relationship, even when the breach might reasonably be viewed as a consequence of a contracting party’s negligence. See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.1986) (“When the injury is only the economic loss to the subject of a contract itself, the action sounds in contract alone.”). In other words, the economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic losses in negligence when the loss is the subject matter of a contract between the parties. Coastal Conduit & Ditching, Inc. v. Noram Energy Corp., 29 S.W.3d 282, 285 (T .3d 355, 378 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we overrule JP Morgan’s fifth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subject to certain exceptions the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for economic damages arising out of matters governed by contract (B) holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property  damage claims (C) recognizing fraud in the inducement claims independent of contract claims without discussion of economic loss rule (D) holding economic loss rule did not bar recovery of tort damages on statutory fraud claim based upon fraudulent inducement (E) holding economic loss rule did not bar negligent misrepresentation claim where parties had no contract

A: (D)
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Q: justification was pretextual.” Smith v. District of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C.Cir.2005) (quoting Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C.Cir.2005)). The court should assess the plaintiffs challenge to the employer’s explanation in light of the totality of the circumstances of the case. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1291. The strength of the plaintiffs prima fa-cie case, especially the existence of a causal connection, can be a significant factor in his attempt to rebut the defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289 n. 4 (stating that “a prima facie case that strongly suggests intentional discrimination may be enough by itself to survive summary judgment”); Laurent v. Bureau of Rehab., Inc., 544 F.Supp.2d 17, 23 n. 5 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Meadows v. Mukasey, 555 F.Supp.2d 205, 211-13 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position (B) holding that the plaintiff demonstrated pretext in part by establishing a causal connection (C) holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity (D) holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury (E) holding that the plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection

A: (E)
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Q: Kodak Co., 98 F.Supp.2d 141, 147 (D.Mass.2000) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Arruda v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 310 F.3d 13, 18-19 (1st Cir.2002). 123 . See id. at 46-47 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1298, at 625-26 (2d ed.1990)). 124 . Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 228. 125 . See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12651(a)(1) & (2); Del.Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1201(a)(1) & (2); D.C.Code §§ 2-308-14(a)(1) & (2); Fla. Stat. §§ 68.082(2)(a) & (b); Haw.Rev.Stat. §§ 661-21(a)(1) & (2); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.175/3(a)(1) & (2); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 5B(1) & (2); Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 357.040(1)(a) & (b); Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 71-5-182(a)(1)(A) & (B); Tex. Hum. Res.Code Ann. § 36.002; Va.Code Ann. §§ 8.01-216.3(A)(1) & (2). 126 . Cf. Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 227-28 (<HOLDING>). 127 .Id. at 232. 128 . See id. at 225 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions (B) holding that the federal false claims act is an antifraud statute to which rule 9bs heightened pleading requirements apply (C) holding that the group pleading doctrine survives the pslra as to rule 9bs particularity requirements but does not apply to the pslras scienter requirements (D) holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim (E) holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983

A:
(B)
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