In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Court of Utah, in applying the good-faith exception to a Belton search, recently cautioned: "If the case law had been ambiguous prior to the time the officers conducted a search later definitively declared unconstitutional, the good-faith exception would not apply and the evidence would be excluded.” Utah v. Baker, 229 P.3d 650, 664 (Utah 2010). 80 . See Belton, supra note 1, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860. 81 . Compare Thornton, supra note 59, 541 U.S. at 622, 124 S.Ct. 2127 (declining to address argument that Belton rule applies only to “recent occupants” of vehicle, while noting that petitioner had conceded "he was in ‘close proximity, both temporally and spatially,’ to his vehicle” when approached by police officer) with Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383, 388-89 (D.C.1993) (<HOLDING>). 82 . See Gant, supra note 2, 129 S.Ct. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer may search a suspects vehicle incident to a lawful arrest (B) holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key (C) holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle (D) holding belton did not extend to search of vehicle incident to arrest of individual who has parked locked and walked fifteen to twenty feet away from an automobile before being stopped and arrested (E) holding that belton permits the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile even when the defendant is arrested outside as long as the officer made initial contact while the defendant was inside the automobile

A: (D)
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Q: omitted). Even if we were to do so, it would not change the outcome, since we see no error in the district court’s ruling regardless of whether the robbery and drug conspiracy were related. 3 . This course of action is permissible, though "we have repeatedly mentioned 'our strong preference for James proceedings.' ” United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1273 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir.1995)). 4 . The conspiracy supporting the introduction of the out-of-court statement need not be the same as the conspiracy charged in the indictment, so long as the statement was in furtherance of the uncharged conspiracy. United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 82 (2d. Cir.1999); see also United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 675 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 5 .Burnett testified at one point that he had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to instruct the jury on additional uncharged conspiracies is not reversible error so long as the jury is instructed that the government has the burden to prove the charged conspiracy (B) holding that although it is proper to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown it is error to instruct the jury on the mcdonnell douglas burden shifting scheme (C) holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error (D) holding failure to instruct jury on requirement of corroboration of informants testimony is error (E) holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial

A: (A)
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Q: of other courts have concluded, outside the RICO and Clayton Act context, that "by reason of" should be read to require only "but for” rather than proximate causation. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) ("The words ‘because of' mean ‘by reason of: on account of.’ Thus, the ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took adverse action ‘because of age is that age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act. To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); Robinson Knife Mfg. Co. v. C.I.R., 600 F.3d 121, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Spirtas Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 555 F.3d 647, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in 26 cfr  1263ale3i the language  directly benefit or are incurred by reason of boils down to a butfor causation test (B) holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support (C) holding in an appeal from a postanswer default judgment that third prong of craddock test required appellant to offer to reimburse appellee for legal expenses he incurred in obtaining default judgment even though most of the fees incurred had not been paid (D) holding that pursuant to the eaja courts may not award expenses of an attorney that are not incurred or expended solely or exclusively in connection with the case before the court (E) holding a tribe subject to 1 a tax on the use of certain highway motor vehicles 26 usc  4481a 2 a tax on diesel fuel used in highway vehicles 26 usc  4041a 3 a tax on special fuels used in motor vehicles 26 usc  4041b and 4 a tax on manufacturing in this case a truck chassis assembled by the tribe 26 usc  4061a 4218a

A:
(A)
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