In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED 1 . In the original petition in the Sullivan Suit, Ms. Sullivan averred that she was represented by a power of attorney appointing Mr. Ban-daries as her attorney in fact and caregiver and granting him "full power and authority and in her name and behalf” to "conduct, man .2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair). But see Marleau v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 333 Or. 82, 37 P.3d 148, 156 (2001) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under south carolina law slander is actionable per se where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery (B) holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under missouri law (C) recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages (D) holding that statement made to plaintiffs neighbors that plaintiff committed adultery was not slander per se because adultery is no longer a crime under oregon law (E) holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under louisiana law
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: or “plain error” exists. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah 1992); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). In the present case, or in any similar case, the only way that a defendant could challenge the constitutionality of section 78 — 3—31(6)(a) would be first to consent to a hearing by a commissioner and then to challenge the validity of that very consent. Such a procedure would likely be futile inasmuch as it would invariably result in the withdrawal of the consent, either by the defendant or by court order. Indeed, absent the approach taken by Ohms, it is unlikely that section 78-3-31(6)(a) would ever be subject to constitutional scrutiny. This is precisely the sort of exceptional circu Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). For example, a legislator cannot appoint 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that utah const art vi  1 limits legislatures ability to delegate legislative powers or functions to others (B) holding that the governor of new york has only those powers delegated to him by the state constitution and the statutes (C) holding that the contact clause reaches every form in which the legislative power of a state is exerted whether it be a constitution a constitutional amendment an enactment of the legislature a bylaw or ordinance of a municipal corporation or a regulation or order of some other instrumentality of the state exercising delegated legislative authority (D) holding that crime definition and penalty powers are essential legislative functions that cannot constitutionally be delegated by the utah legislature to any other person or body (E) holding that legislative functions such as powers of zoning and rezoning cannot be delegated
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: property is properly analyzed under takings law, a court must first examine whether the government intended to invade a protected property interest or whether the alleged invasion of a claimant’s property was the direct, natural, or probable result of defendant’s intentional actions. Id. at 1355-56. Next, the court must determine whether the government appropriated a benefit for itself at the property owner’s expense or preempted the owner’s right to enjoy their property for an extended period of time. Id. at 1357-58. In order to meet the second prong of the test, plaintiffs must prove that defendant’s interference with their property “was substantial and frequent enough to rise to the level of a taking.” Id. at 1357; see also Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Wilfong v. United States, 480 F.2d 1326, 1329 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the measure of damages of converted property is the market value at the time of conversion (B) holding that testimony by the owners expert to the value of trees on appropriated property was properly admitted to rebut or impeach testimony by the appropriating agencys expert that the trees had no value in terms of their effect on the propertys market value (C) holding that the state is obligated to pay property owners when it regulates private property under its police power in such a manner that the regulation effectively deprives the owner of the economically viable use of that property (D) holding that a takings claimant must show that the invasion appropriated a benefit to the government at the expense of the property owner at least by preempting the property owners right to enjoy its property for an extended period of time rather than merely by inflicting an injury that reduces the propertys value (E) holding that the property owners testimony alone placed the value of the stolen property above the amount necessary to constitute grand larceny
[EX A]:
(D)