In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: rise to the level of the allegations in Harke-ma. While physical abuse obviously endangers a child, Ma Donna’s account of her January 1997 fight with F.G. is not inconsistent with F.G.’s charge (except for the allegation of hair-pulling). An alleged single incident of borderline abuse or neglect has been held not to constitute sufficient endangerment to warrant a custody modification. See Smith, 508 N.W.2d at 227 (insufficient endangerment where child was injured by fallen cuckoo clock and mother allegedly examined clock before child). Under the circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in giving this incident little weight. This court has been inconsistent in categorizing a custodial parent’s efforts to isolate the child from relatives. Compare Westphal, 457 N.W.2d at 229 (<HOLDING>) with Smith, 508 N.W.2d at 227 (stating that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that postadoption visitation of child who was adopted by grandparents on basis of biological parents unconditional consent was required to promote childs best interests (B) holding that paramount consideration in terminationofparentalrights proceeding is best interests of the child (C) holding mothers cutting off contact with grandparents to be best interests consideration but not evidence of endangerment (D) holding that best interests of the child analysis requires consideration of all section 5328a factors (E) holding unconstitutional a statute authorizing courts to recognize grandparents as having the same standing as parents for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child where the child actually resided with the grandparents in a stable relationship
[EX A]: holding that postadoption visitation of child who was adopted by grandparents on basis of biological parents unconditional consent was required to promote childs best interests

[EX Q]: and began questioning the two men. The fact that the detectives in this ease requested that Peterkin answer questions apart from Durovic, and separated them by about ten feet, does not convert an otherwise voluntary encounter into a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The first moment at which Peterkin may have been seized was when Detective Lascik took Peterkin’s identification back to the van to run a background cheek. By that time, however, Peterkin and Durovic had already given the detectives conflicting stories, including whether they knew each other. This inconsistency, together with the detectives’ earlier observations of their unusual behavior, was enough to create reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop. See United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458-59 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brown, 345 F.3d 574, 578 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous (B) holding that after receiving conflicting stories from a driver and passenger the officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the terry stop and conduct background checks on them both (C) holding that receiving conflicting stories from the driver and passenger of a stopped car about their travel gave the officer reasonable suspicion to extend the terry stop (D) holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver (E) holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation
[EX A]: holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous

[EX Q]: S1753-02 (daily ed. March 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-358, pt. 1, at 35 (“[CAFRA] would [also] amend section 2461 of title 28 to give the government the option of pursuing criminal forfeiture as an alternative to current civil forfeiture if civil forfeiture is otherwise authorized.”). Thus, the intent of Congress when passing CAFRA was two-fold — to expand the criminal forfeiture authority to the civil forfeiture context and to require that appropriate due process procedures were implemente no meaningful difference between the propriety of an in personam money judgment arising directly under 21 U.S.C. § 853 ... and the propriety of an in personam money judgment under 21 U.S.C. § 853 by way of 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c).”); Capoccia, 402 Fed.Appx. at 641 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court concludes that under 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while some courts have adopted the intent to silence requirement we see no reason why the forfeiture doctrine should be limited to such cases (B) holding that reference to ordinance is not improper reference to an external document because injunction sufficiently describes the act sought to be enjoined and reference to the ordinance as stated in the injunction is merely to give further notice as to the enjoined conduct but the reference was unnecessary to give the appellants sufficient notice of that conduct (C) holding that when a plea agreement or consent order does not explicitly prohibit seeking the forfeiture of substitute assets via civil forfeiture under  981 the statutory scheme controls and requires the forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to  2461c and 853p (D) holding that a single implicit reference to the email in which the complaint makes no explicit reference to nor does it quote at all from is insufficient to establish that the email was incorporated by reference into the complaint (E) holding that since the reference in  2461c to the procedures of  853 includes the latter statutes implicit authorization of in personam money judgments we see no reason why this reference should not also include the forfeiture of substitute assets
[EX A]:
holding that while some courts have adopted the intent to silence requirement we see no reason why the forfeiture doctrine should be limited to such cases