TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: v. Allen, 615 F.3d 1122, 1136 (9th Cir.2010) (emphasizing the parsimonious nature of an effective EA) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b)). The DOE has more than met its burden here. Accordingly, we find that the DOE’s discussion of the 2005 anthrax shipping incident in the DREA and the FREA satisfies NEPA. b. The “Restricted” Experiments We do not reach the issue of whether the DOE’s decision not to include information about “restricted” experiments in the FREA was arbitrary or capricious because the district court properly found that this argument was waived. Here, Tri-Valley CAREs did not address the district court’s ruling that the argument was deemed waived in its opening appellate bricf. Thus, the issue is not properly before us. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Claims not made in an opening brief in a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arguments not raised by a party in its open ing brief are deemed waived (B) holding that arguments not raised in district court are waived (C) holding that arguments not raised before the trial court are waived (D) holding that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived (E) holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: an individual has adequately stated a pri-ma facie claim. Cf. Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir.1995) (“An inquiry into the reasonableness of procedures ... belies a claim that liability under [15 U.S.C.] § 1681e(b) must be predicated on the effect of that information once disseminated .... The district court was required to consider whether [the defendant] was liable under § 1681e(b) before it determined that [the plaintiff] had suffered no recoverable damages.”). Several courts have previously recognized the possibility that a claim for actual or compensatory damages under FCRA may include compensation for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury or out-of-pocket expenses. See, e.g., Bakker v. McKinnon, 152 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere  conclusory statements  rather they must  sufficiently articulate  true demonstrable emotional distress  including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any (B) holding that under privacy act federal government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actual damages but not with respect to damages for mental or emotional distress (C) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the incomplete and late submission of expert reports was not harmless (D) holding that under the first amendment where there is no proof of actual malice damages are limited to actual injury which excludes punitive damages but is not limited to outofpocket loss (E) holding that even in the absence of outofpocket expenses or costs incurred the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding actual and punitive damages when appellees testified about how they felt when appellant obtained their credit reports and violated their privacy thereby causing them some emotional distress

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: the ADEA prohibit employers from discriminating with respect to “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). “[A] materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment” is considered an adverse employment action. Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir.1997) (internal quotes omitted); see also, de la Cruz v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 82 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir.1996). An action “injurious to current employment or the ability to secure future employment” is an adverse employment action. Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466 (2d Cir.1997). The Second Circuit has held that a downgrade in evaluation is an adverse employment action. See Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Dominic v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a negative performance evaluation on its own is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action as a matter of law (B) holding that a negative criticism or performance evaluation unaccompanied by a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment does not constitute adverse employment action (C) recognizing retaliation involving promotion as adverse employment actions under the first amendment (D) holding in the context of a first amendment retaliation claim that adverse employment actions may include negative evaluation letters (E) holding that lesser actions than discharge refusal to hire refusal to promote demotion reduction in pay and reprimand may also be considered adverse employment actions in the first amendment retaliation context

SOLUTION:
(D)