TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: separate recording of the trust or declaration of trust. As there is no evidence on the face of the deeds indicating a. contrary intent, the Personal Representatives, pursuant to their fiduciary responsibilities, seek a declaration that, pursuant to section 689.07(1), Norman held fee simple title to the properties on the date of his death. These allegations are clearly sufficient under the plain language of the statute. See Raborn, 974 So.2d at 328 (stating that under section 689.07(1), a deed that simply refers to grantee as “trustee” conveys a fee simple estate, and applying the statute to find that deed at issue fell under “contrary intention” exception such that grantee held mere legal title as trustee); One Harbor Fin, Ltd. v. Hynes Props., LLC, 884 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Heiskell v. Morris, 182 So.3d 714 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title (B) holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence (C) holding that trial court erred by granting surviving spouse fee simple title to estates exempt property (D) holding that trial court correctly applied section 689071 to find that grantee who held title as trustee owned property in fee simple absolute (E) holding that where individual held title to property as trustee but gave mortgage to bank in her individual capacity a title reference on the mortgage to the deed into her as trustee provided constructive notice that the mortgage was supposed to be from the individual as trustee or at the least that the holder of a subsequent interest would not be a bona fide purchaser

SOLUTION: holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title

PROBLEM: judicial review of an arbitration award. See UHC Management Co., 148 F.3d at 998 (“ “We may not set an award aside simply because ... the arbitrators erred in interpreting the law or in determining the facts.’ ”) (quoting Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 751). This third challenge is nonetheless partially cognizable, but only to the extent it can be read as an assertion that there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, a statutory ground under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2), as a claim of misconduct by the arbitrators in refusing to hear evidence or to provide a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, another statutory ground under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3), or as an extra-statutory challenge to the “fundamental fairness” of the proceedings. See P & P Indus., Inc., 179 F.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>). Hoffman’s fourth challenge is to the denial 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit (B) holding right to be fundamental (C) holding that section 34810 is an adequate and independent state ground (D) recognizing plain or fundamental error (E) recognizing review for fundamental unfairness of the proceedings as an independent extrastatutory ground

SOLUTION: recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit

PROBLEM: in this case. First, it clearly appears on this record that both the Land Department and Waddell relied on the Land Department’s classification of the property as commercial pursuant to the requirements of the Arizona exchange statutes. Waddell admits in his affidavit that he knew at the time of the sale that the property was used as a farm and Arizona law set acreage limitations on the sale of agricultural property. The Land Department assumed the constitutionality of the exchange statutes, which were not declared unconstitutional until Fain, almost five years after the sale. Based on these statutes, the Land Department did not see any need to reclassify the property as commercial subject to an interim, special use as agriculture. See Havasu Heights, 158 Ariz. at 552, 764 P.2d at 37 (<HOLDING>). Because both parties relied on the commercial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute (B) holding that in action by property owner to recover land taken by eminent domain current titleholder to land might be necessary party if district court were to restore land to plaintiff (C) holding land for speculation is a legitimate commercial use grazing on land so classified subject to a special use permit (D) holding that animal husbandry operations were included in the definition of farm even if the animals do not touch the ground graze on the land or feed from crops grown on the land and holding that land used to support buildings used in the production of agricultural products is a productive use of the land (E) holding that a petitioner in a judicial review from the land use board of appeals had constitutional standing because the land use decision would affect her use and enjoyment of a nearby estuary that she used for passive recreation

SOLUTION:
holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute