In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: federal courts intervene in the matter. The argument is unavailing, however, where the pending question is whether the Board’s proceedings constitute an effort by the state to impose its regulatory authority in a field preempted by Congress. See Association of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 208 F.3d 1, 2000 WL 298563, at *3 (1st Cir. March 27, 2000)(finding that the court’s initial invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was unwise where “the ultimate legal determination of whether the Massachusetts regulations are preempted by the [federal Clean Air Act] is a question of federal preemption law for the courts alone to decide”); Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 41 (1st Cir.1972)(<HOLDING>). The state defendants also move to dismiss 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and it does not matter that the plaintiff was using state law as the vehicle to press her assertion (B) holding that plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before the puerto rico labor relations board before invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine whether the boards assertion of jurisdiction was proper (C) recognizing the general rule that parties must exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from federal courts  (D) holding that plaintiff could not present his erisa estoppel claim to the district court because he did not properly exhaust it before the administrative review board (E) holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: campus is a limited public forum. Def. Br. 12. The Court agrees with the defendants’ assessment. The Court begins by recognizing that “the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum.” Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). Accordingly, the Second Circuit has noted, “[s]ome portions of a public college’s campus may be a public forum.” Davis v. Stratton, 360 FedAppx. 182, 184 (2d Cir.2010). Significant to the analysis, however, is that these areas may constitute a designated public forum only to the extent they are “intentionally openfed]” to First Amendment activities. Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir.2004); see also Ochshom, 645 F.3d at 540 (<HOLDING>); Hotel Emps., 311 F.3d at 545 (noting that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a high school is not a public forum thus precluding free airing of religious views (B) holding that a public high school newspaper was a limited public forum not a traditional or designated public forum because there was no evidence that the school permitted indiscriminate use by the general public quoting hazelwood sch dist v kuhlmeier 484 us 260 267 108 sct 562 98 led2d 592 1988 (C) holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence (D) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (E) recognizing that government is not required to retain open nature of designated public forum
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: of being performed by the estate representative. See TPS Freight Distribs., Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank-Dallas, 788 S.W.2d 456, 458-59 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1990, writ denied); see also Solomon v. Greenblatt, 812 S.W.2d 7, 17 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, no writ). Thus, to the extent there is a “presumption” regarding survival of a contractual obligation after the death of one of the parties, it is exactly the converse of that advanced by the Estate and adopted by the trial court. Neither the historical treatment of alimony in Texas, nor Texas case law, indicates that the general rules of alimony—i.e., court-ordered spousal support—should apply to contracts for spousal support, particularly the rule that alimony presumptively terminates on the obligor’s death. Cf. Hutchings, 406 S.W.2d at 421 (<HOLDING>). Because Texas law mandates that we apply 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation (B) holding that an obligors voluntary unemployment would not affect his child support payments (C) holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts (D) recognizing that payments to secured creditors are only required in equal monthly amounts if property to be distributed  is in the form of periodic payments (E) holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts and under contract principles payments survive obligors death absent agreement to contrary shown by provisions of contract or surrounding circumstances
[EX A]:
(E)