TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: states that a lack of due diligence should not prevent a party from presenting the new evidence. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 cmt. j (1982); see also Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J.Super. 558, 788 A.2d 834, 840 (2002) (“[T]he judge may consider diligence, or lack of diligence, ... [but] a lack of diligence does not require invocation of collateral estoppel particularly where, as here, plaintiff attempted to obtain Dr. Matthew’s evaluation prior to the arbitration proceeding.”). But see Klein v. Comm’r, 880 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir.1989) (“A party may not assert a change in controlling facts when the facts allegedly showing a change in circumstances could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence.”); Calcutt v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 14, 25, 1988 WL 71262 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the fairness 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial (B) holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel (C) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action

SOLUTION: holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial

PROBLEM: 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *3-5 (D.Or. Dec. 13, 2010) (collecting cases); see also Nelson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 446 Fed.Appx. 158, 158 (11th Cir.2011) (similar). 93 . See, e.g., Wright v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, No. CV 11-00095-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 4101513, at *2 (D.Ariz. Sept. 14, 2011) (citing Fletcher v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 798 F.Supp.2d 925, 930 (N.D.Ill.2011)). 94 . Vida, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5. 95 . Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1069 (N.D.Cal.2011) (citations omitted). 96 . Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir.2011). 97 . Id. at 1040 (citations omitted). 98 . Id. 99 . Id. at 1039. 100 . Id. 101 . Id. (citation omitted). 102 . Dkt. 30 at 5-6; Dkt. 47 at 17-27. 103 . See In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 397-405 (D.Idaho 2009) (<HOLDING>); Saxon Mortg. Servs. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that creditors could not seek relief from a bankruptcy stay because they were not the real parties in interest and lacked standing as they were not holders of the notes and failed to establish that mers was the holder or had authority to transfer the notes (B) holding that the creditors had standing because the plan eliminated their interests in the borrower notes and deeds of trust and disposed of the assets in the estate from which they seek to be paid (C) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because they failed to demonstrate any likelihood that they would end up back in jail where alleged constitutional violations occurred (D) holding that despite evidence of voluntary transfer of promissory notes and the plaintiffs possession thereof the plaintiff was not the holder of the note under the ucc as the notes were not drawn issued or indorsed to her to bearer or in blank the plaintiff testified to some of the circumstances under which she obtained possession of the notes but the trial court made no findings of fact with respect thereto (E) holding that mers was not the beneficiary of a deed of trust under the oregon trust deed act absent conveyance to mers of the beneficial right to repayment and that mers could not hold or transfer legal title to the deed as the lenders nominee

SOLUTION: holding that the creditors had standing because the plan eliminated their interests in the borrower notes and deeds of trust and disposed of the assets in the estate from which they seek to be paid

PROBLEM: “insurer” technically is considered part of the “business of insurance” is not material. Barnett Bank, at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1111 (“The word 'relates’ is highly general, and this Court has interpreted it broadly in other pre-emption contexts.”). Thus, for example, the Internal Revenue Service is not part of the “business of insurance,” and yet we have held that a Treasury Regulation, which resulted in a tax on insurance companies, rendered the MeCarran-Ferguson Act “inapplicable by its own terms.” See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 598 F.2d 1211, 1219 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct. 229, 62 L.Ed.2d 169 (1979); see also Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson, 820 F.2d 1406, 1414-15 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035, 109 S.Ct. 1932, 104 L.Ed.2d 404 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Therefore we conclude that Congress expressly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period (B) holding that rule 6e did not extend the period in which a workers compensation carrier was required to pay a compensation award under the longshore and harbor workers compensation act where the act required payment within ten days of filing of the order as opposed to within ten days of service of notice provided for in the rule (C) holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act (D) holding that the longshore and harbor workers compensation act specifically relates to business of insurance (E) holding that an injured workers initial election to seek state compensation does not implicate the exclusivity provision to preclude the worker from later seeking compensation under the longshore act

SOLUTION:
holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period