In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5524, and thus a two-year statute of limitations applies to this case. See Sameric Corp. of Del, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998). The date when a Section 1983 action accrues, however, is a matter of federal law. Wallace v. Koto. 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). A Section 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599; see also Sanduteh v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, Giles asserts that the City violated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (B) holding that in an environmental contamination ease a cause of action accrues  when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of his or her cause of action and of the identity of a party or parties who may be responsible for the injury (C) holding that a federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the existence of and source of the injury not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong (D) holding that  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (E) holding that a  1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action 

Output: holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury


Input: Consider Input: a favorable decision, by which we mean that the “prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling” is not “too speculative.” In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1101 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The NMCGA contends that the provision for attorneys’ fees is an “egregious and illegal use of tax dollars.” NMCGA’s Response at 7. It is well established that a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge state and federal spending decisions. Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1399 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, Cl. 183, 184-85 (2006) (<HOLDING>). While NMCGA does not have standing to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties (B) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (C) holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment (D) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (E) holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim

Output: holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties


Input: Consider Input: was reasonable. Cf. Vt. Elec. Power Co., 131 Vt. at 434-35, 306 A.2d at 692 (approving process whereby Board gave parties in post-certification proceeding opportunity to comment and convince Board that hearing was necessary for further review as to location of transmission lines). ¶ 82. The real question is whether the Board abused its discretion in denying a hearing in this instance, given the com ments it received from the parties. The Towns do not challenge the Board’s finding that their expert was unqualified, which was the basis for the Board’s conclusion that they failed to raise a significant issue warranting a technical hearing. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the Board’s decision not to hold a hearing. Cf. In re D.B., 161 Vt. 217, 222, 635 A.2d 1207, 1210 (1993) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 83. Regarding the merits of the Board’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that vrcp 78b2 which gives trial courts discretion whether to hold hearings on written motions provides trial courts with discretion to deny evidentiary hearings on posttrial motions (B) holding that issues raised and dealt with in posttrial evidentiary hearings are preserved for appeal (C) holding that issues are not waived for failing to file posttrial motions from a remand proceeding where no evidence was presented because no posttrial motions were required under those circumstances (D) holding that issues raised and dealt with in posttrial evidentiary hearings may be preserved for appeal (E) holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions


Output: holding that issues raised and dealt with in posttrial evidentiary hearings are preserved for appeal