instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
is outside the ambit of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 891. Specifically, we held: Recall that in the majority of those cases, the court specifically considered whether the defendant invoked the right to remain silent and concluded that the defendant's statement or action was an invocation of the right. See Combs [v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 286 (6th Cir.2000), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 623, 148 L.Ed.2d 533 (2000)]; [United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997, 112 S.Ct. 1702, 118 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992)]; Coppola [v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1567 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 418, 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989)]; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (<HOLDING>)[, reh'g denied ]. Based on these cases and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously (B) holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer (C) holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously (D) holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent (E) holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent
answer:
(A)


question:
to the poisonous tree”) (quoting Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1117). To be able to object to the police conducting an illicit protective sweep of the Gonzalez residence, Defendant would have to have some basis to claim that the sweep violated his rights. He does not. We conclude, therefore, that his subsequent detention was lawful. 2. Defendant’s detention occurred after the police had conducted the sweep of Gonzalez’s residence, and only an individual with a legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence could object to the sweep. After entering the garage, officers acted reasonably in detaining Defendant when they caught him red handed with large quantities of marijuana, cuttings tools, and scales in plain sight. See United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337, 1344 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). We reject any contention that the officers 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the standard of probable cause applies to all arrests without the need to balance the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations thus an officer may without violating the fourth amendment arrest an offender if probable cause exists to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence (B) holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it (C) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment (D) holding a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the fourth amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed (E) holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed
answer:
(D)


question:
Id. at 153, 121 S.Ct. 2079; see also United States v. Parker, No. WDQ-09-0360, 2011 WL 4682177, at *2 (D.Md. Oct. 3, 2011) (“Article IV(e)’s dismissal is strictly interpreted; there are no exceptions for de minimis, technical, or harmless errors.”); United States v. Gezelman, 522 F.Supp.2d 344, 347 (D.Mass.2007) (interpreting Bozeman as rejecting the view that a prisoner must be involved in rehabilitative programs for the IAD to apply and holding that the IAD must be strictly applied). Because the interpretation of the IAD is a question of federal law, we must follow the Supreme Court of the United States’ holding in Bozeman. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 438, 101 S.Ct. 703; In re All Assessments, 67 S.W.3d 805, 818-19 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (“[O]nly the decisions of the United Stat t.App.2000) (<HOLDING>); State v. Breen, 126 Idaho 305, 882 P.2d 472, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the iad inapplicable to a prisoner at a temporary holding facility and noting that while there may be an occasional case in which a prisoner awaiting transfer is involved in rehabilitative programs offered at the local facility such rehabilitation efforts themselves ultimately would be disrupted by that prisoners transfer to his permanent correctional residence (B) holding that because the stated purpose of the iad is to prevent interference with a prisoners rehabilitative environment there is no reason for the iad to apply to a prisoner until he or she is assigned to the institution where the sentence will be served (C) holding that an inmate had no liberty interest in avoiding transfer to a more restrictive facility (D) holding the iad was not applicable to a prisoner who had been sentenced but was incarcerated in a local jail or holding facility while awaiting transfer to the assigned penal institution (E) holding that court would not imply a bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private prison facility
answer:

(A)