instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
answer:
(C)


question:
an insurer to await the filing of a complaint against its insured will force insurers to defend claims that are unlikely to result in a duty to indemnify. We recognize the reality of Patrons’s concerns. We conclude, however, that the rationale supporting the comparison test outweighs those concerns. See Dingwell, 414 A.2d at 227. “We have always recognized that the application of the comparison test will occasionally requ dgment action before the injured claimant filed an action against the insured. Dolley, 669 A.2d at 1321. Rather than rejecting the action on ripeness grounds, we determined the insurer’s duly to defend vel non on the basis of what the corn-plaint might have alleged, in view of the parties' stipulation. Id. at 1323. 5 . See State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d at 38 (<HOLDING>); Perreault v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 568 
 Holding statements: (A) holding insurers duty to defend is determined by allegations in the petition (B) holding that insurance company could sue in insureds name following assignment of insureds interest against tortfeasor (C) holding that an insurers duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint against the insured (D) holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss (E) holding that insureds criminal convictions were sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issue of the insureds subjective intent for purposes of evaluating the insurers duty to defend
answer:
(E)


question:
to final disposition of the appeal.”). DISCUSSION In his first appellate issue, Gardner asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment without stating the grounds on which it based its ruling. We hold that two well-established summary-judgment principles are fatal to Gardner’s argument. First, our summary-judgment jurisp of fact and conclusions of law have no place in a summary judgment proceeding. If summary judgment is proper, there are no facts to find, and the legal conclusions have already been stated in the motion and response.” Willms v. Americas Tire Co., Inc., 190 S.W.3d 796, 810 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (internal citations omitted); see IKB Indus., 938 S.W.2d at 441 (same); Linwood v. NCNB Tex., 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>). As these cases suggest, the trial court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial courts judgment must comply with the statutory requirement that the judgment contain written findings of fact and conclusions of law (B) holding that appellate deadlines are not extended by request for findings of fact and conclusions of law following summary judgment because they have no place in a summary judgment proceeding (C) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed (D) holding that findings of fact and legal conclusions are neither necessary nor proper in summary judgment proceeding (E) holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment
answer:

(B)