TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. Bridgewater, A.C.J., and Hunt, J., concur. 1 O’Connor later produced a valid concealed weapons permit. 2 Simple possession of a controlled substance is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to deliver. State v. Harris, 14 Wn. App. 414, 418, 542 P.2d 122 (1975); see State v. Sims, 119 Wn.2d 138, 142, 829 P.2d 1075 (1992) ("Where one merely possesses a controlled substance without the statutory element of intent, one is guilty of simple possession under RCW 69.50.401(d), absent unwitting possession.”); State v. Robbins, 68 Wn. App. 873, 877, 846 P.2d 585 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 3 It is not clear when he purchased the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant could only be sentenced to a single offense under section 1244011 not both conspiracy with intent to deliver and possession with intent to deliver (B) holding second simple possession conviction was not an aggravated felony because it was not prosecuted as recidivist possession (C) holding that possession with intent to distribute and simple possession are the same offense under blockburger (D) holding that trial court may arrest judgment on conviction for possession with intent to deliver and enter judgment of guilt on simple possession (E) holding that the defendants prior drug conviction for simple possession did not constitute a controlled substance offense because the plain language of  4b12b requires that the prior conviction involve possession with intent to distribute

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: justification was pretextual.” Smith v. District of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C.Cir.2005) (quoting Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C.Cir.2005)). The court should assess the plaintiffs challenge to the employer’s explanation in light of the totality of the circumstances of the case. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1291. The strength of the plaintiffs prima fa-cie case, especially the existence of a causal connection, can be a significant factor in his attempt to rebut the defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289 n. 4 (stating that “a prima facie case that strongly suggests intentional discrimination may be enough by itself to survive summary judgment”); Laurent v. Bureau of Rehab., Inc., 544 F.Supp.2d 17, 23 n. 5 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Meadows v. Mukasey, 555 F.Supp.2d 205, 211-13 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position (B) holding that the plaintiff demonstrated pretext in part by establishing a causal connection (C) holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity (D) holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury (E) holding that the plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: its own reasons, we review both decisions.” Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.2000). Petitioners’ primary contention is that the IJ deprived them of due process by prejudging the case and preventing them from fully developing the record. Petitioners, however, did not raise a due process argument before the BIA. Because the due process claims made here are in the nature of procedural errors that the BIA could have remedied, they are subject to the exhaustion requirement. Because these claims were not exhausted before the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to review them. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir.2004). On this record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, see Lopez-Reyes v. INS, 79 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), and that petitioners did not suffer past 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that substantial evidence supports an adverse credibility finding if it is supported by specific cogent reasons (B) holding that we review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence (C) holding an ijs credibility findings are entitled to deference if supported by specific cogent reasons (D) holding that explicit credibility finding must be more than passing remark of disbelief and must be supported by specific cogent reasons (E) holding that an ijs credibility determinations enjoy highly deferential review when supported by specific cogent reasons that bear a legitimate nexus to the findings

SOLUTION:
(A)