In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: that is presumptively constitutional). The only case of which I am aware construing DeFillippo and denying qualified immunity is Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board, 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002). But in that case “two Ninth Circuit cases [were] directly on point” because they had declared parallel statutes of other States — permitting an arrest for refusing to identify oneself — unconstitutional. Id. at 881. That of course does not remotely describe today’s case. Nor does Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250 (6th Cir.1997), offer any refuge to Leonard. It dealt not with the question whether an officer could be denied qualified immunity for failing to predict a judicial ruling declaring a statute unconstitutional but with whether the statute covered the plaintiffs conduct. See id. at 1256 (<HOLDING>). In the end, Leonard not only asks us to take 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arrest to retrieve car keys where ownership of the car was in dispute was not supported by probable cause (B) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (C) holding that shouting epithets from a moving car did not provide probable cause to arrest the plaintiff under a disorderlyconduct statute (D) holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest (E) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: statement “is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” Id. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court departed from its ruling in Roberts and established a new standard for determining when hearsay statements of an unavailable witness may be admitted as evidence against a criminal defendant consistently with the Confrontation Clause. The standard set forth- in Crawford actually expanded defendants’ confrontation rights beyond what was contemplated in Roberts. Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-55, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (requiring unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination to admit testimonial hearsay statements of witnesses not appearing at trial), with Roberts, 448 U.S. at 72-73, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (<HOLDING>). Prior to the decision in Crawford, this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that witness hearsay statements may be admitted whenever they bear sufficient indicia of reliability even without crossexamination (B) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements (C) holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence (D) holding that judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability including reliable hearsay in a probation revocation hearing (E) holding that it would have been proper to admit party opponent admissions although they were based on multiple levels of hearsay and test their reliability on crossexamination but upholding the district courts exclusion of the statements where the hearsay statements lacked any factual content and lacked any indicia of trustworthiness
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: its content. Id. It is well-established that Rule 1002 does not apply in situations where the mere existence of an independent factual condition is sought to be proved, even if the condition is contained in or effectuated through a writing. See Fed.R.Evid. 1002 advisory committee’s note (“[A]n event may be proved by nondocumentary evidence, even though a written record of “it was made.... For example, payment may be proved without producing the written receipt which was given. Earnings may be proved without producing books of account in which they are entered.”); Dalton v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 1216, 1223 (5th Cir.1993) (concluding the rule did not apply to proof of a debt through an affidavit rather than bank documentation); see also United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 483 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, Ms. Smith testified that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate (B) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (C) recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing (D) holding trial court should have required segregation because tort claims entailed proof of facts unnecessary for proof of the contract claim (E) holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer
[EX A]:
(C)