TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

SOLUTION: holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241

PROBLEM: were convicted of conspiring to use, carry, or possess a firearm in furtherance of, inter alia, a conspiracy to violate the Neutrality Act and a conspiracy to provide services to the Taliban. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c),(o); J.A. 3223. Both Count Five and Count Eleven, in other words, ■ expressly allow one conspiracy to serve as the predicate for another conspiracy. Nothing about this statutory framework is unconstitutional, improper, or even unusual. Courts have recognized that one conspiracy can serve as the predicate for another conspiracy when the “[overarching] conspiracy and the predicate conspiracy are distinct offenses with entirely different objectives.” United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1135 (3rd Cir.1990); see also United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 918 (2nd Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman (B) holding that congress intended to allow multiple punishments for rico conspiracies and conspiracies to commit the underlying predicate offense even though the offenses were the same under the blockburger test (C) holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy (D) holding that judge erred in not explaining to jury that it could consider predicate acts listed in relation to substantive rico count when deciding whether defendants had also conspired to violate rico (E) recognizing money laundering as a predicate act under rico

SOLUTION: holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman

PROBLEM: full amount of $45,000 was recoverable. Even if that amount were found to be the value of the property on either the date of loss or sentencing, the value of the portion of the property recovered by Workman must be determined and deducted from that amount. More importantly, we disagree with the thrust of the government’s argument, namely, that any sums Workman expended to recover the property are recoverable as long as the total is less than the value of the property when Paul first acquired it. That is not in keeping with the plain language of the statute. We hold that an award of restitution under the VWPA cannot include consequential damages such as attorney’s and investigators’ fees expended to recover the property. See United States v. Arvanitis, 902 F.2d 489, 497 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Barany, 884 F.2d 1255, 1261 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that restitution for consequential damages such as legal fees expended to investigate a fraudulent insurance claim are unavailable under the vwpa (B) holding that restitution under the vwpa was more akin to compensation for actual loss than a criminal penalty that may not bear interest (C) holding that consequential damages are not to be considered (D) holding that provision barring recovery of consequential damages did not necessarily bar all loss of use damages but damages for loss of use of money were consequential (E) holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not

SOLUTION:
holding that restitution under the vwpa was more akin to compensation for actual loss than a criminal penalty that may not bear interest