In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
in their Constitution, or from the Congress that the Constitution had empowered. We made a similar point in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 416, where we considered a suit against a State in another State’s courts: “This [traditional] explanation [of sovereign immunity] adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be sued in its own courts without its consent, but it affords no support for a claim of immunity in another sovereign’s courts. Such a claim necessarily implicates the power and authority of a second sovereign; its source must be found either in an agreement, express or implied, between the two sovereigns, or in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of the first as a matter of comity.” Cf. United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 646 (1892) (<HOLDING>). Subjecting States to federal jurisdiction in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action cannot be maintained under young in unique circumstances where the suit against the state officer affects an essential attribute of state sovereignty in a manner that the action must be understood as one against the state (B) holding a states regulation of wyoming national guard was insufficient to implicate a special sovereignty interest because of the dual federal and state nature of national guard service (C) recognizing that a suit by the national government against a state does no violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty (D) holding the governors emergency powers to take private property for the public benefit was a special sovereignty interest but the relief requested was not so much of a divestiture of the states sovereignty to render the suit as one against the state itself (E) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
then the trial court erred in allowing prejudgment interest to accrue on that sum at 10% per annum “[bjecause no prejudgment interest statute applies to this case.” Assuming arguendo that their argument was true, then the answer to the problem is found in their own brief. They acknowledge that the prejudgment interest scheme established under § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code applied if no other statute did. See Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 530-31 (Tex.1998) (dealing with Texas Revised Civil Statute art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a), the predecessor to § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code). And, at the time of judgment, see Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy, Co., 113 S.W.3d 400, 414 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), prejudgment interest accrued at the rate of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate (B) holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment (C) holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment (D) holding that the penalty is applicable (E) holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
he was charged with violating only §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, not with violating § 841(b). This argument is patently meritless. Subsection 841(b) does not state a substantive offense, but simply establishes the penalties to be imposed upon conviction for a substantive offense. Thus, once the cotut properly exercised its jurisdiction to convict Pinkley of offenses under §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, it properly sentenced him according to statute. Pinkley’s reliance upon the recent decision in United States v. Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.2001), that § 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) is unconstitutional is unavailing. This court has rejected the same facial constitutional challenge to § 841(b) presented in Buck-land. United States v. Talley, 15 Fed. Appx. 215, 218 (6th Cir.2001) (unpublished table decision) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to satisfy due process findings made at sentencing need only be based upon a preponderance of the evidence (B) recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings (C) holding that objections are required to challenge magistrate judges findings as well as magistrates failure to make additional findings (D) holding that it is the commissioners findings of fact to the extent they modify or replace the administrative law judges findings that are relevant on appeal (E) holding that  841b is facially constitutional because congress did not specify that only judges may make the findings required by  841b or that those findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence  

Ex Output:

(E)