TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: to those sentences because no error in the sentencing appears on the face of the record. Ninety-nine years is a “term of years not less than five years.” While Thomas’ sentences, under court interpretations of § 566.030.2, may not be authorized, we are not able to reach such issues where the sentencing defect is not so patent as to present a jurisdictional issue. This sentencing does not present a jurisdictional issue. Conclusion Thomas is ordered to be returned to the circuit court of the City of St. Louis for resentencing on the three first degree robbery counts within the limits authorized by the law. SO ORDERED. All concur. 1 . All sectional references are to Missouri Revised Statutes 1986, unless otherwise indicated. 2 . See, e.g., State v. Williams, 828 S.W.2d 894 (Mo.App.1992)(<HOLDING>); State v. Charron, 743 S.W.2d 436 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (B) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (C) holding sentence of thirtyfive years in prison with ten years probation for seconddegree murder is within the statutory maximum under 1997 statutes (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding sentence of 100 years for forcible rape was in excess of statutory maximum

SOLUTION: holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum

PROBLEM: See Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 627, 651 A.2d 92, 95 (1995). However, apart from any persuasive weight afforded the Ninth Circuit’s decision in C’Est Moi, NHIC proffers no case law specifically suggesting that common law doctrines such as uberrimae fidei and equitable fraud may not be modified or superseded by a contractual agreement between the insurer and the insured. On the contrary, as we have noted, a number of courts have embraced the ability of parties to contract around common law. See, e.g., King, 906 F.2d at 1540-41; Conn. Indem. Co., 390 F.Supp.2d at 166-67; Progressive N. Ins. Co., 314 F.Supp.2d at 829-30; see also, e.g., McBride v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2007 WL 5185293, at *18, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16917, at **64-65 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 29, 2007) (<HOLDING>). 19 . NHIC points out that during a telephone 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application (B) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (C) holding that insurance application clause modified federal common law governing misrepresentations because  once an insurer has entered into a policy by using an application form more favorable to the insured than the law provides it may not rely on a rule of law which is more stringent than the application form  quoting espinosa v guardian life ins 856 fsupp 711 717 dmass1994 (D) holding that the mccarranferguson act which bars application of a federal law in the face of a state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance did not preclude the concurrent assertion of the federal rico statute and nevada insurance law (E) recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous

SOLUTION: holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application

PROBLEM: Tobacco Co., 177 F.R.D. 491, 498 (D.Kan. 1997) (stating that "[e]ven if there is a general prospect of litigation, a document is not protected by work product immunity if the document was prepared merely in the regular course of business.” Id.) 56 . See Marten, 1998 WL 13244, at * 11. 57 . Id. 58 . See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bunge N. Am., Inc., No. 05-2192-JWL, 2008 WL 2548129, at *7 (D. Kan. June 23, 2008) (overruling work-product objection because plaintiff, in its privilege log, relied only on eonclusory assertions that the documents were created in anticipation of litigation and did not provide sufficient information for the court to determine whether the materials were created in the ordinary course of business); Bo-hannon v. Honda Motor Co., 127 F.R.D. 536, 539 (D.Kan. 1989) (<HOLDING>); McCoo, 192 F.R.D. at 683 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because plaintiff could not establish which portions of the tapes had been played in court plaintiff failed to meet his burden (B) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction (C) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (D) holding that plaintiff did not meet his burden to establish workproduct protection because he relied on bare conclusions unsupported by affidavit or other specific explanation (E) holding that a physician who relied only on personal observation without any personal study or experiment to justify his conclusions did not meet the daubert standard

SOLUTION:
holding that because plaintiff could not establish which portions of the tapes had been played in court plaintiff failed to meet his burden