In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: felt compelled, at the very least, to guess why the prosecutor behaved as he did. But the Batson framework was designed to avoid such “needless and imperfect speculation,” by asking prosecutors to perform the “simple” task of placing race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes on the record. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172, 125 S.Ct. 2410. As a result, this Court must conclude that the Appellate Division applied Batson and its progeny in an unreasonable manner. The Court appreciates the gravity of this holding, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s admonition that AEDPA creates a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388. Even in the Batson context, however, AEDPA deference has its limits. See, e.g., Jones, 555 F.3d at 101 (<HOLDING>). Enforcing those limits is the only way to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new york courts unreasonably applied batson (B) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (C) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (D) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action (E) holding that new york law applies to this matter

A: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york
****
Q: other court’s construal of the statute. See Thrivent, 251 S.W.3d at 622-23; J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co. v. Estes, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 836, 839-40 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied); Poole v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 14-99-00740-CV, No, 14-99-01056-CV, 2000 WL 1721150, at *1, 2000 Tex.App. LEXIS 6825, at *3-*4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 12, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication); Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d at 331. Finally, this argument is contrary to the prevailing view among state courts outside of Texas as well, which have held that an order vacating an award and directing a rehearing (without denying confirmation) is not final and appealable. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 31, 582 So.2d 162, 162-63 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Carner v. Freedman, 175 So.2d 70, 71 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable (B) holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable

A: holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable
****
Q: but execution of the sentence was stayed until August 6, 1996, then again until September 16, 1996, in order to afford Appellant the opportunity to pay the $360 purge amount. Appellant failed to purge herself of contempt and ultimately served thirty days in jail. No appeal was taken from that order. Appellant was again held in civil contempt on May 20, 1997, for failing to make any payments towards the court-ordered restitution. This second contempt proceeding is the subject of- the instant appeal. The trial court sentenced Appellant to thirty days in jail with a purge provision in the amount of $320, but failed to make a finding that Appellant had the present ability to pay the purge amount. This, as the State concedes, was error. See Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274, 1277 (Fla.1985)(<HOLDING>). Although the record supports the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that incarceration for civil contempt cannot be imposed absent a finding by the trial court that the eontemnor has the present ability to purge himself of contempt (B) holding that father being held in jail based on presumption of ability to comply could not have been incarcerated for civil contempt of child support order after failing to appear at contempt hearing without affirmative finding based on evidence that he had present ability to pay purge amount (C) holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive (D) recognizing that no warning to a contemnor is necessary when contempt is flagrant the aoc also argues that williamss use of the term bullshit justifies a separate contempt finding particularly in light of the warning provided by the initial contempt citation17 assuming without deciding that certain forms of contempt are so selfevident that they excuse a court from complying with the plain terms of the statute we disagree that the record before us presents such circumstances regarding the trial courts initial contempt finding we decline the aocs invitation to speculate that williamss inaudible comment to the court was contemptuous on its face williamss comment may have been a patent obscenity or an innocuous comment taken out of context by the court or anything in between further the trial courts failure to make findings deprives us of any other relevant cireumstances not apparent in the bare transcript such circumstances might include williamss body language gestures or even a general air of defiance while these circumstances when combined with williamss actual comment may well have supported a contempt citation we cannot uphold the contempt finding based on mere conjecture therefore we conclude that the first finding of contempt is insupportable on the facts present in the recordt18 whether williamss use of the term bullshit independently supports a contempt finding presents a closer question the record reveals that williams used that term to describe either the sentence the trial court had just imposed or the trial courts initial contempt citation more troubling however than the language itself is the apparent challenge to the courts authority and decorum see utah code ann  783211 defining contempt as inter alia dlisorderly contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding see also haton v tulsa 415 us 697 698 94 sct 1228 39 led2d 693 1974 a single isolated usage of street vernacular not directed at the judge or any officer of the court cannot constitutionally support the conviction of criminal contempt emphasis added (E) holding that because civil contempt is only to obtain compliance it must be used only where the contemnor has the present ability to comply with the court order and the trial court specifically finds that the contemnor has that ability

A:
holding that father being held in jail based on presumption of ability to comply could not have been incarcerated for civil contempt of child support order after failing to appear at contempt hearing without affirmative finding based on evidence that he had present ability to pay purge amount
****