In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

of the statute, the FDA’s regulations, the FDA’s internal interpretation, and precedent all demonstrate that a sterilizer for dental hand-pieces is a “device” as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(h). That being so, both SteriSafe and its accessory SteriDot are within the jurisdiction of the FFDCA. Defendant nevertheless posits three reasons why SteriSafe and SteriDot are not devices. First, defendant argues that the government failed to prove that dental handpieces transmit disease and, thus, that SteriSafe actually prevents disease. Such proof is not required. Congress had two purposes in enacting' the FFDCA: (1) to regulate products that actually prevent disease, and (2) to regulate products that falsely claim that they prevent disease. Because of those d 1006 (9th Cir.1952) (<HOLDING>). Defendant next argues that the Steri-Safe is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the doctor who submitted an expert report did not demonstrate knowledge of cancer treatment he was not qualified to offer an opinion that an earlier diagnosis could have produced a better outcome for the plaintiff (B) holding that a machine that allegedly eliminated lumps from womens breasts was governed by the ffdca even though expert witnesses expressed the unanimous belief that appellants instruments are useless for diagnosis or treatment of any human ailment (C) holding the expert witnesses were protected by witness immunity to ensure expert objectivity (D) holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for  trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis (E) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law
(B)

to obtain the benefit of the bond, for which it paid a significant premium, only through legal action. Accordingly, Olympic Steamship applies here. Colorado Structures, 125 Wn. App. at 928 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We agree. ¶27 Lastly, in McGreevy, where this court awarded reasonable attorney fees in addition to the limits of the insurance policy, we reasoned, “when an insurer unsuccessfully contests coverage, it has placed its interests above the insured. Our decision in Olympic Steamship remedies this inequity by requiring that the insured be made whole.” McGreevy, 128 Wn.2d at 39-40. Likewise, West placed “its interests” above that of Structures. Id. Structures should be awarded attorney fees under Olympic Steamship, so as to be made “whole.” Dayton, 124 Wn.2d at 280 (<HOLDING>)- Without the application of Olympic Steamship 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the contract was not authorized by law (B) recognizing that under georgia law attorneys fees are allowed where authorized by statute or contract (C) holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case (D) holding that an award of attorney fees was authorized by ocga  13111 a 3 when the requirements of that statute were satisfied (E) holding that a court has power to award attorney fees when authorized by contract statute or recognized ground of equity
(E)

OPINION BLACKBURN, District Judge. Currently before the court is the motion of plaintiff Linda N. Lewis to remand. Upon consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, the argument of counsel, and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that plaintiffs motion to remand is due to be granted. This dispute arises out of defendants’ decision to terminate plaintiffs employment. On February 1, 1996, plaintiff filed suit in the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Jefferson County, Alabama, alleging that defendants violated Alabama Code § 25-5-11.1, which prohibits an employer from terminating an employee for claiming workers’ compensation benefits under Alabama law. Defendants removed the case to federal court on March 20, 1996, and 725 (7th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 955, 115 S.Ct. 377, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  255111 claim does not arise under alabamas workers compensation laws (B) holding action did not arise under the patent laws (C) holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws (D) holding that illinois cause of action for retaliation does not arise under its workers compensation laws (E) holding that retaliation claim did not arise under states workers compensation laws

(D)