In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: (citations omitted). Kaul believes that because the Court did not include seizing cigarettes fi*om Indians inside a reservation on this list, Stephan lacked jurisdiction to execute the search warrant at Kaul’s store. However, we do not read Oklahoma Tax Commission and Colville as necessarily prohibiting state officers from conducting search and seizure operations within a reservation’s borders under the authority of a federal grant of criminal jurisdiction to the state. Instead, these opinions merely offer several options that state officials may employ to enforce regulatory cigarette tax statutes. Here, Kaul waived the argument that the Kansas statute was regulatory in nature because she did not raise that issue below. Thus, for purposes of this appea 3, 2061, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction (B) recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes  to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians (C) holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation (D) holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians (E) holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization
[A]: holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction


[Q]: include the element that elevates the crime to a higher level.” As we noted in State v. Bean, 153 N.H. 380 (2006), “[i]n Glanville, the State, although not required to do so under Johnson, attempted to charge the defendant with a specific variant of the crime allegedly attempted, but failed to accurately set forth that variant in the indictment.” Bean, 153 N.H. at 384; see Johnson, 144 N.H. at 178. Indeed, Glanville recognized that all that was required “[t]o charge the defendant with attempted armed robbery, class A felony, [was for] the indictment ... to allege that the defendant (1) with a purpose to commit armed robbery, (2) committed acts constituting a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” Glanville, 145 N.H. at 634 (emphasis added); cf. Casanova, 164 N.H. at 566 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the indictment in this case 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because statutory variants of an underlying crime are not elements of an attempt to commit the underlying crime jurors are not required to unanimously find which specific statutory variant the defendant intended to commit it is sufficient that they unanimously conclude that the defendant intended to commit any of the applicable statutory variants (B) holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred (C) holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways (D) recognizing that entrapment is a statutory defense rooted in the notion that congress could not have intended to criminally punish those who commit elements of crime but are induced by the government to commit the acts and that outrageous conduct defense is rooted in constitutional law (E) holding that an individual cannot attempt to commit murder of the second or third degree because the crime of attempt is a specific intent crime and an attempt to commit second or third degree murder would require proof that the individual intended to perpetrate an unintentional killing which is logically impossible
[A]: holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred


[Q]: broadly enough to subsume gateway issues into an arbitral dispute, and there is evidence that both parties agreed to the covenants, then the trial court should compel arbitration and leave issues of validity and enforceability to the arbitrator.” Id. at 382 (emphasis added). Some courts have explicitly determined that the parties must first agree to arbitrate arbitrability, before any gateway issues can be considered by the arbitrator. Accordingly, unless an agreement to arbitrate first comes into existence, the parties have not agreed to submit any issues to the arbitrator, much less contract formation issues. See, e.g., Denar Restaurants, LLC v. King, No. 02-13-00142-CV, 2014 WL 2430854, at *6 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth May 30, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); see also Vallejo v. Garda CL Southwest, Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that questions of arbitrability canbe delegated to the arbitrator but concluding that the parties did not agree to submit any issues to the arbitrator because the agreement never came into existence by its terms (B) holding that questions of procedure are for the arbitrator not the courts (C) holding that while the determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement is for the court the enforcement of pleading requirements before the arbitrator is a procedural matter for the arbitrator (D) holding that upon vacating an arbitration award the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator (E) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator
[A]:
holding that questions of procedure are for the arbitrator not the courts