In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: for ‘non-generic burglary’ does not.” United States v. Rainer, 616 F.3d 1212, 1213 (11th Cir.2010). A “generic” burglary is “any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). A “non-generic” burglary is one that “do[es] not include all of the elements essential to generic burglaries,” including burglaries of boats, automobiles, and other non-buildings. Rainer, 616 F.3d at 1214. The government has a legitimate interest in “prevent[ing] repeat offenders from continuing to victimize society.” See United States v. Johns, 984 F.2d 1162, 1164 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court in Taylor determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding substantive due process not violated when licensing decisions are based on scheme rationally related to a governmental interest (B) holding that the particular method is not rationally related to legitimate government interest if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable (C) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection as rule was uniformly applied not arbitrary and rationally related to legitimate government interest (D) recognizing due process concerns inherent in sentencing based on false criminal history (E) holding that sentencing criminals in part based on criminal history is rationally related to a legitimate government interest

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: assumed the illegible stamp was the certification. We are not persuaded by Mr. Grynberg's argument that because the certification was illegible on the e-filed copy, L & R Venture's copy of the judgment did not comply with the Act. The flegibility created by the electronic filing process did not transform L & R Venture's properly authenticated judgment into an unauthenticated one. And, contrary to Mr. Grynberg's assertion, L & R Venture's counsel's presentation of the original copy at the hearing was not to correct an improper filing, but rather to prove that the original filing was properly authenticated. See C.R.C.P. 44(c) ("This Rule does not prevent the proof of official records or of entry or lack of entry therein by any method authorized by law."); cf. Griggs, 754 P.2d at 784-85 (<HOLDING>). It may be, however, as Mr. Grynberg contends, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court lacked authority to enforce a foreign judgment where the plaintiff filed only an affidavit describing the foreign judgment and not a certified copy of the judgment itself in the first instance (B) holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular (C) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that a foreign judgment filed under the montana uefja may not be subjected to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening or vacating as a domestic judgment and remain consistent with full faith and credit  the only defenses that may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a final judgment are those defenses directed at the validity of the foreign judgment

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: Act (VUFA), section 6105, and for the duration of [Appellant’s] probation and/or parole period, [Appellant] is subject to random searches of his/her residence. The search will be limited to the space occupied by [Appellant]. The searches will be conducted by the agents of the Gun Violence Task Force. Sentencing Order 3/18/08. ¶ 6 First, we note that the trial court did not sentence Appellant to probation; thus, there can be no probation conditions. Secondly, because the court sentenced Appellant to a maximum term of incarceration of two or more years, Appellant’s parole would be under the exclusive supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“PBPP”) and not the Court of Common Pleas. 61 P.S. § 331.17, and see Commonwealth v. Camps, 772 A.2d 70, 74 (Pa.Super.2001) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, any condition the sentencing court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parole is not a right in pennsylvania (B) holding that there was no legal right to court review of parole board decision because there is no legal right to release on parole (C) recognizing that it is well established that where a state provides a discretionary parole regime prisoners do not have a liberty or property interest in parole (D) holding that it is well settled that the pennsylvania board of probation and parole has exclusive authority to determine parole when the offender is sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of two or more years (E) holding that a defendant at federal sentencing who is on state parole where no parole revocation has occurred is not subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment thus ussg  5g13 is inapplicable


Output: (D)