In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: is adverse to its interests. Lamar cites no authority establishing that either “fact” was material to determining whether City exceeded the scope of its powers by surrendering and contracting away zoning authority that would otherwise have applied to Lamar’s efforts to rebuild or relocate eight of the forty-two signs identified in the Agreement. For reasons we explain, neither factual contention prevented the entry of summary judgment in favor of City as a matter of law. We have already explained that the Agreement hindered City’s zoning authority, and that zoning authority is an exercise of police powers. City thus established all that was necessary to demonstrate that the Agreement exceeded the scope of City’s powers in violation of section 432.070. Stewart, 165 S.W.2d at 629 (<HOLDING>). It is true that “[t]he due process clauses of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing governmental interest in rehabilitation (B) holding that a local governmental body exceeds its jurisdiction under crcp 106a4 when it exercises discretion it does not have (C) holding that if a contract surrenders or contracts away governmental functions then it exceeds the scope of a governmental entitys powers and is void (D) holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability (E) holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: that she disapproved of what she reasonably believed to be unlawful retaliation. B. Form and Context To the extent that Thomas’ conduct was expressive, the message was communicated to her immediate supervisor, Miller, and other court employees. She did not, however, attempt to inform the general public about the allegedly retaliatory practices. That Thomas chose to convey her views privately rather than publicly is not determinative of whether her expression is entitled to protection. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979). Because content is the most important factor, we have concluded that speech about a matter of public concern may be protected even when made in a private context. See, e.g., Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1174 (<HOLDING>); Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 979 (“[T]he public 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected (B) holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged (C) holding that a memorandum given to the employees supervisors was protected speech when the memorandum alleged criminal wrongdo ing (D) holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected (E) holding the separate document rule violated when the alleged judgment was included with the memorandum and order of the court

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir.1994); United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir.1988). We held that a district court may empanel an anonymous jury if it “conclud[es] that there is a strong reason to believe the jury needs protection [ ... and] tak[es] reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effects on the defendant and to ensure that his fundamental rights are protected.” Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1090 (quoting United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir.1991)). The Group I appellants assumed that a trial court’s decision to empanel and sequester an anonymous jury was reviewable only for abuse of discretion, an assumption implicitly followed by the Edmond court. See Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1091 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192). 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions (B) holding that voir dire of jury may be delegated to magistrate judge where defendant consents to the delegation because the district court retains the ultimate decision on empaneling the jury (C) recognizing the district courts broad discretion to utilize civil procedures in a manner that is useful and equitable to the parties (D) holding that the empaneling of an anonymous jury is left to the district courts discretion subject to the broad constraints noted above (E) holding that district courts discretion is extremely broad


Output: (D)