In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: rules or orders.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 382.113(a). The legislature imposed only the two restrictions previously mentioned: an ordinance must be consistent with the Act and the commission’s rules and orders and may not make unlawful a condition or act approved or authorized under the Act or the commission’s rules or orders. Id. § 382.113(b). If the ordinance violates one of these restrictions, however, then its preemption is implied with unmistakable clarity. We therefore turn next to the first of these restrictions and address the question of whether the Act and the ordinance are consistent. 3. The Clean Air Act and the tent with state legislation, we begin by comparing the purpose of each. See City of Weslaco v. Melton, 158 Tex. 61, 63-64, 308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1958) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute (B) holding state and federal actions not parallel for colorado river purposes because the remedies were different  one was equitable and the other compensatory  and the sources of law came from different states (C) holding that an implied warranty of merchantability does not create a labeling requirement different from or in addition to those mandated by fifra because the implied warranty of merchantability arises from the sale itself not from a state labeling regulation citation omitted (D) holding that completing sixth grade and a limited ability to read were not inconsistent with a valid iq score of 68 (E) holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade a raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes
[EX A]: recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute

[EX Q]: the instructions misstated the law or misled the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” United States v. Felts, 579 F.3d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir. 2009). We will not reverse a conviction because of an erroneous instruction unless we are “left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations.” Id. at 1342-43 (quotation marks omitted). We evaluate the instruction as a whole and in the context of the entire trial. United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 16, 2017) (No. 16-8072). Challenges to jury instructions that are raised for the first time on appeal, however, are reviewed for plain error only. United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 973 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise rule 11 error at trial has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule (C) holding that plainerror review applies where the defendant fails to object to a constructive amendment (D) holding that plainerror review applies when a defendant fails to make a specific rule 32i3b objection based on a district courts failure to resolve a factual dispute (E) holding that plain error review applies where the defendant fails to object to the lack of an opportunity to allocute
[EX A]: holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review

[EX Q]: customs and practices of the trade could conclude that WQIS’s liability under Coverage C ceased once the Coverage A limit was reached. See Morgan Stanley, 225 F.3d at 275 (describing when a contract provision is ambiguous). First, the phrase “liabilities covered” in the Coverage C insuring provision could reasonably be read to refer only to liabilities that WQIS was required to cover under Coverage A, that is, up to $5 million per vessel. Under this interpretation, any liability above $5 million was not “covered,” and - therefore defense costs incurred with respect to liabilities above $5 million did not arise from “liabilities covered.” See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on other grounds by 85 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable person could conclude that once 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due (B) holding that allied may not be held liable for portion of attorneys fees paid pretender of defense due to policy provision precluding reimbursement for defense costs voluntarily incurred (C) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself (D) holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the  insurance policy (E) holding where an insurance policy indemnifies defense costs paid as a result of occurrences covered that the insurer need only reimburse defense costs for claims that are established to be covered through judgment and settlement and not for claims only potentially falling within the policys coverage
[EX A]:
holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due