In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); Hagemeister v. Vanity Fair Properties, 508 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1973, writ dism’d). Thus, collateral estoppel dictates that venue of any subsequent suit involving the same subject matter and the same parties as the initial suit be governed by the venue determination in the initial suit. See Orozco, 681 S.W.2d at 245-46; Pinney, 558 S.W.2d at 36. First, Miller II involves the same parties as the Windsor suit. Both State & County and Windsor were parties to the Windsor suit. Although Ledbetter and Curtiss were not named in the Windsor suit, as officers of State & County, they were in privity with a party; thus, collateral estoppel would apply to them as well. Cf. Getty Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Youell & Cos. v. Getty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant in second suit was in privity for res judicata purposes because his interests were aligned with those of defendant in first suit which concerned same facts (B) holding that res judicata applies when the question of jurisdiction is raised and determined (C) holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings (D) holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings (E) holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties
[A]: (E)


[Q]: party to file a protest with the contracting agency or to file an action in a district court of the United States or the United States Claims Court.” Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). STANDING The plaintiffs legal standing to appeal the GAO’s decision lies in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.. Section 702 provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review” thereof. The court finds that the plaintiff, as an unsuccessful bidder, has standing to challenge the agency’s decision to award the contract to a third party. See Choctaw Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 761 F.2d 609, 615-16 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). FINDINGS OF FACT The majority of facts are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the losing bidder has standing to challenge the award of a government procurement contract (B) holding that if the government is obligated to rebid the contract and the unsuccessful bidder could compete for the contract once again and therefore has an economic interest and standing to challenge the award (C) holding that without a valid reason for cancelling the procurement  the government violated its duty to conduct a fair procurement (D) holding that the definition of procurement under the tucker act is broader than the definition of procurement contract in the fgcaa such that an agency can engage in a procurement process for the purposes of the tucker act even though it is using a cooperative agreement instead of a procurement contract to memorialize the parties agreement (E) holding that city had implied contract with bidder to treat bidder fairly
[A]: (A)


[Q]: I would affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment. See Lynch v. Am. Family Mut Ins. Co., 626 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Minn.2001) (stating that an insurer’s liability is generally determined by the insurance contract, as long as the relevant insurance policy neither (1) omits coverage that is required by law nor (2) violates applicable statutes). I agree with the majority’s decision that the plain language of the policy prevents Pepper from recovering UIM benefits. But I cannot conclude that the policy exclusion violates Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2010), the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. Minnesota caselaw allows for insurance companies to impose limitations on receipt of UIM benefits. See, e.g., Myers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Minn.1983) (<HOLDING>). As explained by the majority, we have held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insurance policys exclusion of vehicles owned by furnished for or made available for the regular use of the named insured from the definition of an underinsured motor vehicle is valid (B) holding that the insurance applicable to the tortfeasors vehicle must be compared to the underinsured vehicle policy limits to determine whether a vehicle is underinsured (C) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling (D) holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured (E) holding that under the plain and obvious meaning of the uim statute a prerequisite to the term underinsured motor vehicle is the existence of  bodily injury liability insurance coverage which is less than the liability for damages imposed by law  and where no such coverage existed tortfeasor was not underinsured under the statute but rather uninsured concluding that terms underinsured and uninsured are mutually exclusive as applied to the same motor vehicle and the combination of these two coverages by the insured was contrary to legislative intent
[A]:
(A)