TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981))); State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996) (listing the four factors discussed above) (citations omitted). Finally, if the proponent provides a sufficient explanation for the peremptory challenges, the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the peremptory challenges has proven purposeful discrimination. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769; Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2416; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. ¶ 16 Since deciding Batson, the Supreme Court has continually increased the scope of the Batson test. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409-10, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that batson applies to a prosecutors use of peremptory challenges regardless of whether the stricken juror is of the same race as the defendant (B) holding that the constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges (C) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (D) holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause (E) holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race

SOLUTION: holding that the constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges

PROBLEM: 55(c) motion on or before August 22, 2012, the 90th day after it was filed, that motion was denied by operation of law on that date, which denial terminated the trial court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v. Lenoir, 5 So.3d 1282, 1283 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (“The trial court loses jurisdiction to consider [a postjudgment] motion after the expiration of the 90-day period.”). Because its jurisdiction terminated on August 22, 2012, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the November 16, 2012, order purporting to set aside the default judgment against Thurmond; the March 16, 2013, order purporting to deny Thurmond’s summary-judgment motion; and the April 16, 2013, order purporting to enter a summary judgment in favor of Parrish. See Sibley v. Sibley, 90 So.3d 191, 193 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (<HOLDING>). A judgment entered by a trial court lacking 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void (B) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (C) holding trial court order which purportedly corrected divorce decree to alter marital property division was void because it was entered  after this court obtained jurisdiction (D) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (E) holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief

SOLUTION: holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void

PROBLEM: of the [Marion County] small claims court shall be taken to the superior court of the county and tried de novo." Retaining the identical language, the Legislature re-codified the statute in 2004 as Indiana Code section 33-34-3-15(a). 2 . Atlantic Coast sought interlocutory review of the trial court's order, which the Court of Appeals accepted. The Court of Appeals addressed this claim in the instant appeal. 3 . Atlantic Coast does not challenge the Court of Appeals' determination regarding the discovery order, and the Cooks do not challenge the determination that they waived appellate review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Delta Airlines on the Cooks' negligence claim. 4 . Compare, for example, Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), and O'Carroll v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding federal law preempts state regulation of voip provider but expressing no opinion on applicability of state laws generally governing such companies including laws concerning taxation (B) holding that general maritime law preempts state law (C) holding that the flsa preempts certain state law claims (D) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans (E) holding that federal law establishes the applicable standards of care in the field of aviation safety generally and thus preempts the entire field from state regulation

SOLUTION:
holding federal law preempts state regulation of voip provider but expressing no opinion on applicability of state laws generally governing such companies including laws concerning taxation