TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: that, although the trial court was initially prepared to suppress based solely on the deputies’ conduct in providing Gomez’s name, the court ultimately applied the Neil factors and, finding that the identification was unreliable, ruled the state failed to establish that the witness’ recollection was independent of the suggestive identification. On these facts, the trial court could properly conclude that it was unnecessarily suggestive for the victims to be provided the defendant’s name and resulting access to his photo on the website before having any opportunity to identify him, thus giving rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See generally Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 518 (Fla.2005)(quoting Washington v. State, 653 So.2d 362, 365 (Fla.1994)) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. State, 566 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that showup identification proce dure was not unduly suggestive where officer said to eyewitness we got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about (B) holding that unprovoked flight is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such (C) holding showing of a single photo is unduly suggestive (D) holding that showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive where defendant was handcuffed and placed under police spotlight (E) holding due process requires suppression of testimony regarding pretrial identification when procedure employed is impermissibly suggestive

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: of the writ, the CCA examines the substance of the claim to see if it establishes a prima facie case of retardation, and only upon deciding that question can the state court decide whether remand is appropriate.”). 10 . Brown v. Dretke, 419 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir.2005). 11 . 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). 12 . Id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-17, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)). 13 . In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.2005). 14 . Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 & nn. 24-25 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (citing American Association of Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support 5 (9th ed.1992)). 15 . See Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 361-63 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Bri-seno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 (“[T]he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant suffered from significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and related limitations in adaptive functioning (C) holding that a district court did not clearly err in finding materiality where the prior art reference at issue had been considered material by examiners in related foreign patent applications (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that superior court did not clearly err in finding that the parent had not remedied the problematic conduct

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: the information was filed whether he affirms or denies that he has been previously convicted.”). Accordingly, he contends that the Government failed to meet its burden of proving the convictions. See United States v. Reliant, 568 F.3d 125, 141 (4th Cir.2009) (listing facts the government must prove). The district court’s error was, however, harmless. “Although § 851 [ (c) ] allows a defendant to attack a prior conviction ... [§ 851(e) ] precludes challenges to convictions ‘which occurred more than five years before the date of the information alleging such prior conviction.’ ” Rounsavall, 115 F.3d at 566, quoting 21 U.S.C. § 851(e); United States v. Samuels, 543 F.3d 1013, 1020 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Henderson’s convictions occurred 20 and 16 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due to statute defendant cannot collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance sentence unless in violation of the right to counsel (B) holding that prior felony drug convictions that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance the defendants sentence if the conspiracy continued after his earlier convictions were final (C) holding amended language gives district courts discretion to permit collateral attack on prior convictions used to enhance sentence (D) holding that a defendant cannot collaterally challenge a prior conviction used to calculate criminal history points (E) holding that a defendant cannot collaterally attack a prior state conviction during a federal sentencing proceeding in a different case

SOLUTION:
(A)