In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Raye Ellen Stiles appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her action alleging, among other claims, housing discrimination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo and may affirm the district court on any ground supported by the record. Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 733-34 (9th Cir.2012). We affirm. Summary judgment on Stiles’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, aggravation of preexisting conditions, and public humiliation was proper because she already litigated these claims in Arizona state court, and, thus, res judicata precludes her from bringing such claims in federal court. See Sunkist Growers v. Fisher, 104 F.3d 280, 283-84 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Summary judgment on Stiles’ federal claims 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person has standing to bring suit under the civil rights act if she or he can show that she or he was punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities (B) holding that plaintiff had standing to bring a rico conspiracy claim despite his inability to bring a substantive rico claim (C) holding that while parents may not bring a title ix claim as individuals they may bring such claim on behalf of a deceased child (D) holding that under arizona law a litigant may not bring a claim identical to one she has previously litigated (E) holding that plaintiffs may bring a section 1983 claim for damages to vindicate their rights under idea
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: although incorporated or approved in the decree, is not merged therein, the parties may enforce it by s clear that "jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events.” Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1112, 1 L.Ed.2d 1205 (1957) (citation omitted). 18 . Courts in this district have long recognized that "a coiporation is an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action suit.” See Gibson v. BoPar Dock Co. Corp., 780 F.Supp. 371, 373 (W.D.Va.1991) (citing Tower Hill Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 33 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir.1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 607, 50 S.Ct. 157, 74 L.Ed. 650 (1930)); Bates v. Cekada, 130 F.R.D. 52, 59 (E.D.Va.1990) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Taylor v. Swirnow, 80 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to maintain a derivative cause of action a shareholder must maintain a continuous ownership interest in the corporation (B) recognizing that a corporation is properly aligned as a defendant in a shareholder derivative suit when the corporation is in antagonistic hands (C) recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action (D) holding that a shareholder who disposes of his shares loses standing to bring a derivative action no longer a shareholder in the corporation the defendant cannot maintain a derivative action on its behalf (E) recognizing that the corporation is always deemed to be an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: expression is not limited to speech that could be construed as discrimination on the basis of union membership. Rather, it broadly protects “any views or opinions on the subject of employer-employee relations.” TenmCode Ann. § 49-5-606(a)(5). This language, particularly “any views” and “the subject of employer-employee relations,” comprehends a range of expression much broader than opinions on the desirability of unionism or union membership. And even though most cases dealing with employer expression, including those cited by the district court, involve comments on the merits of impending unionization in the employer’s company, case law upholding the employer’s right to expression is not limited to this circumstance. See Fla. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 735, 751-53 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); NLRB v. Monroe Tube Co., 545 F.2d 1320, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding judges letter to the editor advocating against gay rights constituted speech fully protected by the first amendment (B) holding that letter that was copied to the schools board of directors was written pursuant to her duties and was not protected speech (C) holding that  8e protected an employers speech undertaken to correct any misunderstandings informing employees that their signed union cards were not confidential and that the employer retained the right to discharge or discipline employees for cause (D) holding that company letter to employees advising them of their right to ask for an opportunity to obtain legal counsel before speaking with a nlrb agent following a failed union election was protected speech under the first amendment and  8c (E) holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline
[EX A]:
(D)