In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

voters of the political subdivision or subdivisions whose combined territory composes the territory of a district shall be qualified voters of the district. The nomination and election shall be by separate nonpartisan ballot. The term of each member of the board thus elected shall be six years and until his successor is elected and qualified. (Emphasis added.) No definition of a “qualified voter” is provided in SDCL Chapter 49-36. Thus, we must turn to the definition of “voter” as provided under SDCL Title 12, and the South Dakota Constitution as to what qualifies a person as a “voter” within the meaning of Chapter 49-36. See SDCL 12-1-1. [¶44.] Our state affords great protection to a citizen’s voting franchise. SD Const, art. 6, § 19; Duffy v. Mortenson, 497 N.W.2d 437, 439 (S.D.1993) (<HOLDING>). A court must strictly adhere to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a fair referendum assuring the equal right to vote under  101a1 includes the right of members to have the vote scheduled at a time when they can exercise their vote and the right to be free from intimidation or fear of reprisal (B) holding constitutional a tax on a private citizens interest in housing on government property received as part of the private citizens compensation (C) holding it is not the policy of the state of south dakota to disenfranchise its citizens of their constitutional right to vote (D) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (E) holding that the right to vote is fundamental
(C)

not impliedly preempt the field of law related to the price, route, and service of motor carriers of property, and does not impliedly preempt by conflict her state-law claims. As stated above, in Kelley the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that § 14501(c) preempts the field of law regarding price, route, and service of motor carriers of property. See Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1509-10 (“Here, Congress has clearly chosen ... to preempt the entire field of price, service, and route regulation of intrastate motor carrier activities.”). Furthermore, other federal courts have held that § 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts state tort claims relating to price, route, or service against motor carriers of property. See, e.g., Data Mfg., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 557 F.3d 849 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs statelaw claims alleging common law misrepresentation and statutory misrepresentation under the texas insurance code art 2121 not preempted because they were not dependent on  the right to recover benefits under the erisa plan (B) holding fraudulent representations to the fda could not sustain statelaw claims (C) holding that  14501c1 preempted statelaw claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and money had and received related to billing practices of motor carrier of property (D) holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient (E) holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted
(C)

would seem to be an outstanding liability of CCI that would affect its net worth and, therefore, Jeff's total net worth as a CCI shareholder. 7 . We are cognizant that our refusal to consider this issue now could lead to more litigation in the future, given the litigiousness of these parties, but this does not permit us to ignore jurisdictional rules. See In re Guardianship of Hickman, 811 N.E.2d 843, 850 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. We further note that even if the trial court revisits the question of modifying Jeff's child support obligation upon termination of this appeal, such modification could only be made effective upon the date the trial court reobtains jurisdiction following certification of this appeal as final. See Harris v. Harris, 800 N.E.2d 930, 937 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. 8 . Despite the Crider 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court was permitted to rule on child support modification request filed before appeal was certified as final but that effective date of modification could be no earlier than when indiana supreme court denied transfer on appeal and trial court reobtained jurisdiction (B) holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed (C) holding that since district court of appeal properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3850 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal the district court of appeal should have vacated the order rather than affirming on the merits (D) holding that where the issue of sanctions was not before the court of appeals when the appeal was filed the district court retained jurisdiction (E) holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal

(A)