In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

types of property which do not pass to the trustee under Section 70 of the Act. See, Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a “Specialized Type of Property” ... in our Economic System, 66 N.W.U.L.Rev. 502, 525-532 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, 395 U.S. at 340, 89 S.Ct. 1820; Lines v. Frederick, supra, 400 U.S. at 19, 91 S.Ct. 113. The Supreme Court has recently held, in what is a logical corollary to the notion of specialized property, that at times a trustee has too tenuous a relationship to a given claim to have standing to assert that claim on behalf of the bankrupt estate. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 92 S.Ct. 1678, 32 L.Ed.2d 195 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In view of these evolving federal policies of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses (B) holding that the relevant indenture agreement allowed the trustee to bring tort and fraud claims on behalf of the bondholders (C) holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee (D) holding that a trustee does not have standing to sue a thirdparty on behalf of debenture holders (E) holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee
holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses

unlawful harm under that public policy may include actions that violate recognized and accepted standards of conduct, such as applicable codes of ethics. The critical question in this case is whether under all of the surrounding circumstances MacDougall’s termination by Weiehert violated that clear mandate of public policy and was in retaliation for either his vote on the municipal parking ban ordinance or his refusal to change the ordinance. At the outset, we recognize that conduct that is directed against constitutionally-protected activity may violate a clear mandate of public policy, even though it may not offend any other statutory or legal standard. Supra at 390, 393, 677 A.2d at 167, 168. Compare Shovelin v. Central New Mexico Elec. Coop., Inc., 115 N.M. 293, 850 P.2d 996 (1993) (<HOLDING>) with Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employees retaliatory discharge based on employees election to public office did not violate public policy (B) recognizing public policy limits on employer discretion in discharging employees (C) holding public employees conduct and expression in internal investigation of employees at county prosecutors office to expose potential wrongdoing constituted matter of public concern (D) recognizing retaliatory discharge claim where employer prevented employees exercise of workers compensation rights because of employees intention to file claim (E) holding that the discharge of an employee hospitalized for illness did not violate public policy
recognizing public policy limits on employer discretion in discharging employees

findings of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ determined that Avilez retained a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with an additional restriction: she could only stand or walk two hours out of an eight-hour work day. AR 16; see Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that an RFC may deviate from the Commissioner’s Medical-Vocational Guideline grids “[w]hen the grids do not completely describe the claimant’s abilities and limitations”). Since the RFC fell between the categories of light and sedentary, the ALJ correctly decided to consult a vocational expert (“VE”) for expert testimony. AR 25; see, e.g., Thomas, 278 F.3d at 960 (<HOLDING>). The ALJ properly relied on the VE’s testimony 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that vocational expert testimony in response to a hypothetical can constitute substantial evidence of residual functional capacity (B) holding that vocational experts testimony that there were jobs claimant could perform constituted substantial evidence (C) holding that a vocational expert must be consulted when an rfc falls between two categories (D) holding that claimants pain should have formed a paxt of aljs question to vocational expert (E) holding that an alj is entitled to rely on vocational experts testimony that is based on assumptions that are supported by evidence in the record

holding that vocational expert testimony in response to a hypothetical can constitute substantial evidence of residual functional capacity