instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
purpose of this Memorandum is to explain why the Court declined to do these things. As disclosed by plaintiff in its ex parte motion, the sale of decoding devices like those defendants are claimed to have offered and sold is prohibited by federal criminal statute, see 47 U.S.C. § 553(b), as well as by Illinois criminal statute, see 720 ILCS 5/16-10(a)(4). Under the circumstances, information disclosing defendants’ purchases and sales of the devices, the revenues obtained from those sales, the assets they now have that may have been derived from those sales, and the locations where they keep their records and other descrambling devices is, without question, information that might tend to incriminate the defendants. See, e.g., FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); SEC v. Rehtorik, 755 F.Supp. 1018, 1019 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government (B) holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment (C) holding that abrogating the right to sell endangered eagles feathers did not implicate the fifth amendment (D) holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege (E) recognizing that preliminary injunction requiring defendant to disclose records might implicate fifth amendment
answer:
holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government


question:
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) because Erickson failed to allege specific facts showing a pattern of racketeering activity. See Sanford v. Member-Works, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557-58 (9th Cir.2010) (discussing elements of a.RICO claim and particularity requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)). The district court properly dismissed Erickson’s claims under the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (“RES-PA”) and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) as time-barred because Erickson filed his action more than three years after the alleged violations. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (prescribing at most a three-year statute of limitations for violations of RES-PA); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (an action for damages under TILA must be brought within one year of the alleged violation); see also King, 784 F.2d at 915 (<HOLDING>). However, after the district court dismissed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fiveyear limitation period in 28 usc  2462 runs from date of predicate violation not from date of administrative assessment of sanction (B) holding limitations period for filing petition for postconviction relief runs from date of final judgment not from date of subsequent order revoking appeal bond (C) holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer (D) holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction (E) holding  under section 1144s predecessor statute  that the 180day period runs from the date of the confirmation order even if the fraud is not discovered in the 180day period
answer:
holding fiveyear limitation period in 28 usc  2462 runs from date of predicate violation not from date of administrative assessment of sanction


question:
It was undisputed, ho nkruptcy petition on March 7, 2001. The petition scheduled the Board as a priority creditor in the estimated amount of $10,000. The bankruptcy court then sent the Board official notice of the petition. The notice indicated that the meeting of creditors would be held on April 19, 2001, and that the claims bar date for governmental claims was September 3, 2001. The parties do not dispute that this notice complied with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, the Board does not contend that it did not receive this official notice. Therefore, like the creditor in Gregory, the Board received constitutionally adequate notice of its right to payment — in the form of the official notice mandated by the Bankruptcy Code — and it ignored the Joyes’ bankruptcy 88) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as the Joyes correctly point out, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a creditor who had received actual notice of a bankruptcy proceeding through his counsel did not suffer a due process violation because he had notice in time to file a complaint or at least to file a timely motion for an extension of time (B) holding that where an action is brought by the debtors at the initial proceeding the appeal of that action is not a continuing proceeding against the debtors (C) holding that because creditor did not file a proof of claim on a prepetition contract matter the peculiar powers of the bankruptcy court had not been invoked (D) holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons (E) holding that the operative fact is whether or not the creditor has notice of the debtors bankruptcy proceeding in time to file a timely proof of claim
answer:

holding that a creditor who had received actual notice of a bankruptcy proceeding through his counsel did not suffer a due process violation because he had notice in time to file a complaint or at least to file a timely motion for an extension of time