In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: was satisfied that protocols were followed after examining their case notes and the data collected. Further, Quartaro testified to the various safeguards Cellmark employed to protect against the risk of errors and to detect any such errors, if made. Accordingly, Quartaro could have been meaningfully cross-examined on the general and specific risks of error in forensic testing, whether the result of carelessness, incompetence, or fraud. See Boyd, 686 F.Supp.2d at 385 (finding no constitutional violation when only the DNA analyst who wrote the report, and not the intervening-testing analysts, testified because “the testifying expert was himself familiar with the[ ] intervening procedures and could be fully cross-examined as to their efficacy, accuracy, etc.”); Munoz, 958 N.E.2d at 1174 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Quartaro certainly could have been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible (B) holding that a forensic accountant is an expert witness not a lay witness (C) holding that an expert who offers an independent opinion based on another analysts report can be meaningfully crossexamined on the general risk of error in forensic testing (D) recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue (E) holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion
[A]: (C)


[Q]: statement during closing argument regarding his personal opinion of the defendant’s guilt was improper, but not reversible error). Where it appears that no other verdict could have been properly rendered, prosecutorial misconduct is not reversible error. Hillen v. People, 59 Colo. 280, 284, 149 P. 250, 252 (1915). In light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial against the defendant, we conclude that the prosecutor’s improper remark during closing argument was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 985 (emphasis added); see also Harris, 888 P.2d at 268 (stating that “the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial will be considered on appeal when evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct”); Grandbouche v. People, 104 Colo. 175, 185, 89 P.2d 577, 581 (1939) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. People, 70 Colo. 313, 317, 201 P. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment (B) holding the rule that the singular includes the plural obviously  is not one to be applied except where it is necessary to carry out the evident intent of the statute (C) holding that 1 usc  1 does not apply except where it is necessary to carry out the evident intent of the statute (D) holding that the rule is that where the guilt of an accused is evident incidental improper action upon the part of the prosecuting officer may be overlooked (E) holding that the prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment
[A]: (D)


[Q]: F.3d 518, 527 (2d Cir.2005). Although Patterson argues that it “was certainly possible” for his California conduct not to have been fraudulent, Appellant’s Br. at 25, that possibility, which appears remote, did not foreclose the district court’s conclusion of probable relevant criminality. See United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d at 190. Finally, the district court’s observation that it “must give [the Guidelines] some heavy weight,” Sentencing Tr. at 30 (Jan. 3, 2007), when reviewed in the context of the full sentencing transcript, raises no concern as to the district court’s proper understanding of its obligation to make an “individualized assessment” of the appropriate sentence consistent with the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. at 596-97 (<HOLDING>). The district court explicitly acknowledged 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the sentencing guidelines (B) holding that a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the sentencing guidelines (C) holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range (D) holding that district court may not presume reasonableness of guidelines sentencing range in particular case (E) holding that a court of appeals may presume reasonable a district courts proper application of the sentencing guidelines
[A]:
(D)