In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Id. The district court excluded this portion of the expert’s testimony. Id. at 1397. Relying on Downing, the Third Circuit reversed. Id. at 1401. We agree that expert testimony on eyewitness identification may properly be admitted under Daubert in certain circumstances, but Stevens simply does not persuade us that the district court abused its discretion in the instant case. We note that here there were five eyewitness identifica tions, not one. Likewise, as counsel for the government pointed out at argument, there was also testimony that Mr. Smith changed his alibi. In this admittedly close case, we hold only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony under the circumstances. See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification (B) holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification (C) holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider certain additional factors in evaluating the validity of eyewitness identification testimony (D) holding that a specific instruction was unnecessary because eyewitness was crossexamined and the eyewitness testimony was discussed in defense counsels opening statement (E) holding exclusion of expert eyewitness identification testimony harmless error where governments case included three separate eyewitnesses and a palm print that discredited the defendants alibi
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: in their pension payments would only be temporary, rather than receiving any express representations regarding that fact. See Grossman Decl. Ex. D at 141-42 (Avitabile); id. Ex. E at 119 (Keelin). Further, as previously noted, it is undisputed that all five plaintiffs received clear and unambiguous written information that accurately described the Level Income Option and indicated that the reduced payments would continue “until death.” These (and other) accurate written communications rendered any inconsistent oral representations (assuming, arguendo, that there were any) entirely immaterial, because plaintiffs had full notice of their benefit rights and could not reasonably have been misled by anything to the contrary. Adams v. Tetley USA, Inc., 363 F.Supp.2d 94, 109 (D.Conn.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Ballone, 109 F.3d at 126; Adams, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud a plaintiff must have justifiably relied to his detriment on the defendants material misrepresentations (B) holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage (C) holding that class actions may be reasonably litigated through use of legitimate inferences based on the nature of the alleged misrepresentations at issue (D) holding that contractor could not show that it reasonably relied upon alleged misrepresentation (E) holding that plan beneficiaries could not have reasonably relied on any alleged oral misrepresentations in light of a signed severance agreement containing information to the contrary
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: evidence showing that the defendants used the mark selectively or that they failed to use it pervasively in all their commercial dealings, even if these dealings were low in volume. Furthermore, though the Allard Court granted ownership rights to the defendants based only on oral testimony of various “solicitations” and insubstantial documentary evidence of prior use, the Court noted that there was also good evidence of widespread public recognition of the defendants’ use of the service mark. Evidence of public recognition is only necessary in cases requiring proof of secondary meaning, but such evidence may be probative of a party’s actual use of a mark in cases where secondary meaning is not required. See id.; see also Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 330 F.Supp. 428, 431 (M.D.Fla.1971) (<HOLDING>). Public recognition is probative of a party’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (B) holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff (C) holding that the plaintiff established a right to a slogan based on evidence of public recognition of its use by the plaintiff (D) holding that a plaintiff had established a primafacie failuretohire case notwithstanding evidence that the position sought by the plaintiff was ultimately filled with a person of the same race as the plaintiff (E) holding that mere use of a road will not make a road a public road even though such use is with the knowledge and consent of the landowner unless the use is accompanied by  recognition by public authority or by its maintainance sic
[EX A]:
(C)