In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to her or to the government, and some of which may be quite different than either thought possible. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21; see also Sotirion v. United States, 617 F.3d 27, 38 (1st Cir. 2010). At the time of sentencing there was no “sentencing error”. Petitioner made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights, choosing the certainty of a binding plea agreement over the uncertainty of a jury trial. He cannot accept the benefit of that agreement and then repudiate it when a change in circumstances later arises. See Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21. A retroactive determination that an advisory guideline range may have been ■ miscalculated does not overcome petitioner’s appellate waiver; See Sotirion, 617 F.3d at 38; see also United States v. Calderon-Pacheco, 564 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). In view of the circumstances, the Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver (B) holding a showing of egregious facts required to vault the hurdle erected by the waiver (C) holding that the failure to provide a person with all of the information required by ors 4261001 constitutes an egregious error that justifies plain error review (D) recognizing waiver by acquiescence as a possible defense to an action for past due alimony but finding no waiver under the facts presented (E) holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case
[A]: holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver


[Q]: a favorable decision, by which we mean that the “prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling” is not “too speculative.” In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1101 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The NMCGA contends that the provision for attorneys’ fees is an “egregious and illegal use of tax dollars.” NMCGA’s Response at 7. It is well established that a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge state and federal spending decisions. Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1399 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, Cl. 183, 184-85 (2006) (<HOLDING>). While NMCGA does not have standing to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties (B) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (C) holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment (D) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (E) holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim
[A]: holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties


[Q]: refer to the road by its correct designation, despite, its description as "state highway 27” throughout the record below. 2 . We note that, in response to INDOT’s motion to dismiss, Union County designated an affidavit of its sanitarian, which is evidence outside of the pleadings and thus would ordinarily convert this matter into a motion for summary judgment, since it was not expressly excluded by the trial court. See Ind. Trial Rule 12(B). However, it is apparent from the trial court's disposition of this motion that the designated affidavit played no part in its decision. Thus while it was error for the trial court to not formally exclude the affidavit in its order, that error was harmless. Cf. Reich v. Lincoln Hills Christian Church, Inc., 888 N.E.2d 239, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (<HOLDING>). We therefore shall examine this case from a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  (B) holding the trial courts failure to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment after an affidavit was filed in response to the motion was harmless error where the affidavit had no impact on thedecisive statute of frauds issue (C) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (D) holding that a trial court is not required to convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment where external evidence is submitted if the external evidence is irrelevant to the issue (E) holding that district court has discretion when deciding to convert a defendants motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment
[A]:
holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable