In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: was a “substantial factor” or “motivating factor” in Walker’s allegedly retaliatory actions. Abrams argues that a reasonable jury could infer, as a result of this chronology, that he was “falsely arrested” and that he was arrested “because of what [he] said.” Abrams then opines that “the arrest was for an illegal purpose” and finally that “[a]nger often leads to unthinking retaliation.” After reviewing the record and the standards presented in our line of cases, we agree with the district court’s finding that this chronology is unconvincing, as it fails to present “definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion,” Michael v. St. Joseph County, 259 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir.2001), contains mere speculation, and demands the making of unreasonable inferences in suppo -84 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that such a step would not be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest (B) holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest (C) holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity (D) holding that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a  1983 claim alleging false arrest (E) recognizing first amendment retaliation right
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: S.E.2d at 629 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Sparks v. Peacock, plaintiff husband filed an action in superior court seeking contributions for payments on promissory notes executed by both he and his wife. Unlike the Garrison litigants, however, the parties in Sparks had not brought an action for equitable distribution in district court. Based on the wife’s motion, the superior court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, this Court acknowledged the jurisdictional nature of section 7A-244, stating that if the parties had indeed brought an equitable distribution action and such action was pending pursuant to section 7A-244, the superior court would not have jurisdiction over the propriety of payments on the promissory note. Id. at 641, 500 S.E.2d at 118 (<HOLDING>); see also Ward v. Ward, 116 N.C. App. 643, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that defendant correctly stated that the district court has jurisdiction over equitable distribution actions and citing section 7a244 (B) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties (C) holding that personal jurisdiction over partner did not follow from jurisdiction over partnership citing sher (D) holding that court of claims has jurisdiction over actions for breach of standard contract (E) recognizing the difference between jurisdiction over an action and jurisdiction over an issue and holding that although section 2074207 vests the family court with exclusive jurisdiction over actions to determine paternity under section 621302a1 the probate court has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of paternity when the issue is essential to the probate courts determination of heirs
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: Int'l, Inc. v. Sage Apartments, L.L.C., 167 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (party filed notice of non-suit while stay imposed by appellate court was pending); In re Martinez, 77 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 2002, orig. proceeding) (same); In re Consol. Freightways, 75 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding) (party filed motion to enforce agreement during pendency of stay automatically imposed by insurance code due to other party’s insurer being declared “impaired”); Paine v. Sealey, 956 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (party served requests for admissions while automatic bankruptcy stay was in effect); Burrhus v. M & S Mach. & Supply Co., Inc., 897 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); see also Harrell v. NationsBank of Tex., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellate deadlines are stayed during pendency of automatic stay imposed by insurance code (B) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (C) holding that the plaintiff had standing even though automatic stay had terminated and his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because he also sought actual damages for violation of the automatic stay (D) holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor  counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay (E) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay
Example Output:
(A)