In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
or property on which it is found, is insufficient to support a finding of possession.” Murray v. United States, 403 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir.1969) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, there must be additional proof of knowledge and control to sustain a conviction for possession. Although control of marijuana may be established by evidence that a person smoked marijuana, the smoke in the hotel room does not provide the additional proof necessary to sustain Petitioner’s conviction. As discussed above, the record in this case supports merely an inference that someone smoked marijuana in the room, not that Petitioner, one of five occupants of the room, smoked marijuana. In Garrison, 272 Md. 123, 321 A.2d 767, Judge O’Donnell, writing for t .2d 252, 254 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. State, 9 Md.App. 48, 55, 262 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of presence of marijuana plants on property puckett jointly owned with his wife was not sufficient to create rational inference that puckett was in possession of the marijuana (B) holding that a defendants conviction for two possession of marijuana counts could not be supported by his possession of two marijuana cigarettes dropped from his hand and again for his possession of several packets of marijuana found in a nearby jacket during the same search (C) holding evidence of marijuana plants on premises defendant owned with his wife insufficient where marijuana plants were grown in an uncultivated area and there was a total absence of evidence of the defendants involvement (D) holding that jurys failure to find the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana could not be reconciled with a verdict of guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to purchase (E) holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
recipient venue because their lack of standing here means it is not a district “in which [the case] might have been brought,” according to the requirements of the transfer statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiffs suggest that this court should “sensibly confirm[] that inherent in any discretionary transfer here is the idea that jurisdiction cannot be destroyed.” PI. Resp. 25. The argument is artful but unpersuasive. “There is no valid reason for reading the words ‘where it might have been brought’ to narrow the range of permissible federal forums beyond those permitted by federal venue statutes.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 623, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); see also Carbonara v. Olmos, 1994 WL 61797, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1994) (<HOLDING>). B. Standing of SAF SAF asserts both 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (C) holding that transfer to a district in which circuit law likely precluded standing was proper because the language of  1404a refers only to whether venue is proper and not a plaintiffs capacity to sue (D) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (E) holding that venue is proper in any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
wages. Our Supreme Court has observed that the bond related statutes were enacted for the protection of employees and material suppliers who cannot avail themselves of otherwise available remedies, such as liens. Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, Inc., supra, 239 Conn. 714; Herbert S. Newman & Partners, P.C. v. CFC Construction Ltd. Partnership, 236 Conn. 750, 757, 674 A.2d 1313 (1996); KMK Insulation, Inc. v. A. Prete & Son Construction Co., 49 Conn. App. 522, 527, 715 A.2d 799 (1998). It is undisputed that the subcontractor’s employees themselves would have been entitled to enforce payment on the bond against both the general contractor, as principal, and ICSP, as surety on the bond. See, e.g., American Masons’ Supply Co. v. F.W. Brown Co., supra, 174 Conn. 226-27 (<HOLDING>). The question before us is whether the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that surety was liable to subcontractor on payment bond because payment bond applied to any claimant who among other things supplied materials that were reasonably required for use in the performance of the subcontract  (B) holding that a paywhenpaid clause does not preclude a subcontractors recovery under the miller act payment bond because the federal legislation conditions payment of the subcontractor not on payment by the government to the contractor but rather on the passage of time from completion of the work or provision of materials (C) holding that where contract between contractor and subcontractor allowed subcontractor to recover if contractor recovered contractor was not barred from bringing suit on behalf of subcontractor (D) holding that persons supplying labor or materials to a subcontractor on a public works project may seek reimbursement under a statutory payment bond provided by the general contractor (E) holding that a clause making payment by the owner an express condition precedent to payment by the general contractor to the subcontractor was enforceable

Ex Output:

(D)