In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: 879 (citations omitted). We think there is a reasonable fit here between the State’s purpose of protecting society from persons who have been determined to be likely to reoffend if not placed in a secure facility and their placement in such a facility. Therefore, Garren has failed to show a substantive due process violation. VII. Vagueness. Although Garren states in a division heading in his brief that chapter 229A is vague as applied and on its face, he makes no argument in his brief in support of the contention that the statute is vague as applied to him. We deem this issue waived. See Iowa R.App.P. 14(a)(3) (“Failure in the brief to state, to argue or to cite to authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”); State v. Cooley, 608 N.W.2d 9, 13-14 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Garren is precluded from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief (B) holding issue waived where matter not addressed beyond reference in heading in brief (C) holding that an issue mentioned in a brief but not addressed is waived (D) holding issues argued orally but not addressed in brief were waived (E) holding an issue listed in statement of issues on appeal but not addressed in brief is abandoned

Answer: holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief


Question: Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir.1994))). 17 . See Executone, 26 F.3d at 1320 ("We must sustain an arbitration award even if we disagree with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the underlying contract as long as the arbitrator’s decision 'draws its essence' from the contract.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 18 . See also Parsons & Whittemore, 744 F.2d at 1483-84 (recounting that the arbitration panel awarded postjudgment interest at state statutory rate). 19 . We construe the parties’ intentions "generously” to determine whether they agreed to arbitrate a particular issue. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). 20 . Cf. Newmont, 615 F.3d at 1272, 1276 (<HOLDING>). 21 . Riebesell, 586 F.3d at 794; 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court should consider issues relating to making and performance of agreement to arbitrate (B) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator (C) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate the particular issue any doubt about who should decide the consolidation issue was resolved in favor of the arbitrator (D) holding that companys contention that union repudiated the agreement to arbitrate a particular dispute was a matter for the arbitrator and not the court to decide (E) holding that agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising out of contract authorized arbitrator to decide postjudgment interest issues

Answer: holding that court should consider issues relating to making and performance of agreement to arbitrate


Question: risked losing their last chance to defend themselves. Taking into consideration all of these factors, particularly the split-second nature of the decision, we conclude as a matter of law that Appellants had probable cause to believe that Waterman’s oncoming vehicle posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm at least to Officers Batton and Heisey. While reasonable officers would have recognized the possibility that Waterman intended only to accelerate by them rather than at them, they also — in the instant they had to decide — could have interpreted the acceleration in the face of their show of force as the initiation of a second attempt by Waterman to avoid capture by using his vehicle as a weapon against law enforcement personnel. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (<HOLDING>). Thus, although Appellants could have held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm (B) holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others (C) holding that use of deadly force was justified against a suspect when officer forced to make a splitsecond decision relied on his reasonable belief that another officer had seen a gun in the suspects hands even though the suspects hands were handcuffed in front of him and the defendant officer never saw a weapon (D) holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon (E) recognizing that deadly weapon finding may be made even when weapon used is unknown

Answer:
holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm