In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: appeals from the district court’s order denying his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion for reconsideration challenging the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm. Henderson contends that the district abused its discretion by denying his motion, which we construe as a motion for relief from final judgment based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Straw v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 1167, 1171-72 (9th Cir.1989). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Henderson’s motion because his almost two-year delay before filing the motion was not reasonable. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c) (“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.... ”); In re Hammer, 940 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an over twoyear delay without any excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law (B) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to find an unexcused twoyear delay unreasonable (C) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (D) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony (E) holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: 1 We note that the Supreme Court of Georgia recently vacated portions of the trial court’s injunction order in Barham v. City of Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375 (738 SE2d 52) (2013). 2 Am. Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Mom & Pop Stores, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 1, 7 (3) (497 SE2d 616) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 3 Levine v. Sun Trust Robinson Humphrey, 321 Ga. App. 268, 275 (3) (740 SE2d 672) (2013) (punctuation omitted). 4 Am. Petroleum Prods., 231 G 215 SE2d 294) (1975) (“[When] the complaining party cannot legitimately claim surprise, either because he knew of the existence of the witness or had equal means of knowing, it is not error to fail to invoke the sanctions of postponement, mistrial, barring the witness, etc.”). Cf. Malley Motors, Inc. v. Davis, 183 Ga. App. 599, 600 (1) (359 SE2d 394) (1987) (<HOLDING>). 18 See Hunter v. Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (B) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (C) holding that trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of a witness who was not listed in the pretrial order and no reason was given for the failure to list the witness (D) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (E) holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: F.2d at 890. The more recent case of Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1999), also discusses the requirements of these types of agreements. There, the court stated: “A settled-but-not-paid requirement, finally, also accords with the long-established rule that a contractor need not pay its sub before making a claim on its behalf. See George Leary Constr. Co. v. United States, 63 Ct.Cl. 206, 223, 1927 WL 2960 (1927) (Tt is easy to forecast the financial ruin of a Government contractor if the rule is to be established that he may not receive amounts due from the Government under his contract until he establishes . . . that he has paid his subcontractor all he owes him.’); see also Severin v. United States, 99 Ct.Cl. 435, 443, 1943 WL 4198 (1943) (<HOLDING>).” 175 F.3d at 1250. The Morrison court went on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bankruptcy trustee for contractor could not avoid prepetition payment of funds from contractor to subcontractors (B) holding that where contract between contractor and subcontractor allowed subcontractor to recover if contractor recovered contractor was not barred from bringing suit on behalf of subcontractor (C) holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate (D) holding that if contractor is hable to sub that liability though not yet satisfied by payment might well constitute actual damages to the contractor and sustain their suit under rule that contractor may only sue to recover its own damages (E) holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor
[EX A]:
(D)