instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
9006(b)(3). There is no excusable neglect basis for enlarging the claims bar date included in Rule 3002(c). Accordingly, the excusable neglect standard found in Rule 9006(b)(1) does not authorize extensions of the claims deadline imposed in chapter 13 cases. In re Oscar, 2005 WL 6522763 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Apr. 14, 2005). “[S]ince 1994, the courts have almost uniformly ruled that proofs of claim that are untimely filed in a Chapter 13 case may not be deemed timely filed, and that the claimants thereunder should not take from, or be permitted to recover from, the debtor’s estate under the Chapter 13 plan.” Daniels, 466 B.R. at 217 (listing examples). This Court has consistently held that late claims are not permitted in chapter 13 cases. In re Dumain, 492 B.R. 140, 148 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2013) (<HOLDING>). As such, the Court will not allow Ocwen’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding impairment of secured creditors foreclosure remedy permissible (B) holding that failure to comply with bankruptcy rule 4004 may be waived (C) holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added (D) holding that secured creditors must comply with the bar date imposed by bankruptcy rule 3002c (E) holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor
answer:
holding impairment of secured creditors foreclosure remedy permissible


question:
[u]nder [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(l)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, ... a federal habeas [corpus] court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Applying these standards to the present case, the court’s inquiry must be whether the uit Court of Appeals case for the proposition that the application of a statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does not violate the ex post facto clause because it is a protective measure and does not impose any new or different punishment. See United States v. O’Neal (“O’Neal”), 180 F.3d 115, 124-25 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (criticizing Davis). Additionally, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding north carolina felony firearms act did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was a measured public safety provision and its applicability to previously convicted felons was eminently reasonable (D) holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive (E) holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause
answer:
holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause


question:
attack could establish such a violation. Obviously, if the record in any given case indicated that, irrespective of any statistics, the death sentence was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor incident to that particular trial, there would be a violation of § 53a-46b (b) (1). We conclude only that, subject to the requirement that the defendant make his statistical challenge at trial, § 53a-46b (b) (1) provides an appropriate statutory vehicle for his statistical claim on appeal. 21 We do not decide whether, as a matter of state law, all other criminal defendants may raise the type of claim under consideration here in a habeas corpus petition when the claim was not raised at trial in the first instance. Cf. Summerville v. Warden, supra, 229 Conn. 421-22 (<HOLDING>). We merely decide that this defendant and any 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing exception to cause and prejudice standard governing procedural defaults for claims of factual innocence (B) recognizing the public interest exception (C) recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception (D) recognizing such an exception (E) recognizing exception
answer:

recognizing the public interest exception