In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: diligent effort' requires such pointed measures as an examination of telephone company records, utility company records, and records maintained by the county treasurer, county recorder, or similar ree-ord keepers."). {47 Here, the motion for publication Brown filed in 1978 states that "search has been made of the public records of the County of Weld and County of Morgan, State of Colorado." Such a search, if undertaken with reasonable diligence, should have resulted in the discovery of the 1950 Deeds, as they were readily available matters of public record and part of the relevant chain of title. Each document identified Tulsa, Oklahoma, as the city of the Gadbois' residence. Brown could-and should-have discovered this information. See In re Colon, 563 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>) 4 48 Sunﬂarly, Brown could-and should-have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that implied easement arose because each deed in chain of title referenced community plan (B) holding that a typographical error in a security deed does not necessarily invalidate the legal description when the deed also referred to the propertys physical address (C) holding that trustees have a duty to exercise the same judgment and prudence that a careful owner would exercise in the sale of his own property (D) recognizing that a per son exercising reasonable prudence and diligence in examining propertys chain of title would have located a deed containing a misstatement in its descmptlon of the property (E) recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title

Answer: (D)


Question: customs and practices of the trade could conclude that WQIS’s liability under Coverage C ceased once the Coverage A limit was reached. See Morgan Stanley, 225 F.3d at 275 (describing when a contract provision is ambiguous). First, the phrase “liabilities covered” in the Coverage C insuring provision could reasonably be read to refer only to liabilities that WQIS was required to cover under Coverage A, that is, up to $5 million per vessel. Under this interpretation, any liability above $5 million was not “covered,” and - therefore defense costs incurred with respect to liabilities above $5 million did not arise from “liabilities covered.” See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on other grounds by 85 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable person could conclude that once 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due (B) holding that allied may not be held liable for portion of attorneys fees paid pretender of defense due to policy provision precluding reimbursement for defense costs voluntarily incurred (C) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself (D) holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the  insurance policy (E) holding where an insurance policy indemnifies defense costs paid as a result of occurrences covered that the insurer need only reimburse defense costs for claims that are established to be covered through judgment and settlement and not for claims only potentially falling within the policys coverage

Answer: (E)


Question: by needlessly delaying the trial. He had never requested to substitute counsel previously and had no history of “gaming” the system. The trial judge repeatedly referred to Carlson’s motion as “late,” but considering that the charges against him had been pending such a relatively short time and that he filed his motion to substitute immediately after he retained new counsel, the timing of his motion was certainly understandable. Finally, Carlson was not asking for a long continuance. Notably, we do not know how long Ms. Shellow would have needed to prepare because the trial judge never asked her. Apparently, any delay would have been unacceptable to the trial judge. That sort of rigidity can only be characterized as arbitrary. See, e.g., Linton v. Penny 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The State’s argument that Carlson was not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the length of a continuance was not unreasonable because of defendants part in extending the delay (B) holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant (C) holding that one minute delay between the initial stop of the defendant and the officers question regarding whether the defendant had any illegal substances and his request to search the defendants car was sufficiently contemporaneous with the issuance of the citation such that there was no appreciable delay and certainly no unreasonable delay (D) holding a fivemonth delay in searching a computer did not invalidate the search because there was no showing that the delay caused a lapse in probable cause that it created prejudice to the defendant or that officers acted in bad faith (E) holding that in a case involving serious charges a trial judge acted arbitrarily in denying a continuance where there was no evidence of a scheme to delay the trial no showing of inconvenience to the witnesses opposing counsel or the court and the length of the requested delay was not unreasonable

Answer:
(E)