In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: up to $2,000, which would have set aside, in a literal sense, a discrete “amount . . . necessarily consumed for the support of’ the taxpayer and his or her family. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. at 572. This description, made in reference to an income tax exemption, is not applicable to the question of whether an income tax assessed on gross rather than net income is unfair, unreasonable, or disproportionate. Certainly nothing in that opinion suggested that such an exemption was necessary in order to render that tax constitutional. Where we have found that a tax was unfair, unreasonable, or disproportionate, the constitutional deficiency has been of a much different character than the one the petitioners allege here. See Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462, 470-71 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Opinion of the Justices, 132 N.H. 777, 783-84 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety (B) holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts (C) holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue (D) holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others (E) holding that taxpayers failure to follow state requirement that he report change in federal income tax did not except state tax liability from discharge

Output: holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety


Input: Consider Input: the bankruptcy court’s power to control dissemination of information more broadly. Judge Steven Gerling, for example, observed in In re Bennett, that If the information [sought to be protected] does not represent trade secrets or confidential research, development or commercial information, then whether to permit access to the information is a matter left to the Court’s discretion. It requires the Court to examine the relevant facts and circumstances and then to balance the interests of the party opposing disclosure with that of the public. In re Bennett, 226 B.R. 331, 336 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1998); see also In re Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2nd Cir.1994) (discussing § 107 and use of records for improper purpose); In re Robert Landau Associates, 50 B.R. 670, 675-76 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>); but see In re Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. 675, 679 
 Holding statements: (A) holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter (B) holding that when the trial court signed an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint but refused to enter a final judgment on that order the order refusing to enter judgment was appealable under former ors 190102a (C) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality (D) recognizing inherent authority but vacating order not supported by necessary findings (E) holding that while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judges signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court the city waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the indiana supreme court has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection and more recently this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect

Output: holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter


Input: Consider Input: I would, in sum, wholly affirm the judgment of the district court on the basis of its summary judgment decision, which I commend unreservedly. See Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F.Supp.3d 768 (D.Md.2014). I. A. Let’s be real: The assault weapons banned by Maryland’s FSA are exceptionally lethal weapons of war. In fact, the most popular of the prohibited semiautomatic rifles, the AR-15, functions almost identically to the military’s fully automatic M16. Significantly, the Supreme Court in its seminal Heller decision singled out “M-16 rifles and the like,” i.e., arms “that are most useful in military service,” as being “dangerous and unusual weapons” not even protected by the Second Amendment. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624-25, 627, 128 S.Ct. 2788, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Similar to the district court — and unlike 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment (B) holding that the eleventh amendment protects a state from suit by its own citizens (C) recognizing that the second amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by lawabiding citizens for lawful purposes such as shortbarreled shotguns and machineguns (D) holding first amendment does not protect nonexpressive conduct (E) holding that the first amendment does not protect true threats against the president


Output: holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment