In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B). Thus, it is clear that, under some circumstances, injunctions can constitute claims which are dischargeable in bankruptcy. The court must determine whether this case presents such a circumstance. A number of courts have considered whether an injunction prohibiting future breaches of a noncompete agreement can constitute a claim under Section 101(5)(B), reaching conflicting results based on a variety of reasonings. See e.g., In re Oseen, 133 B.R. 527 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1991) (finding that the injunction did not constitute a claim); In re Udell, 18 F.3d 403 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); In re Ward, 194 B.R. 703 (Bankr.D.Mass.1996) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim (B) holding an appeal of injunction moot where the injunction expired three months before the appellate court heard arguments in the case (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) holding federal injunction countermanding a state court injunction did not violate antiinjunction act (E) holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified

A: (A)
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Q: should be drawn from the defendant's failure to call his accomplices to testify. The prosecutor remarked only that Mitchell had the power to subpoena witnesses, and that the defense could do so "if they thought it would contradict something [the State! presented.” In light of defense counsel’s earlier statements that "clearly you have a situation where a misidentification could take place,” and that the jury should be able to see Corprew, Cochran, and Henderson in the courtroom, the prosecutor's remarks did not relate to the substance of those witnesses’ potential testimonies. Had the prosecutor inferred that Corprew, Cochran, and Henderson would have testified unfavorably to the defense, that inference might well have conflicted with Christensen, 274 Md. at 140-41, 333 A.2d at 49 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we conclude that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court has discretion to permit defendant to call accused witness to stand and permit witness to invoke fifth amendment privilege in front of jury where entire defense was centered on witness commission of crime (B) holding that sixth amendment only requires that witness be brought to court not that he be required to take witness stand after refusing to testify and observing that it is irrelevant whether the witnesss refusal is grounded in a valid fifth amendment privilege an invalid privilege or something else entirely (C) holding that an adverse inference cannot be drawn from a defendants failure to call a witness if the states evidence establishes that the witness is an accomplice who would be entitled to assert a fifth amendment privilege (D) holding that witness was not an accomplice in distributing marijuana to himself (E) holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify

A: (C)
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Q: the tickets were just one component of that entire program. Here, in contrast, the TEA just as clearly does not provide any portion of driver education; it merely licenses driver education schools. Second, in the lottery cases, the lottery commissions contracted with the lottery providers, which were paid commissions for acting as agents for the state. Winborne, 677 S.E.2d at 307; Paxton, 451 S.E.2d at 785. Here, there is no such agency or contractual relationship. These cases are therefore unpersuasive. The only other cases that have held a public entity liable for a private actor’s inaccessibility involved similar situations where the private actors had a contractual or agency relationship with the public entity. See, e.g., Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); Indep. Hous. Servs. of S.F. v. Fillmore Ctr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state could be liable under ada for inaccessibility of company it contracted with to provide state inmates with jobs (B) holding that an employer cannot be held liable under the ada if it had no knowledge of the employees alleged disability (C) recognizing that under california state law only ceremonial marriages can be contracted (D) holding that a physician under contract with north carolina to provide medical services to prison inmates was a state actor for purposes of  1983 (E) holding that the plain text of title ii of the ada unambiguously extends to state prison inmates

A:
(A)
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