In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of death which does not meet these requirements is voidable by the donor (if he recovers) or his personal representative. Hulley v. Chedic, 22 Nev. 127,146, 36 P. 783 (1894). In other words, a gift in contemplation of death'is presumptively voidable by the personal representative of the deceased, and the presumption may be rebutted by the donee with clear and convincing evidence of the six elements listed above. Although Goldsworthy and Hulley are the only Nevada cases ever to have examined the gift causa mortis doctrine, and they have never been overruled, at least one Nevada case has suggested (in a different context) that the burden of proof may not be on the donee. North Arlington Medical Building, Inc. v. Sanchez Construction Company, 86 Nev. 515, 521, 471 P.2d 240, 244 (Nev.1970) (<HOLDING>). North Arlington is not really on point, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable (B) holding that inter vivos gift to minor is presumptively effective under nrs 167040 (C) holding that the purpose of nrs 1760551 is to ensure that all time served is credited towards a defendants ultimate sentence (D) holding that belowguidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable (E) holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: or property on which it is found, is insufficient to support a finding of possession.” Murray v. United States, 403 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir.1969) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, there must be additional proof of knowledge and control to sustain a conviction for possession. Although control of marijuana may be established by evidence that a person smoked marijuana, the smoke in the hotel room does not provide the additional proof necessary to sustain Petitioner’s conviction. As discussed above, the record in this case supports merely an inference that someone smoked marijuana in the room, not that Petitioner, one of five occupants of the room, smoked marijuana. In Garrison, 272 Md. 123, 321 A.2d 767, Judge O’Donnell, writing for t .2d 252, 254 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. State, 9 Md.App. 48, 55, 262 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of presence of marijuana plants on property puckett jointly owned with his wife was not sufficient to create rational inference that puckett was in possession of the marijuana (B) holding that a defendants conviction for two possession of marijuana counts could not be supported by his possession of two marijuana cigarettes dropped from his hand and again for his possession of several packets of marijuana found in a nearby jacket during the same search (C) holding evidence of marijuana plants on premises defendant owned with his wife insufficient where marijuana plants were grown in an uncultivated area and there was a total absence of evidence of the defendants involvement (D) holding that jurys failure to find the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana could not be reconciled with a verdict of guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to purchase (E) holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: of an accused in a second trial when the accused has already been convicted or acquitted of that crime, and it forbids punishing an accused more than once for the same offense in a single prosecution. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 845; Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 369-70 (Tex.Crim.App.2008); see also Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 629. This is a multiple-punishments case. The relevant inquiry in a multiple-punishments double-jeopardy case is always whether the Legislature intended to permit multiple punishments. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368, 103 S.Ct. 673. However, because two subsections of a single statute are at issue in this case, we must first “ascertain whether [the] alleged conduct violates two distinct statutory provisions within one statute.” Vick, 991 S.W.2d at 832 (<HOLDING>); Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 847-48 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unlawful restraint an included offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault so conviction on the former was vacated (B) holding that multiple prosecutions for aggravated sexual assault based on different statutory subsections are permissible because the legislature defined the allowable unit of prosecution as each completed act (C) holding that aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense in prosecution for armed burglary attempted robbery and use of a firearm in the com mission of a felony because the allegation in the information that the accused carried a firearm was insufficient to charge the elements of aggravated assault (D) holding that no apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range (E) holding in a multiplepunishment case that aggravated sexual assault focuses on prohibited conduct


Output: (B)