In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: completed his nine month term of incarceration and was released from custody on Jply 28, 2017. Any challenge to the procedural or substantive reasonableness of his term' of confinement is thus moot. See United States v. Probber, 170 F.3d 345, 347-49 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing as moot an appeal from a judgment revoking supervised release where defendant had already completed his term of confinement). However, because defendant would still be entitled to a reduction of his term of supervised release if the court were to find such a reduction appropriate, we will analyze whether, as defendant claims, the supervised release component of the District Court’s sentence was either procedurally or substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Mazza Alaluf, 621 F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). Defendant contends that the District Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding substantive reasonableness sentencing challenge to be moot when defendant had completed prison sentence but addressing challenge to supervised release conditions (B) holding that where trial court did not inform defendant of supervised release term during plea colloquy but did advise defendant of term in presentence report and at sentencing defendants sentence stands (C) holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e (D) holding that a completed term of confinement did not render a challenge to the reasonableness of a sentence moot where defendant could receive a reduced term of supervised release (E) holding defendant convicted under  841b1a may receive lifetime term of supervised release
[A]: (D)


[Q]: as here, where officers were attempting to handcuff an individual who had been resistant. See Rodriguez v. Farrell, 294 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir.2002) (finding no excessive force, and noting that an officer need not credit an arrestee’s claims of pain, especially when the arrestee is in the process of being handcuffed); Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 650-53 (9th Cir.2001) (finding no excessive force where plaintiff suffered a fractured finger after officer pushed plaintiff to the ground for purpose of handcuffing her despite being told of preexisting back and shoulder injuries, and where plaintiff had earlier posed a threat to officers’ safety and ability to control a crowd); Huang v. Harris County, No. 00-20806, 2001 WL 822534, at *10 (5th Cir. June 22, 2001) (<HOLDING>); Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1288, 1293 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that force was reasonable where officer broke resisting arrestees thumb by twisting her wrist in an effort to prevent her from kicking him  and place her in handcuffs (B) holding that conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive where the female plaintiffs supervisor frequently tried to get plaintiff to date him using many direct as well as indirect propositions for sex including following her into the restroom repeated attempts to touch her breasts place his hands down her pants and pull off her pants and enlisting the assistance of others to hold her while he attempted to grope her (C) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (D) holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim (E) holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment
[A]: (A)


[Q]: its commission.” O’Grady v. Libertyville, 304 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir.2002). The changes in Indiana’s parole procedures did not alter the statutory punishment for the crime (life in prison) or the standards for determining the initial date for parole consideration (after 20 years of serving time) or change the standards for determining a prisoner’s suitability, set out in Ind.Code § 11-13-3-3 and 220 Ind. Admin. Code 1.1-2-3. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 146 L.Ed.2d 236 (2000) (upholding Georgia administrative regulation changing frequency of parole hearings for prisoners serving life sentences from every three years to every eight years against ex post facto challenge); Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we have explicitly held that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant who received a suspended sentence of 157 days in jail was convicted of an offense punishable by more than oneyear of incarceration because california law provided for a sentence of up to three years imprisonment (B) holding that a statute imposing a one dollar court cost for law enforcement on every person convicted of a crime was not a violation of the separation of powers doctrine because it is reasonable that one convicted of a crime should be made to share in the improvement of agencies that society has had to employ in defense against the very acts for which he has been convicted (C) holding that there was no ex post facto violation when california changed frequency of reconsideration for parole from every year to up to every three years for prisoners convicted of more than one homicide (D) holding that the plaintiff could not assert a continuing violation when there was a three year gap in time from one allegation to the next (E) holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim
[A]:
(C)