instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
resource. Power that is not exercised is not management or control even though in a legal sense the resource may belong in part or appertain to that party. While the Government is correct in their argument that there is not a double recovery until the total value of the damaged or injured resource has been recovered, a given trustee cannot recover more than what its stewardship is determined to be. To allow otherwise would create the undesirable situation of a race to the courthouse between co-trustees with the first in time being the first in right. Moreover, once a state, federal or other public trustee recovers such damages, res judicata would prevent a second trustee from recovering the same public losses. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, settlement would be discouraged by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims to the vsf benefits under various theories were barred by the res judicata effect of the state court judgment in castellano iii (B) holding that the plaintiffs earlier claims of infringement by possession and its later claims of infringement by use of its source code arose from the same nucleus of operative facts and therefore the later claims were barred by res judicata (C) holding that a trustees claim was barred by res judicata and stating that the trustee could have asked the bankruptcy court to reserve his fraud claims for later adjudication which would have avoided his claims being barred (D) holding that the plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata when the federal courts judgment was finalized by denial of his petition for certiorari (E) holding that the united states and the state of alaska as public trustees under the cwa and cercla could recover all lost use damages caused by the spill and that private claims for lost recreational use were barred under res judicata
answer:
(E)


question:
February 8, 2011 probation extension order failed to extend his probation period because the October 26, 2005 restitution order was improperly delegated to the probation officer, rather than determined by the circuit court as required by Code § 19.2-305.1(D), thus any subsequent order is invalid. In relevant part, Code § 19.2-305.1(D) states that “[a]t the time of sentencing, the court shall determine the amount to be repaid by the defendant and the terms and conditions thereof.” The amount of restitution to be paid by the defendant is within the sole province of the circuit court to determine and that determination may not be delegated to another department of government. See Code § 19.2-305.2; see also McCullough v. Commonwealth, 38 Va.App. 811, 815, 568 S.E.2d 449, 451 (2002) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the circuit court’s October 26, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing (B) holding part of the sentencing phase of trial the restitution amount is determined following conviction and is a matter resting within the sole province of the sentencing judge (C) holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase (D) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount (E) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses
answer:
(B)


question:
stopped his car and approached his window. We see no evidence that Byrd targeted Pulliam because he fit a particular profile. Instead, Byrd followed Pul-liam because he saw him make an abrupt lane change that could indicate driving under the influence. And once Byrd saw Pulliam violate § 27-51-302, he was entitled to stop his car. III. Pulliam contends that even if the traffic stop was legal, Byrd violated his Fourth Amendment rights by continuing to detain him after he had finished- investigating the traffic violation. Byrd asked for Pulliam’s license and registration, wrote up a traffic ticket, and questioned Pulliam about his trip while Pulliam was in the back of his squad car. Byrd had a right to do all of these things. See United States v. Ramos, 42 F.Sd 1160, 1163 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Byrd next either held on to Pulliam’s license 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers may question motorists about their license registration and travel plans (B) holding that asking a detained motorist whether he would consent to a search of his automobile for contraband even after he had produced a valid drivers license did not necessarily make the traffic stop unreasonable in scope or duration (C) holding that a reasonable investigation of a traffic stop typically includes asking for a license and registration asking the driver to sit in the patrol car and asking about destination and purpose of travel (D) holding that during a routine traffic stop it is reasonable for an officer to search the driver for weapons before placing the driver in a patrol car if placing the driver in the patrol car during the investigation prevents officers or the driver from being subjected to a dangerous condition and placing the driver in the patrol car is the least intrusive means to avoid the dangerous condition (E) holding that request for license destination and purpose of trip within reasonable scope of detention
answer:

(C)