In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: was indeed barred (or limited) under the mandatory Guidelines regime, see Koon, 518 U.S. at 92-95, 116 S.Ct. 2035, the alternative sentencing methodology employed by his sentencing court did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory. Nor did the court exclude or limit its consideration of any category of sentencing factors. To the contrary, the court extended Simpson an open-ended invitation to make mitigating arguments, regardless of whether they would have been available under the Guidelines scheme. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 25-26. And Simpson responded to that invitation by citing a series of factors in support of a sente 440 (D.C.Cir.1995). In later cases, we settled on a plain error standard of review for such claims. See United States v. Draffin, 286 F.3d 606, 609 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); In re Sealed Case, 204 F.3d 1170, 1173 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts denial of a downward departure was an exercise of discretion and therefore not reviewable (B) holding that failure to identify ground of admissibility limited appellate review to plain error (C) holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure (D) holding that the failure to grant a sentencing departure on an unrequested ground is reviewable only for plain error (E) holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: that she disapproved of what she reasonably believed to be unlawful retaliation. B. Form and Context To the extent that Thomas’ conduct was expressive, the message was communicated to her immediate supervisor, Miller, and other court employees. She did not, however, attempt to inform the general public about the allegedly retaliatory practices. That Thomas chose to convey her views privately rather than publicly is not determinative of whether her expression is entitled to protection. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979). Because content is the most important factor, we have concluded that speech about a matter of public concern may be protected even when made in a private context. See, e.g., Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1174 (<HOLDING>); Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 979 (“[T]he public 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected (B) holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged (C) holding that a memorandum given to the employees supervisors was protected speech when the memorandum alleged criminal wrongdo ing (D) holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected (E) holding the separate document rule violated when the alleged judgment was included with the memorandum and order of the court

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: “escape” offense for purposes of sentencing. See Burtlow, 299 N.W.2d at 668 (“Even though the word ‘escape’ does not appear in subsection three, the crime is plainly an escape offense within the meaning of [the consecutive sentence statute].”). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found no basis upon which to distinguish escape and failure-to-appear offenses in the context of a continuing-offense analysis: [A] defendant who fails to appear for sentencing presents a threat to society analogous to that posed by an escaped prisoner. Both are convicted criminals obligated to serve sentences or facing sentencing. In addition, the failure of a defendant to appear for sentencing poses a threat to the integrity and authority of the court. United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930, 110 S.Ct. 2168, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to appear for sentencing is a continuing offense because a convicted criminal has a continuing obligation to face sentencing and presents an ongoing threat to the integrity and authority of the court so long as he has not appeared (B) holding that the defendants oral promise to appear was insufficient to amount to a required appearance within the meaning of the failure to appear statute (C) holding that dismissal for failure to appear at a deposition is on the merits (D) holding that failure to appear when released on bond was a continuing offense (E) holding that failure to appear is also a continuing offense


Output: (E)