TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: that is so related structurally to another substance as to be theoretically derivable from it even when not so obtainable in practice (the methoxy of naphthalene).” Webster’s Int’l 608. Thus, while some of the general purpose dictionaries provide support for Defendant’s suggested definition for derivative, others define the term as proposed by Plaintiffs. Technical dictionaries can also assist claim construction by showing how those skilled in the art define “derivatives.” Moba v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[A]s this court has repeatedly counseled, the best indicator of claim meaning is its usage in context as understood by one of skill in the art at the time of invention.”); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, again, the cited sources provide 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning (B) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (C) holding that the specifications reference to a selector sufficed as one skilled in the art would have understood the term (D) holding a technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention unless it is apparent from the patent and the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a different meaning (E) holding that courts may consult scientific dictionaries and technical treatises to deter mine the ordinary meaning of a technical term to persons skilled in the art

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: See Lorber 675 F.2d at 1067. The court noted that the classification of the surcharge as a non-tax fee was “a close question,” but concluded that because the surcharge was triggered by “voluntary” choice, the surcharge was possessed more of the character of a service fee than that of a tax. See id. The Lorber court also held that extending priority status to the surcharge was contrary to the trend of then-recent amendments to § 64 of the old Bankruptcy Act, which tended toward the erosion of the preferred status of taxes. See id., 675 F.2d at 1067-68. The court explained that, following the grant by Congress of priority status to claims for taxes, the federal government and its state and local counterparts began to increase the types and levels of taxation. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. (<HOLDING>). Even courts in the Ninth Circuit, purporting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber (B) holding that ohios reimbursement claims met the lorber criteria but were not excise taxes because they were not universally applicable to similarly situated entities and in addition disadvantaged private creditors with like claims (C) holding west virginias reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber suburban ii and the chateaugay district court decision (D) holding reimbursement claims were excise taxes under the lorber test without addressing the bankruptcy codes central policy of equal distribution (E) holding that michigan reimbursement claims were excise taxes under both lorber and suburban ii

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: the bankruptcy court construed his Motion as a request under §§ 503(b)(2) and 503(b)(1)(A). On appeal, Jones has not mentioned § 503(b)(4) or argued that the bankruptcy court erroneously construed his Motion, except to state that the bankruptcy court failed to consider his request under § 330(a)(1). Manning highlighted that Jones’s appellate brief “appears to substitute § 503(b)(1)(A) for 503(b)(4),” which Manning attributes to Jones realizing that "§ 503(b)(4) simply is not applicable to the present case.” (Appellee’s Second Br. 7, ECF No. 10). Without expressing any opinion on the soundness of Manning’s statement, the Court does not consider any claim under § 503(b)(4) because Jones has waived this point. LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Vill. of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The Court notes that page 19 of Jones's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief (B) holding that failure to include an issue in statement of issues did not bar the appellant from raising the issue in its opening brief (C) holding that a partys failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waived the issue even though the party raised the issue in his reply brief (D) holding that argument not raised in opening brief is waived (E) holding that appellant waived the issue on appeal by not raising it in its opening brief even though the lower courts decision was based on that point

SOLUTION:
(E)