In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

waived those rights. Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress his statements. Defendant argues that the trial court made numerous errors in its order. Generally, an appellate court’s review of a trial court’s order on a motion'to suppress is limited to a determination of whether its findings are supported by competent evidence and, in turn, whether the findings support the trial court’s ultimate conclusions of law. E.g., State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). However, here, as noted above, the State argues that defendant failed to preserve the issue because he did not object at trial. Defendant coun ters that no objection was necessary, distinguishing our recent opinion in State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 554, 648 S.E.2d 819, 821 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s contention is that the judge who 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a general ruling by the trial court is insufficient to preserve a specific issue for appellate review (B) holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal (C) holding that a party failed to preserve error by not pursuing a ruling at trial where the courts motion in limine ruling invited the party to attempt to admit the evidence during trial (D) holding that general objection did not preserve error on appeal (E) holding that a trial courts evidentiary ruling on a pretrial motion is not sufficient to preserve the issue    for appeal unless a defendant renews the objection during trial
holding a general ruling by the trial court is insufficient to preserve a specific issue for appellate review

partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court’s order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants’ arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment
holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied

award a reasonable sum of future medical expenses. Thus, the trial court’s ruling granting a partial directed verdict on future medical expenses, even if procedurally 1 sor substantively erroneous, is not a valid basis for remanding this matter for a new trial. Jury instruction as to past medical expenses award The third and final legal error the majority cites is the tidal court’s failure to instruct the jury on the law regarding past medical expenses incurred in good faith. The majority, however, fails to cite any authority, nor could I find any, requiring a jury be instructed on the law regarding recovery of past medical expenses incurred in good faith. This law is simply a jurisprudential principle. See Watson v. Hicks, 15-0046-48, p. 26 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/27/15), 172 So.3d 655, 675 (<HOLDING>). Regardless, Plaintiffs did not raise this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under title vii the ultimate issue is the reason for the individual plaintiffs treatment not the relative treatment of different groups within the workplace (B) holding that medical treatment is included in the traditional definition of necessaries (C) holding that a claimant establishes a prima facie case for compensable medical treatment where a qualified physician indicates treatment was necessary for a workrelated condition (D) holding that a tortfeasor is required to pay the expenses of over treatment or unnecessary medical treatment unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith  (E) holding ec is not responsible for medical treatment required independently by the subsequent noncompensable injury when the removal of a hindrance to recovery from the compensable injury is merely an incidental effect of such treatment

holding that under title vii the ultimate issue is the reason for the individual plaintiffs treatment not the relative treatment of different groups within the workplace