In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: next argues that the standstill agreement initially executed on January 24, and repeatedly extended until March 26, tolled the running of the sixty-day cure period provided in the Distribution Agreement, and that because the parties entered into the initial standstill agreement four days before the end of the cure period, Innomed was entitled to four additional days to cure the breach beyond the expiration of the last standstill agreement on March 26, 2001. We agree with the district court, however, that the language of the standstill agreement unambiguously indicates that the parties agreed simply to postpone the date on which the termination would become effective, rather than to toll the running of the cure period. See Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 629 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law (B) holding that where the language of the contract is unambiguous and conveys a definite meaning the court may decide the meaning of the contract as a matter of law (C) holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties (D) holding as a general rule of contract law if no other meaning is reasonable the court shall rule as a matter of law that the meaning is established (E) holding that where each side ascribes a different meaning to what the sides claim is the unambiguous language in a contract the contract is ambiguous and summary judgment is improper

A: holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law
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Q: language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability “from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik’s] attendance” it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik’s attendance at the gym — in essence all of Sydlik’s claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release

A: holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release
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Q: would materialize only if Opus West had sufficient general assets to pay such compensation.” As any payout from the benefit plans would only have occurred if Opus West continued to remain solvent, they assert, that contingency defeats any allegation that plaintiffs suffered a “concrete financial loss.” Examining whether plaintiffs suffered “concrete financial injury” begins with the principle enunciated in Diaz that RICO standing must be based on “a harm to a specific business or property interest.” 420 F.3d at 900. By agreeing to receive deferred compensation through Opus West’s top hat plans, plaintiffs made their right to receive the compensation dependent on the company’s ongoing success. The parties agree that the top hat plans provi osp., Inc., 441 B.R. 120, 130 (9th Cir.BAP2010) (<HOLDING>). As a consequence, courts in other contexts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that funds deposited with ing were property of the bankruptcy estate because the ing account was held in the debtor hospitals name and the plan documents plainly provided that compensation deferred under the plan would remain part of the hospitals unrestricted assets and would not be held in trust the plan was unfunded and the hospitals obligations were purely contractual in nature the participation agreement that the doctor executed similarly acknowledged that any contributions to the ing account remained the sole property of the company based on these undisputed facts the bankruptcy court correctly determined that the doctor held no interest in the ing account funds (B) holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property (C) holding that workers compensation awards remained property of the estate despite confirmation of the debtors plans where the confirmation orders specifically provided that property of the estate did not vest in the debtor until the completion of the plan (D) holding that executives participating in an unfunded top hat plan had no ownership interest in the  funds that could be forfeited the funds remain part of the general assets of the corporation subject to the claims of its general creditors (E) holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan

A:
holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property
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