In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: F.2d 448, 451 (1st Cir.1975). Anderson’s condition at the time of the statement was described as excited, nervous and scared, and he appeared as if “he did not know what to do.” Moreover, his statement directly related to an exciting event, the shooting. Thus, based on the evidence and circumstances known at the time of its ruling, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the exciting event witnessed by Anderson was the shooting itself. Accordingly, to the extent the trial court based its ruling on the fact that Anderson personally perceived the shooting, we find no abuse of discretion. We further note that the startling occurrence that triggers the excited utterance need not necessarily be the crime itself. See Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154-55 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court could have found startling event or condition was declarants sustaining an injury or the pain she later experienced (B) holding that a logical nexus between the injury sued upon and an unre lated prior condition satisfied the rondinelli test requiring only the possibility that the plaintiffs claimed damages in whole or in part resulted from a condition or event unrelated to the defendants negligence (C) holding that a lower court properly admitted a fouryear olds hearsay statement although she made it 1215 hours after the startling event (D) holding that statement must be product of a startling event (E) holding a condition precedent is an act or event that must be performed or occur after the contract has been formed before the contract becomes effective

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: we now reverse the decision of the trial court. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. 1 . We set forth additional facts in the companion case issued today, Dep't. of Revenue v. Adams, 762 N.E.2d 728 (Ind.2002). 2 . The CSET is a tax on the possession of certain narcotics. We discuss the tax and the procedures for collecting it in greater detail infra. 3 . All of the cocaine at issue in this case was discovered prior to the time the police served a valid search warrant. 4 . Ind.Code § 35-48-4-1 (1998). 5 . Id. § 35-48-4-6. 6 . United States Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the revenue officers' entry of Adam's home to collect the CSET assessment was a search. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Thomas v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (B) holding that revenue officers conducted a search when they entered a cottage and seized records when levying on delinquent tax (C) holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business (D) holding search unreasonable when conducted on the highway in broad day light (E) holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: attempt to resolve it). While the record does not reveal the bankruptcy court’s reasons for denying relief from the injunction, the district court’s opinion affords some guidance. In upholding the bankruptcy court’s refusal to relax the injunction, that court cited the substantial delay in the liquidation of BRMC that this litigation already had caused and concluded that, in all events, any proceeding brought by the churches in the probate court likely would be a waste of time. BRMC III, 2004 WL 1778881, at *5-*6 & n. 12. Although the matter is far from clear, we assume, for argument’s sake, that the probate court retains the authority, even at this late date, to modify its decree confirming Ms. Krauss’s estate plan. Cf. O’Brien v. Dwight, 363 Mass. 256, 294 N.E.2d 363, 380-81 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Even so, the mere fact that relief which is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probate courts have the continuing power to revoke or modify their decrees but suggesting that such action would only be appropriate in limited circumstances (B) holding that the power to terminate a contract atwill subsumes the power to modify its terms (C) recognizing district courts power to admit evidence for a limited purpose (D) holding that the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized but rather includes the power to take actions without which the power of recognition might be thwarted (E) holding that consent decrees and orders should be construed as contracts


Output: (A)