In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: facts underlying the charges for which the defendant had been acquitted were an “integral and natural part of an account of the [defendant’s] crimef.]” The same cannot be said for the facts at issue here, which relate to a seizure that occurred on an entirely different occasion. For that reason, we do not find either Agee or Solomon directly relevant to the present controversy. As a result, we will first examine the challenged evidence in light of the principles traditionally employed in evaluating challenges to evidence admitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b), which focus on the similarity between the prior incident and the incident that underlies the current charges against the defendant. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708, 717 (1990) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the events of 10 February 2005 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case (B) holding that the estoppel doctrine did not apply because unlike the situation in ashe v swenson the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (C) holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because    the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (D) holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct (E) holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal
[EX A]: holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case

[EX Q]: While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation — 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. § 1103) — which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (“An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal.”). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant’s release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc  1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest
[EX A]: holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute

[EX Q]: defendant’s conversion by wrongful act inconsistent with the property rights of the plaintiff; and (3) damages.” In re Emery, 317 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Burlesci v. Petersen, 68 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1065, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 704 (1998)). One partner can be liable to another for conversion of partnership property. Oakdale Vill. Grp. v. Fong, 43 Cal.App.4th 539, 546, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 810 (1996), as modified on denial of reh’g, (Apr. 10, 1996). Further, intangible property such as corporate shares and bonds may be the proper subject of a conversion claim. See Am. Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1411 (9th Cir.1996) (collecting California cases); see also Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 125, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 621 (2007) (<HOLDING>). However, more abstract intangible property, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding (B) holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss (C) holding that it is not (D) holding insufficiently definite bonus agreement that did not establish amount or method for determining amount of payment (E) holding that a businesss net operating loss is the proper subject of conversion because it is a definite recordable amount
[EX A]:
holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding