In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

District Attorney’s Office to discriminate in the jury selection process. On April 26, 2007, the PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant relief and the instant appeal followed. Appellant raises the following claim: The lower court erred by limiting Appellant’s hearing solely to proof of a policy or culture of discrimination by the Philadelphia District Attorney and further erred by denying Appellant the opportunity to develop and prove discrimination in his case. Before we proceed with a review of the merits of this issue, we must ascertain whether the PCRA court was correct in its conclusion that Appellant timely filed his fifth PCRA petition for, if he did not, we are without jurisdiction to address his claim. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 941 A.2d 1263 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), any PCRA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed (B) holding that the time requirements of the statute are as much a part of the jurisdictional threshold as the mandate to file for a rehearing and that the time limits must be strictly construed and may not be waived by ferc or evaded by the courts (C) holding pcra time limits are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed (D) holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign (E) holding  2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed
holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed

trial, arguing the court improperly excluded its sole expert witness, Bolt, from testifying at trial. The court denied the motion, stating that it did not completely exclude Bolt from testifying at trial, “but rather determ limine serve as the basis for the rule that “error claimed in a court’s ruling on a motion in limine is waived unless a timely objection is made when the evidence is offered at trial.” State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2006) (quoting State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Iowa 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Simkins v. City of Davenport, 232 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Iowa 1975). This is because the error only occurs, if at all, when the evidence is offered at trial and is either admitted or refused. State v. Langley, 265 N.W.2d 718, 720 (Iowa 1978) (<HOLDING>). There is, however, an exception to this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a sentence is imposed it is a valid final judgment until it is reversed or vacated (B) holding that it is not (C) holding that a bankruptcy order is not final unless it 1 (D) recognizing further normally the ruling is not a final one it is a red flag to counsel that the evidence is not to be brought before the jury unless and until it is separately taken up with the court  at trial (E) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence
holding that once a sentence is imposed it is a valid final judgment until it is reversed or vacated

sexual assault victims.” Id. at 1026. Conversely, in People v. Spicola, the New York Court of Appeals recently held “the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he allowed the expert to testify about CSAAS [Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome] to rehabilitate the boy’s credibility.” 16 N.Y.3d 441, 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d 620, 635 (2011). Significantly, here, the State offered the challenged expert testimony in its case in chief against Dudley, not in rebuttal. Spi-cola is therefore distinguishable. But, the observation of the Spicola dissent (concluding that allowing an expert to connect general characteristics to a specific complainant is equivalent to bolstering the victim’s credibility and is therefore inadmissible); State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116, 1130 (La.1993) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. La-Caprucia, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse (B) holding that an expert testifying to child sexual abuse symptoms must limit the testimony to general characteristics that cannot directly concern the particular victims (C) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse (D) holding that the testimony of an expert witness is admissible when the witness outlines the general characteristics of sexually abused children and then states that the victims symptoms are consistent with those characteristics (E) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case

holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse