In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of serious physical harm,” Gamer, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. at 1701, to Ponseti, or to others if the suspects were allowed to flee. Because Pon-seti could have reasonably believed that the suspects posed an imminent, deadly threat, we conclude that he was justified in using deadly force. Conclusion We therefore conclude that the magistrate judge erred in denying Ponseti’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment below is REVERSED. 1 . The woman was struck once in the right side of her abdomen. 2 . Under the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, the terms "directed verdict” and "judgment notwithstanding the verdict” have been replaced by the single term “judgment as a matter of law.” 3 . But see Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Smith also observes: “Furthermore, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law (B) holding that a violation of the wellestablished rule of brignoniponce constituted an egregious violation of the fourth amendment (C) holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts (D) holding that the notice requirement found in rule 41d is not required by the fourth amendment (E) holding that the significant injury requirement of johnson v morel 876 f2d 477 5th cir1989 a case involving a fourth amendment violation is no longer valid in the wake of hudson v mcmillianus 112 sct 995 117 led2d 156 1992 in which the supreme court held that a showing of a significant injury was not required to prove an eighth amendment violation

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: that he was on S.L.’s property, and he admitted that he took cigarettes and a lighter from the patio table. According to the recorded statement that Andrus gave to Detective Le-wállen, after' entering S.L.’s garage, An-drus changed his mind about being on S.L.’s property and decided to leave. The evidence at trial shows that Andrus did not have permission to be on the property or in S.L.’s garage or breezeway. Given the circumstances proven by the evidence admitted during Andrus’s trial, the jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that Andrus, when entering the garage or breezeway, intended to commit theft under a standard of beyond reasonable doubt even if he later changed his mind - about committing a crime. See Mauldin v. State, 628 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Solis v. State, 589 S.W.2d 444, 446 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendants plea to indictment alleging 8000 theft was not an admission to the theft amount (B) holding that against her will in the rape statute means without her consent and that the fact that the victim was under the age of consent was sufficient to establish that element (C) holding that the defendants entry into the building having been made in the nighttime without the consent of the owner is sufficient to show an intent to commit theft (D) holding that the plaintiff must show felonious intent to commit theft in order to establish a violation of section 8120141 (E) holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: proceeding, see DelMonico, 116 So.3d at 1213-14, 1217-20, we decline to reach the qualified immunity issue because it was not raised below. See AGM Invs., LLC, 219 So.3d at 927 n.5. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on count one and remand for further proceedings. In all other respects, we affirm. AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED. ORFINGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur. 1 . See Perl v. Omni Int'l of Miami, Ltd., 439 So.2d 316, 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (concluding that fraud count in complaint based on earlier unemployment compensation case was barred by litigation privilege (citing Robertson v. Indus. Ins. Co., 75 So.2d 198, 199 (Fla. 1954))). 2 . See LatAm Invs., LLC v. Holland & Knight, LLP, 88 So.3d 240, 242-43 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). Although count three is actually a claim for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack (B) holding that an escrow agent and title insurer may have voluntarily assumed a duty to advise the buyers on their potential legal liability for  subcontractors liens on the property in addition to the defendants ordinary contractual and professional duties as an escrow agent and title insurer (C) holding litigation privilege applied to action for abuse of process citing am natl title  escrow of fla v guar title  tr co 748 so2d 1054 1055 fla 4th dca 2000 (D) recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim (E) holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title


Output: (C)