TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: the Bond offering because they underwrote the transaction and sold the Bonds to investors, either directly or through their brokers. Indeed, given the role of underwriters generally, Baird, Jones, and Stern “had a duty to make an to speak, they knew investors might rely on the statements made. The law firms’ duty, however, must also be considered in light of the services they were retained to perform. Because Kutak and Stinson were not hired to opine on the feasibility of the Event Center, they cannot have been held to a duty to investigate or determine whether the financial projections were realistic unless these firms otherwise became involved in the making, preparing, or drafting of those projections. See N.Y. City Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Berry, 616 F.Supp.2d 987, 994 (N.D.Cal.2009) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, to the extent the law firms 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors (B) holding that substantial participation requires particular facts relating to each djefendants specific role in the preparation of each of the allegedly misleading statements (C) recognizing that questions of changed conditions and the amount of child support must be resolved on the particular facts of each case (D) holding that district court must conduct individualized assessment based on particular facts of each case (E) holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case

SOLUTION: holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors

PROBLEM: inquiry — • whether New Provo Canyon’s treatment of one individual constituted state action — differs substantially from that in Milonas, irrespective of whether, for purposes of a class action suit, Old Provo Canyon’s treatment of its patients generally constituted state action. Thus, the question here does not present the necessary “like facts” to trigger the stare decisis doctrine. D. Collateral Estoppel For the very same reason, Taylor’s collateral estoppel argument fails. Collateral esto Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553; Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Logistics Control Group, 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.1985) (discussed below). 13 . Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553-54; Lib. Mut. Ins., 969 F.2d at 1388-89; Holloway, 813 F.2d at 878-79; see also Nipper v. Snipes, 1 F.3d 415, 415-417 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Id. at 1553; see also Lib. Mut. Ins., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (B) holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body (C) holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial (D) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (E) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact

SOLUTION: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint

PROBLEM: until a final decision were issued in this case on PNM’s Emergency Fuel Clause.... We supported giving PNM an interim fuel clause solely as a way to give PNM some interim relief until we and the rest of the [PRC] had the opportunity to determine, based on the record in this case, whether a more permanent fuel clause or some other relief should be given to PNM. {42} It is well established that adverse rulings do not constitute a valid basis for disqualification based on personal bias or prejudgment of a disputed factual issue. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 541, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or partiality recusal motion.”); State v. Hernandez, 115 N.M. 6, 20, 846 P.2d 312, 326 (1993) (<HOLDING>); United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 96 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that personal bias cannot be inferred from an adverse ruling (B) holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an officials single decision or act (C) holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence (D) holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence (E) holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances

SOLUTION:
holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an officials single decision or act