TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: June 1993 was being denied. Katz asserts that he never received the letter and, therefore, until March 27, 1995, when he received the notice of the denial of coverage, Colonial had led him to believe that his policy covered registered nursing care provided at a general hospital. As the dispute as to whether Katz actually received the letter cannot be resolved at this juncture, I now consider whether, if he did not receive the letter, Colonial should be estopped from denying coverage for the October/November private nursing care. In order to prevail under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Katz must show (1) a material representation, (2) reasonable reliance upon that representation, and (3) damage resulting from that representation. Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1009 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Katz asserts that Colonial’s failure to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing difference between tolling and equitable estoppel (B) recognizing cause of action (C) holding that ejven if there were no express preemption under erisa  514a of the cause of action in that case it would be preempted because it conflicted directly with an erisa cause of action (D) recognizing the cause of action (E) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: carrying it during and in relation to such a crime, with additional penalties attaching if the firearm was brandished or discharged. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Whether the defendant was accountable for one firearm or ten, however, is completely irrelevant to the commission of the § 924(c) offense. Thus, because § 924(c) pertains to particular unlawful uses of a firearm while § 2K2.1(b)(l) pertains to the number of firearms involved, these two enhancements punish different types of conduct. We therefore conclude that enhancing a defendant’s offense level based on the number of weapons involved in the offense underlying his § 924(c) conviction does not constitute impermissible double counting under the Guidelines. Accord United States v. Terrell, 608 F.3d 679, 683-84 (10th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trading drugs for a gun violates the in furtherance of prong of  924c (B) holding that evidence is sufficient for  924c conviction where it shows weapons proximity to drugs and its accessibility (C) holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a  924c sentence for the same firearm (D) holding that because the number of weapons involved in the underlying offense to a  924c conviction is a separate type of offense conduct than that punished by  924c itself the district court did not engage in doublecounting  when it applied an  increase under  2k21bla in conjunction with the sentence for violating  924c (E) holding without discussion that the district court erred by applying the numberofweapons enhancement to an offense underlying the defendants  924c conviction

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: peculiar positions as state actors, leaving a discrete plaintiff vulnerable to foreseeable injury.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). We, as well as other appellate courts, have held that the state-created danger theory is a viable mechanism for establishing a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208; see also Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir.1993); Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir.1993); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir.1990). We are aware of no court of appeals which has recognized the constitutional validity of the state-created danger theory in the context of an immigration case. But see Builes v. Nye, 239 F.Supp.2d 518 (M.D.Pa.2003) (<HOLDING>). We decline to do so here, and hold that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it improper to deny cat relief based on adverse credibility finding where objective documentary evidence establishes likelihood of torture (B) holding that despite petitioners inability to establish habeas relief under cat because evidence did not support finding that colombian government would acquiesce to torture by drug cartel  petitioner was entitled to relief under statecreated danger exception (C) holding that errors in state law cannot support federal habeas relief (D) holding that a negative credibility finding for the purposes of an asylum claim does not preclude relief under cat where documented country conditions corroborate a claim of torture (E) holding petitioner not entitled to habeas relief on claim state court improperly used petitioners prior federal offense to enhance punishment

SOLUTION:
(B)