TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: Cordova’s final policymaking authority concerning the termination or transfer of employees. For the aforesaid reasons, I conclude summary judgment should enter against Singer on the § 1981 and § 1983 claims against the School District. B. Liability of Cordova under § 1981. I have concluded the School District is not liable to Singer under § 1981. I consider Defendants’ additional argument concerning the § 1981 claim since it remains of relevance to Singer’s § 1981 claim against Cor-dova. Defendants argue § 1981 does not apply to religious discrimination and the claim should be dismissed insofar as it is based on such discrimination. See Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 n. 3 (10th Cir.1993); Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Singer cites the holding in Shaare Tefila 
 Holding statements: (A) holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination (B) holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex (C) holding that a violation of  1981 requires purposeful race discrimination (D) holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort (E) holding  1981 is directed to racial discrimination although not necessarily limited to the technical or restrictive meaning of race but does not apply to sex or religious discrimination

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: interest of safety and security at the institution. Accordingly, the order of the district court denying Hyde’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Chief Judge LANSING and Judge PERRY concur. 1 . Roles was addressed in the context of FERPA. However, as we discuss below, there is no distinction between FERPA’s compelling govern mental interest standard and that embodied in RLUIPA. 2 .Some states along with the Federal Bureau of Prisons allow sweat lodges and other Native American religious practices at maximum security prisons. See Pounders v. Kempker, 79 Fed. Appx. 941, 943 n. 2 (8th Cir.2003) (noting that Missouri eventually built a sweat lodge at its maximum security Potosi Correctional Center); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Morrison v. Cook, 1999 WL 717218, *4 (D.Or. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that removal from house arrest and return to general prison population was a matter of inmate classification (B) holding that africanamerican plaintiffs claims that defendants should have known that placing him in a jail with a large population of white inmates put him at risk of being attacked were without merit because the plaintiff had not alleged any specific facts which would show that he was in danger of being assaulted by the other inmates (C) holding that prison conditions are those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population (D) recognizing general rule (E) recognizing that general population inmates at oregon maximum security prison were allowed to participate in weekly sweat lodge ceremonies

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: eligibility for coverage; and 4. Determine whether proof of your loss is satisfactory for receipt of benefit payments according to the terms and conditions of the Plan. (See id. at P0433-034.) Defendants argue that because the above-quoted language is contained in the same document as the STD Plan Summary, the Court should interpret it to apply to the STD Plan as well. The above-quoted language, however, appears in a section generally headed “LTD Plan Summary.” (See id. at P0414, P0427.) Because the document is, at best, ambiguous as to whether the quoted language applies to both plans, the Court cannot say that it unambiguously grants Kemper discretion to determine eligibility for benefits under the STD Plan or to interpret the terms of the STD Plan. See Kearney, 175 F.3d at 1089-90 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator (B) holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion (C) holding plan language requiring satisfactory written proof that you have become disabled did not unambiguously confer discretion in the plan administrator (D) holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion (E) holding that even though the summary plan description did not include discretionary language the grant of discretionary authority in the plan controlled

SOLUTION:
(D)