instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
involvement with five or more kilograms of cocaine, arguing that he had withdrawn before El Don organized the delivery of the intercepted 7.2 kilograms of cocaine on March 25, 2011. Ortega argues that the sole evidence of a conspiracy existing at the time of the seizure of 7.2 kilograms of cocaine on March 25, 2011 was the April 17, 2011 phone calls between Ortega and El Don. In that call Ortega had arranged for El Don to buy five kilograms of cocaine. Ortega’s argument is unavailing. A conspiracy between Ortega and El Don having been established by the government, the burden rested with Ortega to prove that he affirmatively withdrew from it, not with the government to prove the nonexistence of withdrawal. See Smith v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 714, 720, 184 L.Ed.2d 570 (2013) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Ortega has not met his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in passing 21 usc  846 congress left the common law burden of proving the affirmative defense of withdrawal on the defendant rather than requiring the government to prove nonexistence of withdrawal (B) holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea (C) holding that the defendant has the burden of proving a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea (D) holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea (E) holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence
answer:
(A)


question:
fees for tax years 1995 through 1999, the parties stipulated that judgment was sought against Connie Ogg in rem only. 3 . Although it has been amended several times since its enactment in 1985, section 33.011 has always provided a process for a taxpayer to request a waiver of penalties and interest if the act or omission of an officer, employee, or agent of the appraisal district or taxing unit caused or resulted in the taxpayer’s failure to pay the tax before delinquency. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 33.011 (Vernon 2001). Here, the trial court stated in a finding of fact that the Oggs did not request a waiver of penalties or interest pursuant to section 33.011. The parties do not challenge that particular finding of fact. See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex.1986) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Act of May 24, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unchallenged findings of fact are binding unless contrary is established as matter of law or there is no evidence to support finding (B) holding that unless an affirmative defense is established as matter of law defendant bears burden of obtaining jury findings necessary to support defense (C) holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings (D) holding that judgment on the pleadings will not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes that there are no material issues of fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (E) holding that motion to dismiss should not  be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law
answer:
(A)


question:
conducting a review for harm — even if the error is not preserved. See Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.1984). Second, we apply fundamental-error review when an important public interest or public policy is at stake. See, e.g., Ramsey, 205 S.W.2d at 983. “Pub . 1350, 25 L.Ed.2d 594, on remand, 457 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.1970). Substantively, public-interest-based fundamental error is rare, implicated only when our most significant state public interests are at stake. The meaning of the “public interest” that is adversely affected must be extremely circumscribed, or the exception would swallow the rule. Thus, it cannot be enough to allege that an error violates a party’s constitutional rights. See Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex.2001) (<HOLDING>) (citing Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that by fading to timely raise the issue before the trial court the defendant had waived the right to raise the issue on appeal that the trial court failed to consider less severe sanctions (B) holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue (C) holding that because appellant had waived review of constitutional challenge to sentencing statute by failing to raise it at the first opportunity the trial court correctly proceeded to examine whether the appellants trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise constitutional challenges to the sentencing statutes (D) holding that constitutional claim that paternity suit should not be barred by statute of limitations is waived by failing to raise the issue before the trial court (E) holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief
answer:

(D)