In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: variance criteria rendering its decision arbitrary and capricious; and, 5) erred in “taking” appellants’ property without just compensation. The County supports appellants’ contentions except for the last one, with which it disagrees. The County also contends the Board erred in applying the wrong law. The individual appellees, who opposed the variance applications, support the Board’s decision. Discussion 1. Applicable Law A. State Law Before we address the merits of appellants’ contentions, we shall address the County’s contention that the Board applied inapplicable law. The County asserts that the Board incorrectly applied a presumption that the requested use did not conform to the purpose and intent of the Critical Area Program because, while that presumption was added 677 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In 2002, the General Assembly amended the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that the board did not have to consider whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the entire lot but rather whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the buffer (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that the question of whether it might have been error for the court to have denied leave to amend is not before us because plaintiffs never requested it (E) recognizing that a district attorney must have reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury and that the trial judge must have reasonable discretion in deciding whether the bounds of propriety have been exceeded
[A]: (B)


[Q]: fact that the oil traversed part of Transocean’s vessel before entering the Gulf of Mexico. We recognize that the aforementioned incidents involved blameless third parties, whereas here the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon might have contributed to the discharge. By all accounts, if the vessel’s blowout preventer had functioned properly, the oil would not have entered navigable waters in violation of the Clean Water Act. The defendants therefore reason that liability is properly imposed upon the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon. Yet it is well estab lished that this section of the Clean Water Act leaves no room for civil-penalty defendants to shift liability via allegations of third-party fault. See United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1314 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Early in the implementation of the Act’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys (B) holding exculpatory statements by a third party should have been admitted in the punishment phase notwithstanding the hearsay rule (C) holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding defendant liable for penalty notwithstanding fault of a third party
[A]: (E)


[Q]: and should reject the prior circuit opinion as having been effectively overruled.” 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). We adopt the Third Circuit’s Smith test, which retains Reves’ operation or management test in its definition of the underlying substantive § 1962(c) violation, but removes any requirement that the defendant have actually conspired to operate or manage the enterprise herself. Under this test, a defendant is guilty of conspiracy to violate § 1962(c) if the evidence showed that she “knowingly agreefd] to facilitate a scheme which includes the operation or management of a RICO enterprise.” Smith, 247 F.3d at 538. Schoenberg’s role in the activities of the Erne enterprise is enough to justify her § 1962(d) conspiracy conviction. See Howard, 208 F.3d at 751 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341, 1346 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges (B) holding that the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction requires that the outofstate coconspirator was or should have been aware of the acts performed in the forum state in furtherance of the conspiracy (C) holding that in addition to the general conspiracy principles mentioned in salinas a defendant must also have been aware of the essential nature and scope of the enterprise and intended to participate in it  (D) holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication (E) holding that a conspiracy claim must contain supportive factual allegations describing the general composition of the conspiracy some or all of its broad objectives and the defendants general role in the conspiracy
[A]:
(C)