In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
the direction that McDowell testified the assailant fled. Other evidence also confirmed that Hayward’s blood was found in the victim’s pockets and on the car. The discrepancies in McDowell’s testimony did not prove that he failed to observe or could not recall the most important points about which he testified. Hayward is correct that the trial court relied on McDowell’s testimony that Des-tefano said “I don’t have no more” in finding that the murder occurred during a robbery for pecuniary gain. However, that aspect of McDowell’s testimony never wavered. Although McDowell was older, in poor health, and possibly confused about some aspects of the event he witnessed, that does not provide a basis to disqualify him. See, e.g., Belcher v. Johnson, 834 So.2d 422, 422-23 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). Even insanity of a witness has been found to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an elderly woman with dementia is not disqualified as a witness simply for those reasons (B) holding that an order was final for these identical reasons (C) holding that a forensic accountant is an expert witness not a lay witness (D) holding that juror was not automatically disqualified under beckett because of the jurors friendship with a law enforcement officer who was a key witness for the stale (E) holding outofcourt statements relating to reasons for investigation are not admissible where the reasons for the investigation are not at issue

Ex Output:
holding that an order was final for these identical reasons


Ex Input:
where he admitted that other Dunkin’ Donuts shops do sell soft drinks such as milk, juice or soda. See Trpko Taseski Depo., attached as Exh. 3B to plaintiffs motion, p. 61. Defendants’ only response to plaintiffs argument regarding the inapplicability of the rider are these two brief sentences: “Plaintiffs cases are inappositive. The controlling principle of law is that money paid under a mistake of fact can be recouped in an action assumpsit.” However, defendants’ claim of a “mistake of fact” is unsupported by the record. To the contrary, the facts presented confirm that no mistake was made because defendants’ were correct in voluntarily paying fees on the sales of such products. There is therefore no ground for an actio ranchise Guide (CCH) ¶ 11,290 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 30, 1997) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue that the Michigan Franchise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under michigan franchise investment law franchisees failure to comply with lawful provisions in franchise agreements by failing to pay royalties and advertising fees and failing to file monthly sales reports constituted good cause for franchisors termination of agreements where franchisor gave notice of termination in writing and franchisees made no effort to cure (B) holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable (C) holding that franchisees tax evasion scheme provided cause for termination (D) holding that franchisees illegal sale of cigarettes to minors provided cause for termination (E) holding that traditional commercial contract provided for termination at will under arkansas law

Ex Output:
holding that under michigan franchise investment law franchisees failure to comply with lawful provisions in franchise agreements by failing to pay royalties and advertising fees and failing to file monthly sales reports constituted good cause for franchisors termination of agreements where franchisor gave notice of termination in writing and franchisees made no effort to cure


Ex Input:
contains the right of passage and access to the premises. Thus, the fact that TIA had such a right does not distinguish the present case from Gibbs, in which the defendant also had a license to use the premises but was not found to have maintained or controlled the premises. The plaintiffs’ argument in this case is further weakened by the fact that, under the contract between NYCCOC and TIA, just as was the case in Gibbs, NYCCOC, the “licensor,” explicitly retained the duty of maintenance and repair. (Varvaro Deck Ex. I, Feb. 10, 2006 Revised Agreement ¶ 22.) Hence, the plaintiffs have failed to present evidence showing that TIA owned, maintained, or controlled the space to justify imposing on TIA the nondelegable duty of the owner of premises. See Lyons, 2007 WL 2265577, at *5 (<HOLDING>). Because the plaintiffs have not proffered any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decoration contractor freeman was not subject to premises liability because it did not occupy own control or make special use of the premises at the javits center (B) holding that defendant properly established that it did not owe premises liability duty because it did not own occupy or control premises where injury occurred but that defendant was not entitled to traditional summary judgment because it failed to address duty arising out of alleged creation of dangerous condition (C) holding that while a lawfully issued warrant to search premises authorizes the officers executing it to search in a reasonable manner whatever spots within the described premises their professional experience indicates may be used as a cache for the items named in the warranty such a warrant does not by its own force permit a search of the persons residents or visitorswho chance to be at the premises at the time the warrant is executed or belongings of a nonresident visitor present on the premises (D) holding that the policy insured property but failure to occupy premises negated coverage (E) holding that a contractor had no duty of care to a third party under a premises liability theory because the contractor was not a landowner or occupier but expressing no opinion as to whether the contractor owed a duty to the third party under general negligence principles because the third partys legal theory was restricted to premises liability

Ex Output:

holding that defendant properly established that it did not owe premises liability duty because it did not own occupy or control premises where injury occurred but that defendant was not entitled to traditional summary judgment because it failed to address duty arising out of alleged creation of dangerous condition