In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: customs and practices of the trade could conclude that WQIS’s liability under Coverage C ceased once the Coverage A limit was reached. See Morgan Stanley, 225 F.3d at 275 (describing when a contract provision is ambiguous). First, the phrase “liabilities covered” in the Coverage C insuring provision could reasonably be read to refer only to liabilities that WQIS was required to cover under Coverage A, that is, up to $5 million per vessel. Under this interpretation, any liability above $5 million was not “covered,” and - therefore defense costs incurred with respect to liabilities above $5 million did not arise from “liabilities covered.” See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on other grounds by 85 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable person could conclude that once 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due (B) holding that allied may not be held liable for portion of attorneys fees paid pretender of defense due to policy provision precluding reimbursement for defense costs voluntarily incurred (C) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself (D) holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the  insurance policy (E) holding where an insurance policy indemnifies defense costs paid as a result of occurrences covered that the insurer need only reimburse defense costs for claims that are established to be covered through judgment and settlement and not for claims only potentially falling within the policys coverage
[A]: (E)


[Q]: automobiles are likewise per se reasonable given probable cause, then by the same logic any search or seizure could be carried out without a warrant, and we would simply have read the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution”). The Court cannot allow law enforcement to emasculate well settled constitutional protections in order to cure their own mistake. 9 . The Court notes that the Supreme Court has implied that exigent circumstances are never necessary to justify a warrantless search, but has never expressly stated such a conclusion without first noting that the vehicle in question was somehow readily mobile. See Search And Seizure, supra at 477-81, 91 S.Ct. 2022. As a result, lower courts have split when interpreting its meaning. See United States v. Reed, 26 F.3d 523 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Reis, 906 F.2d 284 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that among the circumstances accepted as providing exigent circumstances for a warrantless search are those where a true emergency exists (B) holding that officers cannot base a warrantless search on an exigent circumstance of their own creation (C) holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest (D) holding that camey notwithstanding the fact that a car is moveable alone is not sufficiently exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search (E) holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee
[A]: (D)


[Q]: cocaine and that she would “hook them up” with Hunter. Ebert also indicated that she had seen Hunter in possession of a small gun on several occasions, and her descriptions of that gun matched the gun found in her apartment. Additionally, Hunter’s instant offense occurred about three years after he was arrested and convicted in Texas for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, an offense involving Hydrocodone, MDMA, powder and crack cocaine, and a handgun. A defendant’s active involvement in drug distribution reasonably supports the inference that his possession of a loaded firearm was for protection of even a small amount of drugs. United States v. Condren, 18 F.3d 1190, 1198 — 1200 (5th Cir. 1994); cf. United States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 693 — 94 (5th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>)- The district court’s finding that Hunter’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding harmless any error in district courts drug quantity determination where undisputed quantity of drugs was enough to place defendant at the base offense level calculated by the district court (B) holding that apprendi is not implicated where the defendant has stipulated to the amount of drugs for which he was held responsible and the district court did not rely on any fact outside of the plea agreement to determine drug quantity at sentencing (C) holding that simultaneous possession of a small quantity of drugs and a gun standing alone was insufficient to apply the enhancement where there was a lack of any evidence of current or recent drug distribution or sales of any kind by the defendant (D) holding the large quantity of drugs sufficient evidence of intent to distribute (E) holding that where the indictment charged drug quantity but drug quantity was not submitted to the jury the district court erred in using drug quantity to increase the penalty beyond the twentyyear maximum of  841b1c
[A]:
(C)