TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: 39:4-88(b), the mandate to drive within a single lane to the extent practicable applies, whether or not a deviation from that lane imposes a risk to another driver. The statute’s second clause addresses a related, but discrete, mandate of the Code. It requires a driver to ascertain the safety of switching lanes before conducting a lane change. N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b). Unlike the violation described in the first clause of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b), the violation described in the second clause is avoided if a driver, in a roadway with multiple lanes traveling in the same direction, first determines that departure from a lane may be conducted safely. The Appellate Division’s limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b) to the violation identified in the statute’s second clause would render t .App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the courts of our sister states, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness (B) holding that tex transp code ann  545060a describes one offense (C) holding that no offense alleged where affidavit described offense as felony (D) holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense (E) holding that the statute describes but one offense which can be committed by either or both of two methods

SOLUTION: holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness

PROBLEM: subpoena does not fit within the statutory language. The question surrounding the subpoena’s validity in no way relates to any information that Star Bank would be required to disclose under FCRA, even assuming that FCRA’s requirements apply to Star Bank. {See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) for the definition of a “consumer reporting agency.”) The Hahns’ claimed reliance on whatever Bonynge said regarding the subpoena therefore provides them with no basis to toll the two year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Hahns have failed to demonstrate that the wilful misrepresentation tolling exception applies to their case. We therefore hold that all of their claims raised under FCRA are barred by the statute of limitations. See Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We find no inequity in reaching this result. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim (B) holding that equitable tolling is available to avoid time limitations in the statutory provisions governing veterans benefits (C) holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims (D) holding that an ohio tolling statute violated the commerce clause because it gave nonresident corporations the choice between being subject to general jurisdiction in the state by appointing an instate agent for service of process or being subject to a tolling of the statute of limitations on claims against them (E) holding that a plaintiff must fit within the precise wording of the tolling exception to avoid being barred by fcras statute of limitations provision

SOLUTION: holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim

PROBLEM: released funds through New York banks acting as agents for various corporations; and (4) a Lloyds’ employee visited three Tennessee banks in an unsuccessful attempt to generate business for Lloyds. These contacts are not sufficient to establish general jurisdiction over Lloyds. First, Lloyds’ accounts with Tennessee addresses do not support the court’s ruling. Lloyds points out that these 108 customers represented a mere 0.000675% of Lloyds 16 million account holders, and none of those accounts were opened after 2002. The fact that 108 account holders have Tennessee addresses is merely fortuitousLloyds markets and sells its accounts in the United Kingdom, not in Tennessee. Further, no me Tennessee banks justify the exercise of general jur vs., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1045-46 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The foregoing contacts amount to nothing more 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a ceos trip to the forum state to negotiate a services contract did not constitute the continuous and systematic general business contacts required to subject the corporation to general jurisdiction in the state (B) holding that thirteen business trips of short duration over eighteen months was not continuous and systematic solicitation of business in the state to justify general jurisdiction (C) holding that 155 trips to texas by foreign corporation personnel over a tenyear period did not support general jurisdiction because evidence did not establish a general business presence (D) holding that the court must look for continuous and systematic general business contacts  ie general jurisdiction  if the causes of action do not arise from or relate to the foreign defendants contacts with the forum state (E) recognizing general jurisdiction where availment is systematic and continuous

SOLUTION:
holding that a ceos trip to the forum state to negotiate a services contract did not constitute the continuous and systematic general business contacts required to subject the corporation to general jurisdiction in the state