In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
the State argued that Wright and Jackson were the two shooters at the trials of Wright, Oglesby, and Jackson. The State denies that it presented mutually exclusive, false, or misleading evidence. It contends that the evidence permits two factual scenarios: the shooters were either Jackson and Wright or Jackson and defendant. This is not a case where the prosecutor destroyed the credibility of one witness to convict one defendant and then used that same witness to convict a co-defendant for the same crime. See, e.g., Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 738 (1986). Nor is this a case where the prosecutor improperly argued facts that were unsupported by the evidence. Nichols v. Collins, 802 F.Supp. 66, 75 (S.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), habeas corpus denied, sub nom, Nichols v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal (B) holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment (C) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (D) holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal (E) holding in case in which defendant challenged his murder conviction and death sentence on ground that states conflicting theories in the trial of his accomplice constituted a denial of due process that state may be constitutionally estopped from obtaining a fact finding in one trial and seeking and obtaining an inconsistent fact finding in another trial

Ex Output:
holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal


Ex Input:
even if the 1993 judgment was final and appealable, they may challenge the merits of the 1993 judgment in this appeal from the 1995 order. This appeal is untimely only if the District Court’s 1993 decision — which ordered only that ISP submit a plan to remedy the constitutional flaws in its policy — was a final judgment, appealable to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We believe that the District Court’s 1993 order was no more final under § 1291 than the one at issue in Sherpell v. Humnoke School Dist., 814 F.2d 538 (8th Cir.1987), which held that a district court order to a school district to submit a plan to remedy an unconstitutional atmosphere of racial hostility was not an appealable final judgment. Id. at 539; see also Hendrickson v. Griggs, 856 F.2d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The November 1995 judgment is, therefore, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (B) holding that the modification or dissolution of an injunction in a limitation of liability proceeding is appealable as a matter of right under  1292a1 (C) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (D) holding injunction ordering prison to submit plan for reformation of unconstitutional prison conditions not appealable as interlocutory order under 28 usc  1292a1 (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable

Ex Output:
holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable


Ex Input:
pleads two counts of unjust enrichment, one on a contract-based theory and the other on a tort fraud theory. He correctly argues that by virtue of his allegation that he worked above the agreed-upon hours set forth in his employment contract, he can state a quasi-contract claim and seek an award for unjust enrichment because the additional hours worked' were not covered by an express contract. See, e.g., Buenaventura v. Champion Drywall, Inc., 803 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1219 (D.Nev.2011) (allowing unjust enrichment claim based on failure to provide adequate compensation); McCullough v. Lennar Corp., No. 09-CV-1808-WQH-NLS, 2009 WL 3805305, at *6 (S.D.Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (same); United States ex. Falco Constr. Corp. v. Summit Gen. Contracting Corp., 760 F.Supp. 1004, 1011 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (<HOLDING>). Risinger’s unjust enrichment claim thus seeks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a provision making all payments to subcontractor by  contractor expressly contingent upon payment for the work by contractor from owner is a payifpaid clause under texas law (B) holding that where contract between contractor and subcontractor allowed subcontractor to recover if contractor recovered contractor was not barred from bringing suit on behalf of subcontractor (C) holding that subcontractor can recover in quasicontract from contractor for work not encompassed in the agreement between the two (D) holding that the owner could maintain a 93a claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the thirdparty beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor (E) holding that subcontractor could recover damages from general contractor for delay in performance under state law

Ex Output:

holding that a provision making all payments to subcontractor by  contractor expressly contingent upon payment for the work by contractor from owner is a payifpaid clause under texas law