In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: susceptible to many meanings. Although there is no direct statement that Mooney failed to perform his duties with regard to assisting his clients with their investments, this is the clear import of the specific language used. “Only knew” clearly implies that Mooney knew nothing about anything else. What was implied in that statement is made express in the next — “didn’t know anything about investments.” “Hated helping clients” also unambiguously indicates that Mooney was not interested in executing his duties to his clients. These statements embody a “pejorative implication” that a reasonable listener would perceive “as an assertion that the [plaintiff] failed to perform his duties as an advisor.” Mehta v. Ohio Univ., 958 N.E.2d 598, 609 (Ohio Ct.App.2011); see Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707 (<HOLDING>). The statement “invested her in all of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement (B) holding that where the appellant remained at the scene rendered aid and gave his name to the police the evidence was insufficient to convict him under section 3742 even though the appellant initially lied about his involvement in the accident (C) holding no error in rejecting the appellants proffered instruction even though that statement was based on language from case law when the amci instruction was a proper statement of the law (D) holding that though there was no express statement that the appellant had committed perjury the clear impact of the specific language in nine sentences was that the appellant lied while under oath which weighed in favor of an actionable statement (E) holding that hearing officer had no obligation under 38 cfr  3103c2 to advise appellant as to physicians statement because that statement would not have helped prove the claim  that is that statement would not have provided a nexus with the veterans service

A: holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement
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Q: L.Ed.2d at 1035-86). Unfortunately, the adjective "readily" is subject to differing interpretations, and there has been disagreement regarding the meaning of "readily mobile." Decisions of the Indiana Court of Appeals are not consistent regarding whether automobiles under police observation or control are readily mobile so as to be subject to warrantless search under the automobile exception. E.g., compare, v. State, T5 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (legally parked automobile surrounded by police officers held not inherently mobile to qualify for automobile exeeption), transfer denied, and Edwards v. State, 768 N.E.2d 506, 508-09 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (impounded vehicle no longer "inherently mobile"), trams. not sought, with Johnson v. State, 766 N.E2d 426, 483 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002) (<HOLDING>), trans. demied, and Justice v. State, 765 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver (B) holding that ready mobility existed when a car was capable of being driven even after the driver was arrested and despite the absence of other potential drivers (C) holding that ocga  40520 as safeharbor provision requires a defendant to produce a drivers license that was valid at the time the vehicle was being driven (D) holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key (E) holding detention lawful when police referred driver to secondary to check ownership of the vehicle after the driver admitted that the car did not belong to him and the registration revealed that the car was owned by another

A: holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver
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Q: Esparaza, in both her individual and official capacities, is entitled to summary judgment on Count Three because Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that she took any adverse action against him. The remaining Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Count Three because the Arbitrator’s 1998 decision included factual findings which eliminated all support for Plaintiffs claim pursuant to the Michigan Constitution. For the reasons discussed below, the Court does not agree. The Court has serious doubts that the arbitration proceeding, or the Arbitrator’s findings, are capable of precluding a claim brought pursuant to the Michigan Constitution on a retaliation theory. See Arslanian v. Oakwood United Hospitals et al., 2000 WL 461585 (Mich.App. April 21, 2000) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, even if the Arbitrator’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that antidiscrimination rights under title vii cannot be waived by a collective bargaining agreement (B) holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration award (C) holding that the claim accrued after the employer denied a request for arbitration as untimely under the collective bargaining agreement (D) holding that arbitration pursuant to collective bargaining agreement is not res judicata and cannot collaterally estop a civil rights claim (E) holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights

A:
holding that antidiscrimination rights under title vii cannot be waived by a collective bargaining agreement
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