In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: February 8, 2011 probation extension order failed to extend his probation period because the October 26, 2005 restitution order was improperly delegated to the probation officer, rather than determined by the circuit court as required by Code § 19.2-305.1(D), thus any subsequent order is invalid. In relevant part, Code § 19.2-305.1(D) states that “[a]t the time of sentencing, the court shall determine the amount to be repaid by the defendant and the terms and conditions thereof.” The amount of restitution to be paid by the defendant is within the sole province of the circuit court to determine and that determination may not be delegated to another department of government. See Code § 19.2-305.2; see also McCullough v. Commonwealth, 38 Va.App. 811, 815, 568 S.E.2d 449, 451 (2002) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the circuit court’s October 26, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing (B) holding part of the sentencing phase of trial the restitution amount is determined following conviction and is a matter resting within the sole province of the sentencing judge (C) holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase (D) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount (E) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses

A: (B)
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Q: judge is provided for in Ind. P-C.R. 1, § 4(b), it is not automatic as Barclay asserts. Instead, “the rule requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a rational inference of bias or prejudice.” Jackson v. State, 643 N.E.2d 905, 907 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied (citing State ex rel. Whitehead v. Madison County Circuit Court, 626 N.E.2d 802, 803 (Ind.1993)). Barclay’s affidavit presents the fact that the trial court judge accepted his guilty plea without an adequate factual basis as his evidence of bias. Even taking this assertion as true, it does not support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. See Smith v. State, 613 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ind.1993), reh’g denied, cert, denied (<HOLDING>); Jackson, 643 N.E.2d at 907 (holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced (B) holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion (C) holding that the fact that the judge received adverse publicity for granting postconviction relief in another case did not require the judge to recuse herself (D) holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith (E) holding that counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to recuse the judge who presided at trial when the judge had also prosecuted a prior case that was used to enhance the current case

A: (C)
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Q: David K. Lewis, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that his due process rights were violated in connection with the confiscation of a television set. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment based on the doctrine of issue preclusion because Lewis’s due process claims were previously litigated and decided on the merits in a state habeas proceeding. See In re Lewis, 03W0051B, slip op. at 1-2 (Cal.Super.Ct. March 12, 2004); Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding issue preclusion bars section 1983 plaintiff from relitigating fourth amendment issue decided in state court criminal proceeding (B) holding that aedpa limits a federal habeas court to the record before the state court where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state court (C) holding that a habeas claim is procedurally barred where it was already raised on direct appeal and decided on the merits by this court (D) holding that the federal habeas corpus court could reach the merits of a due process claim even though there was no contemporaneous objection in state court trial where the state habeas corpus court reached the merits rather than rely on the procedural default defense (E) holding that a state habeas proceeding decided on the merits precluded a section 1983 action in federal court

A:
(E)
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