In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: that the people in the venire do not represent a fair and reasonable cross-section of the District of New Mexico. See United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 & n. 4 (1st Cir.1979)(stating that residents of counties, cities, and towns do not constitute a distinct, cognizable group for purposes of Sixth Amendment cross-section analysis); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 582 (10th Cir.1976)(“Mere geographical imbalance, absent evidence that an identifiable and cognizable segment of the community has been systemically excluded or underrepresented by reason of such imbalance, does not violate the statutory and constitutional requirement that the jury panel represent a ‘fair cross section’ of the community.”); United States v. Traficant, 209 F.Supp.2d 764, 780-81 (N.D.Ohio 2002)(<HOLDING>). Considering the foregoing, the Court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant did not prove that italianamericans are a cognizable group (B) holding that residents of a geograph ic area are not a distinct cognizable group and citing united states v test which made clear that a geographic area is not a distinct group for support (C) holding same and citing physicians multispecialty group (D) recognizing women as a distinct group (E) recognizing native americans as a distinct group
[EX A]: holding that the defendant did not prove that italianamericans are a cognizable group

[EX Q]: ... shall exist within the United States,” U.S. Const, amend. XIII, § 1, and empowers Congress to enforce its provisions, see U.S. Const, amend. XIII, § 2. The Supreme Court has interpreted this grant of power broadly, finding that Congress can affirmatively enforce the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude, and enact legislation to erase “all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). Moreover, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968), the Supreme Court opened the door to the inclusion of private acts of racial discrimination within the “badges and incidents of slavery” language as stated in the Civil Rights Cases. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413, 88 S.Ct. 2186 (<HOLDING>). Although the Thirteenth Amendment was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 42 usc  1982 a provision of the civil rights act of 1866 which allows victims of racial discrimination to sue private defendants was a valid exercise of congress thirteenth amendment authority (B) holding official immunity is available in claims of discrimination if plaintiff fails to establish his treatment by defendants was so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent racial discrimination that racial discrimination is the probable explanation (C) holding that civil rights claims under 42 usc  1981 and 1982 are personal injury tort claims (D) holding that the retaliation provision of title vii is an adequate exercise of congress authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights
[EX A]: holding official immunity is available in claims of discrimination if plaintiff fails to establish his treatment by defendants was so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent racial discrimination that racial discrimination is the probable explanation

[EX Q]: therefore properly denied Chen’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief insofar as they were based on his sexual orientation. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006). Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Chen’s application for CAT relief based on his claim of a likelihood of torture for having departed China illegally. Notwithstanding generalized evidence indicating that torture occurs in Chinese prisons, an applicant cannot demonstrate that he is more likely than not to be tortured “based solely on the fact that []he is part of the large class of persons who have left China illegally.” Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir.2005); see also Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 118-19 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Because Chen provided no basis for the agency 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pain and suffering does not survive the death of the injured (B) holding that beyond evidence of inhumane prison conditions a cat claimant must provide some evidence that the authorities act with the specific intent to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering on those detained (C) recognizing as an element of pain and suffering (D) holding that detention in squalid overcrowded cells without adequate food water sanitation exercise or medical treatment in haitian prisons does not constitute torture under cat because there is no evidence that haitian authorities have the specific intent to inflict pain or suffering (E) recognizing as separate from pain and suffering
[EX A]:
holding that pain and suffering does not survive the death of the injured