Given a document and an entity the task is to select the author's sentiment towards the entity. Sentiments can be Positive, Neutral and Negative. Select Positive if the article expresses a positive view towards the given entity or praises its quality or skills. Select Neutral if the document expresses no clear view towards the entity or has equal amounts of positive and negative statements or expressing some fact/quote by someone else. Select Negative if the article expresses a negative view towards like harsh remarks, criticizing entities action/decision etc. Note that URLs in the text have been replaced with [Link].

Input: Consider Input: What is the sentiment of the following document towards the entity Steve Ranson ? But  Steve Ranson  the former editor of the Lahontan Valley News and an advocate for protecting students' First Amendment rights   said a brand-new Nevada law says otherwise.
 Ranson  advocated for the passage of a law last legislative session  commonly referred to as the New Voices legislation  that explicitly prohibits school district ârestrictions on the publication of any content in a pupil publication.â
 Ranson  said the photos of athletes on club teams hardly constitute a disruption.
âIf itâs not disruptive  Iâm not seeing what their logic is â  Ranson  said.

Output: Positive


Input: Consider Input: What is the sentiment of the following document towards the entity George W Bush ? Bush delivers a speech to crew onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln to declare combat operations over in Iraq , as the carrier steamed toward San Diego , California on May 1 , 2003 . 
Bush felt a heavy burden of responsibility for protecting the nation . 
They included the chairman of Bush 's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board , Brent Scowcroft ; the former CENTCOM commander Anthony Zinni , and the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee , Ike Skelton . 
When George W. Bush entered office , "nation building" was anathema . 
He also felt that those pushing for war had no idea that the war might last ten years .52 Skelton sent Bush multiple questions about the cost and duration of the occupation , noting that he should not "take the first step without considering the last ." 
Bush 's decision-making style was based on his gut instincts .58 His snap judgment that somehow Saddam was behind September 11 , or might be behind the next attack on America , remained with him . 
-- President George W. Bush , State of the Union , January 29 , 2002 . 
Once it became clear that Bush was on a track to war , they sought to find a diplomatic exit or , failing that , to garner international support and create legitimacy for an invasion . 
The fact that Saddam "tried to kill -LSB- his -RSB- dad" weighed on Bush 's decision making . 
President George W. Bush 's decision to invade Iraq on March 20 , 2003 , was not a blunder on the scale of those of Napoleon , Hitler and Tojo . 
Powell also told Bush that the United States would "own" Iraq after an invasion and that it would dominate all other foreign - policy initiatives . 
Bush 's decision-making style was based on his gut instincts . 
Bush was reelected in November of 2004 as much because of as despite his invasion of Iraq . 
Inspections were moving too slowly for the Bush team . 
This unfinished business concerned Bush directly . 
Bush considered himself to be "the decider ." 
In this environment different factors conspired to lead Bush to a decision to pursue an optional war that most Americans believe in retrospect did much more harm than good to their interests . 
Bush felt that September 11 was the "Pearl Harbor of the 21st Century ," 59 and that his new and transcending purpose as president was to prevent another , possibly worse , one .60 . 
And yet this flawed concept drove the Bush administration to an early and uncoordinated decision for war , brushing aside the need for analysis , distorting intelligence , marginalizing senior officers who raised doubts and neglecting postconflict stabilization requirements . 
In March , when the French threatened to veto a second resolution , Bush dropped the effort and gave Saddam a forty-eight-hour ultimatum to leave Iraq . 
Bush was quick to reach decisions , and , once reached , he saw change as a sign of weakness .61 After he reached an early decision on war , he was prepared to try a UN resolution , but not change his fundamental course . 
Rice was Bush 's closest confidant . 
Bush made the case for this during a June 2002 speech at West Point , arguing that the United States could not rely on Cold War concepts such as deterrence and containment to deal with terrorists who are willing to commit suicide for their cause . 
During his UN General Assembly speech in September 2002 , Bush tied the doctrine of preemption to Iraq , noting "with every step the Iraqi regime takes towards gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons , our own options to confront that regime will narrow ." 
If there was a debate inside the Bush Administration , it was one - sided and muted ." 
on the fifth anniversary of U.S. President George W. Bush 's "Mission Accomplished" speech which declared an end to major hostilities in Iraq during a rally on Pennsylvania Avenue in Front of the White House in Washington , DC , May 1 , 2008 . 
Shortly after the September 11 attacks , Tenet presented Bush with a list of countries malevolent enough to help al Qaeda get a dirty bomb : Iraq was on the top of that list . 
That notion had a profound impact on Bush .66 Bush said : "I made my decision -LSB- for war -RSB- based upon enough intelligence to tell me that -LSB- our -RSB- country was threatened with Saddam Hussein in power ." 
Bush did not back down from his decision to proceed toward war , but he did agree to give a UN resolution a try . 
Even before the inauguration , Cheney asked outgoing Secretary of Defense William Cohen to provide Bush with a briefing focused on Iraq . 
It is not clear exactly when Bush decided to invade Iraq . 
When the George W. Bush administration entered office , its initial focus was on China and military transformation . 
31 On September 17 , Bush told his advisors : "I believe Iraq was involved ." 
The fifth was impatience on the part of the Bush team to wait for the results of the arms inspectors who were making progress in Iraq , results that could have obviated the need for war . 
A week after the attack , Wolfowitz began sending memos to Rumsfeld making the case for an attack on Iraq .34 Cheney soon began talking about Iraq as a threat to peace .35 Bush told the British prime minister , Tony Blair , in mid-September that Iraq was not the immediate problem .36 But that changed after the fall of Kabul .37 . 
That all changed on September 11 , 2001.10 Initially , Bush , Wolfowitz and others thought that Iraq might be behind the attacks .11 So did a large majority of the American people , a belief reinforced by the speculation of administration officials . 
It became clear that this was not the case , as Bush finally revealed ,12 but for many this connection stuck . 
Bush indicated that as soon as the Taliban were driven from Afghanistan , he would turn his attention to Saddam .13 . 
In March of 2002 , Bush informally told a group of senators : "We 're taking him -LSB- Saddam -RSB- out ." 
Bureaucratically they formed the leading position within the Bush administration in 2002 , with Cheney dominating the White House and Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz controlling Defense . 
Cheney had daily contact with Bush and was his closest advisor on national security matters . 
The CIA had missed several indications that might have given specific warning about the September 11 attack and was not about to be caught off guard again .15 Because the Bush administration had not acted on more-general intelligence warnings of the al Qaeda threat to the U.S. homeland , it would take any future warning much more seriously . 
The intelligence that Bush and others received was based on outdated and incorrect evidence , material from untrustworthy human sources , and worst-case analysis .70 The United States had no reliable intelligence assets in Iraq .71 International WMD inspectors had been kicked out of Iraq since 1998 ; so in that sense Saddam brought this about himself . 
On November 21 , 2001 , Bush asked that the war plan for Iraq be secretly updated , which shocked the military .38 By the end of December 2001 , Central Command -LRB- CENTCOM -RRB- Commander Tommy Franks was at the Bush ranch in Crawford , Texas , briefing the President and his national security team on the war plan .39 .

Output: Negative


Input: Consider Input: What is the sentiment of the following document towards the entity Joe III ? The similarities between Joe Kennedy III and Donald Trump are  in a sense  obvious. Both are white men  northeasterners  teetotalers. They are products of the Ivy League and great wealth. They joined their respective family trades – real estate for Trump  politics for Joe III.
The differences are obvious too  and more illuminating. Joe III is a liberal avatar of American institutions: the Kennedy family  Stanford  Harvard Law. Self-effacing in person  he recognizes how easy his path has been – he only briefly served as an assistant DA before taking a House seat -- and had  until now  chosen to mitigate charges of nepotism by playing the part of diligent backbencher. The Kennedys  for all their famous faults  have the saving grace that comes from being in on the joke; when President Kennedy appointed his younger brother attorney general  he quipped that he was just trying to give Bobby some experience before he started practicing law.
The result is the great destabilization of the Trump era. Few  it seems  have a firm grasp on what is happening  let alone what might happen next. Everybody  regardless of their ideology  thinks they're losing. A realignment appears to be happening in our politics  but nobody can agree on what it looks like. "We all feel the fault lines of a fractured country " as  Joe III  put it in  his  stilted  awkward speech on Tuesday night.
There is  of course  an element of nostalgia in liberalism's newfound fondness for our institutions. Trump-era liberalism  with its emphasis on American global leadership and veneration of federal agencies and the mainstream press  would be easily recognizable to that first generation of Kennedys. And in that sense  it makes sense that  Joe III  would become a natural face of contemporary Democratic politics.
Tuesday night was an attempt to make  Joe III  a symbol of institutional resistance to Trump. To the question of whether the institutions are worth saving  and therefore capable of reform   Joe III 's answer is an enthusiastic yes.  He  is  in a sense  already a symbol of how  his  own family has repaired itself from its reckless  impulsive  and selfish ways;  he  seems serious   he  is sober. The message  he  sends is that  his  family   his  party  and all the other institutions that nurtured  him  still have an innate and positive utility  an essential role to play. Where Trump says the rot must be amputated   Joe III  promises that a strong dose of antibiotics is all that's needed.
Whether this message resonates among the Democratic rank-and-file is another story. While the liberal commentariat   Joe III's  natural constituency  remains fixated on norms and the need to defend institutions  a newly ascendant left sees civility as a neoliberal plot to uphold the status quo. And whereas  Joe III  and  his  ilk see Trump as an aberration  the left sees  him  as a symptom of a decayed political order  they  wish to abolish and replace.
Robert Kennedy once said that he wished he had been born poor so he could have been a revolutionary. As his career advances  Joe III might harbor a similar desire  if only because his party is increasingly moving in a revolutionary direction.


Output: Positive