TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: ah officer may ask a question outside the scope of the initial justification for the stop so long as it does not further lengthen the time taken to process the initial justification for the stop. In other words, if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid. This reasoning is explained in both United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc), and United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5th Cir.1993). In both cases, the courts held that questions by police officers during a traffic stop are not seizures or searches proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and cited United States Supreme Court cases dealing with non-custodial police-citizen encounters for support. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent (B) holding that police may approach persons and ask questions or permission to search so long as police do not imply that answers or consent are required (C) holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: showing he was denied a constitutional right. Because Weaver’s application for a COA raises several claims, it is impossible to glean from the present record which issue(s) the district court thought worthy of appeal. Cf. Murray, 145 F.3d at 1250-51 (determining that while court of appeals could not decide issue not specified in COA, it could “construe the issue specification in light of the pleadings and other parts of the record”). Therefore we must remand the record for the district court to specify the issue or issues for appeal. See Muniz v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 43, 46 (5th Cir.1997); Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1076 (6th Cir.1997); Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1584 (11th Cir.1996); but cf. Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). It is so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding remand for specification of issues unnecessary where clear from briefing appellant had not made substantial showing he was denied any constitutional right (B) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (C) holding that appellant had waived any objection to an instruction that he had himself introduced and which was amended by the state without objection from appellant (D) holding that application of section 9711h as amended did not deprive appellant of any constitutional right (E) holding that where appellant acknowledged timely receiving notice by regular mail appellant appeared and fully participated at the trial and appellant made no claim that he was harmed in any way appellee had fulfilled the primary purposes of texrcivp 21a

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: price. Moreover, as a practical matter, there is no “interim” between the placement of the customer’s bid and its acceptance or rejection during which the customer could exert control over Priceline. The electronic transaction is nearly instantaneous. In effecting that transaction, Priceline’s actions are akin to those of an intermediary or middleman rifling through its inventory of discounted hotel rooms until it locates an item for which the customer has stated a willingness to pay a specified price. The fact that only Priceline has access to both its algorithm and its particular inventory of discounted hotel rooms does not create a fiduciary relationship with a customer where none otherwise exists. See Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20, 42, 761 A.2d 1268 (2000) (<HOLDING>). No different conclusion regarding agency is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that technical expertise or sjuperior skill and knowledge alone do not create a fiduciary duty among parties involved in a business transaction (B) holding that a fiduciary who receives consideration in connection with a transaction involving plan assets violated section 406b and a nonfiduciary who facilitated that transaction could be liable (C) holding that parties intent to create or extend agency relationship may be inferred from their conduct viewed in light of all circumstances surrounding transaction (D) recognizing step transaction doctrine whereby courts must consider all steps of transaction in light of entire transaction so that substance of transaction will control over form of each step (E) holding that a sellers superior knowledge of a product does not justify imposition of a fiduciary relationship in the absence of a conscious assumption of fiduciary duties

SOLUTION:
(A)