instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
claimant was injured while exiting an elevator in a parking garage which was not owned or maintained by her employer. However, the claimant’s employer instructed her to park in certain designated spaces which it leased in the garage. Because the employer leased the parking spaces from the garage operator and presumably could pressure the garage operator to keep the facility in a safe condition, Pierson held that there was “sufficient indicia of em ployer control to support the ... conclusion that the [employer] should be responsible for the effects of an injury to an employee which occurred in the garage.” 987 S.W.2d at 318. Since the claimant was utilizing a reasonable means to walk from her parking space to her employer when she fell, she zona, 142 Ariz. 501, 690 P.2d 802 (App.1984)(<HOLDING>); Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees (B) holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs (C) holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer (D) holding that an injury occurring in a parking lot which was leased but not controlled by an employer was compensable because the employer instructed its employees to park in that lot (E) holding landowner had duty to provide security in parking lot to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties
answer:
(D)


question:
to dedicate all of their disposable income to their plan. The Trustee’s supplemental objection raised, for the first time, whether Section 1325(a)(5) bars a debtor from confirming a plan that strips off a wholly unsecured lien where the debtor has received a discharge in a prior bankruptcy case within the proscribed period set forth in Section 1328(f). Although TD Bank had previously argued that the Debtors’ ability to strip off its lien was contingent upon the entry of a discharge order, TD Bank did not rely on Section 1325(a)(5). IV. Discussion A. Jurisdiction and Venue The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and discharge in a bankruptcy case filed within four years of filing an earlier Chapter 7 petition 253 F.3d 778, 781-83 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). However, there is no prohibition against lien 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage lien can be avoided under nobelman (B) holding that a socalled chapter 20 debtor may strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien (C) holding that an allowed wholly unsecured consensual junior lien may not be stripped off in a chapter 7 case (D) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage on chapter 13 debtors residence could not be stripped down into an unsecured claim by debtors plan (E) holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge
answer:
(C)


question:
premise. Landgraf holds that: When a ease implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). However, neither of these decisions addressed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding new statute applicable only prospectively (B) holding the general rule is that in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary a law affecting substantive rights liabilities and duties is presumed to apply prospectively (C) holding that state statutes are exempt from the implied limitations of the commerce clause only when the congressional direction to do so has been unmistakably clear (D) holding that there is no clear congressional intent that firreas statutes of limitations 12 usc  1821e12a  apply only prospectively (E) holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent
answer:

(D)