In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the B-side breakers were cross-phased caused transformer B to fail, and the failure of transformer B necessitated its testing, removal, oil disposal, repair and reinstallation. No additional link in the causal chain was necessary to bring about the injury or damages. The parties can be “conclusively presumed to have foreseen” that Powell’s substandard performance would result in the failure of the transformer and that failure of a transformer would require HP to incur costs associated with repairing it. Cf. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 816. We are not persuaded otherwise by Powell’s argument that direct damages in this case should be limited to the cost of uncrossing the wrongfully crossed cables or the difference between the value of Powell’s actual services and the value of t *8-9 (<HOLDING>). Powell asserts that these provisions refer to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury (B) holding costs of providing power during construction delay were direct damages because contract provision specified that owner would provide electricity to construction site (C) recognizing the rights of third parties who were not signatories to a construction contract (D) holding that construction safety manuals and codes were properly admitted as objective standards of safe construction (E) holding that whether clause in construction contract providing that no damages would be available for delay was enforceable was a factual question where there was evidence that damages resulted from unreasonable delay beyond the contemplation of the parties
[A]: (B)


[Q]: an interpretation of section 85.321 that would make any party who holds a mineral interest indefinitely liable to all subsequent interest holders for prior alleged damage to the land. The consequences of such an interpretation run contrary to the legislative intent to protect and encourage the development of Texas natural resources. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59. We are mindful of the consequences of a particular construction. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.023(5); McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 745. Absent a legislative enactment clearly abrogating the common law, we conclude that Emerald does not have standing as a subsequent lessee to pursue a claim under section 85.321 for Exxon’s alleged wrongful actions as a prior lessee. See, e.g., Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 342-43 (Tex.2006) (<HOLDING>). C. Negligence Per Se Because our holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law (B) holding that tex loc govt code  51075 abrogated city of texarkana v city of new boston 141 sw3d 778 texapptexarkana 2004 (C) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract (D) holding that the city of boston was acting as a market participant when it contracted for public works construction (E) holding that distribution of catalogs to city addresses constituted use within city subject to taxation under municipal code provision
[A]: (B)


[Q]: 84 (3d Cir.1999) ("[W]hen parents unilaterally withdraw their children from public school, absent mitigating circumstances, they are not entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition until they request review proceedings.”) (citing Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 156-58 & n. 14 (3d Cir.1994)); Marissa F. v. The William Penn Sch. Dist., 2005 WL 2304738, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 20, 2005) (barring plaintiffs from receiving reimbursement for any time student was in private school before their request for due process). 16 . Although not clear, to the extent the State is arguing that Loveland was inappropriate because it did not meet the IDEA’S requirements, the argument fails. See Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114 S.Ct. 361, 126 L.Ed.2d 284 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Warren G., 190 F.3d at 84 (rejecting argument 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 12a2 did not apply to a private placement memorandum which was subject to a section 42 exemption (B) recognizing that parents seeking an alternative placement may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board but concluding that the ideas mainstreaming requirement remains a consideration that bears upon a parents choice of an alternative placement and may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate (C) holding that when a private placement of securities purported to be exempt under rule 506 rjegardless of whether the private placement actually complied with the substantive requirements of regulation d or rule 506 the securities sold to plaintiffs are federal covered securities because they were sold pursuant to those rules (D) holding that protective placement statute unconstitutionally deprived individuals of an automatic periodic reexamination of the need for continued protective placement (E) holding that a private alternative placement need not meet the criteria of a fape
[A]:
(E)