In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to her knowledge and lack of mistake. So that goes specifically to the case-the State's ability to enter this in its case in chief. ... [T}he prejudice just simply is not extensive at all. The only prejudice that goes to Ms. Downs is that she possessed an ... unlawful controlled substance. 13 We hold that the trial court did not exceed its broad discretion in admitting the evidence for three reasons. First, the evidence at issue is not the type of evidence that Utah courts "have previously deemed highly prejudicial." See State v. Johnso (Utah 1998) ("[Gruesome photographs of a homicide victim's corpse will unfairly prejudice and inflame the jury and therefore require the proponent to show that they have unusual probative value."), and State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1989) (<HOLDING>). Because the evidence at issue is "not the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (B) holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim (C) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (D) holding that the gruesome portion of the videotapeshowing closeup shots of the victims stab wounds in her chest her slit throat and her beaten face as well as her bloodcovered neck shoulders and blouseshould have been excluded under rule 408 (E) holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment
[A]: holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine


[Q]: rules or orders.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 382.113(a). The legislature imposed only the two restrictions previously mentioned: an ordinance must be consistent with the Act and the commission’s rules and orders and may not make unlawful a condition or act approved or authorized under the Act or the commission’s rules or orders. Id. § 382.113(b). If the ordinance violates one of these restrictions, however, then its preemption is implied with unmistakable clarity. We therefore turn next to the first of these restrictions and address the question of whether the Act and the ordinance are consistent. 3. The Clean Air Act and the tent with state legislation, we begin by comparing the purpose of each. See City of Weslaco v. Melton, 158 Tex. 61, 63-64, 308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1958) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute (B) holding state and federal actions not parallel for colorado river purposes because the remedies were different  one was equitable and the other compensatory  and the sources of law came from different states (C) holding that an implied warranty of merchantability does not create a labeling requirement different from or in addition to those mandated by fifra because the implied warranty of merchantability arises from the sale itself not from a state labeling regulation citation omitted (D) holding that completing sixth grade and a limited ability to read were not inconsistent with a valid iq score of 68 (E) holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade a raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes
[A]: recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute


[Q]: contract claims under general liability policies. See Keystone Filler & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. American Mining Ins. Co., 179 F.Supp.2d 432 (M.D.Pa.2002); Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria County v. Int’l Ins. Co., 454 Pa.Super. 374, 685 A.2d 581 (1996) (en banc); see also Augenblick v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 99-3419, 1999 WL 975118 (E.D.Pa. Oct.8, 1999). General liability policies provide the insured coverage for personal injury or property damage resulting from an “occurrence,” and are intended “to protect the insured from liability fo e in Redevelopment Authority — that there is no ‘occurrence’ if the underlying claim is one merely for breach-of-contract — has been followed by numerous state and federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania.”) (citing cases); Augenblick, 1999 WL 975118, at *2, 5 (<HOLDING>). In contrast to those cases, U.S. Specialty’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer (B) holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract (C) holding that insureds breach of contract suit against insurer raised a coverage issue which was not settled by insurers payment of only part of what insured was claiming in breach of contract action (D) holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract (E) holding insurer did not have to cover insured for a breach of contract because it was not an accident
[A]:
holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer