In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
397 So.2d 874, 874-75 (Miss.1981)). However, in McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., Inc., 626 So.2d 603 (Miss.1993), the Mississippi Supreme Court carved out “a narrow public policy exception” to the employment-at-will doctrine, holding that regardless of whether the employment is at-will, (1) an employee who refuses to participate in an illegal act as in Laws [v. Aetna Finance Co., 667 F.Supp. 342 (N.D.Miss.1987) ], shall not be barred by the common law rule of employment at will from bringing an action in tort for damages against his employer; (2) an employee who is discharged for reporting illegal acts of his employer to the employer or anyone else is not barred by the employmen ming Wheeler); Hammons v. Fleetwood Homes of Mississippi, Inc., 907 So.2d 357, 360 (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). As plaintiffs have presented no evidence to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the mcarn exception requirefs that the acts complained of warrant the imposition of criminal penalties as opposed to mere civil penalties (B) recognizing district courts discretion in assessing civil penalties under 21 usc  842c (C) holding that a claim for civil damages based on alleged violation of criminal statute under which criminal penalties result was properly dismissed because criminal violations are brought not in the name of the individual party but rather by and on behalf of the state of ohio or its subdivisions (D) holding that a judgment that requires the performance of an act is enforceable by civil and criminal contempt penalties emphasis omitted (E) holding double jeopardy clause applicable to civil penalties under the false claims act

Ex Output:
recognizing district courts discretion in assessing civil penalties under 21 usc  842c


Ex Input:
45 U.S.C. § 56, and 46 U.S.C. § 30106, are essentially identical, stating that the action must be “commenced” or “brought” within the three year period. The Supreme Court in Burnett specifically found that the state court suit had been properly “commenced” although it was filed in an improper venue. 380 U.S. at 426, 85 S.Ct. at 1053. Furthermore, because the principle of uniformity that drove the Burnett decision applies with equal force to a general maritime action, other courts have correctly held that Burnett applies in general maritime cases. See, e.g., Prejean, 721 So.2d at 1276 (citing 1 Martin J. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries § 5:10 (4th ed.1990)); Davis, 659 F.Supp. at 156-157; People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F.Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.La.1968) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s second argument for distinction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries (B) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (C) holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction (D) holding that burnett and its justification of uniformity is equally applicable to admiralty actions (E) holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures

Ex Output:
holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries


Ex Input:
of Texas has done the opposite. For the need factor, courts are concerned with “the seriousness of the crime or accident to which the officer responds” before the high-speed pursuit begins. See Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467. For the risk factor, “an officer in a police pursuit must assess both the risk that the suspect will injure a third party and the risk that the officer himself will injure a third party.” Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 583 (emphasis in original). I also note that the majority criticizes Martinez for being speculative about whether the fleeing driver would have returned to normal driving practices if Deputy Johnson has discontinued pursuit. Of course it was the County’s burden to establish as a matter of law that the need outweighed the risk. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 653 (<HOLDING>). Given the County’s and the majority’s 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial (B) holding that a defendant bears the burden of establishing affirmative defenses under the wprkers compensation statute (C) holding defendant bears burden of establishing affirmative defense of official immunity (D) holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence (E) holding that unless an affirmative defense is established as matter of law defendant bears burden of obtaining jury findings necessary to support defense

Ex Output:

recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial