In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: were driven by ‘[p]rice in an all-inclusive sense, which starts with the freight rate.’ ” (Doc. S-l at 56). No effort was made to differentiate or promote any aspect of Trailer Bridge’s products or services. Instead, the statement provided a brief explanation of the factors affecting price in the entire Puerto Rican cabotage market. Cf American Simmental Ass’n v. Coregis Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir.2002) (“The plain and ordinary meaning of ‘advertising idea’ generally encompasses an idea for calling public attention to a product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable qualities so as to increase sales or patronage.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Proxima Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 132, 1994 WL 245671 at *1 (9th Cir.1994) (unpublished table decision) (<HOLDING>). Regardless of whether the statement lulled 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statements of product superiority and that product was industry approved were puffery (B) holding that a contract for an exclusive agency to market a product contains an implied promise to use all reasonable efforts to market the product (C) holding that the essential wrong of trademark infringement the appropriation of the good will of anothers established mark may be effectively accomplished by advertising matter associating that others distinguishing mark with the product of defendant (D) holding that the shape of a product was not an advertising idea because there was no allegation in the complaint that the design itself was a trademark or was intended to distinguish the product from others that might enter the market citation omitted (E) holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: from representing plaintiffs “in either this or similar actions.” Id. at 1196. Likewise here, Yanny would be prohibited from representing the interests of any party against his former client, the Church of Scientology organization. However, I see no basis for precluding Berry or the Musick, Peeler firm from representing F.A.C.T.Net based on the fact that they formerly represented Yanny in defending him against charges made by the Church of Scientology. Moreover, in suing Yanny as it did, Plaintiffs waived any privilege with respect to any information relevant to the issues raised by their claims and released Yanny from his obligation of secrecy with respect to that information. See Carlson, Collins, Gordon & Bold v. Banducci, 257 Cal.App.2d 212, 228, 64 Cal-Rptr. 915 (Cal.App.1967) (<HOLDING>) That principle of California professional 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that authorization cards are privileged from disclosure to employer (C) holding an attorney is released from those obligations of secrecy which the law places upon him whenever the disclosure of a communication otherwise privileged becomes necessary to the protection of the attorneys own rights (D) holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client (E) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: a parolee does not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only [] the conditional liberty properly dependant on observance of special parole restrictions.” Id. at 365, 118 S.Ct. 2014 (quotation omitted); accord Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (“[R]evocation[ ] is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, [even if it] does result in a loss of liberty.”); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (recognizing that a parolee does not have the full panoply of constitutional rights to which a criminal defendant is entitled). Relying on these cases, we have reached the same- conclusion in the supervised-release context. See United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788, 792 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The panel’s decision is thüs- contrary to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release (B) holding that  3605 authorizes a transferee court to revoke a term of a defendants supervised release for violations committed prior to the transfer of jurisdiction (C) holding that the fourth amendment does not require a warrant based on an oath or affirmation to revoke an individual on supervised release (D) holding that constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants through the sixth amendment apply in nonsummary criminal contempt prosecutions just as they do in other criminal prosecutions (E) holding that proceedings to revoke supervised release  need not comply with the procedural protections constitutionally guaranteed for criminal prosecutions
[EX A]:
(E)