instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
to allege damages through June 30, 2006 is the focus of their motion.”). Because the Government does not oppose Plaintiff supplementing the September 4, 2009 Complaint to seek damages through the end of 2009, the issue before the court is whether Plaintiff may supplement to allege a claim for damages incurred through December 31, 2009, or through December 31, 2010. See System Fuels, 73 Fed.Cl. at 211 (“Supplementation may be limited or curtailed to avoid prejudice.” (citation omitted)). Although Plaintiff may have given the Government an estimate of 2010 damages as early as July 2010, Plaintiff did not identify the specific 2010 damages claimed or provide the Government with supporting documentation of those damages until April 20, 2011 — t 4 Fed.Cl. 727 (2006) (“SMUD III") (<HOLDING>), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 293 Fed.Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that smud is entitled to 53159863 in mitigation costs but staying entry of judgment pending the outcome of this proceeding (B) holding that smud was entitled to 39796234 in damages (C) holding that a plaintiff is entitled to either statutory treble damages or punitive damages whichever is the greater (D) holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of nominal damages when she had failed to request them (E) holding that smud was entitled to mitigation damages for costs incurred from may 15 1997 to december 31 2003
answer:
holding that smud is entitled to 53159863 in mitigation costs but staying entry of judgment pending the outcome of this proceeding


question:
allege no physical harm resulting from Wells Fargo’s voluntary undertaking of services. See Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex.2000) (“One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965))) (emphasis added); see also Vodicka v. Lahr, No. 03-10-00126-CV, 2012 WL 2075713, at *6 (Tex.Ct.App. Jun. 6, 2012) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for negligent undertaking because that tort requires proof of physical harm resulting from failure to exercise reasonable care in rendering services to another and plaintiffs had alleged only economic harm (B) holding that economic loss rule precluded the plaintiffs tort claims because they only alleged injuries to the subject of the contract itself (C) holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm (D) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (E) holding that the plaintiffs stated a claim for conspiracy because they alleged an actionable tort
answer:
holding that economic loss rule precluded the plaintiffs tort claims because they only alleged injuries to the subject of the contract itself


question:
in any way suggest that it is a payment in lieu of taxes. Instead, the dividend-based payment is calculated based on a percentage of the City’s equity or investment in the properties of the electric division. This sum is not in the nature of an ad valorem tax and is separate and distinct from tax equivalent payments calculated based on the value of the utility’s property. See Town of Middleton v. City of Bolivar, No. W2011-01592-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2865960, at *18-24 (Tenn.Ct. App. July 13, 2012) (examining the distinction between PILOT payments and other types of fees). Accordingly, the City is not entitled to subtract the dividend based payment required by subsection 693(6) from the total tax equivalent payment made by MLGW prior to calculating Shelby County’s share. See id. at *23 (<HOLDING>). In summary, we agree with the trial court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to require a defendant to pay all back taxes (B) holding that the gas laws mandate that pilots be in lieu of all state city and local taxes or charges did not bear on the utilitys authority to pay franchise fees that were not in the nature of property taxes and that the utility was required to pay both franchise fees and pilots (C) holding that  charges should be given more precise content by taxes and fees  (D) holding that taxes were a claim against the estate that had to be filed in probate court thus reversing an order requiring heirs to pay taxes on estate property because the district court did not have jurisdiction (E) holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes
answer:

holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to require a defendant to pay all back taxes