In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
--------
Question: provider in the course of treatment. In cases involving successive tortfeasors whose separate causal contributions to the plaintiff’s harm can be measured, the doctrine of joint and several liability applies only to the enhanced portion of the injury. See Keeton et al. § 52, at 352 (discussing distinction between original tortfeasor’s liability, which encompasses entire injury, and treating physician’s liability, which extends only to negligent treatment); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. c. 17. Even though the original tortfeasor may be held hable for both the original and the enhanced injury, the imposition of entire liability is only temporary. The original tortfeasor, whose duty is of a different character and who is not in pari delicto with a successive 35, 42 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Thus liability for the enhanced injury may be 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor (B) holding that contribution will lie where no statute precludes recovery from the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought (C) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because it was not an innocent party (D) recognizing a right to contribution (E) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because claim properly was for contribution

Answer: recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor


Question: ... shall exist within the United States,” U.S. Const, amend. XIII, § 1, and empowers Congress to enforce its provisions, see U.S. Const, amend. XIII, § 2. The Supreme Court has interpreted this grant of power broadly, finding that Congress can affirmatively enforce the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude, and enact legislation to erase “all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). Moreover, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968), the Supreme Court opened the door to the inclusion of private acts of racial discrimination within the “badges and incidents of slavery” language as stated in the Civil Rights Cases. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413, 88 S.Ct. 2186 (<HOLDING>). Although the Thirteenth Amendment was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 42 usc  1982 a provision of the civil rights act of 1866 which allows victims of racial discrimination to sue private defendants was a valid exercise of congress thirteenth amendment authority (B) holding official immunity is available in claims of discrimination if plaintiff fails to establish his treatment by defendants was so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent racial discrimination that racial discrimination is the probable explanation (C) holding that civil rights claims under 42 usc  1981 and 1982 are personal injury tort claims (D) holding that the retaliation provision of title vii is an adequate exercise of congress authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights

Answer: holding official immunity is available in claims of discrimination if plaintiff fails to establish his treatment by defendants was so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent racial discrimination that racial discrimination is the probable explanation


Question: opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit, PER CURIAM: Tracey Lamont Coad pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2012), and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), to 212 months’ imprisonment. Coad appealed, and this Court affirmed the criminal judgment. The Supreme Court of the United States granted Coad’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated this Court’s judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (<HOLDING>). Coad v. United States, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding residual clause of acca void for vagueness (B) holding that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the acca violates the constitutions guarantee of due process (C) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (D) holding that va code  182603 is not void for vagueness (E) holding c4c factor void for vagueness unless limiting construction was given

Answer:
holding that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the acca violates the constitutions guarantee of due process