In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
on CRiminal Justice, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). In 1997, the legislature amended the child pornography statute to eliminate a loophole in the existing statute that impeded prosecution of individuals for possession or promotion of child pornography depicted or distributed by computer. Id.; House Comm, on CRiminal JURISPRUDENCE, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). There is nothing in these materials to suggest that the legislature intended to prohibit anything other than pornography depicting actual children. Therefore, we conclude that the Texas child pornography statute prohibits only the possession of visual materials depicting real children. Because the Texas statute only prohibits pornography depicting actual children, the sta App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Appellant also contends that the statute is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding twentyeight charges against defendant for possession of child pornography were not multiplicious (B) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (C) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (D) holding that an overbreadth challenge to a child pornography law was rendered moot by amendment to the statute (E) recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
all of the requested documents meet that definition however. That is an issue for the trial court to resolve when it reconsiders Gulfcoast’s objections. We next address the issue of the trial court’s failure to perform a balancing test or conduct an in camera review. “When a party asserts the need for protection against disclosure of a trade secret, the court must first determine whether, in fact, the disputed information is a trade secret [which] usually requires the court to conduct an in camera review.” Summitbridge Nat’l Invs. v. 1221 Palm Harbor, L.L.C., 67 So.3d 448, 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (citing Ameritrust Ins. v. O’Donnell Landscapes, 899 So.2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)); see also Westco, Inc. v. Scott Lewis’ Gardening & Trimming, 26 So.3d 620, 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). This court has previously held that internal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a party claims a document is privileged and the trial court fails to conduct an in camera review or balancing test the trial court has departed from the essential requirements of the law (B) holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial (C) holding that the proper test for balancing national security interests with a persons due process rights is the mathews balancing test (D) recognizing that a party cannot complain on appeal that the trial court considered an issue that that party consented to submit to the trial court (E) holding that in eases where the state fails to disclose to the defendant prior to trial the substance of any oral statement allegedly made by the defendant then the state has committed a discovery violation and the trial court must conduct a richardson hearing upon learning of the possible violation

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
it from regulatory jurisdiction, which “extends to the entire surface and bed of all waterbodies subject to tidal action ... even though portions of such waterbodies may be extremely shallow.” 33 C.F.R. § 329.12(b). Once made, a determination of navigability applies over the entire surface of the water and “is not extinguished by later actions or events which impede or destroy the navigable capacity.” 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(c). Under this broad definition, the waters in which Gateway’s piers stand are clearly navigable. There is ample authority that under the RHA the government can remove structures that were erected lawfully but subsequently found to be in navigable waters under the RHA. See, e.g., Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 35 S.Ct. 551, 59 L.Ed. 939 (1915) (<HOLDING>); Donnell v. U.S., 834 F.Supp. 19, 25-27 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that secretary of war could not be enjoined from redrawing harbor lines effectively forcing owner to remove 200 feet of lawfully constructed wharf that obstructed channel widening and deepening project (B) holding that a landowner whose property was taken in a highway widening project could recover only for the lost land and not for losses caused by traffic islands constructed as part of the same project (C) holding that loss of access resulting from a median strip constructed as part of a highway widening project was a proper consideration because any factor that has a present quantifiable effect on the market value of the property is proper as an element of damages (D) holding that corps may order wharf owners to remove portion of legally constructed wharf in navigable waters to allow for construction of dock (E) holding that even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties

Ex Output:

(A)