instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
see State v. Sosa, 1997-NMSC-032, ¶ 9, 123 N.M. 564, 943 P.2d 1017. {34} Defendant argues that two provisions in the current Delinquency Act suggest the Legislature’s intent to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the Section 32A-2-20 findings. These two provisions, Section 32A-2-24(B) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in probation revocation hearings), and Section 32A-2-16(E) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding), are readily distinguishable from the amenability determination under Section 32A-2-20(B). First, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding is constitutionally mandated. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. Second, a probation revocation hearing, l 7, 1140-41 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>); State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 649, 651, 674 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (D) holding that treatment as a child is not a constitutional right but a right granted by the legislature and statute met basic due process requirements (E) holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard
answer:
holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel


question:
note that, contrary to Kooby and EHI’s assertion, the trial court is not required to hold a hearing on this m 2d 814) (1991) (same). 10 Rogers v. Norris, 262 Ga. App. 857, 857 (1) (586 SE2d 747) (2003) (“Although we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, ‘the trial court must make findings on these issues before we may determine whether its discretion was abused.’ ” (quoting Ga. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Patillo, 194 Ga. App. 279, 279 (390 SE2d 431) (1990))); see also Wood v. Notte, 238 Ga. App. 748, 749 (1) (519 SE2d 923) (1999) (same); Crenshaw, 202 Ga. App. at 611 (1) (same). 11 See Rogers, 262 Ga. App. at 857 (1) (“Failure to make [findings of fact] mandates that we vacate the order dismissing the appeal and remand the case Ga. App. 40, 43 (555 SE2d 508) (2001) (<HOLDING>); A. Roberts Corp. v. Roberts, 207 Ga. App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it (B) holding that trial court made sufficient findings of fact when it dismissed appeal (C) holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case (D) holding that a reviewing court will only presume that the trial court made implicit factual findings when such findings were necessary to its ultimate conclusion (E) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact
answer:
holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it


question:
v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 770 F.Supp. 558 (D.Nev.1991) (applying Nevada law); Millar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 167 Ariz. 93, 804 P.2d 822 (Ariz.Ct.App.1990)). Because the question of whether the efficient proximate cause doctrine should apply in first party property claims is an issue of first impression in Maryland, I must predict how the Maryland Court of Appeals would rule were it to confront this issue. See Delawder v. American Woodmark Corp., 178 Fed.Appx. 197, 202 n. 3 (4th Cir.2006) (because neither the West Virginia legislature nor any West Virginia court had defined the term within the context of the statute, “we must predict how the West Virginia Supreme Court would define this term if it had to confront this issue”); Doe v. Doe, 973 F.2d 237, 240 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). I conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a federal court sitting in diversity is bound to follow the law of the forum state (B) holding that uncertainty for pullman abstention means that a federal court cannot predict with any confidence how a states highest court would decide an issue of state law (C) holding that federal courts sitting in diversity shall apply state substantive law (D) holding that a federal court sitting in diversity must predict how a state court would decide an issue (E) holding that a federal court must decide an issue regarding the interpretation of a state law according to its anticipation of how the highest state court would hold
answer:

holding that a federal court sitting in diversity is bound to follow the law of the forum state