In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

the genus of goods or services for which it seeks protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2), (b)(2); 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.32(a)(6), 2.71(a); TMEP § 1402.01; see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2014) (“Parties that choose to recite services in their trademark application that exceed their actual services will be held to the broader scope of the application.”); Octocom Sys., 918 F.2d at 942 (“[R]egistrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application.... ”). The PTO will generally accept any identification of goods or services so long as it is “specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise.” TMEP § 1402.01; see also In re Omega SA 494 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity (B) holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action (C) holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant (D) holding that it is within the discretion of the pto to require that ones goods be identified with particularity in a trademark application (E) holding that a rule 10b5 claim must be stated with particularity
(D)

a hearing mandated if he can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold a federal evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 12, 112 S.Ct. 1715. It appears, however, that AEDPA overruled the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception, and that at this time, district courts cannot order evi-dentiary hearings unless the requirements of § 2254(e)(2) are met. See Shumate v. Newland, 75 F.Supp.2d 1076, 1084, 1098-99 (N.D.Cal.1999) (“AEDPA, however, has ‘reduced considerably the degree of the district court’s discretion’ by imposing threshold requirements that must be met before a request for an evidentiary hearing may be entertained.”) (quoting Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.1999)); Rodriguez v. Zavaras, 42 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1054-55 (D.Colo.1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Porter v. Gramley, 112 F.3d 1308, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional (B) holding that evidentiary hearing not necessary where proposed administrative action is based on undisputed material facts (C) holding that aedpa did not codify keeney but instead significantly curtails the availability of evidentiary hearings to develop material facts (D) holding that when a state has given petitioner a full and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed to develop material facts to support it he is not entitled to develop further facts in a federal habeas evidentiary hearing unless he demonstrates either cause for the failure and prejudice resulting therefrom or a fundamental miscarriage of justice (E) holding that an evidentiary hearing may be used to develop the factual basis of a prisoner complaint
(C)

to a statutory or regulatory violation so long as these objections are in connection with a procurement or proposed procurement”). To possess standing to bring a bid protest, a plaintiff must be an “interested party”—i.e., an actual or prospective bidder (or offeror) who possesses a direct economic interest in the procurement. Sys. Application & Techs., Inc., 691 F.3d at 1382 (citing Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); see also Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 704 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013). An offeror has a direct economic interest if it suffered a competitive injury or prejudice as a result of an alleged error in the procurement process. Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Weeks Marine, Inc., 575 F.3d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that actual prejudice is not a necessary element of an insurers untimely notice defense (B) recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim (C) holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice (D) holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing (E) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim

(D)