In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: while the parties informally agreed to extend the discovery deadline in order to allow further expert depositions, we do not regard this arrangement as a waiver by plaintiffs of their right to receive documents of such volume and complexity in a sufficiently timely manner to allow an effective response. We recognize, of course, the normal tendency for preparations to intensify as trial approaches and, thus, suggest no general bar to material produced seasonably and in good faith. See Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 266 (1st Cir.1993). In this case, however, we believe that, if Ford intended to rely on this evidence at trial, it should have made more diligent efforts at its timely production. Cf. Glover v. Grace Pac. Corp., 86 Hawai'i 154, 164, 948 P.2d 575, 585 (App.1997) (<HOLDING>). The trial court, nevertheless, distinguished 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates (B) holding the record which included the opinion of several physicians was sufficient for the alj to arrive at a decision (C) holding that the trial court properly excluded an expert who failed to arrive at his final opinion before the discovery cutoff date (D) holding that plaintiff need not have submitted requests for admissions by the august 15 discovery motion cutoff date or by the discovery cutoff date of september 15 because requests for admissions are distinct from other general discovery devices and are not subject to discovery cutoff dates (E) holding that requests for admissions are subject to discovery cutoff dates

A: holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates
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Q: 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther’s theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts “a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman.” White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther’s termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, § 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law

A: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
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Q: interest arbitration to bind the employer to a new agreement when the employer had lawfully repudiated its 8(f) relationship with the union. Relying on Collier Electric, the Board held that so long as the interest arbitration clause was “arguably binding” on the employer, the union did not commit an unfair labor practice by invoking interest arbitration, even though the agreement had expired and the employer had withdrawn from its 8(f) relationship with the union. Baylor Heating, 301 N.L.R.B. at 260-61. In other words, if the union can make a reasonable argument that the contract language allows it to submit “unresolved bargaining issues to interest arbitration,” the union “will be free to invoke its contract rights, includi mpa Sheet Metal Co., 786 F.2d 1459, 1460-61 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement (B) holding that notwithstanding the expiration of the original labor contract the employer was bound by a renewal contract issued by the arbitration panel according to the interest arbitration clause (C) holding that interest arbitration clauses survive the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and rejecting the argument that contractual interest arbitration obligations are canceled by the absence of a statutory duty to bargain (D) holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs (E) holding that the arbitration agreement in a written contract did not apply to a dispute arising from a subsequent oral agreement which did not incorporate the arbitration clause from the written contract

A:
holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement
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