In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 558, 563, 564 S.E.2d 94, 96 (2002). DISCUSSION Moody argues the circuit court erred in granting Dairy-land’s motion for summary judgment, asserting Dairyland did not make a meaningful offer of UIM coverage because it failed to offer coverage in amounts less than the statutory minimum limits. We disagree. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Hawkins v. Bruno Yacht Sales, 353 S.C. 31, 40, 577 S.E.2d 202, 207 (2003).. Moreover, “[w]here the terms of the statute are clear, [this Court] must apply those terms according to their literal meaning.” Brown v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 515, 560 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2002); see also Rowe v. Hyatt, 321 S.C. 366, 369, 468 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In relevant part, section 38-73-470 provides 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning (B) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (C) holding when interpreting a statute words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statutes operation (D) holding that where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation (E) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning
[A]: holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning


[Q]: in the context of an election case, even in the absence of a class action, and concluding that the case was not moot); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n. 5, 93 S.Ct. 1245, 36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973) (concluding that plaintiffs’ class action challenge to New York’s Election Law was capable of repetition yet evading review, although primary election had passed and the petitioners would be eligible to vote in the next primary); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (in challenge to a provision of Tennessee’s election law, concluding that, although plaintiff would be eligible to vote in the next election, the controversy was capable of repetition yet evading review); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 628 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We adopt the approach of the former cases, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appeal was not moot despite the fact that the election had passed because there would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar future controversy emphasis added (B) holding that although the 1972 election had long since passed the case was not moot because the statute under review would apply to other candidates in the future (C) holding that election case was not moot after election because there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining parties would be subject to that same action in the future (D) holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided (E) holding that plaintiffs claims were not moot although the election was over because the same issues would affect minorparty candidacies in the future but failing to address whether fulani herself would be affected
[A]: holding that appeal was not moot despite the fact that the election had passed because there would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar future controversy emphasis added


[Q]: judgment order on appeal. 2 . Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir.2010) (citing Threadgill v. Prudential Sec. Grp., Inc., 145 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir.1998)). 3 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). 4 . Compare Fleming v. Yuma Reg'l Med. Ctr., 587 F.3d 938, 939 (9th Cir.2009), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1006, 130 S.Ct. 3468, 177 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2010) (“[T]he Rehabilitation Act covers discrimination claims by an independent contractor.”) with Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 345 (8th Cir.2006) (“With respect to Dr. Wojewski’s claims under ... the Rehabilitation Act, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the defendants because Dr. Wojewski was not an employee of the hospital.”). See also Schrader v. Fred A. Ray, M.D., P.C., 296 F.3d 968, 969-75 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 546 (6th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action (B) holding that the rehabilitation act does not incorporate the adas requirement that the employer have fifteen or more employees (C) holding employer was entitled to rely and act upon the written advice from the employees physician (D) holding unconscionable an arbitration agreement requiring employees to arbitrate claims against the employer but not requiring the employer to arbitrate claims against the employees (E) holding that the national parks act does not incorporate state procedural housekeeping rules such as rules of evidence or civil procedure but the act does incorporate outcome determinative state law
[A]:
recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action