In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: — cannot alone support guilty verdicts. There must be some further evidence adduced indicating the defendant’s commission of the charged criminal acts. See United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d at 69; United States v. Scheibel, 870 F.2d 818, 822 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Johnson, 513 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir.1975). True enough. But these cases do not hold that, if such actus reus evidence is adduced, there is some temporal limit on the jury’s consideration of consciousness-of-guilt evidence to establish mens rea. Indeed, if flight or false exculpatory statements were indicative only of a defendant’s knowledge and intent at the time of those actions, the evidence would be irrelevant to the charged crime and properly excluded. Instead, the law admits consciousness-of-gui 209 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). (4) The Admissions to Goldsmith Still further 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendants false exculpatory statements admissible to show consciousness of guilt (B) recognizing that evidence of government knowledge of the defendants conduct could be part of a defendants argument that it did not knowingly submit false claims (C) holding parties to an exculpatory clause where the parties intent is clear (D) recognizing that defendants attempt to persuade a witness to make false exculpatory statements is probative of guilty knowledge and intent (E) holding that defendants attempt to mislead a client by providing it with false information was illegal witness tampering because defendant was trying to corruptly persuade or mislead the client with the intent of influencing its potential testimony before the grand jury

A: holding defendants false exculpatory statements admissible to show consciousness of guilt
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Q: controversy turns, in part, on a categorization of the loss at issue; an inherently factual determination requiring the testimony of Penn and NBC staff juxtaposed against Gioia’s onsite analysis. Thus, Gioia is a material witness and his convenience weighs in favor of transfer. B. Locus of the Operative Facts “Where there is no material connection between the district and’the operative facts, ... the interests of justice require the transfer of [the] action.” Manao Invests., 1997 WL 53200, at *2 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). ‘When determining the locus of operative facts in a declaratory judgment action concerning the interpretation of an insurance policy contract, this Court has considered where the insurance contract was made.” Royal Ins., 2002 WL 31385815, at *3-4 (<HOLDING>). Here, while it is unclear whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution (B) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (C) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (D) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york (E) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action

A: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership
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Q: without restrictions. This testimony from Doctor Wolfe, which was the only expert medical testimony offered, does not support Mrozg's assertion that Harrison's failure to cooperate with prescribed treatment, exaggeration of symptoms, and failure to complete physical therapy aggravated or increased his injuries. To the contrary, Doctor Wolfe testified that ninety percent of people with Harrison's soft tissue injuries "get well within three (8) months, ninety (90) days" and that Harrison recovered in approximately seven weeks. Tr. at 185. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the evidence did not support the giving of the mitigation of damages instruction. See, e.g., Kristoff v. (Glasson, 778 N.E.2d 465, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages (B) holding that plaintiffs proof that she became depressed and was prescribed depression medication by her family physician was insufficient to support claim and stating evidence that randolph is very depressed and very upset is insufficient to sustain damages for mental anguish (C) holding that evidence that plaintiff did not regularly perform her prescribed exercises was insufficient to support a mitigation of damages claim in the absence of physician testimony that she failed to mitigate her damages (D) holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action (E) holding in a landlordtenant dispute that even though defendant proved failure to mitigate damages because it did not also prove how much the plaintiffs damages increased by failure to mitigate the trial court did not err in refusing to reduce plaintiffs damages

A:
holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages
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