In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

officer was not acting in the lawful discharge of his official duties when he commanded Green to come speak with him. See generally Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. 656, 658 (1) (727 SE2d 257) (2012) (describing circumstances in which a citizen may walk or even run from a law enforcement officer). By expressly challenging whether the officer was lawfully discharging his official duties in their encounter, Green implicitly challenged his own knowledge that the officer’s commands to him were lawful. Indeed, Green’s counsel argued at trial that, because the officer made no lawful commands to Green, the state could not show that Green had the knowledge required by the statute for the offense of misdemeanor obstruction. See Thomas v. State, 322 Ga. App. 734, 738 (2) (b) (746 SE2d 216) (2013) (<HOLDING>); Gibson v. State, 265 Ga. App. 325, 328 (593 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a capital defendant is mentally competent to abandon any and all challenges to his or her death sentence including appeals state postconviction collateral review and federal habeas corpus if he or she has the mental capacity to understand the choice between life and death and to make a knowing and intelligent decision not to pursue further remedies (B) holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right (C) holding that defendants disobedience cannot have been knowing and wilful if officer has not made clear to defendant that he or she was compelled to obey (D) holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority (E) holding that a person has standing to bring suit under the civil rights act if she or he can show that she or he was punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities
(C)

CURIAM. Appellant, John Mark Vaughan, Jr., filed a Rule 3.800(a) motion, claiming that his sentence was illegal under Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines could have been imposed under the valid 1994 guidelines. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to attach the relevant portions of the record to support this finding, which ordinarily would require reversal. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 741 So.2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). However, appellant failed to allege that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a movant successfully challenges an illegal prr sentence in a rule 3800a motion at resentencing the movant is entitled to be present at sentencing represented by counsel with an opportunity to present mitigating evidence (B) holding that burden is on trial court denying a facially sufficient rule 3800a motion to attach record establishing movant is not entitled to relief (C) holding motion for substitution of judge properly denied where movant failed to attach affidavit (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding that a rule 3800a motion that does not allege that the court records show the defendants entitlement to additional jail credit is facially insufficient
(B)

1992 to reserve its rights, Liberty waived its notice provision defense to liability under the policy. Liberty knew of the Johnson Lawsuit by April, 1987 and the DEQ order by May, 1987. There is undisputed evidence that soon thereafter, a Liberty representative contacted Joslyn’s attorney, William J. Rotenberry, to request information about the Site. In a letter, dated February 2, 1988, Mr. Rotenberry enclosed a copy of the Environmental Investigation performed at the Site “as well as other documents which indicate activity through the current date.” Liberty’s communication with Joslyn’s attorney after it had notice of both the occurrence and suit gave rise to an obligation to issue a reservation of rights letter within a reasonable amount of time. See Peavey, 971 F.2d at 1175 (<HOLDING>); V/O Exportkhleb v. M/V ANPA 773 F.Supp. 832, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (B) holding that the liability creating event constitutes an occurrence (C) holding that insurer who after being told of occurrence contacted insureds attorney for information should have issued reservation of rights letter within a reasonable time after  it was informed of the occurrence (D) holding that insurer that waited five months after being informed of occurrence and two months after being informed of suit against insured to deliver reservation of rights letter waived its noncoverage defense (E) holding that there was no coverage because there was no occurrence within the meaning of the policy because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident or an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy

(C)