In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: But he claims that release at age 60 is a geriatric release and the functional equivalent of life without parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also argues that such release violates the principles in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery because release at age 60 provides only grim prospects for any meaningful future outside prison. [¶12.] Even if Charles’s 92-year sentence is equivalent to a sentence of life without parole, that alone does not mean his sentence is unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment precedent. The United States Supreme Court bars mandatory life sentences without parole against juvenile homicide offenders, not discretionary sentences of life without parole. See Miller, 567 U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2469; State v. Springer, 2014 S.D. 80, ¶ 15, 856 N.W.2d 460, 466 (<HOLDING>). [¶13.] In response, Charles asks this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentences of life without parole unique in their severity (B) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (C) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (D) holding that consecutive fixedterm sentences for juveniles who committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are not clearly unconstitutional under graham even when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole (E) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: or “plain error” exists. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah 1992); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). In the present case, or in any similar case, the only way that a defendant could challenge the constitutionality of section 78 — 3—31(6)(a) would be first to consent to a hearing by a commissioner and then to challenge the validity of that very consent. Such a procedure would likely be futile inasmuch as it would invariably result in the withdrawal of the consent, either by the defendant or by court order. Indeed, absent the approach taken by Ohms, it is unlikely that section 78-3-31(6)(a) would ever be subject to constitutional scrutiny. This is precisely the sort of exceptional circu Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). For example, a legislator cannot appoint 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that utah const art vi  1 limits legislatures ability to delegate legislative powers or functions to others (B) holding that the governor of new york has only those powers delegated to him by the state constitution and the statutes (C) holding that the contact clause reaches every form in which the legislative power of a state is exerted whether it be a constitution a constitutional amendment an enactment of the legislature a bylaw or ordinance of a municipal corporation or a regulation or order of some other instrumentality of the state exercising delegated legislative authority (D) holding that crime definition and penalty powers are essential legislative functions that cannot constitutionally be delegated by the utah legislature to any other person or body (E) holding that legislative functions such as powers of zoning and rezoning cannot be delegated

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: discovery. NYC admits that it did not provide its Initial Disclosures before the discovery deadline, however, NYC argues that: (1) it was awaiting information for use in its Initial Disclosures and alerted Empire to this fact; (2) the late disclosure was not in bad faith; and (3) regardless, the late disclosure contained information already provided in discovery, so no prejudice to Empire resulted. NYC denies that it did not produce a witness or that it did not provide additional documentation. Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to impose various sanctions when a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2); see also Transatlantic Bulk Shipping Ltd. v. Saudi Chattering S.A., 112 F.R.D. 185, 189 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (<HOLDING>). It is clear that sanctions may be imposed 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing power of bankruptcy court under  105 of the code and bankruptcy rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay (B) recognizing power of bankruptcy court to impose sanctions on parties and counsel who willfully abuse the judicial process but not finding sanctions appropriate against debtor and his attorney for their repeated bankruptcy filings (C) recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal (D) holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291 (E) holding that under rule 37b  sanctions are appropriatefor defendants proven dishonesty and repeated violations of three court orders


Output: (E)