TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: though it may be more expedient for the legislature to redraft the statute in its entirety. See Hill, 202 Ill. 2d at 156; McDougall, 389 Ill. at 155. Defendant further contends that the decision by another division of this appellate district in In re E.H., 355 Ill. App. 3d 564 (2005), which he claims held section 115 — 10 to be facially unconstitutional en toto, is “controlling.” We begin by initially noting that defendant misstates the effect that the decision of one appellate court panel has upon the subsequent considerations of another. We are not bound by the decisions of the other divisions of this district so that even if E.H. held as defendant claims, it would not be “controlling” over our analysis. Muller v. Health & Hospital Governing Comm’n, 106 Ill. App. 3d 383, 386 (1982) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 93 Ill. 2d 543 (1983) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement (B) holding that appellate court is not bound by the agencys interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue (C) holding that the attorney generals decision not to provide representation to an employee is reviewable by the appellate division not by the law division where the actions against the employee are pending (D) holding itself not bound by the opinion of another division of its own appellate district (E) holding that this court is not bound by decisions of the appellate division or the third circuit even where those decisions concern the same parties and legal issues

SOLUTION: holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement

PROBLEM: felt compelled, at the very least, to guess why the prosecutor behaved as he did. But the Batson framework was designed to avoid such “needless and imperfect speculation,” by asking prosecutors to perform the “simple” task of placing race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes on the record. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172, 125 S.Ct. 2410. As a result, this Court must conclude that the Appellate Division applied Batson and its progeny in an unreasonable manner. The Court appreciates the gravity of this holding, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s admonition that AEDPA creates a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388. Even in the Batson context, however, AEDPA deference has its limits. See, e.g., Jones, 555 F.3d at 101 (<HOLDING>). Enforcing those limits is the only way to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new york courts unreasonably applied batson (B) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (C) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (D) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action (E) holding that new york law applies to this matter

SOLUTION: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york

PROBLEM: strips circuit courts of the authority to impose sanctions against parties filing frivolous lawsuits. I do not take this position lightly. Prior to this decision, our law was clear. Sanctions may be imposed against a party “as the result of his or her vexatious, wanton, or oppressive assertion of a claim or defense that cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the application, extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Syl., in part, Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. Canady, 175 W.Va. 249, 332 S.E.2d 262 (1985). See, e.g., Pritt v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 204 W.Va. 388, 513 S.E.2d 161 (1998) (per curiam) (affirming sanctions against plaintiff for filing a baseless lawsuit); Syl. pt. 4, in part, State ex rel. Roy Allen S. v. Stone, 196 W.Va. 624, 474 S.E.2d 554 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, this Court has held that “[t]he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a circuit court has discretion under rule 11 to impose attorneys fees on litigants who bring vexatious and groundless lawsuits (B) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (C) holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion (D) holding that rule 11 does not authorize a district court to award appellate attorneys fees due to similar concerns (E) holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions

SOLUTION:
recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11