TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: of two dates between Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro in 1988. In its view, the evidence was irrelevant and inflammatory. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion in limine with respect to this evidence. The court believed that the evidence was relevant and ought to be before the jury because it had the task of evaluating the overall relationship of Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro. Evidence that is relevant to the background of the case is admissible for that purpose. At the very least, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court not to exclude this evidence in a motion in limine; the evidence was at least potentially relevant for the purpose the judge identified. See Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). LCFS did not object during the trial when Ms. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time (B) holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment (C) holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background (D) holding that section 102 of the civil rights act of 1991 does not apply to preenactment conduct (E) holding that the  1981 amendments contained in  101 of the civil rights act of 1991 do not apply retroactively

SOLUTION: holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time

PROBLEM: as well as recent country reports and his own affidavit, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that he failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegation that conditions in China have materially changed. We have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no abuse of discretion in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish changed conditions in China. Id. at 275 (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as “the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] ... it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion”); Jian Huan Guan, v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In addition, we find that the BIA did not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bia did not abuse its discretion in denying a petitioners untimely motion to reopen where she submitted proof of the birth of her two sons a letter from her parents warning of the danger of forced sterilization and a purported sterilization certificate for her cousin who also had two children (B) holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen (C) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (D) holding that the bia correctly imputed a parents knowledge that she and her children were not eligible for entry to the united states to her children (E) holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it

SOLUTION: holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen

PROBLEM: as the dissent seems to imply, for a court simply to state the legal standard borfectly. It must also apply that standard correctly. Here, after accdrately stating the standard for an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court “conflated the requirements for a postbonviction evidentia-ry hearing with the requirements for a new trial” when it evaliiated the credibility of Caldwell’s witnesses without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Id. (emphases in original omitted). To be sure, a postconviction court has discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing on grounds that are unrelated to a recanting witness’s credibility — for example, when an alleged recantatioh does not actually contradict a witness’s trial testimony. Cf. Opsahl v. State (Opsahl II), 710 N.W.2d 776, 782 (Minn.2006) (<HOLDING>). In such a situation, a petitioner would not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where movant alleged the names of uncalled witnesses and them anticipated testimony which would have been relevant mitigation evidence in the penalty phase but did not allege that trial counsel knew of the witnesses or that the witnesses were available to testify at trial the movant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction relief motion because he did not allege facts sufficient to satisfy the standard applicable to his claim (B) holding that relief was unavailable in part because some recanting witnesses reversed any recantation they may have made and others claimed merely that they did not give a full explanation of their testimony at trial (C) holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial (D) holding that neglect was not excusable where the defendants did not do all that they were required to do after they received the summons and complaint in that they did not contact a lawyer or make any other arrangements with respect to their defense (E) holding that bare conclusions of lay fact witnesses did not amount to any evidence at all and that the fact that they were admitted without objection added nothing to their probative force

SOLUTION:
holding that where movant alleged the names of uncalled witnesses and them anticipated testimony which would have been relevant mitigation evidence in the penalty phase but did not allege that trial counsel knew of the witnesses or that the witnesses were available to testify at trial the movant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction relief motion because he did not allege facts sufficient to satisfy the standard applicable to his claim