In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: objectively by a reasonable person. Cooper v. Albacore Holdings, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 238, 244-45 (Mo.App.E.D.2006). Here, the trial court found that the Employer’s alleged conduct was not sufficient as a matter of law to objectively establish severe or pervasive hostility based on a disability. Whether “a reasonable person would objectively consider [an employer’s] behavior towards [a claimant] severe enough to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment” is a question of fact. Cooper, 204 S.W.3d at 245; see also Howard, 149 F.3d at 840; 37 William C established, whether a reasonable person would similarly find the conduct offensive will generally be a question of fact for the jury. Cf. Meyerkord v. Zipatoni Co., 276 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Mo.App.E.D.2008) (<HOLDING>); Y.G. v. Jewish Hasp, of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave (B) holding that whether misrepresentations would be highly offensive to a reasonable person are questions for a jury (C) holding that questions of proximate cause are within the exclusive domain for the jury and may only be removed when reasonable minds cannot differ (D) holding in determining whether driver was insured under terms of policy exclusion of person using vehicle without a reasonable belief person was entitled to do so must be considered (E) holding that whether an encounter is consensual hinges on whether a reasonable person would have felt free to disregard the police and go about his business
[EX A]: holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave

[EX Q]: Brown’s argument that she was speaking as a citizen is supported by the fact that ordinary citizens may similarly report public misconduct to the Auditors. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-61dd (conferring right to file reports with Auditors on “any person”). The existence of a civilian analogue to Brown’s conduct strengthens her allegations that her speech was as a citizen and thus protected by the First Amendment. See Matthews I, 779 F.3d at 176. The instant case is not similar to other cases of its type that were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage. In many of those cases, the plaintiff-employee had made an admission that the alleged speech was made, at least in part, pursuant to his or her official duties. See Matthews v. Lynch, 483 Fed.Appx. 624, 626 (2d Cir. 2012) (Matthews III) (<HOLDING>); Anemone, 629 F.3d at 116. Here, there is no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel (B) holding that a plaintiff did not complain to the eeoc pursuant to official duties but rather as a citizen (C) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (D) holding that speech was pursuant to official duties because plaintiff conceded at oral argument that as an internal affairs officer he had a broad responsibility to investigate and report police misconduct (E) holding police officer is a public official
[EX A]: holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel

[EX Q]: an intention that suits for pension benefits by disappointed applicants are equitable.”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112, 101 S.Ct. 922, 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981); see also Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace and Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1258-59 (2d Cir.1996); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir.985); Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058, 106 S.Ct. 800, 88 L.Ed.2d 776 (1986); In re Vorpahl, 695 F,2d 318, 321-22 (8th Cir.1982); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980). Some district courts have suggested that Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989), calls these holdings into doubt. See, e.g., Hulcher v. United Behavioral Sys., 919 F.Supp. 879, 885 (E.D.Va.1995) (<HOLDING>); Vaughn v. Owen Steel Co., 871 F.Supp. 247, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1132a1b affords the plaintiff adequate relief for her benefits claim and a cause of action under  1132a3 is thus not appropriate (B) holding plaintiff had no claim under  1132a3 because his grievance that benefits were denied is specifically addressed in  1132a1b (C) holding that plaintiff in erisa action was entitled to restitution under similar circumstances (D) holding that claims for misrepresentation under texas insurance code were preempted because the plaintiffs sought to recover benefits under an erisa plan (E) holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under  1132a1b
[EX A]:
holding that  1132a1b affords the plaintiff adequate relief for her benefits claim and a cause of action under  1132a3 is thus not appropriate