In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability “from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik’s] attendance” it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik’s attendance at the gym — in essence all of Sydlik’s claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release
[A]: holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release


[Q]: in cases decided under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Meyers, 616 F.3d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (characterizing the Segal standard as a "background rule under the old Bankruptcy Act, to which courts still refer in the era of the Bankruptcy Code”); Andrews, 80 F.3d at 910-11 (applying the Segal standard to determine whether post-petition payments under a pre-petition non-compete agreement were property of the debtor’s estate); Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1423 (concluding the Bankruptcy Code "follows Segal insofar as it includes after-acquired property 'sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past’ but eliminates the requirement that it not be entangled with the debtor’s ability to make a fresh start”). But see Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir.2006) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Although the parties frame the issue as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code (B) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (C) holding that the question of whether an interest is a claim for bankruptcy purposes is to be resolved by reference to the text history and purpose of the bankruptcy code (D) holding although congress has specifically approved of segals result segals sufficiently rooted test did not survive the enactment of the bankruptcy code footnote omitted (E) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate
[A]: holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code


[Q]: 286 (1996). Instead, “[a]pportionment of a fee award between fees incurred on a contract cause of action and those incurred on other causes of action is within the trial court’s discretion.” Id. In this case, appellants do not challenge the district court’s conclusion that Datacom’s tort and contract claims were inextricably intertwined. Therefore, we affirm the attorney’s fee award against Datacom. However, Moore was not a party to the Charter contract, or to Datacom’s causes of action based on contract. As a result, Moore would not have been entitled to fees against Charter had Moore prevailed on his tort claims. We therefore hold Charter is not entitled to fees from Moore by prevailing on contract claims against Datacom. See Abdallah, 43 Cal.App.4th at 1111, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 286 (<HOLDING>); Hsu v. Abbara, 9 Cal.4th 863, 870, 39 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees (B) holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed (C) holding that the plaintiff who prevailed in an ipra enforcement action was entitled to an award of damages fees and costs (D) holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 usc  1983 claim was entitled to an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal (E) holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees
[A]:
holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees