In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: “multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn.2006) (citations omitted). Both requirements are met here. The district court convicted and sentenced Wallace for two distinct crimes committed upon two distinct victims: once for attempting to rape R.L. and once for stabbing and killing Kenneth Williams. And Wallace does not argue, nor have we found any legal basis to conclude, that the multiple sentences imposed by the district court in this case unfairly exaggerate the criminality of his conduct. See, e.g., State v. Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d 849, 850-51 (Minn.1980) (<HOLDING>). In fact, we squarely rejected the precise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts (B) holding that the district court did not err by sentencing a defendant to consecutive prison terms for seconddegree manslaughter and aggravated assault committed against two separate victims because the multiple sentences did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendants conduct (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding in assault and involun tary manslaughter case that district court has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences based on finding of whether multiple counts involved the same harm (E) holding that separate sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and with intent to rob were barred
[EX A]: holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts

[EX Q]: to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. As a matter of first consideration, any court has the duty to determine, sua sponte, whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case. Welch v. McDougal, 876 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied). As material to this question, section 65.023(b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code requires that an application for an injunction to stay proceedings in a suit or execution on a judgment must be tried in the court in which the suit is pending or the judgment was rendered. This requirement is jurisdictional and does not relate merely to venue. See Butron v. Cantu, 960 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); Home Sav. Ass’n v. Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Because the Gard-ners seek to challenge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is  no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court (B) holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions (C) holding that a dis trict court has no authority to issue injunction restraining enforcement of judgment of the county court where as here the judgment solely resolves who is entitled to immediate possession (D) holding that motion to dismiss should not  be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law (E) holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state
[EX A]: holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is  no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court

[EX Q]: and allowing them to respond to Kuljis’s claims would not cause undue delay or injury to Kuljis. They averred that they were ready for trial, that they would reimburse Kuljis for all reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the “default” judgment, and that they were willing to refund the security deposit immediately, subject to its being accepted by Kuljis and his attorney. ■ On appeal, the Nguyens argue that they have established that their collective failure to respond adequately to Kuljis’s motions for summary judgment was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but the result of accident or mistake. See Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 442-44; Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 685; see also Imkie v. Methodist Hosp., 326 S.W.3d 339, 346 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The majority agrees that Tho and Giang 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pro se litigant who appeared in court under belief that her appearance was all that was needed to respond to summary judgment established that her failure to respond or ask for extension of time were mistakes based on misunderstanding of law and satisfied wheeler test (B) holding that district court did not err in summarily granting defendants motion for summary judgment pursuant to local rule where pro se plaintiff failed to respond to motion after district court had warned plaintiff that it would deem his failure to respond a consent to granting of motion (C) holding that a pro se party must be advised of consequences of failing to respond to a dispositive motion including an explanation that the failure to respond  may result in the district court granting the motion and dismissing the case (D) holding that upon a demon stration of abuse a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant reasonable notice and an opportunity to respond (E) holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond
[EX A]:
holding that district court did not err in summarily granting defendants motion for summary judgment pursuant to local rule where pro se plaintiff failed to respond to motion after district court had warned plaintiff that it would deem his failure to respond a consent to granting of motion