In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: 9006(b)(3). There is no excusable neglect basis for enlarging the claims bar date included in Rule 3002(c). Accordingly, the excusable neglect standard found in Rule 9006(b)(1) does not authorize extensions of the claims deadline imposed in chapter 13 cases. In re Oscar, 2005 WL 6522763 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Apr. 14, 2005). “[S]ince 1994, the courts have almost uniformly ruled that proofs of claim that are untimely filed in a Chapter 13 case may not be deemed timely filed, and that the claimants thereunder should not take from, or be permitted to recover from, the debtor’s estate under the Chapter 13 plan.” Daniels, 466 B.R. at 217 (listing examples). This Court has consistently held that late claims are not permitted in chapter 13 cases. In re Dumain, 492 B.R. 140, 148 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2013) (<HOLDING>). As such, the Court will not allow Ocwen’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding impairment of secured creditors foreclosure remedy permissible (B) holding that failure to comply with bankruptcy rule 4004 may be waived (C) holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added (D) holding that secured creditors must comply with the bar date imposed by bankruptcy rule 3002c (E) holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor
Example Output: holding impairment of secured creditors foreclosure remedy permissible

Example Input: the public interest and ‘[considerations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system’ require that the district court defer to local government administrators.” Id. In Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1166, the Sixth Circuit was very clear that, where “decisional law has changed so that the enjoined behavior, which once might have been a violation of federal law, is no longer a matter of federal law at all” the injunction must be vacated. In light of the fact that no federal right underpins the 1974 decree — as well as the fact that the “local government administrators” in this case appear to favor vacating the decree — the court can identify no reason that the 1974 consent decree should remain in effect. Cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (<HOLDING>); Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act (B) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated (D) holding that a court errs when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of  changes in statutory or decisional law (E) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes
Example Output: holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act

Example Input: omitted). Accordingly we concluded that because misdemeanor battery could be violated through the “least touching,” the statute did not require the use of violent force and thus was not a crime of violence under the federal generic statute. Id. Ortegar-Mendez, however, is readily distinguishable because a conviction under § 273.5(a) requires more than a simple battery. Unlike § 242, which criminalizes the use of “force or violence,” § 273.5(a) contains no differentiating provision. California Penal Code § 273.5(a) requires that the defendant “willfully inflict ... corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition.” (emphasis added). The commonsense reading of this language is that § 273.5(a) requires the use of violence. See United States v. Jimenez, 258 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Unlike simple battery, which requires 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that marital communications which arise from an act of violence by a spouse committed against the children of either spouse should constitute an exception to the marital privilege because such communications fail to satisfy the conditions underlying the creation of the privilege (B) holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor (C) holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium (D) holding that a defendant could not reasonably  dispute that inflicting corporal injury on his spouse involved the use of violence (E) holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that the code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse
Example Output:
holding that marital communications which arise from an act of violence by a spouse committed against the children of either spouse should constitute an exception to the marital privilege because such communications fail to satisfy the conditions underlying the creation of the privilege