In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: on behalf of’ MBC. The record also discloses that the contract makes no reference to MBC and was signed by Mullís as “Contractor.” The record further discloses that payments were made to Mullís, not MBC, and that the payments were deposited into Mullis’s personal account, not into MBC’s account in a separate bank. This evidence supports the trial court’s findings and its ultimate conclusion that Mullís was individually liable for any damages suffered by the Brennans. If Mullís wanted to act as agent for MBC and bind the corporation to the contract, he should have signed the contract in his corporate capacity. This would have had the effect of insulating him from liability. See Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), aff'd, 638 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind.1994) (<HOLDING>). Mullís, without any citation to authority, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (B) holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity (C) holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to determine whether the defendant intended to be bound in his personal andor corporate capacity where the agreement contained certain personal guarantees by the defendant but where the defendant signed the agreement only in a corporate capacity with no signature blocks provided for signing in a personally capacity (D) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (E) holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: expenses related to the children’s needs at the time of the hearing. The trial court made numerous, in-depth findings regarding the children’s accustomed standard of living, the needs of the children, and the variance between the expenses incurred by defendant on behalf of the children and expenses incurred by plaintiff on behalf of the children. These findings are sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that the Pataky presumption was rebutted. Although in most cases, the custodial parent obtains an increase in child support, a court has discretionary authority to enter an order establishing child support in an amount less than the amount established by a separation or child support agreement. See Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 234-35, 346 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1986) (<HOLDING>). We hold the trial court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter (B) holding that it was error for the trial court to determine the issue of child support without a child support guidelines worksheet (C) holding trial court had discretionary authority to enter order setting child support amount as less than that provided for in the parties separation agreement (D) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality (E) holding that an order that determines only the right to attorneys fees without setting the amount is a nonappealable nonfinal order
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: and reimbursement claim based on the plan. Looking to FEHBA’s legislative history, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the purpose of FEHBA was to establish health insurance for federal employees and that insurance carriers “help the government fulfill the basic task of establishing a health benefits program for federal employees.” Id. at 1233. The Jacks court concluded that OPM “has direct and extensive control over these benefit contracts under the FEHBA.” The court determined that even though the plan “allows the carrier the discretion to pursue subrogation,” that “does not foreclose the application of the federal officer removal statute” because “the subrogation provision is necessarily a product of the benefit payment pro F.Supp.2d 848 (W.D.Mo.2011) (<HOLDING>); Van Horn v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that health insurer contracted with fehba was not acting under a federal agency within the meaning of the federal officer removal statute (B) holding that the fact that the insurance carrier voluntarily entered into a mutually agreed upon contract with the opm to administer healthcare benefits to federally employed enrollees does not rise to the level of a relationship defined as acting under a federal officer  (C) holding that a health plan insurer contracting with a government agency under a federal benefits program is considered a person acting under a federal officer (D) holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school (E) holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract
[EX A]:
(B)