In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Attorney General, Mary Jo Volkert, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daniel M. King, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Judgment affirmed. Ray and Self, JJ., concur. 1 U. S. Const, amend. V; see also Ga. Const. Art. 1, § 3, ¶1 (a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph, private property shall not be taken or damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid.”); Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., _ U. S. _, _ (II) (A) (1) (135 SCt 2419,192 LE2d388) (2015) (“The principle reflected in the [Takings] Clause goes back at least 800 years to the Magna Carta . . . .”). 2 See, e.g., Wood v. B & S Enters., 314 Ga. App. 128, 128 (723 SE2d 443) (2012). 3 See Kellett v. Dep’t of Transp., 174 Ga.App. 214, 21 .App. 622, 624-25 (6) (522 SE2d 661) (1999) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge (B) holding that although portion of trial courts jury charge was inapplicable any error in providing it was harmless in light of the fact that charge considered as a whole was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury (C) holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole (D) holding that because trial court actually gave part of a jury charge that appellant claimed was improperly omitted and because remainder of courts charge adequately defined one of the legal terms at issue the courts jury charge taken as a whole was not misleading and did not constitute reversible error (E) holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence
(A)

The agency reasonably found that unfulfilled threats, which were the only individualized harm Yang alleged he had suffered, did not rise to the level of persecution. See Ci Pan v. United States Atty. General, 449 F.3d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir.2006). This is so, even when considered in conjunction with his father’s alleged beating, because, as the IJ noted, Yang did not allege that this incident resulted in any injuries to his father or caused Yang any continuing harm. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir.2007) (“the statutory scheme unambiguously dictates that applicants can become candidates for asylum relief only based on persecution that they themselves have suffered or must suffer”); see also Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141-42 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the agency did not err in finding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an asylum applicant cannot claim past persecution based solely on the harm that was inflicted on a family member on account of that family members political opinion or other protected characteristic (B) recognizing that an applicant may be able to demonstrate persecution based on persecution of family members where the applicant shares  the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family member was in the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident citing jorgetzoc v gonzales 435 f3d 146 150 2d cir2006 (C) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution (D) recognizing that the harm suffered by family members in combination with other factors  would presumably only be persecution where  the applicant not only shares or is perceived to share the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family members but was also within the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident (E) holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person
(D)

is devoted to contesting that Plaintiffs statements on the first day of the Harvard program fall within the ambit of the First Amendment. See Def. Hall Mot. at 14-15. However, even assuming that Plaintiffs statements at the Harvard program were not protected conduct, Plaintiffs other alleged actions—filing a lawsuit contending that government officials violated state law and criticizing one of those officials in the media—clearly are protected. See Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 723 (6th Cir.2010) (comments in press protected activity); Eckerman v. Tenn. Dep’t of Safety, 636 F.3d 202, 208 (6th Cir.2010) (“The filing of a lawsuit to redress grievances is clearly protected activity under the First Amendment.”); Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 587-588 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Hall does not suggest otherwise. See Def. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing first amendment retaliation right (B) recognizing that the first amendment encompasses criticism of government officials (C) recognizing criticisms of public officials is at core of speech protected by first amendment (D) holding that criticism of the defendants failure to express remorse penalized his assertion of fifth amendment rights (E) recognizing that the first amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power

(B)