TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: to the registrations of any party to the action. Decrees and orders shall be certified by the court to the Commissioner, who shall make appropriate entry upon the records of the Patent and Trademark Office, and shall be controlled thereby. 15 U.S.C. § 1119. 27. The legal issue in a cancellation proceeding is the right to register a mark and when a mark is not incontestable, a court may cancel the mark on any ground which would have prevented registration initially. International Order of Job's Daughters, 727 F.2d at 1091. 28. As noted, a mark "which does not fulfill the functions of a trademark, but, rather, serves essentially a utilitarian or functional purpose cannot be registered as a trademark." Id.; see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson, 25 F.2d 833, 834-35 (4th Cir.1928) (<HOLDING>). 29. Because Shakespeare's mark is a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that automobile racing is not an ultrahazardous activity (B) holding that diamondshaped tread on tire which is a mechanically functional feature of an automobile tire cannot be registered (C) holding when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile he may as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest search the passenger compartment of that automobile (D) holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer (E) holding that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered  stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his drivers license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the fourth amendment

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: court may not impose multiple gun minimum sentences on convictions arising from the same criminal episode. To the extent that the state’s assignment of error implicitly raised that issue, I would hold that defendant is correct. See State v. Hardesty, 298 Or 616, 618-19, 695 P2d 569 (1985); see also State v. Wells, 82 Or App 283, 285-86, 728 P2d 533 (1986). I conclude, therefore, that the sentencing court did not err when it imposed a gun minimum sentence on only one count in this case. 2 The inclusion of the language “with a firearm” in the title of the offense for which defendant was sentenced in 1991 is and was sufficient under ORS 161.610(2) to allege use or threatened use of a firearm as an element in aggravation. But see State v. Pies, 104 Or App 646, 650-51, 802 P2d 702 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 3 The judgment in that case simply sentenced 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting (B) holding that to be guilty of aiding and abetting under  924c the defendant must have directly facilitated or encouraged use of the firearm mere presence at the scene of the crime and knowledge that the crime is being committed is not enough (C) holding that a defendant convicted of committing a felony with a firearm on an aiding and abetting theory might not personally have used or threatened to use the firearm and thus that the conviction might not count for purposes of imposing a gun minimum sentence under ors 161610 (D) holding that no active facilitation of the principals use of the firearm is necessary for an aiding and abetting conviction under  924c (E) holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used

SOLUTION:
(C)