In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: Abreu’s App. at 1878.) The defendants do not challenge now, nor did they contest at trial, the accuracy of these statements as related to the bank statements. The declaration that the bank statements were kept in the ordinary course of the banks’ businesses did not add to the Government’s case against the defendants for submitting false loan applications. It was the information contained in the bank statements themselves, which is not contested on appeal, that the Government relied upon to make its case. The authenticity of the bank statements has never been challenged, and the admission of the statements contained in the Rule 902(11) Certifications as related to the bank statements simply had no effect on the verdict. Cf. United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Government of Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 964 
 Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous admission of evidence not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the only other evidence against defendant was the uncorroborated testimony of a cooperating witness of questionable credibility (B) holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt (C) holding the admission of plea allocutions of codefendants to be harmless against a crawford challenge where the government did not emphasize the allocutions which were used only as corroboration for other evidence showing the existence of an enterprise in a rico case (D) holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record (E) holding that trial courts error in failing to sua sponte give instruction was harmless because state did not emphasize this evidence in closing argument and evidence of appellants guilt was otherwise overwhelming
Example Output: holding erroneous admission of evidence not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the only other evidence against defendant was the uncorroborated testimony of a cooperating witness of questionable credibility

Example Input: 188 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio E.D.1981); In re Davis, 16 B.R. 473 (D.Kan.1981). Or after a judgment has been entered: In re Young, 22 B.R. 620 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.E.D.1982); In re Breuer, 4 B.R. 499, 6 B.C.D. 136 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.1980). (5)Courts that hold that a debtor may cure a default where a foreclosure sale has been held provided that the debtor’s right of redemption under state law has not expired: In re Johnson, 29 B.R. 104 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1983); In re Chambers, 27 B.R. 687 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1983); In re Taylor, 21 B.R. 179 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1982); In re Thompson, 17 B.R. 748 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mich.1982). 32 B.R. at 790. To the fourth group we add the following recent opinions by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits: Grubbs v. Houston First American Savings Association, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Clark, 738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir.1984) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding debtor could cure default partly because the bank held a recourse loan and therefore could recover against the original borrower personally (B) holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court (C) holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank (D) holding that a debtor may cure a default after acceleration but expressing no limit on the right (E) holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default
Example Output: holding debtor could cure default partly because the bank held a recourse loan and therefore could recover against the original borrower personally

Example Input: people who are not government officials (“and other person acting under color of law”) are “government,” and thus proper defendants under RFRA, indicates that individual capacity suits must be permitted because no one who is not a government official has an “official capacity” in which to be sued. Moreover, Congress knows how to specify that a statutory provision applies to government officials only in their “official capacity” when it wants to, and has not done so here. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which provides, in part, “[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity ... may ... be brought in any judicial district,” and Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 100 S.Ct. 774, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The court also reads RFRA to allow for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that since damage claims in an article 78 proceeding may only be asserted against individuals in their official capacities the plaintiff could not have recovered damages against the education officials in their individual capacities and therefore cannot be barred by res judicata  (B) holding that an action brought against the state officials in their official capacities was not properly removed to federal court because the district court lacked jurisdiction (C) holding that such claims however cannot be brought directly against the state or a state agency but only against state officials in their official capacities (D) holding based in part on this statutory language that  1391e is not applicable to actions for money damages brought against federal officials in their individual capacities (E) holding suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permissible because they are in effect suits against the officials in their individual capacities
Example Output:
holding that since damage claims in an article 78 proceeding may only be asserted against individuals in their official capacities the plaintiff could not have recovered damages against the education officials in their individual capacities and therefore cannot be barred by res judicata