In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: (second factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the [private] insurer and the insured”). Finally, despite the MSP provision that the United States can pursue "any entity” for reimbursement, see id. (third factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry''), the MSP provision limits reimbursement to recoveries from "primary plans,” whose definition lists only entities which are clearly "within” the insurance industry. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) ("primary plan" means “a group health plan or large group health plan, ... a workmen's compensation law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan ... or no-fault insurance”); cf. Kachanis, 844 F.Supp. 877 (D.R.I.1994) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Finally, the Fund raises a puzzling 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  1012 applicable to feca provision allowing united states to recover from any third party (B) holding that the secretary of the interior breached the united states duty of loyalty despite the absence of any applicable treaty or statutory provision (C) holding that a states entitlement to indemnification from a third party does not vitiate the states sovereign immunity against a money judgment (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding that an ancillary forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 usc  853n is a civil action for the purpose of allowing a third party to recover attorneys fees
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: waived his attorney-client privilege when his attorney failed to make timely objections to questions that it alleged sought privileged communications. This argument has no merit for two reasons. First, many of the questions Airdata asked did not seek confidential communications. Therefore, no objection was necessary to preserve the privilege. Second, Jenney’s current attorney did make timely objections to those questions actually seeking confidential communications. The fact that Jenney’s attorney had to interrupt him to make the objection is not sufficient to establish a waiver. Because the objections were made as soon as the confidential nature of the communication became apparent, Jenney did not waive the privilege. Cf. Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee, 837 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege (C) holding that disclosure orders adverse to the attorneyclient privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine (D) holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts (E) holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: when a prosecutor acts as a complaining witness in support of a warrant application. (Citations omitted.) The Sixth Circuit also follows the “functional approach” in deciding whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity. For example, in Cady v. Arenac County, 574 F.3d 334 (6th Cir.2009), plaintiff alleged that a county prosecutor violated his constitutional rights by conditioning a plea on plaintiffs agreement not to bring a civil action against the people who plaintiff was charged with assaulting. While the condition was questionable, and perhaps a First Amendment violation, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the complaint on grounds of absolute immunity: “[Pjrosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct ... insofar as that conduct is intimatel 86) (<HOLDING>); Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 432 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prosecutors alleged use of perjured testimony the nondisclosure of exculpatory information  conflict of interest problems and  spy allegations are all related to the acts of an advocate and thus come within the area of prosecutorial immunity (B) holding that the court must consider the adequacy of the inquiry into the conflict the extent of the conflict and the timeliness of the motion (C) holding that absolute immunity applies to claims of perjured testimony (D) holding that a prosecutors preparation and filing of an information and a motion for an arrest warrant are protected by absolute immunity (E) holding that the constitution does not encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information
[EX A]:
(A)