In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: immunity exists. In Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984), the fifth circuit held that when a probation officer erroneously prepared a motion for revocation of appellant’s probation, she was only entitled to qualified immunity. The court distinguished its earlier case of Spaulding v. Nielsen, supra: We find Spaulding not controlling in the case at hand. Whereas in Spaulding the probation officer was acting at the direction of the court during the presen-tence report process, in the immediate case the probation officer acted at her own initiative and at a different phase of the criminal process less intimately associated with the judiciary. Galvan, at 215. See also Griffin v. Leonard, 821 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We note also third circuit decisions, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (B) holding under facts presented that probation officer was entitled to at least qualified immunity (C) holding officials are entitled to qualified immunity for reasonable mistakes of law (D) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted (E) holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity

A: (B)
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Q: a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, id., and “the court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations.” Warren v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C.Cir.2004). 1. Equal protection “Unless a classification ... is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage,” statutory distinctions are presumed constitutional, and will survive a challenge if the classification is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). Although not every non-suspect legislative classification passes muster under rational basis review, see, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 84 L.Ed.2d 751 (1985) (<HOLDING>), “the judiciary may not sit as a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts (B) holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others (C) holding that a preferential state tax rate for domestic businesses violated the equal protection clause because the states justifications  that the tax promoted domestic industry and encouraged investment in domestic assets  were not legitimate government interests since if they were any discriminatory tax would be valid if the state could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business (D) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety (E) holding that if federal income tax statutes are intended to benefit anyone it is the federal government to whom the withheld tax is to be remitted there is no indication anywhere in the language of the statutes that congress intended to confer rights on employees with respect to the withholding of tax

A: (C)
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Q: be invalid where used to enter a private residence. Further, there are a host of “retake” state statutes and at least one federal statute authorizing the Attorney General to issue arrest warrants (arrest warrants for aliens pending deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)) that authorize nonjudicial arrest warrants. Thus, despite my position the search of Lucas’s primary residence was conducted pursuant to an invalid administrative warrant, I conclude it was objectively reasonable for officers, in arresting Lucas in his primary residence, to rely on the statute that authorized the issuance of the arrest warrant. As a result, I disagree with Judge Beam’s view that the good-faith exception was inapplicable in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Hunt, 893 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), opinion withdrawn in part on other grounds, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant (B) holding that the vehicle of a recent occupant may be searched incident to arrest as an exception to the warrant requirement where it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest (C) holding that a warrant lacking a description of items to be seized was not facially invalid and finding in the alternative that even if the warrant were found to be deficient the seized evidence was admissible under the good faith exception (D) holding that it is a violation of the fourth amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant (E) holding the leon goodfaith excep tion applied to save evidence seized as part of the execution of an arrest warrant issued by the oregon department of corrections pursuant to its authority under an oregon statute and citing the krull decision in support

A:
(E)
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