In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: But he claims that release at age 60 is a geriatric release and the functional equivalent of life without parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also argues that such release violates the principles in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery because release at age 60 provides only grim prospects for any meaningful future outside prison. [¶12.] Even if Charles’s 92-year sentence is equivalent to a sentence of life without parole, that alone does not mean his sentence is unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment precedent. The United States Supreme Court bars mandatory life sentences without parole against juvenile homicide offenders, not discretionary sentences of life without parole. See Miller, 567 U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2469; State v. Springer, 2014 S.D. 80, ¶ 15, 856 N.W.2d 460, 466 (<HOLDING>). [¶13.] In response, Charles asks this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentences of life without parole unique in their severity (B) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (C) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (D) holding that consecutive fixedterm sentences for juveniles who committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are not clearly unconstitutional under graham even when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole (E) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham

A: (C)
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Q: is “doubtful that the judicial interpretation of advisory Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by an independent commission implicates either of the twin concerns that motivate the rule of lenity.,” United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 719 (11th Cir. 2010) (William Pryor, J., concurring). And in any event, the text of the guideline is clear—“ ‘prior sentence’ means a sentence imposed prior to sentencing on the instant Qffense,” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. 1. ' Burke’s alternative'ground for appeal— that the district court erred in calculating his sentence because his 1999 Florida conviction for armed robbery is not a “crime of violence” as that term is used in section 2K2.1(4)(A) of the Guidelines—is foreclosed by binding precedent. United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 938 (11th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>); Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1246 (holding that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that armed robbery suspect was entitled to bail hearing even though armed robbery was considered capital offense under mississippi law because maximum sentence was life imprisonment (B) holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act (C) holding that the illinois crime of failure to report for imprisonment is not a violent felony for purposes of the armed career criminal act (D) holding that violence is synonymous with force in affirming armed robbery conviction (E) holding that attempted burglary under florida law qualified as a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 18 usc  924e2biihereinafter acca because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another

A: (B)
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Q: included offense instructions requested by a party constitutes error, as does the trial court’s failure to give an appropriate included offense instruction that has not been requested. Such error, however, is harmless when the jury convicts the defendant of the charged offense or of an included offense greater than the included offense erroneously omitted from the instructions. The error is harmless because jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions, and, under the standard jury instructions, the jury, “in reaching a unanimous verdict as to the charged offense [or as to the greater included offense, would] not have reached, much less considered,” [Holbron ], 80 Hawai'i [at] 47, 904 P.2d [at 932,] the absent lesser offense on which it should have been instructed. [Id.] (<HOLDING>). To the extent that [State v.]Kupau [, 76 
 Holding statements: (A) holding due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the charged offense and new york law that requires the defendant in a second degree murder prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter when no element of the charged offense is presumed does not violate the due process clause (B) holding that the trial courts erroneous instruction on the nonexistent included offense of attempted reckless manslaughter was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the jury reached a unanimous guilty verdict as to the charged offense of attempted murder in the second degree (C) holding that defendants conviction    must be vacated where defendant argued that trial court committed plain error in instructing jury on nonexistent crime of attempted second degree murder (D) holding that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue based on the first districts decision in montgomery that the standard attempted manslaughterbyact instruction was fundamentally erroneous where betts was charged with attempted firstdegree premeditated murder and convicted of the necessary lesserincluded offense of attempted seconddegree murder (E) holding that where jury had opportunity to convict defendant of manslaughter but convicted of greater offense of second degree murder refusing to give instruction on negligent homicide was if error harmless

A:
(B)
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