In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: Commission, and appellants, yet the County Commissioners did not require any of them to face cross-examination before submitting those documents. Appellants maintain that all of this documentary evidence should have been placed before the County Commissioners by sworn witnesses who faced cross-examination, and, therefore, it should not have been considered by them. We disagree. “A zoning board, along with other administrative agencies, is generally not bound by the technical rules of evidence although it must observe fundamental fairness in dealing with the parties who appear before it.” Ginn v. Farley, 43 Md.App. 229, 236, 403 A.2d 858, cert. denied, sub nom. Engel v. Farley, 286 Md. 747 (1979). See also Entzian v. Prince George’s County, 32 Md.App. 256, 262, 360 A.2d 6 (1976) (<HOLDING>). The documents properly could be considered by 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence (B) holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound (C) holding that agency is bound by its regulations (D) recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence (E) recognizing that zoning agency bodies   are not bound by strict rules of evidence

Output: recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence


Input: Consider Input: District Attorney’s Office to discriminate in the jury selection process. On April 26, 2007, the PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant relief and the instant appeal followed. Appellant raises the following claim: The lower court erred by limiting Appellant’s hearing solely to proof of a policy or culture of discrimination by the Philadelphia District Attorney and further erred by denying Appellant the opportunity to develop and prove discrimination in his case. Before we proceed with a review of the merits of this issue, we must ascertain whether the PCRA court was correct in its conclusion that Appellant timely filed his fifth PCRA petition for, if he did not, we are without jurisdiction to address his claim. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 941 A.2d 1263 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), any PCRA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed (B) holding that the time requirements of the statute are as much a part of the jurisdictional threshold as the mandate to file for a rehearing and that the time limits must be strictly construed and may not be waived by ferc or evaded by the courts (C) holding pcra time limits are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed (D) holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign (E) holding  2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed

Output: holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed


Input: Consider Input: rights, so long as it is done so knowingly and voluntarily. Cf. Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So.2d 850, 858-59 (Fla.2007) (allowing homeowners to waive their constitutional rights to homestead exemptions in certain circumstances as long as it is done knowingly and voluntarily); In re Shambow’s Estate, 153 Fla. 762, 15 So.2d 837, 837 (1943) (“It is fundamental that constitutional rights which are personal may be waived.”); Hartwell v. Blasingame, 564 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (allowing homeowners to waive their constitutional right to homestead exemptions). And the Restaurant, as a subsequent lessee, is bound by the prior owners’ waiver of those rights in exchange for the after-the-fact permits. Cf. Palm Beach Polo, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 918 So.2d 988, 995 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the County argues that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the owners at the time the land was seized are owed compensation rather than the subsequent purchasers (B) holding that subsequent property owners were bound by prior owners agreement to restrict building density and preserve certain portions of land as a condition of the original zoning approval (C) holding that the property owners duty of reasonable care included maintaining the automatic doors into the building and concluding that disputes of material fact remained as to the property owners constructive notice that the automatic doors were closing too quickly (D) holding that a challenge by taxpayers and property owners to the issuance of municipal bonds was barred by a judgment entered in a prior action (E) recognizing that where the location of a deeded right of way is uncertain it may be clarified by the agreement of subsequent owners


Output: holding that the owners at the time the land was seized are owed compensation rather than the subsequent purchasers