In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: the effect that the code-fendant’s confession must be disregarded in determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence is ineffective and cannot overcome the prejudicial effect of the incriminating statement on the jury. Id. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. As such, the trial court’s curative instruction in the instant case was insufficient to cure the erroneous admission of Hertz’s statement to Hathcock. Nonetheless, this Court has also recognized that a Bruton violation does not automatically require reversal of an otherwise valid conviction but, rather, is subject to a harmless error analysis. See Farina v. State, 679 So.2d 1151, 1155 (Fla.1996) (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284, (1969)); see also Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1322 (Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 644-45 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness (B) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause violation in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not require the conviction to be overturned (C) holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error (D) holding confrontation clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus upholding firstdegree murder conviction (E) holding that testimony at trial in violation of defendants constitutional confrontation right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the testimony was cumulative
[EX A]: holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness

[EX Q]: his claims based on injury to his eye and knees. But Mr. Sanders does not state any basis for his challenge to those decisions. Finally, Mr. Sanders claims that he has been deprived of due process and discriminated against based on his race. As already stated, we have jurisdiction to consider constitutional arguments. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). But Mr. Sanders does not provide any facts to substantiate his arguments. Nor do we see any basis for his arguments in the record. In the absence of any evidentiary support, Mr. Sanders’s passing remarks amount to no more than a constitutional label for his otherwise factual disagreement "with the decisions of the Veterans Court and the Board. That does not suffice to create jurisdiction. See Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 225 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal (B) holding that rcw 1040200 does not create a constitutional right to be advised of immigration consequences therefore failure to comply with statute does not create constitutional harm (C) holding that a board decision is required to vest the court of veterans appeals with jurisdiction over a claimants appeal (D) holding that mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim (E) holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court
[EX A]: holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal

[EX Q]: chance to work out a problem.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Brenneman v. Famous Dave’s of Am., Inc., 507 F.3d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 2007)); Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LP, 534 F.3d 473, 482 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding employee could not recover because she “assumed the worst and made no effort to allow Wal-Mart the opportunity to remedy the problems she identified”); Barker v. YMCA of Racine, 18 Fed.Appx. 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Employees who quit without giving their employer a reasonable chance to resolve a problem have not been constructively discharged. Here, Ms. Barker did not try to resolve her work problems—she merely walked away from her job without notice .... ” (Citation omitted.)); Yearous v. Niobrara Cty. Mem’l Hosp., 128 F.3d 1351, 1357 (10th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); Kilgore v. Thompson & Brock Mgmt., Inc., 93 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no constructive discharge when plaintiffs only waited brief time before resigning and unreasonably refused to explore any option short of resignation (B) holding that in order to sustain an action for constructive discharge the plaintiff must show that the conduct resulting in the resignation violated a virginia public policy embodied in an existing statute (C) holding claim accrued when employee tendered letter of resignation not when resignation became effective (D) holding that constructive discharge may qualify as a tangible employment action depriving employer of right to assert affirmative defense when a supervisors official act precipitates the constructive discharge (E) recognizing that a constructive discharge claim and a hostile work environment claim are not equivalent because a constructive discharge claim imposes a higher standard
[EX A]:
holding that in order to sustain an action for constructive discharge the plaintiff must show that the conduct resulting in the resignation violated a virginia public policy embodied in an existing statute