In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: The savings clause states that “[compliance with an order [under the MDA] shall not relieve any person from liability under Federal or State law.” 21 U.S.C.A. § 360h(d). While the savings clause almost certainly prohibits a holding that the MDA preempts all state law liability, our interpretation of § 360k(a) does not preclude all liability. Further, nothing in the savings clause suggests that some tort liability, as opposed to other types of liability, must be preserved. Interpreting the savings clause to preserve non-tort liability, such as contract liability, is not only permissible, but also comports with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a savings clause in a recent preemption case. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 817, 826, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, where the preemptive intent of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the illinois consumer fraud act preempted by the federal airline deregulation act to the extent the state law applied to airline frequent flier programs (B) holding consumer claims under the texas deceptive trade practices act nonassignable (C) holding that the airline deregulation act preempts claims under the illinois consumer fraud and deceptive business practices act but does not preempt state breach of contract actions (D) holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act (E) holding that cjlaims for unfair competition and deceptive business practices involving trade names brought under illinois statutes are to be resolved according to the principles set forth under the lanham act and noting that illinois courts look to federal case law and apply the same analysis to state infringement claims
Example Output: holding the illinois consumer fraud act preempted by the federal airline deregulation act to the extent the state law applied to airline frequent flier programs

Example Input: has recently held that a police officer may order passengers out of a vehicle during a traffic stop without violating the passengers’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). The Court reasoned that the public interest in protecting an officer’s safety outweighed the minimal intrusion involved in requiring passengers to exit the vehicle. See id. at 413-15, 117 S.Ct. 882. The same rationale applies here. An officer may reasonably conclude that his safety is best protected by having the passengers remain in the vehicle. Further, the intrusion involved with having passengers remain in their vehicle is de minimis — the officer is merely maintaining the status quo. See United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 11 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Defendant Garner refused to comply with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop (B) holding that passengers of a vehicle which they did not own had standing to challenge the validity of a traffic stop (C) holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop (D) holding police officers making a traffic stop could order passengers out of the stopped car (E) holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction
Example Output: holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop

Example Input: 580, 589, 605 A.2d 1106 (1991), aff'd. o.b., 127 N.J. 394, 605 A.2d 1073 (1992). “The purpose of the principle is to effectuate current policy.” Kruvant v. Mayor & Council of Cedar Grove, 82 N.J. 435, 440, 414 A.2d 9 (1980). A municipality may change its land-use ordinances after an application has been filed, even “in direct response to the application.” Burcam Corp. v. Planning Bd., 168 N.J.Super. 508, 521, 403 A.2d 921 (1979). However, the time-of-decision rule is not automatic. See Lake Shore, supra, 255 N.J.Super. at 589, 605 A.2d 1106. A court must balance the municipality’s zoning interest against the developer’s degree of reliance on the old statute and its entitlements of right. Id. at 590-91, 605 A.2d 1106. See also Phillips v. Curiale, 128 N.J. 608, 617, 608 A.2d 895 (1992) (<HOLDING>). In this case, resolution of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that retroactive application of statute turns on legislative intent and whether retroactivity works either unconstitutional interference with vested rights or manifest injustice (B) holding retroactive application (C) holding no retroactive application (D) recognizing a general principle that retroactive application of rules is permitted absent any manifest injustice (E) holding that retroactive application of amendments will not result in manifest injustice
Example Output:
holding retroactive application