In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 235, 239 (Fed.Cir.1988). On appeal, Mr. Baney does not challenge the Board’s determination that collateral estoppel bars his leave-related claims. We agree with the Board that Mr. Baney’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel because they challenge the same issues that Mr. Baney actually litigated and that were necessary to the decisions in previous proceedings. See, e.g., Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 409 Fed.Appx. 319 (Fed.Cir.2010) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with eleven and a half hours of AWOL in November 2008); Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 263 Fed.Appx. 892 (Fed.Cir.2008) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with 23 days of leave while on active military duty for 30 days); see also Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 327 Fed.Appx. 895 (Fed.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because relitigation of issue was barred by collateral estoppel res judicata determination of finality of judgment dismissed for lack of standing was not relevant (B) holding that collateral attacks on bankruptcy courts jurisdiction are barred by res judicata (C) holding that the plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata when the federal courts judgment was finalized by denial of his petition for certiorari (D) holding that mr baneys challenge to being charged with 208 hours of annual leave while on active military duty for 30 days was barred by the res judicata effects of our 2008 decision (E) holding that a trustees claim was barred by res judicata and stating that the trustee could have asked the bankruptcy court to reserve his fraud claims for later adjudication which would have avoided his claims being barred
[A]: (D)


[Q]: for a mitigating role adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Section 3B1.2 “authorizes a four-level reduction in offense level if the defendant is deemed a ‘minimal’ participant in the criminal activity! ] [and] a two-level reduction if he is deemed a ‘minor’ participant....” United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 783 (6th Cir. 2012). The difference between “minimal” and “minor” is “not just semantic,” United States v. Lopez, 937 F.2d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 1991), and the standards are not interchangeable. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n. 5 (defining a “minor participant” as “a defendant ... who is less culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as minimal”) (emphasis added); United States v. Friedman, 998 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). Both Griffith and the Government focus their 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this distinction (B) holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements (C) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (D) holding that the district court improperly used the two different standards under ussg  3b12 interchangeably thus blurring the distinction between section 3b12a and b (E) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel
[A]: (D)


[Q]: because the complaint seeks only an injunction against future enforcement of the helmet law. Any past injury suffered by the plaintiffs does not give them standing to enjoin future enforcement of the helmet law. Insofar as the complaint seeks an injunction against future enforcement of the helmet law based on the possible vague application of the law to the individual plaintiffs, such a claim is not ripe for review. Where there are insufficient facts to determine the vagueness of a law as applied, the issue is not ripe for adjudication. See Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir.1996) (concluding that vagueness of one provision of a regulation was not ripe for review due to insufficient facts); Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 2521, 135 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act violates neither separation of powers nor principles of due process by allowing a victim veto that precludes application of the act as well as holding that the act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment (B) holding that the statute of limitations in a criminal case is a nonjurisdictional affirmative defense that is waived if not raised in the trial court (C) holding as brady violation prosecutions failure to disclose to defense that prosecution had agreed not to prosecute key witness in exchange for his testimony at trial (D) holding that in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages not only for his unlawful arrest and imprisonment but also for expenses of his defense (E) holding that the vagueness of brady handgun act not ripe for adjudication in suit for injunction but could be raised as a defense in the case of an unlikely criminal prosecution of law enforcement agents
[A]:
(E)