In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: conversion should have an opportunity to reassert objections to exemptions. Indeed, Rule 1019(2) specifically addresses time period for actions after conversion, and provides for the re-running of times allowed for filing a claim, objecting to discharge and objecting to dischargeability. There is no new time period, however, for the trustee to assert objections to exemptions. “If a new time period for objections to exemptions began to run upon conversion of a case, one would expect to see it mentioned in Rule 1019(2), [and][i]t is not there.” In re Brown, 178 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1995). Where the statute is clear, it is not appropriate to look to policy arguments. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41, 109-S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (<HOLDING>), and none of the policy arguments are 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear (B) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (C) holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry  is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful (D) holding that pursuant to 28 usc  2254d1 if  the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry (E) holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end

Answer: recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear


Question: to commit himself to such an alternative to a federal sentence. 2 . Defendant also raises two additional arguments: (1) that the district court improperly based its sentence on the defendant’s refusal to waive his constitutional and statutory rights to oppose his deportation; and (2) that the district court failed to appreciate the scope of its authority to consider, as a mitigating circumstance upon which to base a departure, defendant's vulnerability and susceptibility to abuse in prison due to his physical condition. Both arguments lack merit. As to the first argument, the conditioning of a downward departure on the surrender of a statutory right to a deportation hearing would not have offended due process. See United States v. Galvez-Falconi, 174 F.3d 255, 260 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). See generally United States v. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart (B) holding that district court had authority to grant section 5k20 downward departure despite governments opposition (C) holding that the district court was not required to state affirmatively on the record that it knew it possessed the authority to depart downward (D) holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart (E) holding that where a defendant malees a showing that the act of consenting to deportation carries unusual assistance to the administration of justice district court has authority under ussg  5k20 to depart downward in absence of the governments consent

Answer: recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart


Question: organizations are included as defendants in the complaint; T.R. 75(A)(5). Regardless of whether Franklin County is a preferred venue, its status as such is trumped by Trial Rule 76(A), which states explicitly that a motion requesting a change of venue “shall be granted only upon a ’ showing that the county where suit is pending is a party.” That is clearly the case here. Accordingly, the trial court was required to grant the City’s motion and erred in failing to do so. See Scott v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 833 N.E.2d 1094, 1101 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (“According to the plain reading of Trial Rule 76, a change of venue occurs when the county is a party to the action.”); see also Bd. of Comm’rs of LaPorte Cnty. v. Great Lakes Transfer, LLC, 888 N.E.2d 784, 790 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (<HOLDING>). [5] The City also claims that the case should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings (B) holding that the defendant waived the issue of change of venue where the trial court denied the motion for a change of venue without prejudice stating that it was willing to reconsider the motion at any time during the jury selection process but the defendant never renewed the motion for a change of venue (C) holding that tr 76a required that the trial court grant the motion for change of venue from laporte county where laporte county was a party to the action despite the fact that it was also a preferred venue (D) holding that motion to transfer also must show either that county where action is pending is improper or that venue is mandatory in another county (E) holding that venue was improper in the county of death because no other event occurred there

Answer:
holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings