In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: such entities from exercising their right of eminent domain. We disagree. The statute unambiguously prohibits any curtailment or limitation of an FmHA-indebted water association’s services resulting from municipal annexation or inclusion. This language indicates a congressional mandate that local governments not encroach upon the services provided by such associations, be that encroachment in the form of competing franchises, new or additional permit requirements, or similar means. To read a loophole into this absolute prohibition, as Madison would have us do, and allow a city to do via condemnation what it is forbidden by other means, would render nugatory the clear purpose of § 1926(b). See Moore Bayou Water Association, Inc. v. Town of Jonestown, 628 F.Supp. 1367 (N.D.Miss.1986) (<HOLDING>). Madison contends that this construction of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents (B) holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate (C) holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted (D) holding municipal condemnation of water associations facilities and certificate violative of  1926b (E) holding that because exclusion was not provided to certificate holder terms of the certificate controlled

Output: holding that  1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents


Input: Consider Input: Sept. 3, 1998)(variance is not material “where the allegations and proof substantially correspond, the variance is not of a character which could have misled the defendant at trial and is not such as to deprive the accused of his right to be protected against another prosecution for the same offense”). A material variance is sometimes referred to as a “fatal variance.” We have not been consistent in requiring materiality, but have sometimes reversed upon a finding of variance without exploring the further question of materiality. Compare Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 625, 124 S.W. 668 (1910)(variance is not material unless it could mislead defense or expose defendant to danger of subsequent prosecution for same offense); Plessinger v. State, 536 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1976)(<HOLDING>) with Pedrosa v. State, 155 Tex.Crim. 155, 232 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error (B) holding that heightened evidentiary standard of proof is not required where the sentencing enhancement is based entirely on the extent of the conspiracy to which the defendant pled guilty (C) holding that where a defendant is misled and induced to plead by his counsels mistaken advice then he may be allowed to withdraw his plea (D) holding variance between enhancement allegation and proof renders evidence legally insufficient only if variance is material (E) holding variance in style of case pled for enhancement not material where defendant not surprised or misled to his prejudice

Output: holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error


Input: Consider Input: (1989), Detroit Edison Co v Detroit, 208 Mich App 26; 527 NW2d 9 (1994), and City of Taylor, 263 Mich App 551. This long line of cases discussing reasonable control under Const 1963, art 7, § 29 is supported by the common law. And the control exercised by Taylor here is also in accord with the common law. Under the traditional common-law rule, utilities have been required to bear the entire cost of relocating from a public right-of-way whenever requested to do so by state or local authorities. 12 E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations § 34.74a (3d ed. 1970); 4A J. Sackman, Nichols’ Law of Eminent Domain § 15.22 (rev. 3d ed. 1981). This rule was recognized and approved by this Court as long ago as New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Comm’n of New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453, 462 (1905) (<HOLDING>). [Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Auth v 
 Holding statements: (A) holding individual standing not available where inter alia there is no claim that plaintiff sustained a loss disproportionate to that sustained by the corporation (B) holding that feca is the sole remedy for the back injury sustained on the job by a us postal service employee (C) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence (D) holding that the injury sustained by the utility is damnum absque injuria (E) holding that a claim for loss of consortium  cannot stand because there is no evidence of bodily injury sustained


Output: holding individual standing not available where inter alia there is no claim that plaintiff sustained a loss disproportionate to that sustained by the corporation