In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions “could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited.” Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) (“We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse’s liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void.”). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years
[EX A]: holding that such provisions are valid

[EX Q]: make a hearing unnecessary. These contentions have no merit. Although we retain jurisdiction to resolve the State’s motion to dismiss this appeal, we first remand this matter to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing. We remand because whether Mr. Comer has expressly or impliedly consented to the filing of any pleadings in federal court is a critical question of fact that we believe the district court is in a better position to resolve. Indeed, we have previously recognized the general presumption that an attorney is authorized to act on his client’s behalf. See, e.g., Nevius, 105 F.3d at 459; Lucky, 86 F.3d at 925; Deutscher v. Angelone, 16 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir.1994); cf. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, — U.S. —, —, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1040, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (<HOLDING>). When parties have challenged this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan (B) holding that attorney lacked standing to file notice of appeal on behalf of client who couldnot be located because the client must make the ultimate decision regarding the appeal internal quotation marks omitted (C) recognizing that counsel have the authori ty to file an appeal on their clients behalf even when the client does not expressly give them his consent to do so (D) holding broker and clients agreed to arbitration where newaccount forms signed by clients expressly incorporated separate unsigned client agreement containing arbitration provision even if client agreement was not attached or read by clients because they were presumed to have read newaccount form which placed them on notice of client agreement (E) recognizing the right to counsel on appeal
[EX A]: holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan

[EX Q]: Commission argues that the decision in In re Farmers Frozen Food Co., 221 F.Supp. 385 (N.D.Cal.1963), is factually similar to the matter at bar, and should be followed to find that its assessment is a “tax.” In Farmers Frozen Food, decided under the Bankruptcy Act (“Act”), the court confronted the issue of whether an assessment levied pursuant to a marketing order under the California Marketing Act of 1937 was a “tax” so as to be afforded priority status. As with assessment funds collected by the Commission, monies collected under the marketing order were to be used for promotional and research activities benefiting another California commodity industry. In Farmers Frozen Food, the court determined that the marketing order assessment constituted a “tax” aft 2-03 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, interpretation of the public 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable (B) holding that permit fee assessments required by statute are not taxes under the code (C) holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes (D) holding that taxes are not private property that can be physically taken by the government (E) holding that background check assessments required by statute are not taxes under the code
[EX A]:
holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable