In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: the common level ratio. The Board may hold a hearing to consider the objections, but it may also decide the objections have merit and adjust its calculations. If not satisfied with the outcome of the hearing, the taxpayer may “appeal de novo such ratio determination to the Commonwealth Court.” Id. It has long been established that “[wjhere a remedy is provided by an act of assembly, the directions of the legislation must be strictly pursued and such remedy is exclusive.” Lurie v. Republican Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 63, 192 A.2d 367, 369 (1963). This Court has explained that “where a statutory remedy exists, it is exclusive unless the jurisdiction of the courts is preserved thereby.” Lashe v. Northern York County School District, 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 541, 417 A.2d 260, 264 (1980) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>). Where the statutory remedy is an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa (B) holding that a litigant could not avoid the procedure prescribed by statute in favor of a class action in equity (C) holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action (D) recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice (E) holding that district court in making class certification decision should avoid focusing on merits of underlying class action

A: holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa
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Q: acts of sexual harassment by the plaintiffs co-workers, about which defendants’ supervisors neither knew nor should have known, does not give rise to a cognizable sexual harassment claim and will not revive an otherwise stale sexual harassment claim. See Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir.1994) (“[Because no harassment event occurring during the violation period was ever brought to the attention of [the employer] while [the plaintiff] was still employed, there is no violation during the limitation period that can serve as the anchor for the earlier conduct.”). Additionally, the plaintiff cannot rely on the continuing violations doctrine, because there is no nexus between the conduct of the coworkers in 1994 and the earlier incidents going back to 1992. See Id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, there being no dispute as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur (B) holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate disparate treatment because she failed to show she was similarly situated to coworker to whom she compared herself (C) holding that the plaintiff could not rely on the continuing violations doctrine because she had failed to demonstrate a sufficiently close nexus between alleged touching incidents by a supervisor and the later conduct of fellow employees (D) holding that a constitutional claim against nongovernment entities only lies where there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the  entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself (E) holding that plaintiff cook at a nursing home had sufficiently pled requisite public policy and a close fit where she alleged she was fired for expressing concerns that a fellow employee was contaminating the area where she was preparing food

A: holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur
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Q: there was no vexatious litigant order entered against Wolfe at the time he filed in district court, there was no state court judgment from which he could have been seeking relief. Instead of seeking relief from prior state court judgments, Wolfe seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the threatened future enforcement of the Vexatious Litigant Statute. He argues that the statute violates the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause; that it constitutes an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder; and that it subjects vexatious litigants to double jeopardy. In his prayer for relief, Wolfe requests “a declaration that California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 391-391.7 .:. are unconstitutional on the nburgh, 970 F.2d 501, 508 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We construe Wolfe’s references to the prior 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (B) holding that the threat of injury was not speculative because the plaintiffs had been previously charged under the challenged statute (C) holding that plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden to show that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because plaintiffs claims of prohibitive costs were too speculative (D) holding that damages were not available to a plaintiff who challenged an ordinance under a due process theory because the plaintiff had not sought a permit and therefore any claim for damages was purely speculative (E) holding that plaintiffs legal malpractice claim was not ripe until the appeal had been exhausted because plaintiffs harm remained speculative until then

A:
holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision
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