In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: But he claims that release at age 60 is a geriatric release and the functional equivalent of life without parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also argues that such release violates the principles in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery because release at age 60 provides only grim prospects for any meaningful future outside prison. [¶12.] Even if Charles’s 92-year sentence is equivalent to a sentence of life without parole, that alone does not mean his sentence is unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment precedent. The United States Supreme Court bars mandatory life sentences without parole against juvenile homicide offenders, not discretionary sentences of life without parole. See Miller, 567 U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2469; State v. Springer, 2014 S.D. 80, ¶ 15, 856 N.W.2d 460, 466 (<HOLDING>). [¶13.] In response, Charles asks this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentences of life without parole unique in their severity (B) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (C) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (D) holding that consecutive fixedterm sentences for juveniles who committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are not clearly unconstitutional under graham even when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole (E) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham
[A]: (C)


[Q]: and, therefore, uninformed. We cannot agree. There is no statement of personal knowledge by the executrix stating whether Burnett consulted with legal counsel prior to executing the CSA or Guaranty. Plaintiff certified JTB, Inc. defaulted under the CSA and provided the documents supporting entry of judgment against it. JTB, Inc. never challenged the action or the relief sought. Proof of the Guaranty and its execution by Burnett was also provided to support judgment under the cognovit provision. Moreover, the Guaranty is clearly written and its waiver provisions are boldly identified, as is the confession of judgment clause. Importantly, plaintiffs action was based on the Guaranty, not the terms of its CSA with JTB, Inc. See Tam Enters., supra, 369 N.J.Super. at 59, 848 A.2d 27 (<HOLDING>). Further, the provision contains a succinct 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that selfserving deposition testimony standing alone is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment (B) holding a guarantee of a note that contains a cognovit provision alone is insufficient to permit confession of judgment against the guarantors (C) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (D) holding that a confessed judgment was not enforceable against a corporate president who individually guaranteed payment of corporate note signed by him in his capacity as president and which authorized confession of judgment (E) holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment
[A]: (B)


[Q]: from the past discrimination. But of course, if an employer engages in a series of acts each of which is intentionally discriminatory, then a fresh violation takes place when each act is committed. Id. at 628, 127 S.Ct. 2162, citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). In response to Ledbetter, Congress passed the Fair Pay Act in order to overturn and reverse its effects. See, Pub.L. No. 111-2, 125 Stat. 5 (2009); see also, Johnson v. District of Columbia, 632 F.Supp.2d 20, 21 (D.D.C.2009) (“Through the Fair Pay Act, Congress intended to reverse the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter * * *.”); Mays v. Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 2009 WL 2163177 at *2 (D.Kan., July 1, 2009) (<HOLDING>). For our purposes, the Fair Pay Act changed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mandatory language such as will pay or shall pay creates the necessary moneymandate for tucker act purposes (B) holding statute of limitations for discriminatory pay practices begins when initial pay decision was made (C) recognizing that the fair pay act overturned the ledbetter decision (D) holding that the defendants could not be held in contempt for failure to pay more than the fee cap amount because the court cannot order the djefendants to violate an act of congress to pay the total award (E) holding that a panel of the court of appeals is bound by a prior decision of another panel of the same court addressing the same question but in a different case unless overturned by an intervening decision from a higher court
[A]:
(C)