instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
business is a disputed question of fact which cannot be resolved on summary judgment. State Auto disputes Appellants’ arguments and also posits in the alternative that, even if Kraus was an “insured” at the time he committed the acts in question, Appellants’ false imprisonment claims were subsumed by their sexual assault claims. As discussed below, we conclude that the district court correctly found that the determination of whether Kraus was an “insured” under the policy is a question of law where the pertinent facts are undisputed, that the policy is not ambiguous, and that Kraus’s acts fall within the Criminal-Acts Exclusion. Because we affirm the district court on those grounds, we do not reach State Auto’s alternative argument in support 2d 349, 633 N.W.2d 707 (Wis.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Michelet v. Scheuring Sec. Servs. Inc., 680 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question (B) holding that the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment or while performing duties related to the conduct of the employers business for purposes of insurance coverage were questions of fact that precluded summary judgment particularly since there was a question regarding the employees intent in performing the act in question (C) holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred (D) holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury (E) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact
answer:
(B)


question:
remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s detention.” Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381, 97 S.Ct. 1224, 51 L.Ed.2d 411 (1977); see also St 06 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (same). Whether RIDA created an adequate substitute for habeas corpus for those aliens to whom a petition for review is available, however, is different from whether RIDA created any adequate substitute for those aliens for whom it is no longer available. Unlike in previous cases where we have upheld RIDA against Suspension Clause challenges, Singh never had the ability to obtain judicial review of the merits of his removal through a petition for review filed within 30 days of his removal order. Cf. Puri, 464 F.3d at 1043; Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). By the time RIDA created jurisdiction in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law (B) holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (C) holding that  109g2 does not apply when the creditor seeking relief in the first case received the requested relief (D) holding that a rule 60b motion that presents grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief or seeks to add a new ground for relief requires authorization (E) holding that ridas elimination of habeas corpus does not violate the suspension clause where the petitioner had a means for seeking relief direct review  and simply failed to pursue the relief that the statutory scheme allows
answer:
(E)


question:
to overcome this presumption by persuading the finder of fact, by a prepon derance of the evidence, that the income tax assessments are erroneous. See Sullivan v. United States, 618 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir.1980). Klimek has failed to offer any evidence that the tax assessments are incorrect in the amount the Government claims. He has never challenged in the Tax Court the Notices of Deficiency or the Certificates of Assessments and Payments for tax years 1980 through 1988 and 1990 through 1992. Nor has Klimek ever rebutted or even responded to the Government’s requests for admissions regarding tax years 1980 through 1988 and 1990 through 1992, except to return them with the words “Refused for Fraud” scrawled across them. See Lane v. United States, 328 F.2d 602, 603 (5th Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>). Given the fact that Klimek bears the burden 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial court may enter summary judgment for a nonmoving party under appropriate circumstances (B) holding that a trial court is not required to convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment where external evidence is submitted if the external evidence is irrelevant to the issue (C) holding that if no countervailing evidence is introduced the trial court is  justified in fact required to enter summary judgment for the government the amount of the taxes proved to be due (D) holding that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the court is reviewing administrative record for sufficiency of evidence (E) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion
answer:

(C)