In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther’s theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts “a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman.” White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther’s termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, § 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law

A: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
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Q: offense; the maximum sentence is 10 years for each offense, which must run concurrently under Hale. By enhancing only one count and running it consecutively to the second count, appellant was sentenced to 12 years. This sentence exceeds the statutory maximum if both sentences had been enhanced under section 775.084 and run concurrently, or if neither had been enhanced and run consecutively. As such the appellant’s sentence violates Hale. Although appellant was not sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 5 years for the second offense, as explained in State v. Hill, 660 So.2d 1384 (Fla.1995), the requirement that sentences run consecutively is not limited to only the minimum mandatory portion of. a total sentence: The State argues that Hale and its predecessors, Palmer v. State A 1997) (<HOLDING>). Here appellant was sentenced as an habitual 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies (B) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (C) holding fifteen year hfo mandatory minimum sentences on the three robbery convictions were required to run concurrently with the twentyfive year nonhfo mandatory minimum on the murder sentence (D) holding hfo mandatory minimum sentence for robbery must run concurrently with sentences imposed for nonhfo first degree murder convictions (E) holding that the fifteen year minimum sentence imposed under section 924e does not violate the eighth amendment

A: holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies
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Q: at *13 (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194). In applying this doctrine, “the Second Circuit has determined that ’New York in fact affords an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the form of, inter alia, a Court of Claims- action.’” Id. (italics omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Burke, 256 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir.2001)); see also Malik v. City of N.Y., No. 11-CV-6062, 2012 WL 3345317, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2012) (“New York provides such an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the form of state law causes of action for negligence, replevin, and conversion.”), adopted by 2012 WL 4475156 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012). District courts thus routinely dismiss claims by inmates who assert that they were deprived of property by corrections officers. See, e.g., West, 2014 WL 4290813, at *6 (<HOLDING>); JCG v. Ercole, No. 11-CV-6844, 2014 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional (B) holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies (C) holding the deprivation of the inmates property interest in his mail is not a cognizable constitutional injury given the availability of adequate state postdeprivation remedies under new york law internal quotation marks omitted (D) recognizing probable cause as complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution in new york internal quotation marks and brackets omitted (E) holding that deprivation of personal property does not violate the constitution if there are adequate state remedies available

A:
holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional
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