In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: is “doubtful that the judicial interpretation of advisory Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by an independent commission implicates either of the twin concerns that motivate the rule of lenity.,” United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 719 (11th Cir. 2010) (William Pryor, J., concurring). And in any event, the text of the guideline is clear—“ ‘prior sentence’ means a sentence imposed prior to sentencing on the instant Qffense,” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. 1. ' Burke’s alternative'ground for appeal— that the district court erred in calculating his sentence because his 1999 Florida conviction for armed robbery is not a “crime of violence” as that term is used in section 2K2.1(4)(A) of the Guidelines—is foreclosed by binding precedent. United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 938 (11th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>); Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1246 (holding that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that armed robbery suspect was entitled to bail hearing even though armed robbery was considered capital offense under mississippi law because maximum sentence was life imprisonment (B) holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act (C) holding that the illinois crime of failure to report for imprisonment is not a violent felony for purposes of the armed career criminal act (D) holding that violence is synonymous with force in affirming armed robbery conviction (E) holding that attempted burglary under florida law qualified as a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 18 usc  924e2biihereinafter acca because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another
[A]: (B)


[Q]: 235, 239 (Fed.Cir.1988). On appeal, Mr. Baney does not challenge the Board’s determination that collateral estoppel bars his leave-related claims. We agree with the Board that Mr. Baney’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel because they challenge the same issues that Mr. Baney actually litigated and that were necessary to the decisions in previous proceedings. See, e.g., Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 409 Fed.Appx. 319 (Fed.Cir.2010) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with eleven and a half hours of AWOL in November 2008); Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 263 Fed.Appx. 892 (Fed.Cir.2008) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with 23 days of leave while on active military duty for 30 days); see also Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 327 Fed.Appx. 895 (Fed.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because relitigation of issue was barred by collateral estoppel res judicata determination of finality of judgment dismissed for lack of standing was not relevant (B) holding that collateral attacks on bankruptcy courts jurisdiction are barred by res judicata (C) holding that the plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata when the federal courts judgment was finalized by denial of his petition for certiorari (D) holding that mr baneys challenge to being charged with 208 hours of annual leave while on active military duty for 30 days was barred by the res judicata effects of our 2008 decision (E) holding that a trustees claim was barred by res judicata and stating that the trustee could have asked the bankruptcy court to reserve his fraud claims for later adjudication which would have avoided his claims being barred
[A]: (D)


[Q]: United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673-676, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980)). 7 . See also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 45-46 (2d Cir.2001) (discussing the AEDPA standard of review), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 915, 122 S.Ct. 2381, 153 L.Ed.2d 199 (2002). 8 . See also Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 309-310 (2d Cir.2001). 9 . Moxley’s claim is based on clearly established federal law, i.e., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). 10 . See also Overton v. Newton, 295 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2002). 11 . The prosecutor's reason for striking Patterson was the "prospective juror’s lack of significant employment experiences." R & R at 18; Tr. at 306-309. Such a basis is not inappropriate. See United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). 12 . Moxley failed to offer any evidence that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial courts erroneous refusal to strike juror for cause impaired defendants statutory right to his allotted number of peremptory challenges (B) holding that is not the fact that a jury is all white or all black that violates batson rather it is the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors (C) holding that trial judges determination  that the prosecutors use of peremptory challenges to strike all four africanamerican venirepersons for lack of education and business experience was not pretextual  was not clearly erroneous (D) holding that batson applies to a prosecutors use of peremptory challenges regardless of whether the stricken juror is of the same race as the defendant (E) holding that pretext may be established by proving that prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to exclude africanamerican venirepersons for a given reason or reasons but then failed to apply the same reason or reasons to exclude similarly situated white venirepersons
[A]:
(C)