In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of common law fraud, it is considered a fraudulent act and is protected by 9(b)). We conclude that 9(b) applies to FCA fraud claims because not only is such a conclusion in accord with other courts and our more recent decisions, but also because its applicability is consistent with the purposes of Rule 9: (1) to inhibit claims that are filed as a pretext to uncover unknown wrongs; (2) to protect defendants from the harm that results from charges of serious wrongdoing; and (3) to give defendants notice of the complained-of conduct, enabling defendants to prepare a defense. Coronet Insurance Co. v. Seyfarth, 665 F.Supp. 661, 666 (N.D.Ill.1987). See also U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 755 F.Supp. 1055, 1058 (S.D.Ga.1990) (<HOLDING>); U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a broad claim with no factual support was insufficient to satisfy rule 9b (B) holding that rule 9b applies to fca (C) holding that californias ucl claims are subject to rule 9b pleading standards (D) holding that charge of money laundering need not satisfy rule 9b (E) holding plaintiffs speculations did not satisfy rule 9b requirements

Output: holding a broad claim with no factual support was insufficient to satisfy rule 9b


Input: Consider Input: hold that a court of appeals may not award a new trial on the basis of an erroneous eviden-tiary decision” in the absence of a post-verdict motion. Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 448 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir.2006). Likewise, in Metcalf v. Bochco, 200 Fed.Appx. 635, 637 n. 1 (9th Cir.2006), the Ninth Circuit stated that Unitheim "deals with the specific situation of a party’s failure to renew, post-verdict, a Rule 50 motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a civil jury trial” and reasoned that "Unitherm is inapposite” to Metcalf's case because the appellants did not "challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.” 3 . Our circuit has repeatedly accepted such claims of retaliation for taking FMLA leave. See, e.g., Arban v. West Publ’g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 403 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Wysong v. Dow Chemical Co., 503 F.3d 441, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers oral denial of plaintiffs request for fmla leave showed interference (B) holding that  825220c is a reasonable interpretation of the statutes prohibition on interference with and restraint of employees rights under the fmla  2615a1  and that the labor departments conclusion that employer use of the taking of fmla leave as a negative factor in employment actions  violates  the act is  a reasonable one (C) holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave (D) holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jurys conclusion that west retaliated against arban for taking leave under the fmla (E) holding that employee who exceeded fmla leave was subject to immediate discharge on the very first workday that he was both absent from work and no longer protected by the fmla

Output: holding that employers oral denial of plaintiffs request for fmla leave showed interference


Input: Consider Input: taxes. However, we conclude that the “erroneous nonrebate refund” case law does not control this case for two reasons: first, the 1995 refund was not “erroneous”; and second, the rationale for treating erroneous nonrebate refunds as nontax liabilities does not apply to the 1995 refund. First, we do not believe that the 1995 refund was “erroneous.” Court-ordered refunds, even if unmerited, are not “erroneous” for the purposes of tax law. Deeming such refunds to be “erroneous” would allow the IRS to circumvent the court’s order: after making the refund, the IRS could immediately recover it by suing the taxpayer under IRC § 7405, which creates a cause of action for the recovery of erroneous refunds. See United States v. Russell Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 13, 16-18 (2d Cir.1965) (Friendly, J.) (<HOLDING>). This is consistent with the case law, which 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a refund is not erroneous and therefore not recoverable by a  7405 suit when it was deliberately made by the irs to satisfy a court order regardless of the merits of that order (B) holding the order of the circuit court did not involve the merits of the action and was therefore interlocutory and not reviewable by the supreme court for lack of finality (C) holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits (D) holding adjudication order based upon a determination on the merits in juvenile court is a final and appealable order (E) holding the collateral order exception does not apply to a pretrial order denying class certification because the order is subject to revision prior to a decision on the merits


Output: holding the order of the circuit court did not involve the merits of the action and was therefore interlocutory and not reviewable by the supreme court for lack of finality