In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: the peremptory strike. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). In this case, we cannot say that the Florida state court’s judgment was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, specifically the Supreme Court’s holding in Bat-son. As for the State’s strike of the first black prospective juror, the interaction between the parties and the state court (where, upon being challenged, the State revealed that it wished to strike this juror because two prosecutors had seen her sleeping during the jury selection process, and the trial court then moved onto the next juror) was adequate under Batson, so trial counsel was not ineffective in that respect. See Hightower v. Terry, 459 F.3d 1067, 1072 n. 9 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even assuming that Sneed’s counsel 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this purpose albeit implicitly (B) recognizing that a trial judge can implicitly find a prosecutors proffered reasons credible (C) holding that the trial judge cannot simply rjubber stamp  a prosecutors nonracial explanation no matter how whimsical or fanciful  but in order to permit a questioned peremptory challenge  must conclude that the proffered reasons are first neutral and reasonable and second not a pretext (D) holding that findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate substantial and credible evidence (E) holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors

A: (B)
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Q: improperly determined that the “neither expected nor intended” language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an “occurrence.” ¶21 The CGL policy’s core provision defines “occurrence” by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was “neither expected nor intended.” This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured’s expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an “occurrence” and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). ¶22 Here the District Court found that Ribi 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended

A: (A)
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Q: Commission, and appellants, yet the County Commissioners did not require any of them to face cross-examination before submitting those documents. Appellants maintain that all of this documentary evidence should have been placed before the County Commissioners by sworn witnesses who faced cross-examination, and, therefore, it should not have been considered by them. We disagree. “A zoning board, along with other administrative agencies, is generally not bound by the technical rules of evidence although it must observe fundamental fairness in dealing with the parties who appear before it.” Ginn v. Farley, 43 Md.App. 229, 236, 403 A.2d 858, cert. denied, sub nom. Engel v. Farley, 286 Md. 747 (1979). See also Entzian v. Prince George’s County, 32 Md.App. 256, 262, 360 A.2d 6 (1976) (<HOLDING>). The documents properly could be considered by 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence (B) holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound (C) holding that agency is bound by its regulations (D) recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence (E) recognizing that zoning agency bodies   are not bound by strict rules of evidence

A:
(E)
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