TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you are given text for US Congressional and California state bills, your task is to generate a summary for this bill.
PROBLEM: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``American Missile Protection Act of 
1998''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The threat of weapons of mass destruction delivered by 
        long-range ballistic missiles is among the most serious 
        security issues facing the United States.
                    (A) In a 1994 Executive Order, President Clinton 
                certified, that ``I ... find that the proliferation of 
                nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (`weapons of 
                mass destruction') and the means of delivering such 
                weapons, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat 
                to the national security, foreign policy, and economy 
                of the United States, and hereby declare a national 
                emergency to deal with that threat.'' This state of 
                emergency was reaffirmed in 1995, 1996, and 1997.
                    (B) In 1994 the President stated, that ``there is 
                nothing more important to our security and the world's 
                stability than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons 
                and ballistic missiles''.
                    (C) Several countries hostile to the United States 
                have been particularly determined to acquire missiles 
                and weapons of mass destruction. President Clinton 
                observed in January of 1998, for example, that ``Saddam 
                Hussein has spent the better part of this decade, and 
                much of his nation's wealth, not on providing for the 
                Iraqi people, but on developing nuclear, chemical and 
                biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them''.
                    (D) In 1996, the Senate affirmed that, ``it is in 
                the supreme interest of the United States to defend 
                itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile 
                attack, whatever the source.''
            (2) The long-range ballistic missile threat to the United 
        States is increasing.
                    (A) Several adversaries of the United States have 
                stated their intention to acquire intercontinental 
                ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United 
                States.
                            (i) Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has 
                        stated, ``If they know that you have a 
                        deterrent force capable of hitting the United 
                        States, they would not be able to hit you. If 
                        we had possessed a deterrent--missiles that 
                        could reach New York--we would have hit it at 
                        the same moment. Consequently, we should build 
                        this force so that they and others will no 
                        longer think about an attack.''
                            (ii) Abu Abbas, the head of the Palestine 
                        Liberation Front, has stated, ``I would love to 
                        be able to reach the American shore, but this 
                        is very difficult. Someday an Arab country will 
                        have ballistic missiles. Someday an Arab 
                        country will have a nuclear bomb. It is better 
                        for the United States and for Israel to reach 
                        peace with the Palestinians before that day.''
                            (iii) Saddam Hussein has stated, ``Our 
                        missiles cannot reach Washington. If we could 
                        reach Washington, we would strike if the need 
                        arose.''
                            (iv) Iranian actions speak for themselves. 
                        Iran's aggressive pursuit of medium-range 
                        ballistic missiles capable of striking Central 
                        Europe--aided by the continuing collaboration 
                        of outside agents--demonstrates Tehran's intent 
                        to acquire ballistic missiles of ever-
                        increasing range.
                    (B) Over 30 non-NATO countries possess ballistic 
                missiles, with at least 10 of those countries 
                developing over 20 new types of ballistic missiles.
                    (C) From the end of World War II until 1980, 
                ballistic missiles were used in one conflict. Since 
                1980, thousands of ballistic missiles have been fired 
                in at least six different conflicts.
                    (D) The clear trend among countries hostile to the 
                United States is toward having ballistic missiles of 
                greater range.
                            (i) North Korea first acquired 300-
                        kilometer range Scud Bs, then developed and 
                        deployed 500-kilometer range Scud Cs, is 
                        currently deploying the 1000-kilometer range 
                        No-Dong, and is developing the 2000-kilometer 
                        range Taepo-Dong 1 and 6000-kilometer range 
                        Taepo-Dong 2, which would be capable of 
                        striking Alaska and Hawaii.
                            (ii) Iran acquired 150-kilometer range CSS-
                        8s, progressed through the Scud B and Scud C, 
                        and is developing the 1300-kilometer range 
                        Shahab-3 and 2000-kilometer range Shahab-4, 
                        which would allow Iran to strike Central 
                        Europe.
                            (iii) Iraq, in a two-year crash program, 
                        produced a new missile, the Al-Hussein, with 
                        twice the range of its Scud Bs.
                            (iv) Experience gained from extending the 
                        range of short- and medium-range ballistic 
                        missiles facilitates the development of 
                        intercontinental ballistic missiles.
                    (E) The technical information, hardware, and other 
                resources necessary to build ballistic missiles are 
                increasingly available and accessible worldwide.
                            (i) Due to advances in information 
                        technology, a vast amount of technical 
                        information relating to ballistic missile 
                        design, much of it formerly classified, has 
                        become widely available and is increasingly 
                        accessible through the Internet and other 
                        distribution avenues.
                            (ii) Components, tools, and materials to 
                        support ballistic missile development are 
                        increasingly available in the commercial 
                        aerospace industry.
                            (iii) Increasing demand for satellite-based 
                        telecommunications is adding to the demand for 
                        commercial Space Launch Vehicles, which employ 
                        technology that is essentially identical to 
                        that of intercontinental ballistic missiles. As 
                        this increasing demand is met, the technology 
                        and expertise associated with space launch 
                        vehicles also proliferate.
                    (F) Russia and China have provided significant 
                technical assistance to rogue nation ballistic missile 
                programs, accelerating the pace of those efforts. In 
                June of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence, 
                reporting to Congress on weapons of mass destruction-
                related equipment, materials, and technology, stated 
                that ``China and Russia continued to be the primary 
                suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to stem 
                the flow of dual-use goods and modern weapons to 
                countries of concern.''
                    (G) Russia and China continue to engage in missile 
                proliferation.
                            (i) Despite numerous Russian assurances not 
                        to assist Iran with its ballistic missile 
                        program, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
                        State for Nonproliferation testified to the 
                        Senate, that ``the problem is this: there is a 
                        disconnect between those reassurances, which we 
                        welcome, and what we believe is actually 
                        occurring.''
                            (ii) Regarding China's actions to 
                        demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to 
                        nonproliferation, the Director of Central 
                        Intelligence testified to the Senate on January 
                        28, 1998, that, ``the jury is still out on 
                        whether the recent changes are broad enough in 
                        scope and whether they will hold over the 
                        longer term. As such, Chinese activities in 
                        this area will require continued close 
                        watching.''
                    (H) The inability of the United States to defend 
                itself against weapons of mass destruction delivered by 
                long-range ballistic missile provides additional 
                incentive for hostile nations to develop long-range 
                ballistic missiles with which to threaten the United 
                States. Missiles are widely viewed as valuable tools 
                for deterring and coercing a vulnerable United States.
            (3) The ability of the United States to anticipate future 
        ballistic missile threats is questionable.
                    (A) The Intelligence Community has failed to 
                anticipate many past technical innovations (for 
                example, Iraq's extended-range Al-Hussein missiles and 
                its development of a space launch vehicle) and outside 
                assistance enables rogue states to surmount traditional 
                technological obstacles to obtaining or developing 
                ballistic missiles of increasing range.
                    (B) In June of 1997, the Director of Central 
                Intelligence reported to Congress that ``many Third 
                World countries--with Iran being the most prominent 
                example--are responding to Western counter-
                proliferation efforts by relying more on legitimate 
                commercial firms as procurement fronts and by 
                developing more convoluted procurement networks.''
                    (C) In June of 1997, the Director of Central 
                Intelligence stated to Congress that ``gaps and 
                uncertainties preclude a good projection of exactly 
                when `rest of the world' countries will deploy ICBMs.''
                    (D) In 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence 
                testified that Iran would have a medium-range missile 
                by 2007. One year later the Director stated, ``since I 
                testified, Iran's success in getting technology and 
                materials from Russian companies, combined with recent 
                indigenous Iranian advances, means that it could have a 
                medium-range missile much sooner than I assessed last 
                year.'' Department of State officials have testified 
                that Iran could be prepared to deploy such a missile as 
                early as late 1998, nine years earlier than had been 
                predicted one year before by the Director of Central 
                Intelligence.
            (4) The failure to prepare adequately for long-range 
        ballistic missile threats could have severe national security 
        and foreign policy consequences for the United States.
                    (A) An attack on the United States by a ballistic 
                missile equipped with a weapon of mass destruction 
                could inflict catastrophic death or injury to citizens 
                of the United States and severe damage to their 
                property.
                    (B) A rogue state's ability to threaten the United 
                States with an intercontinental ballistic missile may 
                constrain the United States' options in dealing with 
                regional threats to its interests, deter the United 
                States from taking appropriate action, or prompt allies 
                to question United States security guarantees, thereby 
                weakening alliances of the United States and the United 
                States' world leadership position.
            (5) The United States must be prepared for rogue nations 
        acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with weapons of 
        mass destruction.
                    (A) In its resolution of ratification for the START 
                II Treaty, the United States Senate declared that 
                ``because deterrence may be inadequate to protect the 
                United States against long-range ballistic missile 
                threats, missile defenses are a necessary part of new 
                deterrent strategies.''
                    (B) In September of 1994, Secretary of Defense 
                Perry stated that in the post-Cold War era, ``we now 
                have opportunity to create a new relationship based not 
                on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather 
                on another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.''
                    (C) On February 12, 1997, the Under Secretary of 
                Defense for Policy testified to the Senate that ``I and 
                the administration are quite willing to acknowledge 
                that if we saw a rogue state, a potential proliferant, 
                beginning to develop a long-range ICBM capable of 
                reaching the United States, we would have to give very, 
                very serious attention to deploying a limited national 
                missile defense.''
            (6) The United States has no defense deployed against 
        weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-range ballistic 
        missiles and no policy to deploy such a national missile 
        defense system.

SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is 
technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system 
capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited 
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or 
deliberate).

SOLUTION: American Missile Protection Act of 1998 - States as U.S. policy to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending U.S. territory against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).

PROBLEM: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Genetically Engineered Food Right-
to-Know Act''.

SEC. 2. PURPOSE AND FINDINGS.

    (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to establish a consistent 
and enforceable standard for labeling of foods produced using genetic 
engineering, including fish, thereby providing consumers with knowledge 
of how their food is produced.
    (b) Findings.--Congress finds that--
            (1) the process of genetically engineering food organisms 
        results in material changes to food derived from those 
        organisms;
            (2) the Food and Drug Administration requires the labeling 
        of more than 3,000 ingredients, additives, and processes;
            (3) individuals in the United States have a right to know 
        if their food was produced with genetic engineering for a 
        variety of reasons, including health, economic, environmental, 
        religious, and ethical;
            (4) more than 60 countries, including the United Kingdom 
        and all other countries of the European Union, South Korea, 
        Japan, Brazil, Australia, India, China, and other key United 
        States trading partners have laws or regulations mandating 
        disclosure of genetically engineered food on food labels;
            (5) in 2011, Codex Alimentarius, the food standards 
        organization of the United Nations, adopted a text that 
        indicates that governments can decide on whether and how to 
        label foods produced with genetic engineering; and
            (6) mandatory identification of food produced with genetic 
        engineering can be a critical method of preserving the economic 
        value of exports or domestically sensitive markets with 
        labeling requirements for genetically engineered foods.

SEC. 3. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT.

    (a) In General.--Section 403 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 343) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
    ``(z)(1) If it is a food that has been genetically engineered or 
contains 1 or more genetically engineered ingredients, unless such 
information is clearly disclosed, as determined by the Secretary.
    ``(2) This paragraph does not apply to food that--
            ``(A) is served in restaurants or other similar eating 
        establishments, such as cafeterias and carryouts;
            ``(B) is a medical food (as defined in section 5(b) of the 
        Orphan Drug Act);
            ``(C) is a food that would be subject to this paragraph 
        solely because it was produced using a genetically engineered 
        vaccine; or
            ``(D) is a food or processed food that would be subject to 
        this paragraph solely because it includes the use of a 
        genetically engineered processing aid (including yeast) or 
        enzyme.
    ``(3) In this paragraph:
            ``(A) The term `genetic engineering' means a process 
        involving the application of--
                    ``(i) in vitro nucleic acid techniques, including 
                recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct 
                injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles; or
                    ``(ii) fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family 
                that--
                            ``(I) overcome natural physiological 
                        reproductive or recombinant barriers; and
                            ``(II) are not techniques used in 
                        traditional breeding and selection.
            ``(B) The term `genetically engineered', used with respect 
        to a food, means a material intended for human consumption that 
        is--
                    ``(i) an organism that is produced through the 
                intentional use of genetic engineering; or
                    ``(ii) the progeny of intended sexual or asexual 
                reproduction (or both) of 1 or more organisms that is 
                the product of genetic engineering.
            ``(C) The term `genetically engineered ingredient' means a 
        material that is an ingredient in a food that is derived from 
        any part of an organism that has been genetically engineered, 
        without regard to whether--
                    ``(i) the altered molecular or cellular 
                characteristics of the organism are detectable in the 
                material; and
                    ``(ii) the organism is capable for use as human 
                food.''.
    (b) Guaranty.--
            (1) In general.--Section 303(d) of the Federal Food, Drug, 
        and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 333(d)) is amended--
                    (A) by striking ``(d)'' and inserting ``(d)(1)''; 
                and
                    (B) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(2)(A) No person shall be subject to the penalties of 
        subsection (a)(1) for a violation of subsection (a), (b), or 
        (c) of section 301 involving food that is misbranded within the 
        meaning of section 403(z) if such person (referred to in this 
        paragraph as the `recipient') establishes a guaranty or 
        undertaking that--
                    ``(i) is signed by, and contains the name and 
                address of, a person residing in the United States from 
                whom the recipient received in good faith the food 
                (including the receipt of seeds to grow raw 
                agricultural commodities); and
                    ``(ii) contains a statement to the effect that the 
                food is not genetically engineered or does not contain 
                a genetically engineered ingredient.
            ``(B) In the case of a recipient who, with respect to a 
        food, establishes a guaranty or undertaking in accordance with 
        subparagraph (A), the exclusion under such subparagraph from 
        being subject to penalties applies to the recipient without 
        regard to the manner in which the recipient uses the food, 
        including whether the recipient is--
                    ``(i) processing the food;
                    ``(ii) using the food as an ingredient in a food 
                product;
                    ``(iii) repacking the food; or
                    ``(iv) growing, raising, or otherwise producing the 
                food.
            ``(C) No person may avoid responsibility or liability for a 
        violation of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of section 301 
        involving food that is misbranded within the meaning of section 
        403(z) by entering into a contract or other agreement that 
        specifies that another person shall bear such responsibility or 
        liability, except that a recipient may require a guaranty or 
        undertaking as described in this subsection.
            ``(D) In this subsection, the terms `genetically 
        engineered' and `genetically engineered ingredient' have the 
        meanings given the terms in section 403(z).''.
            (2) False guaranty.--Section 301(h) of the Federal Food, 
        Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 331(h)) is amended by 
        inserting ``or 303(d)(2)'' after ``section 303(c)(2)''.
    (c) Unintended Contamination.--Section 303(d) of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 333(d)), as amended by subsection 
(b), is further amended by adding at the end the following:
            ``(3)(A) No person shall be subject to the penalties of 
        subsection (a)(1) for a violation of subsection (a), (b), or 
        (c) of section 301 involving food that is misbranded within the 
        meaning of section 403(z) if--
                    ``(i) such person is an agricultural producer and 
                the violation occurs because food that is grown, 
                raised, or otherwise produced by such producer, which 
                food does not contain a genetically engineered material 
                and was not produced with a genetically engineered 
                material, is contaminated with a food that contains a 
                genetically engineered material or was produced with a 
                genetically engineered material; and
                    ``(ii) such contamination is not intended by the 
                agricultural producer.
            ``(B) Subparagraph (A) does not apply to an agricultural 
        producer to the extent that the contamination occurs as a 
        result of the negligence of the producer.''.
    (d) Promulgation of Regulations.--Not later than 1 year after the 
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall promulgate proposed 
regulations establishing labeling requirements for compliance in 
accordance with section 403(z) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, as added by subsection (a).

SOLUTION: Genetically Engineered Food Right-to-Know Act - Amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to deem misbranded any food that has been genetically engineered or contains one or more genetically engineered ingredients, unless such information is clearly disclosed. Exempts from this requirement any food that: (1) is served in restaurants or other similar eating establishments, (2) is a medical food, (3) would be subject to such requirement solely because it was produced using a genetically engineered vaccine, or (4) would be subject to such requirement solely because it includes the use of a genetically engineered processing aid (including yeast) or enzyme. Defines &quot;genetically engineered&quot; as a material intended for human consumption that is: (1) an organism produced through the intentional use of genetic engineering, or (2) the progeny of intended sexual or asexual reproduction (or both) of one or more organisms that is the product of genetic engineering. Defines &quot;genetically engineered ingredient&quot; as an ingredient in a food that is derived from any part of an organism that has been genetically engineered, without regard to whether: (1) the altered molecular or cellular characteristics of the organism are detectable in the material, and (2) the organism is capable for use as human food. Excludes from penalties for misbranding of genetically engineered food or ingredients any recipient that establishes a guaranty or undertaking that: (1) is signed by, and contains the name and address of, a person residing in the United States from whom the recipient received the food in good faith (including the receipt of seeds to grow raw agricultural commodities); and (2) contains a statement to the effect that the food is not genetically engineered or does not contain a genetically engineered ingredient. Applies this exclusion from penalties without regard to the manner in which the recipient uses the food. Excludes an agricultural producer also from such penalties when a violation occurs because food the producer has grown, raised, or otherwise produced, which neither contains nor was produced with a genetically engineered material, is subsequently contaminated with a food that does contain or was produced with a genetically engineered material, and the agricultural producer has not intended any such contamination nor was negligent in the matter.

PROBLEM: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``United States China Policy Act of 
1994''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The economic, social, political, and cultural welfare 
        of the people of China, who constitute one-fifth of the world's 
        population, is a matter of global humanitarian concern.
            (2) By virtue of its size, its economic vitality, its 
        status as a nuclear power, and its role as a permanent member 
        of the United Nations Security Council, China plays a 
        significant role in world affairs.
            (3) The United States policy toward China involves 
        balancing multiple interests, including promoting human rights 
        and democracy, securing China's strategic cooperation in Asia 
        and the United Nations, protecting United States national 
        security interests, controlling the proliferation of weapons of 
        mass destruction, promoting a peaceful and democratic 
        transition in Hong Kong, and expanding United States economic 
        contact with China.
            (4) United States policy toward China must include as a key 
        objective the promotion of internationally recognized human 
        rights. Specific priorities and methods should be appropriate 
        to the circumstances. Engagement with China rather than its 
        isolation is more likely to foster United States interests.
            (5) The opening of China to the West, the adoption of free 
        market economic reforms, the emergence of a strong and 
        entrepreneurial economy that ensures the rise of a Chinese 
        middle class; all have led to expanded individual freedom, a 
        weakening of state control over personal expression, access to 
        the media in the United States, Hong Kong, and the West, and 
        major improvements in living standards for the Chinese people.
            (6) United States policies that encourage economic 
        liberalization and increased contact with the United States and 
        other democracies foster respect for internationally recognized 
        human rights and can contribute to civil and political reform 
        in China.
            (7) The President's policy statement of May 26, 1994, 
        provides a sound framework for expanding and extending the 
        relationship of the United States with China while continuing 
        the commitment of the United States to its historic values. The 
        United States must develop a comprehensive and coherent policy 
        toward China that addresses the complex and fast-changing 
        reality in that country and promotes simultaneously the human 
        rights, diplomatic, economic, and security interests of the 
        United States toward China.
            (8) The United States has an interest in a strong, stable, 
        prosperous, and open China whose government contributes to 
        international peace and security and whose actions are 
        consistent with the responsibilities of great power status. 
        Whether those expectations are met will determine the breadth, 
        depth, and tone of the United States-China bilateral 
        relationship.
            (9) Peace and economic progress in East Asia is best 
        assured through a web of cooperative relations among the 
        countries of the region, including China and the United States. 
        The emergence of a militarily powerful China that seeks to 
        dominate East Asia would be regarded as a matter of serious 
        concern by the United States and by other countries in the 
        Asia-Pacific region.
            (10) Yet China's performance has been uneven on a number of 
        issues of concern to the United States. In particular, the 
        Chinese Government has failed to observe internationally 
        recognized human rights. In this regard the Congress makes the 
        following declarations:
                    (A) The Chinese Government itself has made 
                commitments to observe universal human rights norms.
                    (B) Human rights have universal application and are 
                not solely defined by culture or history.
                    (C) Chinese policies of particular concern to the 
                United States are the criminalization of dissent, the 
                inhumane treatment in prisons, and the serious 
                repression in non-Han-Chinese areas like Tibet.
            (11) Genuine political stability in China and greater 
        respect for internationally recognized human rights, as well as 
        continued economic growth and stability, will only occur in 
        China as a result of a strengthened legal system (based on the 
        rule of law and property rights), the emergence of a civil 
        society, and the creation of political institutions that are 
        responsive to public opinion and the interests of social 
        groups.
            (12) China has entered a major transition in its political 
        history which will determine the nature of the domestic system, 
        including respect for internationally recognized human rights, 
        and the Chinese Government's foreign policy. The Chinese 
        Government should accelerate the process of reform of all 
        aspects of Chinese society.
            (13) Existing official bilateral and multilateral 
        institutions provide useful venues for engagement with China 
        concerning the rule of law, civil society, respect for 
        internationally recognized human rights, and political 
        institutions that provide humane and effective governance.
            (14) American nongovernmental and business organizations, 
        in their various forms of engagement in China, have contributed 
        in that country to the initial emergence of civil society, the 
        strengthening of the legal system, and the expansion of 
        economic autonomy.

SEC. 3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY.

    Congress affirms the President's policy and makes the following 
recommendations for the conduct of United States policy toward China:
            (1) The United States should continue a steady and 
        comprehensive policy of pressing for increased Chinese 
        adherence to international norms, especially those concerning 
        internationally recognized human rights.
            (2) Of particular concern to the United States are the 
        following:
                    (A) The accounting and release of political 
                prisoners.
                    (B) Access to Chinese prisoners by international 
                humanitarian organizations.
                    (C) Negotiations between the Chinese Government and 
                the Dalai Lama on Tibetan issues.
            (3) The official dialogue with the Chinese Government on 
        human rights issues should continue and be intensified.
            (4) As he considers appropriate, the President should use 
        other available modes of official interaction with China to 
        pursue initiatives that are relevant to promoting increased 
        respect for human rights in China.
            (5) The United States should expand broadcasting to China, 
        through the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia.
            (6) The United States should work through available 
        multilateral fora, such as the United Nations Human Rights 
        Commission, to express concerns about human rights in China and 
        to encourage Chinese adherence to, and compliance with, 
        international human rights instruments. At all appropriate 
        times, the United States should work toward and support joint 
        actions to address significant problems. In particular, the 
        United States should seek to secure the participation of other 
        governments in overtures to secure the accounting and release 
        of political prisoners, to encourage access to Chinese 
        prisoners by international humanitarian organizations and 
        negotiations between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama.
            (7) Where possible, the United States should take further 
        steps to foster in China the rule of law, the creation of a 
        civic society, and the emergence of institutions that provide 
        humane and effective governance.
            (8) To better carry out the recommendation in paragraph 
        (7), the Secretary of State should encourage United States 
        posts in China to increase reporting on the human rights 
        situation, the rule of law, civil society, and other political 
        developments in China, and to increase appropriate contacts 
        with domestic nongovernmental organizations.
            (9) United States non-governmental organizations should 
        continue and expand activities that encourage the rule of law, 
        the emergence of a civic society, and the creation of 
        institutions that provide humane and effective governance.
            (10) When considering the termination of the suspensions of 
        United States Government activities enacted in section 902(a) 
        of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 
        and 1991, the President should explore whether such 
        terminations could be used to elicit specific steps by the 
        Chinese government to enhance respect for internationally 
        recognized human rights or correct abuses of such rights.

SEC. 4. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
              CHINA.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--Concerning the promotion of human rights 
in China, it shall be the policy of the United States to promote the 
following objectives:
            (1) An effective legal system, based on the rule of law.
            (2) Respect for internationally recognized human rights.
            (3) The emergence of civil society.
            (4) The creation of institutions that provide humane and 
        effective governance.
    (b) Factors.--In determining how to carry out the objectives stated 
in subsection (a), the President should consider the following factors:
            (1) The circumstances under which it is appropriate to 
        provide support to organizations and individuals in China.
            (2) The circumstances under which it is appropriate to 
        provide financial support, including through the following 
        means:
                    (A) Directly by the United States Government.
                    (B) Through United States nongovernmental 
                organizations which have established a sound record in 
                China.
            (3) The extent to which the objectives of subsection (a) 
        should be promoted through exchanges, technical assistance, 
        grants to organizations, and scholarships for advanced study in 
        the United States.
            (4) How to assure accountability for funds provided by the 
        United States Government.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1995.--
            (1) Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for 
        education and cultural exchange programs of the United States 
        Information Agency for fiscal year 1995, up to $1,000,000 is 
        authorized to be available for programs to carry out the 
        objectives of subsection (a).
            (2) In addition to such amounts as may otherwise be made 
        available for broadcasting to China for fiscal year 1995, of 
        the amounts authorized to be appropriated for international 
        broadcasting for fiscal year 1995, an additional $5,000,000 may 
        be used for broadcasting to China .

SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS.

    It is the sense of Congress that, in the event that international 
humanitarian organizations undertake activities in China related to the 
treatment of prisoners, the President should make available an 
additional contribution to those organizations to support such 
activities.

SEC. 6. PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN THE ACTIVITIES OF UNITED STATES BUSINESS 
              IN CHINA.

    (a) In General.--Congress endorses President Clinton's efforts to 
work with the leaders of the United States business community to 
develop voluntary principles that could be adapted by United States 
companies doing business in China to further advance human rights and 
commends United States companies that have previously adopted such 
principles or are considering taking such action.
    (b) Other Countries.--Congress urges the President to encourage 
other governments to adopt similar principles to govern the activities 
of their business organizations with activities in China.

SEC. 7. PERIODIC REPORTS.

    Not more than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act 
and annually for the 2 subsequent years, the President shall submit to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, a report (in a classified 
form in whole or in part as necessary) which reviews for the preceding 
12-month period those activities supported by the United States 
Government to promote the objectives stated in section 4(a).

SEC. 8. COMMISSION ON LAW AND SOCIETY IN CHINA.

    The President is authorized to establish a United States commission 
on law and society in the People's Republic of China to undertake the 
following responsibilities and such other duties as the President 
considers appropriate:
            (1) To monitor developments in China with respect to the 
        following:
                    (A) The development of the Chinese legal system.
                    (B) The emergence of civil society.
                    (C) The development of institutions that provide 
                humane and effective governance.
            (2) To engage in an ad hoc dialogue with Chinese 
        individuals and nongovernmental organizations who have an 
        interest in the subjects indicated in paragraph (1).
            (3) To report to the President and to the Congress the 
        commission's findings regarding the subjects identified in 
        paragraph (1) and its discussions with Chinese individuals and 
        organizations concerning those subjects.
            (4) To make recommendations to the President on United 
        States policy toward China in promoting the objectives 
        identified in section 4(a).
            (5) To assess and report to the President and the Congress 
        on whether the creation of a United States-China Commission on 
        Law and Society would contribute to the objectives identified 
        in section 4(a).

            Passed the House of Representatives August 9, 1994.

            Attest:

                                           DONNALD K. ANDERSON,

                                                                 Clerk.

SOLUTION:
United States China Policy Act of 1994 - Declares that the Congress affirms the President's policy toward China and makes the following recommendations for the conduct of U.S. policy toward that country, including:  (1) a continued U.S. policy of pressing for increased Chinese adherence to internationally recognized human rights; (2) U.S. concern for the accounting and release of political prisoners, access to Chinese prisoners by international humanitarian organizations, and negotiations between China and the Dalai Lama on Tibetan issues; (3) expanded U.S. broadcasting to China through the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia; and (4) further U.S. steps to foster in China the rule of law, the creation of a civic society, and the emergence of institutions that provide humane and effective governance. 
Urges the President, when considering termination of the suspensions of U.S. Government activities enacted in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, to explore whether such terminations could be used to elicit specific steps by the Chinese to enhance respect for internationally recognized human rights or to correct abuses of such rights. 
(Sec. 4) Declares it to be U.S. policy, in fostering human rights in China, to promote the following objectives:  (1) an effective legal system, based on the rule of law; (2) respect for internationally recognized human rights; (3) the emergence of civil society; and (4) the creation of institutions that provide humane and effective goverance. 
Authorizes appropriations for programs to carry out the objectives of this Act. 
(Sec. 5) Expresses the sense of the Congress that, in the event that international humanitarian organizations undertake activities in China related to the treatment of prisoners, the President should make available additional contributions to such organizations to support them. 
(Sec. 6) Declares that the Congress endorses President Clinton's efforts to work with U.S. leaders of the business community to develop principles that could be adapted by U.S. companies doing business in China to advance human rights.  Commends U.S. companies that have adopted such principles.  Urges the President to encourage other governments to adopt such principles in governing the activities of their businesses in China. 
(Sec. 7) Requires the President to review and report to specified congressional committees on U.S. activities to promote human rights in China. 
(Sec. 8) Authorizes the President to establish a U.S. commission on law and society in China to monitor developments in China with respect to the specified objectives of U.S. policy.