TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. In determining the purpose of section 13-21-101, it is appropriate to look to legislative history as indicative of the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Willer, 817 P.2d at 519-20. The 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101 created the distinction between judgments which the judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal. The General Assembly intended that the amendment, and its market-determined interest rate, apply only to judgments which the judgment debtor appeals. See Act of March 25, 1982, ch. 39, 1982 Colo. Laws 227 (entitled “An Act Concerning Interest Payable on Appealed Money Judgments in Civil Actions” (emphasis added)); see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The statements of the bill’s sponsors also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent (B) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (C) holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period (D) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent (E) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent

SOLUTION: holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent

PROBLEM: negligence placed the plaintiff....” Brown v. Philadelphia Coll, of Osteopathic Med., 449 Pa.Super. 667, 674 A.2d 1130, 1135-36 (1996). Russell’s actions were intentional, not negligent. The impact rule, which depends upon the negligence of a defendant, is therefore inapposite to this case. 7 . Because DiSalvio’s federal cause of action survives Russell's Motion to Dismiss, the Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over DiSalvio’s remaining state law claims. 9 . Unlike the School District Defendants, Russell has not argued that this tort is unavailable to plaintiffs in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 10 . The Court similarly rejects Russell’s argument that DiSalvio cannot recover punitive damages from him under her § 1983 claim. See Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 11 . DiSalvio suggests that Magill should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages may be awarded for egregious violations of the lmrda (B) holding that punitive damages may be imposed against employer for tortious conduct of employee (C) holding that punitive damages may be awarded under  1983 when the defendants conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others (D) holding that a supervisor with no personal involvement may be liable for the constitutional violation of a subordinate for culpable action or inaction in the training supervision or control of his subordinates acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation  or reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others (E) holding that since the complaint set out a deliberate indifference claim it follows logically that reckless or callous indifference has been noticed

SOLUTION: holding that punitive damages may be awarded for egregious violations of the lmrda

PROBLEM: Note-holders’ claims. 3. Contract Terms An indenture trustee has a fiduciary duty to the noteholders and is required to act with the same care as if it owned the investment. See, e.g., Flight Transp. Corp., 874 F.2d at 578 (citing Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-ooo(c)). The Indenture in this case incorporates this standard by mandating that WTC’s services be performed with “the same degree of care and skill in their exercise as a prudent Person would exercise or use under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs.” (See Indenture at § 7.1(a).) If the indenture trustee fulfills its duties, it is entitled to reimbursement of its expenses, including attorneys’ fees, in accordance with the terms of the indenture. See, e.g., Flight Transp. Corp., 874 F.2d at 583 (<HOLDING>); In re W.T. Grant Co., 119 B.R. 898, 900 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses (B) holding that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in awarding opposing counsels attorneys fees and expenses as sanctions without affording the sanctioned party the right to examine question or provide argument against the claimed fees and expenses (C) holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee (D) holding parties agreement provided clear contractual justification for the award of costs and expenses including attorneys fees to the prevailing party (E) holding that the relevant indenture agreement allowed the trustee to bring tort and fraud claims on behalf of the bondholders

SOLUTION:
holding that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in awarding opposing counsels attorneys fees and expenses as sanctions without affording the sanctioned party the right to examine question or provide argument against the claimed fees and expenses