In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Plaintiff did not meet the notice requirements of the CFRA and the FMLA. Plaintiff did not notify Defendant in advance that Plaintiff would be absent from March 31, 2014 through April 3, 2014. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo., Exhs. Vol. II. Additionally, Plaintiff did not call in sick or ask someone to call Defendant on his behalf on any of those four days of absence, even though Plaintiff made 26 phone calls to individuals or entities other than McCale or Defendant. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo,, Exhs. Vol. II. Thus, unlike in Avila, upon which Plaintiff relies, Plaintiff did not call in sick during his absence from March 31, 2014 through April 3,2014. See Avila, 165 Cal.App.4th at 1258, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, two weeks prior to Plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party (B) holding that absence from prior state was temporary during the time it was contemplated that the parent and child would return to the other state (C) holding that spouse was not required to return to work immediately upon divorce to avoid judicial imputation of income (D) holding that calling in sick during an absence and providing hospital forms describing the illness upon return to work is sufficient notice (E) holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights
[A]: (D)


[Q]: arbitrators, Eventys argues, the circuit court could have assured that both parties would have an opportunity to make their arguments to that forum. Alternatively, Eventys maintains, the circuit court should have considered and expressly ruled upon Eventys’s arguments that the provision purporting to waive class action claims was unconscionable and unenforceable. Eventys further argues that, because the “terms and conditions” did not include a severability provision, the circuit court’s necessary determination that FDUTPA’s remedial purposes are frustrated by the class action waiver provision would then invalidate the entire arbitration provision. For this argument, Eventys relies principally on the analysis in S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski, 976 So.2d 600, 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>), and a group of federal cases holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contractual provisions in an arbitration agreement purporting to prohibit consumers from prosecuting class actions for small sums of money per consumer but for a substantial number of consumers are irreconcilably at odds with the remedial purposes of fdutpa contrary to the public policy of this state and unenforceable for that reason (B) holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute  the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable (C) holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable (D) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (E) holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy
[A]: (A)


[Q]: UC Hastings Mot. at 5-8), and courts in their home forums have addressed related arguments in the past. See, e.g., Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 275 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming the district court’s holding that the University of Iowa and its Board of Regents were immune, under the Eleventh Amendment, from suit on plaintiffs § 1983 claims); Scherer v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 49 Fed.Appx. 658, 658 (8th Cir.2002) (affirming the district court’s holding that the University of Missouri and its Curators were immune, under the Eleventh Amendment, from suit on plaintiffs ADA claim) (citing Sherman v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 871 F.Supp. 344, 348 (W.D.Mo.1994)); Gallagher v. Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law, No. C011277PJH, 2001 WL 1006809, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 16, 2001) (<HOLDING>). Because the relevant circuit and district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding michigan friend of the court employees absolutely immune from suit under  1983 (B) holding that uc hastings was immune under the eleventh amendment from suit on plaintiffs  1983 claims and granting motion to dismiss (C) holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981 (D) holding college school district immune from suit in federal court under eleventh amendment (E) recognizing that section 1983 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment
[A]:
(B)