In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 35 . Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 36 . Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 37 . Kimmelman v. Monison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 38 . Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 39 . The Court notes that the state standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel applied by the state parallels the federal standard as stated in Strickland. See Baker v. State, 243 Kan. 1, 755 P.2d 493 (1988); Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 694 P.2d 468 (1985). 40 . Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). 41 . Id. at 753, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 42 .Id. at 754, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 43 . Id. at 752, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (“Legal 2005) (<HOLDING>). 46 . Moreover, the Court finds no error in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel was not deficient for failing to make an objection that lacked merit (B) holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel (C) holding counsel deficient because she could have had no reasonable basis for not objecting to certain inadmissible evidence despite no evidence of counsels strategy (D) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument (E) holding counsel was not deficient in not objecting to testimony that was permissible within state rules of evidence

Answer: (E)


Question: did not arise out of her employment, given that she was no longer employed at Riverside when she was injured. Respondents counter that, for purposes of the NIIA, the employment relationship continues for a reasonable amount of time after an employee quits or is fired, so that Fanders was still considered an employee when she was injured, and thus, the NILA applied and was Fanders’ sole remedy. The NIIA only covers injuries that arise out of and in the course of the injured claimant’s employment. NRS 616C. 150(1). An in jury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the workplace. Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment (B) holding employees under age discrimination in employment acts adea parallel retaliation provision includes former employees as long as the alleged discrimination is related to or arises out of the employment relationship (C) holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment (D) holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment (E) holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law

Answer: (A)


Question: of petitioner’s exchange with Sprague, he should not have imposed a sentence of incarceration in the absence of counsel, without record proof of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Because Sprague had a right to counsel, there should have been no suggestion that he could suffer a disability for exercising that right. This constitutes legal error and an abuse of discretion. The United States Supreme Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense * * * unless he was represented by counsel * * Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662, 122 S.Ct. 1764, 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)); see also State v. Bluitt, 850 A.2d 83, 88-89 (R.I.2004) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order for a waiver of counsel to be valid the trial court must ensure that the defendants waiver of his right to counsel is done knowingly and intelligently so that the record establishes that the defendants choice is made with eyes open (B) holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary (C) holding that trial judges must be satisfied that an accused is making a knowing voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel having been advised of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation such that there is a record demonstration that an accused elected to proceed without counsel with eyes open (D) holding that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person who has been advised by competent counsel may not be collaterally attacked (E) holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act

Answer:
(C)