In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals
[EX A]: holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision

[EX Q]: amount and terms of the deductions ...” In case of any failure to pay wages due to an employee as required by Section 41-10-40 or 41-10-50 the employee may recover in a civil action an amount equal to three times the full amount of the unpaid wages, plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as the court may allow. § 41-10-80(C). The South Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted this treble damages provision to mean that the decision to award the penalty of treble damages is discretionary, and the penalty should not be imposed “if there is a good faith dispute over wages allegedly due.” Rice, 456 S.E.2d at 383. Fruehauf asks us to extend the requirement that there be a bona fide, good faith wage dispute to require that Wall show that Fruehauf willf 335 S.C. 598, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) (<HOLDING>); O’Neal v. Intermedical Hospital of South 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client (B) holding that the lack of a confidentiality agreement does not necessarily defeat an argument that information is a trade secret because where an employee acquires during the course of his employment a special technique or process developed by his employer he is under a duty not to use it to the detriment of his employer (C) holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm (D) holding that an employee who breaches the duty of loyalty to his employer forfeits his right to compensation and creates a good faith dispute over the payment of his wages by virtue of his bad behavior (E) holding that when an employee is injured by his employers tortious conduct his employer owes him damages and compensation under the act
[EX A]: recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client

[EX Q]: found that there was sufficient evidence to show that the conspiracy began in 1992. Accordingly, the district court included 1992 and 1993 in its calculation of McGuire’s sentence, adopted the reasoning of the PSR, and set McGuire’s offense level at 28, which put McGuire in a sentencing range of 78 to 97 months. The district court sentenced McGuire to 78 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. On October 13, 1999, the court entered final judgment. McGuire argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction to change his sentence, asserting that the sentence was “imposed” under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(c) when the district co (2d Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Townsend, 33 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Clay, 37 F.3d 338, 340 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 869 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment (B) holding that imposition occurs at time of entry of judgment (C) holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact (D) recognizing difference in elements between offense of actual entry and attempted entry (E) holding that imposition occurs at time of oral pronouncement
[EX A]:
holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment