In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: charge for each item or items. The Trial Court, however, refused to admit the last page of the bill that contained only a description of miscellaneous and a corresponding charge. Plaintiff had no testimony or other evidence to explain to the jury anything about the charge listed on the last page of the bill. The Trial Court stated such a description would force the jury to speculate regarding what supplies were encompassed within the charge for these miscellaneous items. A jury may not engage in speculation. Stringer v. Cooper, 486 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tenn.Ct.App.1972) (stating “we understand the holding in those cases and many more like them to be that a jury may not speculate as to cause when one is not shown.... ”); Moon v. Johnston, 47 Tenn.App. 208, 337 S.W.2d 464, 469 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Without any testimony or other evidence to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the defendants act was the or a proximate cause of the injury the matter is for the jury to decide (B) holding a jury is not permitted to speculate or guess as to proximate cause (C) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury (D) holding proximate cause almost always a question solely for the jury (E) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury

Answer: (B)


Question: with “complete and final discretionary authority to interpret the plans and maintain control over the operation and administration of the plans.” Accordingly, the Chevron Plan, via the Services Agreement and the SPD, delegates authority to Aetna regarding benefit eligibility for the Medical Plan. Moreover, in this situation, Aetna made a factual determination that certain diagnostic testing and IVIG treatments were not medically necessary. “[F]actual determinations made by [an] administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion.” Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir.1999); see also Chandler v. Hartford Life, No. 05-50688, 2006 WL 1209363, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr.28, 2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp., 168 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion (B) holding that a denial of benefits will not be reviewed de novo where the language of an erisa plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (C) holding that arbitrary and capricious standard applies to section 1132a1b denial ofbenefits claims if the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (D) holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion (E) holding that  rjegardless of the administrators ultimate authority to determine benefit eligibility  factual determinations made by the administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion 

Answer: (E)


Question: Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723 (“We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.”), vacated by settlement, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.1991), reinstated by order, 12 F.3d 190 n. * (11th Cir.1994); see also Dolihite v. Maughon ex rel. Videon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55 (11th Cir.1996) (awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could “reasonably rely on” judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth’s surroundings). We affirm the dismissal of Acosta’s complaint against Watts. Acosta’s complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a claim of deliberate indifference against unknown named personnel in the Office of Medical Designation. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005 (<HOLDING>). Acosta alleged that he had a serious medical 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for damages against federal agents acting under their authority who allegedly violated plaintiffs fourth amendment rights (B) recognizing a cause of action for damages against officials who violate constitutional or statutory rights under color of federal law (C) recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights (D) holding plaintiff may sue federal agents for money damages for violation of his constitutional rights (E) recognizing an action for damages against unknown federal agents for the violation of constitutional rights

Answer:
(E)