In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
or creating documents with mistakes on them and signing my name to them to make me appear as if I had been inaccurate .... ” Paragraph 25: The sentence “I confidentially complained about this behavior to Bruce Smith, who, instead of taking action to prevent Burchfield from continuing her pattern of behavior toward me, apparently told Burchfield to counsel me.” Paragraph 32: The sentence “I believe that this move was the beginning point of a concerted effort to remove me from the workplace based on my age.” Paragraph 36: The sentence “I believe that Albertson’s did not provide all of the time sheets from all vendors of temporary help.” Paragraph 37: The sentence “I believe that my combination of formal college education and experience, even though I did not obtain a co h Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). With respect to paragraphs 22, 28, 34, 39, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a single conversation to be sufficient evidence of dissolution to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that mere conclusion of affiant without some supporting facts are insufficient to raise fact issue necessary to preclude summary judgment (C) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (D) recognizing that the plaintiffs mere assertions that the defendant had a discriminatory intent were inadequate without substantial factual evidence to raise an issue to preclude summary judgment (E) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
did not arise out of her employment, given that she was no longer employed at Riverside when she was injured. Respondents counter that, for purposes of the NIIA, the employment relationship continues for a reasonable amount of time after an employee quits or is fired, so that Fanders was still considered an employee when she was injured, and thus, the NILA applied and was Fanders’ sole remedy. The NIIA only covers injuries that arise out of and in the course of the injured claimant’s employment. NRS 616C. 150(1). An in jury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the workplace. Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment (B) holding employees under age discrimination in employment acts adea parallel retaliation provision includes former employees as long as the alleged discrimination is related to or arises out of the employment relationship (C) holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment (D) holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment (E) holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
for a mitigating role adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Section 3B1.2 “authorizes a four-level reduction in offense level if the defendant is deemed a ‘minimal’ participant in the criminal activity! ] [and] a two-level reduction if he is deemed a ‘minor’ participant....” United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 783 (6th Cir. 2012). The difference between “minimal” and “minor” is “not just semantic,” United States v. Lopez, 937 F.2d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 1991), and the standards are not interchangeable. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n. 5 (defining a “minor participant” as “a defendant ... who is less culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as minimal”) (emphasis added); United States v. Friedman, 998 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). Both Griffith and the Government focus their 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this distinction (B) holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements (C) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (D) holding that the district court improperly used the two different standards under ussg  3b12 interchangeably thus blurring the distinction between section 3b12a and b (E) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel

Ex Output:

(D)