TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: reasons for his back problems, reasons that Anderson, given his attitude toward work and pain, apparently accepted without question. Considering the evidence as a whole, I conclude that substantial evidence does not support a conclusion that Anderson did know or should have known he had a compensable injury which needed to be reported to Frontier until Drs. Gallagher and Pinto provided reports to Anderson’s attorney in April or May 2009. It was these reports that first established a relationship between Anderson’s injury and his work for Frontier. Therefore, I would hold that the letter sent by Anderson’s attorney on May 13, 2009, constituted timely notice to Frontier under the statute and our case law. 1 . Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 320-22, 101 N.W.2d 200, 205-06 (1960) (<HOLDING>). 2 . A worker may qualify for social security 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act (B) recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury (C) holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute (D) recognizing that a preexisting disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim arising out of employment if the employment aggravated accelerated or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce disability for which compensation is sought (E) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable

SOLUTION: holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act

PROBLEM: reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts.” Mungin v. State, 982 So.2d 986, 998 (Fla.2006). A. Stipulating to Evidence for the Motion to Suppress Parker’s May 7, 1982, Statement In this claim, Parker contends that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the evidence used to decide whether his May 7, 1982, statement was admissible. Parker’s May 7 statement was admitted during the resentencing proceeding through the testimony of Detective Powers. Because Parker had invoked his right to counsel prior to making the May 7 statement, the admissibility of that statement under United States Supreme Court precedent turns on whether Parker initiated the May 7 contact with law enforcement. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The stipulated evidence included hearsay 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available  unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (B) holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (C) holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications (D) holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (E) holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police

SOLUTION: holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police

PROBLEM: of Concern related to time and attendance. Def.’s Statement Fact ¶ 122. Ms. Britt’s effort to portray Ms. Wilson as possessing an anti-Muslim animus fails. Ms. Britt does not allege that Ms. Wilson expressed her anti-Muslim animus in any other way beyond allegedly denying her Ramadan accommodation. Contrary to Ms. Britt’s assertions, the record evidence shows that Ms. Wilson exercised her discretion, against the advice of HR, to accommodate Ms. Britt’s request for modified hours during Ramadan. As such, Ms. Britt has failed to identify facts sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Ms. Wilson’s desire to retaliate against Ms. Britt was the “but for” cause of Ms. Britt’s termination. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (<HOLDING>). b. Mis. Trask’s July 19, 2012 email summary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is nothing to indicate that the principle of employer responsibility does not extend equally to other title vii claims such as a claim of unlawful retaliation (B) holding that title vii retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of butfor causation which requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer (C) holding that discrimination and retaliation claims are considered distinct types of claims that must be raised independently if the retaliation occurred prior to the filing of the administrative charge (D) holding that the court finds more persuasive the decisions of the circuit courts which reject reading a thirdparty retaliation cause of action into title vii but ultimately finding that the participation prong of title vii is potentially broad enough to encompass retaliation against third parties in the circumstances alleged in the instant case (E) holding that title vii retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the butfor cause of the challenged employment action

SOLUTION:
holding that there is nothing to indicate that the principle of employer responsibility does not extend equally to other title vii claims such as a claim of unlawful retaliation