In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: to use the latter route to circumvent Congress’s apparent intent in enacting the AEDPA to bar all review of such decisions. Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1046 (D.C.Cir.1998). In 1997, the Ninth Circuit held that the new restrictions on successive petitions do not prevent a petitioner from bringing a § 2241 claim after he has already brought a § 2255 claim. See United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278 (9th Cir.1997). Furthermore, in 1998, the Second Circuit held that a § 2255 petition that followed a § 2241 petition was not barred. See Corrao v. United States, 152 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir.1998), citing Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474 (2d Cir.1 the execution of a sentence are properly raised in a § 2241 petition”); United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 489 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Corrao, 152 F.3d at 191 (“a motion under § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subject matter jurisdiction under  2241 is present in the custodial court when the petition challenges the manner location or condition of a sentences execution (B) holding that a petition under  2241 attacks the execution of a sen tence while a  2255 petition attacks the validity of a judgment and sentence (C) holding that an attack on the computation and execution of a sentence must come in the form of a  2241 petition (D) holding that  2255 is unavailable to attack execution of sentence (E) holding that it is well settled in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that  2255 will lie only to attack the imposition of a sentence and that an attack on the execution thereof may be accomplished only by way of habeas corpus in the district of confinement
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: erred by failing to instruct the jury that a confidential informant’s testimony must be corroborated, in conformity with article 38.141. We agree. Our holding that there was some “other evidence” to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement does not eliminate the need for an instruction. See Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (noting court “might disagree” with court of appeals’s holding that there was no evidence ten o the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the requirements of article 38.141 here, but asserts that the trial court’s error resulted in harm under the “egregious harm standard” of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (applying egregious harm analysis to unobjected-to charge error). See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632 (<HOLDING>); Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 692 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding egregious harm standard applied where appellant failed to object to lack of instruction on accomplice witness testimony (B) holding egregious harm resulted from erroneous jury instruction authorizing conviction based on legally inadequate theory (C) holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated (D) holding that where appellant failed to present either expert or lay testimony as to the appropriate standard of care to be used appellant failed to present any evidence indicating the existence of an issue of fact thus summary judgment was proper (E) holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: showing that a defendant knew or had reason to know of specific instances of actual infringement. b. Analysis The evidence adduced at trial demonstrates eBay had general knoivledge of infringement by sellers using its website. Such general knowledge, however, does not require eBay to take action to discontinue supplying its service to all those who might be engaged in counterfeiting. Having concluded that, as a matter of law, general knowledge of infringement is insufficient, the Court proceeds to consider whether the generalized assertions of infringement made by Tiffany are sufficiently specific to impute to eBay k ., 180 F.Supp.2d 678, 690-91 (D.Md.2001) (finding that demand letter notifying defendant of plaintiffs position is insufficient); Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F.Supp. at 964 (<HOLDING>); Coca-Cola, 64 F.Supp. at 987 (holding general 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trademark owners mere assertion that its domain name is infringed is insufficient to impute knowledge of infringement and a demand letter is also insufficient (B) holding that contributory trademark infringement requires some predicate act of infringement (C) holding that although the underlying action is one for trademark infringement the infringement occurred as a result of the underlying defendants use of the trademark in their advertising (D) holding that trademark owners demand letter is insufficient to resolve  uncertainty of infringement (E) holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract
Example Output:
(D)