In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: in calculating the reduction of state workers’ compensation benefits advances the legislature’s intent to reduce the state’s compensation burden by taking advantage of the workers’ compensation government benefits offset to its fullest extent. Accordingly, we hold that SSDI child’s benefits are to be included when calculating the amount of the reduction in an employer’s payment of workers’ compensation benefits under Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4. II. The Fund makes the argument that the WCCA exceeded its authority in examining the Social Security Act. The WCCA’s jurisdiction does not extend to interpreting or applying legislation designed specially for the handling of claims outside the workers’ compensation system. Taft v. Advance United Expressways, 464 N.W.2d 725, 727 (Minn.1991) (<HOLDING>). In that Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4, is a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the primary goal when interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the specific insurance policy (B) holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable (C) holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law (D) holding that the tucker acts waiver does not extend to statutory claims (E) holding that the jurisdiction of the wcca did not extend to interpreting or applying the law related to claims against the minnesota insurance guaranty association
[EX A]: holding that the primary goal when interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the specific insurance policy

[EX Q]: required expert testimony at trial. We agree with other appellate courts that the statute does not violate the open courts provision by requiring an expert report sooner rather than later in the litigation. See, e.g., Gill v. Russo, 39 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Knie v. Piskun, 23 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied). Mocega’s fifth point is overruled. Notice of Hearing Mocega’s final two points assert the trial court was required to grant her the grace period provided under art. 4590i, § 13.01(g). A motion under that section is timely if filed before “any hearing” on a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Urquhart’s motion was “heard” by submission on April 3rd. See Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>). Mocega’s motion was not filed until April 
 Holding statements: (A) holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation (B) holding that a hearing does not contemplate an oral presentation unless required by express language or context (C) holding that oral rendition of judgment supported by the courts docket sheet was insufficient express specific written order is required (D) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes (E) holding that express oral agreement with government agent was not binding because among other factors applicable regulations required contract to be in writing
[EX A]: holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation

[EX Q]: for the employee.” Id. at 1011. “However, employers can effectively disclaim any implied contractual obligation arising from such provisions.” Id. “‘The legal effect of such a disclaimer is, in the first instance, a question for the court to decide.’ ” Id. (quoting Smith v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 620 A.2d 265, 269 (D.C.1993)). A mere statement that the employee handbook is not a contract does not necessarily settle the matter. See Strass, 744 A.2d at 1012-14. Rather, for provisions relating to employee termination to be “unenforceable at law,” our cases have held that the employee handbook “must contain language clearly reserving the employer’s right to terminate at will.” Sisco v. GSA Nat’l Capital Fed. Credit Union, 689 A.2d 52, 55 (D.C.1997); See, e.g., Smith, 620 A.2d at 269 (<HOLDING>); see also Kerrigan v. Britches of Georgetowm, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that wrongful or malicious interference with atwill employment contract may give rise to a tortious interference claim the fact that the employment is at the will of the employer and the employee does not make it one at the will of third parties (B) holding that employee handbook did not give rise to implied contract where it stated that it was not a contract and that employment was terminable at will (C) holding that an employment contract of an indefinite duration is terminable at will (D) holding that a contract of an indefinite duration is terminable at will (E) holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law
[EX A]:
recognizing that wrongful or malicious interference with atwill employment contract may give rise to a tortious interference claim the fact that the employment is at the will of the employer and the employee does not make it one at the will of third parties