In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and § 1981 the exclusive remedies for employment discrimination by a municipality and its employees, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under § 1983. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss Johnson’s § 1983 claims. AFFIRMED. 1 . Count Eight asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim against the individual defendants for alleged conspiracy to violate Johnson's § 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment rights. This count is not at issue on this appeal. 2 . The defendants also moved to dismiss the § 1981 claim. The district court granted dismissal against the City only, citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2722, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (<HOLDING>). 3 .We review de novo a question of law 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in  1981 by state governmental units (B) holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment (C) holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies (D) holding that where it is alleged that state has violated rights conferred by constitution governmental immunity is not available in state court action but declining to infer a right to sue the state for damages on the basis of a violation of the michigan constitution (E) holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law
[A]: holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment


[Q]: 393 N.W.2d 286, 290-91 (S.D.1986). • GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, (dissenting).. [¶ 26.] I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the lower court on Issue 2. I would hold the trial court erred when it granted partial summary judgment to 01-esens, holding City’s operation of food service at the municipal bar was an ultra vires act. [¶27.] An express grant of authority from the legislature “includes those incidental or implied powers that are necessary to enable a municipality to perform the function authorized.” City of Rapid City v. Rensch, 77 S.D. 242, 246, 90 N.W.2d 380, 383 (1958) (citation omitted). A municipality is vested with discretion as to how it exercises specific powers conferred upon it by the legislature, as long as the methods employed are n , 59 N.W.2d 732, 734 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Actions taken under a municipality’s implied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding municipality had implied authority to enter into a long term contract to establish a golf course although state statute did not specifically grant authority to establish golf courses as public parks (B) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (C) holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority (D) holding that plaintiff had no authority or statutory right for actions proper course was to report actions to proper legal authority (E) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality
[A]: holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute


[Q]: comment g. In addition, “an invitee may anticipate that the premises are reasonably safe for his intended use.” Page, J., THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY, § 4.16, 94 (1976). ■ Our opinions in Tribe, supra, Coburn, supra, and Beach, supra, have evidently failed to clarify our views of the duty problem. We therefore summarize the relevant principles. 1. The question of duty is decided by the court. The question is whether the relationship of the parties was such that the defendant was under an obligation to use some care to avoid or prevent injury to the plaintiff. If the answer is no, the defendant is not liable even though he may have acted negligently in light of the foreseeable risks. Prosser, supra, § 53, at 356-359; see, also, Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 705 P.2d 945 (1985) (<HOLDING>). In the context of this case, therefore, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a business owner owes the duty to his guests to exercise reasonable care to protect them from injury at the hands of a fellow guest (B) holding that a negligent misrepresentation claim brought by an independent third party health care provider was not preempted by erisa (C) holding that a negligent host was under no duty of care to the victim injured by an automobile driven by an intoxicated guest (D) holding that a talk show host did not owe a cognizable duty to protect a guest on the show from the homicidal acts of third parties (E) holding automobile exclusion in general liability policy did not apply because plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision and training was a separate and distinct theory of recovery from the use of an automobile
[A]:
holding that a business owner owes the duty to his guests to exercise reasonable care to protect them from injury at the hands of a fellow guest