In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

of any act which is within the scope of the lawful duty or authority of that officer, ... or who knowingly resists or obstructs the service or execution by any authorized person of any civil or criminal process or order of any court, commits a simple misdemeanor---However, if a person commits an interference with official acts, as defined in this subsection, and in so doing inflicts bodily injury other than serious injury, that person commits an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 719.1(1). Because an aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law carries the possibility of a two-year prison sentence, see Iowa Code § 903.1(2), it qualifies as a “prior felony conviction” for purposes of § 4B1.1, see USSG § 4B1.2, comment, (n.1). See United States v. Postley, 449 F.3d 831, 832 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). To convict Malloy under section 719.1(1), a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an aggravated misdemeanor conviction under section 7191 is a felony for purposes of assessing criminal history points under ussg  4a12c (B) holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony (C) holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law (D) holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law (E) holding that conviction under  2702a3 or 4 is an aggravated felony under  101a43f
holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony

for the district court to grant his motion to withdraw his plea. But Harvey has not challenged the district court's ultimate finding that he was competent to stand trial based on the court's consideration of the opinions of all three psychiatrists. In light of the district court's unchallenged and supported determination that Harvey was competent to stand trial (and therefore competent to plead), Harvey cannot argue that the court committed obvious error in failing to sua sponte permit him to withdraw his plea on the basis of his "marginal competence." Nor can he claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue Harvey's marginal competency as a reason for withdrawing the plea. Harvey's claims related to his competency therefore fail. { 18 We affirm. 1 . The court stat Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 940-42 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel (B) holding an attorneys mistaken prediction about a possible sentence does not render a defendants plea unknowing and involuntary (C) holding that a defense attorneys failure to uncover a defendants prior felony convictions and the attorneys inaccurate sentencing prediction did not render the defendants plea unknowing and involuntary because the defendant knew at the time he pleaded guilty what his sentence might be (D) holding that ineffective assistance can render a guilty plea involuntary (E) holding that an inaccurate sentencing estimate did not render a plea unknowing unintelligent or involuntary because the defendant was informed of the statutory maximum
holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel

on Fourth Amendment grounds. 2. Standing Conferred by the Statute The government further asserts that the defendants lack standing to challenge the subpoenas because “DOC was the target of the subpoena, not the defendants.” Gov’t’s Reply at 4. The government’s position finds direct support in the decisions of two circuit courts. In United States v. Moffett, 84 F.3d 1291 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit concluded. that a criminal defendant who was not the direct recipient of a subpoena issued pursuant to § 876 was not “in the zone of interest the statute is meant to protect” and thus had no standing to challenge the subpoena, id. at 1293. Citing Moffett, the Ninth Circuit subsequently came to the same conclusion. See United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). These out-of-circuit authorities must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government had not produced evidence that the defendant intended to influence an official proceeding because the evidence showed only that he intended to influence the state civil proceedings that he had brought against his insurance agency (B) holding the defendant does not possess statutory standing to attack the subpoena  because he has not demonstrated that he was within the zone of interests intended to be protected by  876a (C) holding that the plaintiff did not have standing because it was not able to demonstrate how its economic interests fell within the zone of interests protected by the nhpa (D) holding that as title vi is a remedial statute the zone of interests to be protected  must be construed broadly (E) holding that the plaintiffs did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the tcpa because they attempted to use the statute in a way not intended or contemplated by congress and because their damages are not of the vexatious and intrusive nuisance nature sought to be redressed by congress in enacting the tcpa

holding that the government had not produced evidence that the defendant intended to influence an official proceeding because the evidence showed only that he intended to influence the state civil proceedings that he had brought against his insurance agency