In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: the genus of goods or services for which it seeks protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2), (b)(2); 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.32(a)(6), 2.71(a); TMEP § 1402.01; see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2014) (“Parties that choose to recite services in their trademark application that exceed their actual services will be held to the broader scope of the application.”); Octocom Sys., 918 F.2d at 942 (“[R]egistrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application.... ”). The PTO will generally accept any identification of goods or services so long as it is “specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise.” TMEP § 1402.01; see also In re Omega SA 494 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity (B) holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action (C) holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant (D) holding that it is within the discretion of the pto to require that ones goods be identified with particularity in a trademark application (E) holding that a rule 10b5 claim must be stated with particularity
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: constructive, or judicially imposed lien, or (4) asserted against real or personal property. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.903; Cardenas v. Wilson, 428 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (noting that 51.903 inquiry into mechanic’s lien determines only that mechanic’s lien is provided by Texas law, not whether the underlying mechanic’s lien was valid). If the motion requires greater inquiry, then it is a motion for declaratory judgment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a) (West 2015); State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) (“We look to the substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of title given to it.”); Nguyen, 2016 WL 2343893, at *2 (citing Becker, 2010 WL 877569, at *2-3 (<HOLDING>)). A motion for declaratory judgment must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (B) holding motion requesting more relief than section 51903 provides was motion for declaratory judgment (C) holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment (D) holding that substance of motion to extend time was a section 1301f motion rather than a section 1301g motion and that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the section 1301f motion (E) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable 
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: tenants by the entireties. Because at the time they executed the Release, the Mahans had knowledge of Claim 7 and knew that it would be assigned to them, their execution of the Release released the bankruptcy estate from their right to assert Claim 7. Debtor’s argument that the Ma-hans did not release Claim 7 because they did not own it when they executed the Release is unavailing. “[A] general release which is not restricted by its terms to particular claims or demands ... will ordinarily be regarded as embracing all claims or demands which had [m]atured at the time of its execution.” Sottile v. Gains Constr. Co., 281 So.2d 558, 561 (Fla.3d Dist.Ct.App.1973), rev. denied, 289 So.2d 737 (Fla.1974), receded from on other grounds, Brown v. Brown, 432 So.2d 704 (Fla.3d Dist.Ct.App.1983) (<HOLDING>); Plumpton v. Continental Acreage Dev., 830 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all inclusive language  from the beginning of the world to the days present barred all claims arising prior to releases execution (B) holding that release which barred all claims from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of these presents included all claims which had matured at the time of its execution (C) holding that despite release language discharging defendant from claims upon or by reason of any matter cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of these presents release did not bar any claims accruing after the date of execution (D) holding that a release of such claims or other matters arising from the beginning of time to the date of execution of this agreement did not protect the defendant from liability arising from unconstitutional conduct that occurred after the agreements execution (E) holding equitable estoppel barred the plaintiffs claims because all of the claims of the amended complaint were in existence during the bankruptcy proceedings yet the plaintiff did not disclose any of the claims in its bankruptcy petitions plans of reorganization or disclosure statements
[EX A]:
(B)