In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: a hearing mandated if he can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold a federal evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 12, 112 S.Ct. 1715. It appears, however, that AEDPA overruled the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception, and that at this time, district courts cannot order evi-dentiary hearings unless the requirements of § 2254(e)(2) are met. See Shumate v. Newland, 75 F.Supp.2d 1076, 1084, 1098-99 (N.D.Cal.1999) (“AEDPA, however, has ‘reduced considerably the degree of the district court’s discretion’ by imposing threshold requirements that must be met before a request for an evidentiary hearing may be entertained.”) (quoting Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.1999)); Rodriguez v. Zavaras, 42 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1054-55 (D.Colo.1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Porter v. Gramley, 112 F.3d 1308, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional (B) holding that evidentiary hearing not necessary where proposed administrative action is based on undisputed material facts (C) holding that aedpa did not codify keeney but instead significantly curtails the availability of evidentiary hearings to develop material facts (D) holding that when a state has given petitioner a full and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed to develop material facts to support it he is not entitled to develop further facts in a federal habeas evidentiary hearing unless he demonstrates either cause for the failure and prejudice resulting therefrom or a fundamental miscarriage of justice (E) holding that an evidentiary hearing may be used to develop the factual basis of a prisoner complaint
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: defense, or a development in the controlling law that foreclosed the claim. The record here betrays no significant change in circumstances prior to trial that reasonably should have caused the plaintiffs to conclude that their claims were no longer viable. In fact, the most notable development in the case prior to trial sent a contrary signal: the court denied the Mayor’s post-discovery summary judgment motion as to the plaintiffs’ central political discrimination claim. While the fact that a claim has survived summary judgment is not, on its own, “entitled to decretory significance,” Foster, 943 F.2d at 144, it has some value in determining whether a claim was or became unreasonable or without foundation. See id.; Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1559 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Jensen v. Stangel, 762 F.2d 815, 818 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court abused its discretion in finding suit unreasonable and groundless where inter alia the court had denied two prior summary judgment motions (B) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact (C) holding that the trial court grants or denies motions for summary judgment on the basis of what is contained in the motions for summary judgment and the responses thereto (D) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (E) holding district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on summary judgment motion where inter alia plaintiff had been given repeated notices court intended to rule on motion and it was plaintiffs burden to rebut defendants evidence
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: Judge. The State challenges the trial court’s order dismissing an information against Larry Daniel Jones on the basis of double jeopardy. Because the Florida charge is not barred under the dual sovereign exception to double jeopardy, we reverse. Jones was charged with interference with child cust L.Ed.2d 641 (1985). Jones argues that Booth is inapplicable because it involved a federal-state context instead of a state-to-state situation. We find no basis for this distinction. See State v. McNab, 642 So.2d 41 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). As Jones notes in his brief, a number of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the same for malicious prosecution (B) holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated (C) holding that a judgment in a criminal prosecution for dwi did not bar a subsequent civil proceeding founded on the same facts (D) holding that states nonproseeution agreement did not bar subsequent federal prosecution (E) holding that foreign states prosecution did not bar subsequent florida prosecution for same conduct
[EX A]:
(E)