In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: a hearing mandated if he can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold a federal evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 12, 112 S.Ct. 1715. It appears, however, that AEDPA overruled the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception, and that at this time, district courts cannot order evi-dentiary hearings unless the requirements of § 2254(e)(2) are met. See Shumate v. Newland, 75 F.Supp.2d 1076, 1084, 1098-99 (N.D.Cal.1999) (“AEDPA, however, has ‘reduced considerably the degree of the district court’s discretion’ by imposing threshold requirements that must be met before a request for an evidentiary hearing may be entertained.”) (quoting Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.1999)); Rodriguez v. Zavaras, 42 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1054-55 (D.Colo.1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Porter v. Gramley, 112 F.3d 1308, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional (B) holding that evidentiary hearing not necessary where proposed administrative action is based on undisputed material facts (C) holding that aedpa did not codify keeney but instead significantly curtails the availability of evidentiary hearings to develop material facts (D) holding that when a state has given petitioner a full and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed to develop material facts to support it he is not entitled to develop further facts in a federal habeas evidentiary hearing unless he demonstrates either cause for the failure and prejudice resulting therefrom or a fundamental miscarriage of justice (E) holding that an evidentiary hearing may be used to develop the factual basis of a prisoner complaint
[A]: (C)


[Q]: 1 We note that the Supreme Court of Georgia recently vacated portions of the trial court’s injunction order in Barham v. City of Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375 (738 SE2d 52) (2013). 2 Am. Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Mom & Pop Stores, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 1, 7 (3) (497 SE2d 616) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 3 Levine v. Sun Trust Robinson Humphrey, 321 Ga. App. 268, 275 (3) (740 SE2d 672) (2013) (punctuation omitted). 4 Am. Petroleum Prods., 231 G 215 SE2d 294) (1975) (“[When] the complaining party cannot legitimately claim surprise, either because he knew of the existence of the witness or had equal means of knowing, it is not error to fail to invoke the sanctions of postponement, mistrial, barring the witness, etc.”). Cf. Malley Motors, Inc. v. Davis, 183 Ga. App. 599, 600 (1) (359 SE2d 394) (1987) (<HOLDING>). 18 See Hunter v. Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (B) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (C) holding that trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of a witness who was not listed in the pretrial order and no reason was given for the failure to list the witness (D) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (E) holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony
[A]: (C)


[Q]: expect to incur liability in excess of the SIR amount. Ger-ling’s election not to exercise its right to offer Dorsey a defense left Dorsey to its own devices and thus free to agree to any reasonable, noneollusive consent judgment. The distinction between the rejection of a duty to defend and the rejection of a right to offer a defense is not, under the facts of this case, sufficient to effect a release for Gerling. See Red Giant Oil Co. v. Lawlor, 528 N.W.2d 524 (Iowa 1995), and Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 547 So.2d 148 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989)(both holding that an agreement to proceed only against available insurance proceeds is not a release of the insurer). F. Gerling’s Argument Concerning “Proper lusia Ready Mix[, Inc.], 436 So.2d 868, 871 [(Ala.1983)](<HOLDING>); Truitt Oil & Gas Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co., [231 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unintended damage to a pipeline caused by the defective coating supplied by insureds subsidiary was caused by an occurrence within the meaning of the liability policy (B) holding that an insurer has no obligation to pay diminished value in addition to repairs (C) holding that an insurer was obligated to pay for damages and a loss in value to a water treatment plant caused by the insureds defective product (D) holding that insureds demand to insurer was liquidated when insurer did not point to any evidence at trial in support of its contention that damages were disputed (E) holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control
[A]:
(C)