In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

a housing development. Streckfus, 504 N.E.2d at 274. She was an at-will employee but had an employment agreement with the development's management company. Id. at 274-275. Her employment agreement referenced a management contract between the development and the management company, and the management contract provided procedures by which the management company could terminate a Resident Manager. Id. Our supreme court held that "as a matter of law, the Employment Agreement did not contain any job security provision which altered the employment at will relationship. ... Id. at 276. The Trails fail to demonstrate that Eddie states a claim upon which relief could be granted based upon the Club's Articles of Incorporation or the Club's standard practices. See also Orr, 689 N.E.2d at 719-720 (<HOLDING>). Even viewing the Trails' breach of contract 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitration agreement in an employee handbook was illusory where the employer expressly reserved a right to unilaterally rescind any provisions of the handbook (B) holding that employee handbook did not give rise to implied contract where it stated that it was not a contract and that employment was terminable at will (C) holding employee handbook or employers printed statement of policy are promises in implied offer of unilateral contract which an employee can accept by beginning or continuing to work for employer (D) holding that employee may claim contract created based on employer promise of severance pay to employee (E) holding that an employee handbook did not constitute a valid unilateral contract between the employee and employer in the absence of adequate independent consideration
(E)

partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court’s order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants’ arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment
(C)

Even construing the indemnity provision strictly in favor of TPS, see U.S.B. Acquisition Co. v. Stamm, 660 So.2d 1075, 1079 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995), we find no support whatsoever for TPS’s reading of “attorneys’ fees” as applying only to judgments obtained against SBA by third parties. Nor do we find any basis under Florida law for setting aside an express attorneys’ fee provision in a duly executed, arms-length commercial contract. The cases on which TPS relies are inapposite, as they address only attorneys’ fees incurred in establishing the right to common-law indemnity, not contractual indemnity. See, e.g., Bravo Elec. Co., Inc. v. Carter Elec. Co., 532 So.2d 698, 701 n. 3 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1988) (Cowat, J., dissenting); cf. Kuhns v. Koob, 408 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Avis Renh-A-Car 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees and court costs are recoverable under general hold harmless indemnity agreement (B) holding that insured may recover legal fees incurred in defending itself in a declaratory judgment action brought by insurer but not for those incurred in prosecuting cross claims and counterclaims against insurers (C) holding that indemnitee may recover attorneys fees incurred in defending indemnity agreement (D) holding theft act entitles defendant to recover reasonable and necessary attorneys fees in successfully defending theft act claim even if defendant does not recover any actual damages (E) holding that beneficiaries of an alleged will may recover reasonable expenses and attorneys fees when defending a will in good faith

(C)