instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
erred by failing to instruct the jury that a confidential informant’s testimony must be corroborated, in conformity with article 38.141. We agree. Our holding that there was some “other evidence” to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement does not eliminate the need for an instruction. See Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (noting court “might disagree” with court of appeals’s holding that there was no evidence ten o the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the requirements of article 38.141 here, but asserts that the trial court’s error resulted in harm under the “egregious harm standard” of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (applying egregious harm analysis to unobjected-to charge error). See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632 (<HOLDING>); Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 692 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding egregious harm standard applied where appellant failed to object to lack of instruction on accomplice witness testimony (B) holding egregious harm resulted from erroneous jury instruction authorizing conviction based on legally inadequate theory (C) holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated (D) holding that where appellant failed to present either expert or lay testimony as to the appropriate standard of care to be used appellant failed to present any evidence indicating the existence of an issue of fact thus summary judgment was proper (E) holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds
answer:
(A)


question:
the sophisticated user defense, a supplier has no duty to warn the ultimate user if it has reason to believe that the user will realize its dangerous condition. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn.2004); see also Ritchie v. Glidden, 242 F.3d 713, 724 (7th Cir.2001) (stating, under Indiana law, that the sophisticated purchaser defense to a failure-to-warn claim brought under negligence or strict liability theories provides that product suppliers do not have a duty to warn employees or customers of knowledgeable industrial purchasers as to product-related hazards). In addition to limiting a supplier’s duty, the “sophisticated user” concept also affects the element of proximate cause. Crook v. Kaneb Pipe Line Operating P’ship, L.P., 231 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Strong, 667 F.2d at 688 (“Even if [the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury (B) holding in a negligence action that the air traffic controllers failure to warn of an impending danger cannot be the proximate cause of an injury after the pilot himself discovered its presence appreciated the danger and decided to fly ahead into it (C) holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible (D) holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury (E) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury
answer:
(D)


question:
appeared in court on December 7, 2007, and the court dismissed the cases for failure to prosecute because the State had not filed any charging documents in either case. The court subsequently entered orders dismissing the cases with prejudice, because “[t]he State failed to file the charging documents or take any action to prosecute the case.” [¶ 4] The district court generally has jurisdiction to hear criminal eases under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06(1), but in this case the issue is whether the court could dismiss a criminal action under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(b) when a charging document has not been filed. This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(1). See City of Jamestown v. Snellman, 1998 ND 200, ¶ 5, 586 N.W.2d 494 (<HOLDING>); State v. Howe, 247 N.W.2d 647, 652 (N.D.1976) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal (B) holding that the value of stolen blank money orders may be established by circumstantial evidence showing the market value for filled in money orders and the fact that the defendants had the necessary equipment to fill in the money orders and to make the completed orders appear valid (C) holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders (D) holding the state may appeal orders of dismissal that have the same effect as orders quashing an information (E) holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291
answer:

(D)