instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
been completed and 2) further investigation into issues such as whether there was hair in the shotgun hole was not necessary because, if used at trial, it would have been perceived as “tearing apart the victim.” Thus, Roark’s decision to not investigate was essentially a combination of acts within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and one that falls within the category of strategic or tactical decisions that should not be second guessed. Hollon does not present any persuasive argument that' the investigation was below an objective standard. Consequently, we uphold the district court’s determination that Hollon has not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard. D. Suppression of Hollon’s Confession Hollon argues that Roark rendered in ) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the district court determined 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed (B) holding that a petitioner must show  that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had counsel raised the issue (C) holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different (D) holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different (E) holding that where the record supported the district courts conclusion that statements would not have been suppressed and there had been nothing submitted on appeal to lead to a different conclusion the petitioner had not shown any resulting prejudice from the failure to file a motion to suppress and therefore had not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
answer:
(E)


question:
421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975), and is consistent with the holdings in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382, 103 S.Ct. 683, 687, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983), and in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, supra. Blue Chip Stamps held that a section 10(b) plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of a security, and thus limited standing under the 1934 Act to “plaintiffs ... who have at least dealt in the security to which the prospectus, representation, or omission relates.” Id. 421 U.S. at 747, 95 S.Ct. at 1931. Put and call option trading on an underlying security is directly affected by the prospecti, representations and omissions of the issuer of the underlying security. See Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 506. Cf. Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303 (D.Mass.1987) (<HOLDING>). In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (B) holding that class representatives cannot appear pro se (C) holding that sellers of covered calls are not atypical class representatives (D) holding that a class representatives ignorance of the case is not a bar to certification unless it impairs the representatives ability to vigorously prosecute the action (E) holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent
answer:
(C)


question:
care ... to reasonably assure itself that its immediate vendee and distributor was so informed as to be able and likely to transmit ... knowledge of [the product’s] dangers.”); In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, 971 F.2d 831, 838 (2d Cir.1992) (stating that “[t]he sophisticated intermediary doctrine protects a manufacturer from liability only if the chain of distribution is such that the duty to warn ultimate users should fall on an intermediary in that chain, rather than on the manufacturer”); Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 741 (3rd Cir. 1990) (weighing totality of factors is required to determine reasonableness of reliance on a third party as a conduit of necessary product information); Stuckey v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arizona rule of civil procedure 52a requires the court to find only the ultimate facts not the evidentiary facts upon which the ultimate facts are based (B) holding that the defendant pharmacist had undertaken a duty to accurately warn of a drugs side effects with respect to the warning actually given but not a duty to warn of all possible side effects of the medication (C) holding that there is no necessity to warn a consumer already aware through common knowledge or learning of a specific hazard (D) holding that the staffing agency which forwarded a background check conducted by another entity to the ultimate employer was liable under  1681bb3 because its decision to furnish the report to the ultimate employer was an adverse action (E) holding that a suppliers duty to warn an ultimate consumer can be discharged by a warning given to an intermediary but focus is on whether the intermediarys knowledge was sufficient to protect the ultimate consumer
answer:

(E)