In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: the bankruptcy court’s power to control dissemination of information more broadly. Judge Steven Gerling, for example, observed in In re Bennett, that If the information [sought to be protected] does not represent trade secrets or confidential research, development or commercial information, then whether to permit access to the information is a matter left to the Court’s discretion. It requires the Court to examine the relevant facts and circumstances and then to balance the interests of the party opposing disclosure with that of the public. In re Bennett, 226 B.R. 331, 336 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1998); see also In re Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2nd Cir.1994) (discussing § 107 and use of records for improper purpose); In re Robert Landau Associates, 50 B.R. 670, 675-76 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>); but see In re Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. 675, 679 
 Holding statements: (A) holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter (B) holding that when the trial court signed an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint but refused to enter a final judgment on that order the order refusing to enter judgment was appealable under former ors 190102a (C) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality (D) recognizing inherent authority but vacating order not supported by necessary findings (E) holding that while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judges signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court the city waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the indiana supreme court has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection and more recently this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect

Output: holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter


Input: Consider Input: method (under § 3663) in favor of an incorrect method (under § 1593), the district court erred. Moreover, we hold that the district court’s error was “plain,” because the statutes are clear and because the government openly admitted that its proposed methodology derived from the wrong restitution statute. See United States v. Tuyet Thi-Bach Nguyen, 565 F.3d 668, 677 (9th Cir.2009) (“An error is plain when it is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’ under the law.”). Finally, we hold that the error affected Defendants’ substantial rights and affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The government did not present evidence — and the district court did not make findings — of the victims’ actual losses, as required by § 3663. See Bussell, 504 F.3d at 964 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Joyner, 201 F.3d 61, 81 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that restitution is proper under  2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses (B) holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted (C) holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction (D) holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses  (E) holding that restitution in the full amount of each victims losses does not exceed the statutory maximum

Output: holding that restitution is proper under  2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses


Input: Consider Input: claims, specifically, those tort claims that are intertwined with ecclesiastical investigations or proceedings involving the employment or discipline of clergy. As demonstrated above, the plaintiffs’ tort claims are intertwined with ecclesiastical investigations and proceedings involving the employment and discipline of Reverend Greer. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ tort claims would trigger the same type of impermissible investigation prohibited by Ex parte Bole, regardless of the plaintiffs’ third-party status. Because the petitioners have demonstrated that the First Amendment protections set out in Ex parte Bole are applicable to this case, I would grant the relief requested in the petition for the writ of mandamus. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 1 . inn.Ct.App. Sept. 22, 1997) (<HOLDING>); Missouri: Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that first amendment barred parishioners negligent hiring and supervision and breach of fiduciary duty claims against pastor and church for sexual contact that occurred between pastor and parishioner during the course of a counseling relationship (B) holding that first amendment barred child victim of sexual abuse by priest from bringing negligent hiring and supervision claims but that first amendment would not be violated by adjudication of claim of intentional failure to supervise priest (C) holding that first amendment barred negligent hiring and supervision claim against archdiocese for alleged sexual abuse of minor by priest (D) recognizing torts of negligent hiring supervision and retention (E) holding that negligent retention and supervision claims based upon a pastors sexual contact with parishioners was barred by the first amendment


Output: holding that first amendment barred parishioners negligent hiring and supervision and breach of fiduciary duty claims against pastor and church for sexual contact that occurred between pastor and parishioner during the course of a counseling relationship