In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: income. As the majority notes, the Internal Revenue Code is not the standard for determining weekly gross income for child support purposes, see op. at ¶ 13 (quoting Child Supp. G. 3(A), cmt. 2(b) that the weekly gross income figure may not be the same as gross income for tax purposes). It may be unfair to exclude all of the settlement proceeds where they have inured to the family’s benefit in the past but it may also be unfair to include all of the proceeds where Scott has need of them for his own care. Commentary to Guideline 3(A) urges judges to “be innovative in finding ways to include income that would have benefited the family had it remained intact, but be receptive to deviations where reasons justify them.” Child Supp. G. 3(A), cmt. 2(b); see also Harris, 800 N.E.2d at 940-41 (<HOLDING>). [5] Because the trial court’s decision was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in including only the net amount of settlement proceeds from a wrongful termination lawsuit because that is the amount that would have ultimately benefited the children if the family had remained intact (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge (D) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount (E) holding prejudgment interest is to be determined on the entire amount of compensatory damages and then reduced by the amount of interest which would have accrued at present value on the settlement amount determined before trial

A: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served
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Q: by the parties. These considerations are consistent with the principle [sic] legislative purpose behind enactment of the Uniform Arbitration Act: to provide and encourage an expedited, efficient, relatively uncomplicated, alternative means of dispute resolution, with limited judicial intervention or participation, and without the primary expense of litigation— attorneys’ fees. Id. at 153-54, 423 S.E.2d at 750. The court concluded that “in arbitration proceedings, both the arbitrator or arbitration panel and the superior courts upon confirmation are limited to applying only [our AR.S. § 12-1510] in determining whether attorneys’ fees should be or were properly awarded.” Id. at 155, 423 S.E. at 751; see also Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis, Inc., 380 Mass. 91, 97, 401 N.E.2d 839, 843 (1980) (<HOLDING>). In our view, to permit a trial court to award 
 Holding statements: (A) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees (B) holding that attorneys fee statute does not overpower the policy expressed in our ars  121510 against the award of attorneys fees in arbitration proceedings (C) holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency (D) holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees (E) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees

A: holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees
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Q: which offered a coherent theory of innocence based on the very limited exculpatory evidence in the record. A defense counsel need not be the equal of Clarence Darrow to pass constitutional muster, see Wise v. Smith, 735 F.2d 735, 738 (2d Cir. 1984), and in this case petitioner was plainly afforded constitutionally adequate representation at his trial. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, I recommend that the writ be denied and the petition dismissed with prejudice. Pursuant to Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from this date to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court 42, 43 (2d Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1044, 88 S.Ct. 1643, 20 L.Ed.2d 305 (1968) (<HOLDING>). 1 . By the time of trial, Mr. White and Ms. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court must resolve all claims for relief raised in a habeas petition regardless of whether habeas relief is granted or denied (B) holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted (C) holding that the insufficiency of factual data necessary for the resolution of a question presented is a reason for declining to grant declaratory relief (D) holding that insufficiency of indictment is not a basis for habeas relief (E) holding that remand for new trial is remedy for factual insufficiency of evidence

A:
holding that the district court must resolve all claims for relief raised in a habeas petition regardless of whether habeas relief is granted or denied
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