In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: by assenting to forfeiture provisions included in plea agreements. In United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir.1999), a criminal defendant entered into a plea bargain under which he “agree[d] to forfeit and otherwise waive any ownership right he might possess in all items seized during the investigation of any of the acts alleged.” The defendant then filed a motion for the return of his property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), and the district court denied the motion. Id. We affirmed the district court’s decision, observing that “[t]he district court was entirely correct in denying Le’s motion because Le ... relinquished any ownership rights he may have had in the property.” Id. at 1278. See also United States v. Grover, 119 F.3d 850, 852 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). On appeal Mr. Montoya suggests that he should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that a rule 41e claimant relinquished any possessory claim he had to the property when he signed a forfeiture agreement at the time he entered into a plea bargain (C) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (D) holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present (E) holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel

Output: holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea


Input: Consider Input: purpose, we would have some authority to solve taxpayer’s problem. See Rhodes, 166 Vt. at 157, 688 A.2d at 1311 (noting that, to invoke impossibility rule, party “must dem onstrate why this Court should not construe the statute in its ordinary sense or why the consequences of such construction will cause hardship or constitute impossibility”). But our standard under this prudential rule is very limited and does not ordinarily extend to making choices, among many available, to solve the problem. There is simply no way to construe the statute to allow a transfer that occurred 319 days after an LLC’s articles of organization were filed without reading the words “at the time of formation” out of the statute. See Colwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 VT 5, ¶ 15, 175 Vt. 61, 819 A.2d 727 (<HOLDING>). ¶23. It is true that the Department’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (B) recognizing that though statute at hand does not fully address the problem legislature intended to address in view of the number of choices available to solve the problem    this is an inappropriate case for the court to fashion the particular remedy appellants seek because to do so would place court in the position of making policy choices best left to legislature (C) holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature (D) holding that considering an amendment is not the time to address the merits of a case (E) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language

Output: holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case


Input: Consider Input: power to determine whether claimants to a share of decedent’s stock in a Native American Corporation are adopted children. Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 57-58 (Alaska 1977). The Alaska court also, in Ollestead v. Native Village of Tyonek, 560 P.2d 31 (Alaska), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938, 98 S.Ct. 426, 54 L.Ed.2d 297 (1977), held state courts were without jurisdiction to determine whether claimants to oil royalties were members of a Native Village. In Comenout v. Burdman, 84 Wash.2d 192, 525 P.2d 217 (1974), the court held that jurisdiction under Public Law 280 existed to terminate the parental rights of reservation Indians. See also In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash.2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976); Duluth Lumber and Plywood Co. v. Delta Development, Inc., 281 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1979) (<HOLDING>). Voorhees v. Spencer, 89 Nev. 1, 504 P.2d 1321 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the wisconsin supreme court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in determining that public law 280 conferred civil jurisdiction to the state of wisconsin to commit burgess an enrolled member of an indian tribe as a sexually violent person (B) holding that state failed to assume even partial jurisdiction in compliance with public law 280 (C) holding that pursuant to amended public law 280 a tribe must consent to state court civil jurisdiction over actions arising against member indians in indian country (D) holding the existence of jurisdiction in state courts to hear a dispute by a materials supplier against a contractor in an indian housing agency under the authority of public law 280 (E) holding that state has no jurisdiction over civil suit by nonindian against indian where cause of action arises on indian reservation


Output: holding that the wisconsin supreme court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in determining that public law 280 conferred civil jurisdiction to the state of wisconsin to commit burgess an enrolled member of an indian tribe as a sexually violent person