In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

absence of any effort to serve Bustos with a summons or a complaint, the Receiver cannot claim substantial compliance with Rule 4. The Receiver’s failure even to attempt to comply with Rule 4 is no “minor defect,” United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th Cir.1984), that can be remedied by actual notice. More importantly, the difficulty here runs deeper than mere insufficient service of process. The Receiver never filed a complaint and never named Bustos as a party. In other words, the Receiver never commenced an action against Bustos, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 3; it simply named Bustos in a motion for the disgorgement of allegedly ill-gotten gains earned through the sale of unregistered securities. See In re Alpha Telcom, 2004 WL 3142555, at *1 (<HOLDING>). Prior to Bustos’s intervention in the action, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons (B) holding that the court lacks jurisdiction where a complaint was filed more than 30 days after the filing of the summons (C) holding that a title vii cause of action is limited to those discrimination allegations in the complaint that have been under the scrutiny of a formal eeoc complaint (D) holding that a formal summons and complaint were unnecessary because the motion before the court is not an independent action (E) holding that service of a statecourt summons and complaint after removal to federal court is valid service
(D)

judge is provided for in Ind. P-C.R. 1, § 4(b), it is not automatic as Barclay asserts. Instead, “the rule requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a rational inference of bias or prejudice.” Jackson v. State, 643 N.E.2d 905, 907 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied (citing State ex rel. Whitehead v. Madison County Circuit Court, 626 N.E.2d 802, 803 (Ind.1993)). Barclay’s affidavit presents the fact that the trial court judge accepted his guilty plea without an adequate factual basis as his evidence of bias. Even taking this assertion as true, it does not support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. See Smith v. State, 613 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ind.1993), reh’g denied, cert, denied (<HOLDING>); Jackson, 643 N.E.2d at 907 (holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced (B) holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion (C) holding that the fact that the judge received adverse publicity for granting postconviction relief in another case did not require the judge to recuse herself (D) holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith (E) holding that counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to recuse the judge who presided at trial when the judge had also prosecuted a prior case that was used to enhance the current case
(C)

employee of Chevron Products Company, not Chevron, and because Kehm provides no reason to ignore the corporate separateness of these two entities, Barnes’s acts cannot be attributed to Chevron. See Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir.1980) (“The mere fact that a subsidiary company does business within a state does not confer jurisdiction over its nonresident parent, even if the parent is sole owner of the subsidiary.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, the fact that Chevron sent Kehm a cease and desist letter does not rise to the level of purposeful availment for purposes of jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, since the letter expresses the goal not to do business in Pennsylvania. See Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) Accordingly, Kehm has not shown sufficient 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum (B) holding that the massachusetts longarm statute provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident personal representative when the decedent had sufficient contacts with the forum such that the decedent would have been subject to personal jurisdiction had he lived (C) holding that the effects of a tortious act cannot subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in a forum where no other contacts exist (D) holding that personal jurisdiction is proper if party has sufficient minimum contacts (E) holding that a patentee does not subject itself to personal jurisdiction in a forum solely by informing a party who happens to be located there of suspected infringement as grounding personal jurisdiction on such contacts alone would not comport with principles of fairness

(E)