In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

to obtain the benefit of the bond, for which it paid a significant premium, only through legal action. Accordingly, Olympic Steamship applies here. Colorado Structures, 125 Wn. App. at 928 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We agree. ¶27 Lastly, in McGreevy, where this court awarded reasonable attorney fees in addition to the limits of the insurance policy, we reasoned, “when an insurer unsuccessfully contests coverage, it has placed its interests above the insured. Our decision in Olympic Steamship remedies this inequity by requiring that the insured be made whole.” McGreevy, 128 Wn.2d at 39-40. Likewise, West placed “its interests” above that of Structures. Id. Structures should be awarded attorney fees under Olympic Steamship, so as to be made “whole.” Dayton, 124 Wn.2d at 280 (<HOLDING>)- Without the application of Olympic Steamship 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the contract was not authorized by law (B) recognizing that under georgia law attorneys fees are allowed where authorized by statute or contract (C) holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case (D) holding that an award of attorney fees was authorized by ocga  13111 a 3 when the requirements of that statute were satisfied (E) holding that a court has power to award attorney fees when authorized by contract statute or recognized ground of equity
(E)

Def.’s Mot., Ex. E, Gaskins’ Decl. ¶ 5. Although plaintiff said that he “heard the rumor about [the cubicle] being unsafe[,]” he contends that the cubicle was not in disrepair and was removed solely in retaliation for his EEO complaint. Def.’s Mot., Ex. A, Jones Dep. at 113, 115. However, plaintiff did not testify that he was unable to complete his work assignments; rather, he testified that the result of the cubicle being dismantled was that he “had no place to put none of [his] stuff[,]” which included “records and stuff[,]” although he testified that the cubicle was replaced with a desk, albeit a small one. Id. at 114-15. These facts do not support a finding of an adverse action sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See, e.g., Brodetski, 141 F.Supp.2d at 45 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). III. Conclusion For the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the administrative transfer of a teacher which denied him the opportunity to teach his preferred subject could constitute an adverse employment action (B) holding that plaintiff s allegations that defendants denied him his right to choose a new workstation on two occasions do not constitute adverse employment actions even if they made plaintiff feel slighted or wrong (C) recognizing that employment actions can be adverse even if such actions are subsequently withdrawn (D) holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false (E) recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually
(B)

697 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tenn.1985) (same). In finding specific jurisdiction, the district court relied on the following facts: (1) Lloyds sent three wire transfers from Hercules Holdings to the account of Space Age Industries in Erwin, Tennessee (Hogsed’s account); (2) Tennessee residents wired funds to The Bond Partnership at Lloyds; (3) Lloyds and its attorney responded to letters from Harris and other individuals in Tennessee about this litigation; and (4) Lloyds faxed a two-page bank statement to Hogsed detailing numerous transactions involving the transfer of substantial funds from Tennessee customers to the accounts of Hercules Holdings at Lloyds. The d response to communications initiated by Harris and others in Tennessee. Cf. Rice v. Karsch, 154 Fed.Appx. 454, 460 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 91 F.3d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that easements using terms telephone telegraph and communications could properly be utilized for both internal communications and for thirdparty voice and data communications (B) holding that defendants communications sent into tennessee did not constitute purposeful availment because all were in response to communications initiated by the plaintiff (C) holding that internet purchase of one compact disc by plaintiffs counsel did not constitute purposeful availment (D) holding ban preempted by federal communications commission regulations (E) holding that subsection b did not apply because the communications at issue were not being stored by an electronic communication service

(B)