In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978);, 5 LaFave, Israel, & King, Criminal Procedure § 25.3(c) (West 1999). A finding of insufficient evidence is equivalent to an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325-26, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984). 3 . An exception to this bar is when the conviction is overturned on appeal. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964). 4 . The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to both individuals and corporations. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). 5 . Compare Brown, 432 U.S. at 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (<HOLDING>) with Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 78 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bargainedfor plea waives the right to attack multiple convictions on double jeopardy grounds (B) holding that the prosecution cannot divide a single crime into multiple units to avoid double jeopardy (C) holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (D) holding that a defendant and his attorney are a single entity with respect to double jeopardy waiver (E) holding the first question for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis is whether congress expressed its intent concerning multiple convictions at a single trial for different statutory violations arising from the same act or transaction

Answer: (B)


Question: of his experience’ in detecting criminal activity”) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). Based on the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that the officers possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to effect an investigative detention of Mr. Hishaw as he left the apartment in the pickup. Even though the initial stop was justified, we must still assess the reasonableness of the subsequent pat-down search. In order to comport with the Fourth Amendment, that search must have been “reasonably related in scope” to the basis for the stop (i.e., the officers’ suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs). See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In that regard, this circuit has concluded that an 169 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop (B) holding that like burglary car theft is a crime that often involves the use of weapons and other instruments of assault that could jeopardize police officer safety and thus justifies a protective frisk under terry to ensure officer safety (C) holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes (D) holding that when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle the officer may in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officers safety and the safety of others (E) holding that the officer had reasonable belief that the occupants of the vehicle were armed where the officer knew that drug dealers are frequently armed and therefore frisk of the vehicle was permissible

Answer: (D)


Question: 938, 949-50 (10th Cir.2008). Even assuming without deciding we were free to revisit the governing standard of review, we question whether de novo review would be appropriate or make any difference in this case. Even when the constitutional fact doctrine applies, credibility determinations remain subject to clear error review, see Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989), and a sincerity finding is in the end "almost exclusively a credibility assessment,” Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir.2007). In those few instances where the Supreme Court has mandated de novo review of facts involving a litigant’s state of mind, the inquiry has usually involved some purely legal question. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 511, 104 S.Ct. 1949 (<HOLDING>); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116-17, 106 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that on appeal an appellate court does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight the courts duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding (B) holding that the court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff states a claim of a constitutional violation at all and then must determine whether the claimed right was clearly established before proceeding to the qualified immunity question (C) holding that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record with no guidance from the briefing party to determine if the record supports the partys argument (D) holding appellate court must when evaluating actual malice in libel case independently determine whether the evidence in the record  is of the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of first amendment protection (E) recognizing that appellate court is in same position as trial court to assess evidence when all of the proof is contained in the record by deposition

Answer:
(D)