In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

purpose of this Memorandum is to explain why the Court declined to do these things. As disclosed by plaintiff in its ex parte motion, the sale of decoding devices like those defendants are claimed to have offered and sold is prohibited by federal criminal statute, see 47 U.S.C. § 553(b), as well as by Illinois criminal statute, see 720 ILCS 5/16-10(a)(4). Under the circumstances, information disclosing defendants’ purchases and sales of the devices, the revenues obtained from those sales, the assets they now have that may have been derived from those sales, and the locations where they keep their records and other descrambling devices is, without question, information that might tend to incriminate the defendants. See, e.g., FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); SEC v. Rehtorik, 755 F.Supp. 1018, 1019 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government (B) holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment (C) holding that abrogating the right to sell endangered eagles feathers did not implicate the fifth amendment (D) holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege (E) recognizing that preliminary injunction requiring defendant to disclose records might implicate fifth amendment
holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government

small pieces of the Walkway, or access to the Walkway, built upon it. See Def.-Int. Reply at p. 14 (noting that the second of two issues remaining for the Court to decide, given that the public trust doctrine gov erns a large portion of the land at issue, is “whether the state acted rationally in determining that access across the perpendicular paths and scattered small portions of the Walkway constructed on uplands is ‘reasonably necessary’ to protect that public’s right of access to the remaining 88.7 percent of the Walkway that is situated on tidelands”). Plaintiffs’ taking claims with respect to this small portion of the property at issue are governed by the reasonableness test enunciated in Matthews. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 95 N.J. 306, 326, 471 A.2d 355 (1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 93, 83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (B) holding that in order to exercise its rights under the public trust doctrine the public must be given both access to and use of privatelyowned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary (C) holding that the borough of deals dedication of a portion of a beach for use by its residents only was immaterial given the public trust doctrines requirement that the public be afforded the right to enjoy all dry sand beaches owned by a municipality (D) holding that under the public standing doctrine it is only necessary that the relator shall be a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws (E) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public
holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege

the District Court of Appeal for Florida in Ocasio v. Bureau of Crimes, etc., 408 So. 2d 751, 752 (Fla. App. 1982), cited to State ex rel. Perez v. Wall, 41 Fla. 463, 26 So. 1020 (1899), for the following proposition: “ ‘We do not think it can be maintained that a husband is related to his wife by affinity. They are embraced in the definition of neither affinity nor consanguinity, but are regarded in law ... as one person.’ ” See, also, Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So. 2d 727 (1941) (estates by entirety are predicated on unity of husband and wife making them one person in law); Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967) (historically, by marriage husband and wife are one person in law). See, also, State v. Hooper, 140 Kan. 481, 37 P.2d 52 (1934) (<HOLDING>). While there is authority that husband and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that doctrine of affinity grew out of canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one (B) holding that the trial court committed manifest error by substituting its judgment for that of a valid and enforceable contractual agreement between the parties when it awarded wife nearly half the value of specific assets acquired during the marriage in disregard of antenuptial agreement calling for husband to take 23 and wife to take 13 of property acquired during the marriage (C) holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage (D) holding claims waived because they all grew out of their unsatisfactory business relationship (E) holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted

holding that the trial court committed manifest error by substituting its judgment for that of a valid and enforceable contractual agreement between the parties when it awarded wife nearly half the value of specific assets acquired during the marriage in disregard of antenuptial agreement calling for husband to take 23 and wife to take 13 of property acquired during the marriage