In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
paid with Vested Funds and Seized Funds. And while the majority of the ICE contract price was paid with DFI money, approximately $12 million, the record reflects that $8 million of the contract price was paid with Seized Funds. Thus, defendants have failed, with respect to either contract, to demonstrate that no “claim” was submitted within the meaning of the-FCA. And, accordingly, they are not entitled to summary judgment on this issue. B. Presentment Before FCA liability will attach to a “claim” for payment under § 3729(a)(1), the false or fraudulent “claim” must be “knowingly presented], or caus[ed] to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United Government or a member of the Armed Services of the United States.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1); see also Totten II, 380 F.3d at 491 (<HOLDING>). This requirement ultimately presents no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a statement in the motion for new trial entitled certificate of presentment in which appellate counsel stated the motion was handdelivered to the trial court insufficient to establish presentment (B) holding that presentment is a requirement of the fca (C) holding that the fca includes a materiality requirement (D) recognizing that criminal contempt is not initiated by an indictment or presentment (E) holding that certificate of presentment and docket entry noting filing of motion were insufficient evidence of presentment

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
before it was in assumpsit for attorney fees purposes. See Schulz, 67 Haw. at 436, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Higa is not directly on point, its reasoning is a compelling indication of how the Hawaii Supreme Court would rule on the attorney fee question before us. The plaintiffs also seek to distinguish Higa because it involved a client suing his own attorney, and thus in that case there was privity of contract between the two parties. In the present case, Mrs. Helfand was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the defendants and Mr. Helfand. This distinction is irrelevant. Courts have extended the right to sue for breach of contract to intended third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12, 883 P.2d 38, 48 n. 12 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 82 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies (B) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (C) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (D) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract (E) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
these decisions appear to be inconsistent with this court’s opinion in Vimy Ridge Municipal Water Improvement District No. 139 of Little Rock v. Ryles, 373 Ark. 366, 284 S.W.3d 70 (2008). By certifying this case to us, the court of appeals is seeking clarification of the rule and is asking us to resolve the conflict in the decisions of our appellate courts. In Jasper v. Johnny’s Pizza, 305 Ark. 318, 807 S.W.2d 664 (1991), the notice of appeal failed to designate the judgment or order being appealed as required by Rule 3(e). We held that this was not a fatal defect that required the dismissal of the appeal. Instead, this court held that it is the timing of a notice of appeal that is of jurisdictional significance. See also Davis v. Ralston Purina Co., 248 Ark. 14, 449 S.W.2d 709 (1970) (<HOLDING>). In subsequent decisions, we have held that an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding time for filing notice of appeal under rule 8002 is jurisdictional (B) holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal (C) holding that timeliness of filing of notice of appeal is a jurisdictional issue (D) holding that the filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional but irregularities in the other procedural steps found in rule 3e are merely grounds for such action as this court deems appropriate (E) holding same as to the filing of a notice of an interlocutory appeal

Ex Output:

(D)