In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: was satisfied that protocols were followed after examining their case notes and the data collected. Further, Quartaro testified to the various safeguards Cellmark employed to protect against the risk of errors and to detect any such errors, if made. Accordingly, Quartaro could have been meaningfully cross-examined on the general and specific risks of error in forensic testing, whether the result of carelessness, incompetence, or fraud. See Boyd, 686 F.Supp.2d at 385 (finding no constitutional violation when only the DNA analyst who wrote the report, and not the intervening-testing analysts, testified because “the testifying expert was himself familiar with the[ ] intervening procedures and could be fully cross-examined as to their efficacy, accuracy, etc.”); Munoz, 958 N.E.2d at 1174 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Quartaro certainly could have been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible (B) holding that a forensic accountant is an expert witness not a lay witness (C) holding that an expert who offers an independent opinion based on another analysts report can be meaningfully crossexamined on the general risk of error in forensic testing (D) recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue (E) holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: lease, for the first time in his reply brief, thus, he has waived it. In most circumstances a litigant who fails to raise an argument until his reply brief wül be deemed to have waived that argument. Wilson v. O’Leary, 895 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1990). This case is before us, however, on a motion for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The inquiry we are faced with is whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support his allegation. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This court has held that when reviewing Rule 12(b)6) motions, we wül consider new factual allegations raised for the first time on appeal provided they are consistent with the complaint. See Hrubec v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 981 F.2d 962, 963-64 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Dawson v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 369, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint (B) holding that the essential inquiry in conversion of a rule 12b6 motion to a rule 56 motion is whether the appellant should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted into one for summary judgment or was taken by surprise and deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the pleadings (C) holding that a plaintiff may attempt to survive a rule 12b6 motion by adding essential new facts in a brief on appeal (D) holding that class claims that fail to meet the requirements of rule 23 may be properly dismissed by granting a rule 12b6 motion (E) holding that plaintiff cannot introduce new allegations or new facts in opposition to a motion to dismiss

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: that a colorable claim of innocence opens both gateways, it is still insufficient to override the longstanding rule that a freely and voluntarily entered guilty plea bars a collateral attack on the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in summarily denying Woods’ untimely and successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Woods was not entitled to appointed counsel. As a final note, Woods argues in his brief that the district court needed to appoint him counsel. However, the district court is only required to provide counsel when the motion raises the sort of a substantial question of law or fact that requires a preliminaiy hearing. See Supreme Court Rule 183(i) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 271); Lujan v. State, 270 Kan. 163, 170-71, 14 P.3d 424 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Given that the motion, files, and records 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not err by failing to hold an oral hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal because the appellant was afforded a full opportunity to respond to the motion (B) holding that the lower court was not required to hold a hearing on a motion to transfer (C) holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves (D) holding that a motion for a preliminary injunction and a hearing on that motion were insufficient to prevent the plaintiff from dismissing by notice (E) holding that the district court may summarily dismiss the motion or determine that a potentially substantial issue or issues of fact are raised in the motion   and hold a preliminary hearing after appointment of counsel


Output: (E)