In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: individual has breached a duty of reasonable care. Bolick v. Sunbird Airlines, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 443, 386 S.E.2d 76 (1989), aff'd, 327 N.C. 464, 396 S.E.2d 323 (1990). Sudden emergency does not change or reduce the standard of reasonable care. It is simply one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a person acted reasonably under the circumstances. Id. The sudden emergency doctrine permits the court to call to the attention of the jury that an emergency faced by the actor may influence its determination of whether specific conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. The doctrine of sudden emergency is not a legal defense which operates to bar an action. Id. But cf. Hinson v. Brown, 80 N.C. App. 661, 343 S.E.2d 284, rev. denied, 318 N.C. 282, 348 S.E.2d 138 (1986) (<HOLDING>). External forces that have been found to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency (B) holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead (C) recognizing that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense a party must plead and prove (D) holding that a claim of exemption is an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded (E) holding that to avoid an affirmative defense  a plaintiff must plead specifically matters of affirmative avoidance pursuant to rule 5508
Example Output: holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency

Example Input: its discretion by modifying the timesharing agreement without evidence that the welfare of the minor child would be promoted by returning him to his former school in Lake County and changing the timesharing arrangement to have the father assume the primary timesharing responsibilities. See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2014); Holland v. Holland, 140 So.3d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 584 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new hearing. On remand, the court shall take evidence and use the best interests of the child standard to determine if modification is in the child’s best interests in light of the parties’ inability to agree which school the minor child will attend. See, e.g., Watt v. Watt, 966 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Once that determination is made, the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification (B) holding that a hearing is required when a modification of parenting time would change the established custodial environment (C) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (D) holding that a custodial parents move to a foreign state without more is not a substantial change of circumstances that would support a modification of custody (E) holding that parties inability to agree on which private high school child would attend constituted substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of parenting plan
Example Output: holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification

Example Input: from New York’s surcharge program and was not preempted. The prevailing wage law merely “alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans,” Id. at 334, 117 S.Ct. 832, and thus is “no different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject to local regulation, which Congress could not possibly have intended to eliminate.” Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668, 115 S.Ct. 1671. More recently, in De 6th Cir.1995) (ERISA preempted claim for the refusal to authorize inpatient treatment for a mental health patient); Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir.1993) (ERISA preempts malpractice claim against an HMO for denying precertification for heart surgery); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans (B) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (C) holding that erisa preempts wrongful death and state common law actions when plaintiff asserts insurers delay in authorization of procedure caused the patients death (D) holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother (E) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death
Example Output:
holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans