TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: an individual has adequately stated a pri-ma facie claim. Cf. Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir.1995) (“An inquiry into the reasonableness of procedures ... belies a claim that liability under [15 U.S.C.] § 1681e(b) must be predicated on the effect of that information once disseminated .... The district court was required to consider whether [the defendant] was liable under § 1681e(b) before it determined that [the plaintiff] had suffered no recoverable damages.”). Several courts have previously recognized the possibility that a claim for actual or compensatory damages under FCRA may include compensation for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury or out-of-pocket expenses. See, e.g., Bakker v. McKinnon, 152 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere  conclusory statements  rather they must  sufficiently articulate  true demonstrable emotional distress  including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any (B) holding that under privacy act federal government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actual damages but not with respect to damages for mental or emotional distress (C) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the incomplete and late submission of expert reports was not harmless (D) holding that under the first amendment where there is no proof of actual malice damages are limited to actual injury which excludes punitive damages but is not limited to outofpocket loss (E) holding that even in the absence of outofpocket expenses or costs incurred the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding actual and punitive damages when appellees testified about how they felt when appellant obtained their credit reports and violated their privacy thereby causing them some emotional distress

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: substantial rights. Mares, 402 F.3d at 520. The district court made no comments suggesting it would have imposed a lesser sentence in the absence of mandatory guidelines. See United States v. Bringier, 405 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir.2005) (stating the issue as “whether [the defendant] has demonstrated that the sentencing judge would have reached a different result had it sentenced [the defendant] under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 264, 163 L.Ed.2d 238 (2005) (No. 05-5535). Therefore, Tovar fails to demonstrate plain error. Tovar contends for the first time on appeal that the statute under which he was convicted, 21 U.S.C. § 841, is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (<HOLDING>). As he concedes, however, this issue is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that ojther than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that any fact other than a prior conviction may not be used to enhance a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that other than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that other than fact of prior conviction any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: two years experience as patrol officers. An officer’s experience is taken into consideration in determining if there was reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. See United States v. Carter, 1999 WL 1007044, at *3-4. 13 . The Government argues that under the Supreme Court's decision in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), McCray was not seized until he was actually subdued by the officers. Hodari D., held that seizure under the Fourth Amendment requires either 1) physical force applied by the police on the suspect; or 2) submission by the suspect to the officer’s authority. See id. at 626-627 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 1547. The court agrees and determines that McCray was not seized until he was tackled by the officers. 14 . 443 U.S. at 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637 (<HOLDING>). 15 . McCray's statements will be suppressed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the forceable stop at issue was an investigatory stop rather than an arrest (B) holding that a tip may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop (C) holding that circumstances created reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop (D) holding that an areas reputation for criminal activity alone cannot justify an investigatory stop (E) holding there was no reasonable suspicion which would justify an investigatory stop despite report of a domestic disturbance

SOLUTION:
(D)