In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: bar, of rule 32:1.3 for dilatory handling of estates despite notices and inquiries from beneficiaries). Johnson’s failure to respond to Neefs phone calls and requests for information, failure to notify Neef of what progress had or had not been made on the case, and failure to provide notice of termination, contact information, return of paperwork, or a return of unearned fees violated rules 32:1.4 (duty to keep client informed) and 32:1.16(d) (duty to protect client’s interests upon termination of representation). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 263, 268 (Iowa 2010) (finding attorney’s neglect of client’s legal matters and failure to keep clients informed about their cases violated rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4, and 32:1.16(d)); Earley, 774 N.W.2d at 307-08 (<HOLDING>). Johnson also violated rule 32:8.4(c) (duty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the attorney violated mlrpc 13 when he did not prosecute his clients claim after filing a complaint or protect against expiration of the statute of limitation for his clients complaint and caused discovery sanctions to be filed for his failure to respond to discovery requests (B) holding an attorney violated his duty of candor to the tribunal by changing his clients interrogatory answers without the clients knowledge (C) holding attorney violated rules 3214 and 32116d when he failed to keep his clients informed about the status of their cases failed to communicate with his clients after their repeated requests for information and failed to  account for or return client money from retainer fees (D) holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan (E) holding that equitable tolling applied when the attorney informed his client there was no such thing as a oneyear filing deadline and consistently lied to his client and the clients wife

A: holding that the attorney violated mlrpc 13 when he did not prosecute his clients claim after filing a complaint or protect against expiration of the statute of limitation for his clients complaint and caused discovery sanctions to be filed for his failure to respond to discovery requests
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Q: has recently held that a police officer may order passengers out of a vehicle during a traffic stop without violating the passengers’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). The Court reasoned that the public interest in protecting an officer’s safety outweighed the minimal intrusion involved in requiring passengers to exit the vehicle. See id. at 413-15, 117 S.Ct. 882. The same rationale applies here. An officer may reasonably conclude that his safety is best protected by having the passengers remain in the vehicle. Further, the intrusion involved with having passengers remain in their vehicle is de minimis — the officer is merely maintaining the status quo. See United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 11 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Defendant Garner refused to comply with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop (B) holding that passengers of a vehicle which they did not own had standing to challenge the validity of a traffic stop (C) holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop (D) holding police officers making a traffic stop could order passengers out of the stopped car (E) holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction

A: holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop
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Q: to three counts of aggravated sexual battery, see Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-67.3 (LexisNexis Supp.2006); (2) in February 1985, Mills pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, see id.; and (3) in August 1990, Mills pleaded guilty to yet another count of aggravated sexual battery, see id. Based on these convictions, the district court at sentencing determined that Mills was subject to 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(b)(l) (West Supp.2006), which requires a statutory minimum sentence of 15 years when the defendant “has a prior conviction ... under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor.” Accordingly, the court imposed a sentence of 180 months imprisonment. II. Mills 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (<HOLDING>). According to Mills, because the federal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction (B) holding that a court can look only to the statutory elements charging documents and jury instructions to determine whether an earlier conviction after trial qualified as a violent felony under the acca (C) holding that courts should look to the statutory definition of the crime charged rather than the actual facts of the individuals prior conviction to determine whether the crime qualifies as a violent felony under the acca (D) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (E) holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense

A:
holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction
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