In this task, you are given text for US Congressional and California state bills, your task is to generate a summary for this bill.

Ex Input:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Medicare Spending Transparency Act 
of 2011''.

SEC. 2. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF AGGREGATE DATA ON MEDICARE PROVIDERS OF 
              SERVICES AND SUPPLIERS.

    (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to make aggregate 
information about providers of services and suppliers under the 
Medicare program under title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 1395 et seq.) publicly available and to provide a new level of 
transparency in such program.
    (b) Public Availability.--Section 1128J of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. 1320a-7k) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subsection:
    ``(f) Public Availability of Certain Medicare Data.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall, to the extent 
        consistent with applicable information, privacy, security, and 
        disclosure laws, including the regulations promulgated under 
        the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
        and section 552a of title 5, United States Code, make available 
        to the public on the Internet website of the Centers for 
        Medicare & Medicaid Services the following data with respect to 
        title XVIII:
                    ``(A) A complete list of the providers of services 
                and suppliers participating in the program under such 
                title, including the business address of such providers 
                of services and suppliers.
                    ``(B) Aggregate information about each such 
                provider of services and supplier, including--
                            ``(i) the total number of individuals 
                        furnished items or services by the provider of 
                        services or supplier for which payment was made 
                        under such title during the preceding year;
                            ``(ii) the number of unique patient 
                        encounters conducted by the provider of 
                        services or supplier for which payment was made 
                        under such title during the preceding year;
                            ``(iii) the average number of codes billed 
                        under such title by the provider of services of 
                        supplier per patient encounter during the 
                        preceding year;
                            ``(iv) the total amount paid to such 
                        provider of services or supplier under such 
                        title during the preceding year;
                            ``(v) the top 50 billing codes on claims 
                        paid under such title to the provider of 
                        services or supplier during the preceding year, 
                        as determined by volume, including a 
                        description of such codes;
                            ``(vi) the top 50 billing codes on such 
                        claims paid during such year, as determined by 
                        dollar amount, including a description of such 
                        codes; and
                            ``(vii) the top 50 diagnosis and procedure 
                        code pairs on such claims paid during such 
                        year, as determined by volume, including a 
                        description of such codes.
            ``(2) Implementation.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
        of enactment of the Medicare Spending Transparency Act of 2011, 
        the Secretary shall promulgate regulations to carry out this 
        subsection.''.

SEC. 3. ACCESS TO MEDICARE CLAIMS AND PAYMENT DATA BY QUALIFIED 
              INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS.

    (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to allow qualified 
individuals and groups access to information on claims and payment data 
under the Medicare program for purposes of conducting health research 
and detecting fraud under such program.
    (b) Access to Medicare Claims and Payment Data by Qualified 
Individuals and Groups.--Section 1128J of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 1320a-7k), as amended by section 2, is amended by adding at the 
end the following new subsection:
    ``(g) Access to Medicare Claims and Payment Data by Qualified 
Individuals and Groups.--
            ``(1) In general.--For purposes of conducting health 
        research and detecting fraud under title XVIII, and to the 
        extent consistent with applicable information, privacy, 
        security, and disclosure laws, including the regulations 
        promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and 
        Accountability Act of 1996 and section 552a of title 5, United 
        States Code, and subject to any information systems security 
        requirements under such laws or otherwise required by the 
        Secretary, a qualified individual or group shall have access to 
        claims and payment data of the Department of Health and Human 
        Services and its contractors related to title XVIII. 
        Notwithstanding any other provision of law, such data shall 
        include the identity of individual providers of services and 
        suppliers under such title.
            ``(2) Definition of qualified individual or group.--
                    ``(A) In general.--In this subsection, the term 
                `qualified individual or group' means an individual or 
                entity that the Secretary has determined, in accordance 
                with subparagraph (B), has relevant experience, 
                knowledge, and technical expertise in medicine, 
                statistics, health care billing, practice patterns, 
                health care fraud detection, and analysis to use data 
                provided to the individual or the entity under this 
                subsection in an appropriate, responsible, and ethical 
                manner and for the purposes described in paragraph (1).
                    ``(B) Procedures.--The Secretary shall establish 
                procedures for determining, in a timely manner, whether 
                an individual or entity is a qualified individual or 
                group.
            ``(3) Procedures.--The Secretary shall establish procedures 
        for the storage and use of data provided to a qualified 
        individual or group under this subsection. Such procedures 
        shall ensure that, in the case where the qualified individual 
        or group publishes an analysis of such data (or any analysis 
        using such data), the qualified individual or group discloses 
        the following information (in a form and manner, and at a time, 
        specified by the Secretary):
                    ``(A) The name of the qualified individual or 
                group.
                    ``(B) The sources of any funding for the qualified 
                individual or group.
                    ``(C) Any employer or other relevant affiliations 
                of the qualified individual or group.
                    ``(D) The data analysis methods used by the 
                qualified individual or group in the analysis 
                involved.''.

Ex Output:
Medicare Spending Transparency Act of 2011 - Amends title XI of the Social Security Act (SSA) to direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), consistent with applicable information, privacy, security, and disclosure laws, to make public on the Internet website of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services the following data with respect to SSA title XVIII (Medicare): (1) a complete list of service providers and suppliers participating in the Medicare program, including their business addresses; and (2) certain aggregate information about each provider and supplier.

Entitles a qualified individual or group, for health research and fraud detection purposes, to access to Medicare claims and payment data of both HHS and its contractors. Directs the Secretary to establish procedures for the storage and use of data provided to such an individual or group.


Ex Input:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``American Missile Protection Act of 
1998''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The threat of weapons of mass destruction delivered by 
        long-range ballistic missiles is among the most serious 
        security issues facing the United States.
                    (A) In a 1994 Executive Order, President Clinton 
                certified, that ``I ... find that the proliferation of 
                nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (`weapons of 
                mass destruction') and the means of delivering such 
                weapons, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat 
                to the national security, foreign policy, and economy 
                of the United States, and hereby declare a national 
                emergency to deal with that threat.'' This state of 
                emergency was reaffirmed in 1995, 1996, and 1997.
                    (B) In 1994 the President stated, that ``there is 
                nothing more important to our security and the world's 
                stability than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons 
                and ballistic missiles''.
                    (C) Several countries hostile to the United States 
                have been particularly determined to acquire missiles 
                and weapons of mass destruction. President Clinton 
                observed in January of 1998, for example, that ``Saddam 
                Hussein has spent the better part of this decade, and 
                much of his nation's wealth, not on providing for the 
                Iraqi people, but on developing nuclear, chemical and 
                biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them''.
                    (D) In 1996, the Senate affirmed that, ``it is in 
                the supreme interest of the United States to defend 
                itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile 
                attack, whatever the source.''
            (2) The long-range ballistic missile threat to the United 
        States is increasing.
                    (A) Several adversaries of the United States have 
                stated their intention to acquire intercontinental 
                ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United 
                States.
                            (i) Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has 
                        stated, ``If they know that you have a 
                        deterrent force capable of hitting the United 
                        States, they would not be able to hit you. If 
                        we had possessed a deterrent--missiles that 
                        could reach New York--we would have hit it at 
                        the same moment. Consequently, we should build 
                        this force so that they and others will no 
                        longer think about an attack.''
                            (ii) Abu Abbas, the head of the Palestine 
                        Liberation Front, has stated, ``I would love to 
                        be able to reach the American shore, but this 
                        is very difficult. Someday an Arab country will 
                        have ballistic missiles. Someday an Arab 
                        country will have a nuclear bomb. It is better 
                        for the United States and for Israel to reach 
                        peace with the Palestinians before that day.''
                            (iii) Saddam Hussein has stated, ``Our 
                        missiles cannot reach Washington. If we could 
                        reach Washington, we would strike if the need 
                        arose.''
                            (iv) Iranian actions speak for themselves. 
                        Iran's aggressive pursuit of medium-range 
                        ballistic missiles capable of striking Central 
                        Europe--aided by the continuing collaboration 
                        of outside agents--demonstrates Tehran's intent 
                        to acquire ballistic missiles of ever-
                        increasing range.
                    (B) Over 30 non-NATO countries possess ballistic 
                missiles, with at least 10 of those countries 
                developing over 20 new types of ballistic missiles.
                    (C) From the end of World War II until 1980, 
                ballistic missiles were used in one conflict. Since 
                1980, thousands of ballistic missiles have been fired 
                in at least six different conflicts.
                    (D) The clear trend among countries hostile to the 
                United States is toward having ballistic missiles of 
                greater range.
                            (i) North Korea first acquired 300-
                        kilometer range Scud Bs, then developed and 
                        deployed 500-kilometer range Scud Cs, is 
                        currently deploying the 1000-kilometer range 
                        No-Dong, and is developing the 2000-kilometer 
                        range Taepo-Dong 1 and 6000-kilometer range 
                        Taepo-Dong 2, which would be capable of 
                        striking Alaska and Hawaii.
                            (ii) Iran acquired 150-kilometer range CSS-
                        8s, progressed through the Scud B and Scud C, 
                        and is developing the 1300-kilometer range 
                        Shahab-3 and 2000-kilometer range Shahab-4, 
                        which would allow Iran to strike Central 
                        Europe.
                            (iii) Iraq, in a two-year crash program, 
                        produced a new missile, the Al-Hussein, with 
                        twice the range of its Scud Bs.
                            (iv) Experience gained from extending the 
                        range of short- and medium-range ballistic 
                        missiles facilitates the development of 
                        intercontinental ballistic missiles.
                    (E) The technical information, hardware, and other 
                resources necessary to build ballistic missiles are 
                increasingly available and accessible worldwide.
                            (i) Due to advances in information 
                        technology, a vast amount of technical 
                        information relating to ballistic missile 
                        design, much of it formerly classified, has 
                        become widely available and is increasingly 
                        accessible through the Internet and other 
                        distribution avenues.
                            (ii) Components, tools, and materials to 
                        support ballistic missile development are 
                        increasingly available in the commercial 
                        aerospace industry.
                            (iii) Increasing demand for satellite-based 
                        telecommunications is adding to the demand for 
                        commercial Space Launch Vehicles, which employ 
                        technology that is essentially identical to 
                        that of intercontinental ballistic missiles. As 
                        this increasing demand is met, the technology 
                        and expertise associated with space launch 
                        vehicles also proliferate.
                    (F) Russia and China have provided significant 
                technical assistance to rogue nation ballistic missile 
                programs, accelerating the pace of those efforts. In 
                June of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence, 
                reporting to Congress on weapons of mass destruction-
                related equipment, materials, and technology, stated 
                that ``China and Russia continued to be the primary 
                suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to stem 
                the flow of dual-use goods and modern weapons to 
                countries of concern.''
                    (G) Russia and China continue to engage in missile 
                proliferation.
                            (i) Despite numerous Russian assurances not 
                        to assist Iran with its ballistic missile 
                        program, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
                        State for Nonproliferation testified to the 
                        Senate, that ``the problem is this: there is a 
                        disconnect between those reassurances, which we 
                        welcome, and what we believe is actually 
                        occurring.''
                            (ii) Regarding China's actions to 
                        demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to 
                        nonproliferation, the Director of Central 
                        Intelligence testified to the Senate on January 
                        28, 1998, that, ``the jury is still out on 
                        whether the recent changes are broad enough in 
                        scope and whether they will hold over the 
                        longer term. As such, Chinese activities in 
                        this area will require continued close 
                        watching.''
                    (H) The inability of the United States to defend 
                itself against weapons of mass destruction delivered by 
                long-range ballistic missile provides additional 
                incentive for hostile nations to develop long-range 
                ballistic missiles with which to threaten the United 
                States. Missiles are widely viewed as valuable tools 
                for deterring and coercing a vulnerable United States.
            (3) The ability of the United States to anticipate future 
        ballistic missile threats is questionable.
                    (A) The Intelligence Community has failed to 
                anticipate many past technical innovations (for 
                example, Iraq's extended-range Al-Hussein missiles and 
                its development of a space launch vehicle) and outside 
                assistance enables rogue states to surmount traditional 
                technological obstacles to obtaining or developing 
                ballistic missiles of increasing range.
                    (B) In June of 1997, the Director of Central 
                Intelligence reported to Congress that ``many Third 
                World countries--with Iran being the most prominent 
                example--are responding to Western counter-
                proliferation efforts by relying more on legitimate 
                commercial firms as procurement fronts and by 
                developing more convoluted procurement networks.''
                    (C) In June of 1997, the Director of Central 
                Intelligence stated to Congress that ``gaps and 
                uncertainties preclude a good projection of exactly 
                when `rest of the world' countries will deploy ICBMs.''
                    (D) In 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence 
                testified that Iran would have a medium-range missile 
                by 2007. One year later the Director stated, ``since I 
                testified, Iran's success in getting technology and 
                materials from Russian companies, combined with recent 
                indigenous Iranian advances, means that it could have a 
                medium-range missile much sooner than I assessed last 
                year.'' Department of State officials have testified 
                that Iran could be prepared to deploy such a missile as 
                early as late 1998, nine years earlier than had been 
                predicted one year before by the Director of Central 
                Intelligence.
            (4) The failure to prepare adequately for long-range 
        ballistic missile threats could have severe national security 
        and foreign policy consequences for the United States.
                    (A) An attack on the United States by a ballistic 
                missile equipped with a weapon of mass destruction 
                could inflict catastrophic death or injury to citizens 
                of the United States and severe damage to their 
                property.
                    (B) A rogue state's ability to threaten the United 
                States with an intercontinental ballistic missile may 
                constrain the United States' options in dealing with 
                regional threats to its interests, deter the United 
                States from taking appropriate action, or prompt allies 
                to question United States security guarantees, thereby 
                weakening alliances of the United States and the United 
                States' world leadership position.
            (5) The United States must be prepared for rogue nations 
        acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with weapons of 
        mass destruction.
                    (A) In its resolution of ratification for the START 
                II Treaty, the United States Senate declared that 
                ``because deterrence may be inadequate to protect the 
                United States against long-range ballistic missile 
                threats, missile defenses are a necessary part of new 
                deterrent strategies.''
                    (B) In September of 1994, Secretary of Defense 
                Perry stated that in the post-Cold War era, ``we now 
                have opportunity to create a new relationship based not 
                on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather 
                on another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.''
                    (C) On February 12, 1997, the Under Secretary of 
                Defense for Policy testified to the Senate that ``I and 
                the administration are quite willing to acknowledge 
                that if we saw a rogue state, a potential proliferant, 
                beginning to develop a long-range ICBM capable of 
                reaching the United States, we would have to give very, 
                very serious attention to deploying a limited national 
                missile defense.''
            (6) The United States has no defense deployed against 
        weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-range ballistic 
        missiles and no policy to deploy such a national missile 
        defense system.

SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is 
technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system 
capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited 
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or 
deliberate).

Ex Output:
American Missile Protection Act of 1998 - States as U.S. policy to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending U.S. territory against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).


Ex Input:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Traditional Banking Regulatory 
Relief Act of 2015''.

SEC. 2. REGULATORY RELIEF FOR TRADITIONAL BANKING ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) Regulatory Capital Requirements.--
            (1) In general.--Section 18 of the Federal Deposit 
        Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1828) is amended by adding at the end 
        the following new subsection:
    ``(aa) Treatment of Traditional Banking Organizations.--
            ``(1) Regulatory capital requirements.--
                    ``(A) Simple leverage ratio.--The appropriate 
                Federal banking agencies shall issue regulations 
                establishing a minimum simple leverage ratio at no less 
                than 10 percent. The simple leverage ratio requirement 
                shall be consistent with regulations promulgated 
                pursuant to section 38 (relating to prompt corrective 
                action).
                    ``(B) Application to traditional banking 
                organization.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
                law, a traditional banking organization that meets the 
                minimum simple leverage ratio established under 
                subparagraph (A) may elect, by notice to the 
                appropriate Federal banking agencies, to maintain the 
                minimum simple leverage ratio as its sole measure of 
                capital adequacy.
                    ``(C) Exemption from risk-based capital 
                requirement.--The risk-based capital requirement in 
                section 38(c)(1)(A) shall not apply to a traditional 
                banking organization that makes an election under 
                subparagraph (B) and complies with regulations issued 
                in accordance with this paragraph.
                    ``(D) Grace period.--A traditional banking 
                organization that makes an election under subparagraph 
                (B) and fails to maintain the minimum simple leverage 
                ratio described in subparagraph (A) (as determined by 
                the first quarterly report of condition issued after 
                making such an election) shall be exempt from the risk-
                based capital requirement in section 38(c)(1)(A) for a 
                period of 18 months beginning on the date of such 
                determination.
            ``(2) Reservation of authority.--Notwithstanding any other 
        provision of this subsection, an appropriate Federal banking 
        agency may require additional capital adequacy measures 
        applicable to a newly chartered traditional banking 
        organization or for an individual traditional banking 
        organization if such measures are required to ensure the safety 
        and soundness of the banking organization or to prevent an 
        unacceptable risk to the Deposit Insurance Fund.
            ``(3) Definitions.--
                    ``(A) Traditional banking organization.--The term 
                `traditional banking organization' means any bank 
                holding company, savings and loan holding company, 
                bank, or savings association that individually, and 
                when including its parent, subsidiaries, and all 
                affiliates, meets the following requirements:
                            ``(i) Has zero trading assets and zero 
                        trading liabilities.
                            ``(ii) Does not engage in swaps or 
                        security-based swaps (as such terms are defined 
                        in section 1a of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 
                        U.S.C. 1a)), other than swaps or security-based 
                        swaps referencing interest rates or foreign 
                        exchange swaps (as such terms are defined in 
                        such section).
                            ``(iii) Has a total gross notional exposure 
                        of swaps and security-based swaps of not more 
                        than $3,000,000,000.
                    ``(B) Simple leverage ratio.--
                            ``(i) In general.--The term `simple 
                        leverage ratio' means--
                                    ``(I) total equity less goodwill 
                                and deferred tax assets, divided by
                                    ``(II) total assets less goodwill 
                                and deferred tax assets,
                        as measured by generally accepted accounting 
                        principles.
                            ``(ii) Measurements.--For purposes of 
                        measuring the simple leverage ratio capital 
                        requirements of a traditional banking 
                        organization, the appropriate Federal banking 
                        agencies may, by regulation, require--
                                    ``(I) the exclusion, from total 
                                equity, of other intangible assets; or
                                    ``(II) the addition, to total 
                                assets, of off-balance sheet items.
                            ``(iii) Rule of construction.--The simple 
                        leverage ratio shall not be construed to be a 
                        generally applicable leverage capital 
                        requirement for purposes of section 171 of the 
                        Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
                        Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5371).''.
            (2) Phase-in for certain organizations.--
                    (A) In general.--Notwithstanding the minimum simple 
                leverage ratio requirement under section 18(aa)(1)(B) 
                of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, a traditional 
                banking organization with a simple leverage ratio of 8 
                percent or more may make an election under such section 
                18(aa)(1)(B) during the 18-month period beginning on 
                the date of the enactment of this Act.
                    (B) Requirement to meet the minimum simple leverage 
                ratio.--A traditional banking organization making an 
                election pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall have until 
                the end of the 18-month period described under 
                subparagraph (A) to meet the minimum simple leverage 
                ratio, or the organization's election under section 
                18(aa)(1)(B) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act shall 
                be terminated.
                    (C) Definitions.--For purposes of this paragraph:
                            (i) Minimum simple leverage ratio.--The 
                        term ``minimum simple leverage ratio'' means 
                        the minimum simple leverage ratio established 
                        under section 18(aa)(1)(A) of the Federal 
                        Deposit Insurance Act.
                            (ii) Other terms.--The terms ``simple 
                        leverage ratio'' and ``traditional banking 
                        organization'' have the meaning given those 
                        terms, respectively, under section 18(aa)(3) of 
                        the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
    (b) Short Form Call Report.--Section 7(a) of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(a)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
            ``(12) Short form reporting.--The appropriate Federal 
        banking agencies shall issue regulations allowing for a reduced 
        reporting requirement for a traditional banking organization 
        that elects to maintain a simple leverage ratio as its sole 
        measure of capital adequacy pursuant to section 18(aa).''.
    (c) On-Site Examinations.--Section 10(d) of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1820(d)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (4)--
                    (A) in the paragraph heading, by inserting ``and 
                traditional banking organizations'' after ``certain 
                small institutions'';
                    (B) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``or is a 
                traditional banking organization defined in section 
                18(aa)(3)'' after ``$1,000,000,000'';
                    (C) by striking subparagraph (B) and redesignating 
                subparagraphs (C) through (E) as subparagraphs (B) 
                through (D), respectively;
                    (D) in subparagraph (B) (as so redesignated), by 
                striking ``condition'' and all that follows through 
                ``$200,000,000'' and inserting ``condition was found to 
                be outstanding or good'';
                    (E) in subparagraph (C) (as so redesignated), by 
                striking ``and'' at the end;
                    (F) in subparagraph (D) (as so redesignated), by 
                striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; 
                and
                    (G) by adding at the end the following new 
                subparagraph:
                    ``(E) the appropriate Federal banking agency 
                believes the 18-month period is consistent with the 
                safety and soundness of the banking organization.''; 
                and
            (2) by striking paragraph (10).
    (d) Stress Testing.--Section 165(i)(2)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5365(i)(2)(A)) is 
amended by inserting ``, unless such companies are traditional banking 
organizations (as defined in section 18(aa)(3) of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act)'' after ``annual stress tests''.
    (e) Technical Amendment.--Section 18 of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1828) is amended by moving subsection (y) so 
as to appear above subsection (z).

Ex Output:

Traditional Banking Regulatory Relief Act of 2015  This bill amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) to prescribe capital requirements for traditional banking organizations (TBOs) at a minimum simple leverage ratio of no less than 10%. A TBO is any bank holding company, savings and loan holding company, bank, or savings association that individually (and when including its parent, subsidiaries, and affiliates) meets the following criteria:  has zero trading assets and zero trading liabilities, does not engage in swaps or security-based swaps other than those referencing interest rates or foreign exchange swaps, and   has a total gross notional exposure of swaps and security-based swaps of not more than $3 billion.  &quot;Simple leverage ratio&quot; means:  total equity less goodwill and deferred tax assets, divided by   total assets less goodwill and deferred tax assets, as measured by generally accepted accounting principles.   A TBO meeting this minimum simple leverage ratio may notify the federal banking agencies to maintain it as the sole measure of its capital adequacy. The risk-based capital requirement shall not apply to it. If the TBO fails to maintain the minimum simple leverage ratio, it shall remain exempt from the risk-based capital requirement for an 18-month grace period. The bill grants a TBO with a simple leverage ratio of 8% or more a phase-in period of 18 months after enactment of this bill within which to elect to meet the minimum simple leverage ratio as its sole measure of capital adequacy.   The federal banking agencies, with respect to reports of condition, shall permit a reduced reporting requirement for a TBO electing to maintain a simple leverage ratio as its sole measure of capital adequacy.  The 18-month on-site examination cycle shall apply to TBOs (and, as under current law, to insured depository institutions whose assets total less than $1 billion) if the appropriate federal banking agency believes this is consistent with the TBO's safety and soundness.  The bill repeals the authority of federal banking agencies, at their discretion, to increase the maximum asset amount of insured depository institutions for certain purposes.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is amended to exempt TBOs from mandatory annual stress tests.