instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
(“Due process requires that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his ‘day in court.’ ”). The 1992 statute, as applied in this case, provided State Farm no “fair opportunity” to be heard before it was called upon to divest itself of a significant property interest if it chose to preserve its long-recognized right of subrogation. Instead, the statute placed State Farm in the untenable position of being bound by law to the outcome of private settlement negotiations between the Hassens and UniSun that essentially determined its immediate liability for an award of damages, including noneconomic damages, even though it was not a party to the negotiations and had no available means to assert any legal defenses to the Hassens’ claim. Cf. Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So.2d 604 (Fla.1956) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the statute entitled State Farm 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not (B) holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it (E) holding that a corporation is entitled to due process of law insofar as property rights are concerned so that a money judgment may not be entered against it where it was not a party to a cause and was not served with process even though the principal stockholder was a party to the cause
answer:
holding that it is not


question:
partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court’s order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants’ arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment
answer:
holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied


question:
by Otay Mesa to date. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580 n.11, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (cautioning that “the government cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response.”). After the first appeal in this case, the only remaining issue before this Court was to determine the amount Otay Mesa should recover in just compensation, with interest, for the Government’s taking of a permanent easement over Otay Mesa’s property. Given the Government’s stipulation, Otay Mesa is entitled to reimbursement for its reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in securing just compensation for the Government’s taking, Cloverport Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl.Ct. 121, 127 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The Government stipulated to the taking of an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the government stipulated to liability for a taking the uniform relocation act applied at that point and mandated the award of reasonable attorneys fees and expenses even though there was limited success on the merits and certainly not the results reached that the plaintiff had contemplated (B) holding that the court of appeals erred in modifying the judgment to include attorneys fees when the trial courts refusal to grant attorneys fees was not the subject of a point of error (C) holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees (D) holding that the plaintiff had established an entitlement to relief on the merits of the claim  and was therefore entitled to fees even though it was remanded to the agency for further action (E) holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal
answer:

holding that the court of appeals erred in modifying the judgment to include attorneys fees when the trial courts refusal to grant attorneys fees was not the subject of a point of error