In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: other court’s construal of the statute. See Thrivent, 251 S.W.3d at 622-23; J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co. v. Estes, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 836, 839-40 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied); Poole v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 14-99-00740-CV, No, 14-99-01056-CV, 2000 WL 1721150, at *1, 2000 Tex.App. LEXIS 6825, at *3-*4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 12, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication); Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d at 331. Finally, this argument is contrary to the prevailing view among state courts outside of Texas as well, which have held that an order vacating an award and directing a rehearing (without denying confirmation) is not final and appealable. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 31, 582 So.2d 162, 162-63 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Carner v. Freedman, 175 So.2d 70, 71 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable (B) holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable
[EX A]: holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable

[EX Q]: his claims based on injury to his eye and knees. But Mr. Sanders does not state any basis for his challenge to those decisions. Finally, Mr. Sanders claims that he has been deprived of due process and discriminated against based on his race. As already stated, we have jurisdiction to consider constitutional arguments. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). But Mr. Sanders does not provide any facts to substantiate his arguments. Nor do we see any basis for his arguments in the record. In the absence of any evidentiary support, Mr. Sanders’s passing remarks amount to no more than a constitutional label for his otherwise factual disagreement "with the decisions of the Veterans Court and the Board. That does not suffice to create jurisdiction. See Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 225 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal (B) holding that rcw 1040200 does not create a constitutional right to be advised of immigration consequences therefore failure to comply with statute does not create constitutional harm (C) holding that a board decision is required to vest the court of veterans appeals with jurisdiction over a claimants appeal (D) holding that mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim (E) holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court
[EX A]: holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal

[EX Q]: either argument as a reason for reversal. 26 . There was no hearsay exception that would have permitted admission of Brisbon’s out-of-court statements as substantive evidence against Wonson. Brisbon’s statements implicating Wonson could not be introduced against Wonson as an admission because they were not made by or attributable to him, see Chaabi v. United States, 544 A.2d 1247, 1248 (D.C. 1988), nor were they admissible under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest because they did not directly implicate the declarant, Brisbon. See Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190, 199-200 (D.C. 1979) (en banc) (adopting the principles set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)); Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994) (<HOLDING>). 27 . Only "in a certain, limited class of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nonself inculpatory statements are not statements against penal interest under fedrevid 804b3 (B) holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care (C) holding that statements in proof of loss are not conclusive claimant could explain statements (D) holding that only selfinculpatory aspects of hearsay statement but not other parts of statement are admissible under exception for statements against penal interest (E) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay
[EX A]:
holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care