In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence.” Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 417, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964) (“established rule” is that “recognition operates retroactively to validate past acts”); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942) (recognition is retroactive in effect); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328-330, 57 S.Ct. 758, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937) (recognition is retroactive). Further, the FSIA itself is retroactive in application and applies to actions of foreign sovereigns prior to the passage of the FSIA. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 124 S.Ct. 2240, 159 L.Ed.2d 1, (2004) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the FSIA would apply to all 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fsia applied retroactively to actions of the austrian government in 1948 (B) holding that kotecki limit applied retroactively (C) holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government (D) holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review (E) recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: While R.E. concerned the use of retrospective testimony by DOE to support a finding that it provided a child a FAPE, the court’s rejection of E.Z.-L.’s substantive challenge introduced doubt about whether parents could prospectively challenge their child’s educational placement without first enrolling the child in the recommended placement school. DOE argued that R.E. foreclosed all such prospective challenges on the basis that they are inherently speculative. The argument found some acceptance. See, e.g., E.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 13 Civ. 6709, 2014 WL 4332092, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2014) (rejecting prospective challenge as “impermissibly speculative and premature”); P.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 13 Civ. 4772, 2014 WL 3673603, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (<HOLDING>). But most courts did not adopt this hardline 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student (B) holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement (C) holding that the sro correctly concluded that a challenge tothe does choice of school is improper where the student never attended the school (D) holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school (E) holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: persecution. See Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 612 (8th Cir.2004). Being forced on occasion to work without pay for the police is troublesome, but we cannot conclude that this alone rises to the level of persecution. “[P]ersecution is an extreme concept” and low-level types of intimidation or harassment are not sufficiently severe. Shoaira, 377 F.3d at 844 (internal marks omitted). We have stated that brief periods of detention, ethnic conflict, or isolated violence do not necessarily constitute persecution. See Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 990 (8th Cir.2004) (noting isolated violence does not compel a finding of persecution); Al Tawm v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir.2004) (noting brief detention not necessarily persecution); Feleke v. INS, 118 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>).' We conclude that substantial evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding political unrest and ethnic conflict do not compel a finding of persecution (B) holding that a minor beating even in conjunction with threats did not compel a finding of persecution (C) holding that evidence of multiple interrogations and 24hour detention did not compel finding of persecution (D) holding that evidence of kidnapping at gunpoint interrogation and beating did not compel finding of persecution (E) holding that minor abuse during brief detention did not compel finding of past persecution
[EX A]:
(A)