In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: to the registrations of any party to the action. Decrees and orders shall be certified by the court to the Commissioner, who shall make appropriate entry upon the records of the Patent and Trademark Office, and shall be controlled thereby. 15 U.S.C. § 1119. 27. The legal issue in a cancellation proceeding is the right to register a mark and when a mark is not incontestable, a court may cancel the mark on any ground which would have prevented registration initially. International Order of Job's Daughters, 727 F.2d at 1091. 28. As noted, a mark "which does not fulfill the functions of a trademark, but, rather, serves essentially a utilitarian or functional purpose cannot be registered as a trademark." Id.; see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson, 25 F.2d 833, 834-35 (4th Cir.1928) (<HOLDING>). 29. Because Shakespeare's mark is a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that automobile racing is not an ultrahazardous activity (B) holding that diamondshaped tread on tire which is a mechanically functional feature of an automobile tire cannot be registered (C) holding when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile he may as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest search the passenger compartment of that automobile (D) holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer (E) holding that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered  stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his drivers license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the fourth amendment
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: as an exhibit, he was able to make his argument that the victim was vindictive towards defendant. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in this respect, we are not persuaded that it is more probable than not that any such error was outcome determinative. (MCOA Op. at 5.) Petitioner contends that, by barring the introduction of the actual letters sent by Gordon and barring cross-examination that quoted those letters, the trial court prevented him from effectively cross-examining Gordon about her bias and motive for giving false evidence against him. I disagree. Unlike in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, the trial court did not “prohibit! ] all inquiry” into Gordon’s possible bias and motivation to lie. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Vasquez, 496 F.3d at 571 (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Petitioner’s representations, he 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this distinction (B) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel (C) recognizing distinction between barring all inquiry into a witness bias and barring a particular form of crossexamination (D) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (E) recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: vis-á-vis a jointly tried co-defendant. 391 U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620. A statement is powerfully incriminating only when it is inculpatory on its face. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1702. The confession in Bruton fit that description because it identified both the declarant and his codefendant by name as the perpetrators of the crime. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Statements that are incriminating only when linked to other evidence in the case do not trigger application of Bruton’s preclusionary rule. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702. This criterion is easier to state than to apply; for example, it does not allow a prosecutor merely to delete a codefen-dant’s name. See, e.g., Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Zuñiga and Vega challenge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a codefendants sentence is not relevant to an appellants guilt innocence or punishment (B) holding that simply replacing a codefendants name with a symbol or a blackedout space is insufficient to wrest an inculpatory statement from brutons precedential orbit (C) holding recording of eyewitnesss inculpatory statement made in custodial interrogation testimonial in nature (D) holding that a defendant was pot unduly surprised by the delayed disclosure of evidence showing that he made an inculpatory statement (E) holding that where a defendants name is replaced with a neutral pronoun as long as identification of the defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other than the redacted confession and a limiting instruction is given to the jury there is no bruton violation
[EX A]:
(B)