In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: 27 . State v. Davenport, 510 P.2d 78, 82 n. 8 (Alaska 1973), quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). 28 . Williams v. State, 737 P.2d 360, 362 (Alaska App.1987). 29 . Davenport, 510 P.2d at 80. 30 . Id. at 82 & n. 8. 31 . - See Landon v. State, 941 P.2d 186, 190 (Alaska App.1997); Stam v. State, 925 P.2d 668, 670 (Alaska App.1996) (when assessing the trustworthiness of hearsay information contained in a search warrant application, courts presume that police officers and citizen informants are credible sources of information}. 32 . Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 322-25 (Alaska 1985) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible (B) holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause (C) holding that the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is subject to a harmlesserror analysis (D) holding as a matter of law that adaptations of subject matter or expressions in the public domain cannot support a finding of copyright infringement (E) holding that as a matter of state law the aguilarspinelli test continues to govern the evaluation of hearsay information offered to support a search or seizure

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: have pleaded that the 2007 Agreement was terminated, and the Court is required to accept that fact as true at this stage of the litigation. Therefore the continued use of Plaintiffs’ trademarks by Defendant as alleged would be without the benefit of a license. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the trademark infringement claim is DENIED. C. Breach of Contract Plaintiffs claim that Big Time Toys breached the parties’ contracts when it failed to cure its default on the royalty payments. Am. Compl. ¶ 88. As an initial matter, the continued use of a licensed trademark after termination of a license agreement can be actionable as both breach of contract and trademark infringement. See, e.g., Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. v. D & L Ice Cream Co., 576 F.Supp. 1055, 1060 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>); Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co., 107 F.Supp.2d 369, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contributory trademark infringement requires some predicate act of infringement (B) holding that although the underlying action is one for trademark infringement the infringement occurred as a result of the underlying defendants use of the trademark in their advertising (C) holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong (D) holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract (E) holding that continued use of trademark after termination of franchise for nonpayment of royalties constitutes lanham act violation

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: by the legislature. See Goldman, 151 N.H. at 773-74. II. Confidentiality Citing Goodrow v. Perrin, 119 N.H. 483, 485 (1979), and Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the respondent asserts that he “has a vested [constitutional] right to maintain the confidences he shared with his treatment team, which cannot be taken away by legislative fiat.” Although any such assertion is belied by his limited waivers of confidentiality discussed below with respect to his asserted contractual rights, we address this argument for guidance in other circumstances where such limited waivers may not exist. We have never recognized a constitutional right to the privacy of medical information on behalf of incarcerated persons and we decline to do so now. But cf. In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 230 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 554, 559 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records (B) recognizing stu dents right to be free of stateoccasioned damage to the students bodily integrity (C) recognizing that the right to be free of stateoccasioned damage to a persons bodily integrity is protected by the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process (D) recognizing state constitutional right of individual privacy that    may be asserted to prevent unwanted infringements of bodily integrity (E) recognizing a constitutional right of privacy in mental health records


Output: (D)