In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: then the trial court erred in allowing prejudgment interest to accrue on that sum at 10% per annum “[bjecause no prejudgment interest statute applies to this case.” Assuming arguendo that their argument was true, then the answer to the problem is found in their own brief. They acknowledge that the prejudgment interest scheme established under § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code applied if no other statute did. See Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 530-31 (Tex.1998) (dealing with Texas Revised Civil Statute art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a), the predecessor to § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code). And, at the time of judgment, see Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy, Co., 113 S.W.3d 400, 414 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), prejudgment interest accrued at the rate of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate (B) holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment (C) holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment (D) holding that the penalty is applicable (E) holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract
[A]: (B)


[Q]: in their pension payments would only be temporary, rather than receiving any express representations regarding that fact. See Grossman Decl. Ex. D at 141-42 (Avitabile); id. Ex. E at 119 (Keelin). Further, as previously noted, it is undisputed that all five plaintiffs received clear and unambiguous written information that accurately described the Level Income Option and indicated that the reduced payments would continue “until death.” These (and other) accurate written communications rendered any inconsistent oral representations (assuming, arguendo, that there were any) entirely immaterial, because plaintiffs had full notice of their benefit rights and could not reasonably have been misled by anything to the contrary. Adams v. Tetley USA, Inc., 363 F.Supp.2d 94, 109 (D.Conn.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Ballone, 109 F.3d at 126; Adams, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud a plaintiff must have justifiably relied to his detriment on the defendants material misrepresentations (B) holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage (C) holding that class actions may be reasonably litigated through use of legitimate inferences based on the nature of the alleged misrepresentations at issue (D) holding that contractor could not show that it reasonably relied upon alleged misrepresentation (E) holding that plan beneficiaries could not have reasonably relied on any alleged oral misrepresentations in light of a signed severance agreement containing information to the contrary
[A]: (E)


[Q]: in light of the participation in this litigation of defendant Avendrá (a non-party to the Master and 1999 Agreements).” Thereafter, Marriott appealed the court’s refusal to compel CTF to arbitrate, and CTF cross-appealed the court’s order staying CTF’s breach of contract suit pending resolution of the arbitration between Marriott and HPI. II. JURISDICTION We may review the denial of Marriott’s motion to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B), which provides for jurisdiction over appeals from orders “denying a petition under [9 U.S.C. § 4] to order arbitration to proceed[.]” Marriot order that unreasonably delays a plaintiffs right to have its case heard is appealable. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d at 735; see also Haberern v. Lehigh & New England Ry., 554 F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Here, the District Court decided two 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a stay order of indefinite length which singles out a claim for extended delay while others of a similar nature proceed is appealable (B) holding that a stay order is appealable because it amounts to a refusal to hear and decide a case (C) holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment (D) holding that grant or denial of debtors claim of property exemption is final appealable order (E) holding that an order dismissing a claim without prejudice is a final appealable order if the statute of limitations for that claim has expired
[A]:
(A)