In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: in their Constitution, or from the Congress that the Constitution had empowered. We made a similar point in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 416, where we considered a suit against a State in another State’s courts: “This [traditional] explanation [of sovereign immunity] adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be sued in its own courts without its consent, but it affords no support for a claim of immunity in another sovereign’s courts. Such a claim necessarily implicates the power and authority of a second sovereign; its source must be found either in an agreement, express or implied, between the two sovereigns, or in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of the first as a matter of comity.” Cf. United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 646 (1892) (<HOLDING>). Subjecting States to federal jurisdiction in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action cannot be maintained under young in unique circumstances where the suit against the state officer affects an essential attribute of state sovereignty in a manner that the action must be understood as one against the state (B) holding a states regulation of wyoming national guard was insufficient to implicate a special sovereignty interest because of the dual federal and state nature of national guard service (C) recognizing that a suit by the national government against a state does no violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty (D) holding the governors emergency powers to take private property for the public benefit was a special sovereignty interest but the relief requested was not so much of a divestiture of the states sovereignty to render the suit as one against the state itself (E) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: a hearing mandated if he can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold a federal evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 12, 112 S.Ct. 1715. It appears, however, that AEDPA overruled the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception, and that at this time, district courts cannot order evi-dentiary hearings unless the requirements of § 2254(e)(2) are met. See Shumate v. Newland, 75 F.Supp.2d 1076, 1084, 1098-99 (N.D.Cal.1999) (“AEDPA, however, has ‘reduced considerably the degree of the district court’s discretion’ by imposing threshold requirements that must be met before a request for an evidentiary hearing may be entertained.”) (quoting Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.1999)); Rodriguez v. Zavaras, 42 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1054-55 (D.Colo.1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Porter v. Gramley, 112 F.3d 1308, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional (B) holding that evidentiary hearing not necessary where proposed administrative action is based on undisputed material facts (C) holding that aedpa did not codify keeney but instead significantly curtails the availability of evidentiary hearings to develop material facts (D) holding that when a state has given petitioner a full and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed to develop material facts to support it he is not entitled to develop further facts in a federal habeas evidentiary hearing unless he demonstrates either cause for the failure and prejudice resulting therefrom or a fundamental miscarriage of justice (E) holding that an evidentiary hearing may be used to develop the factual basis of a prisoner complaint

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: the harassment,” Murray, 57 F.3d at 250. As the Second Circuit has recognized, “not every response to a complaint should take the form of discharge;” even a mere written warning can be an appropriate response if it conveys the message that further harassment will not be tolerated. Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 63; see also Torres, 116 F.3d at 639 (“[R]esolution will vary from case to case.”). By far the best evidence that Metro-North’s response was effective is that plaintiff has not been sexually harassed by Chapman or any other Metro-North employee since meeting with Ms. Gormley-O’Connor, see Wahlstrom Dep. at 30, 248, nor has Chapman been accused of accosting any other employees since returning from his suspension, see Chapman Dep. at 64, 279; Sinigiani Dep. at 49; cf. Murray, 57 F.3d at 251 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, while factual issues exist as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination (B) holding that where the plaintiffs allegations concerning a hostile work environment consist of facts that occurred more than one year before the filing of the complaint such a claim is timebarred (C) holding that allegations of failure to remedy a hostile work environment provided no basis for relief where the evidence demonstrated that the harassment had ended by the time plaintiffs complaint was filed (D) holding that the allegations of plaintiffs coemployees of sexual harassment by manager were irrelevant to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim absent evidence that plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of the alleged harassment (E) holding that a charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of sex did not support a complaint for hostile environment sexual harassment


Output: (C)