In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
use of low-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. While we recognize that drivers may be accustomed to quickly flashing their high-beam headlights at an oncoming vehicle as a signal to dim headlights, there is no evidence in this case that the officer was driving with his high-beam headlights. Furthermore, the statute does not provide any exceptions for the momentary flashing of high-beam headlights. Thus, we must conclude the statute prohibits the use of high-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle, for any length of time and for any purpose. [¶ 12] We recognize that at least one other appellate court has interpreted similar statutory language and reached the opposite conclusion. See Waukesha County v. Meinhardt, 2001 WI App 146, ¶¶ 9-10, 630 N.W.2d 277 (<HOLDING>). In another case involving a similar statute, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that meinhardt did not commit a violation by flashing his highbeam headlights two times at an oncoming vehicle because the plain language of the statute did not prohibit the quick flashing of highbeam headlights (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute (D) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (E) holding the trial judge did not commit reversible error through the chosen method of remedying the batson violation

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
if the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary ...”); Douglas by Kelly v. Bd. of Edu., 127 Ill.App.3d 79, 82 Ill.Dec. 211, 468 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1984) (finding that where a school’s window pane fell on plaintiff while she was sitting at her desk, plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict based on res ipsa loqui-tur); Moore v. Atchison, 28 Ill.App.2d 340, 171 N.E.2d 393 (1960) (finding that directed verdict for the plaintiff was proper where there was no direct evidence as to why two trains collided, even though the defendant showed that the equipment was properly inspected and in excellent working order, because the circumstances made the inference of negligence so strong that reasonable men could not reject it); Silvern v. Barbagallo, 195 N.Y.S.2d 32 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1959) (<HOLDING>); Richard Equipment Corp. v. Manhattan Indus. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the injured passenger of a cab was entitled to summary judgment against the driver because the prima facie proof is so convincing that the inference of negligence is inescapable (B) holding the standard of proof in summary judgment rulings is the same as it would be at trial (C) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (D) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (E) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
on a peer-to-peer file sharing network” and “knowingly allowed others access to his Ares Shared Folder.” Viewing the instructions as a whole, we cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion in refusing to give the jury Meisel’s proposed identification instruction. Although it is certainly possible Meisel’s proposed theory-of-defense instruction could have given the jury a “clearer understanding of the issues,” the district coui’t’s jury instructions were not erroneous or inadequate as given. See Bowling, 619 F.3d at 1183-84. And although this'court, if it were deciding the issue in the first instance, might well have instructed the jury consistent with Meisel’s theory-of-defense instruction, the governing standard of review is a deferential one; See Jordan, 485 F.3d at 1218 (<HOLDING>). The , district court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the arbitrary and capricious standard this court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment (B) holding that under the abuseofdiscretion standard this court will reverse only if the district courts decision is arbitrary capricious or whimsical or results in a manifestly unreasonable judgment quotation omitted (C) holding court of appeals should review district courts determination regarding punitive damages under abuseofdiscretion standard (D) holding that under chevron step two courts may not disturb an agency rule unless it is arbitrary or capricious in substance or manifestly contrary to the statute internal quotations omitted (E) holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable

Ex Output:

(B)