In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: of TILA;” (2) "The notes and security instruments signed by plaintiff and borrowers for the purchase of mobile homes were extensions of credit subject to TILA;” (3) "The requirement that insurance policies contain provisions covering Green Tree's possible repossession expenses are credit charges as defined by TILA and occur annually when each policy is renewed;” and (4) "No TILA disclosures are given by Green Tree.” (See Am.Compl. ¶¶ 21-23.) Green Tree does not rebut these contentions and instead only addresses the merits of the arbitration issue. In this Memorandum Opinion and Order, however, the court only addresses the question of whether Plaintiff may be compelled to arbitrate her claims, not the merits of the underlying claims themselves. 6 . See. also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480-83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration (B) holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration (C) holding that an agreement to submit age discrimination claims to arbitration does not constitute a waiver (D) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (E) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra

A: (A)
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Q: The State, by contrast, argues that because the court’s summary denial of Pinholster’s claim was an adjudication on the merits, we apply the usual deference required by AEDPA. Under our precedent, the California Supreme Court’s denial of Pinholster’s petition for writ of habeas corpus “on the substantive ground that it is without merit,” Pinholster II, 525 F.3d at 754, constitutes a decision on the merits of his federal claim. See Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that “the California Supreme Court’s denial of a habeas petition without comment or citation constituted a decision on the merits of the federal claims” (citing Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc))); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has not addressed the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted (B) holding that we must first determine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal (C) holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred (D) recognizing that we construe postcard denials such as these to be decisions on the merits citing hunter 982 f2d at 348 (E) recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court

A: (D)
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Q: a civilian to fill a position traditionally occupied by a deputy sheriff. Id. at 772. In determining whether the sheriff was justified in retaliating against Fuerst, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the notion that Fuerst spoke as a public employee under Garcetti when he criticized the proposal: Because Fuerst’s comments that precipitated the adverse action taken against him were made in his capacity as a union representative, rather than in the course of his employment as a deputy sheriff — his duties as deputy sheriff did not include commenting on the sheriffs decision to hire a public-relations officer — the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos is inapposite. Id. at 774 (citation omitted); see also Baumann v. District of Columbia, 744 F.Supp.2d 216, 224 (D.D.C.2010) (<HOLDING>); Hawkins v. Boone, 786 F.Supp.2d. 328, 335 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that speech about financial assistance and handling racial discrimination does not qualify as protected speech (B) holding that a police officer speaking to a public official about his concerns over public safety issues is speaking in his capacity  as a police officer and not as a citizen (C) holding that a police officers deposition in a fellow officers  1983 action alleging unlawful retaliation was protected speech (D) holding that fire departments are analogous to police departments in this respect (E) holding that police officers criticism of his departments handling of a sniper incident was protected speech because the officer spoke in his capacity as police union president

A:
(E)
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