In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: not impliedly preempt the field of law related to the price, route, and service of motor carriers of property, and does not impliedly preempt by conflict her state-law claims. As stated above, in Kelley the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that § 14501(c) preempts the field of law regarding price, route, and service of motor carriers of property. See Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1509-10 (“Here, Congress has clearly chosen ... to preempt the entire field of price, service, and route regulation of intrastate motor carrier activities.”). Furthermore, other federal courts have held that § 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts state tort claims relating to price, route, or service against motor carriers of property. See, e.g., Data Mfg., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 557 F.3d 849 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs statelaw claims alleging common law misrepresentation and statutory misrepresentation under the texas insurance code art 2121 not preempted because they were not dependent on  the right to recover benefits under the erisa plan (B) holding fraudulent representations to the fda could not sustain statelaw claims (C) holding that  14501c1 preempted statelaw claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and money had and received related to billing practices of motor carrier of property (D) holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient (E) holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: clause. We conclude that reckless battery is a violent crime under the force clause, an issue not addressed by the Holloway opinion. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 20 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012). We further note that the Holloway court’s conclusion with respect to reckless battery accorded with then-binding instruction from the United States Supreme Court that the residual clause is limited to an offense that “typically involve[s] purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct.” United States v. Holloway, supra at 260, quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008). Last year, however, the Supreme Court retreated from this characterization of the residual clause. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270, 2277 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court iterated that “[t]he phrase 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally  (B) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (C) holding that burglary is violent felony (D) holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause (E) holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: so would not be appropriate in this case. Cf. Def.'s Corrected Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.'s Mot. for J. Upon the Agency R„ ECF No. 41 ("Def.'s Br.”) at 20-23 (arguing that the court should decline to reach the merits of AHSTAC's contention in this regard because AHSTAC failed to make this argument before the agency in the first instance); 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) (”[T]he Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”) (emphasis added); Blue Field (Sichuan) Food Indus. Co. v. United States, - CIT -, 949 F.Supp.2d 1311, 1321 (2013) (“This court has discretion to determine when it will require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d)); Itochu Bldg. Prods, v. United States, 733 F.3d 1140, 1145 (Fed.Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). 17 . Importantly, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a courts authority to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in actions brought under the apa is limited when neither the statute nor agency rules specifically mandate exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review (B) recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a  1983 action (C) holding that requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is appropriate where doing so can protect administrative agency authority and promote judicial efficiency (D) holding that courts have consistently required exhaustion of administrative remedies under foia (E) holding that proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary under section 1997ea
Example Output:
(C)