In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of whether the images on the site constituted child pornography, the receipt shows Shiver’s familiarity with making commercial transactions for pornographic images on the Internet. The government also presented evidence specifically showing that the image of one child in particular had been produced in North Carolina. That the latter image ended up on Shiver’s computer in Florida strongly suggests that it traveled in interstate commerce. We likewise reject Shiver’s contention that the government’s evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that he “knowingly possessed” the images of child pornography on his computer. Although we have interpreted the meaning of “knowing possession” in other contexts, see, e.g., United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 748 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted), we have not yet had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the phrase possession or custody in  5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession (B) holding in a similar factual situation that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because it had no actual or constructive possession of the letters of credit involved (C) recognizing theory of constructive possession (D) holding that constructive possession need not be exclusive but may be shared by others (E) holding that k no wing possession can be demonstrated by proof of either actual or constructive possession

Output: holding that the phrase possession or custody in  5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession


Input: Consider Input: the report and recommendation did not notify the parties that they must file timely objections to preserve their right to appellate review. He argues that the firm waiver rule should not be enforced in the absence of such an explicit notification. While we have held that the firm waiver rule is inapplicable when pro se litigants are not given explicit notice of the rule, see id. at 659, we have never extended that practice to counseled cases. We decline to do so today, because we expect counsel to know the rules. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 n. 5 (10th Cir.2007) (“[W]e expect counsel to know the pleading rules of the road without being given personal notice of them by the district court.”); United States v. Windrix, 405 F.3d 1146, 1157 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). While 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) provides that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules (B) holding that a criminal defendants counsel is charged with knowledge of the local criminal rules in their entirety including those parts of the local civil rules incorporated by reference (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying its own local rules even though those rules prevented it from considering some facts improperly alleged by plaintiffs that might have been relevant to the summary judgment motion (D) holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery (E) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings

Output: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules


Input: Consider Input: to serve a particular area, a telephone company must obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity from the KCC. K.S.A. 66-131. The KCC is vested with discretion in this area to regulate telephone companies in order to maintain a statewide telecommunications system and to provide for efficient and effective service to communities in Kansas. Therefore, any municipal franchisee must still obtain KCC approval to serve its franchised area. The power of a city to grant franchises does not confer upon that city any power to decide whether a telephone company should be granted a certificate of convenience and necessity. See K.S.A. 12-2002 (stating that the Franchise Act does not affect the jurisdiction of the KCC); City of New Strawn v. Kansas Corporation Commission, 5 Kan. App. 2d at 635 (<HOLDING>). That power was specifically vested in the KCC 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that restrictive covenants in franchise agreements are enforceable to protect the basic product which the franchisor has to sell namely the franchise itself   (B) holding that franchisor has an interest in the goodwill its franchise has created (C) holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit  and the district court has considerable authority whether or not to exercise this power in light of such considerations as judicial economy convenience fairness to litigants and eomity  (D) holding that the kcc has the power to deny a certificate of convenience and necessity regardless of whether the city has granted a franchise (E) recognizing that the legislature has the sole power of enacting law


Output: holding that restrictive covenants in franchise agreements are enforceable to protect the basic product which the franchisor has to sell namely the franchise itself