In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: would allow for the award of attorney fees whenever a statute or contract provides for one side to pay expenses, even when such attorney fees were not contemplated. The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent in this regard. Therefore, I do not join in the majority’s opinion that the term “expenses” as used in section 13-7-4(d) includes attorney fees, but would hold that because that section does not specifically provide for an award of attorney fees, such award was improper here. For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority’s determination that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. However, I dissent rs of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986); In re Olliff, 258 Ga. 157, 366 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Head v. Savage, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 32, 38 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan (D) holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs (E) holding that expenses refers to costs

Output: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid


Input: Consider Input: 2. Although the substance of the inquiry remains the same, the Supreme Court has counseled that the question whether a defendant can show a violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights “is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). With that said, we do not quarrel with the district court’s analysis on this point. Several distinguished jurists continue to use the “standing” terminology as useful shorthand. See, e.g., United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir.2004) (Selya, J.) (acknowledging after Rakas that the term “standing” “is imprecise,” but adopting the usage “[f]or simplicity’s sake”). But, regardless of terminolo 1 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). As we observe below, the conclusion that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (B) holding a person who is present at anothers home with permission simply for the purpose of consummating a business transaction does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy there (C) holding that for purposes of federal constitutional law a person does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to trash discarded outside the home (D) holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business (E) holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence

Output: holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells


Input: Consider Input: right of a party....”). 68 . United. States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir.2008). 69 . Id. 70 . United States v. Davis, 393 F.3d 540, 548 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir.1993)). 71 . Skelton, 514 F.3d at 442 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)). 72 . Id. at 439 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674(1986)). 73 . Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431. 74 . United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1389 (5th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 715, 718 (4th Cir.1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 75 . United States v. Farias-Farias, 925 F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir.1991). 76 . See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (<HOLDING>). 77 .Id. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (the factors 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction (B) holding that the constitutionally improper denial of a defendants opportunity to impeach a witness for bias like other confrontation clause errors is subject to chapman harmlesserror analysis (C) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that the improper denial of a defendants opportunity to impeach for bias is subject to harmlesserror review in which the reviewing court must determine if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that appellate court should review error in trial procedure to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt


Output: holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction