In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). In Landgraf, the Court noted that a statute only truly operates retroactively if applying it would “impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Id. 114 S.Ct. at 1505; see also RTC v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 30 F.3d 1384, 1387-88 (11th Cir.1994)(analyzing retroactivity of lease repudiation damage limitation provision of FIRREA). Thus, like other courts that have analyzed similar FIRREA provisions, we must address prior banking law to determine whether application of the damage limitation provisions of § 1821(e)(3) would have the retroactive effect defined in Landgraf. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit, 30 F.3d at 1388 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that, in the Crafts’ case, it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is not retroactive (B) holding that firreas damage limitations for repudiation of leases worked no substantive change in the law and thus their application was not retroactive (C) holding retroactive application (D) holding no retroactive application (E) recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: of discretion standard. See State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 603, 886 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1994). Statements stemming from a state actor’s custodial interrogation of a defendant are not admissible unless he is warned of his Fifth Amendment “right to remain silent” and that “anything said can and will be used against [him] in court.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). ¶ 19 The State concedes here that Appellant was in police custody when Nurse Geyer questioned him at the hospital. Even if a defendant is in custody, however, Miranda warnings are required when a med ical professional conducts an interrogation only if that medical professional is a state actor. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1876, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (<HOLDING>). See also State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 633 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a public safety exception to the requirement that miranda warnings be given in order to use a suspects statement as evidence against him at trial (B) holding that phrase i know i have the right to remain silent together with phrase and knowing that anything i say may be used against me substantially complied with article 3822 warnings even though warnings failed to advise accused that his statement could be used against him at his trial or in court because it advised him his statement could be used against him in any type of context not just those mentioned in article 3822 subsection 2a1 and 2 (C) holding that a defendants jailhouse statements to a courtappointed psychiatrist could not be used against him in the penalty phase of a murder trial because the psychiatrist failed to give the defendant miranda warnings (D) holding that the warnings in their totality satisfied miranda (E) holding that the government cannot use postarrest silence against a defendant because miranda warnings give implicit assurances that silence will not be used against a person and accordingly it would be fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process to allow a defendants silence to be used to impeach him at trial
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 248 (Iowa 2006); Imagnu v. Wodajo, 85 Md. App. 208, 582 A.2d 590 (1990); Webster v. Webster, 271 Neb. 788, 716 N.W.2d 47, 52 (2006); Stiel v. Stiel, 348 S.W.3d 879, 885-86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011); Brockway v. Brockway, 921 P.2d 1104 (Wyo. 1996). 22 Hartley v. Hartley, 205 P.3d 342, 352 (Alaska 2009) (“We have consistently recognized that the superior court is in the best position to assess each party’s circumstances and to determine what division of property is most equitable.”); In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561, 567 (1976); In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 538 (Colo. 1995) (“The method adopted may vary with the facts in each case.” (citations omitted)); Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 785 A.2d 197, 216 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Forrester v. Forrester, 953 A.2d 175, 186 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the method used to distribute retirement benefits was properly a matter within the trial courts discretion (B) recognizing offset method (C) holding it is within the trial courts discretion to choose on a casebycase basis the method although expressly rejecting the reserved jurisdiction method (D) recognizing this method of submission (E) recognizing this method
[EX A]:
(C)