In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

not explicitly mentioning the prior art problem of having to store complete copies of the web site’s content on multiple servers, claim 6 contains provisions that refer to the solution to this problem: the preamble language indicating that the nodes (servers) contain different resources, and the steps relating to the delayed resource-binding aspect of the invention. The claim does not, however, make any reference to the bottleneck problem or to the bypass solution of that problem. Therefore, without explicit claim language relating to the bottleneck problem, we see no reason why the invention as recited in claim 6 must include the bypass feature described in the written description as a solution to that problem. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 298 F.3d 1817 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Alteon also relies on the “Detailed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the computer readable code claimed in claim 6 the product claim was a part or component of that invention (B) holding that claimed invention did not need to solve both problems in the prior art when claim included language addressing only one problem (C) recognizing that courts must be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the claimed invention without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention (D) holding that the moving party must show prior art references which alone or combined with other references would have rendered the invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (E) holding that the one challenging the patent must in part show that the subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered it obvious by its addition to the prior art
(B)

case because in Revenue Cabinet, as here, the sales tax statute did not impose a test for passage of title, and an administrative rule did impose a test for passage of title. Id. at 738-39. Here, Hales makes no claim that the impermanence of its materials results in a generally understood, implicit agreement to pass title at some point before delivery. Moreover, our statute requires an explicit agreement on passage of title before the statutory presumption can be rebutted; there is no obvious provision in this statute for an implicit understanding, which the Kentucky court thought sufficient. Consequently, the facts of Revenue Cabinet aré inapposite and its result is inapplicable to the case at bar. See also Kurtz Concrete, Inc. v. Spradling, 560 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo.1978) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the Commission applied the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title insurer not in business of supplying information in issuing either title commitment or policy of title insurance for purposes of exception to moorman prohi bition against recovery of economic losses in tort further holding that contract defines title insurers liability (B) holding that title passes on mixture of readymix concrete because of usage of trade (C) recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim (D) holding in a slander of title action that attorneys fees are recoverable as part of the costs of removing the cloud from the title (E) holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title
(B)

is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a district court or a case filed in the district court is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit court, the circuit clerk or a judge of the court where the case was filed shall transfer the case to the docket of the appropriate court, and the clerk shall make such cost and docket fee adjustments as may be required and transfer all case records.” § 12-11-9, Ala.Code 1975. The requirement that a district court transfer an action within the jurisdiction of the circuit court is jurisdictional. § 12-11-9. However, for a district-court order transferring an action to the circuit court to be effective, the circuit court must have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Alexander v. Hawk, 189 So.3d 824, 827 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (<HOLDING>); Darby v. Schley, 8 So.3d 1011, 1014 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court had subjectmatter jurisdiction and yet that judgment void for lack of jurisdiction to render the particular judgment (B) holding that a transfer order issued by a district court in another circuit is reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court (C) holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court (D) holding that when the district court dismissed rather than transferred a case not within its jurisdiction and a party appealed that dismissal the circuit court could consider only the propriety of the dismissal on appeal and determining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the merits of the action (E) holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment

(E)