In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: CURIAM. Appellant, Roberto Trejo, was indicted for racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering. His predicate offenses included attempted first degree murder, shooting into a building, and three armed robberies with a firearm. He was also charged on substantive counts for the same five offenses. Trejo was acquitted on the racketeering, conspiracy, and shooting into a building charges, but convicted of attempted second degree murder with a firearm and the three armed robberies. We affirm on all issues raised in this appeal, including his fifty-year sentence. The United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) does not apply to appellant’s sentence. See Guzman v. State, 110 So.3d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>). As we did in Guzman, we certify conflict with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham (B) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (C) holding that the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile does not violate the holding of roper (D) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (E) holding that double jeopardy clause does not prohibit imposition of death sentence in alabama despite life sentence in georgia in murdertrial arising from same homicide

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: judge is provided for in Ind. P-C.R. 1, § 4(b), it is not automatic as Barclay asserts. Instead, “the rule requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a rational inference of bias or prejudice.” Jackson v. State, 643 N.E.2d 905, 907 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied (citing State ex rel. Whitehead v. Madison County Circuit Court, 626 N.E.2d 802, 803 (Ind.1993)). Barclay’s affidavit presents the fact that the trial court judge accepted his guilty plea without an adequate factual basis as his evidence of bias. Even taking this assertion as true, it does not support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. See Smith v. State, 613 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ind.1993), reh’g denied, cert, denied (<HOLDING>); Jackson, 643 N.E.2d at 907 (holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced (B) holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion (C) holding that the fact that the judge received adverse publicity for granting postconviction relief in another case did not require the judge to recuse herself (D) holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith (E) holding that counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to recuse the judge who presided at trial when the judge had also prosecuted a prior case that was used to enhance the current case

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: courts, noted that stock options are a form of deferred compensation that has been earned by the employee. 564 Pa. 586, 769 A.2d 1165, 1168 (2001). In Fisher, the husband received several stock options from his employer during the marriage. Id. at 1167. These options would terminate even upon the husband’s death or disablement. Id. The court in Fisher reasoned that un-vested stock options are similar to pension benefits, in that both are awarded to the employee to induce that employee to remain in his or her present employment; otherwise, an employee’s compensation would arguably be higher. Id. The court, also relying upon the majority of other states, concluded that unvested stock options that were earned prior to the divorce must be considered marital a Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husbands unvested stock options as marital property (C) holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect (D) holding that unvested stock options subject to the contingency of debtors future employment are property of the bankruptcy estate (E) holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust


Output: (B)