In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: removed. Section 141(b) does not contemplate that a director’s term could end through board shrinkage. A bylaw that seeks to achieve this result conflicts with Section 141(b) and is void. This interpretation of Section 141(b) comports with how our law has developed. Under the common law, “the voluntary assumption of management responsibility by the directors carried with it a concomitant vested right to serve out the full term for which they were elected unless there was cause for removal....” Drexler, supra, § 13.01, at 13-2; see Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del.Ch.1988) (“At common law a director had a vested right in his position arising from his duties and responsibilities to the corporation.”); see also Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857 (Del.Ch.1957) (Seitz, C.) (<HOLDING>). “Prior to 1967, the [DGCL] was silent as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders (B) recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause (C) recognizing common law privileges (D) recognizing the presidents authority to remove sec members for good cause despite governing statutes silence (E) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary
[A]: holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders


[Q]: results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence. (b) Nothing in this section is intended to exclude from evidence statements made during a polygraph examination which are otherwise admissible. Under the plain language of this rule, the military judge’s ruling was correct. By adding this Rule, the 1991 amendment to the Manual for Courts-Martial restored the armed forces to the approach followed in the 1969 Manual. Cf. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 253 (C.M.A.1987)(2-1 decision holding that the trial judge has the discretion to admit the results of polygraph examinations); United States v. Williams, 39 M.J. 555, 558 (A.C.M.R.1994)(<HOLDING>). The concerns behind this rule include: that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding ban violated the sherman act (B) holding that the governments use of classified evidence in detentionpendingdeportation proceedings violated detainees due process rights and inter alia justified his release (C) holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence that other persons had a motive to kill the victims because inter alia such evidence was speculative (D) holding that the absolute ban on polygraph evidence violated due process and the right to present evidence citing inter alia chambers v mississippi 410 us 284 93 sct 1038 35 led2d 297 1973 (E) holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material
[A]: holding ban violated the sherman act


[Q]: the garnishee but are still subject to a contingency that has not occurred and thus has not assuredly made the money the debtor’s own.” Id. at 1356 n. 34; see also Cummings Gen, Tire Co. v. Volpe Constr. Co., 230 A.2d 712, 713 (D.C.1967) (“[M]oney payable upon a contingency or condition is not subject to garnishment until the contingency has happened or the condition has been fulfilled”). Accordingly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has long held that future rental payment to be owed by a tenant constitutes a “contingent liability” at the time that a writ of garnishment is levied, and therefore, is not considered a “credit” that may be attached by a judg ment creditor under Section 16-546. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Wrenn, 67 App.D.C. 94, 89 F.2d 838, 840-41 (1937) (<HOLDING>); see also Smith, 644 A.2d at 1356 n. 34 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa (B) holding lessor entitled to full months rent when rent due on first of month and lease rejected on second (C) holding that unearned rent is not a debt  and instead constitutes a contingent liability because rent does not accrue to the lessor as a debt unless the lessee has enjoyed the use of the land (D) holding that future rent is not attachable under statute providing that a debt is not attachable unless it is certain to become due (E) holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or
[A]:
holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa