In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
to his defense, an in camera review of those records must be conducted to ascertain whether they contain evidence that is reasonably necessary, and therefore essential, to the defense. Only when the trial court finds such evidence, should it be provided to the defendant. Id. at 562. This court agrees with the reasoning of Stanaway. To hold the statutory privilege superior to Mr. White’s right to obtain potentially exculpatory evidence would be unconstitutional. Id. at 573-75. Because a court has already determined that the adoption records sought by Mr. White may contain evidence relevant to Mr. White’s defense, denying Mr. White access to such evidence would violate his right to due process. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>). “An in camera review by the trial court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution (B) holding that suppression by government of evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material to guilt (C) holding that suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request by the defense violates due process where evidence is material either to guilt or punishment irre spective of the good faith of the prosecution (D) holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution (E) holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
we held that, The penetration offense alleged in the first indictment clearly required a separate and distinct act (involving appellee’s sexual organ with the child’s female sexual organ) from the act alleged in the second indictment (which involved appel-lee’s mouth with the child’s sexual organ). In this case the second indictment alleged that appellee caused the child’s sexual organ to contact his mouth ency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct. Appellant concedes to this view, the plain language of the statute supports it, and so does our caselaw. See Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630 (stating that a grammatical analysis suggests that the unit of prosecution for indecency with a child by exposure is the exposure and, ultimately, adopting that viewpoint); Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. State, 550 S.W.2d 89, 91 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive (B) holding that a similar statute created separate offenses (C) holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation (D) holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive (E) holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
to restore a sense of fairness to lost-chance cases. A purely prospective application of Scafidi would clearly frustrate that purpose. VI Also at issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury an ultimate outcome charge. See Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 413 A.2d 322 (1980). Defendant does not contest the proposition that in cases governed by Scafidi an ultimate outcome charge is generally appropriate. Instead, he asserts that any error in not giving the charge was harmless. We disagree. The primary justification for giving a jury an ultimate outcome charge is that it informs the jury about the impact of its decision. In Roman, supra, we stated “that a jury in a comparative negligence situation should be given an ultimate out . 518, 485 A.2d 338 (Law Div.1984) (<HOLDING>). In Scafidi, we acknowledged that the jury’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages (B) holding that where the courts instructions caused a jury to consider erroneous criterion of liability plaintiff was prejudiced and new trial was warranted (C) holding that the seventh amendment does require that the jury also be allowed to determine the amount of any punitive damages awarded (D) holding that when a plaintiff files suit alleging that multiple tortfeasors are responsible for the plaintiffs injury any settlements are to be credited against the amount for which the liable parties as a whole are found responsible but for which only the nonsettling defendant remains in court (E) holding that ultimate outcome charge which would inform jury that any damages awarded to plaintiff in personal injury action would be molded to reflect only that percentage of liability which jury attributes to nonsettling defendant was warranted

Ex Output:

(E)