In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: CURIAM: Michael Disch appeals his convictions for mailing threatening communication, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), and making false statements to an FBI agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Disch argues that the district court judge was required to recuse himself sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and § 455(b). Ordinarily, we review a judge’s decision not to recuse himself under § 455(a) and § 455(b) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir.1999); see also Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (11th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). However, when a defendant fails to seek 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error (B) holding that a  455b violation is subject to harmless error review (C) holding that violation of rule 16 in that case was not harmless error (D) holding that confrontation clause violations are subject to harmless error review (E) holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis

A: holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error
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Q: to commit himself to such an alternative to a federal sentence. 2 . Defendant also raises two additional arguments: (1) that the district court improperly based its sentence on the defendant’s refusal to waive his constitutional and statutory rights to oppose his deportation; and (2) that the district court failed to appreciate the scope of its authority to consider, as a mitigating circumstance upon which to base a departure, defendant's vulnerability and susceptibility to abuse in prison due to his physical condition. Both arguments lack merit. As to the first argument, the conditioning of a downward departure on the surrender of a statutory right to a deportation hearing would not have offended due process. See United States v. Galvez-Falconi, 174 F.3d 255, 260 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). See generally United States v. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart (B) holding that district court had authority to grant section 5k20 downward departure despite governments opposition (C) holding that the district court was not required to state affirmatively on the record that it knew it possessed the authority to depart downward (D) holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart (E) holding that where a defendant malees a showing that the act of consenting to deportation carries unusual assistance to the administration of justice district court has authority under ussg  5k20 to depart downward in absence of the governments consent

A: recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart
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Q: the conduct was sufficiently extreme to result in liability.” Taking all of Taing’s evidence as true, Farrens’ conduct is not in the ballpark of Washington’s standard for outrageousness, and the summary judgment evidence does not support the more extreme characterization of events contained in Taing’s pleadings and briefs. Evidence that Farrens might have yelled at Taing once, combined with continued lecturing when Taing asked her to stop so her blood “won’t go up and up,” simply are not the types of behavior that Washington law recognizes as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. There is no evidence that Farrens continued her lecturing after Taing began to manifest symptoms of illness or an anxiety attack, nor was there evidence that Tain 2d 536, 539 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Boeing relies on Saridakis v. United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 (B) holding claim not preempted where court is required to read and apply cba provisions that are neither uncertain nor ambiguous (C) holding that a claim based on a supervisors circulation of a suspension letter accusing the plaintiff of cocaine use was not preempted despite cba provisions authorizing employee discipline (D) holding that the plaintiffs claim that he was owed wages following his discharge was preempted because this right was created by a cba provision stating that an employee who is discharged shall be paid immediately (E) holding that plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim under michigan law was not preempted because the statelaw tort of retaliatory discharge creates rights independent of those established by the collective bargaining agreement further holding that discrimination claim was not preempted even though the employer was likely to rely on provisions of the cba in its defense

A:
holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301
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