In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: the effect that the code-fendant’s confession must be disregarded in determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence is ineffective and cannot overcome the prejudicial effect of the incriminating statement on the jury. Id. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. As such, the trial court’s curative instruction in the instant case was insufficient to cure the erroneous admission of Hertz’s statement to Hathcock. Nonetheless, this Court has also recognized that a Bruton violation does not automatically require reversal of an otherwise valid conviction but, rather, is subject to a harmless error analysis. See Farina v. State, 679 So.2d 1151, 1155 (Fla.1996) (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284, (1969)); see also Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1322 (Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 644-45 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness (B) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause violation in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not require the conviction to be overturned (C) holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error (D) holding confrontation clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus upholding firstdegree murder conviction (E) holding that testimony at trial in violation of defendants constitutional confrontation right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the testimony was cumulative

Output: holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness


Input: Consider Input: reasonable presumption against waiver should be indulged. Commonwealth v. Hooks, 375 Mass. 284, 288 (1978). A defendant’s illiteracy or low intelligence is not dispositive of his capacity to waive Miranda rights and render a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary confession. See Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 346, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 86-87 (2000) (concluding that the defendant, who had a learning disability and an IQ in the eighties, validly waived his rights in light of his “considerable prior experience with the police and in receiving Miranda warnings,” as well as his “cunning” attempts to exculpate himself “after being confronted with the [ ] evidence against him”); Commonwealth v. Hartford, 425 Mass. 378, 380-81 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Dingle, 73 Mass.App.Ct. 274, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a 15yearold was of suitable intelligence and maturity to validly waive miranda rights specifically focusing on the fact that the juvenile had been advised of his rights on three prior occasions and had once asked for an attorney (B) recognizing that plaintiffs had standing to allege infringements of their first amendment rights where the record established that they had been threatened with enforcement of the statute and that such enforcement would cause them injury (C) holding that language difficulties may impair the ability of a person in custody to waive his miranda  rights in a free and aware manner (D) holding admissible suspects statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his miranda rights (E) holding that irrespective of the suspects limited reasoning ability and iq of 73 evidence that the suspect had held various parttime jobs had been living on his own possessed a drivers license and had prior experience with law enforcement was probative of competence to waive miranda rights

Output: holding that a 15yearold was of suitable intelligence and maturity to validly waive miranda rights specifically focusing on the fact that the juvenile had been advised of his rights on three prior occasions and had once asked for an attorney


Input: Consider Input: 9 (1st Cir.2002), the court did not even consider the possibility that Buckhannon might be limited splely to the contexts of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act. Instead, the court simply noted that the plaintiff had “relied on the so-called catalyst theory to support this claim [for attorneys’ fees.] The Supreme Court thwarted that initiative when it recently consigned the catalyst theory to the scrap heap.” Id. at 30 (internal citations omitted). Other courts have similarly held Buckhannon applicable to a variety of statutes authorizing attorneys’ fees for “prevailing parties” or for parties who have “substantially prevailed.” See, e.g., Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Department of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 455 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 794 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea (B) holding buckhannon applicable to the fair credit reporting act 15 usc  1681 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties (C) holding buckhannon applicable to the equal access to justice act 28 usc  2412 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties (D) holding buckhannon applicable to the freedom of information act 5 usc  552 et seq which provides attorneys fees for complainants who have substantially prevailed (E) holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 usc  1983 claim was entitled to an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal


Output: holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea