In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: the trial court erroneously classified property as marital when in fact it was non-marital, the question becomes what relief, if any, this court ought to grant. “The erroneous characterization of property requires reversal of the order dividing marital property if the error materially impacts the overall distribution of the marital property.” Halupa v. Halupa, 943 S.W.2d 272, 278 (Mo.App. E.D.1997). Here, by our calculation, the difference in the calculation is roughly five thousand dollars. The trial court awarded to each party a percentage of the property based on their respective contributions. The trial court was free to conclude that Wife was entitled to a share of the value of the home due to her significant contributions. Moritz v. Moritz, 844 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Mo.App. W.D.1992)(<HOLDING>). Because the property was not transmuted, it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonowning spouse is entitled to some benefit when marital funds are used to improve nonmarital property (B) holding that a trial court may find that a nonowning spouse is entitled to some benefit by reason of marital funds having been used to pay off debts on the owning spouses nonmarital property (C) holding that home purchased with separate funds and titled in one spouses name was transmuted into marital property because home was used as marital residence and the other spouse contributed to payments and repairs on home (D) holding that clear language in one portion of a later may cause ambiguity in another portion to dissipate (E) holding that one spouse may be entitled to a portion of the equity in home purchased with nonmarital funds

A: (E)
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Q: lease, for the first time in his reply brief, thus, he has waived it. In most circumstances a litigant who fails to raise an argument until his reply brief wül be deemed to have waived that argument. Wilson v. O’Leary, 895 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1990). This case is before us, however, on a motion for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The inquiry we are faced with is whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support his allegation. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This court has held that when reviewing Rule 12(b)6) motions, we wül consider new factual allegations raised for the first time on appeal provided they are consistent with the complaint. See Hrubec v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 981 F.2d 962, 963-64 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Dawson v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 369, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint (B) holding that the essential inquiry in conversion of a rule 12b6 motion to a rule 56 motion is whether the appellant should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted into one for summary judgment or was taken by surprise and deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the pleadings (C) holding that a plaintiff may attempt to survive a rule 12b6 motion by adding essential new facts in a brief on appeal (D) holding that class claims that fail to meet the requirements of rule 23 may be properly dismissed by granting a rule 12b6 motion (E) holding that plaintiff cannot introduce new allegations or new facts in opposition to a motion to dismiss

A: (C)
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Q: the Court has intimated that tolling based on mental incapacity is allowed. More recently, it decided Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 122 S.Ct. 1036, 152 L.Ed.2d 79 (2002), a bankruptcy case that involved whether 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i)’s lookback period could be tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition. The Court noted that equitable tolling has been widely permitted in the two situations acknowledged in Irwin, supra, and its progeny. Young, 535 U.S. at 50, 122 S.Ct. 1036. Significantly, and of critical importance to the outcome of Young, the Supreme Court said, “We have acknowledged, however, that tolling might be appropriate in other cases, and this, we believe is one.” Id. (citations omitted). Equitable tolling of federal statutes of limi (1st Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and D.C. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 26 usc  6511 may not be equitably tolled but that mental incapacity is a grounds for tolling when available (B) holding that 42 usc  405g may be equitably tolled based on a plaintiffs mental impairment (C) holding that 5 usc  7703b2 can be tolled due to mental incapacity (D) holding that mental incapacity is an extraordinary circumstance that may warrant equitable tolling (E) holding that  2401b of the ftca can be equitably tolled

A:
(A)
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