TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: law did not authorize the arresting officer to require Turbyne to take a breath test when the blood test was unavailable. Gillett, 629 P.2d at 619 n. 10. Nor do our decisions in Gillett and Riley construe the statute as allowing the police to compel a different test when extraordinary circumstances prevent administration of the driver-selected test. The good cause exception we established in those cases applies to excuse the judicial sanction of dismissal of the charges when the police are prevented in circumstances beyond their control from administering the driver-selected test. As Shinaut and Dike demonstrate, when a driver selected to take the chemical test not initially selected, he or she may have voluntarily consented to the search of his or her person. Shinaut, 940 P.2d at 384 (<HOLDING>). When the controlling facts are undisputed, as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation (B) holding that error in excluding a police officers report was harmless where the same evidence was presented by another witness (C) holding that a person must request a reasonable accommodation before he has been terminated he cannot wait until he is terminated and then months later  request reinstatement and demand a reasonable accommodation (D) holding that erroneous accommodation of a citizens request by a police officer does not warrant the sanction of excluding evidence (E) holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada

SOLUTION: holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation

PROBLEM: It is axiomatic, however, that states act through their officials and agencies. Thus, under Will, those state agencies and other political subdivisions which carry out the state’s business and have immunity from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment constitute “arms of the state.” Pursuant to Will, such entities would not be considered persons under § 1983. Those political subdivisions which are not provided immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, do not rise to the level of “arms of the state” and would, under Will, be considered to be persons for the purposes of § 1983. See Barket, Levy & Fine v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1086-88 (8th Cir.1991) (bi-state agency is a “person” under § 1983); Magula v. Broward Gen. Medical Ctr., 742 F.Supp. 645, 649 (S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Since the Will decision was handed down, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment (B) holding that an ohio school district is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the state and therefore it is not entitled to assert eleventh amendment immunity from suit (C) holding that the anne arundel board of education is an arm of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that the puc is not an arm of the state and rejecting claim of immunity (E) holding that because hospital district is more like a municipality than an arm of the state hospital district did not have eleventh amendment immunity

SOLUTION: holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment

PROBLEM: entrapment.” Here also, this decision charts a different course from almost all of the circuits and deviates from the course previously set by our decisions. This circuit, along with every other circuit except the Second, has steadfastly held that there is no defense of private entrapment. See United States v. Mahkimetas, 991 F.2d 379, 386 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Jones, 950 F.2d 1309, 1315 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1700, 118 L.Ed.2d 410 (1992); United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir.1986). Even the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1168-69 & n. 10 (2d Cir.1980), has been placed in doubt by the subsequent caselaw of that circuit. See United States v. Pilarinos, 864 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 126-27 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways (B) holding no derivative entrapment where middleman was induced by a government agent to commit crime responding to pressure takes it upon himself to induce another to participate in crime (C) recognizing that entrapment is a statutory defense rooted in the notion that congress could not have intended to criminally punish those who commit elements of crime but are induced by the government to commit the acts and that outrageous conduct defense is rooted in constitutional law (D) holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred (E) holding an inducement to commit a crime by a private party who has no government involvement does not establish an entrapment defense

SOLUTION:
holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways