instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
§ 924(c) conviction is invalid after Bailey and Bousley, it argues we are prohibited from reaching the merits of his claim because Abdullah did not present his Bailey/Bousley challenge on direct appeal or in the § 2255 proceedings below. Alternatively, the government argues the claim is barred by AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. We assume for purposes of this appeal that Abdullah did not procedurally default his Bailey claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. Notwithstanding such an assumption, we conclude the claim is barred because Abdullah failed to adequately raise the issue before the district court in this § 2255 proceeding. Generally, a habeas claim cannot be raised by a petitioner for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Petty v. Card, 195 F.3d 399, 400 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 78, 148 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court (B) holding that the convention claim was procedurally defaulted (C) holding that court may address procedurally defaulted claim on the merits where it is more efficient to do so (D) holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted (E) holding that an argument not raised before the district court is procedurally defaulted
answer:
holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court


question:
speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav
answer:
holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241


question:
date of sentencing. See United States v. Labeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir.1998) (“If the defendant has completed his state prison term before the federal sentence is imposed, § 5G1.3 does not apply, and his federal prison term cannot be imposed concurrently.”). While not technically incarcerated at the time of his sentencing, Scott nonetheless argues that his term of term of imprisonment was not “discharged” because New York law defines parole as a part of the sentence of imprisonment. See New York Penal Law § 70.40(l)(a) (“Release on parole shall be in the discretion of the state board of parole, and such person shall continue service of his or her sentence or sentences while on parole, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the executive law and the c Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ramirez, 252 F.3d 516, 519 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the iad was not applicable to a prisoner who had been sentenced but was incarcerated in a local jail or holding facility while awaiting transfer to the assigned penal institution (B) holding that because the defendant was not imprisoned  incarcerated in a penal institution  when he was sentenced  he was not subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment and could not invoke  5g13 (C) holding that the concurrent sentencing requirement of  5g13b  is only triggered when there is an undischarged term of imprisonment at the time of sentencing (D) holding that   3584a allows the district judge to specify the sequence of service of terms of imprisonment only when sentences are imposed at the same time or the other sentence is an undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant is already subject  (E) holding that a term of imprisonment begins at the time a prisoner is sentenced
answer:

holding the iad was not applicable to a prisoner who had been sentenced but was incarcerated in a local jail or holding facility while awaiting transfer to the assigned penal institution