In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: to her knowledge and lack of mistake. So that goes specifically to the case-the State's ability to enter this in its case in chief. ... [T}he prejudice just simply is not extensive at all. The only prejudice that goes to Ms. Downs is that she possessed an ... unlawful controlled substance. 13 We hold that the trial court did not exceed its broad discretion in admitting the evidence for three reasons. First, the evidence at issue is not the type of evidence that Utah courts "have previously deemed highly prejudicial." See State v. Johnso (Utah 1998) ("[Gruesome photographs of a homicide victim's corpse will unfairly prejudice and inflame the jury and therefore require the proponent to show that they have unusual probative value."), and State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1989) (<HOLDING>). Because the evidence at issue is "not the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (B) holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim (C) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (D) holding that the gruesome portion of the videotapeshowing closeup shots of the victims stab wounds in her chest her slit throat and her beaten face as well as her bloodcovered neck shoulders and blouseshould have been excluded under rule 408 (E) holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment

Answer: holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine


Question: While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation — 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. § 1103) — which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (“An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal.”). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant’s release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc  1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest

Answer: holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute


Question: the armbands because of its desire to avoid the controversy associated with the Vietnam War. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510, 89 S.Ct. 733. School officials also feared that if the armbands were worn, the friends of a high school student in the district who had been killed in the Vietnam War would “be difficult to control” and that disagreeing students would wear armbands of other colors, causing the potential for conflict. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509-10, n. 3, 89 S.Ct. 733. In rejecting the concerns of school officials as a basis for prohibiting sp eld the censorship of speech and expression by school officials when such activity has caused material and substantial disruption or collided with the rights of others. See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County, 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Blackwell, supra, 363 F.2d at 751-54 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ban of confederate flags on school grounds was not an unconstitutional restriction of students first amendment rights where racial tensions existed at the school raciallybased fights had occurred in the months leading up to the case and the confederate flag is inappropriate in the school context because it is so associated with racial prejudice that it is likely to provoke feelings of hatred and ill will in others (B) holding unconstitutional a free transfer provision by which students were allowed to transfer solely on a racial basis from the school to which they had been assigned by virtue of redistricting if they were in a racial minority in their new school (C) holding that a school district was not required to move a nurse to a students neighborhood school to comply with the idea (D) holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school (E) holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours

Answer:
holding unconstitutional a free transfer provision by which students were allowed to transfer solely on a racial basis from the school to which they had been assigned by virtue of redistricting if they were in a racial minority in their new school