In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for “anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,” because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for “wil-fully taking away her husband” and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability). But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute (B) holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses (C) recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that police officers were immune from liability for damages resulting from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
[EX A]: holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute

[EX Q]: of any act which is within the scope of the lawful duty or authority of that officer, ... or who knowingly resists or obstructs the service or execution by any authorized person of any civil or criminal process or order of any court, commits a simple misdemeanor---However, if a person commits an interference with official acts, as defined in this subsection, and in so doing inflicts bodily injury other than serious injury, that person commits an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 719.1(1). Because an aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law carries the possibility of a two-year prison sentence, see Iowa Code § 903.1(2), it qualifies as a “prior felony conviction” for purposes of § 4B1.1, see USSG § 4B1.2, comment, (n.1). See United States v. Postley, 449 F.3d 831, 832 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). To convict Malloy under section 719.1(1), a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an aggravated misdemeanor conviction under section 7191 is a felony for purposes of assessing criminal history points under ussg  4a12c (B) holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony (C) holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law (D) holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law (E) holding that conviction under  2702a3 or 4 is an aggravated felony under  101a43f
[EX A]: holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony

[EX Q]: (8th Cir.2007)). “Continuances are generally disfavored and are not granted without a compelling reason.” Id. We have held the FSA is not retroactive. See United States v. Smith, 632 F.3d 1043, 1047-49 (8th Cir.2011) (concluding “the general savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, requires us to apply the penalties in place at the time the crime was committed”) (quoting United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909-10 n. 7 (8th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. McBride, — Fed.Appx. -,-, No. 10-2689, 2011 WL 2206725, at *2 (8th Cir.June 8, 2011) (unpub. per curiam). But even if we assume Woods can show prejudice, Woods fails to provide any support for his contention the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion. See id. at-, 2011 WL 2206725, at *3 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hawthorne, 414 Fed.Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a second continuance until congress acted on the fsa and assuming error no prejudice exists because the fsa is not retroactive (B) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (C) holding that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in denying a continuance because she acted within reason by accommodating the attorney (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form
[EX A]:
holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing