In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: was indeed barred (or limited) under the mandatory Guidelines regime, see Koon, 518 U.S. at 92-95, 116 S.Ct. 2035, the alternative sentencing methodology employed by his sentencing court did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory. Nor did the court exclude or limit its consideration of any category of sentencing factors. To the contrary, the court extended Simpson an open-ended invitation to make mitigating arguments, regardless of whether they would have been available under the Guidelines scheme. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 25-26. And Simpson responded to that invitation by citing a series of factors in support of a sente 440 (D.C.Cir.1995). In later cases, we settled on a plain error standard of review for such claims. See United States v. Draffin, 286 F.3d 606, 609 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); In re Sealed Case, 204 F.3d 1170, 1173 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts denial of a downward departure was an exercise of discretion and therefore not reviewable (B) holding that failure to identify ground of admissibility limited appellate review to plain error (C) holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure (D) holding that the failure to grant a sentencing departure on an unrequested ground is reviewable only for plain error (E) holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: Court of Utah, in applying the good-faith exception to a Belton search, recently cautioned: "If the case law had been ambiguous prior to the time the officers conducted a search later definitively declared unconstitutional, the good-faith exception would not apply and the evidence would be excluded.” Utah v. Baker, 229 P.3d 650, 664 (Utah 2010). 80 . See Belton, supra note 1, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860. 81 . Compare Thornton, supra note 59, 541 U.S. at 622, 124 S.Ct. 2127 (declining to address argument that Belton rule applies only to “recent occupants” of vehicle, while noting that petitioner had conceded "he was in ‘close proximity, both temporally and spatially,’ to his vehicle” when approached by police officer) with Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383, 388-89 (D.C.1993) (<HOLDING>). 82 . See Gant, supra note 2, 129 S.Ct. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer may search a suspects vehicle incident to a lawful arrest (B) holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key (C) holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle (D) holding belton did not extend to search of vehicle incident to arrest of individual who has parked locked and walked fifteen to twenty feet away from an automobile before being stopped and arrested (E) holding that belton permits the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile even when the defendant is arrested outside as long as the officer made initial contact while the defendant was inside the automobile
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: by Otay Mesa to date. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580 n.11, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (cautioning that “the government cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response.”). After the first appeal in this case, the only remaining issue before this Court was to determine the amount Otay Mesa should recover in just compensation, with interest, for the Government’s taking of a permanent easement over Otay Mesa’s property. Given the Government’s stipulation, Otay Mesa is entitled to reimbursement for its reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in securing just compensation for the Government’s taking, Cloverport Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl.Ct. 121, 127 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The Government stipulated to the taking of an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the government stipulated to liability for a taking the uniform relocation act applied at that point and mandated the award of reasonable attorneys fees and expenses even though there was limited success on the merits and certainly not the results reached that the plaintiff had contemplated (B) holding that the court of appeals erred in modifying the judgment to include attorneys fees when the trial courts refusal to grant attorneys fees was not the subject of a point of error (C) holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees (D) holding that the plaintiff had established an entitlement to relief on the merits of the claim  and was therefore entitled to fees even though it was remanded to the agency for further action (E) holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal
Example Output:
(A)