In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B). Thus, it is clear that, under some circumstances, injunctions can constitute claims which are dischargeable in bankruptcy. The court must determine whether this case presents such a circumstance. A number of courts have considered whether an injunction prohibiting future breaches of a noncompete agreement can constitute a claim under Section 101(5)(B), reaching conflicting results based on a variety of reasonings. See e.g., In re Oseen, 133 B.R. 527 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1991) (finding that the injunction did not constitute a claim); In re Udell, 18 F.3d 403 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); In re Ward, 194 B.R. 703 (Bankr.D.Mass.1996) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim (B) holding an appeal of injunction moot where the injunction expired three months before the appellate court heard arguments in the case (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) holding federal injunction countermanding a state court injunction did not violate antiinjunction act (E) holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: Raye Ellen Stiles appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her action alleging, among other claims, housing discrimination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo and may affirm the district court on any ground supported by the record. Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 733-34 (9th Cir.2012). We affirm. Summary judgment on Stiles’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, aggravation of preexisting conditions, and public humiliation was proper because she already litigated these claims in Arizona state court, and, thus, res judicata precludes her from bringing such claims in federal court. See Sunkist Growers v. Fisher, 104 F.3d 280, 283-84 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Summary judgment on Stiles’ federal claims 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person has standing to bring suit under the civil rights act if she or he can show that she or he was punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities (B) holding that plaintiff had standing to bring a rico conspiracy claim despite his inability to bring a substantive rico claim (C) holding that while parents may not bring a title ix claim as individuals they may bring such claim on behalf of a deceased child (D) holding that under arizona law a litigant may not bring a claim identical to one she has previously litigated (E) holding that plaintiffs may bring a section 1983 claim for damages to vindicate their rights under idea
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: claim. Hall avers that the review procedures only allow United to consult with a health care professional. Thus, he concludes that the structure and organization of the plan prove that United did not have the right to demand an IME when reviewing an appeal after termination of benefits. The Court rejects Hall’s suggested interpretation of the plan. When interpreting the plan at issue, the Court is to “tak[e] all the provisions as a part of an integrated Agreement and view[ ] the provisions in the light of ERISA’s integrated statutory scheme.” Bickley, 461 F.3d at 1329. Thus, Hall’s suggestion that the Court should only look to one part of the plan is unreasonable, as the Court must look at the entire plan. See also Babikian v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 63 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Looking at the language addressing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an erisa insurance policy is governed by a uniform body of federal common law which requires policy language to be interpreted in an ordinary and popular sense as would a person of average intelligence and experience (B) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (C) holding that policy terms must be read in their ordinary and popular sense (D) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans (E) holding that absent follow form language provision that excess policy would continue as underlying policy did not impose coverage as provided in underlying policy
[EX A]:
(A)