In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: allege no physical harm resulting from Wells Fargo’s voluntary undertaking of services. See Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex.2000) (“One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965))) (emphasis added); see also Vodicka v. Lahr, No. 03-10-00126-CV, 2012 WL 2075713, at *6 (Tex.Ct.App. Jun. 6, 2012) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for negligent undertaking because that tort requires proof of physical harm resulting from failure to exercise reasonable care in rendering services to another and plaintiffs had alleged only economic harm (B) holding that economic loss rule precluded the plaintiffs tort claims because they only alleged injuries to the subject of the contract itself (C) holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm (D) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (E) holding that the plaintiffs stated a claim for conspiracy because they alleged an actionable tort
[EX A]: holding that economic loss rule precluded the plaintiffs tort claims because they only alleged injuries to the subject of the contract itself

[EX Q]: the evidence of Robertson’s alleged prior threat to his ex-wife as Williams rule evidence, the State cannot rely on the law of impeachment to introduce the same evidence through the back door by asking an impermissible question regarding an alleged prior crime. Finally, we address whether the admission of this collateral-crime evidence constitutes reversible error. This Court has held that the erroneous admission of irrelevant collateral crimes evidence “is presumed harmful error because of the danger that a jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demon strated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged.” Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 115 (Fla.1989) (quoting Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903, 908 (Fla.1981)); accord Czubak v. State, 570 So.2d 925, 928 (Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, given the highly inflammatory 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted (B) holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder (C) holding that where court informed jurors that the defendant had escaped from custody the trial judge acted within his judicial capacity and did not testify  (D) holding collateral crime evidence that defendant was an escaped convict was presumptively harmful (E) holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime
[EX A]: holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted

[EX Q]: what ever [sic] terms you apply to guess work or subconscious feelings give rise to some thoughtful, some articulable, reasonable reflection on an evaluation of the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. Memorandum of Law, Statement of Facts, attached to Petition (Docket # 1) (quoting T.723). Turning first to the trial court’s alleged direction that a juror should be able to “articulate” his or her “reasonable doubt,” this statement is a variation on New York’s pattern jury instructions, which define reasonable doubt in part as “a doubt for which some reason can be given.” Vargas, 86 F.3d at 1277 (quoting 1 Criminal Jury Instructions (New York) § 3.07, at 92 (1983) and citing People v. Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, 300, 303, 449 N.Y.S.2d 168, 170, 171, 434 N.E.2d 237, 238-39, 239-40 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 847, 103 S.Ct. 104, 74 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution (B) holding that charge defining reasonable doubt as a doubt for which you can conscientiously express a reason was neither confusing nor inaccurate (C) holding potential prejudice caused by equating reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt mitigated by providing an alternate definition of reasonable doubt as a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act (D) holding that the giving of an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction can never be harmless error (E) holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases
[EX A]:
holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution