instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
the Society over in Russia when the company began to sell its SMIRNOV vodka there. A pending litigation in a foreign country between essentially the same parties, even one that concerned a slightly different topic, has been found to create a objectively reasonably apprehension of suit. See Ethicon, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 369 F.Supp. 934, 936-37 (D.N.J.1973). Therefore, even though it appears as if the defendants have never directly threatened the plaintiffs with legal action in the United States, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have introduced sufficient evidence to support their claim that they reasonably feared a lawsuit if they attempted to enter the U.S. market. Cf. Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of America, 257 F.2d 485, 490 (3d Cir.1958) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, because the court finds that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the declaratory judgment act is a procedural device (B) recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is procedural in nature and not an extension of federal court jurisdiction (C) holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment (D) holding that letter stating that the defendant was fully prepared to take all necessary legal action in order to protect defendants work was sufficient to show an actual threat of litigation and created a case or controversy for the purposes of the declaratory judgment act (E) recognizing that it is not essential for there to be a direct threat of litigation in order to invoke the declaratory judgment act
answer:
(E)


question:
improperly determined that the “neither expected nor intended” language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an “occurrence.” ¶21 The CGL policy’s core provision defines “occurrence” by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was “neither expected nor intended.” This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured’s expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an “occurrence” and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). ¶22 Here the District Court found that Ribi 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended
answer:
(A)


question:
to the effective date of the Act, it could have done so.... Since it did not, and since there is nothing ambiguous in the statute’s language concerning its reach or applicability, there is no need to conduct the Landgraf retroactivity analysis. Id. at 61-62 (footnote omitted); see also United States v. One “Piper” Aztec “F” De Luxe Model 250 23 Aircraft Bearing Serial No. 27-7651057, 321 F.3d 355, 359 (3d Cir.2003) (“[The] CAFRA applies to ‘any forfeiture proceeding commenced on or after [August 23, 2000].’ The plain language is clear: the commencement of a forfeiture proceeding can mean only the point when the government first files a complaint for forfeiture in rem under 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2).... No other interpretation is sensible.”); $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d at 1185-86 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); cf. United States v. Real 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (B) holding that the cafras heightened burden of proof was not applicable to a civil forfeiture action in which the complaint had been filed on november 9 1999 congress manifested a clear intent to apply the cafras heightened burden of proof only to judicial forfeiture proceedings in which the governments complaint was filed on or after august 23 2000because congressional intent is clear we need not resort to judicial default rules to determine the retroactive scope of the legislation (C) holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence (D) holding that the cafras heightened burden of proof standard was applicable to a civil forfeiture action that was pending at the time of cfras enactment (E) holding that section 523a2c shifts the burden of production and not the burden of proof on the issue of intent only
answer:

(B)