In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: quantity function as elements by increasing the maximum penalty a defendant may receive, are they elements of an aggravated offense or are they sentencing factors with heightened due process requirements? See id. at 573, 575 (Hug, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s apparent conclusion that the penalty provisions of § 841(b) are not elements of the offense). The district court correctly interpreted Buckland as holding that drug type and quantity are not elements of the offense, but rather are material facts that must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Buckland opinion emphasized that the relevant inquiry is not whether a penalty provision is an element, but rather whether it exposes the defendant to a longer sentence than woul (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so (B) holding jury is entitled to accept the states version of the facts and reject appellants version or reject any of the witnesses testimony (C) holding that biased on buckland we must reject valensias contention that the sentencing provisions of  841 create separate crimes (D) holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes (E) holding the crimes merge where the jury was not asked to determine whether two assaults occurredeventhough the evidence may have been sufficient to support separate crimes

Answer: recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so


Question: No. 25. The‘government asserts that “defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulgéd,” citing DOC’s written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov’t’s Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government’s position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (B) holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone conversations where inmates received a handbook alerting them that all telephone calls were recorded and were exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials (E) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company

Answer: holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth


Question: absence of fault or negligence on the part of defendant; and (5) the absence of any adequate remedy at law. Hess cannot satisfy these requirements— especially (3) and (4). There was no fraud alleged in this case, and this court has only awarded relief “on the ground of mistake ... where mutual mistake is shown and where the party seeking relief is without fault or negligence in the premises.” Hess was also negligent in failing to pursue his remedies on direct appeal. V For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of the writ of habeas corpus is VACATED. Hess’ motions to dismiss his counsel, appoint substitute counsel, appear pro se, and for an out-of-time appeal are all DENIED; and Appellant’s motion to supplement the record is DENIED AS MOOT. 1 . 135 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). 2 . 154 F.3d 196 (5th Cir.1998). 3 . Id. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in general aedpa applies only to habeas petitions filed after the statutes effective date of april 24 1996 and noting that aedpas special procedures for 28 usc  2254 petitions in capital cases apply also to petitions pending on april 24 1996 (B) holding that prisoners had one year from the effective date of aedpa april 24 1996 to file their habeas petitions before they could be considered timebarred by the operation of  2244d1 (C) holding that habeas petitions challenging judgments of conviction that became final before the effective date of the aedpa are not time barred if filed within one year from aedpas effective date april 241996 (D) holding that prisoners whose convictions became final on or before april 24 1996 must file their  2255 motions before april 24 1997 (E) holding that the aedpa applies to those habeas corpus petitions filed after its effective date of april 24 1996

Answer:
holding that in general aedpa applies only to habeas petitions filed after the statutes effective date of april 24 1996 and noting that aedpas special procedures for 28 usc  2254 petitions in capital cases apply also to petitions pending on april 24 1996