In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: variance criteria rendering its decision arbitrary and capricious; and, 5) erred in “taking” appellants’ property without just compensation. The County supports appellants’ contentions except for the last one, with which it disagrees. The County also contends the Board erred in applying the wrong law. The individual appellees, who opposed the variance applications, support the Board’s decision. Discussion 1. Applicable Law A. State Law Before we address the merits of appellants’ contentions, we shall address the County’s contention that the Board applied inapplicable law. The County asserts that the Board incorrectly applied a presumption that the requested use did not conform to the purpose and intent of the Critical Area Program because, while that presumption was added 677 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In 2002, the General Assembly amended the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that the board did not have to consider whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the entire lot but rather whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the buffer (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that the question of whether it might have been error for the court to have denied leave to amend is not before us because plaintiffs never requested it (E) recognizing that a district attorney must have reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury and that the trial judge must have reasonable discretion in deciding whether the bounds of propriety have been exceeded

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: employees to determine who has authority to accept service, service is proper when, objectively viewed, it is calculated to give notice to the corporation. See id. at 273, 428 N.Y.S.2d 890, 406 N.E.2d 747 (“[W]hen the corporation is regularly doing business in the State, it generally cannot be heard to complain that the summons was delivered to the wrong person when the process server has gone to its offices, made proper inquiry of the defendant’s own employees, and delivered the summons according to their directions.”). Thus, service may be sustained where the employee accepting service has apparent authority to do so. Courts within the Second Circuit have adopted this broadening approach. See, e.g., Melkaz Int’l Inc. v. Flavor Innovation Inc., 167 F.R.D. 634, 642-43 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>); Leo v. Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.R.D. 407, 414 
 Holding statements: (A) holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits (B) holding service on corporation proper where process server went to corporate defendants headquarters identified himself to an employee of corporate defendant and stated that he was there to serve legal papers and the employee then directed him to another employee who accepted service even though neither employee was authorized to accept service and neither represented that she was in fact so authorized because both were obviously corporate defendant employees and the employee redelivered the summons and complaint to an employee authorized to accept service on the same date (C) holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service (D) holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously (E) holding that a clerical employee was not an agent authorized to accept service of process for the corporation


Output: (B)