In this task, you are given text for US Congressional and California state bills, your task is to generate a summary for this bill.

Example Input: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Cyber-Security Enhancement and 
Consumer Data Protection Act of 2006''.

SEC. 2. PERSONAL ELECTRONIC RECORDS.

    Section 1030(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (B); and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(D) a means of identification (as defined in 
                section 1028(d)) from a protected computer; or
                    ``(E) the capability to gain access to or remotely 
                control a protected computer.''.

SEC. 3. USE OF FULL INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE POWER FOR CRIMINAL 
              PENALTIES.

    (a) Broadening of Scope.--Section 1030(e)(2)(B) of title 18, United 
States Code, is amended by inserting ``or affecting'' after ``which is 
used in''.
    (b) Elimination of Requirement of an Interstate or Foreign 
Communication for Certain Offenses Involving Protected Computers.--
Section 1030(a)(2)(C) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
striking ``if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign 
communication''.

SEC. 4. RICO PREDICATES.

    Section 1961(1)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
inserting ``section 1030 (relating to fraud and related activity in 
connection with computers),'' before ``section 1084''.

SEC. 5. CYBER-EXTORTION.

    Section 1030(a)(7) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
inserting ``, or to access without authorization or exceed authorized 
access to a protected computer'' after ``cause damage to a protected 
computer''.

SEC. 6. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CYBER-CRIMES.

    Section 1030(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
inserting ``or conspires'' after ``attempts''.

SEC. 7. NOTICE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT.

    (a) Criminal Penalty for Failure to Notify Law Enforcement.--
Chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following:
``Sec. 1039. Concealment of security breaches involving personal 
              information
    ``(a) Offense.--Whoever owns or possesses data in electronic form 
containing a means of identification (as defined in section 1028), 
having knowledge of a major security breach of the system containing 
such data maintained by such person, and knowingly fails to provide 
notice of such breach to the United States Secret Service or Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, with the intent to prevent, obstruct, or 
impede a lawful investigation of such breach, shall be fined under this 
title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
    ``(b) Definitions.--As used in this section--
            ``(1) Major security breach.--The term `major security 
        breach' means any security breach--
                    ``(A) whereby means of identification pertaining to 
                10,000 or more individuals is, or is reasonably 
                believed to have been acquired, and such acquisition 
                causes a significant risk of identity theft;
                    ``(B) involving databases owned by the Federal 
                Government; or
                    ``(C) involving primarily data in electronic form 
                containing means of identification of Federal 
                Government employees or contractors involved in 
                national security matters or law enforcement.
            ``(2) Significant risk of identity theft.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The term `significant risk of 
                identity theft' means such risk that a reasonable 
                person would conclude, after a reasonable opportunity 
                to investigate, that it is more probable than not that 
                identity theft has occurred or will occur as a result 
                of the breach.
                    ``(B) Presumption.--If the data in electronic form 
                containing a means of identification involved in a 
                suspected breach has been encrypted, redacted, requires 
                technology to use or access the data that is not 
                commercially available, or has otherwise been rendered 
                unusable, then there shall be a presumption that the 
                breach has not caused a significant risk of identity 
                theft. Such presumption may be rebutted by facts 
                demonstrating that the encryption code has been or is 
                reasonably likely to be compromised, that the entity 
                that acquired the data is believed to possess the 
                technology to access it, or the owner or possessor of 
                the data is or reasonably should be aware of an unusual 
                pattern of misuse of the data that indicates fraud or 
                identity theft.''.
    (b) Rulemaking.--Within 180 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
jointly promulgate rules and regulations, after adequate notice and an 
opportunity for comment, as are reasonably necessary, governing the 
form, content, and timing of the notices required pursuant to section 
1039 of title 18, United States Code. Such rules and regulations shall 
not require the deployment or use of specific products or technologies, 
including any specific computer hardware or software, to protect 
against a security breach. Such rules and regulations shall require 
that--
            (1) such notice be provided to the United States Secret 
        Service or Federal Bureau of Investigation before any notice of 
        a breach is made to consumers under State or Federal law, and 
        within 14 days of discovery of the breach;
            (2) if the United States Secret Service or Federal Bureau 
        of Investigation determines that any notice required to be made 
        to consumers under State or Federal law would impede or 
        compromise a criminal investigation or national security, the 
        United States Secret Service or Federal Bureau of Investigation 
        shall direct in writing within 7 days that such notice shall be 
        delayed for 30 days, or until the United States Secret Service 
        or Federal Bureau of Investigation determines that such notice 
        will not impede or compromise a criminal investigation or 
        national security;
            (3) the United States Secret Service shall notify the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation, if the United States Secret 
        Service determines that such breach may involve espionage, 
        foreign counterintelligence, information protected against 
        unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or 
        foreign relations, or Restricted Data (as that term is defined 
        in section 11y of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
        2014(y))), except for offenses affecting the duties of the 
        United States Secret Service under section 3056(a) of title 18, 
        United States Code; and
            (4) the United States Secret Service or Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation notify the Attorney General in each State 
        affected by the breach, if the United States Secret Service or 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation declines to pursue a criminal 
        investigation, or as deemed necessary and appropriate.
    (c) Immunity From Lawsuit.--No cause of action shall lie in any 
court against any law enforcement entity or any person who notifies law 
enforcement of a security breach pursuant to this section for any 
penalty, prohibition, or damages relating to the delay of notification 
for law enforcement purposes under this Act.
    (d) Civil Penalty for Failure to Notify.--Whoever knowingly fails 
to give a notice required under section 1039 of title 18, United States 
Code, shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for 
each day of such failure, but not more than $1,000,000.
    (e) Relation to State Laws.--
            (1) In general.--The requirement to notify law enforcement 
        under this section shall supersede any other notice to law 
        enforcement required under State law.
            (2) Exception for state consumer notice laws.--The notice 
        required to law enforcement under this section shall be in 
        addition to any notice to consumers required under State or 
        Federal law following the discovery of a security breach. 
        Nothing in this section annuls, alters, affects or exempts any 
        person from complying with the laws of any State with respect 
        to notice to consumers of a security breach, except as provided 
        by subsections (b) and (c).
    (f) Duty of Federal Agencies and Departments.--An agency or 
department of the Federal Government which would be required to give 
notice of a major security breach under section 1039 of title 18, 
United States Code, if that agency or department were a person, shall 
notify the United States Secret Service or Federal Bureau of 
Investigation of the breach in the same time and manner as a person 
subject to that section. The rulemaking authority under subsection (b) 
shall include the authority to make rules for notice under this 
subsection of a major security breach.
    (g) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following new item:

``1039. Concealment of security breaches involving personal 
                            information.''.

SEC. 8. PENALTIES FOR SECTION 1030 VIOLATIONS.

    Subsection (c) of section 1030 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended to read as follows:
    ``(c)(1) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) or (b) 
is a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 30 years, 
or both.
    ``(2) The court, in imposing sentence for an offense under 
subsection (a) or (b), shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed 
and irrespective of any provision of State law, order that the person 
forfeit to the United States--
            ``(A) the person's interest in any personal property that 
        was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the 
        commission of such violation; and
            ``(B) any property, real or personal, constituting or 
        derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or 
        indirectly, as a result of such violation.''.

SEC. 9. DIRECTIVE TO SENTENCING COMMISSION.

    (a) Directive.--Pursuant to its authority under section 994(p) of 
title 28, United States Code, and in accordance with this section, the 
United States Sentencing Commission shall forthwith review its 
guidelines and policy statements applicable to persons convicted of 
offenses under sections 1028, 1028A, 1030, 1030A, 2511 and 2701 of 
title 18, United States Code and any other relevant provisions of law, 
in order to reflect the intent of Congress that such penalties be 
increased in comparison to those currently provided by such guidelines 
and policy statements.
    (b) Requirements.--In determining its guidelines and policy 
statements on the appropriate sentence for the crimes enumerated in 
paragraph (a), the Commission shall consider the extent to which the 
guidelines and policy statements may or may not account for the 
following factors in order to create an effective deterrent to computer 
crime and the theft or misuse of personally identifiable data--
            (1) the level of sophistication and planning involved in 
        such offense;
            (2) whether such offense was committed for purpose of 
        commercial advantage or private financial benefit;
            (3) the potential and actual loss resulting from the 
        offense;
            (4) whether the defendant acted with intent to cause either 
        physical or property harm in committing the offense;
            (5) the extent to which the offense violated the privacy 
        rights of individuals;
            (6) the effect of the offense upon the operations of a 
        government agency of the United States, or of a State or local 
        government;
            (7) whether the offense involved a computer used by the 
        government in furtherance of national defense, national 
        security or the administration of justice;
            (8) whether the offense was intended to, or had the effect 
        of significantly interfering with or disrupting a critical 
        infrastructure;
            (9) whether the offense was intended to, or had the effect 
        of creating a threat to public health or safety, injury to any 
        person, or death; and
            (10) whether the defendant purposefully involved a juvenile 
        in the commission of the offense to avoid punishment.
    (c) Additional Requirements.--In carrying out this section, the 
Commission shall--
            (1) assure reasonable consistency with other relevant 
        directives and with other sentencing guidelines;
            (2) account for any additional aggravating or mitigating 
        circumstances that might justify exceptions to the generally 
        applicable sentencing ranges;
            (3) make any conforming changes to the sentencing 
        guidelines; and
            (4) assure that the guidelines adequately meet the purposes 
        of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, 
        United States Code.

SEC. 10. DAMAGE TO PROTECTED COMPUTERS.

    (a) Section 1030(a)(5)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) by striking ``or'' at the end of clause (iv);
            (2) by inserting ``or'' at the end of clause (v); and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
                            ``(vi) damage affecting ten or more 
                        protected computers during any 1-year 
                        period.''.
    (b) Section 1030(g) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
striking ``or'' after ``(iv),'' and inserting ``, or (vi)'' after 
``(v)''.
    (c) Section 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i) of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ``(v) (relating to protection of computers)'' and 
inserting ``(vi) (relating to the protection of computers)''.

SEC. 11. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR RESOURCES TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE 
              CRIMINAL ACTIVITY INVOLVING COMPUTERS.

    (a) Additional Funding for Resources.--
            (1) Authorization.--In addition to amounts otherwise 
        authorized for resources to investigate and prosecute criminal 
        activity involving computers, there are authorized to be 
        appropriated for each of the fiscal years 2007 through 2011--
                    (A) $10,000,000 to the Director of the United 
                States Secret Service;
                    (B) $10,000,000 to the Attorney General for the 
                Criminal Division of the Department of Justice; and
                    (C) $10,000,000 to the Director of the Federal 
                Bureau of Investigation.
            (2) Availability.--Any amounts appropriated under paragraph 
        (1) shall remain available until expended.
    (b) Use of Additional Funding.--Funds made available under 
subsection (a) shall be used by the Director of the United States 
Secret Service, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and the Attorney General, for the United States Secret Service, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the criminal division of the 
Department of Justice, respectively, to--
            (1) hire and train law enforcement officers to--
                    (A) investigate crimes committed through the use of 
                computers and other information technology, including 
                through the use of the Internet; and
                    (B) assist in the prosecution of such crimes; and
            (2) procure advanced tools of forensic science to 
        investigate, prosecute, and study such crimes.
Example Output: Cyber-Security Enhancement and Consumer Data Protection Act of 2006 - (Sec. 2) Amends the federal criminal code to prohibit obtaining without authorization: (1) a means of identification from a protected computer (a computer exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the federal government); or (2) the capability to gain access to or remotely control a protected computer.

(Sec. 3) Revises the definition of "protected computer" to include a computer the use of which affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication. Eliminates the criminal law requirement that conduct constituting computer fraud involve an interstate or foreign communication.

(Sec. 4) Includes computer fraud within the definition of racketeering for purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

(Sec. 5) Includes threats to access a protected computer without authorization or to exceed such authorized access within the definition of computer-related extortion.

(Sec. 6) Expands the crime of computer fraud to include conspiracy to commit computer fraud.

(Sec. 7) Imposes a fine and/or prison term of up to five years for failure to notify the U.S. Secret Service or Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of a major security breach in a database containing identification information with the intent to prevent, obstruct, or impede a lawful investigation of such breach. Defines "major security breach" as any security breach that involves: (1) the acquisition of the identification information of 10,000 or more individuals causing a significant risk of identity theft; (2) databases owned by the federal government; and (3) data containing identification information of federal employees or contractors involved in national security matters or law enforcement.

Directs the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security to jointly issue regulations on the form, content, and timing of notices of major security breaches. Requires that such regulations provide that notice of a security breach be provided to the Secret Service or FBI before notice is provided to consumers and within 14 days after discovery of such breach.

Grants immunity to law enforcement entities or to any person who notifies law enforcement of a security breach.

Imposes a civil penalty of $50,000 for each day any individual fails to provide notice of a major security breach (not to exceed $1 million).

(Sec. 8) Increases the prison term for computer fraud to a maximum of 30 years. Requires forfeiture of any personal property used to commit computer fraud.

(Sec. 9) Directs the U.S. Sentencing Commission to review and amend its guidelines and policy statements to reflect congressional intent to increase criminal penalties for computer fraud.

(Sec. 10) Imposes criminal penalties for damage affecting ten or more protected computers during any one-year period.

(Sec. 11) Authorizes additional funding in FY2007-FY2011 to the Director of the Secret Service, the Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, and the Director of the FBI to investigate and prosecute crimes committed through the use of computers.

Example Input: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Coordination of Wind and Flood 
Perils Act of 2010''.

SEC. 2. PAYMENT OF MULTIPERIL CLAIMS.

    The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 is amended by inserting 
after section 1312 (42 U.S.C. 4019) the following new section:

``SEC. 1312A. PAYMENT OF MULTIPERIL CLAIMS.

    ``(a) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are--
            ``(1) to allow an insured individual or small business to 
        commence repairs or replacement, or both, of insured property 
        and to recommence business operations as soon as possible after 
        a natural disaster; and
            ``(2) to remove the burden of determining flood and wind 
        loss allocation for the purpose of insurance claims from the 
        insured and to place such burden on the entities that are 
        responsible for the payment of such claims.
    ``(b) Payment of Multiperil Claims.--
            ``(1) In general.--In the event of an occurrence of loss 
        resulting from physical damage to or loss of real property or 
        personal property related thereto located in the United States 
        arising from the combined perils of flood and wind, the 
        Administrator and any insurer (including a State-run windpool) 
        that insures the wind peril shall enter into good faith 
        negotiations regarding--
                    ``(A) the general method or methods by which proven 
                claims for such multiperil losses shall be adjusted and 
                paid; and
                    ``(B) the allocation of such payments between the 
                insurer, the Administrator, and the insured.
            ``(2) Limitation.--
                    ``(A) In general.--In the event that the 
                Administrator and an insurer (including a State-run 
                windpool) that insures the wind peril cannot agree as 
                to the specific distribution of perils that resulted in 
                a loss described under paragraph (1), the Administrator 
                shall pay 50 percent of the disputed claim until the 
                claim can be settled.
                    ``(B) Fair share.--The terms of any agreement or 
                negotiations entered into pursuant to paragraph (1) 
                shall require that, in order to fully compensate the 
                insured for his, her, or its loss as soon as 
                practicable after the occurrence of such loss, an 
                insurer (including a State-run windpool) that insures 
                the wind peril pay 50 percent of any disputed claim 
                until the claim can be settled.
                    ``(C) No overcompensation.--The Administrator and 
                an insurer (including a State-run windpool) that 
                insures the wind peril shall work collaboratively to 
                ensure that an insured policyholder does not receive 
                payments under this section in excess of the amount of 
                the insured's actual loss.
                    ``(D) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this 
                section shall be construed to negate, set aside, or 
                void any policy limit, including any loss limitation, 
                set forth in a standard flood insurance policy.
    ``(c) Failure To Reach Agreement on Loss Allocation.--The terms of 
any agreement or negotiations entered into pursuant to subsection 
(b)(1) shall require that if an insurer (including a State-run 
windpool) that insures the wind peril and the Administrator fail to 
reach an agreement regarding multiperil losses pursuant to subsection 
(b), including as to the cause or allocation of a multiperil loss, then 
each such entity shall agree to have any dispute relating to multiperil 
losses resolved by the arbitration panel established under subsection 
(d).
    ``(d) Arbitration Panel.--
            ``(1) Establishment.--As allowed under section 1307(e) of 
        the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4104), and 
        notwithstanding any other provision of law, not later than 90 
        days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator 
        of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall establish an 
        arbitration panel to efficiently and clearly resolve disputes 
        relating to multiperil losses between the Administrator and an 
        insurer (including a State-run windpool) that insures the wind 
        peril.
            ``(2) Membership.--The arbitration panel established under 
        paragraph (1) shall be comprised of 5 members.
            ``(3) Required qualifications.--
                    ``(A) Administrative law expertise.--At least 1 
                member of the arbitration panel established under 
                paragraph (1) shall have expertise in administrative 
                law.
                    ``(B) Water resources expertise.--At least 1 member 
                of the arbitration panel established under paragraph 
                (1) shall have expertise in water resources.
                    ``(C) Hurricane modeling expertise.--At least 1 
                member of the arbitration panel established under 
                paragraph (1) shall have expertise in hurricane 
                modeling.
            ``(4) No fema employees.--No member of the arbitration 
        panel established under paragraph (1) may be a current or 
        former employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
            ``(5) Independence.--Each member of the arbitration panel 
        established under paragraph (1) shall be independent and 
        neutral.''.
Example Output: Coordination of Wind and Flood Perils Act of 2010 - Amends the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 to direct the Administrator of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and any insurer (including a state-run windpool), in the event of loss resulting from physical damage to real property or personal property arising from the combined perils of flood and wind, to enter into good faith negotiations regarding: (1) payment and adjustment of proven claims for multiperil losses; and (2) the allocation of such payments among the insurer, the Administrator, and the insured.

Directs the Administrator to pay 50% percent of the disputed claim until it can be settled, if the Administrator and the insurer cannot agree as to the specific distribution of perils that resulted in a loss.

Requires such good faith negotiations to require that: (1) in order to fully compensate the insured for losses as soon as practicable, the insurer against wind peril shall pay 50% of any disputed claim until the claim can be settled; and (2) if an insurer against wind peril and the Administrator fail to agree regarding multiperil losses, then each shall agree to have any dispute resolved by the arbitration panel established under this Act.

Directs the Administrator to establish an arbitration panel to resolve disputes relating to multiperil losses between the Administrator and an insurer against wind peril.

Example Input: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``ILSA Enhancement 
and Compliance Act''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
    TITLE I--AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996

Sec. 101. Multilateral regime.
Sec. 102. Imposition of sanctions.
Sec. 103. Description of sanctions.
Sec. 104. Termination of sanctions.
Sec. 105. Sunset.
Sec. 106. Definitions.
Sec. 107. Effective date.
TITLE II--OFFICE OF GLOBAL SECURITY RISK IN THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
                               COMMISSION

Sec. 201. Establishment of office.
Sec. 202. Reports.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) On September 16, 2003, the Under Secretary for Arms 
        Control and International Security, John R. Bolton, stated 
        before the Committee on International Relations of the House of 
        Representatives that: ``Without question, among rogue states, 
        those most aggressively seeking to acquire or develop weapons 
        of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and which are 
        therefore threats to our national security, are Iran and North 
        Korea, followed by Libya and Syria. It is also the case that 
        these states are among those we identify as state sponsors of 
        terrorism.''.
            (2) In his statement before the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency (IAEA) of the United Nations on September 8, 2003, 
        United States Ambassador Kenneth Brill denounced Iran's 
        patterns of deception regarding its nuclear program by 
        declaring Iran to be ``working in secret, going back into the 
        1980s, to develop sophisticated nuclear facilities; stalling, 
        stonewalling, and on a number of occasions first providing the 
        IAEA false information, and then changing its story when the 
        original version was revealed to be inaccurate; and attempting 
        to cover up traces of its activities to avoid detection by the 
        Agency''.
            (3) The Final Resolution of the Board of Governors of the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency on September 11, 2003, noted 
        with concern, ``that the agency environmental sampling at 
        Natanz has revealed the presence of two types of highly 
        enriched uranium, which requires additional work to enable the 
        Agency to arrive at a conclusion; that IAEA inspectors found 
        considerable modifications had been made to the premises at the 
        Kalaye Electric Company prior to inspections that may impact on 
        the accuracy of the environmental sampling; that some of Iran's 
        statements to the IAEA have undergone significant and material 
        changes, and that the number of outstanding issues has 
        increased since the report; and that despite the Board's 
        statement in June 2003 encouraging Iran as a confidence-
        building measure, not to introduce nuclear material into its 
        pilot centrifuge enrichment cascade at Natanz, Iran has 
        introduced such material''.
            (4) The Government of Iran, in a letter to the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency of August 19, 2003, 
        acknowledged that, in the early 1990s, there had been ``bench 
        scale'' uranium conversion experiments. Iran has indicated that 
        more time will be needed to find the people involved in these 
        experiments and to trace any other closed down facilities.
            (5) Iranian authorities have stated that none of the 
        imported uranium had been processed and specifically, that it 
        had not been used in any centrifuge tests. It was observed, 
        however, during IAEA verification in March 2003, that some of 
        the UF&lt;INF&gt;6&lt;/INF&gt; was in fact missing from the two small 
        cylinders.
            (6)(A) Iranian authorities told the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency that the decision to launch a centrifuge 
        enrichment program had actually been taken in 1985 and that 
        Iran had received drawings of the centrifuge through a foreign 
        intermediary around 1987.
            (B) The Iranian authorities described the program as having 
        consisted of three phases: activities during the first phase, 
        from 1985 until 1997, had been located mainly at the Atomic 
        Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) premises in Tehran; during 
        the second phase, between 1997 and 2002, the activities had 
        been concentrated at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran; 
        during the third phase, 2002 to the present, the research and 
        development and assembly activities were moved to the Natanz 
        facility.
            (7) In the August 19, 2003, letter from Iran, the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency was informed that, in the 
        past, apart from planned co-operation in laser fusion and laser 
        spectroscopy which never materialized, there had been a 
        research thesis on laser spectroscopy prepared by a university 
        student in co-operation with the laser division of the Atomic 
        Energy Organization of Iran. Such a study by the AEOI could 
        later prove to be relevant to the implementation of laser 
        enrichment programs in Iran.
            (8) In September 2003, Britain, France, and Germany 
        nevertheless offered western technology to Iran if it stopped 
its nuclear fuel enrichment program and accepted more intrusive United 
Nations inspections of its nuclear facilities, all in defiance of the 
United States efforts to achieve a united front to counter the 
burgeoning Iranian nuclear program.
            (9) European oil investment and credit provisions have 
        unquestionably helped the Iranian economy by enabling it to 
        build its nuclear program. The Iranians are boasting that as 
        much as $20,000,000,000 in oil agreements have been signed 
        between Iran and European Union countries since 1995.
            (10) France's Totalfina formed a multi-billion dollar 
        consortium to develop Iranian oil fields of South Pars in 1995 
        and has been adding to its development ever since. Britain has 
        issued credit guarantees to back up its oil investments in Iran 
        as well.
            (11) Germany is actively seeking to increase its exports to 
        Iran and in 2001 it quadrupled its export insurance to that 
        country. The French bank BNP Paribas has arranged 
        $2,230,000,000 in loans for Iran since 1990.
            (12) Europe has also been actively seeking a European 
        Union-Iran trade pact, formally giving the go-ahead to pursue 
        investments in Iran.
            (13) The Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, 
        John S. Wolf, in testimony before the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations of the Senate on March 19, 2003, stated that: ``Libya 
        has crossed the nuclear threshold and is among the list of 
        nuclear wannabees. These wannabees seek nuclear weapons 
        capabilities even though they are all parties to the [Treaty on 
        the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons].''.
            (14) In testimony before the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the Senate on February 10, 2003, the Director 
        of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, remarked: ``Libya 
        clearly intends to reestablish its offensive chemical weapons 
        capability and has produced at least 100 tons of chemical 
        agents at its Rabta facility.''.
            (15) In addition to manufacturing and possessing chemical 
        weapons, Libya has a history of employing them. According to 
        the Department of Defense, in 1987 Libya employed chemical 
        agents against troops from its neighboring country of Chad. 
        Libya has used missiles and aircraft in combat. Libya also 
        ``fired SCUD missiles at an Italian island in 1987'', according 
        to the 2001 Department of Defense ``Proliferation: Threat and 
        Response'' Report.
            (16) According to the same report, Libya may be capable of 
        producing small quantities of biological agents. And, ``with 
        the suspension of UN sanctions, Libya's ability to acquire 
        biological-related equipment and expertise will increase''.
            (17) The Government of Libya continues to seek ballistic 
        missile delivery systems that could be used for chemical or 
        nuclear warfare. On October 31, 2002, the director of the 
        United States Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Ronald 
        Kadish, stated: ``The Libyans have been pretty active in trying 
        to get missile capability, and not just short-range. They have 
        enough money to buy it . . . We worry a lot about Libya in the 
        Missile Defense Agency.''.

    TITLE I--AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996

SEC. 101. MULTILATERAL REGIME.

    (a) Multilateral Negotiations.--Section 4(a) of the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
            (1) by inserting ``and Libya'' after ``Iran''; and
            (2) by striking ``Iran's efforts'' and inserting ``the 
        efforts of both Iran and Libya''.
    (b) Reports to Congress.--Section 4(b) of the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as 
follows:
    ``(b) Reports to Congress.--The President shall prepare and 
transmit to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 6 
months after the date of enactment of the ILSA Enhancement and 
Compliance Act, and once every 6 months thereafter, a report on the 
specific diplomatic efforts undertaken pursuant to subsection (a), the 
results of these efforts, and a description of proposed diplomatic 
efforts pursuant to such subsection. Each report shall include--
            ``(1) the countries that have agreed to undertake measures 
        to further the objectives of section 3 with respect to either 
        Iran or Libya;
            ``(2) a description of those measures, including--
                    ``(A) government actions with respect to public or 
                private entities (or their subsidiaries) located in 
                their territories, that are engaged in Iran or Libya;
                    ``(B) any decisions by the governments of these 
                countries to rescind or continue the provision of 
                credits, guarantees, or other governmental assistance 
                to these entities; and
                    ``(C) actions taken in international fora to 
                further the objectives of section 3; and
            ``(3) the countries that have not agreed to undertake 
        measures to further the objectives of section 3 with respect to 
        Iran or Libya, and the reasons therefor.''.
    (c) Suspension.--Section 4(c) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as follows:
    ``(c) Suspension.--The President may suspend the application of 
section 5(a) with respect to nationals of a country on a case by case 
basis for a period of not more than 6 months, if the President 
certifies to the appropriate congressional committees at least 30 days 
before the suspension is to take effect that--
            ``(1) the suspension is vital to the national security of 
        the United States; and
            ``(2) the country has undertaken substantial measures, 
        including economic sanctions, to prevent the acquisition and 
        development of weapons of mass destruction by the Government of 
        Iran or Libya, as the case may be, and to carry out activities 
        described in section 2 of this Act.''.
    (d) Investigations.--Section 4 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new subsection:
    ``(f) Investigations.--
            ``(1) In general.--Upon public or private disclosure of 
        activity related to investment in Iran or Libya as described in 
        this Act, the President shall direct the Secretary of the 
        Treasury to initiate an investigation into the possible 
        imposition of sanctions with respect to such activity and to 
        provide a recommendation to the President for such purposes.
            ``(2) Determination and notification.--Not later than 90 
        days after the date of the disclosure of activity described in 
        paragraph (1), the President shall make a determination whether 
        or not to impose sanctions with respect to the activity and 
        shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the 
        basis for this determination.''.

SEC. 102. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

    (a) Sanctions With Respect to Development of Petroleum Resources.--
Section 5(a) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 
1701 note) is amended--
            (1) in the heading, by striking ``to Iran'' and inserting 
        ``to Development of Petroleum Resources'';
            (2) by striking ``, with actual knowledge,''; and
            (3) by striking ``Iran's ability to develop petroleum 
        resources in Iran'' and inserting ``the ability of Iran or 
        Libya to develop petroleum resources, as the case may be''.
    (b) Sanctions With Respect to Development of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction or Other Military Capabilities.--Section 5(b) of the Iran 
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to 
read as follows:
    ``(b) Mandatory Sanctions With Respect to Development of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction or Other Military Capabilities.--Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, the President shall impose 2 or more of the 
sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6 if the 
President determines that a person has, on or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to 
Iran or Libya any goods, services, technology, or other items the 
provision of which significantly and materially--
            ``(1) contributed to the ability of Iran or Libya to 
        acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or 
        destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional 
        weapons or enhanced the military or paramilitary capabilities 
        of Iran or Libya; or
            ``(2) contributed to the ability of Iran or Libya to 
        maintain its aviation capabilities.''.
    (c) Persons Against Which the Sanctions Are To Be Imposed.--Section 
5(c)(2) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 
note) is amended--
                    (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or'' at the 
                end;
                    (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period and 
                inserting ``; or''; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following new 
                subparagraph:
                    ``(D) is a private or government lender, insurer, 
                underwriter, re-insurer, or guarantor of the person 
                referred to in paragraph (1).''.

SEC. 103. DESCRIPTION OF SANCTIONS.

    Paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6 of the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking ``may'' 
each place it occurs and inserting ``shall''.

SEC. 104. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.

    Section 8 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 
note) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) by striking the heading;
                    (B) in the introductory matter preceding paragraph 
                (1)--
                            (i) by inserting ``or Libya'' after 
                        ``Iran'' the first place it appears; and
                            (ii) by inserting ``or Libya, as the case 
                        may be'' after ``Iran'' the second place it 
                        appears;
                    (C) in paragraph (1)(C), by striking ``and'' at the 
                end;
                    (D) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the 
                end and inserting ``; and''; and
                    (E) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(3) poses no threat to the national security of the 
        United States, its interests, or allies.''; and
            (2) by striking subsection (b).

SEC. 105. SUNSET.

    Section 13 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 
1701 note) is hereby repealed.

SEC. 106. DEFINITIONS.

    (a) Investment.--Section 14(9) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended in the last sentence by 
striking ``does not include'' and inserting ``includes''.
    (b) Person.--Section 14(14)(B) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
            (1) by inserting after ``trust'' the following: ``, 
        financial institution, insurer, underwriter, re-insurer, 
        guarantors''; and
            (2) by striking ``operating as a business enterprise''.
    (c) Petroleum Resources.--Section 14(15) of the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``and'' and inserting a comma; and
            (2) by inserting ``, and petroleum by-products'' after 
        ``resources''.

SEC. 107. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    The amendments made by sections 102 and 103 shall apply to 
investments made on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

TITLE II--OFFICE OF GLOBAL SECURITY RISK IN THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
                               COMMISSION

SEC. 201. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE.

    The Securities and Exchange Commission shall establish an Office of 
Global Security Risk within the Division of Corporation Finance. The 
duties of this office shall include, but will not be limited to:
            (1) Establishing a process by which the Commission 
        identifies all issuers (as defined in section 2(a)(7) of the 
        Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201(a)(7))) that are 
        operating in countries, particularly Iran and Libya, the 
        governments of which the Secretary of State has determined, for 
        purposes of section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 
        1979 (50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)(1)), have repeatedly provided 
        support for acts of international terrorism.
            (2) Ensuring that all issuers operating in countries 
        described in paragraph (1) are disclosing to investors the 
        nature of their operations in such countries.
            (3) Implementing enhanced disclosure requirements based on 
        the asymmetric nature of the risk to corporate share value and 
        reputation stemming from business interests in these higher 
        risk countries.
            (4) Coordinating with other government agencies to ensure 
        the sharing of relevant information across the Federal 
        Government.
            (5) Initiating a global dialogue to ensure that foreign 
        corporations whose shares are traded in the United States are 
        properly disclosing their activities in countries described in 
        paragraph (1) to United States investors.

SEC. 202. REPORTS.

    The Commission shall provide the appropriate Congressional 
committees with quarterly reports on the activities of Office of Global 
Security Risk established pursuant to section 201.
Example Output:
ILSA Enhancement and Compliance Act - Amends the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to urge the President to immediately commence diplomatic efforts to establish a multilateral sanctions regime against Libya (currently limited to Iran). Expands reporting requirements by the President to Congress to cover Libya and specified governmental actions and assistance with respect to Iran or Libya.

Authorizes the President to suspend the application of sanctions upon certification that: (1) the suspension is vital to national security; and (2) the country has undertaken substantial measures to prevent the acquisition and development of weapons of mass destruction by the Government of Iran or Libya.

Directs the President: (1) upon disclosure of specified activity related to investment in Iran or Libya, to direct the Secretary of the Treasury to initiate an investigation; and (2) to impose two or more of specified mandatory sanctions upon determining that a person has provided to Iran or Libya any goods, services, technology, or other items which significantly and materially contributed to their ability to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or specified other capabilities.

Makes specified sanctions under the Act mandatory. Repeals the Act's sunset provision.

Directs the Securities and Exchange Commission to establish an Office of Global Security Risk to: (1) establish a process for identifying all issuers that are operating in countries (particularly Iran and Libya) whose governments have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; and (2) ensure and enhance issuer disclosures regarding operations, risks of operating, and activities in such countries.