In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 1 . We do not reach the question of whether it was proper for a Minnesota peace officer to go outside Minnesota's borders and attempt to compel a blood sample under Minnesota law. In this case, the sample was obtained using Wisconsin's procedure inside Wisconsin's borders and our holding is limited to these facts. 2 . Both parties make arguments regarding Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68 (Minn.1978). These cases, due to the natural exigency involved in obtaining blood-alcohol evidence, recognize the power of a peace officer to compel a blood sample from a dri Tex. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party waives the attorneyclient privilege when it voluntarily consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the communication in issue (B) holding that the michigan usury act mcla  43831 a statute setting forth the legal interest rate in michigan is preempted according to the explicit terms of hola (C) holding that the law of michigan rather than the forum applied to manufacturers claim of attorneyclient privilege in a products liability suit because the communication took place in michigan and therefore michigan had most significant relationship to communication (D) holding that litigating franchise dispute in michigan does not require that michigan law govern dispute as michigan franchise investment law does not expressly void choice of law provisions in franchise agreement (E) holding michigan friend of the court employees absolutely immune from suit under  1983
(C)

erred by failing to instruct the jury that a confidential informant’s testimony must be corroborated, in conformity with article 38.141. We agree. Our holding that there was some “other evidence” to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement does not eliminate the need for an instruction. See Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (noting court “might disagree” with court of appeals’s holding that there was no evidence ten o the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the requirements of article 38.141 here, but asserts that the trial court’s error resulted in harm under the “egregious harm standard” of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (applying egregious harm analysis to unobjected-to charge error). See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632 (<HOLDING>); Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 692 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding egregious harm standard applied where appellant failed to object to lack of instruction on accomplice witness testimony (B) holding egregious harm resulted from erroneous jury instruction authorizing conviction based on legally inadequate theory (C) holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated (D) holding that where appellant failed to present either expert or lay testimony as to the appropriate standard of care to be used appellant failed to present any evidence indicating the existence of an issue of fact thus summary judgment was proper (E) holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds
(A)

action by the State to recover the costs of legal assistance. Therefore, the entry of this judgment was a “stage” of the criminal proceeding for which Dudley was entitled to counsel. Our characterization of the cost judgment in Sluyter as a civil liability does not alter our conclusion. See Sluyter, 763 N.W.2d at 582 (stating cost judgment entered against acquitted defendant creates a civil liability). As previously noted, the legislature has injected this matter, which would ordinarily be civil, in a criminal action and provided for counsel throughout the criminal prosecution, ending with judgment on behalf of the State. We think it proper to focus on the legislative intent evidenced by these statutes, rather than on the label attached to the final judgment. See Jones, 964 P.2d at 403 (<HOLDING>). Because the criminal case did not end, by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding postacquittal proceedings were part of criminal case notwithstanding that they resulted in a reimbursement award that was civil in nature stating legislative intent was more important than labels (B) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only (E) recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings

(A)