In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: for [her] employer! ] to operate efficiently and effectively.” Id. at 418-19, 126 S.Ct. 1951. The point of this inquiry, then, is “both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their im portant public functions.” Id. at 420, 126 S.Ct. 1951. With that premise as a backdrop, the Supreme Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951; see also Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 364-65 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Garcetti and its Sixth Circuit progeny 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern (B) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (C) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (D) holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless  related to his job duties (E) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected
Example Output: holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern

Example Input: 375 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004). Since, as we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we need not consider whether the District’s failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its own case (as opposed to at the close of Smith’s case) further limits our review “to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by the evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice,” Fredrick, 254 F.3d at 162. The District presents two fact-based challenges to the jury’s verdict. First, it argues that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the District had a deliberately indifferent policy or custom under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, it claims that even had such a policy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom (B) holding that county liability under  1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior (C) holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc  1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition (D) recognizing respondeat superior liability (E) holding that municipal liability for purposes of claims brought under 42 usc  1983 must stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom rather than simply from respondeat superior
Example Output: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom

Example Input: the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator. See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator “when deficiencies in the arbitrator’s process call into question the arbitrator’s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition”); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen’s Ass’n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while the determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement is for the court the enforcement of pleading requirements before the arbitrator is a procedural matter for the arbitrator (B) holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union (C) holding that upon vacating an arbitration award the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator (D) holding that the trial court not the arbitrator must decide a challenge to an arbitration provision based on public policy (E) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator
Example Output:
holding that while the determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement is for the court the enforcement of pleading requirements before the arbitrator is a procedural matter for the arbitrator