In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

other court’s construal of the statute. See Thrivent, 251 S.W.3d at 622-23; J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co. v. Estes, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 836, 839-40 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied); Poole v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 14-99-00740-CV, No, 14-99-01056-CV, 2000 WL 1721150, at *1, 2000 Tex.App. LEXIS 6825, at *3-*4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 12, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication); Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d at 331. Finally, this argument is contrary to the prevailing view among state courts outside of Texas as well, which have held that an order vacating an award and directing a rehearing (without denying confirmation) is not final and appealable. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 31, 582 So.2d 162, 162-63 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Carner v. Freedman, 175 So.2d 70, 71 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable (B) holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable
holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable

allege no physical harm resulting from Wells Fargo’s voluntary undertaking of services. See Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex.2000) (“One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965))) (emphasis added); see also Vodicka v. Lahr, No. 03-10-00126-CV, 2012 WL 2075713, at *6 (Tex.Ct.App. Jun. 6, 2012) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for negligent undertaking because that tort requires proof of physical harm resulting from failure to exercise reasonable care in rendering services to another and plaintiffs had alleged only economic harm (B) holding that economic loss rule precluded the plaintiffs tort claims because they only alleged injuries to the subject of the contract itself (C) holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm (D) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (E) holding that the plaintiffs stated a claim for conspiracy because they alleged an actionable tort
holding that economic loss rule precluded the plaintiffs tort claims because they only alleged injuries to the subject of the contract itself

or serious bodily injury.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (emphasis added). A car can be a deadly weapon. Butler v. State, 928 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd). Randy and Gary collectively testified that Appellant rammed them with his vehicle two or three times, and Randy testified that Appellant caught them even after he drove sixty or seventy miles-per-hour while fleeing from Appellant. Although neither Randy nor Gary testified that they were physically injured by Appellant’s conduct, there is no requirement that the deadly weapon actually cause death or serious bodily injury before the jury can affirmatively answer the deadly weapon question. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B); see also McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497, 503 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). The evidence is legally sufficient to support 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reckless conduct was lesserincluded offense of aggravated assault by threatening another with imminent bodily injury by use of deadly weapon because the danger of serious bodily injury in the lesser offense is necessarily established when a deadly weapon is used in the commission of an offense as required for the greater offense (B) holding that although defendants vehicle was not used with deadly effect it was a deadly weapon because it was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury if not for an oncoming drivers evasive maneuver (C) holding that it was a double jeopardy violation to convict and sentence for both dui with serious bodily injury and driving without a valid license with serious bodily injury based on an injury to a single victim (D) holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a deadlyweapon finding because a motor vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se and there was no testimony in the record that defendant operated his vehicle in a manner that was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury (E) holding section 107a17bs plain language does not require that the actor actually intend death or serious bodily injury an object is a deadly weapon if the actor intends a use of the object in which it would be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury

holding that reckless conduct was lesserincluded offense of aggravated assault by threatening another with imminent bodily injury by use of deadly weapon because the danger of serious bodily injury in the lesser offense is necessarily established when a deadly weapon is used in the commission of an offense as required for the greater offense