In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: enter a residence without a warrant if an objectively reasonable basis exists for the officer to believe that there is an immediate need for police assistance for the protection of life or substantial property interests.” Seibert v. State, 923 So.2d 460, 468 (Fla. 2006) (citing Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278, 293-94 (Fla. 1997)). Whether an emergency actually existed is immaterial “so long as the officer reasonably believes it to exist because of objectively reasonable facts. The officer’s conclusion then may be based on a combination of the ‘objective’ nature of the circumstances and the officer’s ‘subjective’ perception of those circumstances.” State v. Boyd, 615 So.2d 786, 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); see also Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1559, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (<HOLDING>). The record supports that law enforcement 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable (B) holding that in determining prejudice a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury (C) holding that the court must consider the totality of the circumstance when determining whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant (D) holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith (E) holding a search permissible where the officer reasonably believed he faced an emergency situation that would result in the destruction of evidence

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: was a “substantial factor” or “motivating factor” in Walker’s allegedly retaliatory actions. Abrams argues that a reasonable jury could infer, as a result of this chronology, that he was “falsely arrested” and that he was arrested “because of what [he] said.” Abrams then opines that “the arrest was for an illegal purpose” and finally that “[a]nger often leads to unthinking retaliation.” After reviewing the record and the standards presented in our line of cases, we agree with the district court’s finding that this chronology is unconvincing, as it fails to present “definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion,” Michael v. St. Joseph County, 259 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir.2001), contains mere speculation, and demands the making of unreasonable inferences in suppo -84 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that such a step would not be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest (B) holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest (C) holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity (D) holding that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a  1983 claim alleging false arrest (E) recognizing first amendment retaliation right

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: plain error. Because the record contains other cognizable errors that in and of themselves require a new trial, see text infra, we are content to allow our comments on the “property interest” ruling to stand as a guide to the district court on retrial. See Rosaly v. Ignacio, 593 F.2d 145, 147-48 (1st Cir.1979) (employing a similar strategy)- This brings us to the two evi-dentiary bevues (both of which were properly preserved). In employment discrimination cases, the factors that motivate a decision are central to the decisionmaker’s liability in his personal capacity. See Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 204 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.2000) (stating that a political discrimination claim “has no meaning absent the allegation of impermissible motivation”); see also Gómez I, 218 F.Supp.2d at 77 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 7 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the most important factor in the preservation hierarchy is whether the relevant issue was raised in the trial court and the least important factor is whether the appellant alerted the trial court to the specific argument raised on appeal (B) recognizing that there is an important privacy interest in corporate financial documents the court agrees that the information can be protected therefore the court  required that the information be disclosed pursuant to a confidentiality order only to be used in connection with this litigation (C) recognizing that admission is important to the evaluation of witness credibility (D) recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important (E) recognizing that the information possessed by the defendant is an important variable in that equation


Output: (E)