instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
background nor his current offense can support the conclusion that he is a worst offender. The maximum sentence was therefore not justified. In deciding to impose the maximum sentence, Judge Michalski relied primarily on his conclusion that Skrepich was incapable of rehabilitation and could not personally be deterred. The judge thus gave primary emphasis to the need to protect the public by isolating Skrepich from the community. While the judge also indicated that a lengthy sentence would serve the sentencing goals of general deterrence and community condemnation, it seems clear that these goals could not, in themselves, support the imposition of a maximum, ten-year term for a first offender convicted of a class B felony. See Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198, 1204-05 (Alaska 1985) (<HOLDING>). The appropriateness of the maximum term 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts failure to explain the effect of supervised release was harmless where the maximum term of incarceration under the actual sentence of imprisonment and supervised release less than six years as well as his worstcase scenario less than nine years was less than the maximum term of incarceration twenty years al lowed by law (B) holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony (C) holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder (D) holding that a term of substantially less than twenty years would serve the objectives of general deterrence and community condemnation in the case of a first offender convicted of seconddegree murder an unclassified felony (E) holding that twenty years was not excessive for second felony offender convicted of simple burglary
answer:
(D)


question:
of the Licenses; revocation is made explicit in a filing before the bankruptcy court (which filing is not itself an order) and is implicit in the Public Notice announcing the re-auction of the Licenses previously held by NextWave. Nevertheless, as this Court's prior opinion makes clear, we think that the FCC action in question is unmistakably regulatory in nature. But even if the FCC’s acts do not amount to "decisions” or "orders” of the Commission, subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, that would not expose the FCC's acts to review in the bankruptcy court. A regulatory action short of a decision or order is an exercise of regulatory discretion that is not subject to review. See Bethesda-Chevy Chase Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC, 385 F.2d 967, 968 (D.C.Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Telecommunications Research & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding allegation made in enforcement suit does not impose the kind of legal obligation with which the finality doctrine is concerned (B) holding that obligation to pay pension benefits gave rise to a constructive trust relationship and obligation was not discharged in bankruptcy (C) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (D) holding that a regulatory action that did not impose an obligation deny a right or fix a legal relationship was not reviewable (E) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right
answer:
(D)


question:
(Emphasis added.) Finally, paragraph 13 of the Restrictions states that “[n]o structure shall be commenced or erected on any of said lots” unless approved, either affirmatively or by default, by the architectural committee, “[pjrovided ... that the design, location and the kind of materials and the building to be built on said lot shall be governed by all of the restrictions herein set forth and said building shall be in harmony with existing buildings and structure 193, 197-98 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1959) (interpreting restrictive covenants to manifest an intent to preserve the residential character of the properties, which included the prohibition of constructing roads, especially roads not bene-fitting the property owners); see also Rush v. Miller, 21 Wash.App. 156, 584 P.2d 960, 963 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Hanley v. Misischi, 111 R.I. 233, 302 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute (B) holding that a roadway benefitting land outside the subdivision was not a residential purpose and was therefore a violation of the restrictive covenant (C) holding that a restrictive covenant with a tenyear term was unenforceable (D) holding that a restrictive covenant with worldwide restrictions on competition is not reasonable (E) holding that a roadway is a structure and its construction would violate the restrictive covenant limiting the land to residential purposes
answer:

(B)