In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier

Answer: holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language


Question: of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi appears to indicate that the assets must be blocked at the time judgment against the asset is finalized. See 556 U.S. 366, 369, 377-79, 129 S.Ct. 1732, 1735, 1739-40, 173 L.Ed.2d 511 (2009) (“We ultimately hold that the Cubic Judgment was not a ‘blocked asset’ at the time the Court of Appeals handed down its decision.... ”). The controlling determination in that case, though, was that the asset in question was never blocked because Iran’s interest in it arose after the Treasury Department unblocked all Iranian assets. Id. at 376, 129 S.Ct. at 1739. In Holy Land Foundation, the assets were unreachable because they were unblocked during the pendency of the original civil suit, prior to the commencement of any execution proceeding. 722 F.3d at 687 (<HOLDING>). This rule is not just prescribed by law; it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment (B) holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order (C) holding that the governments restraining order against a blocked asset obtained prior to the entry of a civil judgment unblocked it for tria purposes (D) recognizing that a stay contained in anex parte order did not serve to suspend the effectiveness of the restraining notice otherwise any judgment debtor could obtain such an order without notice to the court that a restraining notice had been served or to the judgment creditor and recover his property theretofore properly made the subject of the restraining notice (E) holding that the cubic judgment was not blocked

Answer: holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment


Question: 7, and 10), plaintiffs response thereto, and the reply brief of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center, Nora Marden, and Joan K. Richards, and for the reasons stated in the accompa nying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED; 2. Count I is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; 3. The Court having declined to exercise its jurisdiction as to the remaining Counts of the complaint, they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their reassertion in state court; 4. The petition of defendant James E. Clark to join in the motion of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center and Joan K. Richards to dismiss the complaint (docket entry #9) is GRANTED AS UNOPPOSED; 5. The petition of defendant Nora 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Even absent Dr. Klavan’s concession on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that amtrak was a state actor (B) holding that a privately owned nursing home that received ninety percent of its funding from the state and was subject to significant state regulation was nevertheless not a state actor (C) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (D) holding that such a physician was a state actor under  1983 (E) holding that a school was not a state actor even though it had to comply with many state regulations to be eligible for state funding and almost all of its students had been referred to it by the state

Answer:
holding that amtrak was a state actor