In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: the sophisticated user defense, a supplier has no duty to warn the ultimate user if it has reason to believe that the user will realize its dangerous condition. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn.2004); see also Ritchie v. Glidden, 242 F.3d 713, 724 (7th Cir.2001) (stating, under Indiana law, that the sophisticated purchaser defense to a failure-to-warn claim brought under negligence or strict liability theories provides that product suppliers do not have a duty to warn employees or customers of knowledgeable industrial purchasers as to product-related hazards). In addition to limiting a supplier’s duty, the “sophisticated user” concept also affects the element of proximate cause. Crook v. Kaneb Pipe Line Operating P’ship, L.P., 231 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Strong, 667 F.2d at 688 (“Even if [the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury (B) holding in a negligence action that the air traffic controllers failure to warn of an impending danger cannot be the proximate cause of an injury after the pilot himself discovered its presence appreciated the danger and decided to fly ahead into it (C) holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible (D) holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury (E) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: that is so related structurally to another substance as to be theoretically derivable from it even when not so obtainable in practice (the methoxy of naphthalene).” Webster’s Int’l 608. Thus, while some of the general purpose dictionaries provide support for Defendant’s suggested definition for derivative, others define the term as proposed by Plaintiffs. Technical dictionaries can also assist claim construction by showing how those skilled in the art define “derivatives.” Moba v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[A]s this court has repeatedly counseled, the best indicator of claim meaning is its usage in context as understood by one of skill in the art at the time of invention.”); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, again, the cited sources provide 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning (B) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (C) holding that the specifications reference to a selector sufficed as one skilled in the art would have understood the term (D) holding a technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention unless it is apparent from the patent and the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a different meaning (E) holding that courts may consult scientific dictionaries and technical treatises to deter mine the ordinary meaning of a technical term to persons skilled in the art

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: subpoena, but that it was necessary to do so on a document-by-document basis. Order on Mot. for Summ. J. at 2-4. Now the Committee contends that the documents that survived that review are not covered by the deliberative process privilege because the privilege only applies to deliberations concerning the development of policy. See PL’s Mem. for Mot. to Compel at 26-27 (asserting that the privilege allows “agency decisionmakers to engage in that frank exchange of opinions and recommendations necessary to the formulation of pol . U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 478 F.Supp.2d 77, 83 (D.D.C.2007) (finding that deliberative process privilege covered email messages discussing the agency’s response to news article); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Reno, No. 00-0723, 2001 WL 1902811 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2001), at *3 (<HOLDING>). Following the same reasoning, the Court holds 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that internal emails about how to present an agency decision to the public were covered by the deliberative process privilege (B) holding that deliberations about how to handle press inquiries and other public relations issues are covered by exemption 5 under foia (C) holding that a foia request should be read to seek all documents covered by a catchall (D) holding that documents concerning how to respond to ongoing inquiries from the press and congress about the entry of a government witness and mexican national into the united states fell under the deliberative process privilege (E) holding that the government cannot waive foia exemption 6 on behalf of the individual whose privacy interests the exemption protects


Output: (B)