In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

664, 669 (Colo.1988), the exercise of such power must be guided so that any action taken by a city "in response to a land use proposal will be rational and consistent." Beaver Meadows v. Board of County Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928, 936 (Colo.1985). The Colorado Springs Zoning Code specifically allows the City to take into account the effect on the neighborhood. See § 4-6-602(C)(1) ("Will the project design be harmonious with surrounding land uses and neighborhood?") In my view, this standard is insufficient to provide "all users and potential users of land with notice of the particular standards and requirements" imposed by the City for plan approval. Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 790 P.2d 827, 832 (Colo.1990); see also Bauer, 182 Colo. at 327, 513 P.2d at 204 (<HOLDING>); Kosinski v. Lawlor, 177 Conn. 420, 418 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of requests to change zoning or comprehensive zoning plans (B) holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a trier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the towns zoning boards actions and that as a result the zoning board violated appellants rights to substantive due process (C) holding a zoning authority acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it denies a permit meeting the general zoning qualifications solely because of the type of building to be constructed (D) holding that in the limited circumstances when local zoning authorities actions prohibit personal wireless service the act preempts local zoning law (E) holding that a zoning commission was capable of being sued directly under section 1983 because zjoning commissions function legislatively when adopting zoning regulations and holding public hearings for the adjudication of individual petitions for zoning redress
(C)

we held that, The penetration offense alleged in the first indictment clearly required a separate and distinct act (involving appellee’s sexual organ with the child’s female sexual organ) from the act alleged in the second indictment (which involved appel-lee’s mouth with the child’s sexual organ). In this case the second indictment alleged that appellee caused the child’s sexual organ to contact his mouth ency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct. Appellant concedes to this view, the plain language of the statute supports it, and so does our caselaw. See Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630 (stating that a grammatical analysis suggests that the unit of prosecution for indecency with a child by exposure is the exposure and, ultimately, adopting that viewpoint); Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. State, 550 S.W.2d 89, 91 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive (B) holding that a similar statute created separate offenses (C) holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation (D) holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive (E) holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity
(A)

shall not be hable to the customer under any law or regulation of the United States or any constitution, law, or regulation of any State or political subdivision thereof, for such disclosure or for any failure to notify the customer of such disclosure. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c). Plaintiffs do not dispute that the alleged disclosures by Defendant Oxford Bank, which serve as the basis for the fraud claim, were made pursuant to § 3403(c). Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that § 3403(c) does not protect Defendant Oxford Bank, relying on Lopez v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Florida, 129 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1997). However, § 3403(c) on its face applies in the instant case such that Defendant Oxford Bank is immune from suit. See Waye v. Commonwealth Bank, 846 F.Supp. 321, 324 (W.D.Pa.1994) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs’ reliance on Lopez is clearly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on claim of breach of fiduciary duty where underlying claim was a common law negligence action (B) holding that  3403 barred plaintiffs negligence and bad faith claims against bank for reporting to federal authorities that plaintiffs were involved in a check kiting scheme which they claim was untrue bank had no fiduciary duty to refrain from reporting suspected illegal activity on the part of their customers (C) holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor (D) recognizing that a bank customer may have a tort claim against a bank for the wrongful dishonor of a check (E) holding that a bank receiving a check because of a encoding error is not a collecting bank

(B)