In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: in favor of William Spencer, et al., (Spencer) and setting the penalties for violation of the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Spencer cross-appeals the denial of post-trial motions and refusal to award attorney’s fees. We affirm on all grounds. I BART’s unjust enrichment claim fads for want of a loss. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 881 (2000) (noting that the elements of unjust enrichment are “receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.”). Even assuming that County of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 158 Cal.App.4th 533, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 (2008), recognized an exception to this rule, BART’s claim does not fall into that exception. See Peterson v. Cellico P’ship, 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1594, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Concrete financial loss is required for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (B) holding that walsh does not support plaintiffs assertion that they need not allege any actual injury to bring an unjust enrichment claim (C) holding that where plaintiffs filed a complaint for conversion unjust enrichment and injunctive relief they had an adequate remedy at law (D) holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed

A: holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement
****
Q: 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther’s theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts “a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman.” White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther’s termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, § 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law

A: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
****
Q: before he filed suit. For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s order granting summary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . Jones v. Comm’r, 338 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir.2003). 2 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). 3 . Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (West Supp.2011). 4 . Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.1999). 5 . Haussecker v. Childs, 935 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996), aff'd, 974 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.1998). 6 . Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex.1996). 7 . See, e.g., id. at 457 (<HOLDING>). 8 . Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Norwood, 58 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings (B) holding that procedural bar rule does not apply to ineffectiveness claims (C) holding that the discovery rule categorically does not apply to misappropriationoftradesecrets claims because in most cases trade secret misappropriation generally is capable of detection within the time allotted (D) holding that the discovery rule does not apply to  bill of review claims to set aside probate judgments (E) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law

A:
holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings
****