In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: court is without power to extend that authority beyond the scope granted by the statute, and no District of Columbia court has ever found service upon such an unauthorized official to be valid against a foreign corporation. Accordingly, we conclude that service upon the Director was ineffective to bring Am-eritrade within the jurisdiction of the district court. Finally, Gorman urges that it would be unfair if a foreign corporation, lawfully subject to the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia because it does business here, could evade that jurisdiction by keeping its agents out of the District and hence beyond the range of effective service of process. If such a loophole does exist, the legislature can, of course, remove it by amending § 13-384 to provide an alternative method 1) (<HOLDING>); Oriental Trading Co. v. Firetti, 236 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that making phone calls and sending facsimiles into the forum may be sufficient to confer specific jurisdiction (B) holding that purposeful availment may exist when a defendant makes phone calls and sends facsimiles into the forum state and such communications form the bases for the action of an intentional tort (C) holding that the defendant companys action in sending a representative to ohio to negotiate a resolution of a prior dispute did not confer personal jurisdiction (D) holding that foreseeability of causing injury in forum state is not sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction (E) holding that phone and facsimile communications to the forum purchase orders and payments sent to the forum a choice of law clause within the contract regarding the forum state and delivery of the product within the forum state were not enough to satisfy minimum contacts
[EX A]: holding that purposeful availment may exist when a defendant makes phone calls and sends facsimiles into the forum state and such communications form the bases for the action of an intentional tort

[EX Q]: United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d 865, 880 (6th Cir.1994). B. Sufficiency of the evidence K. Kennedy and Scarborough moved for judgments of acquittal at the close of the government’s proof, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain their convictions. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 29(a). The district court considered and denied the motions, and neither defendant renewed his or her respective motion at the close of all the evidence, see Swidan, 888 F.2d at 1080, or within 14 days after their guilty verdicts,' see Fed. R.Crim.P. 29(c)(1). They have thus failed to preserve their rights to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in the absence of a miscarriage of justice. See Swidan, 888 F.2d at 1080; see also United States v. Faymore, 736 F.2d 328, 334 (6th Cir.1984) '(<HOLDING>).' Both K. Kennedy and Scarborough conceded at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice (B) holding that the defendants insufficientevidence claim was barred by his failure to renew his rule 29 motion at the close of all the evidence because there was no manifest miscarriage of justice (C) holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence (D) holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial (E) holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence
[EX A]: holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice

[EX Q]: reference to § 3553(a)(2)(A) and (3)). This is because supervised release “serves an entirely different purpose than the sentence imposed under § 3553(a).” Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 502 n.15, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 179 L.Ed.2d 196. (2011). As the Supreme Court explained, ‘[supervised release fulfills rehabilitative . ends, . distinct from those served by incarceration.” Johnson, 529 U.S. at 59, 120 S.Ct. 1114. Pointing out that, “Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community -life,” id,, the Court has stressed that “supervised release, unlike incarceration, provides individuals with po-stconfinement assistance,” id, at 60, 120 S.Ct. 1114. See also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 708-09, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court’s view- of the role of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release (B) recognizing the congressional policy in providing for a term of supervised release after incarceration is to improve the odds of a successful transition from the prison to liberty (C) holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e (D) holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses (E) recognizing district courts broad discretion to impose prison term up to the statutory maximum for violations of supervised release internal quotation marks omitted
[EX A]:
holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release