In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

20 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 24(b) ("Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.... In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."). [ 21] 21. State v. Weidner, 684 P.2d 103, 113 (Alaska 1984) (adopting four-part test from Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1324-25 (D.C.Cir.1981)). 22 . Harvey v. Cook, 172 P.3d 794, 799 (Alaska 2007). [23] 23. Scammon Bay Ass'n v. Ulak, 126 P.3d 138, 143 (Alaska 2005) (citing Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227, 1231 (Ist Cir.1992)); see also Kirk v. Demientieff, 145 P.3d 512, 520 (Alaska 2006) (<HOLDING>). 24 . Ulak, 126 P.3d at 143. 25 . AOIC's May 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (B) holding that a law firm could intervene in a former clients action to protect its interest in its contingency fee (C) holding attorneys motion to intervene in former clients tort suit untimely because attorney had clear and early notice that former client would not adequately represent his interests (D) holding that ambiguous agreement between attorney and client must be construed in the clients favor (E) holding that presumption of access to and knowledge of confidential information between attorney and former client notwithstanding attorneys declarations to the contrary may not be rebutted
(C)

jurisdiction to exercise its discretion to treat the matter before it as a petition for a writ of certiorari. See, e.g., In re Temporary Custody of Five Minors, 105 Nev. 441, 777 P.2d 901 (1989). In light of the far reaching consequences of the issues presented, we are confident the district court would have exercised that discretion for the same reasons we have exercised our discretion to review the instant original petition. 3 Nev. Const, art. 6, § 8. 4 NRS 4.370(3). 5 State of Nevada v. Justice Court, 112 Nev 803, 919 P.2d 401 (1996). 6 See generally NCJC Canon 2. 7 Nev. Const, art. 6, § 8; NRS 4.370(3). 8 NRS 189.120; State v. Shade, 110 Nev. 57, 867 P.2d 393 (1994). 9 See Parsons v. State, 116 Nev. 928, 937, n.8, 10 P.3d 836, 841-42 n.8 (2000). 10 40 Nev. 228, 161 P. 737 (1916) (<HOLDING>). 11 106 Nev. 203, 789 P.2d 584 (1990) (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a city liable for the unconstitutional firing of two clerks by a municipal judge when it was clear the city had delegated to him final administrative authority over employment matters (B) holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court (C) holding that the city had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute allowing certain communities within the same county as the city to incorporate as towns without the citys consent (D) holding that a municipal court had no constitutional or statutory authority to rule on the legality and constitutionality of a tax imposed on attorneys practicing within the city limits (E) holding that a blakely challenge fell within the defendants waiver of his right to appeal the constitutionality or legality of the guidelines
(D)

judgment order on appeal. 2 . Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir.2010) (citing Threadgill v. Prudential Sec. Grp., Inc., 145 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir.1998)). 3 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). 4 . Compare Fleming v. Yuma Reg'l Med. Ctr., 587 F.3d 938, 939 (9th Cir.2009), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1006, 130 S.Ct. 3468, 177 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2010) (“[T]he Rehabilitation Act covers discrimination claims by an independent contractor.”) with Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 345 (8th Cir.2006) (“With respect to Dr. Wojewski’s claims under ... the Rehabilitation Act, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the defendants because Dr. Wojewski was not an employee of the hospital.”). See also Schrader v. Fred A. Ray, M.D., P.C., 296 F.3d 968, 969-75 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 546 (6th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action (B) holding that the rehabilitation act does not incorporate the adas requirement that the employer have fifteen or more employees (C) holding employer was entitled to rely and act upon the written advice from the employees physician (D) holding unconscionable an arbitration agreement requiring employees to arbitrate claims against the employer but not requiring the employer to arbitrate claims against the employees (E) holding that the national parks act does not incorporate state procedural housekeeping rules such as rules of evidence or civil procedure but the act does incorporate outcome determinative state law

(B)