In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975).” Peters v. Narick, 165 W.Va. 622, 628 n. 13, 270 S.E.2d 760, 768 n. 13 (1980). This Court has determined repeatedly that the West Virginia Constitution may be more protective of individual rights than its federal counterpart. See, e.g., State v. Bonham, 173 W.Va. 416, 317 S.E.2d 5 Daley, 174 W.Va. 299, 324 S.E.2d 713 (1984) (state constitution compels striking limitation on soliciting after sunset even if federal constitution does not); Woodruff v. Board of Trustees of Cabell Huntington Hospital, 173 W.Va. 604, 611, 319 S.E.2d 372, 379 (1984) (Article III, § 1 "more stringent in its limitation on waiver [of fundamental rights] than is the federal constitution”); Pushinsky v. West Virginia Board of Law Examiners, 164 W.Va. 736, 266 S.E.2d 444 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 707, 255 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution (B) recognizing that state constitution imposes more stringent limitations on power of state to inquire into lawful associations and speech than those imposed by federal constitution (C) recognizing exception under state constitution (D) holding that appellate court assumes appellant claims no greater protection under state constitution than that provided by federal constitution when state and federal claims not briefed separately (E) holding missouri constitution requires stricter separation of church and state than does federal constitution

Answer: recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution


Question: court’s description of the panel’s rationale as “one over which reasonable jurists may differ” can hardly be construed as a ringing endorsement of Bush v. Gore’s precedential value or its application to the issue of variations in voting technology. Shelley II, 344 F.3d at 918. At the very least, the Ninth Circuit’s unanimous decision in Shelley II divested the panel decision of whatever precedential value it otherwise would have had. Undeterred, the majority struggles to accord such value to Shelley I because the rationale adopted by the majority is virtually identical to the one provided by the Shelley I panel — namely, that the plaintiffs’ novel equal protection claims are controlled by Supreme Court precedents that mandate the equal weighting of votes. Compare Maj. Op. at 870-71 (<HOLDING>), with Shelley I, 344 F.3d at 894-95 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error (B) holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional (C) holding that the counties use of outdated technology results in the weighting of votes differently (D) holding that a plaintiff need only show that the results of a polygraph examination were a factor in the termination of employment and rejecting requirement that results be the sole factor for employees discharge (E) holding that in a statutory fee case the results obtained factor was already subsumed in the lodestar and that results multipliers should be awarded only in some cases of exceptional success

Answer: holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error


Question: at 573 (I960)). Thus, where a movant’s sole claim is for monies paid based on a change in decisional law, the courts are hard pressed to find extraordinary circumstances or undue hardship under Rule 60(b)(6). For example, in In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 840 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir.1988), the court faced the question of “whether a final money judgment may be reopened [pursuant to a Rule 60(b)(6) motion] several years after the time for appeal has expired because of a favorable legal ruling in some other party’s appeal.” Finding that money judgments are inherently final and devoid of prospective application, the court denied relief. See id. at 194-95; but cf. Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Shalala (In re Blue Diamond Coal Co.), No. 3:93-CV-473, slip op. at 6-9 (E.D.Tenn. Nov. 4, 1998) (<HOLDING>). Under the Rule 60(b)(6) doctrine, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eastern enterprises decision was sufficiently extraordinary to warrant vacation of a final judgment (B) holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant (C) holding that such an order is not sufficiently final to be suitable for appellate review (D) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment (E) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence

Answer:
holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant