instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
separate recording of the trust or declaration of trust. As there is no evidence on the face of the deeds indicating a. contrary intent, the Personal Representatives, pursuant to their fiduciary responsibilities, seek a declaration that, pursuant to section 689.07(1), Norman held fee simple title to the properties on the date of his death. These allegations are clearly sufficient under the plain language of the statute. See Raborn, 974 So.2d at 328 (stating that under section 689.07(1), a deed that simply refers to grantee as “trustee” conveys a fee simple estate, and applying the statute to find that deed at issue fell under “contrary intention” exception such that grantee held mere legal title as trustee); One Harbor Fin, Ltd. v. Hynes Props., LLC, 884 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Heiskell v. Morris, 182 So.3d 714 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title (B) holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence (C) holding that trial court erred by granting surviving spouse fee simple title to estates exempt property (D) holding that trial court correctly applied section 689071 to find that grantee who held title as trustee owned property in fee simple absolute (E) holding that where individual held title to property as trustee but gave mortgage to bank in her individual capacity a title reference on the mortgage to the deed into her as trustee provided constructive notice that the mortgage was supposed to be from the individual as trustee or at the least that the holder of a subsequent interest would not be a bona fide purchaser
answer:
holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title


question:
See Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 627, 651 A.2d 92, 95 (1995). However, apart from any persuasive weight afforded the Ninth Circuit’s decision in C’Est Moi, NHIC proffers no case law specifically suggesting that common law doctrines such as uberrimae fidei and equitable fraud may not be modified or superseded by a contractual agreement between the insurer and the insured. On the contrary, as we have noted, a number of courts have embraced the ability of parties to contract around common law. See, e.g., King, 906 F.2d at 1540-41; Conn. Indem. Co., 390 F.Supp.2d at 166-67; Progressive N. Ins. Co., 314 F.Supp.2d at 829-30; see also, e.g., McBride v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2007 WL 5185293, at *18, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16917, at **64-65 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 29, 2007) (<HOLDING>). 19 . NHIC points out that during a telephone 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application (B) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (C) holding that insurance application clause modified federal common law governing misrepresentations because  once an insurer has entered into a policy by using an application form more favorable to the insured than the law provides it may not rely on a rule of law which is more stringent than the application form  quoting espinosa v guardian life ins 856 fsupp 711 717 dmass1994 (D) holding that the mccarranferguson act which bars application of a federal law in the face of a state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance did not preclude the concurrent assertion of the federal rico statute and nevada insurance law (E) recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous
answer:
holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application


question:
maximum, or (4) the waiver is otherwise unlawful, i.e., the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or pub-He reputation of judicial proceedings. Id, at 1327. Af noted’ Martmez waived his rigbt to appeal any component of his conviction in the plea agreement Further> at the plea colloquy, the district court asked Martinez if he understood that he was waiving his right to appeal bofch his sentence and any comPonent of his conviction or sentence’ and defendant said that he did derstand this’ Tr' of Plea Hr’g’ at 12‘ The appeal waiver did not provide any exception to the broad aPPeal waiver permitting him to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss' Thus> this claim is ^thin the scope of the appeal waive1' See United States v. Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225, 1233 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Further, Martmez has not met his burden of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendan s appeid he denial of his motion to dismiss was ithin scope of his appeal waiver because the plea cements waiver provision did not reserve this issue as an exceptionto the waiver (B) recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary (C) holding that a plea agreement with a waiver of direct appeal rights does not include a waiver of collateral remedies because the government could have included a waiver of collateral rights in the plea agreement and chose not to do so (D) holding that the waiver in two previous contracts was insufficient to support waiver of the contract at issue in that appeal (E) holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver
answer:

recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary