In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: purpose, we would have some authority to solve taxpayer’s problem. See Rhodes, 166 Vt. at 157, 688 A.2d at 1311 (noting that, to invoke impossibility rule, party “must dem onstrate why this Court should not construe the statute in its ordinary sense or why the consequences of such construction will cause hardship or constitute impossibility”). But our standard under this prudential rule is very limited and does not ordinarily extend to making choices, among many available, to solve the problem. There is simply no way to construe the statute to allow a transfer that occurred 319 days after an LLC’s articles of organization were filed without reading the words “at the time of formation” out of the statute. See Colwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 VT 5, ¶ 15, 175 Vt. 61, 819 A.2d 727 (<HOLDING>). ¶23. It is true that the Department’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (B) recognizing that though statute at hand does not fully address the problem legislature intended to address in view of the number of choices available to solve the problem    this is an inappropriate case for the court to fashion the particular remedy appellants seek because to do so would place court in the position of making policy choices best left to legislature (C) holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature (D) holding that considering an amendment is not the time to address the merits of a case (E) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language
[EX A]: holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case

[EX Q]: rule may be outdated, we have also recognized that “it is uniquely a province of the legislature to change it.” Reiter v. Yellowstone County (1981), Mont., 627 P.2d 845, 849, 38 St.Rep. 686, 690. In Reiter, we noted that because of the operation of section 39-2-503, MCA, the at-will employee was not employed on a “discharge for cause only” basis. We stated, “assuming arguendo that appellant had an implied contract with an implied covenant of good faith, the employer did not act in bad faith because its conduct was statutorily permissible.” 627 P.2d at 849-850, 38 St.Rep. at 690. In other words, under section 39-2-503, MCA, an employer or employee could terminate employment for any or all reasons, provided the reasons or manner of termination did not 7), 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (<HOLDING>); and Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. (1974), 114 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a contract action when employee terminated in order not to receive earned bonuses or commissions (B) holding employee not terminated in bad faith because no evidence suggested that employer discharged employee in order to retain em ployees previously earned sales commissions (C) recognizing contract action and limiting damages to those for breach of contract when employee terminated for refusal to date foreman (D) holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee (E) recognizing a tort action for wrongful discharge when employee was terminated because he refused to commit a criminal act
[EX A]: holding employee not terminated in bad faith because no evidence suggested that employer discharged employee in order to retain em ployees previously earned sales commissions

[EX Q]: in deceptive practices, Wilkey and his attorney were not deceived into thinking that the report was not favorable to him and therefore could not have relied on that assumption. Wilkey continues to assert that he was put “on unequal footing” in front of the hearing board. Appellant Br. at 25. However, a claim of fraud is concerned only with reliance on deception and provides no relief to those who see past the misrepresentations with which they are confronted. See Bryans v. English Nanny & Governess Sch., Inc., 117 Ohio App.3d 303, 690 N.E.2d 582, 590 (1996) (finding that there was no fraud when the plaintiff, by her own admission, “knew what [she] was getting [herself] into” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Andersons, Inc. v. Consol, Inc., 348 F.3d 496, 506 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, in the absence of evidence of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under ohio law fraud claim failed because there was no evidence of reliance (B) holding it was error to submit a fraud claim to the jury partly because there was no principle of law establishing an obligation of disclosure (C) holding that defense of fraud was waived where no special issue was submitted and there was disputed evidence (D) holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law (E) holding that a fraud claim premised on thirdparty reliance raises a cognizable claim under new york law
[EX A]:
holding it was error to submit a fraud claim to the jury partly because there was no principle of law establishing an obligation of disclosure