In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

for relief under § 3582(c). Nor is Brown entitled to pursue his claims through § 2241. A prisoner may proceed under § 2241 if § 2255 would be “inadequate of ineffective.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir.2002) (per curiam). We have held that § 2255’s “safety valve” applies only in rare circumstances, such as when an intervening change in the statute under which the petitioner was convicted renders the petitioner’s conduct non-criminal. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Brown has not satisfied that standard here, as he makes no allegation that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, but instead asserts only that he is “innocent” of being a career offender. See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120-21 (<HOLDING>). Brown must obtain a certificate of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under  841 and 846 was not cognizable under  2241 (B) holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor (C) holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (D) holding that dorsainvil did not permit petitioner to challenge sentence via  2241 based on intervening change in sentencing law (E) holding challenge to armedcareercriminal enhancement improper under  2241
holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under  841 and 846 was not cognizable under  2241

trial, arguing the court improperly excluded its sole expert witness, Bolt, from testifying at trial. The court denied the motion, stating that it did not completely exclude Bolt from testifying at trial, “but rather determ limine serve as the basis for the rule that “error claimed in a court’s ruling on a motion in limine is waived unless a timely objection is made when the evidence is offered at trial.” State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2006) (quoting State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Iowa 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Simkins v. City of Davenport, 232 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Iowa 1975). This is because the error only occurs, if at all, when the evidence is offered at trial and is either admitted or refused. State v. Langley, 265 N.W.2d 718, 720 (Iowa 1978) (<HOLDING>). There is, however, an exception to this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a sentence is imposed it is a valid final judgment until it is reversed or vacated (B) holding that it is not (C) holding that a bankruptcy order is not final unless it 1 (D) recognizing further normally the ruling is not a final one it is a red flag to counsel that the evidence is not to be brought before the jury unless and until it is separately taken up with the court  at trial (E) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence
holding that once a sentence is imposed it is a valid final judgment until it is reversed or vacated

requirements under UFTA, Gulf and Security nevertheless contend that as a matter of law and of public policy the statute of limitations should not have commenced in this action until they obtained the default judgment against Clark in August of 1997 in California. ¶24 As far as the law is concerned, Gulf and Security vigorously argue under the mistaken assumption that a creditor may not assert an UFTA claim until after the underlying judgment is entered. This persistent assumption represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law under UFTA. ¶25 Gulf and Security base their theory on our decision in Murphy v. Atkinson (1993), 262 Mont. 164, 864 P.2d 273, as well as a recent appellate court decision from California, Cortez v. Vogt (Cal.Ct.App. 1997), 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 853-54 (<HOLDING>). In Murphy, we determined that a cause of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the twoyear time limitation of rule 3850 does not commence until the sentence becomes final (B) holding that statements and charges by municipality may not be amended in light of legislative purpose of shielding police and similar employees from harassment (C) holding that in view of legislative statements of policy and purpose of the ufta as a cumulative and additional remedy limitation period did not commence until debtorcreditor relationship existed after judgment was made final (D) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence (E) holding that statements made in the course of negotiation were not contracts and such statements were merged into the final written agreement

holding that the twoyear time limitation of rule 3850 does not commence until the sentence becomes final