In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Id. The district court excluded this portion of the expert’s testimony. Id. at 1397. Relying on Downing, the Third Circuit reversed. Id. at 1401. We agree that expert testimony on eyewitness identification may properly be admitted under Daubert in certain circumstances, but Stevens simply does not persuade us that the district court abused its discretion in the instant case. We note that here there were five eyewitness identifica tions, not one. Likewise, as counsel for the government pointed out at argument, there was also testimony that Mr. Smith changed his alibi. In this admittedly close case, we hold only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony under the circumstances. See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification (B) holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification (C) holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider certain additional factors in evaluating the validity of eyewitness identification testimony (D) holding that a specific instruction was unnecessary because eyewitness was crossexamined and the eyewitness testimony was discussed in defense counsels opening statement (E) holding exclusion of expert eyewitness identification testimony harmless error where governments case included three separate eyewitnesses and a palm print that discredited the defendants alibi
[A]: (B)


[Q]: added). Plaintiffs point out, correctly, that beneficial use is an evolving and dynamic requirement of federal and state law. See Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal.2d 132, 140, 60 Cal.Rptr. 377, 429 P.2d 889 (1967) (While “what is a reasonable use of water depends on the circumstances of each case, such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of transcendent importance.”). Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 requires that all water provided pursuant to the Act be put to “beneficial use,” as defined by state law. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383; California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 665-67, 98 S.Ct. 2985, 57 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1978); see also City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1242, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 294, 5 P.3d 853 (2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (B) holding that mandamus was appropriate to require the director to deliver the full decreed water rights of a water right holder (C) holding that the montana constitution protects water rights against unreasonable state action  (D) holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district (E) recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest
[A]: (A)


[Q]: it is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”). B. Whether the FDIC Properly Determined the Amount of Deposit Insurance to Which Plaintiffs Were Entitled under the Regulations Applicable on August 8, 2008 18. The FDIC’s deposit insurance determinations are governed the regulations set forth in 12 C.F.R. Part 330. Regulations governing recognition of deposit ownership and fiduciary relationships note that, except in circumstances not relevant here, when “determining the amount of insurance available to each depositor, the FDIC shall presume that deposited funds are actually owned in the manner indicated on the deposit account records of the insured depository institution.” 12 C.F.R. § 330.5(a)(1). See also Villafane-Neriz v. F.D.I.C., 75 F.3d 727, 731 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). “Deposit account records” include “account 
 Holding statements: (A) holding affidavit statements by custodian of records based upon review of companys business records contained sufficient evidence of ownership of account (B) holding that the fdic is entitled to rely exclusively on the account records of the failed institution and that while ownership under state law is one prerequisite for insurance coverage the deposit account records are controlling (C) holding that when state law prohibited discovery of records of a medical review committee the district court should have determined whether the records came within the statutes coverage and if so whether the right of access nevertheless outweighed the public policy expressed by state law (D) holding that seventeen missing records does not constitute improper record keeping because the fact that the records are not at the station does not mean that the records are incorrect or inaccurate (E) holding that records relating to a student court were not education records
[A]:
(B)