In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: as well as recent country reports and his own affidavit, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that he failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegation that conditions in China have materially changed. We have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no abuse of discretion in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish changed conditions in China. Id. at 275 (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as “the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] ... it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion”); Jian Huan Guan, v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In addition, we find that the BIA did not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bia did not abuse its discretion in denying a petitioners untimely motion to reopen where she submitted proof of the birth of her two sons a letter from her parents warning of the danger of forced sterilization and a purported sterilization certificate for her cousin who also had two children (B) holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen (C) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (D) holding that the bia correctly imputed a parents knowledge that she and her children were not eligible for entry to the united states to her children (E) holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it
[A]: holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen


[Q]: 879 (citations omitted). We think there is a reasonable fit here between the State’s purpose of protecting society from persons who have been determined to be likely to reoffend if not placed in a secure facility and their placement in such a facility. Therefore, Garren has failed to show a substantive due process violation. VII. Vagueness. Although Garren states in a division heading in his brief that chapter 229A is vague as applied and on its face, he makes no argument in his brief in support of the contention that the statute is vague as applied to him. We deem this issue waived. See Iowa R.App.P. 14(a)(3) (“Failure in the brief to state, to argue or to cite to authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”); State v. Cooley, 608 N.W.2d 9, 13-14 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Garren is precluded from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief (B) holding issue waived where matter not addressed beyond reference in heading in brief (C) holding that an issue mentioned in a brief but not addressed is waived (D) holding issues argued orally but not addressed in brief were waived (E) holding an issue listed in statement of issues on appeal but not addressed in brief is abandoned
[A]: holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief


[Q]: section 302, but to preempt it. The debtors argue that precluding conversion of pending cases defeats the purpose of the 1986 Act, pointing to legislative history indicating that the Act was meant to give relief to farm families in economic crisis. See, e.g., 132 Cong.Rec. H9001 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986) (remarks of Mr. Synar). However, the purpose of giving farm families relief is not inconsistent with a decision to make the provisions of the new chapter available only in cases filed after the effective date of the Act. Congress could rationally have chosen to avoid disrupting the progress of pending cases, while finding it preferable to change the law governing future cases. Cf. Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors’ Committee, 454 U.S. 354, 102 S.Ct. 695, 70 L.Ed.2d 542 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Congress’ general intent to give farm 
 Holding statements: (A) holding to the effect that a court must consider section 24 fifth in conjunction with the antidiscrimination provisions of the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 as amended which are codified at title 11 of the united states code (B) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective (C) holding the broad jurisdictional grant given the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 bankruptcy act unconstitutional (D) holding that the bankruptcy reform act effectively overruled wrenn (E) holding that the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 publ no 95598 92 stat 2549 precluded dismissal of cases pending before enactment of the reform act in order to refile under the act
[A]:
holding to the effect that a court must consider section 24 fifth in conjunction with the antidiscrimination provisions of the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 as amended which are codified at title 11 of the united states code