In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: (8th Cir.2007)). “Continuances are generally disfavored and are not granted without a compelling reason.” Id. We have held the FSA is not retroactive. See United States v. Smith, 632 F.3d 1043, 1047-49 (8th Cir.2011) (concluding “the general savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, requires us to apply the penalties in place at the time the crime was committed”) (quoting United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909-10 n. 7 (8th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. McBride, — Fed.Appx. -,-, No. 10-2689, 2011 WL 2206725, at *2 (8th Cir.June 8, 2011) (unpub. per curiam). But even if we assume Woods can show prejudice, Woods fails to provide any support for his contention the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion. See id. at-, 2011 WL 2206725, at *3 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hawthorne, 414 Fed.Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a second continuance until congress acted on the fsa and assuming error no prejudice exists because the fsa is not retroactive (B) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (C) holding that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in denying a continuance because she acted within reason by accommodating the attorney (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: Attorney General, Mary Jo Volkert, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daniel M. King, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Judgment affirmed. Ray and Self, JJ., concur. 1 U. S. Const, amend. V; see also Ga. Const. Art. 1, § 3, ¶1 (a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph, private property shall not be taken or damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid.”); Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., _ U. S. _, _ (II) (A) (1) (135 SCt 2419,192 LE2d388) (2015) (“The principle reflected in the [Takings] Clause goes back at least 800 years to the Magna Carta . . . .”). 2 See, e.g., Wood v. B & S Enters., 314 Ga. App. 128, 128 (723 SE2d 443) (2012). 3 See Kellett v. Dep’t of Transp., 174 Ga.App. 214, 21 .App. 622, 624-25 (6) (522 SE2d 661) (1999) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge (B) holding that although portion of trial courts jury charge was inapplicable any error in providing it was harmless in light of the fact that charge considered as a whole was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury (C) holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole (D) holding that because trial court actually gave part of a jury charge that appellant claimed was improperly omitted and because remainder of courts charge adequately defined one of the legal terms at issue the courts jury charge taken as a whole was not misleading and did not constitute reversible error (E) holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: Amendment in his effort to confer with counsel. Although the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), found in that clause a right to counsel, calling the presence of counsel “the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege,” id. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602, and “[a]lthough conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may significantly impair that right [to avoid self-incrimination], a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990). That is of no help to Padilla, who does not face the prospect of a trial. But see Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), cert. granted sub nom. Chavez v. Martinez, — 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where they used threats and physical violence against the plaintiff in march 1992 to coerce a confession that was later used to convict him of murder (B) holding that application of statutory mandatory minimum in  841b1a does not violate defendants fifth and fourteenth amendment rights (C) holding that mental coercion led to an involuntary confession (D) holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  (E) holding that a plaintiff may bring a  1983 action alleging a violation of fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to be free from police coercion in pursuit of a confession even though statements were not used against him at trial
[EX A]:
(E)