In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: and Waste Control Specialists. LLC v. Sierra Club, appellate cause number. 03-12-00335-CV. 4 . See Sierra Club v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, cause number D-l-GN-12-001586. 5 .Despite this, the trial court issued a written order denying the motion twenty days after the deadline for ruling on the motion had passed. The order — though included in the record on appeal — is of no effect. Jain v. Cambridge Petroleum Grp., Inc., 395 S.W.3d 394, 396 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) ("The trial court's signing the order denying the motion [to dismiss pursuant to the Act] after it was already denied by operation of law is legally of no effect because the motion to dismiss was already denied.”); reran v. Fryer, 586 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Cor-pus Christi 1979, writ ref'd) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Appellees also insist that Sierra Club 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (B) holding court lost jurisdiction to enter its order after thirty days and the motion was denied by operation of law (C) holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed (D) holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction (E) holding that an order purporting to overrule a motion for new trial that had already been overruled by operation of law was a nullity

Output: holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions


Input: Consider Input: how much more of a connection to interstate commerce, if any, must be shown under a substantial rather than a de minimis standard. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 859-60 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 2455 (suggesting in a pre-Lopez opinion that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress could only reach criminal activity “ ‘substantially affecting interstate commerce.’ ”). It is clear, however, that the direct interstate connection required by Instruction 10 is much more substantial than the indirect interstate connection articulated by the government and disapproved of by the Court in Lopez. In Lopez, the connections articulated by the government between the possession of a firearm in a local school zone and interstate commerce were, to say the least, attenuated. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (<HOLDING>); see also Hicks, 106 F.3d at 189 (describing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference (B) holding that adverse inference rule is permissive (C) recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference (D) holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference (E) recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference

Output: holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference


Input: Consider Input: cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 687, 126 L.Ed.2d 655 (1994). 2 . The statute, in pertinent part, reads as follows: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 . For purposes of the motion, the Court will treat the plaintiff as having a constitutionally protected property interest in his position. See Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 968 F.2d 393, 401 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Most courts in the district, in fact, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a mississippi statute providing that employees could be terminated only for cause establishes a property interest under the fourteenth amendment (B) holding that a public employee who may only be terminated for cause has a property interest in his position that is protected by the 14th amendment (C) holding that any constitutionally protected property interest an employee has as a result of his employment contract is satisfied by payment of the full compensation due under the contract (D) holding driving licenses to be property protected by the 14th amendment (E) holding that contract of employment providing that professor could be terminated only for cause constituted property right protected by fourteenth amendment


Output: holding that a mississippi statute providing that employees could be terminated only for cause establishes a property interest under the fourteenth amendment