In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

arm’s-length transaction or from making as prompt or searching investigation as might otherwise be expected. In some situations there is no legal duty to use means available for discovering the fraud.... We are not prepared to say, however, that one in a relationship of trust and confidence is always justified as a matter of law in neglecting every precaution until something occurs to arouse his suspicions. Courseview, 312 S.W.2d at 205; Duthu v. Pena, 228 F.3d 409, 2000 WL 1056126, at *7-9 (5th Cir.2000) (unpublished) (collecting cases). This case presents precisely the sort of intentional concealment of ill-gotten profits (in the face of a duty to disclose such profits) that allows a plaintiff to benefit from equitable estoppel. See Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex.1983) (<HOLDING>);. Gibson v. Burkhart, 650 S.W.2d 185, 188-89 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a cause of action accrues once an injury has occurred and manifested itself (B) holding that because a physician lias a duty to disclose a negligent act or fact that an injury has occurred and physician failed to do so cause of action was deferred until victim learned of the right of action (C) recognizing negligent procurement to be a negligence cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action (E) recognizing the cause of action
holding a cause of action accrues once an injury has occurred and manifested itself

reasonable presumption against waiver should be indulged. Commonwealth v. Hooks, 375 Mass. 284, 288 (1978). A defendant’s illiteracy or low intelligence is not dispositive of his capacity to waive Miranda rights and render a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary confession. See Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 346, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 86-87 (2000) (concluding that the defendant, who had a learning disability and an IQ in the eighties, validly waived his rights in light of his “considerable prior experience with the police and in receiving Miranda warnings,” as well as his “cunning” attempts to exculpate himself “after being confronted with the [ ] evidence against him”); Commonwealth v. Hartford, 425 Mass. 378, 380-81 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Dingle, 73 Mass.App.Ct. 274, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a 15yearold was of suitable intelligence and maturity to validly waive miranda rights specifically focusing on the fact that the juvenile had been advised of his rights on three prior occasions and had once asked for an attorney (B) recognizing that plaintiffs had standing to allege infringements of their first amendment rights where the record established that they had been threatened with enforcement of the statute and that such enforcement would cause them injury (C) holding that language difficulties may impair the ability of a person in custody to waive his miranda  rights in a free and aware manner (D) holding admissible suspects statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his miranda rights (E) holding that irrespective of the suspects limited reasoning ability and iq of 73 evidence that the suspect had held various parttime jobs had been living on his own possessed a drivers license and had prior experience with law enforcement was probative of competence to waive miranda rights
holding that a 15yearold was of suitable intelligence and maturity to validly waive miranda rights specifically focusing on the fact that the juvenile had been advised of his rights on three prior occasions and had once asked for an attorney

unable to determine which, if any, conditions might mitigate adverse effects on adjoining properties. (Def.’s Mem. at 2.) This inability resulted from “uncertainty” regarding ILC’s proposed use, the County asserts (Def.’s Resp. at 13), again criticizing ILC’s reliance on testimony of counsel rather than ILC’s directors. (Def.’s Resp. at 5, 7.) Again, any purported uncertainty regarding ILC’s proposed use and how it could conduct its activities within the conditions placed on its proposed use appears to rest on an unsupported assumption that ILC would exceed its proposed use. ILC alleges that the “delay, uncertainty, and expense” that have accompanied its efforts to gain approval of its Conditional Use Application impose a substantial burden. Sts. Constantine and Helen, 396 F.3d at 901 (<HOLDING>). Importantly, the Seventh Circuit has noted 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing same factors (B) recognizing burden (C) holding that a citys requirement that the plaintiff refile a complete permit application did not constitute a substantial burden (D) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (E) holding that such factors may constitute a substantial burden

recognizing same factors