In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: (“Due process requires that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his ‘day in court.’ ”). The 1992 statute, as applied in this case, provided State Farm no “fair opportunity” to be heard before it was called upon to divest itself of a significant property interest if it chose to preserve its long-recognized right of subrogation. Instead, the statute placed State Farm in the untenable position of being bound by law to the outcome of private settlement negotiations between the Hassens and UniSun that essentially determined its immediate liability for an award of damages, including noneconomic damages, even though it was not a party to the negotiations and had no available means to assert any legal defenses to the Hassens’ claim. Cf. Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So.2d 604 (Fla.1956) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the statute entitled State Farm 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not (B) holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it (E) holding that a corporation is entitled to due process of law insofar as property rights are concerned so that a money judgment may not be entered against it where it was not a party to a cause and was not served with process even though the principal stockholder was a party to the cause
Example Output: holding that it is not

Example Input: its discretion by modifying the timesharing agreement without evidence that the welfare of the minor child would be promoted by returning him to his former school in Lake County and changing the timesharing arrangement to have the father assume the primary timesharing responsibilities. See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2014); Holland v. Holland, 140 So.3d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 584 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new hearing. On remand, the court shall take evidence and use the best interests of the child standard to determine if modification is in the child’s best interests in light of the parties’ inability to agree which school the minor child will attend. See, e.g., Watt v. Watt, 966 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Once that determination is made, the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification (B) holding that a hearing is required when a modification of parenting time would change the established custodial environment (C) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (D) holding that a custodial parents move to a foreign state without more is not a substantial change of circumstances that would support a modification of custody (E) holding that parties inability to agree on which private high school child would attend constituted substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of parenting plan
Example Output: holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification

Example Input: when he injured a woman by accidentally hitting her with a golf cart. We agree with the district court that St. Paul Travelers, Inc., (St. Paul), the insurer, owed a duty to defend Scher from the time the Red Cross tendered Scher’s defense to St. Paul. See Montrose Chem. Corp. of California v. Super. Ct., 6 Cal.4th 287, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 861 P.2d 1153, 1160 (1993) (explaining that the duty to defend arises if there is potential liability). Indeed, St. Paul concedes this point on appeal. However, the district court erred in interpreting the terms of the St. Paul policy to exclude from the definition of “covered person,” volunteers who were not acting at the express direction of Kraft. See Bank of the West v. Super. Ct., 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264-65, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545 (1992) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). As a result, St. Paul was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (B) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning (C) holding that an erisa insurance policy is governed by a uniform body of federal common law which requires policy language to be interpreted in an ordinary and popular sense as would a person of average intelligence and experience (D) holding that policy terms must be read in their ordinary and popular sense (E) holding that we are to read the statutory language in its ordinary and natural sense and if doubts remain resolve them in the light not only of the policy intended to be served by the enactment but as well by all other available aids to construction and looking to supplemental legislation and the scheme and structure of the legislation
Example Output:
holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning