In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
to landslide, even though earth movement was the most immediate cause). We therefore conclude that this is a case of multiple causation. B. We must now determine whether the deterioration or the fungicide manufacturers’ failure to warn is the “proximate efficient cause” of the damage to Berry’s irrigation pipes. In Sabella, the California Supreme Court defined “proximate efficient cause” both as “the one that sets others in motion” and as “the predominating or moving efficient cause.” Sabella, 27 Cal.Rptr. at 695, 377 P.2d at 895; see Garvey, 257 Cal.Rptr. at 296, 770 P.2d at 708 (“Sabella defined ‘efficient proximate cause’ alternatively as the ‘one that sets others in motion’ and as ‘the predominating or moving efficient cause.’”) (citations omitted); Howell, 267 Cal.Rptr. at 716 (<HOLDING>); Brian Chuchua’s Jeep, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d at 445 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the existence of purely jurisdictional elements (B) recognizing existence of two tests (C) recognizing first two exceptions (D) recognizing that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact (E) recognizing the existence of the special relationship

Ex Output:
recognizing the existence of purely jurisdictional elements


Ex Input:
10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *3-5 (D.Or. Dec. 13, 2010) (collecting cases); see also Nelson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 446 Fed.Appx. 158, 158 (11th Cir.2011) (similar). 93 . See, e.g., Wright v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, No. CV 11-00095-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 4101513, at *2 (D.Ariz. Sept. 14, 2011) (citing Fletcher v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 798 F.Supp.2d 925, 930 (N.D.Ill.2011)). 94 . Vida, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5. 95 . Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1069 (N.D.Cal.2011) (citations omitted). 96 . Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir.2011). 97 . Id. at 1040 (citations omitted). 98 . Id. 99 . Id. at 1039. 100 . Id. 101 . Id. (citation omitted). 102 . Dkt. 30 at 5-6; Dkt. 47 at 17-27. 103 . See In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 397-405 (D.Idaho 2009) (<HOLDING>); Saxon Mortg. Servs. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that creditors could not seek relief from a bankruptcy stay because they were not the real parties in interest and lacked standing as they were not holders of the notes and failed to establish that mers was the holder or had authority to transfer the notes (B) holding that the creditors had standing because the plan eliminated their interests in the borrower notes and deeds of trust and disposed of the assets in the estate from which they seek to be paid (C) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because they failed to demonstrate any likelihood that they would end up back in jail where alleged constitutional violations occurred (D) holding that despite evidence of voluntary transfer of promissory notes and the plaintiffs possession thereof the plaintiff was not the holder of the note under the ucc as the notes were not drawn issued or indorsed to her to bearer or in blank the plaintiff testified to some of the circumstances under which she obtained possession of the notes but the trial court made no findings of fact with respect thereto (E) holding that mers was not the beneficiary of a deed of trust under the oregon trust deed act absent conveyance to mers of the beneficial right to repayment and that mers could not hold or transfer legal title to the deed as the lenders nominee

Ex Output:
holding that the creditors had standing because the plan eliminated their interests in the borrower notes and deeds of trust and disposed of the assets in the estate from which they seek to be paid


Ex Input:
notice. Although in R.G. the record contained an order that notice be sent, we nonetheless find it controlling here. Appellant next argues that R.G. was wrongly decided because it did not require the State affirmatively to show he received notice. Appellant cites no authority holding section 54.11 places this burden on the State. Rather, he analogizes to Family Code section 53.06, which provides, “The juvenile court shall direct issuance of a summons to ... the child named in the petition.... ” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 53.06 (Vernon 1996). He also relies on the case law interpreting section 53.06, which requires the State affirmatively to show the juvenile received service of summons for jurisdiction to vest in the juvenile court. See In the Matter of D.W.M., 562 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex.1978) (<HOLDING>); see also Grayless v. State, 567 S.W.2d 216, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles (B) holding that juvenile court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims (C) recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings (D) holding the trial court had jurisdiction where summons was served on the attorney advocate for the juveniles guardian ad litem (E) holding 1 record must affirmatively show summons with which juvenile was served for jurisdiction to vest in juvenile court and 2 no jurisdiction existed despite juveniles attendance because no affirmative showing of service was made

Ex Output:

holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles