In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 235, 239 (Fed.Cir.1988). On appeal, Mr. Baney does not challenge the Board’s determination that collateral estoppel bars his leave-related claims. We agree with the Board that Mr. Baney’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel because they challenge the same issues that Mr. Baney actually litigated and that were necessary to the decisions in previous proceedings. See, e.g., Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 409 Fed.Appx. 319 (Fed.Cir.2010) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with eleven and a half hours of AWOL in November 2008); Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 263 Fed.Appx. 892 (Fed.Cir.2008) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with 23 days of leave while on active military duty for 30 days); see also Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 327 Fed.Appx. 895 (Fed.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because relitigation of issue was barred by collateral estoppel res judicata determination of finality of judgment dismissed for lack of standing was not relevant (B) holding that collateral attacks on bankruptcy courts jurisdiction are barred by res judicata (C) holding that the plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata when the federal courts judgment was finalized by denial of his petition for certiorari (D) holding that mr baneys challenge to being charged with 208 hours of annual leave while on active military duty for 30 days was barred by the res judicata effects of our 2008 decision (E) holding that a trustees claim was barred by res judicata and stating that the trustee could have asked the bankruptcy court to reserve his fraud claims for later adjudication which would have avoided his claims being barred

A: (D)
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Q: of Liability Provisions SBVS argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to lost rent or diminution in value damages because both of the Agreements contain provisions barring the award of consequential damages. The Court concludes that the enforceability of these provisions turns on disputed facts and, therefore, that summary judgment on this issue is improper. Generally, provisions limiting liability in construction contracts are enforceable under California law so long as the parties negotiated and expressly agreed to the limitations. See Cal. Civ.Code § 2782.5. However, such a provision is unenforceable if it is unconscionable or otherwise contrary to public policy. Markborough California, Inc. v. The Superior Court of Riverside County, 227 Cal.App.3d 705, 715, 277 Cal.Rptr. 919 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Under § 1668 of the California Civil Code, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs who had been served and received responses to interrogatories on personal jurisdiction had had such a fair opportunity (B) holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant (C) holding contract not unconscionable where parties were of equal bargaining power plaintiff had opportunity to have an attorney review the contract the contract was clear and easily read the plaintiff had been a party to similar contracts in the past and was under no financial pressure to sign the con tract (D) holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish procedural unconscionability since he had a reasonable opportunity to consider the agreement and the arbitration clause was clearly set forth in the contract (E) holding that limitation of liability clause in construction contract that is not unconscionable or in violation of public policy is valid so long as parties had a fair opportunity to accept reject or modify limitation and affirming summary judgment on basis that plaintiff had presented no evidence that it had had no such opportunity

A: (E)
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Q: 523(a)(4) defalcation prong, as stated by this court in In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684, 704 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1993), aff'd sub nom. Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 189 B.R. 882 (E.D.Pa.), reconsideration denied sub nom. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 198 B.R. 91 (E.D.Pa.1996), that the term “fiduciary capacity” is very narrowly defined. Thus, we stated, at id., that, to give rise to § 523(a)(4) liability, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to prove only that there was a fiduciary relationship between the parties, but also to prove that there is an express trust held by the fiduciary (debtor) on behalf of the beneficiary (creditor), which did not arise out of the action that created the fiduciary relation ship. See In re Spector, 133 B.R. 733, 739-40 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1991) (<HOLDING>); In re Shervin, 112 B.R. 724, 730-31 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal law defines fiduciary capacity and fraud or defalcation (B) holding that a statutorilyimposed fiduciary obligation created an express trust fiduciary relationship for purposes of  523a4 (C) holding that the fraud or defalcation prong of  523a4 requires the showing of an express trust (D) holding that an attorney is a fiduciary under section 523a4 (E) holding a duty of care without more insufficient to satisfy the fiduciary relationship element of  523a4 the federal courts adopting this narrow interpretation of fiduciary for purposes of the bankruptcy code gen erally hold that an express or technical trust is necessary to trigger the defalcation provision of  523a4

A:
(C)
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