In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

that, although the trial court was initially prepared to suppress based solely on the deputies’ conduct in providing Gomez’s name, the court ultimately applied the Neil factors and, finding that the identification was unreliable, ruled the state failed to establish that the witness’ recollection was independent of the suggestive identification. On these facts, the trial court could properly conclude that it was unnecessarily suggestive for the victims to be provided the defendant’s name and resulting access to his photo on the website before having any opportunity to identify him, thus giving rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See generally Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 518 (Fla.2005)(quoting Washington v. State, 653 So.2d 362, 365 (Fla.1994)) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. State, 566 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that showup identification proce dure was not unduly suggestive where officer said to eyewitness we got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about (B) holding that unprovoked flight is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such (C) holding showing of a single photo is unduly suggestive (D) holding that showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive where defendant was handcuffed and placed under police spotlight (E) holding due process requires suppression of testimony regarding pretrial identification when procedure employed is impermissibly suggestive
(C)

then the trial court erred in allowing prejudgment interest to accrue on that sum at 10% per annum “[bjecause no prejudgment interest statute applies to this case.” Assuming arguendo that their argument was true, then the answer to the problem is found in their own brief. They acknowledge that the prejudgment interest scheme established under § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code applied if no other statute did. See Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 530-31 (Tex.1998) (dealing with Texas Revised Civil Statute art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a), the predecessor to § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code). And, at the time of judgment, see Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy, Co., 113 S.W.3d 400, 414 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), prejudgment interest accrued at the rate of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate (B) holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment (C) holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment (D) holding that the penalty is applicable (E) holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract
(B)

fees in the amount of $6821.25. Baratta appealed the order, disputing both the entitlement and the amount granted. We find that Valley Oak was entitled to attorney’s fees because it was the prevailing party and properly claimed attorney’s fees. Chapter 720, Florida Statutes, deals with homeowners’ associations. It provides legal redress against the .association, members, directors, and officers for failure to comply with statutes, association documents, or community rules. Prevailing parties in the litigation are entitled to recover attorney’s fees under section 720.305, Florida Statutes (2002). Valley Oak became the prevailing party when Ba-ratta’s claim was dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Norland v. Villages at Country Creek Master Ass’n, 851 So.2d 770, 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). Valley Oak, as the prevailing party, properly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees (B) holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action (C) holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees (D) holding that the defendant became the prevailing party and thus properly claimed attorneys fees when the plaintiffs claim was involuntarily dismissed for failure to prosecute (E) holding that a defendant homeowners association was the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees when a plaintiff homeowners action was dismissed for failure to prosecute

(E)