instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
however, had received the full procedural due process to which he was entitled for the 1996 events to which the court was referring. The events, in fact, culminated in a decision and order of the Lincoln County Appeal Board calling for Pratt’s reinstatement. Defendants, therefore, are entitled to a summary judgment on this issue. Furthermore, because the LCPO has been dissolved, the issue of Pratt’s employment status, particularly after he was reinstated, is now moot. B. Constitutionally Protectable Property Interest Neither Exists In Pratt’s Job Duties Nor In Pratt’s Suspension When Such Suspension Is With Pay. [¶ 19] Pratt argues the defendants are not entitled to a qualified immunity because the defendants obstructed the reinstatement order of the Appeal Board -42 (4th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Fields v. Durham, 909 F.2d 94, 98 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under article i section 9 a person has no constitutionally protected privacy interest in abandoned property (B) holding inmates possess a constitutionally cognizable property interest in the interest earned on money held in their prison accounts (C) holding that sovereign immunity does not protect the state from claims for statutory employment benefits that constitute a protected property interest (D) holding that constitutionally protected property interest in employment does not extend to right to possess and retain particular job or to perform particular services (E) holding parental rights are constitutionally protected fundamental interest
answer:
holding that under article i section 9 a person has no constitutionally protected privacy interest in abandoned property


question:
so complete a defense as he might reasonably have desired”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 820, 115 S.Ct. 81, 130 L.Ed.2d 34 (1994); 2d Cir.: United States v. Lawal, 736 F.2d 5, 9-10 (1984) (applying authorities for non-constitutional error to erroneous exclusion of hearsay); 3d Cir.: United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1498-1500 (3d Cir.1988) (making "non-constitutional 'harmless error' determination” for erroneous exclusion of hearsay), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 836, 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989); 4th Cir.: United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 184-85 (1992) (citing Kotteakos as authority for holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay was harmless), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 914, 113 S.Ct. 2351, 124 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993); 5th Cir.: United States v. Barnett, 945 F.2d 1296, 1301 n. 3 (1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1487, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a (B) holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion (C) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right (D) holdingthat erroneous admission of hearsay did not prejudiceresults of trial so as to require reversal (E) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay
answer:
holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a


question:
an insurer to await the filing of a complaint against its insured will force insurers to defend claims that are unlikely to result in a duty to indemnify. We recognize the reality of Patrons’s concerns. We conclude, however, that the rationale supporting the comparison test outweighs those concerns. See Dingwell, 414 A.2d at 227. “We have always recognized that the application of the comparison test will occasionally requ dgment action before the injured claimant filed an action against the insured. Dolley, 669 A.2d at 1321. Rather than rejecting the action on ripeness grounds, we determined the insurer’s duly to defend vel non on the basis of what the corn-plaint might have alleged, in view of the parties' stipulation. Id. at 1323. 5 . See State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d at 38 (<HOLDING>); Perreault v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 568 
 Holding statements: (A) holding insurers duty to defend is determined by allegations in the petition (B) holding that insurance company could sue in insureds name following assignment of insureds interest against tortfeasor (C) holding that an insurers duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint against the insured (D) holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss (E) holding that insureds criminal convictions were sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issue of the insureds subjective intent for purposes of evaluating the insurers duty to defend
answer:

holding insurers duty to defend is determined by allegations in the petition