instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
evidence to conclude that the government’s conduct in this case amounted to a material breach, it denied Malone’s appeal. 87-2 BCA 1119,758, at 99,966. In our view, the government materially breached this contract. According to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241(e) (1981), “the extent to which the behavior of [a] party failing to perform ... comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing” is a significant factor in determining whether that party’s breach is material. The Restatement also states that “[sjubter-fuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith,” as does lack of diligence and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance. Id. § 205 comment d; cf. Lewis-Nicholson, Inc. v. United States, 550 F.2d 26, 32, 213 Ct.Cl. 192 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. United States, 151 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subcontractor could recover damages from general contractor for delay in performance under state law (B) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (C) holding that governmentcaused delay in contractor performance violated implied duty not to hinder performance of other party (D) holding that performance may be valid acceptance (E) holding that prior positive performance evaluations are not dispositive as to whether the employer was satisfied with the employees performance by the time of the termination
answer:
(C)


question:
a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, id., and “the court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations.” Warren v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C.Cir.2004). 1. Equal protection “Unless a classification ... is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage,” statutory distinctions are presumed constitutional, and will survive a challenge if the classification is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). Although not every non-suspect legislative classification passes muster under rational basis review, see, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 84 L.Ed.2d 751 (1985) (<HOLDING>), “the judiciary may not sit as a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts (B) holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others (C) holding that a preferential state tax rate for domestic businesses violated the equal protection clause because the states justifications  that the tax promoted domestic industry and encouraged investment in domestic assets  were not legitimate government interests since if they were any discriminatory tax would be valid if the state could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business (D) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety (E) holding that if federal income tax statutes are intended to benefit anyone it is the federal government to whom the withheld tax is to be remitted there is no indication anywhere in the language of the statutes that congress intended to confer rights on employees with respect to the withholding of tax
answer:
(C)


question:
on James’ EEO complaint. James’ EEO complaint was filed on April 2, 1986. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1613.281(b), James was authorized to file suit in federal district court “[a]fter one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days from the date of filing a complaint with the agency if there has been no decision.” Thus, his original complaint was filed prior to the time of authorization. However, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on March 2,1987. More than 180 days had elapsed by this time. The court concludes that the 180-day requirement in 29 C.F.R. § 1613.281(b) is better viewed as a condition precedent rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Cf Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983) (<HOLDING>); see also Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding exhaustion of regulatory administrative process is jurisdictional prerequisite to district court hearing discrimination claim (B) holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling (C) holding that the receipt of a righttosue letter in a title vii claim is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite (D) holding that the requirement of an actual case or controversy is a jurisdictional prerequisite under the constitution (E) holding that a coa is a jurisdictional prerequisite
answer:

(C)