In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury * * Black’s Law Dictionary 390 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Second) Torts § 903 (defining compensatory damages as “damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by him”); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 463 (3rd ed. 1961) (defining compensatory damages as “damages awarded to make good or compensate for an injury sus tained — distinguished from punitive damages ”). When civil rights plaintiffs seek “damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts.” Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2542, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (<HOLDING>). “Punitive damages aside, damages in tort 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are available in an intentional discrimination action even if the jury does not assess compensatory damages (B) holding that punitive damages which are based on the same underlying action justifying nondischargeability of compensatory damages are likewise nondischargeable (C) holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated (D) holding that damages based on the abstract value of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in action under civil rights act of 1871 (E) holding that damages based on the abstract value or importance of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such cases
[EX A]: holding that punitive damages are available in an intentional discrimination action even if the jury does not assess compensatory damages

[EX Q]: separate recording of the trust or declaration of trust. As there is no evidence on the face of the deeds indicating a. contrary intent, the Personal Representatives, pursuant to their fiduciary responsibilities, seek a declaration that, pursuant to section 689.07(1), Norman held fee simple title to the properties on the date of his death. These allegations are clearly sufficient under the plain language of the statute. See Raborn, 974 So.2d at 328 (stating that under section 689.07(1), a deed that simply refers to grantee as “trustee” conveys a fee simple estate, and applying the statute to find that deed at issue fell under “contrary intention” exception such that grantee held mere legal title as trustee); One Harbor Fin, Ltd. v. Hynes Props., LLC, 884 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Heiskell v. Morris, 182 So.3d 714 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title (B) holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence (C) holding that trial court erred by granting surviving spouse fee simple title to estates exempt property (D) holding that trial court correctly applied section 689071 to find that grantee who held title as trustee owned property in fee simple absolute (E) holding that where individual held title to property as trustee but gave mortgage to bank in her individual capacity a title reference on the mortgage to the deed into her as trustee provided constructive notice that the mortgage was supposed to be from the individual as trustee or at the least that the holder of a subsequent interest would not be a bona fide purchaser
[EX A]: holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title

[EX Q]: filed state petition for postconviction review. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001). Here, beca evens, J., concurring) (“[I]n our post-AEDPA world there is no reason why a district court should not retain jurisdiction over a meritorious claim and stay further proceedings pending the complete exhaustion of state remedies. Indeed, there is every reason to do so when AEDPA gives a district court the alternative of simply denying a petition containing unexhausted but nonmeritorious claims, and when the failure to retain jurisdiction would foreclose federal review of a meritorious claim because of the lapse of AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period.”); cf Palmer v. Carlton, 276 F.3d 777, 781 (citing Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374 (2d Cir.2001)) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has recently held, however, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a petition unexhausted because the petition provides no citation of any case that might have alerted the court to the alleged federal nature of the claim and the petition does not contain a factual description supporting the claim citations omitted (B) holding that a district court faced with a mixed petition should stay the unexhausted claims pending exhaustion rather than dismiss them without prejudice for the same purpose it is preferable to stay proceedings pending exhaustion (C) holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider claims raised in a petition for review unless the petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies (D) holding that a district court faced with a mixed petition should dismiss only the unexhausted claims in the habeas petition and stay further proceedings on the remaining portion until the petitioner has exhausted hisher remedies in state court (E) holding that a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing any claims that have not been exhausted in state court
[EX A]:
holding a petition unexhausted because the petition provides no citation of any case that might have alerted the court to the alleged federal nature of the claim and the petition does not contain a factual description supporting the claim citations omitted