In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: of priorities for economic development” — were the centers of power in many areas of importance. Harry Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789-1910, Law and Soc’y (Fall 1975) 57, 97. See generally id. at 86-100 (discussing diffusion of power and rnment’s contentions here ... would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”); id. at 578, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (“[T]he federal balance is too essential a part qf our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (<HOLDING>); id. at 178, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (“No matter how 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that despite 1985 amendments minimum jurisdictional amount remains 50000 (B) holding that the protect act amendments to the standard of review apply retroactively (C) holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an officials single decision or act (D) holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect (E) holding unconstitutional taketitle provision of the lowlevel radioactive waste policy amendments act of 1985
[A]: (E)


[Q]: that on her return a company manager told Watson in a four-hour meeting in which she cried constantly that she was a poor and incompetent supervisor; that a manager transferred supervisory duties away from her and told her to go home; and that a personnel manager told her that she was considered a bitch and that she could either resign or be demoted to a position in which she would be supervised by her subordinate trainees. We believe that these facts, though covering a shorter period than that in Nolan, could constitute the necessary aggravating factors such that a trier of fact could (but not necessarily would) conclude that a reasonable person would find the conditions so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify resigning. See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration (B) holding in a fair labor standards act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion harassed over the next two weeks and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job (C) holding right to liquidated damages under fair labor standards act nonwaivable (D) holding that discriminatory pay reduction under fair labor standards act does not constitute continuing violation (E) holding that the otca limitations period applied to a claim alleging a breach of the fair labor standards act by the state
[A]: (B)


[Q]: could have been the culpable party” and that “the court’s rulings left the defense with no way to suggest an answer to [the] question” of “who else the cocaine could have come from.” III. Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress physical evidence obtained as a result of the arrest team’s entry into the apartment. He argued, and contends again on appeal, that as the officers did not have a search warrant for the premises and as he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment as a frequent guest, the entry of the arrest team violated the Fourth Amendment. Citing Morton v. United States, 734 A.2d 178 (D.C.1999), the trial court found that Brown had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment as an invited guest of Powell, the owner of the premises. See id. at 182 (<HOLDING>). The court ruled, however, that although the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the driver of a ear owned by his wife who had given him permission to use it had a legitimate expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment (B) holding that rooming house residents had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the front hallway of the house they shared which was not obviously a rooming house open to the general public (C) holding that because social guests of the host generally have a legitimate expectation of privacy  appellant met his burden of showing that he had a protectible interest in the house the police entered in order to seize him (D) holding that defendant staying in abandoned house had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key to the house and the ability to let people in and out of it (E) recognizing record supported determination that defendant lacked expectation of privacy in house
[A]:
(C)