In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: Thus, CERC-LA specifically provides for a private right of action to institute civil actions to recover the costs involved in the cleanup of hazardous wastes from those responsible for their creation. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir.1989); 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 917, 111 S.Ct. 2014, 114 L.Ed.2d 101 (1991). Moreover, an entity that is responsible for the remediation of a hazardous waste site under CERCLA may assert a claim for contribution against other responsible parties under § 9613(f). New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1122 (3d Cir.1997). See also SC Holdings, Inc. v. AAA Realty Co., 935 F.Supp. 1354, 1362 (D.N.J.1996)(<HOLDING>). In its reply papers, the Novak Group does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the michigan department of natural resources liable under cercla for remedial actions which exacerbated the contamination at a site (B) recognizing a right to contribution (C) holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla (D) holding that parties liable for at least a portion of the costs of remediating a hazardous site are limited to the contribution scheme under section 9613f of cercla (E) holding that site control alone is an improper basis for imposition on lessees of owner liability under cercla

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: Attorney General, Mary Jo Volkert, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daniel M. King, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Judgment affirmed. Ray and Self, JJ., concur. 1 U. S. Const, amend. V; see also Ga. Const. Art. 1, § 3, ¶1 (a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph, private property shall not be taken or damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid.”); Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., _ U. S. _, _ (II) (A) (1) (135 SCt 2419,192 LE2d388) (2015) (“The principle reflected in the [Takings] Clause goes back at least 800 years to the Magna Carta . . . .”). 2 See, e.g., Wood v. B & S Enters., 314 Ga. App. 128, 128 (723 SE2d 443) (2012). 3 See Kellett v. Dep’t of Transp., 174 Ga.App. 214, 21 .App. 622, 624-25 (6) (522 SE2d 661) (1999) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge (B) holding that although portion of trial courts jury charge was inapplicable any error in providing it was harmless in light of the fact that charge considered as a whole was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury (C) holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole (D) holding that because trial court actually gave part of a jury charge that appellant claimed was improperly omitted and because remainder of courts charge adequately defined one of the legal terms at issue the courts jury charge taken as a whole was not misleading and did not constitute reversible error (E) holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: sentence, or resentencing. See id. § 9546. Consequently, because the only claim at issue in a motion for post-conviction DNA testing is a convicted individual’s eligibility for such testing under the aforementioned provisions of Section 9543.1, when the trial court enters an order either granting or denying the testing, the litigation under this section is at an end: the sole claim between the parties — the Commonwealth and the movant — has been addressed by the trial court and finally disposed of. Thus, under the plain language of Rule 341(b), because a trial court order granting or denying the motion for DNA testing disposes of all claims raised by all parties to the litigation, it is, therefore, a final order. See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 566 Pa. 307, 310-11, 780 A.2d 646, 648 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In the instant matter, the Commonwealth, as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonfinal order is immediately appealable where it finally determined claims of right separable from and collateral to rights asserted in the action emphasis added (B) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (C) holding that pursuant to parap 341b order of pcra court which fully and finally disposed of all issues before it was final and immediately appealable (D) holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court (E) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order


Output: (C)