In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
so restricted. Rather, ... the doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system. One of those realities is that attorneys often must rely on the assistance of investigators and other agents in the compilation of materials in preparation for trial. It is therefore necessary that the doctrine protect materials prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney himself. Id. at 238-39, 95 S.Ct. 2170. Accordingly, federal courts have consistently ruled that the work product doctrine is not inapplicable merely because the material was prepared by or for a party’s insurer or agents of the insurer. See Railroad Salvage of Conn. Inc. v. Japan Freight Consolidators (U.S.A.), Inc., 97 F.R.D. 37, 41 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 779 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.1985); Home Ins. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that correspondence between defendant and its liability carriers was protected (B) holding that the prohibition of inmatetoinmate correspondence was not an unconstitutional infringement of prisoners first amendment rights (C) recognizing correspondence appeared to establish a settlement relationship between the parties given the letters presented an attempt to curb further litigation (D) recognizing first amendment and fourteenth amendment interests in inmate correspondence (E) holding that a sixmonth gap between the protected activity and the employees termination was insufficient to infer that the protected activity was a contributing factor

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
or creating documents with mistakes on them and signing my name to them to make me appear as if I had been inaccurate .... ” Paragraph 25: The sentence “I confidentially complained about this behavior to Bruce Smith, who, instead of taking action to prevent Burchfield from continuing her pattern of behavior toward me, apparently told Burchfield to counsel me.” Paragraph 32: The sentence “I believe that this move was the beginning point of a concerted effort to remove me from the workplace based on my age.” Paragraph 36: The sentence “I believe that Albertson’s did not provide all of the time sheets from all vendors of temporary help.” Paragraph 37: The sentence “I believe that my combination of formal college education and experience, even though I did not obtain a co h Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). With respect to paragraphs 22, 28, 34, 39, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a single conversation to be sufficient evidence of dissolution to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that mere conclusion of affiant without some supporting facts are insufficient to raise fact issue necessary to preclude summary judgment (C) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (D) recognizing that the plaintiffs mere assertions that the defendant had a discriminatory intent were inadequate without substantial factual evidence to raise an issue to preclude summary judgment (E) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
425 F.3d 20, 22-23 (1st Cir.2005) (mandatory conditions); United States v. Tulloch, 380 F.3d 8, 13-14 & n. 8 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (standard conditions). We also note that at least two other circuits have held that defendants have constructive notice for “special” conditions that become “recommended” when certain criteria are met. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 937 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Asunción-Pimental, 290 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir.2002) (stating that, where specific factors necessary to make “special” conditions “recommended” are present, “these ‘special’ conditions are no different in practical terms from ‘standard’ conditions, that is, they are generally recommended”). But see United States v. Thomas, 299 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The financial disclosure condition imposed by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release (B) holding that for purposes of revoking supervised release the applicable guidelines are those in effect at the time of the supervised release violations rather than those in effect at the time of initial offense (C) holding that the failure to articulate  orally that conditions  5d13d2 and 3 apply to a defendants sentence of supervised release does not create a conflict with the judgment imposing these conditions (D) recognizing that probation officers are mandated to enforce a sentencing courts terms and conditions of supervised release (E) holding that conditions announced for the first time in a written judgment that govern more than the basic administration of supervised release violate a defendants right to be present at sentencing

Ex Output:

(E)