In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

waived his attorney-client privilege when his attorney failed to make timely objections to questions that it alleged sought privileged communications. This argument has no merit for two reasons. First, many of the questions Airdata asked did not seek confidential communications. Therefore, no objection was necessary to preserve the privilege. Second, Jenney’s current attorney did make timely objections to those questions actually seeking confidential communications. The fact that Jenney’s attorney had to interrupt him to make the objection is not sufficient to establish a waiver. Because the objections were made as soon as the confidential nature of the communication became apparent, Jenney did not waive the privilege. Cf. Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee, 837 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege (C) holding that disclosure orders adverse to the attorneyclient privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine (D) holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts (E) holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant
(A)

concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. However, courts faced with this issue have refused to apply this provision to government employees testifying in criminal trials based on the rationale that no individual can bind the sovereign. See United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1246 (7th Cir.1979) ("Because the agents of the Government are supposedly disinterested in the outcome of a trial and are traditionally unable to bind the sovereign, their statements seem less the product of the adversary process and hence less appropriately described as admissions of a party.” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954, 100 S.Ct. 2923, 64 L.Ed.2d 812 (1980); United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Durrani, 659 F.Supp. 1183 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible (B) holding inconsistent out of court statements otherwise admissible not admissible against government in criminal prosecution (C) holding in a criminal case that a statement by an unavailable declarant was not admissible as a declaration against his penal interest and was not admissible under rule 804b5 either (D) holding statements by coconspirator nontestimonial and thus admissible (E) holding alford plea admissible in burglary prosecution
(B)

F.3d 1348, 1353 (11th Cir.2012). Thus, Plasencia’s claim is not proeedurally barred because the state court did not “clearly and expressly [state] that its judgment rests on a procedural bar.” See Johnson, 938 F.2d at 1173. Furthermore, Plasencia exhausted his state court remedies because he presented his claim to the state’s highest court in his motion for rehearing on direct appeal, and in his Rule 3.850 motion, which was affirmed per curiam by the Second District Court of Appeal. See Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir.2010) (stating to exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must have presented the issues raised in the federal habeas petition to the state’s highest court,' either on direct appeal or collateral review); see also Jenkins v. State, 385 So.2d 1356, 1359 (Fla.1980) (<HOLDING>). II. BLAKELY ERROR Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute could not grant jurisdiction to dis trict courts of appeal over nonfinal arbitration order because the florida constitution reserved to the florida supreme court the power to define the interlocutory jurisdiction of district courts (B) holding new york could lawfully modify a florida custody decree because florida court had right under florida law to change the decree (C) holding a per curiam affirmance from a florida district court of appeal is not renewable by the florida supreme court (D) holding that where florida state court had not addressed choiceoflaw issues with regard to directors liability federal court could presume that florida court would follow the restatement second of conflict of laws based on the florida courts past reliance on the treatise (E) holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction

(C)