instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
1999) (same); Hill v. Fidelity Fin. Servs. (In re Hill), 152 B.R. 204, 206 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1993) (same); In re Reese, 194 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr.D.Md.1996) (same); Barclays Am./Mortgage Corp. v. Wilkinson (In re Wilkinson), 186 B.R. 186, 191 (Bankr.D.Md.1995) (same); In re Redditt, 146 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr.S.D.Miss.1992) (stat ing that “[b]y the statute’s own terms, only the trustee has standing to exercise the strong-arm avoidance powers”); Mast v. Borgess Medical Center (In re Mast), 79 B.R. 981, 982 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1987) (same); In re Driver, 133 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.1991) (stating that “a Chapter 13 debtor is not explicitly bestowed with the trustee’s strong arm transfer avoidance powers.”); Hollar v. United States (In re Hollar), 174 B.R. 198, 203 (M.D.N.C.1994) (<HOLDING>). As In re Higgins, most of the majority 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that chapter 13 debtors have standing to bring avoidance actions by reasoning that chapter 13 trustee has standing but little incentive to bring avoidance actions that will result in benefit to debtors of recovering exempt assets (B) holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case (C) holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees  avoidance power (D) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (E) holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13
answer:
(C)


question:
court failed to question any of the prospective jurors regarding their understanding and acceptance of the first Zehr principle, defendant is presumed innocent of the charges against him. With regard to the second Zehr principle, the State’s burden of proof, the circuit court questioned the prospective jurors as to whether they would sign the appropriate verdict form if the State had or had not met its burden of proof. This was a “general question concerning the juror’s willingness to follow the law” (177 Ill. 2d R. 431, Committee Comments, at lxxix) which did not comply with the 2007 amended rule’s requirement that the court question the prospective jurors regarding their understanding and acceptance of the State’s burden. See also People v. Anderson, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (2009) (<HOLDING>). The circuit court questioned the prospective 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plan did not comply (B) holding that such a general question regarding the prospective jurors willingness to follow the law did not comply with the 2007 amended version of rule 431b (C) recognizing general rule (D) holding that the february 28 2007 interim rule was invalid because it failed to comply with the administrative procedure act (E) recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions
answer:
(B)


question:
Settlement is GRANTED. However, the Court wishes to clarify the Magistrate’s analysis of the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The Magistrate states in his report and recommendation that “in this Circuit a district court has jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements, on motion by counsel especially when the non-moving party refuses to comply with the agreement before the case has been dismissed.” Mag. Report and Recommendation at 5, Le Bon Pain, Inc. v. Guyon and Co., Inc., No. 89-0616 (July 26, 1989). The Magistrate notes the existence of an intracircuit conflict over the issue of whether a district court retains jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements before a case has been dismissed. Compare Cia Anon Venezolana De Navigacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33 (5th Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>) with Londono v. City of Gainesville, 768 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court has the inherent power to summarily enforce settlement agreements  in a pending case (B) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals (C) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it (D) recognizing use of ancillary jurisdiction in subsequent proceedings for the exercise of the courts inherent power to enforce its judgments (E) recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants
answer:

(A)