In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

to recall the mandate discussed in Calderon, by comparison, seek the adjudication of constitutional claims; they do not constitute collateral attacks on the integrity of the court of appeals’s judgment. Hence, they differ from true Rule 60(b) motions and must be denied. D. Having distinguished between SSHPs and Rule 60(b) motions, I nonetheless share the majority’s general concern that petitioners will disguise the former as the latter to avoid AEDPA’s restrictions. We must craft a holding that curtails this abuse. We do not write on a blank slate here, as virtually all of our sister circuits have addressed this issue. Some circuits have held that all Rule 60(b) motions are SSHPs, regardless of the nature of the claims presented. See Lopez v. Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Gee v. Shillinger, 1998 WL 43155, *1-*2, 1998 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court erred in failing to recharacterize a rule 60b motion as an sshp and reversing with the instruction to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (B) holding that defenses under rule 60b may be waived (C) holding without specifying exceptions that rule 60b motions are sshps under aedpa (D) holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc  3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp (E) holding without extended discussion that the peti tioners rule 60b motion was an sshp under aedpa
(E)

from representing plaintiffs “in either this or similar actions.” Id. at 1196. Likewise here, Yanny would be prohibited from representing the interests of any party against his former client, the Church of Scientology organization. However, I see no basis for precluding Berry or the Musick, Peeler firm from representing F.A.C.T.Net based on the fact that they formerly represented Yanny in defending him against charges made by the Church of Scientology. Moreover, in suing Yanny as it did, Plaintiffs waived any privilege with respect to any information relevant to the issues raised by their claims and released Yanny from his obligation of secrecy with respect to that information. See Carlson, Collins, Gordon & Bold v. Banducci, 257 Cal.App.2d 212, 228, 64 Cal-Rptr. 915 (Cal.App.1967) (<HOLDING>) That principle of California professional 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that authorization cards are privileged from disclosure to employer (C) holding an attorney is released from those obligations of secrecy which the law places upon him whenever the disclosure of a communication otherwise privileged becomes necessary to the protection of the attorneys own rights (D) holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client (E) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense
(C)

vehicles, such as trucks, could also be driven off-road, trucks are occasionally needed for off-road driving for such legitimate purposes as the maintenance of the park grounds and the transportation of large and/or cumbersome machinery. Clearly, off-road motorcycling would serve no such purposes. Thus, like in Wroblewski Shanks has not alleged facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality coupled with a readily apparent justification for the ban. Therefore, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss Shanks’ equal protection claim. C. Substantive Due Process In determining whether there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel, courts have also looked to the substantive branch of the Due Process clause. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3rd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Jonathan Hangartner, Comment, The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that false statements are constitutionally protected (B) holding right to travel emanates from concept of substantive due process (C) recognizing that before due process guarantees are implicated there must be a deprivation by the government of constitutionally protected interest (D) recognizing that a defendants right to be heard in criminal proceedings prior to sentencing is constitutionally protected (E) holding that while there is not a constitutionally protected right of intrastate travel under equal protection there is a constitutionally protected right to intrastate travel arising from the due process clause

(E)