In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
--------
Question: separate recording of the trust or declaration of trust. As there is no evidence on the face of the deeds indicating a. contrary intent, the Personal Representatives, pursuant to their fiduciary responsibilities, seek a declaration that, pursuant to section 689.07(1), Norman held fee simple title to the properties on the date of his death. These allegations are clearly sufficient under the plain language of the statute. See Raborn, 974 So.2d at 328 (stating that under section 689.07(1), a deed that simply refers to grantee as “trustee” conveys a fee simple estate, and applying the statute to find that deed at issue fell under “contrary intention” exception such that grantee held mere legal title as trustee); One Harbor Fin, Ltd. v. Hynes Props., LLC, 884 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Heiskell v. Morris, 182 So.3d 714 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title (B) holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence (C) holding that trial court erred by granting surviving spouse fee simple title to estates exempt property (D) holding that trial court correctly applied section 689071 to find that grantee who held title as trustee owned property in fee simple absolute (E) holding that where individual held title to property as trustee but gave mortgage to bank in her individual capacity a title reference on the mortgage to the deed into her as trustee provided constructive notice that the mortgage was supposed to be from the individual as trustee or at the least that the holder of a subsequent interest would not be a bona fide purchaser

Answer: holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title


Question: made in open court. It also serves as a stipulation that no proof by the prosecution need b[e] advanced .... It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending controversy.’ ” Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n. 4, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (quoting Woodard v. State, 42 Ala.App. 552, 171 So.2d 462, 469 (1965)). See also Dingier v. State, 408 So.2d 530, 531 (Ala.1981) (same). In the case at hand, Clark entered into a “good behavior” stipulation that the State could prove a prima facie case of guilt. When Clark failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, he was adjudicated guilty based on his stipulation. During a hearing on Clark’s motion for a new trial, the prosecutor described a “goo (Ala.Crim.App.1999), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Because Clark was adjudicated guilty based 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed (B) holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea (C) holding that court must decide case on basis of facts admitted unaffected by stipulation made by counsel (D) holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional (E) holding that a defendants strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendants stipulation did not establish guilt

Answer: holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed


Question: limit Section 74.351(a) imposes on a health liability claimant. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a new trial with respect to dismissal of her claims. We overrule Awoniyi’s second point of error. Attorney’s-Fee AwaRD to the Hospital In her third point of error, Awoniyi contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the hospital because she timely served her expert report on the hospital. As discussed above, Awoniyi’s expert report was not served timely. Where an expert report is not served timely, Section 74.351 imposes a duty on the trial court, upon a health care provider’s motion, to dismiss the claims and to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the health care provider. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>). The trial court thus did not err in awarding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the term shall is mandatory for purposes of statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous (B) holding that attorneys fee statute using shall language is not discretionary (C) holding that a statute shall not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication (D) holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language (E) holding provision in attorneys fee contract requiring client that terminated contract to immediately pay attorney fee equal to present value of attorneys interest in case was inconsistent with public policy and unconscionable

Answer:
holding that the term shall is mandatory for purposes of statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous