In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: are reversed with instructions that he be re-sentenced under a correctly calculated score sheet. Cooper also asserts the same argument for his 41.712-month sentence on the delivery of cocaine charge. The question, however, is whether this error is harmless because Cooper was sentenced as a habitual felony offender. While the 41.712-month sentence happened to be equal to the minimum guidelines sentence under the incorrectly calculated score sheet, the guidelines scoresheet is legally irrelevant because Cooper was habitualized. See § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2002)(“A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002 [The Criminal Punishment Code].”); Tannihill v. State, 848 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); LaFleur v. State, 812 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(<HOLDING>); Kenon v. State, 780 So.2d 258, 261 (Fla. 5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding habitual sentence rendered guidelines scoresheet irrelevant (B) holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal (C) holding if the plea agreement was not conditioned on the sentencing guidelines an appellant is not entitled to relief because his sentence is not illegal (D) holding that defendant entitled to resentencing if the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines would constitute an impermissible departure sentence under the 1994 guidelines (E) holding that defendant should be resentenced where district court imposed a sentence under an erroneously calculated guidelines range  even where the sentence imposed fell within the correct range
[EX A]: holding habitual sentence rendered guidelines scoresheet irrelevant

[EX Q]: purpose of this Memorandum is to explain why the Court declined to do these things. As disclosed by plaintiff in its ex parte motion, the sale of decoding devices like those defendants are claimed to have offered and sold is prohibited by federal criminal statute, see 47 U.S.C. § 553(b), as well as by Illinois criminal statute, see 720 ILCS 5/16-10(a)(4). Under the circumstances, information disclosing defendants’ purchases and sales of the devices, the revenues obtained from those sales, the assets they now have that may have been derived from those sales, and the locations where they keep their records and other descrambling devices is, without question, information that might tend to incriminate the defendants. See, e.g., FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); SEC v. Rehtorik, 755 F.Supp. 1018, 1019 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government (B) holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment (C) holding that abrogating the right to sell endangered eagles feathers did not implicate the fifth amendment (D) holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege (E) recognizing that preliminary injunction requiring defendant to disclose records might implicate fifth amendment
[EX A]: holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government

[EX Q]: its judgment after conducting an ore tenus proceeding, the trial court’s judgment is presumed to be correct and will not be disturbed unless the record shows that it is contrary to the great weight of evidence. Ex parte McConathy, 911 So.2d 677 (Ala.2005). “The ore tenus rule does not, however, extend to cloak a trial judge’s conclusions of law or incorrect application of law to the facts with a presumption of correctness.” $3,011 in United States Currency v. State, 845 So.2d 810, 814 (Ala.Civ.App.2002). Section 20-2-93, Ala.Code 1975, provides for the forfeiture o g that 10-week delay between the seizure of property and the institution of forfeiture proceedings did not meet the promptness requirement of § 20 — 2—90(c)); Eleven Automobiles v. State, 384 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App.1980) (<HOLDING>); Winstead v. State, 375 So.2d 1207 (Ala.Civ. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a forfeiture proceeding instituted four weeks after seizure met the promptness requirement of the statute (B) holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court (C) holding that forfeiture proceeding instituted more than seven months after property was seized did not meet the promptness requirement of  202  93c (D) holding that forfeiture proceedings instituted eight months after the seizure of property failed to meet the promptness requirement (E) holding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a criminal forfeiture action where a state court in a related state court forfeiture proceeding had in personam jurisdiction over the same currency subject to forfeiture
[EX A]:
holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court