TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: evaluate each piece of evidence according to its independent worth. B. The Copyright Act of 1909 The plaintiff renewed its copyright in The URANTIA Book in 1983, by which time the Copyright Act of 1976 had become effective. However, the renewal section under which the book falls, Section 304, is identical to that of Section 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909. Furthermore, as the plaintiff correctly states, “[t]he passage of the [1976 Act] did not alter the definition of a Svork for hire’ for the purpose of renewing a copyright originally registered under the [1909 Act].... Thus, whether The URANTIA Book is a ‘eommis-sioned work’ must be decided under the Copyright Act of 1909.” (Pl.’s Br. at 5 n. 4.) See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 217, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 1758, 109 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 606 n. 2 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court (B) holding renewal rights in pre1978 works require court to look to the language of and case law interpreting  24 (C) recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result (D) holding that if statutory language is plain and unambiguous this court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent (E) holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language

SOLUTION: holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court

PROBLEM: citizens of Alabama for purposes of the diversity jurisdiction analysis. This narrow and specialized statute provides in pertinent part: In any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen. Andalusia and Hughes, who are insureds but not parties defendant, contend that a realignment of Lane will make the case into a direct action by Lane against the insurers, and because it is one in which the insureds are not joined as parties defendant, diversity would be destroyed by § 1332(a)(1). This contentio d.2d 73 (1974). But where the s 13 F.Supp. 367, 371 (D.Conn.1970) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 456 F.2d 282 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding action by insured against his own insurer under uninsured motorist provisions of policy not a direct action within section 1332c proviso (B) holding that insured cannot bring an action against its insurer for bad faith failure to settle a claim in the absence of an excess verdict (C) holding action by judgment creditor of insured against insurer for bad faith failure to settle claim against insured not a direct action within section 1332c proviso (D) holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith (E) holding that a negligence claim against an insured and a bad faith claim against the insurer are not separate as the first must be proved to prevail on the second

SOLUTION: holding action by insured against his own insurer under uninsured motorist provisions of policy not a direct action within section 1332c proviso

PROBLEM: for the proposition that “a plaintiff is not required to produce evidence of emotional distress beyond his own testimony.” King, 452 F.Supp.2d at 1281. Two other courts faced with the same question since Moore was decided, however, have come out the other way and required more than an FCRA plaintiffs own testimony to support a claim for emotional distress damages. See Sampson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. CV204-187, 2005 WL 2095092, at *5 (S.D.Ga. Aug. 29, 2005) (collecting cases and concluding that an FCRA plaintiff “must produce some form of independent, corroborating evidence of her humiliation and embarrassment at trial to recover compensatory damages for emotional distress”); Jordan v. Trans Union LLC, No. 1:05 CV 305 GET, 2006 WL 1663324, at *7-8 (N.D.Ga. June 12, 2006) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Moore provides dubious support 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs proof that she became depressed and was prescribed depression medication by her family physician was insufficient to support claim and stating evidence that randolph is very depressed and very upset is insufficient to sustain damages for mental anguish (B) holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment (C) holding the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that the plaintiff could be awarded damages for anxiety mental anguish and loss of consortium for a violation of the kentucky act (D) holding that a complaints bare assertions alone were insufficient for certification (E) holding in a case arising under the fcra that the remainder of plaintiffs complaints such as feeling frustrated and degraded are insufficient standing alone to support damages for mental anguish

SOLUTION:
holding that plaintiffs proof that she became depressed and was prescribed depression medication by her family physician was insufficient to support claim and stating evidence that randolph is very depressed and very upset is insufficient to sustain damages for mental anguish