In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: and to allow it to brief the issue of whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled as to potential opt-in plaintiffs in this action. ECF No. 14. The motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs response, and defendant’s reply amount to the' very briefing of the issue that the motion seeks. See ECF Nos. 14, 15 and 16. It boils down to a simple proposition, succinctly summarized by Judge Blackburn in a case cited by the defendant: “Tolling is available' only ‘when [a plaintiff] diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.’” Young v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 11-cv-REB-MJW, 2013 WL 1223613, R *2 (D. Colo. March 25, 2013). Cf. Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Here, we have a district court order in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that equitable tolling is available when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence (B) holding that  2244d is subject to equitable tolling if ae petitioner demonstrates  1 that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and 2 that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filling quoting pace v diguglielmo 544 us 408 418 125 sct 1807 161 led2d 669 2005 (C) holding that extraordinary circumstances did not include the mere neglect of the professional who was in a position to file a timely application (D) holding in a habeas case that tolling is available when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control (E) holding that ejquitable tolling is appropriate when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence
[A]: holding that equitable tolling is available when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence


[Q]: rejected'this argument, holding that the allegations, even if true, did not amount to an -IDEA procedural violation. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 et seq. (setting forth the procedural safeguards afforded to parents when their child is in special education). 13 . It is worth noting that at least one state— Massachusetts, as the IDEA permits, has enacted a more stringent standard. Specifically, children in Massachusetts who are eligible for special education services are entitled to IEPs that provide for their “maximum possible development.'' See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71B § 2 (emphasis added); Frank S. v. School Committee of the Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School District, 26 F.Supp.2d 219, 226 (D.Mass.1998). 14 . See Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 134 F.3d 659, 663 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (citing Hartmann v. Loudoun County, 118 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent some statutory infraction the task of education belongs to the educators who have been charged by society with that critical task (B) holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather  than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors (C) holding that since the performer of a task which could be performed by a layperson represented that he was in fact a professional engineer krs 413245 applied (D) holding that certain veniremen had been improperly excluded because they acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might affect their deliberations but only to the extent that they would view their task with greater gravity (E) holding that it was pure speculation that if the preference payment had not been made the vendor would have been included as a critical vendor and the court would have approved it
[A]: holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather  than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors


[Q]: within the Act’s exception for petitions “based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day” that allows a party to file a petition for review “within sixty days after such grounds arise.” Id. North Carolina contends that our January 4, 2013, decision in NRDC v. EPA, 706 F.3d 428, 435-37 (D.C.Cir.2013), constituted after-arising grounds under section 7607(b). But North Carolina brought its petition more than ten months after we issued NRDC — well outside of the sixty-day window for petitions that the after-arising grounds exception provides. Even assuming, without deciding, that NRDC constituted after-arising grounds, North Carolina’s petition is thus still untimely. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b); see also Am. Rd. & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA, 588 F.3d 1109, 1113-14 (D.C.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). The State explains that it did not bring its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner was dili gent for equitable tolling purposes where petitioner filed state petition two months after conviction was final and filed federal petition seven days after discovering state had denied petition on the merits (B) holding that a fiduciary corporation was a purchaser within the meaning of  12a2 and was entitled to bring suit on its own behalf or on behalf of its clients (C) holding that a petitioner may amend a habeas petition rather than filing a second or successive petition when the first petition has not yet reached a final decision (D) holding that a petitioner invoking the afterarising grounds exception must bring its petition within sixty days of when its afterarising claim ripens (E) holding that the sentencing disposition which commits the juvenile to a residential program for sixty days followed by sixty days of community control exceeds the maximum sentence permitted by statute for a seconddegree misdemeanor
[A]:
holding that petitioner was dili gent for equitable tolling purposes where petitioner filed state petition two months after conviction was final and filed federal petition seven days after discovering state had denied petition on the merits