In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Legislative acts are those which involve policy-making decision of a general scope or, to put it another way, legislation involves line-drawing. Where the decision affects a small number or a single individual, the legislative power is not implicated, and the act takes on the nature of administration. In addition, the act must be “procedurally” legislative, that is, passed by means of established legislative procedures. This principle requires that constitutionally accepted procedures of enacting the legislation must be followed in order to assure that the act is a legitimate, reasoned decision representing the will of the people which the governing body has been chosen to serve. E.g., Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the procedure the legislature follows 
 Holding statements: (A) holding on the merits that the existence of an unexercised legislative veto provision in a statute would render invalid actions taken under the statute unless the legislative veto provisions were severable from the portion of the statute pursuant to which the challenged actions were taken (B) holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission (C) holding onehouse legislative veto unconstitutional (D) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (E) holding acts of voting to be quintessentially legislative and the introduction of a budget to be formally legislative

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
designs. Moreover, we also note that the similarity of the products need not be identical, as Exmark seems to argue, because the similarity may be defined in terms of the defect and any differences among the products may merely go to the weight of the evidence and not its discoverability or admissibility. See Jackson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 1070, 1082-88 (5th Cir.1986); see also Uniroyal Goodrich Tire, 977 S.W.2d at 341; Davidson Oil Country Supply, Inc. v. Klockner, Inc., 908 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir.1990). We note that many other decisions from courts around the nation reject the notion that discovery in a strict product liability case is uniformly limited to the specific product at issue. See, e.g., In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1191 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Brownlow v. General Motors Corp., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs work environment was not affected by comments and conduct of which she was not aware (B) recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available (C) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (D) holding that plaintiffs allegation that defendant had exclusive knowledge as the manufacturer did not support claim that defendant was aware of a defect (E) holding that discovery on other tires was not overbroad where plaintiffs alleged that defendant was aware of tread separation problem

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
to do it. The Bankruptcy Court provided counsel for Debtor with the opportunity at the October 3, 2013 status conference to address IndyMac’s argument that conversion was appropriate “based on the record that’s before the Court today” due to “lack of compliance with [the Bankruptcy Court’s] status conference order,” including the untimely filing of the status report and the “monthly operating reports [which] are missing” or “chronically late throughout the entire case.” (Suppl. Notice of Lodgment Supp. Mot. Stay, Ex. 7 at 5-6, 8, ECF No. 20-8). The Scheduling Order and the October 3, 2013 hearing provided Debtor with sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard to meet due process requirements. See In re Bijelonic, No. CV 11-08077-JVS, 2012 WL 2263289, at *5 (C.D.Cal. June 15, 2012) (<HOLDING>). Debtor contends that, prior to the October 3, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bankruptcy courts initial scheduling order provided sufficient notice and opportunity to present evidence to meet due process requirements when the bankruptcy court sua sponte converted a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 because a debtor failed to comply with an initial scheduling order by not submitting a status report prior to the second status con ference and failing to appear at the second status conference (B) recognizing the distinction between the reorganized debtor and the converted debtor and holding an asset which was not property of the original chapter 11 estate does not become property of the converted chapter 7 estate (C) holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7 (D) holding that a bankruptcy court is given wide discretion to convert a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 for cause and an order for conversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (E) holding that claims for alleged legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against attorneys that represented the chapter 11 debtor in possession belonged to the bankruptcy estate and upon conversion of the case to chapter 7 such claims belonged to the chapter 7 trustee as successor to the debtor in possession

Ex Output:

(A)