In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 540 U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 1019, 157 L.Ed.2d 1016 (2004) (citing United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980) and Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986)). 20 . See United States v. Cuong Gia Le, et al., Criminal No. 03-48-A (E.D.Va. December 9, 2003) (Ex Parte Order). 21 . Only one of the six charged defendants — • Cuong Gia Le — had been charged prior to the return of the Superseding Indictment. 22 . See Schwartz, 372 F.2d at 682 (citing Mallory, 354 U.S. at 454, 77 S.Ct. 1356). 23 . The statute also provides a limited "safe harbor" for a voluntary confession made after arrest, but before arraignment, "if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 534 n. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding texas law governs the procedural matter of preservationoferror requirements even if another jurisdictions law governs substantive issues (B) holding that  3501 not mcnabbmallory governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court (C) holding that federal law governs remedies available under title ix (D) holding that federal law governs res judicata effect of an earlier federal judgment based on federal law (E) holding that federal common law governs equitable remedies available under erisa
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: or creating documents with mistakes on them and signing my name to them to make me appear as if I had been inaccurate .... ” Paragraph 25: The sentence “I confidentially complained about this behavior to Bruce Smith, who, instead of taking action to prevent Burchfield from continuing her pattern of behavior toward me, apparently told Burchfield to counsel me.” Paragraph 32: The sentence “I believe that this move was the beginning point of a concerted effort to remove me from the workplace based on my age.” Paragraph 36: The sentence “I believe that Albertson’s did not provide all of the time sheets from all vendors of temporary help.” Paragraph 37: The sentence “I believe that my combination of formal college education and experience, even though I did not obtain a co h Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). With respect to paragraphs 22, 28, 34, 39, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a single conversation to be sufficient evidence of dissolution to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that mere conclusion of affiant without some supporting facts are insufficient to raise fact issue necessary to preclude summary judgment (C) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (D) recognizing that the plaintiffs mere assertions that the defendant had a discriminatory intent were inadequate without substantial factual evidence to raise an issue to preclude summary judgment (E) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: trustee which would be property of the estate. See generally In re Si Yeon Park, Ltd., 198 B.R. 956 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1996). Such a turnover requirement may undermine the Barton Doctrine to some degree. Neither statutory provision, however, is germane to this proceeding. As mentioned above, the former statute is inapplicable because it is limited to receivers that operate businesses. The trustee concedes that Mr. Freeman was appointed solely as a liquidating receiver. The latter statute is inapplicable because its directives are addressed to “custodians” — a term defined by section 101(11) to include receivers — whose duties involve controlling property of the debtor for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. See Matter of Miami General Hosp., Inc., 1111 B.R. 363, 366 (S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>); see generally Matter of Cash Currency 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the receiver of assets not the subsequent purchaser of the assets retained all liabilities not specifically enumerated in a similar purchase and assumption agreement (B) holding that a receiver of insurance policies did not have standing because it failed to prove it was the assignee of the policyholders claims (C) holding that the receiver for a corporation had no standing to sue for inter alia receipt of funds fraudulently obtained fraud and unjust enrichment even though he was appointed on behalf of all the creditors because those were claims of the creditors not of the corporation (D) recognizing that the bangor punta doctrine was not applicable to suit brought by receiver of insolvent insurance company for the benefit of creditors (E) holding that a receiver appointed for the parent corporation of the debtor was not a custodian of the debtorsubsidiary because the receiver was not appointed to take control of the debt ors assets for the benefit of the debtors creditors
[EX A]:
(E)