instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
February 8, 2011 probation extension order failed to extend his probation period because the October 26, 2005 restitution order was improperly delegated to the probation officer, rather than determined by the circuit court as required by Code § 19.2-305.1(D), thus any subsequent order is invalid. In relevant part, Code § 19.2-305.1(D) states that “[a]t the time of sentencing, the court shall determine the amount to be repaid by the defendant and the terms and conditions thereof.” The amount of restitution to be paid by the defendant is within the sole province of the circuit court to determine and that determination may not be delegated to another department of government. See Code § 19.2-305.2; see also McCullough v. Commonwealth, 38 Va.App. 811, 815, 568 S.E.2d 449, 451 (2002) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the circuit court’s October 26, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing (B) holding part of the sentencing phase of trial the restitution amount is determined following conviction and is a matter resting within the sole province of the sentencing judge (C) holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase (D) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount (E) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses
answer:
(B)


question:
language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability “from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik’s] attendance” it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik’s attendance at the gym — in essence all of Sydlik’s claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release
answer:
(C)


question:
Granite thus assumed "an advocacy role" "almost akin to Granite entering a general appearance for the trial court." This "desperate act," they contend, "constitutes nothing but a transparent effort to curry favor with the trial court." Granite's filing, they conclude, "has denied [the Spaffords] any meaningful opportunity to try their case, upon remand, before an impartial and disinterested tribunal within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." A due process challenge is a question of law, which we review for correctness. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶ 25, 100 P.3d 1177. 1 36 To begin with, this case presents nothing remotely approaching a violation of the Due Process Clause. Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2256-57, 178 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009) (<HOLDING>). But see id. at 2272-74 (Roberts, C.J., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion (B) holding that no federal court other than the supreme court may entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a judgment of a state court (C) holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction (D) holding that due process required disqualification of a state supreme court justice from an appeal where the appellants chairman and president contributed 8 million to that supreme court justices election campaign after a 50 million verdiet was entered in the trial court (E) holding that the question of recusal of a supreme court justice is to be left to the individual justice
answer:

(D)