In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

This Court has reviewed these decisions and is in agreement with their reasoning and conclusions that the public policy exception does not give rise to a protected property interest in continued employment in this case. Likewise, the implied covenant is not the source of a protected property interest. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to at-will employment and affords an employee the right to be dealt with fairly and in good faith. See Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 191 P.3d 205, 213-14 (2008). Breach of the covenant may give rise to an action for wrongful termination but it does not convert at-will employment to term employment nor form the basis for a protected property interest. See Hollister v. Forsythe, 22 F.3d 950, 952-52 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate (B) recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract (C) holding an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was insufficient to create a property interest in continued employment under montanas statutory scheme for at will employment (D) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (E) recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages
recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate

abused its discretion by providing an unreasonable characterization of the record evidence. See McElwee, 896 A.2d at 18 & nn. 7-8. While SEPTA claims that this, too, necessarily entailed unwarranted fact-finding on the part of the Commonwealth Court, we believe that it aligns with the approach utilized in Sienkiewicz I, wherein this Court not only determined that no record evidence existed to support a particular factual finding central to the trial court’s decision to grant relief (i.e., that Penn-DOT had installed curbing along the “Stafford Straightaway”), but proceeded to delineate the essential facts that were proved by the uncontradicted record evidence in ultimately agreeing with Penn-DOT’s position that relief was unjustified. See Sienkiewicz I, 584 Pa. at 282, 883 A.2d at 502 (<HOLDING>). Under the circumstances of this case, then, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (B) holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property (C) recognizing distinction and allowing recovery for impairment of access and not obstructed flow of traffic (D) holding that the landownerlicensee relationship ceased when the licensee left the landowners property (E) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking
holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property

SEC v. Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 858 (9th Cir.2001). To the extent that the Underwriters knew or should have known of facts tending to undermine the Official Statements, they had a duty to disclose those facts. (e) Kutak & Stinson Plaintiffs have pled facts indicating that Kutak and Stinson may also be responsible for the alleged omissions — at least to the extent these law firms knowingly failed to disclose facts that tended to undermine the affirmative impressions created by the Official Statements. In preparing the Official Statements, Kutak, as bond counsel, represented the Issuer and Stinson represented the Underwriters. Thus, they had a fiduciary duty to the Authority and to Baird, Stern, and Jones, not to the Bondholders. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 174, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (<HOLDING>). The lack of a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action brought pursuant to  1983 cannot lie against federal officers (B) holding that a fraud claim premised on thirdparty reliance raises a cognizable claim under new york law (C) holding that a  10b claim premised on an omission cannot lie absent a duty to speak (D) holding that upon choosing to speak one has a duty to be both accurate and complete  (E) holding that silence can constitute misrepresentation when there is duty to speak

holding that an action brought pursuant to  1983 cannot lie against federal officers