In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the effect that the code-fendant’s confession must be disregarded in determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence is ineffective and cannot overcome the prejudicial effect of the incriminating statement on the jury. Id. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. As such, the trial court’s curative instruction in the instant case was insufficient to cure the erroneous admission of Hertz’s statement to Hathcock. Nonetheless, this Court has also recognized that a Bruton violation does not automatically require reversal of an otherwise valid conviction but, rather, is subject to a harmless error analysis. See Farina v. State, 679 So.2d 1151, 1155 (Fla.1996) (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284, (1969)); see also Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1322 (Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 644-45 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness (B) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause violation in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not require the conviction to be overturned (C) holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error (D) holding confrontation clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus upholding firstdegree murder conviction (E) holding that testimony at trial in violation of defendants constitutional confrontation right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the testimony was cumulative
[A]: holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness


[Q]: 593, 598 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1, 135 L.Ed.2d 1098 (1996), and of mixed questions of law and fact, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). However, the state court’s factual findings underlying those determinations are presumed to be correct and binding, as long as they were made after a full, fair, and adequate hearing on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 1994) (pre-AED-PA); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of es ing that the findings of the trial court on discriminatory intent in Batson challenge are reviewed for clear error); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (B) holding that the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under general statutes  46a60 is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (C) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (D) holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard (E) holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard
[A]: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard


[Q]: morning. However, he asserted that he hoped to represent Plaintiff if the case were reopened. 9 .Plaintiff testified that attorney Weeks advised her to let Watkins and Andrews proceed with reopening her case. 10 . Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981). 11 . Dr. Kilgore’s testimony that he observed a gradual but severe decline in Watkins' health in the two to three years prior to the grievance proceeding is not conclusive of Watkins’ alleged incapacitation from the date of removal to the date of dismissal. Compare Benjamin v. Lockhart, No. 94-3020, 1996 WL 44197, *3 (E.D.La. Feb. 2, 1996) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>) with Russell v. Henderson, No. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing rule (B) holding that a motion that alleged rule 60b1 grounds could not be treated as a rule 60b6 motion in the absence of allegations of aggravating circumstances (C) recognizing that debilitating illness which precludes all participation in the litigation may constitute compelling reason for relief under rule 60b6 (D) holding that rule 60b6 may be used to grant relief in case of extreme and undue hardship (E) holding that relief under rule 60b6 is not available unless the other clauses 1 through 5 are inapplicable
[A]:
recognizing rule