TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: that it can be restored, as when a house suffers smoke and water damage in a fire, the tort-feasor is liable for the costs of restoring the property to its former condition, up to the total value of the property. Applying these rules to fire-damaged trees is problematic. Is it the loss of the tree that is permanent, or the loss to the real estate? A tree that has burned and is dead is permanently destroyed, but the land on which the tree was located can be restored, either immediately by bringing in a fully grown tree or by planting a sapling. The question of “permanent” versus “temporary” damage is ultimately less helpful than the question of how the trees were used and their intrinsic value to the property. See, e.g., Mosteller v. Naiman, 416 N.J. Super. 632, 638, 7 A.3d 803 (2010) (<HOLDING>). One legal encyclopedia explains the use-value 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that quantifying damages for trees is a  complex subject  that depends upon the evidence in the particular case  (B) holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality (C) recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law (D) holding that the question whether section 3553b permits departure in some particular case is subject to plenary review (E) holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis

SOLUTION: holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality

PROBLEM: or require the information it did. In light of the information possessed by the District as of June 2, 2011, the District’s interference with Rutherford’s right to return began then, and continued until the District ultimately terminated him. Once a technical violation of the FMLA has been established—and here, the undisputed facts show that a violation occurred—the interference inquiry turns to whether the plaintiff experienced prejudice resulting from the violation. Ridings v. Riverside Medical Center, 537 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2008). The District arg e his fitness to return to work, he had such proof—a note from his doctor stating that he was fit to work—and attempted to present it on June 2, 2011. See Vannoy v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). Instead of reinstating him, the District kept 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave (B) holding a plaintiff to be ineligible for fmla leave wherein the plaintiff had not accumulated enough work hours (C) holding that a plaintiff who was unable to return to work before his fmla leave expired did not allege any denial of an fmla right but noting that ragsdale left open the possibility that employees could recover for notice violations on a casebycase basis if there was actual harm resulting from the violations (D) holding that both the cfra and the fmla require the employee to provide notice to the employer of the employees intent to take leave (E) holding that sufficient evidence of prejudice existed where plaintiff would have structured leave differently but employer had not provided notice of fmla right to reinstatement

SOLUTION: holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave

PROBLEM: doubt, however, on whether estoppel may run against the government. For example, in Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990), the Supreme Court held that courts may not use the doctrine of equitable estoppel to award money not authorized by Congress. The Court declined to address, however, “[w]hether there are any extreme circumstances that might support estoppel in a case not involving payment from the Treasury.” Id. at 434, 110 S.Ct. at 2476. In a recent opinion, the Federal Circuit indicated that estoppel may run against the government in certain circumstances and that OPM v. Richmond should not be extended beyond its precise holding. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 985 F.2d 1574, 1581 (Fed.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see Brush v. Office of Personnel Management, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that richmond was limited to estoppel claims involving payment from the public treasury (B) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa (C) recognizing that equitable estoppel will not lie against the government as it lies against private litigants and acknowledging merrill as the leading case in the courts modern line of estoppel decisions (D) holding that this court erred in concluding that richmond stands for the proposition that equitable estoppel will not lie against the government for any monetary claim and remanding for consideration of the facts supporting the estoppel claim (E) holding estoppel claim could not lie in tort where the facts that support the claim could not support a claim for fraud or misrepresentation

SOLUTION:
recognizing that richmond was limited to estoppel claims involving payment from the public treasury