In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: claims that respondent was aware World Bowling was purchasing the bowling alley from appellants but was never informed of the details of the purchase. We reject respondent’s contention that it could not have actual knowledge of appellants’ misfiled U.C.C.-l because any details it knew about the purchase of the bowling alley and its contents took place before the U.C.C.-l was filed. First, respondent had notice that the bowling alley contents were encumbered because it was involved with the sale until the time of closing. Second, the plain language of section 386.9-401(2) does not require that knowledge of the contents be gained only after the U.C.C.-l is misfiled and we may not add this requirement to the statute. Martinco v. Hastings, 265 Minn. 490, 497, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Finally, both the district court and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks (B) holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature (C) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (D) holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted (E) holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature

Output: holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature


Input: Consider Input: marks and citations omitted). {12} We are unconvinced that application of Texas law to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate would violate any fundamental principle, or public policy of New Mexico, nor are we convinced that the outcome of this determination would differ, depending upon whether we applied the law of Texas or New Mexico. Under Texas law, any doubts about whether there is an agreement to arbitrate must be resolved in favor of arbitration. See Dell, Inc. v. Muniz, 163 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Tex.App.2005); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 195 (Tex.App.2003). It is not clear that New Mexico has applied the same presumption to this initial determination of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. See DeArmond, 2003-NMCA-148, ¶ 8, 134 N.M. 630, 81 P.3d 573 (<HOLDING>). {13} Even though the presumption in favor of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (C) recognizing that a legally enforceable contract is still a prerequisite for arbitration and characterizing the holding in first options of chicago inc v kaplan 514 us 938 94445 115 sct 1920 131 led2d 985 1995 as stating that the presumption in favor of arbitration is reversed when there is a dispute as to the existence of an agreement (D) recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement (E) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added

Output: holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement


Input: Consider Input: tolling of the [EEOC] filing is inappropriate ... notwithstanding the plaintiffs allegations that she was given incorrect information by both an EEOC employee and her own counsel.” See Crossman v. Crosson, 905 F.Supp. 90, 95 n. 3 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also South v. Saab Cars USA Inc., 28 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir.1994) (“[L]ack of due d ]” delay as grounds alone for applying the equitable tolling doctrine. (PI. Mem. 10.) No principle of law supports the proposition that the applicability of equitable tolling is measured by time alone. Rather, the relevant inquiry centers of the factual circumstances leading to the delay; equitable tolling does not excuse ordinary neglect. See Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); Toolan v. Bd. of Educ. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period (B) holding the 90 day period begins to run the date the eeoc right to sue letter is delivered to plaintiffs counsel (C) holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included (D) holding in the context of the 90day period during which a plaintiff must bring suit after receiving a right to sue letter that in the absence of a recognized equitable consideration the court cannot extend the limitations period by even one day (E) holding that the limitations period for  1983 actions arising in ohio is the twoyear period found in ohio rev code  230510 and that the limitations period starts to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action 


Output: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period