TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: Statement. They were, however, obtained prior to this Court’s actual approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement, which occurred on December 19, 2008 (i.e. at the joint hearing on approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement and the Amended Plan). Although typically a disclosure statement should be approved before the proponent solicits votes for the plan, here the premature solicitation was harmless and, as noted by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia, a harmless failure to comply with § 1125’s solicitation requirements “is not necessarily fatal to the success of a Chapter 11 reorganization.” In re N.W. Recreational Activities, Inc., 8 B.R. 10, 12 (Bankr.D.Ga.1980); see also First Am. Bank of N.Y. v. Century Glove, Inc., 81 B.R. 274, 278-80 (D.Del.1988) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(d)(2)(B)(vi), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case (B) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding hearing in chambers was not per se a violation of due process (E) holding that a plan proponents failure to obtain court approval of solicitation materials is not per se fatal to the confirmation process

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: we held that, The penetration offense alleged in the first indictment clearly required a separate and distinct act (involving appellee’s sexual organ with the child’s female sexual organ) from the act alleged in the second indictment (which involved appel-lee’s mouth with the child’s sexual organ). In this case the second indictment alleged that appellee caused the child’s sexual organ to contact his mouth ency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct. Appellant concedes to this view, the plain language of the statute supports it, and so does our caselaw. See Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630 (stating that a grammatical analysis suggests that the unit of prosecution for indecency with a child by exposure is the exposure and, ultimately, adopting that viewpoint); Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. State, 550 S.W.2d 89, 91 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive (B) holding that a similar statute created separate offenses (C) holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation (D) holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive (E) holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: judge is not a final order). Accordingly, whatever might be true in other circumstances as to the appealability upon its entry of an order making a priority determination, the Trust could not have appealed as of right from the August 26, 1999 order until after the entry of the order in Adversary Nos. 99-0231 and 99-0524 concluding the adversary proceedings on January 31, 2000, as the August 26, 1999 order did not conclude Adversary No. 99-0231. See In re Professional Ins. Mgmt., 285 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir.2002) (“[A] bankruptcy court order ending a separate adversary proceeding is appealable as a final order even though that order does not conclude the entire bankruptcy case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Durability, Inc., 893 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); In re Compton Corp., 889 F.2d 1104, 1106 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment (B) holding that partial summary judgment is not a final appealable judgment when it did not settle completely any of the matters in controversy or adjudicate completely the rights and liabilities of the parties (C) holding that a bankruptcy courts partial summary judgment order that established the priority of one creditor relative to another but did not completely resolve the particular adversary proceeding was interlocutory in nature and therefore not directly appealable (D) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable

SOLUTION:
(C)