In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions “could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited.” Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) (“We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse’s liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void.”). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years
[A]: holding that such provisions are valid


[Q]: two for support). The fallacy of this position is that it confuses and commingles two conflicting strands of case law which follow opposing judicial routes. As noted above, in every case cited by the majority in footnote two, the fruits of a search were deemed admissible only after the search was found to be constitutional, i.e., distinctions as to admissibility of the fruits of a particular search against the consenting occupant and the nonconsenting occupant were never drawn. There is no authority for the majority’s proposition that the fruits of an unconstitutional search should be admitted into evidence. Indeed such a proposition violates one of the founding principles of the Fourth Amendment. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Most commentators also agree failure to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible (B) holding that the physical fruits of a miranda violation must be suppressed (C) holding that evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed (D) holding that regardless of the applicable framework defendants statement must be suppressed (E) holding that the evidence obtained as part of an illegal stop should have been suppressed even where the defendants consented to the search
[A]: holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible


[Q]: the Plaintiffs’ Activities Involved Interstate Commerce The final question is whether the plaintiffs’ activities involved interstate commerce. For the purpose of the Motor Carrier Act exemption, “[a] carrier engages in interstate commerce by either actually transporting goods across state lines or transporting within a single state goods that are in the flow of interstate commerce.” Barefoot, 16 F.3d 1216, at *2 (citing Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. I.C.C., 528 F.2d 1042, 1044 (5th Cir. 1976)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(1) (“Highway transportation by motor vehic e intrastate transport of empty bottles destined for a bottling plant outside the state was a part of interstate commerce); Glanville v. Dupar, Inc., No. H-08-2537, 2009 WL 3255292, at *9-10 (S.D.Tex. Sept. 25, 2009) (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit has specifically 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the connection between the robbery and interstate commerce was much more direct than in wang because at the time of the robbery the victim in walker was selling illegal drugs that had traveled through interstate commerce (B) recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce (C) holding that the time appliances were at a distribution center within the state did not break the continuity of interstate movement the subsequent delivery from the distribution center was the last phase in the interstate shipment (D) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce (E) holding after lopez that the interstate nexus element of the hobbs act still requires the government to show only a minimal connection to interstate commerce
[A]:
holding that the connection between the robbery and interstate commerce was much more direct than in wang because at the time of the robbery the victim in walker was selling illegal drugs that had traveled through interstate commerce