In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: if the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary ...”); Douglas by Kelly v. Bd. of Edu., 127 Ill.App.3d 79, 82 Ill.Dec. 211, 468 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1984) (finding that where a school’s window pane fell on plaintiff while she was sitting at her desk, plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict based on res ipsa loqui-tur); Moore v. Atchison, 28 Ill.App.2d 340, 171 N.E.2d 393 (1960) (finding that directed verdict for the plaintiff was proper where there was no direct evidence as to why two trains collided, even though the defendant showed that the equipment was properly inspected and in excellent working order, because the circumstances made the inference of negligence so strong that reasonable men could not reject it); Silvern v. Barbagallo, 195 N.Y.S.2d 32 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1959) (<HOLDING>); Richard Equipment Corp. v. Manhattan Indus. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the injured passenger of a cab was entitled to summary judgment against the driver because the prima facie proof is so convincing that the inference of negligence is inescapable (B) holding the standard of proof in summary judgment rulings is the same as it would be at trial (C) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (D) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (E) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: bankruptcy trustee from selling or administering the homestead, even for the benefit of joint creditors. The legal effect of the non-debtor spouse’s right to assert the Florida constitutional exemption meant that the debtor spouse was still “receiving the benefits” of the Florida constitutional exemption, even though he had not claimed that exemption in his bankruptcy case. Consequently, the debtor was ruled ineligible for the wildcard exemption. The court noted that a different outcome would have obtained if the non-debtor spouse had affirmatively waived the right to claim the homestead protection. No such waiver existed, however, either in Hernandez or in this case. Other courts have also reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., In re Watford, 427 B.R. 552, 559 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2010) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Bennett, 395 B.R. 781, 790 (Bankr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other (B) holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a selfsettled revocable trust even though the settlor and the beneficiary as well as the bankruptcy debtor were the same person (C) holding that where a married debtor files an individual bankruptcy case and claims the  522b3b tbe exemption the debtor indirectly obtains the benefit of floridas constitutional homestead protection by virtue of the nondebtor spouses ability to claim the homestead exemption (D) holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property (E) holding even though debtor would have been entitled to iowa homestead exemption but for former spouses iowa code section 59821 lien debtor could not avoid the lien because it attached to the homestead prior to or simultaneously with debtors acquisition of the interest in the homestead

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: recognizes that the rights of unborn children are protected from third-party actors, criminalizing murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, aggravated assault, and assault against an unborn child. Geiser, at ¶ 17; see also N.D.C.C. §§ 12.1-17.1-02 to 12.1-17.1-06. Under N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-17.1, the legislature defined unborn child as, “ ‘the conceived but not yet born offspring of a human being, which, but for the action of the actor would beyond a reasonable doubt have subsequently been born alive.’ ” Geiser, at ¶ 17 (quoting N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17.1-01(3)). Therefore, as stated in Geiser, “[t]his makes it clear that when the Legislature wants to cover unborn children, it does so expressly” and, if the legislature “intended N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-22.2(l)(b) to include unborn (2005) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the definition of person in the hawaii manslaughter statute did not include a fetus and thus did not apply when a woman caused the death of her fetus by smoking crystal methamphetamine (B) holding that fetus was not a human being for purposes of attempted firstdegree intentional homicide and firstdegree reckless injury statutes (C) holding for purposes of establishing the offense of reckless manslaughter against a pregnant woman a fetus is not a person (D) holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute (E) holding that a woman possessed immunity from criminal prosecution for causing injury or death to her fetus


Output: (C)