In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: the terms of the agreement as to the status of the donor in writing. After the mother and her partner ended their relationship, the sperm donor filed suit to adjudicate his parental rights. The court looked to the plain language of the Texas statute and determined that the sperm donor lacked standing to pursue the paternity action. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 160.702 (Vernon Supp.2006) (“A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”). The “do-it-yóurself” manner in which the artificial insemination was conducted does not alter the fact that B.O.C. was a sperm donor under section 742.14. The statute does not require that the artificial insemination be performed in a clinical setting to apply. Compare McIntyre v. Crouch, 98 Or.App. 462, 780 P.2d 239 (1989) (<HOLDING>), with C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc.2d 9, 639 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the donor nonpaternity statute did not explicitly reference physician involvement the statute applied even though the sperm was not provided to a physician (B) holding that writ was explicitly abolished by statute (C) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (D) holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case (E) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: process.” Final Rule Establishing an Administrative Appeal Process for the Regulatory Program of the Corps of Engineers, 65 Fed. Reg. at 16488. Additionally, the preamble notes that, because physical circum stances can change over time, "JDs are not necessarily 'final' even as an administrative matter.” Id. Based on the foregoing, it seems rather doubtful that the Corps’ decision to certify Dr. Booth’s delineation constituted a final determination entitled to preclusive effect. See Zurcher v. Bilton, 379 S.C. 132, 135, 666 S.E.2d 224, 226 (2008) (issue preclusion applies when an issue has been "actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment”) (emphasis added). 10 . See Chasm Hydro, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 58 A.D.3d 1100, 872 N.Y.S.2d 235 (2009) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 107 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding local regulation of hazardous waste disposal facilities preempted by comprehensive and detailed state regulatory scheme (B) holding that federal power act and cwa largely preempted the field of regulating hydroelectric facilities (C) holding pennsylvania statute regulating subrogation is a law regulating insurance (D) holding that subsequent congressional statute regulating registration of aliens retroactively preempted state law (E) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: these arguments is sufficient to override the designation of Shar-key which appears in the record and Pine Tree did not abuse its discretion is so concluding. First, plaintiff contends that Sharkey waived her rights to the death benefits under the pension program when, attendant to the dissolution of her marriage to Decedent, she executed a Voluntary Separation Agreement, which was incorporated into, but not merged in the judgment of divorce. The Separation Agreement contained, inter alia, a mutual release by the Decedent and Sharkey of “any and all rights or interests which [they now have] or may hereafter acquire in the real, personal or other property of the other.” See Defs.’ Ex. 14. This contention founders on the rule of Estate of Altobelli v. IBM, 77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The Separation Agreement in this case neither 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself (B) holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language (C) holding that plan participants in a defined benefit pension plan have no claim to the plans surplus assets (D) holding that the family courts award to exwife of interest in 387 of debtors military pension payable directly from the plan was not subject to discharge because interest in pension plan was not a debt rather it was considered exwifes separate ownership interest (E) holding that exwife had no interest in exhusbands erisa plan because each party clearly intended by the terms of a property settlement to relinquish all interests in the pension plans of the other
[EX A]:
(E)