In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

in the petition no later than thirty days from the day on which the first defendant was served. Id. at 1262-63 (internal citations omitted). As a general premise, under the “first-served rule,” defendants who are properly served within thirty days of the first defendant’s service must join in the removal petition. The “failure to do so renders the petition defective.” Id. at 1262. Under the facts of Getty, however, the application of the first-served rule did not produce an inequitable result. Nonetheless, recognizing the potential for harsh results, other decisions provide that exceptional circumstances may sometimes require relief from strict application of the rule in order to achieve equitable results. See Milstead Supply Co. v. Cas. Ins. Co., 797 F.Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties (B) holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective (C) holding that dismissal of some but not all of the defendants who had been served with complaint is not a final order (D) holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served (E) holding that the defendants consent to search was voluntary although he had been served with a subpoena
holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties

of the evidence. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. In interpreting Hicks, supra, the Second Circuit has stated definitively as follows: [Defendant] misreads the Supreme Court’s statement in Hicks that once a defendant produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his or her action, the plaintiff must then establish that the defendant’s actions were intentionally discriminatory. [Defendant] takes this statement as requiring the plaintiff to adduce additional evidence after the defendant’s production — evidence beyond that presented in the plaintiffs prima facie case. Justice Scalia took pains to preclude such an interpretation of the Court’s decision when he observed that, upon rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons for its action , 142 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1189, 127 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (B) holding that former employer met its burden of proof that ubc exception applied (C) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (D) holding plaintiffs ultimate burden of proof can be met by combining proof submitted in its prima facie case with evidence that defendants proffered reasons for its acts were false (E) recognizing that a plaintiffs burden in establishing a prima facie case is not onerous
holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence

cases where no murder occurs, would turn around and not intend to impose cumulative punishments in cases where there are actual murder victims. Third, §§ 2113(a) and (e) and §§ 924(c) and (j) were clearly designed for different purposes: the armed robbery statute was designed to punish those who take money from banks by force or violence, whatever the means, and the firearm statute was designed to punish those who use or carry firearms during violent crimes, whatever the underlying crime. We therefore conclude, notwithstanding our assumption of the likely failure of the two statutes to pass the Blockburger test, that Congress fully and clearly intended to permit cumulative punishments for violations of § 2113 and § 924(j). See United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 864 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We also reject Allen’s proposed reliance on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy (B) recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute (C) holding that congress intended to allow multiple punishments for rico conspiracies and conspiracies to commit the underlying predicate offense even though the offenses were the same under the blockburger test (D) holding that because the ultimate question is legislative intent the blockburger test cannot authorize two punishments where the ljegislature clearly intended only one (E) holding that  1962d does not violate the principle prohibiting conviction of multiple conspiracies under an indictment charging a single conspiracy

holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy