In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Athletic Ass’n, 980 F.2d 382, 386-87 (6th Cir.1992). The district court below also acknowledged this interest as a substantial one. TSSAA’s other two justifications, however, are very much in dispute. Brentwood, for example, argues that there is no support in the record for the proposition that student athletes need protection from exploitation. The district court agreed. It concluded that TSSAA offered no proof that exerting undue influence on middle school athletes to recruit them for athletic purposes actually harms those students. Proof of actual harm, however, is not required in order to recognize a state actor’s interest in preventing reasonably anticipated harm. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, Ohio, 240 F.3d 553, 565-66 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Finally, TSSAA’s newly asserted interest in a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the village could regulate doortodoor solicitation based on a fear of an anticipated harm without proof of actual harm (B) holding that likelihood of irreparable harm must be based on evidence in the record not unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm the plaintiff might suffer (C) recognizing  1951 includes fear of economic harm (D) holding that because persecution cannot be based on a fear of psychological harm alone petitioner was ineligible for withholding of removal based on the psychological harm she would suffer if her us citizen daughter were to undergo fgm (E) holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages speculative harm or the threat of future harm
(A)

background nor his current offense can support the conclusion that he is a worst offender. The maximum sentence was therefore not justified. In deciding to impose the maximum sentence, Judge Michalski relied primarily on his conclusion that Skrepich was incapable of rehabilitation and could not personally be deterred. The judge thus gave primary emphasis to the need to protect the public by isolating Skrepich from the community. While the judge also indicated that a lengthy sentence would serve the sentencing goals of general deterrence and community condemnation, it seems clear that these goals could not, in themselves, support the imposition of a maximum, ten-year term for a first offender convicted of a class B felony. See Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198, 1204-05 (Alaska 1985) (<HOLDING>). The appropriateness of the maximum term 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts failure to explain the effect of supervised release was harmless where the maximum term of incarceration under the actual sentence of imprisonment and supervised release less than six years as well as his worstcase scenario less than nine years was less than the maximum term of incarceration twenty years al lowed by law (B) holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony (C) holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder (D) holding that a term of substantially less than twenty years would serve the objectives of general deterrence and community condemnation in the case of a first offender convicted of seconddegree murder an unclassified felony (E) holding that twenty years was not excessive for second felony offender convicted of simple burglary
(D)

I and II. So ORDERED 1 .Although Barstow names the County as a Defendant in the caption of his complaint, he does not list the County as a party to the action. The Court concludes that no claim is articulated against the County by his complaint. 2 . Barstow failed to submit a Statement of Material Facts in accordance with Local Rule 56. 3 . Not only did Barstow fail to submit his own Statement of Material Facts, he also failed to properly controvert Defendants' Statement of Material Facts in accordance with Local Rule 56. Therefore, Defendants facts are deemed to be admitted, since they are supported by citations to the record. See Local Rule 56(e). Unfortunately for Barstow, his pro se status does not change this outcome. See Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 27-28, n. 2 (1st Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) (citing D.P.P.R. 311.12); see also Eagle Eye 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court is well within its authority to enter judgment based on the pro se appellants blatant disregard of a local rule of the district court for the district of puerto rico requiring that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to include in her opposition a separate short and concise statement of the material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried properly supported by specific reference to the record (B) holding that once motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported opposing party has burden of showing by means of affidavits or other verified evidence that there exists genuine dispute of material fact (C) holding that once motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported opposing party bears burden of showing by means of affidavits or other verified evidence that genuine dispute of material fact exists (D) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment (E) holding that claims raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not properly before a court

(A)