In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

filed, is the verdict, and a showing that the writing is incorrect is not an impeachment of the verdict itself.” (punctuation omitted)). 19 See former OCGA § 17-9-41 (“The affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict.”); Fulton County v. Phillips, 91 Ga. 65, 65 (16 SE 260) (1892) (syllabus by the court) (“According to repeated rulings of this court, the affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain, but not to impeach, their verdict.”); see also former OCGA § 9-10-9 (providing the same rule in civil procedure). 20 See generally OCGA § 24-1-2 (e) (“Except as modified by statute, the common law as expounded b tate, 323 Ga. App. 15, 17 (2) (747 SE2d 99) (2013). 34 Freeman, 264 Ga. at 278; see Wade v. State, 261 Ga. 105, 107-08 (6) (401 SE2d 701) (1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Ingram v. State, 290 Ga. 500, 503 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err (B) holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating (C) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection (D) holding that upon objection to the form of the verdict trial court did not err in returning jury for further deliberations (E) holding that a district court did not err by submitting a special verdict form to the jury this particular verdict form did not specify a standard of proof
(D)

That decision will not be disturbed on appeal even in cases in which the record does not reflect that the issue was ever considered by the parties or the trial court. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 671. As appellee points out, Wilson was a case in which the defendant appealed after the trial court denied his motion to suppress, and did not involve a State’s appeal. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress); Flores, 871 S.W.2d at 720. Although distinguishable in this respect, the reasoning of Wilson is still applicable to the instant case and the observations made in Wilson remain true regardless of which party originally initiates the appellate process. Cf. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (<HOLDING>); State v. Brady, 763 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex.App. — 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing though not relying upon the line of cases which hold the government may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the motion to suppress was granted or denied (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (C) holding that standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised for the first time on appeal (D) holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal (E) holding defendants argument the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress was reviewable as a constitutional issue even though defendant failed to raise the issue in a written posttrial motion
(A)

2010) (quoting Atomic Tattoos, LLC v. Morgan, 45 So.3d 63, 65 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)). However, “the protection of former customers generally does not qualify as a legitimate business interest where no identifiable agreement exists with such customers establishing that they would return with future work.” Carter, 9 So.3d at 1265 (citing Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So.2d 812 (Fla.1994)). Additionally, protection of an employer from ordinary competition is not a legitimate business interest, and a covenant designed solely for that purpose will not be enforced. PartyLite Gifts, Inc. v. MacMillan, 895 F.Supp.2d 1213, 1224 (M.D.Fla.2012) (interpreting section 542.335(1)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes); Colucci v. Kar Kare Auto. Grp., Inc., 918 So.2d 431 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). The party seeking enforcement of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding similar agreement void on public policy grounds (B) holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy (C) recognizing an agreement whose sole purpose is to prevent competition per se is void as a matter of public policy (D) holding physicians covenants not to compete are unenforceable and void as a matter of public policy (E) holding that where agreement prohibits recovery of attorneys fees in civil rights case the relevant portions of the arbitration policy are therefore void as against public policy

(C)