In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of purely legal questions, such as whether a given set of facts alleged by the plaintiffs would demonstrate a constitutional violation. 4 . We note that the record contains no indication that the OSHP employs explicit racial criteria or admits to racially-motivated decision making. If such a showing could be made, the plaintiffs would not need to establish the existence of a similarly situated class that was not investigated. See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir.2000) ("[I]t is not necessary to plead the existence of a similarly situated non-minority group when challenging a law or policy that contains an express, racial classification.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 44, 151 L.Ed.2d 16 (2001); cf. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1104-05 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). "In its more recent pronouncements on laws 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is unnecessary for criminal defendant to establish threeprong test for discrimination in grand jury selection where there is direct evidence of exclusion based upon race (B) holding that a defendants guilty plea   forecloses independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury (C) holding that racial discrimination in selection of grand jurors compelled dismissal of indictment (D) holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge (E) holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: erred by failing to instruct the jury that a confidential informant’s testimony must be corroborated, in conformity with article 38.141. We agree. Our holding that there was some “other evidence” to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement does not eliminate the need for an instruction. See Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (noting court “might disagree” with court of appeals’s holding that there was no evidence ten o the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the requirements of article 38.141 here, but asserts that the trial court’s error resulted in harm under the “egregious harm standard” of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (applying egregious harm analysis to unobjected-to charge error). See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632 (<HOLDING>); Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 692 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding egregious harm standard applied where appellant failed to object to lack of instruction on accomplice witness testimony (B) holding egregious harm resulted from erroneous jury instruction authorizing conviction based on legally inadequate theory (C) holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated (D) holding that where appellant failed to present either expert or lay testimony as to the appropriate standard of care to be used appellant failed to present any evidence indicating the existence of an issue of fact thus summary judgment was proper (E) holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: Sanusi v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (citing Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 473 (B.I.A.1992) (“[T]he Board ordinarily will not consider a discretionary grant of a motion to remand unless the moving party meets a ‘heavy burden’ and presents evidence of such a nature that the Board is satisfied that if proceedings before the immigration judge were reopened, with all the attendant delays, the new evidence offered would likely change the result in the case.”)). Accordingly, the BIA did not commit legal error, and we lack jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the BIA’s conclusion that the § 212(c) factors did not warrant a grant of discretionary relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i);De La Vega v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 141, 144, 146-47 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 135, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of cancellation of removal based on a lack of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship (B) holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law (C) holding that the real id act does not restore jurisdiction over discretionary determinations (D) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the bias discretionary determinations concerning whether to grant cancellation of removal and that sjection 106 of the real id act does not override the jurisdictiondenying provision of 8 usc  1252a2b unless the petitioner raises a constitutional claim   or question  of law within the meaning of 8 usc  1252a2d (E) holding that the real id act leaves this court deprived of jurisdiction to review discretionary and factual determinations


Output: (D)