In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 397 So.2d 874, 874-75 (Miss.1981)). However, in McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., Inc., 626 So.2d 603 (Miss.1993), the Mississippi Supreme Court carved out “a narrow public policy exception” to the employment-at-will doctrine, holding that regardless of whether the employment is at-will, (1) an employee who refuses to participate in an illegal act as in Laws [v. Aetna Finance Co., 667 F.Supp. 342 (N.D.Miss.1987) ], shall not be barred by the common law rule of employment at will from bringing an action in tort for damages against his employer; (2) an employee who is discharged for reporting illegal acts of his employer to the employer or anyone else is not barred by the employmen ming Wheeler); Hammons v. Fleetwood Homes of Mississippi, Inc., 907 So.2d 357, 360 (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). As plaintiffs have presented no evidence to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the mcarn exception requirefs that the acts complained of warrant the imposition of criminal penalties as opposed to mere civil penalties (B) recognizing district courts discretion in assessing civil penalties under 21 usc  842c (C) holding that a claim for civil damages based on alleged violation of criminal statute under which criminal penalties result was properly dismissed because criminal violations are brought not in the name of the individual party but rather by and on behalf of the state of ohio or its subdivisions (D) holding that a judgment that requires the performance of an act is enforceable by civil and criminal contempt penalties emphasis omitted (E) holding double jeopardy clause applicable to civil penalties under the false claims act
[EX A]: recognizing district courts discretion in assessing civil penalties under 21 usc  842c

[EX Q]: to the section 924(c) jury instruction, we review it for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d 1056, 1066 (8th Cir.1996). Although the pre-Bailey instruction was given to the jury (because Bailey had no rovide a defendant, upon their motion, any statement or report made by a government witness that relates to the subject matter of the direct testimony of that witness. 18 U.S.C. § 3500. The government need not provide the statement, however, until after the witness testifies on direct examination. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). 6 . The district court’s ruling was essentially a discovery matter, which we review for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Byrne, 83 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the fbi informants file contained no brady material not already provided to the defendant in a summary (B) holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation (C) holding that an fbi agents rough notes of an interview of the defendant were not brady material because there was no independent showing that they contained evidence that was material to the defendants guilt or innocence (D) holding a trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require disclosure of an informants name (E) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
[EX A]: holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation

[EX Q]: constitutionally obstruct despite the provision of counsel. Indeed, in Benjamin v. Fraser, when considering impediments to pre-trial detainees’ ability to visit with counsel, we recognized that a state could not “ ‘unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts.’ ” Benjamin 264 F.3d at 187, 188 (emphasis added) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) and determining that “both the due process right of access to the courts and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are implicated,” and that there was no error in measures ordered to remedy undue delays associated with attorney visits). See also Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-81, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Nor can I agree with the majority’s holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding same for writ of error coram nobis (B) holding that rule 4as time limits govern an appeal from a district court order granting or denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis (C) holding that the state could not deny an indigent criminal appellant a transcript to appeal pro se from the denial of a writ of error coram nobis or permit that the appellant at the will of the public defender be entirely cut off from any appeal at all (D) holding that federal court may not issue writ of coram nobis for state prisoner (E) holding that in the absence of a valid excuse for delay a coram nobis petition is subject to denial
[EX A]:
holding same for writ of error coram nobis