instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
evidence suggesting that each of the hotel stays involved the same individual, (e.g., the perpetrator gave the same fictitious address and/or fictitious telephone number; tips on credit card vouchers were in such amounts that the totals rounded off to even dollar amounts, the perpetrator departed prior to the scheduled end of his stay without checking out). “Evidence of this kind may be sufficient alone to establish a perpetrator’s identity. See United States v. Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518, 524-25 (3d Cir.1979) (finding similar modus operandi evidence probative of identity); 2 Jack B. Wein-stein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 404[16] (1992) (discussing "signature” evidence in context of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)).” See also Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Evidence of individual modus operandi may be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of testimony which denominated appellants modus operandi in previously uncharged and charged crimes was not clearly erroneous (B) holding that rule 404b evidence is probative of intent only when the prior acts were part of the same scheme or involved a similar modus operandi as the present offense (C) holding that prior con victions are not related simply because the crimes used the same modus operandi were part of a crime spree or shared the same motive (D) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (E) holding other crimes evidence was properly admitted to establish modus operandi when the defendant attacked older women as they exited their garages in the same area of chicago
answer:
(A)


question:
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 1257, 10 L.Ed.2d 389 (1963). At the outset, we consider the effect of TAPAA’s introductory paragraph. Section 1653(c)(1) prescribes that, “Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law,” the owner of a vessel carrying trans-Alaska oil and the Fund “shall be strictly liable without regard to fault in accordance with the provisions of this subsection....” 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1). Section 1653(c)(1) is the general statement of liability, and as such it introduces the subsequent subsections which contain TAPAA’s operational details. While some courts have found “notwithstanding” phrases to preempt explicitly the application of other laws, see, e.g., Complaint of Hokkaido Fisheries Co., Ltd., 506 F.Supp. 631, 634 (D.Alaska 1981) (<HOLDING>), we do not find the phrase dispositive in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that denial of permit under section 404 of the clean water act was a taking (B) holding that district courts are without jurisdiction to review preenforcement orders issued under the clean water act (C) holding that adequate notice is a mandatory precondition of a clean water act citizen suit (D) holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act (E) holding that similar notwithstanding language in the clean water act preempted application of limitation act to limit owners liability for cleanup costs
answer:
(E)


question:
and that the error was not fundamental. In Cagle v. State, 821 So.2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), in which the State conceded error on appeal, this court clearly stated: A trial court may conduct probation revocation proceedings in an informal manner and it may question witnesses, but it may not assume the role of the prosecutor. Edwards v. State, 807 So.2d 762, 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Doing so deprives the defendant of the fair and impartial tribunal which is the cornerstone of due process. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980). Such conduct amounts to fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Sparks v. State, 740 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Id. at 444; see also Lyles v. State, 742 So.2d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the trial court assumed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial courts failure to dismiss the action to quiet title was error because the plaintiff was not in possession of the land in question but the error was not fatal to the claim because the superior court could sua sponte amend the pleadings to include an action in ejectment (B) holding lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction is fundamental error that this court may properly raise and recognize sua sponte (C) holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error (D) holding that trial court committed fundamental error where it gave the appearance of partiality by taking sua sponte action which benefitted the state ie reopening the probation revocation hearing and ordering the probationer to submit to fingerprinting (E) holding that a claim is considered exhausted by arizonas fundamental error review if it was explicitly noted in the briefs presented to the state appellate court or the state court mentions it is considering the claim sua sponte
answer:

(D)