In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

otherwise nonremovable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). While the amended third-party complaint alleges a claim involving a federal question against the Chase Defendants, the Circuits are split on whether section 1441(c) permits removal by a third-party defendant. Compare Lewis v. Windsor Door Co., 926 F.2d 729, 733 (8th Cir.1991) (‘We do not ... believe § 1441(c) was intended to effect removal of a suit, not otherwise within federal jurisdiction, because of the introduction of a third-party claim.” (internal quotations omitted)) and First Nat’l Bank of Pulaski v. Curry, 301 F.3d 456, 465 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) with Carl Heck Eng’rs, Inc. v. Lafourche 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct (B) holding that removal under section 1441c may only be done by the original defendant (C) holding that  1441c does not allow the remand of claims that are not separate and independent (D) recognizing that  1441c limits removal to situations in which a federal question is joined with a separate and independent claim of a nonfederal nature (E) holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand
(B)

interest” at issue here because “[pjursuant to the Treaty of 1866 and the Thirteenth Amendment, the Cherokee Nation has no authority to treat its Freedmen citizens as anything less than full equals.” Freedmen’s Opp’n to Crittenden’s Mot. Dismiss [Dkt. # 123] at 14. By raising this argument to eviscerate the Nation’s claim of prejudice, the Freedmen are asking the Court to reach the merits of their claims against the Nation. This the Court cannot do. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has squarely rejected a similar argum pelling claim of sovereign immunity” and finds that the Nation’s interests would be prejudiced if the case were to proceed in its absence. Republic of Philippines, 553 U.S. at 869, 128 S.Ct. 2180; see also Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 1001 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Davis, 192 F.3d at 960) (internal 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity extends to agencies and subdivisions of the tribe (B) recognizing a strong presumption favoring arbitrability (C) holding that there is a strong policy favoring dismissal for nonjoinder due to tribal sovereign immunity but that rule 19b factors must still be considered (D) holding that state did not have jurisdiction over tribe where tribe paid into workers compensation program but had not waived sovereign immunity (E) recognizing the strong policy favoring dismissal when a court cannot join a tribe because of sovereign immunity
(E)

was a “substantial factor” or “motivating factor” in Walker’s allegedly retaliatory actions. Abrams argues that a reasonable jury could infer, as a result of this chronology, that he was “falsely arrested” and that he was arrested “because of what [he] said.” Abrams then opines that “the arrest was for an illegal purpose” and finally that “[a]nger often leads to unthinking retaliation.” After reviewing the record and the standards presented in our line of cases, we agree with the district court’s finding that this chronology is unconvincing, as it fails to present “definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion,” Michael v. St. Joseph County, 259 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir.2001), contains mere speculation, and demands the making of unreasonable inferences in suppo -84 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that such a step would not be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest (B) holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest (C) holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity (D) holding that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a  1983 claim alleging false arrest (E) recognizing first amendment retaliation right

(C)