In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: the sophisticated user defense, a supplier has no duty to warn the ultimate user if it has reason to believe that the user will realize its dangerous condition. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn.2004); see also Ritchie v. Glidden, 242 F.3d 713, 724 (7th Cir.2001) (stating, under Indiana law, that the sophisticated purchaser defense to a failure-to-warn claim brought under negligence or strict liability theories provides that product suppliers do not have a duty to warn employees or customers of knowledgeable industrial purchasers as to product-related hazards). In addition to limiting a supplier’s duty, the “sophisticated user” concept also affects the element of proximate cause. Crook v. Kaneb Pipe Line Operating P’ship, L.P., 231 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Strong, 667 F.2d at 688 (“Even if [the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury (B) holding in a negligence action that the air traffic controllers failure to warn of an impending danger cannot be the proximate cause of an injury after the pilot himself discovered its presence appreciated the danger and decided to fly ahead into it (C) holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible (D) holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury (E) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: is correct. We will also assume that the court’s erro umed error prejudiced him is that other evidence supports the finding that he was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy. In the district court, Vasquez did not object to the PSR’s statement that he “recruited Wornick and Sella” into the conspiracy. Although the district court did not explicitly find that Vasquez recruited two of his co-conspirators, “[i]t is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a[PSR] admits those facts for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.2006). And we have held many times that a defendant’s recruitment of co-conspirators supports a § 3B1.1 enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 n. 2 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1304 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer leader manager or supervisor under  3bllc in part because the defendant actively recruited two individuals to transport drugs (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was a manager or supervisor under  3bllb in part because he recruited accomplices (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer or leader under  3blla in part because he recruited coconspirators

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: 361 Pa.Super. 491, 495 n. 3, 522 A.2d 1138, 1140 n. 3 (Pa.Super.Ct.1987) (listing state statues and statues that recognize a medical review privilege); IIA Hospital Law Manual (Medical Books) 78-106 (1996) (listing state statues dealing with discovery and admissibility of medical records, and giving a summary of each)); D.C.Code Ann. § 32-505 (1981). Thus, as in Jaffee, the nearly unanimous state legislative recognition of the self-critical analysis privilege in the medical peer review context confirms the appropriateness of recognizing the privilege in this forum. See 518 U.S. at 13,116 S.Ct. 1923. Recognizing the self-critical analysis privilege in this case is also supported by New Mexico’s own statutory privilege. See Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 N.Y.1976) (<HOLDING>). It is true that unlike the psychotherapist 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law (B) holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law (C) holding that federal courts presiding over causes of action created by state law should apply state substantive law but federal procedural law (D) recognizing a strong policy of comity between state and federal sovereigns impels federal courts to recognize state privileges where this can be accomplished at no substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy (E) holding that a federal court may resort to state law analogies for the development of a federal common law of privileges in instances where the federal rule is unsettled


Output: (D)