In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 1257, 10 L.Ed.2d 389 (1963). At the outset, we consider the effect of TAPAA’s introductory paragraph. Section 1653(c)(1) prescribes that, “Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law,” the owner of a vessel carrying trans-Alaska oil and the Fund “shall be strictly liable without regard to fault in accordance with the provisions of this subsection....” 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1). Section 1653(c)(1) is the general statement of liability, and as such it introduces the subsequent subsections which contain TAPAA’s operational details. While some courts have found “notwithstanding” phrases to preempt explicitly the application of other laws, see, e.g., Complaint of Hokkaido Fisheries Co., Ltd., 506 F.Supp. 631, 634 (D.Alaska 1981) (<HOLDING>), we do not find the phrase dispositive in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that denial of permit under section 404 of the clean water act was a taking (B) holding that district courts are without jurisdiction to review preenforcement orders issued under the clean water act (C) holding that adequate notice is a mandatory precondition of a clean water act citizen suit (D) holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act (E) holding that similar notwithstanding language in the clean water act preempted application of limitation act to limit owners liability for cleanup costs

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
that placed a forty-five day time limit on the administrator’s decision to grant or deny a license. See Redner, 29 F.3d at 1500. In the event the administrator exceeded the forty-five day time limit, the ordinance stated that “the applicant may be permitted to begin operating the establishment for which a license is sought," unless and until the County Administrator notifies the applicant of a denial of the application.” See id. at 1500-01 (citation omitted). We held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because its use of the word “may” rather than “shall” allowed the individuals responsible for enforcing the ordinance to suppress the protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on their part or any judicial determination. See id. at 1501 (<HOLDING>). In Lady J. Lingerie, we examined the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff (B) holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review (C) holding also that the ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review (D) holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record (E) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of a request to change a comprehensive zoning plan

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
Restatement was not error. Plaintiffs rely on Bell v. Poplar Bluff Physicians Group, Inc., for the contention that incidental transfer of a product does not relieve an entity from strict products liability. Bell v. Poplar Bluff Physicians Group, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Mo.App.1994). This case is distinguishable however, because in Bell there was no question that the implant placed into petitioner’s body was done so in the course of the business of respondent. Id. The issue was whether respondent was a “seller” within the meaning of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. In this case, the issue is whether Corrigan sold the manlift in the course of its business. This is apparently a question of first impression in Missouri. Corrigan characterizes the issue 713 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The case of Abbott v. U.S.I. Clearing Corp., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for a transaction to constitute a sale and trigger a first right of refusal it must involve an armslength transaction resulting in an actual change in control of the burdened property rather than simply moving it from the individual owners to an entity controlled by them (B) holding that net lease provisions in agreement together with other factors establish that the transaction is a sale (C) holding that an auction sale by an unlicensed auctioneer did not invalidate the sale (D) holding that the onetime sale of an industrial saw by a sawmill was an isolated transaction that did not come within the provisions of section 402a (E) holding that an isolated derogatory remark did not create an inference of discrimination

Ex Output:

(D)