TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: L.Ed.2d at 1035-86). Unfortunately, the adjective "readily" is subject to differing interpretations, and there has been disagreement regarding the meaning of "readily mobile." Decisions of the Indiana Court of Appeals are not consistent regarding whether automobiles under police observation or control are readily mobile so as to be subject to warrantless search under the automobile exception. E.g., compare, v. State, T5 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (legally parked automobile surrounded by police officers held not inherently mobile to qualify for automobile exeeption), transfer denied, and Edwards v. State, 768 N.E.2d 506, 508-09 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (impounded vehicle no longer "inherently mobile"), trams. not sought, with Johnson v. State, 766 N.E2d 426, 483 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002) (<HOLDING>), trans. demied, and Justice v. State, 765 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver (B) holding that ready mobility existed when a car was capable of being driven even after the driver was arrested and despite the absence of other potential drivers (C) holding that ocga  40520 as safeharbor provision requires a defendant to produce a drivers license that was valid at the time the vehicle was being driven (D) holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key (E) holding detention lawful when police referred driver to secondary to check ownership of the vehicle after the driver admitted that the car did not belong to him and the registration revealed that the car was owned by another

SOLUTION: holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver

PROBLEM: Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 523-26 (6th Cir.2008). Here, the Plaintiff was terminated by the Defendants three weeks after the filing of the Complaint in this case. This close temporal proximity between the Plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse employment action is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for his engagement in pro tected activity. See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection (B) holding in a discrimination case that a close temporal proximity sufficient to survive summary judgment existed where the challenged employment action occurred one month after the protected activity (C) holding that intervening misconduct can sever the temporal proximity connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment (D) holding that temporal proximity between the alleged retaliators knowledge of a protected activity and an adverse employment action may be sufficient to establish causal connection or retaliatory motive in some cases (E) holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection

SOLUTION: holding in a discrimination case that a close temporal proximity sufficient to survive summary judgment existed where the challenged employment action occurred one month after the protected activity

PROBLEM: suggests, that at this point, the defense can say with assurance that third-party guilt cannot be advanced. That simply does not validate Mann’s prior conduct. At the very least, this case involves an appearance of impropriety. See RPC 1.7(c) (setting forth appearance of impropriety rule). Although debate is raging over the continued vitality of that concept in other contexts, it is a critical factor in a capital case, where public confidence in the fairness of the proceedings leading to the verdict is a paramount consideration. State v. Loyal, 164 N.J. 418, 430, 753 A.2d 1073 (2000) (observing that when appearance of impropriety is found in criminal matter, disqualification of attorney is regularly required); State v. Rivera, 232 N.J.Super. 165, 177-78, 556 A.2d 1227 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 169, 564 A.2d 885 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice (B) recognizing the conflict (C) recognizing conflict (D) holding that a conflict of interest independent of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel  constitute cause where the conflict caused the attorney to interfere with the petitioners right to pursue his  1 claim (E) recognizing that attorneys may be disqualified under conflict of interest rules where defendants right to counsel of choice is outweighed by need to preserve public confidence in judicial system

SOLUTION:
recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice