TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: contract claims under general liability policies. See Keystone Filler & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. American Mining Ins. Co., 179 F.Supp.2d 432 (M.D.Pa.2002); Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria County v. Int’l Ins. Co., 454 Pa.Super. 374, 685 A.2d 581 (1996) (en banc); see also Augenblick v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 99-3419, 1999 WL 975118 (E.D.Pa. Oct.8, 1999). General liability policies provide the insured coverage for personal injury or property damage resulting from an “occurrence,” and are intended “to protect the insured from liability fo e in Redevelopment Authority — that there is no ‘occurrence’ if the underlying claim is one merely for breach-of-contract — has been followed by numerous state and federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania.”) (citing cases); Augenblick, 1999 WL 975118, at *2, 5 (<HOLDING>). In contrast to those cases, U.S. Specialty’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer (B) holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract (C) holding that insureds breach of contract suit against insurer raised a coverage issue which was not settled by insurers payment of only part of what insured was claiming in breach of contract action (D) holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract (E) holding insurer did not have to cover insured for a breach of contract because it was not an accident

SOLUTION: holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer

PROBLEM: the instructions misstated the law or misled the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” United States v. Felts, 579 F.3d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir. 2009). We will not reverse a conviction because of an erroneous instruction unless we are “left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations.” Id. at 1342-43 (quotation marks omitted). We evaluate the instruction as a whole and in the context of the entire trial. United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 16, 2017) (No. 16-8072). Challenges to jury instructions that are raised for the first time on appeal, however, are reviewed for plain error only. United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 973 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise rule 11 error at trial has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule (C) holding that plainerror review applies where the defendant fails to object to a constructive amendment (D) holding that plainerror review applies when a defendant fails to make a specific rule 32i3b objection based on a district courts failure to resolve a factual dispute (E) holding that plain error review applies where the defendant fails to object to the lack of an opportunity to allocute

SOLUTION: holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review

PROBLEM: program was rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of protecting Davis’s health and the public at large and attempt to rebut Davis’s allegations of anti-gay animus by asserting “as the Step I grievance [response] indicates, Davis’[s] situation presented a safety risk.” The question of whether Davis was removed from the public-works program because of safety reasons or because of anti-gay animus, however, is the issue in dispute in this case, and the defendants’ arguments are better suited for a motion for summary judgment. At this stage of the proceedings, the district court was required to treat Davis’s allegations — not the contested statements contained in the grievance response — as true. See Delay, 585 F.3d at 1005; Hill, 630 F.3d at 471. Because Davis al ir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Davis’s complaint likewise contains 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prisoner stated a valid equal protection claim when he alleged he was denied a work assignment because of his sexual orientation (B) holding that an isolated comment is not direct evidence of discrimination even if a plaintiff interpreted it as motivated by a discriminatory animus (C) holding that a gay prisoner alleging discriminatory treatment because of his sexual orientation was not required to identify any nonhomosexual prisoners who were similarlysituated but treated better because the complaint contained allegations that if true constituted direct evidence of discriminatory motive and animus (D) holding that sexual orientation and sexual identity are immutable (E) holding that evidence which suggests but does not prove a discriminatory motive is circumstantial evidence by definition

SOLUTION:
holding that a prisoner stated a valid equal protection claim when he alleged he was denied a work assignment because of his sexual orientation