In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

proceeding”). Here, the only evidence that th .Crim.App.2000) (stating, in motion to suppress context, “[T]he judge may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony, even if that testimony is not controverted”). Appellant’s and Sanchez’s after-the-fact, out-of-court averrals about appellant’s ability to understand the proceedings and waivers he signed were untimely factual statements in appellant’s self-interest. Even though the State did not offer affidavits to controvert appellant’s and Sanchez’s affidavits, it was within the trial court’s discretion to disbelieve the assertions contained in those affidavits that appellant does not read or speak English. See Charles, 146 S.W.3d at 210; Shanklin, 190 S.W.3d at 167; see also Phuong Anh Thi Le, 300 S.W.3d at 327 (<HOLDING>). The trial court, and not this Court, is in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record (B) holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record (C) recognizing that the bia must defer to the factual findings of the ij unless they are clearly erroneous (D) holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts (E) holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record
holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record

Leak should not have been admitted, because, they say, 1) its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value and 2) it was inadmissible under the general exclusionary rule. However, Tinsley and Tuscaloosa County did not object before the trial court based on these grounds. Because Tinsley and Tuscaloosa County failed to state these grounds for their objection, the alleged error was not preserved for appeal. Rule 103, Ala. R. Evid. The trial record shows that Tinsley and Tuscaloosa County based their objection to the testimony on a relevancy argument. They do not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that the evidence was relevant. Therefore, they have not presented any basis for appellate review on this issue. See Landreth v. State, 600 So.2d 440 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal (B) holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered (C) holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified (D) holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal (E) holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal
holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal

a civilian to fill a position traditionally occupied by a deputy sheriff. Id. at 772. In determining whether the sheriff was justified in retaliating against Fuerst, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the notion that Fuerst spoke as a public employee under Garcetti when he criticized the proposal: Because Fuerst’s comments that precipitated the adverse action taken against him were made in his capacity as a union representative, rather than in the course of his employment as a deputy sheriff — his duties as deputy sheriff did not include commenting on the sheriffs decision to hire a public-relations officer — the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos is inapposite. Id. at 774 (citation omitted); see also Baumann v. District of Columbia, 744 F.Supp.2d 216, 224 (D.D.C.2010) (<HOLDING>); Hawkins v. Boone, 786 F.Supp.2d. 328, 335 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that speech about financial assistance and handling racial discrimination does not qualify as protected speech (B) holding that a police officer speaking to a public official about his concerns over public safety issues is speaking in his capacity  as a police officer and not as a citizen (C) holding that a police officers deposition in a fellow officers  1983 action alleging unlawful retaliation was protected speech (D) holding that fire departments are analogous to police departments in this respect (E) holding that police officers criticism of his departments handling of a sniper incident was protected speech because the officer spoke in his capacity as police union president

holding that speech about financial assistance and handling racial discrimination does not qualify as protected speech