In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
to Richardson. 6 . In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the Supreme Court extended Batson and its progeny to prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of gender. 7 . The Slate also points out that the presiding judge in the instant case is an African American jurist. Judge Green's sensitivity and efforts to seat a constitutional and racially-diverse jury for defendant, is evidenced in the debate over Richardson. Even though the judge originally found the state’s race-neutral reasons as to Richardson valid, he became concerned about the exclusion of African Americans from defendant's jury. However, the judge’s race is not relevant to Batson analysis. See State v. Tilley, 99-0569, p. 8 (La.7/6/00), 767 So.2d 6, 15 (<HOLDING>). 8 . A discussion of the assignments of error 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case (B) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (C) recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination (D) holding that custody decision based on race is not justified (E) holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant

Ex Output:
holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case


Ex Input:
64 L.Ed.2d 795 (1980). We are faced with precisely such circumstances here. In their July 30 telephone conversation, Garcia negotiated with Papo for the purchase of heroin. He also instructed Papo to deliver the heroin to DeJe-sus, a direction that Papo clearly intended to carry out. Garcia’s instructions to Papo and Papo’s evident assent are independently admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 803(3). Under that rule, hearsay statements reflecting a declarant’s intentions or future plans are admissible to prove subsequent acts. Fed.R.Evid. 803 advisory committee note. Accordingly, the July 30 Garcia-Papo conversation is admissible to prove that Papo and Garcia intended to carry out a narcotics transaction in which DeJesus would serve as a middleman. See United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d at 104 (<HOLDING>). The July 30 conversation also is arguably 
 Holding statements: (A) holding coconspirators hearsay statements independently admissible under fedrevid 8033 to show declarants intent to engage in illicit drug transaction (B) holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care (C) holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay (D) holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators (E) holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy

Ex Output:
holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care


Ex Input:
of a firearm, in the absence of any aggravating circumstances charged in the indictment, does not constitute a per se ‘crime of violence’ .... ” Johnson, 953 F.2d at 115. The court reasoned that “[t]he danger inherent in the mere possession of a firearm is, in many cases, too highly attenuated to qualify the offense as a per se ‘crime of violence.’ ” Id. “While a felon in possession of a firearm may pose a statistical danger to society,” the offense in and of itself cannot be categorically considered a crime of violence. Id. While I recognize that, strictly speaking, the holding of Johnson applies only in the context of the Sentencing Guidelines, I can discern no basis to decline to apply its reasoning here. But cf. Fonner v. Thompson, 955 F.Supp. 638, 640-641 (N.D.W.Va.1997) (<HOLDING>). This is especially true in light of the very 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo (B) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (C) holding that bop interpretation of  922g1 as a crime of violence is permissible construction of  3621e2b and limiting the holding of johnson to the interpretation of sentencing guidelines (D) holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation (E) holding that in reviewing a claim construction decided under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness

Ex Output:

recognizing that the standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo