In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
(3) the de fendant’s culpability in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled person. See Securities & Exchange Com’n v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir.1996). First, as the Court has found, plaintiffs have failed properly to plead a violation of the 1934 Act. Second, as we also have noted, plaintiffs have failed properly to allege scienter and/or culpability on the part of “Merrill Lynch.” Even had we found a properly pled violation of the 1934 Act, we would not automatically impute this violation to “Merrill Lynch” as a controlling entity. See Baesa, 969 F.Supp. at 242 (“[T]he law in this circuit is clear that a subsidiary’s fraud cannot be automatically imputed to its corporate parent.”). See also Chill v. General Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Novak, 997 F.Supp. at 435. Finally the Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper (B) holding that district court has the power to decide what portion of subsidiarys income should be reallocated to its parent (C) holding that a parent company would at the very least have to have been deliberately blind to its subsidiarys fraud in order to have the requisite scienter (D) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible (E) holding that a subsidiarys contacts can be imputed for purposes of service of process where a parent uses the subsidiary to do what it otherwise would have done itself 

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
Accordingly, the second Olano prong is satisfied: the error, both as to the absence of a jury determination on an essential element of the offense and the failure to include that element in the indictment, was indeed “plain.” c. Did the plain error affect Thomas’s substantial rights? An error affects a defendant’s “substantial rights” if it is “prejudicial” and it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Gore, 154 F.3d at 47. “Though ‘prejudice’ is also required to show that an error is not ‘harmless,’ pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a), the important difference of plain error prejudice [in most cases] is that ‘[i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of pers , 2001), with United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 100-01 3d Cir. (2001) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (B) holding that constitutional error cannot be premised on error in a charge unless the error violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed (D) holding at the governments urging that a similar error was an error in both the trial and sentencing (E) holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
see infra ¶ 35, we should not force such changes on the legislature by judicial mandate. 15 . The dissent posits that equitable adoption may represent the wishes of some decedents and may not prolong all estate proceedings. See infra ¶¶ 47-48. But this hedging is significant; it ultimately supports the conclusion that equitable adoption adds uncertainty and complexity to the intestacy scheme. Justice DURHAM, dissenting: 4[ 34 I disagree with the majority's conclusion that it is "impossible" to follow both the doctrine of equitable adoption and Utah's version of the Uniform Probate Code (Probate Code o n the basis of policy, they are responsible for determining the constitutionality of challenged statutes. See, e.g., Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶¶ 64, 83, 54 P.3d 1069 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, courts can call the attention 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the statutory scheme of two federal laws was not void for vagueness and did not violate equal protection or due process even though the defendants conduct violated both laws (B) holding that an amendment to the colorado constitution that repealed all local and statewide laws prohibiting sexualorientation discrimination violated the federal equal protection clause (C) holding that central assessment by the unit method of valuation did not violate the equal protection clause of the united states constitution or the uniform operation of laws provision in the utah constitution (D) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause (E) holding that the multicounty signature requirement for initiatives violated the uniform operation of laws clause and the federal equal protection clause

Ex Output:

(E)