In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Petitioner Jaswinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we grant the petition for review. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s order without discussion, thus we review the substance of the immigration judge’s order. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845 (9th Cir.2003). The IJ erred when she found Singh’s testimony inconsistent and implausible, and therefore the record compels finding Singh’s testimony, credible. Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). First, the IJ erred when she found that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an adverse credibility determination is overturned only if each proffered reason for the determination fails (B) holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination (C) holding that an adverse credibility determination must be supported by a true inconsistency (D) holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum (E) holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
appropriate relief for such a violation is for the habeas court to “vacate the judgment of conviction and enter a new judgment from which an appeal can be taken.” Id. Defendant argues that the Peak line of eases applies to his situation, and that his appellate rights should thus be reinstated. However, the Peak rule does not apply in defendant’s ease, as the appeal at issue is not an appeal from a conviction. A Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach to an appeal from a supervised release revocation hearing. Borrego v. United States, 975 F.Supp. 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y.1997). This follows logically from the fact that there is no guaranteed constitutional right to counsel at the supervised release revocation hearing itself. See United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel (D) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (E) holding that most of the fundamental constitutional procedural protections that are normally applicable to a criminal prosecution are not required for supervisedrelease proceedings as a matter of constitutional law including a right to counsel

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
provision gives the BIA non-reviewable discretion.” Id. In the instant case, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to grant Lushaj’s motion to reopen because that decision is committed to the discretion of the BIA. See Anin, 188 F.3d at 1279. Accordingly, we dismiss Lushaj’s petition with respect to his claim that the BIA should have exercised its sua sponte authority to grant his motion to reopen and deny his petition with respect to his claim that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen. DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART. 1 . Lushaj does not challenge the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider. Therefore, he has abandoned this issue on appeal. See Rowe v. Schreiber, 139 F.3d 1381, 1382 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Even if we had jurisdiction to review the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned (B) holding that issues not briefed are deemed abandoned (C) holding that issues not raised in the initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned (D) holding that issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned (E) holding that issues not raised in an initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned

Ex Output:

(A)