In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: a result, he had assented to the Estate’s producing the letters. Despite their lack of objection prior to producing the documents, the Opposing Parties contend the Estate “inadvertently” produced the documents and, further, that the stipulated protective order in this ease (the “Protective Order”) requires KFI to return the documents. KFI argues the Estate voluntarily produced the documents. As detailed herein, this court finds the documents were not inadvertently disclosed. When parties stipulate to a protective order requiring the return of inadvertently produced documents, the agreement is enforceable if the proponent actually produced the document(s) inadvertently and otherwise complies with the terms of the order. See VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 11-12 (D.Mass.2000) (<HOLDING>). Absent an agreement, courts have applied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in agency adjudications in which the government has not claimed privilege written reports made at the time of an event must be produced when the credibility of the witness on matters discussed in the report is in question (B) holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply fully against the government because the possibility of harm to a private party is often if not always grossly outweighed by the public interest in enforcement of congressionally mandated public policy (C) holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing (D) holding that where the district court decided two issues in the certified order but identified only the damages issue as the controlling question of law the court of appeals could nonetheless address the other issue (E) holding stipulated protective order mandated return of two documents inadvertently produced with approximately 25000 intentionally produced pages proponents established that the production of the materials at issue was not a considered or grossly negligent decision but the result of inattention ie inadvertence
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: the sufficiency of the evidence,” we “must affirm the verdict ‘if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the evidence that the elements of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1218, 117 S.Ct. 1709, 137 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997)). hi. A. The principal issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in admitting the text messages obtained from Govan’s cell phone. First, Govan argues that the district court erred by applying the good-faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Govan argues that for the good-faith 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required (B) holding that because evidence supporting search warrant was illegally obtained evidence recovered by executing warrant was fruit of the illegal search (C) holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not bar the use of evidence obtained by police officers acting in good faith and with reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant (D) holding that evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is not barred by the exclusionary rule (E) holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to evidence obtained by police officers acting in reasonable reliance on search warrant later held invalid
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: was insufficient). This court was similarly unanimous. See Wheeler, 121 Hawai'i at 385, 219 P.3d at 1172. It was not debatable whether the failure to allege the public-road element (i.e., the definition of "operating”) yields a sufficient charging instrument, because this would have been in derogation of a settled constitutional principle. See State v. Jendrusch, 58 Haw. 279, 281, 567 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1977) (noting that a charge omitting an element of the offense constitutes a denial of due process). 33 . See also United States v. Rivera-Nevarez, 418 F.3d 1104, 1107 (10th Cir.2005) (''Decisions of statutory interpretation are fully retroactive because they do not change the law, but rather explain what the law has always meant.”); In re Blackshire, 98 F.3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 992 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the us supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc  924c in an earlier case was not an expression of a new rule because the court merely interpreted a substantive criminal statute using rules of statutory construction (B) holding that for purposes of statutory construction expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other (C) holding that a prior us supreme court decision did not present a new rule of criminal procedure but merely interpreted a statute (D) holding that in relation to is an element of 18 usc  924c (E) holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order
[EX A]:
(A)