In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: to dedicate all of their disposable income to their plan. The Trustee’s supplemental objection raised, for the first time, whether Section 1325(a)(5) bars a debtor from confirming a plan that strips off a wholly unsecured lien where the debtor has received a discharge in a prior bankruptcy case within the proscribed period set forth in Section 1328(f). Although TD Bank had previously argued that the Debtors’ ability to strip off its lien was contingent upon the entry of a discharge order, TD Bank did not rely on Section 1325(a)(5). IV. Discussion A. Jurisdiction and Venue The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and discharge in a bankruptcy case filed within four years of filing an earlier Chapter 7 petition 253 F.3d 778, 781-83 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). However, there is no prohibition against lien 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage lien can be avoided under nobelman (B) holding that a socalled chapter 20 debtor may strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien (C) holding that an allowed wholly unsecured consensual junior lien may not be stripped off in a chapter 7 case (D) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage on chapter 13 debtors residence could not be stripped down into an unsecured claim by debtors plan (E) holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge

A: (C)
****
Q: hostile work environment claims from the general Ricks rule because such claims “ ‘cannot be said to occur on any particular day,’ and instead usually involve a pattern of acts that aren’t ‘actionable on [their] own’ but give rise to a legal violation only when assessed in their totality.” Almond, 665 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115-16, 122 S.Ct. 2061). Here, the Court does not construe Plaintiffs pleadings to allege a hostile work environment claim. Even construing Plaintiffs pleadings liberally, his generic assertions that Defendant Beilis treated him in a hostile manner toward the end of his employment and sent him hostile emails fall far short of asserting a claim for age-based hostile work environment. See Phillips v. Moore, 164 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1254 (D.Kan.2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, despite Plaintiffs averment that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supervisors routine vulgar references to plaintiff could not support a hostile work environment claim because plaintiff was unaware of the comments and to show that he or she perceived the environment as hostile a title vii plaintiff must at least have been aware of those comments (B) holding that the plaintiff failed to state an agebased hostile work environment claim where the plaintiffs proffered evidence was nothing more than a collection of unrelated and infrequent incidents of conduct by the defendants that the plaintiff subjectively construe as acts motived by agerelated animus and which was devoid of the agerelated comments or ridicule that are hallmarks of hostile work environment claims (C) holding that certain conduct was irrelevant to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim absent evidence that plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of it (D) recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 (E) holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive

A: (B)
****
Q: limit Section 74.351(a) imposes on a health liability claimant. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a new trial with respect to dismissal of her claims. We overrule Awoniyi’s second point of error. Attorney’s-Fee AwaRD to the Hospital In her third point of error, Awoniyi contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the hospital because she timely served her expert report on the hospital. As discussed above, Awoniyi’s expert report was not served timely. Where an expert report is not served timely, Section 74.351 imposes a duty on the trial court, upon a health care provider’s motion, to dismiss the claims and to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the health care provider. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>). The trial court thus did not err in awarding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the term shall is mandatory for purposes of statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous (B) holding that attorneys fee statute using shall language is not discretionary (C) holding that a statute shall not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication (D) holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language (E) holding provision in attorneys fee contract requiring client that terminated contract to immediately pay attorney fee equal to present value of attorneys interest in case was inconsistent with public policy and unconscionable

A:
(B)
****