Your task is to extract the thesis of an opinionated news article by selecting some of its text segments. The thesis is a summarization of what the author wants to persuade the reader of. Your answer should consist of segments of the given text. Note that you are not allowed to combine different sentences.

The trap of insecurity: Extrajudicial killings in Kenya. Over the years, Kenyan police have acquired a dubious reputation of being a source of insecurity instead of one of security . In many instances, the police represent clear, palpable and imminent danger to the lives of Kenyan citizens . The transformation of the police from a security institution into a bastion of insecurity didn't occur overnight , nor did it come as a surprise ; it was the inevitable outcome of a number of factors . Some of these factors are beyond their control . For instance ,  policemen are underpaid and ill-equipped to do their job ; others seem to be an institutional choice, such as the endemic corruption within the police force . Under the previous constitution, the police were at the beck and call of the executive , which used it as a tool of coercion to further its political goals . As a result , when confronted by a new security situation, the executive's default response has been to set up a "special" police unit to address the situation . In most cases, t he unit would operate under minimum oversight and maximum impunity . More than any other institution in the country, the police has deep institutional problems , but one of the most detrimental ones is its involvement in extrajudicial killings. Remarkably, this is not only a new phenomenon , but it is deeply entrenched with a clear pattern . In the 1990s, crime was on the rise in Kenya . In order to stem the high rates of carjacking and violent robberies, in 1995 the government formed a new police unit called the Flying Squad. This special unit was given the express authority to shoot any suspect on sight without due process . As a result, the unit was implicated in multiple and egregious extrajudicial killings , which they claimed was their way of dealing with the new security reality . In some cases, the police officers were caught shooting suspects after they had surrendered or were lying face down . The unit executed several innocent people in cold blood . The police command instead of seeing the unit's trigger-happy attitude as dangerous, celebrated it as the only "medicine" with which to treat spiralling crime . The late 1980s and 1990s saw deep economic problems, shrinking political space for dissent and increasing insecurity . This was the time when criminal gangs emerged and flourished . These gangs e stablished their "spheres of influence" , mostly in slum areas, where the state's presence was negligible . To establish loyalty from the community and enhance their legitimacy, these groups provided security for a token fee . To exert their superiority, from time to time, these groups engaged each other over "territories" and business interests . Among these groups were the Mungiki, the Taliban, the Kosovo boys, the Baghdad boys, Chinkororo, and the Kalenjin Warriors . Mungiki is a Kikuyu word for multitude . The organisation had both a cultural and political element to it . In the beginning of the group's existence, the social aspect was more prominent and it involved traditional Kikuyu beliefs in the god named Ngai. But as the organisation expanded, it began taking an overtly political posture , which brought them into confrontation with the state . Mungiki operated primarily in the Nairobi slums, in the Central Province and parts of the Rift Valley . In these areas, the group started providing the poor in slum areas with protection and social services for a fee . Refusal to pay the protection " tax " almost always resulted in violence and killings . In 2002, the Kenyan government banned 18 of these criminal gangs . The spread of Mungiki's influence forced the government in 2007 to establish a special police unit called Kwekwe which was tasked primarily with hunting down members of Mungiki . But Kwekwe's operation against the criminal group went too far . According to a National Commission on Human Rights 2008 report:"Extrajudicial executions and other brutal acts of extreme cruelty have been perpetrated by the police against so-called Mungiki adherents and that these acts may have been committed pursuant to official policy sanctioned by the political leadership, the police commissioner and top police commander" . HRW observed in 2008 that,"The brutality of the police crackdown matched or even exceeded that of the Mungiki itself." Kenya has been in the crosshairs of the transnational jihadi movement . In the past, the fact that Kenya was seen as being firmly in the western sphere of influence made Kenya a target , with most of the incidents, including the 1998 US embassy attack, targeting western interests . However ,  after Kenya's intervention in Somalia in 2011, the country itself become a target . Terrorism activity in Kenya reached a peak with the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in September 2013 , when unidentified gunmen killed 67 people and injured almost 200 others . As a response to the growing terrorism threat, the Kenyan government created the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in March 2003, following the 2002 attack on an Israeli-owned Mombasa hotel . This was also accompanied by the passage of Anti-Terrorism Act in 2012 . As part of the wider counterterrorism effort, the government also began a huge crackdo wn on the Somali and Muslim communities especially in Nairobi, parts of Northern Kenya and coastal Kenya . As the crackdown intensified, a number of extrajudicial killings of Muslim preachers took place, some in the coastal city of Mombasa . Most of the victims were suspected of having connections with Somalia's al-Shabab group . While in almost all the cases the police deny culpability , research by human rights organisations reveals the ATPU's involvement . In its August 2014 report,"Kenya: Killings, disappearance by anti-terror police," HRW points to" ...evidence of at least 10 cases of extrajudicial killings of terrorism suspects, some of whom were last seen in ATPU custody or had been threatened by the unit's officers after courts had released them" . The Kenyan government has accused some of the clerics who were killed of recruiting Muslim youth for terrorism activities through their mosques . However ,  despite initiating investigations against them, the government never followed through to prosecute the imams . After public outcry over the killing of Muslim cleric Ibrahim "Rogo" Omar, the government set up a task force to investigate his murder . The director of public prosecution promised in 2013 that he will institute an inquest, but has not done so yet . One of the commissions established following the 2007-2008 violence to look at the role of the police, was the Waki Commission . Established to look into the circumstances and facts surrounding the violence and provide recommendations, the Waki Commission found that of the 1,500 deaths, the police was responsible for more than 30 percent of them . As a result several reform measures were proposed including the establishment of a civilian oversight of the police, and many other reforms . However ,  due to lack of political will, the police reforms have stalled . The extrajudicial killings by the police in Kenya are anchored in a systemic lack of accountability and deeply entrenched culture of pervasive impunity . While the police undoubtedly face ever changing security challenges , its involvement in extrajudicial killings make matters worse . Effective security sector reform is the only way forward .
Over the years, Kenyan police have acquired a dubious reputation of being a source of insecurity instead of one of security

The hostage rescue dilemma. Saturday's failed hostage rescue mission in Yemen was indeed tragic . While the official details as to exactly what happened have not yet been released , it appears Luke Somers, an American journalist, and Pierre Korkie, a South African teacher, were killed by their captors during a night-time rescue attempt carried out by US Navy SEALs . Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had been holding Somers and Korkie captive for over a year . It was the second such attempt to rescue Somers in two weeks . On November 25, a SEALs team hit what they thought was the compound holding Somers , who, as it turns out, had been moved from there just hours before . In Saturday's operation, the SEALs knew Somers' exact location . To maintain stealth, they landed by V-22 Osprey several kilometres away, and then made the trek overland to the compound where Somers and Korkie were being held captive . But something went terribly wrong in the final approach . Perhaps it was a barking dog or some other noise , but the SEALs came under fire as they approached the compound's main entrance . The element of surprise, which is so critical to rescue operations, was lost , and a fierce firefight ensued . Within 30 minutes, the SEALs had secured the compound and put Somers and Korkie, who were both still alive on a V-22 that had a surgical team standing by . Unfortunately, medics were unable to save them . Plainly necessary . For Somers, Saturday's rescue mission was as urgent as it was plainly necessary . Late last week AQAP released a video stating he would be killed in 72 hours unless unspecified demands were met . Those demands have not been made public, but likely involved payment of a ransom or release of AQAP captives, something the US is prohibited by law from doing . For Korkie, the sense of urgency in attempting the rescue operation is more controversial . According to the South African charity Gift of the Giving, a deal had been made with AQAP to release Korkie in just a matter of days, suggesting to many that it would have been better to wait . Maybe there was a deal that would have gone through in the end . Maybe there wasn't . But in rescue operations, hope is not figured into the equation , where planners and decision makers have to weigh the risks of action against the consequences of inaction . By their very nature, hostage rescue operations are among the most difficult and risky military missions to carry out . With little margin for error, either in intelligence or the operation itself, they demand highly trained and equipped special operations units that only a handful of countries have . Are they dangerous and uncertain? Absolutely . Are they impossible? No . In 2012, US Navy SEALs rescued Jessica Buchanan, an American aid worker, and Poul Hagen Thisted, a Danish aid worker , who had been held hostage by Somali pirates for 93 days . The pirates were demanding a $45m ransom for their release . In this particular case, precise intelligence as to their exact location, along with concerns about Buchanan's rapidly declining health, were major factors in moving forward with the rescue mission . Under the cover of darkness, the SEAL Team parachuted 19km from where they were being held, and then moved cross-country to conduct the rescue . Nine pirates were killed during the operation , and Buchanan and Thisted were unharmed . In 2009, US Navy SEAL snipers ended the hostage ordeal of American Richard Phillips, captain of the cargo ship Maersk Alabama , which had been hijacked by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean five days earlier . Talks with the pirates ended when they threw the phone used to communicate with negotiators into the ocean . When one of the pirates pointed his rifle at Captain Phillips' back , snipers shot and killed all three in near simultaneous fashion . Captain Phillips was unharmed . Heartbreaking failures . In 2005, US Delta Force operators rescued Roy Hallums, an American civilian contractor kidnapped by an al-Qaeda cell in Iraq, after 311 days in captivity . Again , the intelligence as to Hallums' location was exact - pull up the kitchen carpet and open the faux cement trap door leading into his one room cell . Hallums was unharmed in the operation . But , as was all too evident on Saturday, there are heartbreaking failures, too . This past July, US special operations forces attempted to rescue James Foley in Syria . Unfortunately, the intelligence as to where he was being held was incorrect . Foley was brutally murdered by ISIL just a few weeks later , the videotape of which was released on the internet for the world to see . In 2010, the US special operations team attempting to rescue her in Afghanistan accidentally killed Linda Norgrove, a British citizen . There are other failures, all tragic, as well . But there are also other successes , where hostages like Jessica Buchanan, Poul Thisted, Captain Phillips and Roy Hallums, all of whom faced indefinite captivity or even death, are home with their families because decisions were made to rescue them based on calculated risks . No guessing, no maybes, no "let's keep our fingers crossed and hope for the best" . Rescue missions are risky, both for the hostages and for the operators who carry them out . Lives are at stake , and it's never an easy choice to give the "green light" . But given the circumstances, particularly when dealing with terrorist organisations, leaders can't always sit back and wait to see what happens . Sometimes, it's less risky to act than not to . And in the case of a hostage rescue operation, I'd place my life in the hands of men dedicated to the task before taking my chances with the likes of a terrorist in the hope that maybe they'll let me go .
Saturday's failed hostage rescue mission in Yemen was indeed tragic

Five ways Obama could make Castro pay Cuba's $6 billion debt to Americans. In his half century reign of terror, Cuban dictator Fidel Castro committed manifold atrocities . Documented evidence reveals him to be a ruthless tyrant who endlessly abused the most basic of human rights -a man who played a pivotal role in bringing the world to the precipice of nuclear annihilation for 13 harrowing days in October of 1962 . Beyond his crimes against humanity and the callous suffering he inflicted on the people of Cuba, he ruined the lives and livelihoods of thousands of Americans . He stole their land, homes, bank accounts, possessions and businesses . He absconded with their property under the guise of "nationalization." But he is, in truth, a thief . Will his victims now be fairly compensated or otherwise see the return of their confiscated property in the wake of America's first steps toward rapprochement with Cuba? The answer is both legal and political . President Obama holds the key . So, don't get your hopes up . The Theft . In the first half of the 20th century, Americans and U.S  businesses dominated Cuba . They accumulated vast holdings of property and operated many of the most lucrative businesses . All of that ended with the Cuban Revolution in 1959 . Castro "nationalized" U.S.-owned industries and seized much of the island's private property from Americans . There was no restitution . One legal scholar called it the largest uncompensated expropriation by a foreign government in history . The U.S  retaliated with an embargo, prohibiting all trade . But the Americans who were expelled from Cuba were left holding titles and deeds to homes and businesses to which they had no access . Their property rights were dissolved , and any legal judgments obtained were unenforceable against an isolated nation that refused to recognize any authority other than its own . Thousands pursued legal recourse and sought reparations under indemnification programs established by Congress . Others filed lawsuits and secured judgments . But Castro didn't care . He repudiated the legitimacy of the restitution programs, the valuation of losses and the legal authority of the courts . This , even though Cuba admits their renegade nationalization was, and is, compensable . So what , then ,  does Castro consider fair compensation? Judging from his payouts to other aggrieved nations, it is mere pennies on the dollar . How do you value dirt? In 1961, the U.S  Commerce Department valued American property seized by the Cuban government at roughly $ 1 to 1.8 billion . Nearly 6-thousand claims were legally certified . Other published reports placed the theft as high as $ 9 billion . But the truth is, it's impossible to know -especially inasmuch as the value of everything plummeted the moment Castro took control of the island . What would the same confiscated properties be worth in today's dollars? $50 billion? $100 billion? How about nothing at all? Given how the Castro brothers have driven their economy into the ground, making Cuba one of the poorest nations in the world , valuation could be closer to dirt than dollars . Which invites another question : assuming a monetary value could somehow be devised, how would Cuba pay for it? With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Castros lost their financial benefactor . The island is blighted and broke . Even if it offered government bonds as compensation , are they worth the paper upon which they are written? How could they be secured? Reclaim the property? Theoretically, it is possible for the confiscated property to be reclaimed someday by the original owners . But that would require a dramatic Cuban transformation from socialism to democracy where private property ownership is permitted . In a recent speech, Cuban President Raul Castro insisted Cuba would not renounces its core socialist ideals as part of the deal he negotiated with President Obama to renew diplomatic relations . Even if some semblance of democracy were to be restored to Cuba in the distant future , what remains of the stolen property? No one knows how many of the private residences that were seized have been divided or fallen into decay . Some may no longer exist . And what of the current occupants? Would they allow themselves to be kicked out? The same may be true of the many farms, industries and commercial businesses that were confiscated and have been put to other uses in the last 5 decades . Yes, they have development potential in an open, free market society . But ,  again, the future of Cuba is nebulous . How realistic is the return of these vast holdings under a continuing Castro regime? What Obama should do . As a first condition to normalizing relations, President Obama should demand that all American victims of stolen property be compensated equitably . He is already obligated by law to do this under the Helms-Burton Act . But Obama has a propensity to ignore or overrule with impunity those laws he regards as misguided or inconvenient . This is one law he should follow . A second condition should be the establishment of a commission of judges with legally binding authority to render compensation decisions . Several reparation models can be studied and replicated, notably the tribunal that dispensed claims in post-unification Germany . President Obama has the power and leverage to force the Castro regime to capitulate if Cuba wants to end the sanctions and restore economic relations . But so far, he has uttered not a word about a desire to do so . And when it comes to negotiations with adversaries, Obama tends to give away the store .

Beyond his crimes against humanity and the callous suffering he inflicted on the people of Cuba, he ruined the lives and livelihoods of thousands of Americans