In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: See Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 627, 651 A.2d 92, 95 (1995). However, apart from any persuasive weight afforded the Ninth Circuit’s decision in C’Est Moi, NHIC proffers no case law specifically suggesting that common law doctrines such as uberrimae fidei and equitable fraud may not be modified or superseded by a contractual agreement between the insurer and the insured. On the contrary, as we have noted, a number of courts have embraced the ability of parties to contract around common law. See, e.g., King, 906 F.2d at 1540-41; Conn. Indem. Co., 390 F.Supp.2d at 166-67; Progressive N. Ins. Co., 314 F.Supp.2d at 829-30; see also, e.g., McBride v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2007 WL 5185293, at *18, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16917, at **64-65 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 29, 2007) (<HOLDING>). 19 . NHIC points out that during a telephone 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application (B) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (C) holding that insurance application clause modified federal common law governing misrepresentations because  once an insurer has entered into a policy by using an application form more favorable to the insured than the law provides it may not rely on a rule of law which is more stringent than the application form  quoting espinosa v guardian life ins 856 fsupp 711 717 dmass1994 (D) holding that the mccarranferguson act which bars application of a federal law in the face of a state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance did not preclude the concurrent assertion of the federal rico statute and nevada insurance law (E) recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous

Answer: holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application


Question: It is axiomatic, however, that states act through their officials and agencies. Thus, under Will, those state agencies and other political subdivisions which carry out the state’s business and have immunity from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment constitute “arms of the state.” Pursuant to Will, such entities would not be considered persons under § 1983. Those political subdivisions which are not provided immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, do not rise to the level of “arms of the state” and would, under Will, be considered to be persons for the purposes of § 1983. See Barket, Levy & Fine v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1086-88 (8th Cir.1991) (bi-state agency is a “person” under § 1983); Magula v. Broward Gen. Medical Ctr., 742 F.Supp. 645, 649 (S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Since the Will decision was handed down, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment (B) holding that an ohio school district is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the state and therefore it is not entitled to assert eleventh amendment immunity from suit (C) holding that the anne arundel board of education is an arm of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that the puc is not an arm of the state and rejecting claim of immunity (E) holding that because hospital district is more like a municipality than an arm of the state hospital district did not have eleventh amendment immunity

Answer: holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment


Question: treating physician’s opinion does not deserve “controlling weight,” the ALJ “must” consider “certain factors — namely, the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the specialization of the treating source — in determining what weight to give the opinion.” Id. In other words, “a decision denying benefits ‘must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the treating [physician’s] medical opinion.’ ” Id. (emphasis added). Generally speaking, if an ALJ’s decision fails to follow these procedural rules, the decision should not be affirmed unless it can be shown that any error was harmless. See, e.g., id. at 547 (<HOLDING>); Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that remand was necessary when the alj failed to adhere to  4041527d2s procedural requirements and noting that a de minimis violation of those procedural requirements may qualify as harmless error (B) holding that court had no obligation to inform pro se litigant of procedural requirements due to clear evidence in record including inter alia defendants mention of requirements in summary judgment motion that litigant knew requirements (C) holding that court may not impose procedural requirements on agency decisionmaking that go beyond those of the administrative procedure act (D) holding that courts must strictly adhere to title viis procedural requirements and stating that these requirements are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants (E) holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged to be cause for the procedural default of other claims is itself an independent claim subject to the procedural requirements of exhaustion

Answer:
holding that court had no obligation to inform pro se litigant of procedural requirements due to clear evidence in record including inter alia defendants mention of requirements in summary judgment motion that litigant knew requirements