In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: trial court’s judgment wherein the appellant was sentenced to a loss of liberty”).’ ““““Berry v. State, 630 So.2d 127, 130 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (footnote omitted). See also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 494, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (‘ “If the accused ... is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.... The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus.” ’) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); Weakley v. State, 721 So.2d 235, 236 (Ala.1998) (<HOLDING>).” “““Thus it is the lack of counsel, coupled 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (B) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (C) recognizing the right to counsel on appeal (D) holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel (E) holding that the right to counsel at arraignment is a jurisdictional matter
[A]: (E)


[Q]: case because in Revenue Cabinet, as here, the sales tax statute did not impose a test for passage of title, and an administrative rule did impose a test for passage of title. Id. at 738-39. Here, Hales makes no claim that the impermanence of its materials results in a generally understood, implicit agreement to pass title at some point before delivery. Moreover, our statute requires an explicit agreement on passage of title before the statutory presumption can be rebutted; there is no obvious provision in this statute for an implicit understanding, which the Kentucky court thought sufficient. Consequently, the facts of Revenue Cabinet aré inapposite and its result is inapplicable to the case at bar. See also Kurtz Concrete, Inc. v. Spradling, 560 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo.1978) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the Commission applied the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title insurer not in business of supplying information in issuing either title commitment or policy of title insurance for purposes of exception to moorman prohi bition against recovery of economic losses in tort further holding that contract defines title insurers liability (B) holding that title passes on mixture of readymix concrete because of usage of trade (C) recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim (D) holding in a slander of title action that attorneys fees are recoverable as part of the costs of removing the cloud from the title (E) holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title
[A]: (B)


[Q]: Even so, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of “whether the evidentiary framework of [McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)] ... is appropriate in the ADEA context.” Gross, 557 U.S. at -, 129 S.Ct. at 2349 n. 2. We have used the analytical framework from McDonnell Douglas in ADEA cases where a plaintiff offers circumstantial evidence to prove a claim of discrimination. Cofield v. Goldkist, Inc., 267 F.3d 1264, 1268 n. 6 (11th Cir.2001) (noting that “[a]l-though the McDonnell Douglas framework originally applied to Title VII cases, it is now widely accepted that the framework applies to claims of discrimination under the ADEA as well”). Sinc ., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a 56year old employee was replaced by a 40year old employee this qualified as someone substantially younger for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case (B) holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination (C) holding that the fourth prong of a prima facie age discrimination case was satisfied where plaintiff was replaced by two individuals  one who was four years younger than plaintiff and the other who was ten years younger (D) holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case (E) holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive
[A]:
(B)