In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

or require the information it did. In light of the information possessed by the District as of June 2, 2011, the District’s interference with Rutherford’s right to return began then, and continued until the District ultimately terminated him. Once a technical violation of the FMLA has been established—and here, the undisputed facts show that a violation occurred—the interference inquiry turns to whether the plaintiff experienced prejudice resulting from the violation. Ridings v. Riverside Medical Center, 537 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2008). The District arg e his fitness to return to work, he had such proof—a note from his doctor stating that he was fit to work—and attempted to present it on June 2, 2011. See Vannoy v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). Instead of reinstating him, the District kept 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave (B) holding a plaintiff to be ineligible for fmla leave wherein the plaintiff had not accumulated enough work hours (C) holding that a plaintiff who was unable to return to work before his fmla leave expired did not allege any denial of an fmla right but noting that ragsdale left open the possibility that employees could recover for notice violations on a casebycase basis if there was actual harm resulting from the violations (D) holding that both the cfra and the fmla require the employee to provide notice to the employer of the employees intent to take leave (E) holding that sufficient evidence of prejudice existed where plaintiff would have structured leave differently but employer had not provided notice of fmla right to reinstatement
holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave

farmer-brewer, importer or wholesaler. If the legislature intended the obligation to run with the product, it would have said it.” Heublein, 434 Mass. at 698 (approving Commission declaration to this effect) (citations and quotations omitted). It is thus the general rule that “a supplier is not obligated under Section 25E to continue to make sales to those wholesalers with whom an unaffiliated predecessor did business.” Brown-Forman, 65 Mass.App.Ct. at 499. This principle has been applied consistently in the few reported decisions by Massachusetts courts, confirming that purchasers of liquor businesses are not ordinarily saddled with the Section 25E restrictions of either their sellers or those through whom their sellers distributed product. See, e.g., Heublein, 434 Mass. at 701-02 (<HOLDING>); Pastene Wine & Spirits, 401 Mass. at 619 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supplier who acquired all assets and operations related to manufacture and sale of prod uct in armslength transaction did not succeed to predecessor suppliers section 25e obligations a former suppliers obligations under section 25e to continue to sell its product to its wholesalers is not imputed to a successor supplier who obtains ownership of the product through an arms length asset acquisition (B) holding a successor corporation does not have a postsale duty to warn of product defects where the successor never succeeded to any service contracts was not aware of the products defects and did not know the location of the product at the time of plaintiffs injury (C) holding that a successor corporation had a duty to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its predecessors cba because there was substantial continuity in the business enterprise (D) holding that section 388 of the restatement does not require the supplier to give information concerning available means for amelioration of obvious dangers even though the supplier is aware of those means and the party to whom the chattel is supplied is not (E) holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury
holding a successor corporation does not have a postsale duty to warn of product defects where the successor never succeeded to any service contracts was not aware of the products defects and did not know the location of the product at the time of plaintiffs injury

of having used the drug charged. Gipson, 24 M.J. at 253; McMorris, 643 F.2d at 461-2. Is it admissible on an accused’s behalf — we think so in spite of the absolute prohibition in Military Rule of Evidence 707. See United States v. Williams, 39 M.J. 555 (A.C.M.R. 1994). We agree the President may promulgate rules of evidence for trials by court-martial. However, the President may not promulgate a rule which infringes on an accused’s constitutional right to present relevant, material, and favorable evidence. See, e.g., Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M.J. 90 (C.M.A.1988) (striking down President’s rule in R.C.M. 916(k)(2) precluding accused from presenting evidence of partial mental responsibility to negate state of mind element of an offense); United States v. Hollimon, 16 M.J. 164 (C.M.A.1983) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, we recognize a constitutional 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same (B) holding evidence of past uncharged sexual encounters admissible in child sexual abuse case to show relationship between defendant and alleged victim (C) holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii (D) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse (E) recognizing constitutional limit on presidents bar in milrevid 412a on admission of reputation or opinion evidence of noneonsensual sexual offense victims past sexual behavior

holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same