In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

676 F.2d 969, 975 (3d Cir. 1982); Carty v. Schneider, 986 F. Supp. 933, 38 V.I. 213 (D.V.I. 1997). In contrast, a fine is a criminal contempt sanction if the amount of the fine is fixed and imposed unconditionally as a punishment for past disobedience. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632-33 (“An unconditional penalty is criminal in nature because it is solely and exclusively punitive in character.” (citations and quotations omitted)); see also Latrobe Steel Co., 545 F.2d at 1343 (“[T]he penalties arising out of adjudications of criminal contempt are generally an absolute fine of a specific amount . . . .”). Criminal fines are retroactive, and may not be avoided by purging the contemptuous conduct. See Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590, 67 S. Ct. 918, 921, 91 L. Ed. 1117 (1947) (<HOLDING>). Here, the June 13, 2006, order was phrased in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error (B) holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it (C) holding that a flat unconditional fine for 50 was a criminal sanction because the contemnor had no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance (D) holding that a fiftytwo million dollar fine could not be imposed as a sanction for criminal contempt except through a jury trial (E) holding that the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for imposition of that fine
(C)

fundamental error analysis. 4 . During this hearing the court allowed Dr. Bail-on to testily telephonically from the hospital at which the patient was located. 5 . Alternatively, an appellate court could remand the matter to the superior court for evidentiary hearings and findings on the effectiveness of appointed counsel. See In re Condry's Estate, 117 Ariz. 566, 568, 574 P.2d 54, 56 (App.1977). In In re Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-4942, 142 Ariz. 240, 242, 689 P.2d 183, 185 (App. 1984), we reversed and remanded the matter to the juvenile court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the parent had received adequate notice of the hearings against him and whether the parent had received effective assistance of counsel. 142 Ariz. at , 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. Carriger, 132 Ariz. 301, 304, 645 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitution requires  an opportunity  granted at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner  for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (B) holding that the due process clause is violated if the prosecution fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant (C) holding if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecutions case to meaningful adversarial testing  the adversary process itself is presumptively unreliable (D) holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (E) holding that the prosecutions suppression of evidence material to guilt or punishment violates due process regardless of the prosecutions good or bad faith
(C)

to the rule, ‘it may generally be said that any delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial.’ ”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 18.2 (1984)); State v. Dixon, 969 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (“[A] delay of eight months or longer should be considered presumptively prejudicial.”); City of Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186, 290 Mont. 148, 965 P.2d 866, 877 (establishing 200 days as length of delay necessary to trigger further analysis), overruled in part by Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204; Pierce v. State, 921 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. App. 1996) (“Most delays of eight months or longer are considered presumptively unreasonable and prejudicial.”). But see United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Derose, 74 F.3d 1177, 1185 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell (B) holding no presumptive prejudice for approximately 7month delay on charges of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and reentry of deported alien (C) holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute (D) holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine (E) holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine

(B)