In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

comprehensive plan nor its land use regulations prohibited the development of so-called non-jurisdictional wetlands. On August 17 or 18, 2006, Rish began to clear and fill his property. The neighbors, including Johnson, protested to the County, but to no avail. On August 21, 2006, these parties filed a complaint seeking in-junctive relief alleging that the clearing violated Gulf County’s comprehensive plan because it failed to maintain a 50-foot buffer for the wetlands. The neighbors alleged standing under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2006). The trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that Johnson and the other neighbors did not possess standing to seek relief under section 163.3215. This court reversed. Johnson v. Gulf County et al., 965 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Throughout this litigation, Rish proceeded to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (B) holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention (C) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court (D) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (E) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case
holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention

in cases decided under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Meyers, 616 F.3d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (characterizing the Segal standard as a "background rule under the old Bankruptcy Act, to which courts still refer in the era of the Bankruptcy Code”); Andrews, 80 F.3d at 910-11 (applying the Segal standard to determine whether post-petition payments under a pre-petition non-compete agreement were property of the debtor’s estate); Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1423 (concluding the Bankruptcy Code "follows Segal insofar as it includes after-acquired property 'sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past’ but eliminates the requirement that it not be entangled with the debtor’s ability to make a fresh start”). But see Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir.2006) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Although the parties frame the issue as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code (B) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (C) holding that the question of whether an interest is a claim for bankruptcy purposes is to be resolved by reference to the text history and purpose of the bankruptcy code (D) holding although congress has specifically approved of segals result segals sufficiently rooted test did not survive the enactment of the bankruptcy code footnote omitted (E) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate
holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code

manager-trainees. 25 . When Foradori's counsel asked Feigenb-aum “if we don’t understand all of their training [i.e. Captain D's training policies as evidenced in Captain D's manuals] as was suggested [by defense counsel], whose fault is that[?],” the district court sustained Captain D’s objection, stating that such opinion was outside of Feigenbaum’s area of expertise. Also, the district court sustained objections to plaintiff counsel's mischaracterization of King's testimony and to leading questions. 26 . In a motion in limine, Captain D's raised a Daubert objection to Feigenbaum's qualifications; however, Captain D’s waived it by failing to timely object to his qualification and testimony at trial. See C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 701 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Waggener, 837 F.2d 220, 222 (5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to object does not preclude raising the issue on appeal where erroneous evidence is offered in violation of an order in limine (B) holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue (C) holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal (D) holding that failure to raise an issue in an opening brief waives that issue (E) holding defendant failed to preserve for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence that was the subject of the motion in limine where defendant failed to object to evidence when offered at trial

holding that failure to object does not preclude raising the issue on appeal where erroneous evidence is offered in violation of an order in limine