In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: showing he was denied a constitutional right. Because Weaver’s application for a COA raises several claims, it is impossible to glean from the present record which issue(s) the district court thought worthy of appeal. Cf. Murray, 145 F.3d at 1250-51 (determining that while court of appeals could not decide issue not specified in COA, it could “construe the issue specification in light of the pleadings and other parts of the record”). Therefore we must remand the record for the district court to specify the issue or issues for appeal. See Muniz v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 43, 46 (5th Cir.1997); Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1076 (6th Cir.1997); Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1584 (11th Cir.1996); but cf. Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). It is so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding remand for specification of issues unnecessary where clear from briefing appellant had not made substantial showing he was denied any constitutional right (B) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (C) holding that appellant had waived any objection to an instruction that he had himself introduced and which was amended by the state without objection from appellant (D) holding that application of section 9711h as amended did not deprive appellant of any constitutional right (E) holding that where appellant acknowledged timely receiving notice by regular mail appellant appeared and fully participated at the trial and appellant made no claim that he was harmed in any way appellee had fulfilled the primary purposes of texrcivp 21a

A: (A)
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Q: industry is constitutional.” Reply [# 29] at 3. Defendants maintain that “the Court may not rely on a federal regulation (9 C.F.R. § 2.126) or on the Guide to conclude that the Fourth Amendment right at issue is clearly established.” Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Defendants further argue that even if the Court considered the regulation and the Guide, they do not limit the APHIS’ powers of inspection or set policy. Id. at 5. As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that they are not challenging the statutory scheme governing the USDA’s warrantless searches, but rather are challenging the application of that statutory scheme by the Inspector Defendants on May 7, 2013 at Big Cats. See, e.g., LeSueur-Richmond Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261, 268-69 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). In LeSueur, the Fourth Circuit closely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy (B) holding that under the fourth amendment a party may challenge both the constitutionality of the act permitting warrantless searches as well as the conduct of the government officials in a particular case (C) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause (D) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (E) holding there is no requirement that the government obtains a warrant at the first moment probable cause exists  the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of warrantless searches is one of reasonableness under the circumstances

A: (B)
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Q: its inability to agree, the law must afford defendant the benefit of the final non-unanimous verdict that might have been returned absent the coercion. Having erroneously been deprived of a substantial opportunity to receive a jury verdict resulting in imprisonment rather than death, the defendant may not be subject to another capital sentencing proceeding. We recognize that any reversible error in a capital case may be said in some sense to have deprived a defendant of the opportunity to receive a jury verdict resulting in imprisonment, and that nevertheless the usual and proper remedy for such errors is reversal of the death sentence and a retrial of the sentencing proceeding in which the defendant may again face the death penalty. See State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 67 (<HOLDING>). But a Czachor error is critically different 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants (B) holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty (C) holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing (D) holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error (E) holding that resentencing is required

A:
(C)
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