In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: to allege damages through June 30, 2006 is the focus of their motion.”). Because the Government does not oppose Plaintiff supplementing the September 4, 2009 Complaint to seek damages through the end of 2009, the issue before the court is whether Plaintiff may supplement to allege a claim for damages incurred through December 31, 2009, or through December 31, 2010. See System Fuels, 73 Fed.Cl. at 211 (“Supplementation may be limited or curtailed to avoid prejudice.” (citation omitted)). Although Plaintiff may have given the Government an estimate of 2010 damages as early as July 2010, Plaintiff did not identify the specific 2010 damages claimed or provide the Government with supporting documentation of those damages until April 20, 2011 — t 4 Fed.Cl. 727 (2006) (“SMUD III") (<HOLDING>), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 293 Fed.Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that smud is entitled to 53159863 in mitigation costs but staying entry of judgment pending the outcome of this proceeding (B) holding that smud was entitled to 39796234 in damages (C) holding that a plaintiff is entitled to either statutory treble damages or punitive damages whichever is the greater (D) holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of nominal damages when she had failed to request them (E) holding that smud was entitled to mitigation damages for costs incurred from may 15 1997 to december 31 2003

Output: holding that smud is entitled to 53159863 in mitigation costs but staying entry of judgment pending the outcome of this proceeding


Input: Consider Input: initially stopping the truck for failing to illuminate the rear license plate in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1706(e). See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998) (“An initial traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment ... if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” (citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc))). Wilson also does not dispute that the smell of alcohol on VanHouden together with VanHouden’s admission that he had been drinking justified the further detention of the truck and its occupants in order for Deputy Watkins to conduct field sobriety tests on VanHouden. See United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops (B) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (C) holding that the discovery of 2000 in cash during a traffic stop supported a finding of reasonable suspicion (D) holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment (E) holding detection of alcohol on a drivers breath during a routine traffic stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion

Output: holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops


Input: Consider Input: 69 P.3d 318 (2003). In conducting this review, our primary purpose is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Id. Further, “it is the duty of this court to construe two statutes dealing with the same subject matter so that the integrity of both will be maintained.” Gilbert v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr., 127 Wn.2d 370, 375, 900 P.2d 552 (1995). ¶19 Petitioner mistakenly focuses on whether appointment of guardians is discretionary or mandatory. The plain language of the TAA is unambiguous and requires that appointment of guardians under the TAA be governed by TEDRA’s procedures. Because TEDRA makes appointment of guardians discretionary, so too must appointment of guardians be discretionary under the TAA. See In re Estate of Jones, 152 Wn.2d 1, 10-11, 93 P.3d 147 (2004) (<HOLDING>). ¶20 In any event, the parties focus on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one provisions permission for removal only for  reasons specified  in a second provision incorporated the second provisions catchall phrase  for any other cause or reason which to the court appears necessary  emphasis omitted quoting in re estate of jones 116 wn app 353 363 67 p3d 1113 2003 rcw 1128250 (B) holding that in connection with crossmotions for summary judgment the substance of the plaintiffs motion and her silence in response to the defendants characterization of her claims as being based on violations of specified statutory provisions established abandonment of claims based on other statutory provisions set forth in her complaint (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (E) holding that such provisions are valid


Output: holding that in connection with crossmotions for summary judgment the substance of the plaintiffs motion and her silence in response to the defendants characterization of her claims as being based on violations of specified statutory provisions established abandonment of claims based on other statutory provisions set forth in her complaint