In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: an interpretation of section 85.321 that would make any party who holds a mineral interest indefinitely liable to all subsequent interest holders for prior alleged damage to the land. The consequences of such an interpretation run contrary to the legislative intent to protect and encourage the development of Texas natural resources. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59. We are mindful of the consequences of a particular construction. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.023(5); McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 745. Absent a legislative enactment clearly abrogating the common law, we conclude that Emerald does not have standing as a subsequent lessee to pursue a claim under section 85.321 for Exxon’s alleged wrongful actions as a prior lessee. See, e.g., Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 342-43 (Tex.2006) (<HOLDING>). C. Negligence Per Se Because our holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law (B) holding that tex loc govt code  51075 abrogated city of texarkana v city of new boston 141 sw3d 778 texapptexarkana 2004 (C) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract (D) holding that the city of boston was acting as a market participant when it contracted for public works construction (E) holding that distribution of catalogs to city addresses constituted use within city subject to taxation under municipal code provision

Answer: (B)


Question: the words of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, 'is of the very essence of judicial duty.”\’) (internal citation omitted); Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 326 Mont. 304, 109 P.3d 257, 260-61 (2005) (rejecting Baker v. Carr-based political question argument and concluding that, "[a]s the final guardian and protector of the right to education, it is incumbent upon the court to assure that the system enacted by the Legislature enforces, protects and fulfills the right [to education]”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (1993) (concluding that constitutional right to adequate education is justiciable and that "any citizen” has standing to "enforce the State’s duty” to fulfill this right); Abbott v. Burke, 149 N.J. 145, 693 A.2d 417, 428-29 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the absence of exceptional circumstances deference should be given to trial court (B) holding that a school board policy prohibiting employees from sending their children to private schools interfered with employees constitutional right to control the education of their children (C) holding that while legislative findings are due deference that cannot foreclose a courts constitutional analysis (D) holding that a trial courts statutory interpretation is given no deference on review (E) holding that while deference should be given to legislative content and performance standards it is still the courts duty to ensure that these standards together with funding measures comport with the constitutional guarantee of a thorough and efficient education for all new jersey school children

Answer: (E)


Question: but clear, as a matter of law, that the “military exception” applies only to the person who served in the armed forces — not his or her children. As I read Cuevas-Gaspar, no one in that case, much less the mother whose residency status was imputed, served in the United States military. The principle behind the Cuevas-Gaspar imputation rule is to avoid separating children from their permanent resident parents with whom they have resided for a significant period of time in the United States. See Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1024 (“[W]e are instructed ... that our immigration statutes and regulations are replete with provisions ‘giving a high priority to the relation between permanent resident parents and their children.’ ”); see also Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The so-called “military exception” of 8 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child (B) recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children (C) recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children (D) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (E) holding in the primary case on which cuevasgaspar relied imputation of a parents residency status to a child may be justified where deportation would sever the bonds between parents and their children who had resided legally in the united states for the better part of their lives

Answer:
(E)