In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: added). Plaintiffs point out, correctly, that beneficial use is an evolving and dynamic requirement of federal and state law. See Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal.2d 132, 140, 60 Cal.Rptr. 377, 429 P.2d 889 (1967) (While “what is a reasonable use of water depends on the circumstances of each case, such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of transcendent importance.”). Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 requires that all water provided pursuant to the Act be put to “beneficial use,” as defined by state law. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383; California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 665-67, 98 S.Ct. 2985, 57 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1978); see also City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1242, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 294, 5 P.3d 853 (2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (B) holding that mandamus was appropriate to require the director to deliver the full decreed water rights of a water right holder (C) holding that the montana constitution protects water rights against unreasonable state action  (D) holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district (E) recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: and systematic,” even when the cause of action has no relation to those contacts. LSI Indus. Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2000) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). The district court correctly found that it lacked general jurisdiction over Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer has very limited contacts with California. Oppenheimer has shipped unspecified items to the defendant Spectrum Effects, Inc. of California. However, the record gives no indication of the context and significance of these shipments for Oppenheimer’s business. Appellants failed to show that these acts amount to continuous and systematic contacts with California. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Oppenheimer has exhibited 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a choice of law provision is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant (B) holding that purchases even if occurring at regular intervals were insufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation (C) holding that business visits and purchases within a forum even if occurring at regular intervals are not enough to support general jurisdiction over a defendant (D) holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction (E) holding no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: successfully challenges his sentence on appeal and the cause is remanded for resentencing, the resentencing is a ‘de novo’ proceeding, at which either side may present evidence anew regarding the appropriate sentence.”). The principle of de novo sentencing often benefits the defendant. See, e.g., Galindez, 955 So.2d at 525 (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (“In fact, because resentencing is de novo, the State was required to produce evidence on sentencing issues even if the State established the fact at the original sentencing.”); Tubwell v. State, 922 So.2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“As this resentencing proceeding was de novo, the state was not relieved of its burden to prove the prior offenses.” (citations omitted)); Rich v. State, 814 So.2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Mills v. State, 724 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because resentencing following reversal is a new proceeding the state must introduce evidence that the defendant qualifies for enhanced sentencing even though such evidence was introduced in the previous sentencing hearing (B) holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing (C) holding that on resentencing following reversal the state was required to introduce evidence to prove the defendant qualified for an enhanced sentence and could not only rely upon evidence introduced at a prior sentencing hearing (D) recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard (E) holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing
[EX A]:
(A)