In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: until he received the order in March 2001. While in ordinary circumstances he likely would be faulted for not exercising due diligence to determine the disposition of his motions during the two year period contemplated by the rule, petitioner had no reason to make such an inquiry in this case because he believed that in accordance with the April 1999 order, he had been permitted to withdraw his motions to vacate sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that Snell has pled an adequate basis for avoiding the two year time limitation imposed by the rule. We further conclude that he otherwise timely sought relief to the extent his petition seeking belated appeal was filed within two years of his discovery of the existence of September 1998 order. Cf. Adams v. State, 543 So.2d 1244 (Fla.1989)(<HOLDING>). In response to our order to show cause why a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a rule 3850 motion based upon new facts or a significant change in the law must be filed within two years of the time such facts become known or such change is announced (B) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (C) holding that a subsequent petition may be filed upon a showing of a change in circumstances (D) holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms (E) holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: fees, an award of reasonable fees is mandatory, as long as there is proof of reasonable fees ... and the plaintiff has been awarded damages.” Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 462 (5th Cir.2002), citing Tex. Civ. Peac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 38.001(8) (Vernon 2002). Accord Coffel v. Stryker Corp., 284 F.3d 625, 640 (5th Cir.2002) (“[t]he award of reasonable attorneys’ fees is mandatory under § 38.001 if the plaintiff prevails in his or her breach of contract claim and recovers damages”). The only discretion the Fifth Circuit permits is discretion to determine the amount of the attorney’s fees award. See id. The availability of a section 38.001 award is not conditioned on a contractual provision for attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. 1999) (<HOLDING>); Golden v. Murphy, 611 S.W.2d 914, 915 
 Holding statements: (A) holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees (B) holding that prevailing party to contract dispute may recover attorneys fees either pursuant to contract or pursuant to statute (C) holding that prevailing party was entitled to attorneys fees under an option contract which had expired prior to litigation because the parties were litigating their performance under the terms of the contract (D) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees (E) holding defendant waived request for fees pursuant to contract provision by only generally referring to fees in the answer and not citing the contract
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: are alleged to establish this claim. Id. And, although the Government had considerable leeway to make or withhold payments to affect contract completion, only payment to Plaintiff (or withholding payment altogether) would achieve Contract completion in this case. Id. at 10. The Government failed to do either. Id. B. The Court’s Resolution. The June 30, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and Final Order considered Plaintiffs argu ment that notification of default or imminent default was “superfluous and unnecessary.” United Surety, 87 Fed.Cl. at 589. The court rejected this argument, as a matter of law. Id. at 591. Instead, the court held that the Government owed no duty to a surety until notice is received. Id. (citing Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 909 F.2d 495, 499 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>)) (emphasis added). Plaintiff also argues that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that obligee can recover from surety attorneys fees that are provided for in obligees subcontract so long as the total recovery against the surety does not exceed the penal amount of the bond (B) recognizing that the gjovernment as obligee owes no equitable duty to a surety  unless the surety notifies the government that the principal has defaulted under the bond  notice by the surety is essential before any governmental duty exists (C) holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation (D) holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors (E) holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety
[EX A]:
(B)