In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: to the section 924(c) jury instruction, we review it for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d 1056, 1066 (8th Cir.1996). Although the pre-Bailey instruction was given to the jury (because Bailey had no rovide a defendant, upon their motion, any statement or report made by a government witness that relates to the subject matter of the direct testimony of that witness. 18 U.S.C. § 3500. The government need not provide the statement, however, until after the witness testifies on direct examination. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). 6 . The district court’s ruling was essentially a discovery matter, which we review for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Byrne, 83 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the fbi informants file contained no brady material not already provided to the defendant in a summary (B) holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation (C) holding that an fbi agents rough notes of an interview of the defendant were not brady material because there was no independent showing that they contained evidence that was material to the defendants guilt or innocence (D) holding a trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require disclosure of an informants name (E) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment

Output: holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation


Input: Consider Input: the ISBE would terminate on August 1, 2011, and the consent decree for CPS on September 1, 2012. With the consent decrees terminated, the only remaining action is for the Monitor to file the final report detailing her findings of the agencies’ compliance with the decrees. Then, just a few months before the consent decree for CPS was set to terminate, CPS filed a motion with the district court to decertify the original “Corey H.” class and vacate the consent decree it had agreed to in 1998 and also in 2010. The district court denied the motion and CPS appealed to this court. On appeal, CPS contends that the district court erred by denying its motion on the ground that our decision in Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir.2012), mandates that we d th Cir.1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Even if this case were not moot, we would not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23 (B) holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (D) holding that consent decree could not preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims that could not have been brought at time consent decree was filed and to which they were legally and procedurally entitled (E) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated

Output: holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23


Input: Consider Input: all of the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the settlement proposed and to afford them an opportunity to present their objections. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity present their objections.”); Mars s case clearly satisfies all of the necessary requirements. The Class Notice indicates the nature of the pending litigation. Stipulation of Settlement, Ex. F-2, at 4-7. The Class Notice indicates that any 00, 503 (10th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). 117. Though the Court will address all of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (B) holding that notice apprised class members sufficiently of information that notice was intended under the rule to convey (C) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (D) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (E) holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members


Output: holding that notice of judgment was insufficient