In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Petitioner Jaswinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we grant the petition for review. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s order without discussion, thus we review the substance of the immigration judge’s order. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845 (9th Cir.2003). The IJ erred when she found Singh’s testimony inconsistent and implausible, and therefore the record compels finding Singh’s testimony, credible. Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). First, the IJ erred when she found that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an adverse credibility determination is overturned only if each proffered reason for the determination fails (B) holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination (C) holding that an adverse credibility determination must be supported by a true inconsistency (D) holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum (E) holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: dominion and control over” the weapon. Id. at 126 (quoting Evans, 888 F.2d at 895). The case law in this circuit, then, clearly recognizes that under the statute an individual “carries” a firearm when it is within an accessible distance from that individual. Although this circuit has not addressed the definition of “carry” since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey, other circuits nave addressed the issue and continue to define “carry” broadly. Most circuits agree that a weapon must be accessible to the defendant in order to meet the definition of “carry.” In United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667 (2nd Cir.1996), a firearm located in a secret compa 4 (4th Cir.1997) (finding that firearm need not be accessible to be “carried”); United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where drugs cash and drug scales were found in defendants parlor and a gun was found in a secret compartment in defendants bathroom vanity (B) holding that use of gun was attributable to defendant who aided and abetted armed robbery but never personally carried gun (C) holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle (D) holding that gun found in unreachable secret compartment in vehicle was carried (E) holding that a defendant may not be charged with two separate offenses premised on two amounts of cocaine one found in a box and one found in a bag located in the passenger compartment of the defendants vehicle
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: even a single act of NWP by which it held Mr. Brink out as an agent authorized to modify the CBA, Plaintiff has failed to establish the lack of a genuine issue regarding the existence of apparent authority. Despite Plaintiffs failure to show as a matter of law that Brink acted with apparent authority, NWP may still be bound to the Standard Clause under the agency principle of ratification. Accordingly, Mr. Brink’s actions, even his unauthorized acts, will have binding effect if NWP knew of, and accepted, the benefits of Mr. Brink’s actions without taking steps to disavow them. See Restatement, (Second) Agency, § 98 (A receipt of benefits may constitute an affirmance by which a ratification is established); see also Yarnall v. Yorkshire Worsted Mills, 370 Pa. 93, 87 A.2d 192, 193 (1952) (<HOLDING>); Presbyterian Board of Relief for Disabled 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under illinois law silence can constitute acceptance under the terms of the restatement of contracts (B) holding that under  98 of restatement principal elected to ratify unauthorized act by accepting benefits of agreement with full knowledge of its terms and was therefore bound to terms of agreement (C) holding federal court is not bound by terms of plea agreement between defendant and state authorities (D) holding that when a court accepts a fixed plea agreement it is bound by the agreements terms (E) holding that both the state and the defendant are bound to the terms of a plea agreement under santobello
[EX A]:
(B)