In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: act, 1976 PA 267, MCL 15.261 to 15.275. (3) If the board arbitrarily and capriciously violates section 7(9), the board shall he subject to the penalties prescribed in the freedom of information act, 1976 PA 442, MCL 15.231 to 15.246. B If “a statute gives new rights and prescribes new remedies, such remedies must be strictly pursued; and a party seeking a remedy under the act is confined to the remedy conferred thereby and to that only.” Monroe Beverage Co, Inc v Stroh Brewery Co, 454 Mich 41, 45; 559 NW2d 297 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “[w]hen a statute provides a remedy for enforcement of a common-law right, the statutory scheme is merely cumulative and not exclusive.” Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc, 273 Mich App 187, 201; 729 NW2d 898 (2006) (<HOLDING>). At common law there has always been a remedy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration (B) holding that the plaintiffs claims for unjust enrichment were not barred by the availability of relief under the public works bonding act mcl 129201 et seq because a plaintiff enjoyed the right at common law to recover in quantum meruit from a defendant who had been unjustly enriched (C) recognizing that action for quantum meruit relief exists to avoid unjust enrichment (D) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed

A: holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration
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Q: claims that respondent was aware World Bowling was purchasing the bowling alley from appellants but was never informed of the details of the purchase. We reject respondent’s contention that it could not have actual knowledge of appellants’ misfiled U.C.C.-l because any details it knew about the purchase of the bowling alley and its contents took place before the U.C.C.-l was filed. First, respondent had notice that the bowling alley contents were encumbered because it was involved with the sale until the time of closing. Second, the plain language of section 386.9-401(2) does not require that knowledge of the contents be gained only after the U.C.C.-l is misfiled and we may not add this requirement to the statute. Martinco v. Hastings, 265 Minn. 490, 497, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Finally, both the district court and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks (B) holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature (C) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (D) holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted (E) holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature

A: holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature
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Q: States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). The Supreme Court has recognized that “searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). However, the Supreme Court has permitted exceptions to the warrant requirement when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (allowing school officials to conduct warrantless searches of student property without probable cause); see also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable (B) holding neither the warrant requirement nor the probable cause requirement should apply to noninvestigatory workrelated purposes or for investigations of workrelated misconduct  (C) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (D) holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause (E) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause

A:
holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable
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