In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: The defendants, contend that, assuming their conduct was unlawful and negligent as charged in the complaint, it was nevertheless not the proximate cause of the injuries suffered. But a tortfeasor is generally held answerable for the injuries which result in the ordinary course of events from his negligence and it is generally sufficient if his negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries. The fact that there were also intervening causes which were foreseeable or were normal incidents of the risk created would not relieve the tortfeasor of liability. Ordinarily these questions of proximate and intervening cause are left to the jury for its factual determination. [Ibid, (citations omitted).] See also, J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 352, 714 A.2d 924 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 465-66, 545 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prolonged sexual abuse of neighboring adolescent girls by defendants husband with known proclivity for such behavior not a superseding cause of wifes negligent failure to warn victims or take other reasonable steps to prevent harm to them (B) holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims (C) holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person (D) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (E) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse

Answer: (A)


Question: arbitrators, Eventys argues, the circuit court could have assured that both parties would have an opportunity to make their arguments to that forum. Alternatively, Eventys maintains, the circuit court should have considered and expressly ruled upon Eventys’s arguments that the provision purporting to waive class action claims was unconscionable and unenforceable. Eventys further argues that, because the “terms and conditions” did not include a severability provision, the circuit court’s necessary determination that FDUTPA’s remedial purposes are frustrated by the class action waiver provision would then invalidate the entire arbitration provision. For this argument, Eventys relies principally on the analysis in S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski, 976 So.2d 600, 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>), and a group of federal cases holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contractual provisions in an arbitration agreement purporting to prohibit consumers from prosecuting class actions for small sums of money per consumer but for a substantial number of consumers are irreconcilably at odds with the remedial purposes of fdutpa contrary to the public policy of this state and unenforceable for that reason (B) holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute  the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable (C) holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable (D) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (E) holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy

Answer: (A)


Question: 183, 185-87, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). The judge, though immune from private suit, is not immune from criminal prosecution by a state or federal agency. See Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-31, 101 S.Ct. at 186-88. Applying the rule here, the trial judge below — and the court-appointed psychiatrists who proved that they were functioning as an arm of the court — are immune from private prosecution by a private citizen. However, if they violated a criminal law, they are not immune from criminal prosecution by the government. Some cases using the functional approach have held that certain administrative functions of judges are not part of the judicial function and therefore are outside the scope of judicial immunity. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (<HOLDING>). However, the case before us today does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an employee must be able to perform essential job functions at the time of termination (B) holding that the defendant is not entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea when the judge made no promise to sentence him (C) holding judge not able to invoke judicial immunity in  1983 damages action against him for employment decision made in the exercise of his administrative functions (D) holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a claim for money damages against the librarian of congress in his official capacity because immunity had not been waived and the exceptions to immunity did not apply (E) holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury

Answer:
(C)