In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

issue in question.” Bradley Ventures, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., 371 Ark. 229, 264 S.W.3d 485, 490 (2007). UAMS maintains that collateral estoppel applies to Dodson I and II, barring both of Dodson’s pending claims, but our discussion is considerably narrower. First, I would set aside Dodson I because I am uncertain that the court’s relevant finding was “essential to the judgment.” Powell, 289 S.W.3d at 444. Second, I would set aside Count II, which is Dodson’s impliedeontract claim. Importantly, Count II is premised on UAMS’s conduct after Dodson II, i.e., sending Dodson bills for the embryo storage fees, and therefore cannot be precluded by the earlier chancery court decision. See Ripplin Shoals Land Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); cf. id. at 1042 (“[R]es judicata does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying contract (B) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment (C) holding that a prior judgment regarding a permit to modify an existing bridge does not preclude a plaintiff from challenging a decision on a new application describing and a different bridge design (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit a design defect products liability expert to submit an untimely addendum stating a new claim of failure to warn after defense expert refuted the basis of original design defect opinion (E) holding untimeliness of motion to modify medical insurance payment did not preclude motion to modify maintenance
holding that an assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying contract

to commit himself to such an alternative to a federal sentence. 2 . Defendant also raises two additional arguments: (1) that the district court improperly based its sentence on the defendant’s refusal to waive his constitutional and statutory rights to oppose his deportation; and (2) that the district court failed to appreciate the scope of its authority to consider, as a mitigating circumstance upon which to base a departure, defendant's vulnerability and susceptibility to abuse in prison due to his physical condition. Both arguments lack merit. As to the first argument, the conditioning of a downward departure on the surrender of a statutory right to a deportation hearing would not have offended due process. See United States v. Galvez-Falconi, 174 F.3d 255, 260 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). See generally United States v. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart (B) holding that district court had authority to grant section 5k20 downward departure despite governments opposition (C) holding that the district court was not required to state affirmatively on the record that it knew it possessed the authority to depart downward (D) holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart (E) holding that where a defendant malees a showing that the act of consenting to deportation carries unusual assistance to the administration of justice district court has authority under ussg  5k20 to depart downward in absence of the governments consent
recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart

the purchaser assume that responsibility. ECRA further provides that the DEP or transferees can void the sale if the trans-feror fails to comply with any provision of the Act, and that penalties of up to $25,000 per day may be imposed on those who fail to comply. The Act also provides that obligations imposed by the Act are intended to “constitute continuing regulatory obligations imposed by the state” and are not to be considered as liens or claims dis-chargeable in bankruptcy. In re Borne Chemical Co., 54 B.R. at 128. Obviously, the interests could not be satisfied with a money judgment. See Torwico Elecs., Inc., v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection (In re Torwico Elecs., Inc.), 8 F.3d 146, 150-51 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1576, 128 L.Ed.2d 219 (1994) (<HOLDING>). In the case at issue, DMAS can be compelled 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing inherent power of bankruptcy courts to equitably surcharge a debtors exemption to protect integrity of the bankruptcy process and to ensure that debtor does not exempt amount greater than allowed under bankruptcy code (B) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate (C) holding debtors obligation to clean up hazardous waste on property was not claim under bankruptcy code state didnt have right to payment but instead had right to force debtor to comply with existing environmental laws (D) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (E) holding that the bankruptcy code should not be understood to force bankruptcy courts to use statelaw procedures and statelaw actors to determine what portion of a debtors real property is an exempt homestead

recognizing inherent power of bankruptcy courts to equitably surcharge a debtors exemption to protect integrity of the bankruptcy process and to ensure that debtor does not exempt amount greater than allowed under bankruptcy code