TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: is knowing and voluntary, when there is a factual foundation to support it, when the state has agreed to it, then the discretion has ended and the plea must be accepted.” Id. at 1041. We noted, however, that this rule applied only to “unconditional and unqualified” guilty pleas, not to negotiated pleas where the State has agreed to a particular sentence or to the disposition of particular charges, or where the State opposes the plea. Id. at 1041-42 (on motion for rehearing). Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i) provides: “A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may expressly reserve the right to appeal a prior dispositive order of the lower tribunal, identifying with particularity the point of law being reserved.” See State v. Ashby, 245 So.2d 225 (Fla.1971) (<HOLDING>). A trial judge has wide discretion to refuse 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review (B) holding that a defendant in a criminal case might plead no contest conditioned on the right to preserve for appellate review a question of law (C) holding that the defendant failed properly to preserve assignment of error for appellate review because the trial court had no opportunity to consider the defendants contention as presented on appeal (D) holding that there is no due process right to appellate review (E) holding that under state procedural law a timely objection is necessary to preserve a batson question for appellate review

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: Id. The district court excluded this portion of the expert’s testimony. Id. at 1397. Relying on Downing, the Third Circuit reversed. Id. at 1401. We agree that expert testimony on eyewitness identification may properly be admitted under Daubert in certain circumstances, but Stevens simply does not persuade us that the district court abused its discretion in the instant case. We note that here there were five eyewitness identifica tions, not one. Likewise, as counsel for the government pointed out at argument, there was also testimony that Mr. Smith changed his alibi. In this admittedly close case, we hold only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony under the circumstances. See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification (B) holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification (C) holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider certain additional factors in evaluating the validity of eyewitness identification testimony (D) holding that a specific instruction was unnecessary because eyewitness was crossexamined and the eyewitness testimony was discussed in defense counsels opening statement (E) holding exclusion of expert eyewitness identification testimony harmless error where governments case included three separate eyewitnesses and a palm print that discredited the defendants alibi

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: 919 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.1990) (same). 47 . Duncan v. Alabama, 881 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir.1989). 48 . See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). 49 . (1) "I want to see if my mom got me a lawyer yet. I don’t know, I ain’t got in contact with her yet.” (2) "Yes, sir, the reason I was wanting one here.” (3) "That is why I was wanting my lawyer. I want to see if my mom has a lawyer so I can have him with me." (4) "I was waiting on — I want my mom to get me a lawyer.” (5) “Another one.” 50 . (1) "Well, I’m acting as your attorney today.” (2) "Well, that’s why I’m representing you today."' 51 . "I went back and explained to you that you did have a lawyer appointed for you." 52 . See Cannady v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 752, 755 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Fleming, 837 F.2d at 947 (holding that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding do you think i need a lawyer to be ambiguous (B) holding that a suspect made an acceptable request for counsel by stating i dont think i want to talk to you anymore without a lawyer (C) holding that the defendant did not invoke his right to counsel because his statement i wanna call my lawyer when read in context did not represent a request to terminate the interrogation until his counsel was present (D) holding that appellants statement i think i need a lawyer     is just as ambiguous as the statement made by the defendant in davis (E) holding that statement i think i should call my lawyer was an unequivocal request for counsel

SOLUTION:
(E)