instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
include reasonable attorney’s fees for legal services benefitting the children. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 151.001(a), (c); In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d at 327, n. 55; Searcy, 17 S.W. at 373; Askey, 11 S.W. at 1101-02. In Hardin v. Hardin, this court cited section 154.001 but did not cite section 151.001 or section 156.401(a). See Hardin, 161 S.W.3d at 24-27. Nonetheless, the Hardin court noted that the duty of a parent to pay attorney’s fees as necessaries is based upon a parent’s duty to support his children. See id. at 25. In addition, the Hardin court cited non-enforcement cases that cited the statutory predecessor to section 151.001. See id. at 25-26 (citing Roosth v. Roosth and Daniels v. Allen); Roosth v. Roosth, 889 S.W.2d 445, 456-57 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Daniels v. Allen, 811 S.W.2d 278, 280 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that father pay attorneys fees to mother as necessaries for the benefit of the children in divorce decree and citing statutory predecessor to section 151001 (B) holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries (C) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay reasonable attorneys fees incurred by mother as necessaries for the children (D) holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule (E) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction may order one parent to pay the reasonable attorneys fees of the other parent as additional child support if the fees are necessaries for the benefit of the children
answer:
(A)


question:
(Bankr.N.D.Ill.1999); In re Fisher, 151 B.R. 895, 898 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1993). Other courts have held to the contrary. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 421 B.R. 341, 354-55 (S.D.Tex.2009) (collecting cases); Bank United v. Manley, 273 B.R. 229, 250 (N.D.Ala.2001); In re Tate, 253 B.R. 653, 662 (Bankr.W.D.N.C.2000); In re Williams, 244 B.R. 858, 865-66 (S.D.Ga.2000). There is also disagreement about whether the bankruptcy court may exercise jurisdiction over a nationwide class of debtors or is limited to exercising jurisdiction over debtors whose petitions are filed within the same judicial district. Compare, e.g., In re Noletto, 244 B.R. 845, 849 (Bankr.S.D.Ala. 2000) (permitting nationwide class) with Barrett v. Avco Fin. Servs. Mgmt. Co., 292 B.R. 1, 8 (D.Mass.2003) (<HOLDING>). The class at issue in this case was limited 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over the governments prosecutorial discretion decisions (B) holding court lacks jurisdiction over putative class members whose bankruptcies were discharged outside of judicial district (C) holding that it is not necessary that all putative class members share identical claims (D) holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members (E) holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification
answer:
(B)


question:
(9th Cir. 2000)). This conclusion is fully consistent with general principles of California contract law. See Faigin v. Signature Grp. Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (“There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.”) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (“Express covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.”); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (<HOLDING>). “The reason for the rule is simply that where 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employment manuals express disclaimer superseded alleged implied contractual term (B) holding that under georgia law the duty of good faith cannot be breached apart from an express contractual term (C) holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract (D) holding that plaintiffs express contract with the surety company precludes an implied contract with defendant (E) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance
answer:

(C)