In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: improperly determined that the “neither expected nor intended” language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an “occurrence.” ¶21 The CGL policy’s core provision defines “occurrence” by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was “neither expected nor intended.” This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured’s expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an “occurrence” and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). ¶22 Here the District Court found that Ribi 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended

Answer: (A)


Question: 106 S.Ct. at 2553. And if plaintiff cannot support each essential element of his claim, summary judgment must be granted because a complete failure of proof regarding an essential element necessarily renders other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. The Court reviews defendants’ motion for summary judgment in light of the forgoing standard. DISCUSSION There is no question in this case of Brod-nicki’s innocence. But, because “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested,” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979), Brodnieki’s innocence is irrelevant to the question of whether there was probable cause for his arrest. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2631, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) (<HOLDING>). The issue before the Court is whether the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged (B) holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed (C) holding that initial illegal detention does not call into question validity of arrest pursuant to valid warrant wjhere the police effectuate an arrest in an illegal manner but nonetheless have probable cause to make the arrest the proper fourth amendment remedy is to exclude only that evidence which is a fruit of the illegality (D) holding that where an arrest was premised on both legally and illegally obtained evidence the validity of the arrest would depend on whether the untainted information considered by itself establishes probable cause (E) holding that the validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime the mere fact that the subject is later acquitted of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest

Answer: (E)


Question: White arrived on the scene to when he arrived with the appellant at the Travis County Jail.” However; in light of M'cNeely, we conclude that this case is distinguishable from Schmerber. Here, although Roop was involved in á traffic accident, nothing in‘the record suggests that this fact significantly ■ delayed the collection of Roop’s blood. Officer White testified that he came into contact with Roop at about- 4:00 a.m., placed Roop under arrest at 4:25, and ordered her blood to be drawn at 5:09. The stop for Roop to use the restroom took just a few minutes, and the drive to the jail took only seven to eight minutes. We are not persuaded that'the mere existence of-a traffic accident constitutes a per se exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw. - See Evans, 2015 WL 545702, at *6 (<HOLDING>). In addition, “[ajlthough the findings of fact 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers cannot base a warrantless search on an exigent circumstance of their own creation (B) holding that the threat of imminent destruction of evidence of criminal activity created an exigent circumstance (C) recognizing exigent circumstance exception to warrant requirement (D) holding that accident investigation by itself is not exigent circumstance (E) holding that blood alcohol dissipation was not sufficient by itself to create an exigent circumstances exception to virginia statutory requirement that the driver be arrested within three hours of the offense

Answer:
(D)