In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: purpose, we would have some authority to solve taxpayer’s problem. See Rhodes, 166 Vt. at 157, 688 A.2d at 1311 (noting that, to invoke impossibility rule, party “must dem onstrate why this Court should not construe the statute in its ordinary sense or why the consequences of such construction will cause hardship or constitute impossibility”). But our standard under this prudential rule is very limited and does not ordinarily extend to making choices, among many available, to solve the problem. There is simply no way to construe the statute to allow a transfer that occurred 319 days after an LLC’s articles of organization were filed without reading the words “at the time of formation” out of the statute. See Colwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 VT 5, ¶ 15, 175 Vt. 61, 819 A.2d 727 (<HOLDING>). ¶23. It is true that the Department’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (B) recognizing that though statute at hand does not fully address the problem legislature intended to address in view of the number of choices available to solve the problem    this is an inappropriate case for the court to fashion the particular remedy appellants seek because to do so would place court in the position of making policy choices best left to legislature (C) holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature (D) holding that considering an amendment is not the time to address the merits of a case (E) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language
[EX A]: holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case

[EX Q]: partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court’s order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants’ arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment
[EX A]: holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied

[EX Q]: the fact that its analysis of whether the Ingram’s job performance justified the pay differential leads to the question of Merrill Lynch’s intent even though the EPA is a strict liability statute. The Settlement states that Merrill Lynch can rebut Class-wide statistical evidence of discrimination “with evidence related to the individual Claimant’s case.” (R. 112, Settlement ¶ 7.11(8)(e).) In addition, some appellate courts consider whether the employee’s actual job performance justified the pay differential, rather than only considering whether a job-wide wage disparity between male and female employees was due to a bona fide job evaluation system. See, e.g., Ryduchowski, 203 F.3d at 144, Ambrose v. Summit Polymers, Inc., No. 05-1048, 2006 WL 797939, at *5-6 (6th Cir. Mar.24, 2006) (<HOLDING>). Ingram herself raises the issue of Merrill 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs burden was to show that the misconduct for which she was discharged was nearly identical to that engaged in by a male employee whom her employer retained internal quotation omitted (B) holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired (C) holding that a plaintiff could not proceed on her procedural due process claim brought under  1983 because she did not show that she had exhausted her state law remedies or alleged that those remedies were inadequate (D) holding that because the plaintiffs skills had deteriorated during the period she claims she was paid less than a male employee who performed equal work the plaintiff was not entitled to proceed further under the epa (E) holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position
[EX A]:
holding plaintiffs burden was to show that the misconduct for which she was discharged was nearly identical to that engaged in by a male employee whom her employer retained internal quotation omitted