In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 45 U.S.C. § 56, and 46 U.S.C. § 30106, are essentially identical, stating that the action must be “commenced” or “brought” within the three year period. The Supreme Court in Burnett specifically found that the state court suit had been properly “commenced” although it was filed in an improper venue. 380 U.S. at 426, 85 S.Ct. at 1053. Furthermore, because the principle of uniformity that drove the Burnett decision applies with equal force to a general maritime action, other courts have correctly held that Burnett applies in general maritime cases. See, e.g., Prejean, 721 So.2d at 1276 (citing 1 Martin J. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries § 5:10 (4th ed.1990)); Davis, 659 F.Supp. at 156-157; People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F.Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.La.1968) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s second argument for distinction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries (B) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (C) holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction (D) holding that burnett and its justification of uniformity is equally applicable to admiralty actions (E) holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures
[A]: holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries


[Q]: in nature and may be waived if not timely raised. Section 1445(c) applies to prohibit the removal of a civil action arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of a state. It does not prohibit federal district court’s from exercising supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367. The state worker compensation statutes themselves may affect the court’s jurisdiction by requiring claims to be filed with an administrative agency. However, such is not the case for claims of retaliatory discharge for exercising rights under Michigan’s WDCA. As noted above, the expeditious and inexpensive procedures found in Michigan’s WDCA are not utilized when an employee alleges retaliatory discharge. Such a claim is treated like any other tort and can be filed in state court. See Delke, 460 N.W.2d at 327-28 (<HOLDING>); see also Lamoria, 584 N.W.2d at 600; Chiles 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge (B) holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws (C) recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act (D) holding that retaliation claim did not arise under states workers compensation laws (E) holding that the bureau of workers disability compensation did not have jurisdiction to hear retaliation claims and explaining that the michigan legislatures intent was not to create an administrative remedy for retaliatory discharge
[A]: recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge


[Q]: 365, not sold under section 363, pursuant to the Sale Order. Bechtel argues, therefore, that its right of setoff under those Contracts cannot be affected by section 363 and must be determined under section 365. Contrary to Bechtel’s assertions, executory contract rights are a form of “property” that is salable “free and clear” of interests under section 363(f). In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc., 209 F.3d 291, 302 (3d Cir.2000) (concluding that assignment of leases and executory contracts are subject to sale under section 363, and particularly section 363(m), because “[b]oth exec-utory contracts and unexpired leases ... are included in the definition of ‘property of the estate’ contained in section 541.”); Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 498 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In addition to complying with section 363, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that provision in prepetition agreement which precluded sale of assets by debtor was not a bar to a sale under section 363 because prepetition agreements purporting to in terfere with a debtors rights under the bankruptcy code are not enforceable (B) holding that because  363 sale was subject to court approval debtor was not bound to perform until then and could withdraw the application to approve and abandon the contract (C) holding that a judgment lien attaches to a vendors interest in an executory land contract (D) holding that section 363 governs the sales of executory contracts here section 365 provides some limitations and conditions to assignments none of which negates the applicability of section 363 to the sale at auction of an executory contract (E) holding that sale under section 363 eliminates unexercised setoff rights but not recoupment defense
[A]:
holding that provision in prepetition agreement which precluded sale of assets by debtor was not a bar to a sale under section 363 because prepetition agreements purporting to in terfere with a debtors rights under the bankruptcy code are not enforceable