In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: intended to purchase the entire 9.69 acre parcel described in the purchase and sale agreement. These findings have support in the record. Based on the evidence, the trial court could reasonably have been persuaded that it was highly probable that the parties operated under a mutual mistake as to the description in the deed. [¶ 18] Roger also argues that the doctrine of merger by deed prohibits reformation. “The doctrine of merger by deed provides that once a ... deed is accepted it becomes the final statement of the agreement between the parties and nullifies all provisions of the purchase-and-sale agreement.” Bryan, 665 A.2d at 1022 (quotation marks omitted). Merger by deed, however, does not prohibit reformation upon proof of a mutual mistake of fact at the time of closing. Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). C. Joint Accounts [¶ 19] Roger contends that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed (B) holding in part that party seeking reformation of deed must show the original intent or agreement of parties by clear and convincing evidence (C) holding merger by deed prohibits reformation when one of the parties learns of a mistake before closing and still signs the deed (D) holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed (E) recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title

A: (C)
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Q: at the La Vega site. The fact that the Esso station at La Vega ceased its operations in 1998 does not change the prospective nature of plaintiffs’ suit at the time it was brought. Moreover, in PauÉuxet the Court stated that it did not agree “with the reasoning which, apparently, led the Louisiana district court, following the Hamker decision, to dismiss a number of actions simply because no violations occurred on the dates the complaints were filed. A plaintiff who makes allegations warranting injunctive relief in good faith, judged objectively, may recover a penalty judgment for past violations even if the injunction proves unattainable.” Pawtuxet, 807 F.2d at 1094 (citing .1992); Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 1312, 1322 (D.Or.1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court concludes as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters (B) holding that a worker injured on actual navigable waters in the course of employment is covered under the lhwca (C) holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states (D) holding a discharge of pollutants is ongoing if the pollutants continue to reach navigable waters even if the discharger is no longer adding pollutants to the point source itself (E) holding that to achieve goals of cwa epa is required to establish and enforce technologybased limitations on individual discharges into the countrys navigable waters from point sources

A: (D)
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Q: does not justify a warrant-less blood draw from a driver who refuses to consent... or objects to the blood draw .... Consent to a search must be voluntary."); State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 (Idaho 2014) (same); Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939, 946 (Nev. 2014) ("The implied consent provision . . . does not allow a driver to withdraw consent, thus a driver's so-called consent cannot be considered voluntary. Accordingly, we conclude that [the implied consent provision] is unconstitutional."); State v. Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 243 (S.D. 2014) (ruling that a Fourth Amendment totality of the circumstances analysis must be performed to determine whether consent to a blood draw taken pursuant to state implied consent law was voluntary); Aviles v. State, 443 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) (<HOLDING>). 5 People v. Hyde, 393 P.3d 962, 966 (Colo. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required (B) holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test (C) holding that implied consent and blood draw statutes are not permissible exceptions to the warrant requirement and stating that to hold otherwise flies in the face of mcneelys repeated mandate that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances of each case (D) recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances (E) holding that independent of the implied consent law the fourth amendment requires an arrestees consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw

A:
(C)
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