In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Legislative acts are those which involve policy-making decision of a general scope or, to put it another way, legislation involves line-drawing. Where the decision affects a small number or a single individual, the legislative power is not implicated, and the act takes on the nature of administration. In addition, the act must be “procedurally” legislative, that is, passed by means of established legislative procedures. This principle requires that constitutionally accepted procedures of enacting the legislation must be followed in order to assure that the act is a legitimate, reasoned decision representing the will of the people which the governing body has been chosen to serve. E.g., Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the procedure the legislature follows 
 Holding statements: (A) holding on the merits that the existence of an unexercised legislative veto provision in a statute would render invalid actions taken under the statute unless the legislative veto provisions were severable from the portion of the statute pursuant to which the challenged actions were taken (B) holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission (C) holding onehouse legislative veto unconstitutional (D) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (E) holding acts of voting to be quintessentially legislative and the introduction of a budget to be formally legislative
[A]: (C)


[Q]: was a “substantial factor” or “motivating factor” in Walker’s allegedly retaliatory actions. Abrams argues that a reasonable jury could infer, as a result of this chronology, that he was “falsely arrested” and that he was arrested “because of what [he] said.” Abrams then opines that “the arrest was for an illegal purpose” and finally that “[a]nger often leads to unthinking retaliation.” After reviewing the record and the standards presented in our line of cases, we agree with the district court’s finding that this chronology is unconvincing, as it fails to present “definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion,” Michael v. St. Joseph County, 259 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir.2001), contains mere speculation, and demands the making of unreasonable inferences in suppo -84 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that such a step would not be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest (B) holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest (C) holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity (D) holding that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a  1983 claim alleging false arrest (E) recognizing first amendment retaliation right
[A]: (C)


[Q]: v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 407-08, 100 S.E.2d 4 (1957)). Likewise in this case, the presence of signs barring unauthorized admittance is sufficient to establish that the access road is not “open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.” Va.Code § 46.2-100. 395 F.3d at 521 (emphasis as in the Fourth Circuit opinion). The court also rejected a government argument that taxis, buses, delivery trucks, and people in search of directions such as defendant Smith also used the road, and that such use brought it within the definition of “highway.” The court said: Because the general public is not permitted on the access road, it is not “open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.” Va.Code § 46.2-100. See also Flinchum, 24 Va.App. at 737, 485 S.E.2d 630 (<HOLDING>). Id. D. The Virginia Cases There are at least 
 Holding statements: (A) holding road was still a public highway although fifty years had passed since the road was used by the public (B) holding that a road not open to the public at all times was not a highway (C) holding that case law had made clear that masturbating in car on public road was sufficiently open (D) holding the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances (E) holding that a bia road was a tribal road by considering the nature of the rightofway at issue and finding that although the tribe had relinquished certain gatekeeping rights by allowing public use of the road and collaborating with the bia in maintaining it the tribe had maintained other significant gatekeeping rights because the rightofway was not granted to the state and the road did not form any part of the states highway system
[A]:
(B)