In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
proceeding”). Here, the only evidence that th .Crim.App.2000) (stating, in motion to suppress context, “[T]he judge may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony, even if that testimony is not controverted”). Appellant’s and Sanchez’s after-the-fact, out-of-court averrals about appellant’s ability to understand the proceedings and waivers he signed were untimely factual statements in appellant’s self-interest. Even though the State did not offer affidavits to controvert appellant’s and Sanchez’s affidavits, it was within the trial court’s discretion to disbelieve the assertions contained in those affidavits that appellant does not read or speak English. See Charles, 146 S.W.3d at 210; Shanklin, 190 S.W.3d at 167; see also Phuong Anh Thi Le, 300 S.W.3d at 327 (<HOLDING>). The trial court, and not this Court, is in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record (B) holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record (C) recognizing that the bia must defer to the factual findings of the ij unless they are clearly erroneous (D) holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts (E) holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record

Ex Output:
holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record


Ex Input:
by the parties. These considerations are consistent with the principle [sic] legislative purpose behind enactment of the Uniform Arbitration Act: to provide and encourage an expedited, efficient, relatively uncomplicated, alternative means of dispute resolution, with limited judicial intervention or participation, and without the primary expense of litigation— attorneys’ fees. Id. at 153-54, 423 S.E.2d at 750. The court concluded that “in arbitration proceedings, both the arbitrator or arbitration panel and the superior courts upon confirmation are limited to applying only [our AR.S. § 12-1510] in determining whether attorneys’ fees should be or were properly awarded.” Id. at 155, 423 S.E. at 751; see also Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis, Inc., 380 Mass. 91, 97, 401 N.E.2d 839, 843 (1980) (<HOLDING>). In our view, to permit a trial court to award 
 Holding statements: (A) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees (B) holding that attorneys fee statute does not overpower the policy expressed in our ars  121510 against the award of attorneys fees in arbitration proceedings (C) holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency (D) holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees (E) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees

Ex Output:
holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees


Ex Input:
of A.M., 786 P.2d 476, 478-79 (Colo.App.1989)(interpreting C.R.J.P. 4’s requirement that a dependency and neglect petition be filed with the district court within ten days from the day the child is taken into custody as a rule not affecting the court’s jurisdiction such that a failure to object in time to the child’s extended custody will waive the requirement). Instead, the time requirement of 19-1-108(5) is a procedural rule that creates a condition precedent to the party’s right to appeal the magistrate’s order. Because such procedures can be waived and because the Department failed to raise the requirements of 19 — 1—108(5) before the district court reviewed C.S.’s petition, the Department has waived any argument under 19-1-108(5). Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611, 617-618 (Colo.2002)(<HOLDING>); see also Ex Parte H.F., 843 So.2d 190, 191-92 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court and this court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants motion for modification of sentence based on amendment 706 even though the defendant filed the motion before march 3 2008 because the district court ruled on the motion after that date (B) holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law (C) holding that crim p 35s requirement that criminal defendants file a motion for relief with the state court before proceeding to habeas corpus implicates the doctrine of exhaustion of legal remedies and not the concept of subject matter jurisdiction and any argument based on crim p 35 is therefore waivable (D) holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved on the facts appearing in the record and that under such circumstances the defendants remedy is to file a petition for habeas corpus (E) holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus

Ex Output:

holding that the district court and this court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants motion for modification of sentence based on amendment 706 even though the defendant filed the motion before march 3 2008 because the district court ruled on the motion after that date