instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
a “responsible person” under § 6672 in these circumstances. B. Willfulness 1. Standard of Review As with the previous issue, the government asserts that the determination of willfulness under § 6672 is a question of law subject to de novo review, while Bradshaw argues that it is a question of fact on which the district judge’s ruling can not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Some circuits have held that the ultimate issue of willfulness is subject to de novo review. United States v. McCombs, 30 F.3d at 320 (noting, however, that this is a difficult question that, in similar contexts, has divided the courts for over a century); Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d at 1505-07. Our prior decisions have, however, treated this as an issue of fact. See Taylor, 69 F.3d at 417-18 (<HOLDING>); Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033 (reviewing jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings (B) holding that the district court sitting in review of the decision of the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failure to pay over taxes was willful because the bankruptcy court had made no findings on willfulness we remanded for bankruptcy court findings (C) holding that 28 usc  1961a applies to bankruptcy court judgments because a bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court (D) holding that bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings and conclusions in a core proceeding over which the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority (E) holding that the bankruptcy court has the inherent power to award sanctions for badfaith conduct in a bankruptcy court proceeding
answer:
holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings


question:
45 U.S.C. § 56, and 46 U.S.C. § 30106, are essentially identical, stating that the action must be “commenced” or “brought” within the three year period. The Supreme Court in Burnett specifically found that the state court suit had been properly “commenced” although it was filed in an improper venue. 380 U.S. at 426, 85 S.Ct. at 1053. Furthermore, because the principle of uniformity that drove the Burnett decision applies with equal force to a general maritime action, other courts have correctly held that Burnett applies in general maritime cases. See, e.g., Prejean, 721 So.2d at 1276 (citing 1 Martin J. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries § 5:10 (4th ed.1990)); Davis, 659 F.Supp. at 156-157; People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F.Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.La.1968) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s second argument for distinction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries (B) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (C) holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction (D) holding that burnett and its justification of uniformity is equally applicable to admiralty actions (E) holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures
answer:
holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries


question:
(Colo. 1982) (noting that strict prima facie case may be impossible at discovery stage). Decisions regarding discovery are best left to the trial court in its reasoned discretion; Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 57, 459 A.2d 503 (1983); and employing the typical prima facie burden shifting could lead to endless minitrials to settle discovery matters in the underlying action. Accordingly, we reject a strict burden shifting approach and instead employ the test adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which requires a showing of probable cause to believe that the privileged communications were made with the intent to perpetrate a civil fraud and that the communications were made in furtherance of that fraud. See United States v. Zolin, supra, 491 U.S. 563 n.7 (<HOLDING>); Matter of Mendel, 897 P.2d 68, 74 (Alaska 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing confusion caused by prima facie language (B) holding that unintended damage to a pipeline caused by the defective coating supplied by insureds subsidiary was caused by an occurrence within the meaning of the liability policy (C) holding that delay caused by or consented to by a defendant is not unreasonable (D) holding that eco nomic injury caused by contractual obligations that stemmed from compliance with a regulation were sufficiently caused by the regulation to support standing (E) holding under the policy language that diminution of market value is not a cause of loss but a measure of a loss caused by something else
answer:

holding that unintended damage to a pipeline caused by the defective coating supplied by insureds subsidiary was caused by an occurrence within the meaning of the liability policy