In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

that any negligent infliction claim remains before us on this appeal (as none has been separately argued) that claim is preempted for the same reasons. III. Conclusion We hold that Humble’s intentional infliction/tort of outrage claim is preempted on the facts of this case, and her race and nationality discrimination claims have been abandoned. Humble’s reasonable accommodation claim under the WLAD is not preempted, and we remand that claim for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Humble requests that a remand to state court for the latter claim be ordered, but we leave it to the district court to make that discretionary determination. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 . 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 2 . Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 216, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Id. at 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904. Without 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 (B) holding that broad language releasing all claims whether in contract tort or otherwise necessarily included a bad faith claim (C) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (D) holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith (E) holding that a state law tort of bad faith was necessarily based on breach of duties contained in the cba and was therefore preempted
holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301

abused its discretion by providing an unreasonable characterization of the record evidence. See McElwee, 896 A.2d at 18 & nn. 7-8. While SEPTA claims that this, too, necessarily entailed unwarranted fact-finding on the part of the Commonwealth Court, we believe that it aligns with the approach utilized in Sienkiewicz I, wherein this Court not only determined that no record evidence existed to support a particular factual finding central to the trial court’s decision to grant relief (i.e., that Penn-DOT had installed curbing along the “Stafford Straightaway”), but proceeded to delineate the essential facts that were proved by the uncontradicted record evidence in ultimately agreeing with Penn-DOT’s position that relief was unjustified. See Sienkiewicz I, 584 Pa. at 282, 883 A.2d at 502 (<HOLDING>). Under the circumstances of this case, then, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (B) holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property (C) recognizing distinction and allowing recovery for impairment of access and not obstructed flow of traffic (D) holding that the landownerlicensee relationship ceased when the licensee left the landowners property (E) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking
holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property

venerable requirement that a cross-appellant file a notice of cross-appeal. See Smeaton v. Smeaton, 6 as (presumably) a purveyor of ideas: The record shows it was a book purchaser; not a book publisher. Part of the constitutional difficulty with section 212.06(9) is the uncertainty it creates about just which ideas a book must express, in order for its purchase to escape the tax. See generally State v. Ashcraft, 378 So.2d 284, 285 (Fla.1979) (noting that “overbreadth of a law may have a chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment freedoms”). Given the pall this uncertainty casts, pursuing tax refunds book by book in individual cases would not afford an adequate remedy for the constitutional harm. See Metro. Dade County v. Dep’t of Commerce, 365 So.2d 432, 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. Dep’t of Gen. Servs. v. Willis, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding declaratory relief available in circuit court against an administrative agency where a partys constitutional rights are endangered (B) holding that the judicial immunity available to federal officers extends to section 1983 actions for declaratory and injunctive relief (C) holding that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not available in the administrative process (D) holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action (E) holding that neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the fdcpa

holding that the judicial immunity available to federal officers extends to section 1983 actions for declaratory and injunctive relief