In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: are differences between sanctions under Rule 37(a) and substitution of counsel conditioned on payment of fees, the parallel considerations convince us that the Cunningham rationale applies here. Like Rule 37(a) sanctions, the present situation invokes concerns regarding finality, avoiding piecemeal appeals, and availability of effective appellate review.” Id. Cases from the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits further support interpreting Cunningham as applying more broadly than to Rule 37(a) sanctions alone. The First Circuit recognized in Empresas Omajede, Inc. v. Bennazar-Zequeira, 213 F.3d 6, 9 n. 4 (1st Cir.2000), that Cunningham affirmed its precedents denying interlocutory appeals in the sanctions area. See, e.g., United States v. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Appeal of Licht & Semonoff 796 F.2d 564, 573 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable (B) holding sanctions pursuant to rule 26g not immediately appealable (C) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (D) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order (E) holding an order of rule 37a sanctions against an attorney is immediately appealable under  1291
Example Output: holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable

Example Input: method (under § 3663) in favor of an incorrect method (under § 1593), the district court erred. Moreover, we hold that the district court’s error was “plain,” because the statutes are clear and because the government openly admitted that its proposed methodology derived from the wrong restitution statute. See United States v. Tuyet Thi-Bach Nguyen, 565 F.3d 668, 677 (9th Cir.2009) (“An error is plain when it is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’ under the law.”). Finally, we hold that the error affected Defendants’ substantial rights and affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The government did not present evidence — and the district court did not make findings — of the victims’ actual losses, as required by § 3663. See Bussell, 504 F.3d at 964 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Joyner, 201 F.3d 61, 81 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that restitution is proper under  2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses (B) holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted (C) holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction (D) holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses  (E) holding that restitution in the full amount of each victims losses does not exceed the statutory maximum
Example Output: holding that restitution is proper under  2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses

Example Input: b. C.A.’s Claim is not Moot The defendants argue that C.A.’s claim is moot because they have submitted the requisite payment authorization to enroll C.A. at Cabin John Middle School. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 1. The plaintiffs, in their reply, point out that DCPS has not submitted any documentary evidence, other than a declaration, to prove that it submitted the required paperwork. Pis.’ Reply at 4. The plaintiffs further allege that while the defendants may have submitted the payment authorization for C.A.’s enrollment at Cabin John, the defendants recently “rescinded funding authorization for [C.A.]’s Grafton School placement.” Id. at 5. A failure to fund a student’s placement constitutes a unilateral change in the placement, Petties v. Dist. of Columbia, 881 F.Supp. 63, 66 (D.D.C.1995) (<HOLDING>). DCPS’ failure to fund C.A.’s placement, in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a city or town a sidewalk is that part of a street or highway that is intended or used by pedestrians (B) holding that failure to make payments in whole or in part or cutting off funds for special education programs amounts to a unilateral change in students placements which is prohibited by the idea (C) holding that in order to constitute a materially adverse change in the terms of plaintiffs employment a transfer must include either diminished responsibilities a demotion evidenced by a change in salary title or benefits or other indices unique to the particular situation (D) holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child (E) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody
Example Output:
holding that in a city or town a sidewalk is that part of a street or highway that is intended or used by pedestrians