In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: to her or to the government, and some of which may be quite different than either thought possible. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21; see also Sotirion v. United States, 617 F.3d 27, 38 (1st Cir. 2010). At the time of sentencing there was no “sentencing error”. Petitioner made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights, choosing the certainty of a binding plea agreement over the uncertainty of a jury trial. He cannot accept the benefit of that agreement and then repudiate it when a change in circumstances later arises. See Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21. A retroactive determination that an advisory guideline range may have been ■ miscalculated does not overcome petitioner’s appellate waiver; See Sotirion, 617 F.3d at 38; see also United States v. Calderon-Pacheco, 564 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). In view of the circumstances, the Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver (B) holding a showing of egregious facts required to vault the hurdle erected by the waiver (C) holding that the failure to provide a person with all of the information required by ors 4261001 constitutes an egregious error that justifies plain error review (D) recognizing waiver by acquiescence as a possible defense to an action for past due alimony but finding no waiver under the facts presented (E) holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case

A: holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver
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Q: In my judgment, it is extremely doubtful that the obviously dispensable involvement of the judiciary in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins and ends in the Executive Branch is a proper exercise of judicial power. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. Appx. 697, 702-703 (1864) (opinion of Taney, C. J.); United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48 (1852). It may well follow that the misguided opinion of today’s majority has nothing more than an advisory character. Whether or not that be so, the better rea soning in Justice Souter’s far wiser and far more scholarly opinion will surely be the law one day. For these reasons, as well as those set forth in Justice Souter’s opinion, I respectfully dissent. 1 See, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F. 3d 630 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution (B) holding that a federal court may order a state to pay cleanup costs pursuant to the comprehensive environmental response compensation and liability act of 1980 (C) holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken (D) holding that bankruptcy court may enjoin state environmental reclamation order (E) holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs

A: holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution
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Q: of record rather than the alien. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also favor notice of counsel of record rather than actual notice of the client. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b) (stating that “whenever service under these rules is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court”). Case precedent also indicates that actual notice of an alien is not required under the INA. See Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 669 n. 6 (3d Cir.1990) (noting in dicta that notice to attorney comprised actual notice to alien); Reyes-Arias v. INS, 866 F.2d 500, 502-3 (D.C.Cir.1989) (finding actual knowledge of attorney constitutes reasonable notice); Newton v. INS, 622 F.2d 1193, 1194 (3d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Anin received notice as required by the INA. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice (D) holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice (E) holding that notice to original attorney not formally withdrawn comprised proper notice

A:
holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city
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