In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: clause. We conclude that reckless battery is a violent crime under the force clause, an issue not addressed by the Holloway opinion. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 20 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012). We further note that the Holloway court’s conclusion with respect to reckless battery accorded with then-binding instruction from the United States Supreme Court that the residual clause is limited to an offense that “typically involve[s] purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct.” United States v. Holloway, supra at 260, quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008). Last year, however, the Supreme Court retreated from this characterization of the residual clause. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270, 2277 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court iterated that “[t]he phrase 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally  (B) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (C) holding that burglary is violent felony (D) holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause (E) holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act
[A]: (D)


[Q]: did not arise out of her employment, given that she was no longer employed at Riverside when she was injured. Respondents counter that, for purposes of the NIIA, the employment relationship continues for a reasonable amount of time after an employee quits or is fired, so that Fanders was still considered an employee when she was injured, and thus, the NILA applied and was Fanders’ sole remedy. The NIIA only covers injuries that arise out of and in the course of the injured claimant’s employment. NRS 616C. 150(1). An in jury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the workplace. Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment (B) holding employees under age discrimination in employment acts adea parallel retaliation provision includes former employees as long as the alleged discrimination is related to or arises out of the employment relationship (C) holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment (D) holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment (E) holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law
[A]: (A)


[Q]: the statutory restrictions were justified. See generally 696 F.3d at 458-⅜7. 209 . Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); 210 . Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). 211 . Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (quoting this statement of the principle — as the first sentence of the opinion — from Connick, 461 U.S. at 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-45, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (explaining that the first case in the line, Pickering, was rooted in same rationale as 1950s-era cases invalidating loyalty oaths and political disclosure requirements made a condition of government employment). 212 . See Connick, 461 U.S. at 144-45, 103 S.Ct. 1684; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419, 126-S.Ct. 1951 (<HOLDING>). 213 . See .Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-19, 126 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that georgias revised death 4356 penalty sentencing scheme differed from that ruled unconstitutional in furman v georgia 408 us 238 92 sct 2726 33 led2d 346 1972 because it focused the jurys attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant (B) recognizing that the first amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict incidentally or intentionally the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens citing perry v sindermann 408 us 593 597 92 sct 2694 33 led2d 570 1972 (C) holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline (D) holding that if the harm alleged in fact affects the recreational or even the mere aesthetic interests of the plaintiff that will suffice for standing purposes citing sierra club v morton 405 us 727 73436 92 sct 1361 31 led2d 636 1972 (E) holding that a new york city family court judge had no constitutionally protected property right to reappointment after her tenyear term expired and the mayor decided not to reappoint her and explaining that the fact that many or even most incumbent judges have been reappointed cannot operate to raise appellants subjective expectation to a constitutionally protected right  appellant has failed entirely to demonstrate any mu tually explicit understanding sufficient to establish a property right citing perry 408 us at 601 92 sct 2694 bd of regents of state colls v roth 408 us 564 577 92 sct 2701 33 led2d 548 1972
[A]:
(B)