In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: conversion should have an opportunity to reassert objections to exemptions. Indeed, Rule 1019(2) specifically addresses time period for actions after conversion, and provides for the re-running of times allowed for filing a claim, objecting to discharge and objecting to dischargeability. There is no new time period, however, for the trustee to assert objections to exemptions. “If a new time period for objections to exemptions began to run upon conversion of a case, one would expect to see it mentioned in Rule 1019(2), [and][i]t is not there.” In re Brown, 178 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1995). Where the statute is clear, it is not appropriate to look to policy arguments. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41, 109-S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (<HOLDING>), and none of the policy arguments are 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear (B) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (C) holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry  is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful (D) holding that pursuant to 28 usc  2254d1 if  the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry (E) holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end
Example Output: recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear

Example Input: Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word “claimant” in subsection four. Under the plurality’s view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word “claimant” in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of “prevailing party.” This is because, in order for the word “claimant” in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid
Example Output: holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence

Example Input: the burden of proving (1) that the defendant was enriched, (2) that such enrichment was at the plaintiff’s expense, and (3) “that the circumstances were such that in equity or good conscience [the defendant] should return the money or property to [the plaintiff].” Martin v. Martin, 54 V.I. 379, 394 (V.I. 2010) (citing Gov’t Guarantee Fund of Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F. Supp. 441, 460, 35 V.I. 356 (D. V.I. 1997)). However, this Court summarily adopted those elements of unjust enrichment by citing a single District Court of the Virgin Islands case, without determining whether that rule represents the sounder rule for the Virgin Islands. See Gov’t of the V.I. v. Connor, 60 V.I. 599, 607 n.1 (V.I. 2014); Banks v. Int’l Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (V.I. 2011) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, after this Court issued its Martin 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a trial judge can implicitly find a prosecutors proffered reasons credible (B) recognizing that a construction contract implicitly imposes a duty on contractors to perform work according to the standard of due care (C) recognizing wrongful adoption cause of action grounded in fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation (D) recognizing that the legislature implicitly repealed 1 vic  4 through its adoption of 4 vic  21 in 2004 (E) recognizing this purpose albeit implicitly
Example Output:
recognizing that a trial judge can implicitly find a prosecutors proffered reasons credible