In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

exception, which provides that “[t]here is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen” if the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). After review of the administrative record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the petition in part and deny the petition in part. I Ms. Lian acknowledges that binding circuit precedent prohibits us from reaching her challenge to the BIA’s refusal to reopen her proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, Ms. Lian urges us to overrule 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte (B) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review claims that have not been raised before the bia (C) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the bia refusing to reopen immigration proceedings sua sponte (D) holding that a decision of the bia whether to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 cfr  10032a is entirely discretionary and therefore beyond the courts review  ie the court lacks jurisdiction to review the bias decision not to reopen (E) holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to review legal arguments not raised before the bia
(C)

improperly determined that the “neither expected nor intended” language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an “occurrence.” ¶21 The CGL policy’s core provision defines “occurrence” by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was “neither expected nor intended.” This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured’s expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an “occurrence” and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). ¶22 Here the District Court found that Ribi 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended
(A)

Knecht Bros. v. Ames Constr., Inc., 404 N.W.2d 859 (Minn.App.1987), in which we held that the clear application of a UCC provision made the appellant’s position frivolous. Id. at 861. Similarly, in Summit House Co. v. Gershman, 502 N.W.2d 422 (Minn.App.1993), this court concluded that the appellant’s claim was frivolous because the appellant’s inter pretation of the law was contrary to existing law. Id. at 425. In the instant case, however, no Minnesota law existed on the issue, and the application of the UCC provision was unclear. We hold that the Bank’s position was not frivolous or taken in bad faith. Although the Bank’s reliance on the WTA provision proved unconvincing, its position was sufficiently grounded in the statute. See Nelson v. Engen, 347 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Minn.App.1984) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the Bank instituted proceedings 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction that omitted elements of crime that defense had conceded was error although not plain error (B) holding that appellants innovative theory based on minnesotas nofault act although in error was not frivolous (C) holding that a jury verdict will be sustained on any reasonable theory based on the evidence (D) holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory (E) holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory

(B)