In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: Defendants’ Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 22 (“Plaintiffs appear to be claiming that they are entitled to ‘Class of One’ review[.]”)) Furthermore, County Defendants did not explicitly address the appeal issue anywhere in their motion. Given this background, it was not error for the Court to ascribe the “class of one” argument to Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge, nor was it error for the Court to find that County Defendants had not met their burden on the question of summary judgment. To the extent that County Defendants now contend that Plaintiffs “class of one” argument must fail because no other party has appealed for a waiver, this is a new argument that is not appropriate in a motion for reconsideration. See Haw. Stevedores, Inc. v. HT & T Co., 363 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1269 (D.Haw.2005) (<HOLDING>). Should County Defendants wish to re-visit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court will generally not consider arguments presented for the first time on appeal (B) holding that reconsideration pursuant to rule 59 cannot be premised on the same arguments presented in the complaint and motions (C) holding that motions for reconsideration are not appropriate if the movant asks the court to hear new arguments or supporting facts that could have been presented originally (D) holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision (E) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration

Answer: (D)


Question: of a portion of their property to Greenheart constituted a transaction for a commercial purpose is supported by the evidence. The Browns owned 320 acres that they used for ranching and farming — operations on which the Browns relied to derive income. The Browns also acquired water rights for a portion of their land which they leased out and eventually sold. The Brown Property had a portion that lacked water rights and it was this portion — without any improvements — that the Browns sold. Although the Brown Property did include their residence, the portion sold to Greenheart did not include the residence, and the existence of a residence on the property does not automatically disqualify a land conveyance from being a commercial transaction. See Watson, 144 Idaho at 219, 159 P.3d at 856 (<HOLDING>); Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 306, 900 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute (B) holding that a previous decision assuming a malpractice action was a commercial transaction for the purpose of awarding attorney fees was not binding because the court in that case was not asked  to decide whether a malpractice action involving a commercial transaction falls within the parameters of the statute (C) holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property (D) holding sale of property was commercial transaction where the land was for both a family retreat and for logging (E) holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property

Answer: (D)


Question: 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976) for the period prior to October 1, 1982 and 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (<HOLDING>), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute does not apply retroactively to claims accruing prior to the effective date (B) holding that the fcia rate should apply to a march 30 1982 judgment against a private party for the entire postjudgment period (C) holding that the fcia does not apply to a july 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment (D) holding that the fcia does not apply to a september 1981 judgment against the united states for interest accruing after the acts effective date (E) holding that the fcia does not apply to a june 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date

Answer:
(C)