In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
other than delay. The same is true of Mr. Leland’s contention that he was not adequately kept informed by his attorney as the case progressed, that Mr. Largay failed to undertake requested actions, and that he relied too heavily on the prospect of a dramatic change in the legal landscape following Blakely up to Booker. But, there is no factual specificity to any of these arguments. Mr. Leland nowhere suggests what an evidentiary hearing would reveal to justify the relief he has requested. If the § 2255 petitioner wishes an evidentiary hearing, he must at a minimum present a plausible basis to conclude that the evidence would lead to a different result. Here, Mr. Leland has asserted no factual basis for such a conclusion. Cf. Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 61 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing based on  2255 petitioners mere eonclusory allegations in his affidavit (B) holding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing because the petitioners allegations were not implausible and a final determination of the merits of petitioners claim would be best served by greater development of the facts many of which the government disputes (C) holding that review under  2254d1 is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits rejecting the petitioners claim that the federal habeas court could consider evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing (D) holding that the state courts rejection of the petitioners ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the state court (E) holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the bia to fail to consider the merits of a petitioners claim

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
(3) Dr. Hickman’s observation that Seever’s surgeries, residual pain, and physical limitations “have taxed his psychological coping abilities,” ApltApp. at 372. But Dr. Hick man interpreted this information as presenting no more than a slight impairment—meaning that he could still function well—as to understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions, and he declined to identify any other mental capabilities affected by Seever’s depression. We will not fault the ALJ for failing to interpret Seever’s symptoms and test results differently than Dr. Hickman. See Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1022 (10th Cir.1996) (observing that an ALJ may not substitute his lay opinion for a medical opinion); Hamilton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1500 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Nor are we convinced that the ALJ should have 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that this court may not reweigh evidence (B) recognizing this method (C) recognizing this presumption (D) recognizing this distinction (E) recognizing this rule

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
to recognize a mere breach of contract that has an incidental effect on the plaintiffs business relations with third parties as a wrongful act under a claim of tortious interference. See Volcjak, 124 Md.App. at 512-13, 723 A.2d at 479; K & K Management, Inc., 316 Md. at 162-63, 557 A.2d at 978. Here, Mates bases her claim on the grounds that her removal from the board and subsequent termination was in violation of NAVI’s corporate by-laws. See First Am.Compl. ¶ 29. Assuming arguendo that the corporate bylaws acted as a contract between the board and the corporation, Mates’ claim of tor-tious interference would be based on nothing more than a breach of contract, which Maryland courts have refused to recognize as a basis for this tort. See Volcjak, 124 Md.App. at 513, 723 A.2d at 479 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Mates has failed to a state a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the lmra preempted plaintiffemployees claim under michigan law for tortious interference with contractual relations breach of contract is an essential element of a tortious interference claim and resolution of such claim would require the court to interpret collective bargaining agreement to determine if that agreement had been breached (B) holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference (C) holding that where no wrongful conduct by the defendant was alleged ie a breach accompanied by violence intimidation defamation fraud or other tortious conduct other than the breach of its contractual obligation under its bylaws no claim for tortious interference can lie (D) holding no specific jurisdiction where alleged tortious conduct was not related to defendants contacts with texas (E) holding that where both defamation and tortious interference claims are pled and are based on same facts minnesota law requires the application of the actual malice standard to tortious interference claims

Ex Output:

(C)