In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Erickson-Puttmann concedes that her Title VII claim against Gill fails because Gill was not her employer. See e.g., Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly Community Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th Cir.1997) (“Our Court quite recently has squarely held that supervisors may not be held individually liable under Title VII.” (citing Spencer v. Ripley County State Bank, 123 F.3d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir.1997) (per cu-riam))). Lenhardt v. Basic Inst, of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir.1995) (noting that “[e]very circuit that has considered the issue ultimately has concluded that an employee, even one possessing supervisory authority, is not an employer upon whom liability can be imposed under Title VII.”); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the court concludes that summary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii (B) holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii (C) holding individual employees may be liable under title vii (D) holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii (E) holding that there is no individual liability under title vii
holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii

opposing party’s motion. We have held that there is an “overarching liberal policy of allowing amendments under Rule 15.” Ex parte Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 858 So.2d 950, 954 (Ala.2003). However, Rule 15 “‘is not carte blanche authority to amend ... at any time.’ ” Burkett v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 607 So.2d 138, 141 (Ala.1992)(quoting Stallings v. Angelica Uniform Co., 388 So.2d 942, 947 (Ala.1980)). The trial court has discretion to deny an amendment for good cause. Ex parte GRE Ins. Group, 822 So.2d 388, 390 (Ala.2001); Stallings, 388 So.2d at 947. The deadline in the scheduling order does not curtail the trial court’s discretion in considering the merits of the offered amendment. See Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, 1066 (8th Cir.2005)(<HOLDING>). The trial court can refuse to allow an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (B) holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict (C) holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions (D) holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions (E) holding that the scheduling order merely prescribes the date by which all motions to amend shall be filed the date on the scheduling order does not confine the district courts consideration of the merits of such motions and does not preclude it from finding that an amendment would result in prejudice
holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act

436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. In this case, Hill has alleged that Britt (1) sexually abused her in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) spoke "with her about her pending case outside the presence of an attorney in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and (3) unlawfully searched her and her home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 194-227, 274. Accordingly, Hill has alleged sufficient facts that Britt violated her constitutional rights to state a claim for relief plausible on its face. Cf., e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330-31, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and its various exceptions); United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 482 (4th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel (B) holding that the same waiver standard applies when assessing whether a defendant has waived his sixth amendment right to counsel during a postindictment interrogation as when assessing whether a defendant has waived his fifth amendment right to counsel preindictment (C) holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an allegedly coerced interrogation where the taped interrogation was played for jurors and the defendant crossexamined the witness at length about the interrogation (D) holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel (E) holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation

recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel