In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

despite the underlying circumstances. See United States v. Moudy, 132 F.3d 618, 620 (10th Cir.1998) (stating that “[ejvery escape scenario is a powder keg, which may or may not explode into violence and result in physical injury to someone at any given time, but which always has the serious potential to do so” and that this characterization applies “to all escapes, whether or not violence was actually involved”) (citing United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir.1994)). C. Sixth Amendment Claim Finally, Mr. Flowers argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by failing to submit the fact of his prior convictions to a jury. This argument is also foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1223, 1226 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we AFFIRM Mr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact of prior convictions under  924e need not be charged in an indictment and proven to a jury and also that the government need not charge in an indictment and prove to a jury that a defendants prior conviction constitutes a violent felony under  924e (B) holding that district court may enhance sentence based on fact of prior convictions under  924e regardless of whether admitted by defendant or found by jury (C) holding that facts regarding prior convictions need not be charged in an indictment nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that elements of statute which became  924e need not be reflected in indictment for crime charged
(A)

clause. We conclude that reckless battery is a violent crime under the force clause, an issue not addressed by the Holloway opinion. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 20 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012). We further note that the Holloway court’s conclusion with respect to reckless battery accorded with then-binding instruction from the United States Supreme Court that the residual clause is limited to an offense that “typically involve[s] purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct.” United States v. Holloway, supra at 260, quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008). Last year, however, the Supreme Court retreated from this characterization of the residual clause. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270, 2277 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court iterated that “[t]he phrase 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally  (B) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (C) holding that burglary is violent felony (D) holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause (E) holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act
(D)

subject-matter jurisdiction over tort claims that are intertwined with ecclesiastical investigations or proceedings involving the employment or discipline of clergy. Ex parte Bole, supra. In Ex parte Bole, the plaintiff was a pastor emeritus of a church and the defen dant was a lay member of the church. 103 So.3d at 42. After the lay member made statements to the church’s hierarchy (“the Conference”) concerning the pastor, the Conference initiated an investigation that ultimately led to the pastor being asked to refrain from further activities with the church. 103 So.3d at 48. The pastor sued the lay member, alleging defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction 2d 302, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (1995) (same). “Federal courts: Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1427 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1250 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claim of breach of fiduciary duty against pastor for sexual relationship with parishioner during the course of pastoral counseling was tantamount to impermissible clergy malpractice claim (B) holding that first amendment barred parishioners negligent hiring and supervision and breach of fiduciary duty claims against pastor and church for sexual contact that occurred between pastor and parishioner during the course of a counseling relationship (C) holding that negligent retention and supervision claims based upon a pastors sexual contact with parishioners was barred by the first amendment (D) holding that first amendment barred adults breach of fiduciary duty claim against pastor for actions that occurred when parishioner was a minor (E) holding that first amendment barred negligent supervision claim against a church regarding sexual relationship between adult parishioner and priest during the course of a marital counseling

(B)