In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: provider in the course of treatment. In cases involving successive tortfeasors whose separate causal contributions to the plaintiff’s harm can be measured, the doctrine of joint and several liability applies only to the enhanced portion of the injury. See Keeton et al. § 52, at 352 (discussing distinction between original tortfeasor’s liability, which encompasses entire injury, and treating physician’s liability, which extends only to negligent treatment); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. c. 17. Even though the original tortfeasor may be held hable for both the original and the enhanced injury, the imposition of entire liability is only temporary. The original tortfeasor, whose duty is of a different character and who is not in pari delicto with a successive 35, 42 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Thus liability for the enhanced injury may be 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor (B) holding that contribution will lie where no statute precludes recovery from the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought (C) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because it was not an innocent party (D) recognizing a right to contribution (E) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because claim properly was for contribution

Output: recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor


Input: Consider Input: victim’s undisputed injuries, this court held that the statute required proof that the bodily injury was a foreseeable, rather than intentional, result of the rights-viólating conduct. Woodlee, 136 F.3d at 1405. At no point did this court even consider the possibility that the statute might not require proof of foreseeability at all, i.e., that the statute, imposed strict liability .on a defendant for bodily .injury resulting from his conduct. Because there is no logical distinction between the statutory language at issue in Woodlee and the language of § 841(b)(1)(E) that we are now tasked with interpreting, I believe that we are bound by Woodlee to interpret § 841(b)(1)(E) as incorporating a proximate cause requirement. See United States v. Ensminger, 174 F.3d 1143, (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). To conclude otherwise creates an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel (B) holding that a panel may not reconsider issues decided earlier in the same case by the en banc court (C) holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court (D) holding that only intervening law from the supreme court or this court sitting en banc can overrule a prior panel decision (E) holding that we are bound by prior panel opinions until they are overruled or abrogated by the supreme court or this court sitting en banc

Output: holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel


Input: Consider Input: authority to consent even if he did not. Because we hold that Reed had actual authority to consent to the search, there is no need for us to determine whether the officer’s conduct was justified by Reed’s apparent authority. We leave the apparent-authority doctrine to be further developed in a case in which its application is, unlike here, determinative of the outcome. Conclusion Because he possessed actual authority over the appellant’s bedroom, Reed had the power to consent to a search of the appellant’s bedroom. The search of the appellant’s bedroom was, therefore, reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and, as there are no other points of error requiring remand, we affirm the judgment of the 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant (B) holding that it is unreasonable to search individuals who are in the same general area as someone being searched under a valid warrant without something more to establish probable cause (C) holding that if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause the warrant was nevertheless valid (D) holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable (E) holding that police do not need probable cause or a warrant to search items that have already been searched for inventory purposes


Output: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant