In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
rule is limited to questions that seek evidence about the informant’s police sanctioned conduct in apprehending a suspect, then the informant’s claim of privilege under such circumstances would be spurious. In this context he is immune from prosecution. We believe that this is the correct limitation because Norman is premised on a line of cases holding that state agents are not accomplices to illegal conduct of which they are charged to discover. Norman quotes Ex parte Turner, 545 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.Cr.App.1977) for the proposition that the law is well settled that if an informant is acting as a state agent, then the informant’s claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment is spurious. Id. at 344. In turn, Turner, supra, is premised upon Woodward v. State, 490 S.W.2d 850 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (<HOLDING>). See also, Vela v. State, 373 S.W.2d 505 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred (B) holding that an undercover agent is not an accomplice as long as the agent does not bring about the crime but merely obtains evidence to be used against those engaged in crime (C) holding that expert testimony of irs agent regarding tax liability did not usurp the function of the jury as agent did not give her opinion about the guilt of the defendant (D) holding that a private citizen acting as undercover agent is not an accomplice witness so long as he does not bring about the crime (E) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent

Ex Output:
holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred


Ex Input:
and seeking to dismiss the four new claims asserted against them in the amended complaint. Also on January 8, 2010, Wells Fargo filed a supplemental motion to dismiss [26], addressing the new claims against it and renewing its request that all counts be dismissed. II. Discussion The Court must determine whether: (1) Giscombe eliminated the deficiencies of his previous shotgun pleading, and (2) if so, whether the complaint should be dismissed for the other reasons asserted by ABN, Citimortgage, and Wells Fargo in their motions to dismiss. A. Legal Standard The sufficiency of Giscombe’s amended complaint depends on whether it is a shotgun pleading; if so, it will fall short of the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The defining characteristic of a shotgun 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the liberal notice and simplified pleading principles underlying the federal rules of civil procedure (B) holding that under leatherman a federal court may not apply a pleading requirement more stringent than that provided for in the federal rules of civil procedure even in  1983 litigation (C) holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted (D) holding that the fact that federal rule of civil procedure 9b requires a heightened pleading standard for some claims but not for a section 1983 claim against a municipality means that the rules do not require a heightened pleading standard for such a claim (E) holding that a shotgun pleading is in no sense the short and plain statement of a claim required by rule 8 of the federal rules of civil procedure

Ex Output:
recognizing the liberal notice and simplified pleading principles underlying the federal rules of civil procedure


Ex Input:
affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion to dismiss the Riffle’s bankruptcy petition, was a “final” decision of the district court within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) that conferred jurisdiction on this Court. Regardless of the finality of that decision, jurisdiction was proper by the time this Court heard the appeal. When Community Bank filed its notice of appeal of the district court’s judgment on September 9, 2008, the bankruptcy court had already confirmed the Riffles’ Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, issuing its order on June 20, 2008. Such a confirmation order is a final order that may be appealed. See Maiorino v. Branford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir.1982) (suggesting in dicta that such an order is final); cf. In re Layo, 460 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); In re Am. Preferred Prescription, Inc., 255 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an unappealed contempt order by a bankruptcy court is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes (B) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (C) holding that an unappealed order is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes (D) holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal (E) holding that chapter 13 order is a final judgment on the merits for preclu sion analysis purposes

Ex Output:

holding that an unappealed contempt order by a bankruptcy court is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes