In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

should be drawn from the defendant's failure to call his accomplices to testify. The prosecutor remarked only that Mitchell had the power to subpoena witnesses, and that the defense could do so "if they thought it would contradict something [the State! presented.” In light of defense counsel’s earlier statements that "clearly you have a situation where a misidentification could take place,” and that the jury should be able to see Corprew, Cochran, and Henderson in the courtroom, the prosecutor's remarks did not relate to the substance of those witnesses’ potential testimonies. Had the prosecutor inferred that Corprew, Cochran, and Henderson would have testified unfavorably to the defense, that inference might well have conflicted with Christensen, 274 Md. at 140-41, 333 A.2d at 49 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we conclude that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court has discretion to permit defendant to call accused witness to stand and permit witness to invoke fifth amendment privilege in front of jury where entire defense was centered on witness commission of crime (B) holding that sixth amendment only requires that witness be brought to court not that he be required to take witness stand after refusing to testify and observing that it is irrelevant whether the witnesss refusal is grounded in a valid fifth amendment privilege an invalid privilege or something else entirely (C) holding that an adverse inference cannot be drawn from a defendants failure to call a witness if the states evidence establishes that the witness is an accomplice who would be entitled to assert a fifth amendment privilege (D) holding that witness was not an accomplice in distributing marijuana to himself (E) holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify
(C)

its concern with Plaintiffs’ lack of proof of causation and specific damages when the court entered summary judgment against them on their injurious falsehood/business disparagement and wrongful interference with business relations claims, and Plaintiffs’ testimony at trial failed to further illuminate their assertion that Petta’s statements caused them special damages. Plaintiffs’ testimony about special damages was unsupported by any documentary evidence, including any business operations analysis, tax returns or similar exhibits, or expert testimony, and Plaintiffs’ own con-clusory statements provided little quantifiable evidence of their claimed damages, leaving the jury to speculate regarding special damages. See Gilmore v. Cohen, 95 Ariz. 34, 36-37, 386 P.2d 81, 82-83 (1963) (<HOLDING>). ¶43 Furthermore, the evidence presented does 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not entitle a person to a federal remedy for every breach of contract by a state thus unless every breach of every public contract is to be actionable as a violation of constitutional rights it is necessary to distinguish between mere contract rights and constitutional property rights internal citations and quotation marks omitted (B) holding that the governments position must have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted (C) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (D) recognizing in a breach of contract ease that the plaintiff in every case should supply some reasonable basis for computing the amount of damage and must do so with such precision as from the nature of his claim and the available evidence is possible citations omitted (E) holding that one method of computing damages for a breach of contract is the contract price less the reasonable cost of completion
(D)

have not before explicitly considered — is whether we have jurisdiction to determine whether these jurisdictional facts are present. Drakes argues, and the government concedes, that we have jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(C). We agree, thus joining all of our sister circuits which have considered the issue. See, e.g., Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1220-21 (10th Cir.2001); Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F.3d 3, 9 (1st Cir.2000): Bell v. Reno, 218 F.3d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir.2000); Lewis v. INS, 194 F.3d 539, 542 (4th Cir.1999); Santos v. Reno, 228 F.3d 591, 597 n. 11 (5th Cir.2000); Diakite v. INS, 179 F.3d 553, 554 (7th Cir.1999) (per curiam); Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.2000); see also Lettman v. Reno, 168 F.3d 463, 465 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 207 F.3d 1368 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the transitional rules preclude direct judicial review of the bias discretionary determination of extreme hardship in suspension of deportation cases (B) holding that district courts retain jurisdiction after iirira to decide habeas corpus challenges involving pure questions of law (C) holding that the court of appeals has jurisdiction to decide its jurisdiction under the transitional rules of the iirira (D) holding that a defendant that invokes the jurisdiction of a court as a plaintiff waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim for which it invoked the courts jurisdiction (E) holding that where the issue of sanctions was not before the court of appeals when the appeal was filed the district court retained jurisdiction

(C)