In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
added). Plaintiffs point out, correctly, that beneficial use is an evolving and dynamic requirement of federal and state law. See Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal.2d 132, 140, 60 Cal.Rptr. 377, 429 P.2d 889 (1967) (While “what is a reasonable use of water depends on the circumstances of each case, such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of transcendent importance.”). Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 requires that all water provided pursuant to the Act be put to “beneficial use,” as defined by state law. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383; California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 665-67, 98 S.Ct. 2985, 57 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1978); see also City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1242, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 294, 5 P.3d 853 (2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (B) holding that mandamus was appropriate to require the director to deliver the full decreed water rights of a water right holder (C) holding that the montana constitution protects water rights against unreasonable state action  (D) holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district (E) recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
Ill 1997). AirTouch alleges that the City’s denial will in effect prohibit it from providing personal wireless services because alternative sites leave “gaps” in its service or will be too costly to provide. a. Gap In Coverage AirTouch has presented evidence of a gap in coverage in its wireless services on the Fanita Drive-Highway 125 corridor from Navajo Drive to the Highway 52 Connector. (Tifft Decl. at ¶ 11.) Air-Touch argues that if a decision leaves “significant gaps” in wireless services, § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) has been violated. The City argues that a mere gap is not sufficient; there must be a general ban for that provision to apply. AirTouch is supported by recent decisions of the Second and Third Circuit. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 640-41 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 70 (3rd Cir.) (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  332c7biii applies only to blanket prohibitions and general bans or policies and not to individual zoning decisions (B) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law (C) holding that  332c7b iii does not apply only to general bans and stating that prohibiting only general bans would 1 require a court to wait for a series of denied applications and 2 lead to the untenable result that once personal wire services are available within the jurisdiction of a state or local government  the state or local government could deny any further applications with impunity (D) holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional (E) holding that a district court cannot require a unit of state or local government to abide by a consent decree that does not serve any federal interest

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
211, 36 S.Ct. 595, 60 L.Ed. 961 (1916). Access to the courts is also not a fundamental right unless the denial of that access itself impinges on a recognized fundamental right. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658-60, 93 S.Ct. 1172, 1172-75, 35 L.Ed.2d 572, 76 (1973) (access to courts to seek welfare relief not a fundamental right). Being grounded in the common law, not the constitution, the right to receive compensation for tortious injury is simply not fundamental. See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 882, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 407, 506 P.2d 212, 231 (1973). Those few states which have applied strict scrutiny in a similar context are simply outside the mainstream of state constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 83, 688 P.2d 961, 973 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Under Texas case law, as in most states, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that right of access to recover damages for bodily injury was fundamental but noting that numerous other states have held otherwise (B) recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings (C) holding that the right to vote is fundamental (D) holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right (E) holding right to be fundamental

Ex Output:

(A)