In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: of other courts have concluded, outside the RICO and Clayton Act context, that "by reason of" should be read to require only "but for” rather than proximate causation. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) ("The words ‘because of' mean ‘by reason of: on account of.’ Thus, the ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took adverse action ‘because of age is that age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act. To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); Robinson Knife Mfg. Co. v. C.I.R., 600 F.3d 121, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Spirtas Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 555 F.3d 647, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in 26 cfr  1263ale3i the language  directly benefit or are incurred by reason of boils down to a butfor causation test (B) holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support (C) holding in an appeal from a postanswer default judgment that third prong of craddock test required appellant to offer to reimburse appellee for legal expenses he incurred in obtaining default judgment even though most of the fees incurred had not been paid (D) holding that pursuant to the eaja courts may not award expenses of an attorney that are not incurred or expended solely or exclusively in connection with the case before the court (E) holding a tribe subject to 1 a tax on the use of certain highway motor vehicles 26 usc  4481a 2 a tax on diesel fuel used in highway vehicles 26 usc  4041a 3 a tax on special fuels used in motor vehicles 26 usc  4041b and 4 a tax on manufacturing in this case a truck chassis assembled by the tribe 26 usc  4061a 4218a
[A]: holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support


[Q]: L.Ed.2d at 1035-86). Unfortunately, the adjective "readily" is subject to differing interpretations, and there has been disagreement regarding the meaning of "readily mobile." Decisions of the Indiana Court of Appeals are not consistent regarding whether automobiles under police observation or control are readily mobile so as to be subject to warrantless search under the automobile exception. E.g., compare, v. State, T5 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (legally parked automobile surrounded by police officers held not inherently mobile to qualify for automobile exeeption), transfer denied, and Edwards v. State, 768 N.E.2d 506, 508-09 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (impounded vehicle no longer "inherently mobile"), trams. not sought, with Johnson v. State, 766 N.E2d 426, 483 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002) (<HOLDING>), trans. demied, and Justice v. State, 765 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver (B) holding that ready mobility existed when a car was capable of being driven even after the driver was arrested and despite the absence of other potential drivers (C) holding that ocga  40520 as safeharbor provision requires a defendant to produce a drivers license that was valid at the time the vehicle was being driven (D) holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key (E) holding detention lawful when police referred driver to secondary to check ownership of the vehicle after the driver admitted that the car did not belong to him and the registration revealed that the car was owned by another
[A]: holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver


[Q]: area’ ....” Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). The technology at issue in Kyllo was a thermal imager that produced images showing heat distributions within the defendant’s home and in comparison with his neighbors’ homes. Id. at 29-30, 121 S.Ct. 2038. Based on their thermal imaging scan of Kyllo’s residence, officers determined that Kyllo was using halide lights to grow marijuana in his house. Id. at 30, 121 S.Ct. 2038. Though the officers obtained additional information about Kyl-lo’s increased electricity usage by subpoenaing his utility company, the Court determined that the officers’ use of the thermal imager constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038; id. . 2010) (non-prece-dential) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, courts agree that individuals do 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in phone and fax numbers dialed (B) holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells (C) holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building (D) holding that where there is no evidence of shared use or common authority an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the files kept on a personally owned computer (E) holding that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in identifying information transmitted for isps and phone providers to provide service
[A]:
holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in phone and fax numbers dialed