In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: the action should pro ceed among the existing parties or be dismissed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b). Defendant neglected to offer any explanation for how and why Mr. Stroud is essential, other than that he was named in the underlying state court case. That is not enough. Mr. Stroud is not a necessary or indispensable party under Rule 19 because this Court can administer complete relief — an order compelling arbitration— among the existing parties and Mr. Stroud himself is not claiming an interest in this arbitration action that will be impaired by his absence. Although failing to dismiss this case may result in piecemeal litigation, that factor alone is not compelling enough to find Mr. Stroud to be an indispensable party. Cf. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). This Court therefore properly limits its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (B) holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived (C) holding that district courts are required to compel arbitration of claims subject to arbitration clause even if the result is piecemeal litigation (D) holding that faa was inapplicable where parties involved in action are not parties to an arbitration agreement under which issues are referable to arbitration (E) holding that in determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists in petition to compel arbitration district court was correct in looking only to citizenship of parties in action before it  parties who signed arbitration agreement  and that nondiverse agents in underlying state case were not indispensable parties as any potential prejudice resulting from piecemeal litigation is overcome by faas strong bias in favor of arbitration

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: sophisticated consumer” might well reach the same conclusion. In sum, particularly at this early stage, defendants cannot establish as a matter of law that Santander is a creditor exempt from the FDCPA. Thus, the motion to dismiss should be denied. TCPA Claims Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under the TCPA based on an exception contained in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2), which excepts calls to a residential line when made pursuant to an “established business relationship.” It is difficult to imagine how that exemption would apply to Letricia Hamlett, who was not a signatory to the loan, but in fairness there is at least one case that supports this odd interpretation of the law. See Santino v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., No. 09-CV-982, 2011 WL 754874, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2011) (<HOLDING>); but see Watson v. NCO Group, Inc., 462 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  2254 applies to administrative proceedings (B) holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action (C) holding exemption applies to nondebtor (D) holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action (E) holding that  1447c applies to counsel

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: 811 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa.Super.Ct.2002). 10 . Because the Court concludes that the Franchisees have stated a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith within the bounds established by Razumic and Witmer, the Court need not consider the parties' arguments about whether the duty of good faith might extend beyond termination to other aspects of the franchise relationship. 11 . It is undisputed that the defendants are ''persons” that may be held liable under RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (defining "person” as "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property”). 12 . Indeed, because the corporate defendants are both "persons” and "enterprises,” it is not clear whether they could be held liable under § 1962(b). See Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1190 (<HOLDING>). The Court of Appeals has held that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to prevail under civil rico plaintiff must prove that defendants participated in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (B) holding that a pattern of racketeering activity required multiple illegal schemes (C) holding that instructions allowing a jury to find an enterprise from evidence of its activity as opposed to its structure properly conveyed the holding in turkette that proof of a pattern of racketeering activity may be sufficient in a particular case to permit a jury to infer the existence of an associationinfact enterprise (D) holding that to state a  1962a claim plaintiff must allege that the defendants received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity and invested it in the acquisition of any interest in or the establishment or operation of a rico enterprise (E) recognizing that it is difficult to understand how a corporation can acquire or maintain an interest in itself through a pattern of racketeering activity and that 1962b may require that the person and enterprise be distinct entities


Output: (E)