In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: It is axiomatic, however, that states act through their officials and agencies. Thus, under Will, those state agencies and other political subdivisions which carry out the state’s business and have immunity from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment constitute “arms of the state.” Pursuant to Will, such entities would not be considered persons under § 1983. Those political subdivisions which are not provided immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, do not rise to the level of “arms of the state” and would, under Will, be considered to be persons for the purposes of § 1983. See Barket, Levy & Fine v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1086-88 (8th Cir.1991) (bi-state agency is a “person” under § 1983); Magula v. Broward Gen. Medical Ctr., 742 F.Supp. 645, 649 (S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Since the Will decision was handed down, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment (B) holding that an ohio school district is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the state and therefore it is not entitled to assert eleventh amendment immunity from suit (C) holding that the anne arundel board of education is an arm of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that the puc is not an arm of the state and rejecting claim of immunity (E) holding that because hospital district is more like a municipality than an arm of the state hospital district did not have eleventh amendment immunity

Answer: holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment


Question: S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975).” Peters v. Narick, 165 W.Va. 622, 628 n. 13, 270 S.E.2d 760, 768 n. 13 (1980). This Court has determined repeatedly that the West Virginia Constitution may be more protective of individual rights than its federal counterpart. See, e.g., State v. Bonham, 173 W.Va. 416, 317 S.E.2d 5 Daley, 174 W.Va. 299, 324 S.E.2d 713 (1984) (state constitution compels striking limitation on soliciting after sunset even if federal constitution does not); Woodruff v. Board of Trustees of Cabell Huntington Hospital, 173 W.Va. 604, 611, 319 S.E.2d 372, 379 (1984) (Article III, § 1 "more stringent in its limitation on waiver [of fundamental rights] than is the federal constitution”); Pushinsky v. West Virginia Board of Law Examiners, 164 W.Va. 736, 266 S.E.2d 444 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 707, 255 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution (B) recognizing that state constitution imposes more stringent limitations on power of state to inquire into lawful associations and speech than those imposed by federal constitution (C) recognizing exception under state constitution (D) holding that appellate court assumes appellant claims no greater protection under state constitution than that provided by federal constitution when state and federal claims not briefed separately (E) holding missouri constitution requires stricter separation of church and state than does federal constitution

Answer: recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution


Question: the same test is used with respect to appellate counsel.”). In other words, Petitioner “must first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable” in failing to raise the issue on appeal, and then “must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unreasonable failure [to raise the issue], he would have prevailed on his appeal.” Smith, 528 U.S. at 285-86, 120 S.Ct. 746. Under the first prong, “it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent” for “fail[ing] to raise a particular claim” because “appellate counsel ... need not (and should not) raise every non-frivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.” Smith, 528 U.S. at 288, 120 S.Ct. 746; see also Jones, 463 U.S. at 754, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (<HOLDING>); Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 95 (“Counsel is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel (B) holding that appellate counsel is not required to raise meritless issues on appeal (C) holding that similar argument did not raise a colorable question of law for purposes of jurisdiction (D) recognizing that appellate counsel is under no duty to raise every colorable claim suggested by a client (E) recognizing that every theory of relief must raise federal issue for claim to arise under federal law

Answer:
holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel