TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: this petition for prohibition. Petitioner is mistaken in an essential respect. Although he characterizes his challenge as involving subject matter jurisdiction, he is mistaken. There can be no dispute that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving dissolution of marriage. See § 26.012(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006) (circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all actions at law not cognizable in the county courts). The fact that petitioner wishes to dispute in the pending dissolution action is whether there was any marriage at all to dissolve. An attack on the validity of an alleged marriage has nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction but is simply an issue to be determined in the dissolution action. See Marden v. Marden, 276 So.2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (<HOLDING>). It is true that a petition for a writ of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding that standing existed (C) holding that in an action brought by alleged wife for permanent alimony suit money attorneys fees and restraining order an issue of fact existed concerning whether a commonlaw marriage existed thus precluding summary judgment (D) holding that material issue of fact existed concerning whether employer orally promised to discharge employee only for cause (E) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife

SOLUTION: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment

PROBLEM: with a total of 8.3 grams of cocaine in them was consistent with both an intent to sell and with personal use. Id. at 631. We noted that the police did not find any money or drug paraphernalia on the defendant and there were “no other facts which would suggest an intent to sell.” Id. The packaging and weight of the drugs in this case is similar to that in Valentin, giving rise to similar conclusions about Alleyne’s intent. The state attempts to distinguish Valentin in two ways. First, there was no money found on Valentin, while Alleyne had $36 in his pocket and another $20 found in the paper bag with the marijuana. However, neither the amount of money found, nor the denominations of it were inconsistent with personal use. See Williams v. State, 569 So.2d 1376, 1377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). Second, while the arresting officer in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell (B) holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine (C) holding that evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of front seat passenger of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in paper bag in foot well of volkswagen on passengers side near gearshift in presence of marijuana smoke (D) holding that evidence consisting of 10 pieces of cocaine marijuana rolling paper 72 and a weapon was not sufficient to prove intent to sell (E) holding that there was sufficient evidence of intent to sell or deliver where the defendant was in possession of one large cocaine rock and eight smaller rocks

SOLUTION: recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell

PROBLEM: that the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause are not money-mandating and claims based upon these provisions are beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. E.g., Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed.Cir.1997); LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed.Cir. 1995); United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed.Cir.1983). The Court notes that the captioned and titled defendants in Mr. Baker’s complaint (“Transworld Systems, and Max Federal Credit Union,” “Doc Due Little Movies,” and “Max Federal Credit Union and Pentago Federal Credit Union”) are not the United States or any agency thereof. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2001); see also Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v. United States and Federal Express Corp., 264 F.3d 1071 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, because the United States or agency 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court (B) holding that a bivens claim cannot be brought against a federal agency (C) holding that a transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit (D) holding that neither mere participation in a federal program nor provision requiring compliance with federal law is sufficient to establish that the state consented to be sued in federal court (E) holding that federal express despite the use of the word federal in its name is not a federal agency and therefore cannot be sued in this court

SOLUTION:
holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court