In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: against the Debtor have been discharged and that MDE’s pursuit of those claims in the State Court Action constitutes a violation of the discharge injunction. Accordingly, the Court orders the Respondents to cease any further pursuit of the Debtor in connection with the alleged claims but denies the Debtor’s -request for an award of damages and attorneys’ fees. A separate order will be entered consistent with this ruling. 1 . Unless otherwise noted, all statutory and rule references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1532, and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 2 . In addition to the pleadings filed in this matter, the Court takes judicial notice of the docket in the Debtor's case. See Cervac v. Littman (In re Littman), 561 B.R. 79, 83 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Unless otherwise noted, future references 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket (B) recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record (C) recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice (D) holding that the appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in related proceedings (E) holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket
[A]: recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record


[Q]: of two dates between Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro in 1988. In its view, the evidence was irrelevant and inflammatory. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion in limine with respect to this evidence. The court believed that the evidence was relevant and ought to be before the jury because it had the task of evaluating the overall relationship of Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro. Evidence that is relevant to the background of the case is admissible for that purpose. At the very least, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court not to exclude this evidence in a motion in limine; the evidence was at least potentially relevant for the purpose the judge identified. See Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). LCFS did not object during the trial when Ms. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time (B) holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment (C) holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background (D) holding that section 102 of the civil rights act of 1991 does not apply to preenactment conduct (E) holding that the  1981 amendments contained in  101 of the civil rights act of 1991 do not apply retroactively
[A]: holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time


[Q]: citizens if the wrong decision is made”). In sum, we are aware of no basis for expanding district court jurisdiction beyond the limits se F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1970) (“[W]hen administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief.”). We are nonetheless persuaded by the contrary view that the word “denial” connotes more than a mere refusal to act. See Saccacio, 211 F.3d at 104 (“It may be that [the plaintiff] has not been afforded the ultimate relief for which he applied, but it is simply not the case that his application for relief has been denied by the agency.”); Owen, 122 F.3d at 1354 (<HOLDING>); Burtch, 120 F.3d at 1090 (“In the context of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claimants failure to lose weight does not constitute a refusal to follow the treatment (B) holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547 (C) holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 (D) holding that atfs refusal to act on application did not constitute denial (E) holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim
[A]:
holding that a claimants failure to lose weight does not constitute a refusal to follow the treatment