In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: to preserve evidence exists between a third party and another in the absence of a special relationship, such as one created by contract or statute. Id. Under that analysis, this court will need to consider the primary purpose of the third-party here, Giant Eagle. (2) “Duty” of a third-party employer to its employee Pennsylvania courts have not directly considered whether the existence of an employer/employee relationship creates a duty on the part of a third-party employer to preserve evidence of a work-related accident for a potential products liability suit by an employee. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is no such duty. See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F.Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D.Ark.1989); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 179 Mich.App. 136, 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither common law nor workers disability compensation act imposed affirmative duty on employer to preserve evidence which might be used in employees thirdparty liability action (B) holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme (C) holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability (D) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (E) holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties

A: (A)
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Q: the defendant’s applicable guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).” Id., app. note 1(A). In November 2007, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 706, which reduced the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses under § 2Dl.l(c) by two levels. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). The Commission later made the amendment retroactively applicable. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. May 1, 2008). As indicated, Jefferson sought to have his sentence reduced as result of those amendments. However, they do not apply here because Jefferson was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence required by statute. See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because the District Court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based (B) holding that a defendant whose original sentence was based upon the careeroffender guideline and not  2d11 could not receive a sentence reduction based on amendment 706 because it did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range (C) holding that while amendment 706 was applicable to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (D) holding that amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range where the defendants received statutory mandatory minimum sentences and thus the defendants were not eligible for relief under  3582 (E) holding that while amendment 706 was applica ble to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline

A: (D)
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Q: vehicle cases under the [Policitical Subdivisions Tort Claim] Act has been the involvement of the motor vehicles as motor vehicles in accidents. In no cited case has a waiver to immunity been found where the plaintiff has alleged the sole involvement of the governmental motor vehicle lay in carrying a passenger to an area for discharge that the governmental agency knew or should have known was unsafe. The Complaint alleges the bus driver did nothing wrong other than allowing [appellant] to leave the bus in a certain place. The Comp ne whether Paula Jo Lehman continued to be an “occupant” of the bus after she had alighted from the bus and was crossing the street behind the bus to get to her school. See Walker v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 323 Pa.Super. 427, 470 A.2d 993 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Assuming, without deciding, that she was no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding port authority required to provide basic loss benefits under section 204a4 of nofault act regardless of whether passenger continued to be occupant as bus was involved in an accident when passenger struck by passing vehicle after alighting from bus (B) holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle (C) holding that ttcas motorvehicle waiver did not apply to claim whose gravamen was that bus drivers failure to supervise the public  by for example failing to supervise tortfeasor passenger and failing to return to pick up victim passenger  allowed tortfeasor who had threatened victim on bus to assault victim after both had exited (D) holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle (E) holding that fourth amendment rights of a passenger of a legally stopped vehicle were not violated by police officers instruction that he remain inside the vehicle during traffic stop after passenger repeatedly tried to exit

A:
(A)
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