In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions “could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited.” Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) (“We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse’s liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void.”). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years
Example Output: holding that such provisions are valid

Example Input: litigation. The district court can correct any abuses at the fees for fees stage under the “reasonableness” standard. The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment (B) holding that time entries such as preparation for hearing or preparation for school visit were too vague and reducing overall fee award by twentyfive percent (C) holding that fee application must be sufficiently detailed to allow court to make an independent evaluation as to what fees are actual and necessary and finding that failure to keep contemporaneous records does not automatically result in denial of the fees but the lack thereof justifies a reduction of the fee to the level proven (D) holding that attorneys fees for the preparation of the fee application are compensable (E) holding that the independent counsel reauthorization act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application
Example Output: holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment

Example Input: in the District Court for the Northern District of Iowa dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part and reverse in part. In his pro se complaint, Berge named Estherville Law Enforcement Center (ELEC) Investigator Greg VanLangen, ELEC Sergeant Brett Shatto, ELEC Chief Eric Milburn, and Emmet County Sheriff Larry Lamack. He alleged that VanLangen arrested him based on evidence “that was false and unconstitutionally acquired,” that the evidence was derived from “a non-testimonial identification procedure,” and that VanLangen filed a sworn affidavit which contained false information received from a confidential informant, which led to Berge’s arrest, all in violation of Iowa state laws and the F -12 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 494-95 (8th Cir. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that false arrest supports a claim against state police under  1983 because it violates the fourth amendment (B) holding allegation that false affidavit was basis for arrest warrant is sufficient to state  1983 fourth amendment claim against affiant officer (C) holding that search warrant which was lacking sufficient description of premises and did not have affidavit attached was not fatally defective when read together with affidavit and when one of officers executing warrant was affiant (D) holding that it was clearly established for  1983 purposes that an arrest founded upon a recalled warrant violates the fourth amendment (E) recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim
Example Output:
holding that false arrest supports a claim against state police under  1983 because it violates the fourth amendment