instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
in a 3-2 decision does not settle the intent issue, because Honkanen did not consider the difference between intent to injure or inflict pain and intent to correct. Additionally, Honkanen’s rationale may be outdated in light of the 2001 amendments to NRS 48.061, which expand the use of bad-act evidence in domestic violence cases, 2001 Nev. Stat., ch. 360, § 1, at 169; see NRS 33.018(1)(a) (defining “domestic violence” to include battery on an accused’s minor child), and Bigpond, which recognizes that character evidence can be admissible so long as it has a credible, non- propensity purpose, such as explaining the relationship dynamics between a domestic-violence victim and the accused. 128 Nev. at 111, 270 P.3d at 1246; see also Harris v. State, 195 P.3d 161, 182 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Cherry, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper (B) holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence (C) recognizing that the holding in harvey v state 604 p2d 586 590 alaska 1979 a case similar to honkanen had been abrogated by the amendment of alaskas rule 404b to allow admission of prior incidents of domestic violence as an exception to the general rule against admitting such evidence (D) recognizing general rule (E) recognizing this as the general rule
answer:
holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper


question:
pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for “anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,” because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for “wil-fully taking away her husband” and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability). But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute (B) holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses (C) recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that police officers were immune from liability for damages resulting from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
answer:
holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute


question:
has made good faith efforts to repay the loan; (3) whether the Debtor filed for bankruptcy for the sole reason of discharging student loan debt; (4) whether additional facts and circumstances such as a medical condition, employability and the like weigh in favor of a hardship discharge. Anelli, 262 B.R. at 8. This Court added: In considering these and other factors, the Court acknowledges that the First Circuit has suggested, though in dictum, that the “hardship alleged ... must be undue and attributable to truly exceptional circumstances, such as illness or the existence of an unusually large number of dependents.” TI Federal Credit Union v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921, 927 (1st Cir.1995); see also Lohman v. Connecticut Student Loan Found. (In re Lohman), 79 B.R. 576, 581 (Bankr.D.Vt.1987) (<HOLDING>). At the same time, the Court must balance the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the absence of exceptional circumstances deference should be given to trial court (B) holding that where the board of immigration is permitted to reopen proceedings in exceptional circumstances its decision not to reopen a case is unreviewable because there are no statutory regulatory or caselaw definitions of exceptional circumstances  and  thus no manageable standard to apply on review (C) recognizing that this special circumstances exception is very narrowly limited  and that only on rare occasions does a case present such circumstances (D) holding that such a threat would not supply exceptional circumstances (E) holding hardship is discovered in the rare case based on exceptional circumstances
answer:

holding in the absence of exceptional circumstances deference should be given to trial court