In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: in that the timely filing of such claims is both mandatory and jurisdictional. That limitation derives from the proposition of sovereign immunity. It is well established that a claim against the United States is barred absent waiver of sovereign immunity, “ ‘and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’ ” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)). A waiver of immunity cannot be implied; it must be “unequivocally expressed in the statutory text.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The United States has expressly consented to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal (B) holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity (C) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states (D) holding that federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against the united states or one of its agencies absent a clear waiver of sovereign immunity (E) holding that a lack of a waiver of sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction

A: (D)
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Q: of the Licenses; revocation is made explicit in a filing before the bankruptcy court (which filing is not itself an order) and is implicit in the Public Notice announcing the re-auction of the Licenses previously held by NextWave. Nevertheless, as this Court's prior opinion makes clear, we think that the FCC action in question is unmistakably regulatory in nature. But even if the FCC’s acts do not amount to "decisions” or "orders” of the Commission, subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, that would not expose the FCC's acts to review in the bankruptcy court. A regulatory action short of a decision or order is an exercise of regulatory discretion that is not subject to review. See Bethesda-Chevy Chase Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC, 385 F.2d 967, 968 (D.C.Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Telecommunications Research & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding allegation made in enforcement suit does not impose the kind of legal obligation with which the finality doctrine is concerned (B) holding that obligation to pay pension benefits gave rise to a constructive trust relationship and obligation was not discharged in bankruptcy (C) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (D) holding that a regulatory action that did not impose an obligation deny a right or fix a legal relationship was not reviewable (E) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right

A: (D)
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Q: 7261. The Court reviews the Secretary’s interpretation of law de novo. See Hatch, supra. After reviewing the Secretary’s analysis of the rating schedule with regard to tinnitus, the Court concludes that he failed to take account of a basic canon of construction, specifically, to look to the plain text of the regulation. “The basic principles that apply to construing statutes apply equally to construing regulations. ‘The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language.’ ” Otero-Castro, supra (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993)) (internal citations omitted). Here, the Secretary’s interpre tation cannot stand because it conflicts with the plain meaning of the regulation. See DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet.App 202, 207 (1995) (<HOLDING>) (citing Combee v. Principi, 4 Vet.App 78, 91 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bias interpretation of immigration law is entitled to deference except where the interpretation is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute (B) holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (C) holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation (D) holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation (E) holding that interpretation of regulation by va that conflicted with plain meaning of regulation not entitled to deference

A:
(E)
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