TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: detention of the van, its driver, and its passenger exceeded the valid reason for the initial stop and violated the Fourth Amendment. The subsequent search of the vehicle was an unconstitutional search, and the drugs and drug paraphernaha discovered were fruit of the poisonous tree. The trial court’s denial of appellants’ motions to suppress should have been granted. In light of this holding, we need not address the third point, that omissions of facts in Ramsey’s affidavit for search warrant undermined the drug dog’s reliability and amounted to a Franks violation; or the fourth point, that the search warrant was objectively unreasonable and that there was no basis for a nighttime search. Reversed and remanded. Hart, Robbins, and Neal, JJ. te, 84 Md. App. 243, 578 A.2d 816 (1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, after Ramsey determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that coming from the wrong neighborhood does not give rise to reasonable suspicion (B) holding innocent facts when considered together can give rise to reasonable suspicion (C) holding that the fact that defendant granted consent to police to search some items and then refused to give consent to additional searches cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion (D) holding the drivers refusal to consent to search of automobile did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that vehicle contained narcotics (E) holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: that on her return a company manager told Watson in a four-hour meeting in which she cried constantly that she was a poor and incompetent supervisor; that a manager transferred supervisory duties away from her and told her to go home; and that a personnel manager told her that she was considered a bitch and that she could either resign or be demoted to a position in which she would be supervised by her subordinate trainees. We believe that these facts, though covering a shorter period than that in Nolan, could constitute the necessary aggravating factors such that a trier of fact could (but not necessarily would) conclude that a reasonable person would find the conditions so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify resigning. See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration (B) holding in a fair labor standards act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion harassed over the next two weeks and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job (C) holding right to liquidated damages under fair labor standards act nonwaivable (D) holding that discriminatory pay reduction under fair labor standards act does not constitute continuing violation (E) holding that the otca limitations period applied to a claim alleging a breach of the fair labor standards act by the state

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: v. Mohler, 694 N.E.2d 1129 (Ind.1998), we conclude that the new rule of law announced in Bryant v. State, 660 N.E.2d 290 (Ind.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 293, 136 L.Ed.2d 213 (1996), is not retroactive under Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487 (Ind.1990), and so does not entitle Gary Elvers to post-conviction relief. On July 24, 1992, the Indiana Department of Revenue assessed Gary Elvers (“Elvers”) a Controlled Substance Excise Tax (“CSET”) for possessing marijuana. The State charged Elvers with possession of marijuana, a class A misdemeanor, and failure to pay the CSET on July 28, 1992. Elvers pled guilty to the charge of possession on May 24, 1993. On July 3, 1996, Elvers filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on this Court’s decision in Bryant, 660 N.E.2d 290 (<HOLDING>), which the post-conviction court denied. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because cset is punishment the double jeopardy clause bars drug prosecution after cset has been assessed (B) holding that if double jeopardy clause is not violated because legislature intended double punishment section 7019 is not applicable and merger is not required (C) holding that the jeopardy clause bars retrial when the prosecution failed to supply sufficient evidence to merit conviction (D) holding that unlike under the federal constitution a civil forfeiture is punishment under the new mexico double jeopardy clause (E) holding that civil forfeitures are neither punishment nor criminal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause

SOLUTION:
(A)