In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: See Lorber 675 F.2d at 1067. The court noted that the classification of the surcharge as a non-tax fee was “a close question,” but concluded that because the surcharge was triggered by “voluntary” choice, the surcharge was possessed more of the character of a service fee than that of a tax. See id. The Lorber court also held that extending priority status to the surcharge was contrary to the trend of then-recent amendments to § 64 of the old Bankruptcy Act, which tended toward the erosion of the preferred status of taxes. See id., 675 F.2d at 1067-68. The court explained that, following the grant by Congress of priority status to claims for taxes, the federal government and its state and local counterparts began to increase the types and levels of taxation. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. (<HOLDING>). Even courts in the Ninth Circuit, purporting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber (B) holding that ohios reimbursement claims met the lorber criteria but were not excise taxes because they were not universally applicable to similarly situated entities and in addition disadvantaged private creditors with like claims (C) holding west virginias reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber suburban ii and the chateaugay district court decision (D) holding reimbursement claims were excise taxes under the lorber test without addressing the bankruptcy codes central policy of equal distribution (E) holding that michigan reimbursement claims were excise taxes under both lorber and suburban ii

Answer: (E)


Question: as here, the recalcitrant witness is at liberty pending appeal. In so holding, we join all of the circuits which have squarely addressed the issue. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 906 F.2d 78, 82-83 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom. Backiel v. United States, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990); In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 189 (D.C.Cir.1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 785 F.2d 629, 631 n. 4 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Johnson, 736 F.2d 358, 361-62 n. 5 (6th Cir.1984); In re Witness Before Special October 1981 Grand Jury, 722 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir.1983); In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir.1982); Brown v. United States, 465 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.1972). But see In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928, 96 S.Ct. 276, 46 L.Ed.2d 256 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The foregoing cases have noted that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the deadmans statute should not be extended by judicial construction to cases not clearly within its terms (B) recognizing that denying outofeell exercise for extended periods may constitute cruel and unusual punishment (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration (E) holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to guantanamo

Answer: (D)


Question: vague standard. See, e.g., id. (describing the "reasonable belief” standard as one that "appears to be roughly comparable to the reasonable ‘ar-ticulable suspicion’ standard applied by the Supreme Court” in “stop and frisk” cases, and directing that "doubtful cases [should] be resolved in the defendant’s favor_”) (emphasis added). 12 . See, e.g., Test, supra, 420 U.S. at 30, 95 S.Ct. 749 (recognizing that without discovery, "a party almost invariably would be unable to determine whether he has a potentially meritorious jury challenge."); United States v. Royal, 100 F.3d 1019, 1025 (1st Cir.1996) (‘‘[A] litigant need only allege that he is preparing a motion to challenge the jury selection process.”). 13 . See, e.g., United States v. Davenport, 824 F.2d 1511, 1514-15 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district court could not declare jury advisory in action triable of right by a jury and even if no right to jury trial existed in case it would be abuse of discretion to declare jury advisory after both sides rested but before jury was instructed (B) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial (C) holding death qualification of jury prior to guilt phase of bifurcated capital trial did not violate defendants sixth amendment right to impartial jury representative of fair crosssection of the community (D) holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury (E) holding that defendant had unqualified right to the jury list but not the jury qualification questionnaires without some demonstration of necessity

Answer:
(E)