In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: the Department must make in order to obtain the order it seeks in this action, as well as certain other issues that are likely to arise on remand. We conclude the Department's petition adequately sets forth the necessary elements it must prove in order to involuntarily treat Saenz: (1) that he has refused to consume food and fluids sufficient to maintain his health for an extended period; (2) that, as a result, he has been diagnosed by a physician as suffering from moderate to severe malnutrition, dehydration or other deleterious condition; and (3) that, pursuant to reliable medical opinion, Saenz is in imminent danger of suffering serious harm or death unless he is given medical treatment, including, if necessary, forced hydration and/or forced feeding. Cf. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. We next consider the Department's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest (B) holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate (C) holding that a detention officers alleged negligent conduct of failing to medically screen an inmate who later committed suicide in a holding cell  in violation of the police departments policies  was not the proximate cause of the inmates death when there was no evidence that the inmate would have been unable to kill himself if he had been medically screened and any claim that the inmate would have presented as suicidal in such screening was purely speculative (D) holding that the due process clause permits the state to involuntarily treat a prison inmate who is seriously mentally ill if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest (E) holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate  with antipsychotic drugs against his will under certain circumstances while not limiting treatment to those circumstances
[EX A]: holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest

[EX Q]: in the record of any possible medical treatment that Monroe County or the individual defendants could have provided to save the life of the Decedent. Phillips argues in her brief that it is not necessary for her to prove chemotherapy would have saved the Decedent’s life. First, she refers to the fright and anxiety both she and the Decedent suffered because of the delay in chemotherapy. In this regard, Phillips confuses the causation issue. In a survival action, damages for the Decedent’s physical suffering and mental anxiety as a result of the alleged deprivation of medical care would have been appropriate. In a wrongful death context, however, no damages are available until the plaintiff has cleared the causation hurdle. See Wilks v. Am. Tobacco Co., 680 So.2d 839, 842 (Miss.1996) (<HOLDING>). Second, Phillips suggests that she need only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (B) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (C) holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother (D) holding that a failure to include a beneficiary in a wrongful death action is a defect because the wrongful death act restricts plaintiffs to a single action (E) holding that mississippis wrongful death statute creates an independent cause of action
[EX A]: recognizing cause of action for wrongful death

[EX Q]: (stating in dicta that “the granting of credit for pretrial confinement is not necessarily limited to the situations discussed in Anglin'’). 2 See generally NRS 176.055(1) (“whenever a sentence of imprisonment ... is imposed, the court may order that credit be allowed against the duration of the sentence ... for the amount of time which the defendant has actually spent in confinement before conviction”). 3 See NRS 34.724(2)(c); NRS 176.555. 4 See Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 877 P.2d 1058 (1994) (claims appropriate for direct appeal, including a challenge to the sentence imposed, must be pursued on direct appeal or will be considered waived), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999); see also Parrish v. State, 116 Nev. 982, 12 P.3d 953 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 5 111 Nev. 1172, 1176, 901 P.2d 639, 642 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court (B) holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion (C) holding the district attorney is vested with the sole discretion as to what crimes will be charged and that discretion will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion (D) holding that a sentencing determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the district court (E) holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion
[EX A]:
holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court