In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: substantial rights. Mares, 402 F.3d at 520. The district court made no comments suggesting it would have imposed a lesser sentence in the absence of mandatory guidelines. See United States v. Bringier, 405 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir.2005) (stating the issue as “whether [the defendant] has demonstrated that the sentencing judge would have reached a different result had it sentenced [the defendant] under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 264, 163 L.Ed.2d 238 (2005) (No. 05-5535). Therefore, Tovar fails to demonstrate plain error. Tovar contends for the first time on appeal that the statute under which he was convicted, 21 U.S.C. § 841, is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (<HOLDING>). As he concedes, however, this issue is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that ojther than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that any fact other than a prior conviction may not be used to enhance a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that other than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that other than fact of prior conviction any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: if the terms of the health care plan specifically exclude from coverage the cost of an appendectomy, then any injuries caused by the refusal to cover the appendectomy are properly attributed to the terms of the plan itself, not the managed care entity that applied those terms. 4 Respondents also argue that ERISA § 502(a) completely pre-empts a state cause of action only if the cause of action would be pre-empted under ERISA § 514(a); respondents then argue that their causes of action do not fall under the terms of § 514(a). But a state cause of action that provides an alternative remedy to those provided by the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism conflicts with Congress’ clear intent to make the ERISA mechanism exclusive. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S.133, 142 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 5 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan (B) recognizing cause of action (C) holding that ejven if there were no express preemption under erisa  514a of the cause of action in that case it would be preempted because it conflicted directly with an erisa cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa (E) recognizing the cause of action

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: but it is "as provided in Section 30 of the Automated External Defibrillator Act.” The current version of the Good Samaritan Act was not in force at the time of Mr. Tobin's death, and therefore it cannot govern the issue retroactively. 45 . Plaintiffs seem to concede that the off-duty flight attendants are entitled to immunity under the Samaritan Act, but claim that on-duty flight attendants are not, because they worked "for compensation.” 46 . 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 49/10 (1998). 47 . In re Heanue, 355 Ill.App.3d 645, 291 Ill. Dec. 537, 823 N.E.2d 1123 (2005); see Johnson v. Matviuw, 176 Ill.App.3d 907, 126 Ill. Dec. 343, 531 N.E.2d 970 (1989). 48 . In re Heanue, 291 Ill.Dec. 537, 823 N.E.2d at 1129. See Rodas v. SwedishAmerican Health System Corp., 594 F.Supp.2d 1033 (N.D.Ill.2009) (<HOLDING>). But see Henslee v. Provena Hospitals, 373 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under illinois law doctors were immune from civil damages under the samaritan act because they did not derive economic benefit directly from the service performed (B) holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that payments from a tortfeasors insurer are not from a collateral source because they stem directly from the tortfeasor (D) holding that police officers were immune from liability for damages resulting from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) holding that port authority is immune from punitive damages


Output: (A)