TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: ... clearly does not rise to the level of constitutional error when the failure was correct as a matter of state law.” 593 F.2d at 267. He noted also that “the highest court of Kentucky expressly held that the state trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested lesser included offense instruction.” I do not find any error in this conclusion. Shortly after this court decided Pilón, however, the Supreme Court invalidated on due process grounds an Alabama law which forbade the jury to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included offense in a capital case when the evidence would have supported such a verdict. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). See also Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2052, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Beck was concerned with imposition of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction (B) holding that beck requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction as a matter of due process in a capital case (C) holding that due process does not require a lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter where not requested (D) holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given (E) holding that a lesser included offense instruction might be constitutionally required in capital cases because of their unique nature

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: the genus of goods or services for which it seeks protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2), (b)(2); 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.32(a)(6), 2.71(a); TMEP § 1402.01; see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2014) (“Parties that choose to recite services in their trademark application that exceed their actual services will be held to the broader scope of the application.”); Octocom Sys., 918 F.2d at 942 (“[R]egistrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application.... ”). The PTO will generally accept any identification of goods or services so long as it is “specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise.” TMEP § 1402.01; see also In re Omega SA 494 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity (B) holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action (C) holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant (D) holding that it is within the discretion of the pto to require that ones goods be identified with particularity in a trademark application (E) holding that a rule 10b5 claim must be stated with particularity

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: concluding “the clarity of the exclusions in question” supported the conclusion “a reasonable person could not have understood coverage would exist”). Goodwin does not identify in his affidavit any way in which he misunderstood the policy exclusion. He merely quotes the insuring clause from the policy and then states that he “expect[ed] that this language means just what it says.” But insurance policy provisions are not interpreted in isolation. See Thomas, 749 N.W.2d at 682; Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 494 N.W.2d 690, 692 (Iowa 1993), called into doubt on other grounds by Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d at 113 n. 1. The insuring clause must be read in conjunction with the policy exclusions. Cf. Harlan v. Valley Ins. Co., 128 Or.App. 128, 875 P.2d 471, 472-73 (1994) (<HOLDING>). If the policy is not considered as a whole, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave (B) holding in determining whether driver was insured under terms of policy exclusion of person using vehicle without a reasonable belief person was entitled to do so must be considered (C) holding that to be convicted under dwi statute a person must be driving or in actual physical control of the vehicle but motion of the vehicle is not necessary (D) holding that a lookout is not using a vehicle entitled to liability coverage under an insurance policy (E) holding that unlicensed driver who was driving vehicle with permission of owners permittee could reasonably believe that permittee had authority to permit him to drive vehicle and thus driv er was entitled to liability coverage notwithstanding auto policy exclusion for any person using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that person is entitled to do so driver could have reasonable belief that he was entitled to use vehicle even though he was unlicensed where he was doing so at specific request of permittee and actual owner never instructed driver not to drive vehicle nor instructed permittee not to allow others to drive vehicle

SOLUTION:
(B)