instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
immunity exists. In Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984), the fifth circuit held that when a probation officer erroneously prepared a motion for revocation of appellant’s probation, she was only entitled to qualified immunity. The court distinguished its earlier case of Spaulding v. Nielsen, supra: We find Spaulding not controlling in the case at hand. Whereas in Spaulding the probation officer was acting at the direction of the court during the presen-tence report process, in the immediate case the probation officer acted at her own initiative and at a different phase of the criminal process less intimately associated with the judiciary. Galvan, at 215. See also Griffin v. Leonard, 821 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We note also third circuit decisions, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (B) holding under facts presented that probation officer was entitled to at least qualified immunity (C) holding officials are entitled to qualified immunity for reasonable mistakes of law (D) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted (E) holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity
answer:
(B)


question:
I. Jurisdiction The Court of Federal Claims has “jurisdiction to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting to ... a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement,” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2012). A party is an “interested party” with standing to bring suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) if the party “is an ’ actual or prospective bidder whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract.” Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 704 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2013). A bidder has a direct economic interest if it suffered a competitive injury or prejudice. Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). In a post-award bid protest, the protestor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing (B) recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim (C) holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice (D) holding that actual prejudice is not a necessary element of an insurers untimely notice defense (E) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim
answer:
(A)


question:
there is no precise line of demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of public policies from matters purely personal, a survey of cases in other States involving retaliatory discharges shows that a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed. Dicomes v. State, 113 Wash.2d 612, 782 P.2d 1002, 1006 (1989) (en banc) (citation omitted). Little argued that Windermere discharged her because she made a complaint about sexual harassment. The Washington Supreme Court held recently that Revised Code of Washington sections 49.12.200 and 49.60.010 embody a clearly articulated public policy condemning sex discrimination in employment. See Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash.2d 58, 69, 993 P.2d 901, 907 (2000) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Relatedly, discharging an employee because of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employer did not regard the employee as disabled because it called the employee back from disability leave to work on a special project (B) holding that the supervisors failure to give employee new assignments once she announced that she was pregnant and that her maternity leave would occur during the two months prior to the employers busiest time did not constitute evidence of discrimination (C) holding that an employer was justified in demoting plaintiff after she returned from maternity leave because plaintiff could not rebut the employers evidence that she was having performance problems before she went on leave and that additional performance problems were discovered while she was on leave (D) holding that discharging an employee because she was on maternity leave would violate that poli cy (E) holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave
answer:

(D)