In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: evaluate each piece of evidence according to its independent worth. B. The Copyright Act of 1909 The plaintiff renewed its copyright in The URANTIA Book in 1983, by which time the Copyright Act of 1976 had become effective. However, the renewal section under which the book falls, Section 304, is identical to that of Section 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909. Furthermore, as the plaintiff correctly states, “[t]he passage of the [1976 Act] did not alter the definition of a Svork for hire’ for the purpose of renewing a copyright originally registered under the [1909 Act].... Thus, whether The URANTIA Book is a ‘eommis-sioned work’ must be decided under the Copyright Act of 1909.” (Pl.’s Br. at 5 n. 4.) See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 217, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 1758, 109 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 606 n. 2 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court (B) holding renewal rights in pre1978 works require court to look to the language of and case law interpreting  24 (C) recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result (D) holding that if statutory language is plain and unambiguous this court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent (E) holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language
[EX A]: holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court

[EX Q]: 669 (1971). Although Plaintiff requests resolution of seemingly unsettled State law questions, the issues at bar fall squarely within the Burford parameters: Plaintiff has presented difficult issues of state law, gaming is arguably an area of important state policy in Texas, and the Texas Lottery Commission (TLC) provides the unified State enforcement mechanism for some aspects of gaming law in Texas. Moreover, both the TLC and Office of the Attorney General provide an administrative procedure for organizations and individuals to request advisory opinions regarding the legality of proposed gaming actions. Certification to the Texas Supreme Court to answer the state law question at issue here would be ideal. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974)(<HOLDING>). However, under the Texas Constitution, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court (B) holding that certification of a remand order divests federal court jurisdiction (C) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the court (D) holding that it was proper in determining certification to consider whether certification would foster the settlement of the case with advantage to the parties and with great savings in judicial time and services (E) holding that certification to the state supreme court rests in the sound discretion of the federal court and that certification in the long run saves time energy and resources as well as helps to build a cooperative judicial federalism
[EX A]: holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court

[EX Q]: ponds started migrating through the soil to underlying groundwater almost immediately after beginning pond operation in 1960.” Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded as a matter of law that property damage occurred upon initial exposure in 1960, and should have concluded as a matter of law that property damage occurred in each policy period from 1961-70. [Id. at 995-96 (citations omittedXemphasis added).] The court rejected the insurers’ argument that the insured had failed to demonstrate “actual injury” during the relevant policy periods and held that “[u]nder the continuous trigger theory, proof of actual injury in the sense of manifestation of injury is not required.” Ibid. See also Armotek Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 952 F.2d 756, 763 (3d Cir.1991)(<HOLDING>). In Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. California 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  exposure and manifestation occurred at the time of the damage causing oil spill (B) holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did (C) holding that canadian citizens have standing to intervene in nepa based suit against agency on the basis of citizenss claims that possible oil spill from transalaskan oil pipeline might cause damage to canada (D) holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations (E) holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed
[EX A]:
holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did