instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
we held that, The penetration offense alleged in the first indictment clearly required a separate and distinct act (involving appellee’s sexual organ with the child’s female sexual organ) from the act alleged in the second indictment (which involved appel-lee’s mouth with the child’s sexual organ). In this case the second indictment alleged that appellee caused the child’s sexual organ to contact his mouth ency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct. Appellant concedes to this view, the plain language of the statute supports it, and so does our caselaw. See Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630 (stating that a grammatical analysis suggests that the unit of prosecution for indecency with a child by exposure is the exposure and, ultimately, adopting that viewpoint); Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. State, 550 S.W.2d 89, 91 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive (B) holding that a similar statute created separate offenses (C) holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation (D) holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive (E) holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity
answer:
(A)


question:
statute and provides for a specific penalty of a fine of $1250. Id. § 321 J.2(2)(a)(2); see State v. Daniel, 574 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Iowa 1998) (“[T]he district court may not use the penalty provisions provided in section 903.1(1) if a specific penalty is provided in another statute.”). Because section 903.1 is only applicable “if a specific penalty is not provided fo'd’ and section 321J.2 does provide for a specific penalty, section 903.1 is not applicable as to the fine portion of the sentence. Iowa Code § 903.1(1) (emphasis added). Furthermore, as we noted above, we read general and specific statutes together, but if an irreconcilable conflict exists between the general and specific statutes, then the specific statute prevails. Lutgen, 606 N.W.2d at 314; see Lee, 561 N.W.2d at 354-55 (<HOLDING>); Sandifer, 570 N.W.2d at 257 (same). In this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1001 controls over the limitations provision of the wrongful death statute (B) holding a specific sentencing statute controls over the general sentencing provisions of section 9031 (C) recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one (D) holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions (E) holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls
answer:
(B)


question:
are plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.” Malbrough, 275 Va. at 168, 655 S.E.2d at 3. Moreover, “we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). A law enforcement officer has a legitimate constitutional basis for seizing a person if the officer has either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe, “based on objective facts, that the [person] officers had probable cause to arrest the appellant for the earlier offense of reckless driving, thereby also meeting the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion to detain the appellant to investigate that same offense. See United States v. Lopez, 911 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1184 (Ind. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion (B) holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop (C) holding that although officers observation and stop of the defendants vehicle occurred outside of the officers geographical jurisdiction the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspects vehicle (D) holding that probable cause to stop a vehicle was supported by the fact that the defendant had previously been arrested for illegally transporting liquor (E) holding that circumstances created reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop
answer:

(B)