In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Supreme Court rejected Cook’s claim of error on direct appeal, finding that the prosecutor’s comments were not directed at Cook’s decision not to testify, and that the comment about the videotape was invited by Cook’s cross-examination and argument. Cook, 821 P.2d at 741-43. The district court agreed that the comments were either comments on the state of the evidence or invited by Cook’s arguments and cross-examination. In addition, the district court found that, if there was error, it was harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). Comment on the refusal to testify at trial violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (<HOLDING>). Also, a prosecutor’s comment on a defendant’s 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the fifth amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on a defendants failure to testify (B) holding that it is improper for prosecutor to comment on accuseds postarrest silence (C) holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds silence during police custodial interrogation (D) holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds testimonial silence (E) holding that the fifth amendment  forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accuseds silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt

Ex Output:
recognizing that the fifth amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on a defendants failure to testify


Ex Input:
Discipl. LEXIS 78, *9 (attorney disbursed all settlement proceeds to client less amount he retained for himself, after having been placed on notice that prior attorney claimed an in terest in any settlement funds in violation of Colo, RPC 1.15(b)). III. ANALYSIS OF SANCTION In both the Dunn and McCarthy matters, Rishel engaged in knowing conversion by obtaining funds from third parties for a stated purpose, failing to utilize the funds for that purpose, retaining the funds for an extended period of time after the third parties had withdrawn authorization, and failing to refund the amounts paid to the third parties despite their demand that he do so. The presumptive sanction for knowing conversion of the property of another is disbarment. People v. Dice, 947 P.2d 339, 340 (Colo.1997)(<HOLDING>); Motsenbocker; 926 P.2d at 577 (attorney 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause (B) holding that a lawyers knowing misappropriation of funds whether belonging to a client or third party warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation (C) holding that an attorney should not be disbarred for misappropriation of client funds where there were no aggravating factors the attorneys clients did not suffer actual harm and the attorney established several mitigating factors (D) holding that permanent disbarment was appropriate for failure to remit 2000 in settlement funds to client and failing to answer the charges (E) recognizing that a lawyer hired by a third person to represent a client should exercise judgment on behalf of the client independent from the interests of the third person

Ex Output:
holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause


Ex Input:
in keeping with the literal direction of the writ and order — not the mere fact of removal— that gives rise to Pahnke’s cause of action. We must therefore decide whether Pahnke’s immediate removal consistent with the express declaration of the writ and order is the kind of discretionary act that warrants the protection of official immunity. See Anderson, 678 N.W.2d at 656. A nondiscretionary, ministerial duty is one that is “absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Id. at 659 (quotation omitted). Minnesota appellate courts have recently applied the distinction between discretionary and ministerial duties to various law-enforcement actions. See, e.g., Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 492 (Minn.2006) (<HOLDING>); Thompson, 707 N.W.2d at 675 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers have no affirmative duty to search out favorable evidence for the defendant (B) holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report (C) holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search (D) holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records (E) holding that policy requiring police officers to discontinue vehicular pursuit if they could establish offenders identity imposed a ministerial duty and that officers did not have discretion to ignore the policy

Ex Output:

holding that police officers have no affirmative duty to search out favorable evidence for the defendant