In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: is correct. We will also assume that the court’s erro umed error prejudiced him is that other evidence supports the finding that he was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy. In the district court, Vasquez did not object to the PSR’s statement that he “recruited Wornick and Sella” into the conspiracy. Although the district court did not explicitly find that Vasquez recruited two of his co-conspirators, “[i]t is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a[PSR] admits those facts for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.2006). And we have held many times that a defendant’s recruitment of co-conspirators supports a § 3B1.1 enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 n. 2 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1304 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer leader manager or supervisor under  3bllc in part because the defendant actively recruited two individuals to transport drugs (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was a manager or supervisor under  3bllb in part because he recruited accomplices (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer or leader under  3blla in part because he recruited coconspirators
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: would, in general, slow down the dispute resolution process.” Id. at 946, 115 S.Ct. 1920. Moreover, it was rejected as “legally erroneous,” for the “basic objective in this area is not to resolve disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties’ wishes, but to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, are enforced according to their terms and according to the intentions of the parties.” Id. at 946, 115 S.Ct. 1920. C. In This Case, The Question Of Arbitrability Is For The Court The second question is whether the power to determine arbitrability resides with the court or the AAA Panel. The answer turns upon what the parties agreed to about that question in the Merger Agreement. First Option 543, 546-547, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964)(<HOLDING>). Similarly, a disagreement about whether an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should decide whether an arbitration agreement survived a corporate merger and bound the resulting corporation (B) holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement (C) holding trial court must decide whether to compel arbitration of personal injury claim of party who was not signatory to arbitration agreement (D) holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived (E) holding that a gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a question of arbitrability for a court to decide
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: to foreign sovereign immunity also do not help Bodi. Bodi argues that the differences between tribal immunity and the immunity enjoyed by foreign nations suggest that a tribe waives its immunity by removing to federal court. In refusing to extend Lapides to the tribal immunity context, the Eleventh Circuit in Contour Spa reasoned in part that tribal sovereign immunity is instead “more analogous to foreign sovereign immunity,” and that “[t]he significance of the comparison inheres in the fact that foreign sovereigns do not waive their sovereign immunity by removing a case to federal court.” Id. at 1206 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1047 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001), and Rodriguez v. Transnave Inc., 8 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>)). Bodi asserts that this comparison should cut 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 28 usc  1331 does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity (B) holding the contract was not authorized by law (C) holding that removal by a foreign sovereign is explicitly authorized by 28 usc 1441d and clearly cannot constitute waiver (D) holding that 28 usc  1361 which provides that district courts shall have original jurisdiction  to compel an officer or employee of the united states  to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity (E) holding that the provisions of title 28 in general and the foreign sovereign immunities act in particular are not laws regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce as contemplated by 28 usc  157d
[EX A]:
(C)