In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

charge for each item or items. The Trial Court, however, refused to admit the last page of the bill that contained only a description of miscellaneous and a corresponding charge. Plaintiff had no testimony or other evidence to explain to the jury anything about the charge listed on the last page of the bill. The Trial Court stated such a description would force the jury to speculate regarding what supplies were encompassed within the charge for these miscellaneous items. A jury may not engage in speculation. Stringer v. Cooper, 486 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tenn.Ct.App.1972) (stating “we understand the holding in those cases and many more like them to be that a jury may not speculate as to cause when one is not shown.... ”); Moon v. Johnston, 47 Tenn.App. 208, 337 S.W.2d 464, 469 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Without any testimony or other evidence to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the defendants act was the or a proximate cause of the injury the matter is for the jury to decide (B) holding a jury is not permitted to speculate or guess as to proximate cause (C) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury (D) holding proximate cause almost always a question solely for the jury (E) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury
(B)

1999) (same); Hill v. Fidelity Fin. Servs. (In re Hill), 152 B.R. 204, 206 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1993) (same); In re Reese, 194 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr.D.Md.1996) (same); Barclays Am./Mortgage Corp. v. Wilkinson (In re Wilkinson), 186 B.R. 186, 191 (Bankr.D.Md.1995) (same); In re Redditt, 146 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr.S.D.Miss.1992) (stat ing that “[b]y the statute’s own terms, only the trustee has standing to exercise the strong-arm avoidance powers”); Mast v. Borgess Medical Center (In re Mast), 79 B.R. 981, 982 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1987) (same); In re Driver, 133 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.1991) (stating that “a Chapter 13 debtor is not explicitly bestowed with the trustee’s strong arm transfer avoidance powers.”); Hollar v. United States (In re Hollar), 174 B.R. 198, 203 (M.D.N.C.1994) (<HOLDING>). As In re Higgins, most of the majority 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that chapter 13 debtors have standing to bring avoidance actions by reasoning that chapter 13 trustee has standing but little incentive to bring avoidance actions that will result in benefit to debtors of recovering exempt assets (B) holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case (C) holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees  avoidance power (D) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (E) holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13
(C)

7801, 7802, 7803, 7804, or 7805), depending upon the predominant disability. 38 C.F.R. § 4.118, DC 7806. Here, the language of Diagnostic Code 7806 is unambiguous: the diagnostic code explicitly mentions corticosteroids as an example of “systemic therapy” and does not further distinguish between different types of corticosteroid application. Otherwise stated, as used in Diagnostic Code 7806, “constant or near-constant systemic therapy such as corticosteroids .or other immunosuppressive drugs [ ] required during the past 12-month period,” defines systemic therapy as the use of corticosteroids without any limitation of type of use, and it is well settled that the Board is not permitted to add criteria not included in the rating schedule. See Drosky v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 251, 255 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Pernorio v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 625, 628 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the boards imposition of additional requirements other than those specified in the diagnostic code was impermissible (B) holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified (C) holding that the faa extends to employment cases for employees other than those engaged in transportation of goods (D) holding that appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the coa (E) holding that the faa extends to employment cases for employees other than those engaged in transportation

(A)