In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: but rather whether there is at least one common question that will generate a common answer “apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 1225 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Wang, 737 F.3d at 544 (“[s]o long as there is even a single common question, a would-be class can satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).”). Here, the question of whether using the name-only matching logic assures maximum accuracy is such a question. See Acosta v. Trans Union LLC, 243 F.R.D. 377, 384 (C.D.Cal.2007) (common question of whether defendants maintained reasonable procedures to assure maximum accuracy satisfied commonality prerequisite); Clark v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 2001 WL 1946329, at *2 (D.S.C. March 19, 2001) (<HOLDING>). Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied for the FCRA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant conceded the accuracy of his prior convictions in his psi report by failing to object to the report (B) holding that certain information on police blotter show up and arrest sheets and front page of offense report are public information (C) holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy (D) holding that question of what reasonable procedures if any have been set up by the defendants to assure maximum accuracy of the information contained in the consumer report including information regarding or related to bankruptcy among other questions satisfied the commonality requirement of rule 23a2 (E) holding that the right of access to government information or sources of information within the governments control is not mandated by the first or fourteenth amendments
[A]: (D)


[Q]: Court would apply its own jurisprudence because Braun prescribes an objective just cause standard-the standard Jurgens requests. 65 . Cassel, 14 P.3d at 284 (quoting Univ. of Alaska v. Tovsen, 835 P.2d 445, 447 (Alaska 1992)). 66 . Id. at 284 (quoting Baldwin, 769 P.2d at 304). 67 . See NPMC 2.36.010(A) (stating that purpose of chapter is to "establish and operate a system of personnel administration based upon equitable merit principles and professional methods governing ... removal, [and] discipline ... of employees"), .310(A) (requiring system of "uniform and equitable administration of discipline"), .310(B) (requiring that "discipline [] be administered in increasingly progressive severity"), .321(F) (allowing board to impose "lesser disciplinary action"); Tovsenm, 835 P.2d at 447 (<HOLDING>). 68 . See Braun, 816 P.2d at 142. 69 . See 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a termination of a government contract does not constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property without just compensation or without due process of law (B) holding that words found evaluated and unsatisfactory in personnel regulation required an objective just cause termination (C) holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases (D) holding that termination is an adverse employment action (E) holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable
[A]: (B)


[Q]: that the district judge grant the prison officers’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to paragraphs one through four of Count III; this the district court did by minute order dated August 3, 1999. However, the district court never acted on the recommendation that it construe the screening order as another report and recommendation, nor did it ever enter an order dismissing any counts of the complaint, which it was required to do since the magistrate judge lacks power to enter a dispositive order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. This would ordinarily mean that there is not a final judgment for us to review since there are still claims pending before the district court, and thus, that we would lack appellate jurisdiction. See Chacon v. Babcock, 640 F.2d 221, 222 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, it is clear from the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the general rule that once all claims against all parties have been dismissed a prior order will become final for purposes of appeal under 28 usc  1291 (B) holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 (C) holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees (D) holding that order denying motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition is final under 28 usc  1291 (E) holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants
[A]:
(B)