instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
an insurer to await the filing of a complaint against its insured will force insurers to defend claims that are unlikely to result in a duty to indemnify. We recognize the reality of Patrons’s concerns. We conclude, however, that the rationale supporting the comparison test outweighs those concerns. See Dingwell, 414 A.2d at 227. “We have always recognized that the application of the comparison test will occasionally requ dgment action before the injured claimant filed an action against the insured. Dolley, 669 A.2d at 1321. Rather than rejecting the action on ripeness grounds, we determined the insurer’s duly to defend vel non on the basis of what the corn-plaint might have alleged, in view of the parties' stipulation. Id. at 1323. 5 . See State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d at 38 (<HOLDING>); Perreault v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 568 
 Holding statements: (A) holding insurers duty to defend is determined by allegations in the petition (B) holding that insurance company could sue in insureds name following assignment of insureds interest against tortfeasor (C) holding that an insurers duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint against the insured (D) holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss (E) holding that insureds criminal convictions were sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issue of the insureds subjective intent for purposes of evaluating the insurers duty to defend
answer:
(E)


question:
540 U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 1019, 157 L.Ed.2d 1016 (2004) (citing United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980) and Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986)). 20 . See United States v. Cuong Gia Le, et al., Criminal No. 03-48-A (E.D.Va. December 9, 2003) (Ex Parte Order). 21 . Only one of the six charged defendants — • Cuong Gia Le — had been charged prior to the return of the Superseding Indictment. 22 . See Schwartz, 372 F.2d at 682 (citing Mallory, 354 U.S. at 454, 77 S.Ct. 1356). 23 . The statute also provides a limited "safe harbor" for a voluntary confession made after arrest, but before arraignment, "if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 534 n. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding texas law governs the procedural matter of preservationoferror requirements even if another jurisdictions law governs substantive issues (B) holding that  3501 not mcnabbmallory governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court (C) holding that federal law governs remedies available under title ix (D) holding that federal law governs res judicata effect of an earlier federal judgment based on federal law (E) holding that federal common law governs equitable remedies available under erisa
answer:
(B)


question:
(quoting Ringgold v. National Maintenance Corp., 796 F.2d 769, 770 (5th Cir.1986)). 17 . See Zambuto v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 544 F.2d 1333, 1335 (5th Cir.1977); Tatum v. Community Bank, 866 F.Supp. 988, 994 (E.D.Tex.1994). 18 . Dft.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 2. 19 . See generally Pit's Aff., Affidavit of Carla Nowell set forth in Plt.’s Resp., and Cloutman Aff. 20 . See Cloutman Aff. at Ex. A & Ex. C(3). 21 . See Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir.1996). 22 . Franks v. Bowman Transportation, 495 F.2d 398, 405 (5th Cir.1974) (addressing limitations period under predecessor statute to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976); see also Espinoza v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1250 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 23 . See Zambuto, 544 F.2d at 1335; Tatum, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although it was not clear why plaintiff apparently filed the complaint in this action prior to his receipt of the righttosue notice since issuance of a righttosue notice is not a jurisdictional requirement however the eeocs subsequent issuance of the notice satisfies the statutory requirements in this case (B) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (C) holding that mailing of eeoc righttosue notice to address designated by claimant suffices to start 90day period for bringing title vii action unless claimant through no fault of his own failed to receive the notice or for some other equitable reason statute should be tolled until he actually receives notice (D) holding that the state was estopped to argue that the 90day notice period  expired on a date prior to the expiration date it cited to the claimant (E) holding that the delivery of an eeoc decision to the former attorney of a claimant did not constitute notice to the claimant
answer:

(C)