In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: on the foregoing, we conclude that Layman’s and Sparks’ sentences are inappropriate. Like Quiroz, ten years of Layman’s sentence should be suspended to probation and five years of Sparks’ sentence should be suspended to probation. IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence Lastly, Sparks argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his felony murder conviction because he did not enter the house. However, Sparks, whose cursory argument is less than a page long, cites no cases in support of his claim. Sparks has therefore waived this issue on appeal. See Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (stating that each argument must be supported by citations to authorities, statutes, and the appendix or parts of the record on appeal relied on); Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 202-03 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. Waiver notwithstanding, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when an appellant fails to offer an argument on an issue that issue is abandoned (B) holding that a claim is waived on appeal when not supported by citation to relevant authority (C) holding that a party waives an argument if the party fails to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support of the argument (D) holding when a party fails to provide arguments or supporting authority for his assertion the party is deemed to have abandoned the issue (E) holding that an issue is waived when a party fails to provide adequate citation to authority

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability “from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik’s] attendance” it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik’s attendance at the gym — in essence all of Sydlik’s claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: and sentences from the third remand. The district court denied that petition, and we affirmed. See Smith v. Coleman, 453 Fed.Appx. 625 (6th Cir.2011). 2 . Respondent’s argument that this petition should be reviewed under AEDPA's deferential standard because even though it was filed prior to a state court judgment, it was not considered until after a judgment had been rendered, is unavailing. What determines our standard of review is the nature of the claims raised and "the time [the petitioner] filed his petition,” Stow v. Murashige, 389 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir.2004) (alteration omitted), not the "present status of the case pending against him,” Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.1987); see also Jacobs v. McCaughtry, 251 F.3d 596, 597 (7th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). But see Jackson v. Coalter, 337 F.3d 74 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding   2241 is the proper avenue by which to challenge pretrial detention (B) holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (C) holding that defendant did not have standing to raise facial challenge to validity of aggravated assault statutes for their risk of creating double jeopardy grounds because he himself was not charged in way that created double jeopardy (D) holding that  2241 was the proper statute for the petitioners pretrial double jeopardy challenge (E) holding that a delinquency proceeding places a juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the double jeopardy clause


Output: (D)