In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: rule is limited to questions that seek evidence about the informant’s police sanctioned conduct in apprehending a suspect, then the informant’s claim of privilege under such circumstances would be spurious. In this context he is immune from prosecution. We believe that this is the correct limitation because Norman is premised on a line of cases holding that state agents are not accomplices to illegal conduct of which they are charged to discover. Norman quotes Ex parte Turner, 545 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.Cr.App.1977) for the proposition that the law is well settled that if an informant is acting as a state agent, then the informant’s claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment is spurious. Id. at 344. In turn, Turner, supra, is premised upon Woodward v. State, 490 S.W.2d 850 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (<HOLDING>). See also, Vela v. State, 373 S.W.2d 505 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred (B) holding that an undercover agent is not an accomplice as long as the agent does not bring about the crime but merely obtains evidence to be used against those engaged in crime (C) holding that expert testimony of irs agent regarding tax liability did not usurp the function of the jury as agent did not give her opinion about the guilt of the defendant (D) holding that a private citizen acting as undercover agent is not an accomplice witness so long as he does not bring about the crime (E) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent

A: holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred
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Q: to obtain the benefit of the bond, for which it paid a significant premium, only through legal action. Accordingly, Olympic Steamship applies here. Colorado Structures, 125 Wn. App. at 928 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We agree. ¶27 Lastly, in McGreevy, where this court awarded reasonable attorney fees in addition to the limits of the insurance policy, we reasoned, “when an insurer unsuccessfully contests coverage, it has placed its interests above the insured. Our decision in Olympic Steamship remedies this inequity by requiring that the insured be made whole.” McGreevy, 128 Wn.2d at 39-40. Likewise, West placed “its interests” above that of Structures. Id. Structures should be awarded attorney fees under Olympic Steamship, so as to be made “whole.” Dayton, 124 Wn.2d at 280 (<HOLDING>)- Without the application of Olympic Steamship 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the contract was not authorized by law (B) recognizing that under georgia law attorneys fees are allowed where authorized by statute or contract (C) holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case (D) holding that an award of attorney fees was authorized by ocga  13111 a 3 when the requirements of that statute were satisfied (E) holding that a court has power to award attorney fees when authorized by contract statute or recognized ground of equity

A: holding the contract was not authorized by law
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Q: on the proper valuation date of property when the debtor attempts to strip off a wholly unsecured lien. Dean, 319 B.R. at 477. This Court is more persuaded by the cases that use the petition date as the appropriate date to value both the collateral and, necessarily, the first lienholder’s claim, for the purpose of determining whether any value over the first claim exists in the collateral to support the second lien. The Court’s independent review of relevant caselaw reveals that the majority of courts considering this issue have also settled on the petition date as the proper date for valuation in this and other contexts. See, e.g., Marsh v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev. (In re Marsh), 929 F.Supp.2d 852, 855 (N.D.Ill.2013); In re Gilpin, 479 B.R. 905, 908 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2011) (<HOLDING>); In re Levitt & Sons, LLC, 384 B.R. 630, 644 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the correct date to use when determining the controlling statute is date upon which the claim arose (B) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (C) holding the petition date is the appropriate date to value the collateral when the debtors intend to remain in the home (D) holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due (E) holding petition date is proper date to value assets for a hypothetical liquidation under 11 usc  547b

A:
holding the correct date to use when determining the controlling statute is date upon which the claim arose
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