instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
the State argued that Wright and Jackson were the two shooters at the trials of Wright, Oglesby, and Jackson. The State denies that it presented mutually exclusive, false, or misleading evidence. It contends that the evidence permits two factual scenarios: the shooters were either Jackson and Wright or Jackson and defendant. This is not a case where the prosecutor destroyed the credibility of one witness to convict one defendant and then used that same witness to convict a co-defendant for the same crime. See, e.g., Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 738 (1986). Nor is this a case where the prosecutor improperly argued facts that were unsupported by the evidence. Nichols v. Collins, 802 F.Supp. 66, 75 (S.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), habeas corpus denied, sub nom, Nichols v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal (B) holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment (C) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (D) holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal (E) holding in case in which defendant challenged his murder conviction and death sentence on ground that states conflicting theories in the trial of his accomplice constituted a denial of due process that state may be constitutionally estopped from obtaining a fact finding in one trial and seeking and obtaining an inconsistent fact finding in another trial
answer:
holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal


question:
the evidence of Robertson’s alleged prior threat to his ex-wife as Williams rule evidence, the State cannot rely on the law of impeachment to introduce the same evidence through the back door by asking an impermissible question regarding an alleged prior crime. Finally, we address whether the admission of this collateral-crime evidence constitutes reversible error. This Court has held that the erroneous admission of irrelevant collateral crimes evidence “is presumed harmful error because of the danger that a jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demon strated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged.” Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 115 (Fla.1989) (quoting Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903, 908 (Fla.1981)); accord Czubak v. State, 570 So.2d 925, 928 (Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, given the highly inflammatory 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted (B) holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder (C) holding that where court informed jurors that the defendant had escaped from custody the trial judge acted within his judicial capacity and did not testify  (D) holding collateral crime evidence that defendant was an escaped convict was presumptively harmful (E) holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime
answer:
holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted


question:
has the right to confront those who testify against him or her and the right to conduct cross-examination. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S.Ct. 989, 998, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). When a juror communicates objective extrinsic facts regarding the defendant or the alleged crimes to other jurors, the juror becomes an unsworn witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir.1975); United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906, 91 S.Ct. 1373, 28 L.Ed.2d 646 (1971). That the unsworn testimony comes from a juror rather than a court official does not diminish the scope of a defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment. See Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Jeffries III correctly determined that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a jurors communication about the defendants reputation for violence deprived the defendant of his rights to confrontation crossexamination and assistance of counsel embodied in the sixth amendment (B) holding that a new york statute allowing judges in a criminal bench trial to deny counsel the opportunity to make a closing argument deprived defendant of his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel (C) recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel (D) holding that the defendant was deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel where appointed counsels representation presented a conflict of interest (E) holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel
answer:

holding that a new york statute allowing judges in a criminal bench trial to deny counsel the opportunity to make a closing argument deprived defendant of his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel