In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
matter. When it is clear, however, from the relevant parts of the contract taken together and considered with the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement, that the obligation in question was within the contemplation of the parties or was necessary to effect their intention, then such obligation may be implied and enforced. But when the contract between the parties speaks to the obligation sought to be implied, the courts will not write that implied obligation into the contract. Stated conversely, there may be an implied covenant on the part of the lessee (in the absence of any expressed on the subject as in the lease).[ ] Id. (citations, alterations, and quotation omitted). See also Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 123 N.M. 526, 943 P.2d 560, 569 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in accordance with New Mexico law, any 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that endorsement would prevail if inconsistent with policy provisions (B) holding that courts cannot imply covenants which are inconsistent with express provisions (C) holding that state courts may not enforce racially restrictive covenants (D) holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy (E) holding that the law will not imply a contract where there is an existing express contract covering the same subject matter

Ex Output:
recognizing that endorsement would prevail if inconsistent with policy provisions


Ex Input:
While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation — 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. § 1103) — which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (“An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal.”). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant’s release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc  1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest

Ex Output:
holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute


Ex Input:
the litigation in the form cast or in the plaintiffs chosen forum”). [¶ 9] If this Court were to retain jurisdiction only over those claims which arguably are barred by the relevant statutes of limitations and dismiss the remaining causes of action, this would force Sander-son to proceed in a manner akin to an improper splitting of his cause of action. See Freed v. Unruh, 1998 ND 34, ¶ 10, 575 N.W.2d 433 (allowing plaintiff to proceed with lawsuit would be analogous to an improper splitting of cause of action); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Arlt, 61 N.W.2d 429, 434 (N.D.1953) (stating when there is a single cause of action, although there may be different kinds of damages, only one suit can be brought); Jacobson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass’n, 73 N.D. 108, 11 N.W.2d 442 (1943) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Choice Fin. Group v. Schellpfeffer, 2005 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys claim for professional services against person sui juris or against property of such person must rest upon contract of employment express or implied made with person sought to be charged or with his agent (B) holding a person who has availed himself of part of single claim or obligation in action or defense is thereafter estopped from enforcing the remainder of it (C) holding that a motion to intervene is not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party (D) holding that in class action the claim or defense of the representative party must be typical of the claim or defense of each member of the class (E) holding that the rule of splitting of causes of action as related to res judicata does not permit the owner of a single or entire cause of action or an entire indivisible demand to divide or split that cause of action and that all damages from a single wrongful act must be claimed in one action

Ex Output:

holding that attorneys claim for professional services against person sui juris or against property of such person must rest upon contract of employment express or implied made with person sought to be charged or with his agent