In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
that placed a forty-five day time limit on the administrator’s decision to grant or deny a license. See Redner, 29 F.3d at 1500. In the event the administrator exceeded the forty-five day time limit, the ordinance stated that “the applicant may be permitted to begin operating the establishment for which a license is sought," unless and until the County Administrator notifies the applicant of a denial of the application.” See id. at 1500-01 (citation omitted). We held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because its use of the word “may” rather than “shall” allowed the individuals responsible for enforcing the ordinance to suppress the protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on their part or any judicial determination. See id. at 1501 (<HOLDING>). In Lady J. Lingerie, we examined the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff (B) holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review (C) holding also that the ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review (D) holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record (E) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of a request to change a comprehensive zoning plan

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
business is a disputed question of fact which cannot be resolved on summary judgment. State Auto disputes Appellants’ arguments and also posits in the alternative that, even if Kraus was an “insured” at the time he committed the acts in question, Appellants’ false imprisonment claims were subsumed by their sexual assault claims. As discussed below, we conclude that the district court correctly found that the determination of whether Kraus was an “insured” under the policy is a question of law where the pertinent facts are undisputed, that the policy is not ambiguous, and that Kraus’s acts fall within the Criminal-Acts Exclusion. Because we affirm the district court on those grounds, we do not reach State Auto’s alternative argument in support 2d 349, 633 N.W.2d 707 (Wis.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Michelet v. Scheuring Sec. Servs. Inc., 680 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question (B) holding that the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment or while performing duties related to the conduct of the employers business for purposes of insurance coverage were questions of fact that precluded summary judgment particularly since there was a question regarding the employees intent in performing the act in question (C) holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred (D) holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury (E) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
residents according the 1990 U.S. census. Accordingly, Sharper contends the “one-person, one-vote” principal “has been codified into state law.” (Doc. 199, p. 5.) Thus, his claims should not be dismissed on this basis. It is well established that the “one-person, one-vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the judiciary. Wells v. Edwards, 347 F.Supp. 453 (M.D.La.1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1095, 93 S.Ct. 904, 34 L.Ed.2d 679 (1973). However, vote dilution and “one-person, one-vote” claims are distinct. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 402-03, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 954 (4th Cir.1992); see also Voter Info. Project, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 612 F.2d 208, 210-12 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Wells does not require this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing distinction between claims grounded in oneperson onevote and vote dilution in a rule 12b6 challenge to an atlarge method of electing state and city judges (B) recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell (C) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (D) recognizing this distinction (E) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel

Ex Output:

(A)