In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Eighth Circuit and a pair of nonprece-dential decisions from this court, all of which assume that lying to a supervising probation officer is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), a felony. See United States v. Wagner, 573 Fed.Appx. 598, 598-99 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Quillman, 409 Fed.Appx. 18, 21 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Grimes, 54 F.3d 489, 491-92 (8th Cir. 1995). But Grimes was decided before Congress amended § 1001 to exempt from its coverage any false statement made to a “judge or magistrate” by a party in a “judicial proceeding,” 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b), and we haven’t yet considered whether, or to what extent, that exemption covers lies made to a probation officer by a person under supervision, compare United States v. Horvath, 492 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Vreeland, 684 F.3d 653, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probation is not a sentence (B) holding that defendants lies to probation officer preparing presentence report fall within  1001b exception if probation officer must include particular statement in report (C) holding defendants statement that presentence report was correct did not constitute admission to the nature and cireumstances of the crime reflected in the report (D) holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error (E) holding that the defendants statements to the probation officer were insufficient to satisfy the safety valves fifth requirement the probation officer is for purposes of  5c12 not the government

A: (B)
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Q: of the offense charged but convict on the included offense. However, the mere chance that a jury may reject uncontroverted testimony and convict on the lesser charge does not require the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser charge." People v. Ramires, 18 P.3d 822, 827 (Colo.App.2000) (internal citations omitted). 184 The offense of patronizing a prostituted child requires, as relevant here, "knowingly engaging in an act" where "a child perform[s] or offer[s] or agree[s] to perform ... any [sexual] act ... in exchange for money." § 18-7-406(1)(a), 18-7-401(6). Based on the language of the statute, actual performance of a sexual act is not necessary; a mere offer or agreement to perform is sufficient, provided money has been promised. See supra Part V.A; Madden, 111 P.3d at 460 (<HOLDING>). 185 Here, because the uncontrovert-ed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage (B) holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition (C) holding that a party invoking a  547c1 defense must prove the specific measure of the new value given to the debtor in exchange for what was received (D) holding that patronizing a prostituted child requires some record evidence that the defendant attempted to give anything of value  in exchange for sex (E) holding that under 11 usc  547c4 a later payment in exchange for new value only deprives the defendant of the new value defense if the later payment is an otherwise unavoidable transfer

A: (D)
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Q: of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court” is contemptible, regardless of whether the actions disrupt the proceedings. Id. § 78-32-1(5). ¶4 Utah Code section 78-32-3 does not require that the contemptible actions interrupt or block the proceedings in order to be punished summarily. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3. Rather, it only requires that the “contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers.” Id. Even though the juvenile court waited until the end of the certification hearing to issue the contempt order, Weis-kopfs contemptible actions took place in the court's presence; therefore, it properly exercised its summary contempt powers. See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 11, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 5 Weiskopf also asserts that his due 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present (B) holding that defendant waived his right to selfrepresentation where he told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself and the public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of trial without objection (C) holding that if a judge believes the exigencies of the trial require that he defer judgment until its completion he may do so without extinguishing his summary contempt power (D) holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment (E) holding that the commissioner has an obligation to refuse to grant a patent if he believes that doing so would be contrary to law

A:
(C)
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