In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 918 F.2d 154, 159 (11th Cir.1990). A district court should grant a preliminary injunction only if the movant clearly shows: 1. a substantial likelihood that the mov-ant will prevail on the merits; 2. that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is, not issued; 3. that the potential injury to the mov-ant outweighs the possible harm to the nonmovant; and 4. that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id. This Court will address each element in turn. 1. SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS To begin, the instant ease is controlled by this Court’s decision in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116 (M.D.Fla.1991). In Luckie, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with AAA pursuant to the AMEX Window. Id. The defendants argued th 2nd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Also, in Merrill Lynch v. Noonan, [Current] 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (C) holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision (D) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (E) holding that a specific customer agreement can supersede the amex constitution and requiring arbitration before one of the fora named in the agreement

A: (E)
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Q: that in December 1995, his wage was $8.67 per hour. Lewis stated that a Caucasian employee, who misrepresented his knowledge of desktop publishing, was hired at a rate of $9.00 per hour in his department. This employee ultimately was “[p]ushed out the door.” Supp.App. at 354. Lewis also stated that another Caucasian employee received a pay increase from $7.50 to $8.25 per hour after he went from part-time to full-time status, and that a third Caucasian employee told him that he received a raise after his father called the store manager. The District Court held that Lewis failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he had not shown that the employees he identified were similarly situated to him. See Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 857-58 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on his wrongful termination claim, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated (B) holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment (C) holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim (D) holding that employees of differing seniority levels were not similarly situated (E) holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated

A: (B)
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Q: sentencing him to life imprisonment was not erroneous. C. The district court’s failure to consider making Sanchez’s life sentence concurrent with his state term of imprisonment Sanchez argues that the district court erred in finding that it lacked discretion to make his federal life sentence concurrent with his current state term of imprisonment. The government concedes that the district court erred in finding it had no discretion, 2003 WL 22706781 at *275; see also United States v. Arellano-Torres, 303 F.3d 1173, 1181 (9th Cir.2002), but argues that any error is harmless because Sanchez will spend the rest of his life in prison whether the federal sentence runs concurrent with or consecutive to his state sentence. See United States v. Mendoza, 121 F.3d 510, 513-14 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In light of the government’s concession that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudice is shown where a sentencing error may affect the determination of sentence (B) holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed (C) holding that an incorrect guidelines calculation generally requires a remand for resentencing unless we conclude on the record as a whole  that the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed citation omitted (D) recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed (E) holding that an error is harmless where it is highly probably that the error did not affect the outcome of the case

A:
(B)
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