In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: strip frisk of an employee may only be conducted on the order of the Superintendent or Acting Superintendent. (The Officer of the Day may issue this order if the Superintendent or Acting Superintendent is absent from the facility and cannot be contacted). b. Strip frisks must be supervised by a uniformed supervisor having at least the rank of Lieutenant. c. No more than two frisking employees are to be present in addition to the supervising officer. d. Strip frisks shall be conducted in a location and manner which will cause the least possible embarrassment to the employee being searched. e. The supervising and searching officers must be of the same sex as the employee being searched. If a ranking female security supervisor is not available, the Superintendent shall designate a female (<HOLDING>) to conduct the search. f. An employee may 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because there was no evidence before the court of any similarly situated employees who were promoted to a higher salary grade when plaintiff was denied a promotion plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote (B) holding that a retiree with a sixth grade education who was given little time to review the terms had stated a claim (C) holding that the record did not belie the claimants iq of 58 where he attended special education classes did not live independently and dropped out of school at a low grade either in the sixth or eighth grade (D) holding a higher grade than the employee being searched (E) holding the prosecution to a higher burden of proof than the law required is a valid raceneutral reason for excluding a juror

Answer: (D)


Question: the sophisticated user defense, a supplier has no duty to warn the ultimate user if it has reason to believe that the user will realize its dangerous condition. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn.2004); see also Ritchie v. Glidden, 242 F.3d 713, 724 (7th Cir.2001) (stating, under Indiana law, that the sophisticated purchaser defense to a failure-to-warn claim brought under negligence or strict liability theories provides that product suppliers do not have a duty to warn employees or customers of knowledgeable industrial purchasers as to product-related hazards). In addition to limiting a supplier’s duty, the “sophisticated user” concept also affects the element of proximate cause. Crook v. Kaneb Pipe Line Operating P’ship, L.P., 231 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Strong, 667 F.2d at 688 (“Even if [the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury (B) holding in a negligence action that the air traffic controllers failure to warn of an impending danger cannot be the proximate cause of an injury after the pilot himself discovered its presence appreciated the danger and decided to fly ahead into it (C) holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible (D) holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury (E) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury

Answer: (D)


Question: ability to appeal. Id. at 509, 40 P.3d at 911. The supreme court held that the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal order was not an acquittal because the trial court “did not rule on the merits of the case” and “did not enter any decisions as to the guilt of Poohina.” Id. at 510, 40 P.3d at 912. Accordingly, the protection against double jeopardy did not apply to the dismissal order. Id. at 509-10, 40 P.3d at 911-12. Consistent with Poohina, we conclude that the District Court’s dismissal of the charges in Clemente’s case was not an acquittal, and, accordingly, the protection against double jeopardy does not apply. The District Court’s dismissal of the charges did not satisfy the Poohina test for an acquittal. It was not based on a resolution in Clem-ente’s fav 624, 626-28 (1985) (<HOLDING>); People v. Zagarino, 74 A.D.2d 115, 427 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sua sponte dismissal of the charges during trial was not an acquittal that barred retrial based on double jeopardy (B) holding that the dismissal of criminal charges for evidentiary insufficiency is an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause (C) holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds (D) holding that the trial courts dismissal of the charges after jeopardy had attached based on the prosecution witnesses failure to appear was not an acquittal and therefore double jeopardy did not prevent the court from reconsidering its decision and reinstating the charges (E) holding double jeopardy prohibits government appeal and retrial following valid judgment of acquittal entered by trial court after jury deadlocked on criminal contempt charge

Answer:
(A)