TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: court, in addition to other disbursements allowed by law, the following costs: . . . For travel, such sum as the court may allow”); Mass.RCiv.P. 54(d) (“Except when express provision therefore is made either in a statute of the Commonwealth or on these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing pariy unless the court otherwise directs”). However, the Supreme Judicial Court cautioned that “(i]n taxing costs, courts do not seek to compensate litigants fully for the cost of litigation.” Waldman v. American Honda Motor Co., supra, 413 Mass, at 322. Furthermore, the Supreme Judicial Court has advised that “where such costs are permitted, an award of costs is allowable only when based on ‘specific affirmative authority.’ ” Demoulas v. Demoulas, 432 Mass. 43, 64 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 4.Travel Costs of Prevailing Party In 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees and court costs are recoverable under general hold harmless indemnity agreement (B) holding costs of service of subpoenas recoverable (C) holding that costs of daily transcripts during trial are not recoverable (D) holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered (E) holding that fees are not recoverable for work for which the client could not be charged

SOLUTION: holding that attorneys fees and court costs are recoverable under general hold harmless indemnity agreement

PROBLEM: and sold it to nonre-latives. We conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the property is marital. The form of the transaction, while not dispositive, is compelling in the instant case because of Klem’s knowledge of, and experience with, joint tenancies. Klem was fully aware of how joint tenancies operated. As the husband of Hazel, he became the sole owner of Hazel’s family property as a surviving joint tenant, a fact he acknowledged during his deposition. Subsequent to his sole ownership of the property, he knowingly deeded the property to Larry and Colleen as joint tenants. In so doing, he gave both parties an interest in the property. See Melina v. Melina, 411 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Minn.App.1987); Erdahl v. Erdahl, 384 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Finally, also indicative of the donor’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that devise of real estate to one spouse was nonmarital and noting that had testator intended such property to be devised as marital property he could have designated appellant as a joint tenant (C) holding money received from inheritance as nonmarital property presumptively became marital property when placed in joint account under arkansas law (D) holding that transferring joint property into one partys name for estate planning purposes does not convert marital property into nonmarital property (E) holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property

SOLUTION: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate

PROBLEM: at least as best it can be understood, see Versata, 793 F.3d at 1323, 1326-27. 5 . It appears on only two other occasions and is nowhere defined. See 35 U.S.C. § 291 (2016); 42 U.S.C. § 262; see also 35 U.S.C. § 156 ("patent which claims”). 6 . "[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.” 7 . See, e.g., In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). LOURIE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in reviewing a claim construction decided under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness (B) holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation (C) holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range (D) holding that under a due weight deference standard a more reasonable interpretation overcomes an agency interpretation (E) recognizing that the standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo

SOLUTION:
holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation