In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: we now reverse the decision of the trial court. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. 1 . We set forth additional facts in the companion case issued today, Dep't. of Revenue v. Adams, 762 N.E.2d 728 (Ind.2002). 2 . The CSET is a tax on the possession of certain narcotics. We discuss the tax and the procedures for collecting it in greater detail infra. 3 . All of the cocaine at issue in this case was discovered prior to the time the police served a valid search warrant. 4 . Ind.Code § 35-48-4-1 (1998). 5 . Id. § 35-48-4-6. 6 . United States Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the revenue officers' entry of Adam's home to collect the CSET assessment was a search. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Thomas v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (B) holding that revenue officers conducted a search when they entered a cottage and seized records when levying on delinquent tax (C) holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business (D) holding search unreasonable when conducted on the highway in broad day light (E) holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: judgment action the Court should consider the following factors: (1) avoiding needless determination of state law issues; (2) discouraging litigants from filing declaratory actions as a means of forum shopping; and (3) avoiding duplica-tive litigation. Id. In addition, the Court should retain jurisdiction on a declaratory judgment action where it is necessary to avoid piecemeal litigation. Snodgrass v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir.1998). The Court has already concluded that § 616D.030 does not preclude Plaintiffs state law claims, therefore, declining to exercise jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment claim would result in piecemeal litigation. Because a declaratory action is a procedural remedy, the Court grants leav 956 P.2d 117, 119-20 (1998) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  616d030 barred employees actions where employees sued the state industrial insurance system alleging bad faith administration of their workers compensation claims (B) holding that the peculiar risk doctrine has no application to employees of independent contractors whose claims fall within the workers compensation system (C) holding  616d030 barred employees action where employee alleged the insurance carrier acted in bad faith in handling the claim (D) recognizing retaliatory discharge claim where employer prevented employees exercise of workers compensation rights because of employees intention to file claim (E) holding  616d030 did not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a tortious discharge action for filing a workers compensation claim because the statutory scheme applies only to the administration of the act
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: the State violated the defendant’s" Fifth Amendment right by commenting on his failure to testify, “[w]e view the State’s argument from the jury’s standpoint and resolve any ambiguities in the language in favor of it being permissible argument.” Randolph v. State, 353 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex.Crim.App.2011). Here, the State Was reminding the jury about Nickerson's confession, not emphasizing his silence at trial. Because the language was not “manifestly intended or was of such a character'that the jury would necessarily "and naturally take it as a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify,” we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Nickerson’s objection to the State’s statement. See id.; see also Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Further, the charge instructed the jury that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the prosecutors statements were not an inappropriate comment on the defendants failure to testify but rather a comment on the defendants failure to present convincing evidence to support his defense (B) holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify (C) holding a prosecutor may not comment on a defendants silence (D) holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify (E) holding that prosecutor did not comment on defendants failure to testify by referencing defendants written statement and pointing out what defendant did not say
[EX A]:
(E)