TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: Apr. 14, 2011). Accord Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 274 (2d Cir.2009) (dismissing a retaliation claim whose only causal basis was a letter that plaintiff wrote many weeks before the allegedly retaliatory acts, implicating officers other than named defendants). See also Def. Mem. at 11 ("[A] claim that one defendant took action against the plaintiff in retaliation for a complaint made against a different [officer] [should be] viewed with particular skepticism."). 40 . Def, Mem. at 17. 41 . See id. (citing exclusively to Eighth Amendment cases). 42 .Id. 43 . See Wright, 554 F.3d at 274. 44 . Def. Mem. at 18. 45 . Def. Mem. at 19. 46 . Davis, 320 F.3d at 353. 47 . Dawes, 239 F.3d at 493. 48 . Compare Hofelich v. Ercole, No. 06 Civ. 1369, 2010 WL 1459740, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2010) (<HOLDING>), with Rembert v. Cheverko, No. 12 Civ. 9196, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim (B) holding that a verbal threat of being fired is not an adverse employment action for purposes of title vii (C) holding that verbal threats if they are specific can constitute adverse action for retaliation purposes (D) holding that a suspension with pay may constitute materially adverse action for the purposes of retaliation claims depending on the facts of the case (E) holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action

SOLUTION: holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim

PROBLEM: Clause. ¶ 13. Respondent’s main interest in this case is his right to run for elected office. In general, the federal courts have declined to hold that the right to run for elective office is “fundamental,” a position that was applied in the seminal Clements decision. There, a plurality of the high court held that “[f]ar from recognizing candidacy as a fundamental right, we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate’s access to the ballot does not of itself compel close scrutiny.” 457 U.S. at 963 405, 420 (W. Va. 2000) (concluding that constitutional provision forcing judges to vacate office before running for nonjudicial office was supported by “State’s compelling and permissible interest”); Wagner v. Milwaukee County Election Comm’n, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 78, 666 N.W.2d 816 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 16. Respondent’s constitutional arguments 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (B) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (C) holding that states legitimate interests in enacting constitutional provision prohibiting judges from holding other public office far outweigh the burdens put upon the petitioners right to be a candidate for office (D) holding that a school superintendent does not have a constitutional right to actually hold his position and execute the duties of the office (E) holding constitutional provision selfexecuting if it grants right that can be put into operation without further legislative action

SOLUTION: recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights

PROBLEM: all the parties request earlier certification. If the Supreme Court grants transfer or review, the Clerk shall not certify any opinion or memorandum decision until final disposition by the Supreme Court. The trial court, Administrative Agency, and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon the opinion or memorandum decision until the opinion or memorandum decision is certified. It has been said that trial courts lack “jurisdiction” to perform any action in a case while an appeal of a final judgment is pending, except Tor. ministerial tasks such as reassessing costs, correcting the record, or enforcing a judgment. In re Paternity of V.A., 10 N.E.3d 65, 67-68, n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). See also Pflederer v. Kesslerwood, Lake Ass’n, Inc., 878 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (<HOLDING>); Hancock v. State, 786 N.E.2d 1142, 1143, n.1 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issue of costs and fees to be imposed based on wrongful issuance of injunction was not ripe until appellate decision was certified as final (B) holding trial courts action in resentencing defendant following remand on appeal before appellate decision was certified as final was premature and should be considered as a nullity (C) recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs (D) holding that appeal from a decision of the attorney general denying legal representation was before the appellate division as of right to review the final decision of a state officer (E) holding the divesting of jurisdiction by the mailing of a certified copy of the order of remand does not preclude the award of attorneys fees and costs

SOLUTION:
holding trial courts action in resentencing defendant following remand on appeal before appellate decision was certified as final was premature and should be considered as a nullity