In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Sept. 3, 1998)(variance is not material “where the allegations and proof substantially correspond, the variance is not of a character which could have misled the defendant at trial and is not such as to deprive the accused of his right to be protected against another prosecution for the same offense”). A material variance is sometimes referred to as a “fatal variance.” We have not been consistent in requiring materiality, but have sometimes reversed upon a finding of variance without exploring the further question of materiality. Compare Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 625, 124 S.W. 668 (1910)(variance is not material unless it could mislead defense or expose defendant to danger of subsequent prosecution for same offense); Plessinger v. State, 536 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1976)(<HOLDING>) with Pedrosa v. State, 155 Tex.Crim. 155, 232 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error (B) holding that heightened evidentiary standard of proof is not required where the sentencing enhancement is based entirely on the extent of the conspiracy to which the defendant pled guilty (C) holding that where a defendant is misled and induced to plead by his counsels mistaken advice then he may be allowed to withdraw his plea (D) holding variance between enhancement allegation and proof renders evidence legally insufficient only if variance is material (E) holding variance in style of case pled for enhancement not material where defendant not surprised or misled to his prejudice
holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error

controversy turns, in part, on a categorization of the loss at issue; an inherently factual determination requiring the testimony of Penn and NBC staff juxtaposed against Gioia’s onsite analysis. Thus, Gioia is a material witness and his convenience weighs in favor of transfer. B. Locus of the Operative Facts “Where there is no material connection between the district and’the operative facts, ... the interests of justice require the transfer of [the] action.” Manao Invests., 1997 WL 53200, at *2 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). ‘When determining the locus of operative facts in a declaratory judgment action concerning the interpretation of an insurance policy contract, this Court has considered where the insurance contract was made.” Royal Ins., 2002 WL 31385815, at *3-4 (<HOLDING>). Here, while it is unclear whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution (B) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (C) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (D) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york (E) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action
holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership

it was in violation of the bankruptcy stay and, therefore, the justice court was without jurisdiction to enter it. Judgments — even final ones — that are void for jurisdictional defects are subject to collateral attack. Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex.1985); Nguyen v. Intertex, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 288, 294-95 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Zarate v. Sun Operating, Ltd., 40 S.W.3d 617, 620-21 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied). But the ability to collaterally attack a judgment is limited by the long-standing and well-settled rule that we must presume the validity of the judgment under attack and, thus, extrinsic evidence may not be used to establish a lack of jurisdiction. See In re A.G.G., 267 S.W.3d 165, 169 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 914 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court had jurisdiction to consider custody dispute before a divorce or separation action had commenced (B) holding that extrinsic evidence of applicability of automatic stay could not be considered because divorce decree on its face recited that trial court had jurisdiction of matter and no evidence in record of divorce proceeding affirmatively showed that automatic stay deprived trial court of jurisdiction (C) holding that district court had no jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claims that his constitutional rights were violated in state divorce proceeding (D) holding that the jurisdiction of the divorce court with regard to support and maintenance is statutorily determined unless otherwise provided by agreement incorporated into the divorce decree (E) holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce

holding that trial court had jurisdiction to consider custody dispute before a divorce or separation action had commenced