In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
commercial, including ... [any maritime contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce], falls under the Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of business in the United States. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 and 202; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2. A seaman’s contract that contains an agreement to arbitrate generally falls under the convention. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1299 (<HOLDING>) (citing Francisco v. STOLT ACHIEVEMENT MT, 293 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous (B) holding implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in some commercial contracts does not extend to atwill employment contracts (C) holding that contracts for an indefinite period are excluded from the statutes coverage (D) holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims (E) holding that the convention and us implementing statutes do not recognize an exception for seaman employment contracts and concluding that such contracts are commercial for purposes of same

Ex Output:
holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous


Ex Input:
court’s description of the panel’s rationale as “one over which reasonable jurists may differ” can hardly be construed as a ringing endorsement of Bush v. Gore’s precedential value or its application to the issue of variations in voting technology. Shelley II, 344 F.3d at 918. At the very least, the Ninth Circuit’s unanimous decision in Shelley II divested the panel decision of whatever precedential value it otherwise would have had. Undeterred, the majority struggles to accord such value to Shelley I because the rationale adopted by the majority is virtually identical to the one provided by the Shelley I panel — namely, that the plaintiffs’ novel equal protection claims are controlled by Supreme Court precedents that mandate the equal weighting of votes. Compare Maj. Op. at 870-71 (<HOLDING>), with Shelley I, 344 F.3d at 894-95 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error (B) holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional (C) holding that the counties use of outdated technology results in the weighting of votes differently (D) holding that a plaintiff need only show that the results of a polygraph examination were a factor in the termination of employment and rejecting requirement that results be the sole factor for employees discharge (E) holding that in a statutory fee case the results obtained factor was already subsumed in the lodestar and that results multipliers should be awarded only in some cases of exceptional success

Ex Output:
holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error


Ex Input:
(2004). 4 . Ind.Code § 35-49-3-3(a)(3) was amended effective July 1, 2006, to read: “sells, rents, or displays for sale or rent to any person matter that is harmful to minors within five hundred (500) feet of the nearest property line of a school or church.” 5 . The dissent also argues that Zitlaw did not engage in a “performance,” which is defined as "any play, motion picture, dance, or other exhibition or presentation, whether pictured, animated, or live, performed before an audience of one (1) or more persons.” Ind.Code § 35-49-1-7. However, Zitlaw did not make this argument in his Appellant’s Brief. Consequently, this basis for reversing the trial court's denial of Zitlaw's motion to dismiss has been waived. See, e.g., Chupp v. State, 830 N.E.2d 119, 126 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). Waiver notwithstanding, a finding that Zitlaw 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal (B) holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief (C) holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief (D) holding that defendant waived his blakely claim as issue on appeal by failing to raise it in his initial brief (E) holding argument waived for failure to raise it in opening brief

Ex Output:

holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal