In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: the B-side breakers were cross-phased caused transformer B to fail, and the failure of transformer B necessitated its testing, removal, oil disposal, repair and reinstallation. No additional link in the causal chain was necessary to bring about the injury or damages. The parties can be “conclusively presumed to have foreseen” that Powell’s substandard performance would result in the failure of the transformer and that failure of a transformer would require HP to incur costs associated with repairing it. Cf. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 816. We are not persuaded otherwise by Powell’s argument that direct damages in this case should be limited to the cost of uncrossing the wrongfully crossed cables or the difference between the value of Powell’s actual services and the value of t *8-9 (<HOLDING>). Powell asserts that these provisions refer to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury (B) holding costs of providing power during construction delay were direct damages because contract provision specified that owner would provide electricity to construction site (C) recognizing the rights of third parties who were not signatories to a construction contract (D) holding that construction safety manuals and codes were properly admitted as objective standards of safe construction (E) holding that whether clause in construction contract providing that no damages would be available for delay was enforceable was a factual question where there was evidence that damages resulted from unreasonable delay beyond the contemplation of the parties
Example Output: (B)

Example Input: the crime charged. If the evidence is cumulative, the trial court should more closely scrutinize its prejudicial effect. If the evidence is necessary to prove an element of the charge, the trial judge may have erred in not sustaining the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Moreover, a defendant may have a valid objection, under federal rule 611(b), that the government’s cross-examination exceeds the scope of the direct. These added considerations are necessary not only to limit the impact of rule 404(b) on rule 608(b), but also to limit the prejudicial effect of allowing the government to have the last say through evidence of a defendant’s prior misconduct. Smith Grading & Paving, 760 F.2d at 581; see also United States v. Horton, 847 F.2d 313, 324-25 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The purpose of Rule 608(b) is to prevent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that proponent of 404b evidence must identify a proper 404b purpose for admission  that is at issue in  the case (B) holding that evidence of threats or intimidation of a witness is admissible under rule 404b to show consciousness of guilt (C) holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence (D) holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal (E) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: this authority explicitly by statute in 11 U.S.C. § 362. Nor is there any danger of the bankruptcy court having prejudiced Appellant’s rights under Puerto Rico common law. As the bankruptcy court itself stated, the Appellant remains free to present her arguments under Puerto Rico law at the appropriate time, during the foreclosure proceedings in Puerto Rico’s commonwealth courts. (See Hearing Tr., Docket No. 1-7 at 11.) Therefore, any attempts to link this case to the holding in Stem are mistaken. We reject Appellant’s attempt to challenge this routine and plainly constitutional exercise of the bankruptcy court’s authority. This case, thus, fits squarely with several other cases that have been resolved in the wake of Stem. See In Re DiVittorio, 670 F.3d 273, 282 n. 4 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); In Re Garcia, 471 B.R. 324, 329 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that stem did not change a bankruptcy courts authority to decide questions impacting whether to grant relief from automatic stay (B) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay (C) holding that the bankruptcy court relinquishes jurisdiction over estate property when it grants relief from the automatic stay (D) recognizing district courts authority to dispose of contempt action for violation of automatic stay of bankruptcy (E) holding that bankruptcy court order that a stay applied to a particular party was a final order and noting that bankruptcy court orders lifting or denying relief from an automatic stay are final for purposes of appeal
Example Output:
(A)