In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: for the district court to grant his motion to withdraw his plea. But Harvey has not challenged the district court's ultimate finding that he was competent to stand trial based on the court's consideration of the opinions of all three psychiatrists. In light of the district court's unchallenged and supported determination that Harvey was competent to stand trial (and therefore competent to plead), Harvey cannot argue that the court committed obvious error in failing to sua sponte permit him to withdraw his plea on the basis of his "marginal competence." Nor can he claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue Harvey's marginal competency as a reason for withdrawing the plea. Harvey's claims related to his competency therefore fail. { 18 We affirm. 1 . The court stat Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 940-42 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel (B) holding an attorneys mistaken prediction about a possible sentence does not render a defendants plea unknowing and involuntary (C) holding that a defense attorneys failure to uncover a defendants prior felony convictions and the attorneys inaccurate sentencing prediction did not render the defendants plea unknowing and involuntary because the defendant knew at the time he pleaded guilty what his sentence might be (D) holding that ineffective assistance can render a guilty plea involuntary (E) holding that an inaccurate sentencing estimate did not render a plea unknowing unintelligent or involuntary because the defendant was informed of the statutory maximum
[A]: holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel


[Q]: but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 23 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (same). Essentially, the Court determined that the prejudicial quality of testimony regarding an actually coerced confession is, like all other improperly introduced testimony at trial, capable of review. At this point in time, the Fulminante decision stands as the sole, albeit the dispositive, case on this point. In contrast, cases applying the harmless error analysis to the introduction of presumptively coerced statements are legion. See e.g. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 & n. 22, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2652 & n. 22, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 555 & n. 22 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443, 104 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion  (B) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence (D) holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights (E) holding that although miranda required the suppression of testimonial statements made before defendant was advised of his constitutional rights the state court is free of course to consider this harmless error question upon remand
[A]: holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion 


[Q]: may give such retroactive effect to these legal clarifications because “where ... a court is addressing transactions that occurred at a time when there was no clear agency guidance, it would be absurd to ignore the agency’s current authoritative pronouncement of what the statute means.” Id. Therefore, unless the new regulation “replaces a prior agency determination,” this Court may find that the amendment merely provides an explanation for what the law always has been. Id. In order to determine if the amendments to Regulation E marked a change in the rules or served as an interpretation of existing law, this Court will first look to the stated intent of the Board in proffering the amendments. See First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Standard Bank & Trust, 172 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). If an agency plainly states that it is merely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the drastic sanction of preclusion of expert witnesses was not warranted based on failure to furnish discovery by the discovery deadline when the deadline could have been shifted (B) holding that a bankruptcy rule equivalent to rule 6a ala r civ p should be construed to give the benefit of extending the deadline for submission to the day after the holiday regardless of whether the deadline is expressed as the last day of a period of days or as a date certain (C) holding regulatory amendment extending a banks deadline for returning checks could be given retroactive effect (D) holding that where a legislative amendment changed the exemption provisions of a tax statute defining those eligible for certain exemptions and refunds the amendment could only be applied to tax years after its effective date even where the legislature expressly stated the amendment should have retroactive effect and looked to the law in place during the taxable events to determine if the taxpayer was eligible for a refund (E) holding random traffic stops for license and registration checks are contrary to fourth amendment
[A]:
holding that the drastic sanction of preclusion of expert witnesses was not warranted based on failure to furnish discovery by the discovery deadline when the deadline could have been shifted