In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to those sentences because no error in the sentencing appears on the face of the record. Ninety-nine years is a “term of years not less than five years.” While Thomas’ sentences, under court interpretations of § 566.030.2, may not be authorized, we are not able to reach such issues where the sentencing defect is not so patent as to present a jurisdictional issue. This sentencing does not present a jurisdictional issue. Conclusion Thomas is ordered to be returned to the circuit court of the City of St. Louis for resentencing on the three first degree robbery counts within the limits authorized by the law. SO ORDERED. All concur. 1 . All sectional references are to Missouri Revised Statutes 1986, unless otherwise indicated. 2 . See, e.g., State v. Williams, 828 S.W.2d 894 (Mo.App.1992)(<HOLDING>); State v. Charron, 743 S.W.2d 436 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (B) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (C) holding sentence of thirtyfive years in prison with ten years probation for seconddegree murder is within the statutory maximum under 1997 statutes (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding sentence of 100 years for forcible rape was in excess of statutory maximum
[A]: holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum


[Q]: by assenting to forfeiture provisions included in plea agreements. In United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir.1999), a criminal defendant entered into a plea bargain under which he “agree[d] to forfeit and otherwise waive any ownership right he might possess in all items seized during the investigation of any of the acts alleged.” The defendant then filed a motion for the return of his property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), and the district court denied the motion. Id. We affirmed the district court’s decision, observing that “[t]he district court was entirely correct in denying Le’s motion because Le ... relinquished any ownership rights he may have had in the property.” Id. at 1278. See also United States v. Grover, 119 F.3d 850, 852 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). On appeal Mr. Montoya suggests that he should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that a rule 41e claimant relinquished any possessory claim he had to the property when he signed a forfeiture agreement at the time he entered into a plea bargain (C) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (D) holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present (E) holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel
[A]: holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea


[Q]: from the common pleas court. Although Ap-pellees challenged the common pleas court’s order in this regard, as well as its order precluding Ms. Fleck from intervening in the termination proceedings, these issues are not currently being pursued before the Court. 7 . However, Rule of Appellate Procedure 311 specifically allows an appeal as of right, without reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c), from an order granting peremptory judgment in mandamus. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(5). 8 . Apparently, the majority recognized that an appeal as of right from the interim suspension would not lie by virtue of the interlocutory character of the decision. See generally Pa. R.A.P. 341(a) (interposing finality as a prerequisite to appealability, as a general rule). 9 . Accord Kaplan, 388 Pa. at 220, 130 A.2d at 676 (<HOLDING>). Although the Commonwealth Court dissent was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a school acted impermissibly when a public school teacher was not rehired because allegedly he had relayed to a radio station the substance of a memorandum relating to teacher dress and appearance (B) recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts (C) recognizing a school districts implied authority to suspend a tenured teacher in circumstances where he could become an influence inimical to the best welfare of the children (D) holding school districts had standing to bring claims against the state asserting that school financing system had become unconstitutional (E) recognizing the districts duty of care for the protection of school children in its schools
[A]:
holding that a school acted impermissibly when a public school teacher was not rehired because allegedly he had relayed to a radio station the substance of a memorandum relating to teacher dress and appearance