instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
by jury is a fundamental guaranty of the rights and liberties of the people. C Prudential that the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right means that the starting point of our analysis is a presumption against the waiver of this constitutional right. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co., 301 U.S. at 393, 57 S.Ct. at 811-12; In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132 (giving right to trial by jury “same protections as other constitutional rights”); accord Ex parte Cupps, 782 So.2d 772, 775 (Ala.2000) (construing scope of contractual jury waiver strictly and narrowly “in deference to the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial”); see also Note, 58 Baylor L.Rev. at 259. But see Lowe Enters. Residential Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 92, 40 P.3d 405, 410 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Despite the existence of a presumption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy (B) holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts (C) holding that german law presumptively confers joint custody upon both parents until a court enters a contrary order (D) holding  without reference to supreme court case law to the contrary  that in nevada contractual jury waivers are presumptively valid (E) holding appellate waivers are enforceable if invoked by the government
answer:
holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy


question:
citizens of Alabama for purposes of the diversity jurisdiction analysis. This narrow and specialized statute provides in pertinent part: In any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen. Andalusia and Hughes, who are insureds but not parties defendant, contend that a realignment of Lane will make the case into a direct action by Lane against the insurers, and because it is one in which the insureds are not joined as parties defendant, diversity would be destroyed by § 1332(a)(1). This contentio d.2d 73 (1974). But where the s 13 F.Supp. 367, 371 (D.Conn.1970) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 456 F.2d 282 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding action by insured against his own insurer under uninsured motorist provisions of policy not a direct action within section 1332c proviso (B) holding that insured cannot bring an action against its insurer for bad faith failure to settle a claim in the absence of an excess verdict (C) holding action by judgment creditor of insured against insurer for bad faith failure to settle claim against insured not a direct action within section 1332c proviso (D) holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith (E) holding that a negligence claim against an insured and a bad faith claim against the insurer are not separate as the first must be proved to prevail on the second
answer:
holding action by insured against his own insurer under uninsured motorist provisions of policy not a direct action within section 1332c proviso


question:
the substantive motor carrier safety standards for which B&T was cited. Ohio Adm.Code 4901:2-5-02(A) contains no substantive motor carrier safety standards. Finally, this is not a case in which the federal government has authorized Ohio to directly enforce federal regulations, and Ohio Adm.Code 4901:2-5-02 serves merely to provide notice of Ohio’s intent to enforce the federal regulations. In the case of the FMCSRs, the federal government expressly chose to encourage the states to adopt motor carrier rules of their own that are “identical to, or have the same effect as, the FMCSRs,” rather than to authorize the states to directly enforce the FMCSRs. Section 350.105, Title 49, C.F.R.; Section 31142, Title 49, U.S.Code. See Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Assn. (C.A.4, 2001), 248 F.3d 275 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, when the PUCO cited B&T for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that states may enforce their own laws for disabled children and are not limited to the minimum standards of the federal law (B) holding that congress did not authorize the states to enforce federal law where it gave states regulatory control through enforcement of their own laws (C) holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law (D) holding that the rights and duties of the united states on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal law and that in the absence of an applicable act of congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards (E) holding that upon approval by congress a compact between states becomes federal law that binds the states
answer:

holding that states may enforce their own laws for disabled children and are not limited to the minimum standards of the federal law