In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
federal courts intervene in the matter. The argument is unavailing, however, where the pending question is whether the Board’s proceedings constitute an effort by the state to impose its regulatory authority in a field preempted by Congress. See Association of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 208 F.3d 1, 2000 WL 298563, at *3 (1st Cir. March 27, 2000)(finding that the court’s initial invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was unwise where “the ultimate legal determination of whether the Massachusetts regulations are preempted by the [federal Clean Air Act] is a question of federal preemption law for the courts alone to decide”); Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 41 (1st Cir.1972)(<HOLDING>). The state defendants also move to dismiss 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and it does not matter that the plaintiff was using state law as the vehicle to press her assertion (B) holding that plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before the puerto rico labor relations board before invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine whether the boards assertion of jurisdiction was proper (C) recognizing the general rule that parties must exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from federal courts  (D) holding that plaintiff could not present his erisa estoppel claim to the district court because he did not properly exhaust it before the administrative review board (E) holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
plan. Allowing the Debtors to now modify their chapter 13 plan in such a way as to reduce the value received by GMAC is inequitable and such a result is unacceptable under the Bankruptcy Code and relevant case law. The Debtors’ proposed modification is not permitted by § 1329(a). The Bankruptcy Code does not allow the Debtors’ to modify the amount of an allowed secured claim post-confirmation. To allow the Debtors’ to surrender their vehicle and reclassify GMAC’s deficiency as an unsecured claim would shift the loss resulting from the vehicle’s depreciation to GMAC. Such a result seems illogical when any appreciation post-confirmation would benefit the debtor and not the secured creditor. See e.g. Ford Motor Credit Company v. Stevens (In re Stevens), 130 F.3d 1027, 1030 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). A debtor who decides to retain collateral at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a secured creditor is not entitled to receive any more than that to which it was entitled pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan (B) holding that  506a does not require or permit a reduction in the creditors secured claim to account for purely hypothetical costs of sale of chapter 13 debtors residence (C) holding that where a security agreement contained collateral other than collateral for which creditor advanced funds to debtor since it secured antecedent debts as well as new debt and the agreement provided that the security interest secured payment and performance of the debtors present and future debts to the creditor the creditor did not have a pmsi and the debtors could avoid the creditors lien on collateral claimed as exempt (D) holding that the secured creditor was only entitled to the amount of its claim as provided in the debtors chapter 13 plan when the destruction of the vehicle yielded insurance proceeds greater than the secured creditors claim (E) holding that chapter 13 debtors were unable to avoid a creditors unperfected secured claim because they lacked standing

Ex Output:

(D)