In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: the sentencing information balancing test urged by the dissent. The ongoing confusion concerning the breach of Wisconsin plea agreements is further highlighted by this district's issuance of an unusual, three-legged opinion. ¶ 24. While I have some sympathy with the dissent's concern about the continued integrity of the plea bargaining process, I disagree that the facts in this case can result in an unwarranted sentencing "clam up" restriction. The prosecutor not only has a right but a duty to provide information to the sentencing court. Moreover, there is nothing wrong with the prosecutor providing his or her opinion of the defendant's character, even if negative, to the sentencing court so long as the opinion is used to support the recommendation. See Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 324-25 (<HOLDING>). But it makes no sense to allow the prosecutor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erroneous use of statutorily unqualified person to prepare posttrial recommendation requires new recommendation and action (B) recognizing the importance of congressional findings in determining the appropriateness of congresss remedial measures (C) recognizing prosecutors task to attempt to convince the court of the appropriateness of the recommendation (D) holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error (E) holding that if counsel raises an issue the failure to convince the court to rule in an appellants favor is not ineffective performance

A: (C)
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Q: and reimbursement claim based on the plan. Looking to FEHBA’s legislative history, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the purpose of FEHBA was to establish health insurance for federal employees and that insurance carriers “help the government fulfill the basic task of establishing a health benefits program for federal employees.” Id. at 1233. The Jacks court concluded that OPM “has direct and extensive control over these benefit contracts under the FEHBA.” The court determined that even though the plan “allows the carrier the discretion to pursue subrogation,” that “does not foreclose the application of the federal officer removal statute” because “the subrogation provision is necessarily a product of the benefit payment pro F.Supp.2d 848 (W.D.Mo.2011) (<HOLDING>); Van Horn v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that health insurer contracted with fehba was not acting under a federal agency within the meaning of the federal officer removal statute (B) holding that the fact that the insurance carrier voluntarily entered into a mutually agreed upon contract with the opm to administer healthcare benefits to federally employed enrollees does not rise to the level of a relationship defined as acting under a federal officer  (C) holding that a health plan insurer contracting with a government agency under a federal benefits program is considered a person acting under a federal officer (D) holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school (E) holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract

A: (B)
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Q: allowed agents to question beyond the routine inquiry if “suspicious circumstances” exist. Chavira, 9 F.3d at 889. Federal case law has held that suspicious circumstances do not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, and, in determining what constitutes suspicious circumstances, a court examines “the totality of the circumstances.” Massie, 65 F.3d at 848-49. {13} As for moving a vehicle to a secondary area, the court has given Border Patrol agents “ ‘virtually unlimited discretion to refer ears to the secondary inspection area.’ ” Id. at 847 (quoting United States v. Sanders, 937 F.2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir.1991)). Where a routine stop is conducted is “ ‘irrelevant to Fourth Amendment concerns.’ ” Id. (quoting Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d at 753); see also Sanders, 937 F.2d at 1499-1500 (<HOLDING>). The court, however, still requires detentions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dog sniff of an apartment door from a common area is a permissible nonsearch under the fourth amendment (B) holding the correct fourth amendment inquiry assuming the detention is legitimate is whether the questions extended the time that a driver was detained regardless of the questions content (C) holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question when answer could not be implied and that lack of objection waived right to new trial to have jury answer questions (D) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (E) holding that directing defendant to the secondary inspection area to answer additional questions is permissible under the fourth amendment

A:
(E)
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