In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: Majority Opinion in Ford, former Justice Newman authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Saylor joined, in which she specifically expressed her agreement “that appellate counsel acted ineffectively by neglecting to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to investigate and present evidence during the penalty phase of Appellant’s history of abuse and mental illness.” Ford, 809 A.2d at 336 (Newman, J., joined by Saylor, J., concurring). 5 . Although Teague's retroactivity analysis did not gamer five votes, a majority of the High Court soon thereafter reaffirmed the Teague plurality's rule and its two exceptions in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). 6 . Compare with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty (B) holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (C) holding that juveniles are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (D) holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing (E) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants
Example Output: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty

Example Input: 1 We note that the Supreme Court of Georgia recently vacated portions of the trial court’s injunction order in Barham v. City of Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375 (738 SE2d 52) (2013). 2 Am. Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Mom & Pop Stores, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 1, 7 (3) (497 SE2d 616) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 3 Levine v. Sun Trust Robinson Humphrey, 321 Ga. App. 268, 275 (3) (740 SE2d 672) (2013) (punctuation omitted). 4 Am. Petroleum Prods., 231 G 215 SE2d 294) (1975) (“[When] the complaining party cannot legitimately claim surprise, either because he knew of the existence of the witness or had equal means of knowing, it is not error to fail to invoke the sanctions of postponement, mistrial, barring the witness, etc.”). Cf. Malley Motors, Inc. v. Davis, 183 Ga. App. 599, 600 (1) (359 SE2d 394) (1987) (<HOLDING>). 18 See Hunter v. Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (B) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (C) holding that trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of a witness who was not listed in the pretrial order and no reason was given for the failure to list the witness (D) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (E) holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony
Example Output: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness

Example Input: ignoring the “series of events” that occurred between May 2006 and January 2007, and that those events establish the requisite causal connection. The anti-retaliation provision of the FCRA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person for opposing an unlawful employment practice or for making a charge of discrimination. Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7). The district court correctly found that Jiles had not put forth any evidence to show a causal connection between the protected activity of his administrative charge of race discrimination in May 2006 and his January 2007 termination. Further, the district court did not err when it reasoned that the time-frame of eight months does not sufficiently proximate to establish a causal connection. Doc. 72 at 12; see Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364 (<HOLDING>). We therefore find no error in the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a three to four month period between the protected activity is not enough to show very close temporal proximity (B) holding that a three and onehalf month temporal proximity is insufficient to create a jury issue on causation (C) recognizing temporal proximity when agency had knowledge of employees protected activity (D) holding in a discrimination case that a close temporal proximity sufficient to survive summary judgment existed where the challenged employment action occurred one month after the protected activity (E) holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection
Example Output:
holding that a three and onehalf month temporal proximity is insufficient to create a jury issue on causation