In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

witness testifying against him was in custody). This right is not subject to the trial court’s discretion; however, the court may preclude repetitive or unduly harassing interrogation. Ramey,. 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68; Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475. Thus: “[A] defendant need not show interest or motive in that any promises of leniency have, in fact, been made to the witness by the State or that any expectations of special favor exist in the mind of the witness, before cross-examining a witness as to possible bias. Further, the defense is entitled to inquire into such promises or expectations whether they are based on fact or are simply imaginary.” Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68, citing Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475-76. See also People v. Tomes, 284 Ill. App. 3d 514, 520, 672 N.E.2d 289 (1996) (<HOLDING>). “To this end a defendant has the right to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required (B) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (C) holding that limitation on scope and breadth of crossexamination did not significantly curtail effectiveness of witness crossexamination because crossexamination was lengthy and extensive (D) holding it is well established that crossexamination to show that a witness might be vulnerable to pressure whether real or imagined from the state regarding a pending charge is a matter of right (E) holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination
recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required

Commission, and appellants, yet the County Commissioners did not require any of them to face cross-examination before submitting those documents. Appellants maintain that all of this documentary evidence should have been placed before the County Commissioners by sworn witnesses who faced cross-examination, and, therefore, it should not have been considered by them. We disagree. “A zoning board, along with other administrative agencies, is generally not bound by the technical rules of evidence although it must observe fundamental fairness in dealing with the parties who appear before it.” Ginn v. Farley, 43 Md.App. 229, 236, 403 A.2d 858, cert. denied, sub nom. Engel v. Farley, 286 Md. 747 (1979). See also Entzian v. Prince George’s County, 32 Md.App. 256, 262, 360 A.2d 6 (1976) (<HOLDING>). The documents properly could be considered by 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence (B) holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound (C) holding that agency is bound by its regulations (D) recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence (E) recognizing that zoning agency bodies   are not bound by strict rules of evidence
recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence

has been specifically pled in the complaint, the defendant may still overcome a motion for remand by showing through a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory requisite. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 11 F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir.1993). Removal “cannot be based simply upon conclusory allegations.” Felton v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 324 F.3d 771, 774 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335). As the underlying complaint in this case does not request a specific amount of damages, that pleading must be further examined to determine if it is otherwise “facially apparent” that the requisite amount in controversy has been met. This analysis focuses on the nature of the damages alleged; See Simon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 193 F.3d 848, 851 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). But see Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing loss of consortium claims (B) holding that damages comprising an injured shoulder bruises abrasions unidentified medical expenses and a loss of consortium did not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement (C) holding that loss of consortium damages are not recoverable when the nonderivative claim did not result in physical injury (D) recognizing cause of action for loss of consortium (E) holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse

recognizing loss of consortium claims