In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court’s order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants’ arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment

Ex Output:
holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied


Ex Input:
... shall exist within the United States,” U.S. Const, amend. XIII, § 1, and empowers Congress to enforce its provisions, see U.S. Const, amend. XIII, § 2. The Supreme Court has interpreted this grant of power broadly, finding that Congress can affirmatively enforce the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude, and enact legislation to erase “all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). Moreover, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968), the Supreme Court opened the door to the inclusion of private acts of racial discrimination within the “badges and incidents of slavery” language as stated in the Civil Rights Cases. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413, 88 S.Ct. 2186 (<HOLDING>). Although the Thirteenth Amendment was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 42 usc  1982 a provision of the civil rights act of 1866 which allows victims of racial discrimination to sue private defendants was a valid exercise of congress thirteenth amendment authority (B) holding official immunity is available in claims of discrimination if plaintiff fails to establish his treatment by defendants was so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent racial discrimination that racial discrimination is the probable explanation (C) holding that civil rights claims under 42 usc  1981 and 1982 are personal injury tort claims (D) holding that the retaliation provision of title vii is an adequate exercise of congress authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights

Ex Output:
holding official immunity is available in claims of discrimination if plaintiff fails to establish his treatment by defendants was so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent racial discrimination that racial discrimination is the probable explanation


Ex Input:
CLC received was not reasonably equivalent to the value of the dividend, 740 ILCS 160(5)(b)(8) (2002); and (3) CLC was insolvent when the dividend was paid, 740 ILCS 160(5)(b)(9) (2002). The Trust contends fraud can be inferred from these three badges. But in fact only two of the badges are present. First, no reasonably equivalent value was given for the dividend. There is no “reasonably equivalent value” when the consideration for a transfer is either inadequate or nonexistent. Leibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. (In re Image Worldwide, Ltd.), 139 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir.1998). The dividend here was a unilateral transfer of $30,748, and no evidence has been offered that anything was given in return. See Fisher v. Hamilton (In re Teknek, LLC), 343 B.R. 850, 861 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2006) (<HOLDING>). Second, it is undisputed that CLC was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dividend paid to llc members was not a transfer for reasonably equivalent value (B) holding transfer of capital accounts from a limited partnership to a llc was valuable consideration for purposes of imposing state real estate transfer fee because the members received new rights and privileges (C) holding that it is not a collusive transaction when valuable consideration is paid to transfer a debt to a bona fide purchaser even if the transfer was for the purpose of invoking diversity jurisdiction (D) holding that transfer of property to llc involved no consideration for state conveyance tax purposes because it was a unilateral act and not the result of a bargainedfor exchange (E) holding transfer of legal title to property as a capital contribution to llc was in exchange for valuable consideration and constituted a sale of the property

Ex Output:

holding transfer of capital accounts from a limited partnership to a llc was valuable consideration for purposes of imposing state real estate transfer fee because the members received new rights and privileges