In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: (1993). This privilege has been given an “expansive reach” by California courts, as recognized by the California Supreme Court. See Rubin, 4 Cal.4th at 1194, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. This privilege affords absolute immunity against tort liability arising out of such a communication, regardless of attempts by the “plaintiff’ to “plead around” this “absolute barrier.” See id. at 1201-02, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. Thus, the immunity applies regardless of the particular label given to the cause of action (e.g., unfair competition). Section 47(b) protects participants in judicial proceedings from derivative tort actions based on communications in or regarding the judicial proceeding. See Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 781-83, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 830 (1996) (<HOLDING>). A “communication[ ] preparatory to or in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that letter to possible coclaimants seeking support for filing of suit was covered by the privilege (B) recognizing privilege (C) holding that voluntary testimony by spouse is not covered by husbandwife privilege (D) holding that documents reflecting the department of educations review of a universitys compliance with title iv were covered by the privilege and rejecting the argument that a specific policy judgment is necessary for the privilege to apply because the privilege servesto protect the processes by which governmental decisions as well as policies are formulated (E) holding that the initial disclosure of a crime to one spouses without more is covered by the marital communications privilege

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: Ms. Goren bases her statement of facts on her second amended complaint. That complaint, however, is not before this court. On September 3, 1997, the district court entered a judgment dismissing Ms. Goren’s complaint. Ms. Goren subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to alter or amend judgment to permit filing of a second amended complaint. Ms. Goren attached her proposed second amended complaint to that motion. On October 23, 1998, the court entered an order denying Ms. Goren’s motion. In her opening brief, Ms. Goren devoted nearly her en tire argument to the district court’s decision dismissing her amended complaint. Indeed, there is no “Issue Presented" or meaningful argument regarding the district court’s denial of Ms. Goren’s 93) (<HOLDING>). 5 . At oral argument, Ms. Goren’s counsel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prisoner did not engage in protected conduct when he threatened to file a frivolous grievance (B) holding that attorney who allegedly prepared false private placement memoranda regarding limited partnership did not conduct affairs of enterprise because he did not direct  the legal entities he represented to engage in particular transactions (C) holding that appellant forfeited his complaint regarding his sentence because he did not object at trial (D) holding that the defendant had abandoned any possessory or privacy interest in bags found in the truck he was driving where he stated that he did not own the bags did not know who did and did not know what was in them (E) holding that harold fine did not have direct and independent knowledge because he did not personally conduct the audits that led to the public disclosures

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: supervising, or otherwise controlling the agent” in addition to any vicarious liability that may be imposed via the agent’s actions. We hold that plaintiffs under the ICRA may proceed against the employer on either a direct negligence or vicarious liability theory for supervisor harassment in a hostile-work-environment case. The Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense, with the burden of proof on the employer, applies only to claims of vicarious liability. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764, 118 S.Ct. at 2270 (adopting affirmative defense “in order to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority” (emphasis added)); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. at 2292; see also Johnson v. Shinseki, 811 F.Supp.2d 336, 348 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct (B) holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied (C) holding because the court applied the negligence standard the faragher defense is inapplicable (D) holding that equitable defense of laches is inapplicable to claims of fraud (E) holding that even though the court does not usually apply the clearly erroneous standard to mixed questions of fact and law this standard is properly applied to the materiality issue


Output: (C)