In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: inquiry — • whether New Provo Canyon’s treatment of one individual constituted state action — differs substantially from that in Milonas, irrespective of whether, for purposes of a class action suit, Old Provo Canyon’s treatment of its patients generally constituted state action. Thus, the question here does not present the necessary “like facts” to trigger the stare decisis doctrine. D. Collateral Estoppel For the very same reason, Taylor’s collateral estoppel argument fails. Collateral esto Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553; Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Logistics Control Group, 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.1985) (discussed below). 13 . Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553-54; Lib. Mut. Ins., 969 F.2d at 1388-89; Holloway, 813 F.2d at 878-79; see also Nipper v. Snipes, 1 F.3d 415, 415-417 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Id. at 1553; see also Lib. Mut. Ins., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (B) holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body (C) holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial (D) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (E) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact
[EX A]: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint

[EX Q]: challenge to the amount of refund awarded by DOE to a third-party claimant even though they failed to intervene while DOE was deciding the third-party claimant’s award”). Persistent, the defendant analogizes the instant APA claim with that denied in Brooks v. Snow, 313 F.Supp.2d 654 (S.D.Tex.2004). There, the plaintiffs sought a declaration from the court that Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. § 301.722-1 (listing the grounds authorizing the IRS to settle a tax case) was inconsistent with congressional intent, because the regulation omitted delays caused by the IRS in determining tax liability. Id. at 658-59. The court dismissed their complaint, explaining that they had not “allege[d] they ever submitted any offers-in-compromise and, therefore, they have not upp. 239, 255 (Ct.Cl. 1947) (<HOLDING>). Second, and most crucially, this plaintiff 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a refund may include additional taxes paid after the filing of a refund claim so long as the total does not exceed the portion of tax paid prior to the administrative claim (B) holding under section 7422a that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a taxpayers refund claim because the taxpayer failed to file a refund claim before the statute of limitations had run (C) holding that because the amount of the debtors obligation to the government exceeded the amount of their income tax refund the refund did not become property of the estate and could not be exempted (D) holding that a taxpayer only has a refund right after the irs has credited the refund to other underpaid taxes therefore the refund was not part of the bankruptcy estate (E) holding that a subsequent refund request on reassessed taxes was unnecessary as the government already had notice of the plaintiffs claim
[EX A]: holding that a refund may include additional taxes paid after the filing of a refund claim so long as the total does not exceed the portion of tax paid prior to the administrative claim

[EX Q]: that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir.2000). Once the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to move beyond the pleadings and to designate evidence which demonstrates the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact to be resolved at trial. See 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1242 (10th Cir.2013) (citation omitted). A fact is “material” be considered when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep't, 427 F.3d 1303, 1314 (10th Cir.2005) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding hearsay evidence and evidence that violated the best evidence rule in deciding a summary judgment motion (B) holding that hearsay ev idence is not acceptable in opposing a summary judgment motion (C) holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment (D) holding that hearsay evidence is not acceptable in opposing a summary judgment motion (E) holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion
[EX A]:
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding hearsay evidence and evidence that violated the best evidence rule in deciding a summary judgment motion