In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: in calculating the reduction of state workers’ compensation benefits advances the legislature’s intent to reduce the state’s compensation burden by taking advantage of the workers’ compensation government benefits offset to its fullest extent. Accordingly, we hold that SSDI child’s benefits are to be included when calculating the amount of the reduction in an employer’s payment of workers’ compensation benefits under Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4. II. The Fund makes the argument that the WCCA exceeded its authority in examining the Social Security Act. The WCCA’s jurisdiction does not extend to interpreting or applying legislation designed specially for the handling of claims outside the workers’ compensation system. Taft v. Advance United Expressways, 464 N.W.2d 725, 727 (Minn.1991) (<HOLDING>). In that Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4, is a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the primary goal when interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the specific insurance policy (B) holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable (C) holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law (D) holding that the tucker acts waiver does not extend to statutory claims (E) holding that the jurisdiction of the wcca did not extend to interpreting or applying the law related to claims against the minnesota insurance guaranty association

A: holding that the primary goal when interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the specific insurance policy
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Q: this Opinion. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Trustee’s Objection to the Debtor’s Claim of exemption in her Toledo, Ohio house, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), be, and is hereby, SUSTAINED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Trustee’s Objection to the Debtor’s claim of exemption in past due rents, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5), be, and is hereby, DISMISSED without prejudice. 1 . As a resident of Michigan, the Debtor along with her bankruptcy petition also filed a contemporaneous motion for a change of venue to the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, which this Court granted. 2 . Pursuant to § 522(b), a debtor's right to claim an exemption in bankruptcy is determined by the state in which the debtor is domiciled. See In re Vaughan, 188 B.R. 234, 237 (Bankr.E.D.K.y.1995) (<HOLDING>). Some states like Michigan permit their 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that the terms residence and domicile are not the same thing but that a debtor may only claim an exemption in property where he is domiciled (C) holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a selfsettled revocable trust even though the settlor and the beneficiary as well as the bankruptcy debtor were the same person (D) holding that the objector must not only show that the facts do not support the exemption but must also prove that the debtor knowingly deceived the trustee and the creditors at the time the exemption was made (E) holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other

A: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate
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Q: credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event). Yet, the question presented here is whether the crime of involuntary manslaughter is also a crime universally recognized as a “crime involving moral turpitude.” A merely anecdotal survey of court decisions, many of which involve impeachment of witnesses, would suggest that a conviction for involuntary manslaughter is not such a crime, because of the lack of any intent, let alone an “evil intent.” See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mongiovi v. Karnuth, 30 F.2d 825 (W.D.N.Y.1929) (involuntary manslaughter does not involve moral turpitude); Carreker v. State, 661 So.2d 784 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Frascinella, 1 Cal.State Bar 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the longstanding rule that crimes that have fraud as an element are categorically crimes involving moral turpitude and a court may not apply the modified categorical approach if the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral turpitude (B) holding that involuntary manslaughter defined either as reckless or negligent was not a crime of moral turpitude because itwas based on unintentional conduct in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent it is not an offense that is mala in se and thus does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude (C) holding that robbery under california law categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude and noting precedent in this and other circuits that theft crimes are crimes involving moral turpitude (D) recognizing involuntary manslaughter as an offense that does not in and of itself constitute a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of attorney disbarment (E) holding that missouris reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude

A:
recognizing the longstanding rule that crimes that have fraud as an element are categorically crimes involving moral turpitude and a court may not apply the modified categorical approach if the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral turpitude
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