In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: state witnesses regarding their credibility during the course of the trial in chief. Angela Sweat had negotiated with state prosecution involving armed robbery charges, the facts of the plea agreement for impeachment was not permitted by the trial court. This witness was the sole evidence against the petitioner and had the jury known of her motive to lie they would have found me not guilty of the armed robbery charges. This was a denial of my right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the jury would have found me not guilty. Generally, federal courts should not review a state trial judge’s rulings with respect to the admissibility of evidence. Shaw v. Boney, 695 F.2d 528, 530 (11th Cir.1983). Even if the trial court’ h Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Evidentiary rulings are within the broad 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge (B) holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity (C) holding that denigrating insanity defense was inappropriate (D) holding that where the sole defense was insanity excluded testimony was material a crucial critical and highly significant factor (E) holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense

Answer: holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge


Question: his first issue, Samba maintains that the immigration judge placed too little weight on the length of his sentence and the assistance he provided to federal agencies in determining that the offense was a particularly serious crime. We have previously determined that such a claim, “which amount[s] to an argument that the immigration judge ‘abused [his] discretion in weighing the multiple desiderata made relevant by the [BIA’s] definition of a particularly serious crime,’ do[es] not present questions of law and therefore [is] not reviewable under section 1252(a)(2)(D).” Solorzano-Moreno v. Mukasey, 296 Fed.Appx. 391, 394 (5th Cir.2008) (third alteration in original) (quoting Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir.2006)); see also Sung v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that the first issue challenges 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencing judge would commit a statutory error  if the judge failed to consider the applicable guidelines range  as well as the other factors listed in section 3553a (B) holding that the source of the federal funds was not a relevant factor in determining the number of violations (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that the argument that the immigration judge did not consider all of the relevant factors in determining that his children would not suffer the requisite hardship was not a question of law under  1252a2d (E) holding that the family court is required to consider all relevant factors in determining alimony

Answer: holding that a sentencing judge would commit a statutory error  if the judge failed to consider the applicable guidelines range  as well as the other factors listed in section 3553a


Question: 121 L.Ed.2d 513 (1992), in which the Court held that ERISA preempted a state statute that applied only to employers who provided health insurance coverage, and Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139, 111 S.Ct. 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990), in which the Court held that ERISA preempted a common-law cause of action premised on the existence of an ERISA plan). 32 . Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325-28, 117 S.Ct. 832 (refusing to hold that a state statute pertaining to approved apprenticeship programs “referred to” ERISA plans because not all such programs were ERISA plans); see also Corporation Health Ins. v. Tx. Dep’t of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 535 (5th Cir.2000), op. modified, 314 F.3d 784 (5th Cir.2002). 33 . See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 40:2010; cf. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829, 108 S.Ct. 2182 (<HOLDING>). 34 . Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325, 117 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a georgia garnishment statute that solely applied to erisa employee benefit plans was preempted (B) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans (C) holding florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause (D) recognizing that it was beyond dispute that a state statute that required all insured benefit plans to submit to an extra layer of review for certain benefit denials had a substantial effect on erisa plans (E) holding that a state law requiring benefit plans to include minimum benefits related to erisa plans

Answer:
holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans