In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: against the Debtor have been discharged and that MDE’s pursuit of those claims in the State Court Action constitutes a violation of the discharge injunction. Accordingly, the Court orders the Respondents to cease any further pursuit of the Debtor in connection with the alleged claims but denies the Debtor’s -request for an award of damages and attorneys’ fees. A separate order will be entered consistent with this ruling. 1 . Unless otherwise noted, all statutory and rule references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1532, and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 2 . In addition to the pleadings filed in this matter, the Court takes judicial notice of the docket in the Debtor's case. See Cervac v. Littman (In re Littman), 561 B.R. 79, 83 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Unless otherwise noted, future references 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket (B) recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record (C) recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice (D) holding that the appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in related proceedings (E) holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket
[EX A]: recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record

[EX Q]: court’s description of the panel’s rationale as “one over which reasonable jurists may differ” can hardly be construed as a ringing endorsement of Bush v. Gore’s precedential value or its application to the issue of variations in voting technology. Shelley II, 344 F.3d at 918. At the very least, the Ninth Circuit’s unanimous decision in Shelley II divested the panel decision of whatever precedential value it otherwise would have had. Undeterred, the majority struggles to accord such value to Shelley I because the rationale adopted by the majority is virtually identical to the one provided by the Shelley I panel — namely, that the plaintiffs’ novel equal protection claims are controlled by Supreme Court precedents that mandate the equal weighting of votes. Compare Maj. Op. at 870-71 (<HOLDING>), with Shelley I, 344 F.3d at 894-95 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error (B) holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional (C) holding that the counties use of outdated technology results in the weighting of votes differently (D) holding that a plaintiff need only show that the results of a polygraph examination were a factor in the termination of employment and rejecting requirement that results be the sole factor for employees discharge (E) holding that in a statutory fee case the results obtained factor was already subsumed in the lodestar and that results multipliers should be awarded only in some cases of exceptional success
[EX A]: holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error

[EX Q]: 394 Ill. 362, 68 N.E.2d 750; People ex rel. School District No. 88 v. Holland (1943), 384 Ill. 277, 51 N.E.2d 266; Almon v. American Carloading Corp. (1942), 380 Ill. 524, 44 N.E.2d 592.) Although the contrary conclusion was recently reached in Leckrone v. City of Salem (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 126, 503 N.E.2d 1093, we adopt the analysis of the court in National Wrecking Co. v. Midwest Terminal Corp. (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 621, 518 N.E.2d 193, which adheres to the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in Almon. See also Leib v. Toulin, Inc. (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 707, 447 N.E.2d 900; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 362, 375 N.E.2d 522; cf. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller (1985), 472 U.S. 424, 86 L. Ed. 2d 340, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (<HOLDING>). Since no Illinois Supreme Court Rule 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable as collateral orders (B) holding that disclosure orders adverse to the attorneyclient privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine (C) holding that the disqualification order is an issue completely independent of the merits of the action (D) holding that a disqualification order in a criminal case is not appealable (E) holding that disqualification orders do not fall in the collateral order exception
[EX A]:
holding that orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable as collateral orders