In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: hard at Whirlpool, that is not a mitigating factor. Those are things that we are expected to do, all of us. We are expected to work hard at our jobs. We are expected to be involved in our children’s lives. We are expected to be civil to the people that we work and live around. Those aren’t mitigating factor[s]. Those are what every single human being should do. The Defendant is asking for extra credit because he did it sometimes. Appellant argues that these statements misled the jury because Arkansas neither defines nor limits mitigation by statute. And, in fact, he points to decisions by this court wherein the court has held that there is no requirement that the mitigating circumstances reduce culpability for the offense. See Pickens v. State, 292 Ark. 362, 730 S.W.2d 230 (1987) (<HOLDING>). He asserts that the prosecutor’s remarks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence (B) holding that sentencing scheme that permitted a limited range of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional because the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer  not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death (C) holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded (D) holding that relevant evidence supporting a defendants theory of defense should not be excluded unless no other remedy suffices (E) holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor
[A]: holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence


[Q]: (citations omitted). Kaul believes that because the Court did not include seizing cigarettes fi*om Indians inside a reservation on this list, Stephan lacked jurisdiction to execute the search warrant at Kaul’s store. However, we do not read Oklahoma Tax Commission and Colville as necessarily prohibiting state officers from conducting search and seizure operations within a reservation’s borders under the authority of a federal grant of criminal jurisdiction to the state. Instead, these opinions merely offer several options that state officials may employ to enforce regulatory cigarette tax statutes. Here, Kaul waived the argument that the Kansas statute was regulatory in nature because she did not raise that issue below. Thus, for purposes of this appea 3, 2061, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction (B) recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes  to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians (C) holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation (D) holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians (E) holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization
[A]: holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction


[Q]: technician positions are “irreducibly military in nature.” Id. Unpersuaded by the plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the civilian nature of her duties, the court went as far as noting that “the National Guard as a whole is irreducibly military.” Id. at 440. The Sixth Circuit has adhered to this “bright line” rule and has continued to consistently hold that, because dual-status National Guard positions are “irreducibly military in nature,” discrimination claims brought by such technicians are non-justi-ciable. See e.g., Weaver v. Tennessee National Guard, 30 Fed.Appx. 554 (6th Cir.2002) (Title VII claim barred); Brown v. Roche, 206 Fed.Appx. 430, 432 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of plaintiffs ADEA claim); see also Bowers v. Wynne, 615 F.3d 455, 457 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). In Bowers, the district court determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration (B) holding title vii and rehabilitation claims brought by a dualstatus air reserve technician barred (C) recognizing ageplusgender discrimination claim when complaint brought claims under adea and title vii (D) holding that a trustees claim was barred by res judicata and stating that the trustee could have asked the bankruptcy court to reserve his fraud claims for later adjudication which would have avoided his claims being barred (E) holding that air force mechanic was barred by feres from bringing claims under title vii and accordingly the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his claims under rule 12b1
[A]:
holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration