In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

the rate must make a threshold showing that the rate at issue is unreasonable. Milne, 970 F.2d at 570; Covey, 763 F.Supp. at 482-83. Relevant factors in the determination include “relevant rate comparisons, a carrier’s proffer of a particular rate, and whether the rate would have moved the traffic had it been asserted at the time the shipments took place.” Matter of Brown Transport Truckload, Inc., 144 B.R. 183, 187 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1992). One common method of making a prima facie showing of unreasonableness is to provide affidavit testimony demonstrating a significant disparity between the rates sought to be charged by the carrier and the rates charged by competing carriers at the time in question. See, e.g., Vining v. The Eureka Co., 1992 WL 370520, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 8, 1992) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Brown, 144 B.R. at 187 (noting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo (B) holding eighty percent increase in demanded rates and showing that original rates were competitive with other carriers was prima facie unreasonable (C) holding prima facie showing of unreasonableness made by presenting evidence that tariff rates in effect at time of shipments were well above rates paid to other carriers for same service (D) holding that absence of competitive injury was not a defense to prima facie violation of  2e (E) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review
holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo

first, that under New Jersey law a plaintiff assumes the risk of voluntarily participating in a sporting activities, citing Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959) and Pona v. Blvd. Arena, 35 N.J.Super. 148, 113 A.2d 529 (App.Div.1955), and that Buglioli voluntarily participated in a “cat and mouse game.” These cases provide no defense. First, the court knows of no decision after New Jersey adopted its comparative negligence statute interposing “assumption of risk” as a complete defense in a negligence action. To the contrary, a recent case arising from a contact sport accident formulated an appropriate rule by adjusting the standard of care, not by finding “assumption of risk.” See, e.g., Crawn v. Campo, 257 N.J.Super. 374, 608 A.2d 465 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Second, the court finds no New Jersey case 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety (B) holding no evidence of reckless disregard for safety of others when officer entered intersection without stopping and witness did not hear brakes being applied (C) holding that an unlawful act committed with the intent to injure or in a grossly negligent manner that proximately causes death is involuntary manslaughter and that criminal liability is imposed in the latter instance because although the defendants acts are not inherently wrong the defendant has acted or failed to act with awareness of the risk to safety and in wilful disregard of the safety of others (D) holding in actions arising from a contact sport accident plaintiff must show defendant acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others or intentionally (E) holding that cjulpable negligence is negligence of a gross and flagrant character which evinces a reckless disregard for the safety of others
holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety

change in circumstances); United States v. Unger, 915 F.2d 759, 762 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 643 (7th Cir.1989) (“Once the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, only a substantial change in circumstances will require the district court to inquire whether the defendant wishes to revoke his earlier waiver.”); Panagos v. United States, 324 F.2d 764, 765 (10th Cir.1963) (concluding that there were no facts or circumstances preventing “the initial waiver of the right to counsel, knowingly and intelligently made, from extending to and being fully effective at the time of sentencing” where only a reasonable amount of time intervened between the plea and sentencing); Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 834, 840 (8th Cir.1955) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants waiver of counsel when pleading guilty was an implied waiver as to any subsequent proceedings including sentencing four days later (B) holding that defendants failure to obtain counsel despite opportunities to do so implied a waiver of counsel (C) holding officers failure to obtain a written waiver from defendant did not render his oral waiver or subsequent confession involuntary (D) holding that a defendants statements were voluntary after defendant initially refused to sign waiver but later initiated the contact with police and signed the waiver (E) recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary

holding that defendants failure to obtain counsel despite opportunities to do so implied a waiver of counsel