In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

omitted)). This is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires a finder of fact to consider numerous relevant factors, including “substantially identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership.” Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Rabine, 161 F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir.1998). Intent to evade union obligations, though not the keystone to proving alter ego in some other circuits, is the most critical factor in the Seventh Circuit. Compare Trs. of Pension, Welfare & Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Favia Elec. Co., 995 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Centor Contractors, 831 F.2d at 1312), with Rd. Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, U.A., AFL-CIO v. Dorn Sprinkler Co., 669 F.3d 790, 794 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). 1. Ownership, management, operation, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights (B) holding that intent to evade collective bargaining obligations is merely one factor among many that must be considered (C) holding that exercising control over other participants is one factor among many that should be considered not a requirement for applying the adjustment (D) holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement (E) holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation
(B)

uncon-scionability.” Woebse, 977 So.2d at 632 (citing Bland ex rel. Coker v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 927 So.2d 252, 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). Procedural uncon-scionability necessarily takes into account the manner in which the agreement was made. Id. At the hearing, the Estate argued that the facts are identical, really, to the Woebse case, in that it was a five-minute process where she was told to sign here and here, that she didn’t read the agreement. It wasn’t explained as an arbitration agreement to her. It was not explained that it was a voluntary process. Thus, the Estate sufficiently demonstrated that a disputed issue exists as to the making of the agreement so as to require an evidentiary hearing. See Linden v. Auto Trend, Inc., 923 So.2d 1281, 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court should have held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that an evidentiary hearing is necessary only if the party requesting the hearing raises a significant disputed factual issue (C) holding university grievance committee hearing was not an arbitration proceeding even though hearing had significant characteristics of arbitration without substantial evidence to support an arbitration agreement (D) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (E) recognizing that a party may demonstrate that a disputed issue exists as to the making of an arbitration agreement through arguments of counsel at a hearing
(E)

at issue, it was revocable at the pleasure of the grantor); Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md. 301, 311 (1877) (“[A] user [that] has been by sufferance and permission only ... [is] but a license, revocable at pleasure, and ... confer[s] no right in the way. It simply relieve[s] the [party] from being a trespasser ....” (citation omitted)); Goss v. C.A.N. Wildlife Trust, Inc., 157 Md.App. 447, 457, 852 A.2d 996, 1002 (2004) (stating that “a license is merely a personal privilege to do some particular act ... on [another’s] land without possessing any estate or interest therein, while an easement is an interest in land that grants the right to use that land for a specific purpose” (internal quotations omitted)); State ex rel. Shorett v. Blue Ridge Club, 22 Wash.2d 487, 156 P.2d 667, 671 (1945) (<HOLDING>). In conclusion, based on the record before us, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (B) holding that a beach bordering on puget sound used extensively for public recreation was completely wild open vacant unoccupied and in its natural state and therefore public use was presumed to have originated by permission until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (C) holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees (D) holding that the use of a corset spring device was public although the use was by its nature not visible to the general public (E) holding that because public use of a beach was permissive the public was a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner

(E)