In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: search a premises, Weston, 67 M.J. at 393 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988), I do not believe that case to be controlling. Matlock was arrested on the front lawn of the house, Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166, 94 S.Ct. 988, and placed in a nearby police car. Id. at 179, 94 S.Ct. 988 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The arresting officers subsequently approached the house, spoke with a resident who shared a bedroom with Matlock, and received permission to search that bedroom. Id. at 166, 94 S.Ct. 988. The police did not ask Matlock for his consent to search the bedroom, nor did he offer it. Id. The Supreme Court recognized the consent of the cotenant may be valid against a eotenant who has not objected. Id. at 170, 94 S.Ct. 988; see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179-80, 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (<HOLDING>). This case differs from Matlock and Rodriguez 
 Holding statements: (A) holding cotenants consent to search valid where rodriguez who was asleep inside the house was not asked for his consent if police reasonably believed the consenter possessed common authority over the premises (B) holding that the agents superficial and cursory questioning of the consenting party did not disclose sufficient information for the agent reasonably to believe that she had common authority over the premises and that further inquiry was required under rodriguez (C) holding that mother who was resident of house shared with adult daughter could give valid consent to search premises (D) holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises (E) holding that there is no violation of the fourth amendment when the government reasonably believed that the individual giving consent to the search had authority to do so
[EX A]: holding that the agents superficial and cursory questioning of the consenting party did not disclose sufficient information for the agent reasonably to believe that she had common authority over the premises and that further inquiry was required under rodriguez

[EX Q]: 620, 622 (La.App.1967) (same). Takings of temporary easements are measured differently. A landowner must be compensated for the loss of use of property taken by a temporary easement and any impairment of access to the property during the period of construction. Miczek v. Commonwealth, 32 Mass.App. Ct. 105, 108, 586 N.E.2d 1004, 1005 (1992) (involving temporary slope easement). Some courts have held that the damages are equal to the rental value of the property for the period of occupation. 4 Nichols at § 12E.01. This is commonly measured by the rental value of the property as a whole. See Paddock v. Town of Durham, 110 N.H. 106, 108, 261 A.2d 438, 441 (1970); 4A Nichols at § 14.2462. Cf. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 8, 69 S.Ct. 1434, 1439, 93 L.Ed. 1765 (1949) (<HOLDING>). E. Miscellaneous Damages are to be measured 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proper measure of compensation in a temporary taking is the rental value that probably could have been obtained (B) holding that fair market value was proper measure of damages for stock brokers breach of margin agreement caused by sale of plaintiffs shares without authorization noting that generally speaking fair market value is proper measure of damages for breach of contract relating to sale of goods which have an ascertamable value on the market (C) holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure (D) holding that the proper measure of damages to repair defects for a building contract that has not been substantially performed is the contractually agreed upon measure of damages (E) holding that the proper measure of damages was the present value of all unaccrued payments that the plaintiff would have received if the contract had been performed
[EX A]: holding that fair market value was proper measure of damages for stock brokers breach of margin agreement caused by sale of plaintiffs shares without authorization noting that generally speaking fair market value is proper measure of damages for breach of contract relating to sale of goods which have an ascertamable value on the market

[EX Q]: held that the MVFRL mandated that the driver be covered, up to the MVFRL limits, by the owner’s policy issued to Metro Ford from Universal. Id. at 283. Hargrave and Rader teach that the insured exclusion in NCC’s owner’s policy is invalid to the extent it would deny coverage, up to the MVFRL limits, for Bough’s permissive use of the Cougar. See § 303.190.7; Halpin v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. banc 1992). Therefore, the NCC policy provides Bough with the mandatory MVFRL liability insurance coverage of $25,000 per person. The insured exclusion in the NCC policy, however, is enforceable to bar any additional liability insurance coverage for Bough beyond that mandated by the MVFRL. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zumwalt, 825 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Mo.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). Appellant’s first point is granted. Point III 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a household exclusion in the policy was void insofar as it denied coverage in the amount required by  3031902 but it was valid as to any coverage exceeding that amount (B) holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy (C) holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous exclusion applied to all coverage afforded by the policy including the um coverage (D) holding that a hospital may not assert a statutory lien in an amount exceeding the amount it agreed to accept from the patients insurer (E) holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage
[EX A]:
holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy