In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
campus is a limited public forum. Def. Br. 12. The Court agrees with the defendants’ assessment. The Court begins by recognizing that “the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum.” Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). Accordingly, the Second Circuit has noted, “[s]ome portions of a public college’s campus may be a public forum.” Davis v. Stratton, 360 FedAppx. 182, 184 (2d Cir.2010). Significant to the analysis, however, is that these areas may constitute a designated public forum only to the extent they are “intentionally openfed]” to First Amendment activities. Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir.2004); see also Ochshom, 645 F.3d at 540 (<HOLDING>); Hotel Emps., 311 F.3d at 545 (noting that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a high school is not a public forum thus precluding free airing of religious views (B) holding that a public high school newspaper was a limited public forum not a traditional or designated public forum because there was no evidence that the school permitted indiscriminate use by the general public quoting hazelwood sch dist v kuhlmeier 484 us 260 267 108 sct 562 98 led2d 592 1988 (C) holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence (D) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (E) recognizing that government is not required to retain open nature of designated public forum

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability “from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik’s] attendance” it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik’s attendance at the gym — in essence all of Sydlik’s claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
interest in the Annuity to remain with [Claude].” Supporting the trial court’s finding is a letter from Jean to Cindy Lott, Jean’s daughter and the personal representative of her estate, and testimony from Lott. Jean’s letter stated “I went to United today and had my beneficiary changed on my IRA account. I put it in your name and Dianne as [contingent] in case something happens to you. Dianne is beneficiary to my annuity account.” Lott testified that Jean attempted to change the beneficiary of annuity and that Jean thought that the beneficiary was changed. Claude argues, however, that both Jean’s letter and Lott’s testimony violate the Dead Man’s Statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 19-11-20 (1985). Unquestionably, Jean’s letter is admissible. Harris v. Berry, 231 S.C. 201, 98 S.E.2d 251 (1957) (<HOLDING>). In addition, because Lott’s testimony is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants were not in control and therefore were not supervisors and not subject to liability under  1983 (B) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (C) holding that letters written by decedent to the testatrix and a first cousin who were designated as beneficiaries under the will were not within prohibition of the dead mans statute and were improperly excluded (D) holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during and were unrelated to the judicial proceeding (E) holding that because the record does not indicate that the extraneous documents or averments were excluded by the court  we must assume that they were considered

Ex Output:

(C)