In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of the [Marion County] small claims court shall be taken to the superior court of the county and tried de novo." Retaining the identical language, the Legislature re-codified the statute in 2004 as Indiana Code section 33-34-3-15(a). 2 . Atlantic Coast sought interlocutory review of the trial court's order, which the Court of Appeals accepted. The Court of Appeals addressed this claim in the instant appeal. 3 . Atlantic Coast does not challenge the Court of Appeals' determination regarding the discovery order, and the Cooks do not challenge the determination that they waived appellate review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Delta Airlines on the Cooks' negligence claim. 4 . Compare, for example, Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), and O'Carroll v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding federal law preempts state regulation of voip provider but expressing no opinion on applicability of state laws generally governing such companies including laws concerning taxation (B) holding that general maritime law preempts state law (C) holding that the flsa preempts certain state law claims (D) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans (E) holding that federal law establishes the applicable standards of care in the field of aviation safety generally and thus preempts the entire field from state regulation

Output: holding federal law preempts state regulation of voip provider but expressing no opinion on applicability of state laws generally governing such companies including laws concerning taxation


Input: Consider Input: State, after expressing its clear and accurate understanding of the ... issue ..., deliberately steer[s] the District Court away from the question and towards the merits of [the] petition.” Wood v. Milyard, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (internal citation omitted). In Wood, the state had assured the district court that it was “not challenging, but d[id] not concede, the timeliness of the petition.” Id. at 1830. As in Wood, the state’s words and conduct cannot be described as an inadvertent mistake or forfeiture of the exhaustion defense, as was the case in Day, but instead they clearly evidence an express intention to waive the exhaustion requirement. As the First Circuit said, “[t]hat was game, set, and match.” Pike v. Guarino, 492 F.3d 61, 71-72 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits have also held this type of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal (B) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (C) holding that a waived issue ordinarily cannot be resurrected on appeal whereas a forfeited issue may be reviewed for plain error (D) holding statement that  petitioner is correct in her assertion that the claims presented  have been exhausted  was unmistakably clear and could not be resurrected on appeal alteration in original (E) holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court

Output: holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal


Input: Consider Input: accident insurance” as a collateral source. Id. Respondent argues that UIM benefits are akin to payments from the tortfeasor’s liability insurance, which do not constitute collateral sources. Respondent relies on Do, a case in which the supreme court held that “a payment made by a tortfeasor’s automobile insurer is not a collateral source” under section 548.251. 779 N.W.2d at 855. The supreme court observed that the ordinary meaning of “collateral source” refers to a source “wholly independent of’ and unconnected with the tortfeasor, and held that payments made to an injured claimant by the tortfeasor’s liability insurer constitute a direct rather than a collateral source because they derive directly from the tortfeasor’s insurance. See id. at 859-60; see also Dean, 535 N.W.2d at 345 (<HOLDING>). As a result, they do not constitute 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that violence that does not stem from particularized animosity but rather from a financial incentive does not constitute persecution (B) holding hospital could not enforce ben directly against tortfeasors insurer because patient had no right to directly sue insurer (C) holding that an insurer can be estopped from denying coverage for failure to make payments where that insurer has established a course of conduct of accepting late payments (D) holding that payments from a tortfeasors insurer are not from a collateral source because they stem directly from the tortfeasor (E) holding that recovery from the tortfeasors insurer is a condition precedent to a claim for uim benefits


Output: holding that violence that does not stem from particularized animosity but rather from a financial incentive does not constitute persecution