In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
of the offense charged but convict on the included offense. However, the mere chance that a jury may reject uncontroverted testimony and convict on the lesser charge does not require the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser charge." People v. Ramires, 18 P.3d 822, 827 (Colo.App.2000) (internal citations omitted). 184 The offense of patronizing a prostituted child requires, as relevant here, "knowingly engaging in an act" where "a child perform[s] or offer[s] or agree[s] to perform ... any [sexual] act ... in exchange for money." § 18-7-406(1)(a), 18-7-401(6). Based on the language of the statute, actual performance of a sexual act is not necessary; a mere offer or agreement to perform is sufficient, provided money has been promised. See supra Part V.A; Madden, 111 P.3d at 460 (<HOLDING>). 185 Here, because the uncontrovert-ed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage (B) holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition (C) holding that a party invoking a  547c1 defense must prove the specific measure of the new value given to the debtor in exchange for what was received (D) holding that patronizing a prostituted child requires some record evidence that the defendant attempted to give anything of value  in exchange for sex (E) holding that under 11 usc  547c4 a later payment in exchange for new value only deprives the defendant of the new value defense if the later payment is an otherwise unavoidable transfer

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
Defendants’ Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 22 (“Plaintiffs appear to be claiming that they are entitled to ‘Class of One’ review[.]”)) Furthermore, County Defendants did not explicitly address the appeal issue anywhere in their motion. Given this background, it was not error for the Court to ascribe the “class of one” argument to Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge, nor was it error for the Court to find that County Defendants had not met their burden on the question of summary judgment. To the extent that County Defendants now contend that Plaintiffs “class of one” argument must fail because no other party has appealed for a waiver, this is a new argument that is not appropriate in a motion for reconsideration. See Haw. Stevedores, Inc. v. HT & T Co., 363 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1269 (D.Haw.2005) (<HOLDING>). Should County Defendants wish to re-visit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court will generally not consider arguments presented for the first time on appeal (B) holding that reconsideration pursuant to rule 59 cannot be premised on the same arguments presented in the complaint and motions (C) holding that motions for reconsideration are not appropriate if the movant asks the court to hear new arguments or supporting facts that could have been presented originally (D) holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision (E) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
had simply taken the first step in the ultimate disposition of the dispute between the parties. Citizens Nat’l Bank of Beaumont v. Callaway, 597 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd); see also Elm Creek, 940 S.W.2d at 150. Because an interlocutory order may only be appealed when authorized by statute and because there is no such authority for the appeal of an order compelling arbitration, we must follow the holdings of this and other courts in concluding that an order compelling arbitration is an unappealable interlocutory order. See Elm Creek, 940 S.W.2d at 150 (concluding court of appeals had no jurisdiction over interlocutory order compelling arbitration); Gathe v. Cigna Healthplan of Texas, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Bethke v. Polyco, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 431, 434 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable because it is not final and because it is not listed in the uaa appeals provision (B) holding that orders compelling arbitration are not appealable not because of the uaa appeals provision but because it has been definitely settled by the supreme court of this state that an order compelling arbitration is not final and therefore is not appealable (C) holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court (D) holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final (E) holding order compelling arbitration is unappealable

Ex Output:

(E)