In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: that in December 1995, his wage was $8.67 per hour. Lewis stated that a Caucasian employee, who misrepresented his knowledge of desktop publishing, was hired at a rate of $9.00 per hour in his department. This employee ultimately was “[p]ushed out the door.” Supp.App. at 354. Lewis also stated that another Caucasian employee received a pay increase from $7.50 to $8.25 per hour after he went from part-time to full-time status, and that a third Caucasian employee told him that he received a raise after his father called the store manager. The District Court held that Lewis failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he had not shown that the employees he identified were similarly situated to him. See Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 857-58 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on his wrongful termination claim, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated (B) holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment (C) holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim (D) holding that employees of differing seniority levels were not similarly situated (E) holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: any meaning at all, I do not think that [the defendant’s statement that he had a .357 magnum and that no one would get hurt if she put the money in the bag] can reasonably be said to constitute an ‘express threat of death,’ U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). What was conveyed here was, at most, an implicit threat of serious bodily injury or death.”). We agree with the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit, and views of Judges Easterbrook and Arnold that to satisfy the qualifier “express,” a defendant’s statement must distinctly and directly indicate that the defendant intends to kill or otherwise cause the death of the victim. Because four of the five examples in Application Note 6 do not, they are not controlling. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993)(<HOLDING>). Similarly, reliance on the commentary’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that commentary in sentencing guidelines that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guideline it interprets (B) recognizing the guidelines commentary is authoritative (C) holding that sentencing guidelines commentary must be given controlling weight unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or is plainly inconsistent with the guidelines itself (D) holding that guidelines commentary is generally authoritative (E) holding that where the commentary to a guideline is at odds with another provision of the guidelines the guideline prevails
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: the likelihood and probability of infection following treatment. As in Arnold, Kamel’s claims regarding failure to disclose risks and to receive informed consent do not fall within the waiver provision of the TTCA. See id. at 469 (“Failure to receive informed consent [does] not waive immunity under the TTCA.” (citing Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 589)). Likewise, Kamel’s claims of negligent supervision, failure to perform the necessary medical treatment, and failure to use acceptable practices to limit infection are claims for errors in medical judgment or general medical negligence and do not involve the use of tangible property. Therefore, those claims do not fall within the waiver in section 101.021(2). See id.; see also Hall v. Provost, 232 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Kamel contends that the doctors’ use 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that errors in medical judgment do not provide waiver of immunity under ttca (B) holding that general medical malpractice claims do fall with waiver provision of ttca (C) holding that a north carolina rule requiring an expert certification in a medical malpractice case applied in a federal tort claims act case sounding in medical malpractice brought in federal court (D) holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits those claims fall squarely within the scope of erisa (E) holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal
[EX A]:
(B)