In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: v. Eggleston, 202 Ariz. 523, 527, ¶ 16, 47 P.3d 1161, 1165 (App.2002). Second, a statute should be construed in conjunction with other statutes that relate to the same subject or purpose, giving effect to all statutes involved. Id. Third, in furtherance of such harmonization, courts should review the history of the various sections in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature and thereby construe the statutes to further that intent. State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366, 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989). After reviewing the history of the relevant statutory scheme, we conclude that the legislature never intended that the acquisition of land for park purposes be subject to the public auction requirement. See State v. Cornish, 192 Ariz. 533, 537, ¶ 16, 968 P.2d 606, 610 (App.1998) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 12 As part of its comprehensive statutory 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that courts should look to other sources of legislative intent if the statutory language does not convey a clear meaning (B) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent (E) holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous
[A]: (D)


[Q]: grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action. Id. (emphasis added). A defendant must also “file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” Id. § 1446(d). The removal statutes are construed narrowly. Pritchett v. Off its, including the District of Kansas, have also followed this approach. See, e.g., Berbig v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Inc., 568 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1039 n. 9 (D.Minn.2008) (stating that “a failure to comply with the requirements of [Section 1446(a) ] ordinarily is not grounds to deny removal”); Riggs v. Fling Irrigation, Inc., 535 F.Supp.2d 572, 579 (W.D.N.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Yellow, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1215; In re Methyl 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under alabama law the law of the forum applies to procedural matters and that in most instances the statute of limitations is considered to be a procedural rule (B) recognizing that the procedural defect could be corrected through a reinstatement of the termination proceedings (C) holding that if the states criminal complaint against defendant had a jurisdictional defect the prosecution had the right to attempt to correct the defect and a motion to dismiss is one method of doing this (D) holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect (E) holding while there may be some case law to support plaintiffs argument the majority approach is that the failure to attach process defect is merely procedural and that this particular procedural defect may be cured
[A]: (E)


[Q]: may consist of motorcycles rather than ski trails, but the principles are no less applicable.” Post, ¶ 25. This assertion ignores the fact that our decision in Dalury depended in large part on “[t]he major public policy implications . . . underlying the law of premises liability.” 164 Vt. at 334, 670 A.2d at 799. Dalury emphasized the duty of care a business owner has “to make sure that its premises are in safe and suitable condition for its customers.” Id. (quotation omitted). The dissent’s attempt to equate motorcycles to ski hills fails because the strong public policy of premises liability in Dalury has no parallel in the area of motorcycle test riding. Another critical distinction is that there is no claim here that the product offered by defendant 492, 493 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (<HOLDING>). In addition, unlike the ski area in Dalury 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the public interest exception (B) holding that mountaineering does not implicate the public interest (C) holding that a school principals suspension with pay did not implicate a constitutionally protected property interest (D) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (E) holding that mere negligence does not implicate the right to due process
[A]:
(B)