In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 235, 239 (Fed.Cir.1988). On appeal, Mr. Baney does not challenge the Board’s determination that collateral estoppel bars his leave-related claims. We agree with the Board that Mr. Baney’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel because they challenge the same issues that Mr. Baney actually litigated and that were necessary to the decisions in previous proceedings. See, e.g., Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 409 Fed.Appx. 319 (Fed.Cir.2010) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with eleven and a half hours of AWOL in November 2008); Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 263 Fed.Appx. 892 (Fed.Cir.2008) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with 23 days of leave while on active military duty for 30 days); see also Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 327 Fed.Appx. 895 (Fed.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because relitigation of issue was barred by collateral estoppel res judicata determination of finality of judgment dismissed for lack of standing was not relevant (B) holding that collateral attacks on bankruptcy courts jurisdiction are barred by res judicata (C) holding that the plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata when the federal courts judgment was finalized by denial of his petition for certiorari (D) holding that mr baneys challenge to being charged with 208 hours of annual leave while on active military duty for 30 days was barred by the res judicata effects of our 2008 decision (E) holding that a trustees claim was barred by res judicata and stating that the trustee could have asked the bankruptcy court to reserve his fraud claims for later adjudication which would have avoided his claims being barred

A: (D)
****
Q: who are undeniably state actors, colluded with her in her actions. When all intendments are taken in the Plaintiffs’ favor, therefore, their allegations indicate both that Malac infringed their substantive due process rights and that she can be considered a state actor. Accordingly, Malac’s motion to dismiss is denied. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Barbara Malac’s motion to dismiss [Docket No. 47] is DENIED. The motion of Defendant Agent Cynthia Preston and Defendant Agent Nancy Gingras [Docket No. 50] to dismiss is DENIED with respect to Agent Preston, but GRANTED with respect to Agent Gingras. SO ORDERED. 1 . For the propriety of citing this unpublished Second Circuit opinion, see Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-905 (8th Cir.2000) (Arnold, J.) (<HOLDING>), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.2000) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unpublished opinions are of persuasive value at best and not precedential (B) holding that opinions accompanying the denial of certiorari cannot have the same effect as decisions on the merits (C) holding that even district court cases decided by panels of three have no precedential value (D) holding that unpublished opinions have precedential effect (E) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted

A: (D)
****
Q: rather than immune, from taxation, see Lehigh-Northampton Airport Auth., 585 Pa. at 676 n. 9, 889 A.2d at 1180 n. 9 (noting that immunity is a threshold issue, and a non-immune parcel may be tax-exempt on a separate basis), so long as the public use continues. See Pa. Const, art. VIII, § 2(a)(iii) (permitting the General Assembly to exempt from taxation “[t]hat portion of public property which is actually and regularly used for public purposes”); 53 Pa.C.S. § 8812(a)(8) (“The following property shall be exempt from all county, city, borough, town, township, road, poor, county institution district and school real estate taxes: ... [a]ll other public property used for public purposes.... ”); see also Appeal of Mun. Auth. of Borough of West View, 381 Pa. 416, 420, 113 A.2d 307, 309 (1955) (<HOLDING>). See generally Wesleyville Borough v. Erie 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that leased property is exempt from taxation where the lessee uses it for a public purpose (B) holding that lcras property devoted exclusively to public use is exempt from taxation under article xi section 9 (C) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (D) recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate (E) recognizing that unlike public uses private uses of property are characterized by the benefits bestowed on a particular and most often limited sector of the public usually distinguishable by certain characteristics or membership

A:
(A)
****