In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.” Teffeteller v. State, 495 So.2d 744, 745 (Fla.1986). In noncapital cases, too, we have concluded that “resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights.” Trotter v. State, 825 So.2d 362, 367-68 (Fla.2002); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 525 (Fla.2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (“We have consistently held that resentencing proceedings must be a ‘clean slate,’ meaning that the defendant’s vacated sentence becomes a ‘nullity’ and his ‘resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.’ ” (citation omitted)); Walker, 988 So.2d at 8 (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially) (“Generally, courts have held that once a def A 1998) (<HOLDING>); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing (B) holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction (C) holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing (D) holding that even though the defendant did not challenge his prior convictions at the original sentencing lawofthecase principles do not insulate the state from proving them at resentencing (E) holding that at resentencing on violation of probation trial court may revise guidelines scoresheet to reflect prior convictions mistakenly omitted from the original through no fault of the defendant
[A]: (D)


[Q]: of the statute, the FDA’s regulations, the FDA’s internal interpretation, and precedent all demonstrate that a sterilizer for dental hand-pieces is a “device” as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(h). That being so, both SteriSafe and its accessory SteriDot are within the jurisdiction of the FFDCA. Defendant nevertheless posits three reasons why SteriSafe and SteriDot are not devices. First, defendant argues that the government failed to prove that dental handpieces transmit disease and, thus, that SteriSafe actually prevents disease. Such proof is not required. Congress had two purposes in enacting' the FFDCA: (1) to regulate products that actually prevent disease, and (2) to regulate products that falsely claim that they prevent disease. Because of those d 1006 (9th Cir.1952) (<HOLDING>). Defendant next argues that the Steri-Safe is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the doctor who submitted an expert report did not demonstrate knowledge of cancer treatment he was not qualified to offer an opinion that an earlier diagnosis could have produced a better outcome for the plaintiff (B) holding that a machine that allegedly eliminated lumps from womens breasts was governed by the ffdca even though expert witnesses expressed the unanimous belief that appellants instruments are useless for diagnosis or treatment of any human ailment (C) holding the expert witnesses were protected by witness immunity to ensure expert objectivity (D) holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for  trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis (E) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law
[A]: (B)


[Q]: Simply put, a causal connection between the Mr. Black’s DDOT disciplinary proceedings and his whistleblowing complaint is temporally impossible because Mr. Black did not make a formal whistleblow-ing complaint until months after his DDOT disciplinary proceedings started. Thus, Mr. Black has failed to state a plausible retaliation claim under the Whistleblower Protection Act. V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the District’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 1 . Mr. Black concedes that his defamation claim fails because he did not comply with D.C. Code § 12-309 prior to filing this lawsuit. Pl.’s Mem. Opp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss ("Pl.’s Mem. Opp."), Docket No. 15 at 20. See, e.g. Clark v. Flach, 604 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C.2009) (<HOLDING>). 2 . On February 12, 2013, Mr. Black filed a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation (B) holding that the purpose of  12309 is to allow the district to conduct a prompt investigation of the injured persons claim (C) holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report (D) holding that after a reasonable investigation an insurer must promptly settle a claim for the value or within the range assigned to the claim as a result of its investigation (E) holding that the irs has a law enforcement purpose in the context of a criminal tax investigation
[A]:
(B)