In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Def.’s Mot., Ex. E, Gaskins’ Decl. ¶ 5. Although plaintiff said that he “heard the rumor about [the cubicle] being unsafe[,]” he contends that the cubicle was not in disrepair and was removed solely in retaliation for his EEO complaint. Def.’s Mot., Ex. A, Jones Dep. at 113, 115. However, plaintiff did not testify that he was unable to complete his work assignments; rather, he testified that the result of the cubicle being dismantled was that he “had no place to put none of [his] stuff[,]” which included “records and stuff[,]” although he testified that the cubicle was replaced with a desk, albeit a small one. Id. at 114-15. These facts do not support a finding of an adverse action sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See, e.g., Brodetski, 141 F.Supp.2d at 45 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). III. Conclusion For the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the administrative transfer of a teacher which denied him the opportunity to teach his preferred subject could constitute an adverse employment action (B) holding that plaintiff s allegations that defendants denied him his right to choose a new workstation on two occasions do not constitute adverse employment actions even if they made plaintiff feel slighted or wrong (C) recognizing that employment actions can be adverse even if such actions are subsequently withdrawn (D) holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false (E) recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually
(B)

improperly determined that the “neither expected nor intended” language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an “occurrence.” ¶21 The CGL policy’s core provision defines “occurrence” by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was “neither expected nor intended.” This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured’s expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an “occurrence” and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). ¶22 Here the District Court found that Ribi 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended
(A)

decided that § 80A.01(b), as a derivative of § 17(a)(2), “does not require scienter, but supports a negligence based theory of recovery.” Sprangers, 394 N.W.2d at 503. Although the Minnesota cases on § 80A.01 subsequent to Sprangers may appear at first glance to be in conflict because the subparts of the statute are not always referenced, the Minnesota Supreme Court cited to Sprangers with approval when ruling on a securities case involving an unsuitability claim. Minneapolis Employees Retirement Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn.1994) (citing Sprangers’s holding that a “seller of stock may be liable for misrepresentation [under § 80A.01(b) ] irrespective of scienter”). That court also referenced § 80A.01(a) in Foley v. Allard, 427 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn.1988) (<HOLDING>). Sprangers is the state’s most thorough 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this subpart does require scienter (B) holding that 20 of individual defendants holdings raised an inference of scienter (C) holding that this rule does not require the creation of an inventory of documents to be produced (D) holding that this court does not necessarily require the claim to be specifically raised in an eeoc charge provided that it satisfies this scopeofinvestigation test (E) holding the pslra standard for pleading scienter is more stringent than the second circuits standard prior to the act and that motive and opportunity is not an independent basis to show defendants had scienter

(A)