In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: v. Eggleston, 202 Ariz. 523, 527, ¶ 16, 47 P.3d 1161, 1165 (App.2002). Second, a statute should be construed in conjunction with other statutes that relate to the same subject or purpose, giving effect to all statutes involved. Id. Third, in furtherance of such harmonization, courts should review the history of the various sections in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature and thereby construe the statutes to further that intent. State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366, 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989). After reviewing the history of the relevant statutory scheme, we conclude that the legislature never intended that the acquisition of land for park purposes be subject to the public auction requirement. See State v. Cornish, 192 Ariz. 533, 537, ¶ 16, 968 P.2d 606, 610 (App.1998) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 12 As part of its comprehensive statutory 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that courts should look to other sources of legislative intent if the statutory language does not convey a clear meaning (B) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent (E) holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: S. Sprouse Residuary Trust, which is a named defendant in this action. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer only to Mr. Sprouse in this opinion. 4 .Ms. Bagwell, who is not a lawyer, also testified that she thought that the original five-year lease was on "a year[-]to[-]year basis.” 5 . Mr. Sprouse did not take issue with the $534 award for the damage to Mr. Ellis's corn crop. 6 . See also 2 Friedman on Leases § 14.301, at 915 (noting that payment of increased rent under an option constitutes an acceptance of the option). 7 . Painter v. Town of Groveland, 79 So.2d 765, 767 (Fla.1955) (finding such a presumption contrary to statute); Branagen v. Winders & Alm, 194 Iowa 461, 187 N.W. 440, 440-41 (Iowa 1922); Schiltz v. Teledirect Int'l, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); Elec. Sales Eng’rs, Inc. v. Urban Renewal & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there was no renewal but finding estoppel on the part of the landlord (B) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (C) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (D) recognizing the abuse of discretion standard and the requirement of evidentiary support for a finding of estoppel (E) holding that estoppel was a question of fact
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: dismissed by the district court as alleging only one cognizable federal cause of action, that is, for arrest without probable cause. We also hold that the defendants sufficiently pleaded qualified immunity with respect to count one. 8 . The insufficiency of counts two and three, which were dismissed for reasons other than qualified immunity, is not before us under the collateral order doctrine which permits us to consider the immunity issue. See Schmelz v. Monroe County, 954 F.2d 1540, 1542-43 (11th Cir.1992). Nor does this case present us with an opportunity to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to pass on the propriety of the district court's disposition with respect to these counts. See Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, —U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 1211-12, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The district court's dismissal of these two 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pendent jurisdiction allows review of an unappealable order if it is inextricably intertwined with an appealable one  (B) recognizing the rulings in cook and weinberg and holding that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review an order that was not a preliminary ruling upon which the appealed order was predicated (C) holding that an appellate court may not exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal district court order where the merits of the nonfinal order are not inextricably intertwined with the properly appealed collateral order or where review of the former is not necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter (D) holding that certiorari petition is appropriate to review nonfinal pretrial evidentiary order in criminal case (E) holding that an order requiring an employercarrier to provide an ime is a nonfinal order for purposes of invoking appellate jurisdiction
[EX A]:
(C)