In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts.” Mungin v. State, 982 So.2d 986, 998 (Fla.2006). A. Stipulating to Evidence for the Motion to Suppress Parker’s May 7, 1982, Statement In this claim, Parker contends that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the evidence used to decide whether his May 7, 1982, statement was admissible. Parker’s May 7 statement was admitted during the resentencing proceeding through the testimony of Detective Powers. Because Parker had invoked his right to counsel prior to making the May 7 statement, the admissibility of that statement under United States Supreme Court precedent turns on whether Parker initiated the May 7 contact with law enforcement. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The stipulated evidence included hearsay 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available  unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (B) holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (C) holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications (D) holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (E) holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police
[A]: holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police


[Q]: performance is a matter that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Jordan v. Boisvert, 632 So.2d 254, 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). While forfeitures are not favored, a forfeiture will be enforced where it is clear that the parties intended such a result. Nelson v. Hansard, 143 Fla. 898, 197 So. 513, 514 (1940). However, due to this harsh result, a court of equity will “always mitigate forfeitures when it can be done without doing violence to the contract of the parties.” Rader v. Prather, 100 Fla. 591, 130 So. 15, 16-17 (1930) (citing McCaskill v. Union Naval Stores Co., 59 Fla. 571, 52 So. 961, 962 (1910)). A court of equity, though, will not grant relief from a situation traceable to a party’s own neglect, gross negligence, or willful and persistent vio 37, 538 (Fla.1953) (<HOLDING>). Here, the parties intended that a forfeiture 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the equities involved did not lead to an unconscionable result where purchaser planned to use the land for a particular purpose and brought lumber to the site after he defaulted on the agreement (B) holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages (C) holding that a later concession to strike an unconscionable term does not change the fact that the arbitration agreement as written is unconscionable and contrary to public policy (D) holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute (E) holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land
[A]: holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages


[Q]: in April 2004, after which it denied appellant’s requests for an arrest of judgment or new trial, but granted appellant’s motion for a new penalty hearing. The court concluded that mitigation counsel had rendered ineffective assistance during his closing argument. The Commonwealth appealed the trial court’s order granting a new penalty phase hearing and appellant likewise filed an appeal in which he challenged the trial court’s denial of relief on all other claims set forth in his post-sentence motions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s orders granting a new penalty hearing and denying all other claims. In all instances in which the death penalty is imposed, this Court begins its review with an inquiry into the sufficiency of .the evidence 88 A.2d 564, 568 (2005) (<HOLDING>). This case is before us on direct appeal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding guilt phase issues shall be resolved by this court even if death sentence has been vacated by trial court on collateral review (B) holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to issues resolved by arbitration where there has been a final determination on the merits notwithstanding a lack of confirmation of the award citations omitted (C) holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court (D) holding that in some circumstances a sentence on one count may be increased after the sentence on a similar or related count has been vacated on appeal (E) holding that in a new sentencing proceeding after the original sentence has been vacated by the appellate court the trial court is not precluded from applying a drugtrafficking multiplier that it did not use in formulating the original sentence
[A]:
holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to issues resolved by arbitration where there has been a final determination on the merits notwithstanding a lack of confirmation of the award citations omitted