In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: note that, contrary to Kooby and EHI’s assertion, the trial court is not required to hold a hearing on this m 2d 814) (1991) (same). 10 Rogers v. Norris, 262 Ga. App. 857, 857 (1) (586 SE2d 747) (2003) (“Although we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, ‘the trial court must make findings on these issues before we may determine whether its discretion was abused.’ ” (quoting Ga. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Patillo, 194 Ga. App. 279, 279 (390 SE2d 431) (1990))); see also Wood v. Notte, 238 Ga. App. 748, 749 (1) (519 SE2d 923) (1999) (same); Crenshaw, 202 Ga. App. at 611 (1) (same). 11 See Rogers, 262 Ga. App. at 857 (1) (“Failure to make [findings of fact] mandates that we vacate the order dismissing the appeal and remand the case Ga. App. 40, 43 (555 SE2d 508) (2001) (<HOLDING>); A. Roberts Corp. v. Roberts, 207 Ga. App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it (B) holding that trial court made sufficient findings of fact when it dismissed appeal (C) holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case (D) holding that a reviewing court will only presume that the trial court made implicit factual findings when such findings were necessary to its ultimate conclusion (E) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact
[A]: holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it


[Q]: act, 1976 PA 267, MCL 15.261 to 15.275. (3) If the board arbitrarily and capriciously violates section 7(9), the board shall he subject to the penalties prescribed in the freedom of information act, 1976 PA 442, MCL 15.231 to 15.246. B If “a statute gives new rights and prescribes new remedies, such remedies must be strictly pursued; and a party seeking a remedy under the act is confined to the remedy conferred thereby and to that only.” Monroe Beverage Co, Inc v Stroh Brewery Co, 454 Mich 41, 45; 559 NW2d 297 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “[w]hen a statute provides a remedy for enforcement of a common-law right, the statutory scheme is merely cumulative and not exclusive.” Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc, 273 Mich App 187, 201; 729 NW2d 898 (2006) (<HOLDING>). At common law there has always been a remedy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration (B) holding that the plaintiffs claims for unjust enrichment were not barred by the availability of relief under the public works bonding act mcl 129201 et seq because a plaintiff enjoyed the right at common law to recover in quantum meruit from a defendant who had been unjustly enriched (C) recognizing that action for quantum meruit relief exists to avoid unjust enrichment (D) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed
[A]: holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration


[Q]: Financial was ever an unincorporated division of Dow Electronics. In fact, Dow has provided affidavit which plainly explains this. 6 . Plaintiff has cited no authority in support of her position in this regard, and for their part, defendants have not even acknowledged her assertion of this argument and have not bothered to provide the court with any argument or authority on this issue. In fact, defendants assert that "[p]laintiff has not and cannot plausibly argue that this case is not at least ‘related to' Dow’s bankruptcy.” 7 . None of the parties actually provided any authority or even much in the way of argument in support of their position on that issue, and the cases touching this subject are not altogether consistent. See Back v. LTV Corp., 213 B.R. 633, 639 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (<HOLDING>); but see In re Poplar Run Five Ltd. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that postconfirmation claims against the debtors themselves have a conceivable effect on their estates (B) holding that res judicata did not bar debtors objection to creditors proof of claim where the plan expressly reserved the general right to assert postconfirmation objections to claims (C) holding that debtors have no right to jury trial on malpractice claims against their attorneys (D) holding that the debtors had standing to challenge the settlement of the estates right to sue various entities because the outcome of this litigation could potentially have a huge effect on the liabilities of the debtors and could give them a substantial surplus upon emerging from bankruptcy (E) holding that debtors failure to pay postconfirmation taxes pursuant to terms of court order constituted cause for dismissal as a lack of good faith
[A]:
holding that res judicata did not bar debtors objection to creditors proof of claim where the plan expressly reserved the general right to assert postconfirmation objections to claims