TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 116 F.Supp.2d 937, 950-51 (M.D.Tenn.2000). As other circuits have recognized, the treating physician rule is a standard that was developed in the Social Security context requiring the administrative law judge to give deference to the opinions of a claimant’s treating physician when determining the claimant’s eligibility for benefits. See, e.g., Regula, 266 F.3d at 1139; see also Peabody Coal Co. v. Groves, 277 F.3d 829, 833-35 (6th Cir.2002) (applying the “treating physician presumption” in a Black Lungs Benefit case holding that an AL J may place greater weight on the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician than those of non-treating physicians). Several circuits have adopted the treating physician rule in an ERISA context. Regula, 266 F.3d at 1139 (<HOLDING>); Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 901 (8th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that vicarious liability claim against union based on medical malpractice of treating physician is not preempted by erisa (B) holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate (C) holding that an erisa plan administrator is not bound by an ssa disability determination when reviewing a claim for benefits (D) holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician (E) holding as a matter of first impression that the treating physician rule is applicable in the context of a disability benefits determination under erisa

SOLUTION: holding that vicarious liability claim against union based on medical malpractice of treating physician is not preempted by erisa

PROBLEM: 284 So.2d 905, 915-16 (La.1973); see Tesvich v. 3-A’s Towing Co., 547 So.2d 1106, 1111 (La.Ct.App.1989) (“[W]e have concluded on the basis of Lombard that the claim of each plaintiff with respect to his or her leases constitutes a separate occurrence.” (citation omitted)); see also Reynolds v. Transcon. Ins. Co., Civ. A. Nos. 94-1367, 94-1432, 1995 WL 16795, at *5-6 (E.D.La. Jan.17, 1995) (Duval, J.) (discussing and applying Lombard, Tesvich, and Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1359 (5th Cir.1994)). The property damage in the DuroSeal petitions allegedly arose because of several negligent and fraudulent acts on the part of Jotun and others. Each of these acts does not constitute a separate bes, Inc., 924 So.2d 1131, 1133 (La.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); Korossy v. Sunrise Homes, Inc., 653 So.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee (B) holding that property damage occurred when condominium owners received architects report detailing damage not during the four years of construction of the condos (C) holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed (D) holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations (E) holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did

SOLUTION: holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee

PROBLEM: July 2007, the trial court entered separate orders terminating respondent’s parental rights to B.L.H. and Z.L.H. The only ground found by the trial court for terminating respondent’s parental rights to the minor children was under N.C.G.S. § 111 ly to fill procedural gaps where Chapter 7B requires, but does not identify, a specific procedure to be used in termination cases. In re S.D.W. & H.E.W., 187 N.C. App. at 421, 653 S.E.2d at 432; see also In re McKinney, 158 N.C. App. 441, 443, 581 S.E.2d 793, 795 (2003) (applying the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether the contents of a motion .filed to terminate the respondent’s parental rights were sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court); In re Triscari Children, 109 N.C. App. 285, 426 S.E.2d 435 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Article 11 of Chapter 7B expressly states 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred in granting petition for termination of parental rights based on noncompliance with case plan when case plan was not filed and approved by the court until seven months after petition for termination was filed (B) recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights (C) holding that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding may not file a counterclaim (D) holding that the due process clause of the alaska constitution guarantees the right to effective counsel in proceedings for the termination of parental rights (E) holding the requirements for verification established in chapter 1a rule 11b should determine whether a petition for the termination of a respondents parental rights has been properly verified

SOLUTION:
holding that trial court erred in granting petition for termination of parental rights based on noncompliance with case plan when case plan was not filed and approved by the court until seven months after petition for termination was filed