In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

of a portion of their property to Greenheart constituted a transaction for a commercial purpose is supported by the evidence. The Browns owned 320 acres that they used for ranching and farming — operations on which the Browns relied to derive income. The Browns also acquired water rights for a portion of their land which they leased out and eventually sold. The Brown Property had a portion that lacked water rights and it was this portion — without any improvements — that the Browns sold. Although the Brown Property did include their residence, the portion sold to Greenheart did not include the residence, and the existence of a residence on the property does not automatically disqualify a land conveyance from being a commercial transaction. See Watson, 144 Idaho at 219, 159 P.3d at 856 (<HOLDING>); Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 306, 900 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute (B) holding that a previous decision assuming a malpractice action was a commercial transaction for the purpose of awarding attorney fees was not binding because the court in that case was not asked  to decide whether a malpractice action involving a commercial transaction falls within the parameters of the statute (C) holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property (D) holding sale of property was commercial transaction where the land was for both a family retreat and for logging (E) holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property
(D)

business is a disputed question of fact which cannot be resolved on summary judgment. State Auto disputes Appellants’ arguments and also posits in the alternative that, even if Kraus was an “insured” at the time he committed the acts in question, Appellants’ false imprisonment claims were subsumed by their sexual assault claims. As discussed below, we conclude that the district court correctly found that the determination of whether Kraus was an “insured” under the policy is a question of law where the pertinent facts are undisputed, that the policy is not ambiguous, and that Kraus’s acts fall within the Criminal-Acts Exclusion. Because we affirm the district court on those grounds, we do not reach State Auto’s alternative argument in support 2d 349, 633 N.W.2d 707 (Wis.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Michelet v. Scheuring Sec. Servs. Inc., 680 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question (B) holding that the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment or while performing duties related to the conduct of the employers business for purposes of insurance coverage were questions of fact that precluded summary judgment particularly since there was a question regarding the employees intent in performing the act in question (C) holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred (D) holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury (E) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact
(B)

matter, we note that the State does not raise an issue on appeal regarding the merits of the motion to suppress, but argues that as a procedural matter, the trial court erred in reconsidering the motion five years after it was originally denied, without providing prior notice or an evidentiary hearing. Thus, our analysis is limited to this procedural issue, and we do not address the question of whether Miller had reasonable suspicion to detain Wolfe. This Court has held that because a motion to suppress is “nothing more than a specialized objection,” a trial court is “free to reconsider its own earlier suppression ruling.” Montalvo v. State, 846 S.W.2d 183, 137-38 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no pet.); see also State v. Henry, 25 S.W.3d 260, 262 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The State argues that while a trial court may 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress (B) holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (C) holding that ruling on motion to suppress is interlocutory and may be reconsidered (D) holding that erroneously admitted evidence may be considered when ruling on a motion to dismiss (E) holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo

(C)