In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
§ 924(c) conviction is invalid after Bailey and Bousley, it argues we are prohibited from reaching the merits of his claim because Abdullah did not present his Bailey/Bousley challenge on direct appeal or in the § 2255 proceedings below. Alternatively, the government argues the claim is barred by AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. We assume for purposes of this appeal that Abdullah did not procedurally default his Bailey claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. Notwithstanding such an assumption, we conclude the claim is barred because Abdullah failed to adequately raise the issue before the district court in this § 2255 proceeding. Generally, a habeas claim cannot be raised by a petitioner for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Petty v. Card, 195 F.3d 399, 400 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 78, 148 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court (B) holding that the convention claim was procedurally defaulted (C) holding that court may address procedurally defaulted claim on the merits where it is more efficient to do so (D) holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted (E) holding that an argument not raised before the district court is procedurally defaulted

Ex Output:
holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court


Ex Input:
alleged prejudice stems from the unavailability of witnesses, the Fourth Circuit explained in Jones what type of evidence is typically required: “[Cjourts have generally required that the defendant identify the witness he would have called; demonstrate, with specificity, the expected content of that witness’ testimony; establish to the court’s satisfaction that he has made serious attempts to locate the witness; and, finally, show that the information the witness would have provided was not available from other sources.” 94 F.3d at 908; see also U.S. v. Cornielle, 171 F.3d 748, 752 (2nd Cir.1999) (recognizing that actual prejudice “is commonly demonstrated by the loss of documentary evidence or the unavailability of a key witness”); U.S. v. Scoggins, 992 F.2d 164, 167 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Sabath, 990 F.Supp. at 1014 (finding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (B) holding that death of potential alibi witness did not cause actual prejudice because defendant failed to relate the substance of the testimony of the missing witness in sufficient detail and to show witness testimony not available from other sources (C) holding that defendant is under an obligation to give the government notice of an alibi witness even if defendant is unable to locate the witness (D) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (E) holding that the trial courts admonition of a witness even though detailed and strongly stated did not coerce the witness because the court did not threaten or badger the witness and the court provided the witness with her own counsel to ensure that the decision was voluntary

Ex Output:
holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case


Ex Input:
The court ultimately concluded, however, that the danger Mendoza posed to the community — evidenced by the fact that, despite his relatively young age (twenty-five), Mendoza had a history of using aliases, two convictions for driving while impaired, and a prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon — trumped any leniency that these factors might otherwise support. Thus, the court opined that an upward variance was necessary to protect the public from any further crime Mendoza may commit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). We thus conclude the district court’s well-reasoned explanation amply justified the extent of the variance it imposed. Because there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s reasoning in this case, we will defer to it. See Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d at 366-67 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentencing courts decision to impose a sentence six years longer than advisory guidelines range was reasonable because district court employed  3553based reasoning to justify the variance (B) holding sentence within properly calculated advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable (C) holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable (D) holding that district courts decision to exceed the advisory sentencing range in chapter 7 of the sentencing guidelines ussg  7b14 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (E) holding booker error is avoided when district court calculates proper guidelines sentencing range treats guidelines as advisory and imposes reasonable sentence

Ex Output:

holding sentence within properly calculated advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable