In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
performance is a matter that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Jordan v. Boisvert, 632 So.2d 254, 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). While forfeitures are not favored, a forfeiture will be enforced where it is clear that the parties intended such a result. Nelson v. Hansard, 143 Fla. 898, 197 So. 513, 514 (1940). However, due to this harsh result, a court of equity will “always mitigate forfeitures when it can be done without doing violence to the contract of the parties.” Rader v. Prather, 100 Fla. 591, 130 So. 15, 16-17 (1930) (citing McCaskill v. Union Naval Stores Co., 59 Fla. 571, 52 So. 961, 962 (1910)). A court of equity, though, will not grant relief from a situation traceable to a party’s own neglect, gross negligence, or willful and persistent vio 37, 538 (Fla.1953) (<HOLDING>). Here, the parties intended that a forfeiture 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the equities involved did not lead to an unconscionable result where purchaser planned to use the land for a particular purpose and brought lumber to the site after he defaulted on the agreement (B) holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages (C) holding that a later concession to strike an unconscionable term does not change the fact that the arbitration agreement as written is unconscionable and contrary to public policy (D) holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute (E) holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land

Ex Output:
holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages


Ex Input:
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071, 113 S.Ct. 1027, 122 L.Ed.2d 172 (1993). Moreover, after Lopez, courts have recognized that this de minimis standard continues in effect. United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1713, 137 L.Ed.2d 837 (1997); United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (10th Cir.1995). This is because § 1956 regulates activities that, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (stating that “where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence”); cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1361, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 463 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce (B) holding that commerce clause did not provide congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of violence against women act inasmuch as provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce (C) recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce (D) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce (E) holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce

Ex Output:
holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce


Ex Input:
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76, 116 S.Ct. 1114. The Court held that while Congress intended to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity it was without the authority to do so. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73, 116 S.Ct. 1114. b. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiff contends all defendants individually and collectively, acting under the color of state law, deprived her of her property (gaming license) without due process of law and are thus liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against the State and the KSGA may not go forward because a state or state agency is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Reiger v. Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 755 F.Supp. 360 (D.Kan.1990) (Saffels, J.)(<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs assertion that KSGA is considered 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a state agency as an arm of the state cannot constitute a person under  1983 because it is a sovereign entity (B) holding state university is not a person under  1983 (C) holding kansas public employees retirement system is not as a state agency considered a person for purposes of  1983 liability (D) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (E) holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983

Ex Output:

holding a state agency as an arm of the state cannot constitute a person under  1983 because it is a sovereign entity