In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
read to give these words effect in light of the law in certain states, under the plain meaning rule, Green Tree’s position must fail. Herrin, 2007 WL 1975573, at *3. The debtor’s position is also supported by the leading commentators on the Bankruptcy Code. Collier on Bankruptcy states, “[o]nly if a mobile home or cooperative is real property under applicable non-bankruptcy law would the limitations on modification apply, even though the mobile home or cooperative is considered the debtor’s principal residence.” 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1322.06[1][a][ii] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. Revised 2005). Moreover, ignoring the term “real property” within § 1322(b)(2) is contrary to the rules of statutory interpretation. See Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 369 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) This Court does not believe that the result in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing courts must interpret statutes to give effect to all language used rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous (B) holding courts must give effect to every provision and word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or superfluous (C) holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute (D) holding that courts must give effect to every word when interpreting a statute (E) holding principle of statutory construction is to give effect to every clause and word of a statute

Ex Output:
recognizing courts must interpret statutes to give effect to all language used rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous


Ex Input:
claims that respondent was aware World Bowling was purchasing the bowling alley from appellants but was never informed of the details of the purchase. We reject respondent’s contention that it could not have actual knowledge of appellants’ misfiled U.C.C.-l because any details it knew about the purchase of the bowling alley and its contents took place before the U.C.C.-l was filed. First, respondent had notice that the bowling alley contents were encumbered because it was involved with the sale until the time of closing. Second, the plain language of section 386.9-401(2) does not require that knowledge of the contents be gained only after the U.C.C.-l is misfiled and we may not add this requirement to the statute. Martinco v. Hastings, 265 Minn. 490, 497, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Finally, both the district court and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks (B) holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature (C) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (D) holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted (E) holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature

Ex Output:
holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature


Ex Input:
§ 991, at 146 (1956). Similarly, another treatise explains: “The personal representative may require a receipt or a release as a condition precedent to payment of a legacy or distributive share, which receipt or release discharges the representative from further liability, in the absence of impeaching circumstances such as fraud or mistake.” 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 656. Courts in other jurisdictions similarly have found that a personal representative is entitled to a release prior to making a distribution. See Ford v. Wilson, 85 A. 1073, 1077 (Del.Ch. 1913) (personal representative had a right to require a release from a distributee prior to making the final settlement of an estate); Sterrett v. Nat’l Safe Deposit, Savings & Trust Co., 10 App.D.C. 131, 139 (1897) (<HOLDING>); First Midwest Bank v. Dempsey, 157 Ill.App.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if a thirdparty administrator is not a fiduciary under erisa such an administrator still has standing  pursuant to   1331 (B) holding that payment made in reasonable belief that it was required by an insurance contract was involuntary (C) recognizing that the administrator was amply protected if it made a distribution but nonetheless was entitled to exact releases upon payment of distributions (D) recognizing that an employer had a dual role as administrator of plan and as employer and only the role of administrator was held to a fiduciary standard (E) holding that it was not essential to an action by a supplier on a payment bond under the miller act that a demand be made on the general contractor for payment  although there was evidence in the case from which it could be found that the materialman looked to the general contractor for payment  since the statute does not require a demand for payment but merely requires written notice of the claim

Ex Output:

holding that even if a thirdparty administrator is not a fiduciary under erisa such an administrator still has standing  pursuant to   1331