In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: statement during closing argument regarding his personal opinion of the defendant’s guilt was improper, but not reversible error). Where it appears that no other verdict could have been properly rendered, prosecutorial misconduct is not reversible error. Hillen v. People, 59 Colo. 280, 284, 149 P. 250, 252 (1915). In light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial against the defendant, we conclude that the prosecutor’s improper remark during closing argument was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 985 (emphasis added); see also Harris, 888 P.2d at 268 (stating that “the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial will be considered on appeal when evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct”); Grandbouche v. People, 104 Colo. 175, 185, 89 P.2d 577, 581 (1939) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. People, 70 Colo. 313, 317, 201 P. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment (B) holding the rule that the singular includes the plural obviously  is not one to be applied except where it is necessary to carry out the evident intent of the statute (C) holding that 1 usc  1 does not apply except where it is necessary to carry out the evident intent of the statute (D) holding that the rule is that where the guilt of an accused is evident incidental improper action upon the part of the prosecuting officer may be overlooked (E) holding that the prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment

Answer: holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment


Question: 593, 598 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1, 135 L.Ed.2d 1098 (1996), and of mixed questions of law and fact, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). However, the state court’s factual findings underlying those determinations are presumed to be correct and binding, as long as they were made after a full, fair, and adequate hearing on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 1994) (pre-AED-PA); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of es ing that the findings of the trial court on discriminatory intent in Batson challenge are reviewed for clear error); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (B) holding that the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under general statutes  46a60 is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (C) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (D) holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard (E) holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard

Answer: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard


Question: has waived his right to appeal. 3 . The District Court had diversity jurisdiction. over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 4 . We afforded the parties the opportunity to address the standing issue, and in our correspondence to the parties we cited both Rauscher and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Treesdale, 419 F.3d 216 (3d Cir.2005), as potentially controlling authority. The parties inevitably agreed that Rauscher (and F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir.1994) (same), Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.1991) (same), Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir.1989) (same), and United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir.1978) (same), with Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the government not the relator must have suffered the injury in fact required for article iii standing (B) holding that because article iii standing is jurisdictional it must be decided before other legal issues (C) holding noneconomic harm satisfies article iii standing requirements (D) holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention (E) holding that article iii constitutional standing must be addressed before considering lanham act prudential standing

Answer:
recognizing that the government not the relator must have suffered the injury in fact required for article iii standing