TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: from representing plaintiffs “in either this or similar actions.” Id. at 1196. Likewise here, Yanny would be prohibited from representing the interests of any party against his former client, the Church of Scientology organization. However, I see no basis for precluding Berry or the Musick, Peeler firm from representing F.A.C.T.Net based on the fact that they formerly represented Yanny in defending him against charges made by the Church of Scientology. Moreover, in suing Yanny as it did, Plaintiffs waived any privilege with respect to any information relevant to the issues raised by their claims and released Yanny from his obligation of secrecy with respect to that information. See Carlson, Collins, Gordon & Bold v. Banducci, 257 Cal.App.2d 212, 228, 64 Cal-Rptr. 915 (Cal.App.1967) (<HOLDING>) That principle of California professional 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that authorization cards are privileged from disclosure to employer (C) holding an attorney is released from those obligations of secrecy which the law places upon him whenever the disclosure of a communication otherwise privileged becomes necessary to the protection of the attorneys own rights (D) holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client (E) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: business is a disputed question of fact which cannot be resolved on summary judgment. State Auto disputes Appellants’ arguments and also posits in the alternative that, even if Kraus was an “insured” at the time he committed the acts in question, Appellants’ false imprisonment claims were subsumed by their sexual assault claims. As discussed below, we conclude that the district court correctly found that the determination of whether Kraus was an “insured” under the policy is a question of law where the pertinent facts are undisputed, that the policy is not ambiguous, and that Kraus’s acts fall within the Criminal-Acts Exclusion. Because we affirm the district court on those grounds, we do not reach State Auto’s alternative argument in support 2d 349, 633 N.W.2d 707 (Wis.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Michelet v. Scheuring Sec. Servs. Inc., 680 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question (B) holding that the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment or while performing duties related to the conduct of the employers business for purposes of insurance coverage were questions of fact that precluded summary judgment particularly since there was a question regarding the employees intent in performing the act in question (C) holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred (D) holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury (E) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: satisfy the requirements of Due Process. See, Rule 7(c)(1), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (stating that an Indictment “shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged”). Id. The Government disagrees with the Defendant’s contention that the Indictment is unconstitutionally vague, and argues that the Defendant’s conduct satisfies the elements of Section 2250(a)(2)(A), since he is a sex offender by reason of a conviction under Federal law, as defined by SORNA, see, Complaint, Docket No. 1, Affidavit of Moran, at ¶ 7, and that that allegation, alone, provides the Defendant with adequate notice of the crime with which he is being charged. See, United States v. Templeton, 2007 WL 445481 at *3 (W.D.Okla., February 7, 2007)(<HOLDING>). In the alternative, the Government argues 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an indictment was sufficient where it failed to specify which subsection of sorna defendants conviction allegedly meets (B) holding that an indictment under  922g1 was not required to allege a substantial effect on interstate commerce an indictment which tracked the statutory language was sufficient (C) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense (D) holding that evidence of an eighteenyearold conviction was admissible to show intent because that conviction involved exactly the same crime as was charged in the indictment (E) holding that an indictment which cites the pertinent statute and uses its language will be sufficient to support a conviction

SOLUTION:
(A)