In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: (1993). This privilege has been given an “expansive reach” by California courts, as recognized by the California Supreme Court. See Rubin, 4 Cal.4th at 1194, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. This privilege affords absolute immunity against tort liability arising out of such a communication, regardless of attempts by the “plaintiff’ to “plead around” this “absolute barrier.” See id. at 1201-02, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. Thus, the immunity applies regardless of the particular label given to the cause of action (e.g., unfair competition). Section 47(b) protects participants in judicial proceedings from derivative tort actions based on communications in or regarding the judicial proceeding. See Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 781-83, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 830 (1996) (<HOLDING>). A “communication[ ] preparatory to or in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that letter to possible coclaimants seeking support for filing of suit was covered by the privilege (B) recognizing privilege (C) holding that voluntary testimony by spouse is not covered by husbandwife privilege (D) holding that documents reflecting the department of educations review of a universitys compliance with title iv were covered by the privilege and rejecting the argument that a specific policy judgment is necessary for the privilege to apply because the privilege servesto protect the processes by which governmental decisions as well as policies are formulated (E) holding that the initial disclosure of a crime to one spouses without more is covered by the marital communications privilege
[A]: (A)


[Q]: language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability “from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik’s] attendance” it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik’s attendance at the gym — in essence all of Sydlik’s claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release
[A]: (C)


[Q]: his resignation to the DOE. (Id. ¶ 67, 74.) These contentions may carry weight at a later stage of this case. The allegations summarized earlier, which must be assumed as true on a motion to dismiss, however, are sufficient to show that school officials had actual notice of, but failed to investigate or stop Van Amburgh’s sexual harassment of students long before Plaintiffs mother approached Fournier and Salzman. Although the actions Defendants took after the mother’s complaint may eventually defeat Plaintiffs § 1983 claim, it can be sufficiently inferred from the pleadings that school officials exhibited a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of their students by their earlier failure to investigate and supervise. Cf. Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 907 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The court will deny Defendants’ motion to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment was inappropriate where plaintiff actually told her supervisors that she was being sexually harassed and the supervisors did not take any steps whatsoever to investigate those allegations (B) holding that plaintiffs allegations that coworker attempted to grab her breast and later touched and rubbed her thigh that customers made sexually threatening remarks and that supervisors did not respond to her complaints about these incidents did not support a hostile work environment claim (C) holding that a oneday time period between the employees complaint and her supervisors recommendation to fire her was sufficient (D) holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim (E) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment
[A]:
(A)