In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: between cases brought under the federal law and those brought under Maine law. While the First Circuit does make a distinction, it ultimately holds that the negligence per se doctrine of Pratico is strictly limited to cases brought under FELA, and it strongly implies that the doctrine will not be expanded. Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998). 4 . Castine argues that the trooper testified at trial to matters that he had not previously indicated he would address, and therefore, it was unfairly surprised at trial. Generally, a continuance is the appropriate remedy when a party seeks to admit “surprise" evidence at trial. Because Castine did not seek a continuance, however, it may not now claim unfair surprise. See Pettitt v. Lizotte, 454 A.2d 329, 332-33 (Me.1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Because violation of a safety regulation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify (C) holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify (E) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing a defendants surprise fact witness to testify because the plaintiff did not request a continuance
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: of purely legal questions, such as whether a given set of facts alleged by the plaintiffs would demonstrate a constitutional violation. 4 . We note that the record contains no indication that the OSHP employs explicit racial criteria or admits to racially-motivated decision making. If such a showing could be made, the plaintiffs would not need to establish the existence of a similarly situated class that was not investigated. See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir.2000) ("[I]t is not necessary to plead the existence of a similarly situated non-minority group when challenging a law or policy that contains an express, racial classification.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 44, 151 L.Ed.2d 16 (2001); cf. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1104-05 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). "In its more recent pronouncements on laws 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is unnecessary for criminal defendant to establish threeprong test for discrimination in grand jury selection where there is direct evidence of exclusion based upon race (B) holding that a defendants guilty plea   forecloses independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury (C) holding that racial discrimination in selection of grand jurors compelled dismissal of indictment (D) holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge (E) holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the upward variance. AFFIRMED. 1 . We note that the guidelines provide that an upward departure may be warranted if “the defendant’s criminal history category substantially underrepresents the seriousness of the defendants conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). Calderon does not argue that if the nature of his criminal history was actually underrepresented the district court could not consider that as a factor supporting its imposition of an upward variance instead of a departure. See United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 983-84 (11th Cir. 2015) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a defendant qualifies as a career felon it is not necessary to ascertain the defendants criminal history category because the sentencing guidelines mandate a criminal history category of vi (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance after finding that the defendants criminal history category of i understated the seriousness of his criminal history (C) holding that defendants history of deportation and illegal reentry together with his serious criminal record justified the district courts upward variance (D) holding that a district court may depart upward based upon based criminal conduct when such conduct is not included in the computation of criminal history category (E) holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category
[EX A]:
(B)