In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
the entirety ... to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety ... is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B). a. Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law for Entirety Property Exemption To determine whether the Condominium is exempt from process, the court will look to the law of the situs of the real property. In this case that is Florida. “Under Florida law, entireties property is exempt from process to satisfy debts owed to individual creditors of either spouse. Entireties property is not exempt from process to satisfy the joint debts of both spouses.” See In re Monzon, 214 B.R. 38, 40-41 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1997) (citing Neu v. Andrews, 528 So.2d 1278, 1279 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988) and Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843, 846 (1936) (<HOLDING>)). “Courts have generally recognized that § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property (C) holding that a judgment debt against both spouses can be satisfied by selling the entireties property (D) holding that the irs may reach half of a nonliable spouses sole management community property to satisfy a liable spouses tax debt (E) holding that where one spouses arson destroyed the house which both spouses owned as tenants by the entireties the innocent spouse was entitled to recover under their fire insurance policy for her share of the loss

Ex Output:
holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate


Ex Input:
comprehensive plan nor its land use regulations prohibited the development of so-called non-jurisdictional wetlands. On August 17 or 18, 2006, Rish began to clear and fill his property. The neighbors, including Johnson, protested to the County, but to no avail. On August 21, 2006, these parties filed a complaint seeking in-junctive relief alleging that the clearing violated Gulf County’s comprehensive plan because it failed to maintain a 50-foot buffer for the wetlands. The neighbors alleged standing under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2006). The trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that Johnson and the other neighbors did not possess standing to seek relief under section 163.3215. This court reversed. Johnson v. Gulf County et al., 965 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Throughout this litigation, Rish proceeded to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (B) holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention (C) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court (D) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (E) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case

Ex Output:
holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention


Ex Input:
supervisors or the Calhoun County jail of the injury or to follow the city’s policy of reporting all officer-caused injuries. Instead of believing Watkins’s lies, then, Mrs. Watkins argues that the officers determined to punish Watkins by making him suffer for them. There are thus two closely related factual disputes regarding what the officers did after they had made the crucial inference of a substantial risk to Watkins’s health: (1) whether the officers actually believed Watkins’s lies or instead disbelieved them and intended to punish Watkins for lying to them, and (2) whether the officers acted reasonably after having perceived that there was a risk to Watkins’s health. These disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment. Cf. Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 508 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, I believe that the district court erred 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact (B) holding that the reasonableness of a defendants efforts in discharging a duty of care is a question for the trier of fact when the record does not permit summary judgment (C) holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review (D) holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage (E) holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them

Ex Output:

holding that the reasonableness of a defendants efforts in discharging a duty of care is a question for the trier of fact when the record does not permit summary judgment