In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: farmer-brewer, importer or wholesaler. If the legislature intended the obligation to run with the product, it would have said it.” Heublein, 434 Mass. at 698 (approving Commission declaration to this effect) (citations and quotations omitted). It is thus the general rule that “a supplier is not obligated under Section 25E to continue to make sales to those wholesalers with whom an unaffiliated predecessor did business.” Brown-Forman, 65 Mass.App.Ct. at 499. This principle has been applied consistently in the few reported decisions by Massachusetts courts, confirming that purchasers of liquor businesses are not ordinarily saddled with the Section 25E restrictions of either their sellers or those through whom their sellers distributed product. See, e.g., Heublein, 434 Mass. at 701-02 (<HOLDING>); Pastene Wine & Spirits, 401 Mass. at 619 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supplier who acquired all assets and operations related to manufacture and sale of prod uct in armslength transaction did not succeed to predecessor suppliers section 25e obligations a former suppliers obligations under section 25e to continue to sell its product to its wholesalers is not imputed to a successor supplier who obtains ownership of the product through an arms length asset acquisition (B) holding a successor corporation does not have a postsale duty to warn of product defects where the successor never succeeded to any service contracts was not aware of the products defects and did not know the location of the product at the time of plaintiffs injury (C) holding that a successor corporation had a duty to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its predecessors cba because there was substantial continuity in the business enterprise (D) holding that section 388 of the restatement does not require the supplier to give information concerning available means for amelioration of obvious dangers even though the supplier is aware of those means and the party to whom the chattel is supplied is not (E) holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury
Example Output: holding a successor corporation does not have a postsale duty to warn of product defects where the successor never succeeded to any service contracts was not aware of the products defects and did not know the location of the product at the time of plaintiffs injury

Example Input: misconduct “that has affected the grand jury’s charging decision and is brought to the attention of the trial court before the commencement of trial”). The defendant suggests that Benjamin should not be applied retroactively to bar her claim. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (setting forth a three-part test for determining whether a judicial decision should be applied retroactively). We sympathize with the defendant’s belief that retroactive application of Benjamin to preclude any appeal would “pro duce substantial inequitable results.” Id. at 107, 92 S.Ct. at 355 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 1900, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1968)); cf. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339-40 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 107 S.Ct. 928, 93 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a shortened statute of limitations should not be applied retroactively as to bar otherwise valid civil claims (B) holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void (C) holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case (D) holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired (E) holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases
Example Output: holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void

Example Input: and the weapons charge, for which he was sentenced to a concurrent term of five years’ imprisonment. Jackson appealed to this court. LAW/ANALYSIS I. Exclusion of Evidence Jackson argues the trial court erred in excluding his testimony about his personal knowledge of Felder’s violent history. We disagree. The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the trial court’s sound discretion, and an appellate court may only disturb a ruling admitting or excluding evidence upon a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice. State v. Douglas, 369 S.C. 424, 429, 632 S.E.2d 845, 847-48 (2006). Generally, the failure to make a proffer of excluded evidence will preclude review on appeal. State v. Santiago, 370 S.C. 153, 163, 634 S.E.2d 23, 29 (Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>). Where no proffer of excluded testimony is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that objection to testimony at trial on grounds that testimony was irrelevant highly prejudicial and below the threshold requirement of admissibility does not preserve appellate challenge that testimony constitutes inadmissi ble victimimpact testimony (B) holding the excluded testimony was relevant to whether a signature was that of a deceased party and since a statement regarding the issue was the only testimony that could be given by the witness no offer to prove was necessary because the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context of the question asked (C) holding that we could not weigh the prejudice suffered as a result of the exclusion of plaintiffs testimony because we had no way of knowing what the plaintiffs testimony would have been (D) holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been (E) holding that the trial courts statement it would deny the defendants request to make a bill at this time did not discharge the appellants duty to proffer the excluded testimony for preservation of error
Example Output:
holding that objection to testimony at trial on grounds that testimony was irrelevant highly prejudicial and below the threshold requirement of admissibility does not preserve appellate challenge that testimony constitutes inadmissi ble victimimpact testimony