In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: with our ability to review the sentence imposed by the district court for substantive reasonableness because, on review, we must compare the sentence imposed with the correctly calculated Guidelines sentencing range. He contends the relevant Guidelines sentencing range is the post-departure Guidelines sentencing range. But it is the pre-departure Guidelines sentencing range that the district court must correctly calculate and that we must use when we review a sentence for substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir.2006) (“[W]e elect to review the district court’s application of the advisory sentencing guidelines only insofar as they do not involve departures.”); see also United States v. Tankersley, 537 F.3d 1100, 1114 n. 11 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). We used the pre-departure sentence for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause (B) holding that a fee application based on claims that were interrelated nonfrivolous and raised in good faith may still be excessive where the applicant achieved only partial or limited success (C) holding forbearance to sue is a good consideration for a promise founded thereon and it is only essential that the claim be asserted in good faith (D) holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law (E) holding mohamed is still good law

A: (E)
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Q: of the writ, the CCA examines the substance of the claim to see if it establishes a prima facie case of retardation, and only upon deciding that question can the state court decide whether remand is appropriate.”). 10 . Brown v. Dretke, 419 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir.2005). 11 . 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). 12 . Id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-17, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)). 13 . In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.2005). 14 . Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 & nn. 24-25 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (citing American Association of Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support 5 (9th ed.1992)). 15 . See Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 361-63 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Bri-seno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 (“[T]he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant suffered from significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and related limitations in adaptive functioning (C) holding that a district court did not clearly err in finding materiality where the prior art reference at issue had been considered material by examiners in related foreign patent applications (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that superior court did not clearly err in finding that the parent had not remedied the problematic conduct

A: (B)
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Q: goes to voluntariness The Court: Yeah. Crook: As I understand it. Hedgepeth (counsel for State): Well, as I understand it, it does too, but that’s what I want defense counsel to say on the record that he agrees that’s the way our courts ruled that that’s correct and we do not have to have every officer that was involved in everything. ¶ 17. The State submits that these exchanges indicate Sanders’s repeated and absolute waiver of the issue of the volun-tariness of her statement and was strictly based on whether Sanders had requested the presence of a lawyer during questioning. The State responds that Sanders never put on the evidence and expressly declined to attempt to produce evidence sufficient to invoke the Agee evidentiary rule. Hogan v. State, 730 So.2d 94, 98 (Miss.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Further, the State submits that once the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agee applies only where defendant has alleged that his confession was induced by threats or promises (B) holding that confession was not induced from an improper promise where competent evidence supports the trial courts finding that the interviewing officer made no promises during the interrogation (C) holding that confession was involuntary where suspect was a few days short of his sixteenth birthday was questioned for at least four hours prior to his first confession and was not accompanied by counsel friends or family where defendants made no showing that petitioner acted coolly or callously during questioning or that he had past experiences with the police and where police made promises of leniency (D) holding that implicit threats or promises did not render a defendants statement involuntary when a review of the circumstances reveals that the defendants independent will was not overcome so as to induce a confession that he was not otherwise disposed to malee internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that question of whether a confession was coerced was not to be resolved by considering the truth or falsity of the confession

A:
(A)
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