In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: in calculating the reduction of state workers’ compensation benefits advances the legislature’s intent to reduce the state’s compensation burden by taking advantage of the workers’ compensation government benefits offset to its fullest extent. Accordingly, we hold that SSDI child’s benefits are to be included when calculating the amount of the reduction in an employer’s payment of workers’ compensation benefits under Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4. II. The Fund makes the argument that the WCCA exceeded its authority in examining the Social Security Act. The WCCA’s jurisdiction does not extend to interpreting or applying legislation designed specially for the handling of claims outside the workers’ compensation system. Taft v. Advance United Expressways, 464 N.W.2d 725, 727 (Minn.1991) (<HOLDING>). In that Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4, is a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the primary goal when interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the specific insurance policy (B) holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable (C) holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law (D) holding that the tucker acts waiver does not extend to statutory claims (E) holding that the jurisdiction of the wcca did not extend to interpreting or applying the law related to claims against the minnesota insurance guaranty association
[EX A]: holding that the primary goal when interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the specific insurance policy

[EX Q]: in the petition no later than thirty days from the day on which the first defendant was served. Id. at 1262-63 (internal citations omitted). As a general premise, under the “first-served rule,” defendants who are properly served within thirty days of the first defendant’s service must join in the removal petition. The “failure to do so renders the petition defective.” Id. at 1262. Under the facts of Getty, however, the application of the first-served rule did not produce an inequitable result. Nonetheless, recognizing the potential for harsh results, other decisions provide that exceptional circumstances may sometimes require relief from strict application of the rule in order to achieve equitable results. See Milstead Supply Co. v. Cas. Ins. Co., 797 F.Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties (B) holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective (C) holding that dismissal of some but not all of the defendants who had been served with complaint is not a final order (D) holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served (E) holding that the defendants consent to search was voluntary although he had been served with a subpoena
[EX A]: holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties

[EX Q]: We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings in the sentencing phase, but they must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. U.S. v. Fox, 189 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir.1999). We affirm. Nakamura contends the district court erred in determining by a preponderance of the evidence that the conspiracy distributed in excess of 5 grams of actual methamphetamine when only 3.3 grams were recovered and tested for purity. It is undisputed that Nakamura delivered 12.5 grams of unrecovered methamphetamine. Absent evidence to the contrary, it was not clear error for the district court to determine the purity of the unre-covered methamphetamine by extrapolating from the purity of the 3.3 grams actually recovered. See U.S. v. Lopes-Montes, 165 F.3d 730, 731-32 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Nakamura’s contention that he had no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a stipulation to a crucial fact is entered into the record in open court in the presence of the defendant and is agreed to by defendants acknowledged counsel the trial court may reasonably assume that the defendant is aware of the content of the stipulation and agreed to it through his or her attorney (B) holding that at resentencing the district court was entitled to assume that the waiver was still in effect and was not required to again advise defendant of his right to counsel where defendant had waived counsel at the plea stage (C) holding that absent evidence to the contrary the district court was entitled to assume that the remaining 36 kilograms lopes montes agreed to deliver was a mixture with a similar purity level as the 32 kilogram mixture actually recovered (D) holding that the district court erred when it used rule 36 to amend the defendants sentence to include an order of forfeiture that had been agreed to in the plea agreement but which the court failed to make a part of its judgment at sentencing (E) holding that there was no evidence that parties actually agreed to modify stock purchase agreement and thus contract was effective as originally written
[EX A]:
holding that when a stipulation to a crucial fact is entered into the record in open court in the presence of the defendant and is agreed to by defendants acknowledged counsel the trial court may reasonably assume that the defendant is aware of the content of the stipulation and agreed to it through his or her attorney