In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: on the foregoing, we conclude that Layman’s and Sparks’ sentences are inappropriate. Like Quiroz, ten years of Layman’s sentence should be suspended to probation and five years of Sparks’ sentence should be suspended to probation. IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence Lastly, Sparks argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his felony murder conviction because he did not enter the house. However, Sparks, whose cursory argument is less than a page long, cites no cases in support of his claim. Sparks has therefore waived this issue on appeal. See Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (stating that each argument must be supported by citations to authorities, statutes, and the appendix or parts of the record on appeal relied on); Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 202-03 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. Waiver notwithstanding, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when an appellant fails to offer an argument on an issue that issue is abandoned (B) holding that a claim is waived on appeal when not supported by citation to relevant authority (C) holding that a party waives an argument if the party fails to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support of the argument (D) holding when a party fails to provide arguments or supporting authority for his assertion the party is deemed to have abandoned the issue (E) holding that an issue is waived when a party fails to provide adequate citation to authority
[A]: (E)


[Q]: may give such retroactive effect to these legal clarifications because “where ... a court is addressing transactions that occurred at a time when there was no clear agency guidance, it would be absurd to ignore the agency’s current authoritative pronouncement of what the statute means.” Id. Therefore, unless the new regulation “replaces a prior agency determination,” this Court may find that the amendment merely provides an explanation for what the law always has been. Id. In order to determine if the amendments to Regulation E marked a change in the rules or served as an interpretation of existing law, this Court will first look to the stated intent of the Board in proffering the amendments. See First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Standard Bank & Trust, 172 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). If an agency plainly states that it is merely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the drastic sanction of preclusion of expert witnesses was not warranted based on failure to furnish discovery by the discovery deadline when the deadline could have been shifted (B) holding that a bankruptcy rule equivalent to rule 6a ala r civ p should be construed to give the benefit of extending the deadline for submission to the day after the holiday regardless of whether the deadline is expressed as the last day of a period of days or as a date certain (C) holding regulatory amendment extending a banks deadline for returning checks could be given retroactive effect (D) holding that where a legislative amendment changed the exemption provisions of a tax statute defining those eligible for certain exemptions and refunds the amendment could only be applied to tax years after its effective date even where the legislature expressly stated the amendment should have retroactive effect and looked to the law in place during the taxable events to determine if the taxpayer was eligible for a refund (E) holding random traffic stops for license and registration checks are contrary to fourth amendment
[A]: (C)


[Q]: challenged on appeal by the State. Upon entering the room, the officer saw the drugs on the table. Only after Bridges placed appellant under arrest did appellant pick up the two baggies of cocaine and throw them out of the room. Under these facts, Hodari and Perez have no application. All the contraband discovered by the officer was the direct fruit of the initial illegal entry. That Dempsey then picked up the drugs and attempted to throw them out of the room did not amount to an abandonment and most certainly did not turn back time to a point before the Fourth Amendment violation. Because the cocaine was the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation, the trial judge should have granted the suppression motion in its entirety. See Robinson v. State, 615 So.2d 201, 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>); see also U.S. v. Simpson, 944 F.Supp. 1396, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants voluntary consent to search his apartment dissipated taint of prior illegal search (B) holding that cocaine trafficking was not a forcible felony so as to preclude the defense of selfdefense when the killing occurred during an attempt to traffic in cocaine (C) holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business (D) holding that observations made a during prior illegal search should not have been included in the affidavit for the search warrant (E) holding that where the defendant dropped cocaine during the course of an illegal police search no voluntary abandonment occurred
[A]:
(E)