In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: separate recording of the trust or declaration of trust. As there is no evidence on the face of the deeds indicating a. contrary intent, the Personal Representatives, pursuant to their fiduciary responsibilities, seek a declaration that, pursuant to section 689.07(1), Norman held fee simple title to the properties on the date of his death. These allegations are clearly sufficient under the plain language of the statute. See Raborn, 974 So.2d at 328 (stating that under section 689.07(1), a deed that simply refers to grantee as “trustee” conveys a fee simple estate, and applying the statute to find that deed at issue fell under “contrary intention” exception such that grantee held mere legal title as trustee); One Harbor Fin, Ltd. v. Hynes Props., LLC, 884 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Heiskell v. Morris, 182 So.3d 714 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title (B) holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence (C) holding that trial court erred by granting surviving spouse fee simple title to estates exempt property (D) holding that trial court correctly applied section 689071 to find that grantee who held title as trustee owned property in fee simple absolute (E) holding that where individual held title to property as trustee but gave mortgage to bank in her individual capacity a title reference on the mortgage to the deed into her as trustee provided constructive notice that the mortgage was supposed to be from the individual as trustee or at the least that the holder of a subsequent interest would not be a bona fide purchaser
[EX A]: holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title

[EX Q]: and sold it to nonre-latives. We conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the property is marital. The form of the transaction, while not dispositive, is compelling in the instant case because of Klem’s knowledge of, and experience with, joint tenancies. Klem was fully aware of how joint tenancies operated. As the husband of Hazel, he became the sole owner of Hazel’s family property as a surviving joint tenant, a fact he acknowledged during his deposition. Subsequent to his sole ownership of the property, he knowingly deeded the property to Larry and Colleen as joint tenants. In so doing, he gave both parties an interest in the property. See Melina v. Melina, 411 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Minn.App.1987); Erdahl v. Erdahl, 384 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Finally, also indicative of the donor’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that devise of real estate to one spouse was nonmarital and noting that had testator intended such property to be devised as marital property he could have designated appellant as a joint tenant (C) holding money received from inheritance as nonmarital property presumptively became marital property when placed in joint account under arkansas law (D) holding that transferring joint property into one partys name for estate planning purposes does not convert marital property into nonmarital property (E) holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property
[EX A]: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate

[EX Q]: five years. The issue is thus whether the time Hartman served in prison after the IJ’s improper decision should count toward the five-year bar. The Court holds that it should not count and thus, contrary to the BIA’s ruling in March 2002, the application for § 212(c) relief was not untimely when the IJ addressed the merits of that application on January 25, 2001. 1. The Statutory Five-Year Bar At the outset, the Court addresses Hartman’s argument that the five-year clock stops upon filing an application for § 212(c) relief, which, in this case, would be January 1997. The Court disagrees with that argument. The five-year clock of § 212(c) does not stop when an alien, such as Hartman, files an application for a discretionary waiver. See Gomes v. Ashcroft, 311 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Falconi v. INS, 240 F.Supp.2d 215, 218 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina  212c (B) holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a (C) holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for  212c relief (D) holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina  212c (E) holding that iiriras repeal of ina  212c was not impermissibly retroactive because unlike st cyr the petitioner chose to proceed to trial instead of agreeing to a plea and therefore did not detrimentally rely on the availability of  212c relief
[EX A]:
holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina  212c