TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: class’s claims, its interests are not antagonistic to the class, and its chosen counsel are qualified and competent. The Court also notes that the members of the aptly-named Pension Fund Group are public institutional investors, which comports with the PSLRA’s expressed preference for such lead plaintiffs. The PSLRA’s legislative history explains as follows: “[t]he pension funds accounting for $4.5 trillion or nearly half of the institutional assets, in many cases the beneficiaries of pension funds — small investors — have the greatest stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730-34; see also In re Vicuron Pharm. Sec. Litig., NO. CIV. A.04-2627, 225 F.R.D. 508, 511, 2004 WL 2983940, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Oct.7, 2004) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding on motion for preliminary injunction that balance of hardships tipped in favor of public (B) holding that where the issue is one of arbitrability the federal presumption in favor of arbitration shifts to favor a court determination (C) holding that one candidates status as a pension fund tipped the scales in favor of its appointment as lead plaintiff (D) holding that an employees protected interest in a pension vested before he or she became eligible to collect the pension (E) holding that the employers insidious pattern of seeking to tip the scales in its favor during employment disputes justified a decision to declare the entire agreement unenforceable

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. Addressing the identical federal rule, the Supreme Court has stated that “[o]n its face, Rule 23.1 speaks only to the adequacy of the shareholder representatives pleadings.” Kamen, supra, 500 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 1711. The rule itself does not create a demand requirement. Id. “[T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance, not procedure.’ ” Id. at 96-97, 111 S.Ct. 1711 (quoting Daily Income Fund, supra, 464 U.S. at 543-44 & n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 831 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (other citations omitted)); see also Bazata, supra, 400 A.2d at 316 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the demand requirement or its futility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (B) holding that for purposes of super ct civ r 41b demand is not jurisdictional but an element of the shareholders claim (C) holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense (D) holding that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of super ct civ r 15a which permits a party to amend once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served (E) holding the connection is an element

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: defendants settled with appellees, leaving no issue concerning them for the jury to determine, the trial court erred in allowing the McAdams and Chilcoat third-parties to participate in the trial as adversaries of appellants; and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the “reasonably prudent operator standard” is not “reduced” as to appellants because of the fact that appel-lees have other lessors in the same pooled unit and that other lessors should not be considered in deciding whether appellees failed to comply with their duty of good faith to appellants. We first address appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in permitting appellees to join the McAdams and Chil-coat groups as third-party defendants p.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Had appellants prevailed on their claim to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in summary judgment context that appellate court may consider other grounds that the movant preserved for review and trial court did not rule on in the interest of judicial economy (B) holding that the trial court did not err in denying a plea in abatement to obtain joinder of other royalty owners in a pooled unit on grounds that the presence of the other royalty owners was not necessary to determine whether sabre pooled in bad faith and breached the terms of the lease (C) holding that the trial court did not err in denying a plea in abatement on grounds that individuals owning the balance of the working interest were not necessary parties (D) holding that trial court did not err (E) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment

SOLUTION:
(C)