In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: “is one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’ ”. The constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not dependent on the subjective intent of the individual asserting the right but on whether the expectation is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Additionally, a determination of whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate or reasonable entails a balancing of interests. Id. 620 A.2d at 1118 (Citations omitted). Here, Mr. Cass obviously meant to keep the contents of his locker private from the public. Mr. Cass’ locker was locked, and this fact would indicate that he meant to keep the contents private. Simply because he did not own the locker does not preclude him from having an actual expectation of privacy. See, Bnmdidge supra (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 433 Pa.Super. 157, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest (B) holding that a hotel guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his room during the period of time for which the room is rented (C) holding that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his hosts home (D) holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room rented by relatives when he had a key to the room and permission to use the room at will (E) holding that a visitor to a hotel room for purposes of distributing drugs failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room
[EX A]: holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest

[EX Q]: reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. In determining the purpose of section 13-21-101, it is appropriate to look to legislative history as indicative of the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Willer, 817 P.2d at 519-20. The 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101 created the distinction between judgments which the judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal. The General Assembly intended that the amendment, and its market-determined interest rate, apply only to judgments which the judgment debtor appeals. See Act of March 25, 1982, ch. 39, 1982 Colo. Laws 227 (entitled “An Act Concerning Interest Payable on Appealed Money Judgments in Civil Actions” (emphasis added)); see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The statements of the bill’s sponsors also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent (B) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (C) holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period (D) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent (E) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent
[EX A]: holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent

[EX Q]: 1167 (E.D.Mich.1994). There is no issue as to whether plaintiff and Irene were disabled, “otherwise qualified,” or that defendant received federal funds. The only dispute is whether defendant provided effective communication with plaintiff and Irene without a trained ASL interpreter. Courts have found violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA where sign language interpreters have not been provided for a qualified deaf person. See e.g. Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 293 (2d Cir.1990) (finding that school system must provide an enrolled hearing student’s deaf parents with a sign language interpreter at “school initiated conferences incident to the academic and/or disciplinary aspects of their child’s education”); Randolph v. Rodgers, 980 F.Supp. 1051 (E.D.Mo.1997) (<HOLDING>), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 170 F.3d 850 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act (B) holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable (C) holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act (D) holding that neither the ada nor the rehabilitation act applies to prison employment (E) holding that prisoner whose primary means of communication was sign language was entitled to interpreter under the ada and rehabilitation act for disciplinary procedures medical care education programs and counseling
[EX A]:
holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act