In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: (2013) (ex plaining the FDA’s view that “promoting a drug for an off-label use is a violation” of the FDCA’s misbranding provisions). Based on this view, the FDA has recovered millions of dollars in settlements from drug manufacturers that have engaged in off-label promotion. See, e.g., id. at 232 (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History, (Sept. 2, 2009) (trumpeting a mul-ti-billion dollar fine imposed against a drug company that promoted its drugs for uses and dosages that the FDA specifically declined to approve)). The FDA’s informal interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to some deference from courts. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944) (<HOLDING>). But courts have not always agreed with the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation (B) holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference (C) holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law (D) holding that an agencys informal interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference to the extent it has the power to persuade (E) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference

A: holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation
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Q: be dismissed even if a minute entry is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 4(c), because the trial court judge did not sign the minutes as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-106. We disagree. The only page from the trial court minutes for August 28, 2006, that was filed with this Court was the page that included the entry regarding the defendant’s case. While it is true that the particular page of the minutes extracted to supplement the appellate record does not bear the signature of the trial court judge, there is no proof that the judge did not sign the minutes on a subsequent page not included in the record before us, and we presume that the minutes were signed as required by section 16-1-106. See Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1937) (<HOLDING>) There is no proof in the record that rebuts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body (B) holding that although a corporate officer is not presumed to be personally liable for corporate debts the officer may expressly bind himself or herself to be answerable for such debts (C) holding that even in absence of proof that chancellor signed court minutes it must be presumed that he did so and noting that ejvery officer is presumed to have performed his duty (D) holding it immaterial that one charged with willfully selling unregistered securities had no actual knowledge that he was violating the law because he was presumed to have and is chargeable with knowledge of the laws under which he was undertaking to do business (E) holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it

A: holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body
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Q: we next ask whether the City offered a nondiscriminatory reason for his termination and, if so, whether Adair has showed that the City’s non-retaliatory reason is pretext. As previously discussed, the City has offered ample evidence that Adair was physically unable to perform his duties as a firefighter given his lifting restrictions. Indeed, his own doctors concluded that he could not perform the duties of a firefighter. Adair’s inability to perform a firefighter’s duties constitutes a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for his termination. See Buckner, 760 P.2d at 806-07 (offering “the employee’s inability to perform the assigned duties” as an example of a non-retaliatory reason for discharge); Keddington v. City of Bartlesville, 42 P.3d 293, 298 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the City satisfied its burden. At this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once the employees temporarytotaldisability period has ended and the employee is determined to suffer some permanent physical disability which prevents the discharge of assigned duties for the employer the employer bears no  341 liability for then terminating the employee under  341c (B) holding that an employee whose disability is related to his ability to perform the duties of his position is not disabled under the act and therefore an employer has no duty to accommodate (C) holding that an employer who has determined that the employee had not been under a disability can discipline that employee for subsequent unexcused absences and not violate section 510 (D) holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury (E) holding that after the employer determined the employee was not disabled the employer had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to terminate the employee for unexcused absences under section 510

A:
holding that an employee whose disability is related to his ability to perform the duties of his position is not disabled under the act and therefore an employer has no duty to accommodate
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