In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: removal of the access can result in a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, if the state’s use is for a purpose other than a road purpose. But, in Judge Armstrong’s view, any modification of a road for road purposes that denies a landowner’s access does not give rise to a compensable taking. In so concluding, Judge Armstrong discounts as “dictum” the Supreme Court rationale in Burk that an abutter’s right of access to a conventional Highway “can be divested only by condemnation of the easement appurtenant to the abutting property.” 200 Or at 231. Judge Armstrong explains that the court’s conclusion in Burk cannot be reconciled with the court’s analysis in more recent cases in the context of regulations that affect road access. See, e.g., Schrunk, 242 Or at 73 (<HOLDING>). If, Judge Armstrong’s concurrence reasons, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access (B) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking (C) holding ripe a claim for a pre1987 taking because prior to first english california law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an action in inverse condemnation (D) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (E) holding that regulatory restrictions on abutting landowners right of ingress and egress are not compensable when landowner has adequate alternative means to access property

A: (B)
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Q: sophisticated consumer” might well reach the same conclusion. In sum, particularly at this early stage, defendants cannot establish as a matter of law that Santander is a creditor exempt from the FDCPA. Thus, the motion to dismiss should be denied. TCPA Claims Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under the TCPA based on an exception contained in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2), which excepts calls to a residential line when made pursuant to an “established business relationship.” It is difficult to imagine how that exemption would apply to Letricia Hamlett, who was not a signatory to the loan, but in fairness there is at least one case that supports this odd interpretation of the law. See Santino v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., No. 09-CV-982, 2011 WL 754874, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2011) (<HOLDING>); but see Watson v. NCO Group, Inc., 462 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  2254 applies to administrative proceedings (B) holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action (C) holding exemption applies to nondebtor (D) holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action (E) holding that  1447c applies to counsel

A: (C)
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Q: Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir.1994); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1990). Under the incorporation by reference doctrine, the court may also consider documents “whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir.2002). Dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate only when the court is satisfied that the deficiencies in the complaint could not possibly be cured by amendment. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir.2003); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court (B) holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order (C) recognizing utility of amendment as a proper basis for dismissal without leave to amend (D) holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made (E) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court

A:
(D)
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