In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: purpose, we would have some authority to solve taxpayer’s problem. See Rhodes, 166 Vt. at 157, 688 A.2d at 1311 (noting that, to invoke impossibility rule, party “must dem onstrate why this Court should not construe the statute in its ordinary sense or why the consequences of such construction will cause hardship or constitute impossibility”). But our standard under this prudential rule is very limited and does not ordinarily extend to making choices, among many available, to solve the problem. There is simply no way to construe the statute to allow a transfer that occurred 319 days after an LLC’s articles of organization were filed without reading the words “at the time of formation” out of the statute. See Colwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 VT 5, ¶ 15, 175 Vt. 61, 819 A.2d 727 (<HOLDING>). ¶23. It is true that the Department’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (B) recognizing that though statute at hand does not fully address the problem legislature intended to address in view of the number of choices available to solve the problem    this is an inappropriate case for the court to fashion the particular remedy appellants seek because to do so would place court in the position of making policy choices best left to legislature (C) holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature (D) holding that considering an amendment is not the time to address the merits of a case (E) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language

A: holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case
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Q: appealed the judgment of the Court of Veterans Appeals to this court. On appeal the Secretary contends that the Court of Veterans Appeals erred by not deferring to the Department’s reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions governing claims for accrued benefits. The Secretary also disputes Mrs. Jones’s assertion that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. ANALYSIS I. Jurisdiction to hear appeals from final decisions of the Court of Veterans Appeals is conferred upon this court by 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (1994). Under the express terms of that statute, however, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U 625, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2663-64, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to hear 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district courts remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the secretary of health and human services was an immediately appealable order (B) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (E) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order

A: holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable
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Q: or otherwise, with respect to this Agreement ... or for the appointment of a receiver or trustee of the Trust, or for any other remedy with respect to an event of default hereunder ...” (PSA § 6.07 (emphasis added).) This language makes “any other remedy with respect to an event of default” simply one category to which the no-action clause applies, in addition to “any proceeding ... with respect to this Agreement.” Consistent with other courts interpreting similar clauses, the Court concludes that the breadth of this provision— applying to “any proceeding, judicial or otherwise, with respect to this Agreement” — requires that the prerequisites for filing suit apply to Plaintiffs’ contract and tort claims. See Peak Partners, LP v. Republic Bank, 191 Fed.Appx. 118, 126-27 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Feldbaum, 1992 WL 119095, at *6 (interpreting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new york law did not preclude an arbitrators award of punitive damages despite a new york choice of law provision because there was no indication in the contract that the parties intended to limit their remedies in arbitration (B) holding under new york law that a noaction provision containing similar with respect to this indenture language barred negligence claims against a servicer (C) holding that new york law applies to this matter (D) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (E) recognizing a similar exception to its rule with respect to corporations

A:
holding that new york law did not preclude an arbitrators award of punitive damages despite a new york choice of law provision because there was no indication in the contract that the parties intended to limit their remedies in arbitration
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