In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5524, and thus a two-year statute of limitations applies to this case. See Sameric Corp. of Del, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998). The date when a Section 1983 action accrues, however, is a matter of federal law. Wallace v. Koto. 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). A Section 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599; see also Sanduteh v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, Giles asserts that the City violated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (B) holding that in an environmental contamination ease a cause of action accrues  when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of his or her cause of action and of the identity of a party or parties who may be responsible for the injury (C) holding that a federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the existence of and source of the injury not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong (D) holding that  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (E) holding that a  1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action 

Answer: holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury


Question: such entities from exercising their right of eminent domain. We disagree. The statute unambiguously prohibits any curtailment or limitation of an FmHA-indebted water association’s services resulting from municipal annexation or inclusion. This language indicates a congressional mandate that local governments not encroach upon the services provided by such associations, be that encroachment in the form of competing franchises, new or additional permit requirements, or similar means. To read a loophole into this absolute prohibition, as Madison would have us do, and allow a city to do via condemnation what it is forbidden by other means, would render nugatory the clear purpose of § 1926(b). See Moore Bayou Water Association, Inc. v. Town of Jonestown, 628 F.Supp. 1367 (N.D.Miss.1986) (<HOLDING>). Madison contends that this construction of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents (B) holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate (C) holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted (D) holding municipal condemnation of water associations facilities and certificate violative of  1926b (E) holding that because exclusion was not provided to certificate holder terms of the certificate controlled

Answer: holding that  1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents


Question: from California. A Michigan federal magistrate judge ordered his return to California. The following day, a criminal complaint based on the September 1995 heroin sales was filed against Jackson. Jackson was never served, did not appear, and the government subsequently dismissed the complaint without prejudice on November 20,1996. On January 6, 1998, Jackson was indicted for distribution of herom in the September 1995 transactions. Jackson eventually was returned to Michigan in November 1998, appeared before a magistrate judge on November 24, 1998, and was arraigned on December 1,1998. Trial was originally scheduled for March 25, 1999. On March 22, 1999, Jackson’s counsel, Stephen Rabaut, moved to dismiss the mdictment based on United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The district court dismissed the indictment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that eastern michigans federal grand jury system violated equal protection (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (D) holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial (E) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection

Answer:
holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection