instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
would allow for the award of attorney fees whenever a statute or contract provides for one side to pay expenses, even when such attorney fees were not contemplated. The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent in this regard. Therefore, I do not join in the majority’s opinion that the term “expenses” as used in section 13-7-4(d) includes attorney fees, but would hold that because that section does not specifically provide for an award of attorney fees, such award was improper here. For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority’s determination that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. However, I dissent rs of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986); In re Olliff, 258 Ga. 157, 366 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Head v. Savage, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 32, 38 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan (D) holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs (E) holding that expenses refers to costs
answer:
holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid


question:
reasoning of these cases. Moreover, we believe that declaratory relief is also moot when the challenged acts have already “irretrievably occurred.” Accordingly, we apply the teachings of N.J. Tpk. Auth., that the claim for injunctive relief had become “academic by reason of these changed circumstances .... ” Id. at 27. Here, as in N.J. Tpk. Auth., the challenged action awarding the contracts has already occurred, and the work required by them has already been performed. There is no longer a “ ‘subject matter upon which the judgment of the court can operate’ to make a substantive determination on the merits.” Id. at 30 (quoting Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390, 20 S.Ct. 673, 44 L.Ed. 813 (1900)); see also Jersey Cent. Power and Light Co. v. State of N.J., 772 F.2d 35, 36 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). II. For Appellants to be prevailing parties 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot (B) holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc  1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action (C) holding that a challenge to a mining plan was moot where the action sought to be enjoined hadbeen completed (D) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (E) holding that injunctive claim was rendered meaningless since the state action sought to be enjoined has irretrievably occurred
answer:
holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot


question:
court’s January 29, 1991, decision from the bench. On January 29, 1991, the bankruptcy court explained that the IRS was not enjoined from proceeding lawfully to enforce debtor’s outstanding tax liabilities not paid under her plan. See Tr. at 8 (Jan. 29, 1991). By enjoining the IRS from proceeding against debt- or, the bankruptcy court intended only to prevent future violations of the automatic stay in this bankruptcy proceeding. Id. (stating that a “clean lifetime letter” was not intended but that “[t]he sort of thing that has transpired again and again shall not continue”). 13 . Accord Small Business Admin. v. Rinehart, 887 F.2d 165, 169-70 (8th Cir.1989); Inslaw, 113 B.R. at 810; In re Lile, 103 B.R. 830, 835 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1989); see also In re Gustafson, 934 F.2d 216 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Pearson, 917 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs  5629 action against the defendant for alleged fraudulent transfers was subject to the automatic stay provision 11 usc  362a (B) recognizing fdcpa claim for violation of bankruptcy codes automatic stay provision 11 usc  362 which explicitly provides private cause of action (C) holding that a state is immune by virtue of 11 usc  106c from money damages for violating the automatic stay provision of 11 usc  362a (D) holding that debtor did not prove that defendant creditors violated automatic stay under 11 usc  362a with respect to their actions in a state court lawsuit because the creditors actions involved a counterclaim that debtor asserted and were in response to that counterclaim (E) holding rule 11 sanction proceeding was exempt from automatic stay
answer:

holding that the plaintiffs  5629 action against the defendant for alleged fraudulent transfers was subject to the automatic stay provision 11 usc  362a