In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 238 (2) (367 SE2d 786) (1988). 41 Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 302 Ga. App. 726, 730 (2) (b) (691 SE2d 633) (2010) (punctuation omitted). 42 Id. at 731 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted). 43 Fla. Int’l Indem. Co. v. Osgood, 233 Ga. App. 111, 115 (3) (503 SE2d 371) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 44 Griffin, 302 Ga. App. at 731 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted). 45 See Roland v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 265 Ga. 776, 778(2) (462 SE2d 623) (1995) (affirming trial court’s directed verdict in favor of insured on coverage claim but, nonetheless, also affirming court’s directed verdict in favor of insurer on insured’s bad-faith claim in light of the fact that insured’s coverage, despite ultimately succeeding, was based on a doubtful question of law); Griffin, 302 Ga.App. at 731 (2) (b) (<HOLDING>); Assurance Co. of Am. v. BBB Serv. Co., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because insurers nonpayment was based on contention that insured did not have a covered loss under the policy because the value of the property was the same regardless of whether it was serviced by an easement nonpayment was reasonable and not subject to a badfaith claim (B) holding that regardless of the subjective belief of the insured the record established a basis to believe that the insured had committed an act that could give rise to a claim under the policy (C) holding that an insurers obligation to defend an insured was a property interest subject to prejudgment attachment (D) holding in a case involving a multiplevehicle policy that a new offer of uninsured motorist coverage was not required for the addition of a new vehicle which was comparable to the renewal or supplementation of an existing policy events that did not trigger the statutory requirement of a new offer the courts holding was based in part upon the principle that an insurance contract is personal to the insured because it insures the risk of loss to the insured and does not attach to specific vehicles (E) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: CURIAM. Appellant, John Mark Vaughan, Jr., filed a Rule 3.800(a) motion, claiming that his sentence was illegal under Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines could have been imposed under the valid 1994 guidelines. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to attach the relevant portions of the record to support this finding, which ordinarily would require reversal. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 741 So.2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). However, appellant failed to allege that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a movant successfully challenges an illegal prr sentence in a rule 3800a motion at resentencing the movant is entitled to be present at sentencing represented by counsel with an opportunity to present mitigating evidence (B) holding that burden is on trial court denying a facially sufficient rule 3800a motion to attach record establishing movant is not entitled to relief (C) holding motion for substitution of judge properly denied where movant failed to attach affidavit (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding that a rule 3800a motion that does not allege that the court records show the defendants entitlement to additional jail credit is facially insufficient
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: a written contract that an official or employee executed for the State or 1 of its units while the official or employee was acting within the scope of the authority of the official or employee. S.G. § 12-202 provides that: A claim under this subtitle is barred unless the claimant files suit within 1 year after the later of: (1) the date on which the claim arose; or (2) the completion of the contract that gives rise to the claim. Magnetti does not contest that S.G. § 12-201 applies to the University. Indeed, it is without question that the waiver of sovereign immunity applies and includes the University. In Stem, we held that S.G. § 12-201 was applicab — Stern, 380 Md. at 702, 846 A.2d at 1002 (footnote omitted). See also Towson Univ. v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 96, 862 A.2d 941, 957 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Frankel, 361 Md. at 308, 761 A.2d at 329 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that claims over state employment contracts are subject to the oneyear condition precedent set forth in sg  12202 (B) holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims (C) recognizing that a case becomes removable when nondiverse parties are dismissed subject to the oneyear limitation on removal (D) holding over (E) holding that in the employment context only transportation workers employment contracts are exempted from the faas coverage
[EX A]:
(A)