In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Welliver was originally entered into by Wellco, Inc. as Welliver’s predecessor. 4 . Ward is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in Bloss-burg, Pennsylvania. 5 . A “turn-key” project is one “in which all owner need do is 'turn the key' in the lock to open the building with nothing remaining to be done and all risks lo be assumed by contractor.” Black's Law Dictionary 1055 (6th ed.1991). 6 . Welliver is located in Elmira, New York. 7 . Ward Excavating is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business located in Troy, Pennsylvania. 8 . The phrases "peculiar risk” and "special danger” are used interchangeably. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 comment a (1965); Ortiz v. Ra-El Dev. Corp., 365 Pa.Su per. 48, 528 A.2d 1355, 1357 n. 2 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Nowhere in their Brief in Opposition to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agreement which required the submission of an affidavit of payment to subcontractors or lien waivers before payment was made by the general contractor was for the direct benefit of the subcontractors (B) holding corporation that contracted with independent contractor not liable to subcontractors employee plaintiff was unable to establish that peculiar risk or special danger caused injury (C) holding in part that the liability insurance company of the subcontractor which had named the general contractor as an additional insured on the subcontractors policy was liable to reimburse the general contractor for a settlement payment the general contractor had made to the subcontractors employee (D) holding that contract charged primary contractor with a duty of care for all employees on the work site including employees of its subcontractors where contract required primary contractor to comply with applicable state and federal safety statutes and regulations made primary contractor responsible for reviewing safety programs of its subcontractors and primary contractor employed a safety officer to oversee its subcontractors operations (E) holding that bankruptcy trustee for contractor could not avoid prepetition payment of funds from contractor to subcontractors
[A]: holding that an agreement which required the submission of an affidavit of payment to subcontractors or lien waivers before payment was made by the general contractor was for the direct benefit of the subcontractors


[Q]: because of [the dealer’s] precarious financial condition .... ... [W]e decline to hold BMW/NA negligent and liable for damages since it could not reasonably have anticipated the crimes committed by [the dealer’s] principal, Eichler. Although BMW/NA may have been aware of [the dealer’s] shaky financial condition, that knowledge alone gave BMW/NA no cause reasonably to anticipate that Eichler would either engage in any criminal activity or that he would abscond with customer funds. In fact, no amount of supervision by BMW/NA would have enabled it to foresee Eichler’s thievery. Id. In other cases involving the franchisors of automobile dealerships, the courts have reached similar results. See Colson v. Maghami, No. CV 08-2150-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 2744682, at *9-10 (D.Ariz. July 9, 2010) (<HOLDING>); DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Clemente, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer (B) holding that a franchisor had no duty to supervise its automobile dealership or to warn a customer of the dealership who paid a substantial deposit for a limited edition lamborghini reventon and who did not receive either the car or the return of his deposit (C) holding that an automobile dealership had no duty to prevent the misconduct of the executives of another company who misappropriated company funds to make the purchase of several automobiles from the dealership (D) holding that where no evidence was designated to show that a car buyer knew that a sale violated the rights of the dealership that owned the car the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of indcode  26112019 (E) holding that a car dealership could be held vicariously liable for the intentional tort of its employee who shot out the tires of the plaintiffs truck during a repossession attempt
[A]: holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer


[Q]: See Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 627, 651 A.2d 92, 95 (1995). However, apart from any persuasive weight afforded the Ninth Circuit’s decision in C’Est Moi, NHIC proffers no case law specifically suggesting that common law doctrines such as uberrimae fidei and equitable fraud may not be modified or superseded by a contractual agreement between the insurer and the insured. On the contrary, as we have noted, a number of courts have embraced the ability of parties to contract around common law. See, e.g., King, 906 F.2d at 1540-41; Conn. Indem. Co., 390 F.Supp.2d at 166-67; Progressive N. Ins. Co., 314 F.Supp.2d at 829-30; see also, e.g., McBride v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2007 WL 5185293, at *18, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16917, at **64-65 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 29, 2007) (<HOLDING>). 19 . NHIC points out that during a telephone 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application (B) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (C) holding that insurance application clause modified federal common law governing misrepresentations because  once an insurer has entered into a policy by using an application form more favorable to the insured than the law provides it may not rely on a rule of law which is more stringent than the application form  quoting espinosa v guardian life ins 856 fsupp 711 717 dmass1994 (D) holding that the mccarranferguson act which bars application of a federal law in the face of a state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance did not preclude the concurrent assertion of the federal rico statute and nevada insurance law (E) recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous
[A]:
holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application