In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
include reasonable attorney’s fees for legal services benefitting the children. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 151.001(a), (c); In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d at 327, n. 55; Searcy, 17 S.W. at 373; Askey, 11 S.W. at 1101-02. In Hardin v. Hardin, this court cited section 154.001 but did not cite section 151.001 or section 156.401(a). See Hardin, 161 S.W.3d at 24-27. Nonetheless, the Hardin court noted that the duty of a parent to pay attorney’s fees as necessaries is based upon a parent’s duty to support his children. See id. at 25. In addition, the Hardin court cited non-enforcement cases that cited the statutory predecessor to section 151.001. See id. at 25-26 (citing Roosth v. Roosth and Daniels v. Allen); Roosth v. Roosth, 889 S.W.2d 445, 456-57 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Daniels v. Allen, 811 S.W.2d 278, 280 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that father pay attorneys fees to mother as necessaries for the benefit of the children in divorce decree and citing statutory predecessor to section 151001 (B) holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries (C) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay reasonable attorneys fees incurred by mother as necessaries for the children (D) holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule (E) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction may order one parent to pay the reasonable attorneys fees of the other parent as additional child support if the fees are necessaries for the benefit of the children

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
. The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Iowa, to whom this case was referred with the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3). 3 . Montandon also alleged Title VII claims against Todd and Ehlers in their personal capacities, as well as constructive discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. His wife, Tish Walker Montandon, claimed loss of consortium. The district court dismissed these claims. Because they have not been raised on appeal, they are deemed abandoned. See Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 740-41 (8th Cir.1985). 4 . It remains to be seen whether our holding in Quick will remain the law. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), cert, granted, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2430, 138 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title vii does not address samesex harassment (B) holding that samesex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under title vii (C) holding that title vii does not protect employees from harassment based on sexual orientation (D) holding that samcscx sexual harassment claims are actionable under title vii (E) holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
to the defense of Poole. 6 . Moreover, not only did Poole's unilateral decision to have the school’s interior remedi-ated violate the terms of the policy, (see ECF No. 1-2 at 19), and impair Nautilus’s ability to protect its interests, which included mounting a litigation strategy to determine fault, see W. Bend Co. v. Chiaphua Indus., Inc., 112 F.Supp.2d 816, 824 (E.D.Wis.2000) (explaining that prohibitions against voluntarily assuming obligations “exist to give the insurer — which is being asked to foot the bill — an opportunity to protect its interests”), but the late tender to Nautilus appears to have- deprived it of the opportunity to control the defense of Poole in the state action. See Wm. C. Vick Constr. Co. v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 52 F.Supp.2d 569, 596 (E.D.N.C.1999) (<HOLDING>). To hold, as Westfield urges, that Nautilus 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the insurers failure to pay even what it had considered to be a reasonable sum for defense costs despite having nominally accepted the tender of defense constitutes a breach of the duty to defend (B) holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer (C) holding that insurer must pay for defense after it declined to provide a defense and coverage was found to exist (D) holding that delayed notice relieves insurer of obligation to pay defense costs if it was actually prejudiced by delay (E) recognizing that an insurers obligation to pay for prenotification legal expenses is concomitant with its right to control the defense and that a contrary result would require the insurer to pay for those defense costs which it had no opportunity to control

Ex Output:

(E)