In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir.1996)). We conclude that, although the district court erroneously determined that the principles of Daubert did not apply to the re-creation and Agent Constantino’s testimony, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence. Under Daubert, the district court conducts a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2796; see Fed.R.Evid. 702 . This “gate-keeping” obligation on the part of the district court applies to all types of expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Many factors may bear on this inquiry, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dauberts basic gatekeeping obligation  applies to all expert testimony (B) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (C) recognizing the basic principle of contract law that the obligation of good faith is an implied condition in every contract (D) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (E) holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions
[A]: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive


[Q]: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals
[A]: holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision


[Q]: leave to file a civil complaint under a host of federal statutes, alleging employment discrimination by the Department of Transportation and, relatedly, the Federal Aviation Administration. Noting that the proposed complaint asserted claims “again relating to [Arizpe’s] past employment by the Department of Transportation,” the district court concluded that Arizpe failed to show that his claims were not barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, or another legal doctrine and denied Arizpe’s request for leave. Arizpe appeals that denial. We generally review denials of leave under an abuse of discretion standard. See In re Raz, 252 Fed.Appx. 609 (5th Cir.2007) (reviewing a district court’s refusal to grant a “prolific filer” leave to file rine Offshore, Inc., 448 F.3d 825 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, a review of the record and Arizpe’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that venue for litigation was proper based on 28 usc  1441 even though forum selection clause provided that the courts of the commonwealth of massachusetts would be the exclusive forum (B) holding that when action arising under contract containing venue selection clause is filed in court other than that specified in clause case will be transferred to forum selected by contract unless venue selection clause is unreasonable and unjust or invalid due to fraud or overreaching (C) holding that a federal courts order dismissing a case because a forum selection clause mandated venue in england met the requirements for collateral estoppel (D) holding order dismissing action without prejudice based on contractual forum selection clause is final and appealable because it terminates the litigation in the plaintiffs chosen forum (E) holding collateral estoppel elements met considering changed circumstances in the context of an exception to the general rule of collateral estoppel
[A]:
holding that venue for litigation was proper based on 28 usc  1441 even though forum selection clause provided that the courts of the commonwealth of massachusetts would be the exclusive forum