In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: prejudice. Common v. W. Suburban Hosp. Med. Ctr., 301 Ill.App.3d 939, 235 Ill.Dec. 158, 704 N.E.2d 731, 738-39 (1998) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We quoted Common and echoed its sentiment in Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 614 (7th Cir.2000), where we held that a district court’s failure to permit a plaintiff to amend his complaint in order to comply with section 2-622 was an abuse of discretion. Second, although the district court believed that plaintiffs’ counsel should have known to submit an affidavit and report in accordance with section 2-622, it made no specific finding that the failure to do so was in bad faith or an attempt to delay litigation. See Cookson v. Price, 393 Ill.App.3d 549, 333 Ill.Dec. 22, 914 N.E.2d 229, 232 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Further, it did not explain whether or in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a complaint that a report was not timely served was not subject to the twentyone day deadline to object to the sufficiency of a report under former section 74351a (B) holding no jurisdiction where appellant argued report was no report because it failed to mention appellant in any substantive way but trial court found report was merely deficient on element of causation as to appellant and granted extension (C) holding that it was error for the trial court to refuse to permit plaintiff to amend his complaint to include a new affidavit and report complying with section 2622 where there was no indication that the plaintiffs failure to file the report earlier in the litigation was in bad faith (D) holding that the trial courts failure to dismiss the action to quiet title was error because the plaintiff was not in possession of the land in question but the error was not fatal to the claim because the superior court could sua sponte amend the pleadings to include an action in ejectment (E) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel

Output: holding that a complaint that a report was not timely served was not subject to the twentyone day deadline to object to the sufficiency of a report under former section 74351a


Input: Consider Input: removed. Section 141(b) does not contemplate that a director’s term could end through board shrinkage. A bylaw that seeks to achieve this result conflicts with Section 141(b) and is void. This interpretation of Section 141(b) comports with how our law has developed. Under the common law, “the voluntary assumption of management responsibility by the directors carried with it a concomitant vested right to serve out the full term for which they were elected unless there was cause for removal....” Drexler, supra, § 13.01, at 13-2; see Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del.Ch.1988) (“At common law a director had a vested right in his position arising from his duties and responsibilities to the corporation.”); see also Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857 (Del.Ch.1957) (Seitz, C.) (<HOLDING>). “Prior to 1967, the [DGCL] was silent as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders (B) recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause (C) recognizing common law privileges (D) recognizing the presidents authority to remove sec members for good cause despite governing statutes silence (E) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary

Output: holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders


Input: Consider Input: possibilities among various offenders. Felons placed on probation with the first six months to be served in county jail are regarded by the sentencing judge as less serious offenders than those felons sentenced to the penitentiary with no probation. As indicated by the court in Burton, “felons [sentenced to the penitentiary] are in greater need of rehabilitation and need a greater incentive, in the form of good time credits, to get them to conform their behavior to what society will accept.” Burton, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 1023. The good-time credit programs are designed to promote prison discipline; therefore, it is reasonable that persons who are subjected to a penitentiary sentence may need more incentives to conform their behavior to prison rules. Burton, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 1024 (<HOLDING>). We conclude the legislature’s decision to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that youthful offender could be sentenced in excess of six year cap where probation violation was substantive in that he committed several criminal offenses (B) holding that under goodtime credit rules it was constitutional for a felon sentenced to one year in the illinois department of corrections to be released before a misdemeanant sentenced to six months in a county jail (C) holding that a defendant must be granted credit for time served in any institution serving as the functional equivalent of a county jail (D) holding that jail records can properly be considered in determining jail credit issues raised pursuant to rule 3800a (E) holding that a person who was a juvenile at the time of the offense cannot be sentenced to death


Output: holding that youthful offender could be sentenced in excess of six year cap where probation violation was substantive in that he committed several criminal offenses