In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: (Tex.2010) (orig. proceeding). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies creates a jurisdictional bar to proceeding with the claim. See City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex.2008) (“[Njoncompliance [with Chapter 21’s administrative procedures] deprives courts of subject-matter, jurisdiction.”); Smith v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 101 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). A would-be Chapter 21 claimant must first file an administrative complaint with the civil rights division of the Texas Workforce Commission. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.201(a) .(stating that an aggrieved person “may file a complaint with the commission”); id. § 21.0015 (defining “commission” as “the Texas Workforce ■Commission civil rights division”); Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 486-88 (<HOLDING>). The complaint must be filed “not later than 
 Holding statements: (A) holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent (B) holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language (C) holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (D) holding that administrative exhaustion is mandatory despite legislatures use of the word may (E) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional

Answer: holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent


Question: venue, the propriety of venue is fixed in the county chosen by the plaintiff. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.063 (Vernon 1986); Tex.R.Civ.P. 86-1. If a defendant objects to the plaintiffs venue choice and properly challenges that choice through a motion to transfer venue, the question of proper venue is raised. Tex.R.Civ.P. 86. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that venue is maintainable in the county of suit. Id. 87-2(a). If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the trial court must transfer the lawsuit to another specified county of proper venue. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.063(1) (“The court ... shall transfer an action to another county of proper venue if ... the county in which the action is pending is not a proper county....”); Tieuel, 654 S.W.2d at 775 (<HOLDING>). If the plaintiff meets the burden, the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings (B) recognizing that the plaintiff has the right to file suit in any permissible county (C) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (D) holding that even if venue was improper the case should have been transferred not dismissed (E) recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue

Answer: holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings


Question: inference that the defendants engage in those activities or “may be present—whether officially or unofficially—in and around the Chagos Archipelago.” Pis.’ Reply to Brown & Root Opp’n at 4. Likewise, assuming ar-guendo that certain former board members were fully aware of the plaintiffs’ removal from Chagos, that knowledge or awareness is not sufficient to infer that they (and by extension, the defendants) engaged in some kind of a conspiracy to remove the plaintiffs. Id. at 5. As a result, the plaintiffs’ optimistic conclusion that these facts “create!] a reasonable basis for Plaintiffs’ conspiracy and continuing involvement theories” is a classic example of a conclusory allegation unsupported by factual data. Pis.’ Reply to Brown & Root Opp’n at 4; accord Byrd, 174 F.3d at 248 n. 8 (<HOLDING>); Exxon Corp., 40 F.3d at 1487-88 (viewing the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim (B) holding that a conclusory opinion may be rejected (C) holding party opposing summary judgment does not show genuine issue for trial by replacing conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit (D) holding that the plaintiffs allegations that there may well be agency knowledge or documents that could aid his case was plainly conclusory (E) holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint

Answer:
holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim