In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and the defendant subsequently gave a statement. Id. 476. The court held that the detective’s statements at the jail cell did not constitute interrogation. Id. at 479-480. The court further determined that the defendant, by stating that he wanted to tell his side of the story, “ ‘initiated’ further conversation in the ordinary dictionary sense of that word.” Id. at 480. Similarly, in Bunch v Thompson, 949 F2d 1354, 1361 (CA 4, 1991), the court held that a defendant’s statement was not the product of “police-initiated interrogation” where it followed an inquiry that “amounted to nothing more than an effort to ascertain if Bunch had changed his mind about wanting an attorney.” See also McCall v State, 501 So 2d 496, 500 (Ala Crim App, 1986) (<HOLDING>); State v Acquin, 187 Conn 647, 669-670; 448 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime (B) holding that although interrogation may not continue after a suspect has requested counsel the police legitimately may inquire whether the suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney (C) holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation (D) holding that prosecutors who soon after arrest of suspect allegedly directed police to coerce confession from suspect were not entitled to absolute immunity because interrogation is ordinarily a police activity (E) holding that once a suspect has requested counsel interrogators may not reinitiate questioning unless the attorney is present regardless of whether or not there has been an outside consultation

Output: holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime


Input: Consider Input: that may be considered in determining punishment are the subject of article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. Art. 37.07 (Vernon Supp.2004). This statute authorizes the admission of evidence in the punishment phase of trial as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing. Id. The circumstances of the offense are relevant to sentencing and may be considered by the trier of fact in determining the punishment to be assessed. Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). One circumstance of the offense that may be considered is the degree of injury to the victim so long as the fact finder may rationally attribute moral culpability to the accused for that injury. Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76, 78-79 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 896 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sexual assault coercion and harassment certainly may violate contemporary standards of decency and cause physical and psychological harm (B) holding in aggravated sexual assault case that testimony regarding psychological trauma suffered by child victim and its physical manifestations properly admitted (C) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable (D) recognizing trauma that new trial would likely bring to victim of child sexual assault (E) recognizing the purpose of missouris child victim witness protection law sec 491675 et seq as an attempt to minimize the emotional and psychological trauma to the alleged child victim

Output: holding that sexual assault coercion and harassment certainly may violate contemporary standards of decency and cause physical and psychological harm


Input: Consider Input: F.3d at 1071. 24 . Consistent with the framework outlined above, two clearly delineated categories of "initial transferee" cases have emerged. 5 Collier on Bankmptcy § 550.02[4][a] (15th ed.2007). In one line of cases, the recipient of funds is not deemed to be an initial transferee because it simply acts as an uninterested agent between the transferor and another entity — these are the "mere conduit” cases. See, e.g., In re Finley, 130 F.3d at 59; In re Chase & Sanborn Coip., 848 F.2d at 1200; Bonded, 838 F.2d at 893. In the other, the recipient is deemed to be an initial transferee because it obtains a complete ability to do what it wishes with the funds — these are the dominion and control cases. See, e.g., Taunt v. Hurtado (In re Jon Rey Hurtado), 342 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 25 . It could be posited that the third party 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trustee is not required to avoid the initial transfer from the initial transferee before seeking to avoid it and recover from subsequent transferees and noting that this conclusion is consistent with case law that has disallowed automatic recovery from a subsequent transferee following the avoidance of an initial transfer through a stipulated judgment or default when the transferee had not been a party to the underlying avoidance proceeding (B) holding that a trustee may settle with an initial transferee and still pursue recovery against a subsequent transferee but notwithstanding the trustee will still be required to prove that the transfers  were fraudulent and improper in connection with its suit against the subsequent transferee because the trustees settlement with the initial transferee did not involve any determination on the merits as to the initial transfers and in this way the subsequent transferee will be afforded its due process rights to contest the avoidability of these initial transfers (C) holding that agent of corporation who used corporate funds to secure personal loan was initial transferee (D) holding a party to be an initial transferee because she was given legal title to the funds (E) holding that because the recipient of funds had a contractual obligation to immediately transfer them he was not an initial transferee under  550 even though the funds were eventually used to purchase stock in his name


Output: holding that a trustee is not required to avoid the initial transfer from the initial transferee before seeking to avoid it and recover from subsequent transferees and noting that this conclusion is consistent with case law that has disallowed automatic recovery from a subsequent transferee following the avoidance of an initial transfer through a stipulated judgment or default when the transferee had not been a party to the underlying avoidance proceeding