In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: waived his attorney-client privilege when his attorney failed to make timely objections to questions that it alleged sought privileged communications. This argument has no merit for two reasons. First, many of the questions Airdata asked did not seek confidential communications. Therefore, no objection was necessary to preserve the privilege. Second, Jenney’s current attorney did make timely objections to those questions actually seeking confidential communications. The fact that Jenney’s attorney had to interrupt him to make the objection is not sufficient to establish a waiver. Because the objections were made as soon as the confidential nature of the communication became apparent, Jenney did not waive the privilege. Cf. Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee, 837 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege (C) holding that disclosure orders adverse to the attorneyclient privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine (D) holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts (E) holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: the interests of the group of claimants as .a whole necessitates the setting of deadlines to dislodge claims stalled in the claims resolution process. Finally, the Court notes that this conclusion is completely consistent with prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, the Court has, on several occasions, upheld Trust deadlines. See Almalich v. Dalkon Shield Claimant’s Trust, Docket No. 19103 (July 29,1994) (deadline regarding submission of claims material within day-to-day operations); Gunnell, Docket No. 19331 (ADR deadlines within day-to-day operations). Moreover, the Court has affirmed the Trust’s disallowance authority. See e.g., Almalich, Docket No. 19103 (affirming disallowance of claims for failure to submit final claim materials by the stated deadline); Mantush, Docket No. 18298 (<HOLDING>); Besag, Docket No. 19492 (affirming Trust 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust (B) holding that statutory grounds for recusal can be waived both by failing to object and by failing to assert error on appeal (C) recognizing where naked trust created the division of naked legal title and equitable title which may be united at option of cestui que trust (D) recognizing trust authority to disallow claims for failing to select an option by july 1 1991 deadline (E) holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: Here, Defendants challenge venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). Although many federal courts hold that waiver under Rule 12 applies equally to § 1406(a), there appears to be some disagreement on the issue. Compare, e.g., Gardner v. Mylan Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01289, 2010 WL 2595114, at *2 (S.D.W.Va. June 24, 2010) (indicating that Rule 12 waiver guidelines apply to § 1406(a)); Bosse v. Mertoff, No. 05-CV-02170, 2007 WL 484590, at *2 (D.Colo. Feb. 9, 2007) (“[T]here is significant authority for the proposition that, once a defense of improper venue is waived, a defendant is also foreclosed from seeking a transfer under § 1406.”); with, e.g., Johnson v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 12 C 5842, 2013 WL 323404, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 25, 2013) (<HOLDING>). Regardless, it is clear that a party can 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer most appropriate under 28 usc  1406a (B) holding that a partys repeated representations that venue was proper in one forum waived its right to bring a subsequent motion under 28 usc  1406a challenging venue (C) holding that motion to transfer also must show either that county where action is pending is improper or that venue is mandatory in another county (D) recognizing conflicting case law regarding whether waiver  under rule 12b3 extends to a request for a transfer under  1406a given that such a transfer is premised on venue being improper in this district (E) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court
Example Output:
(D)