In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Welliver was originally entered into by Wellco, Inc. as Welliver’s predecessor. 4 . Ward is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in Bloss-burg, Pennsylvania. 5 . A “turn-key” project is one “in which all owner need do is 'turn the key' in the lock to open the building with nothing remaining to be done and all risks lo be assumed by contractor.” Black's Law Dictionary 1055 (6th ed.1991). 6 . Welliver is located in Elmira, New York. 7 . Ward Excavating is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business located in Troy, Pennsylvania. 8 . The phrases "peculiar risk” and "special danger” are used interchangeably. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 comment a (1965); Ortiz v. Ra-El Dev. Corp., 365 Pa.Su per. 48, 528 A.2d 1355, 1357 n. 2 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Nowhere in their Brief in Opposition to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agreement which required the submission of an affidavit of payment to subcontractors or lien waivers before payment was made by the general contractor was for the direct benefit of the subcontractors (B) holding corporation that contracted with independent contractor not liable to subcontractors employee plaintiff was unable to establish that peculiar risk or special danger caused injury (C) holding in part that the liability insurance company of the subcontractor which had named the general contractor as an additional insured on the subcontractors policy was liable to reimburse the general contractor for a settlement payment the general contractor had made to the subcontractors employee (D) holding that contract charged primary contractor with a duty of care for all employees on the work site including employees of its subcontractors where contract required primary contractor to comply with applicable state and federal safety statutes and regulations made primary contractor responsible for reviewing safety programs of its subcontractors and primary contractor employed a safety officer to oversee its subcontractors operations (E) holding that bankruptcy trustee for contractor could not avoid prepetition payment of funds from contractor to subcontractors

Ex Output:
holding that an agreement which required the submission of an affidavit of payment to subcontractors or lien waivers before payment was made by the general contractor was for the direct benefit of the subcontractors


Ex Input:
to Richardson. 6 . In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the Supreme Court extended Batson and its progeny to prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of gender. 7 . The Slate also points out that the presiding judge in the instant case is an African American jurist. Judge Green's sensitivity and efforts to seat a constitutional and racially-diverse jury for defendant, is evidenced in the debate over Richardson. Even though the judge originally found the state’s race-neutral reasons as to Richardson valid, he became concerned about the exclusion of African Americans from defendant's jury. However, the judge’s race is not relevant to Batson analysis. See State v. Tilley, 99-0569, p. 8 (La.7/6/00), 767 So.2d 6, 15 (<HOLDING>). 8 . A discussion of the assignments of error 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case (B) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (C) recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination (D) holding that custody decision based on race is not justified (E) holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant

Ex Output:
holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case


Ex Input:
not review the ICC’s refusal to reopen proceedings unless the motion to reopen was based on new evidence of changed circumstances. Id. Because Appellants’ motion to reopen was based on the ground of material error, the District Court found that it was not reviewable. Id. at 279, 107 S.Ct. 2360. Appellants argued that, under this Court’s holding in Friends of the Atgleiv-Susquehanna Trail, Inc., v. S.T.B., when the STB reopened the 1990 NITU for the limited purpose of substituting NWPTA as trail sponsor, it made the reopening order reviewable “for all purposes.” 252 F.3d 246, 260 (3d Cir.2001) (concluding that when the STB explicitly reopens a case, even for a limited purpose, it makes every aspect of the reopening order subject to review); see also BLE, 482 U.S. at 278, 107 S.Ct. 2360 (<HOLDING>). The District Court rejected this argument, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding adjudication order based upon a determination on the merits in juvenile court is a final and appealable order (B) holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action (C) holding that when the agency reopens a proceeding for any reason and after reconsideration issues a new and final order setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties that order  even if it merely reaffirms the rights and obligations set forth in the original order  is reviewable on its merits (D) holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits (E) holding a general prediction set forth in order does not constitute final agency action

Ex Output:

holding adjudication order based upon a determination on the merits in juvenile court is a final and appealable order