In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: make a hearing unnecessary. These contentions have no merit. Although we retain jurisdiction to resolve the State’s motion to dismiss this appeal, we first remand this matter to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing. We remand because whether Mr. Comer has expressly or impliedly consented to the filing of any pleadings in federal court is a critical question of fact that we believe the district court is in a better position to resolve. Indeed, we have previously recognized the general presumption that an attorney is authorized to act on his client’s behalf. See, e.g., Nevius, 105 F.3d at 459; Lucky, 86 F.3d at 925; Deutscher v. Angelone, 16 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir.1994); cf. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, — U.S. —, —, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1040, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (<HOLDING>). When parties have challenged this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan (B) holding that attorney lacked standing to file notice of appeal on behalf of client who couldnot be located because the client must make the ultimate decision regarding the appeal internal quotation marks omitted (C) recognizing that counsel have the authori ty to file an appeal on their clients behalf even when the client does not expressly give them his consent to do so (D) holding broker and clients agreed to arbitration where newaccount forms signed by clients expressly incorporated separate unsigned client agreement containing arbitration provision even if client agreement was not attached or read by clients because they were presumed to have read newaccount form which placed them on notice of client agreement (E) recognizing the right to counsel on appeal
[A]: (C)


[Q]: discretion. Commonwealth v. Collins, 598 Pa. 397, 957 A.2d 237, 272 (2008). As noted, discovery in death penalty collateral proceedings is permissible only upon leave of court, and only for good cause shown. Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(2). “ ‘A showing of good cause requires more than just a generic demand for potentially exculpatory evidence.’ ” Collins, 957 A.2d at 272 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119, 855 A.2d 726, 750 (2004)). We agree with the Commonwealth that Elliott has failed to demonstrate that the PCRA court abused its discretion by denying Elliott’s request for additional discovery. Elliott has not identified any document that was withheld from him that would have been exculpatory, and his claims to the contrary constitute mere speculation. See Hanible, 30 A.3d at 484 (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Carson, 913 A.2d at 261 
 Holding statements: (A) holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause (B) holding that the government is not required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury (C) holding that record must show that evidence is exculpatory for defendant to establish brady violation (D) holding that speculation that production of requested documents might reveal exculpatory evidence is insufficient to establish good cause for discovery (E) holding that conjecture that opportunity to review homicide file might yield exculpatory evidence is inadequate to demonstrate good cause for discovery
[A]: (E)


[Q]: an employer based on its status as successor to corporations that had designed and manufactured allegedly defective equipment for their own use. The equipment passed to the successor corporation through a series of mergers. The court held that, but for the merger, plaintiff could have sued the predecessor corporations based on their design and manufacture of the defective equipment. The court concluded that this potential liability survived the merger, “since the obligation upon which [the successor] is being sued arose not out of the employment relation, but rather out of [the] independent business transaction” of the merger itself. Id. at 161, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 885, 412 N.E.2d at 940; see also Schweiner v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 120 Wis.2d 344, 354 N.W.2d 767, 772-73 (1984) (<HOLDING>). A strong dissent in Billy exposed the flaws 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a third party holding legal title to property is a necessary party in an action for equitable distribution (B) holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party (C) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (D) holding that plaintiff could recover royalties only for products manufactured by defendant after disclosure of secret but before issuance of patent (E) holding that but for merger plaintiff could have sued predecessor that manufactured defective equipment as third party but not analyzing basis for such a suit
[A]:
(E)