In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. Addressing the identical federal rule, the Supreme Court has stated that “[o]n its face, Rule 23.1 speaks only to the adequacy of the shareholder representatives pleadings.” Kamen, supra, 500 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 1711. The rule itself does not create a demand requirement. Id. “[T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance, not procedure.’ ” Id. at 96-97, 111 S.Ct. 1711 (quoting Daily Income Fund, supra, 464 U.S. at 543-44 & n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 831 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (other citations omitted)); see also Bazata, supra, 400 A.2d at 316 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the demand requirement or its futility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (B) holding that for purposes of super ct civ r 41b demand is not jurisdictional but an element of the shareholders claim (C) holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense (D) holding that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of super ct civ r 15a which permits a party to amend once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served (E) holding the connection is an element
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: S.E.2d at 629 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Sparks v. Peacock, plaintiff husband filed an action in superior court seeking contributions for payments on promissory notes executed by both he and his wife. Unlike the Garrison litigants, however, the parties in Sparks had not brought an action for equitable distribution in district court. Based on the wife’s motion, the superior court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, this Court acknowledged the jurisdictional nature of section 7A-244, stating that if the parties had indeed brought an equitable distribution action and such action was pending pursuant to section 7A-244, the superior court would not have jurisdiction over the propriety of payments on the promissory note. Id. at 641, 500 S.E.2d at 118 (<HOLDING>); see also Ward v. Ward, 116 N.C. App. 643, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that defendant correctly stated that the district court has jurisdiction over equitable distribution actions and citing section 7a244 (B) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties (C) holding that personal jurisdiction over partner did not follow from jurisdiction over partnership citing sher (D) holding that court of claims has jurisdiction over actions for breach of standard contract (E) recognizing the difference between jurisdiction over an action and jurisdiction over an issue and holding that although section 2074207 vests the family court with exclusive jurisdiction over actions to determine paternity under section 621302a1 the probate court has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of paternity when the issue is essential to the probate courts determination of heirs
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: the report and recommendation did not notify the parties that they must file timely objections to preserve their right to appellate review. He argues that the firm waiver rule should not be enforced in the absence of such an explicit notification. While we have held that the firm waiver rule is inapplicable when pro se litigants are not given explicit notice of the rule, see id. at 659, we have never extended that practice to counseled cases. We decline to do so today, because we expect counsel to know the rules. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 n. 5 (10th Cir.2007) (“[W]e expect counsel to know the pleading rules of the road without being given personal notice of them by the district court.”); United States v. Windrix, 405 F.3d 1146, 1157 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). While 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) provides that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules (B) holding that a criminal defendants counsel is charged with knowledge of the local criminal rules in their entirety including those parts of the local civil rules incorporated by reference (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying its own local rules even though those rules prevented it from considering some facts improperly alleged by plaintiffs that might have been relevant to the summary judgment motion (D) holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery (E) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings
[EX A]:
(B)