In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: to use the latter route to circumvent Congress’s apparent intent in enacting the AEDPA to bar all review of such decisions. Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1046 (D.C.Cir.1998). In 1997, the Ninth Circuit held that the new restrictions on successive petitions do not prevent a petitioner from bringing a § 2241 claim after he has already brought a § 2255 claim. See United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278 (9th Cir.1997). Furthermore, in 1998, the Second Circuit held that a § 2255 petition that followed a § 2241 petition was not barred. See Corrao v. United States, 152 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir.1998), citing Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474 (2d Cir.1 the execution of a sentence are properly raised in a § 2241 petition”); United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 489 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Corrao, 152 F.3d at 191 (“a motion under § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subject matter jurisdiction under  2241 is present in the custodial court when the petition challenges the manner location or condition of a sentences execution (B) holding that a petition under  2241 attacks the execution of a sen tence while a  2255 petition attacks the validity of a judgment and sentence (C) holding that an attack on the computation and execution of a sentence must come in the form of a  2241 petition (D) holding that  2255 is unavailable to attack execution of sentence (E) holding that it is well settled in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that  2255 will lie only to attack the imposition of a sentence and that an attack on the execution thereof may be accomplished only by way of habeas corpus in the district of confinement
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: this authority explicitly by statute in 11 U.S.C. § 362. Nor is there any danger of the bankruptcy court having prejudiced Appellant’s rights under Puerto Rico common law. As the bankruptcy court itself stated, the Appellant remains free to present her arguments under Puerto Rico law at the appropriate time, during the foreclosure proceedings in Puerto Rico’s commonwealth courts. (See Hearing Tr., Docket No. 1-7 at 11.) Therefore, any attempts to link this case to the holding in Stem are mistaken. We reject Appellant’s attempt to challenge this routine and plainly constitutional exercise of the bankruptcy court’s authority. This case, thus, fits squarely with several other cases that have been resolved in the wake of Stem. See In Re DiVittorio, 670 F.3d 273, 282 n. 4 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); In Re Garcia, 471 B.R. 324, 329 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that stem did not change a bankruptcy courts authority to decide questions impacting whether to grant relief from automatic stay (B) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay (C) holding that the bankruptcy court relinquishes jurisdiction over estate property when it grants relief from the automatic stay (D) recognizing district courts authority to dispose of contempt action for violation of automatic stay of bankruptcy (E) holding that bankruptcy court order that a stay applied to a particular party was a final order and noting that bankruptcy court orders lifting or denying relief from an automatic stay are final for purposes of appeal
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: court of competent jurisdiction to command the performance of a specified official duty issued by law. See Sutton v. Figgatt, 280 N.C. 89, 92, 185 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1971). The writ may therefore still be issued by our courts, “and the substantive grounds for granting the remedy as developed under our former practice still control.” Fleming, 23 N.C. App. at 420, 209 S.E.2d at 368. The purpose of a writ of mandamus remains, however, a limited and extraordinary remedy to provide a swift enforcement of a party’s already established legal rights. “Mandamus will not lie unless the party seeking the writ has a clea o damages on any grounds since the repeal of the statutory authority for the writ. As our own Rules of Appellate Procedure indicate, mandamus is intended as a swift remedy, “file 917) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that the trial court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action to clear title of a false or fraudulent document that asserts an interest in real property may be joined with an action for damages under  33420a (B) holding that the offense requires that the return be false as to a material matter (C) holding that in an action for breach of contract only nominal damages can be recovered if there is no evidence produced from which the facts necessary to determine damages under the proper rule can be determined (D) holding that district court erred in awarding attorneys fees in civil rights action where plaintiff only recovered 1 in nominal damages (E) holding that absent a false return no damages could be recovered in an action for mandamus
Example Output:
(E)