TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: 593, 598 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1, 135 L.Ed.2d 1098 (1996), and of mixed questions of law and fact, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). However, the state court’s factual findings underlying those determinations are presumed to be correct and binding, as long as they were made after a full, fair, and adequate hearing on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 1994) (pre-AED-PA); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of es ing that the findings of the trial court on discriminatory intent in Batson challenge are reviewed for clear error); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (B) holding that the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under general statutes  46a60 is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (C) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (D) holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard (E) holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard

SOLUTION: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard

PROBLEM: make a hearing unnecessary. These contentions have no merit. Although we retain jurisdiction to resolve the State’s motion to dismiss this appeal, we first remand this matter to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing. We remand because whether Mr. Comer has expressly or impliedly consented to the filing of any pleadings in federal court is a critical question of fact that we believe the district court is in a better position to resolve. Indeed, we have previously recognized the general presumption that an attorney is authorized to act on his client’s behalf. See, e.g., Nevius, 105 F.3d at 459; Lucky, 86 F.3d at 925; Deutscher v. Angelone, 16 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir.1994); cf. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, — U.S. —, —, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1040, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (<HOLDING>). When parties have challenged this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan (B) holding that attorney lacked standing to file notice of appeal on behalf of client who couldnot be located because the client must make the ultimate decision regarding the appeal internal quotation marks omitted (C) recognizing that counsel have the authori ty to file an appeal on their clients behalf even when the client does not expressly give them his consent to do so (D) holding broker and clients agreed to arbitration where newaccount forms signed by clients expressly incorporated separate unsigned client agreement containing arbitration provision even if client agreement was not attached or read by clients because they were presumed to have read newaccount form which placed them on notice of client agreement (E) recognizing the right to counsel on appeal

SOLUTION: holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan

PROBLEM: whether Lamb unreasonably failed to avail herself of her employer’s remedies against sexual harassment. The City argues that Lamb was unreasonable in tailing to report what she perceived to be Peterson’s harassing remarks until months after they were actually made. The City also contends that Lamb failed to cooperate fully during the City’s investigation following her July 11 grievance. However, Lamb indicated that she did not report Peterson’s behavior immediately because she did not wish to cause trouble when she was relatively new to her job. Lamb Aff., ¶ 6. The Fifth Circuit has clarified that delay in reporting alone is not per se an "unreasonable failure” to take care. Watts, 170 F.3d at 510-11. But see Scrivner v. Socorro Independent School District, 169 F.3d 969 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). In addition, while Lamb was perhaps not as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs legal malpractice claim was not ripe until the appeal had been exhausted because plaintiffs harm remained speculative until then (B) holding unreasonable plaintiffs failure to complain from the summer of 1995 until march 1996 (C) holding that definition in iowa code chapter 321 1995 was expressly confined to that chapter and did not apply to iowa code section 36412 1995 (D) holding similar allegations supported that the plaintiffs negligence claim did not accrue until plaintiffs loan payments exceeded his ability to pay (E) holding the 1995 amendment to section 5601c removed all rights to appeal from a section 5402 ruling

SOLUTION:
holding that plaintiffs legal malpractice claim was not ripe until the appeal had been exhausted because plaintiffs harm remained speculative until then