In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 23 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (same). Essentially, the Court determined that the prejudicial quality of testimony regarding an actually coerced confession is, like all other improperly introduced testimony at trial, capable of review. At this point in time, the Fulminante decision stands as the sole, albeit the dispositive, case on this point. In contrast, cases applying the harmless error analysis to the introduction of presumptively coerced statements are legion. See e.g. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 & n. 22, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2652 & n. 22, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 555 & n. 22 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443, 104 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion  (B) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence (D) holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights (E) holding that although miranda required the suppression of testimonial statements made before defendant was advised of his constitutional rights the state court is free of course to consider this harmless error question upon remand

Ex Output:
holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion 


Ex Input:
by jury is a fundamental guaranty of the rights and liberties of the people. C Prudential that the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right means that the starting point of our analysis is a presumption against the waiver of this constitutional right. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co., 301 U.S. at 393, 57 S.Ct. at 811-12; In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132 (giving right to trial by jury “same protections as other constitutional rights”); accord Ex parte Cupps, 782 So.2d 772, 775 (Ala.2000) (construing scope of contractual jury waiver strictly and narrowly “in deference to the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial”); see also Note, 58 Baylor L.Rev. at 259. But see Lowe Enters. Residential Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 92, 40 P.3d 405, 410 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Despite the existence of a presumption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy (B) holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts (C) holding that german law presumptively confers joint custody upon both parents until a court enters a contrary order (D) holding  without reference to supreme court case law to the contrary  that in nevada contractual jury waivers are presumptively valid (E) holding appellate waivers are enforceable if invoked by the government

Ex Output:
holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy


Ex Input:
as a predictor of actual movements because it was predicated on data depicting actual bighorn sheep movements. Given the model’s Payette data-based origin, the Forest Service could reasonably assume that its predictions were sufficiently reliable to satisfy NEPA. Ultimately, the Forest Service used top-rate model designers; relied on peer-reviewed methodologies applied by other bighorn researchers addressing similar issues; and incorporated on-the-ground data of bighorn sheep movements within the Payette. Given the foregoing, and in light of the deference owed to the agency when undertaking technical analysis within its purview, the Forest Service’s reliance on the risk of contact model was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Cf. Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 990-94 (<HOLDING>). 2. Disease model Wool Growers asserts two 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the forest service supervisor had authority to issue orders pursuant to 36 cfr  26150 (B) holding under basic principles of property law that easement rights are subject to regulation by the forest service as the owner of the servient estate (C) holding in suit under the administrative procedure act challenging us forest service approval of forest development plan that injury to aesthetic conservational or recreational interests is sufficient to confer standing (D) holding that the forest service did not act arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to verify its model with ontheground data (E) holding the ihsaa did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting student limited eligibility

Ex Output:

recognizing that the forest service supervisor had authority to issue orders pursuant to 36 cfr  26150