In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: evidence to conclude that the government’s conduct in this case amounted to a material breach, it denied Malone’s appeal. 87-2 BCA 1119,758, at 99,966. In our view, the government materially breached this contract. According to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241(e) (1981), “the extent to which the behavior of [a] party failing to perform ... comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing” is a significant factor in determining whether that party’s breach is material. The Restatement also states that “[sjubter-fuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith,” as does lack of diligence and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance. Id. § 205 comment d; cf. Lewis-Nicholson, Inc. v. United States, 550 F.2d 26, 32, 213 Ct.Cl. 192 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. United States, 151 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subcontractor could recover damages from general contractor for delay in performance under state law (B) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (C) holding that governmentcaused delay in contractor performance violated implied duty not to hinder performance of other party (D) holding that performance may be valid acceptance (E) holding that prior positive performance evaluations are not dispositive as to whether the employer was satisfied with the employees performance by the time of the termination

Answer: (C)


Question: include reasonable attorney’s fees for legal services benefitting the children. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 151.001(a), (c); In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d at 327, n. 55; Searcy, 17 S.W. at 373; Askey, 11 S.W. at 1101-02. In Hardin v. Hardin, this court cited section 154.001 but did not cite section 151.001 or section 156.401(a). See Hardin, 161 S.W.3d at 24-27. Nonetheless, the Hardin court noted that the duty of a parent to pay attorney’s fees as necessaries is based upon a parent’s duty to support his children. See id. at 25. In addition, the Hardin court cited non-enforcement cases that cited the statutory predecessor to section 151.001. See id. at 25-26 (citing Roosth v. Roosth and Daniels v. Allen); Roosth v. Roosth, 889 S.W.2d 445, 456-57 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Daniels v. Allen, 811 S.W.2d 278, 280 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that father pay attorneys fees to mother as necessaries for the benefit of the children in divorce decree and citing statutory predecessor to section 151001 (B) holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries (C) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay reasonable attorneys fees incurred by mother as necessaries for the children (D) holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule (E) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction may order one parent to pay the reasonable attorneys fees of the other parent as additional child support if the fees are necessaries for the benefit of the children

Answer: (A)


Question: claims); see also Stewart, 104 N.M. at 748, 726 P.2d at 1378 (“An insurance policy is a contract and is generally governed by the law of contracts, and the rights and duties of the parties are to be determined by its terms.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, we held that 8.75% was the proper interest to be assessed on the contract damages. {40} Like the trial court in Teague-Strebeck, the trial court in our case awarded damages based on the insurance contract— $100,000 in UM coverage. See 1999-NMCA-109, ¶¶63-64, 127 N.M. 603, 985 P.2d 1183 (observing that the plaintiff “was awarded the benefit of its bargain, the extent of insurance coverage promised by [the defendant’s agent]”); cf. Ellis v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Cos., 1999-NMSC-034, ¶1, 128 N.M. 54, 989 P.2d 429 (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that 8.75% is the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sixyear contract statute of limitations did not apply reasoning that an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on breach of warranty is only nominally based on contract (B) holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional (C) holding that sixyear statute of limitations in  65314 is applicable to violations of  7202 (D) recognizing a sixyear statute of limitations on claims filed under the coal act (E) holding that the sixyear statute of limitations on a written contract is applicable to a cause of action based on a um policy

Answer:
(E)