In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability “from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik’s] attendance” it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik’s attendance at the gym — in essence all of Sydlik’s claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: of the Licenses; revocation is made explicit in a filing before the bankruptcy court (which filing is not itself an order) and is implicit in the Public Notice announcing the re-auction of the Licenses previously held by NextWave. Nevertheless, as this Court's prior opinion makes clear, we think that the FCC action in question is unmistakably regulatory in nature. But even if the FCC’s acts do not amount to "decisions” or "orders” of the Commission, subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, that would not expose the FCC's acts to review in the bankruptcy court. A regulatory action short of a decision or order is an exercise of regulatory discretion that is not subject to review. See Bethesda-Chevy Chase Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC, 385 F.2d 967, 968 (D.C.Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Telecommunications Research & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding allegation made in enforcement suit does not impose the kind of legal obligation with which the finality doctrine is concerned (B) holding that obligation to pay pension benefits gave rise to a constructive trust relationship and obligation was not discharged in bankruptcy (C) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (D) holding that a regulatory action that did not impose an obligation deny a right or fix a legal relationship was not reviewable (E) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: these circumstances, requiring Robert to pay Nicole’s attorneys’ fees constituted an abuse of discretion. Gaudette v. Gaudette, 890 So.2d 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); see also Derrevere v. Derrevere, 924 So.2d 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Bridge-The-Gap Alimony Although we have found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of permanent periodic alimony in this case, the trial court clearly expressed frustration during the proceeding with its lack of ability to consider a short-term alimony award to aid Nicole in making her transition to single life. Section 61.08, Florida Statutes, does not preclude such an award, and the other four district courts of appeal in Florida have expressly recognized bridge-the-gap alimony. See, e.g., Shea v. Shea, 572 So.2d 558, 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>); Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So.2d 748, 753 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that family court may under special circumstances require a supporting spouse to secure an alimony obligation with a life insurance policy (B) recognizing that even though a spouse is already employed or employable an award of rehabilitative alimony may also be justified as a bridgethegap measure to aid the recipient in making the transition from a married to a single state (C) holding that an obligation is in the nature of alimony when it is intended to provide support for the spouse rather than an equalization of property rights (D) holding that property transferred by a spouse to avoid support obligation may be considered on the issue of property distribution as well as alimony (E) holding that an award of temporary or rehabilitative alimony may not be made unless the recipient spouse is not selfsupporting and citing hull v hull 83 mdapp 218 220221 574 a2d 20 1990
[EX A]:
(B)