In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: (3) the de fendant’s culpability in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled person. See Securities & Exchange Com’n v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir.1996). First, as the Court has found, plaintiffs have failed properly to plead a violation of the 1934 Act. Second, as we also have noted, plaintiffs have failed properly to allege scienter and/or culpability on the part of “Merrill Lynch.” Even had we found a properly pled violation of the 1934 Act, we would not automatically impute this violation to “Merrill Lynch” as a controlling entity. See Baesa, 969 F.Supp. at 242 (“[T]he law in this circuit is clear that a subsidiary’s fraud cannot be automatically imputed to its corporate parent.”). See also Chill v. General Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Novak, 997 F.Supp. at 435. Finally the Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper (B) holding that district court has the power to decide what portion of subsidiarys income should be reallocated to its parent (C) holding that a parent company would at the very least have to have been deliberately blind to its subsidiarys fraud in order to have the requisite scienter (D) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible (E) holding that a subsidiarys contacts can be imputed for purposes of service of process where a parent uses the subsidiary to do what it otherwise would have done itself 

A: (C)
****
Q: 548 U.S. at 518, 126 S.Ct. at 2667 (Scalia, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that “compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act can be [a compelling state] interest ... [otherwise] a State could be placed in the impossible position of having to choose between compliance with § 5 and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause”). And we conclude that a plan will be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest when the race-based action taken was reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of the Act. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2490-91, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 1906, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (<HOLDING>); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (B) holding that where the claimed interest is avoidance of liability under section 2 the legislative action must at a minimum remedy the anticipated violation or achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored (C) holding that liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under  1983 where at best the plaintiff has merely claimed that the appellants were aware of alleged violation but did not take appropriate action (D) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (E) holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation

A: (B)
****
Q: As will be discussed below, although (A) the FAA air traffic controllers had a duty to disseminate certain weather related information to Flight 2745, they (B) did not breach this duty as to any CWAs or PIREPs. Furthermore, (C) the controllers did not have a duty to disseminate MISs or the information contained therein. A. Duty to Disseminate Certain Weather Information The existence of a duty in . is not whether the government had a duty to [report weather condition] information, but rather what was the scope of that duty.”). Air traffic controllers are “required to do what a reasonable air traffic controller of their experience and training would have done under the totality of the circumstances.” Kelley v. United States, No. 1:08-cv-31, 2009 WL 1439896 at *5 (E.D.Va. Mar. 26, 2009) (<HOLDING>); see Mussivand, 544 N.E.2d at 270. Here, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (B) holding that the wright amendment an air traffic regulation restricting air traffic from love field in the dallasforth worth area did not violate the right to travel because any impact on interstate travel  even air travel to and from the dallasfort worth area  is negligible (C) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel (D) holding that an air traffic controllers failure to report weather conditions from another faa location to a planes pilot was not negligent (E) holding that during investigatory stop police may transport seized property to another location

A:
(D)
****