In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
to preserve evidence exists between a third party and another in the absence of a special relationship, such as one created by contract or statute. Id. Under that analysis, this court will need to consider the primary purpose of the third-party here, Giant Eagle. (2) “Duty” of a third-party employer to its employee Pennsylvania courts have not directly considered whether the existence of an employer/employee relationship creates a duty on the part of a third-party employer to preserve evidence of a work-related accident for a potential products liability suit by an employee. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is no such duty. See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F.Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D.Ark.1989); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 179 Mich.App. 136, 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither common law nor workers disability compensation act imposed affirmative duty on employer to preserve evidence which might be used in employees thirdparty liability action (B) holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme (C) holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability (D) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (E) holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
CURIAM. Appellant, Roberto Trejo, was indicted for racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering. His predicate offenses included attempted first degree murder, shooting into a building, and three armed robberies with a firearm. He was also charged on substantive counts for the same five offenses. Trejo was acquitted on the racketeering, conspiracy, and shooting into a building charges, but convicted of attempted second degree murder with a firearm and the three armed robberies. We affirm on all issues raised in this appeal, including his fifty-year sentence. The United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) does not apply to appellant’s sentence. See Guzman v. State, 110 So.3d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>). As we did in Guzman, we certify conflict with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham (B) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (C) holding that the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile does not violate the holding of roper (D) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (E) holding that double jeopardy clause does not prohibit imposition of death sentence in alabama despite life sentence in georgia in murdertrial arising from same homicide

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
failed to allege any “specific pattern or series of incidents that support the general allegation” that Plaintiff’s injuries were precipitated through a municipal policy or custom. Hossman v. Blunk, 784 F.2d 793, 797 (7th Cir.1986); see also Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2432-33, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). Moreover, the complaint’s conclusory allegations likewise failed to substantiate any claim that Gerald’s death was caused by a failure to adequately train the police officers involved. See Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768 (7th Cir.1985); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (<HOLDING>). As to these four Defendants, then, no federal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no deliberate indifference when a failure to take reasonable measures was due to defendants mistake (B) holding that a failure to adequately train will only result in  1983 liability where that failure amounts to a deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact (C) holding that deliberate indifference is the level of culpability pretrial detainees must establish to maintain a failure to protect claim under the fourteenth amendment (D) holding city may be liable for the failure to train officers regarding appropriate assistance and treatment of intoxicated persons (E) holding that a complaint alleging a single incident of police officer misconduct together with an assertion that the districts failure to train its officers showed deliberate indifference was sufficient to state a claim under monell

Ex Output:

(B)