In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: facts underlying the charges for which the defendant had been acquitted were an “integral and natural part of an account of the [defendant’s] crimef.]” The same cannot be said for the facts at issue here, which relate to a seizure that occurred on an entirely different occasion. For that reason, we do not find either Agee or Solomon directly relevant to the present controversy. As a result, we will first examine the challenged evidence in light of the principles traditionally employed in evaluating challenges to evidence admitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b), which focus on the similarity between the prior incident and the incident that underlies the current charges against the defendant. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708, 717 (1990) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the events of 10 February 2005 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case (B) holding that the estoppel doctrine did not apply because unlike the situation in ashe v swenson the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (C) holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because    the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (D) holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct (E) holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal

A: holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case
****
Q: susceptible to many meanings. Although there is no direct statement that Mooney failed to perform his duties with regard to assisting his clients with their investments, this is the clear import of the specific language used. “Only knew” clearly implies that Mooney knew nothing about anything else. What was implied in that statement is made express in the next — “didn’t know anything about investments.” “Hated helping clients” also unambiguously indicates that Mooney was not interested in executing his duties to his clients. These statements embody a “pejorative implication” that a reasonable listener would perceive “as an assertion that the [plaintiff] failed to perform his duties as an advisor.” Mehta v. Ohio Univ., 958 N.E.2d 598, 609 (Ohio Ct.App.2011); see Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707 (<HOLDING>). The statement “invested her in all of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement (B) holding that where the appellant remained at the scene rendered aid and gave his name to the police the evidence was insufficient to convict him under section 3742 even though the appellant initially lied about his involvement in the accident (C) holding no error in rejecting the appellants proffered instruction even though that statement was based on language from case law when the amci instruction was a proper statement of the law (D) holding that though there was no express statement that the appellant had committed perjury the clear impact of the specific language in nine sentences was that the appellant lied while under oath which weighed in favor of an actionable statement (E) holding that hearing officer had no obligation under 38 cfr  3103c2 to advise appellant as to physicians statement because that statement would not have helped prove the claim  that is that statement would not have provided a nexus with the veterans service

A: holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement
****
Q: damages. In re TMI Litig. Personal Injury Claims, No. 79-0906 (M.D.Pa. order entered Dec. 30, 1982); App. at 162. While these and companion TMI cases were being litigated in state and district court, the Supreme Court decided Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984), which held in part that states are precluded from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear energy but that states still had authority under the Act to control nonregulatory aspects of nuclear facilities. Id. at 240-41, 256, 104 S.Ct. at 617-18, 625-26. Following the decision in Silkwood, the district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment that had been filed following a Rule 16 confer ence. See In re Three Mile Island Litig., 605 F.Supp. 778, 784 (M.D.Pa.1985) (<HOLDING>) [referred to herein as “TMI I ”]. Shortly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under viwda (B) holding that punitive damages are recoverable in a claim for retaliation under the flsa (C) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under  1988 (D) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under subsection 216b (E) holding that punitive damages are recoverable under the priceanderson act to the extent that damages assessed under the act would not be paid from federal monies

A:
holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under viwda
****