In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Court would apply its own jurisprudence because Braun prescribes an objective just cause standard-the standard Jurgens requests. 65 . Cassel, 14 P.3d at 284 (quoting Univ. of Alaska v. Tovsen, 835 P.2d 445, 447 (Alaska 1992)). 66 . Id. at 284 (quoting Baldwin, 769 P.2d at 304). 67 . See NPMC 2.36.010(A) (stating that purpose of chapter is to "establish and operate a system of personnel administration based upon equitable merit principles and professional methods governing ... removal, [and] discipline ... of employees"), .310(A) (requiring system of "uniform and equitable administration of discipline"), .310(B) (requiring that "discipline [] be administered in increasingly progressive severity"), .321(F) (allowing board to impose "lesser disciplinary action"); Tovsenm, 835 P.2d at 447 (<HOLDING>). 68 . See Braun, 816 P.2d at 142. 69 . See 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a termination of a government contract does not constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property without just compensation or without due process of law (B) holding that words found evaluated and unsatisfactory in personnel regulation required an objective just cause termination (C) holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases (D) holding that termination is an adverse employment action (E) holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable
(B)

use of low-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. While we recognize that drivers may be accustomed to quickly flashing their high-beam headlights at an oncoming vehicle as a signal to dim headlights, there is no evidence in this case that the officer was driving with his high-beam headlights. Furthermore, the statute does not provide any exceptions for the momentary flashing of high-beam headlights. Thus, we must conclude the statute prohibits the use of high-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle, for any length of time and for any purpose. [¶ 12] We recognize that at least one other appellate court has interpreted similar statutory language and reached the opposite conclusion. See Waukesha County v. Meinhardt, 2001 WI App 146, ¶¶ 9-10, 630 N.W.2d 277 (<HOLDING>). In another case involving a similar statute, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that meinhardt did not commit a violation by flashing his highbeam headlights two times at an oncoming vehicle because the plain language of the statute did not prohibit the quick flashing of highbeam headlights (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute (D) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (E) holding the trial judge did not commit reversible error through the chosen method of remedying the batson violation
(A)

approximately eight years later was an unforeseeable intervening act. Id. 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d at 1253. Defendant also stressed that the potential for indeterminate liability for a single wrongful act argued against recognition of a preconception tort cause of action. Id. 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d at 1255. Rejecting defendant’s contentions, the Illinois Supreme Court, 4-3, remanded the case for trial observing that “it is not necessary that the legal duty be owed to one in existence at the time of the wrongful act.” Id. 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d at 1256. A number of cases from other jurisdictions subsequently have recognized malpractice causes of action based on preconception torts. See, e.g., Empire Casualty Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1191 (Colo.1988) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591 (Ind.1992) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the unique relationship between mother and child during pregnancy and birth and permitting mothers claim for emotional distress where the mothers emotional wellbeing and the birth of the child are inextricably intertwined (B) recognizing infants preconception tort claim based on allegations that medical centers misidentification of mothers rh negative blood as rh positive led to doctors failure to administer rhogam following earlier pregnancy causing mothers rh isoimmunization to inflict severe damage to child of subsequent pregnancy (C) recognizing preconception tort cause of action for child born with rubella syndrome based on allegations that physicians who treated mother during earlier pregnancy failed to test or immunize mother for rubella (D) holding ohios child endangerment statute does not apply to mothers who abuse drugs during pregnancy (E) recognizing cause of action for preconception tort based on allegation that obstetricians mismanagement of mothers prior pregnancy including failure to diagnose and test mothers rh isoimmunization was proximate cause of severe injuries to child of subsequent pregnancy

(E)