instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
on the circuit court orders and the statements of defense counsel at the hearing. We hold that neither the doctors nor the trial court could rely on facts and legal conclusions within the circuit court orders. Thus, the doctors’ assertions at the hearing, which were based on facts within the orders, constituted factual statements of counsel. Moreover, the orders were, in effect, memoranda submitted by counsel. In any event, the trial court could not properly consider factual statements from either when deciding the motions, however they are characterized. Cf. Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 457 S.E.2d 601 (1995) (noting that the ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be based solely upon the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint); Gilmore, 290 S.C. 53, 348 S.E.2d 180 (<HOLDING>). This is not to say that circuit court orders 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the judge cannot consider factual statements of counsel in a motion for summary judgment (B) holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment (C) holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment (E) holding that conclusory statements without factual support are of no value to the court when deciding a summary judgment motion
answer:
holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment


question:
was pending on, AEDPA’s effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); United States v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178 (3d Cir.1997). “Because the District Court relied entirely upon the state court record and did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review [of the District Court’s decision] is plenary.” Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 947 (3d Cir.1998) (citing Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir.1997)). Like the District Court, we must presume all state court factual findings tó be correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), but we “exercise plenary review over state court conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact and pure issues of law.” Hassine, 160 F.3d at 947; see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 105, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985)(<HOLDING>); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (B) holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (C) holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction (D) holding that petitions for confirmation or vacatur must show how the ultimate disposition of the matter by the federal court necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law (E) holding that while subsidiary factual questions are subject to  2254ds presumption the ultimate legal question of confessions constitutional voluntariness is a matter for independent federal determination
answer:
holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review


question:
Int'l, Inc. v. Sage Apartments, L.L.C., 167 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (party filed notice of non-suit while stay imposed by appellate court was pending); In re Martinez, 77 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 2002, orig. proceeding) (same); In re Consol. Freightways, 75 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding) (party filed motion to enforce agreement during pendency of stay automatically imposed by insurance code due to other party’s insurer being declared “impaired”); Paine v. Sealey, 956 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (party served requests for admissions while automatic bankruptcy stay was in effect); Burrhus v. M & S Mach. & Supply Co., Inc., 897 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); see also Harrell v. NationsBank of Tex., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellate deadlines are stayed during pendency of automatic stay imposed by insurance code (B) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (C) holding that the plaintiff had standing even though automatic stay had terminated and his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because he also sought actual damages for violation of the automatic stay (D) holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor  counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay (E) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay
answer:

holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void