In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: was satisfied that protocols were followed after examining their case notes and the data collected. Further, Quartaro testified to the various safeguards Cellmark employed to protect against the risk of errors and to detect any such errors, if made. Accordingly, Quartaro could have been meaningfully cross-examined on the general and specific risks of error in forensic testing, whether the result of carelessness, incompetence, or fraud. See Boyd, 686 F.Supp.2d at 385 (finding no constitutional violation when only the DNA analyst who wrote the report, and not the intervening-testing analysts, testified because “the testifying expert was himself familiar with the[ ] intervening procedures and could be fully cross-examined as to their efficacy, accuracy, etc.”); Munoz, 958 N.E.2d at 1174 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Quartaro certainly could have been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible (B) holding that a forensic accountant is an expert witness not a lay witness (C) holding that an expert who offers an independent opinion based on another analysts report can be meaningfully crossexamined on the general risk of error in forensic testing (D) recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue (E) holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion
[A]: (C)


[Q]: this case was scheduled for a date approximately six months after the permanent injunction had expired. The procedural posture of this case is comparable to that of Madonna, in which the plaintiffs challenged their confinements while awaiting a hearing to determine whether they should be committed to mental institutions. 295 N.W.2d at 358. The plaintiffs filed petitions for habeas corpus during their pre-hearing confinements, which lasted only a matter of weeks, but the petitions were not adjudicated before their pre-hearing confinements ended. Id. at 358-59. Approximately two and one-half years later, the supreme court held that the case was not moot, reasoning that “some method of review must exist.” Id. at 361; see also Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 208 n. 2 (Minn.2001) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 188 n. 1, 210 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that challenge to oneyear order for protection was not moot even though it had expired (B) holding that district court may award money due under a statute even though time for disbursement had expired (C) holding that challenge to oneyear residency requirement for divorce action was not moot even though plaintiff had since satisfied requirement (D) holding expired child abuse protective order not moot because of possible effect on future custody determinations (E) holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot
[A]: (A)


[Q]: the judicial proceedings were effected by the district court’s ruling. Instead, Miller argues that the district court was obligated to award nominal damages, régardless of the timeliness of the request, once the jury found that Albright and Cobb violated his constitutional rights. In support of his position, Miller cites Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (“[T]he denial of procedural due process is actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.”); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (“[A] court [must] award nominal damages when a plaintiff establishes a violation of his right to procedural due process but cannot prove actual injury.”); and Risdal v. Halford, 209 F.3d 1071, 1072-73 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). These cases, however, do not address whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff waived the right to nominal damages in an excessive force case because nominal damages were not requested until after the verdict (B) holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict (C) holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative (D) holding that when a jury finds section 1988 liability but fails to award damages nominal damages are available to plaintiff (E) holding that the first amendment right to free speech is absolute and an award of nominal damages is required even if the defendant fails to object to the nominal damages instruction
[A]:
(E)