In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: for [her] employer! ] to operate efficiently and effectively.” Id. at 418-19, 126 S.Ct. 1951. The point of this inquiry, then, is “both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their im portant public functions.” Id. at 420, 126 S.Ct. 1951. With that premise as a backdrop, the Supreme Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951; see also Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 364-65 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Garcetti and its Sixth Circuit progeny 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern (B) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (C) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (D) holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless  related to his job duties (E) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected

A: holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern
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Q: in the petition no later than thirty days from the day on which the first defendant was served. Id. at 1262-63 (internal citations omitted). As a general premise, under the “first-served rule,” defendants who are properly served within thirty days of the first defendant’s service must join in the removal petition. The “failure to do so renders the petition defective.” Id. at 1262. Under the facts of Getty, however, the application of the first-served rule did not produce an inequitable result. Nonetheless, recognizing the potential for harsh results, other decisions provide that exceptional circumstances may sometimes require relief from strict application of the rule in order to achieve equitable results. See Milstead Supply Co. v. Cas. Ins. Co., 797 F.Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties (B) holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective (C) holding that dismissal of some but not all of the defendants who had been served with complaint is not a final order (D) holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served (E) holding that the defendants consent to search was voluntary although he had been served with a subpoena

A: holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties
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Q: court denied the petition based on its conclusion that Boles had procedurally defaulted his claims by not raising them properly in the state court. Boles contends that appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to preserve his claims for review is cause for his procedural default and resulted in prejudice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000). This contention was raised for the first time in Boles’s response to the order to show cause issued by the magistrate judge and was never presented in his habeas petition or in any appeal to the Arizona state courts. Consequently, Boles has not exhausted this claim in state court and the petition should have been dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c); Edwards, 429 U.S. at 451, 453 (<HOLDING>). VACATED and REMANDED with instructions to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (B) holding that the novelty of a petitioners claim can constitute cause for a procedural default (C) holding that ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for procedural default only if counsels performance was constitutionally ineffective (D) holding that each subcategory of ineffective assistance of counsel is an independent claim that must be sufficiently plead (E) holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged to be cause for the procedural default of other claims is itself an independent claim subject to the procedural requirements of exhaustion

A:
recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
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