In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: victim’s undisputed injuries, this court held that the statute required proof that the bodily injury was a foreseeable, rather than intentional, result of the rights-viólating conduct. Woodlee, 136 F.3d at 1405. At no point did this court even consider the possibility that the statute might not require proof of foreseeability at all, i.e., that the statute, imposed strict liability .on a defendant for bodily .injury resulting from his conduct. Because there is no logical distinction between the statutory language at issue in Woodlee and the language of § 841(b)(1)(E) that we are now tasked with interpreting, I believe that we are bound by Woodlee to interpret § 841(b)(1)(E) as incorporating a proximate cause requirement. See United States v. Ensminger, 174 F.3d 1143, (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). To conclude otherwise creates an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel (B) holding that a panel may not reconsider issues decided earlier in the same case by the en banc court (C) holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court (D) holding that only intervening law from the supreme court or this court sitting en banc can overrule a prior panel decision (E) holding that we are bound by prior panel opinions until they are overruled or abrogated by the supreme court or this court sitting en banc

Output: holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel


Input: Consider Input: witness testifying against him was in custody). This right is not subject to the trial court’s discretion; however, the court may preclude repetitive or unduly harassing interrogation. Ramey,. 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68; Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475. Thus: “[A] defendant need not show interest or motive in that any promises of leniency have, in fact, been made to the witness by the State or that any expectations of special favor exist in the mind of the witness, before cross-examining a witness as to possible bias. Further, the defense is entitled to inquire into such promises or expectations whether they are based on fact or are simply imaginary.” Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68, citing Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475-76. See also People v. Tomes, 284 Ill. App. 3d 514, 520, 672 N.E.2d 289 (1996) (<HOLDING>). “To this end a defendant has the right to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required (B) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (C) holding that limitation on scope and breadth of crossexamination did not significantly curtail effectiveness of witness crossexamination because crossexamination was lengthy and extensive (D) holding it is well established that crossexamination to show that a witness might be vulnerable to pressure whether real or imagined from the state regarding a pending charge is a matter of right (E) holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination

Output: recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required


Input: Consider Input: CURIAM. Having considered the appellant’s response to this Court’s show cause order, dated June 30, 2008, we dismiss this appeal. The trial court’s order does not appear to be final as it treated the appel lant’s motion as a rule 3.850 motion and dismissed it without prejudice to file a proper rule 3.850 motion. Therefore, the trial court’s order is a nonappealable, non-final order. See Lee v. State, 939 So.2d 154, 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. State, 884 So.2d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the dismissal of a complaint ordinarily is a nonfinal nonappealable order since amendment generally is available while dismissal of the entire action ordinarily is final (B) holding dismissal without prejudice to refile a facially sufficient motion is a nonappealable nonfinal order (C) holding that an order that determines only the right to attorneys fees without setting the amount is a nonappealable nonfinal order (D) holding borough could not appeal dismissal of complaint without prejudice because  dismissal without prejudice is comparable to a nonsuit under the former practice of lavf  (E) holding that an order granting a motion or application to compel arbitration is nonappealable because it is not listed in the uaa arbitration provision and because it is not a final order


Output: holding that the dismissal of a complaint ordinarily is a nonfinal nonappealable order since amendment generally is available while dismissal of the entire action ordinarily is final