In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: was indeed barred (or limited) under the mandatory Guidelines regime, see Koon, 518 U.S. at 92-95, 116 S.Ct. 2035, the alternative sentencing methodology employed by his sentencing court did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory. Nor did the court exclude or limit its consideration of any category of sentencing factors. To the contrary, the court extended Simpson an open-ended invitation to make mitigating arguments, regardless of whether they would have been available under the Guidelines scheme. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 25-26. And Simpson responded to that invitation by citing a series of factors in support of a sente 440 (D.C.Cir.1995). In later cases, we settled on a plain error standard of review for such claims. See United States v. Draffin, 286 F.3d 606, 609 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); In re Sealed Case, 204 F.3d 1170, 1173 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts denial of a downward departure was an exercise of discretion and therefore not reviewable (B) holding that failure to identify ground of admissibility limited appellate review to plain error (C) holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure (D) holding that the failure to grant a sentencing departure on an unrequested ground is reviewable only for plain error (E) holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: awarding bridge-the-gap, rather than permanent alimony. “Permanent periodic alimony is used to provide the needs and the necessities of life to a former spouse as they have been established during the marriage of the parties.” Rosecan v. Springer, 845 So.2d 927, 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). In determining whether a party is entitled to permanent alimony, the trial court must consider the duration of the parties’ marriage. See Martinez v. Martinez, 761 So.2d 433, 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Zold v. Zold, 911 So.2d 1222, 1234 (Fla.2005). Here, the parties were married for nineteen years. It is well settled, and the trial court properly found, that a nineteen-year marriage qualifies as a long-term marriage. See Cruz v. Cruz, 574 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>); Kvittem v. Kvittem, 365 So.2d 791 (Fla. 4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage (B) holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of  an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred (C) recognizing the common enterprise theory of marriage (D) recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage (E) recognizing seventeenyear marriage as long term
Example Output:
(E)