In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: up to $2,000, which would have set aside, in a literal sense, a discrete “amount . . . necessarily consumed for the support of’ the taxpayer and his or her family. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. at 572. This description, made in reference to an income tax exemption, is not applicable to the question of whether an income tax assessed on gross rather than net income is unfair, unreasonable, or disproportionate. Certainly nothing in that opinion suggested that such an exemption was necessary in order to render that tax constitutional. Where we have found that a tax was unfair, unreasonable, or disproportionate, the constitutional deficiency has been of a much different character than the one the petitioners allege here. See Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462, 470-71 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Opinion of the Justices, 132 N.H. 777, 783-84 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety (B) holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts (C) holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue (D) holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others (E) holding that taxpayers failure to follow state requirement that he report change in federal income tax did not except state tax liability from discharge

A: holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety
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Q: strengthen, not displace, any existing remedies employees may. have at law.” Id. It is clear from these excerpts that the STAA was not enacted to completely preempt state law remedies for retaliation against an employee who refuses to violate safety provisions. See Todd v. Frank’s Tong Service, Inc., 784 P.2d 47, 49-50 (Okla.1989) (noting that Congressional intent surrounding enactment of the STAA demonstrates that state law claims are not preempted); see also Parten v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 923 F.2d 580, 583 (8th Cir.1991) (conclude ing that the Minnesota public policy statute was not an obstacle to the STAA and that Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field of interstate motor carriers); Whitworth v. TNT Bestway Transp., Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1434, 1436 (E.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>); Dobberowsky v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc., 989 
 Holding statements: (A) holding texas exemption law was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause (B) holding that texas whistleblowers act was not preempted by the staa (C) holding a claim of a violation of the texas dtpa is preempted by the carmack amendment (D) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra (E) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied

A: holding texas exemption law was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause
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Q: rule of evidence” that, if the defendant is entitled to introduce into evidence part of a writing, the state is entitled to introduce the remainder of that writing. 295 Or at 490-91 & n 4. The reasoning of Middleton II disposes of the state’s argument in that regard. In summary, we conclude that the trial court erred when it permitted the state to introduce the above-emphasized parts of Smith’s plea agreement. In Snider, this court held that the improper bolstering that occurred in that case was prejudicial error: “In this case, the testimony of [the witness] provided critical evidence about the alleged conspiracy to kidnap and kill the victim. The error in allowing improper bolstering of this witness’s credibility was prejudicial.” 296 Or at 173. See also Keller, 315 Or at 286 (<HOLDING>). In this case, Smith was the only witness who 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error (B) holding that under hubbard a trial courts error in excluding bias evidence would be harmless if either 1 despite the exclusion the jury nonetheless had an adequate opportunity to assess the witnesss credibility or 2 the witnesss credibility was not important to the outcome of the trial emphasis added (C) holding that fact that one witnesss testimony is at odds with testimony of another witness does not supply a sufficient basis for allegations of perjury (D) holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness (E) holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility

A:
holding that under hubbard a trial courts error in excluding bias evidence would be harmless if either 1 despite the exclusion the jury nonetheless had an adequate opportunity to assess the witnesss credibility or 2 the witnesss credibility was not important to the outcome of the trial emphasis added
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