In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: if the terms of the health care plan specifically exclude from coverage the cost of an appendectomy, then any injuries caused by the refusal to cover the appendectomy are properly attributed to the terms of the plan itself, not the managed care entity that applied those terms. 4 Respondents also argue that ERISA § 502(a) completely pre-empts a state cause of action only if the cause of action would be pre-empted under ERISA § 514(a); respondents then argue that their causes of action do not fall under the terms of § 514(a). But a state cause of action that provides an alternative remedy to those provided by the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism conflicts with Congress’ clear intent to make the ERISA mechanism exclusive. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S.133, 142 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 5 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan (B) recognizing cause of action (C) holding that ejven if there were no express preemption under erisa  514a of the cause of action in that case it would be preempted because it conflicted directly with an erisa cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa (E) recognizing the cause of action

A: (C)
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Q: doing something that can be characterized as resistance—even when that resistance includes physically preventing an officer’s manipulations of his body.”). In addition, the black-and-white bus surveillance video fails to clearly show what occurred as the officers forcefully “escorted” Hulett off the bus, and leaves the viewer wondering whether, and to what extent, additional force may have been applied during those moments that might have contributed to plaintiffs broken hip. And even following plaintiffs removal from the bus, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Sergeant Galvin acted in an objectively reasonable manner by dragging plaintiff some distance across the pavement, since plaintiff did not appear to be offering any further resistance at that point. Tracy, 623 F.3d at 98 (<HOLDING>); Meyes v. Baltimore Cnty., 713 F.3d 723, 733 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that otherwise acceptable use of pepper spray became excessive when arrestee was offering no further active resistance (B) holding that bystander prisoners who were exposed to pepper spray when prison officials dispensed spray across their pod area to break up a fight were not subjected to excessive force (C) holding that no objectively reasonable police officer could believe that after vinyard was under arrest handcuffed behind her back secured in the back seat of a patrol car with a protective screen between the officer and the arrestee an officer could stop the car grab such arrestee by her hair and arm bruise her and apply pepper spray to try to stop the intoxicated arrestee from screaming and returning the officers exchange of obscenities and insults during a short fourmile jail ride (D) holding that the use of pepper spray on nonviolent protestors was excessive force (E) holding that two bursts of pepper spray to stop fighting in a cell was not considered excessive force and did not violate prisoners eighth amendment rights

A: (A)
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Q: favorable decision.” Township of Piscataway v. Duke Energy, 488 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir.2007) (citing Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts v. Mirage Resorts, 140 F.3d 478, 484-85 (3d Cir.1998)). Turchi Qua Guarantor While it is alleged that Turchi was to sign the forbearance agreement, he was to do so as a guarantor. That capacity is not without significance. This lawsuit does not seek enforcement of the guarantee. Indeed, it is the Debtor as the primary borrower who has brought it against the lender, the primary obligee. The Court does not read the complaint to allege that Turchi qua guarantor personally suffered a concrete injury as a result of what the Bank is alleged to have done. See e.g., Borough of Berwick v. Quandel Group, Inc., 440 Pa.Super. 367, 371, 655 A.2d 606, 608 (Pa.Super.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Hufsmith v. Weaver, 285 Ark. 357, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (B) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (C) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract (D) holding that majority shareholder who guaranteed debt was not a third party beneficiary and thus lack standing to bring action for tortious interference of corporations contract with defendant (E) holding that borough that guaranteed debt owed by municipal sewage authority to engineering firm lacked standing because it was not party to the contract

A:
(E)
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