instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
or inferences ... based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed.R.Evid. 701(c). In other words, lay testimony must "result[] from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life” and not “from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.” Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee's note (internal quotation marks omitted). "Testimony based solely on a person’s special training or experience is properly classified as expert testimony, and therefore it is not admissible under Rule 701.” Compania Administradora v. Titan Intern’l, Inc., 533 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.2008). This includes testimony about an opinion reached during a parole officer’s investigation. See U.S. v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 216 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Cue’s testimony here does not ”result[] from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding officer could testify based on his training and experience that a defendants actions were consistent with selling cocaine (B) holding that a witness may testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue (C) holding that a law enforcement agent may not testify about an opinion reached during his investigation if the agents reasoning process depended in whole or in part on his specialized training and experience (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying an expert witness in the area of gang identity and investigation based on his training and experience (E) holding an agent from the drug enforcement agency could testify regarding the street value of cocaine where the agent was testifying regarding matters within his personal knowledge and experience as a narcotics officer
answer:
holding officer could testify based on his training and experience that a defendants actions were consistent with selling cocaine


question:
facts underlying the charges for which the defendant had been acquitted were an “integral and natural part of an account of the [defendant’s] crimef.]” The same cannot be said for the facts at issue here, which relate to a seizure that occurred on an entirely different occasion. For that reason, we do not find either Agee or Solomon directly relevant to the present controversy. As a result, we will first examine the challenged evidence in light of the principles traditionally employed in evaluating challenges to evidence admitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b), which focus on the similarity between the prior incident and the incident that underlies the current charges against the defendant. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708, 717 (1990) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the events of 10 February 2005 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case (B) holding that the estoppel doctrine did not apply because unlike the situation in ashe v swenson the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (C) holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because    the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (D) holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct (E) holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal
answer:
holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case


question:
federal firearms disabilities which might be vindicated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1337, which establish original district court jurisdiction over cases involving federal questions and congressional commerce regulations, respectively. Rather, the statute states that a person “may make application to the Secretary” and “the Secretary may grant such relief.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). Second, the standard for granting relief is worded so broadly as to connote administrative agency decisionmaking. Section 925(c) states that relief may be granted if “the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the application will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary 97) (<HOLDING>); Burtch v. United States Dep’t of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress clearly intended to suspend  925c relief by denial of funding for investigating and processing applications under the statute and denying writ of mandamus (B) holding that persons seeking restoration of federal firearms privileges need not exhaust administrative remedies to invoke the judicial review provision of section 925c (C) holding that section 925c authorizes judicial review of only the denial of an application for relief (D) holding that the standard of review is abuse of discretion and an appeal from denial of rule 60b relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review (E) holding that the only role for the judiciary is judicial review of a denial of relief under  925c
answer:

holding that congress clearly intended to suspend  925c relief by denial of funding for investigating and processing applications under the statute and denying writ of mandamus