In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: The savings clause states that “[compliance with an order [under the MDA] shall not relieve any person from liability under Federal or State law.” 21 U.S.C.A. § 360h(d). While the savings clause almost certainly prohibits a holding that the MDA preempts all state law liability, our interpretation of § 360k(a) does not preclude all liability. Further, nothing in the savings clause suggests that some tort liability, as opposed to other types of liability, must be preserved. Interpreting the savings clause to preserve non-tort liability, such as contract liability, is not only permissible, but also comports with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a savings clause in a recent preemption case. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 817, 826, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, where the preemptive intent of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the illinois consumer fraud act preempted by the federal airline deregulation act to the extent the state law applied to airline frequent flier programs (B) holding consumer claims under the texas deceptive trade practices act nonassignable (C) holding that the airline deregulation act preempts claims under the illinois consumer fraud and deceptive business practices act but does not preempt state breach of contract actions (D) holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act (E) holding that cjlaims for unfair competition and deceptive business practices involving trade names brought under illinois statutes are to be resolved according to the principles set forth under the lanham act and noting that illinois courts look to federal case law and apply the same analysis to state infringement claims

Answer: holding the illinois consumer fraud act preempted by the federal airline deregulation act to the extent the state law applied to airline frequent flier programs


Question: a “public official,” places a great emphasis on two of the elements: (1) the statutory powers and duties of a position, and (2) whether that position exercised sovereign power. See, e.g., Spaulding, 102 Iowa at 649, 72 N.W. at 291 (concluding that the treasurer of the commissioners of pharmacy was not a public officer because the position of treasurer “was a creation of the commission ... and at all times subject absolutely to their control”); McKinley, 228 Iowa at 1189-91, 293 N.W. at 451 (concluding that county engineer was an “official” because he furnished a bond and took an oath of office; but more importantly because several statutes defining the powers and duties of the county engineer delegated certain sovereign powers to that position); Whitney, 232 Iowa at 71, 4 N.W.2d at 398 (<HOLDING>); Hutton, 235 Iowa at 56, 16 N.W.2d at 20 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (C) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was an employee not an official and therefore entitled to benefits under the workers compensation act (D) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was not an official because she was not required to give bond or take an oath none of the statutes impose upon her the exercise of discretion in any way they delegate no sovereign power to her (E) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment

Answer: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment


Question: (Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Brief at 12). AFTC has not indicated the precise expense that it believes GFIA should have shouldered, or cited case law on the issue. AFTC’s claim regarding legal fees is unpersuasive. The three A & M companies and GFIA were jointly represented by Greenberg Traurig regarding both the PSA, to which all four entities were signatories, and the PSA Action, in which all four entities were co-plaintiffs. The A & M companies and GFIA each benefited from that joint representation, and AFTC has not disputed that Greenberg Traurig’s rates were reasonable. In such circumstances, parties are not required to divide legal expenses equally; one party may pay all legal fees for joint representation and still receive fair consideration in return. See Frank, 48 F.3d at 639 (<HOLDING>). AFTC has thus failed to establish that the A 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where codefendants conducted a joint defense that provided a benefit to each defendant the joint services represented fair consideration for the payment of reasonable compensation regardless of which defendant paid the bill (B) recognizing ability of one or more joint tortfeasors to settle on behalf of themselves and another joint tortfeasor and then pursue that joint tortfeasor for its share of the settlement payment (C) holding that the rights conferred to a joint account holder by massachusetts statutes and case law in fact give a joint account holder legal title in a joint account (D) holding that childrens book for which plaintiff provided the text and defendant provided the illustrated photographs was a joint work in which each party owned an undivided ownership and thus neither could be held liable to the other for copyright infringement (E) holding in a class action derivative suit that the joint defense privilege cannot be waived without the consent of all the parties to the defense except in the situation where one of the joint defendants becomes an adverse party in a litigation

Answer:
recognizing ability of one or more joint tortfeasors to settle on behalf of themselves and another joint tortfeasor and then pursue that joint tortfeasor for its share of the settlement payment