In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: ones in the present case, are capable of sustaining “direct physical loss or damage.” The definition of “physical,” as provided in the Oxford English Dictionary, is “[o]f or relating to natural phenomena perceived through the senses (as opposed to the mind); of or relating to matter or the material world; natural; tangible, conCrete.” Oxford English Dictionary, Ohio courts have recognized that “[m]oney deposited in a fund is intangible property,” Walther v. Central Trust Co., N.A., 70 Ohio App.3d 26, 32, 590 N.E.2d 375 (Ohio Ct.App.1990), and that “[i]ntangible personal property, by its very nature, is not capable of being physically possessed.” Denezza v. Denezza, 1996 WL 111812, *2, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 935, at *5 (Ct.App. Mar. 15, 1996) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); see also Falck v. United States, 2005 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing limited partnership interest as intangible personal property (B) recognizing that property not subject to physical seizure such as mutual fund shares are intangible property (C) recognizing that the government may seek a personal judgment specific property or substitute property (D) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (E) recognizing that partnership property is a type of ownership

Answer: (A)


Question: a particularized need. 4. Seriousness of the Litigation and Issues Holmes maintains that the gravity of her allegations — namely, that IPRA “concealed] its widespread efforts to cover-up unlawful shootings by police officers,” Pl.’s Reply Br. at 3 — warrants disclosing the draft summary reports. In other words, Holmes asserts that the privilege is overcome because IPRA’s deliberative process, which includes the back-and-forth exchange of draft summary reports between supervisors and investigators, is “part of the code of silence.” Id. Where a plaintiff directly challenges a government agency’s deliberative process, courts routinely find that there is a particularized need for disclosure. See, e.g., Smentek v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 2013 WL 2588709, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Ferrell, 177 F.R.D. at 430-31 (finding a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county (B) holding that mandatory visual strip search policy in county jail was unconstitutional (C) holding that public employees working for the office of cook county assessor and receiving their compensation from cook county had no vested right in the expectation of the continuance of this compensation (D) holding that plaintiffs had a particularized need for cook county jail prebudget documents after observing that the plaintiffs theory is that the county allegedly approved the dental services budget despite knowing that it might create unconstitutional conditions at the jail accordingly  the countys deliberative process is directly at issue in this case (E) holding that employees of county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to contract with the federal government were not federal employees even though county jail had to comply with federal rules and regulations

Answer: (D)


Question: available — beginning on January 4, 2011. Moreover, he noted that Courville had failed to exercise due diligence in seeking to obtain that employment. Additionally, while the ALJ acknowledged the conflicting medical opinions of the physicians who had evaluated Cour-ville, he also noted that, in certain circumstances, the opinion of a treating physician may be entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a non-treating physician. See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 830 n. 3, 123 S.Ct. 1965, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003). Thus, he found that Courville had established a prima facie entitlement to the medical treatment recommended by his treating physician Dr. Sledge — including the surgery. See Turner v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 16 BRBS 255, 257-58 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Finally, he concluded that, based on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions (B) holding that the burden of establishing prima facie case of discriminatory treatment may be satisfied by minimal showing (C) holding the procedural right to request a onetime change of physician during the course of treatment does not attach until claimant actually begins treatment with the initially authorized physician (D) holding that a claimant establishes a prima facie case for compensable medical treatment where a qualified physician indicates treatment was necessary for a workrelated condition (E) holding that a tortfeasor is required to pay the expenses of over treatment or unnecessary medical treatment unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith 

Answer:
(D)