In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: to the exercise of discretion by the trial court. Penn s to avoid the appearance of impropriety is a worthy standard for professional conduct, a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to due process does not entitle him to a prosecution free of such appearances. Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (stating that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not violated when his lawyer has a “possible” or “potential” conflict of interest). Instead, a criminal defendant is denied due process only when his former counsel joins a Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office and is not effectively screened from contact with the Commonwealth’s attorneys who are handling the defendant’s case on a related matter. See Thompson, 246 So.2d at 763 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 236-37 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (B) holding than an attorney who serves as a mediator cannot subsequently represent anyone in a substantially related matter without the consent of the original parties because mediators routinely receive and preserve confidences in much the same manner as an attorney and where the mediator was privy to confidential information the applicable ethical rules impose the same responsibility as the rules relating to any attorneys subsequent representation of a former client (C) holding that defendants right to due process was not violated by the employment of his former counsel in the us attorneys office where the former counsel recused himself and was screened from the prosecution of defendants case (D) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (E) holding that a defendants due process rights are violated only if his former lawyer prosecutes him on a matter related to the representation or discloses client confidences to other prosecutors
[EX A]: holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person

[EX Q]: their quest had generally confirmed their suspicion. Thereafter it was incumbent upon them to make a decision as to their course of action with “reasonable dispatch.” Occidental Life Ins. Co. of North Carolina v. Pat Ryan & Associates, Inc., supra, 496 F.2d at 1268; Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, supra, 488 F.2d at 917; Baumel v. Rosen, supra, 412 F.2d at 574. The question, therefore, is whether plaintiffs were guilty of unreasonable delay during the period from May 20, 1969 to August 27, 1969. Considering the number of plaintiffs involved and the time necessary for counsel to research legal authorities and draft and prepare the original complaint, this Court concludes that there was no unreasonable delay. Cf. Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 343 F.Supp. 245, 255-56 (D.Md.1972) (<HOLDING>), rev’d, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973) (in jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal (B) holding inter alia that 130 days was reasonable period for researching and drafting of complaint (C) holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay (D) holding that delays of 115 days and 101 days were both substantial (E) holding that a difference between 384 days prepreference average number of days to payment and 547 days preference average number of days to payment did not make the payments out of the ordinary course of business
[EX A]: holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal

[EX Q]: § 1521(a), (e). C. Board Application of 38 U.S.C. §§ 1513, 1521 Without considering section 1513, the Board applied section 1521(e) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.351(d)(2), concluding that, without a disability rated as total or permanent, “the provisions for special monthly pension at the housebound rate are not for consideration.” R. at 9. Mr. Hartness argues that the Board erred because it failed to apply section 1513 when considering whether he is entitled to a special monthly pension under section 1521(e). We agree. The Board’s analysis and finding that Mr. Hartness was not entitled to a special monthly pension based on permanent housebound status, without consideration of section 1513, is clearly erroneous. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a), (d)(1); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 52 (1990) (<HOLDING>). On remand, the Board will apply the following 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed (B) holding that the court of appeals must consider and weigh all of the evidence and may only set aside the finding if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust (C) holding that error is harmless if there is substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction (D) holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge (E) holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction
[EX A]:
holding that the court of appeals must consider and weigh all of the evidence and may only set aside the finding if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust