In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: a habeas petition, and since his administrative remedies are now exhausted, this claim can proceed. B. Fox’s Notification Challenge is Properly Before The Court The second half of Fox’s claim relating to the notification requirement of the statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c)(2), is properly brought by him as a petition for a declaratory judgment. Notification claims do not relate to the fact or duration of confinement, therefore challenge to a notification requirement is not properly brought as a habeas petition. See Bunn v. Conley, 309 F.3d 1002, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The notification scheme [under 18 U.S.C § 4042(b) governing violent offender notification] in no way affects the duration, much less the fact, of confinement.”); Henrikson v. Guzik, 249 F.3d 395, 397 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (B) holding that because henrikson is not challenging the fact or duration of his confinement subject matter jurisdiction is not present under 28 us  2241 (C) holding that subject matter jurisdiction under  2241 is present in the custodial court when the petition challenges the manner location or condition of a sentences execution (D) holding that under the fsia personal jurisdiction   depends upon the district court finding subject matter jurisdiction under 28 usc  1330a and proper service under 28 usc  1608 (E) holding that district courts have jurisdiction under 28 usc  2241 to review cat claims for errors of law including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes
[A]: (B)


[Q]: Ill 1997). AirTouch alleges that the City’s denial will in effect prohibit it from providing personal wireless services because alternative sites leave “gaps” in its service or will be too costly to provide. a. Gap In Coverage AirTouch has presented evidence of a gap in coverage in its wireless services on the Fanita Drive-Highway 125 corridor from Navajo Drive to the Highway 52 Connector. (Tifft Decl. at ¶ 11.) Air-Touch argues that if a decision leaves “significant gaps” in wireless services, § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) has been violated. The City argues that a mere gap is not sufficient; there must be a general ban for that provision to apply. AirTouch is supported by recent decisions of the Second and Third Circuit. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 640-41 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 70 (3rd Cir.) (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  332c7biii applies only to blanket prohibitions and general bans or policies and not to individual zoning decisions (B) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law (C) holding that  332c7b iii does not apply only to general bans and stating that prohibiting only general bans would 1 require a court to wait for a series of denied applications and 2 lead to the untenable result that once personal wire services are available within the jurisdiction of a state or local government  the state or local government could deny any further applications with impunity (D) holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional (E) holding that a district court cannot require a unit of state or local government to abide by a consent decree that does not serve any federal interest
[A]: (C)


[Q]: F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir.1983) (noting duress defense “raises broad philosophical issues concerning the nature of voluntary action for purposes of criminal responsibility and the appropriate conditions for holding a person morally blameworthy”; further noting disagreement among state jurisdictions regarding the relation of mens rea and duress). We consider this exposition of the defense compelling and one that we will adopt in this appeal. {13} We also note that we have not uncovered any extrajurisdictional support for Lucero or the State’s argument in this appeal. Even State v 107 (1983) (necessity is a defense to DWI); State v. Olson, 79 Or.App. 302, 719 P.2d 55, 57 (1986) (choice of evils defense available to DUI defendant); State v. Riedl, 15 Kan.App.2d 326, 807 P.2d 697, 699 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Also, see generally Michael J. Yaworsky, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that compulsion is a defense to absolute liability traffic offenses (B) holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability (C) recognizing that substantial change is a defense to a products liability claim (D) holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for failing to give defense counsel materially exculpatory evidence (E) recognizing that miranda warnings are unnecessary for the investigation of routine traffic offenses
[A]:
(A)