In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: UCL and CLRA. In considering whether the plaintiff in Bruno had standing to bring claims arising from the defendants’ gelcap product, when the plaintiff had only purchased the defendants’ liquid product, the court noted that “treatises and the vast majority of persuasive authority indicate that ... the issue of whether a class representative may be allowed to present claims on behalf of others who have similar, but not identical, interests depends not on standing, but on an assessment of typicality and adequacy of representation.” Id. at 530 (citing Greenwood v. Compucredit Corp., No. 4:08-cv-04878, 2010 WL 4807095, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2010); Arevalo v. Bank of Am. Corp., 850 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1017 (N.D.Cal.2011); Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); 7AA Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers have standing to sue (B) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (C) recognizing associational standing when members would have standing in own right (D) holding that because plaintiff had standing to sue for injury arising from his own benefit plan his ability to represent class members with different benefit plans should be analyzed under rule 23 not standing (E) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: erred in denying without a hearing his claim that trial counsel were ineffective because they “were under a conflict of interest in this case because counsels’ interest in spending the minimum amount of time on a case for which they were receiving no money conflicted with [Movant’s] desire that his case be fully litigated and investigated.... ” The State counters that the trial court did not clearly err in denying this claim because Movant failed to plead facts not refuted by the record demonstrating an actual conflict. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest, a movant must show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s performance. Conger v. State, 356 S.W.3d 217, 221 (Mo.App.E.D. 2011) (quotation omitted) (<HOLDING>). “In order to prove a conflict of interest, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel on the strength of gonzalezs sworn responses at the pleataking that no one was threatening him or forcing him to plead where the defendant alleged that his attorney forced him to plead guilty  and threatened him if he did not take the plea (B) holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case (C) holding that right to appeal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel failed to convey plea negotiations timely and adequately inform of consequences of pleading guilty to jury for sentencing waived because plea of guilty to jury was independent of and not supported by alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims (D) holding no coercion where counsel told movant his conviction was likely because movant stated he understood full range of punishment and no one threatened him to plead guilty (E) holding that the movant failed to establish that plea counsel coerced him to plead guilty to avoid taking the case to trial
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: in this state, and must therefore comply with the terms of M.C.L.A. 500.3606. The fact that the terms of the policy were negotiated in another state, or that the policy was executed by the parties to the policy in another state, does not vitiate this result. The Court acknowledges New England Mutual’s argument that it is burdensome to require an insurer to submit its policies for approval to the administrative agencies of the states in which every beneficiary of the policy is located. Nonetheless, the Court concludes that Michigan has a sufficient interest in the application of its law for the protection of its residents in such a case as this to require that the hardship must be borne by insurers. Cf. Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, 293 Md. 629, 446 A.2d 1140 (1982) (<HOLDING>). The question then arises, if New England 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that maryland law controls the operation of a group health insurance policy that covers employees who live and work in maryland notwithstanding the fact that the policy was executed in rhode island and contained a provision that the law of rhode island would control the operation and effect of the policy (B) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (C) holding fact that prototype group disability policy submitted to insurance department for approval contained blanks and that therefore policy actually issued with blanks filled in may have been unapproved in violation of insurance statutes did not warrant voiding of nonduplication of benefits clause in group disability policy (D) recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing (E) holding that public policy favors the exclusion of intentional acts as contained in the mjua policy
[EX A]:
(A)