In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: to facilitate William’s pick ups and returns of the children. The record reflects that Lacey, out of distrust, often would record her interactions with William. William admitted that he routinely avoids interaction with Lacey unless necessary. After reviewing the record under the applicable standard of review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the circumstances of the children or a conservator have materially and substantially changed since rendition of the divorce decree and that it is in the children’s best interests to modify the decree to give Lacey the exclusive right to consent to psychiatric and psychological treatment of the children. See Swaab v. Swaab, 282 S.W.3d 519, 534 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (<HOLDING>); Baltzer, 240 S.W.3d at 477 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting mother the exclusive right to consent to all psychiatric and psychological treatment of the child (C) holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time (D) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child

Output: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction


Input: Consider Input: of attorney-client privilege, nor could they. There was thus no error in admitting the bill. J. The Apportionment of Damages Defendants Ashton and Short contend that the Court erred in refusing to apportion damages among the Defendants. This issue as such was first raised in Defendants’ Amended Motion and would not need to be considered by the Court. Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., supra. Prior to the charge of the Court, the parties were advised of the charge and Ash-ton and Short vaguely objected because of the potential for joint and several liability; however they did not propose any points for charge with respect to the apportionment of damages. See Frankel v. Burke’s Excavating, Inc., 269 F.Supp. 1007 (E.D.Pa.1967), aff’d 397 F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. 1968) (<HOLDING>). In any event, under Section 433(b), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that alleged defects in special interrogatories could not be the basis for a new trial when counsel had not pointed out the alleged defect to the court (B) holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment (C) holding that the court had no jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a plea agreement (D) holding because plaintiff had not alleged defendant made a misrepresentation or that the alleged defect posed a safety risk the district court  properly dismissed plaintiffs  fraudulent concealment claim (E) holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect

Output: holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment


Input: Consider Input: has admitted in this and prior proceedings that he committed intentional torts against Ms. Lewis, and, therefore, cannot deny an intent to injure. Such an admission, regardless of its characterization, is not sufficient to show the intent required by section 523(a)(6) because such intent may be present in some, but not all intentional torts. For example, under Virginia law, conduct that is intentional or reckless is all that is required to establish the intent requirement of intentional infliction of emotional distress (an intentional tort). Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 639 S.E.2d 182, 189 (2007). Yet, intentional or reckless conduct is not sufficient to establish the intent required under section 523(a)(6). See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Even if the Court were to consider the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  523a6 requires the actor to intend the injury not just the act that leads to the injury (B) holding that the word willful in a6 modifies the word injury indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury (C) holding that there must be proof of both a willful act and malicious injury to establish nondischargeability under section 523a6 (D) holding that a mere deliberate or intentional act that causes injury is not sufficient to establish willfulness in the context of 11 usc  523a6 (E) holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury


Output: holding that  523a6 requires the actor to intend the injury not just the act that leads to the injury