In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
the justifiable use of deadly force to specific circumstances, such as when the actor “reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another.” Id. § 776.012(1). As discussed at length above, Lieutenant Weippert’s conduct was objectively reasonable and he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Penley posed a threat of great bodily harm to the lieutenant and others. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Penleys, the evidence reveals no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lieutenant Weippert’s use of force was reasonably necessary. Under Florida law, Lieutenant Weippert had no duty to retreat and his use of force was justifiable. See State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 337-38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle (B) holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded (C) holding that after being chased by a carfull of angry men it would have been reasonable for mr rivera a private citizen to believe that deadly force was necessary even if only a single unarmed pursuer had approached his nowstopped car because the pursuer and his friends had already threatened riveras life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a highspeed chase and throwing deadly missiles namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna (D) holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure (E) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car

Ex Output:
holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle


Ex Input:
the public interest and ‘[considerations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system’ require that the district court defer to local government administrators.” Id. In Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1166, the Sixth Circuit was very clear that, where “decisional law has changed so that the enjoined behavior, which once might have been a violation of federal law, is no longer a matter of federal law at all” the injunction must be vacated. In light of the fact that no federal right underpins the 1974 decree — as well as the fact that the “local government administrators” in this case appear to favor vacating the decree — the court can identify no reason that the 1974 consent decree should remain in effect. Cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (<HOLDING>); Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act (B) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated (D) holding that a court errs when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of  changes in statutory or decisional law (E) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes

Ex Output:
holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act


Ex Input:
for this court to certify issues of state law to the Maryland Court of Appeals that the Fourth Circuit specifically declined to certify in that case. 9 . E.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.1980). 10 . E.g., American Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir.1984). 11 . E.g., Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.1982). 12 . E.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C.Cir.1982). 13 . Some courts adopting the injury-in-fact trigger consider it to be the time when an injury first comes into being, and expert testimony is required to pinpoint this date. See, e.g., Uniroyal v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F.Supp. 1368, 1387-90 (E.D.N.Y.1988) (<HOLDING>). 14 .The insurer argued that the last policy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a job offer which required a claimant to make a daily round trip commute of 232 miles was unreasonable even though the claimant would be provided with a motel room because this would require the claimant to be away from home at least four nights a week (B) holding that risk is measured at the point when the attorneys time was committed to the case (C) recognizing the same point (D) holding inter alia that the issue of whether a naval yard worker was exposed to a manufacturers product was for the jury (E) holding that coverage was triggered only at that point in time one week after each claimant was exposed to the toxic product

Ex Output:

holding that a job offer which required a claimant to make a daily round trip commute of 232 miles was unreasonable even though the claimant would be provided with a motel room because this would require the claimant to be away from home at least four nights a week