In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: officer was not acting in the lawful discharge of his official duties when he commanded Green to come speak with him. See generally Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. 656, 658 (1) (727 SE2d 257) (2012) (describing circumstances in which a citizen may walk or even run from a law enforcement officer). By expressly challenging whether the officer was lawfully discharging his official duties in their encounter, Green implicitly challenged his own knowledge that the officer’s commands to him were lawful. Indeed, Green’s counsel argued at trial that, because the officer made no lawful commands to Green, the state could not show that Green had the knowledge required by the statute for the offense of misdemeanor obstruction. See Thomas v. State, 322 Ga. App. 734, 738 (2) (b) (746 SE2d 216) (2013) (<HOLDING>); Gibson v. State, 265 Ga. App. 325, 328 (593 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a capital defendant is mentally competent to abandon any and all challenges to his or her death sentence including appeals state postconviction collateral review and federal habeas corpus if he or she has the mental capacity to understand the choice between life and death and to make a knowing and intelligent decision not to pursue further remedies (B) holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right (C) holding that defendants disobedience cannot have been knowing and wilful if officer has not made clear to defendant that he or she was compelled to obey (D) holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority (E) holding that a person has standing to bring suit under the civil rights act if she or he can show that she or he was punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities
[A]: (C)


[Q]: child abuse or neglect or who testifies or otherwise participates in a judicial proceeding arising from a report, petition, or investigation of alleged child abuse or neglect is immune from civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Id. § 261.106(a) (emphasis added). The dissent also correctly points out that “Immunity from liability and immunity from suit are two distinct principles.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). Finally, the dissent even recognizes that “[ijmmunity from liability is an affirmative defense, while immunity from suit deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex.2004); see also City of Hous. v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>); Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar (B) holding bjecause immunity from liability constitutes an affirmative defense not a jurisdictional bar only immunity from suit is properly before us today (C) recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit (D) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (E) holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional
[A]: (B)


[Q]: armed. Those are machinations drawn up by the defense attorney.” At that point, Davis’s attorney objected that such a statement attacked Davis over the shoulders of defense counsel, violated his due process rights, and deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The trial court overruled Davis’s objection, and the prosecutor continued, “There’s no evidence to suggest that.” Viewing the prosecutor’s statement in the context of the entire argument, the comment was made in rebuttal, specifically in response to Davis’s claim that Latarsha was armed and had attacked Davis. See Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 256; York v. State, No. PD-1753-06, 2008 WL 2677368, at *5 (Tex.Crim.App. July 2, 2008) (not designated for publication). By saying that the idea that Latarsha was armed was a “machinatio pp.1973) (<HOLDING>); Guy, 160 S.W.3d at 616-17 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prosecutors remarks that defense counsel was a zealot in the courtroom and thank god hes a defense attorney and not part of the government were improper (B) holding prosecutors argument that defense counsel was manufacturing evidence and thus suborning perjury was improper (C) holding prosecutors argument that defense counsels goal was to keep evidence from the jury was improper (D) holding prosecutors statement that defendant and defense counsel were lying when they pleaded not guilty was improper (E) holding that the prosecutors question to the defendant about a prior unrelated offense was improper
[A]:
(D)