In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: see State v. Sosa, 1997-NMSC-032, ¶ 9, 123 N.M. 564, 943 P.2d 1017. {34} Defendant argues that two provisions in the current Delinquency Act suggest the Legislature’s intent to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the Section 32A-2-20 findings. These two provisions, Section 32A-2-24(B) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in probation revocation hearings), and Section 32A-2-16(E) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding), are readily distinguishable from the amenability determination under Section 32A-2-20(B). First, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding is constitutionally mandated. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. Second, a probation revocation hearing, l 7, 1140-41 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>); State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 649, 651, 674 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (D) holding that treatment as a child is not a constitutional right but a right granted by the legislature and statute met basic due process requirements (E) holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard

Output: holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel


Input: Consider Input: v. Valenzuela, 722 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir.1983) (requiring the defendant to shave); United States v. Lamb, 575 F.2d 1310, 1316 (10th Cir.1978) (same); United States v. Murray, 523 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1975) (requiring the defendant to wear a wig); United States v. Roberts, 481 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir.1973) (requiring the defendant to put on a stocking mask worn during the robbery). If a defendant who is compelled to don clothing before the jury does not “testify” for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause, it would seem to follow, a fortiori,' that the Self-Incrimination Clause also provides that a defendant who voluntarily dons clothing before the jury may not be required to subject himself to cross-examination. See United States v. Bay, 762 F.2d 1314, 1315-16 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that a physical 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not err in concluding after an evidentiary hearing that the immunity agreement between defendant and the government did not extend to the charge being prosecuted (B) holding that the district court correctly declined to instruct the jury that the government was required to prove as an element of the offense that the defendant did not intend to establish a life with his wife (C) holding that a district court did not err in concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a downward departure due to his status as an alien subject to removal (D) holding that the district court erred in concluding that a defendant was required to take the stand to display his tattoos because the government may compel a defendant to display such physical characteristics (E) holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered

Output: holding that district court did not err in concluding after an evidentiary hearing that the immunity agreement between defendant and the government did not extend to the charge being prosecuted


Input: Consider Input: 242 (Me.1991).) To the contrary, it is difficult to think of a claim that is more intrinsically work-related than sexual harassment alleged to have created a hostile work environment. Plaintiff also argues that the injury was not work-related because the “activity causing the injury” was not “implied into the contract of employment.” (Id. at 8 (citing Dorey, 591 A.2d at 242).) Plaintiff characterizes the “activity causing the injury” as “tolerance of sexual harassment and a hostile work environment.” (Id.) However, it is clear from the case law that the “activity” in question in this factor is not tortious conduct of the harasser or the attitude of the victim toward the harassment but the activity that the victim was engaged in when she suffered the injury. See Dorey, 591 A.2d at 242 (<HOLDING>). In this case, there is no indication that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employees stress injury solely due to disciplinary proceedings was not compensable under workers compensation (B) holding that an employees visit to the office solely to retrieve medical documents for a workers compensation claim was not an activity implied into the contract of employment (C) holding that an agencys determination on a workers compensation claim was entitled to deference (D) recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act (E) holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim


Output: holding that employees stress injury solely due to disciplinary proceedings was not compensable under workers compensation