In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
of the contract, the plaintiffs claim will only sound in contract. Id. In operation, the rale restricts contracting parties to contractual remedies for those economic losses associated with the relationship, even when the breach might reasonably be viewed as a consequence of a contracting party’s negligence. See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.1986) (“When the injury is only the economic loss to the subject of a contract itself, the action sounds in contract alone.”). In other words, the economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic losses in negligence when the loss is the subject matter of a contract between the parties. Coastal Conduit & Ditching, Inc. v. Noram Energy Corp., 29 S.W.3d 282, 285 (T .3d 355, 378 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we overrule JP Morgan’s fifth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subject to certain exceptions the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for economic damages arising out of matters governed by contract (B) holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property  damage claims (C) recognizing fraud in the inducement claims independent of contract claims without discussion of economic loss rule (D) holding economic loss rule did not bar recovery of tort damages on statutory fraud claim based upon fraudulent inducement (E) holding economic loss rule did not bar negligent misrepresentation claim where parties had no contract

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
CURIAM. Appellant, John Mark Vaughan, Jr., filed a Rule 3.800(a) motion, claiming that his sentence was illegal under Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines could have been imposed under the valid 1994 guidelines. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to attach the relevant portions of the record to support this finding, which ordinarily would require reversal. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 741 So.2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). However, appellant failed to allege that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a movant successfully challenges an illegal prr sentence in a rule 3800a motion at resentencing the movant is entitled to be present at sentencing represented by counsel with an opportunity to present mitigating evidence (B) holding that burden is on trial court denying a facially sufficient rule 3800a motion to attach record establishing movant is not entitled to relief (C) holding motion for substitution of judge properly denied where movant failed to attach affidavit (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding that a rule 3800a motion that does not allege that the court records show the defendants entitlement to additional jail credit is facially insufficient

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
significant change.in benefits.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Lucas, citing Annett v. University of Kansas, 371 F.3d 1233, 1239 (10th Cir. 2004), argues that “[a]cts that carry a significant risk of humiliation, damage to reputation, and a concomitant harm to future employment prospects may be considered adverse actions,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 27. He claims, without evidentiary support, that the corrective action subjected him to potential humiliation as a sexual predator. But his argument rests on a flawed legal premise: Annett defined an “adverse employment action” for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim, which is broader than the definition of an “adverse employment action” for a Title VII discrimination claim. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 61-65, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (<HOLDING>); see also Piercy, 480 F.3d at 1203 (explaining 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a collective bargaining agreement violated the antiretaliation provision of the age discrimination in employment act because on its face it unambiguously denied an employee his contractual right to file an inhouse grievance once he elected to file an age discrimination charge (B) holding that title vii prohibits discrimination based on any race including caucasian (C) holding that title viis antiretaliation provision prohibits any employer action that might dissuade  a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge and thus covers a broader range of employer conduct than its substantive discrimination provision (D) holding that in retaliation case the requisite adverse action is one which well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination (E) holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc

Ex Output:

(C)