In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

to intervene” as a linguistic tool to highlight how little personal participation the defendant had in the arrest in that particular case. The passage shows how far below the required minimum level of involvement that particular defendant exhibited. Read in whole, Brown more accurately shows that personal participation in an arrest, or supervisory control over the arresting officer, is required in order to establish liability for unlawful arrest — mere presence is not enough. However, even assuming Plaintiffs are correct, and that law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene in other officer’s unlawful arrests, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers or Alma Officers violated clearly established law in this case. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Canine Handlers and Alma Officers were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search (C) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force (D) holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant (E) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied
holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim

N.E.2d 968, 973 (Ind.1999). However, when the landowner is a lessor and the lessee is in operational control of the premises, such duty rarely exists. “[A] landlord under many circumstances has no liability to tenants or others for injuries on the property when the tenant is in full control of the leased premises.” Dutchmen Mfg., Inc. v. Reynolds, 849 N.E.2d 516, 525 (Ind.2006). “[I]n the absence of statute, covenant, fraud or concealment, a landlord who gives a tenant full control and possession of the leased property will not be liable for personal injuries sustained by the tenant or other persons lawfully' upon the leased property.” Olds v. Noel, 857 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (citation omitted), tram, not' sought; cf. Rossow v. Jones, 404 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (<HOLDING>), trans. not sought. Yost v. Wabash College, 3 
 Holding statements: (A) holding over (B) holding that captain has reasonable expectation of privacy in all areas of his ship (C) holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building (D) holding that a landlord has a duty of reasonable care over common areas or other areas over which the landlord has retained control (E) holding that a landlord may have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its tenants in common areas
holding over

paid out an allegedly undervalued lump sum to his bank account in the Northern District of Illinois "arguably supports that the 'breach took place’ in the Southern District of Illinois....” Appellant's Br. at 15 n. 5. We shall not consider this undeveloped argument. See United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991) ("We repeatedly have made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived....”). 2 . This court has addressed the meaning of § 1132(e)(2)’s service of process provision ("and process may be served in any other district where a defendant resides or may be found”). See Bd. of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers' Nat’l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1035-37 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Elite Erectors did not determine, however, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that erisas venue provision can provide broad access to the federal courts and clarifying that nationwide service of process is available only if the suit is an action under this subchapter   emphasis in original quoting 29 usc  1132e2 (B) holding such service satisfies due process (C) holding that ricos nationwide service of process provision did not authorize service outside the united states (D) recognizing that it is well settled law that an action is commenced by the service of a summons and without valid service of process the trial court has no jurisdiction to act (E) holding that  1132e2 allows for nationwide service of process and thus jurisdiction and that the nationwide service of process provision comports with the constitution

recognizing that erisas venue provision can provide broad access to the federal courts and clarifying that nationwide service of process is available only if the suit is an action under this subchapter   emphasis in original quoting 29 usc  1132e2