In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

a work-related injury, taking into account such factors as age, education, training, and mental capacity." Id. at 574; see also Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (listing "age, sex, education, economic and social environment, ... [and] permanent impairment" as factors to be weighed (internal quotation marks omitted)). 120 The fact that an employee returned to work for some period of time following his industrial injury does not automatically preclude him from claiming permanent total disability benefits at a later date if he continues to suffer substantial pain throughout the period of his continued employment or if his industrial injury worsens to the point that he is no longer able to maintain regular employment. See Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027-28 (<HOLDING>). See generally Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits (B) holding that an employee who returned to work for six years following his workrelated injury could nevertheless obtain permanent total disability benefits and observing that it may be years before the effect of an injury is felt (C) holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury (D) holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability (E) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence
holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits

Apr. 14, 2011). Accord Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 274 (2d Cir.2009) (dismissing a retaliation claim whose only causal basis was a letter that plaintiff wrote many weeks before the allegedly retaliatory acts, implicating officers other than named defendants). See also Def. Mem. at 11 ("[A] claim that one defendant took action against the plaintiff in retaliation for a complaint made against a different [officer] [should be] viewed with particular skepticism."). 40 . Def, Mem. at 17. 41 . See id. (citing exclusively to Eighth Amendment cases). 42 .Id. 43 . See Wright, 554 F.3d at 274. 44 . Def. Mem. at 18. 45 . Def. Mem. at 19. 46 . Davis, 320 F.3d at 353. 47 . Dawes, 239 F.3d at 493. 48 . Compare Hofelich v. Ercole, No. 06 Civ. 1369, 2010 WL 1459740, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2010) (<HOLDING>), with Rembert v. Cheverko, No. 12 Civ. 9196, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim (B) holding that a verbal threat of being fired is not an adverse employment action for purposes of title vii (C) holding that verbal threats if they are specific can constitute adverse action for retaliation purposes (D) holding that a suspension with pay may constitute materially adverse action for the purposes of retaliation claims depending on the facts of the case (E) holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action
holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim

was a matter for the arbitrator to decide). We find the present case functionally indistinguishable from (and controlled by) those cases in which the parties agree that an underlying dispute is arbitrable, but disagree about the effect of laches, waiver, exhaustion of prearbitration steps, limitations periods, or other “procedural” issues. See supra note 4. Bell and its Union agree that disputes over the reorganization of administrative groups may be resolved through arbitration; they simply disagree on the procedures to be followed. The Union has asked that both of these issues — the reorganization dispute and the procedure to be followed — be submitted to an arbitrator, and we hold that this is the proper course for the parties. See John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 558, 84 S.Ct. 909 (<HOLDING>). The District Court’s judgment will be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a question of arbitrability for a court to decide (B) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties (C) holding that the court must send the parties to arbitration in cases in which arbitrability of the subject matter is unquestioned but a dispute arises over the procedures to be followed (D) holding that because a valid arbitration clause existed the parties had to arbitrate all disputes when the subject matter of the dispute has a reasonable relationship to the subject matter of the contract (E) holding that the state law of preclusion must be followed even when federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim is exclusive

holding that a gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a question of arbitrability for a court to decide