TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: in this sense, inasmuch as he has alleged an imminent violation of his statutory right to personal privacy within the trial court’s power to enjoin. “Standing” can also refer to various judicially-created limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction, such as “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). It is not, however, standing in this so-called prudential sense with wh out the phrase, in Rector v. City of Bowling Green, 594 S.W.2d 891 (Ky.1979) (<HOLDING>). The question thig case presents is who, aside 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nonindustrial property owners did not have standing under the asserted statute to challenge an annexation (B) holding that representation by state officials that they have no present plan to enforce a statute does not divest plaintiffs of standing to challenge the statute because the states position could well change (C) holding that petitioners who asserted neither a property interest nor a possessory interest in property searched or seized were not entitled to assert a constitutional challenge to the search (D) holding annexation ordinance void (E) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: complaint’s allegations are sufficient if they put a reasonable person on notice as to why a plaintiff sues.” Id. Here, a reasonable person would be put on notice that Weatherford’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not solely based on the false arrest or false imprisonment claims. Weatherford’s claim is premised on the officers’ alleged intentional retaliation and abuse of power and process when they violated standard police procedure, disregarded Chief Leonard’s instructions and conspired to intentionally and publicly humiliate Weatherford. Furthermore, we note that Indiana now recognizes a separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, without the need for an accompanying tort. See Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 30-31 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that Weatherford 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotion distress for the first time in indiana (B) recognizing that the indiana tort claims act grants broad immunity to governmental employees from suit for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress (C) holding that claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress fail as matter of law where challenged arrest is supported by probable cause (D) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: can be characterized as “new” or “future” as opposed to “continued” at-will employment. Jimenez, however, correctly responds that in Missouri, a promise of at-will employment does not qualify as consideration,- regardless of whether it is characterized as “new,” “future,” or “continued” at-will employment. Thus, it does not provide the consideration needed to support the arbitration agreement in this case. Defendants concede that Jimenez was an at-will employee. They also agree that under Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15 (Mo.App.W.D.2008), a promise of “continued” at-will employment will not constitute consideration for purposes of- enforcing an arbitration agreement. See also Clemmons v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Mo.App.W.D.2013) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue, however, that this line of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding offer of continued atwill employment did not constitute consideration for the arbitration agreement (B) holding that a postinjury arbitration agreement was not part of a employment contract when a seamans continued employment was not conditioned upon its execution (C) holding in an employment discrimination case that the continued employment of the plaintiffs rival in a position previously held by the plaintiff did not constitute a systemic violation (D) holding that an alleged oral modification of a written employment agreement was not enforceable because the employees action in remaining on the job did not constitute adequate consideration (E) holding that offer of atwill employment is valid consideration to support an arbitration agreement

SOLUTION:
(A)