In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
the effect that the code-fendant’s confession must be disregarded in determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence is ineffective and cannot overcome the prejudicial effect of the incriminating statement on the jury. Id. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. As such, the trial court’s curative instruction in the instant case was insufficient to cure the erroneous admission of Hertz’s statement to Hathcock. Nonetheless, this Court has also recognized that a Bruton violation does not automatically require reversal of an otherwise valid conviction but, rather, is subject to a harmless error analysis. See Farina v. State, 679 So.2d 1151, 1155 (Fla.1996) (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284, (1969)); see also Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1322 (Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 644-45 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness (B) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause violation in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not require the conviction to be overturned (C) holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error (D) holding confrontation clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus upholding firstdegree murder conviction (E) holding that testimony at trial in violation of defendants constitutional confrontation right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the testimony was cumulative

Ex Output:
holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness


Ex Input:
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and part of the “unified judicial system,” is an arm of the state. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir.2000) (“All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system ... are part of ‘Commonwealth government’ and thus are state rather than local agencies.”). As a state agency, the Board has Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. Therefore, as an arm of the state, Lucas may not sue the Board unless one of the three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply. See MCI Telcomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503 (listing immunity exceptions). On appeal, Lucas argues that the Ex Parte Young exception precludes the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to the present action against the Board. Howe 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Neither of these exceptions are applicable in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action (B) holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action (C) holding that a remedial scheme created by congress even if incapable of addressing all of plaintiffs injuries precluded a bivens action (D) holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction (E) holding that young will not apply where congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state

Ex Output:
holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action


Ex Input:
under the Due Pro cess Clause. For example, in Casey, the Supreme Court explicitly noted: Marriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no • doubt correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause in Loving v. Virginia. 505 U.S. at 847-48, 112 S.Ct. 2791; see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974) (recognizing that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has also recognized the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the right to marry is a central part of the liberty protected by the due process clause (B) holding that private sexual contact between consenting adults is a liberty right protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that a state tort claim is a species of property protected by the due process clause (D) holding that entitlement to benefits is a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution (E) holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state

Ex Output:

holding that private sexual contact between consenting adults is a liberty right protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment