In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions “could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited.” Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) (“We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse’s liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void.”). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years
[EX A]: holding that such provisions are valid

[EX Q]: the notice. (Hilsee Supp. Aff. ¶ 6(b), June 8, 2005). Moreover, the notice campaign began in early December, and the deadline to file opt-outs was April 8, 2005. This timeline, spanning a period of four months, is consistent with court-approved best practices for class notice campaigns. Id. at ¶ 6(c)vi. Accordingly, I FIND that there was sufficient notice leading up to the opt-out deadline. Objectors also assert that because the settlement class could have potentially included millions of Class Members, and only 6,524 have “shown their hands” to be included in the class by filing an inventory form, the notice is inadequate. However, many factors contribute to the claims response rate. See, e.g., Zimmer Paper Prod., Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>); 3 Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (B) holding that notice apprised class members sufficiently of information that notice was intended under the rule to convey (C) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (D) holding that where defendant engaged in customary and court approved notice procedure the response rate was not determinative of the adequacy of the class notice (E) holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice
[EX A]: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner

[EX Q]: that the district court’s mention of having considered the “entire lengthy record” indicates that the court, in concluding that amendment would be both untimely and futile, relied in part upon the overall history of the dispute, including the ease CBS had previously initiated in Florida. Whether the court meant to encompass that history within the reason for its decision is not clear,- however; the “lengthy record” in question may well refer only to the present litigation, which alone had been going on for more than three years at the time. In either event, the district court erred; the prolonged nature of a case does not itself affect whether the plaintiff may amend its complaint. See, e.g., Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Kevin Tucker & Assoc., Inc., 64 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to amend when the opposing partys case for prejudice is stated  only in the most conclusory of terms and no particular witnesses or documents are identified to support the argument that a delay would prejudice a party (B) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (C) holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add count when no prejudice resulted from two and onehalf year delay and facts underlying new and old counts were similar (D) holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add claim when party opposing motion made no showing of prejudice from delay (E) holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend after a delay of eight months
[EX A]:
holding that a district court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to amend when the opposing partys case for prejudice is stated  only in the most conclusory of terms and no particular witnesses or documents are identified to support the argument that a delay would prejudice a party