TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: judicial review of an arbitration award. See UHC Management Co., 148 F.3d at 998 (“ “We may not set an award aside simply because ... the arbitrators erred in interpreting the law or in determining the facts.’ ”) (quoting Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 751). This third challenge is nonetheless partially cognizable, but only to the extent it can be read as an assertion that there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, a statutory ground under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2), as a claim of misconduct by the arbitrators in refusing to hear evidence or to provide a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, another statutory ground under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3), or as an extra-statutory challenge to the “fundamental fairness” of the proceedings. See P & P Indus., Inc., 179 F.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>). Hoffman’s fourth challenge is to the denial 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit (B) holding right to be fundamental (C) holding that section 34810 is an adequate and independent state ground (D) recognizing plain or fundamental error (E) recognizing review for fundamental unfairness of the proceedings as an independent extrastatutory ground

SOLUTION: recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit

PROBLEM: it was minor and that Zhang only had five years of education. The IJ reasonably found these explanations insufficient. Zhang also testified inconsistently regarding whether he was fired from his job after authorities arrested him in 2010, or simply did not return to work. Zhang argues that this inconsistency was “nonexistent” because there was more than one reason why he did not return to work. Zhang does not explain, however, why he did not state that he was terminated when he was first asked why he did not- return to work. The agency reasonably found that Zhang’s failure to mention his termination until prompted by the IJ undermined his credibility, and that his explanation that he “did not listen clearly” was unpersuasive. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the agency reasonably found that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences (B) holding that district court need not accept the governments recommendation of a minor role reduction (C) holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief (D) holding that a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to conclude that the petitioner would more likely than not be subjected to torture if removed to china based solely on the fact that she had illegally departed china without more particularized evidence (E) holding that ij need not accept plausible explanation for inconsistency unless reasonable factfinder would be compelled to do so

SOLUTION: holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences

PROBLEM: has never adopted the Ellerth/Faragher model for vicarious liability of an employer for [ ] harassment by a supervisor,” instead relying on the “known or should have known” standard for assessing liability. Stricker v. Cessford Construction Co., 179 F.Supp.2d 987, 1014 (N.D.Iowa 2001); see McElroy v. State, 637 N.W.2d 488, 499 (Iowa 2001) (using federal case law to flesh out the distinction between quid pro quo harassment and sexually hostile work environment claims under the ICRA); Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Iowa 1993) (analyzing propriety of a sexually hostile work environment claim under the ICRA using the same factors as employed by federal courts in analyzing comparable claims under Title VII); Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 833-34 (Iowa 1990) (<HOLDING>); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 (B) recognizing that the elements of title vii sexually hostile work environment claims apply to icra sexually hostile work environment claims (C) holding that the elements of a hostile environment claim under title vii equally apply under title ix (D) recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context (E) holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive

SOLUTION:
recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983