In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

includes a determination of the significance, if any, of the TNRC’s involvement. When the EPA in 1990 shifted from a “strict” to “substantial compliance” standard for private parties, it did so “to encourage private parties to perform voluntary cleanups of sites, and to remove unnecessary obstacles to their ability to recover their costs from the parties that are liable for the contamination.” 55 FecLReg. at 8792-93. The EPA expressly recognized that requiring private parties to adhere to a set of mechanical rules would impede this objective. Thus the list of public comment provisions identified in 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(6) is only a “universe of requirements which are potentially relevant,” and should “not be c Ry. Co. v. Gee Co., 2002 WL 31163777, at *30 (N.D.Ill. Sept.30, 2002) (<HOLDING>); AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Amcast Int’l Corp., 177 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that government involvement must be accompanied by public comment because a purpose of ncp is to ensure that those responsible for the cleanup receive citizens input regarding environmental conditions in the community (B) holding that public participation requirement was satisfied in part because the ncp policy is  to allow potentially responsible parties an opportunity to comment before costs are incurred and no prps were denied an opportunity to comment (C) holding five day public comment period on a portion of an ea insufficient remanding for further public comment (D) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail (E) holding that meetings with representatives of various affected parties were insufficient to meet public participation requirement because there was never an opportunity for the public at large to comment on the plan without explaining why such opportunity was necessary
(B)

Defendants’ Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 22 (“Plaintiffs appear to be claiming that they are entitled to ‘Class of One’ review[.]”)) Furthermore, County Defendants did not explicitly address the appeal issue anywhere in their motion. Given this background, it was not error for the Court to ascribe the “class of one” argument to Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge, nor was it error for the Court to find that County Defendants had not met their burden on the question of summary judgment. To the extent that County Defendants now contend that Plaintiffs “class of one” argument must fail because no other party has appealed for a waiver, this is a new argument that is not appropriate in a motion for reconsideration. See Haw. Stevedores, Inc. v. HT & T Co., 363 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1269 (D.Haw.2005) (<HOLDING>). Should County Defendants wish to re-visit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court will generally not consider arguments presented for the first time on appeal (B) holding that reconsideration pursuant to rule 59 cannot be premised on the same arguments presented in the complaint and motions (C) holding that motions for reconsideration are not appropriate if the movant asks the court to hear new arguments or supporting facts that could have been presented originally (D) holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision (E) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration
(D)

1999) (same); Hill v. Fidelity Fin. Servs. (In re Hill), 152 B.R. 204, 206 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1993) (same); In re Reese, 194 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr.D.Md.1996) (same); Barclays Am./Mortgage Corp. v. Wilkinson (In re Wilkinson), 186 B.R. 186, 191 (Bankr.D.Md.1995) (same); In re Redditt, 146 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr.S.D.Miss.1992) (stat ing that “[b]y the statute’s own terms, only the trustee has standing to exercise the strong-arm avoidance powers”); Mast v. Borgess Medical Center (In re Mast), 79 B.R. 981, 982 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1987) (same); In re Driver, 133 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.1991) (stating that “a Chapter 13 debtor is not explicitly bestowed with the trustee’s strong arm transfer avoidance powers.”); Hollar v. United States (In re Hollar), 174 B.R. 198, 203 (M.D.N.C.1994) (<HOLDING>). As In re Higgins, most of the majority 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that chapter 13 debtors have standing to bring avoidance actions by reasoning that chapter 13 trustee has standing but little incentive to bring avoidance actions that will result in benefit to debtors of recovering exempt assets (B) holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case (C) holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees  avoidance power (D) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (E) holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13

(C)