In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: of the writ, the CCA examines the substance of the claim to see if it establishes a prima facie case of retardation, and only upon deciding that question can the state court decide whether remand is appropriate.”). 10 . Brown v. Dretke, 419 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir.2005). 11 . 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). 12 . Id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-17, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)). 13 . In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.2005). 14 . Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 & nn. 24-25 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (citing American Association of Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support 5 (9th ed.1992)). 15 . See Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 361-63 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Bri-seno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 (“[T]he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant suffered from significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and related limitations in adaptive functioning (C) holding that a district court did not clearly err in finding materiality where the prior art reference at issue had been considered material by examiners in related foreign patent applications (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that superior court did not clearly err in finding that the parent had not remedied the problematic conduct

A: (B)
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Q: of the contract, the plaintiffs claim will only sound in contract. Id. In operation, the rale restricts contracting parties to contractual remedies for those economic losses associated with the relationship, even when the breach might reasonably be viewed as a consequence of a contracting party’s negligence. See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.1986) (“When the injury is only the economic loss to the subject of a contract itself, the action sounds in contract alone.”). In other words, the economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic losses in negligence when the loss is the subject matter of a contract between the parties. Coastal Conduit & Ditching, Inc. v. Noram Energy Corp., 29 S.W.3d 282, 285 (T .3d 355, 378 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we overrule JP Morgan’s fifth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subject to certain exceptions the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for economic damages arising out of matters governed by contract (B) holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property  damage claims (C) recognizing fraud in the inducement claims independent of contract claims without discussion of economic loss rule (D) holding economic loss rule did not bar recovery of tort damages on statutory fraud claim based upon fraudulent inducement (E) holding economic loss rule did not bar negligent misrepresentation claim where parties had no contract

A: (D)
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Q: issues — liability and damages — the Rules do not require a party to wait to file a Rule 50 or Rule 59 until after _ the entry of such a “judgment.” Rule 50 states that a movant “may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50(b). Rule 59 states that “any motion for a new trial shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 59(b). These rules do not, by their terms, preclude the filing of post-trial motions before “judgment” has been filed; they merely require that once “judgment” has been filed, a party has only 10 days to file the motions. The caselaw supports this interpretation of Rules 50 and 59. See Jurgens v. McKasy, 905 F.2d 382, 386 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 
 Holding statements: (A) holding summary judgment may only be entered for one who has filed a motion asking that relief and only after notice and hearing on that motion (B) holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment (C) holding that district courts order granting motion for default judgment was erroneous  because a default judgment cannot be entered until the amount of damages has been ascertained  (D) holding that any motion made within ten days of entry of judgment which seeks a substantive change in the judgment will be considered a rule 59e motion which suspends the finality of the judgment and tolls the time to appeal (E) holding that ten day limit in rule 59 sets only a maximum period and does not nullify an otherwise valid motion made before a formal judgment has been entered

A:
(E)
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