In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: felt compelled, at the very least, to guess why the prosecutor behaved as he did. But the Batson framework was designed to avoid such “needless and imperfect speculation,” by asking prosecutors to perform the “simple” task of placing race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes on the record. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172, 125 S.Ct. 2410. As a result, this Court must conclude that the Appellate Division applied Batson and its progeny in an unreasonable manner. The Court appreciates the gravity of this holding, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s admonition that AEDPA creates a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388. Even in the Batson context, however, AEDPA deference has its limits. See, e.g., Jones, 555 F.3d at 101 (<HOLDING>). Enforcing those limits is the only way to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new york courts unreasonably applied batson (B) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (C) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (D) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action (E) holding that new york law applies to this matter

A: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york
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Q: In my judgment, it is extremely doubtful that the obviously dispensable involvement of the judiciary in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins and ends in the Executive Branch is a proper exercise of judicial power. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. Appx. 697, 702-703 (1864) (opinion of Taney, C. J.); United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48 (1852). It may well follow that the misguided opinion of today’s majority has nothing more than an advisory character. Whether or not that be so, the better rea soning in Justice Souter’s far wiser and far more scholarly opinion will surely be the law one day. For these reasons, as well as those set forth in Justice Souter’s opinion, I respectfully dissent. 1 See, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F. 3d 630 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution (B) holding that a federal court may order a state to pay cleanup costs pursuant to the comprehensive environmental response compensation and liability act of 1980 (C) holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken (D) holding that bankruptcy court may enjoin state environmental reclamation order (E) holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs

A: holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution
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Q: all the allegations in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact.’ ” Corus Staal BV v. United States, 515 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1345 (CIT 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1959 (2007)). Canex argues that the Government failed to exhaust administrative remedies by commencing this action for liquidated damages without engaging in mitigation proceedings. Under 19 C.F.R. § 172.1(b) and 19 U.S.C. § 1623(c), a principal or surety can petition Customs for relief from payment of liquidated damages through such proceedings. See United States v. Cocoa Berkau, Inc., 990 F.2d 610, 615 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Mitigation proceedings are voluntary and informal, and relief is granted at the discretion of Customs. United States v. Ataka Am., Inc., 826 F. Supp. 495, 502 (CIT 1993) (<HOLDING>); Cocoa Berkau, 990 F.2d at 615 (“[T]he 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that liquidated damages under the flsa  are compensation not a penalty or punishment  (B) holding that a mitigation proceeding for liquidated damages under 19 usc  1623cis voluntary (C) holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award (D) holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the fsla (E) holding that liquidated damages under fair labor standards act constitutes compensation for the retention of a workmans pay which might result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages

A:
recognizing that liquidated damages under the flsa  are compensation not a penalty or punishment 
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