In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Parker, we vacate the sentence and remand for resen-tencing. Nearly a month before trial, Parker opted to waive his right to counsel and elected to represent himself. At that time, the trial court conducted a Faretta inquiry and allowed Parker to represent himself throughout the trial. However, when the jury returned with the guilty verdict, the trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing without renewing the offer of counsel. In doing so, the trial court erred. “Once a defendant waives the right to counsel in a criminal case, the court must renew the offer of counsel at each subsequent critical stage of the proceedings, one of which is sentencing.” Serrano v. State, 113 So.3d 895, 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see also Ingraham v. State, 32 So.3d 761, 768-69 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, vacate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage (B) holding postindictment lineup is critical stage of trial at which defendant is entitled to presence of counsel (C) holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel (D) recognizing that brooks protects against denial of counsel at a critical stage of his trial (E) holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: was safe to operate, afforded discretion to the FAA to “make its own findings” whether the submitted documentation satisfied that requirement. Id. Likewise, as the district court noted, 49 C.F.R. § 385.17(f) is not a “check list.” J.A. at 105. It leaves it to the FMCSA to determine whether a carrier’s submission provides evidence that corrective action has been taken, and whether the agency has the resources to reach a final decision within 45 days. Such decisions, which relate to a regulatory agency’s “implementation of a mechanism for compliance review” and necessarily require “balancing the objectives sought to be obtained against such practical considerations as staffing and funding,” constitute discretionary functions themselves. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 819-20, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (<HOLDING>). Discretion thus suffuses 49 C.F.R. § 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver (B) holding that the faas alleged negligence in failing to check certain specific items in the course of certificating a specific aircraft as part of a spotcheck program involved calculated risks but fell squarely within the discretionary function exception (C) holding that actions against the faa for its alleged negligence in certificating aircraft for use in commercial aviation are barred by the discretionary function exception of the federal tort claims act id at 821 104 sct 2755 because the faas decisions as to the manner of enforcing regulations is plainly a discretionary activity id at 819 21 104 sct 2755 (D) holding that the faas application of a spotcheck system to a particular aircraft was a discretionary function (E) holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision 
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: ... to certify the goods or services of any person who meets the standards and conditions which the mark certifies.” In re University of Mississippi, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1909, 1911, 1987 WL 123808 (T.T.A.B.1987). That the owner of a certification mark “cannot refuse to license the mark to anyone on any ground other than the standards it has set,” 3 McCarthy at § 19.96, is an important distinction between the policies embodied in trademarks and certification marks. It is true that certification marks are designed to facilitate consumer expectations of a standardized product, much like trademarks are designed to ensure that a consumer is not confused by the marks on a product. See, e.g. Institut Nat’l Des Appellations d’Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875, 1889-90 (T.T.A.B.1998) (<HOLDING>). But the certification mark regime protects a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that same likelihood of confusion test applied in the context of trademarks also applies to certification marks (B) holding that the likelihood of confusion resulting from the defendants adoption of a trade dress similar to the plaintiffs the touchstone test for a violation of  1125 (C) holding that plaintiff was likely to succeed on merits of  349 claim premised on likelihood of confusion between marks (D) holding that concurrent use of same mark on similar product was sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion (E) holding that even several isolated incidents of actual confusion are insufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion
[EX A]:
(A)