instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
to obtain the benefit of the bond, for which it paid a significant premium, only through legal action. Accordingly, Olympic Steamship applies here. Colorado Structures, 125 Wn. App. at 928 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We agree. ¶27 Lastly, in McGreevy, where this court awarded reasonable attorney fees in addition to the limits of the insurance policy, we reasoned, “when an insurer unsuccessfully contests coverage, it has placed its interests above the insured. Our decision in Olympic Steamship remedies this inequity by requiring that the insured be made whole.” McGreevy, 128 Wn.2d at 39-40. Likewise, West placed “its interests” above that of Structures. Id. Structures should be awarded attorney fees under Olympic Steamship, so as to be made “whole.” Dayton, 124 Wn.2d at 280 (<HOLDING>)- Without the application of Olympic Steamship 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the contract was not authorized by law (B) recognizing that under georgia law attorneys fees are allowed where authorized by statute or contract (C) holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case (D) holding that an award of attorney fees was authorized by ocga  13111 a 3 when the requirements of that statute were satisfied (E) holding that a court has power to award attorney fees when authorized by contract statute or recognized ground of equity
answer:
(E)


question:
of his experience’ in detecting criminal activity”) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). Based on the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that the officers possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to effect an investigative detention of Mr. Hishaw as he left the apartment in the pickup. Even though the initial stop was justified, we must still assess the reasonableness of the subsequent pat-down search. In order to comport with the Fourth Amendment, that search must have been “reasonably related in scope” to the basis for the stop (i.e., the officers’ suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs). See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In that regard, this circuit has concluded that an 169 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop (B) holding that like burglary car theft is a crime that often involves the use of weapons and other instruments of assault that could jeopardize police officer safety and thus justifies a protective frisk under terry to ensure officer safety (C) holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes (D) holding that when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle the officer may in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officers safety and the safety of others (E) holding that the officer had reasonable belief that the occupants of the vehicle were armed where the officer knew that drug dealers are frequently armed and therefore frisk of the vehicle was permissible
answer:
(D)


question:
(10th ed.2014); see also Allie v. Ionata, 503 So.2d 1237, 1240 (Fla.1987) (defining statute of limitations). In contrast, a statute of repose bars a suit after a specified time that is based solely on the actions of the defendant that gave rise to the claim. As á result, the time constraints of a statute of repose are wholly unrelated to when a plaintiff suffers or discovers an actual injury. See Statute of repose, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.2014); see also Universal Eng’g Corp. v. Perez, 451 So.2d 463, 465 (Fla.1984) (quoting Bauld v e, not a limitations statute. The introductory clause of the statute provides that “[a] cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer ... is extinguished unless action is brought” within the time periods pr B.R. 104, 123 (Bankr.D.N.J.1999) (<HOLDING>); Carpenter v. Granderson, 214 B.R. 671, 675 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute of repose was not subject to toiling provision applicable to statute of limitations because among other reasons it would ignore fundamental distinctions between ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose (B) holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed (C) holding that a statute of repose sets absolute parameters of any action (D) holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose (E) holding that defendant bore burden of establishing right to summary judgment on basis of statute of repose defense
answer:

(B)