In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

669 (1971). Although Plaintiff requests resolution of seemingly unsettled State law questions, the issues at bar fall squarely within the Burford parameters: Plaintiff has presented difficult issues of state law, gaming is arguably an area of important state policy in Texas, and the Texas Lottery Commission (TLC) provides the unified State enforcement mechanism for some aspects of gaming law in Texas. Moreover, both the TLC and Office of the Attorney General provide an administrative procedure for organizations and individuals to request advisory opinions regarding the legality of proposed gaming actions. Certification to the Texas Supreme Court to answer the state law question at issue here would be ideal. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974)(<HOLDING>). However, under the Texas Constitution, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court (B) holding that certification of a remand order divests federal court jurisdiction (C) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the court (D) holding that it was proper in determining certification to consider whether certification would foster the settlement of the case with advantage to the parties and with great savings in judicial time and services (E) holding that certification to the state supreme court rests in the sound discretion of the federal court and that certification in the long run saves time energy and resources as well as helps to build a cooperative judicial federalism
(E)

the juror rather than leaving a doubt as to his or her impartiality.” Weinstein Design Group, Inc. v. Fielder, 884 So.2d 990, 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Bryant v. State, 765 So.2d 68, 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). We conclude that prospective jurors Forber and Spurlin’s responses were sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to their impartiality. Admittedly, the State attempted to rehabilitate these prospective jurors and they said they could follow the jury instructions and be fair and impartial. However, based on the totality of the answers given, we find a reasonable doubt as to the ability of these two prospective jurors to serve impartially in this case. Consequently, they should have been stricken for cause. See, e.g., Somerville v. Ahuja, 902 So.2d 930 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Bell v. Greissman, 902 So.2d 846 (Fla. 4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not err by allowing the prosecution to question prospective jurors regarding their ability to announce a death sentence in an appropriate case (B) holding that prospective jurors should have been excused for cause because they did not affirmatively state that their bias against the plaintiffs would not affect their ability to render an impartial verdict (C) holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict (D) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike for cause two potential jurors who had heard andor read about the case but indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented
(B)

states in which we have made zero or very few sales. In addition, there are many local jurisdictions in which we have never made a sale.”). Preliminary injunction hearings are ill-suited for such fine tailoring. More fundamentally, we are not convinced by the government’s premise: that Gordon may challenge the PACT Act only “as applied” against his sales into jurisdictions with which he lacks minimum contacts. The government points out that a court may find a statute to be invalid on its face only if a plaintiff has shown that the Act has no “plainly legitimate sweep.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Repub. Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The government argues that any facial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a jury verdict will be sustained on any reasonable theory based on the evidence (B) holding that facial challenges will be sustained only if no set of circumstances exist under which the act would be valid (C) holding that courts should exercise judicial restraint and decide asapplied challenges before facial challenges (D) holding that on appeal a summary judgment ruling will be upheld if it can be sustained on any grounds even if the trial court gave an incorrect reason for its ruling (E) holding that equitable tolling under  2255 would be allowed if at all only for extraordinary circumstances

(B)