In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: an interpretation of section 85.321 that would make any party who holds a mineral interest indefinitely liable to all subsequent interest holders for prior alleged damage to the land. The consequences of such an interpretation run contrary to the legislative intent to protect and encourage the development of Texas natural resources. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59. We are mindful of the consequences of a particular construction. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.023(5); McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 745. Absent a legislative enactment clearly abrogating the common law, we conclude that Emerald does not have standing as a subsequent lessee to pursue a claim under section 85.321 for Exxon’s alleged wrongful actions as a prior lessee. See, e.g., Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 342-43 (Tex.2006) (<HOLDING>). C. Negligence Per Se Because our holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law (B) holding that tex loc govt code  51075 abrogated city of texarkana v city of new boston 141 sw3d 778 texapptexarkana 2004 (C) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract (D) holding that the city of boston was acting as a market participant when it contracted for public works construction (E) holding that distribution of catalogs to city addresses constituted use within city subject to taxation under municipal code provision

A: (B)
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Q: for ‘non-generic burglary’ does not.” United States v. Rainer, 616 F.3d 1212, 1213 (11th Cir.2010). A “generic” burglary is “any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). A “non-generic” burglary is one that “do[es] not include all of the elements essential to generic burglaries,” including burglaries of boats, automobiles, and other non-buildings. Rainer, 616 F.3d at 1214. The government has a legitimate interest in “prevent[ing] repeat offenders from continuing to victimize society.” See United States v. Johns, 984 F.2d 1162, 1164 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court in Taylor determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding substantive due process not violated when licensing decisions are based on scheme rationally related to a governmental interest (B) holding that the particular method is not rationally related to legitimate government interest if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable (C) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection as rule was uniformly applied not arbitrary and rationally related to legitimate government interest (D) recognizing due process concerns inherent in sentencing based on false criminal history (E) holding that sentencing criminals in part based on criminal history is rationally related to a legitimate government interest

A: (E)
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Q: of injury which would be attributed to a reasonable person under the circumstances of the case.” Kil v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 802, 811, 407 S.E.2d 674, 679 (1991). “This approach ... has been characterized as ‘requiring subjective knowledge of the collision while holding the driver to a stricter reasonable man standard as to the fact or extent of the injury . . . . ” Id. at 810, 407 S.E.2d at 679 (quoting Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 323 Pa.Super. 363, 470 A.2d 634, 637 (1983)). Knowledge of injury may be imputed to a driver “where the fact of personal injury is visible or where the seriousness of the collision would lead a reasonable person to assume there must have been resulting injuries.” People v. Carter, 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 52 Cal.Rptr. 207, 208 (1966) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); see also Marjorie A. Caner, Annotation, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the police roadblock was intended to stop brower by physical impact and did so a seizure occurred (B) holding that where impact slightly dam aged bumper or fender of both cars and bumper had to be pulled away from wheel of one so it could be moved collision was not of sufficient magnitude to compel the conclusion that injuries had probably occurred (C) holding that after two years of litigation the employer had waived any right it had to compel arbitration (D) holding that impact in the district resulting from the defendants conduct that occurred outside the district must be deliberate not incidental (E) holding that plaintiff had not stated an equal protection claim where plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant treated him differently from anyone else who both had problems with alcohol and had been arrested

A:
(B)
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