In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) because Erickson failed to allege specific facts showing a pattern of racketeering activity. See Sanford v. Member-Works, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557-58 (9th Cir.2010) (discussing elements of a.RICO claim and particularity requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)). The district court properly dismissed Erickson’s claims under the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (“RES-PA”) and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) as time-barred because Erickson filed his action more than three years after the alleged violations. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (prescribing at most a three-year statute of limitations for violations of RES-PA); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (an action for damages under TILA must be brought within one year of the alleged violation); see also King, 784 F.2d at 915 (<HOLDING>). However, after the district court dismissed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fiveyear limitation period in 28 usc  2462 runs from date of predicate violation not from date of administrative assessment of sanction (B) holding limitations period for filing petition for postconviction relief runs from date of final judgment not from date of subsequent order revoking appeal bond (C) holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer (D) holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction (E) holding  under section 1144s predecessor statute  that the 180day period runs from the date of the confirmation order even if the fraud is not discovered in the 180day period

Ex Output:
holding fiveyear limitation period in 28 usc  2462 runs from date of predicate violation not from date of administrative assessment of sanction


Ex Input:
Sept. 3, 1998)(variance is not material “where the allegations and proof substantially correspond, the variance is not of a character which could have misled the defendant at trial and is not such as to deprive the accused of his right to be protected against another prosecution for the same offense”). A material variance is sometimes referred to as a “fatal variance.” We have not been consistent in requiring materiality, but have sometimes reversed upon a finding of variance without exploring the further question of materiality. Compare Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 625, 124 S.W. 668 (1910)(variance is not material unless it could mislead defense or expose defendant to danger of subsequent prosecution for same offense); Plessinger v. State, 536 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1976)(<HOLDING>) with Pedrosa v. State, 155 Tex.Crim. 155, 232 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error (B) holding that heightened evidentiary standard of proof is not required where the sentencing enhancement is based entirely on the extent of the conspiracy to which the defendant pled guilty (C) holding that where a defendant is misled and induced to plead by his counsels mistaken advice then he may be allowed to withdraw his plea (D) holding variance between enhancement allegation and proof renders evidence legally insufficient only if variance is material (E) holding variance in style of case pled for enhancement not material where defendant not surprised or misled to his prejudice

Ex Output:
holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error


Ex Input:
by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In movant’s case, § 2255(1) and (3) provide the possible starting date for the one-year limitations period. The Third Circuit’s mandate affirming movant’s conviction and sentence was issued on January 19, 1996, and he did not petition for certiorari. As a result, movant’s conviction became final on April 24,1996, and he had until April 24, 1997 to file a timely § 2255 motion. See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 577 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 335 (3d Cir.1999); Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 662-63 (3d Cir.2005)(<HOLDING>). Movant, however, did not file the instant § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dismissal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 56 did not violate the seventh amendment (B) holding that in california the oneyear statute applies to a  1983 action (C) holding that the aedpa oneyear statute of limitations applies to amendments to  2255 motions (D) holding that federal rule of civil procedure rule 6a applies to the calculation of the aed pas oneyear limitations period (E) holding that former federal rule of civil procedure 6a and e applies to federal habeas petitions

Ex Output:

holding that dismissal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 56 did not violate the seventh amendment