In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: small pieces of the Walkway, or access to the Walkway, built upon it. See Def.-Int. Reply at p. 14 (noting that the second of two issues remaining for the Court to decide, given that the public trust doctrine gov erns a large portion of the land at issue, is “whether the state acted rationally in determining that access across the perpendicular paths and scattered small portions of the Walkway constructed on uplands is ‘reasonably necessary’ to protect that public’s right of access to the remaining 88.7 percent of the Walkway that is situated on tidelands”). Plaintiffs’ taking claims with respect to this small portion of the property at issue are governed by the reasonableness test enunciated in Matthews. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 95 N.J. 306, 326, 471 A.2d 355 (1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 93, 83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (B) holding that in order to exercise its rights under the public trust doctrine the public must be given both access to and use of privatelyowned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary (C) holding that the borough of deals dedication of a portion of a beach for use by its residents only was immaterial given the public trust doctrines requirement that the public be afforded the right to enjoy all dry sand beaches owned by a municipality (D) holding that under the public standing doctrine it is only necessary that the relator shall be a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws (E) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public
[A]: holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege


[Q]: a favorable decision, by which we mean that the “prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling” is not “too speculative.” In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1101 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The NMCGA contends that the provision for attorneys’ fees is an “egregious and illegal use of tax dollars.” NMCGA’s Response at 7. It is well established that a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge state and federal spending decisions. Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1399 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, Cl. 183, 184-85 (2006) (<HOLDING>). While NMCGA does not have standing to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties (B) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (C) holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment (D) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (E) holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim
[A]: holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties


[Q]: that manifestation of a defect is not a prerequisite to class certification, id. at 1173 — a holding consistent with California law as explicated in Hicks and American Honda Motor Co. — it had no occasion to consider whether, in addition to proof of an alleged common defect and defendant’s refusal to honor its warranty to repair that defect, plaintiffs also had to adduce proof — under California law — that it was substantially certain that the alleged defect would cause a malfunction during the future useful life of the class vehicles in order to show predominance. Relying heavily on American Honda, defendants contend that although this question goes to the merits of plaintiffs’ breach of express warranty claim, it overlaps with the predominance inquiry. Compare Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1173 (<HOLDING>). American Honda, however, appears to have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act (B) holding that common questions predominated with respect to plaintiffs claims under state consumer protection laws because the merits of the claims did not overlap with the predominance inquiry (C) holding that the circuit lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the merits of plaintiffs claims are inescapably intertwined with a review of the procedures and merits surrounding the faas order (D) holding that rookerfeldman did not bar the plaintiffs federal action where a pennsylvania state court had previously dismissed the plaintiffs petition for review of an agencys decision for failure to comply with the pennsylvania rules of appellate procedure since the extent of the plaintiffs compliance with those rules had no bearing on the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claims (E) holding that state consumer protection laws do not conflict with 47 usc  201 and 202
[A]:
holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act