In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: the instructions misstated the law or misled the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” United States v. Felts, 579 F.3d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir. 2009). We will not reverse a conviction because of an erroneous instruction unless we are “left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations.” Id. at 1342-43 (quotation marks omitted). We evaluate the instruction as a whole and in the context of the entire trial. United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 16, 2017) (No. 16-8072). Challenges to jury instructions that are raised for the first time on appeal, however, are reviewed for plain error only. United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 973 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise rule 11 error at trial has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule (C) holding that plainerror review applies where the defendant fails to object to a constructive amendment (D) holding that plainerror review applies when a defendant fails to make a specific rule 32i3b objection based on a district courts failure to resolve a factual dispute (E) holding that plain error review applies where the defendant fails to object to the lack of an opportunity to allocute
[EX A]: holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review

[EX Q]: rules or orders.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 382.113(a). The legislature imposed only the two restrictions previously mentioned: an ordinance must be consistent with the Act and the commission’s rules and orders and may not make unlawful a condition or act approved or authorized under the Act or the commission’s rules or orders. Id. § 382.113(b). If the ordinance violates one of these restrictions, however, then its preemption is implied with unmistakable clarity. We therefore turn next to the first of these restrictions and address the question of whether the Act and the ordinance are consistent. 3. The Clean Air Act and the tent with state legislation, we begin by comparing the purpose of each. See City of Weslaco v. Melton, 158 Tex. 61, 63-64, 308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1958) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute (B) holding state and federal actions not parallel for colorado river purposes because the remedies were different  one was equitable and the other compensatory  and the sources of law came from different states (C) holding that an implied warranty of merchantability does not create a labeling requirement different from or in addition to those mandated by fifra because the implied warranty of merchantability arises from the sale itself not from a state labeling regulation citation omitted (D) holding that completing sixth grade and a limited ability to read were not inconsistent with a valid iq score of 68 (E) holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade a raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes
[EX A]: recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute

[EX Q]: the scope of ERISA jurisdiction and preemption, not in deciding when a § 1132(a)(1)(B) claim accrues. White, and the district courts mentioned above, erred in relying on Stevens as authoritative in determining the proper accrual date of § 1132(a)(1)(B) claims for the statute of limitations. But see Watkins, 570 Fed. Appx. at 460 (citing Stevens for the general proposition that § 1132(a)(1)(B) claims accrue upon formal denial of benefits, but nonetheless applying the discovery rule of Moni-son). In Morrison, we addressed accrual for the purposes of the statute of limitations in § 1132(a)(1)(B) claims for the first time, and adopted the '‘discovery rule.” 439 F.3d at 302-03. There we held that a § 1132(a)(1)(B) claim accrues upon "clear and unequivocal repudiation” of benefits. Id. (<HOLDING>). We reiterated this rule in Redmon v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence including that insurer only charged life insurance premium that would ordinarily apply to onehalf the amount of coverage actually permitted by policy as written did not warrant retroactive reformation of policy to reduce coverage amount because it did not demonstrate mistake on insureds part and insurance company did not present evidence on what parties agreed to before the policy was issued (B) holding that the plaintiffs deceased husbands benefits claim had been clearly repudiated by the plan sending him a refund check for his first premium payment and an accompanying letter denying his application to convert his portable life insurance coverage to a group policy (C) holding that the appellant waived his claim on appeal because he failed to address that claim in either his application for a coa or his brief on appeal (D) holding that the insured covered by a group insurance policy purchased through his employer was not entitled to continue receiving coverage for the treatment of his daughters illness after he terminated his employment (E) holding widows claim that deceased husbands former employer and its life insurance carrier were negligent in their handling of husbands conversion of benefits was preempted by erisa finding the liability of the defendants is dependent upon the existence of the erisa plan and the interpretation of rights conferred by it
[EX A]:
holding evidence including that insurer only charged life insurance premium that would ordinarily apply to onehalf the amount of coverage actually permitted by policy as written did not warrant retroactive reformation of policy to reduce coverage amount because it did not demonstrate mistake on insureds part and insurance company did not present evidence on what parties agreed to before the policy was issued