In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: N.E.2d 968, 973 (Ind.1999). However, when the landowner is a lessor and the lessee is in operational control of the premises, such duty rarely exists. “[A] landlord under many circumstances has no liability to tenants or others for injuries on the property when the tenant is in full control of the leased premises.” Dutchmen Mfg., Inc. v. Reynolds, 849 N.E.2d 516, 525 (Ind.2006). “[I]n the absence of statute, covenant, fraud or concealment, a landlord who gives a tenant full control and possession of the leased property will not be liable for personal injuries sustained by the tenant or other persons lawfully' upon the leased property.” Olds v. Noel, 857 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (citation omitted), tram, not' sought; cf. Rossow v. Jones, 404 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (<HOLDING>), trans. not sought. Yost v. Wabash College, 3 
 Holding statements: (A) holding over (B) holding that captain has reasonable expectation of privacy in all areas of his ship (C) holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building (D) holding that a landlord has a duty of reasonable care over common areas or other areas over which the landlord has retained control (E) holding that a landlord may have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its tenants in common areas
[EX A]: holding over

[EX Q]: created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference ... by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts'were occurring. Id. at 127 (citing Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir.1995)). The Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, which found that a supervisor can be held liable only "through the official’s own individual actions,” id. at 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, arguably casts doubt on the continued viability of some of the categories set forth in Hastings On Hudson and Colon. See Grullon, 720 F.3d at 139 (<HOLDING>). For the purposes of this case, however, it is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the same with respect to an apartment (B) holding that no heightened showing is required (C) holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment (D) recognizing that opinion work product subject to discovery upon heightened showing of compelling need (E) recognizing chat iqbal may have heightened the requirements for showing a supervisors personal involvement with respect to certain constitutional violations
[EX A]: holding the same with respect to an apartment

[EX Q]: a sex offender registration order generally must be made at sentencing, if at all. As we noted above, the statute authorizes “the judge who sentences” the defendant to order registration, § 13-3821(C), and it further provides that “the clerk of the superior court ... shall notify the sheriff’ of a discretionary registration order “within ten days after entry of the judgment.” § 13-3821(E). The entry of judgment occurs at sentencing. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 26.2; Whitman, 684 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 7, ¶ 1, 234 Ariz. at —, 324 P.3d at —, 2014 WL 1385396. Thus, the legislature has demonstrated a clear intent that any discretionary order that a person register as a sex offender must occur at the time of sentencing. See State ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz. 589, 594, 667 P.2d 1304, 1309 (1983) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14 By requiring such orders to be made at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission (B) recognizing conflict between legislative intent and language of ors 309051 and 2 (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) recognizing language of statute as clearest indicator of legislative intent (E) holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only
[EX A]:
holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission