In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: on behalf of’ MBC. The record also discloses that the contract makes no reference to MBC and was signed by Mullís as “Contractor.” The record further discloses that payments were made to Mullís, not MBC, and that the payments were deposited into Mullis’s personal account, not into MBC’s account in a separate bank. This evidence supports the trial court’s findings and its ultimate conclusion that Mullís was individually liable for any damages suffered by the Brennans. If Mullís wanted to act as agent for MBC and bind the corporation to the contract, he should have signed the contract in his corporate capacity. This would have had the effect of insulating him from liability. See Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), aff'd, 638 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind.1994) (<HOLDING>). Mullís, without any citation to authority, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (B) holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity (C) holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to determine whether the defendant intended to be bound in his personal andor corporate capacity where the agreement contained certain personal guarantees by the defendant but where the defendant signed the agreement only in a corporate capacity with no signature blocks provided for signing in a personally capacity (D) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (E) holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: that is presumptively constitutional). The only case of which I am aware construing DeFillippo and denying qualified immunity is Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board, 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002). But in that case “two Ninth Circuit cases [were] directly on point” because they had declared parallel statutes of other States — permitting an arrest for refusing to identify oneself — unconstitutional. Id. at 881. That of course does not remotely describe today’s case. Nor does Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250 (6th Cir.1997), offer any refuge to Leonard. It dealt not with the question whether an officer could be denied qualified immunity for failing to predict a judicial ruling declaring a statute unconstitutional but with whether the statute covered the plaintiffs conduct. See id. at 1256 (<HOLDING>). In the end, Leonard not only asks us to take 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arrest to retrieve car keys where ownership of the car was in dispute was not supported by probable cause (B) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (C) holding that shouting epithets from a moving car did not provide probable cause to arrest the plaintiff under a disorderlyconduct statute (D) holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest (E) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: offense” render the warrant general. A warrant must be read as a whole, see, e.g., Tracey, 597 F.3d at 154, and a supporting affidavit likewise “is to be read in its entirety and in a common sense, nontechnical manner,” United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir.2011); see also United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir.1982) (“When a warrant is accompanied by an affidavit that is incorporated by reference, the affidavit may be used in construing the scope of the warrant.”). Accordingly, “such evidence of a criminal offense” refers not to any criminal offense, but to the criminal offense of unlawful contact with a minor defined throughout the remainder of the warrant and affidavit. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Karrer contends that the warrant failed to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the phrase together with other fruits instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this time unknown did not render a warrant general where context made clear that the reference was to false pretenses crime (B) holding that the inclusion of the phrase together with other fruits instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this time unknown did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was clear from the context that the term crime in the warrants referred only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of one specific real estate lot (C) holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder (D) holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins (E) holding prosecutor has discretion to charge defendant under general crime even though more specific crime exists


Output: (A)