In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978);, 5 LaFave, Israel, & King, Criminal Procedure § 25.3(c) (West 1999). A finding of insufficient evidence is equivalent to an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325-26, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984). 3 . An exception to this bar is when the conviction is overturned on appeal. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964). 4 . The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to both individuals and corporations. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). 5 . Compare Brown, 432 U.S. at 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (<HOLDING>) with Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 78 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bargainedfor plea waives the right to attack multiple convictions on double jeopardy grounds (B) holding that the prosecution cannot divide a single crime into multiple units to avoid double jeopardy (C) holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (D) holding that a defendant and his attorney are a single entity with respect to double jeopardy waiver (E) holding the first question for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis is whether congress expressed its intent concerning multiple convictions at a single trial for different statutory violations arising from the same act or transaction

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
bankruptcy trustee from selling or administering the homestead, even for the benefit of joint creditors. The legal effect of the non-debtor spouse’s right to assert the Florida constitutional exemption meant that the debtor spouse was still “receiving the benefits” of the Florida constitutional exemption, even though he had not claimed that exemption in his bankruptcy case. Consequently, the debtor was ruled ineligible for the wildcard exemption. The court noted that a different outcome would have obtained if the non-debtor spouse had affirmatively waived the right to claim the homestead protection. No such waiver existed, however, either in Hernandez or in this case. Other courts have also reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., In re Watford, 427 B.R. 552, 559 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2010) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Bennett, 395 B.R. 781, 790 (Bankr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other (B) holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a selfsettled revocable trust even though the settlor and the beneficiary as well as the bankruptcy debtor were the same person (C) holding that where a married debtor files an individual bankruptcy case and claims the  522b3b tbe exemption the debtor indirectly obtains the benefit of floridas constitutional homestead protection by virtue of the nondebtor spouses ability to claim the homestead exemption (D) holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property (E) holding even though debtor would have been entitled to iowa homestead exemption but for former spouses iowa code section 59821 lien debtor could not avoid the lien because it attached to the homestead prior to or simultaneously with debtors acquisition of the interest in the homestead

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
discussed in a footnote at the end of this opinion. 4 .King’s § 2254 petition at best hinted at this claim. It is not separately enumerated. There is only a single sentence, deeply embedded in his Espinosa claim, that "[o]n direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court gave no consideration to the impact of these invalid aggravating factor[s] on the jury’s weighing. An adequate harmless error analysis was not conducted. See Sochor; Espinosa." (R.l-1 ¶ 13, at 23.) Understandably, the district court did not detect or address so well-hidden a claim. Because we hold that the claim was procedurally barred under state law, in any event, we need not decide whether the claim was properly presented in federal court. 5 . Possibly unnecessarily. See Mills v. Singletary, 606 So.2d 622, 623 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>). 6 . 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984). 7 . The court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant was not barred from raising sentencing issue in rule 3850 motion by virtue of prior rule 3850 motion which did not raise any sentencing issues (B) holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion (C) holding a failuretoreweigh claim barred in part for failure to present it in rule 3850 motion (D) holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion (E) holding that an involuntary plea claim is cognizable in a rule 3850 motion

Ex Output:

(C)