In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

completed his nine month term of incarceration and was released from custody on Jply 28, 2017. Any challenge to the procedural or substantive reasonableness of his term' of confinement is thus moot. See United States v. Probber, 170 F.3d 345, 347-49 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing as moot an appeal from a judgment revoking supervised release where defendant had already completed his term of confinement). However, because defendant would still be entitled to a reduction of his term of supervised release if the court were to find such a reduction appropriate, we will analyze whether, as defendant claims, the supervised release component of the District Court’s sentence was either procedurally or substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Mazza Alaluf, 621 F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). Defendant contends that the District Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding substantive reasonableness sentencing challenge to be moot when defendant had completed prison sentence but addressing challenge to supervised release conditions (B) holding that where trial court did not inform defendant of supervised release term during plea colloquy but did advise defendant of term in presentence report and at sentencing defendants sentence stands (C) holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e (D) holding that a completed term of confinement did not render a challenge to the reasonableness of a sentence moot where defendant could receive a reduced term of supervised release (E) holding defendant convicted under  841b1a may receive lifetime term of supervised release
(D)

judgment action the Court should consider the following factors: (1) avoiding needless determination of state law issues; (2) discouraging litigants from filing declaratory actions as a means of forum shopping; and (3) avoiding duplica-tive litigation. Id. In addition, the Court should retain jurisdiction on a declaratory judgment action where it is necessary to avoid piecemeal litigation. Snodgrass v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir.1998). The Court has already concluded that § 616D.030 does not preclude Plaintiffs state law claims, therefore, declining to exercise jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment claim would result in piecemeal litigation. Because a declaratory action is a procedural remedy, the Court grants leav 956 P.2d 117, 119-20 (1998) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  616d030 barred employees actions where employees sued the state industrial insurance system alleging bad faith administration of their workers compensation claims (B) holding that the peculiar risk doctrine has no application to employees of independent contractors whose claims fall within the workers compensation system (C) holding  616d030 barred employees action where employee alleged the insurance carrier acted in bad faith in handling the claim (D) recognizing retaliatory discharge claim where employer prevented employees exercise of workers compensation rights because of employees intention to file claim (E) holding  616d030 did not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a tortious discharge action for filing a workers compensation claim because the statutory scheme applies only to the administration of the act
(A)

court’s decision did not address it. [¶ 12] In Matter of Boschee, 347 N.W.2d 331, 334-35, we said in appeals from administrative agency decisions, courts may consider only those grounds identified in specifications of error under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-15, and the grounds specified must come within the provisions of N.D.C.C. § 28-32-19. See Dodds v. North Dakota State Highway Comm’r, 354 N.W.2d 165, 169 n. 4 (N.D.1984); Cf., Application of Otter Tail Power Co., 354 N.W.2d 701, 702-04 (N.D.1984) (stating under certain circumstances constitutional issue may be raised for the first time on appeal of administrative agency decision). Clyde did not raise this issue in his specifications of error to the district court. Vetter v. NoHh Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 451, 453-54 (N.D.1996) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, he has not postured his argument in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the power of any administrative agency to reconsider its final decision exists only where the statutory provisions creating the agency indicate a legislative intent to permit the agency to carry into effect such power (B) holding that because the scope of review of agency matters is confined to the administrative record discovery in the form of depositions from agency officials was improper and irrelevant (C) holding that a party who had demonstrated an injury sufficient to confer standing to appeal from an agency decision could raise  any relevant question of law in respect of the order of the agency (D) holding specifications of error in appeal from administrative agency decision must be reasonably specific and calculated to identify the matters truly at issue sufficient to fairly apprise the agency other parties and the court of the particular issues claimed (E) holding that the court must find that the agency entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or the decision is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise

(D)