In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Abreu’s App. at 1878.) The defendants do not challenge now, nor did they contest at trial, the accuracy of these statements as related to the bank statements. The declaration that the bank statements were kept in the ordinary course of the banks’ businesses did not add to the Government’s case against the defendants for submitting false loan applications. It was the information contained in the bank statements themselves, which is not contested on appeal, that the Government relied upon to make its case. The authenticity of the bank statements has never been challenged, and the admission of the statements contained in the Rule 902(11) Certifications as related to the bank statements simply had no effect on the verdict. Cf. United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Government of Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 964 
 Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous admission of evidence not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the only other evidence against defendant was the uncorroborated testimony of a cooperating witness of questionable credibility (B) holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt (C) holding the admission of plea allocutions of codefendants to be harmless against a crawford challenge where the government did not emphasize the allocutions which were used only as corroboration for other evidence showing the existence of an enterprise in a rico case (D) holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record (E) holding that trial courts error in failing to sua sponte give instruction was harmless because state did not emphasize this evidence in closing argument and evidence of appellants guilt was otherwise overwhelming
[A]: holding erroneous admission of evidence not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the only other evidence against defendant was the uncorroborated testimony of a cooperating witness of questionable credibility


[Q]: health, education, and family comfort are also acceptable. See Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443 (1942); Read v. Leitner, 80 Fla. 574, 86 So. 425 (1920). However, a debtor’s homestead was held to be abandoned when a debtor moved to New Hampshire and attempted to sell his property in Fort Myers, Florida. In re Goode, 146 B.R. 860 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1992). In Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), 183 B.R. 968 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995), the Bankruptcy Court held that Chapter 7 debtor’s property did not qualify for homestead exemption since, in placing property on the market for sale or lease, debtor abandoned his intent to use and occupy property as permanent place of residence. Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), supra. But cf., In re Herr, 197 B.R. 939 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Crump, 2 B.R. 222 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1980) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no abandonment of property as homestead was shown merely because after house located on property was destroyed in hurricane debtor had quit premises allowed property to become overgrown with weeds and posted a for sale sign (B) holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead (C) holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property (D) holding that the property held by the revocable trust in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence was a constitutionally protected homestead property (E) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate
[A]: holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead


[Q]: available — beginning on January 4, 2011. Moreover, he noted that Courville had failed to exercise due diligence in seeking to obtain that employment. Additionally, while the ALJ acknowledged the conflicting medical opinions of the physicians who had evaluated Cour-ville, he also noted that, in certain circumstances, the opinion of a treating physician may be entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a non-treating physician. See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 830 n. 3, 123 S.Ct. 1965, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003). Thus, he found that Courville had established a prima facie entitlement to the medical treatment recommended by his treating physician Dr. Sledge — including the surgery. See Turner v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 16 BRBS 255, 257-58 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Finally, he concluded that, based on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions (B) holding that the burden of establishing prima facie case of discriminatory treatment may be satisfied by minimal showing (C) holding the procedural right to request a onetime change of physician during the course of treatment does not attach until claimant actually begins treatment with the initially authorized physician (D) holding that a claimant establishes a prima facie case for compensable medical treatment where a qualified physician indicates treatment was necessary for a workrelated condition (E) holding that a tortfeasor is required to pay the expenses of over treatment or unnecessary medical treatment unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith 
[A]:
holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions