In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation .... The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it .will be recognized as a taking. 260 U.S. at 415, 43 S.Ct. at 160. The seminal case regarding the constitutionality of zoning ordinances is Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). The Supreme Court first noted that zoning ordinances were, at that time, of recent vintage predating the case by approximately twenty-five years. 272 U.S. at 386, 47 S.Ct. at 117. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915). The Euclid 60 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (<HOLDING>); Kasdon v. G.W. Zierden Landscaping, Inc., 541 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cases claiming that government action requires just compensation must be determined on an ad hoc  basis (B) holding that whether an exchange is substantially contemporaneous must be determined on a casebycase basis (C) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action (D) holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the civil rights of institutionalized persons act cripa is inconsistent with discretion to impose on an ad hoc basis a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases (E) holding that to constitute an enterprise under rico the enterprises structure must provide some mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the group on an ongoing rather than an ad hoc basis

Answer: holding that whether an exchange is substantially contemporaneous must be determined on a casebycase basis


Question: reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. In determining the purpose of section 13-21-101, it is appropriate to look to legislative history as indicative of the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Willer, 817 P.2d at 519-20. The 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101 created the distinction between judgments which the judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal. The General Assembly intended that the amendment, and its market-determined interest rate, apply only to judgments which the judgment debtor appeals. See Act of March 25, 1982, ch. 39, 1982 Colo. Laws 227 (entitled “An Act Concerning Interest Payable on Appealed Money Judgments in Civil Actions” (emphasis added)); see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The statements of the bill’s sponsors also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent (B) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (C) holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period (D) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent (E) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent

Answer: holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent


Question: Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, § 1487 (1990 & Supp.1997); here the district court never intimated a concern either with bad faith or with prejudice. Alternatively, C&W might be arguing that the district court’s reference to the “entire lengthy record” is an allusion to our suggestion in Firestone, following Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, that a plaintiffs failure to cure a defect in its complaint after repeated amendments is at some point sufficient to warrant denying it leave to amend yet again. But we Ml not infer such an acute point from such an oblique reference— if it is a reference at all — particularly in light of the policy in favor of hearing cases on their merits. See, e.g., Poloron Prods., Inc. v. Lybrand Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 72 F.R.D. 556, 561 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (<HOLDING>); Rosen v. TRW, Inc., 979 F.2d 191, 194 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs five previous attempts to state cognizable claim did not preclude amendment because federal rules suggest artless drafting of a complaint should not allow for the artful dodging of a claim (B) holding claim is cognizable (C) holding that plaintiffs complaint did not invoke federal courts arising under jurisdiction because it put forth alternate state and federal policies to support its state law claim (D) holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act (E) holding claim is not cognizable

Answer:
holding claim is cognizable