In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

issue, we need not consider the second argument raised. 7 . In a dissent to Smith, Judge Friedman, joined by Judges Pellegrini and Kelley, objected to following the Miller/Lewis/Selan line of cases which automatically equated the refusal to sign a hospital consent form with a refusal to submit to chemical testing. The dissenting judges expressed preference for the other line of caselaw, particularly Conrad, and noted that because Smith orally agreed to the blood test and only refused to sign the hospital consent form, which was a pre-test procedure linked to the test, although not required by section 1547, Smith did not make a knowing and conscious refusal to submit to chemical testing. 8 . Wheatley v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 104 Pa.Cmwlth. 171, 521 A.2d 507 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 9 Although Renwick does not expressly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547 (B) holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion (C) holding that refusal to submit to breathalyzer test did not result from custodial interrogation (D) holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 (E) holding that a district court did not clearly err in crediting agents testimony that a defendant had orally consented despite his refusal to sign consent form
holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547

of whether the images on the site constituted child pornography, the receipt shows Shiver’s familiarity with making commercial transactions for pornographic images on the Internet. The government also presented evidence specifically showing that the image of one child in particular had been produced in North Carolina. That the latter image ended up on Shiver’s computer in Florida strongly suggests that it traveled in interstate commerce. We likewise reject Shiver’s contention that the government’s evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that he “knowingly possessed” the images of child pornography on his computer. Although we have interpreted the meaning of “knowing possession” in other contexts, see, e.g., United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 748 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted), we have not yet had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the phrase possession or custody in  5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession (B) holding in a similar factual situation that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because it had no actual or constructive possession of the letters of credit involved (C) recognizing theory of constructive possession (D) holding that constructive possession need not be exclusive but may be shared by others (E) holding that k no wing possession can be demonstrated by proof of either actual or constructive possession
holding that the phrase possession or custody in  5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession

the authority for which the section provides is being abused.” The government has provided no basis upon which to distinguish the reasoning of In re Letter of Request. In addition, that reasoning finds support in decisions of at least one other circuit and the Supreme Court. See In re Letter Rogatory from Justice Court, 523 F.2d 562, 563-64 (6th Cir. 1976) (“Although it is well-established that records of account belong to the bank and that a depositor may not prevent their disclosure on [F]ourth or [F]ifth Amendment grounds, it does not follow that appellant lacks standing to challenge the district court’s power to issue á subpoena under the terms of an authorizing statute.” (citations omitted)); see also Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449, 84 S.Ct. 508, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the Court concludes that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that taxpayer who is the target but not the recipient of an administrative subpoena pursuant to 26 usc  7602 may challenge the subpoena (B) holding that a denial of an order to quash a subpoena not directed to a movant was a final order if the movant had no further opportunity to challenge the subpoena (C) holding that because a grand jury subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to be reasonable  the burden of showing unreasonableness must be on the subpoena recipient who seeks to avoid compliance but recognizing that a court may be justified under some circumstances in requiring the government to reveal the general subject of the grand jurys investigation before requiring the challenging party to carry its burden of persuasion (D) holding that while a grand jury subpoena for the production of books and papers may implicate the fourth amendment when presented with a challenge to such a subpoena a court need only determine whether the request is far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable (E) holding that the term timely should be read in conjunction with 45c2b that requires a party subject to a subpoena to object to a subpoena duces tecum within 14 days of service of the subpoena

holding that a denial of an order to quash a subpoena not directed to a movant was a final order if the movant had no further opportunity to challenge the subpoena