In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to warrant such a delay. See id. Moreover, despite his argument to the contrary, Staler did not demonstrate that his criminal trial was invalid due to a fundamental error. See Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106. Stuler was indicted and convicted for violating 26 U.S.C. § 7208. See United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 244 (3d Cir.2007) (noting the elements of 26 U.S.C. § 7203 include that the defendant: (1) was required to file the tax returns; (2) failed to file them; and (3) acted willfully). Stuler’s invocation of a host of unrelated statutes and regulations does not alter the fact that “importing” is not an element of a § 7203 charge. He has therefore failed to satisfy his burden of establishing a funda-' mental error. See United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 184 (3d Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>). Because Stuler showed neither that any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any proceeding which is challenged by the writ is presumed to be correct and the burden rests on its assailant to show otherwise (B) recognizing that an agencys decision to terminate an employee is presumed correct (C) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (D) holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged
[A]: recognizing that an agencys decision to terminate an employee is presumed correct


[Q]: where the-plaintiff seeks to subject private parties to § 1983 liability by bestowing on them the title of state actors. The instant case does not involve a situation where the State has “ ‘so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private party] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.’ ” Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1131 (quoting NBC ¶. Communications Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir.1988) (citation omitted)). The Eleventh Circuit in Harvey, confronting facts similar to the case at bar and the issue of whether involuntary commitment by private parties may be considered state action, found an insufficient nexus between the defendants, a private hospital and private physicians, and the State. See id.; see also Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 258 (<HOLDING>). The court observed that “[b]oth the Supreme 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ccmc and its employees were not state actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus test (B) holding that massachusetts statute did not create a sufficiently close nexus between private hospital and the state to warrant labeling private actors state actors (C) holding that foster parents are not state actors (D) holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability (E) holding that private hospital and physicians who involuntarily committed plaintiff under massachusetts statute were not state actors noting that state regulation even if extensive and receipt of federal funds do not establish state action
[A]: holding that ccmc and its employees were not state actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus test


[Q]: themselves provided appellant notice that “[b]e-cause of the nature of the offenses for which [he] was convicted, the trial court was authorized to cumulate the sentences whether or not the offenses arose out of the same criminal episode.” See Millslagle, 150 S.W.3d at 785; see also Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 42.08; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 3.03(b). As to appellant’s Apprendi-Blakely-Ring complaint, “[t]he federal appellate courts have uniformly rejected the contention that Apprendi is violated when a trial court orders the cumulation of sentences which individually lie within the statutory range of punishment but for which the cumulative total exceeds the prescribed statutory maximum for any single offense.” Marrow v. State, 169 S.W.3d 328, 330 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed) (<HOLDING>); see, e.g., U.S. v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellants two eightyear consecutive sentences for rape because they were each within the tenyear statutory range for a single offense did not violate apprendi (B) holding that separate sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and with intent to rob were barred (C) holding that no apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range (D) holding that employees deferred adjudication for indecency with child could make sexual assault of customer foreseeable when sales were made in customers homes (E) holding that indecency with a child by contact is lesserincluded offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child because even though the latter offense did not include intent as an express element lascivious intent was implicitly included
[A]:
holding that appellants two eightyear consecutive sentences for rape because they were each within the tenyear statutory range for a single offense did not violate apprendi