In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
that in December 1995, his wage was $8.67 per hour. Lewis stated that a Caucasian employee, who misrepresented his knowledge of desktop publishing, was hired at a rate of $9.00 per hour in his department. This employee ultimately was “[p]ushed out the door.” Supp.App. at 354. Lewis also stated that another Caucasian employee received a pay increase from $7.50 to $8.25 per hour after he went from part-time to full-time status, and that a third Caucasian employee told him that he received a raise after his father called the store manager. The District Court held that Lewis failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he had not shown that the employees he identified were similarly situated to him. See Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 857-58 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on his wrongful termination claim, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated (B) holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment (C) holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim (D) holding that employees of differing seniority levels were not similarly situated (E) holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
such equitable relief as may be appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). A. Serious Health Condition Wells Fargo first argues that Vincent did not suffer a “serious health condition” as that term is defined by the FMLA. The parties agree that the Court should examine the regulations implementing the FMLA in order to determine whether Vincent suffered from a serious health condition. The parties disagree, however, as to whether the interim regulations or the final regulations, which became effective on April 6, 1995, should be used by the Court in arriving at its determination. The Court finds that the interim regulations which were in effect in January of 1995, the time of Vincent’s termination, govern this action. See Gay v. Gilman Paper Company, 125 F.3d 1432, 1434 n. 4 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Having resolved the dispute as to which set 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it (B) holding that as the court has made clear in several recent decisions a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue (C) holding that the interim regulations governed a dispute in which the serious health condition and subsequent termination occurred prior to april 6 1995 the effective date of the final regulations (D) holding that iiriras effective date is april 1 1997 (E) holding that habeas petitions challenging judgments of conviction that became final before the effective date of the aedpa are not time barred if filed within one year from aedpas effective date april 241996

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
dismiss. See Riley, supra, 61 N.J. at 228, 294 A.2d 7 (“[A] court should be slow to hold that a suit may not proceed as a class action.”). Plaintiffs suggest the “circumstances in Riley, where premature dismissal was reversed, are identical, if not less egregious than, those in this case.” Although we agree courts must liberally view class allegations and allow reasonable inferences to be gleaned from the complaint’s allegations and search for a possible basis for class relief so as to avoid premature dismissals, Carter-Reed, supra, 203 N.J. at 505-06, 518, 4 A.3d 561 we do not abide a view that precludes dismissal, following the required analysis, when a court determines alleged claims do not properly lend themselves to class certification. See Riley, supra, 61 N.J. at 225, 294 A.2d 7 (<HOLDING>). In Riley, the Court examined the pre-trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court in making class certification decision should avoid focusing on merits of underlying class action (B) holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa (C) holding that it is elementary that in order to maintain a class action the class sought to be represented must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable (D) holding a class action should lie unless it is clearly infeasible (E) holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action

Ex Output:

(D)