In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 550, 63 S.Ct. 727, 87 L.Ed. 959 (1943); In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 39, 44 (2d Cir.1979); Matter of Tilco, Inc., 558 F.2d 1369, 1372 (10th Cir.1977). Indeed, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has referred to the decision to reject or assume an executory contract as within the “discretion” of the trustee. Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257, 260 (1st Cir.1963). It is to be noted that Collazo dealt with the rejection of an agreement for the sale of real estate. Although Collazo was decided prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress has given no indication that the “business judgment test” should not continue to apply under the present Code. In re A.J. Lane & Co., Inc., 107 B.R. 435, 440 (Bankr.D.Mass.1989) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, in confronting the question of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable (B) holding that the business judgment test applies to the determination of whether a trustee should be allowed to reject an executory contract for the sale of real estate under  365 (C) holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made (D) holding prospectively that a vendees interest in a real estate contract constitutes real estate within the meaning of the judgment lien statute (E) holding the real estate sale proceeds
[A]: (B)


[Q]: before it was in assumpsit for attorney fees purposes. See Schulz, 67 Haw. at 436, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Higa is not directly on point, its reasoning is a compelling indication of how the Hawaii Supreme Court would rule on the attorney fee question before us. The plaintiffs also seek to distinguish Higa because it involved a client suing his own attorney, and thus in that case there was privity of contract between the two parties. In the present case, Mrs. Helfand was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the defendants and Mr. Helfand. This distinction is irrelevant. Courts have extended the right to sue for breach of contract to intended third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12, 883 P.2d 38, 48 n. 12 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 82 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies (B) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (C) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (D) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract (E) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status
[A]: (D)


[Q]: Ex. 16 (Memorandum from Barbara Birchette to Joyce Dews regarding "RIF Ranking” dated June 13, 1996). Defendant counters "that the evaluation of three teachers [who were over the age of 50] is statistically too small to have any meaning, particularly in light of the actual situation at the business academy.” Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def.’s Reply”) at 4. Defendant notes that regarding the business education teachers, a 41 year old and a 50 year old were rated higher than a 35 year old, a 62 year old, and a 53 year old. Id. at 4. The Court agrees with defendant that this evidence is not highly probative and does not establish that there was discriminatory animus towards older employees in general. See Simpson, 823 F.2d at 942, 943 (<HOLDING>); Goss, 942 F.Supp. at 665 (rejecting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial (B) holding that plaintiffs statistics regarding the average age  of employees retained and fired during the period immediately preceding and following his termination    even if arguably supporting an inference of discrimination to establish a prima facie case  had insufficient probative value to support a jury verdict on the ultimate question of discrimination this was due in part because the plaintiff used the departure of only seventeen people as a basis for his statistical argument which the court concluded was suspect furthermore the plaintiff failed to provide the relative qualifications of those hired and the positions to which they were assigned and he neglected vital information regarding the pool of applicants and whether for example qualified older employees were available or applied for those jobs (C) holding that plaintiff could not establish prima facie case of discrimination where plaintiff failed to meet minimum qualifications for job (D) holding that a general motion for judgment of acquittal which asserted without explanation or argument that the state had failed to prove a prima facie case of the crime charged in the indictment was insufficient to preserve for appeal the specific argument that the state had failed to prove the age of the victim to support a conviction for sexual battery of a child under the age of eleven (E) holding that to make out the fourth element of a prima facie case of sex discrimination plaintiff must prove that males remained in similar positions and similarly for age discrimination that she was otherwise discharged because of her age
[A]:
(B)