TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: five years. The issue is thus whether the time Hartman served in prison after the IJ’s improper decision should count toward the five-year bar. The Court holds that it should not count and thus, contrary to the BIA’s ruling in March 2002, the application for § 212(c) relief was not untimely when the IJ addressed the merits of that application on January 25, 2001. 1. The Statutory Five-Year Bar At the outset, the Court addresses Hartman’s argument that the five-year clock stops upon filing an application for § 212(c) relief, which, in this case, would be January 1997. The Court disagrees with that argument. The five-year clock of § 212(c) does not stop when an alien, such as Hartman, files an application for a discretionary waiver. See Gomes v. Ashcroft, 311 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Falconi v. INS, 240 F.Supp.2d 215, 218 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina  212c (B) holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a (C) holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for  212c relief (D) holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina  212c (E) holding that iiriras repeal of ina  212c was not impermissibly retroactive because unlike st cyr the petitioner chose to proceed to trial instead of agreeing to a plea and therefore did not detrimentally rely on the availability of  212c relief

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: perform work for Kiwi. Synergy alleges that Ms. Willis knew these statements were false when she spoke them. Synergy contends that her intent to induce Synergy to rely on these statements can be inferred by the benefit LHC stood to receive. Finally, Synergy offers documentation of advertising run on behalf of Kiwi as evidence of its damages. Assuming for purposes of this motion that Ms. Willis made the alleged statements, Synergy’s fraud claim fails as a matter of law. First, statements by Ms. Willis as to Kiwi’s financial condition constitute an opinion. In Georgia, statements of opinion will not support a claim for fraud. Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays Bank, PLC, 227 Ga.App. 648, 650, 490 S.E.2d 184 (1997); See also Miller v. Clabby, 178 Ga.App. 821, 822, 344 S.E.2d 751 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Synergy also alleges that Ms. Willis stated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding agency may not rely on expert opinion without disclosing hard data supporting opinion to the public (B) holding that sellers failure to disclose known soil conditions was not a scheme to defraud where seller did not affirmatively lie to buyer (C) recognizing that an expression of opinion about monetary value is not a representation of fact which gives rise to an action for fraud (D) holding that a buyer could not rely on a sellers mere expression of opinion (E) recognizing that a common illustration of an admissible opinion under rule 701 is an expression of opinion by a lay observer of a cars speed

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: from the hostile work environment complaint. ¶29. Thus, assuming that Hall voluntarily entered into the Agreement, nothing in the language of the Agreement, as discussed above, provides the trial court with a basis for finding that, as a matter of law, the Agreement unambiguously permitted Hall’s claims in this case. Rather, on remand, the trial court must consider whether the Agreement unambiguously precluded all or part of Hall’s remaining retaliation claim or whether the language of the Agreement is ambiguous as to its preclusive effect on all or part of that claim in light of the circumstances surrounding the making of the Agreement, thereby requiring the court to instruct a new jury to that effect. See Isbrandtsen v. N. Branch Corp., 150 Vt. 575, 579, 556 A.2d 81, 84 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Tilley v. Green Mt. Power Corp., 156 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court may consider collateral evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement in determining whether the language of the agreement is unclear and if the evidence presented is so plain that no reasonable person could hold any way but one then the court may interpret the meaning as a matter of law (B) holding that trial court may consider circumstances surrounding making of agreement in determining whether agreement is ambiguous and noting that ambiguity exists when language of agreement in and of itself supports reasonable interpretation distinct from reasonable interpretation reached when language is read in light of surrounding circumstances (C) holding that when relevant contract language is ambiguous interpretation is turned over to the factfinder (D) holding that courts may consider extrinsic evidence including the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract in order to determine whether a contractual ambiguity exists (E) holding that in determining whether a seizure has occurred a court must consider if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave

SOLUTION:
(B)