In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: with ever since his age of 13 and believes that this criminal record and his continued violation of the law does require a sentence at the top of the guideline range.” Id. at 8. I. A. Commerce Clause Challenge to Section 922(g)(1) Williams first challenges the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute as it applies to his possession of the Smith and Wesson revolver. Williams posits that because he possessed the gun solely within the State of Wisconsin, and because the record reveals no substantial connection between his possession of the gun and interstate commerce, Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to reach his possession of the gun. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Williams did not make this argument below, so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce (B) holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (C) holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that gunfree school zones act of 1990 which proscribed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school exceeded congressional authority under commerce clause because it reached conduct that did not substantially affect or have a meaningful connection with interstate commerce (E) holding that the gunfree school zones act exceeds congress power under the commerce clause
[EX A]: holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce

[EX Q]: 879 (citations omitted). We think there is a reasonable fit here between the State’s purpose of protecting society from persons who have been determined to be likely to reoffend if not placed in a secure facility and their placement in such a facility. Therefore, Garren has failed to show a substantive due process violation. VII. Vagueness. Although Garren states in a division heading in his brief that chapter 229A is vague as applied and on its face, he makes no argument in his brief in support of the contention that the statute is vague as applied to him. We deem this issue waived. See Iowa R.App.P. 14(a)(3) (“Failure in the brief to state, to argue or to cite to authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”); State v. Cooley, 608 N.W.2d 9, 13-14 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Garren is precluded from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief (B) holding issue waived where matter not addressed beyond reference in heading in brief (C) holding that an issue mentioned in a brief but not addressed is waived (D) holding issues argued orally but not addressed in brief were waived (E) holding an issue listed in statement of issues on appeal but not addressed in brief is abandoned
[EX A]: holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief

[EX Q]: will be set aside.” High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 640 (9th Cir.2004). 8. However, a court may not issue an injunction under NEPA that would cause a violation of other statutory-requirements, such as those found in section 7 of the ESA. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 497, 121 S.Ct. 1711, 149 L.Ed.2d 722 (2001) (“A district court cannot, for example, override Congress’ policy choice, articulated in a statute, as to what behavior should be prohibited”). Nor should an injunction issue under NEPA when enjoining government action would result in more harm to the environment than denying injunctive relief. Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir.1984); Am. Motorcyclist Ass’n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Alpine Lakes Prot. Soc’y v. Schlapfer, 518 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the need for natural gas supply as a substantial public interest (B) holding that any member of the general public can initiate an action to raise issues involving the public trust in air water or other natural resources of the state (C) holding public interest does not favor granting an injunction where government action allegedly in violation of nepa might actually jeopardize natural resources (D) holding on motion for preliminary injunction that balance of hardships tipped in favor of public (E) holding that inevitable harm of limiting public resources does not trump lawful department action
[EX A]:
recognizing the need for natural gas supply as a substantial public interest