In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions “could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited.” Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) (“We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse’s liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void.”). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years

Output: holding that such provisions are valid


Input: Consider Input: law did not authorize the arresting officer to require Turbyne to take a breath test when the blood test was unavailable. Gillett, 629 P.2d at 619 n. 10. Nor do our decisions in Gillett and Riley construe the statute as allowing the police to compel a different test when extraordinary circumstances prevent administration of the driver-selected test. The good cause exception we established in those cases applies to excuse the judicial sanction of dismissal of the charges when the police are prevented in circumstances beyond their control from administering the driver-selected test. As Shinaut and Dike demonstrate, when a driver selected to take the chemical test not initially selected, he or she may have voluntarily consented to the search of his or her person. Shinaut, 940 P.2d at 384 (<HOLDING>). When the controlling facts are undisputed, as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation (B) holding that error in excluding a police officers report was harmless where the same evidence was presented by another witness (C) holding that a person must request a reasonable accommodation before he has been terminated he cannot wait until he is terminated and then months later  request reinstatement and demand a reasonable accommodation (D) holding that erroneous accommodation of a citizens request by a police officer does not warrant the sanction of excluding evidence (E) holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada

Output: holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation


Input: Consider Input: employee,” Ms. Hays had “a reasonable expectation of continued employment based upon district policy” and could only be terminated “for cause.” Thus, Ms. Hays had a substantive due process right to continued employment. See Tonkovich, 159 F.3d at 528. But Ms. Hays has failed to show that the District’s conduct violated her right to continued employment in a manner that “is truly conscience shocking.” See id. (quoting Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 574). Ms. Hays argues that the District terminated her employment “on the basis of comments made by co-workers whose names [Superintendent Timothy] could not recall, making vague charges which he never shared with Hays.” Further, Ms. Hays asserts that Superintendent Timothy’s decision was based on achieving an 8 out of 9 on Mr. Frost’s Post-Con 529 (<HOLDING>). Here, the District states that it terminated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a career teachers substantive due process rights were not violated when the school board decided not to renew her contract due to concerns about her performance (B) holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim (C) recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim (D) holding that a law school professors substantive due process rights were not violated despite his allegations that the university failed to warn him that his conduct was prohibited (E) recognizing a plaintiffs  1988 claim predicated on an alleged violation of his substantive due process rights


Output: holding that a career teachers substantive due process rights were not violated when the school board decided not to renew her contract due to concerns about her performance