In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

WTT Project area as defined by the Corps. NEF contends that we need not consider the State’s argument because the State failed to raise this argument in its initial motion to clarify, instead raising it for the first time in its Rule 59(e) motion. “Rule 59(e) motions are ‘aimed at reconsideration, not initial consideration.’ ” FDIC v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Bank of New England, 897 F.2d 611, 616 (1st Cir.1990)). In World University, this Court held that the defendant’s argument, which it raised for the first time in a Rule 59(e) motion, was barred where there was no reason why the defendant could not have presented its argument prior to its motion to alter or amend the judgment. Id.; see also Engler, 146 F.3d at 374 (<HOLDING>). This rule, however, does not cover the facts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument (B) holding that a party in a habeas case waives an argument by failing to raise it before the district court (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that an argument was barred where the movant could have but did not raise its argument before the district court ruled in the original motion (E) holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court
holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument

we now reverse the decision of the trial court. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. 1 . We set forth additional facts in the companion case issued today, Dep't. of Revenue v. Adams, 762 N.E.2d 728 (Ind.2002). 2 . The CSET is a tax on the possession of certain narcotics. We discuss the tax and the procedures for collecting it in greater detail infra. 3 . All of the cocaine at issue in this case was discovered prior to the time the police served a valid search warrant. 4 . Ind.Code § 35-48-4-1 (1998). 5 . Id. § 35-48-4-6. 6 . United States Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the revenue officers' entry of Adam's home to collect the CSET assessment was a search. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Thomas v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (B) holding that revenue officers conducted a search when they entered a cottage and seized records when levying on delinquent tax (C) holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business (D) holding search unreasonable when conducted on the highway in broad day light (E) holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house
holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted

same issue in another 3.850 motion that was on appeal in this court at the time. See Hines v. State, 714 So.2d 605, 606 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. dism., 727 So.2d 906 (1998). This court affirmed the denial of that untimely and successive 3.850 motion. Thurston v. State, 902 So.2d 813 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). This appeal is at least the third time Thurston has appealed the denial of the same frivolous claim of a violation of Ap-prendi and Blakely in this court. See Thurston v. State, 902 So.2d 813 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (raising the same claim). The claim is utterly without merit, for neither Apprendi nor Blakely are applied retroactively and neither have any applicability to Thurston’s ease. See Hughes v. State, 901 So.2d 837 (Fla.2005); Figarola v. State, 841 So.2d 576, 577 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). Thurston has never adequately explained how 
 Holding statements: (A) holding retroactive application (B) holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review (C) holding that the act is not retroactive (D) holding apprendi is not retroactive (E) holding that the act is retroactive

holding retroactive application