In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: inquiry — • whether New Provo Canyon’s treatment of one individual constituted state action — differs substantially from that in Milonas, irrespective of whether, for purposes of a class action suit, Old Provo Canyon’s treatment of its patients generally constituted state action. Thus, the question here does not present the necessary “like facts” to trigger the stare decisis doctrine. D. Collateral Estoppel For the very same reason, Taylor’s collateral estoppel argument fails. Collateral esto Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553; Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Logistics Control Group, 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.1985) (discussed below). 13 . Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553-54; Lib. Mut. Ins., 969 F.2d at 1388-89; Holloway, 813 F.2d at 878-79; see also Nipper v. Snipes, 1 F.3d 415, 415-417 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Id. at 1553; see also Lib. Mut. Ins., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (B) holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body (C) holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial (D) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (E) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact

A: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint
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Q: of the debtor. This distinction appears immaterial under the language of sec. 409.402(7), Stats. 7 In other contexts, a security interest properly perfected at one time may later become unperfected through creditor inaction. See, e.g. sec. 409.103(l)(d)l, (2)(b), (3)(e), Stats, (four month grace periods preserving perfection in collateral removed from jurisdic tion); sec. 409.403(2) (lapse of financing statements after 5 years unless continued). 8 Interestingly, the Ansley court held that a filing under "the name Ansley Farms instead of the debtor's true name — Emory Ansley — is seriously misleading, making [the]. . . security interest unperfected.. . ." Id,., 467 F.Supp. at 55. Other cases reaching similar results are In Re Wishart, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1296 (Bankr.W.D. Mich. 1972) (<HOLDING>); In Re Brawn, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 565 (D.C. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient (B) holding a filing under mccauleys reprographics and mapping insufficient to perfect a security interest in the assets of the debtor corporation (C) holding that the reservation of a claim need not name a defendant but only identify the type of claim the debtor seeks to retain (D) holding a filing under wishart equipment co insufficient to identify the debtor horace wishart (E) holding a filing under john and mayella lintz insufficient to identify the debtor corporation

A: holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient
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Q: and thus held that the entire agreement was unenforceable. In reaching this conclusion, the district court determined that the cost-splitting provision was severable from the rest of the agreement; had it reached the contrary conclusion, it would not have proceeded to consider the enforceability of the remainder of the agreement. We agree with the district court’s determination that the cost-splitting provision at issue in the present case was sever-able from the rest of the arbitration agreement. That provision was not interwoven with the rest of the agreement and may be deleted without affecting the rest of the agreement’s provisions regarding arbitration. This conclusion is consistent with both Tennessee contract law and our own precedents. See also Giordano, 2001 WL 484360, at *6 (<HOLDING>); Fuller v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack of Del., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that limitation of liability provisions in arbitration agreement included in nursing homes admissions documents violated public policy and were not severable because they constituted financial heart of arbitration agreement (B) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (C) holding that when agreement includes severability provision intent of the parties and policy in favor of arbitration dictate that rest of agreement should be held enforceable (D) holding that costsplitting provision in pep boys arbitration agreement is severable from the rest of the agreement (E) holding that arbitration agreement was not unconscionable where agree ment did not limit punitive damages and limitation of liability provision was severable if unenforceable

A:
holding that limitation of liability provisions in arbitration agreement included in nursing homes admissions documents violated public policy and were not severable because they constituted financial heart of arbitration agreement
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