In this task, you are given text for US Congressional and California state bills, your task is to generate a summary for this bill.

Input: Consider Input: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Firefighters Fairness Act of 
2011''.

SEC. 2. CERTAIN DISEASES PRESUMED TO BE WORK-RELATED CAUSE OF 
              DISABILITY OR DEATH FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN FIRE 
              PROTECTION ACTIVITIES.

    (a) Definition.--Section 8101 of title 5, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (19), by striking 
the period at the end of paragraph (20) and inserting ``; and'', and by 
adding at the end the following:
            ``(21) `employee in fire protection activities' means a 
        firefighter, paramedic, emergency medical technician, rescue 
        worker, ambulance personnel, or hazardous material worker, 
        who--
                    ``(A) is trained in fire suppression;
                    ``(B) has the legal authority and responsibility to 
                engage in fire suppression;
                    ``(C) is engaged in the prevention, control, and 
                extinguishment of fires or response to emergency 
                situations where life, property, or the environment is 
                at risk; and
                    ``(D) performs such activities as a primary 
                responsibility of his or her job.''.
    (b) Presumption Relating to Employees in Fire Protection 
Activities.--Section 8102 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end the following:
    ``(c)(1) With regard to an employee in fire protection activities, 
a disease specified in paragraph (3) shall be presumed to be 
proximately caused by the employment of such employee, subject to the 
length of service requirements specified. The disability or death of an 
employee in fire protection activities due to such a disease shall be 
presumed to result from personal injury sustained while in the 
performance of such employee's duty. Such presumptions may be rebutted 
by a preponderance of the evidence.
    ``(2) Such presumptions apply only if the employee in fire 
protection activities is diagnosed with the disease for which 
presumption is sought within 10 years of the last active date of 
employment as an employee in fire protection activities.
    ``(3) The following diseases shall be presumed to be proximately 
caused by the employment of the employee in fire protection activities:
            ``(A) If the employee has been employed for a minimum of 5 
        years in aggregate as an employee in fire protection 
        activities:
                    ``(i) Heart disease.
                    ``(ii) Lung disease.
                    ``(iii) The following cancers:
                            ``(I) Brain cancer.
                            ``(II) Cancer of the blood or lymphatic 
                        systems.
                            ``(III) Leukemia.
                            ``(IV) Lymphoma (except Hodgkin's disease).
                            ``(V) Multiple myeloma.
                            ``(VI) Bladder cancer.
                            ``(VII) Kidney cancer.
                            ``(VIII) Testicular cancer.
                            ``(IX) Cancer of the digestive system.
                            ``(X) Colon cancer.
                            ``(XI) Liver cancer.
                            ``(XII) Skin cancer.
                            ``(XIII) Lung cancer.
                    ``(iv) Any other cancer the contraction of which 
                the Secretary of Labor through regulations determines 
                to be related to the hazards to which an employee in 
                fire protection activities may be subject.
            ``(B) Regardless of the length of time an employee in fire 
        protection activities has been employed, any uncommon 
        infectious disease, including but not limited to tuberculosis, 
        hepatitis A, B, or C, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 
        and any other uncommon infectious disease the contraction of 
        which the Secretary of Labor through regulations determines to 
        be related to the hazards to which an employee in fire 
        protection activities may be subject.''.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 5 years after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health in 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention shall examine the 
implementation of this Act and appropriate scientific and medical data 
related to the health risks associated with firefighting and submit to 
Congress a report which shall include--
            (1) an analysis of the injury claims made under this Act;
            (2) an analysis of the available research related to the 
        health risks associated with firefighting; and
            (3) recommendations for any administrative or legislative 
        actions necessary to ensure that those diseases most associated 
        with firefighting are included in the presumption created by 
        this Act.
    (d) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section applies to 
an injury that is first diagnosed or a death that occurs, on or after 
the date of enactment of this Act.

Output: Federal Firefighters Fairness Act of 2011- Provides that: (1) specified diseases, including heart disease, lung disease, tuberculosis, hepatitis, human immunodeficiency virus, and specified cancers, of federal employees in fire protection activities shall be presumed to be proximately caused by such employment if the employee is diagnosed with the disease within 10 years of the last active date of employment in fire protection activities; (2) the disability or death of such an employee due to such a disease shall be presumed to result from personal injury sustained while in the performance of duty; and (3) such presumptions may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.

Defines an "employee in fire protection activities" as a firefighter, paramedic, emergency medical technician, rescue worker, ambulance personnel, or hazardous material worker, who: (1) is trained in fire suppression; (2) has the legal authority and responsibility to engage in fire suppression; (3) is engaged in the prevention, control, and extinguishment of fires or response to emergency situations where life, property, or the environment is at risk; and (4) performs such activities as a primary responsibility of his or her job.

Directs the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to examine the implementation of this Act and appropriate scientific and medical data related to the health risks associated with firefighting and to report to Congress on: (1) an analysis of the injury claims made under this Act; (2) an analysis of the available research related to the health risks associated with firefighting; and (3) recommendations for any administrative or legislative actions necessary to ensure that those diseases most associated with firefighting are included in the presumption created by this Act.


Input: Consider Input: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``American Missile Protection Act of 
1998''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The threat of weapons of mass destruction delivered by 
        long-range ballistic missiles is among the most serious 
        security issues facing the United States.
                    (A) In a 1994 Executive Order, President Clinton 
                certified, that ``I ... find that the proliferation of 
                nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (`weapons of 
                mass destruction') and the means of delivering such 
                weapons, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat 
                to the national security, foreign policy, and economy 
                of the United States, and hereby declare a national 
                emergency to deal with that threat.'' This state of 
                emergency was reaffirmed in 1995, 1996, and 1997.
                    (B) In 1994 the President stated, that ``there is 
                nothing more important to our security and the world's 
                stability than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons 
                and ballistic missiles''.
                    (C) Several countries hostile to the United States 
                have been particularly determined to acquire missiles 
                and weapons of mass destruction. President Clinton 
                observed in January of 1998, for example, that ``Saddam 
                Hussein has spent the better part of this decade, and 
                much of his nation's wealth, not on providing for the 
                Iraqi people, but on developing nuclear, chemical and 
                biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them''.
                    (D) In 1996, the Senate affirmed that, ``it is in 
                the supreme interest of the United States to defend 
                itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile 
                attack, whatever the source.''
            (2) The long-range ballistic missile threat to the United 
        States is increasing.
                    (A) Several adversaries of the United States have 
                stated their intention to acquire intercontinental 
                ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United 
                States.
                            (i) Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has 
                        stated, ``If they know that you have a 
                        deterrent force capable of hitting the United 
                        States, they would not be able to hit you. If 
                        we had possessed a deterrent--missiles that 
                        could reach New York--we would have hit it at 
                        the same moment. Consequently, we should build 
                        this force so that they and others will no 
                        longer think about an attack.''
                            (ii) Abu Abbas, the head of the Palestine 
                        Liberation Front, has stated, ``I would love to 
                        be able to reach the American shore, but this 
                        is very difficult. Someday an Arab country will 
                        have ballistic missiles. Someday an Arab 
                        country will have a nuclear bomb. It is better 
                        for the United States and for Israel to reach 
                        peace with the Palestinians before that day.''
                            (iii) Saddam Hussein has stated, ``Our 
                        missiles cannot reach Washington. If we could 
                        reach Washington, we would strike if the need 
                        arose.''
                            (iv) Iranian actions speak for themselves. 
                        Iran's aggressive pursuit of medium-range 
                        ballistic missiles capable of striking Central 
                        Europe--aided by the continuing collaboration 
                        of outside agents--demonstrates Tehran's intent 
                        to acquire ballistic missiles of ever-
                        increasing range.
                    (B) Over 30 non-NATO countries possess ballistic 
                missiles, with at least 10 of those countries 
                developing over 20 new types of ballistic missiles.
                    (C) From the end of World War II until 1980, 
                ballistic missiles were used in one conflict. Since 
                1980, thousands of ballistic missiles have been fired 
                in at least six different conflicts.
                    (D) The clear trend among countries hostile to the 
                United States is toward having ballistic missiles of 
                greater range.
                            (i) North Korea first acquired 300-
                        kilometer range Scud Bs, then developed and 
                        deployed 500-kilometer range Scud Cs, is 
                        currently deploying the 1000-kilometer range 
                        No-Dong, and is developing the 2000-kilometer 
                        range Taepo-Dong 1 and 6000-kilometer range 
                        Taepo-Dong 2, which would be capable of 
                        striking Alaska and Hawaii.
                            (ii) Iran acquired 150-kilometer range CSS-
                        8s, progressed through the Scud B and Scud C, 
                        and is developing the 1300-kilometer range 
                        Shahab-3 and 2000-kilometer range Shahab-4, 
                        which would allow Iran to strike Central 
                        Europe.
                            (iii) Iraq, in a two-year crash program, 
                        produced a new missile, the Al-Hussein, with 
                        twice the range of its Scud Bs.
                            (iv) Experience gained from extending the 
                        range of short- and medium-range ballistic 
                        missiles facilitates the development of 
                        intercontinental ballistic missiles.
                    (E) The technical information, hardware, and other 
                resources necessary to build ballistic missiles are 
                increasingly available and accessible worldwide.
                            (i) Due to advances in information 
                        technology, a vast amount of technical 
                        information relating to ballistic missile 
                        design, much of it formerly classified, has 
                        become widely available and is increasingly 
                        accessible through the Internet and other 
                        distribution avenues.
                            (ii) Components, tools, and materials to 
                        support ballistic missile development are 
                        increasingly available in the commercial 
                        aerospace industry.
                            (iii) Increasing demand for satellite-based 
                        telecommunications is adding to the demand for 
                        commercial Space Launch Vehicles, which employ 
                        technology that is essentially identical to 
                        that of intercontinental ballistic missiles. As 
                        this increasing demand is met, the technology 
                        and expertise associated with space launch 
                        vehicles also proliferate.
                    (F) Russia and China have provided significant 
                technical assistance to rogue nation ballistic missile 
                programs, accelerating the pace of those efforts. In 
                June of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence, 
                reporting to Congress on weapons of mass destruction-
                related equipment, materials, and technology, stated 
                that ``China and Russia continued to be the primary 
                suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to stem 
                the flow of dual-use goods and modern weapons to 
                countries of concern.''
                    (G) Russia and China continue to engage in missile 
                proliferation.
                            (i) Despite numerous Russian assurances not 
                        to assist Iran with its ballistic missile 
                        program, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
                        State for Nonproliferation testified to the 
                        Senate, that ``the problem is this: there is a 
                        disconnect between those reassurances, which we 
                        welcome, and what we believe is actually 
                        occurring.''
                            (ii) Regarding China's actions to 
                        demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to 
                        nonproliferation, the Director of Central 
                        Intelligence testified to the Senate on January 
                        28, 1998, that, ``the jury is still out on 
                        whether the recent changes are broad enough in 
                        scope and whether they will hold over the 
                        longer term. As such, Chinese activities in 
                        this area will require continued close 
                        watching.''
                    (H) The inability of the United States to defend 
                itself against weapons of mass destruction delivered by 
                long-range ballistic missile provides additional 
                incentive for hostile nations to develop long-range 
                ballistic missiles with which to threaten the United 
                States. Missiles are widely viewed as valuable tools 
                for deterring and coercing a vulnerable United States.
            (3) The ability of the United States to anticipate future 
        ballistic missile threats is questionable.
                    (A) The Intelligence Community has failed to 
                anticipate many past technical innovations (for 
                example, Iraq's extended-range Al-Hussein missiles and 
                its development of a space launch vehicle) and outside 
                assistance enables rogue states to surmount traditional 
                technological obstacles to obtaining or developing 
                ballistic missiles of increasing range.
                    (B) In June of 1997, the Director of Central 
                Intelligence reported to Congress that ``many Third 
                World countries--with Iran being the most prominent 
                example--are responding to Western counter-
                proliferation efforts by relying more on legitimate 
                commercial firms as procurement fronts and by 
                developing more convoluted procurement networks.''
                    (C) In June of 1997, the Director of Central 
                Intelligence stated to Congress that ``gaps and 
                uncertainties preclude a good projection of exactly 
                when `rest of the world' countries will deploy ICBMs.''
                    (D) In 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence 
                testified that Iran would have a medium-range missile 
                by 2007. One year later the Director stated, ``since I 
                testified, Iran's success in getting technology and 
                materials from Russian companies, combined with recent 
                indigenous Iranian advances, means that it could have a 
                medium-range missile much sooner than I assessed last 
                year.'' Department of State officials have testified 
                that Iran could be prepared to deploy such a missile as 
                early as late 1998, nine years earlier than had been 
                predicted one year before by the Director of Central 
                Intelligence.
            (4) The failure to prepare adequately for long-range 
        ballistic missile threats could have severe national security 
        and foreign policy consequences for the United States.
                    (A) An attack on the United States by a ballistic 
                missile equipped with a weapon of mass destruction 
                could inflict catastrophic death or injury to citizens 
                of the United States and severe damage to their 
                property.
                    (B) A rogue state's ability to threaten the United 
                States with an intercontinental ballistic missile may 
                constrain the United States' options in dealing with 
                regional threats to its interests, deter the United 
                States from taking appropriate action, or prompt allies 
                to question United States security guarantees, thereby 
                weakening alliances of the United States and the United 
                States' world leadership position.
            (5) The United States must be prepared for rogue nations 
        acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with weapons of 
        mass destruction.
                    (A) In its resolution of ratification for the START 
                II Treaty, the United States Senate declared that 
                ``because deterrence may be inadequate to protect the 
                United States against long-range ballistic missile 
                threats, missile defenses are a necessary part of new 
                deterrent strategies.''
                    (B) In September of 1994, Secretary of Defense 
                Perry stated that in the post-Cold War era, ``we now 
                have opportunity to create a new relationship based not 
                on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather 
                on another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.''
                    (C) On February 12, 1997, the Under Secretary of 
                Defense for Policy testified to the Senate that ``I and 
                the administration are quite willing to acknowledge 
                that if we saw a rogue state, a potential proliferant, 
                beginning to develop a long-range ICBM capable of 
                reaching the United States, we would have to give very, 
                very serious attention to deploying a limited national 
                missile defense.''
            (6) The United States has no defense deployed against 
        weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-range ballistic 
        missiles and no policy to deploy such a national missile 
        defense system.

SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is 
technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system 
capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited 
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or 
deliberate).

Output: American Missile Protection Act of 1998 - States as U.S. policy to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending U.S. territory against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).


Input: Consider Input: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Port Security Grants Act of 2005''.

SEC. 2. PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM.

    (a) Grants Authorized.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
(referred to in this Act as the ``Secretary''), acting through the 
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, 
shall establish a grant program to fairly and equitably allocate 
Federal financial assistance--
            (1) to help implement Area Maritime Transportation Security 
        Plans required under section 70103(b) of title 46, United 
        States Code;
            (2) to correct port security vulnerabilities identified 
        through vulnerability assessments approved by the Secretary; or
            (3) to non-Federal projects contributing to the overall 
        security of an individual port or the system of ports in the 
        United States, as determined by the Secretary.
    (b) Grant Awards.--In awarding grants under this Act, the Secretary 
shall--
            (1) take into account national economic and strategic 
        defense considerations of individual ports; and
            (2) strongly encourage efforts to promote--
                    (A) integration of port wide security;
                    (B) information and intelligence sharing; and
                    (C) joint efforts, such as joint harbor operations 
                centers between all port stakeholders.
    (c) Use of Funds.--Grants awarded under this section may be used--
            (1) to help implement Area Maritime Transportation Security 
        Plans required under section 70103(b) of title 46, United 
        States Code;
            (2) to correct port security vulnerabilities identified 
        through vulnerability assessments approved by the Secretary;
            (3) for the salaries, benefits, overtime compensation, and 
        other costs of additional security personnel for State and 
        local agencies for activities required by the Area Maritime 
        Security Plan for a port area if--
                    (A) the Secretary increases the threat level under 
                the Homeland Security Advisory System to Code Orange or 
                Code Red;
                    (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard raises the 
                Maritime Security level to MARSEC Level 2 or 3; or
                    (C) the Secretary otherwise authorizes such costs;
            (4) for the cost of acquisition, operation, and maintenance 
        of equipment that contributes to the overall security of the 
        port area, as identified in the Area Maritime Security Plan if 
        the need is based upon vulnerability assessments approved by 
        the Secretary or identified in the Area Maritime Security Plan;
            (5) to develop joint harbor operations centers that bring 
        together Federal, State, and local officials and stakeholders 
        into a common operation center that is focused on port area 
        security;
            (6) to conduct vulnerability assessments approved by the 
        Secretary; and
            (7) to conduct port wide exercises to strengthen emergency 
        preparedness of Federal, State, and local officials responsible 
        for port security, including law enforcement personnel, in 
        support of the Area Maritime Security Plan.
    (d) Prohibited Uses.--Grants awarded under this section may not be 
used to construct buildings or other physical facilities or to acquire 
land unless such use is specifically approved by the Secretary in 
support of subsection (c)(5).
    (e) Matching Requirements.--
            (1) Federal funding.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
        Federal funds for any eligible project under this section shall 
        not exceed 75 percent of the total cost of such project.
            (2) Exceptions.--
                    (A) Small projects.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply 
                to grants under this section for stand alone projects 
                costing not more than $25,000. The amount under this 
                subparagraph shall be indexed to the consumer price 
                index and modified each fiscal year after the annual 
                publication of the consumer price index.
                    (B) Reduction in matching requirement.--If the 
                Secretary determines that a proposed project merits 
                support and cannot be undertaken without a higher 
                percentage of Federal financial assistance, the 
                Secretary may award a grant for such project with a 
                lesser matching requirement than is described in 
                paragraph (1).
    (f) Application.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary shall determine who, as an 
        eligible applicant, may submit an application, at such time, in 
        such form, and containing such information and assurances as 
        the Secretary, working through the Office of State and Local 
        Government Coordination and Preparedness, may require.
            (2) Minimum standards for payment or reimbursement.--Each 
        application submitted under paragraph (1) shall include--
                    (A) a comprehensive description of--
                            (i) the need for the project;
                            (ii) the methodology for coordinating the 
                        project into the security of the greater port 
                        area, as identified in the Area Maritime 
                        Security Plan;
                            (iii) any existing cooperation agreements 
                        with other port facilities, vessels, or 
                        organizations that benefit security of the 
                        entire port; and
                            (iv) the applicability of the project to 
                        the Area Maritime Transportation Security Plan; 
                        and
                    (B) a determination by the Captain of the Port that 
                the security project--
                            (i) addresses or corrects port security 
                        vulnerabilities identified by the Coast Guard, 
                        or through port security vulnerability 
                        assessments approved by the Secretary; and
                            (ii) helps to ensure compliance with the 
                        Area Maritime Transportation Security Plan.
            (3) Procedural safeguards.--The Secretary, in consultation 
        with the Office of the Inspector General, shall issue 
        guidelines to establish appropriate accounting, reporting, and 
        review procedures to ensure that--
                    (A) grant funds are used for the purposes for which 
                they were made available;
                    (B) grantees have properly accounted for all 
                expenditures of grant funds; and
                    (C) grant funds not used for such purposes and 
                amounts not obligated or expended are returned.
            (4) Project approval required.--The Secretary may not award 
        a grant under this section unless the Secretary determines 
        that--
                    (A) the project to be carried out with such grant 
                funding--
                            (i) is consistent with vulnerability 
                        assessments approved by the Secretary;
                            (ii) supports cooperation or integration of 
                        Federal, State, local, and industry 
                        stakeholders in the port area; and
                            (iii) helps to implement the Area Maritime 
                        Transportation Security Plan;
                    (B) sufficient funding is available to meet the 
                matching requirement described under subsection (d);
                    (C) the project will be completed without 
                unreasonable delay; and
                    (D) the recipient has authority to carry out the 
                proposed project.
    (g) Coordination and Cooperation.--The Secretary--
            (1) shall ensure that all projects that receive grant 
        funding under this section within any area defined in an Area 
        Maritime Transportation Security Plan are coordinated with 
        other projects in such area; and
            (2) may require cooperative agreements among users of the 
        port and port facilities with respect to projects funded under 
        this section.
    (h) Audits and Examinations.--All grantees under this section shall 
maintain such records as the Secretary may require and make such 
records available for review and audit by the Secretary, the 
Comptroller General of the United States, or the Inspector General of 
the Department of Homeland Security.
    (i) Reports on Security Funding and Compliance.--
            (1) Initial report.--Not later than 6 months after the date 
        of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit an 
        unclassified report to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
        Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
        Homeland Security of the House of Representatives containing a 
        proposal to implement the port security grant program for 
        fiscal years 2007 through 2012.
            (2) Annual reports.--Not later than 1 year after the 
        submission of the report required by paragraph (1), and 
        annually through October 1, 2013, the Secretary shall submit an 
        unclassified report to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
        Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
        Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, regarding 
        the progress made in meeting the objectives described in 
        subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1), that--
                    (A) identifies any funding modifications necessary 
                to meet the objectives described in such subparagraphs 
                (A) and (B);
                    (B) includes an assessment of progress in 
                implementing the grant program established under this 
                Act; and
                    (C) includes any recommendations the Secretary may 
                make to improve these programs.

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

            (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to 
        the Secretary $400,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2007 
        through 2012 to carry out this Act.
            (2) Source of funds.--The amounts authorized to be 
        appropriated under paragraph (1) shall originate from duties 
        collected by United States Customs and Border Protection.


Output: Port Security Grants Act of 2005 - Requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, to establish a grant program to fairly and equitably allocate Federal financial assistance: (1) to help implement Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans; (2) to correct port security vulnerabilities; and (3) for non-Federal projects contributing to the overall security of an individual port or system of ports.

Directs the Secretary, in awarding grants under this Act, to: (1) take into account national economic and strategic defense considerations of individual ports; and (2) strongly encourage efforts to promote integration of port-wide security, information and intelligence sharing, and joint efforts.

Sets forth authorized and prohibited uses of grant funds.

Limits the Federal share of funding for eligible projects to 75 percent of the total cost, subject to specified exceptions.

Requires the Secretary to: (1) establish grant application procedures and requirements, subject to specified minimum standards; and (2) submit reports on security funding and compliance to specified congressional committees.

States that amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act (for FY 2007 through 2012) shall originate from duties collected by U.S. Customs and Border Protection.