In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of the debt itself that is the key factor in determining dischargeability.” 21 B.R. at 912. Therefore, in determining whether a debt to a former spouse is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support, the court must look behind the designation assigned by a state court, or by the parties themselves, as to whether or not a particular obligation was in the nature of support or a property settlement, and to determine the true nature of the obligation. Parisi v. White, 26 B.R. 572, 574 (Bankr.R.I.1983). With this test in mind, we turn to the relevant factors in determining wheth er payments are m the nature of support. Whether the payments are made contingent upon conditions reflecting a need for support is one relevant factor. Cf. Warren v. Taff, 10 B.R. 101, 104 (Bankr.Conn.1981) (<HOLDING>). In the present case the child support 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding that the failure to condition a transfer on death or remarriage of the wife was a factor showing that the transfer was not in the nature of alimony (C) holding transfer restriction granted right of first refusal in event of voluntary or involuntary transfer of stock (D) holding that a denial of transfer was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff asserted only that the transfer would allow him to work closer to home (E) holding that oneyear period commences on date of discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer

Output: holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court


Input: Consider Input: such equitable relief as may be appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). A. Serious Health Condition Wells Fargo first argues that Vincent did not suffer a “serious health condition” as that term is defined by the FMLA. The parties agree that the Court should examine the regulations implementing the FMLA in order to determine whether Vincent suffered from a serious health condition. The parties disagree, however, as to whether the interim regulations or the final regulations, which became effective on April 6, 1995, should be used by the Court in arriving at its determination. The Court finds that the interim regulations which were in effect in January of 1995, the time of Vincent’s termination, govern this action. See Gay v. Gilman Paper Company, 125 F.3d 1432, 1434 n. 4 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Having resolved the dispute as to which set 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it (B) holding that as the court has made clear in several recent decisions a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue (C) holding that the interim regulations governed a dispute in which the serious health condition and subsequent termination occurred prior to april 6 1995 the effective date of the final regulations (D) holding that iiriras effective date is april 1 1997 (E) holding that habeas petitions challenging judgments of conviction that became final before the effective date of the aedpa are not time barred if filed within one year from aedpas effective date april 241996

Output: holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it


Input: Consider Input: time for filing objections to discharge, see In re Gaines, 932 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.1991)—are not final. See, e.g., In re Rebear, 89 B.R. 314 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1988)(incidental procedural matters not immediately appealable). Those orders pose much less risk of leaving the bankruptcy estate with unwarranted assets or liabilities, or of denying creditors their lawful rights. C. The Finality of the Order in this Case Given the understanding of finality developed above, it is clear that the bankruptcy court’s denial of the motion to convert this ease from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 is not a final order for purposes of § 158(a)(1). See Stewart v. Kutner, 656 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. Unit A1981); In re Hebb, 53 B.R. 1003, 1005 (D.Md.1985); In re Klein/Ray Broadcasting, 100 B.R. 509 (9th Cir. BAP 1987)(<HOLDING>). An order denying a motion to convert does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bankruptcy courts decision to convert or dismiss a chapter 11 case is a matter within its discretion (B) holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory (C) holding that a bankruptcy court is given wide discretion to convert a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 for cause and an order for conversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (D) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (E) holding that a debtors right to convert his or her chapter 7 case is not absolute


Output: holding that a bankruptcy courts decision to convert or dismiss a chapter 11 case is a matter within its discretion