In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
plain error review because he did not object to the admissibility of the reports or to the testimony by Detective Duft about the report. See State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 427, 516 S.E.2d 106, 118 (1999) (plain error is error “so fundamental as to amount to a miscarriage of justice or which probably resulted in the jury reaching a different verdict than it otherwise would have reached.”). Indeed, Defendant never disputed that the material was cocaine. He chose not to defend on that basis, but rather focused on portraying himself as a homeless person making a delivery in exchange for beer and cigarettes. Since the identity of the substance was not challenged, the admission of the laboratory reports was harmless error. See State v. Edwards, - N.C. App. -,-, 621 S.E.2d 333, 337 (2005), (<HOLDING>); State v. Thompson, 110 N.C. App. 217, 225, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial delay for dna testing was attributable to the state but was mere negligence (B) holding that failure to require production of dna testing protocols was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the defendant did not dispute that he committed the crimes at issue but rather argued that he was mentally impaired (C) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause violation in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not require the conviction to be overturned (D) holding that harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis not applicable in habeas cases (E) holding the state failed to meet its burden of showing the erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not address the issue on appeal

Ex Output:
holding that trial delay for dna testing was attributable to the state but was mere negligence


Ex Input:
2. Although the substance of the inquiry remains the same, the Supreme Court has counseled that the question whether a defendant can show a violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights “is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). With that said, we do not quarrel with the district court’s analysis on this point. Several distinguished jurists continue to use the “standing” terminology as useful shorthand. See, e.g., United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir.2004) (Selya, J.) (acknowledging after Rakas that the term “standing” “is imprecise,” but adopting the usage “[f]or simplicity’s sake”). But, regardless of terminolo 1 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). As we observe below, the conclusion that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (B) holding a person who is present at anothers home with permission simply for the purpose of consummating a business transaction does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy there (C) holding that for purposes of federal constitutional law a person does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to trash discarded outside the home (D) holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business (E) holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence

Ex Output:
holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells


Ex Input:
residence. Upon arrival, the police recovered shell casings from a .40 caliber weapon. Robles told the police that he was not home when the shots were fired, and he denied-owning a .40 caliber weapon. Despite Robles’ denials, Detective Cabrera recovered a .40 caliber pistol that was registered to Robles. The police did not follow up with Robles or the witnesses. Once again, Robles was not charged. In August 2010, Johnson amended his pending PCRA petition to allege that the Commonwealth violated Brady by withholding the above-described police reports. The PCRA court dismissed Johnson’s amended petition as untimely. On appeal, however, this Court reversed and remanded for a merits review of Johnson’s Brady claim. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 619 Pa. 386, 64 A.3d 621 (2013) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). After remand, the PCRA court granted 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar (B) holding that coleman could use certain information to bring a new and separate suit even though that information was discovered subsequent to a violation of the courts protective order (C) holding that attorney abandonment constitutes an extraordinarycircumstance that allows a federal court to disregard the state procedural bar to hearing a habeas petition (D) holding that infirmities in state habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief (E) holding that the information discovered during the federal habeas proceedings constitutes newly discovered facts for pur poses of the b1ii exception to the pcras jurisdictional time bar

Ex Output:

holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar