In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: the Department must make in order to obtain the order it seeks in this action, as well as certain other issues that are likely to arise on remand. We conclude the Department's petition adequately sets forth the necessary elements it must prove in order to involuntarily treat Saenz: (1) that he has refused to consume food and fluids sufficient to maintain his health for an extended period; (2) that, as a result, he has been diagnosed by a physician as suffering from moderate to severe malnutrition, dehydration or other deleterious condition; and (3) that, pursuant to reliable medical opinion, Saenz is in imminent danger of suffering serious harm or death unless he is given medical treatment, including, if necessary, forced hydration and/or forced feeding. Cf. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. We next consider the Department's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest (B) holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate (C) holding that a detention officers alleged negligent conduct of failing to medically screen an inmate who later committed suicide in a holding cell  in violation of the police departments policies  was not the proximate cause of the inmates death when there was no evidence that the inmate would have been unable to kill himself if he had been medically screened and any claim that the inmate would have presented as suicidal in such screening was purely speculative (D) holding that the due process clause permits the state to involuntarily treat a prison inmate who is seriously mentally ill if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest (E) holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate  with antipsychotic drugs against his will under certain circumstances while not limiting treatment to those circumstances
[EX A]: holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest

[EX Q]: 55(c) motion on or before August 22, 2012, the 90th day after it was filed, that motion was denied by operation of law on that date, which denial terminated the trial court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v. Lenoir, 5 So.3d 1282, 1283 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (“The trial court loses jurisdiction to consider [a postjudgment] motion after the expiration of the 90-day period.”). Because its jurisdiction terminated on August 22, 2012, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the November 16, 2012, order purporting to set aside the default judgment against Thurmond; the March 16, 2013, order purporting to deny Thurmond’s summary-judgment motion; and the April 16, 2013, order purporting to enter a summary judgment in favor of Parrish. See Sibley v. Sibley, 90 So.3d 191, 193 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (<HOLDING>). A judgment entered by a trial court lacking 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void (B) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (C) holding trial court order which purportedly corrected divorce decree to alter marital property division was void because it was entered  after this court obtained jurisdiction (D) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (E) holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief
[EX A]: holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void

[EX Q]: while clearly a cause of the plaintiffs harm, do not create liability because of the intervention of independent judicial review, a superseding cause. We conclude that where, as here, the judicial officer is provided with the appropriate facts to adjudicate the proceeding but fails to proper ly apply the governing law and procedures, such error must be held to be a superseding cause, breaking the chain of causation for purposes of § 1983 and Bivens liability. Cf. Sheppard v. E.W. Scripps Co., 421 F.2d 555, 558 (6th Cir.1970) (concluding that any deprivation of a criminal defendant’s rights in a high profile murder case was a result of the manner in which the judge conducted the trial, thus breaking the chain of causation); Whittington v. Johnston, 201 F.2d 810, 811-12 (5th Cir.1953) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we reject Egervary’s argument that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a predeprivation opportunity to be heard satisfies the due process clause (B) recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard (C) holding that an opportunity to be heard by a contracting officer the very person deciding whether the plaintiff is a responsible contractor satisfies due process (D) holding that attorneydefendants role in instituting commitment proceedings was not the proximate cause of the due process violation suffered by the plaintiff where the presiding judge elected not to provide the plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to be heard (E) holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard
[EX A]:
holding that a predeprivation opportunity to be heard satisfies the due process clause