In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to intervene” as a linguistic tool to highlight how little personal participation the defendant had in the arrest in that particular case. The passage shows how far below the required minimum level of involvement that particular defendant exhibited. Read in whole, Brown more accurately shows that personal participation in an arrest, or supervisory control over the arresting officer, is required in order to establish liability for unlawful arrest — mere presence is not enough. However, even assuming Plaintiffs are correct, and that law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene in other officer’s unlawful arrests, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers or Alma Officers violated clearly established law in this case. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Canine Handlers and Alma Officers were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search (C) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force (D) holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant (E) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied
[A]: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim


[Q]: the information provided in the Unplanned Deviation Reports and investigation reports was an accurate depiction of the incidents occurred, and Acevedo has not shown otherwise. Lastly, this Court notes that Ceinos rated Acevedo in 2005 as “Fully Met Expectations,” which evinces a lack of animus towards Acevedo, insofar as he was accorded positive review by Ceinos despite previous performance issues. In essence, Plaintiffs ask us to excuse Acevedo’s performance by replacing Ceinos’ business judgment with his own absent proof that his employer’s findings were inaccurate or misleading, which is an untenable position in light of the applicable case law. Velazquez-Fernandez v. NCE Foods, Inc., 476 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir.2007) (citing Webber v. Int’l Paper Co., 417 F.3d 229, 238 (1st Cir.2005)) (<HOLDING>). Ex-Lax’s hiring practices, disciplinary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment (B) holding that an employees opinion of the efficacy of an employment decision standing alone cannot supplant the employers business judgment (C) holding that employers have standing to sue (D) holding employer cannot lawfully make the signing of an employment agreement which contains an unenforceable covenant not to compete a condition of continued employment an employers termination of an employee who refuses to sign such an agreement constitutes a wrongful termination in violation of public policy (E) holding that an employers sponsorship of an employees 01 visa does not establish an employment contract for a definite term
[A]: holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment


[Q]: States v. Cohen, 99 F.3d 69 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Hurst, 78 F.3d 482 (10th Cir.1996). Although Bellamy is correct to note that the Sentencing Commission expressed its intent that the Chapter 7 policy statements would only be the first step in a process that would ultimately lead to the promulgation of binding revocation guidelines, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(a) (2002), the Commission has not yet moved beyond this first step. Thus, absent any official action by the Commission, we are left with the policy statements and our law interpreting them. Applying our existing view of Chapter 7 to t f appeals have applied this reasoning in reaching the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 323 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Shaw, 180 F.3d 920, 922-23 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an error was not harmless when the district court chose the lowest end of the improper sentencing range after stating that even if the court isnt correct the court believes it is necessary to sentence at this very high range (B) holding that no notice is necessary when a court exceeds a range recommended by chapter 7 (C) holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7 (D) holding that only general rather than specific reasons must be stated when a court strays from the chapter 7 range (E) holding that the district court did not err by failing to specify a final adjusted sentencing range because we apply a presumption of reasonableness only to sentences falling within the initial sentencing range recommended under the guidelines and there is  no intrinsic need to specify an adjusted sentencing range to aid our appellate review
[A]:
holding that an error was not harmless when the district court chose the lowest end of the improper sentencing range after stating that even if the court isnt correct the court believes it is necessary to sentence at this very high range