In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: Third, the Kimmell court did not actually address whether future projections were actionable, but merely assumed that they were based on the procedural posture of the case and the issues addressed on appeal. Id. Finally, the Second Circuit noted that, “although the Appellate Division in Kimmell [implicitly] found that future prediction/projeetions could qualify as the basis for a negligent misrepresentation claim ..., that finding is contrary to the great weight of authority.” Id. The Court agrees with the Second Circuit’s analysis. The inquiry does not depend on whether the omission itself relates to a past or present fact. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the failure to disclose renders an existing statement of fact false or misleading. Cf. Metropolitan, 532 F.Supp.2d at 1290 (<HOLDING>). If this were not the case, almost any 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the cause of action (B) holding that an omission claim could not be maintained where plaintiff did not point to previous statements that were misleading without further disclosures (C) holding that a duty to disclose arises whenever secret information renders prior public statements materially misleading (D) holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading (E) holding that a cause of action based on an omission requires the plaintiff to show how an alleged omitted fact negates the truth of or renders misleading the statements actually made

Answer: (E)


Question: the genus of goods or services for which it seeks protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2), (b)(2); 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.32(a)(6), 2.71(a); TMEP § 1402.01; see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2014) (“Parties that choose to recite services in their trademark application that exceed their actual services will be held to the broader scope of the application.”); Octocom Sys., 918 F.2d at 942 (“[R]egistrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application.... ”). The PTO will generally accept any identification of goods or services so long as it is “specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise.” TMEP § 1402.01; see also In re Omega SA 494 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity (B) holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action (C) holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant (D) holding that it is within the discretion of the pto to require that ones goods be identified with particularity in a trademark application (E) holding that a rule 10b5 claim must be stated with particularity

Answer: (D)


Question: in Griffin in one or the other of the following respects: It either prohibits inviting the jury to do what the jury is perfectly entitled to do; or it requires the jury to do what is practically impossible. [Id. at 68, 120 S.Ct at 1124, 146 L.Ed.2d at 55 (footnoteq omitted).] Ultimately, the Court concluded that a prosecutor may accuse a defendant of tailoring based on trial presence because such com- merits are “appropriate” and “sometimes essential [ ] to the central function of the trial, which is to discover the truth.” Id. at 73, 120 S.Ct. at 1127, 146 L.Ed.2d at 59. Our appellate case law has, for decades, conformed to the Portuondo approach and permitted the kind of accusations allowed in that case. See State v. Buscham, 360 N.J.Super. 346, 366, 823 A.2d 71 (App.Div.2003) (<HOLDING>). In State v. Robinson, 157 N.J.Super. 118, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prosecutors reference to defendant being only witness in courtroom during testimony as tailoring opportunity not plain error (B) holding that a trial judges decision to close the courtroom during the testimony of a witness without making the requisite casespecific findings of fact was reversible error (C) holding that prosecutors reference to the fact that not one white witness has produced contradictory evidence was plain error (D) holding that prosecutors reference to code of silence among witnesses to shooting not plain error where argument finds support in record (E) holding that prosecutors reference to cooperation agreements with government witnesses was not plain error

Answer:
(A)