In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: by Ankeny should arise rarely and therefore would be unlikely to produce a swarm of cases involving excessive force searches. Also, officials and courts are far more competent to discern which extraordinary tactics constitute excessive force than to determine in the heat of the moment “what constituted] a reasonable wait time in a particular case” before entering' — usually a matter of calculating, wholly subjectively the appropriate number of seconds. Id. at 2166 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In fact, without any difficulty, we have in the past in a case remarkably similar to the one before us struck down, as constituting excessive force, specific tactics such as the ones used in the case before us. See, e.g., Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on the cost side, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding officers punch of an inmate was not excessive force (C) holding that ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing a lawyer into court was a judicial act (D) recognizing that the fourth amendment protects against the use of excessive force by police officers in carrying out an arrest (E) holding that officers had employed constitutionally excessive force by blindly throwing a flash bang grenade into an apartment occupied by five to eight individuals

A: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim
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Q: Sept. 3, 1998)(variance is not material “where the allegations and proof substantially correspond, the variance is not of a character which could have misled the defendant at trial and is not such as to deprive the accused of his right to be protected against another prosecution for the same offense”). A material variance is sometimes referred to as a “fatal variance.” We have not been consistent in requiring materiality, but have sometimes reversed upon a finding of variance without exploring the further question of materiality. Compare Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 625, 124 S.W. 668 (1910)(variance is not material unless it could mislead defense or expose defendant to danger of subsequent prosecution for same offense); Plessinger v. State, 536 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1976)(<HOLDING>) with Pedrosa v. State, 155 Tex.Crim. 155, 232 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error (B) holding that heightened evidentiary standard of proof is not required where the sentencing enhancement is based entirely on the extent of the conspiracy to which the defendant pled guilty (C) holding that where a defendant is misled and induced to plead by his counsels mistaken advice then he may be allowed to withdraw his plea (D) holding variance between enhancement allegation and proof renders evidence legally insufficient only if variance is material (E) holding variance in style of case pled for enhancement not material where defendant not surprised or misled to his prejudice

A: holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error
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Q: along with three other Duke physicians wrote a published article concluding that at the time of the x-rays, Carnell more likely suffered from a blood clot rather than pneumonia. Additionally, there was other evidence presented that Camell’s lung difficulties were not related to pneumonia, but instead due to a blood clot. Given the convincing evidence presented at trial supporting the defendants’ negligence, we find that the jury argument had a harmless effect, if any on the jury’s verdict. Although these statements may have been improper to the extent that the trial court should have given a cautionary instruction, we are unable to conclude that they were of such gross impropriety to entitle the defendants to a new trial. See State v. Vines, 105 N.C. App. 147, 412 S.E.2d 156 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we reject defendants’ first assignment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prosecutors statements regarding his opinion as to the truthfulness of a defense witness considering the evidence against the defendant did not reach the level of the grossly improper statements which would require the trial court to correct them ex mero motu (B) holding that erroneous admission of improper and prejudicial evidence did not require reversal because the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty against the defendant even without the prejudicial testimony (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu to prevent closing argument by the prosecutor that the defendant lied during his testimony (D) holding that the prosecutors repeated comments that the defendant could have denied knowledge of the drugs or rebutted the trafficking charge by testifying were so prejudicial as to constitute plain error (E) holding that the prosecutors argument attacking the integrity of defense counsel was of such gross impropriety as to justify ex mero mo tu correction however in light of the strong and convincing case against the defendant we could not hold that the prosecutrixs improper comments were sufficiently prejudicial as to require a new trial

A:
holding that prosecutors statements regarding his opinion as to the truthfulness of a defense witness considering the evidence against the defendant did not reach the level of the grossly improper statements which would require the trial court to correct them ex mero motu
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