In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: State, after expressing its clear and accurate understanding of the ... issue ..., deliberately steer[s] the District Court away from the question and towards the merits of [the] petition.” Wood v. Milyard, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (internal citation omitted). In Wood, the state had assured the district court that it was “not challenging, but d[id] not concede, the timeliness of the petition.” Id. at 1830. As in Wood, the state’s words and conduct cannot be described as an inadvertent mistake or forfeiture of the exhaustion defense, as was the case in Day, but instead they clearly evidence an express intention to waive the exhaustion requirement. As the First Circuit said, “[t]hat was game, set, and match.” Pike v. Guarino, 492 F.3d 61, 71-72 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits have also held this type of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal (B) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (C) holding that a waived issue ordinarily cannot be resurrected on appeal whereas a forfeited issue may be reviewed for plain error (D) holding statement that  petitioner is correct in her assertion that the claims presented  have been exhausted  was unmistakably clear and could not be resurrected on appeal alteration in original (E) holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court
Example Output: holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal

Example Input: has recently held that a police officer may order passengers out of a vehicle during a traffic stop without violating the passengers’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). The Court reasoned that the public interest in protecting an officer’s safety outweighed the minimal intrusion involved in requiring passengers to exit the vehicle. See id. at 413-15, 117 S.Ct. 882. The same rationale applies here. An officer may reasonably conclude that his safety is best protected by having the passengers remain in the vehicle. Further, the intrusion involved with having passengers remain in their vehicle is de minimis — the officer is merely maintaining the status quo. See United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 11 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Defendant Garner refused to comply with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop (B) holding that passengers of a vehicle which they did not own had standing to challenge the validity of a traffic stop (C) holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop (D) holding police officers making a traffic stop could order passengers out of the stopped car (E) holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction
Example Output: holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop

Example Input: agreed contract provides a clear and specific right of subrogation.” Id. at 651. As we indicated in Fortis Benefits, equitable doctrines conform to contractual and statutory mandates, not vice versa. Id. at 648. We further clarified that “contract-based sub-rogation rights should be governed by the parties’ express agreement and not invalidated by equitable considerations that might control by default in the absence of an agreement.” Id. at 650. Fortis Benefits eliminated the basis for the trial court’s judgment in this case, as Ortiz dealt with equitable subrogation, not, as here, contractual subrogation. Nonetheless, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, appearing to rely in part on the “made whole” doctrine but without expressly claiming to. 315 S.W.3d at 70 (<HOLDING>). Under Fortis Benefits, the “made whole” 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court erred in finding purported wife unavailable to testify and admitting her sworn prior statements in lieu of her live testimony where record did not support courts ruling in light of its own finding that remarriage of wife and defendant was fraudulent and wife did not refuse to testify if claim of privilege was denied (B) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife (C) holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees (D) holding trial court did not abuse discretion in setting aside inheritance exclusively to wife where it was kept in wifes name separate from husband and husband did nothing to contribute to the accumulation of the funds which were not treated as marital property or commingled with other marital assets (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion since there were not enough settlement funds to compensate sigmundiks wife and sons and thus in the words of sigmundiks wife there is nothing left for the estate alteration in original
Example Output:
holding trial court erred in finding purported wife unavailable to testify and admitting her sworn prior statements in lieu of her live testimony where record did not support courts ruling in light of its own finding that remarriage of wife and defendant was fraudulent and wife did not refuse to testify if claim of privilege was denied