In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
by “ ‘(1) the peculiar dignity and protection to which the law cloaks the human person, as contrasted with articles of commerce; (2) the inequality of the bargaining positions and relative intelligence of the contracting parties; (3) the amount of consideration received; (4) the likelihood of inadequate knowledge concerning future consequences of present injury to the human body and brain; and (5) the haste, or lack thereof, with which release was obtained.’ ” Finch, 84 Wn.2d at 146 (quoting Finch v. Carlton, 10 Wn. App. 32, 39, 516 P.2d 212 (1973) (McInturff, J., dissenting)). 2 A few cases have imposed an affirmative duty to explain contracts when the defendants know the signer is illiterate or speaks another language. See Scott v. Bodnar, 52 N.J. Super. 439, 145 A.2d 643 (1958) (<HOLDING>); S. Pac. Co. v. Gastelum, 36 Ariz. 106, 283 P. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding failure to explain consequence of signature to illiterate plaintiff could be grounds for avoiding release (B) holding that failure to explain allegations and possible consequences mandated reversal (C) holding that failure to explain the effect of a term of supervised release was harmless error where term of imprisonment combined with maximum imprisonment for violation of supervised release was still less than statutory maximum (D) holding that 24 hours is sufficient time for a plaintiff to review release (E) holding that fundamental error occurred and reversal was required when trial court failed to explain allegations or to explain adequately future use of adjudication record

Ex Output:
holding that failure to explain allegations and possible consequences mandated reversal


Ex Input:
protected activity for purposes of the first element of a prima facie case and the second element is not disputed. “To establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that ‘the decision-makers were aware of the protected conduct’ and ‘that the protected activity and the adverse employment action were not wholly unrelated.’ ” Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted). “[A]t a mini mum, [a plaintiff] must show that the adverse act followed the protected conduct.” Griffin v. GTE Fla., Inc., 182 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir.1999). In other words, the plaintiff must show a temporal link between a protected activity and an adverse employment action. See Sullivan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Griffin, 182 F.3d at 1281-82 (finding no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding causal link between alleged discriminatory remarks and adverse employment action insufficient (B) holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action (C) holding that an intervening act of misconduct by the plaintiff can break the causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action (D) holding that no causal link existed between protected activity in february 1994 and adverse employment actions in late 1994 and early 1995 (E) holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection

Ex Output:
holding causal link between alleged discriminatory remarks and adverse employment action insufficient


Ex Input:
address the precise language of the agreement. See id. at 1018. That case cannot stand for the proposition that any contractual rate of interest applies postjudgment, because that would conflict with the merger rule and would have made it unnecessary for the court in Hymel to emphasize that the contractual rate of interest applied both before and after judgment. 23 .See also Steven H. Reisberg & Kristin M. Pauley, An Arbitrator’s Authority to Award Interest on an Award Until "Date of Payment”: Problems and Limitations, 2013 Int’l Arb. L.Rev. 25, 29-30 ("To successfully ‘contract out’ of the statutory post-judgment interest rates, it is therefore critical that the language used specifically refer to the post-judgment period.”). 24 . Cf. also Carte Blanche, 888 F.2d at 264, 268-70 (<HOLDING>) 25 . See also Hosier v. Citigroup Global 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arbitration award of postaward interest at 8 accruing from the 31st day after service of this award  until final payment of the award  was insufficient to displace federal rate (B) holding that rule 60a is the proper vehicle for correcting a judgment in order to provide for an award of prejudgment interest where among other things governing law would make the interest award automatic or the district court clearly intended to make the interest award in its prior order (C) holding that arbitral award of 10 interest to the date or dates of payment merged into the judgment (D) holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict (E) holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due

Ex Output:

holding that arbitration award of postaward interest at 8 accruing from the 31st day after service of this award  until final payment of the award  was insufficient to displace federal rate