In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
[u]nder [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(l)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, ... a federal habeas [corpus] court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Applying these standards to the present case, the court’s inquiry must be whether the uit Court of Appeals case for the proposition that the application of a statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does not violate the ex post facto clause because it is a protective measure and does not impose any new or different punishment. See United States v. O’Neal (“O’Neal”), 180 F.3d 115, 124-25 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (criticizing Davis). Additionally, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding north carolina felony firearms act did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was a measured public safety provision and its applicability to previously convicted felons was eminently reasonable (D) holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive (E) holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause

Ex Output:
holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause


Ex Input:
is outside the ambit of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 891. Specifically, we held: Recall that in the majority of those cases, the court specifically considered whether the defendant invoked the right to remain silent and concluded that the defendant's statement or action was an invocation of the right. See Combs [v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 286 (6th Cir.2000), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 623, 148 L.Ed.2d 533 (2000)]; [United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997, 112 S.Ct. 1702, 118 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992)]; Coppola [v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1567 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 418, 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989)]; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (<HOLDING>)[, reh'g denied ]. Based on these cases and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously (B) holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer (C) holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously (D) holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent (E) holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent

Ex Output:
holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer


Ex Input:
on the large number of contradictions about fairly insignificant facts in the testimony to bolster his allegation of error. But this Court is not in the business of retrying cases; the ultimate fact-finder in a criminal trial must remain the jury. The jury heard all of the evidence, and witnessed the demeanor of the witnesses, as well as the give and take of the trial process. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury unless great injustice may result from an absolute misreading of the evidence, a situation which has not arisen here, particularly given the fact that Morris’s own statement inculpated him in the assaults. ¶ 12. It is settled that the jury may freely believe and disbelieve testimony to reach a verdict. See Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss.1983) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. State, 512 So.2d 666, 670 
 Holding statements: (A) holding jurors are the sole arbiters of witness credibility (B) holding that jurors may consider inconsistencies and deficiencies in testimony when assessing witness credibility (C) holding trial court is sole and exclusive judge of witnesses credibility (D) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (E) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses

Ex Output:

holding that jurors may consider inconsistencies and deficiencies in testimony when assessing witness credibility