In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

(9th Cir.1954) (concluding that expert opinions did not support jury verdict, in part because "[o]pinion evidence is only as good as the facts upon which it is based” and record did not support opinions). Here, for the reasons stated, the record demonstrates that the officers' percep tion of an immediate threat — whether correct or not — was clearly reasonable and therefore that their initial use of deadly force was justified. 9 . The situation Appellants faced here — having to determine in a split-second whether a suspect is using his vehicle as a weapon — is analogous to the scenario of an officer forced to make a split-second decision as to whether to use deadly force against a suspect who he believes has a firearm. See, e.g., McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 215-17 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that use of deadly force was justified when suspect in vehicle repeatedly refused orders to raise his hands and the officer perceived that he was holding something (B) holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger (C) holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon (D) holding that use of deadly force was justified against a suspect when officer forced to make a splitsecond decision relied on his reasonable belief that another officer had seen a gun in the suspects hands even though the suspects hands were handcuffed in front of him and the defendant officer never saw a weapon (E) holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station
holding that use of deadly force was justified when suspect in vehicle repeatedly refused orders to raise his hands and the officer perceived that he was holding something

individual has breached a duty of reasonable care. Bolick v. Sunbird Airlines, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 443, 386 S.E.2d 76 (1989), aff'd, 327 N.C. 464, 396 S.E.2d 323 (1990). Sudden emergency does not change or reduce the standard of reasonable care. It is simply one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a person acted reasonably under the circumstances. Id. The sudden emergency doctrine permits the court to call to the attention of the jury that an emergency faced by the actor may influence its determination of whether specific conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. The doctrine of sudden emergency is not a legal defense which operates to bar an action. Id. But cf. Hinson v. Brown, 80 N.C. App. 661, 343 S.E.2d 284, rev. denied, 318 N.C. 282, 348 S.E.2d 138 (1986) (<HOLDING>). External forces that have been found to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency (B) holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead (C) recognizing that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense a party must plead and prove (D) holding that a claim of exemption is an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded (E) holding that to avoid an affirmative defense  a plaintiff must plead specifically matters of affirmative avoidance pursuant to rule 5508
holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency

was unable to meet its burden of showing that remedy under § 1581(c) was manifestly inadequate. Id. at 964. Having found that the plaintiff-appellant could not establish standing under either § 1581(c), nor § 1581(i), the Miller court dismissed the Complaint. Id. Here, NuFarm is seeking to have its potential class members assert jurisdiction under § 1581(i), while NuFarm itself has already established jurisdiction under § 1581(a) for identical claims. See Plaintiffs Motion at 20 (stating “it appears that the great majority of the members of the class have jurisdiction for their claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). . . .”) Under Miller, the scope of § 1581(i) jurisdiction is “strictly limited.” Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 963 F. 2d 356, 360 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>). The Court of Appeals in Thomson examined a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the remedy under another subsection of  1581 is not manifestly inadequate because  1581s builtin safeguards and limitations    are not to be dismissed because they are inconvenient (B) holding that decisions that lie within the trial courts discretion are to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous (C) holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well (D) holding that surveys are admissible only if they are conducted with proper safeguards to insure accuracy and reliability (E) holding that legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute

holding that decisions that lie within the trial courts discretion are to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous