In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: put forth anything to convince the Court that further discovery could rectify this issue. Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to deny or defer Defendant’s Motion as premature. 4. Contractual Limitations on Time to Bring Suit A. How does KRS § 304.14-370 affect contractual limitation provisions? Kentucky law has long recognized “the validity of insurance contract provisions requiring as a condition to sue that the action must be ‘commenced within the time specified by the policy.’ ” Edmondson v. Penn. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 781 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Ky.1989) (internal citations omitted). Courts typically enforced such provisions unless they unreasonably limited the time in which parties could sue. See Ashland Finance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 474 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Ky. 1971) (<HOLDING>). However, KRS § 304.14-370 does place 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable (B) holding that discovery was appropriately tailored as it limited the request to information within a six year time period relating to one specific contract and the deposition of a person most knowledgeable (C) holding that section 10b and rule 10b5 suits must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation (D) holding that cogsa claims must be brought within one year from the time at which the loss occurred (E) holding that a blanket bond contract provision requiring a party to bring suit within one year after discovery of the loss was not unreasonable
[A]: (E)


[Q]: a habeas petition, and since his administrative remedies are now exhausted, this claim can proceed. B. Fox’s Notification Challenge is Properly Before The Court The second half of Fox’s claim relating to the notification requirement of the statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c)(2), is properly brought by him as a petition for a declaratory judgment. Notification claims do not relate to the fact or duration of confinement, therefore challenge to a notification requirement is not properly brought as a habeas petition. See Bunn v. Conley, 309 F.3d 1002, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The notification scheme [under 18 U.S.C § 4042(b) governing violent offender notification] in no way affects the duration, much less the fact, of confinement.”); Henrikson v. Guzik, 249 F.3d 395, 397 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (B) holding that because henrikson is not challenging the fact or duration of his confinement subject matter jurisdiction is not present under 28 us  2241 (C) holding that subject matter jurisdiction under  2241 is present in the custodial court when the petition challenges the manner location or condition of a sentences execution (D) holding that under the fsia personal jurisdiction   depends upon the district court finding subject matter jurisdiction under 28 usc  1330a and proper service under 28 usc  1608 (E) holding that district courts have jurisdiction under 28 usc  2241 to review cat claims for errors of law including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes
[A]: (B)


[Q]: that sexual harassment of men by women, or men by other men, or women by other women would not also be actionable in appropriate cases.” See also Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir.1994) (commenting that “we do not rule out the possibility that both men and women ... have viable claims against [a male supervisor] for sexual harassment”), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 733, 130 L.Ed.2d 636 (1995); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir.1993) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring) (arguing that “harassment is harassment regardless of whether it is caused by a member of the same or opposite sex”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1189, 127 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994); cf. Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 192 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Thus far, only the Fifth Circuit has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a single incident in which a coworker squeezed an employees buttocks was not sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the victims employment and create an abusive working environment (B) holding that homosexual advances by male coworker were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable (C) holding that harassing conduct not sufficiently severe and pervasive where conduct would not have affected the work environment of a reasonable person (D) holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where over twoweek period a coworker stood behind the plaintiff to create physical contact surreptitiously looked at the plaintiffs genitals in the restroom and engaged in unwanted touching (E) recognizing that conduct amounts to actionable sexual harassment only when it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victims employment and create an abusive working environment  alteration in original citation omitted
[A]:
(B)