In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 1024-25 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (J. Mark) (discussing the split of authority and explaining that Congress codified the result of In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d 797 (3d Cir.1985) which encouraged the use of debt repayment plans by ensuring that property acquired post-petition would not be subject to creditors’ claims if Chapter 13 proved unsuccessful). Courts which held that property acquired post-petition must be property of the Chapter 7 estate after conversion did so because they believed such policy was “necessary to discourage strategic, opportunistic behavior that hurts creditors without advancing any legitimate interests of the debtors.” In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 137 (7th Cir.1991). Lybrook, In re Colder, 973 F.2d 862 (10th Cir.1992), and In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>), base their results on policy concerns that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while state law determines the existence of a claim federal law determines when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes (B) holding for  1983 actions that although state law determines the limitations period federal law determines when the claim arises (C) holding that federal law determines definition of executory contract but that state law determines whether a material breach of the contract could occur (D) holding that date of conversion determines what exemptions apply (E) holding that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state law that determines the outcome of the case
[A]: holding that while state law determines the existence of a claim federal law determines when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes


[Q]: law. Courts were unwilling to recognize a common law cause of action against purveyors of intoxicating beverages because, as a matter of law, consumption, rather than the furnishing of alcohol, was considered the proximate cause of the ultimate damages. See Haafke, 347 N.W.2d at 384; Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Iowa 1982). Thus, dram shop statutes were enacted to enable tort plaintiffs to bridge the proximate cause gap between the sale of an intoxicating beverage and the subsequent injury or damage caused by the intoxicated patron. In exchange for this new claim, the legislature mandated that liquor purveyors were strictly liable and carefully prescribed the means by which liability may be ascertained. Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 227. The statute limits recovery for injuri 984) (<HOLDING>); Bauer v. Dann, 428 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa 
 Holding statements: (A) holding tavern employees could be held liable for negligently furnishing alcohol to a patron in violation of a criminal statute or ordinance (B) holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest (C) holding that employer who failed to take remedial action could be held liable for sexual harassment of employee by subcontractors employees (D) holding that tavern will be held liable for serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated patron who then foreseeably becomes involved in a motor vehicle accident (E) holding tavern owner not liable for injuries sustained when intoxicated patron assaulted a police officer
[A]: holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest


[Q]: Simply put, a causal connection between the Mr. Black’s DDOT disciplinary proceedings and his whistleblowing complaint is temporally impossible because Mr. Black did not make a formal whistleblow-ing complaint until months after his DDOT disciplinary proceedings started. Thus, Mr. Black has failed to state a plausible retaliation claim under the Whistleblower Protection Act. V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the District’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 1 . Mr. Black concedes that his defamation claim fails because he did not comply with D.C. Code § 12-309 prior to filing this lawsuit. Pl.’s Mem. Opp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss ("Pl.’s Mem. Opp."), Docket No. 15 at 20. See, e.g. Clark v. Flach, 604 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C.2009) (<HOLDING>). 2 . On February 12, 2013, Mr. Black filed a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation (B) holding that the purpose of  12309 is to allow the district to conduct a prompt investigation of the injured persons claim (C) holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report (D) holding that after a reasonable investigation an insurer must promptly settle a claim for the value or within the range assigned to the claim as a result of its investigation (E) holding that the irs has a law enforcement purpose in the context of a criminal tax investigation
[A]:
holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation