In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: see State v. Sosa, 1997-NMSC-032, ¶ 9, 123 N.M. 564, 943 P.2d 1017. {34} Defendant argues that two provisions in the current Delinquency Act suggest the Legislature’s intent to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the Section 32A-2-20 findings. These two provisions, Section 32A-2-24(B) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in probation revocation hearings), and Section 32A-2-16(E) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding), are readily distinguishable from the amenability determination under Section 32A-2-20(B). First, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding is constitutionally mandated. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. Second, a probation revocation hearing, l 7, 1140-41 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>); State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 649, 651, 674 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (D) holding that treatment as a child is not a constitutional right but a right granted by the legislature and statute met basic due process requirements (E) holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard

Output: holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel


Input: Consider Input: by [the motorist].” Freitas II, 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (citing Desmond, 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353) (brackets in original). In Desmond, the ICA noted that “it is advisable that, at the commencement of the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer inform the parties what procedure he or she will follow.” 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353 (emphasis added). In rejecting Freitas’s argument, this court observed that “procedural due process requires that a person have an ‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (quoting Farmer v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 94 Hawai'i 232, 238, 11 P.3d 457, 463 (2000)); cf. Padilla-Agustin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 21 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Since the hearing officer had advised Freitas 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due process requires not only notice but sufficient information to allow petitioner to prepare and present objection to the agencys preliminary action or decision (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action

Output: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner


Input: Consider Input: proceedings that we have come to expect in criminal proceedings. Accordingly, while the separation of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions is a hallmark of criminal proceedings, due process does not require the strict adherence to separation of functions in civil matters. [Thus], some combination of overlapping of functions in an administrative proceeding is not inconsistent with fundamental fairness. Id. (citations omitted). We also have addressed this issue, albeit tangentially, in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. In Moncier, we considered whether members of a hearing panel should have recused themselves on the ground of alleged bias due to the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions in the Board. As we wrote: When an assertio 4 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Goldstein v. Comm’n on Practice of Supreme 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process (B) holding a continuance of lawyer disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of related criminal proceedings is not constitutionally required (C) holding that michigans lawyer disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process because the functions of investigation prosecution adjudication and review are functionally separate and are handled by different individuals (D) holding that lack of notice of charges in disciplinary proceedings violates the due process clause (E) recognizing that individuals are generally not similarly situated when different decision makers are involved in the respective disciplinary action


Output: holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process