In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: and Defendants, therefore, terminated her employment without notice and an opportunity to be heard. A § 1983 claim for deprivation of procedural due process has three elements: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.2003). Thus, the Due Process Clause protects one’s job only where one has a property right in that job. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was a non-probationary employee in Alabama’s classified service and, therefore, had a property interest in her position. See Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.3d 1119, 1133-35 (Ala.2013) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution (B) holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state (C) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (D) holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law (E) holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: the interpretation of the statute has clearly been vested by a provision of law in the agency’s discretion. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c), (l). If the agency has been clearly vested with interpretive authority, we generally defer to the agency’s interpretation, and may grant relief only if the agency’s interpretation is “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” Id. § 17A.19(10)(i). If the agency has not been clearly vested with discretion to interpret the statute, “we are free to substitute our judgment de novo for the agency’s interpretation and determine if the interpretation is erroneous.” Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 589-90 (Iowa 2004) (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(e)). The legislature has delegated broad authority to 643 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Iowa 2002) (<HOLDING>). Section 147.76 clearly'vests the board of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding board cannot ignore the rules it adopts under the delegation of authority to prescribe rules for its governance and the governance of the university because such rules have the force and effect of statute (B) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (C) holding that director of police department does not have final policymaking authority in miamidade county despite having some discretionary authority (D) holding statute providing the director shall have the power and authority to prescribe all rules not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter necessary and advisable for its detailed administration and to effectuate its purposes vested authority in the department of revenue and finance to interpret section 4224520 (E) holding that congress had exceeded its authority by using its section five power under the fourteenth amendment to enact the statute
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: we overrule appellant’s first point of error. B. Finger-Counting and Hand-Clapping Tests In appellant’s second point of error, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting Trooper Pickett’s testimony concerning the manner in which appellant performed two other field sobriety tests, the “finger-counting” and “hand-clapping” tests. Appellant argues his performance of these tests constituted testimonial acts done prior to receiving his Miranda warning, which rendered testimony concerning appellant’s performance inadmissible. Appellant bases his argument upon the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990), as followed in Texas by Vickers v. State, 878 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1994, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court erred by admitting a doctors testimony that a child victims description of a sexual crime was very believable (B) holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss (C) holding that after review the minutes were unambiguous and the trial judge erred in admitting parol evidence (D) holding that the trial court erred by not considering whether ordering blood tests to disestablish paternity was in the best interest of the child (E) holding that trial court erred by admitting a video showing suspect taking sobriety tests consisting of the recitation of the alphabet from f to w and counting backwards from 90 to 75
[EX A]:
(E)