In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: (2013) (ex plaining the FDA’s view that “promoting a drug for an off-label use is a violation” of the FDCA’s misbranding provisions). Based on this view, the FDA has recovered millions of dollars in settlements from drug manufacturers that have engaged in off-label promotion. See, e.g., id. at 232 (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History, (Sept. 2, 2009) (trumpeting a mul-ti-billion dollar fine imposed against a drug company that promoted its drugs for uses and dosages that the FDA specifically declined to approve)). The FDA’s informal interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to some deference from courts. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944) (<HOLDING>). But courts have not always agreed with the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation (B) holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference (C) holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law (D) holding that an agencys informal interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference to the extent it has the power to persuade (E) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference

A: holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation
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Q: separate recording of the trust or declaration of trust. As there is no evidence on the face of the deeds indicating a. contrary intent, the Personal Representatives, pursuant to their fiduciary responsibilities, seek a declaration that, pursuant to section 689.07(1), Norman held fee simple title to the properties on the date of his death. These allegations are clearly sufficient under the plain language of the statute. See Raborn, 974 So.2d at 328 (stating that under section 689.07(1), a deed that simply refers to grantee as “trustee” conveys a fee simple estate, and applying the statute to find that deed at issue fell under “contrary intention” exception such that grantee held mere legal title as trustee); One Harbor Fin, Ltd. v. Hynes Props., LLC, 884 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Heiskell v. Morris, 182 So.3d 714 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title (B) holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence (C) holding that trial court erred by granting surviving spouse fee simple title to estates exempt property (D) holding that trial court correctly applied section 689071 to find that grantee who held title as trustee owned property in fee simple absolute (E) holding that where individual held title to property as trustee but gave mortgage to bank in her individual capacity a title reference on the mortgage to the deed into her as trustee provided constructive notice that the mortgage was supposed to be from the individual as trustee or at the least that the holder of a subsequent interest would not be a bona fide purchaser

A: holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title
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Q: Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981) (stating that the risk of corruption in cases involving candidate elections is not present in a popular vote on a public issue). The mere fact that advocacy “may influence the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it.” City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 298, 102 S.Ct. 434 (citation omitted). Because “ballot initiatives do not involve the risk of ‘quid pro quo’ corruption present when money is paid to, or for, candidates,” Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 119 S.Ct. 636, 648, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999), this Court does not find the anti-corruption interest to being sufficiently important to justify § 11.30’s chilling effect upon free speech. See also, Swaffer, 610 F.Supp.2d at 970 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the asserted interest in providing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding minnesotas patterned sex offender senfence enhancement statute unconstitutional as applied to one defendant and noting our doubts as to whether the statute could ever be constitutionally applied (B) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants (C) holding that a litigant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute if the law is unconstitutional as applied to that particular litigant (D) holding pennsylvania state ethics act unconstitutional as applied to former judges (E) holding  1130 to be unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff

A:
holding minnesotas patterned sex offender senfence enhancement statute unconstitutional as applied to one defendant and noting our doubts as to whether the statute could ever be constitutionally applied
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