TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir.1997). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quotation omitted). We may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.1991). Plaintiff argues that (1) the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ ignored medical evidence of her disability; (2) the ALJ failed to analyze plaintiffs pain properly under Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 162-64 (10th Cir.19 95) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, plaintiff has not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding aljs listing of factors he considered was inadequate when court was left to speculate what specific evidence led the alj to his conclusion (B) holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion (C) holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion and thus the aljs unexplained conclusion was beyond meaningful review (D) holding the record must demonstrate that the alj considered all of the evidence and the alj must discuss  the evidence supporting his decision  the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon and significantly probative evidence he rejects (E) holding an aljs failure to adequately explain the weight given to treating sources opinions not harmless because the aljs reasoning was not sufficiently specific to make clear that the alj recognized and evaluated the treating relationships

SOLUTION: holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion

PROBLEM: however, had received the full procedural due process to which he was entitled for the 1996 events to which the court was referring. The events, in fact, culminated in a decision and order of the Lincoln County Appeal Board calling for Pratt’s reinstatement. Defendants, therefore, are entitled to a summary judgment on this issue. Furthermore, because the LCPO has been dissolved, the issue of Pratt’s employment status, particularly after he was reinstated, is now moot. B. Constitutionally Protectable Property Interest Neither Exists In Pratt’s Job Duties Nor In Pratt’s Suspension When Such Suspension Is With Pay. [¶ 19] Pratt argues the defendants are not entitled to a qualified immunity because the defendants obstructed the reinstatement order of the Appeal Board -42 (4th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Fields v. Durham, 909 F.2d 94, 98 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under article i section 9 a person has no constitutionally protected privacy interest in abandoned property (B) holding inmates possess a constitutionally cognizable property interest in the interest earned on money held in their prison accounts (C) holding that sovereign immunity does not protect the state from claims for statutory employment benefits that constitute a protected property interest (D) holding that constitutionally protected property interest in employment does not extend to right to possess and retain particular job or to perform particular services (E) holding parental rights are constitutionally protected fundamental interest

SOLUTION: holding that under article i section 9 a person has no constitutionally protected privacy interest in abandoned property

PROBLEM: vis-á-vis a jointly tried co-defendant. 391 U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620. A statement is powerfully incriminating only when it is inculpatory on its face. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1702. The confession in Bruton fit that description because it identified both the declarant and his codefendant by name as the perpetrators of the crime. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Statements that are incriminating only when linked to other evidence in the case do not trigger application of Bruton’s preclusionary rule. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702. This criterion is easier to state than to apply; for example, it does not allow a prosecutor merely to delete a codefen-dant’s name. See, e.g., Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Zuñiga and Vega challenge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a codefendants sentence is not relevant to an appellants guilt innocence or punishment (B) holding that simply replacing a codefendants name with a symbol or a blackedout space is insufficient to wrest an inculpatory statement from brutons precedential orbit (C) holding recording of eyewitnesss inculpatory statement made in custodial interrogation testimonial in nature (D) holding that a defendant was pot unduly surprised by the delayed disclosure of evidence showing that he made an inculpatory statement (E) holding that where a defendants name is replaced with a neutral pronoun as long as identification of the defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other than the redacted confession and a limiting instruction is given to the jury there is no bruton violation

SOLUTION:
holding that a codefendants sentence is not relevant to an appellants guilt innocence or punishment