In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: reimbursement decisions to be made on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 549. Of note here, we explained that “even if the Commission had promulgated fee guidelines, the provider would not have a statutory right or privilege to be paid the amount set out in the guideline.” Id. According to East Side, Vista is, likewise, neither entitled to a fee guideline nor entitled to any set amount of reimbursement. See id. Given that no specific reimbursement amount is required, even where the Division has established fee guidelines, and that the Division can reason ng statute and rule as whole to find broad definition of “prohibited activities” and absence of definition for “market power” as providing constitutionally permissible notice of type of prohibited conduct contemplated); Tinning, 875 S.W.2d at 409 (<HOLDING>). The language in these cases, similar to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (B) holding term share legal fees although not expressly defined provides adequate notices of type of conduct it would include (C) holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment (D) holding that although term was not limited by the specification it was expressly defined in a narrow manner in the prosecution history (E) holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution
[A]: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance


[Q]: 393 N.W.2d 286, 290-91 (S.D.1986). • GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, (dissenting).. [¶ 26.] I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the lower court on Issue 2. I would hold the trial court erred when it granted partial summary judgment to 01-esens, holding City’s operation of food service at the municipal bar was an ultra vires act. [¶27.] An express grant of authority from the legislature “includes those incidental or implied powers that are necessary to enable a municipality to perform the function authorized.” City of Rapid City v. Rensch, 77 S.D. 242, 246, 90 N.W.2d 380, 383 (1958) (citation omitted). A municipality is vested with discretion as to how it exercises specific powers conferred upon it by the legislature, as long as the methods employed are n , 59 N.W.2d 732, 734 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Actions taken under a municipality’s implied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding municipality had implied authority to enter into a long term contract to establish a golf course although state statute did not specifically grant authority to establish golf courses as public parks (B) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (C) holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority (D) holding that plaintiff had no authority or statutory right for actions proper course was to report actions to proper legal authority (E) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality
[A]: holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute


[Q]: Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 8 . Marquez v. State, 921 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S-Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968)). 9 . "The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense other than a capital felony case [seeking the death penalty] ... shall have the right, upon entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by jury. ...” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.13. 10 . Marquez, 921 S.W.2d at 220 ("While article 1.13 provides for the method by which a jury may be waived, it does not provide for the undoing of such waiver.”). 11 . Id. at 221. 12 . Id. at 222. 13 . Id. at 223. 14 . Id. (citing Wheatfall v. State, 882 S.W.2d 829, 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 15 . Id. See also Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 199 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify an attorney based on a matter not raised by the opposing party until only weeks prior to trial (C) holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow questions regarding victims status as a child (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing amendments to pleadings because they came too late (E) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial
[A]:
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify an attorney based on a matter not raised by the opposing party until only weeks prior to trial