In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and § 1981 the exclusive remedies for employment discrimination by a municipality and its employees, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under § 1983. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss Johnson’s § 1983 claims. AFFIRMED. 1 . Count Eight asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim against the individual defendants for alleged conspiracy to violate Johnson's § 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment rights. This count is not at issue on this appeal. 2 . The defendants also moved to dismiss the § 1981 claim. The district court granted dismissal against the City only, citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2722, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (<HOLDING>). 3 .We review de novo a question of law 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in  1981 by state governmental units (B) holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment (C) holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies (D) holding that where it is alleged that state has violated rights conferred by constitution governmental immunity is not available in state court action but declining to infer a right to sue the state for damages on the basis of a violation of the michigan constitution (E) holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law

Output: holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment


Input: Consider Input: removed. Section 141(b) does not contemplate that a director’s term could end through board shrinkage. A bylaw that seeks to achieve this result conflicts with Section 141(b) and is void. This interpretation of Section 141(b) comports with how our law has developed. Under the common law, “the voluntary assumption of management responsibility by the directors carried with it a concomitant vested right to serve out the full term for which they were elected unless there was cause for removal....” Drexler, supra, § 13.01, at 13-2; see Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del.Ch.1988) (“At common law a director had a vested right in his position arising from his duties and responsibilities to the corporation.”); see also Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857 (Del.Ch.1957) (Seitz, C.) (<HOLDING>). “Prior to 1967, the [DGCL] was silent as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders (B) recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause (C) recognizing common law privileges (D) recognizing the presidents authority to remove sec members for good cause despite governing statutes silence (E) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary

Output: holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders


Input: Consider Input: distribution crimes applies when “a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed” by the defendant. USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). The adjustment is appropriate “if the weapon is present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” Id., comment. (n.3). Thus, the guideline clearly requires that before the enhancement is imposed, the government must establish that a weapon is at least present. This circuit has consistently held that in order for § 2D1.1(b)(1) to apply, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a dangerous weapon was present when the crimes ioere committed, and that it was not clearly improbable that the weapon had some nexus with the criminal activity. See United States v. Shields, 44 F.3d 673, 674 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). See also United States v. Bost, 968 F.2d 729, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding enhancement not appropriate because firearms were seized from defendants home thirtyseven days after last known drug sale occurred (B) holding that a city which brought an action for forfeiture of firearms recovered from a drug suspects residence was collaterally estopped from introducing evidence of drug possession thus it could not prove the firearms were used in drug transactions and could not forfeit them (C) holding that unloaded firearms qualify for this enhancement (D) recognizing firearms as common tools of the drug trade (E) holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish at time warrant was issued the required nexus between the contraband to be seized which was mailed to defendants post office box and defendants home


Output: holding that a city which brought an action for forfeiture of firearms recovered from a drug suspects residence was collaterally estopped from introducing evidence of drug possession thus it could not prove the firearms were used in drug transactions and could not forfeit them