TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 1257, 10 L.Ed.2d 389 (1963). At the outset, we consider the effect of TAPAA’s introductory paragraph. Section 1653(c)(1) prescribes that, “Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law,” the owner of a vessel carrying trans-Alaska oil and the Fund “shall be strictly liable without regard to fault in accordance with the provisions of this subsection....” 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1). Section 1653(c)(1) is the general statement of liability, and as such it introduces the subsequent subsections which contain TAPAA’s operational details. While some courts have found “notwithstanding” phrases to preempt explicitly the application of other laws, see, e.g., Complaint of Hokkaido Fisheries Co., Ltd., 506 F.Supp. 631, 634 (D.Alaska 1981) (<HOLDING>), we do not find the phrase dispositive in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that denial of permit under section 404 of the clean water act was a taking (B) holding that district courts are without jurisdiction to review preenforcement orders issued under the clean water act (C) holding that adequate notice is a mandatory precondition of a clean water act citizen suit (D) holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act (E) holding that similar notwithstanding language in the clean water act preempted application of limitation act to limit owners liability for cleanup costs

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: the Title VII limitations period is an affirmative defense; rather, it referred to the filing period as something "like a statute of limitations” which "generally create affirmative defenses.” See Gordon, 675 F.2d at 360. Furthermore, Gordon's discussion came in response to the defendant’s (rejected) claim that the filing period was jurisdictional and did not purport to address, let alone decide, whether compliance with the filing deadline was condition precedent or an affirmative defense. 13 . Plaintiffs have not argued waiver, estoppel, or that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply to cure their tardy filings, and based on the facts before us, we see nothing demanding their application. See, e.g., Biester v. Midwest Health Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Rather, each housekeeper who was told to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that equitable tolling of a statute of limitations may be triggered 1 where a plaintiff has actively pursued his judicial remedies by a filing a defective pleading during the statutory period or 2 where a plaintiff was induced or tricked by his adversarys misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass (B) holding that equitable tolling applied where insurance company statements and conduct lulled plaintiff and his attorney into believing that plaintiffs uninsured motorist claim was properly filed (C) recognizing equitable tolling in the title vii context where the plaintiff has been deceived lulled into inaction actively misled or has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her rights quotations and citations omitted (D) holding equitable tolling appropriate where a party is prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights (E) holding title vii subject to equitable tolling

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: “Under the FAA, absent unmistakable evidence that the parties intended the contrary, it is the courts rather than arbitrators that must decide ‘gateway matters’ such as ... [w]hether an arbitration agreement is binding on a nonparty....” In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex.2005) (orig.proceeding). We do not believe the cited provisions constitute “unmistakable evidence” that the parties intended for an arbitrator to decide whether nonparties are bound by the arbitration agreement, particularly in light of established Texas law placing the initial burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and claims within the scope of that agreement on the party seeking to compel arbitration. See J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>); In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party attempting to compel arbitration must first establish that the dispute in question falls within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement (B) holding trial court must decide whether to compel arbitration of personal injury claim of party who was not signatory to arbitration agreement (C) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (D) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (E) recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement

SOLUTION:
(A)