In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: CBL claim that if the merger is effected, the public will be harmed because Sparrow Hospital will no longer provide late re at the incipiency and block the merger. This court does not find irreparable injury will result from not enjoining the merger because this court sees a very minimal probability that a divestiture would ever be warranted in the future. For reasons that will be explained infra, this court is of the opinion that plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits. Also, plaintiffs claim that if the merger is not enjoined they may lose standing to challenge it, thereby suffering irreparable harm. This court finds no merit in this contention. In making this argument, plaintiffs rely on the case of Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric 477, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (<HOLDING>). For instance, as described above, GLASCCO and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (B) holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts (C) holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation (D) holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing (E) holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit

A: (E)
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Q: to the poisonous tree”) (quoting Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1117). To be able to object to the police conducting an illicit protective sweep of the Gonzalez residence, Defendant would have to have some basis to claim that the sweep violated his rights. He does not. We conclude, therefore, that his subsequent detention was lawful. 2. Defendant’s detention occurred after the police had conducted the sweep of Gonzalez’s residence, and only an individual with a legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence could object to the sweep. After entering the garage, officers acted reasonably in detaining Defendant when they caught him red handed with large quantities of marijuana, cuttings tools, and scales in plain sight. See United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337, 1344 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). We reject any contention that the officers 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the standard of probable cause applies to all arrests without the need to balance the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations thus an officer may without violating the fourth amendment arrest an offender if probable cause exists to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence (B) holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it (C) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment (D) holding a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the fourth amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed (E) holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed

A: (D)
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Q: It was undisputed, ho nkruptcy petition on March 7, 2001. The petition scheduled the Board as a priority creditor in the estimated amount of $10,000. The bankruptcy court then sent the Board official notice of the petition. The notice indicated that the meeting of creditors would be held on April 19, 2001, and that the claims bar date for governmental claims was September 3, 2001. The parties do not dispute that this notice complied with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, the Board does not contend that it did not receive this official notice. Therefore, like the creditor in Gregory, the Board received constitutionally adequate notice of its right to payment — in the form of the official notice mandated by the Bankruptcy Code — and it ignored the Joyes’ bankruptcy 88) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as the Joyes correctly point out, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a creditor who had received actual notice of a bankruptcy proceeding through his counsel did not suffer a due process violation because he had notice in time to file a complaint or at least to file a timely motion for an extension of time (B) holding that where an action is brought by the debtors at the initial proceeding the appeal of that action is not a continuing proceeding against the debtors (C) holding that because creditor did not file a proof of claim on a prepetition contract matter the peculiar powers of the bankruptcy court had not been invoked (D) holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons (E) holding that the operative fact is whether or not the creditor has notice of the debtors bankruptcy proceeding in time to file a timely proof of claim

A:
(E)
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