In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
money judgment can be satisfied out of any of the defendant’s assets.” Billman, 915 F.2d at 920 (citing United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 800-03 (7th Cir.1985)). Consequently, after a conviction on a forfeiture count, the district court may order forfeiture of the defendant’s substitute assets. The Billman Court then examined the question of whether substitute assets could be restrained pending trial and ruled in the affirmative. 915 F.2d at 920-21. With an eye to the remedial purposes of the forfeiture statute, the court read the provision allowing for a restraining order in connection with the substitute assets provision as calling for the preservation and restraint of substitute assets pending trial. Id. at 921; see also United States v. Skiles, 715 F.Supp. 1567 (N.D.Ga.1989) (<HOLDING>). The Fourth Circuit in Billman relied on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that additional witnesses were not needed to corroborate the defendants drug abuse problems because counsel had already introduced sufficient evidence of drug use (B) holding that prior drug trafficking conviction was admissible to prove intent to distribute (C) holding that a state conviction is a drug trafficking offense because the trafficked drug is listed in a csa schedule (D) holding in the drug trafficking context that the government is allowed to restrain additional assets pretrial to ensure sufficient assets for forfeiture (E) recognizing the connection between guns and drug trafficking

Ex Output:
holding that additional witnesses were not needed to corroborate the defendants drug abuse problems because counsel had already introduced sufficient evidence of drug use


Ex Input:
venture” (FAC ¶ 39) are similarly insufficient. See Cannon v. Douglas Elliman, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-7092, 2007 WL 4358456, at *4 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007) (“[Pjleading a joint venture does not trigger joint employer status because it is possible for joint ventures to separately employ different people .... ”); Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Techs., L.L.C., No. 08-CV-5430, 2009 WL 513496, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) (“Plaintiff joint employer allegations are insufficient because they are legal conclusions, not factual allegations, .... While plaintiff is not required to conclusively establish that defendants were her joint employers at the pleading stage, plaintiff must at least allege some facts in support of this legal conclusion.”) cf. Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 635-36 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs arguments that these Defendants 
 Holding statements: (A) holding under flsa 29 usc  216c (B) holding that the authorization under 29 usc  1132a3 extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary party in interest to a transaction barred by 29 usc  1106a (C) holding under 29 usc  216c (D) holding that the finding that entities constitute a single enterprise under 29 usc  203r is separate and distinct from whether an entity is an employer under 29 usc  203d (E) holding that the defendant is in the best position to prove and should bear the burden of establishing its entitlement to an exemption under 29 usc  1108 from 29 usc  1106b erisas prohibited transactions provision

Ex Output:
holding under flsa 29 usc  216c


Ex Input:
Dev. Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir.1992) (noting that substantive due process claims should be limited to “truly irrational” governmental action). Therefore, we conclude that the officers are entitled to summary judgment on appellees’ due process claim. III. The second incident occurring on September 21, 1996, involves appellants Offi cer Stanley and Sergeant Aldrich. These appellants contend that the district court should have granted them qualified immunity on appellees’ Fourth Amendment and due process claims. A. Fourth Amendment As stated above, the relevant inquiry in a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim is whether the officers had probable cause to arrest appellees. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 142, 99 S.Ct. at 2693-94; Hannah, 795 F.2d at 1389 (<HOLDING>). Appellees claim that Officer Stanley and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause (B) recognizing the defense of good faith and probable cause in  1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest (C) holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause (D) holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury (E) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment

Ex Output:

recognizing the defense of good faith and probable cause in  1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest