In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s detention.” Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381, 97 S.Ct. 1224, 51 L.Ed.2d 411 (1977); see also St 06 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (same). Whether RIDA created an adequate substitute for habeas corpus for those aliens to whom a petition for review is available, however, is different from whether RIDA created any adequate substitute for those aliens for whom it is no longer available. Unlike in previous cases where we have upheld RIDA against Suspension Clause challenges, Singh never had the ability to obtain judicial review of the merits of his removal through a petition for review filed within 30 days of his removal order. Cf. Puri, 464 F.3d at 1043; Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). By the time RIDA created jurisdiction in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law (B) holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (C) holding that  109g2 does not apply when the creditor seeking relief in the first case received the requested relief (D) holding that a rule 60b motion that presents grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief or seeks to add a new ground for relief requires authorization (E) holding that ridas elimination of habeas corpus does not violate the suspension clause where the petitioner had a means for seeking relief direct review  and simply failed to pursue the relief that the statutory scheme allows
[A]: (E)


[Q]: 2001) (describing the denial of a jury trial as a structural defect requiring automatic reversal). Similarly, every Florida district court of appeal has issued a decision reversing a conviction obtained without a valid waiver of a jury trial. See, e.g., Montero v. State, 780 So.2d 917, 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because the record failed to show that the defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial); Hyler v. State, 732 So.2d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (concluding that a conviction must be reversed where the record contained no written waiver and did not reflect an inquiry by the trial court that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial); Gamble v. State, 696 So.2d 420, 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); Sansom v. State, 642 So.2d 631, 631 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to inform the defendant of the minimum possible sentence meant that the defendant did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and his rights were therefore automatically substantially affected (B) holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to a sixperson jury and the failure to consult the defendant as to his wishes was an error for which a new trial was the only remedy (C) holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error (D) holding that failure to inform the defendant of the constitutionally mandated right to a sixperson jury when one juror became ill after the jury had been sworn but before trial had begun and the defendants attorney waived his rights without consulting defendant mandates a new trial (E) holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence
[A]: (B)


[Q]: doctrine does not preclude Hawkins from asserting that his judgment debt is dischargeable. The New Jersey state court proceeding dealt exclusively with the issue of whether plaintiff-creditor suffered injuries due to defen dant-debtor’s actions. The issue of whether Hawkins’ actions during the altercation constituted willful and malicious acts as defined by Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code was “ ‘unknown, unarisen, or unaccrued at the time of the original action.’ ” Id. Hawkins voluntarily filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection months subsequent to the entry of the default judgment against him. Thus, the state court neither had reason to deal with the dischargeability of the debt at issue, nor did it have jurisdiction to do so. See Brown, 442 U.S. at 127, 99 S.Ct. 2205 (<HOLDING>). Given these findings, the Court must deny 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bankruptcy courts as compared to state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine issues of dischargeability under the bankruptcy code (B) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate (C) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (D) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code (E) holding that pursuant to federal statute and the courts inherent equitable powers a bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue a separate money judgment after determining the amount and dischargeability of a claim
[A]:
(A)