In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word “claimant” in subsection four. Under the plurality’s view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word “claimant” in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of “prevailing party.” This is because, in order for the word “claimant” in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid
[A]: (A)


[Q]: of the property. See C.R.E. 602; C.R.E. 701. However, there is no evidence in the record which establishes that Pomeranz ever paid a bill relating to the maintenance of the property or that he was personally responsible for any aspect of the maintenance because McDonald’s had been responsible for the payments for the past fifteen years. Because no adequate evidentiary foundation was laid for Pomeranz’s estimation of maintenance expenses on the property, it is impossible, absent pure speculation, to ascertain from the record how Pomeranz obtained the $4,800 estimation. The trial court's factual findings relating to future maintenance expenses are not sustained by either competent or adequate evidence and are therefore clearly erroneous. See Anderson, 170 Colo. at 13, 458 P.2d at 758 (<HOLDING>). The evidence presented by the petitioners on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact (B) holding that a reviewing court will only presume that the trial court made implicit factual findings when such findings were necessary to its ultimate conclusion (C) holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings (D) holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence (E) holding that where the original drug quantity determination is not specific enough for the district court to determine whether it has the authority to reduce a defendants sentence under  3582c2 that court may make new findings of fact that are supported by the record and are not inconsistent with the findings made in the original sentencing proceedings
[A]: (D)


[Q]: that the “claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” §2244(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added); §2244(b)(4). Relying on Circuit precedent, see Brown v. Leming, 171 F. 3d 1031 (CA5 1999); In re Smith, 142 F. 3d 832 (CA5 1998), the Court of Appeals concluded that Tyler did not meet this standard because he “could not show that any Supreme Court decision renders the Cage decision retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” App. 15. The Courts of Appeals are divided on the question whether Cage was “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,” as required by 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Compare Rodriguez v. Superintendent, 139 F. 3d 270 (CA1 1998) (<HOLDING>); Brown, supra (same); In re Hill, 113 F. 3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that child support should have been made retroactive (B) holding the supreme court has not held in a case or a combination of cases that the rule in johnson is retroactive to cases on collateral review and therefore it has not made johnson retroactive (C) holding that cage has been made retroactive to cases on collateral review (D) holding that the act is not retroactive (E) holding that cage has not been made retroactive by the supreme court
[A]:
(E)