In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: otherwise nonremovable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). While the amended third-party complaint alleges a claim involving a federal question against the Chase Defendants, the Circuits are split on whether section 1441(c) permits removal by a third-party defendant. Compare Lewis v. Windsor Door Co., 926 F.2d 729, 733 (8th Cir.1991) (‘We do not ... believe § 1441(c) was intended to effect removal of a suit, not otherwise within federal jurisdiction, because of the introduction of a third-party claim.” (internal quotations omitted)) and First Nat’l Bank of Pulaski v. Curry, 301 F.3d 456, 465 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) with Carl Heck Eng’rs, Inc. v. Lafourche 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct (B) holding that removal under section 1441c may only be done by the original defendant (C) holding that  1441c does not allow the remand of claims that are not separate and independent (D) recognizing that  1441c limits removal to situations in which a federal question is joined with a separate and independent claim of a nonfederal nature (E) holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand

A: (B)
****
Q: a result, he had assented to the Estate’s producing the letters. Despite their lack of objection prior to producing the documents, the Opposing Parties contend the Estate “inadvertently” produced the documents and, further, that the stipulated protective order in this ease (the “Protective Order”) requires KFI to return the documents. KFI argues the Estate voluntarily produced the documents. As detailed herein, this court finds the documents were not inadvertently disclosed. When parties stipulate to a protective order requiring the return of inadvertently produced documents, the agreement is enforceable if the proponent actually produced the document(s) inadvertently and otherwise complies with the terms of the order. See VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 11-12 (D.Mass.2000) (<HOLDING>). Absent an agreement, courts have applied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in agency adjudications in which the government has not claimed privilege written reports made at the time of an event must be produced when the credibility of the witness on matters discussed in the report is in question (B) holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply fully against the government because the possibility of harm to a private party is often if not always grossly outweighed by the public interest in enforcement of congressionally mandated public policy (C) holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing (D) holding that where the district court decided two issues in the certified order but identified only the damages issue as the controlling question of law the court of appeals could nonetheless address the other issue (E) holding stipulated protective order mandated return of two documents inadvertently produced with approximately 25000 intentionally produced pages proponents established that the production of the materials at issue was not a considered or grossly negligent decision but the result of inattention ie inadvertence

A: (E)
****
Q: than liability for contributory infringement of a copyright. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984); Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 806; Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265 (noting that "trademark infringement liability is more narrowly circumscribed than copyright infringement”). Under copyright law, generalized knowledge that copyright infringement may take place in an Internet venue is insufficient to impose contributory liability. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir.2001) ("The mere existence of the Napster system, absent actual notice and Napster’s demonstrated failure to remove the offending material, is insufficient to impose contributory liability.”); Hendrickson, 165 F.Supp.2d at 1088-90 (<HOLDING>). 38 . Of course, a NOCI was not a notice of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that generalized notice of copyright infringements was insufficient to establish knowledge for the purpose of contributory liability (B) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (C) holding that mere authorization and approval of copyright infringements taking place outside the united states is not a copyright violation and does not create jurisdiction over those extraterritorial acts (D) holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply (E) holding manufacturers generalized knowledge of concerns insufficient to meet ucc notice requirement

A:
(A)
****