In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: rights, it must be settled in court. The permit may thus be perfectly valid, so far as the conservation laws are concerned, and yet the permittee’s right to drill under it may depend upon his establishing title in a suit at law. Id. at 191. While we noted that the Railroad Commission “should not do the useless thing of granting a permit to one who does not claim the property in good faith,” the Railroad Commission’s determination of the propriety of the permit has no effect on the propriety of the permittee’s potentially tortious actions. Id. Of course, statutory remedies may preempt common law actions or other standards that may set the bar for liability in tort, but a permit is not a get out of tort free card. Cf. MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 494, 499 (Tex.2010) (<HOLDING>). But in this case, the statute authorizing the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state common law claim seeking to require automobile manufacturers to install airbags would frustrate the purposes of the federal safety standard regulations adopted under the federal motor vehicle safety act which did not require manufacturers to do so and therefore was preempted by conflict (B) holding design planning and enforcement of bus safety rules for school bus transportation were not operation of motor vehicle under section 4145 (C) holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  (D) holding the federal motor vehicle safety standards do not preempt jury findings that a bus manufacturers buses were defectively designed (E) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling
[A]: (D)


[Q]: to his defense, an in camera review of those records must be conducted to ascertain whether they contain evidence that is reasonably necessary, and therefore essential, to the defense. Only when the trial court finds such evidence, should it be provided to the defendant. Id. at 562. This court agrees with the reasoning of Stanaway. To hold the statutory privilege superior to Mr. White’s right to obtain potentially exculpatory evidence would be unconstitutional. Id. at 573-75. Because a court has already determined that the adoption records sought by Mr. White may contain evidence relevant to Mr. White’s defense, denying Mr. White access to such evidence would violate his right to due process. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>). “An in camera review by the trial court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution (B) holding that suppression by government of evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material to guilt (C) holding that suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request by the defense violates due process where evidence is material either to guilt or punishment irre spective of the good faith of the prosecution (D) holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution (E) holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material
[A]: (E)


[Q]: plans that entail ongoing or periodic payment schemes. See Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 12, 107 S.Ct. 2211; Belanger, 71 F.3d at 455-56; Simas, 6 F.3d at 853. While it is true, as Nadworny argues, that Shaw’s and Albertson’s obligations under the severance agreement constitute a one-time, lump sum payment of benefits, as in other cases where the courts have determined that ERISA does not preempt a state law, Pl.’s Mem. at 6-7, several of the cases Nadworny cites in support of his argument are distinguishable from his own case. The holdings in O’Connor, Rodowicz, and Belanger for instance, were decided under different facts; in those cases, the employers offered early retirement packages indiscriminately to their employees as a means of encouraging attrition. O’Connor, 251 F.3d at 268-69 (<HOLDING>); Rodowicz, 192 F.3d at 166 (upholding district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed (B) holding em ployers retirement incentive package that mechanically calculated and offered to a broad class of employees indiscriminately did not implicate erisa (C) holding that serial offer of retirement plans did not implicate erisa (D) holding onetime retirement incentive package was purely automatic and nondiscretionary and thus not under the rubric of erisa (E) holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa
[A]:
(B)