TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: 669 (1971). Although Plaintiff requests resolution of seemingly unsettled State law questions, the issues at bar fall squarely within the Burford parameters: Plaintiff has presented difficult issues of state law, gaming is arguably an area of important state policy in Texas, and the Texas Lottery Commission (TLC) provides the unified State enforcement mechanism for some aspects of gaming law in Texas. Moreover, both the TLC and Office of the Attorney General provide an administrative procedure for organizations and individuals to request advisory opinions regarding the legality of proposed gaming actions. Certification to the Texas Supreme Court to answer the state law question at issue here would be ideal. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974)(<HOLDING>). However, under the Texas Constitution, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court (B) holding that certification of a remand order divests federal court jurisdiction (C) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the court (D) holding that it was proper in determining certification to consider whether certification would foster the settlement of the case with advantage to the parties and with great savings in judicial time and services (E) holding that certification to the state supreme court rests in the sound discretion of the federal court and that certification in the long run saves time energy and resources as well as helps to build a cooperative judicial federalism

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: that in December 1995, his wage was $8.67 per hour. Lewis stated that a Caucasian employee, who misrepresented his knowledge of desktop publishing, was hired at a rate of $9.00 per hour in his department. This employee ultimately was “[p]ushed out the door.” Supp.App. at 354. Lewis also stated that another Caucasian employee received a pay increase from $7.50 to $8.25 per hour after he went from part-time to full-time status, and that a third Caucasian employee told him that he received a raise after his father called the store manager. The District Court held that Lewis failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he had not shown that the employees he identified were similarly situated to him. See Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 857-58 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on his wrongful termination claim, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated (B) holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment (C) holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim (D) holding that employees of differing seniority levels were not similarly situated (E) holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: trans. denied. Section 35-37-4-6 applies to juvenile proceedings. D.G.B. v. State, 833 N.E.2d 519, 524-25 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). L.H. first argues that the case can be “easily and appropriately resolved” by holding that the requirements of the child hearsay statute were not met because A.H. did not testify at a “trial” as required by section 35-37-4-6(e)(2)(A) because there was no trial. Brief of Appellant at 6. L.H. contends that the juvenile court’s judgment should be reversed on this basis. However, the ramification of the requirements of the child hearsay statute not being met is that the hearsay should not be admitted at trial. Reversal would not necessarily be required if other evidence is sufficient to support the adjudication. See Carpenter v. State, 786 N.E.2d 696, 704 (Ind.2003) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, because the issue of whether there 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence (B) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting child hearsay because it failed to exhibit sufficient indications of reliability but noting that it is not every error that warrants reversal of a judgment of conviction and examining whether there was sufficient evidence outside of the hearsay to support the conviction (C) holding that admission of hearsay constituted harmless error when there was more than sufficient other evidence in the record to support the verdict (D) holding that a plain error that is fatal to a conviction is sufficient to warrant reversal (E) holding that the trial courts written order was not the entry of a sentence sufficient to support a determination that a judgment of conviction was entered

SOLUTION:
(B)