instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
for relief under § 3582(c). Nor is Brown entitled to pursue his claims through § 2241. A prisoner may proceed under § 2241 if § 2255 would be “inadequate of ineffective.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir.2002) (per curiam). We have held that § 2255’s “safety valve” applies only in rare circumstances, such as when an intervening change in the statute under which the petitioner was convicted renders the petitioner’s conduct non-criminal. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Brown has not satisfied that standard here, as he makes no allegation that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, but instead asserts only that he is “innocent” of being a career offender. See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120-21 (<HOLDING>). Brown must obtain a certificate of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under  841 and 846 was not cognizable under  2241 (B) holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor (C) holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (D) holding that dorsainvil did not permit petitioner to challenge sentence via  2241 based on intervening change in sentencing law (E) holding challenge to armedcareercriminal enhancement improper under  2241
answer:
holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under  841 and 846 was not cognizable under  2241


question:
of the evidence to have determined the outcome.” Id.; accord Snow v. State, 697 S.W.2d 663, 666-68 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985), pet. dism’d, 794 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). A “single egregious error” may constitute ineffective assistance. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. Frequently, it has. Texas Cases Reversing Without Evidence of Trial Strategy In at least 22 cases decided after the Court of Criminal Appeals decided Jackson v. State, Texas courts have reversed even though no evidence of trial counsel’s reasoning was presented. See Woods v. State, 59 S.W.3d 833, 835-38 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. filed); Mares v. State, 52 S.W.3d 886, 893 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. ref'd); Jaubert v. State, 65 S.W.3d 73 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. granted) (designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); Robison v. State, 35 S.W.3d 257, 265 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing rule (B) recognizing a limited exception to the eightcorners rule for a pure coverage question where the insurer is not questioning the merits of the underlying thirdparty claim and the extrinsic evidence goes strictly to an issue of coverage without contradicting any allegation in the thirdparty claimants pleadings material to the merits of that underlying claim (C) recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court (D) holding that procedural bar rule does not apply to ineffectiveness claims (E) recognizing the rule in robinson and reviewing the merits of ineffectiveness claim without evidence of trial counsels strategy
answer:
recognizing rule


question:
the payment of “prevailing rates” and “regular charges,” Payne could not maintain a cause of action alleging unreasonable, unconscionable and excessive charges. See id. at 1241. The trial court dismissed the complaint; however, on appeal, the First District reversed holding that Payne had alleged the necessary elements to state a cause of action, that he did not need to anticipate Humana’s affirmative defenses, and that Humana’s arguments were more properly raised in an answer rather than in a motion to dismiss. See id. The court held that since the contract between Humana and Payne did not expressly set the governing prices within its four corners, Humana was bound by a reasonableness requirement. See id. (citing F.L. Stitt & Co. v. Powell, 94 Fla. 550, 556, 114 So. 375, 378 (1927)(<HOLDING>); McGill v. Cockrell; 88 Fla. 54, 58, 101 So. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that aln attorney who is employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged pri or to the occurrence of the contingency is limited to quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the client and may not recover the full amount of the agreed contingent fee (B) holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied (C) holding that petitioner had failed to exhaust alternative remedies for review of his fee agreement because the ssa notified petitioner he could obtain his fee by filing a fee petition (D) holding that in determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees under federal fee shifting statutes courts may not enhance the fee award above the lodestar amount to compensate attorneys for assuming the risk of receiving no payment for their services if the lawsuit failed (E) holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee 
answer:

holding that aln attorney who is employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged pri or to the occurrence of the contingency is limited to quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the client and may not recover the full amount of the agreed contingent fee