In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: township in the RLCWA’s district took on a different status simply by virtue of its annexation by another township in the RLCWA’s district. Second, the federal anti-curtailment statute specifically anticipates that a city will use its annexation of property located within the service area of a rural water association as a basis to provide service to that property, and expressly prohibits such provision of service while the water district is indebted to the federal government. See 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b). Third, case law shows that a municipality’s annexation of property located within a rural water association does not, of itself, remove it from the water district for § 1926(b) purposes. See, e.g., Glenpool Util. Serv. Auth. v. Creek County Rural Water Disk, 861 F.2d 1211 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Bell Arthur Water Corp. v. Greenville Util. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (B) holding that  1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents (C) holding municipal condemnation of water associations facilities and certificate violative of  1926b (D) holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district (E) holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted

A: holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially
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Q: or require the information it did. In light of the information possessed by the District as of June 2, 2011, the District’s interference with Rutherford’s right to return began then, and continued until the District ultimately terminated him. Once a technical violation of the FMLA has been established—and here, the undisputed facts show that a violation occurred—the interference inquiry turns to whether the plaintiff experienced prejudice resulting from the violation. Ridings v. Riverside Medical Center, 537 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2008). The District arg e his fitness to return to work, he had such proof—a note from his doctor stating that he was fit to work—and attempted to present it on June 2, 2011. See Vannoy v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). Instead of reinstating him, the District kept 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave (B) holding a plaintiff to be ineligible for fmla leave wherein the plaintiff had not accumulated enough work hours (C) holding that a plaintiff who was unable to return to work before his fmla leave expired did not allege any denial of an fmla right but noting that ragsdale left open the possibility that employees could recover for notice violations on a casebycase basis if there was actual harm resulting from the violations (D) holding that both the cfra and the fmla require the employee to provide notice to the employer of the employees intent to take leave (E) holding that sufficient evidence of prejudice existed where plaintiff would have structured leave differently but employer had not provided notice of fmla right to reinstatement

A: holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave
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Q: on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. Section 217.490. The IAD contains an “anti-shuttling” provision found in Paragraph 5 of Article IV, which provides: If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph 5 of article V of this agreement, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Section 217.490. The rights and protections created by the IAD are statutory rights, not fundamental or constitutional in nature. Kenneth-Smith v. State, 838 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Mo.App. E.D.1992); United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir.1979)(<HOLDING>) As such, a defendant’s protections under the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that prison regulations designed to provide security are not only legitimate but are central to all other correctional goals (B) holding that the protections of the iad are not founded on constitutional rights or the preservation of a fair trial but are designed to facilitate a defendants rehabilitation in prison and to avoid disruptions caused when charges are outstanding against the prisoner in another jurisdiction (C) holding that the iad as construed by fex requires that a prisoner must be tried within 180 days of the date when his request for disposition is actu ally received by the state in which the charges are pending not when the prisoner provides that request to his custodial authorities (D) holding that since the constitutional and statutory extradition provisions are not designed to protect fugitives but rather  are designed to facilitate the administration of justice between states the failure to comply with established procedures does not deprive the fugitive of any protected right and therefore provides no basis for a  1983 claim (E) holding a prisoner has no constitutional right to a job in prison

A:
recognizing that prison regulations designed to provide security are not only legitimate but are central to all other correctional goals
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