TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: seeking to invoke the exception must establish that they agreed to engage in a joint effort and to keep the shared information confidential from outsiders. See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243-44 (2d Cir.1989) (finding valid joint defense privilege where information was “imparted in confidence” between parties “who had agreed upon and undertaken a joint strategy”); United States v. Sawyer, 878 F.Supp. 295, 297 (D.Mass.1995) (despite similar interests between employer and employee, insufficient evidence that communications were made during the course of a joint defense effort; proponent could neither establish time frame of agreement nor acts creating and/or terminating the agreement); United States v. United Tech. Corp., 979 F.Supp. 108, 110, 112 (D.Conn.1997) (<HOLDING>); Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 197 
 Holding statements: (A) holding common interest doctrine shielded information consortium members shared pursuant to collaboration agreement (B) recognizing doctrine (C) recognizing that tribes and states understood that they shared the right to manage the exercise of in common hunting and fishing rights (D) recognizing a subset of the common interest privilege as parents and schools have a corresponding interest in the free flow of information about administrators and faculty members (E) holding that there was no waiver of the work product protection because the business and public relations firm specializing in litigationrelated crisis management shared a common interest

SOLUTION: recognizing doctrine

PROBLEM: is outside the ambit of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 891. Specifically, we held: Recall that in the majority of those cases, the court specifically considered whether the defendant invoked the right to remain silent and concluded that the defendant's statement or action was an invocation of the right. See Combs [v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 286 (6th Cir.2000), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 623, 148 L.Ed.2d 533 (2000)]; [United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997, 112 S.Ct. 1702, 118 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992)]; Coppola [v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1567 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 418, 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989)]; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (<HOLDING>)[, reh'g denied ]. Based on these cases and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously (B) holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer (C) holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously (D) holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent (E) holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent

SOLUTION: holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer

PROBLEM: that a declaration of an' express trust of land must be in writing. S.C.Code Ann. § 62-7-101 (1987). However, “sufficient part performance of a parol contract for the conveyance of land will remove the contract from the statute of frauds.” Stackhouse, 271 S.C. at 521, 248 S.E.2d at 488. To compel specific performance of an oral agreement where part performance is alleged to remove the contract from the statute of frauds, a court of equity must find: 1) clear evidence of an oral agreement; 2) the agreement had been partially executed; and 3) the party who requested performance had completed or was willing to complete his part of the oral agreement. Gibson v. Hrys tlemeyer cannot establish part performance of the alleged agreement. See Stackhouse, 271 S.C. at 521, 248 S.E.2d at 483 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the circuit court did not err by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract (B) holding sufficient part performance of an oral trust agreement is required to remove it from the statute of frauds (C) holding that if part performance is relied upon to remove the oral agreement from the operation of the statute of frauds clear and convincing proof of performance in pursuance of the alleged agreement must be adduced by the party seeking to enforce it (D) holding that the statute of frauds bars a breach of contract claim based on an oral agreement to enter a future employment contract that would need to meet the statute of frauds (E) holding a court must find among other things clear evidence of the existence of an oral agreement for part performance to remove the contract from the statute of frauds

SOLUTION:
holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract