In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: purposes of nonclient standing] is a question of fact.”). Neither party argues that Mark and Marie share some type of legally recognizable confidential relationship, and Marie offered no evidence to the district court that Mark acquired any privileged, confidential information from Marie. In Brown, this court concluded that “disqualification is not warranted absent proof of a reasonable probability that counsel actually acquired privileged, confidential information.” 116 Nev. at 1202, 14 P.3d at 1267 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the context of familial relationships, other courts have declined to disqualify counsel absent proof that counsel actually acquired confidential information from a family member. See, e.g., Addam v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 42 (Ct. App. 2004) (<HOLDING>); DCH Health Services, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a marital dissolution action that a sibling relationship between a husbands attorney and a wifes former physician was insufficient to disqualify the attorney and explaining that the attorneys brother presumably possesses confidential information relating to the wife but there is no evidence that he disclosed any such information to his sister (B) holding that presumption of access to and knowledge of confidential information between attorney and former client notwithstanding attorneys declarations to the contrary may not be rebutted (C) holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney (D) holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts (E) holding that a corporate insider must abstain from trading in shares of his own corporation unless he has first disclosed the material information known to him not because of the relationship between the buyer and seller but because of the relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders and the insider who obtained the confidential information by reason of his position with that corporation that relationship gives rise to a duty to disclose because of the need to prevent the insider from taking unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: substantial rights. Mares, 402 F.3d at 520. The district court made no comments suggesting it would have imposed a lesser sentence in the absence of mandatory guidelines. See United States v. Bringier, 405 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir.2005) (stating the issue as “whether [the defendant] has demonstrated that the sentencing judge would have reached a different result had it sentenced [the defendant] under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 264, 163 L.Ed.2d 238 (2005) (No. 05-5535). Therefore, Tovar fails to demonstrate plain error. Tovar contends for the first time on appeal that the statute under which he was convicted, 21 U.S.C. § 841, is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (<HOLDING>). As he concedes, however, this issue is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that ojther than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that any fact other than a prior conviction may not be used to enhance a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that other than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that other than fact of prior conviction any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: “isolated location” and “absence of other hospitals” revealed Congress’ intent to incorporate a broad range of criteria previously considered in some regions of the country. Plaintiff contends that the SCH regulation contained in 42 C.F.R. § 412.92 narrowed, rather than broadened, the range of factors to be considered in SCH designations by eliminating the consideration of admitting practices of area physicians, the actual use of alternative facilities, and the availability of public transportation. Plaintiff therefore argues that this was a change in policy and that when an agency changes its policy it must provide a reasoned analysis for the change. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 463 U.S. 29, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Defendant disputes plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the national highway traffic safety commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking a motor vehicle safety standard without supplying a reasoned analysis (B) holding that a state common law claim seeking to require automobile manufacturers to install airbags would frustrate the purposes of the federal safety standard regulations adopted under the federal motor vehicle safety act which did not require manufacturers to do so and therefore was preempted by conflict (C) holding that the plaintiffs state commonlaw tort claims were preempted by the national motor vehicle safety act 15 usc 1381 et seq (D) holding that when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle the officer may in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officers safety and the safety of others (E) holding that traffic safety is a substantial government goal


Output: (A)