instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
the sufficiency of the evidence,” we “must affirm the verdict ‘if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the evidence that the elements of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1218, 117 S.Ct. 1709, 137 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997)). hi. A. The principal issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in admitting the text messages obtained from Govan’s cell phone. First, Govan argues that the district court erred by applying the good-faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Govan argues that for the good-faith 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required (B) holding that because evidence supporting search warrant was illegally obtained evidence recovered by executing warrant was fruit of the illegal search (C) holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not bar the use of evidence obtained by police officers acting in good faith and with reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant (D) holding that evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is not barred by the exclusionary rule (E) holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to evidence obtained by police officers acting in reasonable reliance on search warrant later held invalid
answer:
(D)


question:
The defendants, contend that, assuming their conduct was unlawful and negligent as charged in the complaint, it was nevertheless not the proximate cause of the injuries suffered. But a tortfeasor is generally held answerable for the injuries which result in the ordinary course of events from his negligence and it is generally sufficient if his negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries. The fact that there were also intervening causes which were foreseeable or were normal incidents of the risk created would not relieve the tortfeasor of liability. Ordinarily these questions of proximate and intervening cause are left to the jury for its factual determination. [Ibid, (citations omitted).] See also, J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 352, 714 A.2d 924 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 465-66, 545 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prolonged sexual abuse of neighboring adolescent girls by defendants husband with known proclivity for such behavior not a superseding cause of wifes negligent failure to warn victims or take other reasonable steps to prevent harm to them (B) holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims (C) holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person (D) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (E) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse
answer:
(A)


question:
claims, specifically, those tort claims that are intertwined with ecclesiastical investigations or proceedings involving the employment or discipline of clergy. As demonstrated above, the plaintiffs’ tort claims are intertwined with ecclesiastical investigations and proceedings involving the employment and discipline of Reverend Greer. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ tort claims would trigger the same type of impermissible investigation prohibited by Ex parte Bole, regardless of the plaintiffs’ third-party status. Because the petitioners have demonstrated that the First Amendment protections set out in Ex parte Bole are applicable to this case, I would grant the relief requested in the petition for the writ of mandamus. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 1 . inn.Ct.App. Sept. 22, 1997) (<HOLDING>); Missouri: Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that first amendment barred parishioners negligent hiring and supervision and breach of fiduciary duty claims against pastor and church for sexual contact that occurred between pastor and parishioner during the course of a counseling relationship (B) holding that first amendment barred child victim of sexual abuse by priest from bringing negligent hiring and supervision claims but that first amendment would not be violated by adjudication of claim of intentional failure to supervise priest (C) holding that first amendment barred negligent hiring and supervision claim against archdiocese for alleged sexual abuse of minor by priest (D) recognizing torts of negligent hiring supervision and retention (E) holding that negligent retention and supervision claims based upon a pastors sexual contact with parishioners was barred by the first amendment
answer:

(E)