In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

health, education, and family comfort are also acceptable. See Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443 (1942); Read v. Leitner, 80 Fla. 574, 86 So. 425 (1920). However, a debtor’s homestead was held to be abandoned when a debtor moved to New Hampshire and attempted to sell his property in Fort Myers, Florida. In re Goode, 146 B.R. 860 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1992). In Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), 183 B.R. 968 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995), the Bankruptcy Court held that Chapter 7 debtor’s property did not qualify for homestead exemption since, in placing property on the market for sale or lease, debtor abandoned his intent to use and occupy property as permanent place of residence. Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), supra. But cf., In re Herr, 197 B.R. 939 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Crump, 2 B.R. 222 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1980) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no abandonment of property as homestead was shown merely because after house located on property was destroyed in hurricane debtor had quit premises allowed property to become overgrown with weeds and posted a for sale sign (B) holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead (C) holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property (D) holding that the property held by the revocable trust in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence was a constitutionally protected homestead property (E) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate
holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead

by Ankeny should arise rarely and therefore would be unlikely to produce a swarm of cases involving excessive force searches. Also, officials and courts are far more competent to discern which extraordinary tactics constitute excessive force than to determine in the heat of the moment “what constituted] a reasonable wait time in a particular case” before entering' — usually a matter of calculating, wholly subjectively the appropriate number of seconds. Id. at 2166 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In fact, without any difficulty, we have in the past in a case remarkably similar to the one before us struck down, as constituting excessive force, specific tactics such as the ones used in the case before us. See, e.g., Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on the cost side, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding officers punch of an inmate was not excessive force (C) holding that ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing a lawyer into court was a judicial act (D) recognizing that the fourth amendment protects against the use of excessive force by police officers in carrying out an arrest (E) holding that officers had employed constitutionally excessive force by blindly throwing a flash bang grenade into an apartment occupied by five to eight individuals
holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim

court jurisdiction and its silence on the matter of federal jurisdiction”); Erienet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir.1998) (accepting the holding oí International Science, supra, that the federal statute "intended to authorize private causes of action only in state court”); Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecommunications Premium Services, Ltd., 156 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir.1998) ("Congress intended to confer exclusive state court jurisdiction over private rights of action” under the Act); Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1289, modified 140 F.3d 898 (11th Cir.1998) ("Congress intended to assign the private right of action [under the Act] to state courts exclusively”); Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 6 . An earlier Texas intermediate appellate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act (B) holding there is no federal private right of action for borrowers under the nfia (C) holding veilpiercing claim does not state cause of action under erisa and cannot independently support federal subject matter jurisdiction (D) holding subject matter jurisdiction divested because federal cause of action had been dismissed without prejudice (E) holding that the elements of a cause of action were not subject matter jurisdictional simply because the statute that created the cause of action provided that district courts shall have jurisdiction of such actions

holding there is no federal private right of action for borrowers under the nfia