In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: do not apply in ... [piroceedings relating to probation." - Ind. Evidence Rule 101(c)(@2). A probation revocation hearing is not to be equated with an adversarial criminal proceeding. Cox v. State 706 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind.1999) (citing Isaac v. State, 605 N.E2d 144, 149 (Ind.1992)). Rather, a revocation hearing is a narrow inquiry, and its procedures are more flexible than those of a criminal proceeding. Id. In revocation hearings, judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability, including expert testimony and scientific evidence. Carter v. State, 706 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind.1999) (noting that it is beyond doubt that urinalysis has achieved a sufficient level of scientific reliability to be accepted into evidence); see also Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 550 (<HOLDING>); of - Pitman v. State, 749 N.E.2d 557, 559 
 Holding statements: (A) holding hearsay admissible in revocation hearings (B) holding that certified charging informations and police reports are deemed admissible in revocation hearings (C) holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress (D) holding that neither rule 11 nor the protections of boykin apply to probation revocation hearings and observing that less process is due in prison disciplinary proceedings than in probation revocation hearings (E) holding that because the rules of evidence including the rule against hearsay do not apply to sentencing hearings the district court did not err in relying on hearsay in ordering restitution
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: between cases brought under the federal law and those brought under Maine law. While the First Circuit does make a distinction, it ultimately holds that the negligence per se doctrine of Pratico is strictly limited to cases brought under FELA, and it strongly implies that the doctrine will not be expanded. Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998). 4 . Castine argues that the trooper testified at trial to matters that he had not previously indicated he would address, and therefore, it was unfairly surprised at trial. Generally, a continuance is the appropriate remedy when a party seeks to admit “surprise" evidence at trial. Because Castine did not seek a continuance, however, it may not now claim unfair surprise. See Pettitt v. Lizotte, 454 A.2d 329, 332-33 (Me.1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Because violation of a safety regulation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify (C) holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify (E) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing a defendants surprise fact witness to testify because the plaintiff did not request a continuance
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: not have acquired any executory obligations towards Brunson because his employment was terminable at will misses the point. Brunson is not suing to enforce an ex-ecutory obligation but to recover compensation for services which he has already fully performed, allegedly in reliance on promises made to him in advance of such performance. Compare Alston v. Brown Transport Corp., 182 Ga. App. 632 (356 SE2d 517) (1987); Murphine v. Hosp. Auth. of Floyd County, 151 Ga. App. 722 (261 SE2d 457) (1979). Brunson would not have been required to give the company “additional” consideration over and above the performance of his job as a sales representative in order to accept the offer created by these alleged promises. Compare Management Search v. Morgan, 136 Ga. App. 651 (222 SE2d 154) (1975) (<HOLDING>). Similarly misplaced is C. B. A.’s reliance on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the mwa the question of whether an employee was an independent contractor or an employee was a question of statutory interpretation (B) holding that an employers promise to pay a bonus to an employee was not enforceable where the employee was already obligated under a written contract to perform the services in question (C) holding that employee may claim contract created based on employer promise of severance pay to employee (D) holding that under texas law a contract may be terminable at will and without cause but an employer cannot promise to pay employee a certain wage and then unilaterally decide to pay employee less for work she has already performed (E) holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously
[EX A]:
(B)