In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] ... begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”). Section 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) states in part that “attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living ... justifies a higher fee.” (emphasis added). On its face, § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) generally references “the cost of living” not a local/regional cost-of-living. Id. (emphasis added). See Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (“[CJourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”) (citations omitted). Cf. Jones v. Espy, 10 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). This choice of language 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity (B) holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority (C) holding that the more general cpiu for all items applied because if congress had meant to permit upward adjustments based on the increased cost of legal services it would have done so with greater specificity and clarity (D) holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001 (E) holding that based on the statutes purpose and its legislative history the legislature would have included specific language regarding drug rehabilitation if it had meant to include it

Answer: holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity


Question: without including a message of their own. “[T]here are commonsense differences between speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction and other varieties.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (quotations and citation omitted). Common sense dictates that the use of images of Plaintiff Bosley to sell video tapes, website memberships, or defendants’ other wares, at most, constitute commercial speech. The Supreme Court has noted that “advertising which ‘links a product to a cur rent public debate’ is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (<HOLDING>) “Thus, it seems that the Supreme Court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute reaching beyond purely commercial speech to chill fully protected speech can merit application of the overbreadth doctrine (B) holding that information pamphlets are properly characterized as commercial speech (C) holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech (D) recognizing that noncommercial speech is accorded greater protection under the first amendment than is commercial speech and striking down ordinance that imposed a greater restriction on political than on commercial billboards (E) recognizing that code is speech

Answer: holding that statute reaching beyond purely commercial speech to chill fully protected speech can merit application of the overbreadth doctrine


Question: statute, including § 18.1-215, the statute under which Silver was charged. Although not directly raised by Silver, the Court further notes that application of the recent complaint hearsay exception to § 18.1-215 does not raise an ex post facto concern. On brief, Silver indirectly presents an ex post facto argument, claiming that § 18.1-215 of the Code of Virginia is not one of the exceptions delineated in § 19.2-268.2. (Memo. Opp. Mot. in Limine 2-4.) The applicability of the relevant hearsay exception is a mere procedural change that “does ‘not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt’.” Pilcher v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 158, 163, 583 S.E.2d 70, 72 (2003) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884)) (<HOLDING>); see also Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that application of the rape shield law to a case in which the underlying events occurred prior to the enactment of the rape shield law was not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws (B) holding that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them (C) holding that the rape shield statute affects the use of character evidence to impeach witnesses  and is therefore procedural in nature (D) holding that the retroactive application of a statute authorizing the assessment of a cost to a defendant who committed the felony pri or to the statutes enactment did not violate ex post facto laws (E) holding that a rape shield statute was not ex post facto when it barred evidence of a prior sexual relationship that was admissible before enactment of the statute

Answer:
holding that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them