In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: other court’s construal of the statute. See Thrivent, 251 S.W.3d at 622-23; J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co. v. Estes, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 836, 839-40 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied); Poole v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 14-99-00740-CV, No, 14-99-01056-CV, 2000 WL 1721150, at *1, 2000 Tex.App. LEXIS 6825, at *3-*4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 12, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication); Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d at 331. Finally, this argument is contrary to the prevailing view among state courts outside of Texas as well, which have held that an order vacating an award and directing a rehearing (without denying confirmation) is not final and appealable. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 31, 582 So.2d 162, 162-63 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Carner v. Freedman, 175 So.2d 70, 71 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable (B) holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable

Output: holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable


Input: Consider Input: to Richardson. 6 . In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the Supreme Court extended Batson and its progeny to prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of gender. 7 . The Slate also points out that the presiding judge in the instant case is an African American jurist. Judge Green's sensitivity and efforts to seat a constitutional and racially-diverse jury for defendant, is evidenced in the debate over Richardson. Even though the judge originally found the state’s race-neutral reasons as to Richardson valid, he became concerned about the exclusion of African Americans from defendant's jury. However, the judge’s race is not relevant to Batson analysis. See State v. Tilley, 99-0569, p. 8 (La.7/6/00), 767 So.2d 6, 15 (<HOLDING>). 8 . A discussion of the assignments of error 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case (B) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (C) recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination (D) holding that custody decision based on race is not justified (E) holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant

Output: holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case


Input: Consider Input: Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702, 119 S. Ct. 1624, 143 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1999), which expressly defined the term “exaction” to be “the dedication of property to public use.” (Emphasis added.) The City, citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702, 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1635, 143 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1999), argues that the Dolan proportionality standard does not apply here because there was no “exaction” as the United States Supreme Court uses that term — “the dedication of property to public use.” We disagree for the following reasons: (1) the language in Del Monte Dunes defining exactions is nonbinding dicta, see Honesty in Environmental Analysis & Legislation (HEAL) v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Bd., 96 Wn. App. 522, 534, 979 P.2d 864 (1999) (<HOLDING>); and (2) even if Del Monte Dunes did control, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding authority to control limits duty to control (B) holding that the puc does not have the authority to regulate or control the management decisions of a utility absent a finding that the management decision would adversely affect the public (C) holding that pharmaceutical benefit management companies are generally not erisa fiduciaries because they lack discretionary authority or control in the management of the plan but rather engage in ministerial duties (D) holding that a partner in and accounting firm who brought an action under the age discrimination in employment act adea and the employee retirement income security act erisa was considered an employee because he was subject to the control of a management committee which acted in secrecy and had no bona fide ownership interest fiduciary relationship voting right or management control (E) holding that del monte dunes dicta did not control applicability of nollandolan to growth management act regulations


Output: holding authority to control limits duty to control