In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: to its policy holders. For example, the company’s purpose can be readily revealed to the policyholder by the addition of a single line or sentence to the declarations page or by defining the term “driver name.” Thus, this court concludes that the arguments of the defendant are unavailing and that although our holding in this case comports with that of the minority of jurisdictions, we are of the opinion that it represents the better public policy. “And we are also convinced that reasonable expectations of coverage raised by the declaration page cannot be contradicted by the policy’s boilerplate unless the declaration page itself clearly so warns the insured.” Id. at 347, 638 A.2d at 892; see also Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 118 R.I. 321, 327, 373 A.2d 810, 812 (1977) (<HOLDING>). In conclusion, therefore, we affirm the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant (B) holding that an ordinary reader in the face of such detail would be warranted in concluding that any significant limitation on collision insurance would have been explicitly noted (C) holding that the patentees argument that any shape would be equivalent to the conical limitation would write such a limitation out of the claim (D) holding that it is most improbable that a significant change to bankruptcy procedure would have been made without even any mention in the legislative history (E) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible

A: (B)
****
Q: Third, the Kimmell court did not actually address whether future projections were actionable, but merely assumed that they were based on the procedural posture of the case and the issues addressed on appeal. Id. Finally, the Second Circuit noted that, “although the Appellate Division in Kimmell [implicitly] found that future prediction/projeetions could qualify as the basis for a negligent misrepresentation claim ..., that finding is contrary to the great weight of authority.” Id. The Court agrees with the Second Circuit’s analysis. The inquiry does not depend on whether the omission itself relates to a past or present fact. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the failure to disclose renders an existing statement of fact false or misleading. Cf. Metropolitan, 532 F.Supp.2d at 1290 (<HOLDING>). If this were not the case, almost any 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the cause of action (B) holding that an omission claim could not be maintained where plaintiff did not point to previous statements that were misleading without further disclosures (C) holding that a duty to disclose arises whenever secret information renders prior public statements materially misleading (D) holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading (E) holding that a cause of action based on an omission requires the plaintiff to show how an alleged omitted fact negates the truth of or renders misleading the statements actually made

A: (E)
****
Q: rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (emphasis added). Here, “[t]he first half of this test is clearly satisfied: Congress has delegated general rulemaking authority with respect to Medicare to the Secretary of HHS, who in turn has delegated that authority to CMS.” Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir.2008); 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(l) (“The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the administration of the insurance programs under this subchapter.”); see also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96, 115 S.Ct. 1232, 131 L.Ed.2d 106 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The Court then “consider[s] whether CMS has 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys (B) holding that a delegation of authority by the legislature must be express and provide clear statutory standards to guide the delegee (C) holding that a precondition to chevron deference is congressional delegation of administrative authority (D) recognizing the municipal authority to regulate traffic implies broad authority (E) recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority

A:
(E)
****