In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
2 (emphasis added). In its Clarification, the FCC freed itself of this deadline, continuing to state that the order would last until the Fourth FNPRM but giving no time period in which that would occur. Clarification, 15 FCC Rcd 9587, at ¶ ¶ 1, 35. We hold that this extension newly aggrieved CompTel and thus made its petition timely. See Sam Rayburn Dam Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 515 F.2d 998, 1007 (D.C.Cir.1975) (stating that where a party was “aggrieved” by a later interpretation of a rule that it could not have reasonably anticipated, the time limit starts to run at the later event). Cases have held that extension of a temporary order may entitle the parties to seek judicial review of the order. See Public Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 901 F.2d 147, 151 (D.C.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Interstate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a temporary order is later made permanent the permanent order may be challenged (B) holding that the phrase permanent shutdown is unambiguous and can only mean a permanent cessation of plant operations rather than the uneventful transfer of ownership (C) holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction (D) holding that an alien who procured permanent resident status byconcealing his ineligibility had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence (E) holding an order that was interlocutory in form to be final in substance where the force and effect of the order was tantamount to a permanent injunction depriving complainant of a recognized property right

Ex Output:
holding that the phrase permanent shutdown is unambiguous and can only mean a permanent cessation of plant operations rather than the uneventful transfer of ownership


Ex Input:
v. Conlee, 370 Ark. 89, 257 S.W.3d 543 (2007). Kyler Road Home Charles first argues on appeal that the circuit court erred by not awarding him an interest in the home on Kyler Road. Although he acknowledges that Myra had acquired this property prior to the marriage, he asserts that he is entitled to an interest in the home because | ^marital funds were used to reduce the debt on the properly and to make improvements. Our definition of marital properly excludes property acquired before the marriage. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b)(1) (Repl.2009). However, we have long held that a non-owning spouse is entitled to some benefit when marital funds have been expended to improve or reduce the debt on the other spouse’s nonmarital property. See Box v. Box, 312 Ark. 550, 851 S.W.2d 437 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Bagwell v. Bagwell, 282 Ark. 403, 668 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property (B) holding that assets acquired subsequent to separation are not considered marital property absent evidence that spouse used marital property to obtain them (C) holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital (D) holding that the trial court erred in finding that marital property was the former wifes separate property based on a nonseparation agreement in which the former husband purported to relinquish any interest in the marital property (E) holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property

Ex Output:
holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property


Ex Input:
Section 41-22-20(d), Ala.Code 1975, provides that a notice of appeal from a final decision of an administrative agency such as the CONRB of SHPDA must be filed with the pertinent administrative agency within 30 days of the date the petitioner receives notice of, or other service of, the decision rendered by that administrative agency. When the decision of the administrative agency is the denial of a petition or application by operation of law due to the administrative agency’s failure to rule on that petition or application within a specified period, a notice of appeal from such a denial must be filed within 30 days after the petition or application was denied by operation of law. See Noland Health Servs., Inc. v. State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 44 So.3d 1074, 1081-82 (Ala.2010) (<HOLDING>). Section 41-22-11(b) provides that, when a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court (B) holding that the limitations period begins to run at the time that the parties first enter into the franchise agreement (C) holding that the oneyear period begins to run after the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has expired (D) holding that the period for seeking judicial review of denial of con application not expressly ruled upon by the conrb begins to run at the time that application has been denied by operation of law (E) holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach

Ex Output:

holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court