In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

for ‘non-generic burglary’ does not.” United States v. Rainer, 616 F.3d 1212, 1213 (11th Cir.2010). A “generic” burglary is “any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). A “non-generic” burglary is one that “do[es] not include all of the elements essential to generic burglaries,” including burglaries of boats, automobiles, and other non-buildings. Rainer, 616 F.3d at 1214. The government has a legitimate interest in “prevent[ing] repeat offenders from continuing to victimize society.” See United States v. Johns, 984 F.2d 1162, 1164 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court in Taylor determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding substantive due process not violated when licensing decisions are based on scheme rationally related to a governmental interest (B) holding that the particular method is not rationally related to legitimate government interest if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable (C) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection as rule was uniformly applied not arbitrary and rationally related to legitimate government interest (D) recognizing due process concerns inherent in sentencing based on false criminal history (E) holding that sentencing criminals in part based on criminal history is rationally related to a legitimate government interest
(E)

between 1983 and 1986. Stanley’s engineer, Hreha, was present throughout Powers’ deposition. The Court revisits its ruling upon further contemplation of the purpose of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. In a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, there is no distinction between the corporate representative and the corporation. See United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C.1996) (noting that in a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition “[t]he corporation appears vicariously through its designee”). “The Rule 30(b)(6) designee does not give his personal opinion. Rather, he presents the corpo ration’s ‘position’ on the topic.” Id. (citing cases). The designee testifies on behalf of the corporation and holds it accountable accordingly. See Starlight Int’l, Inc., v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 688 (D.Kan.1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Audiotext Communications Network, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed (B) holding that a corporation has a duty under rule 80b6 to provide someone who is knowledgeable in order to provide binding answers on behalf of the corporation (C) holding that an officer or director generally owes a fiduciary duty only to the corporation over which he exercises management authority and any breach of fiduciary duty claims arising out of injuries to the corporation in most cases may only be brought by the corporation itself or derivatively on its behalf (D) holding that individuals assumption of the role of president of the corporation and her authority to sign documents on behalf of the corporation demonstrate that she had the requisite control over the corporation for purposes of finding individual liability under section 5a (E) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation
(B)

71 (1984). Un der this elaboration, states have been shielded when engaged in activities such as purchasing, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808-10, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976), selling commodities produced in a state-owned facility, Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440, 100 S.Ct. 2271, 65 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980), and contracting for the construction of public buildings, White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 205-06, 214-15, 103 S.Ct. 1042, 75 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983). Withal, this shield has relatively modest dimensions; for example, it does not extend to hybrid proprietary/regulatory activities that have downstream effects in a market in which the state is not a participant. See, e.g., S.-Cent. Timber, 467 U.S. at 84-85, 104 S.Ct. 2237 (<HOLDING>). It is uncertain whether the market 
 Holding statements: (A) holding invalid alaskas practice of selling stateowned timber with a contractual condition requiring purchasers partially to process the timber before shipping it out of state (B) holding a state has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state (C) holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice (D) holding that the commission reasonably interpreted the statute as requiring it to assess the condition of the industry as a whole (E) holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state

(A)