In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: this authority explicitly by statute in 11 U.S.C. § 362. Nor is there any danger of the bankruptcy court having prejudiced Appellant’s rights under Puerto Rico common law. As the bankruptcy court itself stated, the Appellant remains free to present her arguments under Puerto Rico law at the appropriate time, during the foreclosure proceedings in Puerto Rico’s commonwealth courts. (See Hearing Tr., Docket No. 1-7 at 11.) Therefore, any attempts to link this case to the holding in Stem are mistaken. We reject Appellant’s attempt to challenge this routine and plainly constitutional exercise of the bankruptcy court’s authority. This case, thus, fits squarely with several other cases that have been resolved in the wake of Stem. See In Re DiVittorio, 670 F.3d 273, 282 n. 4 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); In Re Garcia, 471 B.R. 324, 329 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that stem did not change a bankruptcy courts authority to decide questions impacting whether to grant relief from automatic stay (B) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay (C) holding that the bankruptcy court relinquishes jurisdiction over estate property when it grants relief from the automatic stay (D) recognizing district courts authority to dispose of contempt action for violation of automatic stay of bankruptcy (E) holding that bankruptcy court order that a stay applied to a particular party was a final order and noting that bankruptcy court orders lifting or denying relief from an automatic stay are final for purposes of appeal
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: that placed a forty-five day time limit on the administrator’s decision to grant or deny a license. See Redner, 29 F.3d at 1500. In the event the administrator exceeded the forty-five day time limit, the ordinance stated that “the applicant may be permitted to begin operating the establishment for which a license is sought," unless and until the County Administrator notifies the applicant of a denial of the application.” See id. at 1500-01 (citation omitted). We held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because its use of the word “may” rather than “shall” allowed the individuals responsible for enforcing the ordinance to suppress the protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on their part or any judicial determination. See id. at 1501 (<HOLDING>). In Lady J. Lingerie, we examined the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff (B) holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review (C) holding also that the ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review (D) holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record (E) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of a request to change a comprehensive zoning plan
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover the entire $5,830,000 underlying judgment in this bad faith action. Plaintiffs here are only entitled to $5,730,000—the principal amount of the judgment that exceeds the $100,000 policy limits subsequently paid by Nationwide. The parties disagreed over whether, under Georgia law (as opposed to Nationwide’s policy language discussed above at page 41-45), Nationwide’s partial payment of its $100,000 policy limits should be credited to the principal amount of the underlying judgment for purposes of calculating post-judgment interest. Under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-17, “[w]hen a payment is made upon any debt, it shall be applied first to the discharge of any interest due at the time.” Threatt v. Forsyth County, 262 Ga.App. 186, 585 S.E.2d 159, 163 (2003) (<HOLDING>). On February 23, 2011, the date Nationwide 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits (B) holding that for the purpose of applying ocga  7417 judgments are debts and parties to litigation can be judgment debtors or creditors and that ocga  7417 controls how payments for less than the full amount of a judgment should be allocated between principal and interest (C) recognizing that a final judgment may exist even where no judgment has been entered in accordance with ocga  91158 b (D) holding that where payment toward judgment was for less than the total amount of principal and interest  owed that payment then did not terminate the accrual of interest on the remaining principal (E) holding that a second judgment controls over an earlier judgment entered in the same case
[EX A]:
(B)