instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
Apr. 14, 2011). Accord Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 274 (2d Cir.2009) (dismissing a retaliation claim whose only causal basis was a letter that plaintiff wrote many weeks before the allegedly retaliatory acts, implicating officers other than named defendants). See also Def. Mem. at 11 ("[A] claim that one defendant took action against the plaintiff in retaliation for a complaint made against a different [officer] [should be] viewed with particular skepticism."). 40 . Def, Mem. at 17. 41 . See id. (citing exclusively to Eighth Amendment cases). 42 .Id. 43 . See Wright, 554 F.3d at 274. 44 . Def. Mem. at 18. 45 . Def. Mem. at 19. 46 . Davis, 320 F.3d at 353. 47 . Dawes, 239 F.3d at 493. 48 . Compare Hofelich v. Ercole, No. 06 Civ. 1369, 2010 WL 1459740, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2010) (<HOLDING>), with Rembert v. Cheverko, No. 12 Civ. 9196, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim (B) holding that a verbal threat of being fired is not an adverse employment action for purposes of title vii (C) holding that verbal threats if they are specific can constitute adverse action for retaliation purposes (D) holding that a suspension with pay may constitute materially adverse action for the purposes of retaliation claims depending on the facts of the case (E) holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action
answer:
holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim


question:
was pending on, AEDPA’s effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); United States v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178 (3d Cir.1997). “Because the District Court relied entirely upon the state court record and did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review [of the District Court’s decision] is plenary.” Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 947 (3d Cir.1998) (citing Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir.1997)). Like the District Court, we must presume all state court factual findings tó be correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), but we “exercise plenary review over state court conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact and pure issues of law.” Hassine, 160 F.3d at 947; see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 105, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985)(<HOLDING>); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (B) holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (C) holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction (D) holding that petitions for confirmation or vacatur must show how the ultimate disposition of the matter by the federal court necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law (E) holding that while subsidiary factual questions are subject to  2254ds presumption the ultimate legal question of confessions constitutional voluntariness is a matter for independent federal determination
answer:
holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review


question:
458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982), or a regulation that completely deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of his or her property, see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538, 548, 125 S.Ct. 2074. The third category of takings is gov- . erned by the standard set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), and the fourth category is governed by the standard set forth in Nollan and Dolan. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39, 548, 125 S.Ct. 2074. Because Highlands relies solely on the Nollan and Dolan standard in its initial brief, we do not address the other theories of taking. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548, 125 S.Ct. 2074 (<HOLDING>). 2 . In arguing that the exactions in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the property owner argued only a theory of taking that was no longer a valid theory property owner did not demonstrate his entitlement to relief (B) holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory (C) holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property (D) holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner (E) holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover
answer:

holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory