In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: the harassment,” Murray, 57 F.3d at 250. As the Second Circuit has recognized, “not every response to a complaint should take the form of discharge;” even a mere written warning can be an appropriate response if it conveys the message that further harassment will not be tolerated. Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 63; see also Torres, 116 F.3d at 639 (“[R]esolution will vary from case to case.”). By far the best evidence that Metro-North’s response was effective is that plaintiff has not been sexually harassed by Chapman or any other Metro-North employee since meeting with Ms. Gormley-O’Connor, see Wahlstrom Dep. at 30, 248, nor has Chapman been accused of accosting any other employees since returning from his suspension, see Chapman Dep. at 64, 279; Sinigiani Dep. at 49; cf. Murray, 57 F.3d at 251 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, while factual issues exist as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination (B) holding that where the plaintiffs allegations concerning a hostile work environment consist of facts that occurred more than one year before the filing of the complaint such a claim is timebarred (C) holding that allegations of failure to remedy a hostile work environment provided no basis for relief where the evidence demonstrated that the harassment had ended by the time plaintiffs complaint was filed (D) holding that the allegations of plaintiffs coemployees of sexual harassment by manager were irrelevant to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim absent evidence that plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of the alleged harassment (E) holding that a charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of sex did not support a complaint for hostile environment sexual harassment

A: holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination
****
Q: for a damages claim. See Williams, 216 S.W.3d at 828-29. Nor can Russell change the facts that render her remaining grounds not justiciable. As long as there is no dispute that the release between Metro and American Century is not binding on Russell, and Metro and its representatives have not been awarded and do not seek attorney fees based on section 417.003 of the Labor Code, there is no way in which Russell could re-plead her claims to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. See Bonham State Bank, 907 S.W.2d at 467; WesternGeco, L.L.C., 246 S.W.3d at 781. The trial court therefore did not err in refusing Russell an opportunity to further amend her pleadings. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 1 . S rters, Inc., 372 S.W.2d 525, 530-31 (Tex.1963) (<HOLDING>); Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 366, 190 
 Holding statements: (A) holding governmental immunity was not implicated in a declaratoryjudgment action seeking an interpretation of a competitive bidding statute as applied to the highway commissions policy of requiring all materials furnished under contracts be manufactured in the united states (B) holding that a declaratoryjudgment action seeking to compel officials to perform their legal duties was not barred by  14 however a portion of the action seeking compensatory damages could not be maintained (C) holding a declaratoryjudgment action was proper to construe compulsory school attendance law and did not implicate governmental immunity (D) holding governmental immunity not implicated and a declaratoryjudgment action proper to seek determination of whether plaintiffs were motor carriers for purposes of tax statute (E) recognizing the protection of preliminary governmental materials

A: holding that a declaratoryjudgment action seeking to compel officials to perform their legal duties was not barred by  14 however a portion of the action seeking compensatory damages could not be maintained
****
Q: 420, 112 S.Ct. 773. Note that because the Supreme Court stated that lien stripping would not be permitted in chapter 7 with an “allowed claim,” the implication arises that if the claim becomes disallowed, the lien can be stripped under Section 506(d). 22 . Id. at 418, 112 S.Ct. 773 (stating that the “liens ride through” principle was established before the passage of the 1978 Act, and existed under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). The Supreme Court acknowledged that liens ride through bankruptcy in several cases. See Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 6 S.Ct. 917, 29 L.Ed. 1004 (1886). Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991). 23 . In re Shandrew, 210 B.R. 829 (Bankr. E.D.Cal.1997) (<HOLDING>); accord In re Nevería, 194 B.R. 547 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an allowed wholly unsecured consensual junior lien may not be stripped off in a chapter 7 case (B) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage lien can be avoided under nobelman (C) holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge (D) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage on chapter 13 debtors residence could not be stripped down into an unsecured claim by debtors plan (E) holding that a socalled chapter 20 debtor may strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien

A:
holding that an allowed wholly unsecured consensual junior lien may not be stripped off in a chapter 7 case
****