In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

subpoena does not fit within the statutory language. The question surrounding the subpoena’s validity in no way relates to any information that Star Bank would be required to disclose under FCRA, even assuming that FCRA’s requirements apply to Star Bank. {See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) for the definition of a “consumer reporting agency.”) The Hahns’ claimed reliance on whatever Bonynge said regarding the subpoena therefore provides them with no basis to toll the two year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Hahns have failed to demonstrate that the wilful misrepresentation tolling exception applies to their case. We therefore hold that all of their claims raised under FCRA are barred by the statute of limitations. See Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We find no inequity in reaching this result. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim (B) holding that equitable tolling is available to avoid time limitations in the statutory provisions governing veterans benefits (C) holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims (D) holding that an ohio tolling statute violated the commerce clause because it gave nonresident corporations the choice between being subject to general jurisdiction in the state by appointing an instate agent for service of process or being subject to a tolling of the statute of limitations on claims against them (E) holding that a plaintiff must fit within the precise wording of the tolling exception to avoid being barred by fcras statute of limitations provision
holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim

than the Confrontation Clause, we review for plain error. See United States v. Acosta, 475 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir.2007); United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir.2003). Our consideration of the district court’s decision begins and ends with the first element of plain error review because we conclude that the district court did not err in limiting the scope of Rios’s cross-examination. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (explaining that the first element of plain error review requires that “there must be an error or defect”). A defendant’s right to cross-examination is not unlimited. United States v. Bernegger, 661 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir.2011). The Sixth Amendment confrontation right is satisfied in this regard so Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In sum, establishing a Confrontation Clause 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (B) holding that the district court satisfied the confrontation clause by permitting the defendant to present facts concerning the adverse witnesss plea agreement and incentives to cooperate (C) holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment (D) holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing (E) holding that if a plea agreement is breached the district court may either grant specific performance or allow the defendant to withdraw the plea
holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement

discretion” in the absence of explicit standards or procedures. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). Prior restraints on expression in a public forum have generally been subjected to exacting scrutiny. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 226, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (plurality opinion) (collecting cases). However, “the context in which [a prior restraint] occurs can affect the level of scrutiny applied.” Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Jones, 192 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir.1999). Prior restraints in a nonpublic forum have been upheld as long as they were reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 813, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (<HOLDING>); Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that school officials could prevent a student from distributing invitations in a public elementary school a nonpublic forum because the restraint was reasonable (B) holding that the courthouse lobby was a nonpublic forum (C) holding that a federal charity drive a nonpublic forum could limit participation to a number of select charities as long as the restriction was reasonable and viewpointneutral (D) holding that a statesponsored televised election debate was a nonpublic forum and state officials could exercise broad editorial discretion in deciding which candidates to invite as long as the decisions were reasonable and viewpointneutral (E) holding that a courthouse was a nonpublic forum but an unenclosed courthouse plaza was a designated public forum

holding that school officials could prevent a student from distributing invitations in a public elementary school a nonpublic forum because the restraint was reasonable