instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
526 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that “retire” is not synonymous with “age,” and holding that without more, employer’s statement that' plaintiff should “retire and make everybody happy” was not direct evidence of age discrimination); Erickson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 271 y attitude during the 2010 discussion, Dunn has failed to show a specific link between the Board’s attitude and its decision to nonrenew his contract. After all, not only was there an almost two-year gap between the Board’s 2010 discussion and the 2012 nonrenewal, but the Board rehired Dunn twice during this period despite him being at least sixty years old. Given these circumstances, any link between the 2010 discussion and the 2012 nonrenewal is too attenuated to constitute direct evidence. See Bone, 686 F.3d at 954 (<HOLDING>); Haigh v. Gelita USA, Inc., 632 F.3d 464, 470 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to raise prejudicial comments of trial court on appeal defendant must object to comments when made and move for a mistrial (B) holding that a supervisors repeated comments to an employee that the supervisor wanted to have sex with the employees fifteenyearold daughter were extremely severe because the comments were significantly more offensive than the typical crass comments we have found to be insufficient to constitute harassment in other cases (C) holding that comments relating to age made some three to fifteen or more years prior to plaintiffs discharge were not relevant to show that he was fired because of his age (D) holding that comments made at least four months before the adverse employment action were not connected to the decisionmaking process and thus were not direct evidence of age discrimination (E) holding that supervisors reactions to comments did not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination where comments were made six months prior to plaintiffs discharge and were unconnected to the discharge decision
answer:
(E)


question:
recipient venue because their lack of standing here means it is not a district “in which [the case] might have been brought,” according to the requirements of the transfer statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiffs suggest that this court should “sensibly confirm[] that inherent in any discretionary transfer here is the idea that jurisdiction cannot be destroyed.” PI. Resp. 25. The argument is artful but unpersuasive. “There is no valid reason for reading the words ‘where it might have been brought’ to narrow the range of permissible federal forums beyond those permitted by federal venue statutes.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 623, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); see also Carbonara v. Olmos, 1994 WL 61797, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1994) (<HOLDING>). B. Standing of SAF SAF asserts both 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (C) holding that transfer to a district in which circuit law likely precluded standing was proper because the language of  1404a refers only to whether venue is proper and not a plaintiffs capacity to sue (D) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (E) holding that venue is proper in any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business
answer:
(C)


question:
to the exercise of discretion by the trial court. Penn s to avoid the appearance of impropriety is a worthy standard for professional conduct, a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to due process does not entitle him to a prosecution free of such appearances. Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (stating that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not violated when his lawyer has a “possible” or “potential” conflict of interest). Instead, a criminal defendant is denied due process only when his former counsel joins a Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office and is not effectively screened from contact with the Commonwealth’s attorneys who are handling the defendant’s case on a related matter. See Thompson, 246 So.2d at 763 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 236-37 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (B) holding than an attorney who serves as a mediator cannot subsequently represent anyone in a substantially related matter without the consent of the original parties because mediators routinely receive and preserve confidences in much the same manner as an attorney and where the mediator was privy to confidential information the applicable ethical rules impose the same responsibility as the rules relating to any attorneys subsequent representation of a former client (C) holding that defendants right to due process was not violated by the employment of his former counsel in the us attorneys office where the former counsel recused himself and was screened from the prosecution of defendants case (D) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (E) holding that a defendants due process rights are violated only if his former lawyer prosecutes him on a matter related to the representation or discloses client confidences to other prosecutors
answer:

(E)