In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: to intervene” as a linguistic tool to highlight how little personal participation the defendant had in the arrest in that particular case. The passage shows how far below the required minimum level of involvement that particular defendant exhibited. Read in whole, Brown more accurately shows that personal participation in an arrest, or supervisory control over the arresting officer, is required in order to establish liability for unlawful arrest — mere presence is not enough. However, even assuming Plaintiffs are correct, and that law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene in other officer’s unlawful arrests, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers or Alma Officers violated clearly established law in this case. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Canine Handlers and Alma Officers were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search (C) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force (D) holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant (E) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied

A: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim
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Q: in Bowman were appointed by the court to make educational decisions for children who were wards of the district, so that the advocates effectively acted as “parents” under the IDEA. See id. Accordingly, even though they were licensed attorneys, they could not recover fees as educational advocates because they were not acting in an attorney-client capacity. See id. Pressley distinguishes from this scenario because she was employed by the Chris Anwah Law Firm, instead of being appointed by the court as an advocate. See Adewusi Deck ¶ 1. Furthermore, Pressley’s work on this matter was similar to that performed by the billing attorneys. See PL’s Mot., Ex. B. Yet because she is not a member of the D.C. Bar, Pressley is not entitled to attorney rates. See Dickens, 724 F.Supp.2d at 120 (<HOLDING>); Agapito v. District of Columbia, 477 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees (B) holding that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in considering the prevailing hourly rates in the southern district of new york when awarding attorneys fees (C) holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees (D) holding that attorneys not admitted to the dc bar are not entitled to reimbursement but awarding fees at paralegal rates as equitable relief (E) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because it was filed before the final order awarding attorneys fees

A: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees
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Q: In context; this evidence is hardly sufficient to support the Board’s finding that Horsehead refused to bargain in good faith. In addition to the nine meetings up to this point, the evidence shows continued serious bargaining, substantial personal involvement by the company’s president, development of a creative new offer to address the union’s desire for more money within the economic constraints facing the company, and an offer to extend the expired contract to facilitate further bargaining. Just as the Board has no authority to pass judgment on the content of bargaining proposals (at least if the proposals are not unusually harsh and unreasonable), the Board- is not empowered to flyspeck a party’s choice of bargaining tactics. See Insurance Agents’, 361 U.S. at 488, 80 S.Ct. 419 (<HOLDING>). To borrow a formulation employed in Pease, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing duty to deal in good faith in workers compensation setting (B) holding that counsels strategic decisions should be afforded wide latitude (C) holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty (D) holding that whether impasse exists rests upon factintensive inquiry into the bargaining history the good faith of the negotiating parties the length of negotiations the importance of the issues about which there is disagreement and the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations (E) holding that subject to the duty to bargain in good faith parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations

A:
recognizing duty to deal in good faith in workers compensation setting
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