instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
it was minor and that Zhang only had five years of education. The IJ reasonably found these explanations insufficient. Zhang also testified inconsistently regarding whether he was fired from his job after authorities arrested him in 2010, or simply did not return to work. Zhang argues that this inconsistency was “nonexistent” because there was more than one reason why he did not return to work. Zhang does not explain, however, why he did not state that he was terminated when he was first asked why he did not- return to work. The agency reasonably found that Zhang’s failure to mention his termination until prompted by the IJ undermined his credibility, and that his explanation that he “did not listen clearly” was unpersuasive. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the agency reasonably found that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences (B) holding that district court need not accept the governments recommendation of a minor role reduction (C) holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief (D) holding that a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to conclude that the petitioner would more likely than not be subjected to torture if removed to china based solely on the fact that she had illegally departed china without more particularized evidence (E) holding that ij need not accept plausible explanation for inconsistency unless reasonable factfinder would be compelled to do so
answer:
holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences


question:
reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. In determining the purpose of section 13-21-101, it is appropriate to look to legislative history as indicative of the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Willer, 817 P.2d at 519-20. The 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101 created the distinction between judgments which the judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal. The General Assembly intended that the amendment, and its market-determined interest rate, apply only to judgments which the judgment debtor appeals. See Act of March 25, 1982, ch. 39, 1982 Colo. Laws 227 (entitled “An Act Concerning Interest Payable on Appealed Money Judgments in Civil Actions” (emphasis added)); see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The statements of the bill’s sponsors also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent (B) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (C) holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period (D) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent (E) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent
answer:
holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent


question:
that City Sign could renew the lease “at the end of 10-years.” The parties properly recognize that no Tennessee case has clarified the requisite time frame within which an , 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under an option requiring renewal at the expiration of the lease but providing no more specific time requirement the lessee had a reasonable time to exercise the option within the term of the lease (B) holding that the damage for tenancy at sufferance during the holdover period was the monthly rent under the lease versus the apartments fair market value because the lease contained a provision requiring lease payments beyond the lease term (C) holding that the lease pro vision granting the lessee the option of constructing improvements did not make the construction the pith of the lease (D) recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the termination of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination but gave the lessee a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election (E) holding that under an option requiring renewal at the expiration of the lease the lessee was required to exercise the option on or before the last day of the lease
answer:

holding that under an option requiring renewal at the expiration of the lease but providing no more specific time requirement the lessee had a reasonable time to exercise the option within the term of the lease