TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: of the statute, the FDA’s regulations, the FDA’s internal interpretation, and precedent all demonstrate that a sterilizer for dental hand-pieces is a “device” as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(h). That being so, both SteriSafe and its accessory SteriDot are within the jurisdiction of the FFDCA. Defendant nevertheless posits three reasons why SteriSafe and SteriDot are not devices. First, defendant argues that the government failed to prove that dental handpieces transmit disease and, thus, that SteriSafe actually prevents disease. Such proof is not required. Congress had two purposes in enacting' the FFDCA: (1) to regulate products that actually prevent disease, and (2) to regulate products that falsely claim that they prevent disease. Because of those d 1006 (9th Cir.1952) (<HOLDING>). Defendant next argues that the Steri-Safe is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the doctor who submitted an expert report did not demonstrate knowledge of cancer treatment he was not qualified to offer an opinion that an earlier diagnosis could have produced a better outcome for the plaintiff (B) holding that a machine that allegedly eliminated lumps from womens breasts was governed by the ffdca even though expert witnesses expressed the unanimous belief that appellants instruments are useless for diagnosis or treatment of any human ailment (C) holding the expert witnesses were protected by witness immunity to ensure expert objectivity (D) holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for  trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis (E) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: 669 (1971). Although Plaintiff requests resolution of seemingly unsettled State law questions, the issues at bar fall squarely within the Burford parameters: Plaintiff has presented difficult issues of state law, gaming is arguably an area of important state policy in Texas, and the Texas Lottery Commission (TLC) provides the unified State enforcement mechanism for some aspects of gaming law in Texas. Moreover, both the TLC and Office of the Attorney General provide an administrative procedure for organizations and individuals to request advisory opinions regarding the legality of proposed gaming actions. Certification to the Texas Supreme Court to answer the state law question at issue here would be ideal. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974)(<HOLDING>). However, under the Texas Constitution, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court (B) holding that certification of a remand order divests federal court jurisdiction (C) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the court (D) holding that it was proper in determining certification to consider whether certification would foster the settlement of the case with advantage to the parties and with great savings in judicial time and services (E) holding that certification to the state supreme court rests in the sound discretion of the federal court and that certification in the long run saves time energy and resources as well as helps to build a cooperative judicial federalism

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: Thus, even if there was a violation of rule 11 during the plea hearing, appellate courts must continue to inquire into whether there is evidence that the plea was nonetheless knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. 125. Accordingly, if a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and the district court refuses to allow a defendant to withdraw that plea, the federal Due Process Clause and our Plea Withdrawal Statute-not rule 11-would mandate that we reverse the district court's decision. We therefore proceed under the framework provided in Utah's Plea Withdrawal Statute. 19 Judges have discretion to grant a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea only when "a defendant's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered." State v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, ¶ 32, 282 P.3d 998 (<HOLDING>); see also Utax Cope § T77-13-6(2)(a) (2007). A 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that military judges enjoy broad discretion on matters of continuance (B) holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea (C) holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea (D) holding that prosecution is generally entitled to specific performance or withdrawal of plea following defendants breach but because the government waived its right to withdrawal of plea only the possibility of specific performance remained (E) recognizing that the revised plea withdrawal statute did away with the broad discretion previ ously given to judges on this matter

SOLUTION:
(E)