In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to preserve evidence exists between a third party and another in the absence of a special relationship, such as one created by contract or statute. Id. Under that analysis, this court will need to consider the primary purpose of the third-party here, Giant Eagle. (2) “Duty” of a third-party employer to its employee Pennsylvania courts have not directly considered whether the existence of an employer/employee relationship creates a duty on the part of a third-party employer to preserve evidence of a work-related accident for a potential products liability suit by an employee. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is no such duty. See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F.Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D.Ark.1989); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 179 Mich.App. 136, 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither common law nor workers disability compensation act imposed affirmative duty on employer to preserve evidence which might be used in employees thirdparty liability action (B) holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme (C) holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability (D) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (E) holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties
[A]: (A)


[Q]: an insurer to await the filing of a complaint against its insured will force insurers to defend claims that are unlikely to result in a duty to indemnify. We recognize the reality of Patrons’s concerns. We conclude, however, that the rationale supporting the comparison test outweighs those concerns. See Dingwell, 414 A.2d at 227. “We have always recognized that the application of the comparison test will occasionally requ dgment action before the injured claimant filed an action against the insured. Dolley, 669 A.2d at 1321. Rather than rejecting the action on ripeness grounds, we determined the insurer’s duly to defend vel non on the basis of what the corn-plaint might have alleged, in view of the parties' stipulation. Id. at 1323. 5 . See State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d at 38 (<HOLDING>); Perreault v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 568 
 Holding statements: (A) holding insurers duty to defend is determined by allegations in the petition (B) holding that insurance company could sue in insureds name following assignment of insureds interest against tortfeasor (C) holding that an insurers duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint against the insured (D) holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss (E) holding that insureds criminal convictions were sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issue of the insureds subjective intent for purposes of evaluating the insurers duty to defend
[A]: (E)


[Q]: interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.”). In this case, the Referendum has prevented SDDS from operating Lonetree under the conditions and standards set forth when the legislature passed S.B. 169. However, nothing prevents SDDS from reapplying for another permit and proposing more stringent environmental safeguards. Furthermore, even if SDDS cannot operate Lonetree, the example of the Big Stone waste disposal plant demonstrates that the flow of interstate waste to South Dakota has not been prevented. The Court concludes that the incidental burden which the Referendum imposed on interstate commerce was not “clearly excessive” in comparison to the local benefits. See Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 473, 101 S.Ct. at 728-29 (<HOLDING>); Exxon, 437 U.S. at 128-29, 98 S.Ct. at 2215 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment was improperly granted in view of the need for careful interpretation of the original and reissue claims in light of the specification the prosecution history and the alleged industry practice (B) holding that in 1998 the law was clearly established that excessive duration of a police dog bite and improper encouragement of a continuation of the attack by officers could constitute excessive force (C) holding that even if outofstate plastic producers were burdened relatively more heavily than the minnesota pulpwood industry the burden was not clearly excessive in view of the ecological benefits which would accrue (D) holding that the fines imposed by the challenged city ordinances are not excessive even if the excessive fines clause is applicable (E) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff
[A]:
(C)