In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
to facilitate William’s pick ups and returns of the children. The record reflects that Lacey, out of distrust, often would record her interactions with William. William admitted that he routinely avoids interaction with Lacey unless necessary. After reviewing the record under the applicable standard of review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the circumstances of the children or a conservator have materially and substantially changed since rendition of the divorce decree and that it is in the children’s best interests to modify the decree to give Lacey the exclusive right to consent to psychiatric and psychological treatment of the children. See Swaab v. Swaab, 282 S.W.3d 519, 534 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (<HOLDING>); Baltzer, 240 S.W.3d at 477 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting mother the exclusive right to consent to all psychiatric and psychological treatment of the child (C) holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time (D) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child

Ex Output:
holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction


Ex Input:
284 So.2d 905, 915-16 (La.1973); see Tesvich v. 3-A’s Towing Co., 547 So.2d 1106, 1111 (La.Ct.App.1989) (“[W]e have concluded on the basis of Lombard that the claim of each plaintiff with respect to his or her leases constitutes a separate occurrence.” (citation omitted)); see also Reynolds v. Transcon. Ins. Co., Civ. A. Nos. 94-1367, 94-1432, 1995 WL 16795, at *5-6 (E.D.La. Jan.17, 1995) (Duval, J.) (discussing and applying Lombard, Tesvich, and Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1359 (5th Cir.1994)). The property damage in the DuroSeal petitions allegedly arose because of several negligent and fraudulent acts on the part of Jotun and others. Each of these acts does not constitute a separate bes, Inc., 924 So.2d 1131, 1133 (La.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); Korossy v. Sunrise Homes, Inc., 653 So.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee (B) holding that property damage occurred when condominium owners received architects report detailing damage not during the four years of construction of the condos (C) holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed (D) holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations (E) holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did

Ex Output:
holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee


Ex Input:
judicial responsibility.” Sentencing discretion — the choice of a penalty within the range fixed by legislation — is part of the judiciary's responsibility. Id. at 583-84, 789 P.2d at 1084-85 (citations omitted). When disputes have arisen regarding the division of authority among the three branches of government in the development and administration of the criminal laws, we have acted to prevent one branch from intruding upon the domain of another branch. See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the alabama death penalty statute because the judge did not consider the jurys recommendation the statute which forced the jury to sentence the defendant to death whenever aggravating circumstances existed was not unconstitutional (B) holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available  life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole (C) holding that the sentence entered by the circuit court was illegal because the court had no authority to impose a sentence that exceeded the punishment fixed by the jury (D) holding that dui sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence based upon the prosecutors recommendation was unconstitutional in violation of article 3 because the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor (E) holding that when a sentencing issue centers upon a courts statutory authority to impose a sentence rather than the courts exercise of discretion in fashioning the sentence the issue raised implicates the legality of the sentence imposed

Ex Output:

holding that under the alabama death penalty statute because the judge did not consider the jurys recommendation the statute which forced the jury to sentence the defendant to death whenever aggravating circumstances existed was not unconstitutional