In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: although incorporated or approved in the decree, is not merged therein, the parties may enforce it by s clear that "jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events.” Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1112, 1 L.Ed.2d 1205 (1957) (citation omitted). 18 . Courts in this district have long recognized that "a coiporation is an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action suit.” See Gibson v. BoPar Dock Co. Corp., 780 F.Supp. 371, 373 (W.D.Va.1991) (citing Tower Hill Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 33 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir.1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 607, 50 S.Ct. 157, 74 L.Ed. 650 (1930)); Bates v. Cekada, 130 F.R.D. 52, 59 (E.D.Va.1990) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Taylor v. Swirnow, 80 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to maintain a derivative cause of action a shareholder must maintain a continuous ownership interest in the corporation (B) recognizing that a corporation is properly aligned as a defendant in a shareholder derivative suit when the corporation is in antagonistic hands (C) recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action (D) holding that a shareholder who disposes of his shares loses standing to bring a derivative action no longer a shareholder in the corporation the defendant cannot maintain a derivative action on its behalf (E) recognizing that the corporation is always deemed to be an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: that she disapproved of what she reasonably believed to be unlawful retaliation. B. Form and Context To the extent that Thomas’ conduct was expressive, the message was communicated to her immediate supervisor, Miller, and other court employees. She did not, however, attempt to inform the general public about the allegedly retaliatory practices. That Thomas chose to convey her views privately rather than publicly is not determinative of whether her expression is entitled to protection. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979). Because content is the most important factor, we have concluded that speech about a matter of public concern may be protected even when made in a private context. See, e.g., Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1174 (<HOLDING>); Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 979 (“[T]he public 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected (B) holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged (C) holding that a memorandum given to the employees supervisors was protected speech when the memorandum alleged criminal wrongdo ing (D) holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected (E) holding the separate document rule violated when the alleged judgment was included with the memorandum and order of the court
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: United States v. Reyes, 603 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.1979)). In contrast, other circuits have concluded strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 23(a) is necessary to waive a jury trial. E.g., United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003, 1012 (5th Cir.1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985). Mindful of Rule 23(a)’s writing requirement and the reasons for it, we conclude requiring strict compliance with Rule 23(a) is not justified. In those circumstances where the record clearly reflects a defendant’s waiver of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, we see no practical justification for finding a waiver invalid simply because Rule 23(a)’s writing requirement has not been met. Cf. United States v. Prichard, 875 F.2d 789, 790 (10th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). The Constitution requires only that a waiver 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that technical violations of fedrcrimp 41 d require suppression if there was a deliberate disregard of the rule or if the defendant was prejudiced (B) holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant (C) holding that the validity of a collateral waiver is a threshold issue (D) holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver (E) holding that collateral review of the validity of a jury waiver in the absence of a rule 23a writing is not available absent any indication the defendant was prejudiced by the technical error
[EX A]:
(E)