In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word “claimant” in subsection four. Under the plurality’s view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word “claimant” in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of “prevailing party.” This is because, in order for the word “claimant” in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid

Answer: holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence


Question: v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 116 F.Supp.2d 937, 950-51 (M.D.Tenn.2000). As other circuits have recognized, the treating physician rule is a standard that was developed in the Social Security context requiring the administrative law judge to give deference to the opinions of a claimant’s treating physician when determining the claimant’s eligibility for benefits. See, e.g., Regula, 266 F.3d at 1139; see also Peabody Coal Co. v. Groves, 277 F.3d 829, 833-35 (6th Cir.2002) (applying the “treating physician presumption” in a Black Lungs Benefit case holding that an AL J may place greater weight on the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician than those of non-treating physicians). Several circuits have adopted the treating physician rule in an ERISA context. Regula, 266 F.3d at 1139 (<HOLDING>); Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 901 (8th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that vicarious liability claim against union based on medical malpractice of treating physician is not preempted by erisa (B) holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate (C) holding that an erisa plan administrator is not bound by an ssa disability determination when reviewing a claim for benefits (D) holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician (E) holding as a matter of first impression that the treating physician rule is applicable in the context of a disability benefits determination under erisa

Answer: holding that vicarious liability claim against union based on medical malpractice of treating physician is not preempted by erisa


Question: (D.P.R.2006) ("The motion as to preliminary injunction is DENIED as the Court considers that the preliminary in-junctive relief in this case, being one to determine likelihood of success and there being no 'smoking gun’ evidence, precludes the Court, at this stage, from deciding issues of credibility, weighing of evidence, and issues of motive and intent in order to determine the required injunctive criterion of ‘likelihood of success.' The Court is of the opinion that the described issues are outcome determinative to be made by the jury.”); Franklin v. Ciroli, 865 F.Supp. 940, 947 (D.Mass. 1994) (Tauro, J.) (citing Spencer Co., 489 F.2d at 707); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 1988 WL 159936, *4, No. 88-0033-S, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16427, at *11 (D.Mass. Dec. 29, 1988) (<HOLDING>). See also Waldmann Lighting Co. v. Halogen 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the district court is not bound by its prior factual findings determined in a preliminary injunction hearing (B) holding preliminary injunction improper where it exceeded the relief sought and granted the same relief which would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) holding that a hearing must be held to determine credibility in preliminary injunction cases (E) recognizing the inappropriateness of a preliminary injunction where credibility determinations must be made but granting a preliminary injunction because the legal and factual issues have been sufficiently illuminated

Answer:
recognizing that the district court is not bound by its prior factual findings determined in a preliminary injunction hearing