instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
with ever since his age of 13 and believes that this criminal record and his continued violation of the law does require a sentence at the top of the guideline range.” Id. at 8. I. A. Commerce Clause Challenge to Section 922(g)(1) Williams first challenges the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute as it applies to his possession of the Smith and Wesson revolver. Williams posits that because he possessed the gun solely within the State of Wisconsin, and because the record reveals no substantial connection between his possession of the gun and interstate commerce, Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to reach his possession of the gun. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Williams did not make this argument below, so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce (B) holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (C) holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that gunfree school zones act of 1990 which proscribed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school exceeded congressional authority under commerce clause because it reached conduct that did not substantially affect or have a meaningful connection with interstate commerce (E) holding that the gunfree school zones act exceeds congress power under the commerce clause
answer:
holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce


question:
inquiry — • whether New Provo Canyon’s treatment of one individual constituted state action — differs substantially from that in Milonas, irrespective of whether, for purposes of a class action suit, Old Provo Canyon’s treatment of its patients generally constituted state action. Thus, the question here does not present the necessary “like facts” to trigger the stare decisis doctrine. D. Collateral Estoppel For the very same reason, Taylor’s collateral estoppel argument fails. Collateral esto Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553; Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Logistics Control Group, 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.1985) (discussed below). 13 . Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553-54; Lib. Mut. Ins., 969 F.2d at 1388-89; Holloway, 813 F.2d at 878-79; see also Nipper v. Snipes, 1 F.3d 415, 415-417 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Id. at 1553; see also Lib. Mut. Ins., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (B) holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body (C) holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial (D) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (E) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact
answer:
holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint


question:
court orders denying motions which Burton filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a) challenging his departure sentence. See Burton v. State, 923 So.2d 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); Burton v. State, 889 So.2d 82 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). In his direct appeal and in these prior postconviction proceedings Burton never argued that his conviction for attempted second degree murder with a firearm should not have been classified as a first degree felony. Instead, he simply challenged the trial court’s basis fo 2006) (“Blakely ... is not retroactive”). However, the trial judge granted Burton’s third 3.800(a) motion based upon his erroneous view that Burton was entitled to relief because his direct appeal was in the “pipe-fine” when Apprendi was decided in 2000. See Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So.2d 521, 530 (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>). Because Burton did not object to the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding newly announced rules of constitutional criminal procedure must apply retroactively to all cases state or federal pending on direct review or not yet final with no exception (B) holding that defendant must have clearly objected at trial to the matter he is raising on appeal (C) recognizing that the pipeline theory allows a defendant to seek application of a new rule of law if the case is pending on direct review or not yet final and the defendant timely objected at trial (D) holding that tillman applied to cases then pending on direct appeal ie in the pipeline (E) holding that a new rule for conducting criminal prosecutions should be applied to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final
answer:

holding newly announced rules of constitutional criminal procedure must apply retroactively to all cases state or federal pending on direct review or not yet final with no exception