In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence.” Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 417, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964) (“established rule” is that “recognition operates retroactively to validate past acts”); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942) (recognition is retroactive in effect); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328-330, 57 S.Ct. 758, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937) (recognition is retroactive). Further, the FSIA itself is retroactive in application and applies to actions of foreign sovereigns prior to the passage of the FSIA. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 124 S.Ct. 2240, 159 L.Ed.2d 1, (2004) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the FSIA would apply to all 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fsia applied retroactively to actions of the austrian government in 1948 (B) holding that kotecki limit applied retroactively (C) holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government (D) holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review (E) recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: )4 mile away. Fifth, also at this time, a vehicle registered to Nelson pulled in and parked next to Miller’s car. Sixth, the note at the boat ramp informed Kaplan that he was being watched. Seventh, Miller and Nelson both left the lake at the same time Kaplan left. Eighth, Nelson arrived at the same McDonald’s immediately after Kaplan arrived. Ninth, a passenger from Nelson’s car approached Kaplan’s vehicle and peered into Kaplan’s vehicle from a distance of 10 feet away. Tenth, Nelson drove home from the McDonald’s using what would normally be described as counter-surveillance techniques. Finally, Miller changed his story as to why he was at the lake that day at that time. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1289-90, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 348 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence (B) holding that the conspiratorial agreement may be proved by circumstantial evidence including the acts and conduct of the coconspirators and the inferences that may be drawn from their acts (C) holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence (D) recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence (E) holding that there was no evidence or inferences to be drawn from the evidence to support the damage award
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: acts. Id. at 963. The Lawson court stated that a "critical distinction” of Pylant from the facts before it in Lawson was that in Pylant, there was "not a factual background of consensual sexual discussion, conduct and relations.” Id. And in Lawson, it was "from that background ... that the issue of [the insured’s] intent ar[ose].” Id. 17 . There is no consensus as the applicable standard, and the Mississippi Supreme Court has not addressed the issue. However, numerous courts have logically concluded that a negligence standard should apply. See Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir.1984) (opining that Texas courts would apply the negligence standard of liability to false light privacy actions by private plaintiffs); Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 249 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); West v. Media General Convergence, Inc., 53 
 Holding statements: (A) holding when defamatory statement involved issue of public concern that private individual was required to prove actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages against media defendant (B) holding that defendant who placed private figure in a false light was not entitled to heightened protection of actual malice standard and could instead be found liable on showing of negligence (C) holding plaintiff failed to present evidence of actual malice because defendants explanation of the mistaken statement shows negligence but no more than that (D) holding under federal law that public figure claiming iied based on defamatory nature of speech must prove actual malice (E) holding failure to investigate before publishing is not sufficient to prove actual malice
[EX A]:
(B)