In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: are differences between sanctions under Rule 37(a) and substitution of counsel conditioned on payment of fees, the parallel considerations convince us that the Cunningham rationale applies here. Like Rule 37(a) sanctions, the present situation invokes concerns regarding finality, avoiding piecemeal appeals, and availability of effective appellate review.” Id. Cases from the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits further support interpreting Cunningham as applying more broadly than to Rule 37(a) sanctions alone. The First Circuit recognized in Empresas Omajede, Inc. v. Bennazar-Zequeira, 213 F.3d 6, 9 n. 4 (1st Cir.2000), that Cunningham affirmed its precedents denying interlocutory appeals in the sanctions area. See, e.g., United States v. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Appeal of Licht & Semonoff 796 F.2d 564, 573 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable (B) holding sanctions pursuant to rule 26g not immediately appealable (C) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (D) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order (E) holding an order of rule 37a sanctions against an attorney is immediately appealable under  1291
Example Output: holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable

Example Input: State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444, 221 A.2d 521 (1966))); Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170, 733 A.2d 1159 (1999). Our construction of N.J.S.A 39:4-88(b) is thus consonant with established principles of statutory construction. | IV. Applying statutes that are identical or very similar to the statute before the Court, courts of other states have reached varying conclusions. Several decisions have construed analogous statutes to describe two offenses, as this Court construes N.J.S.A 39:4-88(b). See People v. Butler, 81 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 146 Cal.Rptr. 856, 857 (Cal.Ct.App.1978) (construing Cal. Veh.Code § 21658 to state “two affirmative duties placed upon the operator of a motor vehicle”); People v. Smith, 172 Ill.2d 289, 216 Ill.Dec. 658, 665 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Marx, 289 Kan. 657, 215 P.3d 601, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders (B) holding that plain language of 625 ill comp stat ann 511709 establishes two separate requirements for lane usage (C) holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning (D) holding that in context of motion for reconsideration or to reopen congress envisioned two separate timely petitions for review of two separate final orders (E) holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms
Example Output: holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders

Example Input: 45 U.S.C. § 56, and 46 U.S.C. § 30106, are essentially identical, stating that the action must be “commenced” or “brought” within the three year period. The Supreme Court in Burnett specifically found that the state court suit had been properly “commenced” although it was filed in an improper venue. 380 U.S. at 426, 85 S.Ct. at 1053. Furthermore, because the principle of uniformity that drove the Burnett decision applies with equal force to a general maritime action, other courts have correctly held that Burnett applies in general maritime cases. See, e.g., Prejean, 721 So.2d at 1276 (citing 1 Martin J. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries § 5:10 (4th ed.1990)); Davis, 659 F.Supp. at 156-157; People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F.Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.La.1968) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s second argument for distinction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries (B) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (C) holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction (D) holding that burnett and its justification of uniformity is equally applicable to admiralty actions (E) holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures
Example Output:
holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries