In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

purpose of this Memorandum is to explain why the Court declined to do these things. As disclosed by plaintiff in its ex parte motion, the sale of decoding devices like those defendants are claimed to have offered and sold is prohibited by federal criminal statute, see 47 U.S.C. § 553(b), as well as by Illinois criminal statute, see 720 ILCS 5/16-10(a)(4). Under the circumstances, information disclosing defendants’ purchases and sales of the devices, the revenues obtained from those sales, the assets they now have that may have been derived from those sales, and the locations where they keep their records and other descrambling devices is, without question, information that might tend to incriminate the defendants. See, e.g., FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); SEC v. Rehtorik, 755 F.Supp. 1018, 1019 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government (B) holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment (C) holding that abrogating the right to sell endangered eagles feathers did not implicate the fifth amendment (D) holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege (E) recognizing that preliminary injunction requiring defendant to disclose records might implicate fifth amendment
holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government

the justifiable use of deadly force to specific circumstances, such as when the actor “reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another.” Id. § 776.012(1). As discussed at length above, Lieutenant Weippert’s conduct was objectively reasonable and he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Penley posed a threat of great bodily harm to the lieutenant and others. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Penleys, the evidence reveals no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lieutenant Weippert’s use of force was reasonably necessary. Under Florida law, Lieutenant Weippert had no duty to retreat and his use of force was justifiable. See State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 337-38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle (B) holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded (C) holding that after being chased by a carfull of angry men it would have been reasonable for mr rivera a private citizen to believe that deadly force was necessary even if only a single unarmed pursuer had approached his nowstopped car because the pursuer and his friends had already threatened riveras life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a highspeed chase and throwing deadly missiles namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna (D) holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure (E) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car
holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle

person’s lawyer will not suffice.”). Nonetheless, more recent cases in the Second Circuit interpret Rule 45’s personal service requirement liberally where the type of service used “was calculated to provide timely actual notice.” CareCore, 2008 WL 3833238, at *2 (noting that “nothing in the word ‘delivering’ [in Rule 45(b)(1) ] indicates personal service, and a personal service requirement can be unduly restrictive”); see also Cartier v. Geneve Collections, Inc., No. CV 2007-0201, 2008 WL 552855, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.27, 2008) (agreeing that “ ‘delivery’ under Rule 45 means a manner of service reasonably designed to ensure actual receipt of a subpoena by a witness, rather than personal service”); Cordius Trust v. Kummerfeld, No. 99 Civ. 3200, 2000 WL 10268, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2000) (<HOLDING>). Aristocrat first sought to serve individual 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inhand delivery is not required under rule 45 so long as service is made in a manner that reasonably insures actual receipt of the subpoena (B) holding that because alternative service by means of certified mail reasonably insures actual receipt of the subpoena by the witness the delivery requirement of rule 45 will be met (C) holding that delivery of subpoena via federal express was sufficient because effective service under rule 45 is not limited to personal service (D) holding that service of a subpoena via certified mail is sufficient under rule 45 particularly when defendant does not deny actual receipt (E) holding the rule 4 requirement of delivery to the appropriate united states attorney required personal service not service by certified mail

holding that inhand delivery is not required under rule 45 so long as service is made in a manner that reasonably insures actual receipt of the subpoena