In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: Dubuque’s “irrevocable” decision to relocate was not a vote to categorically refuse Dubuque’s overtures, but a vote to insist on financial disclosure as a prelude to bargaining. The Board’s finding that good-faith bargaining between Dubuque and the UFCW might not have been futile was substantially supported by the record. 3. Retroactivity Finally, Dubuque argues that the Board erred by “retroactively” employing its new test in this case. Again, we disagree. Our formulation of the standard for evaluating challenges to the retroactive application of a ruling from an agency adjudication has varied. Compare Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C.Cir.1972) (applying a five-factor test) with Consolidated Freightways v. NLRB, 892 F.2d 1052, 1058 (D.C.Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted) with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no retroactive application (B) recognizing a general principle that retroactive application of rules is permitted absent any manifest injustice (C) holding retroactive application (D) recognizing principle (E) holding that retroactive application of amendments will not result in manifest injustice
Example Output: (B)

Example Input: the genus of goods or services for which it seeks protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2), (b)(2); 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.32(a)(6), 2.71(a); TMEP § 1402.01; see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2014) (“Parties that choose to recite services in their trademark application that exceed their actual services will be held to the broader scope of the application.”); Octocom Sys., 918 F.2d at 942 (“[R]egistrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application.... ”). The PTO will generally accept any identification of goods or services so long as it is “specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise.” TMEP § 1402.01; see also In re Omega SA 494 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity (B) holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action (C) holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant (D) holding that it is within the discretion of the pto to require that ones goods be identified with particularity in a trademark application (E) holding that a rule 10b5 claim must be stated with particularity
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. Capshaw cannot establish that his attorney’s performance was deficient for failing to object to the admission of cell phone records. His trial counsel would not have prevailed on such an objection under the governing law, and thus counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to object. It is undisputed that the government obtained a court order, under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, requiring Sprint Nextel to produce the cell phone records of Capshaw and three other people to show calls between them during the period of the murder-for-hire plot. Obtaining those telephone rec ords through a § 2703 court order did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v. Mainland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2582, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Capshaw had no reasonable expectation of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish at time warrant was issued the required nexus between the contraband to be seized which was mailed to defendants post office box and defendants home (B) holding that search warrant was constitutionally defective because it did not require notice (C) holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant (D) holding that telephone company records of calls made from a defendants home did not require the government to seek a search warrant (E) holding that consent searches do not require probable cause to justify the search of a home
Example Output:
(D)