In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation — 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. § 1103) — which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (“An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal.”). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant’s release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc  1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest

Ex Output:
holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute


Ex Input:
take place in federal court. The Government maintains that a facially valid certification is not subject to review by this Court and must be held sufficient. It further contends that even if the certification can be reviewed by this Court, the certification at issue here was correct. “Whether the government complied with [the juvenile delinquency certification requirements of] 18 U.S.C. § 5032 is an issue of statutory interpretation which this court reviews de novo.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 241 F.3d 684, 686 (9th Cir.2001). A certification filed in the district court by a United States Attorney is presumed to be accurate, absent circumstances calling into question its accuracy or validity. See Pasadena Research Labs., Inc. v. United States, 169 F.2d 375, 381-82 (9th Cir.1948) (<HOLDING>). A Section 5032 provides in relevant part: A 
 Holding statements: (A) holding generally the law presumes that every man in his private and official character does his duty until the contrary is proved it will presume that all things are rightly done unless the circumstances of the case overturn this presumption (B) holding law court will not overturn conclusions supported by competent and substantial evidence (C) holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under  1346 (D) recognizing a presumption of regularity that undergirds the official acts of public officers causing courts to presume that they have properly discharged their official duties (E) holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation

Ex Output:
holding law court will not overturn conclusions supported by competent and substantial evidence


Ex Input:
agency which administers the scheme.’ ” Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 781 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1987)). Courts consider the following non-exhaustive factors in deciding whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies: “(1) the need to resolve an issue that (2) has been placed by Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative body having regulatory authority (3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an industry or activity to a comprehensive regulatory authority that (4) requires expertise or uniformity in administration.” Id. The doctrine “is to be used only if a claim ‘requires resolution of an issue of first impr -4387, 2011 WL 2111796, at *15 (N.D.Cal. May 26, 2011) (<HOLDING>); Chacanaca, 752 F.Supp.2d at 1124 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although doctrine of primary jurisdiction required trial court to abate claims over which agency had primary jurisdiction trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing temporary injunction to maintain the status quo (B) holding that primary jurisdiction did not apply where the court had to determine whether defendants all natural claims were misleading (C) holding that primary jurisdiction did not apply to claims of violation of fda regulations and guidance concerning all natural fresh antioxidant and other nutrient claims (D) holding that the natural gas act did not completely preempt state law claims within its scope and thus the federal court did not have removal jurisdiction over the contract price dispute filed in state court (E) holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider claims under the all writs act

Ex Output:

holding that although doctrine of primary jurisdiction required trial court to abate claims over which agency had primary jurisdiction trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing temporary injunction to maintain the status quo