In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Privileges and Immunities Clause. The final interest advanced by Defendants to justify Section 470 is the availability of the remedy of attachment against nonresident attorneys. See Def. Mem. Supp. S.J. at 7 (citing Matter of Tang, 39 A.D.2d 357, 333 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App.Div.1972); Matter of Fordan, 5 Misc.2d 372, 158 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Surrogates Ct.N.Y.Co.1956)). The remedy of attachment is a disciplinary measure involving a seizure on a defendant’s property in order to secure the enforcement of a money judgment. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6201 (McKinney 2011). Under Section 470’s current construction, however, an attorney need only maintain an “of counsel” relationship with an in-state office to satisfy the office requirement. Austria v. Shaw, 143 Misc.2d 970, 542 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989) (<HOLDING>). Based on this standard, the remedy of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee (B) recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole (C) holding that the district where the defendant attorneys office was located was the proper venue because the defendants omissions related to their failure to communicate from their office in savannah the details of the ongoing case (D) holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance  the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid (E) holding that an outofstate attorney paying rent for a desk in an attorneys instate office had satisfied the office requirement

A: holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee
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Q: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals

A: holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision
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Q: 13 case, the starting point for determining the cram-down rate is the treasury rate, not the prime rate. 7 . Bankruptcy Judge Letitia Z. Paul, who is now retired, also issued an opinion that although not expressly holding that Till requires use of the Prime Plus Approach, nevertheless used this approach in determining the cramdown rate in a Chapter 13 case. In re Tirey, 350 B.R. 62, 69 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). 8 . In Montemayor, the real estate securing the claim was the debtors' homestead. [Case No. 10-36990, Doc, No. 1, p. 14 of 49], Because this property was the debtors’ principal residence, § 1322(b)(2) prevents modifying the rights of the lien holder—including changing the interest rate. See Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 331, 113 S.Ct. 2106, 124 L.Ed.2d 228 (1993) (<HOLDING>). However, § 1322(b)(5) provides an exception 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1322b2 prohibits modification of the interest rate on the loan on the debtors principal residence (B) holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract (C) holding that the determination of whether the debtor is using real property as his principal residence is made as of the petition date for the purposes of section 1322b2 (D) holding that citys tax hen on debtors principal residence was modifiable despite  1322b2 because not consensual and thus not a security interest (E) holding that modifying an interest rate in a bankruptcy plan constitutes an impermissible modification under  1322b2

A:
holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract
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