In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: inquiry — • whether New Provo Canyon’s treatment of one individual constituted state action — differs substantially from that in Milonas, irrespective of whether, for purposes of a class action suit, Old Provo Canyon’s treatment of its patients generally constituted state action. Thus, the question here does not present the necessary “like facts” to trigger the stare decisis doctrine. D. Collateral Estoppel For the very same reason, Taylor’s collateral estoppel argument fails. Collateral esto Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553; Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Logistics Control Group, 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.1985) (discussed below). 13 . Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553-54; Lib. Mut. Ins., 969 F.2d at 1388-89; Holloway, 813 F.2d at 878-79; see also Nipper v. Snipes, 1 F.3d 415, 415-417 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Id. at 1553; see also Lib. Mut. Ins., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (B) holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body (C) holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial (D) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (E) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact
[EX A]: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint

[EX Q]: to her knowledge and lack of mistake. So that goes specifically to the case-the State's ability to enter this in its case in chief. ... [T}he prejudice just simply is not extensive at all. The only prejudice that goes to Ms. Downs is that she possessed an ... unlawful controlled substance. 13 We hold that the trial court did not exceed its broad discretion in admitting the evidence for three reasons. First, the evidence at issue is not the type of evidence that Utah courts "have previously deemed highly prejudicial." See State v. Johnso (Utah 1998) ("[Gruesome photographs of a homicide victim's corpse will unfairly prejudice and inflame the jury and therefore require the proponent to show that they have unusual probative value."), and State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1989) (<HOLDING>). Because the evidence at issue is "not the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (B) holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim (C) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (D) holding that the gruesome portion of the videotapeshowing closeup shots of the victims stab wounds in her chest her slit throat and her beaten face as well as her bloodcovered neck shoulders and blouseshould have been excluded under rule 408 (E) holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment
[EX A]: holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine

[EX Q]: jokingly stated he had heroin at home but not in his vehicle. Before requesting consent, the officer stated Vargas-Miranda that their conversation was consensual. Vargas-Miranda responded, “Go ahead,” but nonetheless pointed out that the officer had “no right” to conduct the search. Deputy Sheriff Brown repeated that their communications were consensual, and stated that he was “just asking” for consent to search the vehicle. The exchange occurred in a public place. Deputy Sh onsent by stating the officer had no right to search the vehicle, this statement cannot be construed as an “unequivocal act or statement of withdrawal,” especially considering the Vargas-Miranda thereafter watched the search and raised no objection. U.S. v. Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 855, 858 (8th Cir.1993)(<HOLDING>). Lopez-Mendoza argues that even if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his bedroom based upon evidence that defendant 1 did not contest the fact that he had voluntarily given verbal consent to the search 2 did not appear to be nervous or scared and was cooperative with the officers 3 led officers to his bedroom and 4 was present for the search and did not indicate at any time that he wished to revoke his consent (B) holding that the defendants consent to allow the officer to search her purse by way of holding it open for the officer was for consent to a limited view of the purses interior not to surrender possession  for an unrestricted search and thus the officer exceeded the scope of the defendants consent (C) holding that a search exceeded the scope of the initial oral consent and was not validated by a subsequent written consent an allegedly consensual seizure must stand or fall on the basis of the consent preexisting the seizure (D) holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent (E) holding defendants act of watching in silence as the officers examined his truck on a hoist lowered it and prepared to puncture the sheet metal that covered the secret compartment defeated any claim that he withdrew his consent or believed the search exceeded the scope of his consent
[EX A]:
holding the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his bedroom based upon evidence that defendant 1 did not contest the fact that he had voluntarily given verbal consent to the search 2 did not appear to be nervous or scared and was cooperative with the officers 3 led officers to his bedroom and 4 was present for the search and did not indicate at any time that he wished to revoke his consent