In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 35 . Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 36 . Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 37 . Kimmelman v. Monison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 38 . Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 39 . The Court notes that the state standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel applied by the state parallels the federal standard as stated in Strickland. See Baker v. State, 243 Kan. 1, 755 P.2d 493 (1988); Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 694 P.2d 468 (1985). 40 . Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). 41 . Id. at 753, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 42 .Id. at 754, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 43 . Id. at 752, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (“Legal 2005) (<HOLDING>). 46 . Moreover, the Court finds no error in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel was not deficient for failing to make an objection that lacked merit (B) holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel (C) holding counsel deficient because she could have had no reasonable basis for not objecting to certain inadmissible evidence despite no evidence of counsels strategy (D) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument (E) holding counsel was not deficient in not objecting to testimony that was permissible within state rules of evidence

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: issue, we need not consider the second argument raised. 7 . In a dissent to Smith, Judge Friedman, joined by Judges Pellegrini and Kelley, objected to following the Miller/Lewis/Selan line of cases which automatically equated the refusal to sign a hospital consent form with a refusal to submit to chemical testing. The dissenting judges expressed preference for the other line of caselaw, particularly Conrad, and noted that because Smith orally agreed to the blood test and only refused to sign the hospital consent form, which was a pre-test procedure linked to the test, although not required by section 1547, Smith did not make a knowing and conscious refusal to submit to chemical testing. 8 . Wheatley v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 104 Pa.Cmwlth. 171, 521 A.2d 507 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 9 Although Renwick does not expressly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547 (B) holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion (C) holding that refusal to submit to breathalyzer test did not result from custodial interrogation (D) holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 (E) holding that a district court did not clearly err in crediting agents testimony that a defendant had orally consented despite his refusal to sign consent form

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: to be heard on the motion have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.” E.D. Mich. Local Rule 7.1(h)(3); see Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 385 (6th Cir.2004). Here, the district court found that Moniz “simply is attempting to re-argue [] issues which were already ruled upon by the Court when it dismissed his Complaint,” and thus denied the motion to reconsider. R. 14 (Dist. Ct. Order at 3) (Page ID # 129). This court has stated that a district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reconsider where the motion “merely raise[s] arguments that were already ruled upon.” Graham, 358 F.3d at 385; see also Lommen v. McIntyre, 125 Fed.Appx. 655, 659 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). There was no abuse of discretion in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (B) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for reconsideration where the motion presented nothing new and merely rephrased allegations in the complaint (E) holding under third circuit law that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion


Output: (D)