TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: and onto her abdomen onee she submarined. He further indicated that Amanda’s pelvic and leg injuries were caused by- her knees impacting the vehicle’s dash panel. Mr. Lewis concluded that had Amanda not submarined and her seat not collapsed, she would not have sustained these injuries. Additional Evidence Amanda also introduced portions of Nissan’s pre-trial discovery responses wherein Nissan admitted to disposing of its developmental test reports including any reports concerning crashworthiness, front passenger seatbelt spool-out, submarining, and the effectiveness of the Pathfinder’s seatbelt systems. Mr. Whitman explained in detail why he believed that Nissan’s record retention policy was a bad of our sister states. E.g., Stone Man v. Green, 263 Ga. 470, 435 S.E.2d 205, 206 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The undisputed evidence demonstrates that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are as a general rule improper where a defendant has adhered to environmental and safety regulations (B) holding tcpa is remedial statute and that statutory damages are not punitive damages (C) holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa (D) holding a court may not award punitive damages (E) holding that punitive damages are not fines

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 2 . Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963, 965-66 (Fla.1983). 3 . See Bedford v. State, 589 So.2d 245, 251 (Fla.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1009, 112 S.Ct. 1773, 118 L.Ed.2d 432 (1992); State v. Lumarque, 990 So.2d 1241, 1242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Hernandez v. State, 913 So.2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), rev. denied, 941 So.2d 368 (Fla.2006); Sutton v. State, 834 So.2d 332, 334-35 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Biggs v. State, 745 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Waddell v. State, 696 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), rev. denied, 707 So.2d 1128 (Fla.1998); see also Chaeld v. State, 599 So.2d 1362, 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (<HOLDING>), superseded by statute as recognized in Davis 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the legislature intends to punish separate acts even ones in close temporal proximity the blockburger test does not apply because the precondition for employing that test that the two offenses involve the same conduct is absent (B) holding that the right to control the means by which the work is accomplished is clearly the most significant test of the employment relationship and observing that many of the other factors enumerated in the restatement second are merely evidentiary indicia of the right to control (C) recognizing that other courts have found the type of test reliable but finding that this particular urinalysis test was unreliable since the lab did not perform a backup test or identify lab test results and state left questions about how probationers diabetes affected the results (D) holding that the faison test does not apply to false imprisonment and observing that the test has no application when the charge alleges that the defendant kidnapped the victim with any of the other specific intentions identified in  78701lal 3 or 4 (E) holding that a defendant charged with kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim is not entitled to a faison instruction

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: statute, including § 18.1-215, the statute under which Silver was charged. Although not directly raised by Silver, the Court further notes that application of the recent complaint hearsay exception to § 18.1-215 does not raise an ex post facto concern. On brief, Silver indirectly presents an ex post facto argument, claiming that § 18.1-215 of the Code of Virginia is not one of the exceptions delineated in § 19.2-268.2. (Memo. Opp. Mot. in Limine 2-4.) The applicability of the relevant hearsay exception is a mere procedural change that “does ‘not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt’.” Pilcher v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 158, 163, 583 S.E.2d 70, 72 (2003) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884)) (<HOLDING>); see also Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that application of the rape shield law to a case in which the underlying events occurred prior to the enactment of the rape shield law was not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws (B) holding that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them (C) holding that the rape shield statute affects the use of character evidence to impeach witnesses  and is therefore procedural in nature (D) holding that the retroactive application of a statute authorizing the assessment of a cost to a defendant who committed the felony pri or to the statutes enactment did not violate ex post facto laws (E) holding that a rape shield statute was not ex post facto when it barred evidence of a prior sexual relationship that was admissible before enactment of the statute

SOLUTION:
(A)