In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: (8th Cir.2007)). “Continuances are generally disfavored and are not granted without a compelling reason.” Id. We have held the FSA is not retroactive. See United States v. Smith, 632 F.3d 1043, 1047-49 (8th Cir.2011) (concluding “the general savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, requires us to apply the penalties in place at the time the crime was committed”) (quoting United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909-10 n. 7 (8th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. McBride, — Fed.Appx. -,-, No. 10-2689, 2011 WL 2206725, at *2 (8th Cir.June 8, 2011) (unpub. per curiam). But even if we assume Woods can show prejudice, Woods fails to provide any support for his contention the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion. See id. at-, 2011 WL 2206725, at *3 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hawthorne, 414 Fed.Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a second continuance until congress acted on the fsa and assuming error no prejudice exists because the fsa is not retroactive (B) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (C) holding that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in denying a continuance because she acted within reason by accommodating the attorney (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form

A: (A)
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Q: if the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary ...”); Douglas by Kelly v. Bd. of Edu., 127 Ill.App.3d 79, 82 Ill.Dec. 211, 468 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1984) (finding that where a school’s window pane fell on plaintiff while she was sitting at her desk, plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict based on res ipsa loqui-tur); Moore v. Atchison, 28 Ill.App.2d 340, 171 N.E.2d 393 (1960) (finding that directed verdict for the plaintiff was proper where there was no direct evidence as to why two trains collided, even though the defendant showed that the equipment was properly inspected and in excellent working order, because the circumstances made the inference of negligence so strong that reasonable men could not reject it); Silvern v. Barbagallo, 195 N.Y.S.2d 32 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1959) (<HOLDING>); Richard Equipment Corp. v. Manhattan Indus. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the injured passenger of a cab was entitled to summary judgment against the driver because the prima facie proof is so convincing that the inference of negligence is inescapable (B) holding the standard of proof in summary judgment rulings is the same as it would be at trial (C) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (D) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (E) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review

A: (A)
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Q: Eleventh Amendment purposes. The problem with relying now on the decision we made in Mumford is that we nowhere addressed the issue of who would pay for a damage judgment against the court of common pleas. The Supreme Court has now explicitly told us that this is the most important factor bearing on the Eleventh Amendment question. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997) (stating “that the question whether a money judgment against a state instrumentality or official would be enforceable against the State is of considerable importance to any evaluation of the relationship between the State and the entity or individual being sued”); Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994) (<HOLDING>). This court has followed suit; we now 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the vulnerability of the states purse as the most salient factor in eleventh amendment determinations (B) recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important (C) holding that state agencies are treated as states under the eleventh amendment (D) recognizing that the most important factor in determining whether a governmental entity is entitled to eleventh amendment immunity is whether a judgment against it would be paid from the state treasury (E) recognizing the eleventh amendment does not bar the united states from suing a state

A:
(A)
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