In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation — 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. § 1103) — which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (“An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal.”). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant’s release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc  1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest

Answer: holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute


Question: “is one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’ ”. The constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not dependent on the subjective intent of the individual asserting the right but on whether the expectation is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Additionally, a determination of whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate or reasonable entails a balancing of interests. Id. 620 A.2d at 1118 (Citations omitted). Here, Mr. Cass obviously meant to keep the contents of his locker private from the public. Mr. Cass’ locker was locked, and this fact would indicate that he meant to keep the contents private. Simply because he did not own the locker does not preclude him from having an actual expectation of privacy. See, Bnmdidge supra (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 433 Pa.Super. 157, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest (B) holding that a hotel guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his room during the period of time for which the room is rented (C) holding that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his hosts home (D) holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room rented by relatives when he had a key to the room and permission to use the room at will (E) holding that a visitor to a hotel room for purposes of distributing drugs failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room

Answer: holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest


Question: trial, arguing the court improperly excluded its sole expert witness, Bolt, from testifying at trial. The court denied the motion, stating that it did not completely exclude Bolt from testifying at trial, “but rather determ limine serve as the basis for the rule that “error claimed in a court’s ruling on a motion in limine is waived unless a timely objection is made when the evidence is offered at trial.” State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2006) (quoting State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Iowa 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Simkins v. City of Davenport, 232 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Iowa 1975). This is because the error only occurs, if at all, when the evidence is offered at trial and is either admitted or refused. State v. Langley, 265 N.W.2d 718, 720 (Iowa 1978) (<HOLDING>). There is, however, an exception to this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a sentence is imposed it is a valid final judgment until it is reversed or vacated (B) holding that it is not (C) holding that a bankruptcy order is not final unless it 1 (D) recognizing further normally the ruling is not a final one it is a red flag to counsel that the evidence is not to be brought before the jury unless and until it is separately taken up with the court  at trial (E) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence

Answer:
holding that once a sentence is imposed it is a valid final judgment until it is reversed or vacated