In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Privileges and Immunities Clause. The final interest advanced by Defendants to justify Section 470 is the availability of the remedy of attachment against nonresident attorneys. See Def. Mem. Supp. S.J. at 7 (citing Matter of Tang, 39 A.D.2d 357, 333 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App.Div.1972); Matter of Fordan, 5 Misc.2d 372, 158 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Surrogates Ct.N.Y.Co.1956)). The remedy of attachment is a disciplinary measure involving a seizure on a defendant’s property in order to secure the enforcement of a money judgment. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6201 (McKinney 2011). Under Section 470’s current construction, however, an attorney need only maintain an “of counsel” relationship with an in-state office to satisfy the office requirement. Austria v. Shaw, 143 Misc.2d 970, 542 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989) (<HOLDING>). Based on this standard, the remedy of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee (B) recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole (C) holding that the district where the defendant attorneys office was located was the proper venue because the defendants omissions related to their failure to communicate from their office in savannah the details of the ongoing case (D) holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance  the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid (E) holding that an outofstate attorney paying rent for a desk in an attorneys instate office had satisfied the office requirement

A: holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee
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Q: v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1967), stated that section 2(d) shows that the legislature contemplated multiplicity of actions and provides a court with two options: stay the entire proceeding pending arbitration, or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be granted with respect to that issue only. 710 ILCS 5/2(d) (West 1994). The Galt court explained: “In enacting the Uniform Arbitration Act, the [Illinois] Legislature has not eradicated a chancellor’s inherent powers, but the legislature has determined in Section 2 that it is no longer equitable to enjoin arbitration to prevent multiplicity of actions.” Galt, 376 F.2d at 716. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765, 782, 103 S. Ct. 927, 939 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Accord Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs (B) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (C) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (D) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (E) holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed

A: holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs
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Q: modify or revoke a defendant’s term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (1993). Although Congress has amended various provisions of § 3583, including § 3583(e), since 1993, those changes do not have a substantive impact on our discussion here, and the district court’s authority to terminate, modify or revoke a term of supervised release under § 3583(e) remains essentially the same under the current statute. In addition to their authority over the term of supervised release, district courts continue to have the authority to modify, reduce or enlarge the conditions of supervised release at any time prior to the expiration or termination of a defendant’s term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); United States v. Navarro-Espinosa, 30 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Allen, 2 F.3d 538, 539-40 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that modification of original sentence occurred outside the sevenday window and the district court lacked jurisdiction to act pursuant to rule 35c (B) holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release (C) holding that  3583e2 allows a district court to modify the conditions of supervised release without extending the term of that release (D) holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release (E) holding that even if the district court lacked jurisdiction to correct a defendants sentence under fedrcrimp 35c  3583e2 authorized the court to modify the conditions of a defendants supervised release

A:
holding that modification of original sentence occurred outside the sevenday window and the district court lacked jurisdiction to act pursuant to rule 35c
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