In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
in nature and may be waived if not timely raised. Section 1445(c) applies to prohibit the removal of a civil action arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of a state. It does not prohibit federal district court’s from exercising supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367. The state worker compensation statutes themselves may affect the court’s jurisdiction by requiring claims to be filed with an administrative agency. However, such is not the case for claims of retaliatory discharge for exercising rights under Michigan’s WDCA. As noted above, the expeditious and inexpensive procedures found in Michigan’s WDCA are not utilized when an employee alleges retaliatory discharge. Such a claim is treated like any other tort and can be filed in state court. See Delke, 460 N.W.2d at 327-28 (<HOLDING>); see also Lamoria, 584 N.W.2d at 600; Chiles 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge (B) holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws (C) recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act (D) holding that retaliation claim did not arise under states workers compensation laws (E) holding that the bureau of workers disability compensation did not have jurisdiction to hear retaliation claims and explaining that the michigan legislatures intent was not to create an administrative remedy for retaliatory discharge

Ex Output:
recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge


Ex Input:
assault conviction. See Ohio Rev.Code § 3319.39(B). Further, Plaintiffs understanding of the nature of the choice he was required to make is demonstrated by the fact that he discussed the choices with his union representatives' — the President and Vice President of his local union and the President of the Central Ohio union — and discussed the choice with a teacher at Ft. Hayes High School. See Harris, 2008 WL 4186316, *8, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86385, at *20 (finding that the plaintiff “fully understood the options as he testified that he discussed them with his wife and union steward”). Also, Plaintiff was given a reasonable amount of time to choose between termination and resignation as he was given approximately twenty-four hours in which to decide. See Rhoads, 103 Fed.Appx. at 895 (<HOLDING>); Harris, 2008 WL 4186316, *8, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that extremely tight handcuffing for nearly fourteen hours that left indentations in plaintiffs arms for over six hours did not amount to excessive force (B) holding that a difference of opinion about the best course of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference (C) holding that a plan administrators decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious even though an attending physician had submitted a form stating the plaintiff could sit for six hours stand for two hours and walk for two hours (D) holding that seven hours was a reasonable amount of time to deliberate meaningfully about the choice (E) holding that delay of several hours after the vehicle was seized was reasonable

Ex Output:
holding that extremely tight handcuffing for nearly fourteen hours that left indentations in plaintiffs arms for over six hours did not amount to excessive force


Ex Input:
Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 788 F.2d 1280, 1283 (7th Cir.1986); In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 198 B.R. 541, 543 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996). Here, the central issue is whether the Plaintiffs were “known” or “unknown” claimants at the time of the Bar Order. As noted above, actual notice is necessary only as to known creditors while constructive notice is sufficient for unknown creditors. See New York, 344 U.S. at 296, 73 S.Ct. 299; In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co., 974 F.2d 775, 788 (7th Cir.1992). Constructive notice can be satisfied through publication notice since “in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final de .1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Best Products Co., Inc., 140 B.R. 353, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding death caused by unknown object provides sufficient notice (B) holding publication notice in the wall street journal adequate under bankruptcy law (C) holding that governments choice to publish notice in the new york times did not violate statutory publication requirements even though publication in the houston chronicle would have been more likely to provide notice to the claimant (D) holding that notice published in the new york times and the wall street journal was sufficient to satisfy due process owed to unknown creditors (E) holding publication in the wall street journal sufficient notice to unknown creditor injured in louisiana

Ex Output:

holding death caused by unknown object provides sufficient notice