In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: with ever since his age of 13 and believes that this criminal record and his continued violation of the law does require a sentence at the top of the guideline range.” Id. at 8. I. A. Commerce Clause Challenge to Section 922(g)(1) Williams first challenges the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute as it applies to his possession of the Smith and Wesson revolver. Williams posits that because he possessed the gun solely within the State of Wisconsin, and because the record reveals no substantial connection between his possession of the gun and interstate commerce, Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to reach his possession of the gun. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Williams did not make this argument below, so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce (B) holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (C) holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that gunfree school zones act of 1990 which proscribed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school exceeded congressional authority under commerce clause because it reached conduct that did not substantially affect or have a meaningful connection with interstate commerce (E) holding that the gunfree school zones act exceeds congress power under the commerce clause

A: holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce
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Q: act, 1976 PA 267, MCL 15.261 to 15.275. (3) If the board arbitrarily and capriciously violates section 7(9), the board shall he subject to the penalties prescribed in the freedom of information act, 1976 PA 442, MCL 15.231 to 15.246. B If “a statute gives new rights and prescribes new remedies, such remedies must be strictly pursued; and a party seeking a remedy under the act is confined to the remedy conferred thereby and to that only.” Monroe Beverage Co, Inc v Stroh Brewery Co, 454 Mich 41, 45; 559 NW2d 297 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “[w]hen a statute provides a remedy for enforcement of a common-law right, the statutory scheme is merely cumulative and not exclusive.” Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc, 273 Mich App 187, 201; 729 NW2d 898 (2006) (<HOLDING>). At common law there has always been a remedy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration (B) holding that the plaintiffs claims for unjust enrichment were not barred by the availability of relief under the public works bonding act mcl 129201 et seq because a plaintiff enjoyed the right at common law to recover in quantum meruit from a defendant who had been unjustly enriched (C) recognizing that action for quantum meruit relief exists to avoid unjust enrichment (D) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed

A: holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration
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Q: (2012) (punctuation omitted); accord Custer, 293 Ga. App. at 319 (2). 8 Stennette v. Miller, 316 Ga. App. 425, 428 (1) (b) (729 SE2d 559) (2012) (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied); accord Kringle v. Elliott, 301 Ga. App. 1, 2 (686 SE2d 665) (2009); Durham v. Mooney, 234 Ga. App. 772, 773 (1) (507 SE2d 877) (1998). 9 Durham, 234 Ga. App. at 773 (1); accord Torrance v. Brennan, 209 Ga. App. 65, 67 (2) (432 SE2d 658) (1993). 10 See Kringle, 301 Ga. App. at 2 (“[I]n order to infer the requisite knowledge!,] there must be at least one incident that would cause a prudent person to anticipate the actual incident that caused the injury.” (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied)); Durham, 234 Ga. App. at 773 (1) ( ng that there was a jury question regarding whether the dog owne 96 (1) (<HOLDING>); Huff v. Dyer, 297 Ga. App. 761, 763 (1) (678 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an animal clinic was entitled to summary judgment in a personalinjury action in which the plaintiff was bitten by one of its dogs when it was undisputed that the dog had never bitten or harmed anyone before the relevant incident (B) holding that a county was entitled to summary judgment where the claims against the individual defendants had failed (C) holding that dog owners were entitled to summary judgment either under the premisesliability or dangerousanimalliability theories when the dog that bit the plaintiff had never previously attacked or bitten a human and the owners had no superior knowledge of the dogs propensity to bite (D) holding that the owner of a dog who bit the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment when although the dog had previously jumped on the plaintiff in an aggressive manner the dog did not attempt to bite or scratch and the plaintiff conceded that she was unaware of any prior instance when the dog had bitten a person (E) holding that when there was no surprise and no prejudice defendant was entitled to rely on defense of accord and satisfaction in its summary judgment motion even though it was not included in the pleadings

A:
holding that a county was entitled to summary judgment where the claims against the individual defendants had failed
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