instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
on the circuit court orders and the statements of defense counsel at the hearing. We hold that neither the doctors nor the trial court could rely on facts and legal conclusions within the circuit court orders. Thus, the doctors’ assertions at the hearing, which were based on facts within the orders, constituted factual statements of counsel. Moreover, the orders were, in effect, memoranda submitted by counsel. In any event, the trial court could not properly consider factual statements from either when deciding the motions, however they are characterized. Cf. Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 457 S.E.2d 601 (1995) (noting that the ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be based solely upon the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint); Gilmore, 290 S.C. 53, 348 S.E.2d 180 (<HOLDING>). This is not to say that circuit court orders 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the judge cannot consider factual statements of counsel in a motion for summary judgment (B) holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment (C) holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment (E) holding that conclusory statements without factual support are of no value to the court when deciding a summary judgment motion
answer:
holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment


question:
and Waste Control Specialists. LLC v. Sierra Club, appellate cause number. 03-12-00335-CV. 4 . See Sierra Club v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, cause number D-l-GN-12-001586. 5 .Despite this, the trial court issued a written order denying the motion twenty days after the deadline for ruling on the motion had passed. The order — though included in the record on appeal — is of no effect. Jain v. Cambridge Petroleum Grp., Inc., 395 S.W.3d 394, 396 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) ("The trial court's signing the order denying the motion [to dismiss pursuant to the Act] after it was already denied by operation of law is legally of no effect because the motion to dismiss was already denied.”); reran v. Fryer, 586 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Cor-pus Christi 1979, writ ref'd) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Appellees also insist that Sierra Club 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (B) holding court lost jurisdiction to enter its order after thirty days and the motion was denied by operation of law (C) holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed (D) holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction (E) holding that an order purporting to overrule a motion for new trial that had already been overruled by operation of law was a nullity
answer:
holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions


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argument that “unusual circumstances” warranted a departure from the rule. We now turn to our reasons for abrogating Coulter. At issue is Coulters holding that [i]n the absence of unusual circumstances, the hours allowed for preparing and litigating the attorney fee case should not exceed 3% of the hours in the main case when the issue is submitted on the papers without a trial and should not exceed 5% of the hours in the main case when a trial is necessary. Coulter, 805 F.2d at 151. Pla the right to revisit this question, see Collard v. Kentucky Board of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir. 1990). This is true even in the unusual situation where binding circuit precedent overlooked earlier Supreme Court authority. Ballinger v. Prelesnik, 709 F.3d 558, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>); see also Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rule for habeas review in brown v smith 551 f3d 424 6th cir 2008 had been called into doubt by harrington v richter 562 us 86 131 sct 770 178 led2d 624 2011 even though robinson v howes 663 f3d 819 823 n2 6th cir 2011 which was decided after harrington applied brown (B) holding that we are bound to follow almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 even though it has been called into question unless it is explicitly overruled by the supreme court (C) holding that ylsts look through doctrine survives harrington v richter  us  131 sct 770 178 led2d 624 2011 (D) holding that  an award of makewhole relief in the form of surcharge was within the scope of appropriate equitable relief for purposes of  502a3 quoting cigna corp v amara  us  131 sct 1866 1880 179 led2d 843 2011 (E) holding government had not met its burden allowing it to invoke the brown v ohio 432 us 161 97 sct 2221 53 led2d 187 1977 exception
answer:

holding that we are bound to follow almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 even though it has been called into question unless it is explicitly overruled by the supreme court