In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: adopted by this court. Atel Fin. Corp. v. Quaker Coal Co., 321 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir.2003). On this record, the district court did not err when it determined that Roberts had not offered evidence that the monitor was defective. Roberts presented only circumstantial evidence that the monitor was defective. Nevada courts have never directly held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove a defect, yet some Nevada cases have relied on circumstantial evidence to establish the existence of a defect. See Van Duzer v. Shoshone Coca Cola Bottling Co., 103 Nev. 383, 741 P.2d 811, 812-14 (1987) (finding that a bottle was unreasonably dangerous and defective based on supermarket customer’s testimony); Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 686 P.2d 925, 928 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In this case, even if circumstantial evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for district court to allow a mechanical engineer to give expert testimony about a machine with which the engineer had no design experience (B) holding that drivers and witnesses testimony about car steering malfunction could be proof of defect without establishing the mechanical cause of the malfunction (C) holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial (D) holding that a district court was entitled to accept or reject testimony on the basis of the witnesses demeanor and candor or lack thereof and contradictions in the witnesses testimony (E) holding that a cause of action does not arise in negligence when a product malfunctions or is defective and the malfunction or defect results in damage only to the product itself and produces only economic loss
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: dominion and control over” the weapon. Id. at 126 (quoting Evans, 888 F.2d at 895). The case law in this circuit, then, clearly recognizes that under the statute an individual “carries” a firearm when it is within an accessible distance from that individual. Although this circuit has not addressed the definition of “carry” since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey, other circuits nave addressed the issue and continue to define “carry” broadly. Most circuits agree that a weapon must be accessible to the defendant in order to meet the definition of “carry.” In United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667 (2nd Cir.1996), a firearm located in a secret compa 4 (4th Cir.1997) (finding that firearm need not be accessible to be “carried”); United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where drugs cash and drug scales were found in defendants parlor and a gun was found in a secret compartment in defendants bathroom vanity (B) holding that use of gun was attributable to defendant who aided and abetted armed robbery but never personally carried gun (C) holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle (D) holding that gun found in unreachable secret compartment in vehicle was carried (E) holding that a defendant may not be charged with two separate offenses premised on two amounts of cocaine one found in a box and one found in a bag located in the passenger compartment of the defendants vehicle
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: cases where no murder occurs, would turn around and not intend to impose cumulative punishments in cases where there are actual murder victims. Third, §§ 2113(a) and (e) and §§ 924(c) and (j) were clearly designed for different purposes: the armed robbery statute was designed to punish those who take money from banks by force or violence, whatever the means, and the firearm statute was designed to punish those who use or carry firearms during violent crimes, whatever the underlying crime. We therefore conclude, notwithstanding our assumption of the likely failure of the two statutes to pass the Blockburger test, that Congress fully and clearly intended to permit cumulative punishments for violations of § 2113 and § 924(j). See United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 864 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We also reject Allen’s proposed reliance on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy (B) recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute (C) holding that congress intended to allow multiple punishments for rico conspiracies and conspiracies to commit the underlying predicate offense even though the offenses were the same under the blockburger test (D) holding that because the ultimate question is legislative intent the blockburger test cannot authorize two punishments where the ljegislature clearly intended only one (E) holding that  1962d does not violate the principle prohibiting conviction of multiple conspiracies under an indictment charging a single conspiracy
[EX A]:
(C)