In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
options,” including by streamlining communication between the distressed borrower and foreclosing party. See Assemb. B. 278, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); S.B. 900, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). There has been a wave of litigation in state and federal courts challenging various aspects of the MERS System. Almost all of the relevant law is state rather than federal. The results under state law have been inconsistent. See Weber, supra, at 246-56 (cataloguing the “schizophrenic position of state courts” on issues relating to the MERS System). Some state supreme courts have upheld the MERS System on issues ranging from foreclosure authority to recording requirements. See, e.g., Renshaw v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 155 Idaho 656, 315 P.3d 844, 846-47 (2013) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mers lacked standing to foreclose as the lenders nominee (B) holding that because mers receives no payments on the debt it is not the beneficiary even though it is so designated in the deed of trust (C) holding that mers is an ineligible beneficiary within the terms of the washington deed of trust act if it never held the promissory note or other debt instrument secured by the deed of trust and that characterizing mers as the beneficiary has the capacity to deceive and may give rise to an action under the consumer protection act (D) holding that mers may be a beneficiary as nominee for the lender that assignments of the deed of trust between mers members need not be recorded that mers was not liable to the borrower in negligence and that the idaho consumer protection act did not provide a cause of action to the borrower (E) holding that mers was not the beneficiary of a deed of trust under the oregon trust deed act absent conveyance to mers of the beneficial right to repayment and that mers could not hold or transfer legal title to the deed as the lenders nominee

Ex Output:
holding that mers lacked standing to foreclose as the lenders nominee


Ex Input:
to obtain the benefit of the bond, for which it paid a significant premium, only through legal action. Accordingly, Olympic Steamship applies here. Colorado Structures, 125 Wn. App. at 928 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We agree. ¶27 Lastly, in McGreevy, where this court awarded reasonable attorney fees in addition to the limits of the insurance policy, we reasoned, “when an insurer unsuccessfully contests coverage, it has placed its interests above the insured. Our decision in Olympic Steamship remedies this inequity by requiring that the insured be made whole.” McGreevy, 128 Wn.2d at 39-40. Likewise, West placed “its interests” above that of Structures. Id. Structures should be awarded attorney fees under Olympic Steamship, so as to be made “whole.” Dayton, 124 Wn.2d at 280 (<HOLDING>)- Without the application of Olympic Steamship 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the contract was not authorized by law (B) recognizing that under georgia law attorneys fees are allowed where authorized by statute or contract (C) holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case (D) holding that an award of attorney fees was authorized by ocga  13111 a 3 when the requirements of that statute were satisfied (E) holding that a court has power to award attorney fees when authorized by contract statute or recognized ground of equity

Ex Output:
holding the contract was not authorized by law


Ex Input:
be corroborated, the declarant’s age and the circumstances under which the statement was made. Donaldson, 58 M.J. at 488. A military judge’s factual findings on the existence of circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness are reviewed for clear error. Id. “A declarant’s young age is a positive factor supporting admissibility and assuring trustworthiness as it lessens the degree of skepticism with which ,we might view his or her motives.” United States v. Dingle, 27 M.J. 704, 708 (A.F.C.M.R.1988). Here, the military judge determined that AM was not available and the hearsay statements were necessary. The military judge considered AM’s prior testimony in court, made personal observations and considered expert testimony. Cf. United States v. Czachorowski, 66 M.J. 432, 436 (C.A.A.F.2008) (<HOLDING>). The trial judge specifically found that AM 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve for appeal an exception to the hearsay rule that was not specifically raised (B) recognizing that a party could not rely on the hearsay exceptions under rule 804 on summary judgment without showing unavailability of the witness (C) holding a trial judge may not rely only on counsels proffer regarding unavailability to admit hearsay under the residual exception (D) recognizing that the united states constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception (E) holding florida drivers handbook hearsay and not within any recognized exception to hearsay rule

Ex Output:

holding that an objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve for appeal an exception to the hearsay rule that was not specifically raised