In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. As a matter of first consideration, any court has the duty to determine, sua sponte, whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case. Welch v. McDougal, 876 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied). As material to this question, section 65.023(b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code requires that an application for an injunction to stay proceedings in a suit or execution on a judgment must be tried in the court in which the suit is pending or the judgment was rendered. This requirement is jurisdictional and does not relate merely to venue. See Butron v. Cantu, 960 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); Home Sav. Ass’n v. Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Because the Gard-ners seek to challenge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is  no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court (B) holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions (C) holding that a dis trict court has no authority to issue injunction restraining enforcement of judgment of the county court where as here the judgment solely resolves who is entitled to immediate possession (D) holding that motion to dismiss should not  be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law (E) holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state
holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is  no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court

this is irrelevant to the question of whether a loan was made to Busson-Sokolik in the first place. Finding no clear error on the question of whether the funds were in fact transferred to Busson-Sokolik and no defects in the formation of a valid contract between the parties, we affirm the finding that the sum MSOE transferred to Busson-Sokolik was a loan. 2 . “Abuse of discretion” is the clear standard for evaluating a judge’s decision to impose sanctions in a bankruptcy case. See In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1046 (7th Cir.2000). While the standard for evaluating a judge’s decision not to impose sanctions in a bankruptcy case is somewhat less clear, we adopt the Sixth Circuit’s approach of using the "abuse of discretion” standard. See In re Downs, 103 F.3d 472, 480 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 3 . An appeal is frivolous "when the result 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion (B) holding that the applicable standard of review for evaluating a bankruptcy courts denial of fed r bankrp 9011 sanctions is abuse of discretion and noting similar approaches taken by the ninth and tenth circuits (C) holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit (D) holding that the conclusion that the wiretap was necessary in each situation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and bringing the tenth circuit into accordance with the authority of a majority of other circuits (E) holding that the standard of review is abuse of discretion and an appeal from denial of rule 60b relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review
holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion

to further his own goals and sexual gratification; (5) divulged confidences to Linda; and (6) disregarded "all indicia of the transference and countertransference phenomena which normally occurs in the course of psychotherapy.” We note, initially, that each of these allegations is based, in part, on an underlying allegation of fraud. The trial judge has permitted the plaintiff to replead a separate fraud count, the allegations of which essentially duplicate the ones above. Fraud is a distinct cause of action in Illinois. To that extent, we do not believe the allegations of fraud are germane to a count alleging professional negligence, be it that of a psychotherapist or a cleric. Cf. Williams v. Chicago Osteopathic Health Systems, 274 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1048, 654 N.E.2d 613 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we address the count for 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner (B) recognizing differing elements and standard of proof between medical malpractice and fraud (C) holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal (D) holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applicable in fraud actions does not apply to the proof of misrepresentations under ors 743612 (E) holding the provisions of a comprehensive medical malpractice act unconstitutional

recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner