In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability “from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik’s] attendance” it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik’s attendance at the gym — in essence all of Sydlik’s claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release
[A]: holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release


[Q]: health, education, and family comfort are also acceptable. See Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443 (1942); Read v. Leitner, 80 Fla. 574, 86 So. 425 (1920). However, a debtor’s homestead was held to be abandoned when a debtor moved to New Hampshire and attempted to sell his property in Fort Myers, Florida. In re Goode, 146 B.R. 860 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1992). In Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), 183 B.R. 968 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995), the Bankruptcy Court held that Chapter 7 debtor’s property did not qualify for homestead exemption since, in placing property on the market for sale or lease, debtor abandoned his intent to use and occupy property as permanent place of residence. Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), supra. But cf., In re Herr, 197 B.R. 939 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Crump, 2 B.R. 222 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1980) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no abandonment of property as homestead was shown merely because after house located on property was destroyed in hurricane debtor had quit premises allowed property to become overgrown with weeds and posted a for sale sign (B) holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead (C) holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property (D) holding that the property held by the revocable trust in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence was a constitutionally protected homestead property (E) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate
[A]: holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead


[Q]: the LOC will not be invalidated. Morgan’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted, and KLI’s illegality claim is dismissed. D. Plaintiffs’ Gambling Claim Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action alleges that the transactions at issue were “bets” in violation of the New York Anti-Gambling Statute. See N.Y. G.O.L. § 5-401. Although I have characterized KLI’s swap agreements as “bets” and “speculations” on currency fluctuations, the transactions were in the form of forward contracts, swaps and derivatives. Derivatives transactions, forward contracts and swap agreements in currencies and commodities are not considered illegal gambles, and do not violate New York’s gambling statute. See General Elec. Co. v. Metals Res. Group, 293 A.D.2d 417, 741 N.Y.S.2d 218, 219 (1st Dep’t 2002) (<HOLDING>). As such, summary judgment is granted to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a commodities swap agreement is not an illegal contract to gamble  and is exempt from the strictures of   5401 (B) holding if the plea agreement was not conditioned on the sentencing guidelines an appellant is not entitled to relief because his sentence is not illegal (C) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (D) holding that an addition to an abated property is not exempt (E) holding that no action may be maintained on an illegal agreement
[A]:
holding if the plea agreement was not conditioned on the sentencing guidelines an appellant is not entitled to relief because his sentence is not illegal