In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: positions, the defendants did not, and have not, filed a motion to withdraw the reference. Accordingly, this court finds that any right to a jury trial is waived. Stainer v. Latimer (In re Latimer), 918 F.2d 136 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 863, 112 S.Ct. 186, 116 L.Ed.2d 147 (1991) (court finding a defendant’s request for a jury trial was properly denied where defendants never requested withdrawal of the reference); See In re Chemetco, Inc., 308 B.R. 339 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.2004) (distinguishing Latimer because in Latimer no motion was ever filed, but in Chemetco, the court had discretion on timeliness issue when motion to withdraw reference was filed only seven days after the jury demand); Consolidated Industries Corp. v. Welbilt Holding Co., 254 B.R. 237, 241 (N.D.Ind.2000) (<HOLDING>). 28 U.S.C. § 157 requires that a party file a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial (B) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing defendant to withdraw his waiver of jury trial where a lengthy continuance already had been granted (C) holding that a trial courts refusal to withdraw a jury waiver ordinarily does not implicate the federal constitutional right to a jury trial (D) holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver (E) holding with or without a local rule so requiring failure to file motion to withdraw the reference when jury demanded was a waiver of right to jury trial
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: Ms. Goren bases her statement of facts on her second amended complaint. That complaint, however, is not before this court. On September 3, 1997, the district court entered a judgment dismissing Ms. Goren’s complaint. Ms. Goren subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to alter or amend judgment to permit filing of a second amended complaint. Ms. Goren attached her proposed second amended complaint to that motion. On October 23, 1998, the court entered an order denying Ms. Goren’s motion. In her opening brief, Ms. Goren devoted nearly her en tire argument to the district court’s decision dismissing her amended complaint. Indeed, there is no “Issue Presented" or meaningful argument regarding the district court’s denial of Ms. Goren’s 93) (<HOLDING>). 5 . At oral argument, Ms. Goren’s counsel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prisoner did not engage in protected conduct when he threatened to file a frivolous grievance (B) holding that attorney who allegedly prepared false private placement memoranda regarding limited partnership did not conduct affairs of enterprise because he did not direct  the legal entities he represented to engage in particular transactions (C) holding that appellant forfeited his complaint regarding his sentence because he did not object at trial (D) holding that the defendant had abandoned any possessory or privacy interest in bags found in the truck he was driving where he stated that he did not own the bags did not know who did and did not know what was in them (E) holding that harold fine did not have direct and independent knowledge because he did not personally conduct the audits that led to the public disclosures
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: by § 1681a(r)(5), and there was no “credit transaction” within the meaning of § 1681b(a)(3)(A). PCA, therefore, had no purpose specified as permissible under the statute to obtain Pintos’s credit report. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court relied on our decision in Has-bun. Hasbun presented the question of whether a government agency looking to enforce a child support judgment could obtain a credit report on a judgment debt- or under § 1681b(a)(3)(A). 323 F.3d at 802-03. The court determined that debt collection was generally a permissible purpose for obtaining credit reports under § 1681b(a)(3)(A), and that the government, which stood in the shoes of the judgment creditor, could, like any other creditor, obtain credit reports for debt collection. Id. at 803-04, 805 (<HOLDING>). Relying on Hasbun, the district court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1681ba3a applies only if the con sumer initiates a credit transaction (B) holding that amtrak is an agency of the government  for purposes of the constitutional obligations of government (C) holding that the government agency was engaged in the collection of an account under 15 usc  1681ba3a and therefore had a permissible purpose for obtaining the credit report (D) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude an agency finding of no discrimination on the ground that the report would suggest to the jury that it should reach the same conclusion as the agency (E) holding in the context of a fcra violation that a jury could find that a consumers credit score was negatively influenced by the failure to list a debt as disputed because evidence was presented that when a credit reporting agency received notice of a dispute it records the dispute in the credit report and does not include the derogatory information in assessing the credit score
[EX A]:
(C)