instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judg ment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “In deciding a Rule 60(b) motion, a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigant’s claims on the merits against the policy in favor of finality.” Kotlicky v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 817 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir.1987) (citation omitted). Moreover, Rule 60(b) motions are left to the sound discretion of the district judge. See Nat’l Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 930 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). “To prevail on a motion for relief pursuant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that motions to vacate a judgment are addressed to the sound discretion of trial justice (B) holding that a motion to vacate a judgment under fedrcivp 60b is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court   citations omitted (C) holding that fedrcivp 60b motion premised on fraud on the court is available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice (D) holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive  2255 motion (E) holding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and grant trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the supreme court will not upset the courts ruling unless there is a sufficient showing of abuse of discretion
answer:
holding that motions to vacate a judgment are addressed to the sound discretion of trial justice


question:
2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals
answer:
holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision


question:
that the district judge grant the prison officers’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to paragraphs one through four of Count III; this the district court did by minute order dated August 3, 1999. However, the district court never acted on the recommendation that it construe the screening order as another report and recommendation, nor did it ever enter an order dismissing any counts of the complaint, which it was required to do since the magistrate judge lacks power to enter a dispositive order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. This would ordinarily mean that there is not a final judgment for us to review since there are still claims pending before the district court, and thus, that we would lack appellate jurisdiction. See Chacon v. Babcock, 640 F.2d 221, 222 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, it is clear from the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the general rule that once all claims against all parties have been dismissed a prior order will become final for purposes of appeal under 28 usc  1291 (B) holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 (C) holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees (D) holding that order denying motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition is final under 28 usc  1291 (E) holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants
answer:

recognizing the general rule that once all claims against all parties have been dismissed a prior order will become final for purposes of appeal under 28 usc  1291