In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: seeking to invoke the exception must establish that they agreed to engage in a joint effort and to keep the shared information confidential from outsiders. See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243-44 (2d Cir.1989) (finding valid joint defense privilege where information was “imparted in confidence” between parties “who had agreed upon and undertaken a joint strategy”); United States v. Sawyer, 878 F.Supp. 295, 297 (D.Mass.1995) (despite similar interests between employer and employee, insufficient evidence that communications were made during the course of a joint defense effort; proponent could neither establish time frame of agreement nor acts creating and/or terminating the agreement); United States v. United Tech. Corp., 979 F.Supp. 108, 110, 112 (D.Conn.1997) (<HOLDING>); Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 197 
 Holding statements: (A) holding common interest doctrine shielded information consortium members shared pursuant to collaboration agreement (B) recognizing doctrine (C) recognizing that tribes and states understood that they shared the right to manage the exercise of in common hunting and fishing rights (D) recognizing a subset of the common interest privilege as parents and schools have a corresponding interest in the free flow of information about administrators and faculty members (E) holding that there was no waiver of the work product protection because the business and public relations firm specializing in litigationrelated crisis management shared a common interest
[A]: recognizing doctrine


[Q]: comprehensive plan nor its land use regulations prohibited the development of so-called non-jurisdictional wetlands. On August 17 or 18, 2006, Rish began to clear and fill his property. The neighbors, including Johnson, protested to the County, but to no avail. On August 21, 2006, these parties filed a complaint seeking in-junctive relief alleging that the clearing violated Gulf County’s comprehensive plan because it failed to maintain a 50-foot buffer for the wetlands. The neighbors alleged standing under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2006). The trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that Johnson and the other neighbors did not possess standing to seek relief under section 163.3215. This court reversed. Johnson v. Gulf County et al., 965 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Throughout this litigation, Rish proceeded to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (B) holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention (C) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court (D) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (E) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case
[A]: holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention


[Q]: States v. Comparato, 850 F.Supp. 153, 159 (E.D.N.Y.1993), quoting United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 683, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 2137, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983) (“once it has been determined that state law has created property interests sufficient for federal tax lien[s] to attach, state law ‘is inoperative to prevent the attachment’ of such liens”). The Second Circuit noted that “federal law controlled whether [the taxpayers’] interests were exempt from levy by the United States.” Id., 22 F.3d at 458, citing United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 683, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 2137, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983). Because the Second Circuit holding in Comparato governs this case, Mrs. Adler’s renunciation is invalid as against the federal tax lien. But see, Mapes v. United States, 15 F.3d 138 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, any settlement proceeds to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (B) holding that a renunciation pursuant to arizonas probate code does determine whether a person has any interest in property for federal tax purposes (C) holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit (D) holding that pursuant to maryland law the government maintains an everpresent interest in property owners land for tax purposes (E) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety
[A]:
holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property