In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

as this is circumscribed but critical. For the Supreme Court has made plain that qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability” and “is effectively lost if a ease is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (emphasis in original). IV. We thus turn to the sole question over which we have jurisdiction: whether the district court properly concluded that the officers were not entitled to summary judgment under Norman. The officers contend that Ussery suffered only de minimis injuries and so cannot satisfy the requirements for an excessive force claim under Norman. Blue Br. 8, 16-21. We disagree. During the decade when Norman was good law, we never articulated a precise definition of what c 270 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note the telling fact that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where law enforcement officers restrained and abandoned an arrestee for ten minutes causing him to feel frightened vulnerable and humiliated when left alone and immobile in the dark parking lot such that in the months following the incident he had trouble sleeping and was scared to leave his home  the resulting injury was more than de minimis (B) holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him (C) holding that a reasonable officer could not have been expected to anticipate that ten to fifteen minutes of unauthorized detention would amount to a greater than de minimis injury (D) holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody (E) holding that an individuals liberty is restrained only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him

Brown’s argument that she was speaking as a citizen is supported by the fact that ordinary citizens may similarly report public misconduct to the Auditors. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-61dd (conferring right to file reports with Auditors on “any person”). The existence of a civilian analogue to Brown’s conduct strengthens her allegations that her speech was as a citizen and thus protected by the First Amendment. See Matthews I, 779 F.3d at 176. The instant case is not similar to other cases of its type that were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage. In many of those cases, the plaintiff-employee had made an admission that the alleged speech was made, at least in part, pursuant to his or her official duties. See Matthews v. Lynch, 483 Fed.Appx. 624, 626 (2d Cir. 2012) (Matthews III) (<HOLDING>); Anemone, 629 F.3d at 116. Here, there is no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel (B) holding that a plaintiff did not complain to the eeoc pursuant to official duties but rather as a citizen (C) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (D) holding that speech was pursuant to official duties because plaintiff conceded at oral argument that as an internal affairs officer he had a broad responsibility to investigate and report police misconduct (E) holding police officer is a public official
holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel

officers and the public in danger.” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 14). The Court finds such speech to be of significant concern to the general public, as it is analogous to “speech on crime rates, police staffing, equipment shortages and related budgetary matters” that “quite plainly involve matters of public concern.” Morris, 196 F.3d at 111; see White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049, 1060 (2d Cir.1993) (stating that “a state police corps’ performance of its duties is a matter of public concern”). Indeed, there is little doubt that the public has great interest in acquiring information about the proper functioning of its police force — particularly where the information purports to directly relate to their own safety. See Cahill v. O’Donnell, 7 F.Supp.2d 341, 349 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (<HOLDING>). That certain of Plaintiffs statements concern 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employees voluntary testimony is also inherently a matter of public concern (B) holding that investigations into purported police misconduct where civilians were or could have been harmed is a matter of public concern (C) holding that an officers report of misconduct by fellow officer is a matter of public concern (D) holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern (E) holding that alleged misconduct by public officials particularly by law enforcement officials is matter of public concern

holding that employees voluntary testimony is also inherently a matter of public concern