In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

a threat to water quality because they do not introduce any invasive species from outside the Great Lakes. EPA has properly rejected this argument, noting that Lakers can spread or more rapidly distribute invasive species already present, in the Great Lakes. Id. at 501. 16 . Federal regulation permits such limits to be expressed narratively if the calculation of numeric limits is "infeasible.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(k)(3). 17 . EPA also claims general prohibitions can be BMPs, citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, but does not offer an example of something as general as the WQBEL standard being found to be a BMP. As discussed herein, the EPA’s charac-terizationis inconsistent with regulations that require WQBELs to "ensure compliance.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d); see Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (<HOLDING>). 18 . EPA’s response is that petitioners’ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation (B) holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation (C) holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (D) holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (E) holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation
holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation

Brown’s argument that she was speaking as a citizen is supported by the fact that ordinary citizens may similarly report public misconduct to the Auditors. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-61dd (conferring right to file reports with Auditors on “any person”). The existence of a civilian analogue to Brown’s conduct strengthens her allegations that her speech was as a citizen and thus protected by the First Amendment. See Matthews I, 779 F.3d at 176. The instant case is not similar to other cases of its type that were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage. In many of those cases, the plaintiff-employee had made an admission that the alleged speech was made, at least in part, pursuant to his or her official duties. See Matthews v. Lynch, 483 Fed.Appx. 624, 626 (2d Cir. 2012) (Matthews III) (<HOLDING>); Anemone, 629 F.3d at 116. Here, there is no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel (B) holding that a plaintiff did not complain to the eeoc pursuant to official duties but rather as a citizen (C) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (D) holding that speech was pursuant to official duties because plaintiff conceded at oral argument that as an internal affairs officer he had a broad responsibility to investigate and report police misconduct (E) holding police officer is a public official
holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel

is supported by substantial evidence. The IJ also reasonably relied on the absence of evidence of country conditions to corroborate Haidar’s individualized claim of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Diallo, 232 F.3d at 288 (stating that corroboration “typically includes both evidence of general country conditions and evidence that substantiates the applicant’s particular claims”). With respect to the country conditions evidence Haidar did submit, the IJ did not err in finding that such evidence did little to corroborate her specific claims of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution because the articles merely detailed general conditions of unrest in the Ivory Coast. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find no error in the IJ’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution (B) holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal (C) holding that such a report provided substantial evidence to support the conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of future persecution (D) holding that general crime conditions are not a stated ground for a wellfounded fear of future persecution (E) holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable

holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution