In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to preserve evidence exists between a third party and another in the absence of a special relationship, such as one created by contract or statute. Id. Under that analysis, this court will need to consider the primary purpose of the third-party here, Giant Eagle. (2) “Duty” of a third-party employer to its employee Pennsylvania courts have not directly considered whether the existence of an employer/employee relationship creates a duty on the part of a third-party employer to preserve evidence of a work-related accident for a potential products liability suit by an employee. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is no such duty. See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F.Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D.Ark.1989); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 179 Mich.App. 136, 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither common law nor workers disability compensation act imposed affirmative duty on employer to preserve evidence which might be used in employees thirdparty liability action (B) holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme (C) holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability (D) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (E) holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties
[A]: (A)


[Q]: to his defense, an in camera review of those records must be conducted to ascertain whether they contain evidence that is reasonably necessary, and therefore essential, to the defense. Only when the trial court finds such evidence, should it be provided to the defendant. Id. at 562. This court agrees with the reasoning of Stanaway. To hold the statutory privilege superior to Mr. White’s right to obtain potentially exculpatory evidence would be unconstitutional. Id. at 573-75. Because a court has already determined that the adoption records sought by Mr. White may contain evidence relevant to Mr. White’s defense, denying Mr. White access to such evidence would violate his right to due process. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>). “An in camera review by the trial court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution (B) holding that suppression by government of evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material to guilt (C) holding that suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request by the defense violates due process where evidence is material either to guilt or punishment irre spective of the good faith of the prosecution (D) holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution (E) holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material
[A]: (E)


[Q]: the district court’s choice and application of the standard of review to the Plan’s decision. Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. We review- the Plan’s decision denying Barnes and other “Lump Sum” class members additional retirement benefits for an abuse of discretion with scepticism. See Burke v. Pitney Bowes Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan, 544 F.3d 1016, 1023-24 (9th Cir.2008). Where, as here, a plan unambiguously grants an administrator discretionary authority, the court reviews the administrator’s decision for abuse of discretion. Id. In determining the standard of review, we take into account the existence of a structural conflict of interest. Abatie, 458 F.3d at 965 (<HOLDING>); Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plan administrator that was also insurer operated under conflict of interest (B) holding that when the insurer is also the plan administrator we have recognized something akin to a rebuttable presumption of a palpable conflict of interest (C) holding the district court erred by finding an automatic conflict of interest merely because insurer and administrator were the same (D) holding that it is wrong to assume a financial conflict of interest from the fact that the plan administrator is also the insurer (E) holding that a structural conflict of interest exists when an insurer acts as both the plan administrator and the funding source
[A]:
(E)