In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

would allow for the award of attorney fees whenever a statute or contract provides for one side to pay expenses, even when such attorney fees were not contemplated. The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent in this regard. Therefore, I do not join in the majority’s opinion that the term “expenses” as used in section 13-7-4(d) includes attorney fees, but would hold that because that section does not specifically provide for an award of attorney fees, such award was improper here. For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority’s determination that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. However, I dissent rs of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986); In re Olliff, 258 Ga. 157, 366 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Head v. Savage, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 32, 38 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan (D) holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs (E) holding that expenses refers to costs
holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid

from the Fijian military,” was “robbed repeatedly,” had his temple burned by Fijian soldiers, and Fijian soldiers attacked his home and destroyed his property while his wife was home alone. See id. Significantly, the attacks were linked by the fact that they were all carried out by a common entity, as opposed to random acts of violence that this court has characterized as the “common byproduct of civil unrest and economic turmoil.” See Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir.2004). The acts described by Kumar are closer to those in Gormley. Therefore, the evidence does not compel a finding of persecution. Nor did Kumar present evidence that would compel “any reasonable adjudicator” to find that he demonstrated a likelihood of future persecution. See Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1061 (<HOLDING>). Because Kumar’s evidence did not compel a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals (B) holding that personal disputes do not constitute persecution (C) holding that evidence that  is consistent with acts of private violence  or that merely shows that a person has been the victim of criminal activity does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground (D) holding that while widespread violence against a protected group by private individuals and public officials may constitute persecution widespread discrimination that may include persecution of some individuals does not compel such a finding (E) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution
holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals

arises between two states’ statutes of limitations, the Restatement provides: An action will be maintained if it is not barred by the statute of limitations of the forum, even though it would be barred by the statute of limitations of another state. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 142(2). Section 142(2) thus requires Ohio courts to apply Ohio’s statute of limitations to breach of contract actions brought in Ohio, even if the action would be time-barred in another state. See Males v. W.E. Gates & Associates, 29 Ohio Misc.2d 13, 504 N.E.2d 494, 494-95 (Ohio Com.Pl.1985) (applying Ohio’s fifteen-year statute of limitations to a breach of contract action that would have been barred by Virginia’s five-year statute); cf. Mahalsky v. Salem Tool Co., 461 F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>); Mackey v. Judy’s Foods, Inc., 867 F.2d 325, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional error was waived even though petitioner repeatedly used the phrase full faith and credit because petitioner did not cite to the federal constitution or to any cases relying on the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution (B) holding that the full faith and credit clause does not require a state to apply another states law in violation of its own legitimate public policy (C) holding this rule does not deny full faith and credit (D) holding that puerto rican judgments are entitled to full faith and credit (E) holding that texas is required to extend full faith and credit to valid judgments from other states

holding that constitutional error was waived even though petitioner repeatedly used the phrase full faith and credit because petitioner did not cite to the federal constitution or to any cases relying on the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution