In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: (Black, J., concurring)). We are also troubled because, given that there was nothing about the officers’ appearance or conduct that revealed that they were engaged in the performance of their duties, Davis lacked fair notice that mere spoken words, which did not disturb the peace, could nonetheless constitute the crime of obstructing the officer’s performance of duty. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311, 60 S.Ct. at 906. “It is an elemental requirement of our constitutional jurisprudence that laws be reasonably intelligible, providing citizens with fair notice as to what conduct is legal and what conduct is illegal.” Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 6:13 (1996) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (<HOLDING>)). We reiterate that we recognize the need to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion (B) recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority (C) holding unconstitutional vagrancy statutes that were purposely designed to grant police broad discretion (D) holding unconstitutional ordinance that gave executive director excessive discretion in deciding whether the grant of a permit would be detrimental to the public (E) holding that district courts discretion is extremely broad
[A]: holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion


[Q]: Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir.1994))). 17 . See Executone, 26 F.3d at 1320 ("We must sustain an arbitration award even if we disagree with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the underlying contract as long as the arbitrator’s decision 'draws its essence' from the contract.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 18 . See also Parsons & Whittemore, 744 F.2d at 1483-84 (recounting that the arbitration panel awarded postjudgment interest at state statutory rate). 19 . We construe the parties’ intentions "generously” to determine whether they agreed to arbitrate a particular issue. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). 20 . Cf. Newmont, 615 F.3d at 1272, 1276 (<HOLDING>). 21 . Riebesell, 586 F.3d at 794; 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court should consider issues relating to making and performance of agreement to arbitrate (B) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator (C) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate the particular issue any doubt about who should decide the consolidation issue was resolved in favor of the arbitrator (D) holding that companys contention that union repudiated the agreement to arbitrate a particular dispute was a matter for the arbitrator and not the court to decide (E) holding that agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising out of contract authorized arbitrator to decide postjudgment interest issues
[A]: holding that court should consider issues relating to making and performance of agreement to arbitrate


[Q]: of the Zohar Funds and Patriarch, IMG Brands and DCF continued to sell Products beyond the December 31, 2008 termination date of the License Agreement. (Countercl. ¶ 196.) Although such conduct would normally constitute trademark infringement, the License Agreement provided that, following termination of the agreement, IMG Brands could continue to sell Products for an additional 135 days. See Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. v. D & L Ice Cream Co., Inc., 576 F.Supp. 1055, 1060 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (“[T]he continued use by the defendants of a licensed trademark after the Franchise Agreement had been terminated constitutes ... trademark infringement as well as a breach of contract.”); see also Romacorp, Inc. v. TR Acquisition Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5394, 1993 WL 497969 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1993) (<HOLDING>). Lastly, to the extent Houbigant alleges 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong (B) holding that continued use of trademark after termination of franchise for nonpayment of royalties constitutes lanham act violation (C) holding that a plaintiff in a lanham act trademark violation action must demonstrate that the defendants violation tended to deceive consumers (D) holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract (E) holding that defendants statement that it owned the rights to a trademark did not give rise to a false advertising claim under the lanham act
[A]:
holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong