In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

the evidence presented by the summary judgment record in a light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex.2006) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005)). When both sides move for summary judgment, and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court considers both sides’ summary judgment evidence and determines all issues presented. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex.2005). Where the trial court does not specify the g rv., Inc., 798 S.W.2d 606, 615 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the absence of a causal connection 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract (B) holding that erisa provides relief only for clearly ascertainable damages with the intent to make plaintiffs whole which precludes recovery for speculative future harm (C) holding that no recovery exists for speculative damages (D) holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative (E) holding such damages available where local law silent on issue speculative nature of damages does not preclude recovery
holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract

in favor of William Spencer, et al., (Spencer) and setting the penalties for violation of the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Spencer cross-appeals the denial of post-trial motions and refusal to award attorney’s fees. We affirm on all grounds. I BART’s unjust enrichment claim fads for want of a loss. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 881 (2000) (noting that the elements of unjust enrichment are “receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.”). Even assuming that County of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 158 Cal.App.4th 533, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 (2008), recognized an exception to this rule, BART’s claim does not fall into that exception. See Peterson v. Cellico P’ship, 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1594, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Concrete financial loss is required for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (B) holding that walsh does not support plaintiffs assertion that they need not allege any actual injury to bring an unjust enrichment claim (C) holding that where plaintiffs filed a complaint for conversion unjust enrichment and injunctive relief they had an adequate remedy at law (D) holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed
holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement

See New Cingular Wireless Servs., 232 F.R.D. at 300 (rejecting an argument that a class representative was inadequate because he could not show that he “recall[ed] the terms of a settlement for a case he was previously involved in, or that he was aware that his attorneys had filed certain motions in the current case”). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Murray’s involvement in the litigation weighs in favor of finding him an adequate class representative. E*Trade also argues that Murray lacks sufficient understanding of the issues involved in his FCRA suit. A class representative, however, is not required to understand the intricacies of the suit. See Margolis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 815 F.Supp.1150, 1154 (C.D.Ill.1991); New Cingular Wireless Servs., 232 F.R.D. at 300 (<HOLDING>); Cavin, 236 F.R.D. at 394 (same). It is enough 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the mere existence of individualized factual questions with respect to the class representatives claim will not bar class certification (B) holding that class representatives cannot appear pro se (C) holding that a class representatives ignorance of the case is not a bar to certification unless it impairs the representatives ability to vigorously prosecute the action (D) holding that awards of 2500 to majority of representatives and 5000 to deposed representatives were inappropriate where representatives had borne little risk by participating in litigation and provided services that could have been provided by any other class member (E) recognizing that the number of class representatives is not significant under rule 23a

holding that the mere existence of individualized factual questions with respect to the class representatives claim will not bar class certification