TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: method (under § 3663) in favor of an incorrect method (under § 1593), the district court erred. Moreover, we hold that the district court’s error was “plain,” because the statutes are clear and because the government openly admitted that its proposed methodology derived from the wrong restitution statute. See United States v. Tuyet Thi-Bach Nguyen, 565 F.3d 668, 677 (9th Cir.2009) (“An error is plain when it is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’ under the law.”). Finally, we hold that the error affected Defendants’ substantial rights and affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The government did not present evidence — and the district court did not make findings — of the victims’ actual losses, as required by § 3663. See Bussell, 504 F.3d at 964 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Joyner, 201 F.3d 61, 81 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that restitution is proper under  2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses (B) holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted (C) holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction (D) holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses  (E) holding that restitution in the full amount of each victims losses does not exceed the statutory maximum

SOLUTION: holding that restitution is proper under  2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses

PROBLEM: 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther’s theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts “a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman.” White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther’s termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, § 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law

SOLUTION: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy

PROBLEM: becoming final, and the filing of his first state habeas petition. Ramos offered no justification for this 240-day delay, which is substantially longer than the 90-day period in which the courts presume timeliness under California law. See In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311, 317 (1998) (“[A] habeas corpus petition is not entitled to a presumption of timeliness if it is filed more than 90 days after the final due date for the filing of appellant’s reply brief on the direct appeal.”). Without the required justification for his delay, Ramos’s state petitions were not “properly filed,” making the time they were pending before the California courts ineligible for statutory tolling. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir.2010) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Without statutory tolling of the time his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an unexplained gap of 101  days between filing of state habeas petitions made petition untimely under california law and not subject to statutory tolling (B) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (C) holding that a california habeas petition is timely if filed within a reasonable time (D) holding that california supreme courts denial of habeas petition becomes final thirty days after filing (E) holding that the filing of a first federal habeas petition is not an application for other collateral review under the tolling provision of  2244d

SOLUTION:
recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds