In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 23 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (same). Essentially, the Court determined that the prejudicial quality of testimony regarding an actually coerced confession is, like all other improperly introduced testimony at trial, capable of review. At this point in time, the Fulminante decision stands as the sole, albeit the dispositive, case on this point. In contrast, cases applying the harmless error analysis to the introduction of presumptively coerced statements are legion. See e.g. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 & n. 22, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2652 & n. 22, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 555 & n. 22 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443, 104 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion  (B) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence (D) holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights (E) holding that although miranda required the suppression of testimonial statements made before defendant was advised of his constitutional rights the state court is free of course to consider this harmless error question upon remand

Ex Output:
holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion 


Ex Input:
of action to be known as “civil action”[,]’ the statute authorizing foreclosures by action compelled such suits to be brought in equity”) (some brackets added and some in original); Bank of Hawaii v. Davis Radio Sales and Service, Inc., 6 Haw.App. 469, 480-81, 727 P.2d 419, 427 (1986). A complaint in equity is an appeal to the exercise of the equity court’s sound discretion, Fleming v. Napili Kai, Ltd., 50 Haw. 66, 430 P.2d 316 (1967). Equity jurisprudence is not bound by strict rules of law, but can mold its decree “to do justice,” id.,' and a court of equity, once having assumed jurisdiction, may retain the case to afford complete relief. Tugaeff v. Tugaeff, 42 Haw. 455 (1958). Id. at 481, 727 P.2d at 427. See also Forte v. Nolfi, 25 Cal.App.3d 656, 692, 102 Cal.Rptr. 455, 479 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the circuit court had the power 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mers is capable of being a valid beneficiary of a deed of trust and that while entitlement to enforce both the deed of trust and the promissory note is required to foreclose nothing requires those documents to be unified from the point of inception of the loan (B) holding that a promissory note is not enforceable against a party who signed the deed of trust but did not sign the promissory note inasmuch as promissory notes and deeds of trust are separate legal documents with unique purposes (C) holding that while nondebtor purchase money deed of trust can be described as part of the same transaction by which the buyer acquired debtors real property that does not elevate the deed of trust to status of something under a plan confirmed (D) holding that when note and deed of trust were null and void and of no legal effect because of forgery assignee of note and deed of trust nevertheless had equitable lien upon property for value of construction work for which note and deed of trust were given (E) holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed

Ex Output:
holding that mers is capable of being a valid beneficiary of a deed of trust and that while entitlement to enforce both the deed of trust and the promissory note is required to foreclose nothing requires those documents to be unified from the point of inception of the loan


Ex Input:
made in open court. It also serves as a stipulation that no proof by the prosecution need b[e] advanced .... It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending controversy.’ ” Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n. 4, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (quoting Woodard v. State, 42 Ala.App. 552, 171 So.2d 462, 469 (1965)). See also Dingier v. State, 408 So.2d 530, 531 (Ala.1981) (same). In the case at hand, Clark entered into a “good behavior” stipulation that the State could prove a prima facie case of guilt. When Clark failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, he was adjudicated guilty based on his stipulation. During a hearing on Clark’s motion for a new trial, the prosecutor described a “goo (Ala.Crim.App.1999), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Because Clark was adjudicated guilty based 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed (B) holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea (C) holding that court must decide case on basis of facts admitted unaffected by stipulation made by counsel (D) holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional (E) holding that a defendants strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendants stipulation did not establish guilt

Ex Output:

holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed