TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: (“Due process requires that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his ‘day in court.’ ”). The 1992 statute, as applied in this case, provided State Farm no “fair opportunity” to be heard before it was called upon to divest itself of a significant property interest if it chose to preserve its long-recognized right of subrogation. Instead, the statute placed State Farm in the untenable position of being bound by law to the outcome of private settlement negotiations between the Hassens and UniSun that essentially determined its immediate liability for an award of damages, including noneconomic damages, even though it was not a party to the negotiations and had no available means to assert any legal defenses to the Hassens’ claim. Cf. Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So.2d 604 (Fla.1956) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the statute entitled State Farm 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not (B) holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it (E) holding that a corporation is entitled to due process of law insofar as property rights are concerned so that a money judgment may not be entered against it where it was not a party to a cause and was not served with process even though the principal stockholder was a party to the cause

SOLUTION: holding that it is not

PROBLEM: L.Ed.2d at 1035-86). Unfortunately, the adjective "readily" is subject to differing interpretations, and there has been disagreement regarding the meaning of "readily mobile." Decisions of the Indiana Court of Appeals are not consistent regarding whether automobiles under police observation or control are readily mobile so as to be subject to warrantless search under the automobile exception. E.g., compare, v. State, T5 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (legally parked automobile surrounded by police officers held not inherently mobile to qualify for automobile exeeption), transfer denied, and Edwards v. State, 768 N.E.2d 506, 508-09 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (impounded vehicle no longer "inherently mobile"), trams. not sought, with Johnson v. State, 766 N.E2d 426, 483 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002) (<HOLDING>), trans. demied, and Justice v. State, 765 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver (B) holding that ready mobility existed when a car was capable of being driven even after the driver was arrested and despite the absence of other potential drivers (C) holding that ocga  40520 as safeharbor provision requires a defendant to produce a drivers license that was valid at the time the vehicle was being driven (D) holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key (E) holding detention lawful when police referred driver to secondary to check ownership of the vehicle after the driver admitted that the car did not belong to him and the registration revealed that the car was owned by another

SOLUTION: holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver

PROBLEM: Galpin, 40 Minn. 319, 41 N.W. 1054, 1055-56 (1889) ("[W]here the deed or record, in addition to a correct or sufficient description, contains false particulars, the rule is, if there are certain particulars once sufficiently ascertained, which designate the thing intended to be granted, the addition of a circumstance, false or mistaken, will not vitiate the grant.”) (citations omitted). 13 . In re Vondall, 352 B.R. at 198 (citing Howard, McRoberts & Murray v. Starry, 382 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Minn.Ct.App.1986)). 14 . Id. at 198 (declining to find that a legal description was apparent where the defect in the mortgage — an apparently non-existent lot designation — could also be attributed to incorrect block or plat designation); Bank of Ada v. Gullikson, 64 Minn. 91, 66 N.W. 131, 132 (1896) (<HOLDING>). 15 . See Miller v. Hennen, 438 N.W.2d 366, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trustee did not have constructive knowledge of an improperly executed mortgage because ohio law provided that an improperly executed mortgage does not provide constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser (B) holding that a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good or a service under the dtpa (C) holding that the note and the mortgage must coexist to give the mortgage validity (D) holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage (E) holding that a mortgage containing a nonsensical addition designation did not provide constructive notice to subsequent judgment creditors because it was impossible to tell from the face of the mortgage whether the legal description misstated the plat block or addition

SOLUTION:
holding that the trustee did not have constructive knowledge of an improperly executed mortgage because ohio law provided that an improperly executed mortgage does not provide constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser