In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: variance criteria rendering its decision arbitrary and capricious; and, 5) erred in “taking” appellants’ property without just compensation. The County supports appellants’ contentions except for the last one, with which it disagrees. The County also contends the Board erred in applying the wrong law. The individual appellees, who opposed the variance applications, support the Board’s decision. Discussion 1. Applicable Law A. State Law Before we address the merits of appellants’ contentions, we shall address the County’s contention that the Board applied inapplicable law. The County asserts that the Board incorrectly applied a presumption that the requested use did not conform to the purpose and intent of the Critical Area Program because, while that presumption was added 677 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In 2002, the General Assembly amended the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that the board did not have to consider whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the entire lot but rather whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the buffer (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that the question of whether it might have been error for the court to have denied leave to amend is not before us because plaintiffs never requested it (E) recognizing that a district attorney must have reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury and that the trial judge must have reasonable discretion in deciding whether the bounds of propriety have been exceeded
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: to exempt every alien who seeks to adjust his or her status under § 245(i) after illegally reentering the United States following removal. Where Congress intended § 241(a)(5) not to pose a barrier to adjustment of status for aliens who illegally reentered the United States, it made a special exception to the general rule. Because Lino does not fall within the exception, she is bound by the general rule disqualifying aliens who illegally reentered the country from seeking adjustment of status. Finally, six circuits have held that § 241(a)(5) precludes aliens subject to reinstatement orders from obtaining adjustment of status pursuant to § 245(i). See De Sandoval v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 440 F.3d 1276, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2006); Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort, 390 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 21 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not have jurisdiction to order reinstatement of previously dismissed action and thus reinstatement order was void and of no effect and previous order of dismissal was still in effect (B) holding that petitioners claim is not one to the attorney generals decision or action to execute a removal order either since the facts relevant to their claim  took place well before any decision by the attorney general to execute a removal order (C) holding that once a petitioners prior removal order has been reinstated he no longer qualifies for any relief under the ina regardless of whether his application was filed before or after the reinstatement decision was made (D) holding that since the basis for the respondents order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening (E) holding that a federal court must order arbitration once it is satisfied that an agreement for arbitration has been made and has not been honored
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: a particularized need. 4. Seriousness of the Litigation and Issues Holmes maintains that the gravity of her allegations — namely, that IPRA “concealed] its widespread efforts to cover-up unlawful shootings by police officers,” Pl.’s Reply Br. at 3 — warrants disclosing the draft summary reports. In other words, Holmes asserts that the privilege is overcome because IPRA’s deliberative process, which includes the back-and-forth exchange of draft summary reports between supervisors and investigators, is “part of the code of silence.” Id. Where a plaintiff directly challenges a government agency’s deliberative process, courts routinely find that there is a particularized need for disclosure. See, e.g., Smentek v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 2013 WL 2588709, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Ferrell, 177 F.R.D. at 430-31 (finding a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county (B) holding that mandatory visual strip search policy in county jail was unconstitutional (C) holding that public employees working for the office of cook county assessor and receiving their compensation from cook county had no vested right in the expectation of the continuance of this compensation (D) holding that plaintiffs had a particularized need for cook county jail prebudget documents after observing that the plaintiffs theory is that the county allegedly approved the dental services budget despite knowing that it might create unconstitutional conditions at the jail accordingly  the countys deliberative process is directly at issue in this case (E) holding that employees of county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to contract with the federal government were not federal employees even though county jail had to comply with federal rules and regulations
[EX A]:
(D)