In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: their quest had generally confirmed their suspicion. Thereafter it was incumbent upon them to make a decision as to their course of action with “reasonable dispatch.” Occidental Life Ins. Co. of North Carolina v. Pat Ryan & Associates, Inc., supra, 496 F.2d at 1268; Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, supra, 488 F.2d at 917; Baumel v. Rosen, supra, 412 F.2d at 574. The question, therefore, is whether plaintiffs were guilty of unreasonable delay during the period from May 20, 1969 to August 27, 1969. Considering the number of plaintiffs involved and the time necessary for counsel to research legal authorities and draft and prepare the original complaint, this Court concludes that there was no unreasonable delay. Cf. Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 343 F.Supp. 245, 255-56 (D.Md.1972) (<HOLDING>), rev’d, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973) (in jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal (B) holding inter alia that 130 days was reasonable period for researching and drafting of complaint (C) holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay (D) holding that delays of 115 days and 101 days were both substantial (E) holding that a difference between 384 days prepreference average number of days to payment and 547 days preference average number of days to payment did not make the payments out of the ordinary course of business

Output: holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal


Input: Consider Input: of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi appears to indicate that the assets must be blocked at the time judgment against the asset is finalized. See 556 U.S. 366, 369, 377-79, 129 S.Ct. 1732, 1735, 1739-40, 173 L.Ed.2d 511 (2009) (“We ultimately hold that the Cubic Judgment was not a ‘blocked asset’ at the time the Court of Appeals handed down its decision.... ”). The controlling determination in that case, though, was that the asset in question was never blocked because Iran’s interest in it arose after the Treasury Department unblocked all Iranian assets. Id. at 376, 129 S.Ct. at 1739. In Holy Land Foundation, the assets were unreachable because they were unblocked during the pendency of the original civil suit, prior to the commencement of any execution proceeding. 722 F.3d at 687 (<HOLDING>). This rule is not just prescribed by law; it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment (B) holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order (C) holding that the governments restraining order against a blocked asset obtained prior to the entry of a civil judgment unblocked it for tria purposes (D) recognizing that a stay contained in anex parte order did not serve to suspend the effectiveness of the restraining notice otherwise any judgment debtor could obtain such an order without notice to the court that a restraining notice had been served or to the judgment creditor and recover his property theretofore properly made the subject of the restraining notice (E) holding that the cubic judgment was not blocked

Output: holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment


Input: Consider Input: ask us to review the Board’s decision denying their motion to reopen. A denial of a motion to reopen is a final order that may be appealed to this court. Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1361-62 (10th Cir.2004). In their petition for review filed with us on January 22, 2013, petitioners did request review of the denial of their motion to reopen as well as their motion for reconsideration. But this request came too late to obtain judicial review of the motion-to-reopen decision, which had been entered August 31, 2012. Petitioners failed to file a separate petition for review from the motion-to-reopen decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (establishing 30-day time period for filing petition for review); Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 394-406, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (<HOLDING>). We therefore have jurisdiction to consider 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the period for seeking judicial review of the underlying order (B) holding for the same reason that motion for appointment of counsel does not toll the period for filing a federal habeas petition (C) holding that an unauthorized motion for rehearing does not toll defendants time for filing a notice of appeal (D) holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional (E) holding filing of motion for reconsideration does not toll the 30day deadline for filing petition for review


Output: holding that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the period for seeking judicial review of the underlying order