In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
--------
Question: v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 565 F.Supp. 663, 667 n. 10, 669 (N.D.Ill.1983)). However, in all the cases on this issue, the courts made it clear that the client must have made disclosures to the attorney after manifesting an intent to seek legal advice. Herbes, 180 Ill.App.3d at 698-99, 129 Ill.Dec. 480, 536 N.E.2d 164 (finding that counsel for the plaintiff, who was suing a township over its open-space acquisition program, was ineligible to conduct said representation because he had previously engaged in an attorney-client relationship with the township when it interviewed only him for a possible position representing the township in the same program, evidencing the township’s intent to hire him and therefore speak freely regarding the program), Hughes, 565 F.Supp. at 670 (<HOLDING>), Int’l. Paper Co. v. Lloyd Manufacturing Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (B) holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney (C) holding that attorneys should be disqualified where the substantial relationship test is met in order to assure that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship and the loyalty between attorney and client are preserved (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in drawing an adverse inference where the relief defendant refused to give information necessary to determine whether he still possessed any of the funds or whether he had a legitimate claim to them (E) holding that normal attorneyclient relationship does not bar rule 60b relief when the evidence is clear that the attorney and his client were not acting as one

Answer: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client


Question: CURIAM. Anthony McLemore was tried by jury and convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of cannabis. We agree with McLemore that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury his requested special instruction that an element of the crime is knowledge by the defendant that the substances possessed were marijuana and cocaine. See Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 746 (Fla.1996). Even though McLemore disavowed any connection whatsoever to the items, we find that the error was not harmless. See Scott v. State, 808 So.2d 166 (Fla.2002)(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse the convictions and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to give proper instruction regarding disputed element of crime charged was fundamental error requiring reversal and stating that fundamental error is not subject to harmless error review (B) holdingthat because the evidence of the defendants guilt was overwhelming the courts failure to give a requested charge on impeachment constituted harmless error (C) holding that a trial court errs when it fails to give a limiting instruction properly requested by a party (D) holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error (E) holding that failure to give a properly requested chicone instruction cannot be harmless error

Answer: holding that failure to give proper instruction regarding disputed element of crime charged was fundamental error requiring reversal and stating that fundamental error is not subject to harmless error review


Question: 1133 (2002); Stein v. Geonerco, Inc., 105 Wn. App. 41, 45, 17 P.3d 1266 (2001); Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc., 107 Wn. App. 885, 893, 28 P.3d 823 (2001), review denied, 145 Wn.2d 1027, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 954 (2002). The party opposing arbitration bears the burden of showing that the agreement is not enforceable. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92, 121 S. Ct. 513, 148 L. Ed. 2d 373 (2000). WLAD Requirements f 13 Relying on cases holding that an exclusive remedies provision in a collective bargaining agreement does not prevent employees from initiating civil suits in court for violations of the WLAD, Adler argues that the WLAD requires a judicial forum for discrimination claims of employees. See Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wn.2d 563, 577, 731 P.2d 497 (1987) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Phillips v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union (B) holding that petitioners remedy under title vii of the civil rights act was in addition to remedies available under the collective bargaining agreement in force between his employer and his union (C) holding that antidiscrimination rights under title vii cannot be waived by a collective bargaining agreement (D) holding that a collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate is binding upon individual employees even when dispute involves federal cause of action (E) holding that chapter 4960 rcw permits individual employees to pursue their rights under the wlad in court without first exhausting remedies in a collective bargaining agreement

Answer:
holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union