In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: (“Due process requires that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his ‘day in court.’ ”). The 1992 statute, as applied in this case, provided State Farm no “fair opportunity” to be heard before it was called upon to divest itself of a significant property interest if it chose to preserve its long-recognized right of subrogation. Instead, the statute placed State Farm in the untenable position of being bound by law to the outcome of private settlement negotiations between the Hassens and UniSun that essentially determined its immediate liability for an award of damages, including noneconomic damages, even though it was not a party to the negotiations and had no available means to assert any legal defenses to the Hassens’ claim. Cf. Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So.2d 604 (Fla.1956) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the statute entitled State Farm 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not (B) holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it (E) holding that a corporation is entitled to due process of law insofar as property rights are concerned so that a money judgment may not be entered against it where it was not a party to a cause and was not served with process even though the principal stockholder was a party to the cause

Output: holding that it is not


Input: Consider Input: of decision, and this is how the INS has consistently understood these terms.”); Fierro v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2000) (“[Sjubject to possible limitation, we think that the requirement of ‘legal custody’ in section 1432 should be taken presumptively to mean legal custody under the law of the state in question.”). Our decision to look to state law is consistent with our practice in other areas of federal law generally, and immigration law specifically. For example, entitlement to federal social security benefits often hinges on marital status as defined by state law. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52-53 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977); Purganan v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 269, 270-71 (9th Cir.1982); see also Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in the immigration context, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment (B) holding that statute does not provide for the adjudication by the alj of a state law breach of contract action for damages that is independent of the aljs determination of entitlement to benefits under the terms of the applicable agreement (C) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law (D) holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law (E) holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest

Output: holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment


Input: Consider Input: assault and battery committed by Eugene,” and as such are barred by the intentional tort exception found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). (ECF No. 10-1, at 17 n. 6 (citing Perkins v. United States, 55 F.3d 910, 916-917 (4th Cir.1995))). The intentional tort exception provides that the United States retains immunity as to “[a]ny claim arising out of [an] assault [or] battery.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Indisputably, Eugene’s murderous acts constituted assault and battery. That assault could not form the basis for a direct claim against the United States. See, e.g., Stepp v. United States, 207 F.2d 909, 911 (4th Cir.1953) (concluding Section 2680(h) barred respondeat superior claim where servicemember used excessive force in shooting civilian); Wise v. United States, 8 F.Supp.2d 535, 542 (E.D.Va.1998) (<HOLDING>). In other words, the intentional tort 
 Holding statements: (A) holding criminal sexual assault and unlawful restraint included offenses of aggravated crimi nal sexual assault and vacating convictions and sentences on former offenses (B) holding section 2680h barred direct liability claim premised on servicemembers sexual assault and murder of civilian (C) holding that merger did not apply because sexual assault was not a lesser included offense of seconddegree kidnapping involving sexual assault (D) holding that conduct charged under article 120k ucmj was not plainly private when the sexual activity occurred while in the presence of two additional servicemembers in the unlocked barracks room of two other servicemembers who were reasonably likely to unintentionally observe the sexual activity and therefore the failure of the military judge to raise a lawrence issue sua sponte was not plain error (E) holding that allegations of sexual assault by an employee of the church fell within coverage for sexual misconduct


Output: holding criminal sexual assault and unlawful restraint included offenses of aggravated crimi nal sexual assault and vacating convictions and sentences on former offenses