In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: 1999) (same); Hill v. Fidelity Fin. Servs. (In re Hill), 152 B.R. 204, 206 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1993) (same); In re Reese, 194 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr.D.Md.1996) (same); Barclays Am./Mortgage Corp. v. Wilkinson (In re Wilkinson), 186 B.R. 186, 191 (Bankr.D.Md.1995) (same); In re Redditt, 146 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr.S.D.Miss.1992) (stat ing that “[b]y the statute’s own terms, only the trustee has standing to exercise the strong-arm avoidance powers”); Mast v. Borgess Medical Center (In re Mast), 79 B.R. 981, 982 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1987) (same); In re Driver, 133 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.1991) (stating that “a Chapter 13 debtor is not explicitly bestowed with the trustee’s strong arm transfer avoidance powers.”); Hollar v. United States (In re Hollar), 174 B.R. 198, 203 (M.D.N.C.1994) (<HOLDING>). As In re Higgins, most of the majority 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that chapter 13 debtors have standing to bring avoidance actions by reasoning that chapter 13 trustee has standing but little incentive to bring avoidance actions that will result in benefit to debtors of recovering exempt assets (B) holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case (C) holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees  avoidance power (D) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (E) holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13

Answer: (C)


Question: discretion. Commonwealth v. Collins, 598 Pa. 397, 957 A.2d 237, 272 (2008). As noted, discovery in death penalty collateral proceedings is permissible only upon leave of court, and only for good cause shown. Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(2). “ ‘A showing of good cause requires more than just a generic demand for potentially exculpatory evidence.’ ” Collins, 957 A.2d at 272 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119, 855 A.2d 726, 750 (2004)). We agree with the Commonwealth that Elliott has failed to demonstrate that the PCRA court abused its discretion by denying Elliott’s request for additional discovery. Elliott has not identified any document that was withheld from him that would have been exculpatory, and his claims to the contrary constitute mere speculation. See Hanible, 30 A.3d at 484 (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Carson, 913 A.2d at 261 
 Holding statements: (A) holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause (B) holding that the government is not required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury (C) holding that record must show that evidence is exculpatory for defendant to establish brady violation (D) holding that speculation that production of requested documents might reveal exculpatory evidence is insufficient to establish good cause for discovery (E) holding that conjecture that opportunity to review homicide file might yield exculpatory evidence is inadequate to demonstrate good cause for discovery

Answer: (E)


Question: has been obtained in a manner that would undermine the policies of deterrence and integrity of the courts. We are admonished by the Supreme Court in Terry that we, as the judiciary, are responsible to “guard against police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires.” We sustain Appellant’s two points. Conclusion We hold that the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motions to suppress his statements and the marijuana. Therefore, we reverse Appellant’s conviction for the offense of possession of marijuana as well as the conviction for failure to identify and remand those causes to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 65 . See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred when it admitted outofcourt identification of defendant when the witness who made the identification was never asked about defendants identity at trial (B) holding whether passenger was lawfully detained as witness to traffic violation when officer asked his name so that his false identification violated failuretoidentify statute not necessary to decide since other articulable facts justified continued detention (C) holding that appellant was not lawfully detained for investigation of public intoxication when he gave false identification therefore trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his false identification statements (D) holding a trial court erred in determining that a motion to suppress was waived by a speedy trial demand (E) holding that where the opportunity for positive identification is good and not weakened by prior failure to identify and the witness is positive in his identification even after crossexamination identification need not be received with caution

Answer:
(C)