In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: against the Debtor have been discharged and that MDE’s pursuit of those claims in the State Court Action constitutes a violation of the discharge injunction. Accordingly, the Court orders the Respondents to cease any further pursuit of the Debtor in connection with the alleged claims but denies the Debtor’s -request for an award of damages and attorneys’ fees. A separate order will be entered consistent with this ruling. 1 . Unless otherwise noted, all statutory and rule references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1532, and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 2 . In addition to the pleadings filed in this matter, the Court takes judicial notice of the docket in the Debtor's case. See Cervac v. Littman (In re Littman), 561 B.R. 79, 83 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Unless otherwise noted, future references 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket (B) recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record (C) recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice (D) holding that the appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in related proceedings (E) holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket

A: recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record
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Q: reasonable presumption against waiver should be indulged. Commonwealth v. Hooks, 375 Mass. 284, 288 (1978). A defendant’s illiteracy or low intelligence is not dispositive of his capacity to waive Miranda rights and render a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary confession. See Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 346, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 86-87 (2000) (concluding that the defendant, who had a learning disability and an IQ in the eighties, validly waived his rights in light of his “considerable prior experience with the police and in receiving Miranda warnings,” as well as his “cunning” attempts to exculpate himself “after being confronted with the [ ] evidence against him”); Commonwealth v. Hartford, 425 Mass. 378, 380-81 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Dingle, 73 Mass.App.Ct. 274, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a 15yearold was of suitable intelligence and maturity to validly waive miranda rights specifically focusing on the fact that the juvenile had been advised of his rights on three prior occasions and had once asked for an attorney (B) recognizing that plaintiffs had standing to allege infringements of their first amendment rights where the record established that they had been threatened with enforcement of the statute and that such enforcement would cause them injury (C) holding that language difficulties may impair the ability of a person in custody to waive his miranda  rights in a free and aware manner (D) holding admissible suspects statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his miranda rights (E) holding that irrespective of the suspects limited reasoning ability and iq of 73 evidence that the suspect had held various parttime jobs had been living on his own possessed a drivers license and had prior experience with law enforcement was probative of competence to waive miranda rights

A: holding that a 15yearold was of suitable intelligence and maturity to validly waive miranda rights specifically focusing on the fact that the juvenile had been advised of his rights on three prior occasions and had once asked for an attorney
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Q: 4. Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because they only used “directed force.” Defendants argue that those defendants who only used force as directed by their supervisors — Deputies Sanford, Vazquez, and Delgado — are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there was a legitimate penological purpose for their actions. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs resisted cell extractions, and this necessitated use of the Tasers by the Defendants. At trial, the jury found that the deputies engaged in malicious conduct with intent to harm, including using Tasers on sensitive body parts and on unconscious individuals. These findings support Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that denial of outofcell exercise for an extended period violates the eighth amendment (B) holding that the core judicial inquiry in resolving an eighth amendment excessive force claim is whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm (C) holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the eighth amendment (D) holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the eighth amendment (E) holding intent to use or threaten to use force is required under  2l12bla

A:
holding that denial of outofcell exercise for an extended period violates the eighth amendment
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