In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C), 1182(a)(2)(A), 1227(a)(2)(A)®. Furthermore, § 1252(a)(2)(B) precludes judicial review of: (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under [INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) ] or (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security® 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2). However, despite the jurisdictional limitations in § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (a)(2)(B), we are not precluded from reviewing constitutional claims or questions of law raised in a properly filed petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Balogun, 425 F.3d at 1359 (<HOLDING>); see also Frech v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law (B) holding no jurisdiction to review order raising amount of bail and questioning jurisdiction to review denial of motion to reduce bond (C) holding that the real id act leaves this court deprived of jurisdiction to review discretionary and factual determinations (D) holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review (E) holding that a habeas petition filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the real id act cannot be transferred to the court of appeals as a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction

Output: holding no jurisdiction to review order raising amount of bail and questioning jurisdiction to review denial of motion to reduce bond


Input: Consider Input: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

Output: holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241


Input: Consider Input: battery is to make “physical contact” without causing injury, and that physical contact does not have to be violent in nature. See, e.g., Illinois v. Peck, 260 Ill.App.3d 812, 198 Ill.Dec. 760, 633 N.E.2d 222, 223 (1994) (explaining that 720 ILCS 5/12-3 defines battery as making offensive contact with a victim “by any means,” which encompasses spitting at a peace officer). Moreover, a simple battery involving nonviolent physical contact can become “aggravated” by the addition of facts that have nothing to do with physical force. A battery can be aggravated because it causes “great bodily harm,” 720 ILCS 5/12-4(a), or because, as here, the victim is a “peace officer,” 720 ILCS 5/12— 4(b)(6) (2003); see Illinois v. Hale, 77 Ill.2d 114, 32 Ill.Dec. 548, 395 N.E.2d 929, 931-32 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Illinois v. McBrien, 144 Ill.App.3d 489, 98 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery (B) holding that aggravated battery of peace officer encompasses both insulting or provoking contact and battery resulting in bodily harm (C) holding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated battery when the bodily member that is lost or rendered useless in the battery is a tooth (D) holding that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of manslaughter (E) holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two


Output: holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery