In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,-, 117 S.Ct. 832, 838, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that ERISA preempts state common law tort and contract causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured employee benefit plan. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57. The detailed provisions of ERISA § 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that “would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.” Id. at 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549. Similarly, we have held that state law tort and contract claims as well as violations of a state insurance statute are preempted by ERISA. Tingey, 953 F.2d at 1131 (<HOLDING>). In a factually similar case, we held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and negligent misrepresentations (B) holding plaintiffs causes of action for breach of contract breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the arizona insurance code were preempted by erisa (C) holding that erisa  514a preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it was based on the same conduct as a preempted claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (E) holding that the plaintiffs state common law causes of actions for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as well as a statutory cause of action for unfair insurance practices under the california insurance code were preempted by erisa
holding that erisa preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and negligent misrepresentations

induced his employer to terminate his at-will employment?” See Haddle, 119 S.Ct. at 491. The Supreme Court ruled only on that issue. See Haddle, 119 S.Ct. at 492. The Eleventh circuit had already previously rejected the intracorpo-rate conspiracy doctrine. Because the in-tracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not before the Supreme Court, it would be a mistake to draw any inference from the Court’s silence on the issue. See United States v. Stewart, 650 F.2d 178, 180 (9th Cir.1981); Sacramento Valley Chapter of National Electrical Contractors Association v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 632 F.Supp. 1403, 1414 (E.D.Cal.1986), aff'd, 888 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.1989). The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine first developed in the anti-trust context. See Nelson, 200 F.2d at 914 (<HOLDING>). The Seventh Circuit extended the doctrine to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as a general rule the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice (B) holding a corporation cannot conspire with its officers and agents to restrain trade in its own products (C) holding that a hospital can conspire with members of its medical staff (D) recognizing that agents of a corporation may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed in the name of the corporation (E) recognizing that representation of a corporation by its officers in administrative proceedings is allowed
holding that as a general rule the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice

rather than the probate division of the common pleas court, R.C. 2311.04, rather than 2101.31, would have governed the proceedings at trial and would have mandated that the factual issues be tried to a jury. We are not persuaded, however, that R.C. 2311.04 would have conferred upon appellants a right to a jury trial on the factual issues presented in the complaint and in their counterclaims. As we noted above, R.C. 2721.10 and 2311.04 mandate a jury trial of factual issues arising in a declaratory judgment action instituted in the general division of the common pleas court if the action is construed to be “for the recovery of money only, or specific real or personal property.” The right to a jury trial thereby (1983), 12 Ohio App.3d 113, 114, 12 OBR 420, 421, 467 N.E.2d 564, 566 (<HOLDING>). In its complaint, FNB sought declaratory 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a cross claim or counterclaim for affirmative relief must be filed before the statute of limitations expires because a claim is not stripped of its character as an independent action by acquiring the label counterclaim (B) holding that the due process clause confers a right to direct a childs education (C) holding that a jury trial was not required when the money demand although specific was incidental and ancillary to the equitable relief requested and would ripen only if equitable relief were granted (D) holding that rc 231104 confers a right to a jury trial on a legal counterclaim that if true would extinguish the original equitable claim but confers no right on a legal counterclaim that is incidental or ancillary to the original claim (E) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc  1367a

holding that a cross claim or counterclaim for affirmative relief must be filed before the statute of limitations expires because a claim is not stripped of its character as an independent action by acquiring the label counterclaim