In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
hold that a court of appeals may not award a new trial on the basis of an erroneous eviden-tiary decision” in the absence of a post-verdict motion. Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 448 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir.2006). Likewise, in Metcalf v. Bochco, 200 Fed.Appx. 635, 637 n. 1 (9th Cir.2006), the Ninth Circuit stated that Unitheim "deals with the specific situation of a party’s failure to renew, post-verdict, a Rule 50 motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a civil jury trial” and reasoned that "Unitherm is inapposite” to Metcalf's case because the appellants did not "challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.” 3 . Our circuit has repeatedly accepted such claims of retaliation for taking FMLA leave. See, e.g., Arban v. West Publ’g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 403 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Wysong v. Dow Chemical Co., 503 F.3d 441, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers oral denial of plaintiffs request for fmla leave showed interference (B) holding that  825220c is a reasonable interpretation of the statutes prohibition on interference with and restraint of employees rights under the fmla  2615a1  and that the labor departments conclusion that employer use of the taking of fmla leave as a negative factor in employment actions  violates  the act is  a reasonable one (C) holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave (D) holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jurys conclusion that west retaliated against arban for taking leave under the fmla (E) holding that employee who exceeded fmla leave was subject to immediate discharge on the very first workday that he was both absent from work and no longer protected by the fmla

Ex Output:
holding that employers oral denial of plaintiffs request for fmla leave showed interference


Ex Input:
conversion should have an opportunity to reassert objections to exemptions. Indeed, Rule 1019(2) specifically addresses time period for actions after conversion, and provides for the re-running of times allowed for filing a claim, objecting to discharge and objecting to dischargeability. There is no new time period, however, for the trustee to assert objections to exemptions. “If a new time period for objections to exemptions began to run upon conversion of a case, one would expect to see it mentioned in Rule 1019(2), [and][i]t is not there.” In re Brown, 178 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1995). Where the statute is clear, it is not appropriate to look to policy arguments. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41, 109-S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (<HOLDING>), and none of the policy arguments are 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear (B) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (C) holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry  is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful (D) holding that pursuant to 28 usc  2254d1 if  the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry (E) holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end

Ex Output:
recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear


Ex Input:
by any of the Defendants who participated in the disciplinary hearing process, and thus, their bald assertion that Appellees Paul Zuckerman and Jonathan Raskin were not impartial is insufficient to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007))). To the extent the Plaintiffs assert that the disciplinary committee deviated from the proper regulations, their conclusory allegations fail to support a plausible inference that the proceedings were unfair. Winnick, 460 F.2d at 550 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court properly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that physical assaults did not rise to the level of persecution where they did not requirfe medical attention (B) holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims (C) holding that fundamental fairness is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands (D) holding that universitys deviations from procedural guidelines did not rise to constitutional proportions particularly where they were minor deviations and did not affect the fundamental fairness of the hearing (E) recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed

Ex Output:

holding that physical assaults did not rise to the level of persecution where they did not requirfe medical attention