In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: a “responsible person” under § 6672 in these circumstances. B. Willfulness 1. Standard of Review As with the previous issue, the government asserts that the determination of willfulness under § 6672 is a question of law subject to de novo review, while Bradshaw argues that it is a question of fact on which the district judge’s ruling can not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Some circuits have held that the ultimate issue of willfulness is subject to de novo review. United States v. McCombs, 30 F.3d at 320 (noting, however, that this is a difficult question that, in similar contexts, has divided the courts for over a century); Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d at 1505-07. Our prior decisions have, however, treated this as an issue of fact. See Taylor, 69 F.3d at 417-18 (<HOLDING>); Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033 (reviewing jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings (B) holding that the district court sitting in review of the decision of the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failure to pay over taxes was willful because the bankruptcy court had made no findings on willfulness we remanded for bankruptcy court findings (C) holding that 28 usc  1961a applies to bankruptcy court judgments because a bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court (D) holding that bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings and conclusions in a core proceeding over which the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority (E) holding that the bankruptcy court has the inherent power to award sanctions for badfaith conduct in a bankruptcy court proceeding
[A]: holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings


[Q]: options,” including by streamlining communication between the distressed borrower and foreclosing party. See Assemb. B. 278, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); S.B. 900, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). There has been a wave of litigation in state and federal courts challenging various aspects of the MERS System. Almost all of the relevant law is state rather than federal. The results under state law have been inconsistent. See Weber, supra, at 246-56 (cataloguing the “schizophrenic position of state courts” on issues relating to the MERS System). Some state supreme courts have upheld the MERS System on issues ranging from foreclosure authority to recording requirements. See, e.g., Renshaw v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 155 Idaho 656, 315 P.3d 844, 846-47 (2013) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mers lacked standing to foreclose as the lenders nominee (B) holding that because mers receives no payments on the debt it is not the beneficiary even though it is so designated in the deed of trust (C) holding that mers is an ineligible beneficiary within the terms of the washington deed of trust act if it never held the promissory note or other debt instrument secured by the deed of trust and that characterizing mers as the beneficiary has the capacity to deceive and may give rise to an action under the consumer protection act (D) holding that mers may be a beneficiary as nominee for the lender that assignments of the deed of trust between mers members need not be recorded that mers was not liable to the borrower in negligence and that the idaho consumer protection act did not provide a cause of action to the borrower (E) holding that mers was not the beneficiary of a deed of trust under the oregon trust deed act absent conveyance to mers of the beneficial right to repayment and that mers could not hold or transfer legal title to the deed as the lenders nominee
[A]: holding that mers lacked standing to foreclose as the lenders nominee


[Q]: is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent when no evidence indicates that he was aware of a state statute requiring the court to impose a life sentence if the sentencing jury failed to reach a unanimous decision. The California statute at issue here provides that “[i]f the trier of fact [at the sentencing stage] is a jury and has been unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court shall dismiss the jury and impose a punishment of confinement in state prison for life without possibility of parole.” 1977 Cal. Stats., ch. 316, §12. State high courts faced with the issue whether a defendant must be aware of similar capital sentencing provisions have reached differing conclusions. Compare Harris v. State, 295 Md. 329, 339-340, 455 A. 2d 979, 984 (1983) (<HOLDING>), with People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d 111, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal (B) holding prelitigation waiver of jury trial must be made knowingly and voluntarily and courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver of that right (C) holding that an effective notice of appeal must be filed for this court to have jurisdiction to hear the case (D) holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right structural error occurred (E) holding that a court must explain the effect of a jury deadlock for a waiver to be effective
[A]:
holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal