In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: the entirety ... to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety ... is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B). a. Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law for Entirety Property Exemption To determine whether the Condominium is exempt from process, the court will look to the law of the situs of the real property. In this case that is Florida. “Under Florida law, entireties property is exempt from process to satisfy debts owed to individual creditors of either spouse. Entireties property is not exempt from process to satisfy the joint debts of both spouses.” See In re Monzon, 214 B.R. 38, 40-41 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1997) (citing Neu v. Andrews, 528 So.2d 1278, 1279 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988) and Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843, 846 (1936) (<HOLDING>)). “Courts have generally recognized that § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property (C) holding that a judgment debt against both spouses can be satisfied by selling the entireties property (D) holding that the irs may reach half of a nonliable spouses sole management community property to satisfy a liable spouses tax debt (E) holding that where one spouses arson destroyed the house which both spouses owned as tenants by the entireties the innocent spouse was entitled to recover under their fire insurance policy for her share of the loss

Output: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate


Input: Consider Input: contract claims under general liability policies. See Keystone Filler & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. American Mining Ins. Co., 179 F.Supp.2d 432 (M.D.Pa.2002); Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria County v. Int’l Ins. Co., 454 Pa.Super. 374, 685 A.2d 581 (1996) (en banc); see also Augenblick v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 99-3419, 1999 WL 975118 (E.D.Pa. Oct.8, 1999). General liability policies provide the insured coverage for personal injury or property damage resulting from an “occurrence,” and are intended “to protect the insured from liability fo e in Redevelopment Authority — that there is no ‘occurrence’ if the underlying claim is one merely for breach-of-contract — has been followed by numerous state and federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania.”) (citing cases); Augenblick, 1999 WL 975118, at *2, 5 (<HOLDING>). In contrast to those cases, U.S. Specialty’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer (B) holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract (C) holding that insureds breach of contract suit against insurer raised a coverage issue which was not settled by insurers payment of only part of what insured was claiming in breach of contract action (D) holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract (E) holding insurer did not have to cover insured for a breach of contract because it was not an accident

Output: holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer


Input: Consider Input: date of the amendment. Jordan v. Dennison, 278 N.J.Super. 306, 311, 650 A.2d 1041 (App.Div.1995). Although the Legislature substantially modified the no-fault laws in 1988, and then again effective March 12, 1990, the provisions of the Fund Law, including N.J.S.A 39:6-70(n), were not changed. The Fund Law has remained constant since enactment and still requires that the threshold of N.J.S A 39:6A-8a be met if the injured party seeks recovery from the fund. Thus, after January 1, 1989, a person would not be entitled to recover noneconomic damages resulting from injury caused by an identified uninsured motorist from the Fund unless her injuries met the “verbal threshold” delineated in one of nine categories of N.J.S A 39:6A-8a. Cf. Rivera, supra, 285 N.J.Super. at 180, 666 A.2d 619 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff contends that the failure to amend 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort (B) holding that age discrimination is not a personal injury tort (C) holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim (D) holding that sexual harassment is a personal injury tort (E) holding that the tort threshold requirement njsa 39670n is not applicable if the injury to a qualified claimant is caused by a hit and run motorist


Output: holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort