instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
the State argued that Wright and Jackson were the two shooters at the trials of Wright, Oglesby, and Jackson. The State denies that it presented mutually exclusive, false, or misleading evidence. It contends that the evidence permits two factual scenarios: the shooters were either Jackson and Wright or Jackson and defendant. This is not a case where the prosecutor destroyed the credibility of one witness to convict one defendant and then used that same witness to convict a co-defendant for the same crime. See, e.g., Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 738 (1986). Nor is this a case where the prosecutor improperly argued facts that were unsupported by the evidence. Nichols v. Collins, 802 F.Supp. 66, 75 (S.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), habeas corpus denied, sub nom, Nichols v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal (B) holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment (C) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (D) holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal (E) holding in case in which defendant challenged his murder conviction and death sentence on ground that states conflicting theories in the trial of his accomplice constituted a denial of due process that state may be constitutionally estopped from obtaining a fact finding in one trial and seeking and obtaining an inconsistent fact finding in another trial
answer:
holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal


question:
court’s credibility determinations “unless the court credited testimony that was essentially unbelievable as a matter of law,” United States v. Smith, 308 F.3d 726, 746 (7th Cir.2002). There is no clear error in the district court’s decision to credit the presentence investigation report and Officer Morrissey’s sworn testimony over the unsworn, hearsay statement of the defendant. See United States v. Torres-Ramirez, 213 F.3d 978, 980-81 (7th Cir.2000) (‘When the sentence rests on testimony under oath ... it is enough that the judge believe the witness — unless the testimony is illogical or contradicted by documents or other physical evidence, making it clearly erroneous to accept the witness’s version of events.”); United States v. Krankel, 164 F.3d 1046, 1054-55 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Campbell directs us to no inconsistencies in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error (B) holding that where defendant did not offer any rebuttal evidence to refute presentence report district court  was free to adopt facts in psi without further inquiry (C) holding that court may satisfy factual basis requirement by examining presentence report (D) holding that bald unsupported assertions by the defendant cannot refute presentence investigation report (E) holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report
answer:
holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error


question:
object, if the claimed error is fundamental in nature.” Charlton v. State, 702 N.E.2d 1045, 1051 (Ind.1998). Our supreme court has recently observed, however, that claims of fundamental error should not be raised during a post-conviction proceeding. Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind.2002). “The fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule applies to direct appeals. In post-conviction proceedings, complaints that something went awry at trial are generally cognizable only when they show deprivation of the right to effective counsel or issues demonstrably unavailable at the time of trial or direct appeal.” Id. Accordingly, freestanding fundamental error claims in a post-conviction petition may not be raised. See Martin v. State, 760 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, our supreme court has recognized 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that postconviction procedures do not provide a petitioner with a superappeal or opportunity to consider freestanding claims that the original trial court committed error and that such claims are available only on direct appeal (B) holding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to argue the trial court committed fundamental error in giving the thenstandard jury instruction for manslaughter by act even though controlling precedent in the district had approved the instruction when the instruction had been found fundamentally erroneous in another district and conflict between the two districts would have allowed defendant to seek relief in the supreme court (C) holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present (D) holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by giving the standard jury instruction for attempted manslaughter by act (E) holding that freestanding claim that the trial court committed fundamental error in giving a jury instruction after deliberations had begun was unavailable in postconviction proceedings
answer:

holding that postconviction procedures do not provide a petitioner with a superappeal or opportunity to consider freestanding claims that the original trial court committed error and that such claims are available only on direct appeal