TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: types of property which do not pass to the trustee under Section 70 of the Act. See, Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a “Specialized Type of Property” ... in our Economic System, 66 N.W.U.L.Rev. 502, 525-532 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, 395 U.S. at 340, 89 S.Ct. 1820; Lines v. Frederick, supra, 400 U.S. at 19, 91 S.Ct. 113. The Supreme Court has recently held, in what is a logical corollary to the notion of specialized property, that at times a trustee has too tenuous a relationship to a given claim to have standing to assert that claim on behalf of the bankrupt estate. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 92 S.Ct. 1678, 32 L.Ed.2d 195 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In view of these evolving federal policies of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses (B) holding that the relevant indenture agreement allowed the trustee to bring tort and fraud claims on behalf of the bondholders (C) holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee (D) holding that a trustee does not have standing to sue a thirdparty on behalf of debenture holders (E) holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee

SOLUTION: holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses

PROBLEM: in the petition no later than thirty days from the day on which the first defendant was served. Id. at 1262-63 (internal citations omitted). As a general premise, under the “first-served rule,” defendants who are properly served within thirty days of the first defendant’s service must join in the removal petition. The “failure to do so renders the petition defective.” Id. at 1262. Under the facts of Getty, however, the application of the first-served rule did not produce an inequitable result. Nonetheless, recognizing the potential for harsh results, other decisions provide that exceptional circumstances may sometimes require relief from strict application of the rule in order to achieve equitable results. See Milstead Supply Co. v. Cas. Ins. Co., 797 F.Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties (B) holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective (C) holding that dismissal of some but not all of the defendants who had been served with complaint is not a final order (D) holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served (E) holding that the defendants consent to search was voluntary although he had been served with a subpoena

SOLUTION: holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties

PROBLEM: of the INS were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 471(a), 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 291(a)). 3 . Petitioner argues that it was inappropriate to look to the treatment of his family members in determining the likelihood of petitioner being persecuted if he returns to Algeria, because his situation is not identical to theirs. This is mistaken; relatives' situations in the home country, while not conclusive, are certainly relevant. See Aguilar-Solis, 168 F.3d at 573 ("Without some explanation, the fact that close relatives continue to live peacefully in the alien’s homeland undercuts the alien’s claim that persecution awaits his return”); In re A-E—, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1157, 1160 (BIA 1998) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Petitioner also argues that the BIA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the reasonableness of an aliens fear of persecution is reduced when his family remains in his native country unharmed for a long period of time after his departure (B) holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction (C) holding that an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum based exclusively on activities undertaken after his arrival in the united states so long as he demonstrates that authorities in his country are aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities (D) holding that a witness may testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue (E) holding the respondent  implicitly exercised his right to withdraw his voluntary departure request and instead  elected to remain to pursue his motion

SOLUTION:
holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction