In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
second and third elements under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), the existence of a sufficient interest, and whether disposition of that interest would effectively impede the putative intervenors’ ability to protect that interest. Among the interests that satisfy these criteria are injury to reputation, see Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 373, 392 (2d Cir.1981), need to protect the attorney-client privilege, see In re Katz (Jamil v. United States), 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.1980), and need to protect the attorney work-product privilege. See United States v. AT & T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1290-92 (D.C.Cir.1980), citing, Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445, 84 S.Ct. 508, 511-12, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 735 F.2d 1330, 1331 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a district court should allow intervention by a client in the first instance as soon as the attorneyclient privilege issue is raised (B) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (C) holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal (D) recognizing intervention to assert both the attorneyclient and work product privileges (E) holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
2001) (describing the denial of a jury trial as a structural defect requiring automatic reversal). Similarly, every Florida district court of appeal has issued a decision reversing a conviction obtained without a valid waiver of a jury trial. See, e.g., Montero v. State, 780 So.2d 917, 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because the record failed to show that the defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial); Hyler v. State, 732 So.2d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (concluding that a conviction must be reversed where the record contained no written waiver and did not reflect an inquiry by the trial court that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial); Gamble v. State, 696 So.2d 420, 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); Sansom v. State, 642 So.2d 631, 631 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to inform the defendant of the minimum possible sentence meant that the defendant did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and his rights were therefore automatically substantially affected (B) holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to a sixperson jury and the failure to consult the defendant as to his wishes was an error for which a new trial was the only remedy (C) holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error (D) holding that failure to inform the defendant of the constitutionally mandated right to a sixperson jury when one juror became ill after the jury had been sworn but before trial had begun and the defendants attorney waived his rights without consulting defendant mandates a new trial (E) holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions “could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited.” Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) (“We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse’s liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void.”). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years

Ex Output:

(B)