In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: where the-plaintiff seeks to subject private parties to § 1983 liability by bestowing on them the title of state actors. The instant case does not involve a situation where the State has “ ‘so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private party] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.’ ” Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1131 (quoting NBC ¶. Communications Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir.1988) (citation omitted)). The Eleventh Circuit in Harvey, confronting facts similar to the case at bar and the issue of whether involuntary commitment by private parties may be considered state action, found an insufficient nexus between the defendants, a private hospital and private physicians, and the State. See id.; see also Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 258 (<HOLDING>). The court observed that “[b]oth the Supreme 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ccmc and its employees were not state actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus test (B) holding that massachusetts statute did not create a sufficiently close nexus between private hospital and the state to warrant labeling private actors state actors (C) holding that foster parents are not state actors (D) holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability (E) holding that private hospital and physicians who involuntarily committed plaintiff under massachusetts statute were not state actors noting that state regulation even if extensive and receipt of federal funds do not establish state action
[EX A]: holding that ccmc and its employees were not state actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus test

[EX Q]: an intention that suits for pension benefits by disappointed applicants are equitable.”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112, 101 S.Ct. 922, 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981); see also Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace and Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1258-59 (2d Cir.1996); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir.985); Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058, 106 S.Ct. 800, 88 L.Ed.2d 776 (1986); In re Vorpahl, 695 F,2d 318, 321-22 (8th Cir.1982); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980). Some district courts have suggested that Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989), calls these holdings into doubt. See, e.g., Hulcher v. United Behavioral Sys., 919 F.Supp. 879, 885 (E.D.Va.1995) (<HOLDING>); Vaughn v. Owen Steel Co., 871 F.Supp. 247, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1132a1b affords the plaintiff adequate relief for her benefits claim and a cause of action under  1132a3 is thus not appropriate (B) holding plaintiff had no claim under  1132a3 because his grievance that benefits were denied is specifically addressed in  1132a1b (C) holding that plaintiff in erisa action was entitled to restitution under similar circumstances (D) holding that claims for misrepresentation under texas insurance code were preempted because the plaintiffs sought to recover benefits under an erisa plan (E) holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under  1132a1b
[EX A]: holding that  1132a1b affords the plaintiff adequate relief for her benefits claim and a cause of action under  1132a3 is thus not appropriate

[EX Q]: App. at 193 (2). 24 Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied); accord Harvey, 260 Ga. App. at 193 (2). 25 Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (punctuation omitted); accord La Quinta Inns, Inc. v. Leech, 289 Ga. App. 812, 816 (1) (658 SE2d 637) (2008); Harvey, 260 Ga. App. at 193 (2). 26 Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (punctuation omitted); accord Harvey, 260 Ga. App. at 193 (2). 27 See, e.g., Peterson v. Reeves, 315 Ga. App. 370, 375-78 (3) (727 SE2d 171) (2012) (physical precedent only); Purcell v. Breese, 250 Ga. App. 472, 475 (1) (552 SE2d 865) (2001); Brandvain v. Ridgeview Inst., Inc., 188 Ga. App. 106, 116 (3) (b) (372 SE2d 265) (1988); Misfeldt v. Hosp. Auth. of City of Marietta, 101 Ga. App. 579, 583-84 (115 SE2d 244) (1960). 28 See Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (<HOLDING>); Harvey, 260 Ga. App. at 194 (2) (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor the district court relied principally if indeed not entirely on the contract language and that doing so was error because inter alia employment contracts no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or what the terms may not be used to waive protections granted to an individual under title vii or any other act of congress (B) holding that an inmates suicide was an unforeseeable intervening act for which a detention officer was not liable when inter alia there was no evidence that the inmate was in a rage or frenzy or had an uncontrollable impulse at the time when he took his own life but was instead calm and controlled and appeared to have known what he was doing (C) holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof (D) holding that a detention officers alleged negligent conduct of failing to medically screen an inmate who later committed suicide in a holding cell  in violation of the police departments policies  was not the proximate cause of the inmates death when there was no evidence that the inmate would have been unable to kill himself if he had been medically screened and any claim that the inmate would have presented as suicidal in such screening was purely speculative (E) holding that a suicide victim did not kill himself during a rage or frenzy or in response to an uncontrollable impulse when although his physical or psychological pain was obvious and he specifically attributed it to the alleged tortfeasors negligence he recorded a videotape just before he committed suicide in which he appeared to have control of himself and to have known exactly what he was doing
[EX A]:
holding that in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor the district court relied principally if indeed not entirely on the contract language and that doing so was error because inter alia employment contracts no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or what the terms may not be used to waive protections granted to an individual under title vii or any other act of congress