In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

its discretion by modifying the timesharing agreement without evidence that the welfare of the minor child would be promoted by returning him to his former school in Lake County and changing the timesharing arrangement to have the father assume the primary timesharing responsibilities. See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2014); Holland v. Holland, 140 So.3d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 584 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new hearing. On remand, the court shall take evidence and use the best interests of the child standard to determine if modification is in the child’s best interests in light of the parties’ inability to agree which school the minor child will attend. See, e.g., Watt v. Watt, 966 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Once that determination is made, the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification (B) holding that a hearing is required when a modification of parenting time would change the established custodial environment (C) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (D) holding that a custodial parents move to a foreign state without more is not a substantial change of circumstances that would support a modification of custody (E) holding that parties inability to agree on which private high school child would attend constituted substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of parenting plan
holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification

of the debt itself that is the key factor in determining dischargeability.” 21 B.R. at 912. Therefore, in determining whether a debt to a former spouse is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support, the court must look behind the designation assigned by a state court, or by the parties themselves, as to whether or not a particular obligation was in the nature of support or a property settlement, and to determine the true nature of the obligation. Parisi v. White, 26 B.R. 572, 574 (Bankr.R.I.1983). With this test in mind, we turn to the relevant factors in determining wheth er payments are m the nature of support. Whether the payments are made contingent upon conditions reflecting a need for support is one relevant factor. Cf. Warren v. Taff, 10 B.R. 101, 104 (Bankr.Conn.1981) (<HOLDING>). In the present case the child support 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding that the failure to condition a transfer on death or remarriage of the wife was a factor showing that the transfer was not in the nature of alimony (C) holding transfer restriction granted right of first refusal in event of voluntary or involuntary transfer of stock (D) holding that a denial of transfer was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff asserted only that the transfer would allow him to work closer to home (E) holding that oneyear period commences on date of discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer
holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court

possession” instruction. Moreover, the trial court’s instructions defining “knowingly” and “possession” adequately and accurately explained the level of conscious control over the firearm and the ammunition required under the law. For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury regarding a “temporary innocent possession” defense to the possession of a firearm. B. Conduct of Trial Judge We review a district judge’s conduct during trial for an abuse of discretion as well. See United States v. Verbitskaya, 406 F.3d 1324, 1337 (11th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Cox, uld not apply to the cases that have been presented to them, based on the facts as developed at trial. See United States v. Williams, 389 F.3d 402, 405 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Paul, 110 F.3d 869, 872 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants possession of the firearm was not so fleeting as to warrant an instruction on temporary innocent possession (B) holding that possession was not so fleeting as to extend the statute beyond its arguable limits (C) holding that trial court acted properly in refusing to give jury instruction on fleeting possession theory (D) recognizing innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons possession (E) holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense

holding that possession was not so fleeting as to extend the statute beyond its arguable limits