instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C), 1182(a)(2)(A), 1227(a)(2)(A)®. Furthermore, § 1252(a)(2)(B) precludes judicial review of: (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under [INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) ] or (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security® 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2). However, despite the jurisdictional limitations in § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (a)(2)(B), we are not precluded from reviewing constitutional claims or questions of law raised in a properly filed petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Balogun, 425 F.3d at 1359 (<HOLDING>); see also Frech v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law (B) holding no jurisdiction to review order raising amount of bail and questioning jurisdiction to review denial of motion to reduce bond (C) holding that the real id act leaves this court deprived of jurisdiction to review discretionary and factual determinations (D) holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review (E) holding that a habeas petition filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the real id act cannot be transferred to the court of appeals as a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction
answer:
holding no jurisdiction to review order raising amount of bail and questioning jurisdiction to review denial of motion to reduce bond


question:
and Waste Control Specialists. LLC v. Sierra Club, appellate cause number. 03-12-00335-CV. 4 . See Sierra Club v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, cause number D-l-GN-12-001586. 5 .Despite this, the trial court issued a written order denying the motion twenty days after the deadline for ruling on the motion had passed. The order — though included in the record on appeal — is of no effect. Jain v. Cambridge Petroleum Grp., Inc., 395 S.W.3d 394, 396 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) ("The trial court's signing the order denying the motion [to dismiss pursuant to the Act] after it was already denied by operation of law is legally of no effect because the motion to dismiss was already denied.”); reran v. Fryer, 586 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Cor-pus Christi 1979, writ ref'd) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Appellees also insist that Sierra Club 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (B) holding court lost jurisdiction to enter its order after thirty days and the motion was denied by operation of law (C) holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed (D) holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction (E) holding that an order purporting to overrule a motion for new trial that had already been overruled by operation of law was a nullity
answer:
holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions


question:
as Aladdin argues, to only section 29, it could just as reasonably be read to refer, as Bayerische argues, to the PMA as a whole. Indeed, the latter interpretation seems more likely. The clause at issue comes at the end of a sentence that states “no other person shall have any right ... under ... this Agreement, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.” (emphasis supplied). The following sentence, which identifies the Swap Counterparty as “an intended third party beneficiary” (emphasis supplied) has no language of limitation and could reasonably be read as clarification that, whomever else might be a third-party beneficiary, the Swap Counterparty is for certain. See also Sony Computer Entm’t Inc. v. Nippon Express U.S.A. (Ill), Inc., 313 F.Supp.2d 333, 336-38 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, in one of the cases the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a rule requiring an excess carrier to drop down upon the insolvency of the primary carrier would impermissibly shift the risk of the primary carrier to the excess carrier and would require insurance companies to scrutinize one anothers financial stability before issuing secondary policies (B) holding that bill of lading not charterparty governed contract dispute between carrier and shipper (C) holding specifically provided otherwise herein broad enough to refer to full contract between sony and common carrier but not to provision in separate contract between a subcontracted carrier and railway company (D) holding the only lawful interstate common arrangement or through ticketing  is an arrangement between a motor carrier and the air carrier (E) recognizing a breachofduty action by an employee against a workers compensation carrier even though the carrier issued its policy to the employer
answer:

holding that a rule requiring an excess carrier to drop down upon the insolvency of the primary carrier would impermissibly shift the risk of the primary carrier to the excess carrier and would require insurance companies to scrutinize one anothers financial stability before issuing secondary policies