In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: of class members with only Purchase Claims are represented by class representatives with Purchase Claims, and the settlement provides up to $250,000 for these claims. Moreover, class members with only Purchase Claims do not receive less value for identical claims asserted by other class members. Objectors contend inadequate representation is demonstrated in the settlement’s allocation terms, which designate the vast majority of the fund to Injury Claims, while Purchase Claims are capped at $250,OOO. But varied relief among class members with differing claims in class settlements is not unusual. See Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir.1999) (“[Ajlmost every settlement will involve different awards for various class members.”); see also Prudential, 148 F.3d at 289-90 (<HOLDING>). Such differences in settlement value do not, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (B) holding the court was not required to decide the issue of whether the district court properly certified a rule 23b2 class because the court already concluded that the district court appropriately certified the class under rule 23b3 citing authority for the proposition that a court need only find that a class action may be maintained under any of the three subdivisions (C) holding that once district court entered order approving the settlement of class claims it could not alter the class in the absence of egregious error (D) holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed (E) holding the district court properly certified a national settlement class in a circumstance in which the class was comprised of policyholders who allegedly were the victims of several different types of fraudulent and misleading sales practices and the settlement created an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to determine the kind and amount of relief to be granted
[EX A]: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members

[EX Q]: trial court wide latitude in sentencing...." State v. Bluff 2002 UT 66, ¶ 66, 52 P.3d 1210. "Generally, we review sentencing decisions to determine whether the court exceeded its permitted range of discretion, and we will reverse only if we determine that the trial court has failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 108, 1 12, 182 P.3d 708 (quotations and citations omitted). ANALYSIS I. Admissibility of Evidence T9 Defendant asserts that the trial court committed plain error when it allowed two witnesses to testify as to the children's credibility in violation of State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), and rule 608(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Rim-masch, TIS P.2d at 392 (<HOLDING>); see also Utah R. Evid. 608(a)(1) ("The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 608a1 bars admission of an experts testimony as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion (B) holding rule applicable to witness (C) holding plaintiffs waived their right to appellate review of the admission of an experts testimony by failing to object to it at trial (D) holding that even if an experts testimony arguably embraced the ultimate issue such testimony is permissible as long as the experts testimony assists rather than supplants the jurys judgment (E) holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
[EX A]: holding rule applicable to witness

[EX Q]: FAA whether an appeal was immediately permitted or only allowed after arbitration. Id. at 440. Numerous other state courts have reached the same conclusion when confronted with an argument that the FAA preempts state procedures of various types. In Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Sec. Corp., 14 Cal.4th 394, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061, 1069 (1996), the court held that the recognition of a right to a jury trial in FAA § 4 did not preempt California’s use of a summary procedure to decide a motion to compel arbitration. Quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2306, 101 L.Ed.2d 123, 137 (1988), the court said, “It is a ‘general and unassailable proposition ... that States may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation 72, 703 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (1998) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied, 429 Mass. 1107, 710 N.E.2d 604 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that on appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration a court may only determine whether a dispute is subject to arbitration other contractual challenges must be determined by the arbitrator (B) holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration (C) holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court (D) holding that faa  16a3 did not preempt a state statute prohibiting appeal of an order to compel arbitration and reasoning that there is no reason to suppose that the timing of the exercise of the right of appeal from an order compelling arbitration is other than a procedural matter which does not alter the substantive rights of either party (E) holding denial of mandamus challenging arbitration order did not bar appeal of that order after arbitration was completed
[EX A]:
holding that on appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration a court may only determine whether a dispute is subject to arbitration other contractual challenges must be determined by the arbitrator