In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975).” Peters v. Narick, 165 W.Va. 622, 628 n. 13, 270 S.E.2d 760, 768 n. 13 (1980). This Court has determined repeatedly that the West Virginia Constitution may be more protective of individual rights than its federal counterpart. See, e.g., State v. Bonham, 173 W.Va. 416, 317 S.E.2d 5 Daley, 174 W.Va. 299, 324 S.E.2d 713 (1984) (state constitution compels striking limitation on soliciting after sunset even if federal constitution does not); Woodruff v. Board of Trustees of Cabell Huntington Hospital, 173 W.Va. 604, 611, 319 S.E.2d 372, 379 (1984) (Article III, § 1 "more stringent in its limitation on waiver [of fundamental rights] than is the federal constitution”); Pushinsky v. West Virginia Board of Law Examiners, 164 W.Va. 736, 266 S.E.2d 444 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 707, 255 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution (B) recognizing that state constitution imposes more stringent limitations on power of state to inquire into lawful associations and speech than those imposed by federal constitution (C) recognizing exception under state constitution (D) holding that appellate court assumes appellant claims no greater protection under state constitution than that provided by federal constitution when state and federal claims not briefed separately (E) holding missouri constitution requires stricter separation of church and state than does federal constitution
[A]: recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution


[Q]: See Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 627, 651 A.2d 92, 95 (1995). However, apart from any persuasive weight afforded the Ninth Circuit’s decision in C’Est Moi, NHIC proffers no case law specifically suggesting that common law doctrines such as uberrimae fidei and equitable fraud may not be modified or superseded by a contractual agreement between the insurer and the insured. On the contrary, as we have noted, a number of courts have embraced the ability of parties to contract around common law. See, e.g., King, 906 F.2d at 1540-41; Conn. Indem. Co., 390 F.Supp.2d at 166-67; Progressive N. Ins. Co., 314 F.Supp.2d at 829-30; see also, e.g., McBride v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2007 WL 5185293, at *18, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16917, at **64-65 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 29, 2007) (<HOLDING>). 19 . NHIC points out that during a telephone 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application (B) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (C) holding that insurance application clause modified federal common law governing misrepresentations because  once an insurer has entered into a policy by using an application form more favorable to the insured than the law provides it may not rely on a rule of law which is more stringent than the application form  quoting espinosa v guardian life ins 856 fsupp 711 717 dmass1994 (D) holding that the mccarranferguson act which bars application of a federal law in the face of a state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance did not preclude the concurrent assertion of the federal rico statute and nevada insurance law (E) recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous
[A]: holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application


[Q]: 4331. The Rule 12(b)(6) defendants respond that: (1) the ATA does not provide for secondary liability as the statute is silent on that issue, see Al Rajhi Bank Br. 41 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 182, 184, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (noting that “there is no general presumption that [a] plaintiff may ... sue aiders and abettors” and that statutory silence regarding aiding and abetting liability “indicates a deliberate congressional choice with which the courts should not interfere”)); and (2) plaintiffs do not allege the actions of the Rule 12(b)(6) defendants proximately caused their injuries, see id. at 29 (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.E , 114 S.Ct. 1439 (<HOLDING>). Second, we held in Rothstein that Congress 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the lower courts erred in finding that the question of the extraterritorial reach of  10b of the securities and exchange act of 1934 was jurisdictional even though nothing in the analysis of the courts below turned on this mistake (B) holding that a private plaintiff is not entitled to maintain an aiding and abetting action under  10b or rule 10b  5 (C) holding of wilko equally applicable to cases arising under the securities exchange act of 1934 (D) holding that claims under  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement (E) holding that an implicit congressional intent to impose  aiding and abetting liability could not plausibly be inferred from the statutory silence in  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934
[A]:
holding that the lower courts erred in finding that the question of the extraterritorial reach of  10b of the securities and exchange act of 1934 was jurisdictional even though nothing in the analysis of the courts below turned on this mistake