In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
to Richardson. 6 . In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the Supreme Court extended Batson and its progeny to prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of gender. 7 . The Slate also points out that the presiding judge in the instant case is an African American jurist. Judge Green's sensitivity and efforts to seat a constitutional and racially-diverse jury for defendant, is evidenced in the debate over Richardson. Even though the judge originally found the state’s race-neutral reasons as to Richardson valid, he became concerned about the exclusion of African Americans from defendant's jury. However, the judge’s race is not relevant to Batson analysis. See State v. Tilley, 99-0569, p. 8 (La.7/6/00), 767 So.2d 6, 15 (<HOLDING>). 8 . A discussion of the assignments of error 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case (B) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (C) recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination (D) holding that custody decision based on race is not justified (E) holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant

Ex Output:
holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case


Ex Input:
$585,000 compensation for both the value of the condemned property and damage to the remainder. Northborough filed an objection to the commissioner’s decision asserting it had not received just compensation. The State filed an objection claiming the award was excessive. On April 19, 1991, the award was deposited with the clerk of the trial court. Northborough filed a motion to withdraw the $585,000, which the trial court granted on May 2, 1991. The State subsequently took possession of the condemned property and commenced construction on I-45. Prior to the commencement of the jury trial, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether there was a material and substantial impairment of access to the remainder. See State v. Wood Oil Distrib., Inc., 751 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex.1988) (<HOLDING>). The trial court found the improvements to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when ruling on a motion under rule 60b1 the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact unless a request is made (B) holding that the trial court is required to provide reasons for its decision prior to appeal (C) holding the trial court is required to make a determination on impairment of access prior to trial (D) holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds (E) holding that an exhaustion of appellate remedies is required to make a trial courts ruling the law of the case

Ex Output:
holding that when ruling on a motion under rule 60b1 the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact unless a request is made


Ex Input:
claims and state law false arrest/false imprisonment claims. See Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1435 (stating that probable cause constitutes an absolute bar to both state and § 1983 claims alleging false arrest); Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir.2002) (“[T]he existence of probable cause to arrest Dahl defeats her First Amendment claim.”). In addition, because any contact ■with Sada, and any injury therefrom, was incidental to a lawful arrest, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Sada’s battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress c arrest for battery, the district court properly concluded that the question of whether there was probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct is moot. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195-96 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 1 . 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officers subjective reason for making an arrest need not include the criminal offense that later establishes probable cause (B) holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant (C) holding that when an arrest is properly supported by probable cause as to any offense neither the officers subjective reliance on an offense for which no probable cause exists nor his verbal announcement of the wrong offense vitiates the arrest (D) holding that the subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause (E) holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed

Ex Output:

holding that an officers subjective reason for making an arrest need not include the criminal offense that later establishes probable cause