In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
allege no physical harm resulting from Wells Fargo’s voluntary undertaking of services. See Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex.2000) (“One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965))) (emphasis added); see also Vodicka v. Lahr, No. 03-10-00126-CV, 2012 WL 2075713, at *6 (Tex.Ct.App. Jun. 6, 2012) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for negligent undertaking because that tort requires proof of physical harm resulting from failure to exercise reasonable care in rendering services to another and plaintiffs had alleged only economic harm (B) holding that economic loss rule precluded the plaintiffs tort claims because they only alleged injuries to the subject of the contract itself (C) holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm (D) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (E) holding that the plaintiffs stated a claim for conspiracy because they alleged an actionable tort

Ex Output:
holding that economic loss rule precluded the plaintiffs tort claims because they only alleged injuries to the subject of the contract itself


Ex Input:
plain error review because he did not object to the admissibility of the reports or to the testimony by Detective Duft about the report. See State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 427, 516 S.E.2d 106, 118 (1999) (plain error is error “so fundamental as to amount to a miscarriage of justice or which probably resulted in the jury reaching a different verdict than it otherwise would have reached.”). Indeed, Defendant never disputed that the material was cocaine. He chose not to defend on that basis, but rather focused on portraying himself as a homeless person making a delivery in exchange for beer and cigarettes. Since the identity of the substance was not challenged, the admission of the laboratory reports was harmless error. See State v. Edwards, - N.C. App. -,-, 621 S.E.2d 333, 337 (2005), (<HOLDING>); State v. Thompson, 110 N.C. App. 217, 225, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial delay for dna testing was attributable to the state but was mere negligence (B) holding that failure to require production of dna testing protocols was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the defendant did not dispute that he committed the crimes at issue but rather argued that he was mentally impaired (C) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause violation in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not require the conviction to be overturned (D) holding that harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis not applicable in habeas cases (E) holding the state failed to meet its burden of showing the erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not address the issue on appeal

Ex Output:
holding that trial delay for dna testing was attributable to the state but was mere negligence


Ex Input:
found in this case, that the determinative weight of marijuana for purposes of the trafficking statute is when the marijuana is usable or suitable for consumption. We disagree. Defendant cites United States v. Lipp, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Kan. 1999), aff’d, 215 F.3d 1338 (2000), as guidance for their interpretation of “marijuana” as read in the North Carolina statutes. The Lipp case, also dealing with moist marijuana and its weight for the purpose of federal sentencing, interpreted 1993 and 1995 amend ments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (FSG). These amendments came in response to district courts that were issuing sentences for trafficking based on a weight of marijuana that included its natural water content. See United States v. Pinedo-Montoya, 966 F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Garcia, 925 F.2d 170 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencing courts drugquantity calculation can exceed the jurys drugquantity calculation  by over fifty times  so long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the maximum allowed by the jurys calculation and the sentencing courts calculation was supported by sufficient evidence (B) holding that the weight of the blotter paper used as the distribution medium for lsd is included in the weight of the drug for sentencing purposes (C) holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented  to the district court (D) holding that the district court properly considered the moisture content in the calculation of the weight of the marijuana for sentencing purposes (E) holding that district courts calculation of drug quantity under guidelines for purposes of sentencing did not violate stare decisis under neal because such calculation did not conflict with any controlling sentencing precedent

Ex Output:

holding that a sentencing courts drugquantity calculation can exceed the jurys drugquantity calculation  by over fifty times  so long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the maximum allowed by the jurys calculation and the sentencing courts calculation was supported by sufficient evidence