In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation — 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. § 1103) — which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (“An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal.”). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant’s release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc  1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest
[A]: holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute


[Q]: See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.106; State ex rel. WW., No. 12-13-00045-CV, 2013 WL 3156312, at *6 (Tex. App.-Tyler June 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Because W.W. presented evidence to the trial court of his preference to avoid an increased dose ... based upon its side effects and ineffectiveness, it is presumed that the trial court gave his preferences due consideration.”); In re T.O.R., No. 02-12-00376-CV, 2013 WL 362747, at *5 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Jan. 31, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("T.O.R. did not present any evidence to dispute So-biesk’s testimony about the medications’ benefits and the ineffectiveness of alternative treatments.”); M.H. v. State ex rel. M.H., No. 01-09-00205-CV, 2009 WL 2050988, at *4-5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 16, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. A.R.F., No. 12-03-00294-CV, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of conspiracy sufficient and noting lack of evidence that any member of the group did anything but cooperate with the terms of the plan to commit robbery (B) holding evidence sufficient to support trial courts finding in aggravation that the offense was planned (C) holding that the findings of reviewing physicians constituted substantial evidence in support of the secretarys decision to deny benefits (D) holding evidence sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding when patient did not present any evidence to dispute physicians testimony about benefits of treatment with psychoactive medications and lack of alternative treatments (E) holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract
[A]: holding evidence of conspiracy sufficient and noting lack of evidence that any member of the group did anything but cooperate with the terms of the plan to commit robbery


[Q]: these arguments is sufficient to override the designation of Shar-key which appears in the record and Pine Tree did not abuse its discretion is so concluding. First, plaintiff contends that Sharkey waived her rights to the death benefits under the pension program when, attendant to the dissolution of her marriage to Decedent, she executed a Voluntary Separation Agreement, which was incorporated into, but not merged in the judgment of divorce. The Separation Agreement contained, inter alia, a mutual release by the Decedent and Sharkey of “any and all rights or interests which [they now have] or may hereafter acquire in the real, personal or other property of the other.” See Defs.’ Ex. 14. This contention founders on the rule of Estate of Altobelli v. IBM, 77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The Separation Agreement in this case neither 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself (B) holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language (C) holding that plan participants in a defined benefit pension plan have no claim to the plans surplus assets (D) holding that the family courts award to exwife of interest in 387 of debtors military pension payable directly from the plan was not subject to discharge because interest in pension plan was not a debt rather it was considered exwifes separate ownership interest (E) holding that exwife had no interest in exhusbands erisa plan because each party clearly intended by the terms of a property settlement to relinquish all interests in the pension plans of the other
[A]:
holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself