In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: with “complete and final discretionary authority to interpret the plans and maintain control over the operation and administration of the plans.” Accordingly, the Chevron Plan, via the Services Agreement and the SPD, delegates authority to Aetna regarding benefit eligibility for the Medical Plan. Moreover, in this situation, Aetna made a factual determination that certain diagnostic testing and IVIG treatments were not medically necessary. “[F]actual determinations made by [an] administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion.” Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir.1999); see also Chandler v. Hartford Life, No. 05-50688, 2006 WL 1209363, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr.28, 2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp., 168 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion (B) holding that a denial of benefits will not be reviewed de novo where the language of an erisa plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (C) holding that arbitrary and capricious standard applies to section 1132a1b denial ofbenefits claims if the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (D) holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion (E) holding that  rjegardless of the administrators ultimate authority to determine benefit eligibility  factual determinations made by the administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion 
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: (3) Dr. Hickman’s observation that Seever’s surgeries, residual pain, and physical limitations “have taxed his psychological coping abilities,” ApltApp. at 372. But Dr. Hick man interpreted this information as presenting no more than a slight impairment—meaning that he could still function well—as to understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions, and he declined to identify any other mental capabilities affected by Seever’s depression. We will not fault the ALJ for failing to interpret Seever’s symptoms and test results differently than Dr. Hickman. See Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1022 (10th Cir.1996) (observing that an ALJ may not substitute his lay opinion for a medical opinion); Hamilton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1500 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Nor are we convinced that the ALJ should have 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that this court may not reweigh evidence (B) recognizing this method (C) recognizing this presumption (D) recognizing this distinction (E) recognizing this rule
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: would result from pretrial publicity or the kind of prejudice that would require a change of venue. Moreover, the court finds that Johnson waived the issue by failing to renew or reurge her motion for a change of venue at the conclusion of jury selection on the ground that the voir dire of potential jurors demonstrated that the pool was so tainted with prejudice that she could not obtain a fair trial in this district. As the court observed in its pretrial ruling, at the second tier of the analysis of a motion for a change of venue, if the court concludes that no presumption of prejudice is warranted pretrial, the court must look at the voir dire testimony of potential trial jurors to determin 7 L.Ed.2d 909 (2004); People v. Burnham, 2001 WL 936764, *1 (Mich.Ct.App. Aug.17, 2001) (<HOLDING>); State v. Couture, 587 N.W.2d 849, 852 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms (B) holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified (C) holding that the defendant must renew a motion for a change of venue after voir dire to preserve the issue for appeal (D) holding that where a defendant if given the opportunity to renew a motion for a change of venue immediately prior to trial but fails to do so the right to challenge venue is waived (E) holding that the defendant waived the issue of change of venue where the trial court denied the motion for a change of venue without prejudice stating that it was willing to reconsider the motion at any time during the jury selection process but the defendant never renewed the motion for a change of venue
[EX A]:
(E)