In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir.1993) (“The purpose of NEPA is to protect the environment, not the economic interests of those adversely affected by agency decisions.”); Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 475 (9th Cir.1979) (purely financial interests are outside of NEPA’s zone of interests). Accordingly, we have consistently held that purely economic interests do not fall within NEPA’s zone of interests: “[A] plaintiff who asserts purely economic injuries does not have standing to challenge an agency action under NEPA.” Nevada Land Action Ass’n, 8 F.3d at 716; see also Ranchers Cattleman v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1102 (9th Cir.2005) (an economic injury alone will not support a claim under NEPA); Western Radio Servs. Co. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 903 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Port of Astoria, 595 F.2d at 475 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the cause of action (B) holding that a plaintiff whose only complaint was that agency action would cause economic harm asserted an interest outside nepas zone of interests (C) holding that the plaintiff did not have standing because it was not able to demonstrate how its economic interests fell within the zone of interests protected by the nhpa (D) recognizing cause of action (E) holding that the public interest in expression must be weighed against the plaintiffs economic and noneconomic interests
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: would, in general, slow down the dispute resolution process.” Id. at 946, 115 S.Ct. 1920. Moreover, it was rejected as “legally erroneous,” for the “basic objective in this area is not to resolve disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties’ wishes, but to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, are enforced according to their terms and according to the intentions of the parties.” Id. at 946, 115 S.Ct. 1920. C. In This Case, The Question Of Arbitrability Is For The Court The second question is whether the power to determine arbitrability resides with the court or the AAA Panel. The answer turns upon what the parties agreed to about that question in the Merger Agreement. First Option 543, 546-547, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964)(<HOLDING>). Similarly, a disagreement about whether an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should decide whether an arbitration agreement survived a corporate merger and bound the resulting corporation (B) holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement (C) holding trial court must decide whether to compel arbitration of personal injury claim of party who was not signatory to arbitration agreement (D) holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived (E) holding that a gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a question of arbitrability for a court to decide
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: (or seven, which carries the same base offense level of 32, see USSG § 2D1.1(c)(4) (base offense level 32 applies to quantities of at least five but less than fifteen kilograms of cocaine)). But perhaps he is hable for only the one kilogram that was exchanged. Accordingly, as required by § 2255, the District Court should hold “a prompt hearing” to “determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law” on whether there is a reasonable probability that, had he received effective assistance of counsel at his original sentencing, Smack would have established that he was entitled to a shorter sentence. The reasonable probability of any decrease in Smack’s sentence would establish prejudice. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 121 S.Ct. 696, 148 L.Ed.2d 604 (2001) (<HOLDING>). The remedy, in turn, would be to resentence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any reduction in sentence constitutes substantial prejudice for purposes of strickland analysis (B) holding that a permanent change in income constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying a reduction of alimony (C) holding that it is error to engraft onto the prejudice branch of the strickland test a requirement that any increase in a sentence must meet a standard of significance (D) holding that in defining the reasonable probability language in strickland with more precision substantial possibility describes the prejudice standard in strickland (E) holding petitioner demonstrates actual and substantial prejudice by proving a claim under strickland
[EX A]:
(A)