In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Apr. 14, 2011). Accord Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 274 (2d Cir.2009) (dismissing a retaliation claim whose only causal basis was a letter that plaintiff wrote many weeks before the allegedly retaliatory acts, implicating officers other than named defendants). See also Def. Mem. at 11 ("[A] claim that one defendant took action against the plaintiff in retaliation for a complaint made against a different [officer] [should be] viewed with particular skepticism."). 40 . Def, Mem. at 17. 41 . See id. (citing exclusively to Eighth Amendment cases). 42 .Id. 43 . See Wright, 554 F.3d at 274. 44 . Def. Mem. at 18. 45 . Def. Mem. at 19. 46 . Davis, 320 F.3d at 353. 47 . Dawes, 239 F.3d at 493. 48 . Compare Hofelich v. Ercole, No. 06 Civ. 1369, 2010 WL 1459740, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2010) (<HOLDING>), with Rembert v. Cheverko, No. 12 Civ. 9196, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim (B) holding that a verbal threat of being fired is not an adverse employment action for purposes of title vii (C) holding that verbal threats if they are specific can constitute adverse action for retaliation purposes (D) holding that a suspension with pay may constitute materially adverse action for the purposes of retaliation claims depending on the facts of the case (E) holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action
[EX A]: holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim

[EX Q]: agreements and do not own their software outright under Regime 1. 19 . Though this court reviews orders imposing Rule 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion, “[a] district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law_" Giebelhaus, 938 F.2d at 964 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990)). 20 . The Court extended this reasoning in Business Guides to apply the certification requirement of Rule 11 to represented parties who sign court papers, even where they are not required to do so. 498 U.S. at 543, 546-47, 111 S.Ct. at 930-31. 21 . Giebelhaus, 938 F.2d at 965; see also Pony Express Courier Corp. of Am. v. Pony Express Delivery Serv., 872 F.2d 317, 319 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Southeastern’s argument that Lederman and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction (B) holding that a city could not be held vicariously liable for the act of a magistrate who was immune from liability (C) holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii (D) holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable (E) holding that cocounsel who did not sign the answer could not be held liable under rule 11 for its contents
[EX A]: holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction

[EX Q]: v. ITT Consumer Financial Corporation, 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir.2000) (common law ground for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA includes when an award is arbitrary or capricious); Ainsworth v. Skumick, 960 F.2d 939, 940-41 (11th Cir.l992)(arbitration award may be vacated as arbitrary and capricious when court cannot infer any ground for the awards from the facts); U.S. Postal Service v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775, 778-79 (11th Cir.1988) (award may be vacated as arbitrary and capricious if it exhibits a wholesale departure from the law). Hall Street precludes the use of any common-law grounds as an independent basis for vacatur of an arbitration award. See Royce Homes, L.P. v. Bates, 315 S.W.3d 77, 90 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); LeFoumha v. Legend Classic Homes, Ltd., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hall street restricts the grounds for vacatur to those set forth in section 10 of the faa (B) holding that common law grounds such as manifest disregard of law and gross mistake were not valid grounds for vacatur of arbitration award as hall street forecloses any common law grounds for vacatur (C) holding that the statutory grounds for vacatur and modification of arbitration awards may not be supplemented by contract (D) holding that arbitrary and capricious ground for vacatur recognized along with the four grounds for vacatur specified in chapter 1 of the faa could not be used to vacate award under the convention (E) holding that a transcript is necessary if the asserted grounds for vacatur of arbitration award are grounded in the conduct of the proceeding
[EX A]:
holding that hall street restricts the grounds for vacatur to those set forth in section 10 of the faa