In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: Raye Ellen Stiles appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her action alleging, among other claims, housing discrimination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo and may affirm the district court on any ground supported by the record. Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 733-34 (9th Cir.2012). We affirm. Summary judgment on Stiles’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, aggravation of preexisting conditions, and public humiliation was proper because she already litigated these claims in Arizona state court, and, thus, res judicata precludes her from bringing such claims in federal court. See Sunkist Growers v. Fisher, 104 F.3d 280, 283-84 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Summary judgment on Stiles’ federal claims 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person has standing to bring suit under the civil rights act if she or he can show that she or he was punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities (B) holding that plaintiff had standing to bring a rico conspiracy claim despite his inability to bring a substantive rico claim (C) holding that while parents may not bring a title ix claim as individuals they may bring such claim on behalf of a deceased child (D) holding that under arizona law a litigant may not bring a claim identical to one she has previously litigated (E) holding that plaintiffs may bring a section 1983 claim for damages to vindicate their rights under idea

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: removal of the access can result in a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, if the state’s use is for a purpose other than a road purpose. But, in Judge Armstrong’s view, any modification of a road for road purposes that denies a landowner’s access does not give rise to a compensable taking. In so concluding, Judge Armstrong discounts as “dictum” the Supreme Court rationale in Burk that an abutter’s right of access to a conventional Highway “can be divested only by condemnation of the easement appurtenant to the abutting property.” 200 Or at 231. Judge Armstrong explains that the court’s conclusion in Burk cannot be reconciled with the court’s analysis in more recent cases in the context of regulations that affect road access. See, e.g., Schrunk, 242 Or at 73 (<HOLDING>). If, Judge Armstrong’s concurrence reasons, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access (B) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking (C) holding ripe a claim for a pre1987 taking because prior to first english california law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an action in inverse condemnation (D) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (E) holding that regulatory restrictions on abutting landowners right of ingress and egress are not compensable when landowner has adequate alternative means to access property

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: an injunction, and does not require the posting of any type of bond. And, although neither party requested the injunction, neither party appealed from the order. Instead, McKinnon later filed a motion with the trial court, arguing that the injunction should be set aside because it was improperly entered. When the trial judge denied that motion, McKinnon appealed from the later denial order in an improper attempt to belatedly challenge the original injunction order. See, e.g., Betancourt v. Estate of Misdraji, 13 So.3d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (declining to consider issues raised on appeal from denial of successive petition to re-open estate when same issues had been decided in prior orders from which moving party had not appealed); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 921 So.2d 796 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>); M.G. v. State, 711 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 1st DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that receipt of a large inheritance constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying termination of permanent alimony (B) holding that final order for alimony may be modified by trial court on showing of substantial change in circumstances of either party (C) holding that a permanent change in income constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying a reduction of alimony (D) holding that even if change of circumstances is shown trial court is not required to grant modification of periodic alimony award unless husband had in good faith entered into new occupation at reduced income (E) holding that former husband was not entitled to evidentiary hearing on petition to modify alimony where he failed to demonstrate substantial change in circumstances since entry of a prior order denying modification of alimony from which he did not appeal


Output: (E)