TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: 45 U.S.C. § 56, and 46 U.S.C. § 30106, are essentially identical, stating that the action must be “commenced” or “brought” within the three year period. The Supreme Court in Burnett specifically found that the state court suit had been properly “commenced” although it was filed in an improper venue. 380 U.S. at 426, 85 S.Ct. at 1053. Furthermore, because the principle of uniformity that drove the Burnett decision applies with equal force to a general maritime action, other courts have correctly held that Burnett applies in general maritime cases. See, e.g., Prejean, 721 So.2d at 1276 (citing 1 Martin J. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries § 5:10 (4th ed.1990)); Davis, 659 F.Supp. at 156-157; People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F.Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.La.1968) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s second argument for distinction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries (B) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (C) holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction (D) holding that burnett and its justification of uniformity is equally applicable to admiralty actions (E) holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures

SOLUTION: holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries

PROBLEM: effect of an admission by a defendant against a codefendant. {10} Although Rule 1-036 does not address whether a defendant’s deemed admissions can be used against a codefendant, this Court has held that such admissions may not be used against a codefendant. See Wilson v. Galt, 100 N.M. 227, 236, 668 P.2d 1104, 1113 (Ct.App.1983) (stating that Rule 1-036 admissions apply to and bind the party making the admissions, not codefendants). Moreover, other courts that have addressed this issue have likewise concluded that the admissions of a defendant cannot be used against a codefendant. See, e.g., Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1048 (5th Cir.1997) (“Deemed admissions by a party opponent cannot be used against a co-party.”); United States v. Wheeler, 161 F.Supp. 193, 198 (W.D.Ark.1958) (<HOLDING>); Darnall v. Petersen, 8 Neb.App. 185, 592 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies when his claim is deemed denied because of failure of administrator to respond in a timely manner (B) holding that failure to file timely responses to a request for admissions renders them admitted (C) holding that plaintiffs failure to respond to argument warranted dismissal with prejudice (D) holding that facts deemed admitted as to one defendant because of his failure to respond to the plaintiffs request for admissions are not binding on a codefendant (E) holding that requests for admissions seeking purely legal conclusions are inappropriate and the failure to respond to such a request may not be the basis for a summaiy judgment

SOLUTION: holding that a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies when his claim is deemed denied because of failure of administrator to respond in a timely manner

PROBLEM: the residential program. The remain der of the terms and conditions of the disposition order are affirmed. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED. GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, R. B, JJ., concur. 1 . We affirm the remaining issues advanced by I.B. on appeal without discussion. 2 . Fearing that this legislative change left juveniles without a procedure to correct unpre-served disposition errors that did not constitute fundamental error, the Florida Supreme Court adopted ) (concluding that juvenile could not be sentenced to commitment not to exceed 364 days followed by post-commitment community control not to exceed 364 days for battery, where maximum term that juvenile could have received for offense as an adult was one year); see also J.G. v. State, 783 So.2d 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Some Florida courts have held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state may not subject indigent defendants to period of imprisonment beyond statutory maximum (B) holding pursuant to section 985231 ld florida statutes 1999 that duration of commitment which includes any period in an aftercare program may not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense (C) holding apprendi is not implicated where sentence does not exceed statutory maximum sentence authorized for the offense in its simplest form (D) holding that a defendant could not assert an error under apprendi v new jersey because his sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum (E) holding that restitution in the full amount of each victims losses does not exceed the statutory maximum

SOLUTION:
holding that state may not subject indigent defendants to period of imprisonment beyond statutory maximum