In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to the federal district court, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, and moved for summary judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Defendants argued, among other things, that Preston lacked a property interest in his volunteer position with the VFD. Preston rejoined he was a “fire code official” under the Code and IFC and could not be fired except after a hearing and upon a showing of just cause. In December 2009, the district court granted defendants’ motion and dismissed Preston’s case with prejudice. Preston filed a motion to reconsider, see Fed. R.Civ.P. 59, which the district court denied. Preston appeals. II. DISCUSSION Before considering the merits of Preston’s appeal, we briefly examine the latent issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See Clark v. Baka, 593 F.3d 712, 714 (8th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>) (quoting McAdams v. McCord, 533 F.3d 924, 927 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing federal courts duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking (B) holding that even where subjectmatter jurisdiction may go unchallenged on appeal we have an obligation to inquire sua sponte into our jurisdiction over the matter (C) recognizing that even if neither party disputes this courts subject matter jurisdiction under 38 usc  7292 we are obligated to consider the issue sua sponte if there is reason to doubt that jurisdiction exists (D) holding that the court can raise res judicata sua sponte even on appeal (E) recognizing every federal appellate court has a special obligation to consider its own jurisdiction even if it must do so sua sponte
[A]: (E)


[Q]: Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); Hagemeister v. Vanity Fair Properties, 508 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1973, writ dism’d). Thus, collateral estoppel dictates that venue of any subsequent suit involving the same subject matter and the same parties as the initial suit be governed by the venue determination in the initial suit. See Orozco, 681 S.W.2d at 245-46; Pinney, 558 S.W.2d at 36. First, Miller II involves the same parties as the Windsor suit. Both State & County and Windsor were parties to the Windsor suit. Although Ledbetter and Curtiss were not named in the Windsor suit, as officers of State & County, they were in privity with a party; thus, collateral estoppel would apply to them as well. Cf. Getty Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Youell & Cos. v. Getty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant in second suit was in privity for res judicata purposes because his interests were aligned with those of defendant in first suit which concerned same facts (B) holding that res judicata applies when the question of jurisdiction is raised and determined (C) holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings (D) holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings (E) holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties
[A]: (E)


[Q]: that the two-level increase is a misapplication of the Guidelines because § 2B1.1(b)(12)(A) applies only when it is the fraudulent offense itself that carries the risk of death or serious bodily injury. Rizzo contends that the increase was applied based on his attempt to elude apprehension and did not relate to his theft of mail offense. Rizzo argues that trial counsel’s failure to make these objections fell below objective standards of practice and that prejudice resulted. Rizzo’s argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the application of both § 3C1.2 and § 2Bl.l(b)(12)(A) has no merit because the enhancements were based on two separate instances of flight, one on July 25, and one on August 10. See United States v. Gillyard, 261 F.3d 506, 509-12 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The Government concedes that § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no prejudice when evidence complained of would have been admissible against defendant in separate trial (B) holding that there was no legal separation where there was no evidence  that the orders at issue mandated or acknowledged separate existences (C) recognizing that separate ratings can be assigned for separate periods of time based on facts found (D) holding that there was no double counting in applying  3c12 and  3a12b because they were based on separate acts (E) holding that the defendants sentences were properly enhanced under  3a12b because they assaulted an officer employed by the mississippi bureau of narcotics and during the assault made statements including they are the police lets kill them
[A]:
(D)