In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and part of the “unified judicial system,” is an arm of the state. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir.2000) (“All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system ... are part of ‘Commonwealth government’ and thus are state rather than local agencies.”). As a state agency, the Board has Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. Therefore, as an arm of the state, Lucas may not sue the Board unless one of the three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply. See MCI Telcomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503 (listing immunity exceptions). On appeal, Lucas argues that the Ex Parte Young exception precludes the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to the present action against the Board. Howe 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Neither of these exceptions are applicable in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action (B) holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action (C) holding that a remedial scheme created by congress even if incapable of addressing all of plaintiffs injuries precluded a bivens action (D) holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction (E) holding that young will not apply where congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state
[EX A]: holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action

[EX Q]: 718. Under Texas law, a person may engage in the practice of engineering, architecture, or landscape architecture if he is licensed in those professions. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 3271a, § 1.2 (Vernon Supp.1999) (engineering); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art.249a, § 1 (Vernon Supp.1999) (architecture); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 249c, § 5(a) (Vernon Supp.1999) (landscape architecture). The State complains Henry was allowed to testified as to matters requiring expertise in surveying, engineering, architecture, and landscape architecture even though he is not licensed in any of those professions. Therefore, because Henry is not licensed, he was not qualified to testify as an expert. See Prellwitz v. Cromwell, Truemper, Levy, Parker & Woodsmale, 802 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>); but see Southland Lloyd’s Ins. Co. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the tendered expert witness was a licensed psychologist and not a medical doctor he was not qualified to state an expert medical opinion regarding the cause of johns injury (B) holding that a witness who will be giving opinion evidence about a propertys fair market value must be disclosed and designated as an expert pursuant to discovery and other applicable rules (C) recognizing that a licensed chiropractor is a health care provider competent to testify as a medical expert (D) holding that where a treating doctor is called to give an expert opinion on the standard of care that doctor is properly labeled an expert witness and must be disclosed to the other party along with other experts (E) holding that witness giving expert opinion regarding stan dard of care for particular licensed profession must hold license for same profession
[EX A]: holding that because the tendered expert witness was a licensed psychologist and not a medical doctor he was not qualified to state an expert medical opinion regarding the cause of johns injury

[EX Q]: but before its effective date. Bishop argues that defendants therefore had notice that their conduct was unlawful discrimination at the time that it occurred, and may be held liable for it in a suit brought after the effective date of the ADA. In sum, this argument states that the date of enactment governs when conduct became unlawful, while the effective date only governs when an injured party may bring suit to enforce the provisions of the ADA. A careful reading of Landgraf and Rivers, however, counsels against accepting Bishop’s arguments. First, while these opinions did in fact address cases pending at the time of enactment of the ADA, they both speak in terms of the law effective at the time the allegedly discriminatory conduct occurred. See Landgraf — U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 1508 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); Rivers, — U.S. at-, 114 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that aedpa would not apply to a habeas petition that was pending at the time of its enactment (B) recognizing that new law did not apply to claims that accrued prior to enactment (C) holding that aedpa amendments to  2254 apply only to such cases as were filed after the statutes enactment (D) holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment (E) holding that section 1981a does not apply to cases arising before its enactment
[EX A]:
recognizing that aedpa would not apply to a habeas petition that was pending at the time of its enactment