In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: to the exercise of discretion by the trial court. Penn s to avoid the appearance of impropriety is a worthy standard for professional conduct, a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to due process does not entitle him to a prosecution free of such appearances. Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (stating that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not violated when his lawyer has a “possible” or “potential” conflict of interest). Instead, a criminal defendant is denied due process only when his former counsel joins a Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office and is not effectively screened from contact with the Commonwealth’s attorneys who are handling the defendant’s case on a related matter. See Thompson, 246 So.2d at 763 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 236-37 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (B) holding than an attorney who serves as a mediator cannot subsequently represent anyone in a substantially related matter without the consent of the original parties because mediators routinely receive and preserve confidences in much the same manner as an attorney and where the mediator was privy to confidential information the applicable ethical rules impose the same responsibility as the rules relating to any attorneys subsequent representation of a former client (C) holding that defendants right to due process was not violated by the employment of his former counsel in the us attorneys office where the former counsel recused himself and was screened from the prosecution of defendants case (D) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (E) holding that a defendants due process rights are violated only if his former lawyer prosecutes him on a matter related to the representation or discloses client confidences to other prosecutors

Output: holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person


Input: Consider Input: abused its discretion by providing an unreasonable characterization of the record evidence. See McElwee, 896 A.2d at 18 & nn. 7-8. While SEPTA claims that this, too, necessarily entailed unwarranted fact-finding on the part of the Commonwealth Court, we believe that it aligns with the approach utilized in Sienkiewicz I, wherein this Court not only determined that no record evidence existed to support a particular factual finding central to the trial court’s decision to grant relief (i.e., that Penn-DOT had installed curbing along the “Stafford Straightaway”), but proceeded to delineate the essential facts that were proved by the uncontradicted record evidence in ultimately agreeing with Penn-DOT’s position that relief was unjustified. See Sienkiewicz I, 584 Pa. at 282, 883 A.2d at 502 (<HOLDING>). Under the circumstances of this case, then, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (B) holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property (C) recognizing distinction and allowing recovery for impairment of access and not obstructed flow of traffic (D) holding that the landownerlicensee relationship ceased when the licensee left the landowners property (E) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking

Output: holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property


Input: Consider Input: Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 574. 19 . Although the parties did not fully brief this issue, we must consider it as it goes to whether the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See McDonal, 408 F.3d at 182-83 (if court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, case must be remanded to state court). 20 . Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 575. 21 . Id. at 574. 22 . McDonal, 408 F.3d at 184 (quoting Rainwater v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 636, 638-39 (5th Cir.2004) (per curiam)). 23 . See Rainwater, 391 F.3d at 638. 24 . Ameen concedes that she has no cause of action against the individual defendants on her retaliation claim. 25 . WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998). 26 . See Abbott v. Pollock, 946 S.W.2d 513, 520 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). 27 . Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 16.002. 28 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review (B) holding that appellants failed to raise material issue of fact when they relied on their belief that appellee or his employees had spoken disparagingly about them (C) holding that plaintiff failed to show genuine issue of material fact on equitable estoppel claim (D) holding that the nonmovant failed to raise a fact issue on mitigation by not raising a fact issue as to the amount of damages that could have been avoided had the movantproperly mitigated his damages (E) holding that defendants failed to raise triable issue of material fact where they did not establish that the type size of the copy they submitted in opposition to summary judgment motion was identical to that of the original contract


Output: holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review