In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: next argues that the standstill agreement initially executed on January 24, and repeatedly extended until March 26, tolled the running of the sixty-day cure period provided in the Distribution Agreement, and that because the parties entered into the initial standstill agreement four days before the end of the cure period, Innomed was entitled to four additional days to cure the breach beyond the expiration of the last standstill agreement on March 26, 2001. We agree with the district court, however, that the language of the standstill agreement unambiguously indicates that the parties agreed simply to postpone the date on which the termination would become effective, rather than to toll the running of the cure period. See Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 629 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law (B) holding that where the language of the contract is unambiguous and conveys a definite meaning the court may decide the meaning of the contract as a matter of law (C) holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties (D) holding as a general rule of contract law if no other meaning is reasonable the court shall rule as a matter of law that the meaning is established (E) holding that where each side ascribes a different meaning to what the sides claim is the unambiguous language in a contract the contract is ambiguous and summary judgment is improper
[A]: holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law


[Q]: the evidence of rape discussed above in Division 1, we conclude that the evidence at Martin’s trial was sufficient to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found as to both murders. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (2) (requiring a review of the statutory aggravating circumstances foundby the jury);UAP Rule IV (B) (2) (providing that, in all death penalty cases, this Court will determine whether the verdicts are supported by the evidence). See also Ring, 536 U. S. 584; Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. 20. Considering both the murders for which Martin has been sentenced to death and Martin as a defendant, we find that the death sentences imposed in his case were not disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Georgia law. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3); Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716-717 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited in the Appendix support this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts statutorily mandated proportionality review concerns whether a particular death sentence is excessive per se or is substantially out of line (B) holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable
[A]: holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial


[Q]: 1116 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Miguel, 338 F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 2003)). ¶17 The Indiana Court of Appeals employed similar reasoning in upholding its state’s analogous juvenile waiver statute. Villalon, 956 N.E.2d at 702-04. The court recognized that, [a]s a practical matter, a child who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act and is not retained in the juvenile justice system but is waived into adult court will (if found guilty) face harsher consequences for his or her conduct. Nonetheless, Ice makes clear that not all judicial fact-finding ultimately resulting in an increased term of incarceration invades the province of the jury. . . . Villalon provides no argument as to how our juvenile waiver statute might be unders , 765 N.E.2d 1071, 262 Ill. Dec. 463 (2002) (<HOLDING>); State v. Jones, 273 Kan. 756, 778, 47 P.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding missouri transfer rule did not violate equal protection (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (D) holding that the apprendi rule was not implicated because a juvenile transfer proceeding does not involve sentencing or a determination of guilt or innocence (E) holding that the states transfer statute did not violate the apprendi rule because the transfer hearing determines not the minors guilt but the forum in which his guilt may be adjudicated
[A]:
holding missouri transfer rule did not violate equal protection