In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: clause. We conclude that reckless battery is a violent crime under the force clause, an issue not addressed by the Holloway opinion. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 20 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012). We further note that the Holloway court’s conclusion with respect to reckless battery accorded with then-binding instruction from the United States Supreme Court that the residual clause is limited to an offense that “typically involve[s] purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct.” United States v. Holloway, supra at 260, quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008). Last year, however, the Supreme Court retreated from this characterization of the residual clause. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270, 2277 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court iterated that “[t]he phrase 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally  (B) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (C) holding that burglary is violent felony (D) holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause (E) holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act
[A]: (D)


[Q]: blood from 116 unrelated Korean individuals); Jeanne M. Hayes et al. & Maya Freund, “Arab Population Data on the PCR-Based loci: HLADQA1, LDLR, GYPA, HBGG, D758, Gc and D1S80,” 40 J. Forensic Sci. 888 (1995) (collecting ninety-four blood samples from unrelated Arabs); see also Pope, supra, 220 Ill.Dec. at 312, 672 N.E.2d at 1324 (finding that “[b]ecause the PCR polymarker systems are two allele or three allele, the FBI may rely on a smaller database. Thus, the PCR Caucasian database contains only 145 individuals”). Second, the trial court found that the underlying databases were reliable. In light of that finding, questions regarding the size of a database go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See People v. Adams, 195 Mich.App. 267, 489 N.W.2d 192, 198 (1992) (<HOLDING>), modified in part on other grounds, 441 Mich. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility (B) holding that allegations of tampering went to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility (C) holding statistical conclusions admissible and questions regarding the size of a tests database goes to the weight not admissibility of the evidence (D) holding that in face of expert testimony that database was valid questions concerning size of database and statistical conclusions drawn from it went to weight not admissibility of evidence (E) holding that questions regarding size of fbis population databases was matter of weight once principle that frequency calculations could be made from an adequate database was determined to be generally accepted
[A]: (D)


[Q]: as an excessive fine, what is the appropriate remedy! Although the United States Supreme Court in Bajakajian declined to consider the issue, we recognize that like the trial judge in Bajakajian (see note 27, supra), as PERAC points out, a number of courts, after concluding that a statutory forfeiture operated as an excessive fine in the particular circumstances of the case, have proceeded to determine a forfeiture amount that would not be excessive, and have imposed it. See, e.g., United States v. Castello, 611 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1251 (2011) (where forfeiture amount is constitutionally excessive, court must impose alternative fine in exact amount over which fine would become excessive); United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). Cf. United States ex rel. Bunk v. Gosselin 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the eighth amendment succinctly prohibits excessive sanctions it provides excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted  (B) holding in context of case involving racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations act violations that lower court is required to impose maximum fine amount that would not be excessive under eighth amendment (C) holding a fine excessive because it was greater than defendant could pay in a lifetime (D) holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment (E) holding that forfeitures may violate the eighth amendment excessive fines clause
[A]:
(B)