In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the action should pro ceed among the existing parties or be dismissed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b). Defendant neglected to offer any explanation for how and why Mr. Stroud is essential, other than that he was named in the underlying state court case. That is not enough. Mr. Stroud is not a necessary or indispensable party under Rule 19 because this Court can administer complete relief — an order compelling arbitration— among the existing parties and Mr. Stroud himself is not claiming an interest in this arbitration action that will be impaired by his absence. Although failing to dismiss this case may result in piecemeal litigation, that factor alone is not compelling enough to find Mr. Stroud to be an indispensable party. Cf. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). This Court therefore properly limits its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (B) holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived (C) holding that district courts are required to compel arbitration of claims subject to arbitration clause even if the result is piecemeal litigation (D) holding that faa was inapplicable where parties involved in action are not parties to an arbitration agreement under which issues are referable to arbitration (E) holding that in determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists in petition to compel arbitration district court was correct in looking only to citizenship of parties in action before it  parties who signed arbitration agreement  and that nondiverse agents in underlying state case were not indispensable parties as any potential prejudice resulting from piecemeal litigation is overcome by faas strong bias in favor of arbitration
[A]: (E)


[Q]: the key elements required to satisfy the discovery rule are injury (we use “damage” interchangeably with “injury”) and fault. Legally-cognizable damages occur when a plaintiff detrimentally relies on the negligent advice of an attorney. Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 374, 460 A.2d 172. Actual damages are those that are real and substantial as opposed to speculative. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617, 621 (1937). In the legal-malpractice context, actual damages may exist in the form of an adverse judgment. Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 373, 460 A.2d 172. However, a client may suffer damages, in the form of attorney’s fees, before a court has announced its decision in the underlying action. See, e.g., Knight, supra, 553 A.2d at 1235 (<HOLDING>); Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 374, 460 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal (B) holding that debtors have no right to jury trial on malpractice claims against their attorneys (C) holding that although attorneys fees are usually not recoverable unless permitted by statute or contract contractual or statutory authorization was not necessary in a malpractice claim to recover attorneys fees and costs as damages (D) holding that statute of limitations for malpractice begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged malpractice (E) holding that attorneys fees and costs expended as a result of an attorneys alleged malpractice constitute legallycognizable damages for purposes of stating a claim for such malpractice
[A]: (E)


[Q]: the collective or class-wide nature of the charge.”). “The policy behind the single filing rule is that ‘[i]t would be wasteful, if not vain, for numerous employees, all with the same grievance, to have to process many identical complaints with the EEOC.’ ” Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir.1968)). “As long as the EEOC and the company are aware of the nature and scope of the allegations, the purposes behind the filing requirement are satisfied and no injustice or contravention of congressional intent occurs by allowing piggybacking.” Id. at 1223. Our threshold task is to determine the time frame that gave rise to Thiessen’s claims of discrimination. See Jones v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 977 F.2d 527, 532 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Thiessen is relying on the continuing 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the general rule that a court of appeals will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal (B) holding that law of the case acts as a bar only when the issue in question was actually considered and decided by the first court (C) holding that a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived for failure to present the issue first to the trial court (D) holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   (E) holding that for purposes of singlefiling rule the first issue is the effective scope of the eeoc charge actually filed
[A]:
(E)