TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: between 1983 and 1986. Stanley’s engineer, Hreha, was present throughout Powers’ deposition. The Court revisits its ruling upon further contemplation of the purpose of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. In a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, there is no distinction between the corporate representative and the corporation. See United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C.1996) (noting that in a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition “[t]he corporation appears vicariously through its designee”). “The Rule 30(b)(6) designee does not give his personal opinion. Rather, he presents the corpo ration’s ‘position’ on the topic.” Id. (citing cases). The designee testifies on behalf of the corporation and holds it accountable accordingly. See Starlight Int’l, Inc., v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 688 (D.Kan.1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Audiotext Communications Network, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed (B) holding that a corporation has a duty under rule 80b6 to provide someone who is knowledgeable in order to provide binding answers on behalf of the corporation (C) holding that an officer or director generally owes a fiduciary duty only to the corporation over which he exercises management authority and any breach of fiduciary duty claims arising out of injuries to the corporation in most cases may only be brought by the corporation itself or derivatively on its behalf (D) holding that individuals assumption of the role of president of the corporation and her authority to sign documents on behalf of the corporation demonstrate that she had the requisite control over the corporation for purposes of finding individual liability under section 5a (E) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: The State, by contrast, argues that because the court’s summary denial of Pinholster’s claim was an adjudication on the merits, we apply the usual deference required by AEDPA. Under our precedent, the California Supreme Court’s denial of Pinholster’s petition for writ of habeas corpus “on the substantive ground that it is without merit,” Pinholster II, 525 F.3d at 754, constitutes a decision on the merits of his federal claim. See Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that “the California Supreme Court’s denial of a habeas petition without comment or citation constituted a decision on the merits of the federal claims” (citing Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc))); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has not addressed the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted (B) holding that we must first determine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal (C) holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred (D) recognizing that we construe postcard denials such as these to be decisions on the merits citing hunter 982 f2d at 348 (E) recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981))); State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996) (listing the four factors discussed above) (citations omitted). Finally, if the proponent provides a sufficient explanation for the peremptory challenges, the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the peremptory challenges has proven purposeful discrimination. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769; Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2416; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. ¶ 16 Since deciding Batson, the Supreme Court has continually increased the scope of the Batson test. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409-10, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that batson applies to a prosecutors use of peremptory challenges regardless of whether the stricken juror is of the same race as the defendant (B) holding that the constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges (C) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (D) holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause (E) holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race

SOLUTION:
(A)