In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: to intervene” as a linguistic tool to highlight how little personal participation the defendant had in the arrest in that particular case. The passage shows how far below the required minimum level of involvement that particular defendant exhibited. Read in whole, Brown more accurately shows that personal participation in an arrest, or supervisory control over the arresting officer, is required in order to establish liability for unlawful arrest — mere presence is not enough. However, even assuming Plaintiffs are correct, and that law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene in other officer’s unlawful arrests, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers or Alma Officers violated clearly established law in this case. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Canine Handlers and Alma Officers were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search (C) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force (D) holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant (E) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied

A: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim
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Q: with a total of 8.3 grams of cocaine in them was consistent with both an intent to sell and with personal use. Id. at 631. We noted that the police did not find any money or drug paraphernalia on the defendant and there were “no other facts which would suggest an intent to sell.” Id. The packaging and weight of the drugs in this case is similar to that in Valentin, giving rise to similar conclusions about Alleyne’s intent. The state attempts to distinguish Valentin in two ways. First, there was no money found on Valentin, while Alleyne had $36 in his pocket and another $20 found in the paper bag with the marijuana. However, neither the amount of money found, nor the denominations of it were inconsistent with personal use. See Williams v. State, 569 So.2d 1376, 1377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). Second, while the arresting officer in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell (B) holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine (C) holding that evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of front seat passenger of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in paper bag in foot well of volkswagen on passengers side near gearshift in presence of marijuana smoke (D) holding that evidence consisting of 10 pieces of cocaine marijuana rolling paper 72 and a weapon was not sufficient to prove intent to sell (E) holding that there was sufficient evidence of intent to sell or deliver where the defendant was in possession of one large cocaine rock and eight smaller rocks

A: recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell
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Q: of peremptory strikes, the holdings of those Supreme Court opinions would be undermined. But we can engage in no comparative juror analysis here, because we do not know what happened during the entirety of the voir dire. Because we hold that, under the clearly established Supreme Court precedent of Batson, comparative juror analysis is an important tool that courts should utilize on appeal when assessing a defendant’s plausible Batson claim, we also must conclude that all defendants, including those who are indigent, have a right to have access to the tools which would enable them to develop their plausible Batson claims through comparative juror analysis. “[T]he State must provide an indigent defendant with a transcript of prior 94, 87 S.Ct. 362, 17 L.Ed.2d 290 (1966) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that the Court has never 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a courts failure to provide a defendant with any portion of a habeas transcript was error (B) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (C) holding that appellants waived any claim of error as to the portion of the lower courts ruling that they did not expressly challenge on appeal (D) holding that the lack of evidence that the magistrate judge examined the trial transcript in its sufficiencyoftheevidence analysis left the court no alternative but to reverse the denial of habeas relief and remand for review of the transcript (E) holding that failure to review the evidence presented to the magistrate and failure even to have a transcript filed with the district court  was reversible error

A:
holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error
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