In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: “reasonable collection and legal costs” to DLL in the event of a breach by Dr. Rozentsvit. DLL claimed it had incurred $6,898.00 in counsel fees in pursuing its breach of contract and collection action against Dr. Rozent-svit. DLL also attached an affidavit from counsel and the appropriate billing records to support its claim. In conclusion, DLL requested the court to assess costs in the amount of $6,898.00 to Dr. Rozentsvit. ¶23 In substance, DLL’s “petition to assess collection and legal costs” was intended to perform the same function as a motion pursuant to Rule 227.1. Had DLL simply labeled its petition as a “motion for post-trial relief,” Dr. Rozentsvit could not dispute its validity. See Gemini Equipment Co. v. Pennsy Supply Inc., 407 Pa.Super. 404, 595 A.2d 1211, 1214 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, DLL timely filed its petition on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding reasonable an agency determination that a request for an investigative file did not include the employment file (B) holding that even where postconviction petitioner reserved the option to file an amended petition in his opening petition simply filing an amended petition is insufficient to request leave to file an amended petition a motion for leave to file an amended petition was required before it was necessary for the district judge to consider the amended petition (C) holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence (D) holding defendants argument the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress was reviewable as a constitutional issue even though defendant failed to raise the issue in a written posttrial motion (E) holding defendant did not waive issues by failing to file posttrial motions where defendant did file petition for reconsideration which was intended to function as posttrial motion
[A]: (E)


[Q]: to preserve evidence exists between a third party and another in the absence of a special relationship, such as one created by contract or statute. Id. Under that analysis, this court will need to consider the primary purpose of the third-party here, Giant Eagle. (2) “Duty” of a third-party employer to its employee Pennsylvania courts have not directly considered whether the existence of an employer/employee relationship creates a duty on the part of a third-party employer to preserve evidence of a work-related accident for a potential products liability suit by an employee. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is no such duty. See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F.Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D.Ark.1989); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 179 Mich.App. 136, 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither common law nor workers disability compensation act imposed affirmative duty on employer to preserve evidence which might be used in employees thirdparty liability action (B) holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme (C) holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability (D) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (E) holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties
[A]: (A)


[Q]: Moses, 148 F.3d 277, 282 (2d Cir.1998)). Here, it is undisputed that the INS first physically located Trejo-Arroyo and determined his presence in the United States was illegal in August 2003, when he applied for a work permit. Thus, pursuant to Clarke, we must decide whether the INS should have discovered Trejo-Arroyo’s illegal presence earlier, “with the exercise of diligence typical of law enforcement authorities.” 312 F.3d at 1346-47 (citations omitted). In United States v. Mercedes, 287 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir.2002), a ease similar to this one, the Second Circuit held that it was not unreasonable for a listing of false names and different dates and places of birth to delay the INS’s determination that the defendant had previously been deported. See also Herrera-Ordones, 190 F.3d at 511 (<HOLDING>); Bencomo-Castillo, 176 F.3d at 1303 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes (B) holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live (C) holding alien was found when he admitted previous deportation and true identity to ins agent not when he used alias during jailhouse interview with ins agent agents investigated his identity with appropriate methodical diligence and could not have known his identity prior to his admissions (D) holding that while an agents knowledge is imputed to the principal due to the identity of interests that is presumed when an agent acts within the scope of an agency relation this rule does not operate in the converse and the agent cannot be imputed with the information which its principal has failed to give it (E) holding that ins officials did not exercise sufficient diligence in ascertaining the defendants illegal status when although the defendant provided a false name ins had his fingerprints
[A]:
(C)