In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: detention of the van, its driver, and its passenger exceeded the valid reason for the initial stop and violated the Fourth Amendment. The subsequent search of the vehicle was an unconstitutional search, and the drugs and drug paraphernaha discovered were fruit of the poisonous tree. The trial court’s denial of appellants’ motions to suppress should have been granted. In light of this holding, we need not address the third point, that omissions of facts in Ramsey’s affidavit for search warrant undermined the drug dog’s reliability and amounted to a Franks violation; or the fourth point, that the search warrant was objectively unreasonable and that there was no basis for a nighttime search. Reversed and remanded. Hart, Robbins, and Neal, JJ. te, 84 Md. App. 243, 578 A.2d 816 (1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, after Ramsey determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that coming from the wrong neighborhood does not give rise to reasonable suspicion (B) holding innocent facts when considered together can give rise to reasonable suspicion (C) holding that the fact that defendant granted consent to police to search some items and then refused to give consent to additional searches cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion (D) holding the drivers refusal to consent to search of automobile did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that vehicle contained narcotics (E) holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: to exempt every alien who seeks to adjust his or her status under § 245(i) after illegally reentering the United States following removal. Where Congress intended § 241(a)(5) not to pose a barrier to adjustment of status for aliens who illegally reentered the United States, it made a special exception to the general rule. Because Lino does not fall within the exception, she is bound by the general rule disqualifying aliens who illegally reentered the country from seeking adjustment of status. Finally, six circuits have held that § 241(a)(5) precludes aliens subject to reinstatement orders from obtaining adjustment of status pursuant to § 245(i). See De Sandoval v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 440 F.3d 1276, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2006); Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort, 390 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 21 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not have jurisdiction to order reinstatement of previously dismissed action and thus reinstatement order was void and of no effect and previous order of dismissal was still in effect (B) holding that petitioners claim is not one to the attorney generals decision or action to execute a removal order either since the facts relevant to their claim  took place well before any decision by the attorney general to execute a removal order (C) holding that once a petitioners prior removal order has been reinstated he no longer qualifies for any relief under the ina regardless of whether his application was filed before or after the reinstatement decision was made (D) holding that since the basis for the respondents order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening (E) holding that a federal court must order arbitration once it is satisfied that an agreement for arbitration has been made and has not been honored

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: irrelevant, a respondent’s awareness that his conduct will violate an ethical proscription is not itself material.”). Simply because an attorney’s conduct is intentional or dishonest does not by itself establish a dishonest or selfish motive. See In re Alcorn, 202 Ariz. 62, 74, ¶ 42, 41 P.3d 600, 612 (2002) (respondent violated his ethical duty of candor toward the tribunal, but selfish motive was not an aggravating factor). ¶ 43 In the past, we have held that dishonest or selfish motive is an aggravating factor when an attorney received some financial gain or made misrepresentations to cover his or her negligence. These previous holdings of dishonest or selfish motive involved private attorneys, not public sector lawyers. See, e.g., Arrick, 180 Ariz. at 143, 882 P.2d at 950 (<HOLDING>); Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 69, 876 P.2d at 565 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (B) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (C) holding that lawyer who made deliberate misrepresentations to his client to conceal his negligence and improperly retained a fee from that client had a dishonest or selfish motive (D) holding that an attorneys filing a notice of appearance on behalf of his or her client constitute a waiver of service of process by the client (E) holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case


Output: (C)