In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: a threat to water quality because they do not introduce any invasive species from outside the Great Lakes. EPA has properly rejected this argument, noting that Lakers can spread or more rapidly distribute invasive species already present, in the Great Lakes. Id. at 501. 16 . Federal regulation permits such limits to be expressed narratively if the calculation of numeric limits is "infeasible.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(k)(3). 17 . EPA also claims general prohibitions can be BMPs, citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, but does not offer an example of something as general as the WQBEL standard being found to be a BMP. As discussed herein, the EPA’s charac-terizationis inconsistent with regulations that require WQBELs to "ensure compliance.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d); see Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (<HOLDING>). 18 . EPA’s response is that petitioners’ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation (B) holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation (C) holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (D) holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (E) holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation
[A]: holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation


[Q]: reimbursement decisions to be made on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 549. Of note here, we explained that “even if the Commission had promulgated fee guidelines, the provider would not have a statutory right or privilege to be paid the amount set out in the guideline.” Id. According to East Side, Vista is, likewise, neither entitled to a fee guideline nor entitled to any set amount of reimbursement. See id. Given that no specific reimbursement amount is required, even where the Division has established fee guidelines, and that the Division can reason ng statute and rule as whole to find broad definition of “prohibited activities” and absence of definition for “market power” as providing constitutionally permissible notice of type of prohibited conduct contemplated); Tinning, 875 S.W.2d at 409 (<HOLDING>). The language in these cases, similar to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (B) holding term share legal fees although not expressly defined provides adequate notices of type of conduct it would include (C) holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment (D) holding that although term was not limited by the specification it was expressly defined in a narrow manner in the prosecution history (E) holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution
[A]: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance


[Q]: 2012 WL 4344571, *3 (S.D.Fla. Sept. 21, 2012) (Moore, J.); see also Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 645 N.Y.S.2d 433, 668 N.E.2d at 406 (equating “arising out of’ and “based on” for purposes of insurance policy interpretation). Thus, the conversion claims, and any liability incurred as a result, plainly arose out of the TCPA-violating fax advertisements in this case. See Policy at 44. As such, the conversion claims are excluded from coverage by the TCPA Exclusion, and Plaintiff therefore owes no duty to indemnify Med Waste for them. Furthermore, the Policy states that “[w]here there is no coverage under this policy, there is no duty to defend.” Id. at 25; see also Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Dania Dist. Centre, 763 F.Supp.2d 1359, 1366 (S.D.Fla.2011) aff'd, 513 Fed.Appx. 890 (11th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Having found that both the TCPA claims and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that duty to defend ends when it is apparent there is no potential for coverage (B) holding that there is a duty to defend if any of the complaints allegations fall within the risk covered by the policy (C) holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify (D) holding that where claims are cast wholly within policy exclusion there is no duty to defend (E) holding exclusion did not absolve insurer of duty to defend because no factual or legal basis currently exists for applying the exclusion
[A]:
holding that duty to defend ends when it is apparent there is no potential for coverage