In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: before it was in assumpsit for attorney fees purposes. See Schulz, 67 Haw. at 436, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Higa is not directly on point, its reasoning is a compelling indication of how the Hawaii Supreme Court would rule on the attorney fee question before us. The plaintiffs also seek to distinguish Higa because it involved a client suing his own attorney, and thus in that case there was privity of contract between the two parties. In the present case, Mrs. Helfand was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the defendants and Mr. Helfand. This distinction is irrelevant. Courts have extended the right to sue for breach of contract to intended third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12, 883 P.2d 38, 48 n. 12 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 82 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies (B) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (C) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (D) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract (E) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: of purely legal questions, such as whether a given set of facts alleged by the plaintiffs would demonstrate a constitutional violation. 4 . We note that the record contains no indication that the OSHP employs explicit racial criteria or admits to racially-motivated decision making. If such a showing could be made, the plaintiffs would not need to establish the existence of a similarly situated class that was not investigated. See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir.2000) ("[I]t is not necessary to plead the existence of a similarly situated non-minority group when challenging a law or policy that contains an express, racial classification.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 44, 151 L.Ed.2d 16 (2001); cf. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1104-05 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). "In its more recent pronouncements on laws 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is unnecessary for criminal defendant to establish threeprong test for discrimination in grand jury selection where there is direct evidence of exclusion based upon race (B) holding that a defendants guilty plea   forecloses independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury (C) holding that racial discrimination in selection of grand jurors compelled dismissal of indictment (D) holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge (E) holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: court found Seamon’s representation misleading because (1) it did not show accessible curbs when they were near inaccessible ones, and (2) it relied on outdated data. Kirola has not shown that these findings were clearly erroneous either. Finally, the trial record included evidence that the City’s Municipal Transportation Agency provides both public transportation and paratransit services as part of the public right-of-way. Id. at 1205. The paratransit service in particular includes van and taxi service for disabled individuals. Id. The public transportation and para-transit services are the sorts of “other methods” that can satisfy program access even if other particular methods of benefit-ting from the program are inaccessible. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1); see Daubert, 760 F.3d at 988 (<HOLDING>). In sum, we conclude that Kirola has not shown 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a high school is not a public forum thus precluding free airing of religious views (B) holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school (C) holding that the public has an interest in having access to factual data from baseball games (D) holding that high school football games met program access standard where bleachers were inaccessible but other accessible locations provided unobstructed views of the field (E) recognizing that industrial arts teacher with a nineteenyear clean record at the same high school had a property interest protected by the due process clause in his particular assignment to that same high school


Output: (D)