instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
inquiry — • whether New Provo Canyon’s treatment of one individual constituted state action — differs substantially from that in Milonas, irrespective of whether, for purposes of a class action suit, Old Provo Canyon’s treatment of its patients generally constituted state action. Thus, the question here does not present the necessary “like facts” to trigger the stare decisis doctrine. D. Collateral Estoppel For the very same reason, Taylor’s collateral estoppel argument fails. Collateral esto Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553; Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Logistics Control Group, 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.1985) (discussed below). 13 . Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553-54; Lib. Mut. Ins., 969 F.2d at 1388-89; Holloway, 813 F.2d at 878-79; see also Nipper v. Snipes, 1 F.3d 415, 415-417 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Id. at 1553; see also Lib. Mut. Ins., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (B) holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body (C) holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial (D) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (E) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact
answer:
holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint


question:
opposing party’s motion. We have held that there is an “overarching liberal policy of allowing amendments under Rule 15.” Ex parte Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 858 So.2d 950, 954 (Ala.2003). However, Rule 15 “‘is not carte blanche authority to amend ... at any time.’ ” Burkett v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 607 So.2d 138, 141 (Ala.1992)(quoting Stallings v. Angelica Uniform Co., 388 So.2d 942, 947 (Ala.1980)). The trial court has discretion to deny an amendment for good cause. Ex parte GRE Ins. Group, 822 So.2d 388, 390 (Ala.2001); Stallings, 388 So.2d at 947. The deadline in the scheduling order does not curtail the trial court’s discretion in considering the merits of the offered amendment. See Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, 1066 (8th Cir.2005)(<HOLDING>). The trial court can refuse to allow an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (B) holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict (C) holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions (D) holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions (E) holding that the scheduling order merely prescribes the date by which all motions to amend shall be filed the date on the scheduling order does not confine the district courts consideration of the merits of such motions and does not preclude it from finding that an amendment would result in prejudice
answer:
holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act


question:
Appeals’ explanation of the issue in T.C. v. Mac.M., 96 So.3d 115, 117 (Ala.Civ.App.2011), also is helpful: “This court has explained the circumstances under which a juvenile court’s order or judgment is sufficiently final to support an appeal: “ ‘Although a juvenile court’s orders in a dependency case are, in one sense, never “final” because the court retains jurisdiction to modify its orders upon a showing of changed circumstances, see C.L. v. D.H., 916 So.2d 622 (Ala.Civ.App.2005); Committee Comments, Rule 4, Ala. R.App. P., this court has always treated formal dependency adjudications as final and appealable judgments despite the fact that they are scheduled for further review by the juvenile court.’ “D.P. v. Limestone Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 28 So.3d 759, 762 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (<HOLDING>).” Fully in keeping with the “well established” 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order denying a motion for reconsideration constituted a final order because at the time the order was entered all nonsuited claims had been adjudicated and were no longer a bar to finality (B) holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award (C) holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal (D) holding that order awarding maternal grandmother primary physical custody of a child in a dependency case was a final appealable order as opposed to a pendente lite order (E) holding that an order finding with regard to the father that reasonable efforts at reunification were no longer required of the department of human resources was a permanency order that was sufficiently final to support an appeal that order also expressly left in place previous awards of legal custody incident to dependency findings
answer:

holding that an order denying a motion for reconsideration constituted a final order because at the time the order was entered all nonsuited claims had been adjudicated and were no longer a bar to finality