In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: appropriate relief for such a violation is for the habeas court to “vacate the judgment of conviction and enter a new judgment from which an appeal can be taken.” Id. Defendant argues that the Peak line of eases applies to his situation, and that his appellate rights should thus be reinstated. However, the Peak rule does not apply in defendant’s ease, as the appeal at issue is not an appeal from a conviction. A Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach to an appeal from a supervised release revocation hearing. Borrego v. United States, 975 F.Supp. 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y.1997). This follows logically from the fact that there is no guaranteed constitutional right to counsel at the supervised release revocation hearing itself. See United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel (D) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (E) holding that most of the fundamental constitutional procedural protections that are normally applicable to a criminal prosecution are not required for supervisedrelease proceedings as a matter of constitutional law including a right to counsel
[A]: (E)


[Q]: constitutionally obstruct despite the provision of counsel. Indeed, in Benjamin v. Fraser, when considering impediments to pre-trial detainees’ ability to visit with counsel, we recognized that a state could not “ ‘unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts.’ ” Benjamin 264 F.3d at 187, 188 (emphasis added) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) and determining that “both the due process right of access to the courts and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are implicated,” and that there was no error in measures ordered to remedy undue delays associated with attorney visits). See also Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-81, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Nor can I agree with the majority’s holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding same for writ of error coram nobis (B) holding that rule 4as time limits govern an appeal from a district court order granting or denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis (C) holding that the state could not deny an indigent criminal appellant a transcript to appeal pro se from the denial of a writ of error coram nobis or permit that the appellant at the will of the public defender be entirely cut off from any appeal at all (D) holding that federal court may not issue writ of coram nobis for state prisoner (E) holding that in the absence of a valid excuse for delay a coram nobis petition is subject to denial
[A]: (C)


[Q]: that it had not discriminated against Brummett, including the fact that Innovex had fired a substantially younger employee at the same time for violations of the same company policy. Finally, the district court dismissed as “stray remarks” several age-related comments Innovex employees allegedly made to Brummett, concluding that they were either too ambiguous to be probative or had been made by individuals without authority or influence over Innovex’s decision to terminate Brummett’s employment. See, e.g, Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 304 (5th Cir.2000) (“In order for an age-based comment to be probative of an employer’s discriminatory intent, it must be direct and unambiguous____”); Krystek v. University of Southern Mississippi, 164 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Concluding that Brummett was thus unable to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that stray remarks are insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination and concluding that a comment by the decisionmaker that he selected a candidate for a promotion because the candidate was a bright intelligent knowledgeable young man was a stray remark that did not raise an inference of age discrimination (B) holding that stray remarks made almost two years prior to employment action was outdated and lacking in apparent probative value (C) holding that a comment made by a person who played no role in the employment decision was a stray remark that lacked any probative value as a matter of law (D) holding managers discriminatory remark indicative of age bias where buttressed by other evidence of discrimination and thus remark was not an isolated comment (E) holding hispanic supervisor will understand you better to be stray remark
[A]:
(C)