TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: manual labor, as well as engaging in such activities as dancing, fighting, and being jailed for public intoxication. We stated that: [an i]njury aggravated or extended in time by the employee’s neglect or disobedience of his physician’s instructions is not com-pensable as to the additional period.... The proposition that one may continue, or even increase, his disability by his willful and unreasonable conduct, and then claim compensation from his employer for his disability so caused, is untenable. Id. at 410, 244 N.W. at 541 (citing Honnold, Workmen’s Compensation, vol.l, § 137, pp. 521, 523). [¶ 11] Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized the rule in Detling, albeit applying their own states’ standards. See Appleby v. Belden Corp., 22 Ark.App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Hill, 318 A.2d 614, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new statute which required proof that asbestos exposure was substantial contributing factor to claimants medical condition could be applied to pending cases and did not abrogate claimants vested right because she was still able to pursue her cause of action and recover for injury caused by her husbands exposure to asbestos statute merely affected methods and procedure by which that action was recognized protected and enforced not the cause of action itself (B) holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute (C) holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions (D) holding a claimants injury report to a fellow employee did not satisfy the act because the claimants supervisor did not learn of the injury until six months later (E) holding that claimants actions in heavy houseeleaning and house painting in contravention of medical restrictions was so unreasonable as to bar compensation for aggravation of her back injury

SOLUTION: holding that new statute which required proof that asbestos exposure was substantial contributing factor to claimants medical condition could be applied to pending cases and did not abrogate claimants vested right because she was still able to pursue her cause of action and recover for injury caused by her husbands exposure to asbestos statute merely affected methods and procedure by which that action was recognized protected and enforced not the cause of action itself

PROBLEM: While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation — 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. § 1103) — which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (“An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal.”). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant’s release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc  1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest

SOLUTION: holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute

PROBLEM: So.2d 719, 721 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Direct review proceedings include seeking discretionary review in the Florida Supreme Court. Cardali, 794 So.2d at 721. The Florida Supreme Court does not, however, have subject matter jurisdiction over a district court opinion that fails to expressly address a question of law, such as opinions issued without opinion or citation. Beaty v. State, 701 So.2d 856 (Fla.1997) (finding that, where a defendant’s plenary appeal had been per curiam affirmed without written opinion or citation, the two-year period for purposes of filing a motion for postconviction relief began to run from the issuance of the district court’s mandate, rather than from the Supreme Court’s denial of discretionary review); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530 So.2d 286, 288 n. 3 (Fla.1988) (<HOLDING>). In the case before us, this Court’s per 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal courts must accept the decision of the states highest court even if it is an erroneous one (B) holding that a district court decision rendered without opinion or citation constitutes a decision from the highest state court empowered to hear the cause (C) holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide (D) holding that when applying state law this court follows the decision of the highest state court or in the absence of such a decision and any indication that the highest court would rule differently the decisions of the states intermediate courts (E) holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state

SOLUTION:
holding that federal courts must accept the decision of the states highest court even if it is an erroneous one