In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 39:4-88(b), the mandate to drive within a single lane to the extent practicable applies, whether or not a deviation from that lane imposes a risk to another driver. The statute’s second clause addresses a related, but discrete, mandate of the Code. It requires a driver to ascertain the safety of switching lanes before conducting a lane change. N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b). Unlike the violation described in the first clause of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b), the violation described in the second clause is avoided if a driver, in a roadway with multiple lanes traveling in the same direction, first determines that departure from a lane may be conducted safely. The Appellate Division’s limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b) to the violation identified in the statute’s second clause would render t .App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the courts of our sister states, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness (B) holding that tex transp code ann  545060a describes one offense (C) holding that no offense alleged where affidavit described offense as felony (D) holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense (E) holding that the statute describes but one offense which can be committed by either or both of two methods

A: holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness
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Q: traceable to the shock or disturbing effect on the nerves of the patient, and that in turn, the irritation of the nerves caused functional disorders, and, that whether the disability resulted from nervous reaction or from auto-suggestion set in motion by memory of the accident, the result was the same to the injured person. Id. at 209, 13 S.E.2d at 293. The Supreme Court pointed out in Burlington Mills Corp. that the claimant’s disability was occasioned by an injury which “may be fairly traced” to a risk which arose out of and in the course of her employment. There was a direct causal relation between the electric flash and the irritated condition of her nervous system. Id. at 210, 13 S.E.2d at 293; see also E.C. Womack, Inc. v. Ellis, 209 Va. 588, 592-93, 166 S.E.2d 265, 268-69 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Imperial Trash Service v. Dotson, 18 Va.App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable (B) holding injuries suffered on trip for business and pleasure were compensable (C) holding that rico claims were personal and plaintiffs were therefore entitled to sue on their own because their injuries were distinct from the injuries to creditors in general resulting from the diversion of corporate assets (D) holding that psychiatric symptoms resulting in disability from work flowed from injuries received in primary accident and were compensable (E) holding that special damages must be shown to be reasonable and necessarily resulting from accident

A: holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable
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Q: De La Garza, 690 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this case, Burke testified to the financial hardship caused by his injury, but his testimony was limited to the hardship caused by his reduced earning capacity. The following exchange occurred at trial: [Plaintiffs Counsel:] Now, Ronnie, after all of this, how much do you make now working with Bennett? [Burke:] About twenty, about 20,000 and glad to have it. [Plaintiffs Counsel:] Ronnie, you haven’t filed your taxes, have you? [Burke:] No, we haven’t. [Plaintiffs Counsel:] We don’t have your taxes for last year yet. But my point ny that plaintiff did not receive paychecks was not inconsistent with receipt of insurance benefits and did not open the door to collateral source evidence); Mundy, 783 S.W.2d at 745 (<HOLDING>). The trial court therefore did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (B) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing collateral source testimony when plaintiff testified generally about financial hardship caused by injury (C) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to introduce direct evidence of the controlling nature of defendants relationship with the victim (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form (E) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits

A:
holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony
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