TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: we held that, The penetration offense alleged in the first indictment clearly required a separate and distinct act (involving appellee’s sexual organ with the child’s female sexual organ) from the act alleged in the second indictment (which involved appel-lee’s mouth with the child’s sexual organ). In this case the second indictment alleged that appellee caused the child’s sexual organ to contact his mouth ency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct. Appellant concedes to this view, the plain language of the statute supports it, and so does our caselaw. See Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630 (stating that a grammatical analysis suggests that the unit of prosecution for indecency with a child by exposure is the exposure and, ultimately, adopting that viewpoint); Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. State, 550 S.W.2d 89, 91 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive (B) holding that a similar statute created separate offenses (C) holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation (D) holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive (E) holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: as here, where officers were attempting to handcuff an individual who had been resistant. See Rodriguez v. Farrell, 294 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir.2002) (finding no excessive force, and noting that an officer need not credit an arrestee’s claims of pain, especially when the arrestee is in the process of being handcuffed); Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 650-53 (9th Cir.2001) (finding no excessive force where plaintiff suffered a fractured finger after officer pushed plaintiff to the ground for purpose of handcuffing her despite being told of preexisting back and shoulder injuries, and where plaintiff had earlier posed a threat to officers’ safety and ability to control a crowd); Huang v. Harris County, No. 00-20806, 2001 WL 822534, at *10 (5th Cir. June 22, 2001) (<HOLDING>); Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1288, 1293 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that force was reasonable where officer broke resisting arrestees thumb by twisting her wrist in an effort to prevent her from kicking him  and place her in handcuffs (B) holding that conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive where the female plaintiffs supervisor frequently tried to get plaintiff to date him using many direct as well as indirect propositions for sex including following her into the restroom repeated attempts to touch her breasts place his hands down her pants and pull off her pants and enlisting the assistance of others to hold her while he attempted to grope her (C) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (D) holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim (E) holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: 96, 98 (2) (561 SE2d 382) (2002). 12 Id. (punctuation omitted). 13 Id. (citation and punctuation omitted); see Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 207 (II) (107 SC 1702, 95 LE2d 176) (1987); Bruton, 391 U. S. at 135-36. 14 Moss, 275 Ga. at 98 (2); see Bruton, 391 U. S. at 135-36. 15 481 U. S. 200 (107 SC 1702, 95 LE2d 176) (1987). 16 Moss, 275 Ga. at 98 (2) (punctuation omitted); see Richardson, 481 U. S. at 208. 17 Moss, 275 Ga. at 98 (2); see Thomas v. State, 268 Ga. 135, 137-38 (6) (485 SE2d 783) (1997) (“For the admission of a co-defendant’s statements to constitute a Bruton violation the statements standing alone must clearly inculpate the defendant.” (punctuation omitted)); Garlington v. State, 268 Ga. App. 264, 267-68 (1) (a) (601 SE2d 793) (2004). 18 See Moss, 275 Ga. at 99 (2) (<HOLDING>); Thomas, 268 Ga. at 137-38 (6) (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of statement with references to we or they which did not directly implicate defendant did not violate defendants confrontation rights (B) holding that admission of nontestifying oodefendants statement to police that murder defendant came to his apartment and went in bathroom and stayed there for awhile did not violate bruton rule because statement standing alone did not clearly incriminate defendant but only became incriminating when linked with other evidence (C) recognizing the chance that the jury will credit a nontestifying codefendants incriminating statement and conclude that the statement pointed to the objecting defendant as the offender even though he could not crossexamine the declarant (D) holding that two or three references to everyone and they in testimony about confession did not violate bruton because testimony did not implicate the defendant expressly nor was it incriminating on its face (E) holding that the introduction of a jointly tried nontestifying codefendants statement violates the sixth amendment confrontation clause if the statement contains incriminating evidence concerning a defendant

SOLUTION:
(B)