TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. In determining the purpose of section 13-21-101, it is appropriate to look to legislative history as indicative of the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Willer, 817 P.2d at 519-20. The 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101 created the distinction between judgments which the judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal. The General Assembly intended that the amendment, and its market-determined interest rate, apply only to judgments which the judgment debtor appeals. See Act of March 25, 1982, ch. 39, 1982 Colo. Laws 227 (entitled “An Act Concerning Interest Payable on Appealed Money Judgments in Civil Actions” (emphasis added)); see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The statements of the bill’s sponsors also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent (B) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (C) holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period (D) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent (E) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent

SOLUTION: holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent

PROBLEM: the statute.” 167 F.3d at 992 (citing Haun, 90 F.3d at 1100; United States v. Cavalier, 17 F.3d 90, 93 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1217-18 (3d Cir.1993)). See also United States v. Valuck, 286 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir.2002) (reaffirming the holding in Cavalier that “the cashing of an illegally obtained check can promote the completion of an underlying unlawful act”). The Federal Express packages at issue in the money laundering counts contained checks fraudulently obtained by IDM. A rational trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the transfer of the checks from Barbados to New York and the negotiation of those checks promoted the underlying mail fraud scheme, and that by facilitating the negotiation of the checks Bo 88831, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing exception to application requirement when employer does not notify employees of available promotion and does not provide formal mechanism for expressing interest in promotion (B) holding no offense of attempted seconddegree murder where statute allows conviction without proof of intent to kill (C) holding that promotion and concealment are alternative bases for a money laundering conviction proof of intent to accomplish either will suffice (D) holding that it is the fact of concealment and not the intent to conceal that is prohibited under 49 usc  1472f (E) holding that concealment is just one factor to consider and is not a mandatory element

SOLUTION: recognizing exception to application requirement when employer does not notify employees of available promotion and does not provide formal mechanism for expressing interest in promotion

PROBLEM: fact affirmatively rejected the court’s invitation to consider the instruction’s applicability. Additionally, the State argues, the evidence did not generate a self defense instruction, because appellant’s recorded statement to the police and her trial testimony showed that she understood the spitting to be accidental, and appellant did not produce testimony that she believed that she was in immediate or imminent danger of bodily harm. Analysis We agree with the State that any error on the part of the trial court in failing to give a self defense instruction is not only not preserved for our review, but is affirmatively waived. First, appellant waived her rights on this issue when she did not request a self defense instruction. See Tull v. State, 230 Md. 152, 156, 186 A.2d 205 (1962) (<HOLDING>); Martin v. State, 174 Md.App. 510, 520, 922 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction that omitted elements of crime that defense had conceded was error although not plain error (B) holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present (C) holding that failure to request jury instruction about manner in which evidence was obtained was not error and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance because defendant was not entitled to instruction (D) holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error (E) holding that it was not plain error for the court not to give a self defense jury instruction where the defendant did not request one

SOLUTION:
holding that instruction that omitted elements of crime that defense had conceded was error although not plain error