instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
California state prisoner, Roy Lee Brown, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand. Brown contends that his § 2254 petition was timely filed because his state habeas petitions statutorilly tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Brown is entitled to tolling during the time he was seeking one full round of collateral review by the California courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Delhomme v. Ramirez, No. 00-56148, 2003 WL 21947183, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed (B) holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice (C) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (D) holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review (E) holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review
answer:
holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed


question:
that may be considered in determining punishment are the subject of article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. Art. 37.07 (Vernon Supp.2004). This statute authorizes the admission of evidence in the punishment phase of trial as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing. Id. The circumstances of the offense are relevant to sentencing and may be considered by the trier of fact in determining the punishment to be assessed. Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). One circumstance of the offense that may be considered is the degree of injury to the victim so long as the fact finder may rationally attribute moral culpability to the accused for that injury. Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76, 78-79 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 896 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sexual assault coercion and harassment certainly may violate contemporary standards of decency and cause physical and psychological harm (B) holding in aggravated sexual assault case that testimony regarding psychological trauma suffered by child victim and its physical manifestations properly admitted (C) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable (D) recognizing trauma that new trial would likely bring to victim of child sexual assault (E) recognizing the purpose of missouris child victim witness protection law sec 491675 et seq as an attempt to minimize the emotional and psychological trauma to the alleged child victim
answer:
holding that sexual assault coercion and harassment certainly may violate contemporary standards of decency and cause physical and psychological harm


question:
is superficially persuasive, the fundamental differences in the statutory scheme and legislative histories of the two acts require us to find federal pre-emption in the case of train speed limits. b. Vegetation Easterwood also claims that excessive vegetation on the side of the track obstructed the views of the train engineers and the decedent, thereby causing the accident. We find this claim to be partially pre-empted. Under 49 C.F.R. § 213.37 (1990), track owners must keep vegetation on or immediately adjacent to the tracks under control. Because the Secretary has chosen to regulate vegetation, Congress explicitly has pre-empted all state regulation in this area. See 45 U.S.C.A. § 434 (1986); See also Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Tex., 833 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). However, while the Secretary has chosen to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that general maritime law preempts state law (B) holding that 49 usc  44112 applies to owners of aircraft and preempts state law that would hold owners vicariously liable in aircraft accidents (C) holding that the flsa preempts certain state law claims (D) holding that fifra preempts state law failure to warn claims (E) holding that 49 cfr  21337 preempts all state regulation of vegetation immediately adjacent to railbed
answer:

holding that general maritime law preempts state law