In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: at 1459-60 (references to subsidiary as “division” of Kodak not equivalent to evidence that two companies operated as “single economic entity”); Akzona, 607 F.Supp. at 238 (language of annual report and employee testimony describing subsidiaries as divisions of parent not sufficient, even in conjunction with other evidence, to establish alter ego relationship). ... In a case presenting similar questions, the Ninth Circuit found no alter ego relationship was created where the parent company guaranteed loans for the subsidiary, reviewed and approved major decisions, placed several of its directors on the subsidiary’s board, and was closely involved in the subsidiary’s pricing decisions. Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir.1980).... Id. at 927-928 (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiffs proffer evidence that CNOFG 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (B) holding that to establish that subsidiary is agent of parent for jurisdictional purposes the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the parent notwithstanding the maintenance of corporate formalities (C) holding that because the corporate parent and subsidiary defendants before it observed all of the corporate formalities necessary to maintain corporate separateness notwithstanding the parents active involvement in the subsidiaries operations the evidence did not establish that the entities were alter egos of one another (D) holding constitutional due process requires that personal jurisdiction cannot be premised on corporate affiliation or stock ownership alone where corporate formalities are substantially observed and the parent does not exercise an usually high degree of control over the subsidiary (E) holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: 106 S.Ct. at 2553. And if plaintiff cannot support each essential element of his claim, summary judgment must be granted because a complete failure of proof regarding an essential element necessarily renders other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. The Court reviews defendants’ motion for summary judgment in light of the forgoing standard. DISCUSSION There is no question in this case of Brod-nicki’s innocence. But, because “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested,” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979), Brodnieki’s innocence is irrelevant to the question of whether there was probable cause for his arrest. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2631, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) (<HOLDING>). The issue before the Court is whether the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged (B) holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed (C) holding that initial illegal detention does not call into question validity of arrest pursuant to valid warrant wjhere the police effectuate an arrest in an illegal manner but nonetheless have probable cause to make the arrest the proper fourth amendment remedy is to exclude only that evidence which is a fruit of the illegality (D) holding that where an arrest was premised on both legally and illegally obtained evidence the validity of the arrest would depend on whether the untainted information considered by itself establishes probable cause (E) holding that the validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime the mere fact that the subject is later acquitted of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: for employers looking to trick prospective § 216(b) opt-in plaintiffs into signing damaging statements. Perhaps HL-A means to fall back on the distinction, recognized in Morgan and Cameron-Grant (and in this Court’s December 9 Order), between Rule 23 and § 216(b) proceedings. But so what? To say that Rule 23 class actions and § 216(b) actions are different is not to conclude that employers may resort with impunity to dishonest, misleading and abusive tactics to obtain declarations from their employees in § 216(b) actions, with courts being powerless to remedy the situation. And many cases have expressly recognized district courts’ discretion to regulate such communications in the § 216(b) context. See, e.g., Kerce v. West Telemarketing Corp., 575 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1366 (S.D.Ga.2008) (<HOLDING>); Maddox v. Knowledge Learning Corp., 499 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members (B) holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification (C) holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when the prior denial of class certification was based solely on rule 23 deficiencies of the putative representative (D) holding that even if the offer of judgment was undisputed the case could not be dismissed in light of plaintiffs pending motion for conditional certification including authorization to issue optin notice to putative class members  and the fact that one additional plaintiff had already joined the action (E) recognizing that in appropriate circumstances the court may limit the parties communications with putative class members prior to decision on conditional certification question in a  216b action
[EX A]:
(E)