In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: is correct. We will also assume that the court’s erro umed error prejudiced him is that other evidence supports the finding that he was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy. In the district court, Vasquez did not object to the PSR’s statement that he “recruited Wornick and Sella” into the conspiracy. Although the district court did not explicitly find that Vasquez recruited two of his co-conspirators, “[i]t is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a[PSR] admits those facts for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.2006). And we have held many times that a defendant’s recruitment of co-conspirators supports a § 3B1.1 enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 n. 2 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1304 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer leader manager or supervisor under  3bllc in part because the defendant actively recruited two individuals to transport drugs (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was a manager or supervisor under  3bllb in part because he recruited accomplices (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer or leader under  3blla in part because he recruited coconspirators
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). “The fundamental characteristic of a nonjusticiable ‘political question’ is that its adjudication would place a court in conflict with a coequal branch of government.” SCPIF, 369 S.C. at 142-43, 632 S.E.2d at 278 (citing U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393-94, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990)). Therefore, the courts will not rule on questions that are exclusively or predominantly political in nature rather than judicial. SCPIF, 369 S.C. at 143, 632 S.E.2d at 278 (citing Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948)). This Court, specifically, has declined to opine on issues where the constitution delegates authority to the Legislature. See SCPIF (<HOLDING>); cf. Stone v. Leatherman, 343 S.C. 484, 541 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question (B) holding in answer to the single question of whether power has been lawfully vested that municipal court clerks may issue warrants (C) holding that a challenge to the proper weight of the evidence is a question of fact outside this courts jurisdiction (D) holding the question of whether the jmsc properly determined residence of judicial candidate or gave proper weight to concerns regarding residency presented a nonjusticiable political question the court should decline to answer because the power to determine if a person is qualified to hold judicial office is vested with the legislature by the state constitution (E) holding the question of whether an accomplice is credible and the weight to be given to the testimony are issues for the jury to determine
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: free exercise claim pursuant to the “hybrid rights” doctrine. Kane, 2006 WL 997217 *26. The Kane court agreed that “Smith may be read to impose strict scrutiny in ‘hybrid situation[s]’ in which a law ‘involve[s] not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections.’ ” Kane, 2006 WL 997217 *26 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82, 110 S.Ct. 1595). To assert a “hybrid rights” claim in the Ninth Circuit, however, “a free exercise plaintiff must make out a colorable claim that a companion right has been violated — that is, a fair probability or a likelihood, but not a certitude, of success on the merits.’ ” Kane, 2006 WL 997217 *26 (quoting Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999)). See also, Truth, 542 F.3d at 651 (<HOLDING>). Because Plaintiffs’ free speech claim fails 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that free exercise claims implicating other constitutional protections such as free speech could qualify for strict scrutiny review to the extent the plaintiff could make out a colorable claim that it was denied an exemption from the school districts nondiscrimination claim based on religion or content of speech (B) holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech (C) holding that campaign money laundering was in furtherance of political speech but an invalid exercise of free speech rights because it was illegal (D) holding that discrimination based on religion is subjected to strict scrutiny whether a claim arises under the establishment clause the free exercise clause of equal protection clause (E) holding that claim under connecticut law for employer discrimination based upon the employees exercise of privacy and free speech rights not preempted
[EX A]:
(A)