In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: (emphasis added) (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720). 27 . Faust, 337 S.W.3d at 335 (emphasis added). 28 . Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex.1995). 29 . See Crump, 330 S.W.3d at 218. 30 . Synar v. Union Pac. R. Co., No. 12—99— 00428-CV, 2001 WL 1263573, at *6 (Tex.App.-Tyler Oct. 17, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication). 31 . See id. 32 . See Tex.R. Evid. 803(18); Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556. 33 . C 545 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g). 55 . See id. 56 . See Tex.R. Evid. 401; Nichols, 379 S.W.3d at 387-89. 57 . See Sw. Country Enters., Inc., 991 S.W.2d at 493-94; see also Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(B), 33.2; Tex.R. Evid. 103(a)(2). 58 . See Barraza v. Eureka Co., Inc., 25 S.W.3d 225, 232 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). 59 . See Charter Oak Fire Ins. v. Perez, 446 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed (B) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (C) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (D) holding that testimony of plaintiff and her coworkers regarding cause of her injury was pure conjecture (E) holding that plaintiffs allegations that her supervisor was a lesbian and that she made improper remarks to her including telling the plaintiff to invite her to lunch and making comments about plaintiffs coworkers private lives and sexual preferences   and on one occasion approaching the plaintiff from behind hugging her and whispering in her ear a request for a cookie from another table did not suffice to establish a hostile working environment
Example Output: holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed

Example Input: explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981))); State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996) (listing the four factors discussed above) (citations omitted). Finally, if the proponent provides a sufficient explanation for the peremptory challenges, the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the peremptory challenges has proven purposeful discrimination. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769; Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2416; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. ¶ 16 Since deciding Batson, the Supreme Court has continually increased the scope of the Batson test. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409-10, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that batson applies to a prosecutors use of peremptory challenges regardless of whether the stricken juror is of the same race as the defendant (B) holding that the constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges (C) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (D) holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause (E) holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race
Example Output: holding that the constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges

Example Input: The State, by contrast, argues that because the court’s summary denial of Pinholster’s claim was an adjudication on the merits, we apply the usual deference required by AEDPA. Under our precedent, the California Supreme Court’s denial of Pinholster’s petition for writ of habeas corpus “on the substantive ground that it is without merit,” Pinholster II, 525 F.3d at 754, constitutes a decision on the merits of his federal claim. See Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that “the California Supreme Court’s denial of a habeas petition without comment or citation constituted a decision on the merits of the federal claims” (citing Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc))); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has not addressed the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted (B) holding that we must first determine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal (C) holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred (D) recognizing that we construe postcard denials such as these to be decisions on the merits citing hunter 982 f2d at 348 (E) recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court
Example Output:
recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted