In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: basis in which defendants are considered. I question whether that concern for individuality exists under a system which not only admits expert testimony deduced without examining the subject but also, as in this case, accepts the possibility that jurors will allow that evidence, rather than factors more personal to a defendant’s crime and character, to effectively condemn that individual to death. 1 . As the Court of Criminal Appeals admitted, "the State’s case at [Flores’] punishment [hearing], to some extent, rested upon Dr. Griffith's testimony.” Flores v. State, 871 S.W.2d 83, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983) (allowing the use of psychological testimony on a defendant’s alleged "future dangerousness”); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence (B) recognizing that texas courts have adopted the aamr definition of mental retardation providing that mental retardation must manifest before age of 18 years (C) holding that the sentencing structure allowed the jury to give mitigating effect to petitioners prison record (D) holding that the key under pewy i  is that the jury be able to consider and give effect to a defendants mitigating evidence in imposing sentence (E) holding that the sentencing procedure was inadequate in failing to allow jury to give mitigating effect to defendants mental retardation and abusive background
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: class’s claims, its interests are not antagonistic to the class, and its chosen counsel are qualified and competent. The Court also notes that the members of the aptly-named Pension Fund Group are public institutional investors, which comports with the PSLRA’s expressed preference for such lead plaintiffs. The PSLRA’s legislative history explains as follows: “[t]he pension funds accounting for $4.5 trillion or nearly half of the institutional assets, in many cases the beneficiaries of pension funds — small investors — have the greatest stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730-34; see also In re Vicuron Pharm. Sec. Litig., NO. CIV. A.04-2627, 225 F.R.D. 508, 511, 2004 WL 2983940, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Oct.7, 2004) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding on motion for preliminary injunction that balance of hardships tipped in favor of public (B) holding that where the issue is one of arbitrability the federal presumption in favor of arbitration shifts to favor a court determination (C) holding that one candidates status as a pension fund tipped the scales in favor of its appointment as lead plaintiff (D) holding that an employees protected interest in a pension vested before he or she became eligible to collect the pension (E) holding that the employers insidious pattern of seeking to tip the scales in its favor during employment disputes justified a decision to declare the entire agreement unenforceable
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: sale of assets necessary to fund a plan. There is a split of authority whether “under a plan confirmed” limits § 1146(c) to post-confirmation transfers. I find the text to be ambiguous because it can reasonably support two different outcomes. From one perspective, “under a plan confirmed” requires plan confirmation as a precondition to eligibility for the exemption. See NVR Homes, 189 F.3d at 456-57. Alternatively, it can be read as merely describing a type of eligible transfer, i.e., one that is an integral part of the plan process for a plan later confirmed or pursuant to a confirmed plan, as opposed to, for example, a transfer incidental to a debtor’s business operations. See, e.g., City of New York v. Smoss Enter. Corp. (In re Smoss Enter. Corp.), 54 B.R. 950, 951 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Lopez Dev., Inc., 154 B.R. 607, 609 n. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding preconfirmation transfer essential to fund plan is exempt under  1146c (B) holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary (C) holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan (D) holding that where a governmental entity purchases a benefit plan on behalf of government employees and dele gates the administration to a private insurer the plan is a government plan exempt from erisa (E) holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions
[EX A]:
(A)