instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
arm’s-length transaction or from making as prompt or searching investigation as might otherwise be expected. In some situations there is no legal duty to use means available for discovering the fraud.... We are not prepared to say, however, that one in a relationship of trust and confidence is always justified as a matter of law in neglecting every precaution until something occurs to arouse his suspicions. Courseview, 312 S.W.2d at 205; Duthu v. Pena, 228 F.3d 409, 2000 WL 1056126, at *7-9 (5th Cir.2000) (unpublished) (collecting cases). This case presents precisely the sort of intentional concealment of ill-gotten profits (in the face of a duty to disclose such profits) that allows a plaintiff to benefit from equitable estoppel. See Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex.1983) (<HOLDING>);. Gibson v. Burkhart, 650 S.W.2d 185, 188-89 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a cause of action accrues once an injury has occurred and manifested itself (B) holding that because a physician lias a duty to disclose a negligent act or fact that an injury has occurred and physician failed to do so cause of action was deferred until victim learned of the right of action (C) recognizing negligent procurement to be a negligence cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action (E) recognizing the cause of action
answer:
holding a cause of action accrues once an injury has occurred and manifested itself


question:
that post-1978 refinancing of a debt did not constitute a novation, thus debtor could not avoid liens on equipment it owned prior to the 1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Code where no new money was advanced, no additional security was encumbered, and varying the term of years and interest rates was done to benefit the debtor); In re Hemingson, 84 B.R. 604 (Bankr.D.Minn.1988) (<HOLDING>); Geist v. Converse County Bank (In re Geist), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in georgia pursuant to  9107 of the ucc refinancing of a promissory note transforms the obligation thereby destroying purchase money nature of the security interest therefore the creditor lost its purchase money security interest pmsi in a television set when the loans were consolidated and lien was avoidable id 89 br 264 18 bcd 58 (B) holding that there was no presumption of a gift where the wifes money was used to make the purchase but title was placed in the name of the husband and finding the facts sufficient to establish a purchase money resulting trust in favor of the wife (C) holding that under minnesota law refinancing and consolidation of purchase money loans did not destroy their purchase money character for bankruptcy lien avoidance purposes (D) holding that a purchase money security in jewelry was not lost when the perfected purchase money security interest was consolidated with a subsequent retail installment contract (E) holding section 501 applies to both purchase money and refinancing mortgages
answer:
holding that in georgia pursuant to  9107 of the ucc refinancing of a promissory note transforms the obligation thereby destroying purchase money nature of the security interest therefore the creditor lost its purchase money security interest pmsi in a television set when the loans were consolidated and lien was avoidable id 89 br 264 18 bcd 58


question:
7261. The Court reviews the Secretary’s interpretation of law de novo. See Hatch, supra. After reviewing the Secretary’s analysis of the rating schedule with regard to tinnitus, the Court concludes that he failed to take account of a basic canon of construction, specifically, to look to the plain text of the regulation. “The basic principles that apply to construing statutes apply equally to construing regulations. ‘The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language.’ ” Otero-Castro, supra (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993)) (internal citations omitted). Here, the Secretary’s interpre tation cannot stand because it conflicts with the plain meaning of the regulation. See DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet.App 202, 207 (1995) (<HOLDING>) (citing Combee v. Principi, 4 Vet.App 78, 91 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bias interpretation of immigration law is entitled to deference except where the interpretation is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute (B) holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (C) holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation (D) holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation (E) holding that interpretation of regulation by va that conflicted with plain meaning of regulation not entitled to deference
answer:

holding that bias interpretation of immigration law is entitled to deference except where the interpretation is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute