In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: five years. The issue is thus whether the time Hartman served in prison after the IJ’s improper decision should count toward the five-year bar. The Court holds that it should not count and thus, contrary to the BIA’s ruling in March 2002, the application for § 212(c) relief was not untimely when the IJ addressed the merits of that application on January 25, 2001. 1. The Statutory Five-Year Bar At the outset, the Court addresses Hartman’s argument that the five-year clock stops upon filing an application for § 212(c) relief, which, in this case, would be January 1997. The Court disagrees with that argument. The five-year clock of § 212(c) does not stop when an alien, such as Hartman, files an application for a discretionary waiver. See Gomes v. Ashcroft, 311 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Falconi v. INS, 240 F.Supp.2d 215, 218 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina  212c (B) holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a (C) holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for  212c relief (D) holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina  212c (E) holding that iiriras repeal of ina  212c was not impermissibly retroactive because unlike st cyr the petitioner chose to proceed to trial instead of agreeing to a plea and therefore did not detrimentally rely on the availability of  212c relief
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: or even every valid governmental purpose, is an appropriate reason for breaching grand jury secrecy.” Id. at 480, 103 S.Ct. 3164. It goes without saying that the district court’s inherent authority does not include the power to contravene or circumvent an “express grant of or limitation on the ... court’s power contained in a rule or statute.” Dietz v. Bouldin, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 1885, 1892, 195 L.Ed.2d 161 (2016); see also Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426, 116 S.Ct. 1460, 134 L.Ed.2d 613 (1996) (“Whatever the scope of [the court’s] ‘inherent power,’ ,,. it does not include the power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Rule 6(e) is an express limitation on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the substantial rights inquiry of federal rule of criminal procedure 52b mirrors rule 52as harmless error inquiry except that the burden in the former falls on the defendant to show prejudice (B) holding that a district court cannot invoke its inherent authority to circumvent the harmlesserror inquiry required by rule 52a of the federal rules of criminal procedure (C) holding that a shotgun pleading is in no sense the short and plain statement of a claim required by rule 8 of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that rule 33 of the federal rules of criminal procedure is an inflexible claimprocessing rule that may be waived if not raised (E) recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: 3105, *2 (N.D.Ill.1985) (recognizing an exception to the general rule precluding shareholder suits for injuries to the corporation where there is a special duty, such as a contractual duty, between the wrongdoer and the shareholder, but holding that, under Illinois law, where plaintiff’s complaint alleges dissipation of stock due to mismanagement of the corporation, the real harm is to the corporation, not the plaintiff); Cunningham v. Kartridg Pak Co., 332 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Iowa 1983) ("In order to bring an individual cause of action for direct injuries a shareholder must show that the third-party owed him a special duty or that he suffered an injury separate and distinct from that suffered by the other shareholders.”). 2 . See Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Holland v. United States, 63 Fed.Cl. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that standing to sue under a contract requires plaintiff to be in privity or be an intended thirdparty beneficiary (B) holding that the thirdparty beneficiary theory did not apply (C) holding that beneficiaries of a trust that signed an agreement with the fhlbb were not in privity or have thirdparty beneficiary status because the government did not make any promises expressly intended to benefit them (D) holding that the governments cooperation with a thirdparty is not sufficient to establish a thirdparty beneficiary relationship (E) holding that in order for a plaintiff to file suit against the government on a contract claim in the court of federal claims a plaintiff must have either direct privity or thirdparty beneficiary status
[EX A]:
(C)