In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: rejected'this argument, holding that the allegations, even if true, did not amount to an -IDEA procedural violation. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 et seq. (setting forth the procedural safeguards afforded to parents when their child is in special education). 13 . It is worth noting that at least one state— Massachusetts, as the IDEA permits, has enacted a more stringent standard. Specifically, children in Massachusetts who are eligible for special education services are entitled to IEPs that provide for their “maximum possible development.'' See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71B § 2 (emphasis added); Frank S. v. School Committee of the Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School District, 26 F.Supp.2d 219, 226 (D.Mass.1998). 14 . See Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 134 F.3d 659, 663 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (citing Hartmann v. Loudoun County, 118 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent some statutory infraction the task of education belongs to the educators who have been charged by society with that critical task (B) holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather  than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors (C) holding that since the performer of a task which could be performed by a layperson represented that he was in fact a professional engineer krs 413245 applied (D) holding that certain veniremen had been improperly excluded because they acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might affect their deliberations but only to the extent that they would view their task with greater gravity (E) holding that it was pure speculation that if the preference payment had not been made the vendor would have been included as a critical vendor and the court would have approved it

A: holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather  than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors
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Q: intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions “could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited.” Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) (“We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse’s liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void.”). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years

A: holding that such provisions are valid
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Q: I would affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment. See Lynch v. Am. Family Mut Ins. Co., 626 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Minn.2001) (stating that an insurer’s liability is generally determined by the insurance contract, as long as the relevant insurance policy neither (1) omits coverage that is required by law nor (2) violates applicable statutes). I agree with the majority’s decision that the plain language of the policy prevents Pepper from recovering UIM benefits. But I cannot conclude that the policy exclusion violates Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2010), the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. Minnesota caselaw allows for insurance companies to impose limitations on receipt of UIM benefits. See, e.g., Myers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Minn.1983) (<HOLDING>). As explained by the majority, we have held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insurance policys exclusion of vehicles owned by furnished for or made available for the regular use of the named insured from the definition of an underinsured motor vehicle is valid (B) holding that the insurance applicable to the tortfeasors vehicle must be compared to the underinsured vehicle policy limits to determine whether a vehicle is underinsured (C) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling (D) holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured (E) holding that under the plain and obvious meaning of the uim statute a prerequisite to the term underinsured motor vehicle is the existence of  bodily injury liability insurance coverage which is less than the liability for damages imposed by law  and where no such coverage existed tortfeasor was not underinsured under the statute but rather uninsured concluding that terms underinsured and uninsured are mutually exclusive as applied to the same motor vehicle and the combination of these two coverages by the insured was contrary to legislative intent

A:
holding that the insurance applicable to the tortfeasors vehicle must be compared to the underinsured vehicle policy limits to determine whether a vehicle is underinsured
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