In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 526 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that “retire” is not synonymous with “age,” and holding that without more, employer’s statement that' plaintiff should “retire and make everybody happy” was not direct evidence of age discrimination); Erickson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 271 y attitude during the 2010 discussion, Dunn has failed to show a specific link between the Board’s attitude and its decision to nonrenew his contract. After all, not only was there an almost two-year gap between the Board’s 2010 discussion and the 2012 nonrenewal, but the Board rehired Dunn twice during this period despite him being at least sixty years old. Given these circumstances, any link between the 2010 discussion and the 2012 nonrenewal is too attenuated to constitute direct evidence. See Bone, 686 F.3d at 954 (<HOLDING>); Haigh v. Gelita USA, Inc., 632 F.3d 464, 470 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to raise prejudicial comments of trial court on appeal defendant must object to comments when made and move for a mistrial (B) holding that a supervisors repeated comments to an employee that the supervisor wanted to have sex with the employees fifteenyearold daughter were extremely severe because the comments were significantly more offensive than the typical crass comments we have found to be insufficient to constitute harassment in other cases (C) holding that comments relating to age made some three to fifteen or more years prior to plaintiffs discharge were not relevant to show that he was fired because of his age (D) holding that comments made at least four months before the adverse employment action were not connected to the decisionmaking process and thus were not direct evidence of age discrimination (E) holding that supervisors reactions to comments did not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination where comments were made six months prior to plaintiffs discharge and were unconnected to the discharge decision

A: (E)
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Q: who are undeniably state actors, colluded with her in her actions. When all intendments are taken in the Plaintiffs’ favor, therefore, their allegations indicate both that Malac infringed their substantive due process rights and that she can be considered a state actor. Accordingly, Malac’s motion to dismiss is denied. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Barbara Malac’s motion to dismiss [Docket No. 47] is DENIED. The motion of Defendant Agent Cynthia Preston and Defendant Agent Nancy Gingras [Docket No. 50] to dismiss is DENIED with respect to Agent Preston, but GRANTED with respect to Agent Gingras. SO ORDERED. 1 . For the propriety of citing this unpublished Second Circuit opinion, see Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-905 (8th Cir.2000) (Arnold, J.) (<HOLDING>), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.2000) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unpublished opinions are of persuasive value at best and not precedential (B) holding that opinions accompanying the denial of certiorari cannot have the same effect as decisions on the merits (C) holding that even district court cases decided by panels of three have no precedential value (D) holding that unpublished opinions have precedential effect (E) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted

A: (D)
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Q: harm. Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373; see United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1989) (defining “threat” as an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on another), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990). The Edwards court specifically held that RCW 9.61.160 does not require proof of a true threat. Edwards, 84 Wn. App. at 12. Rather, the court indicated that the statute prohibited fighting words. In its analysis, the court noted that RCW 9.61.160 proscribes some protected speech, stating that threats are protected by the First Amendment “unless they are likely to cause an immediate breach of the peace.” Edwards, 84 Wn. App. at 17. But the court concluded, without elaboration, that the majority of threats proscribed under RCW 9.61.160 are likely t 276 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats (B) holding that there can be only one final appealable order (C) holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final (D) holding that it is not (E) holding the court should only apply the doctrine narrowly and only under exceptional circumstances

A:
(A)
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