In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: an insurer to await the filing of a complaint against its insured will force insurers to defend claims that are unlikely to result in a duty to indemnify. We recognize the reality of Patrons’s concerns. We conclude, however, that the rationale supporting the comparison test outweighs those concerns. See Dingwell, 414 A.2d at 227. “We have always recognized that the application of the comparison test will occasionally requ dgment action before the injured claimant filed an action against the insured. Dolley, 669 A.2d at 1321. Rather than rejecting the action on ripeness grounds, we determined the insurer’s duly to defend vel non on the basis of what the corn-plaint might have alleged, in view of the parties' stipulation. Id. at 1323. 5 . See State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d at 38 (<HOLDING>); Perreault v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 568 
 Holding statements: (A) holding insurers duty to defend is determined by allegations in the petition (B) holding that insurance company could sue in insureds name following assignment of insureds interest against tortfeasor (C) holding that an insurers duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint against the insured (D) holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss (E) holding that insureds criminal convictions were sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issue of the insureds subjective intent for purposes of evaluating the insurers duty to defend
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: waived his attorney-client privilege when his attorney failed to make timely objections to questions that it alleged sought privileged communications. This argument has no merit for two reasons. First, many of the questions Airdata asked did not seek confidential communications. Therefore, no objection was necessary to preserve the privilege. Second, Jenney’s current attorney did make timely objections to those questions actually seeking confidential communications. The fact that Jenney’s attorney had to interrupt him to make the objection is not sufficient to establish a waiver. Because the objections were made as soon as the confidential nature of the communication became apparent, Jenney did not waive the privilege. Cf. Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee, 837 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege (C) holding that disclosure orders adverse to the attorneyclient privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine (D) holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts (E) holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: in every case. We do understand, however, that the government was faced with a difficult situation: a district judge who is not willing to follow the sentencing guidelines, but a defendant who was guilty of a serious and despicable offense and deserves a lengthy term of imprisonment. The judgment of sentence is VACATED, and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings before a different district judge, in accordance with this opinion. 1 . All references to the United States Sentencing Guidelines are to the 2000 version, which were the guidelines in effect when Andrews's criminal conduct took place. 2 . United States v. Milton, 147 F.3d 414, 421 (5th Cir.1998) (quoting Burns, 501 U.S. at 137, 111 S.Ct. 2182). 3 . See, e.g., United States v. Clements, 73 F.3d 1330, 1341 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The court noted its belief that Andrews 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court violated fedrcrimp 32 by departing upward in sentence without notice and the psr identified no grounds for departure (B) holding that intention to consider an upward departure transmitted with six days notice in advance of sentencing by fax was sufficient (C) holding that district courts error was not harmless because the court relied on an improper factor in imposing an upward departure (D) holding that uncharged conduct described in psr and which was discussed by the court at sentencing was sufficient to support an upward departure under  5k221 (E) holding that the requisite notice must specifically identify the ground on which the district court is contemplating an upward departure
Example Output:
(B)