In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: interest” at issue here because “[pjursuant to the Treaty of 1866 and the Thirteenth Amendment, the Cherokee Nation has no authority to treat its Freedmen citizens as anything less than full equals.” Freedmen’s Opp’n to Crittenden’s Mot. Dismiss [Dkt. # 123] at 14. By raising this argument to eviscerate the Nation’s claim of prejudice, the Freedmen are asking the Court to reach the merits of their claims against the Nation. This the Court cannot do. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has squarely rejected a similar argum pelling claim of sovereign immunity” and finds that the Nation’s interests would be prejudiced if the case were to proceed in its absence. Republic of Philippines, 553 U.S. at 869, 128 S.Ct. 2180; see also Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 1001 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Davis, 192 F.3d at 960) (internal 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity extends to agencies and subdivisions of the tribe (B) recognizing a strong presumption favoring arbitrability (C) holding that there is a strong policy favoring dismissal for nonjoinder due to tribal sovereign immunity but that rule 19b factors must still be considered (D) holding that state did not have jurisdiction over tribe where tribe paid into workers compensation program but had not waived sovereign immunity (E) recognizing the strong policy favoring dismissal when a court cannot join a tribe because of sovereign immunity
[A]: (E)


[Q]: at 1459-60 (references to subsidiary as “division” of Kodak not equivalent to evidence that two companies operated as “single economic entity”); Akzona, 607 F.Supp. at 238 (language of annual report and employee testimony describing subsidiaries as divisions of parent not sufficient, even in conjunction with other evidence, to establish alter ego relationship). ... In a case presenting similar questions, the Ninth Circuit found no alter ego relationship was created where the parent company guaranteed loans for the subsidiary, reviewed and approved major decisions, placed several of its directors on the subsidiary’s board, and was closely involved in the subsidiary’s pricing decisions. Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir.1980).... Id. at 927-928 (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiffs proffer evidence that CNOFG 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (B) holding that to establish that subsidiary is agent of parent for jurisdictional purposes the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the parent notwithstanding the maintenance of corporate formalities (C) holding that because the corporate parent and subsidiary defendants before it observed all of the corporate formalities necessary to maintain corporate separateness notwithstanding the parents active involvement in the subsidiaries operations the evidence did not establish that the entities were alter egos of one another (D) holding constitutional due process requires that personal jurisdiction cannot be premised on corporate affiliation or stock ownership alone where corporate formalities are substantially observed and the parent does not exercise an usually high degree of control over the subsidiary (E) holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham
[A]: (C)


[Q]: of all evidence, we cannot say that we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the judgment.”); Commonwealth v. Carbaugh, 356 Pa.Super. 42, 47, 514 A.2d 133, 137 (1986) (same conclusion); Commonwealth v. Petrino, 332 Pa.Super. 13, 29, 480 A.2d 1160, 1168 (1984) (same conclusion); but see Commonwealth v. Holland, 518 Pa. 405, 415, 543 A.2d 1068, 1072 (1988) (introduction of statements made by lay witnesses regarding the voluntariness of a confession found to be harmless error); Commonwealth v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 355, 365 A.2d 1237, 1244 (1976) (curative instruction given following improper admission of statement regarding right to silence held sufficient not to require mistrial); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 246 Pa.Super. 132, 138, 369 A.2d 846, 849 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, no such case holds that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession is subject to a harmless error analysis when the defendants guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt (B) recognizing that harmless error analysis is appropriate even if presumptively coerced confession is improperly introduced (C) recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that  the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendants guilt or innocence  (E) holding introduction of actually coerced confession constitutes reversible error even where confession was cumulative in nature
[A]:
(B)