In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: on CRiminal Justice, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). In 1997, the legislature amended the child pornography statute to eliminate a loophole in the existing statute that impeded prosecution of individuals for possession or promotion of child pornography depicted or distributed by computer. Id.; House Comm, on CRiminal JURISPRUDENCE, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). There is nothing in these materials to suggest that the legislature intended to prohibit anything other than pornography depicting actual children. Therefore, we conclude that the Texas child pornography statute prohibits only the possession of visual materials depicting real children. Because the Texas statute only prohibits pornography depicting actual children, the sta App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Appellant also contends that the statute is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding twentyeight charges against defendant for possession of child pornography were not multiplicious (B) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (C) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (D) holding that an overbreadth challenge to a child pornography law was rendered moot by amendment to the statute (E) recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography

Answer: (B)


Question: judge is provided for in Ind. P-C.R. 1, § 4(b), it is not automatic as Barclay asserts. Instead, “the rule requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a rational inference of bias or prejudice.” Jackson v. State, 643 N.E.2d 905, 907 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied (citing State ex rel. Whitehead v. Madison County Circuit Court, 626 N.E.2d 802, 803 (Ind.1993)). Barclay’s affidavit presents the fact that the trial court judge accepted his guilty plea without an adequate factual basis as his evidence of bias. Even taking this assertion as true, it does not support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. See Smith v. State, 613 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ind.1993), reh’g denied, cert, denied (<HOLDING>); Jackson, 643 N.E.2d at 907 (holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced (B) holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion (C) holding that the fact that the judge received adverse publicity for granting postconviction relief in another case did not require the judge to recuse herself (D) holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith (E) holding that counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to recuse the judge who presided at trial when the judge had also prosecuted a prior case that was used to enhance the current case

Answer: (C)


Question: by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1106(a). Noting that the guardian ad litem had not objected at trial to the sufficiency of service of the summons, nor raised such issue on appeal, this Court held that respondent-mother had failed to demonstrate any prejudice to her “from the alleged failure to properly serve [the juvenile].” Id. at 8, 616 S.E.2d at 269. Additionally, this Court did not question the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction based on the service of summons and specifically concluded that the trial court did have subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings. Thus, the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in J.B. was affirmed. See also In re B.D., 174 N.C. App. 234, 620 S.E.2d 911 (2005), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 289, 628 S.E.2d 245 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Here, the record on appeal includes copies of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that guardian ad litems extensive advice to plaintiffs attorney and daily involvement in case exceeded formal role of guardian ad litem (B) holding that guardian ad litem and psychologist fees incurred in child custody proceedings and ordered to be paid directly to the guardian ad litem and psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 (C) holding the trial court had jurisdiction where summons was served on the attorney advocate for the juveniles guardian ad litem (D) holding the district court properly allowed guardian ad litem fees to be taxed as costs (E) holding that where the trial court denies a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a child support case the order is unappealable

Answer:
(C)