In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: are reversed with instructions that he be re-sentenced under a correctly calculated score sheet. Cooper also asserts the same argument for his 41.712-month sentence on the delivery of cocaine charge. The question, however, is whether this error is harmless because Cooper was sentenced as a habitual felony offender. While the 41.712-month sentence happened to be equal to the minimum guidelines sentence under the incorrectly calculated score sheet, the guidelines scoresheet is legally irrelevant because Cooper was habitualized. See § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2002)(“A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002 [The Criminal Punishment Code].”); Tannihill v. State, 848 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); LaFleur v. State, 812 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(<HOLDING>); Kenon v. State, 780 So.2d 258, 261 (Fla. 5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding habitual sentence rendered guidelines scoresheet irrelevant (B) holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal (C) holding if the plea agreement was not conditioned on the sentencing guidelines an appellant is not entitled to relief because his sentence is not illegal (D) holding that defendant entitled to resentencing if the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines would constitute an impermissible departure sentence under the 1994 guidelines (E) holding that defendant should be resentenced where district court imposed a sentence under an erroneously calculated guidelines range  even where the sentence imposed fell within the correct range
[EX A]: holding habitual sentence rendered guidelines scoresheet irrelevant

[EX Q]: quantity function as elements by increasing the maximum penalty a defendant may receive, are they elements of an aggravated offense or are they sentencing factors with heightened due process requirements? See id. at 573, 575 (Hug, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s apparent conclusion that the penalty provisions of § 841(b) are not elements of the offense). The district court correctly interpreted Buckland as holding that drug type and quantity are not elements of the offense, but rather are material facts that must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Buckland opinion emphasized that the relevant inquiry is not whether a penalty provision is an element, but rather whether it exposes the defendant to a longer sentence than woul (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so (B) holding jury is entitled to accept the states version of the facts and reject appellants version or reject any of the witnesses testimony (C) holding that biased on buckland we must reject valensias contention that the sentencing provisions of  841 create separate crimes (D) holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes (E) holding the crimes merge where the jury was not asked to determine whether two assaults occurredeventhough the evidence may have been sufficient to support separate crimes
[EX A]: recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so

[EX Q]: counsel is necessary to warrant the “drastic step of disqualification of counsel.” Id. at 602-03 (citations omitted) (quoting Shaffer v. Farm Fresh, Inc., 966 F.2d 142, 145-46 (4th Cir.1992), and citing Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (4th Cir.1978), and Richmond Hilton Assocs. v. City of Richmond, 690 F.2d 1086, 1089-90 (4th Cir.1982)). The Court notes that “the lawyer’s duty of loyalty long has precluded the representation of conflicting interests.” Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 586, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990); see also Dyntel Corp. v. Ebner, 120 F.3d 488, 492 (4th Cir.1997) (“[UJnder Virginia law it is clear that a lawyer owes his or her client a fiduciary duty.”); Tessier, 731 F.Supp. at 733 (<HOLDING>). This duty of loyalty is reflected in Rules 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the substantial relationship test also concerns the duty of loyalty to a former client (B) holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm (C) holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client (D) recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client (E) holding that erisas duty of loyalty creates a duty to disclose certain information to beneficiaries
[EX A]:
holding that the substantial relationship test also concerns the duty of loyalty to a former client