In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). In Landgraf, the Court noted that a statute only truly operates retroactively if applying it would “impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Id. 114 S.Ct. at 1505; see also RTC v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 30 F.3d 1384, 1387-88 (11th Cir.1994)(analyzing retroactivity of lease repudiation damage limitation provision of FIRREA). Thus, like other courts that have analyzed similar FIRREA provisions, we must address prior banking law to determine whether application of the damage limitation provisions of § 1821(e)(3) would have the retroactive effect defined in Landgraf. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit, 30 F.3d at 1388 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that, in the Crafts’ case, it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is not retroactive (B) holding that firreas damage limitations for repudiation of leases worked no substantive change in the law and thus their application was not retroactive (C) holding retroactive application (D) holding no retroactive application (E) recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary
[A]: holding that the act is not retroactive


[Q]: by Ankeny should arise rarely and therefore would be unlikely to produce a swarm of cases involving excessive force searches. Also, officials and courts are far more competent to discern which extraordinary tactics constitute excessive force than to determine in the heat of the moment “what constituted] a reasonable wait time in a particular case” before entering' — usually a matter of calculating, wholly subjectively the appropriate number of seconds. Id. at 2166 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In fact, without any difficulty, we have in the past in a case remarkably similar to the one before us struck down, as constituting excessive force, specific tactics such as the ones used in the case before us. See, e.g., Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on the cost side, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding officers punch of an inmate was not excessive force (C) holding that ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing a lawyer into court was a judicial act (D) recognizing that the fourth amendment protects against the use of excessive force by police officers in carrying out an arrest (E) holding that officers had employed constitutionally excessive force by blindly throwing a flash bang grenade into an apartment occupied by five to eight individuals
[A]: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim


[Q]: See State v. Bell, 195 N.J.Super. 49, 55, 477 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.1984). “The warrant re quirement is predicated upon the premise that the necessity and reasonableness of a search can best be determined ‘by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of ... [a police] officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’ ” State v. Malik, supra, 221 N.J.Super. at 118, 534 A.2d 27 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436, 440 (1948)). It is well settled, however, that there are several narrowly tailored exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. See Horton v. California, 495 U.S. ——, ——- n. 4, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2306 n. 4, 110 L.Ed.2d 112,120 n. 4 (1990); State v. Bell, supra, 195 N.J.Super. at 55, 477 A.2d 1272 (<HOLDING>). As our Supreme Court expressed in State v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no general reasonableness approach to warrantless seizures (B) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause (C) holding there is no requirement that the government obtains a warrant at the first moment probable cause exists  the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of warrantless searches is one of reasonableness under the circumstances (D) holding that under the fourth amendment a party may challenge both the constitutionality of the act permitting warrantless searches as well as the conduct of the government officials in a particular case (E) holding the touchstone of determining existence of erisa plan is whether an administrative scheme is required
[A]:
holding that there is no general reasonableness approach to warrantless seizures