In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: that it can be restored, as when a house suffers smoke and water damage in a fire, the tort-feasor is liable for the costs of restoring the property to its former condition, up to the total value of the property. Applying these rules to fire-damaged trees is problematic. Is it the loss of the tree that is permanent, or the loss to the real estate? A tree that has burned and is dead is permanently destroyed, but the land on which the tree was located can be restored, either immediately by bringing in a fully grown tree or by planting a sapling. The question of “permanent” versus “temporary” damage is ultimately less helpful than the question of how the trees were used and their intrinsic value to the property. See, e.g., Mosteller v. Naiman, 416 N.J. Super. 632, 638, 7 A.3d 803 (2010) (<HOLDING>). One legal encyclopedia explains the use-value 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that quantifying damages for trees is a  complex subject  that depends upon the evidence in the particular case  (B) holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality (C) recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law (D) holding that the question whether section 3553b permits departure in some particular case is subject to plenary review (E) holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis
[A]: holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality


[Q]: as this is circumscribed but critical. For the Supreme Court has made plain that qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability” and “is effectively lost if a ease is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (emphasis in original). IV. We thus turn to the sole question over which we have jurisdiction: whether the district court properly concluded that the officers were not entitled to summary judgment under Norman. The officers contend that Ussery suffered only de minimis injuries and so cannot satisfy the requirements for an excessive force claim under Norman. Blue Br. 8, 16-21. We disagree. During the decade when Norman was good law, we never articulated a precise definition of what c 270 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note the telling fact that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where law enforcement officers restrained and abandoned an arrestee for ten minutes causing him to feel frightened vulnerable and humiliated when left alone and immobile in the dark parking lot such that in the months following the incident he had trouble sleeping and was scared to leave his home  the resulting injury was more than de minimis (B) holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him (C) holding that a reasonable officer could not have been expected to anticipate that ten to fifteen minutes of unauthorized detention would amount to a greater than de minimis injury (D) holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody (E) holding that an individuals liberty is restrained only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
[A]: holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him


[Q]: claimant was injured while exiting an elevator in a parking garage which was not owned or maintained by her employer. However, the claimant’s employer instructed her to park in certain designated spaces which it leased in the garage. Because the employer leased the parking spaces from the garage operator and presumably could pressure the garage operator to keep the facility in a safe condition, Pierson held that there was “sufficient indicia of em ployer control to support the ... conclusion that the [employer] should be responsible for the effects of an injury to an employee which occurred in the garage.” 987 S.W.2d at 318. Since the claimant was utilizing a reasonable means to walk from her parking space to her employer when she fell, she zona, 142 Ariz. 501, 690 P.2d 802 (App.1984)(<HOLDING>); Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees (B) holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs (C) holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer (D) holding that an injury occurring in a parking lot which was leased but not controlled by an employer was compensable because the employer instructed its employees to park in that lot (E) holding landowner had duty to provide security in parking lot to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties
[A]:
holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees