In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975), and is consistent with the holdings in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382, 103 S.Ct. 683, 687, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983), and in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, supra. Blue Chip Stamps held that a section 10(b) plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of a security, and thus limited standing under the 1934 Act to “plaintiffs ... who have at least dealt in the security to which the prospectus, representation, or omission relates.” Id. 421 U.S. at 747, 95 S.Ct. at 1931. Put and call option trading on an underlying security is directly affected by the prospecti, representations and omissions of the issuer of the underlying security. See Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 506. Cf. Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303 (D.Mass.1987) (<HOLDING>). In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (B) holding that class representatives cannot appear pro se (C) holding that sellers of covered calls are not atypical class representatives (D) holding that a class representatives ignorance of the case is not a bar to certification unless it impairs the representatives ability to vigorously prosecute the action (E) holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
did not lack good moral character, present false testimony, or misrepresent or conceal his criminal act. We disagree. The evidence is clear that Al-Aqaili failed to possess good moral character during the relevant statutory period. In his federal criminal case, Al-Aqaili entered a plea agreement in which he admitted to knowingly committing the crime of mail fraud, a crime Al-Aqaili admits began approximately one month prior to his application for naturalization and continued while his application was pending. Accordingly, Al-Aqaili committed the crime during the period in which he was required to possess good moral character, and it is of no consequence that his conviction occurred after he was already naturalized. See United States v. Jean-Baptiste, 395 F.3d 1190, 1191 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Al-Aqaili’s admission that he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction (B) holding that a naturalized citizen who committed certain unlawful acts during the statutory period prior to taking the oath of allegiance but for which he was indicted arrested and convicted after naturalization stands to lose his precious acquisition for lack of good moral character (C) holding sorna inapplicable to a defendant who traveled during the gap period between enactment and issuance of the interim rule and was indicted on march 15 2007 (D) holding that the defendant who was indicted for first degree rape and convicted of sexual battery had no remedy on appeal when he requested that the erroneous lesser nonincluded charge be submitted to the jury (E) holding that the defendant could be convicted of sexual battery a lesser crime not included in the offense for which he was indicted where the defendant requested that sexual battery be submitted to the jury

Ex Output:

(B)