In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: waived those rights. Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress his statements. Defendant argues that the trial court made numerous errors in its order. Generally, an appellate court’s review of a trial court’s order on a motion'to suppress is limited to a determination of whether its findings are supported by competent evidence and, in turn, whether the findings support the trial court’s ultimate conclusions of law. E.g., State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). However, here, as noted above, the State argues that defendant failed to preserve the issue because he did not object at trial. Defendant coun ters that no objection was necessary, distinguishing our recent opinion in State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 554, 648 S.E.2d 819, 821 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s contention is that the judge who 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a general ruling by the trial court is insufficient to preserve a specific issue for appellate review (B) holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal (C) holding that a party failed to preserve error by not pursuing a ruling at trial where the courts motion in limine ruling invited the party to attempt to admit the evidence during trial (D) holding that general objection did not preserve error on appeal (E) holding that a trial courts evidentiary ruling on a pretrial motion is not sufficient to preserve the issue    for appeal unless a defendant renews the objection during trial
[A]: (E)


[Q]: the sophisticated user defense, a supplier has no duty to warn the ultimate user if it has reason to believe that the user will realize its dangerous condition. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn.2004); see also Ritchie v. Glidden, 242 F.3d 713, 724 (7th Cir.2001) (stating, under Indiana law, that the sophisticated purchaser defense to a failure-to-warn claim brought under negligence or strict liability theories provides that product suppliers do not have a duty to warn employees or customers of knowledgeable industrial purchasers as to product-related hazards). In addition to limiting a supplier’s duty, the “sophisticated user” concept also affects the element of proximate cause. Crook v. Kaneb Pipe Line Operating P’ship, L.P., 231 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Strong, 667 F.2d at 688 (“Even if [the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury (B) holding in a negligence action that the air traffic controllers failure to warn of an impending danger cannot be the proximate cause of an injury after the pilot himself discovered its presence appreciated the danger and decided to fly ahead into it (C) holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible (D) holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury (E) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury
[A]: (D)


[Q]: authority to consent even if he did not. Because we hold that Reed had actual authority to consent to the search, there is no need for us to determine whether the officer’s conduct was justified by Reed’s apparent authority. We leave the apparent-authority doctrine to be further developed in a case in which its application is, unlike here, determinative of the outcome. Conclusion Because he possessed actual authority over the appellant’s bedroom, Reed had the power to consent to a search of the appellant’s bedroom. The search of the appellant’s bedroom was, therefore, reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and, as there are no other points of error requiring remand, we affirm the judgment of the 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant (B) holding that it is unreasonable to search individuals who are in the same general area as someone being searched under a valid warrant without something more to establish probable cause (C) holding that if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause the warrant was nevertheless valid (D) holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable (E) holding that police do not need probable cause or a warrant to search items that have already been searched for inventory purposes
[A]:
(B)