In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: matter, Moton requested that the trial court poll the jury, and the court agreed to do so. The first four jurors questioned all indicated that they freely and voluntarily agreed with the guilty verdict. The court ing that evidence showed that trial court’s refusal to afford defendant first offender treatment was based on deliberate consideration of the case and sentencing options and, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion); Graydon, 313 Ga. App. at 581 (same). 15 Geiger v. State, 295 Ga. 648, 651 (3) (763 SE2d 453) (2014). 16 Graham v. State, 107 Ga. App. 332, 333 (1) (130 SE2d 166) (1963); see generally Boatwright v. State, 91 Ga. 13, 13 (16 SE 101) (1892). 17 Geiger, 295 Ga. at 651 (3) (punctuation omitted). 18 See Columbus v. State, 270 Ga. 658, 664-65 (4) (513 SE2d 498) (1999) (<HOLDING>). 19 Benefield v. State, 278 Ga. 464, 466 (602 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for a continuance when record showed that contrary to defendants contention state did not fail to comply with discovery duties and that defendant failed to show that denial resulted in harm to his case (B) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (C) holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion (D) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: 1999) (same); Hill v. Fidelity Fin. Servs. (In re Hill), 152 B.R. 204, 206 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1993) (same); In re Reese, 194 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr.D.Md.1996) (same); Barclays Am./Mortgage Corp. v. Wilkinson (In re Wilkinson), 186 B.R. 186, 191 (Bankr.D.Md.1995) (same); In re Redditt, 146 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr.S.D.Miss.1992) (stat ing that “[b]y the statute’s own terms, only the trustee has standing to exercise the strong-arm avoidance powers”); Mast v. Borgess Medical Center (In re Mast), 79 B.R. 981, 982 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1987) (same); In re Driver, 133 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.1991) (stating that “a Chapter 13 debtor is not explicitly bestowed with the trustee’s strong arm transfer avoidance powers.”); Hollar v. United States (In re Hollar), 174 B.R. 198, 203 (M.D.N.C.1994) (<HOLDING>). As In re Higgins, most of the majority 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that chapter 13 debtors have standing to bring avoidance actions by reasoning that chapter 13 trustee has standing but little incentive to bring avoidance actions that will result in benefit to debtors of recovering exempt assets (B) holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case (C) holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees  avoidance power (D) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (E) holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: did attempt to make an offer of proof or other motion to enable the trial court to decide the appropriate scope of his testimony. See Whitehead, 116 Ill. 2d at 443. Defendant also argued trial counsel’s claimed failure to object to improper comments by the prosecution. According to defendant, trial counsel did not object when the prosecution impermissibly highlighted his failure to testify, made an issue of trial counsel’s sincerity, misled the jury by suggesting that defendant’s theories of intoxication and reasonable doubt were sufficient in law only if the jury believed both defenses, and referred to him as a “pervert.” These alleged errors were raised on direct appeal as instances of prosecutorial misconduct which denied defendant a fair trial. See Whitehead, 116 Ill. 2d at 445-47 (<HOLDING>). We cannot say, however, even assuming defense 
 Holding statements: (A) holding errors based on the constitutional rights to confrontation and due process may be waived by failure to object at trial (B) holding defendants failure to object timely waives its right to challenge expert report (C) holding failure to object in timely fashion at trial results in waiver of issue for appeal (D) holding claimed errors waived for failure to timely object (E) holding that claimed errors of law are subject to plenary review
[EX A]:
(D)