In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: the Chapter 13 Plan, and by selecting which exemptions, if any, the Debtor should claim on Schedule C, the Defendants engaged in providing legal advice to the Debtor in violation of § 110(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. “Advising of available exemptions ... or actually choosing an exemption for the debtor ... requires the exercise of legal judgment beyond the capacity and knowledge of lay persons.” In re Kaitangian, 218 B.R. 102, 110 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1998). See also In re Dunkle, 272 B.R. 450 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2002) (classifying and selecting exemptions violates § 110); In re Moffett, 263 B.R. 805 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.2001) (advising upon available exemptions violates § 110). Such business practice also constitutes the unlawful practice of law. See In re Bachmann, 113 B.R. 769 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 110(Z)(1), the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing legal services organizations first amendment right of associating to advocate legal rights (B) holding that bpps may not engage in legal assistance make inquiries or answer legal questions (C) recognizing that inmates have no freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance (D) recognizing that courts may make reasoned adjustments in legal system (E) holding that many courts have recognized that an employer may make reasonable inquiries into the retirement plans of its employees

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: industry is constitutional.” Reply [# 29] at 3. Defendants maintain that “the Court may not rely on a federal regulation (9 C.F.R. § 2.126) or on the Guide to conclude that the Fourth Amendment right at issue is clearly established.” Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Defendants further argue that even if the Court considered the regulation and the Guide, they do not limit the APHIS’ powers of inspection or set policy. Id. at 5. As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that they are not challenging the statutory scheme governing the USDA’s warrantless searches, but rather are challenging the application of that statutory scheme by the Inspector Defendants on May 7, 2013 at Big Cats. See, e.g., LeSueur-Richmond Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261, 268-69 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). In LeSueur, the Fourth Circuit closely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy (B) holding that under the fourth amendment a party may challenge both the constitutionality of the act permitting warrantless searches as well as the conduct of the government officials in a particular case (C) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause (D) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (E) holding there is no requirement that the government obtains a warrant at the first moment probable cause exists  the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of warrantless searches is one of reasonableness under the circumstances

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: we proceed to the first step under Edwards-, whether SA KS’s communication with the appellee post-invocation of counsel — but prior - to the appellee’s subsequent waiver — constituted an interrogation. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880; Mil. R. Evid. 305(e)(1). Did SA KS’s Communication Constitute an Interrogation? For purposes of this Article 62, UCMJ, appeal, we review de novo the question of whether SA KS’s communication with the appellee post-invocation of counsel constituted an interrogation. Kosek, 41 M.J. at 63. The military judge ruled that SA KS’s request for consent to search did not constitute an interrogation. AE CXX at 14. We agree. A request to consent to search does not constitute an interrogation. See United States v. Burns, 33 M.J. 316, 320 (C.M.A.1991) (<HOLDING>) (citation and internal quotation marks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda  (B) holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent (C) holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime (D) holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent (E) holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion


Output: (C)