In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: and the prosecutor, the Court finds, one, there is a factual basis for the entry of the plea[.]” We conclude that the summary of the facts presented by the prosecutor and Defendant’s stipulations are sufficient to establish a factual basis for Defendant’s guilty plea. Specifically, the prosecutor’s statements that the victim “is 80 years of age” and “is crippled in her knees with arthritis and requires a crutch to walk” and that Defendant “told his mother that he would kill her and cut her heart out[,]” “grabbed the victim[,]” and “slung her across the room twice and then hit her with her crutch” provided a sufficient factual basis to support Defendant’s guilty plea. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.1(a) & (e); see also State v. May, 159 N.C. App. 159, 166, 583 S.E.2d 302, 306 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude this argument has no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea (B) holding that district court abused discretion in denying motion to withdraw plea based on intervening supreme court decision that may have rendered factual basis of plea insufficient (C) holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed (D) holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari (E) holding that district court properly considered a police report that the defendant had stipulated contained a factual basis for his plea

A: (C)
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Q: v. Jones, 993 P.2d 424, 427-28 (Alaska 1999) (construing a statute to give rise to an equitable lien because it established "an interest in and a right to seek reimbursement from" a particular source). 13 . Cf. AS 09.35.160 (giving a judgment creditor and the process server who levies on property under a writ of execution full control over the timing of a sale in satisfaction of the judgment). 14 . See Alaska R. Civ. P. 89(a). 15 . AS 13.16.505. 16 . AS 13.06.050(39). This definition comports with the definition set out in Uniform Probate Code section 1-201(33), which states: " 'Property' includes both real and personal property or any interest therein and means anything that 'may be the subject of ownership." 17 . Cf. Goldstein v. Prien, 143 Cal.App.2d 123, 299 P.2d 344, 346 (1956) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Since AS 13.16.505 prohibits liens from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is improper for a trustee to liquidate claims that benefit only select creditors with the only benefit to the estate being the recoupment of administrative costs (B) holding that there is a difference between a debtor attempting to pursue an action for his own benefit and a trustee pursuing an action for the benefit of the creditors (C) recognizing under analogous section of california code that the right to recover property conveyed by a decedent in fraud of creditors is an asset of his insolvent estate and that the executor or administrator is a trustee thereof for the benefit of creditors (D) holding that directors of an insolvent corporation are trustees for the creditors (E) recognizing that the bangor punta doctrine was not applicable to suit brought by receiver of insolvent insurance company for the benefit of creditors

A: (C)
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Q: as well as Dr. Kirkham. In other words, an expert, regardless of his credentials, is no more able than a jury to view and interpret the video. In fact, Dr. Kirkham’s two-cents, if you will, may only confuse the jury or, at worst, mislead them with his characterizations of what is on the film. Indeed, a expert’s evaluation, in this instance, may supplant the jury’s exercise of common sense. Although the Sixth Circuit has not ruled explicitly in this regard, other courts have held that when cases involve review of videotaped events, an expert’s opinion should not be permitted when the expert is no better suited than the jury to interpret the video’s contents. Dunlap v. Hood, 2009 WL 362292 at * 1 (N.D. Tex. 2009) citing Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052, 1055 (4th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>). “Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’ standard requires a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that expert testimony should not be admitted as to a matter that is obviously within the common knowledge of jurors because such testimony almost by definition can be of no assistance (B) holding that expert testimony is unnecessary where the case is not a case in which lay jurors would be unable to grasp the issues without expert assistance (C) holding that expert testimony should be excluded when jury is equally competent to form an opinion about ultimate fact issue or experts testimony is within jurys common knowledge (D) holding that jurors do not need expert testimony on matters of common knowledge (E) holding admissible testimony of jurors describing jury review of information not admitted into evidence

A:
(A)
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