In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the justifiable use of deadly force to specific circumstances, such as when the actor “reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another.” Id. § 776.012(1). As discussed at length above, Lieutenant Weippert’s conduct was objectively reasonable and he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Penley posed a threat of great bodily harm to the lieutenant and others. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Penleys, the evidence reveals no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lieutenant Weippert’s use of force was reasonably necessary. Under Florida law, Lieutenant Weippert had no duty to retreat and his use of force was justifiable. See State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 337-38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle (B) holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded (C) holding that after being chased by a carfull of angry men it would have been reasonable for mr rivera a private citizen to believe that deadly force was necessary even if only a single unarmed pursuer had approached his nowstopped car because the pursuer and his friends had already threatened riveras life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a highspeed chase and throwing deadly missiles namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna (D) holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure (E) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car
[A]: holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle


[Q]: marks and citations omitted). {12} We are unconvinced that application of Texas law to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate would violate any fundamental principle, or public policy of New Mexico, nor are we convinced that the outcome of this determination would differ, depending upon whether we applied the law of Texas or New Mexico. Under Texas law, any doubts about whether there is an agreement to arbitrate must be resolved in favor of arbitration. See Dell, Inc. v. Muniz, 163 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Tex.App.2005); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 195 (Tex.App.2003). It is not clear that New Mexico has applied the same presumption to this initial determination of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. See DeArmond, 2003-NMCA-148, ¶ 8, 134 N.M. 630, 81 P.3d 573 (<HOLDING>). {13} Even though the presumption in favor of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (C) recognizing that a legally enforceable contract is still a prerequisite for arbitration and characterizing the holding in first options of chicago inc v kaplan 514 us 938 94445 115 sct 1920 131 led2d 985 1995 as stating that the presumption in favor of arbitration is reversed when there is a dispute as to the existence of an agreement (D) recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement (E) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added
[A]: holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement


[Q]: Linda Giles, and Gina Arias. (Doc. No. 12, Ex. A, ¶ 13.) Plaintiff acknowledges that he received individualized training from these individuals, but claims it only lasted one to one- and-a-half weeks. (PI. Dep., Doc. No. 12, Ex. B, 142^43.) Throughout this later training period, Plaintiff admitted he remained disinterested in the DCD training because of his purported imminent transfer to Piping, and his primary concern was distribution—delivering mail. (PL Dep., Doc. No. 12, Ex. B, 123; Ex A., ¶9.) In deciding motions for summary judgment, a Court may not make credibility determinations. Plaintiff has admitted that he subsequently received individualized training, although its length is disputed. A jury, however, could still conclude that Plaintiffs initial lac 8 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff identifies three employees who were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim (B) holding that a similarly situated employee is one who is comparable to plaintiff in all material respects (C) holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated (D) holding that where one employee involved in fight was more harshly disciplined than the other plaintiff was not similarly situated because he had been more aggressive than the other employee (E) holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured
[A]:
holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim