In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

when there has been neither agreement nor adjudication of the fact. In that situation, the question is one of historical fact, which, until decided, cannot have anything to do with the child’s best interest. A different situation is presented, however, after paternity has been determined, whether by agreement or adjudication. Then, the best interest of the child necessarily is involved. The historical fact of parentage no longer stands alone; now it is intertwined with the interests of the child and no longer is capable of separation. Once paternity is established, § 5-1029 has no further role to play in that arena. The amendment to § 5-1038 does not change that, in my view, without, as there is not in this case, an amendment making it so. Contrary to the majorit , 1083 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted (B) holding the best interest of the child standard does not violate federal constitutional principles (C) holding that the best interest of the child standard should be used in deciding whether to grant a paternity petition (D) holding that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in determining whether to order blood tests to determine paternity (E) holding court properly applied best interest of child standard when determining whether placement goal should be changed
holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted

small pieces of the Walkway, or access to the Walkway, built upon it. See Def.-Int. Reply at p. 14 (noting that the second of two issues remaining for the Court to decide, given that the public trust doctrine gov erns a large portion of the land at issue, is “whether the state acted rationally in determining that access across the perpendicular paths and scattered small portions of the Walkway constructed on uplands is ‘reasonably necessary’ to protect that public’s right of access to the remaining 88.7 percent of the Walkway that is situated on tidelands”). Plaintiffs’ taking claims with respect to this small portion of the property at issue are governed by the reasonableness test enunciated in Matthews. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 95 N.J. 306, 326, 471 A.2d 355 (1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 93, 83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (B) holding that in order to exercise its rights under the public trust doctrine the public must be given both access to and use of privatelyowned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary (C) holding that the borough of deals dedication of a portion of a beach for use by its residents only was immaterial given the public trust doctrines requirement that the public be afforded the right to enjoy all dry sand beaches owned by a municipality (D) holding that under the public standing doctrine it is only necessary that the relator shall be a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws (E) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public
holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege

such withholding); In re Kuykendall, 957 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1997, no pet.) (concluding that the former ten-year time limitation was on the trial court’s jurisdiction and therefore did not afford the obligor a vest ed right); Wilbanks, 722 S.W.2d at 223-24 (affirming contempt judgment entered within six months after child turned eighteen, when child’s eighteenth birthday had occurred before effective date of statute extending contempt jurisdiction beyond child’s majority); Harrison v. Cox, 524 S.W.2d 387, 391-92 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1975, wilt ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming arrearage judgment including payments due before effective date of statute authorizing cumulative judgments); cf. In re M.J.Z., 874 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (<HOLDING>); In re C.L.C., 760 S.W.2d 790, 792 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unlike subject matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction may be waived (B) holding that a defendant that invokes the jurisdiction of a court as a plaintiff waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim for which it invoked the courts jurisdiction (C) recognizing that personal jurisdiction of federal courts of course may be grounded in state longarm or other jurisdiction statutes in civil rico cases (D) holding that former section 1441b defined the courts jurisdiction not the personal rights of obligor or obligee (E) holding that section 1406a grants district courts power to transfer cases even where personal jurisdiction is lacking

holding that unlike subject matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction may be waived