In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: to pay the purchase price. 3.Pursuant to the Securities Purchase Agreement, dated September 2, 2004, Mer-vyn's Holdings purchased 100% of the interests in Holdings I and Holdings II for $429,746,414,84. At the closing, Mervyn’s Holdings used these funds to pay the purchase price. (Am.Compl.$ 58). 5 . Brandt v. Trivest II, Inc. (In re Plassein Int’l Corp.), 352 B.R. 36, (Bankr.D.Del.2006) ("Accordingly, the Court joins with those decisions that have (either implicitly or explicitly) evaluated fraudulent transfer complaints using Rule 8(a)(2)’s notice pleading standard”) Id. at 40-41. See. e.g., Giuliano v. U.S. Nursing Corp. (In re Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc.), 339 B.R. 570, 574-75 (Bankr.D.Del.2006) (applying "liberal notice pleading standard”); AstroPower, 335 B.R. at 333 (<HOLDING>); Official Comm, of Unsecured Creditors v. DVI 
 Holding statements: (A) holding despite collective allegations in complaint the complaint was not deficient under rule 8a because it stated with sufficient particularity facts establishing a causal connection between the defendants actions and the constitutional deprivation (B) holding that a fraudulent transfer complaint need only set forth the facts with sufficient particularity to apprise the defendant fairly of the charges made against him (C) holding that the fraud claims against the defendant should not have been dismissed as the complaint provided him with fair notice of the claims made against her (D) holding that the information must set forth each element of the crime that it charges as well as fairly inform a defendant of the charge against which he must defend (E) holding that a criminal defendant is entitled to know the charges against him and to be tried solely upon the charges against him internal quotation marks and citation omitted
Example Output: (B)

Example Input: by Davis do not establish that members of Region 2 were denied election-related privileges enjoyed by UAW members in other regions. Absent discrimination of this kind, Davis may not maintain an action under Title I. See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 139, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964) (finding that union members were not “discriminated against” for purposes of Title I because they were not denied a “right to vote or nominate which the union has granted to others”). This mismatch between the relief sought by Davis and the protections provided by Title I exists because Title I cannot support a cause of action that seeks to invalidate a previously conducted union election. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 541, 104 S.Ct. 2557, 81 L.Ed.2d 457 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Although Davis purports to rely solely on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the exclusivity provision included in  403 of title iv plainly bars title i relief when an individual union member challenges the validity of an election that has already been completed (B) holding that because the proper defendant in a title vi case is an entity rather than an individual plaintiff could not be sued in his individual capacity under title vi (C) holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii (D) holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original (E) holding that there is no individual liability under title vii
Example Output:
(A)