In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: 45 U.S.C. § 56, and 46 U.S.C. § 30106, are essentially identical, stating that the action must be “commenced” or “brought” within the three year period. The Supreme Court in Burnett specifically found that the state court suit had been properly “commenced” although it was filed in an improper venue. 380 U.S. at 426, 85 S.Ct. at 1053. Furthermore, because the principle of uniformity that drove the Burnett decision applies with equal force to a general maritime action, other courts have correctly held that Burnett applies in general maritime cases. See, e.g., Prejean, 721 So.2d at 1276 (citing 1 Martin J. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries § 5:10 (4th ed.1990)); Davis, 659 F.Supp. at 156-157; People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F.Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.La.1968) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s second argument for distinction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries (B) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (C) holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction (D) holding that burnett and its justification of uniformity is equally applicable to admiralty actions (E) holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures

Answer: holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries


Question: No. 25. The‘government asserts that “defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulgéd,” citing DOC’s written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov’t’s Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government’s position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (B) holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone conversations where inmates received a handbook alerting them that all telephone calls were recorded and were exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials (E) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company

Answer: holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth


Question: 68 L.Ed.2d 238 (1981); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938, 94 S.Ct. 2654, 41 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125, 93 S.Ct. 939, 35 L.Ed.2d 257 (1973); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910, 79 S.Ct. 237, 3 L.Ed.2d 231 (1958). The California Supreme Court has held that the state constitution enshrines a correlative protection. Mitchell, 37 Cal.3d at 274, 208 Cal.Rptr. at 155, 690 P.2d at 628. The Ninth Circuit has addressed the issue of compelled disclosure of media sources in the context of non-grand jury-criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Farr v. Pritchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912, 96 S.Ct. 3200, 49 L.Ed.2d 1203 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In so doing, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a qualified privilege for confidential sources in a libel suit (B) holding that pennsylvanias interest in compensating victim of defamation outweighed new yorks interests in protecting free discussion and financial injury to defendant (C) holding accuseds right to fair trial outweighed newsmans interest in protecting sources and privilege must yield (D) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental (E) recognizing academic privilege but holding plaintiffs need for information outweighed colleges interest in confidentiality

Answer:
recognizing a qualified privilege for confidential sources in a libel suit