instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
and began questioning the two men. The fact that the detectives in this ease requested that Peterkin answer questions apart from Durovic, and separated them by about ten feet, does not convert an otherwise voluntary encounter into a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The first moment at which Peterkin may have been seized was when Detective Lascik took Peterkin’s identification back to the van to run a background cheek. By that time, however, Peterkin and Durovic had already given the detectives conflicting stories, including whether they knew each other. This inconsistency, together with the detectives’ earlier observations of their unusual behavior, was enough to create reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop. See United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458-59 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brown, 345 F.3d 574, 578 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous (B) holding that after receiving conflicting stories from a driver and passenger the officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the terry stop and conduct background checks on them both (C) holding that receiving conflicting stories from the driver and passenger of a stopped car about their travel gave the officer reasonable suspicion to extend the terry stop (D) holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver (E) holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation
answer:
holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous


question:
were convicted of conspiring to use, carry, or possess a firearm in furtherance of, inter alia, a conspiracy to violate the Neutrality Act and a conspiracy to provide services to the Taliban. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c),(o); J.A. 3223. Both Count Five and Count Eleven, in other words, ■ expressly allow one conspiracy to serve as the predicate for another conspiracy. Nothing about this statutory framework is unconstitutional, improper, or even unusual. Courts have recognized that one conspiracy can serve as the predicate for another conspiracy when the “[overarching] conspiracy and the predicate conspiracy are distinct offenses with entirely different objectives.” United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1135 (3rd Cir.1990); see also United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 918 (2nd Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman (B) holding that congress intended to allow multiple punishments for rico conspiracies and conspiracies to commit the underlying predicate offense even though the offenses were the same under the blockburger test (C) holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy (D) holding that judge erred in not explaining to jury that it could consider predicate acts listed in relation to substantive rico count when deciding whether defendants had also conspired to violate rico (E) recognizing money laundering as a predicate act under rico
answer:
holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman


question:
facts, testimony regarding those facts must be tested through confrontation. If the government thinks it necessary to prove nonstatutory aggravating factors, then it should be required to do so with the Confrontation Clause in tact. C. The Sixth Amendment’s Text Because Williams is inapplicable and no Supreme Court opinion is directly controlling, I turn to the Constitution’s text. The Confrontation Clause applies in “all criminal prosecutions.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “If ‘plain meaning’ is the criterion, this is an easy ease. Surely no one would contend that sentencing is not a part, and a vital one, of a ‘criminal prosecution.’ ” Wise, 976 F.2d at 407 (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Robertson v. United States, 417 F.2d 440, 447 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). This reading of the Sixth Amendment’s text 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the confrontation clause did not apply to proceedings before a draft board because such proceedings are not stages in a criminal prosecution (B) holding that lyness does not apply to residency proceedings before school board (C) holding that the right to counsel applies in all critical stages of state and federal criminal proceedings (D) holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing (E) holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings
answer:

holding that lyness does not apply to residency proceedings before school board