TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: determination under the reasonableness test as clearly erroneous, we perceive no error. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. 1 . Appellees’ original complaint was filed before the bylaw amendment was passed. 2 . The lobby, which per Paragraph 7(c) of the Ridgely Declaration is explicitly characterized as a common element, was refurbished in 1990 out of common funds consisting of contributions from each unit owner. To deny the use of the lobby to clients of the commercial owners constitutes an ultra vires taking of a portion of their percentage interest in the common areas in derogation of the Ridgely Condominium declaration as well as certain provisions of the Maryland Condominium Act. Paragraph 8 of the Ridgely Declaration, in pertinent part, provid 495, 500 (1991) (<HOLDING>). See also Jarvis v. Stage Neck Owners Ass'n, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants presence in a dark alleyway at six oclock in the morning behind a closed business in an exclusively commercial area supported the investigative stop and explaining that knowledge of recent burglaries in an area is a relevant circumstance to be considered in determining the reasonableness of an officers suspicion because knowledge of the character of the area is part of an officers expertise (B) recognizing that unit owners own the common elements in fee as tenants in common (C) holding that the requirement of explicitly and prominently was intended by the legislature to ensure that the declaration give unequivocal notice to the project unit owners of the authorization for such use (D) holding that the grant of exclusive use to one unit owner of a common area is sufficient to change the relative interest of the unit owners in that common area (E) holding that the statute in question served to modify prior common law and that the legislature was empowered to make such changes in the common law based on the public interest

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court’s order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants’ arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: this test the trial court ascribed insufficient weight to the government’s interest in the children’s well-being, in the context of this narrowly-tailored statute addressing grandparent involvement in non-intact families. In this regard, the classification under Section 5312 is not based on antagonism against non-intact families, but, like Section 5311, reflects circumstances where the child’s family environment has been disturbed. Accord Seagrave v. Price, 349 Ark. 433, 79 S.W.3d 339, 344 (2002) (“Because the differences in the circumstances between married and divorced parents established the necessity to discriminate between the classes, the [grandparent visitation] statute at issue would not be found unconstitutional.”); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1064 (2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Curtis, 542 Pa. at 261-68, 666 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under strict scrutiny a grandparent visitation statute did not violate equal protection principles given legislative recognition that children of unmarried or separated parents may be at heightened risk for certain kinds of harm when compared with children of intact families (B) holding that nearly identical kansas statute did not violate equal protection clause when subjected to strict scrutiny (C) recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children (D) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (E) holding that biological grandparents were statutory strangers to children following their adoption by stepfather statute authorizing grandparent visitation violated parents constitutional right to privacy

SOLUTION:
(A)