In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: box, .was too small to fit an assault rifle. 2. The package was not immediately recognizable as contraband, preventing seizure under the plain-view doctrine. 3. Deputy Barker could discover whatever lay in the back of the trunk by leaning over the speaker box and searching with his hands. 4. The compartment behind the armrest (where the cocaine was found) was'too small to contain an assault rifle. 5. Deputy Barker did not know whether the car had a trunk-access panel. We reject Mr. Mirabais first argument. Deputy Barker testified based on his mili tary experience and familiarity with assault rifles. In light -of this experience, he testified that a rifle could have fit behind the speaker box. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (<HOLDING>). The district court had little reason to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that police officers can draw inferences from prior experience (B) holding courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor (C) holding court obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor (D) holding that triers of fact may draw only reasonable inferences (E) holding that courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court’s order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants’ arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: (1982)). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit has held that, assuming “the absence of express statutory language precluding the formation of a property right,” a cognizable property interest in a government permit or license requires both a “right to transfer” and a “right to exclude.” Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2005). The government argues that, as a matter of law, a medical license does not meet either of these requirements. The Court agrees. First, it is clear that the holder of a medical license cannot sell or transfer his medical license to another individual or entity; a medical license can only be obtained by-meeting the requirements specified in state law for the holders of such licenses. See Webster, 74 Fed.Cl. at 447 (<HOLDING>). Dr. Filler’s arguments to the contrary are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the verification of mishlers medical license was part of the protected property interest in the license and reversing the district courts dismissal of his complaint (B) holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent (C) holding governments repudiation of license gave patentee right to terminate license (D) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (E) holding that because plaintiff does not have the right to sell assign or otherwise transfer her medical license a medical license does not possess the requisite indicia of transferability


Output: (E)