instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir.2012). Under the specific circumstances presented in this case, Lewis did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation with White. Lewis knew where White was incarcerated when White called Lewis, as he had agreed to send Shavers and White mail there. Furthermore, Lewis was previously incarcerated at the same prison. Thus, he would have received a handbook alerting him that all telephone calls were recorded and been exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded. In these circumstances, Lewis should have known that all outgoing prisoner telephone calls were monitored and recorded. See United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1329 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Harrison, 986 F.Supp. 280, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells (B) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (E) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials
answer:
(C)


question:
to raise any claim contesting Defendants’ entry into her home or taking of photographs, and she cannot add such a claim at this stage of the litigation. To the extent Plaintiff contends that the photographs are inadmissible pursuant to the exclusionary rule, the court disagrees — there is no indication of an illegal search in any of Plaintiff's filings. It appears that Plaintiff voluntarily permitted Defendants to enter the home. After entering the home, the officers were entitled to photograph objects in their plain view, and they were also permitted to photograph evidence they viewed from outside the residence, such as the window screens. See Wilson v. Supt., Attica Corr. Facility, No. 00-CV-0767 (NAM)(GLS), 2003 WL 22765351, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003) (report and recommendation) (<HOLDING>), adopted, Order, 00-CV-0767 (NAM)(GS) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding seizure of evidence in plain view reasonable under fourth amendment (B) holding that visible contraband in plain view within the apartment provided probable cause for an arrest of person found therein (C) holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where the gun cash and a drug ledger were found in one apartment and the drugs were found in a different apartment in the same building (D) holding that statements by defendant and apartment manager that defendant lived in the apartment where drugs were found demonstrated his control over the apartment even though no documents personal effects or keys were found (E) holding that photographs taken of items outside defendants apartment that were in plain view of the officer were properly admitted
answer:
(E)


question:
or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. These provisions have been narrowly construed to prohibit certain forms of direct discrimination between States within the legislative spheres to which the provisions apply: taxation and port-related commerce-and-revenue regulation,' respectively. See, e.g., United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85-86, 103 S.Ct. 2239, 2245-46, 76 L.Ed.2d 427 (1983) (upholding against a Uniformity Clause challenge an oil taxation scheme that had the effect of giving a unique exemption to Alaskan oil, on the grounds that the exemption was based on “neutral factors” and was not intentionally discriminatory); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 433-35, 15 L.Ed. 435 (1855) (<HOLDING>). Nevada correctly notes that the Supreme Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding over (B) holding that the port preference clause prohibits only positive legislation by congress that gives a direct privilege or preference to the ports of any particular state over those of another not federal enactments that merely confer incidental advantages on one port over others (C) holding that congress may not direct a state to enact or enforce a particular law or type of law (D) recognizing that the bill of attainder prohibits punitive legislation (E) holding that the flsa does not confer jurisdiction over ambulance services
answer:

(B)