In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

analysis and did not provide any guidance as to its future implications.... ”); Schafer, 598 N.E.2d at 553 (“Sturrup is out of the mainstream of caselaw on equal protection analysis_(citation omitted));. Robbins, 941 F.Supp. at 793 (“Federal equal protection ‘rational basis’ analysis does not contain an ‘overbroad’ component. Rather, high school transfer rules, like the rule in question, are valid and enforceable.” (citations omitted)); Jordan, 813 F.Supp. at 1381 (refusing to apply Sturrup overbreadth scrutiny and writing “Indiana’s practice of subjecting equal protection and procedural due process claims to ‘over 75 (N.D.Ill.1978) (finding Illinois version of Transfer Rule did not violate equal protection); Simkins v. S.D. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 434 N.W.2d 367 (S.D.1989) (<HOLDING>); Chabert v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 323 
 Holding statements: (A) holding illinois high school associations version of the transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding that the cap does not violate equal protection (D) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection (E) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection as rule was uniformly applied not arbitrary and rationally related to legitimate government interest
(B)

policy, (DE 50, pg. 35), count 6 of the amended complaint is a claim for rescission of the life insurance policies based on “the brokers” fraudulent actions allegedly committed in violation of the brokerage agreements. (DE 50, pg. 33-34). This Court therefore RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the Mo tion to Compel Arbitration as to Defendants Richardson and LBEG. See Provident Bank, 141 F.Supp.2d at 313-314 (granting motion to compel arbitration of claims including fraud, breach of fiduciary-duty, negligence, and rescission where arbitration clause provided that all disputes ‘arising out of the agreement were to be settled by arbitration, and because all the claims arose out of alleged breaches of duty imposed by the parties’ loan agreement); Sease, 697 F.Supp. at 1192-1193 (<HOLDING>) (citing Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 671 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims of breach of fiduciary duty negligence and fraud were subject to arbitration in light of broad arbitration clause which called for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of or relating to this agreement breach thereof or any aecounts   (B) holding that trial court properly denied motion to compel arbitration of claims for fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices because arbitration clause in agreement only applied to indemnification claims and there were no other arbitration clauses in agreement (C) holding that a clause covering any controversy or claim  related directly or indirectly to this agreement was a broad arbitration clause (D) holding that a clause requiring arbitration of any controversy or claim that shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof was sufficiently broad to cover a 1934 securities act claim involving fraudulent misrepresentation (E) holding that the language of the arbitration clause   any controversy or claim arising out of     was broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract
(A)

a “financial institution” and a “financial participant.” JPMC unquestionably fits the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “financial institution.” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(22) (defining “financial institution” to include a “commercial bank”). JPMC also is a “financial participant” because it is a party to outstanding safe harbor contracts totaling at least $1 billion in gross notional or principal dollar amount. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(22A) (defining “financial participant”). That JPMC fits the applicable definitions for safe harbor protection is not in dispute, and the Amended Complaint concedes this point. See First Am. Compl. ¶ 10 (identifying JPMC as a “financial institution”); ¶ 76 (identifying JPMC as a “national banking association chartered under the laws of the United States”); ¶¶ 66-67 (<HOLDING>). B. The Clearance Agreement, the August 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a successor corporation had a duty to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its predecessors cba because there was substantial continuity in the business enterprise (B) recognizing that although walt disney world wdw was a corporate entity separate from disney companys other subsidiaries sufficient promotion of wdws business by the other subsidiaries could support jurisdiction and remanding for a hearing on the extent to which the subsidiaries furthered wdws enterprises (C) recognizing the extent of jpmcs derivatives obligations to lbhi and its subsidiaries (D) recognizing that the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at common law rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time rendered it private (E) holding outside of the context of title vii or the adea that section 24 fifth preempts state law to the extent but only to the extent that it conflicts

(C)