In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: added). Plaintiffs point out, correctly, that beneficial use is an evolving and dynamic requirement of federal and state law. See Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal.2d 132, 140, 60 Cal.Rptr. 377, 429 P.2d 889 (1967) (While “what is a reasonable use of water depends on the circumstances of each case, such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of transcendent importance.”). Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 requires that all water provided pursuant to the Act be put to “beneficial use,” as defined by state law. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383; California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 665-67, 98 S.Ct. 2985, 57 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1978); see also City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1242, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 294, 5 P.3d 853 (2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (B) holding that mandamus was appropriate to require the director to deliver the full decreed water rights of a water right holder (C) holding that the montana constitution protects water rights against unreasonable state action  (D) holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district (E) recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest

A: (A)
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Q: of priorities for economic development” — were the centers of power in many areas of importance. Harry Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789-1910, Law and Soc’y (Fall 1975) 57, 97. See generally id. at 86-100 (discussing diffusion of power and rnment’s contentions here ... would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”); id. at 578, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (“[T]he federal balance is too essential a part qf our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (<HOLDING>); id. at 178, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (“No matter how 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that despite 1985 amendments minimum jurisdictional amount remains 50000 (B) holding that the protect act amendments to the standard of review apply retroactively (C) holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an officials single decision or act (D) holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect (E) holding unconstitutional taketitle provision of the lowlevel radioactive waste policy amendments act of 1985

A: (E)
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Q: differs. This is contrary to the TAA’s plain language as well as its mandate — that we construe it “to effect its purpose and make uniform the construction of other states’ law applicable to an arbitration.” Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code § 171.003 (emphasis added); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.028 (“A uniform act included in a code shall be construed to effect its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it.”). Texas, not federal, law governs this case, and that law is clear: a party may not appeal an order that grants rehearing. V. Section 171.098(a)(5) is uniformly interpreted to prohibit appeals when a rehearing is granted. The concurrence also argues that “subsection (5) allows an appeal when a re ., P.A., 34 Kan.App.2d 340, 118 P.3d 704, 706-08 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Crack Team, 128 S.W.3d at 583 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable (B) holding that there can be only one final appealable order (C) holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable (D) holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action (E) holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable

A:
(C)
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