In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Court’s finding that Porter was not an independent trustee was not due to confusion regarding the proper role of trustees and agents in a corporate trust, as Sparkman contends. Rather, the Tax Court found that “she had no meaningful role” whatsoever. That Porter testified otherwise does not, in itself, establish that the Tax Court committed clear error. The Tax Court, describing Porter’s testimony as “vague, contrived, and non-credible,” plainly did not believe her, and “the Tax Court, like any other court, ‘may disregard uncontradicted testimony by a taxpayer where it finds that testimony lacking in credibility.’ ” Conti v. Comm’r, 39 F.3d 658, 664 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Lerch v. Comm’r, 877 F.2d 624, 631 (7th Cir.1994)); see also Demkowicz v. Comm’r, 551 F.2d 929, 931 (3d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Wood v. Comm’r, 338 F.2d 602, 605 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony (B) holding that where testimony is inherently improbable the court may choose to disregard it (C) holding that a court is not bound to accept testimony at face value even when it is uncontroverted if it is improbable unreasonable or questionable internal citation omitted (D) holding that a party is not bound by the testimony of a witness it calls (E) holding the tax court not bound to accept taxpayers uncontradicted testimony if it found the testimony to be improbable unreasonable or questionable
(E)

the key elements required to satisfy the discovery rule are injury (we use “damage” interchangeably with “injury”) and fault. Legally-cognizable damages occur when a plaintiff detrimentally relies on the negligent advice of an attorney. Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 374, 460 A.2d 172. Actual damages are those that are real and substantial as opposed to speculative. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617, 621 (1937). In the legal-malpractice context, actual damages may exist in the form of an adverse judgment. Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 373, 460 A.2d 172. However, a client may suffer damages, in the form of attorney’s fees, before a court has announced its decision in the underlying action. See, e.g., Knight, supra, 553 A.2d at 1235 (<HOLDING>); Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 374, 460 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal (B) holding that debtors have no right to jury trial on malpractice claims against their attorneys (C) holding that although attorneys fees are usually not recoverable unless permitted by statute or contract contractual or statutory authorization was not necessary in a malpractice claim to recover attorneys fees and costs as damages (D) holding that statute of limitations for malpractice begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged malpractice (E) holding that attorneys fees and costs expended as a result of an attorneys alleged malpractice constitute legallycognizable damages for purposes of stating a claim for such malpractice
(E)

case. In light of our decision that the parties’ dispute will not be resolved by an appraisal proceeding, we need not decide, as appellants assert, whether the district court erred by observing that the appraisal process would be subject to the statutes governing confirmation or vacation of an arbitration award. Nonetheless, pertinent to our holding in this case, we take the opportunity to acknowledge that although some arbitration standards apply in processing appraisal results, Minnesota recognizes a distinction between appraisal and arbitration. Compare QBE, 778 N.W.2d at 398 (stating that “[ajppraisal decisions are subject to Minn.Stat. § [§ ] 572.08-.30 (2008), the arbitration statute”) and David A. Brooks Enters., Inc. v. First Sys. Agencies, 370 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Minn.App.1985) (<HOLDING>) with Johnson, 732 N.W.2d at 346 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that explanations of arbitration awards are not required (B) holding that because appraisal is analogous to arbitration the court would apply principles of arbitration law to this dispute regarding an insurance policy appraisal clause (C) recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit (D) holding that minnesotas arbitration statutes govern appraiser decisions and appraisal awards are to be treated as arbitration awards (E) holding that judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow in scope

(D)