In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: removal of the access can result in a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, if the state’s use is for a purpose other than a road purpose. But, in Judge Armstrong’s view, any modification of a road for road purposes that denies a landowner’s access does not give rise to a compensable taking. In so concluding, Judge Armstrong discounts as “dictum” the Supreme Court rationale in Burk that an abutter’s right of access to a conventional Highway “can be divested only by condemnation of the easement appurtenant to the abutting property.” 200 Or at 231. Judge Armstrong explains that the court’s conclusion in Burk cannot be reconciled with the court’s analysis in more recent cases in the context of regulations that affect road access. See, e.g., Schrunk, 242 Or at 73 (<HOLDING>). If, Judge Armstrong’s concurrence reasons, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access (B) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking (C) holding ripe a claim for a pre1987 taking because prior to first english california law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an action in inverse condemnation (D) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (E) holding that regulatory restrictions on abutting landowners right of ingress and egress are not compensable when landowner has adequate alternative means to access property
[A]: (B)


[Q]: at the La Vega site. The fact that the Esso station at La Vega ceased its operations in 1998 does not change the prospective nature of plaintiffs’ suit at the time it was brought. Moreover, in PauÉuxet the Court stated that it did not agree “with the reasoning which, apparently, led the Louisiana district court, following the Hamker decision, to dismiss a number of actions simply because no violations occurred on the dates the complaints were filed. A plaintiff who makes allegations warranting injunctive relief in good faith, judged objectively, may recover a penalty judgment for past violations even if the injunction proves unattainable.” Pawtuxet, 807 F.2d at 1094 (citing .1992); Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 1312, 1322 (D.Or.1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court concludes as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters (B) holding that a worker injured on actual navigable waters in the course of employment is covered under the lhwca (C) holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states (D) holding a discharge of pollutants is ongoing if the pollutants continue to reach navigable waters even if the discharger is no longer adding pollutants to the point source itself (E) holding that to achieve goals of cwa epa is required to establish and enforce technologybased limitations on individual discharges into the countrys navigable waters from point sources
[A]: (D)


[Q]: Specifically, the EEOC regulations interpreting the Act provide that, in determining whether a claimant is disabled because he is significantly restricted in his ability to perform “either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes,” a court may consider: The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs). 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(ii)(B) (emphasis added). In making this determination, the reviewing court must decide whether the plaintiff is restricted in his or her ability to perform ei stems, Inc., 101 F.3d 346, (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). KCC argues on appeal that Burns’s lifting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lifting restriction of ten pounds did not constitute a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity (B) holding as a matter of law that a twentyfive pound lifting limitation particularly when compared to an average persons abilities  does not constitute a significant restriction on ones ability to lift work or perform any other major life activity (C) holding that a lifting restriction did not substantially limit a computer technicians ability to engage in the major life activity of working (D) holding plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who could not perform heavy lifting failed to meet burden of establishing substantial limitation in major life activity of work (E) holding that a twentyfive pounds lifting restriction did not substantially limit any major life activities
[A]:
(B)