In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: in that the timely filing of such claims is both mandatory and jurisdictional. That limitation derives from the proposition of sovereign immunity. It is well established that a claim against the United States is barred absent waiver of sovereign immunity, “ ‘and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’ ” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)). A waiver of immunity cannot be implied; it must be “unequivocally expressed in the statutory text.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The United States has expressly consented to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal (B) holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity (C) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states (D) holding that federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against the united states or one of its agencies absent a clear waiver of sovereign immunity (E) holding that a lack of a waiver of sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction

Answer: (D)


Question: with “complete and final discretionary authority to interpret the plans and maintain control over the operation and administration of the plans.” Accordingly, the Chevron Plan, via the Services Agreement and the SPD, delegates authority to Aetna regarding benefit eligibility for the Medical Plan. Moreover, in this situation, Aetna made a factual determination that certain diagnostic testing and IVIG treatments were not medically necessary. “[F]actual determinations made by [an] administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion.” Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir.1999); see also Chandler v. Hartford Life, No. 05-50688, 2006 WL 1209363, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr.28, 2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp., 168 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion (B) holding that a denial of benefits will not be reviewed de novo where the language of an erisa plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (C) holding that arbitrary and capricious standard applies to section 1132a1b denial ofbenefits claims if the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (D) holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion (E) holding that  rjegardless of the administrators ultimate authority to determine benefit eligibility  factual determinations made by the administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion 

Answer: (E)


Question: and would prevent law enforcement from getting inside without same). 38 United States v. Santos, 403 F3d 1120, 1132 (II) (B) (2) (e) (10th Cir. 2005); see Brown v. State, 269 Ga. 830, 832-33 (2), n. 2 (504 SE2d 443) (1998) (listing as “reasonably-founded suspicious factors” the following: “an officer’s knowledge of past criminal involvement by individuals inside the stopped vehicle', irregularities in licensing and insurance documentation or the driver’s authority to be operating the stopped vehicle; and the location where the stop occurred” (emphasis supplied)); Giles v. State, 284 Ga. App. 1, 4 (1) (642 SE2d 921) (2007) (considering prior arrest history as a relevant factor in totality of circumstances analysis). Cf. Martin v. State, 316 Ga. App. 220, 226 (2) (729 SE2d 437) (2012) (<HOLDING>). 39 Evans v. State, 262 Ga. App. 712, 716 (1) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that possession of more than seven tons of marijuana justified the district courts refusal to provide a simple possession instruction (B) holding that a past arrest for possession without more is simply not enough to provide reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is currently in possession (C) holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession (D) recognizing innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons possession (E) holding that evidence of appellants prior gun possession was admissible in a homicide prosecution to show malice and intent possession of a gun without more is not wrongful conduct

Answer:
(B)