In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: v. Valenzuela, 722 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir.1983) (requiring the defendant to shave); United States v. Lamb, 575 F.2d 1310, 1316 (10th Cir.1978) (same); United States v. Murray, 523 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1975) (requiring the defendant to wear a wig); United States v. Roberts, 481 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir.1973) (requiring the defendant to put on a stocking mask worn during the robbery). If a defendant who is compelled to don clothing before the jury does not “testify” for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause, it would seem to follow, a fortiori,' that the Self-Incrimination Clause also provides that a defendant who voluntarily dons clothing before the jury may not be required to subject himself to cross-examination. See United States v. Bay, 762 F.2d 1314, 1315-16 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that a physical 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not err in concluding after an evidentiary hearing that the immunity agreement between defendant and the government did not extend to the charge being prosecuted (B) holding that the district court correctly declined to instruct the jury that the government was required to prove as an element of the offense that the defendant did not intend to establish a life with his wife (C) holding that a district court did not err in concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a downward departure due to his status as an alien subject to removal (D) holding that the district court erred in concluding that a defendant was required to take the stand to display his tattoos because the government may compel a defendant to display such physical characteristics (E) holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered
[EX A]: holding that district court did not err in concluding after an evidentiary hearing that the immunity agreement between defendant and the government did not extend to the charge being prosecuted

[EX Q]: options,” including by streamlining communication between the distressed borrower and foreclosing party. See Assemb. B. 278, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); S.B. 900, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). There has been a wave of litigation in state and federal courts challenging various aspects of the MERS System. Almost all of the relevant law is state rather than federal. The results under state law have been inconsistent. See Weber, supra, at 246-56 (cataloguing the “schizophrenic position of state courts” on issues relating to the MERS System). Some state supreme courts have upheld the MERS System on issues ranging from foreclosure authority to recording requirements. See, e.g., Renshaw v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 155 Idaho 656, 315 P.3d 844, 846-47 (2013) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mers lacked standing to foreclose as the lenders nominee (B) holding that because mers receives no payments on the debt it is not the beneficiary even though it is so designated in the deed of trust (C) holding that mers is an ineligible beneficiary within the terms of the washington deed of trust act if it never held the promissory note or other debt instrument secured by the deed of trust and that characterizing mers as the beneficiary has the capacity to deceive and may give rise to an action under the consumer protection act (D) holding that mers may be a beneficiary as nominee for the lender that assignments of the deed of trust between mers members need not be recorded that mers was not liable to the borrower in negligence and that the idaho consumer protection act did not provide a cause of action to the borrower (E) holding that mers was not the beneficiary of a deed of trust under the oregon trust deed act absent conveyance to mers of the beneficial right to repayment and that mers could not hold or transfer legal title to the deed as the lenders nominee
[EX A]: holding that mers lacked standing to foreclose as the lenders nominee

[EX Q]: 7 Cal.4th at 1247, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022. Single, trivial or isolated incidents cannot generally support constructive discharge. Id. at 1247, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022. Adverse conditions must be “extraordinary and egregious,” “unusually aggravated,” or part of a “continuous pattern,” such that any reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign rather than continue the employment relationship. Id. 1246-48, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022; accord Mullins, 15 Cal.4th at 737, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 936 P.2d 1246. The conditions must be unreasonably harsh compared to those experienced by coworkers. Id. at 1247; accord King v. AC & R Advertising, 65 F.3d 764, 768 (9th Cir.1995). The length of time an employee remains on the job is one relevant facto 876 P.2d 1022 (<HOLDING>); King, 65 F.3d at 768 (insufficient as matter 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution (B) holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct (C) holding a defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct has the initial burden to prove thatajuror or jurors did in fact commit the alleged misconduct (D) holding the alleged misconduct taken together did not constitute a pattern of harassment or aggravating conditions (E) holding that defendant did not preserve his challenge to alleged prosecutorial misconduct where he did not timely object
[EX A]:
holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution