In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: UCL and CLRA. In considering whether the plaintiff in Bruno had standing to bring claims arising from the defendants’ gelcap product, when the plaintiff had only purchased the defendants’ liquid product, the court noted that “treatises and the vast majority of persuasive authority indicate that ... the issue of whether a class representative may be allowed to present claims on behalf of others who have similar, but not identical, interests depends not on standing, but on an assessment of typicality and adequacy of representation.” Id. at 530 (citing Greenwood v. Compucredit Corp., No. 4:08-cv-04878, 2010 WL 4807095, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2010); Arevalo v. Bank of Am. Corp., 850 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1017 (N.D.Cal.2011); Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); 7AA Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers have standing to sue (B) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (C) recognizing associational standing when members would have standing in own right (D) holding that because plaintiff had standing to sue for injury arising from his own benefit plan his ability to represent class members with different benefit plans should be analyzed under rule 23 not standing (E) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: paid with Vested Funds and Seized Funds. And while the majority of the ICE contract price was paid with DFI money, approximately $12 million, the record reflects that $8 million of the contract price was paid with Seized Funds. Thus, defendants have failed, with respect to either contract, to demonstrate that no “claim” was submitted within the meaning of the-FCA. And, accordingly, they are not entitled to summary judgment on this issue. B. Presentment Before FCA liability will attach to a “claim” for payment under § 3729(a)(1), the false or fraudulent “claim” must be “knowingly presented], or caus[ed] to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United Government or a member of the Armed Services of the United States.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1); see also Totten II, 380 F.3d at 491 (<HOLDING>). This requirement ultimately presents no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a statement in the motion for new trial entitled certificate of presentment in which appellate counsel stated the motion was handdelivered to the trial court insufficient to establish presentment (B) holding that presentment is a requirement of the fca (C) holding that the fca includes a materiality requirement (D) recognizing that criminal contempt is not initiated by an indictment or presentment (E) holding that certificate of presentment and docket entry noting filing of motion were insufficient evidence of presentment

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: Communications Co., 971 F.Supp. 302, 305-06 (W.D.Tenn.1997). Plaintiffs rebanee on these cases is misplaced for several reasons. None of these cases analyzed whether a court could ignore a federal consumer-protection regulation simply because a tariff was filed with the FCC. The MCI case dealt with whether federal courts have jurisdiction to hear billing-dispute cases arising out of long-distance contracts where the long-distance provider had filed tariffs with the FCC. The issue was one of jurisdiction and the case did not at all address the applicability of federal regulations. In Wegoland, the issue was whether plaintiffs could attack long-distance rates on the theory that the providers had engaged in fraud. Although the Second Circuit broadly reaffirmed the “filed tariff’ doctrine (<HOLDING>), the court did not discuss whether federal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the respondents statelaw claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine (B) holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine (C) holding that suits against longdistance companies for unreasonable rates were barred if the defendant had filed a rate tariff with the fcc (D) holding that the filed rate doctrine barred private right of action for consumer fraud (E) holding that filed rate doctrine did not apply because pharmaceutical companies do not file rates with any agency


Output: (C)