In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: interim orders issued by arbitration panel were resolution of separate and independent claim and subject to confirmation even though the orders did not dispose of all claims submitted to arbitration); The Home Insurance Company v. RHA/Pennsylvania Nursing Homes, Inc., 127 F.Supp.2d 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (an interim award which adjudicated a portion of a damages claim and ordered the payment of that sum is final even though liability and potential damages issues remained to be resolved with respect to the remainder of the same claim; court held that an arbitration award that fully disposes of a separate and independent claim is final for purposes of confirmation under the FAA even if other claims remain pending); Hart Surgical, Inc. v. Ultracision, Inc., 244 F.3d 231 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Publicis Communication v. True North 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award (B) holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants (C) holding that an award which finally and definitely disposes of a separate independent claim may be confirmed although it does not dispose of all the claims that were submitted to arbitration (D) holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 (E) holding that section nine does not limit confirmation of an award to the district court in the district of arbitration and confirmed a new york arbitration over whose parties the court had personal jurisdiction

A: (C)
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Q: function of determining the validity of a claim from the function of fixing the claim’s monetary value. See In re Devitt, 126 B.R. 212, 215 (Bankr.D.Md.1991). Section 502 therefore required the bankruptcy court to “determine[ ] the validity of the claim[s] and the amount allowed.” Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp,, 843 F.2d 636, 646 (2d Cir.1988). It was then but a short and logical step for the bankruptcy court to enter a money judgment against Porges, on the basis of its section 502 determination, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and Bankruptcy Rule 9021. Rule 58 directs the clerk of the court to enter judgment in favor of a prevai 8 L.Ed.2d 939 (1990); see generally United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 221-22, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 1564-65, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). The entry of a money judgment also finds 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the time to file an appeal never began to run because the clerk failed to enter a separate judgment as required by rule 58 (B) holding that because the district courts order failed to comply with rule 58 appellants notice of appeal cannot be considered late (C) holding that in order to prevent uncertainty rule 58 must be mechanically applied (D) holding that a district courts marginal order granting summary judgment did not meet the strict requirements of rule 58 because a party may reasonably be confused as to the standing of its ease when a decision is rendered in such an informal manner (E) holding rule 58 and bankruptcy rule 9021 applied in decision denying proofs of claim following adversary proceeding

A: (C)
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Q: indicating that the decision to demote and reassign Harmon to one of their Fairfax, Virginia locations was based not on his polygraph test results but instead on the company’s belief that Harmon’s refusal to provide additional information demonstrated a need for increased supervision for a period of 30 to 60 days. See Day Dep. at 71-73; Brar Dep. at 54-61. Defendant’s evidence further indicates that CB Squared executives offered Harmon the option of working at a closer location in Garrisonville, Virginia after he complained that the commute to Fairfax in the mornings was prohibitively long. Brar Dep. at 61-63. Such attempts to accommodate Plaintiffs needs could be construed by the trier of fact as inconsistent with an intent to force Plaintiff to resign. See Holsey, 743 F.2d at 209 (<HOLDING>). In his account of the October 16th meeting, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence (B) holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances (C) holding that employers intent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence (D) holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent (E) holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence

A:
(C)
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