TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: case because in Revenue Cabinet, as here, the sales tax statute did not impose a test for passage of title, and an administrative rule did impose a test for passage of title. Id. at 738-39. Here, Hales makes no claim that the impermanence of its materials results in a generally understood, implicit agreement to pass title at some point before delivery. Moreover, our statute requires an explicit agreement on passage of title before the statutory presumption can be rebutted; there is no obvious provision in this statute for an implicit understanding, which the Kentucky court thought sufficient. Consequently, the facts of Revenue Cabinet aré inapposite and its result is inapplicable to the case at bar. See also Kurtz Concrete, Inc. v. Spradling, 560 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo.1978) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the Commission applied the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title insurer not in business of supplying information in issuing either title commitment or policy of title insurance for purposes of exception to moorman prohi bition against recovery of economic losses in tort further holding that contract defines title insurers liability (B) holding that title passes on mixture of readymix concrete because of usage of trade (C) recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim (D) holding in a slander of title action that attorneys fees are recoverable as part of the costs of removing the cloud from the title (E) holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: in this sense, inasmuch as he has alleged an imminent violation of his statutory right to personal privacy within the trial court’s power to enjoin. “Standing” can also refer to various judicially-created limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction, such as “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). It is not, however, standing in this so-called prudential sense with wh out the phrase, in Rector v. City of Bowling Green, 594 S.W.2d 891 (Ky.1979) (<HOLDING>). The question thig case presents is who, aside 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nonindustrial property owners did not have standing under the asserted statute to challenge an annexation (B) holding that representation by state officials that they have no present plan to enforce a statute does not divest plaintiffs of standing to challenge the statute because the states position could well change (C) holding that petitioners who asserted neither a property interest nor a possessory interest in property searched or seized were not entitled to assert a constitutional challenge to the search (D) holding annexation ordinance void (E) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: should have asserted the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applicable to search warrants in an attempt to salvage this search. Because it failed to assert that legal theory as a basis for upholding this search in the trial court, the State cannot obtain the benefit of that law in this Court. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23(b) permits the admission of evidence obtained by an officer in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas or the United States when “the evidence was obtained by a law enforcement officer acting in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23(b); McClintock v. State, 444 S.W.3d 15, 20-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (<HOLDING>). Had the State argued to the trial court that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises (B) holding the search of a computer after the warrant had expired constitutional because despite the delay probable cause for the search continued to exist (C) holding that a visual body cavity search requires probable cause and a search warrant (D) holding that excluding the unlawfully obtained dogsniff evidence the remaining portion of the search warrant did not establish probable cause and therefore appellate court should consider whether the search should be upheld under the goodfaith exception applicable to search warrants (E) holding that observations made a during prior illegal search should not have been included in the affidavit for the search warrant

SOLUTION:
(D)