In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: clause could be vitiated based on evidence of fraud “relating to the merger clause or fraud that invalidates the entire contract including the merger clause.” 228 Mich.App. 486, 498, 579 N.W.2d 411, 417 (1998). The plaintiffs have not alleged fraud in the merger clause itself. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants fraudulently induced them to buy investment properties in Detroit. The plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud in the inducement do not save their breach of contract claim because the remedy for fraud in the inducement is to void the contract, not reform it. See UAW-GM, 228 Mich.App. at 508, 579 N.W.2d at 418 (“Fraud ... makes a contract voidable at the instance of the innocent party.”) (quoting 3 Corbin, Contracts, § 580, p. 431); Star Ins. Co., 392 F.Supp.2d at 929 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs’ argument conflates their tort 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable (B) holding that irss failure to comply with seizure and sale provisions of section 6335 renders tax sales voidable at taxpayers option rather than void as matter of law (C) holding that the filed rate doctrine precludes insureds fraudulent inducement claim (D) holding that making of agreement to arbitrate was not called into question by general allegation that entire contract was void because of fraudulent inducement (E) holding that fraudulent inducement renders a contract void or voidable
[EX A]: holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable

[EX Q]: negligence placed the plaintiff....” Brown v. Philadelphia Coll, of Osteopathic Med., 449 Pa.Super. 667, 674 A.2d 1130, 1135-36 (1996). Russell’s actions were intentional, not negligent. The impact rule, which depends upon the negligence of a defendant, is therefore inapposite to this case. 7 . Because DiSalvio’s federal cause of action survives Russell's Motion to Dismiss, the Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over DiSalvio’s remaining state law claims. 9 . Unlike the School District Defendants, Russell has not argued that this tort is unavailable to plaintiffs in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 10 . The Court similarly rejects Russell’s argument that DiSalvio cannot recover punitive damages from him under her § 1983 claim. See Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 11 . DiSalvio suggests that Magill should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages may be awarded for egregious violations of the lmrda (B) holding that punitive damages may be imposed against employer for tortious conduct of employee (C) holding that punitive damages may be awarded under  1983 when the defendants conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others (D) holding that a supervisor with no personal involvement may be liable for the constitutional violation of a subordinate for culpable action or inaction in the training supervision or control of his subordinates acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation  or reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others (E) holding that since the complaint set out a deliberate indifference claim it follows logically that reckless or callous indifference has been noticed
[EX A]: holding that punitive damages may be awarded for egregious violations of the lmrda

[EX Q]: Clauses of both the Iowa and Federal Constitutions because paragraph P of the parole agreement constituted involuntary consent. The State argued the search was reasonable because Baldón consented to the searches by signing the parole agreement. It asserted Baldón was still serv 0) (avoiding consent issue by relying on the special needs doctrine to justify a parolee search); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (adopting Samson instead of analyzing the parole agreement’s search condition under a consent framework); State v. Heaton, 812 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Minn.Ct.App.2012) (“By agreeing to [the search] condition of parole, appellant diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Himmage v. State, 88 Nev. 296, 496 P.2d 763, 765-66 (1972) (<HOLDING>); People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 401 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing repayment of damages to society as remedial (B) holding that imposing supervised release condition that defendant report to his probation officer upon reentry into the united states is not plain error (C) holding parolee voluntarily agreed to consentsearch provision as a condition of release into society (D) holding defendant agreed to submit to searches as a condition of probation (E) recognizing loss of society damages as remedy available under general maritime law
[EX A]:
recognizing repayment of damages to society as remedial