In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: as well as recent country reports and his own affidavit, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that he failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegation that conditions in China have materially changed. We have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no abuse of discretion in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish changed conditions in China. Id. at 275 (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as “the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] ... it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion”); Jian Huan Guan, v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In addition, we find that the BIA did not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bia did not abuse its discretion in denying a petitioners untimely motion to reopen where she submitted proof of the birth of her two sons a letter from her parents warning of the danger of forced sterilization and a purported sterilization certificate for her cousin who also had two children (B) holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen (C) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (D) holding that the bia correctly imputed a parents knowledge that she and her children were not eligible for entry to the united states to her children (E) holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it
[A]: holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen


[Q]: until they were “in close proximity.” Lowe, 2014 WL 99452, at *3; see also Westport Ins. Corp. v. Bayer, 284 F.3d 489, 498 (3d Cir.2002) (according plain meaning to the district court’s choice of language in affirming its “implicit” findings of fact). These findings control because they are not clearly erroneous. Rather, they are suppo a- suspect takes action that clearly indicates that he “does not yield” to the officers’ show of authority. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547. Action— not passivity — has been the touchstone of our an h Cir.2010) (noting that, “for a person who is moving, to ‘yield’ most sensibly means to stop”), or when a suspect makes suspicious motions consistent with reaching for a weapon, see United States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (D.C.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the suspects in those cases, Lowe 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that i have a gun is sufficient to justify the sentencing enhancement because it merely requires a teller to make the reasonable inference that a robber would use the gun he claimed to have if he did not receive the money he demanded (B) holding that a suspect did not submit to a show of authority when he made continued furtive  gestures including shoving down motions that were suggestive of hiding or retrieving a gun (C) holding that a suspect who continued walking when approached by a police officer did not submit until physically restrained by the officer (D) holding that evidence of appellants prior gun possession was admissible in a homicide prosecution to show malice and intent possession of a gun without more is not wrongful conduct (E) holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept
[A]: holding that i have a gun is sufficient to justify the sentencing enhancement because it merely requires a teller to make the reasonable inference that a robber would use the gun he claimed to have if he did not receive the money he demanded


[Q]: Texas Fund has a legitimate interest in the case and it is in a much better position to protect that interest than any of the other parties. Texas Fund is entitled to intervene in the action to protect its legitimate interests. I foresee no harm or prejudice to any of the other parties by virtue of this intervention. Texas Fund’s intervention in the lawsuit would have little effect on how the case is actually prosecuted before a jury and affects no substantial interest of any of the other parties. Other courts, faced with identical or very similar circumstances, have held that an insurance carrier may intervene as of right in an action brought by the injured party against a third-party tortfeasor. See Smith Petroleum Service, Inc. v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 420 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>); Curtis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 754 F.2d 781, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding if a workers compensation carrier denies liability for medical expenses of its insured the nofault carrier is bound promptly to pay benefits concerning such expenses under its policy (B) recognizing workers compensation insurance carrier owes employee duty of good faith and fair dealing in processing compensation claims (C) holding that rule 6e did not extend the period in which a workers compensation carrier was required to pay a compensation award under the longshore and harbor workers compensation act where the act required payment within ten days of filing of the order as opposed to within ten days of service of notice provided for in the rule (D) recognizing a breachofduty action by an employee against a workers compensation carrier even though the carrier issued its policy to the employer (E) holding that carrier was entitled to intervene as of right where the states workers compensation law permitted subrogation of a compensation carrier
[A]:
holding if a workers compensation carrier denies liability for medical expenses of its insured the nofault carrier is bound promptly to pay benefits concerning such expenses under its policy