TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: of Liability Provisions SBVS argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to lost rent or diminution in value damages because both of the Agreements contain provisions barring the award of consequential damages. The Court concludes that the enforceability of these provisions turns on disputed facts and, therefore, that summary judgment on this issue is improper. Generally, provisions limiting liability in construction contracts are enforceable under California law so long as the parties negotiated and expressly agreed to the limitations. See Cal. Civ.Code § 2782.5. However, such a provision is unenforceable if it is unconscionable or otherwise contrary to public policy. Markborough California, Inc. v. The Superior Court of Riverside County, 227 Cal.App.3d 705, 715, 277 Cal.Rptr. 919 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Under § 1668 of the California Civil Code, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs who had been served and received responses to interrogatories on personal jurisdiction had had such a fair opportunity (B) holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant (C) holding contract not unconscionable where parties were of equal bargaining power plaintiff had opportunity to have an attorney review the contract the contract was clear and easily read the plaintiff had been a party to similar contracts in the past and was under no financial pressure to sign the con tract (D) holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish procedural unconscionability since he had a reasonable opportunity to consider the agreement and the arbitration clause was clearly set forth in the contract (E) holding that limitation of liability clause in construction contract that is not unconscionable or in violation of public policy is valid so long as parties had a fair opportunity to accept reject or modify limitation and affirming summary judgment on basis that plaintiff had presented no evidence that it had had no such opportunity

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: the terms of the agreement as to the status of the donor in writing. After the mother and her partner ended their relationship, the sperm donor filed suit to adjudicate his parental rights. The court looked to the plain language of the Texas statute and determined that the sperm donor lacked standing to pursue the paternity action. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 160.702 (Vernon Supp.2006) (“A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”). The “do-it-yóurself” manner in which the artificial insemination was conducted does not alter the fact that B.O.C. was a sperm donor under section 742.14. The statute does not require that the artificial insemination be performed in a clinical setting to apply. Compare McIntyre v. Crouch, 98 Or.App. 462, 780 P.2d 239 (1989) (<HOLDING>), with C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc.2d 9, 639 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the donor nonpaternity statute did not explicitly reference physician involvement the statute applied even though the sperm was not provided to a physician (B) holding that writ was explicitly abolished by statute (C) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (D) holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case (E) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: 950 S.W.2d 121, 132 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.); Ulloa v. State, 901 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no pet.); Castaneda v. State, 852 S.W.2d 291, 294-95 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, no pet.). A waiver of a “right” is distinguished from a waiver of an “error.” Until there is a timely request for the instruction the constitutional right to the instruction does not arise. Only if there is a timely request for the instruction and the trial court refuses the request does error occur. Whether to request a “no adverse inferences” jury instruction is within the tactical discretion of the defense counsel. Gomez-Olivas, 897 F.2d at 502; Henson v. State, 734 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. ref'd). Cf. Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 62-63 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also 43A George E. Dix & Robert O. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defensive issues not applicable to the case within article 3614 of code of criminal procedure unless and until defense counsel raises issue by requesting jury instruction on issue (B) holding that criminal defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of restitution under the oregon vehicle code (C) holding that issue of inadequate jury instruction was waived because the instruction given was the one expressly requested by defense counsel (D) holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue (E) holding a prior case was not precedent on an issue when the issue was not contested

SOLUTION:
(A)