TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: party to file a protest with the contracting agency or to file an action in a district court of the United States or the United States Claims Court.” Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). STANDING The plaintiffs legal standing to appeal the GAO’s decision lies in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.. Section 702 provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review” thereof. The court finds that the plaintiff, as an unsuccessful bidder, has standing to challenge the agency’s decision to award the contract to a third party. See Choctaw Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 761 F.2d 609, 615-16 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). FINDINGS OF FACT The majority of facts are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the losing bidder has standing to challenge the award of a government procurement contract (B) holding that if the government is obligated to rebid the contract and the unsuccessful bidder could compete for the contract once again and therefore has an economic interest and standing to challenge the award (C) holding that without a valid reason for cancelling the procurement  the government violated its duty to conduct a fair procurement (D) holding that the definition of procurement under the tucker act is broader than the definition of procurement contract in the fgcaa such that an agency can engage in a procurement process for the purposes of the tucker act even though it is using a cooperative agreement instead of a procurement contract to memorialize the parties agreement (E) holding that city had implied contract with bidder to treat bidder fairly

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: 393 N.W.2d 286, 290-91 (S.D.1986). • GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, (dissenting).. [¶ 26.] I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the lower court on Issue 2. I would hold the trial court erred when it granted partial summary judgment to 01-esens, holding City’s operation of food service at the municipal bar was an ultra vires act. [¶27.] An express grant of authority from the legislature “includes those incidental or implied powers that are necessary to enable a municipality to perform the function authorized.” City of Rapid City v. Rensch, 77 S.D. 242, 246, 90 N.W.2d 380, 383 (1958) (citation omitted). A municipality is vested with discretion as to how it exercises specific powers conferred upon it by the legislature, as long as the methods employed are n , 59 N.W.2d 732, 734 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Actions taken under a municipality’s implied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding municipality had implied authority to enter into a long term contract to establish a golf course although state statute did not specifically grant authority to establish golf courses as public parks (B) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (C) holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority (D) holding that plaintiff had no authority or statutory right for actions proper course was to report actions to proper legal authority (E) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: threatened to use a firearm during the commission of the crime”; (2) where the defendant admitted to use or threatened use; and (3) where the court convened a special proceeding and found use or threatened use of a firearm. Or Laws 1979, ch 779, § 2. The third option, action by the sentencing judge, could only occur if, before sentencing, the judge determined that the “conviction” did not necessarily establish use or threatened use of a firearm. That order of events — “conviction” followed by sentencing — indicates that the legislature intended the term “conviction” in ORS 161.610 to mean the finding of guilt as to the underlying criminal charge, and not that finding of guilt combined with the attendant criminal sentence. Compare State v. Isbell, 178 Or App 523, 527, 38 P3d 272 (2001) (<HOLDING>), and State v. Allison, 143 Or App 241, 246, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because any precedes the list of items a felon is prohibited from possessing double jeopardy precludes more than one conviction for possession of any of the items listed (B) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (C) holding that the term conviction means a finding of guilt and not a judgment where it refers to an event that precedes sentencing (D) holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment (E) holding that trial court may arrest judgment on conviction for possession with intent to deliver and enter judgment of guilt on simple possession

SOLUTION:
(C)