TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: reimbursement decisions to be made on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 549. Of note here, we explained that “even if the Commission had promulgated fee guidelines, the provider would not have a statutory right or privilege to be paid the amount set out in the guideline.” Id. According to East Side, Vista is, likewise, neither entitled to a fee guideline nor entitled to any set amount of reimbursement. See id. Given that no specific reimbursement amount is required, even where the Division has established fee guidelines, and that the Division can reason ng statute and rule as whole to find broad definition of “prohibited activities” and absence of definition for “market power” as providing constitutionally permissible notice of type of prohibited conduct contemplated); Tinning, 875 S.W.2d at 409 (<HOLDING>). The language in these cases, similar to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (B) holding term share legal fees although not expressly defined provides adequate notices of type of conduct it would include (C) holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment (D) holding that although term was not limited by the specification it was expressly defined in a narrow manner in the prosecution history (E) holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution

SOLUTION: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance

PROBLEM: supervising, or otherwise controlling the agent” in addition to any vicarious liability that may be imposed via the agent’s actions. We hold that plaintiffs under the ICRA may proceed against the employer on either a direct negligence or vicarious liability theory for supervisor harassment in a hostile-work-environment case. The Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense, with the burden of proof on the employer, applies only to claims of vicarious liability. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764, 118 S.Ct. at 2270 (adopting affirmative defense “in order to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority” (emphasis added)); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. at 2292; see also Johnson v. Shinseki, 811 F.Supp.2d 336, 348 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct (B) holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied (C) holding because the court applied the negligence standard the faragher defense is inapplicable (D) holding that equitable defense of laches is inapplicable to claims of fraud (E) holding that even though the court does not usually apply the clearly erroneous standard to mixed questions of fact and law this standard is properly applied to the materiality issue

SOLUTION: holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct

PROBLEM: Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972), the Supreme Court held that “the forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside.” The Second Circuit, however, has since made clear that the “extra protection that Bremen accords to mandatory forum selection clauses,” is not applicable to a permissive forum-selection clause which “contemplates more than one forum.” Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venezuela, S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir.1993). Further, “[a]n agreement conferring jurisdiction in one forum will not be interpreted as excluding jurisdiction elsewhere unless it contains specific language of exclusion.” John Boutari and Son, Wines and Spirits, S.A v. Attiki Importers and Distribs., Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1994) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue that, despite the Franchise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a forumselection clause which stated that any dispute arising between the parties hereunder shall come within the jurisdiction of the competent greek courts was permissive rather than mandatory (B) holding that a forumselection clause was mandatory where it stated that for any action brought to enforce such terms and conditions venue shall lie exclusively in clark county washington (C) holding that a forumselection clause was mandatory because it provided for exclusive jurisdiction and venue in a particular court (D) holding clause reading the parties agree that in any dispute jurisdiction and venue shall be in california to be mandatory (E) holding that the clause any dispute that shall arise between the parties  with reference to the interpretation of this agreement or their rights with respect to any transaction involved was broad

SOLUTION:
holding that a forumselection clause was mandatory where it stated that for any action brought to enforce such terms and conditions venue shall lie exclusively in clark county washington