In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir.1996)). We conclude that, although the district court erroneously determined that the principles of Daubert did not apply to the re-creation and Agent Constantino’s testimony, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence. Under Daubert, the district court conducts a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2796; see Fed.R.Evid. 702 . This “gate-keeping” obligation on the part of the district court applies to all types of expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Many factors may bear on this inquiry, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dauberts basic gatekeeping obligation  applies to all expert testimony (B) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (C) recognizing the basic principle of contract law that the obligation of good faith is an implied condition in every contract (D) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (E) holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions
Example Output: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive

Example Input: of decision, and this is how the INS has consistently understood these terms.”); Fierro v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2000) (“[Sjubject to possible limitation, we think that the requirement of ‘legal custody’ in section 1432 should be taken presumptively to mean legal custody under the law of the state in question.”). Our decision to look to state law is consistent with our practice in other areas of federal law generally, and immigration law specifically. For example, entitlement to federal social security benefits often hinges on marital status as defined by state law. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52-53 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977); Purganan v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 269, 270-71 (9th Cir.1982); see also Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in the immigration context, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment (B) holding that statute does not provide for the adjudication by the alj of a state law breach of contract action for damages that is independent of the aljs determination of entitlement to benefits under the terms of the applicable agreement (C) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law (D) holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law (E) holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest
Example Output: holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment

Example Input: court of appeals to address the issue was quick to point out that no statute required seat-belt use and no Texas authority supported a common-law duty to use seat belts. See Tom Brown Drilling Co. v. Nieman, 418 S.W.2d 337, 340-41 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). And in lieu of forging a new path, some courts of appeals were able to dispose of the issue on the ground that defendants had no evidence the failure to use seat belts caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. See United Furniture & Appliance Co. v. Johnson, 456 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1970, writ dism’d); Nieman, 418 S.W.2d at 341. Others grappled with the evidentiary difficulties of admitting seat-belt evidence. See Red Top Taxi Co. v. Snow, 452 S.W.2d 772, 779 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1970, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Sonnier v. Ramsey, 424 S.W.2d 684, 689 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of nonuse of seat belts irrelevant to the liability issues involving the plaintiffs alleged contributory negligence (B) holding that contributory negligence in the sense of mere carelessness or inadvertence is not a defense in strict liability cases (C) recognizing contributory negligence as a defense to professional malpractice claims (D) holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence (E) recognizing nonuse of seat belt may constitute such negligence as will permit apportionment of damages under comparative negligence
Example Output:
holding that contributory negligence in the sense of mere carelessness or inadvertence is not a defense in strict liability cases