In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975), and is consistent with the holdings in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382, 103 S.Ct. 683, 687, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983), and in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, supra. Blue Chip Stamps held that a section 10(b) plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of a security, and thus limited standing under the 1934 Act to “plaintiffs ... who have at least dealt in the security to which the prospectus, representation, or omission relates.” Id. 421 U.S. at 747, 95 S.Ct. at 1931. Put and call option trading on an underlying security is directly affected by the prospecti, representations and omissions of the issuer of the underlying security. See Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 506. Cf. Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303 (D.Mass.1987) (<HOLDING>). In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (B) holding that class representatives cannot appear pro se (C) holding that sellers of covered calls are not atypical class representatives (D) holding that a class representatives ignorance of the case is not a bar to certification unless it impairs the representatives ability to vigorously prosecute the action (E) holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: . . . there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision[s].” Murray v. St. Michael’s Coll., 164 Vt. 205, 210, 667 A.2d 294, 299 (1995). In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under Title VII need show only that “a reasonable employee [in the employee’s situation] would have found the challenged action materially adverse,” meaning that it well might have dissuaded a reasonable employee from engaging in the protected activity. 548 U.S. at 68. ¶ 34. Assuming, without deciding, that this is the standard to apply with respect to retaliation claims brought under 21 V.S.A. § 710(b), we conclude that the limited video surveillance in this case in connectio v., 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 35. But in this case, if the release 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney (B) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (C) holding that because a claimant testified that she had no insurance and could not afford treatment her failure to take medication for her symptoms is not a clear and convincing reason for discrediting her symptom testimony (D) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (E) holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: in Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches, 55 Rutgers L.Rev. 547 (2003) [hereinafter Simmons, Can Winston Save Us ] (describing these searches as qualitatively different than ordinary searches, and thus requiring higher constitutional standards). These searches are all so invasive of privacy or dignity that courts have held that the government must show more than the standard requirement of probable cause in order to obtain a warrant. Id. at 550, 560 (“[W]hen a search technique is extraordinarily intrusive, the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment could impose extra limitations ....”); see, e.g., Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (stating a higher-than-probable cause standard for no-knock warrants); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 883 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a compelled surgical intrusion into an individuals body for evidence implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be unreasonable even if likely to produce evidence of a crime (B) holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted (C) holding that ijnadmissible evidence may be material if the evidence would have led to admissible evidence (D) holding that defense counsel may call attention to the states failure to produce evidence (E) recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence
[EX A]:
(A)