instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
375 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004). Since, as we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we need not consider whether the District’s failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its own case (as opposed to at the close of Smith’s case) further limits our review “to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by the evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice,” Fredrick, 254 F.3d at 162. The District presents two fact-based challenges to the jury’s verdict. First, it argues that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the District had a deliberately indifferent policy or custom under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, it claims that even had such a policy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom (B) holding that county liability under  1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior (C) holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc  1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition (D) recognizing respondeat superior liability (E) holding that municipal liability for purposes of claims brought under 42 usc  1983 must stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom rather than simply from respondeat superior
answer:
holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom


question:
718. Under Texas law, a person may engage in the practice of engineering, architecture, or landscape architecture if he is licensed in those professions. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 3271a, § 1.2 (Vernon Supp.1999) (engineering); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art.249a, § 1 (Vernon Supp.1999) (architecture); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 249c, § 5(a) (Vernon Supp.1999) (landscape architecture). The State complains Henry was allowed to testified as to matters requiring expertise in surveying, engineering, architecture, and landscape architecture even though he is not licensed in any of those professions. Therefore, because Henry is not licensed, he was not qualified to testify as an expert. See Prellwitz v. Cromwell, Truemper, Levy, Parker & Woodsmale, 802 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>); but see Southland Lloyd’s Ins. Co. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the tendered expert witness was a licensed psychologist and not a medical doctor he was not qualified to state an expert medical opinion regarding the cause of johns injury (B) holding that a witness who will be giving opinion evidence about a propertys fair market value must be disclosed and designated as an expert pursuant to discovery and other applicable rules (C) recognizing that a licensed chiropractor is a health care provider competent to testify as a medical expert (D) holding that where a treating doctor is called to give an expert opinion on the standard of care that doctor is properly labeled an expert witness and must be disclosed to the other party along with other experts (E) holding that witness giving expert opinion regarding stan dard of care for particular licensed profession must hold license for same profession
answer:
holding that because the tendered expert witness was a licensed psychologist and not a medical doctor he was not qualified to state an expert medical opinion regarding the cause of johns injury


question:
is no dispute that the facts of this case establish a valid disclaimer by Ms. Gillette. We need not look beyond the plain language of Section 6205 to determine the effect of this disclaimer and the proper result in this case. The clear meaning of Section 6205(a) is that the status of the parties and the effect of the disclaimer are fixed to the time of the decedent’s death, regardless of when the disclaimer is actually made. See In re Bute’s Estate, 355 Pa. 170, 49 A.2d 339, 341 (1946) (“When a devise is renounced the renunciation will relate back to the moment when the gift was made and prevent it from ever taking effect, leaving the devisee without an interest in the property and without liability in connection therewith.”); In re Estate of McCutcheon, 699 A.2d 746 (Pa.Super.1997) (<HOLDING>). In addition to relating a disclaimer back to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because a disclaimer relates back to the decedents death the status of parties in the chain of succession are established as of the time of death regardless of when the disclaimer is made (B) holding in case where plaintiff sought damages resulting from the defendants failure to pay the accidental death benefit claims she filed following death of her husband transfer to south carolina was warranted because with the exception of plaintiffs relocation to the state of west virginia following the death of the decedent the cause of action bears virtually no relation to the forum chosen by the plaintiff (C) holding that wife could receive permanent total disability payments after the death of her husband where the husbands claim was pending before the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments and was still pending at the time of his death even though husbands death occurred after the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments as wifes status as a dependent was subject to determination as of the time of husbands injury (D) holding that the ninetyday time period under the federal rule is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a partys death and that mere reference to a partys death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution (E) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute
answer:

holding in case where plaintiff sought damages resulting from the defendants failure to pay the accidental death benefit claims she filed following death of her husband transfer to south carolina was warranted because with the exception of plaintiffs relocation to the state of west virginia following the death of the decedent the cause of action bears virtually no relation to the forum chosen by the plaintiff