TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: his claims based on injury to his eye and knees. But Mr. Sanders does not state any basis for his challenge to those decisions. Finally, Mr. Sanders claims that he has been deprived of due process and discriminated against based on his race. As already stated, we have jurisdiction to consider constitutional arguments. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). But Mr. Sanders does not provide any facts to substantiate his arguments. Nor do we see any basis for his arguments in the record. In the absence of any evidentiary support, Mr. Sanders’s passing remarks amount to no more than a constitutional label for his otherwise factual disagreement "with the decisions of the Veterans Court and the Board. That does not suffice to create jurisdiction. See Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 225 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal (B) holding that rcw 1040200 does not create a constitutional right to be advised of immigration consequences therefore failure to comply with statute does not create constitutional harm (C) holding that a board decision is required to vest the court of veterans appeals with jurisdiction over a claimants appeal (D) holding that mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim (E) holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court

SOLUTION: holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal

PROBLEM: on the conditions stated in the publicly-filed limited partnership certificate. We affirm the appellants’ liability under § 106(l)(b). The certificates of limited partnership for TSG, TMG, and TSG 80 all state that, if necessary to satisfy the partnership’s recourse obligations, each limited partner has agreed, upon demand, to make an additional capital contribution of up to three times the limited partner’s original investment. These certificates were recorded publicly in New York County. Accordingly, the capital of the Limited Partnerships upon which creditors properly could rely included the limited partners’ stated ob ligation to make additional capital contributions. See Arno Management Corp. v. 115 East 69th Assocs., 173 A.D.2d 258, 260, 569 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (1st Dept.1991) (<HOLDING>). Section 106(l)(b) explicitly provides a means 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that limited partner does not have standing to sue for injuries to partnership that merely diminish value of that partners interest (B) holding that appellate jurisdiction is limited to the issues contained in the certificate of appealability (C) recognizing partnership by estoppel only with respect to claims by persons who have reasonably relied upon outward representations of partnership (D) recognizing that same principle applies where defendant is general partner of limited partnership which in turn is general partner of limited partnership with contacts with state (E) holding that the information contained in the certificate of limited partnership binds the partnership and the partners with respect to third parties

SOLUTION: holding that limited partner does not have standing to sue for injuries to partnership that merely diminish value of that partners interest

PROBLEM: Houdek v. Mobil Oil Corp., 879 P.2d 417, 425 (Colo.App.1994); Employers Insurance of Wausau v. RREEF USA Fund-II (Colorado), Inc., 805 P.2d 1186, 1188 (Colo.Ct.App.1991). Here, Plaintiffs confessed the state claims against Cox for misrepresentation, breach of contract, and estoppel against Cox. They did not confess the remainder of causes of action against him, including the state claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Because Cox was required to expend efforts beyond the filing of the motion to dismiss, an award of fees under § 13-17-201 is warranted. Moreover, Plaintiffs are liable for Cox’s attorney fees, notwithstanding that certain claims may remain against other Defendants. See Smith v. Town of Snowmass Village, 919 P.2d 868, 873 (Colo.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). I conclude, pursuant to Colo.Rev.Stat. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though plaintiffs claim was barred by the cgia because it sounded in tort attorney fees were not appropriate where it was a contract claim that was pleaded and thus a contract claim that was dismissed (B) holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees (C) holding the dismissed defendant was not precluded from obtaining its reasonable attorney fees under 1317201 even though the action was still pending against another defendant (D) holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment (E) holding that the defendant was only permitted to recover attorney fees as an item of special damages with respect to the underlying action in which the defendant was sued and was not permitted to recover attorney fees incurred in the malpractice portion of the case as damages

SOLUTION:
holding that even though plaintiffs claim was barred by the cgia because it sounded in tort attorney fees were not appropriate where it was a contract claim that was pleaded and thus a contract claim that was dismissed