In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: by assenting to forfeiture provisions included in plea agreements. In United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir.1999), a criminal defendant entered into a plea bargain under which he “agree[d] to forfeit and otherwise waive any ownership right he might possess in all items seized during the investigation of any of the acts alleged.” The defendant then filed a motion for the return of his property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), and the district court denied the motion. Id. We affirmed the district court’s decision, observing that “[t]he district court was entirely correct in denying Le’s motion because Le ... relinquished any ownership rights he may have had in the property.” Id. at 1278. See also United States v. Grover, 119 F.3d 850, 852 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). On appeal Mr. Montoya suggests that he should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that a rule 41e claimant relinquished any possessory claim he had to the property when he signed a forfeiture agreement at the time he entered into a plea bargain (C) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (D) holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present (E) holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel
[EX A]: holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea

[EX Q]: issue, we need not consider the second argument raised. 7 . In a dissent to Smith, Judge Friedman, joined by Judges Pellegrini and Kelley, objected to following the Miller/Lewis/Selan line of cases which automatically equated the refusal to sign a hospital consent form with a refusal to submit to chemical testing. The dissenting judges expressed preference for the other line of caselaw, particularly Conrad, and noted that because Smith orally agreed to the blood test and only refused to sign the hospital consent form, which was a pre-test procedure linked to the test, although not required by section 1547, Smith did not make a knowing and conscious refusal to submit to chemical testing. 8 . Wheatley v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 104 Pa.Cmwlth. 171, 521 A.2d 507 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 9 Although Renwick does not expressly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547 (B) holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion (C) holding that refusal to submit to breathalyzer test did not result from custodial interrogation (D) holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 (E) holding that a district court did not clearly err in crediting agents testimony that a defendant had orally consented despite his refusal to sign consent form
[EX A]: holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547

[EX Q]: that it was implausible that an Orthodox priest would have retaliated against Farcas if she converted his niece was not supported by any corroborating evidence in the record. Thus, none of the IJ’s findings of implausibility provides a legitimate or cogent basis upon which to make an adverse credibility finding. The IJ also erred by giving diminished weight to affidavits introduced into the record by Farcas at her asylum hearing, as the reasons stated by the IJ for doing so are without merit. Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir.2003) (“Mere failure to authenticate documents, at least in the absence of evidence undermining their reliability, does not constitute sufficient foundation for an adverse credibility determination”); Zhou v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir.2006)(<HOLDING>). Lastly, we hold that the IJ erroneously 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is error for an ij to rely upon the petitioners inability to obtain live testimony from persons living abroad to support an adverse credibility determination (B) holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true (C) holding that after the real id act the ij must still provide specific examples of a petitioners demean or that would support this basis for an adverse credibility determination (D) holding an ij must to address a petitioners explanation for inconsistencies to rely upon them as the basis for an adverse credibility finding (E) holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination
[EX A]:
holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true