In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: unpublished decisions, “[njoticeably absent from the list of factors Pruitt instructs district courts to consider are the merits and substance of the pro se plaintiffs claim.” Rivera v. Kettle Moraine Correctional Inst., No. 14-C-6, 2014 WL 2875897, at *4 (E.D. Wis. June 24, 2014); Kennedy v. Huibregtse, No. 13-C-4, 2014 WL 4924662, at *15 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 30, 2014). On appeal from an adverse judgment in a case where the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion to recruit; the Court of Appeals will consider whether “there is a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have made a difference in the outcome of the litigation” in assessing whether the district court’s abuse of its discretion was prejudicial. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 659 (italics original r. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Mars v. Hanberry, 752 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation (B) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (C) holding that prisoner must allege acts or omissions evidencing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (D) holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs (E) holding that plaintiffs claim must have arguable merit meaning that plaintiffs allegations clearly state a nonfrivolous prima facie case of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need and that the already established evidence indicates more than an extremely slim chance of success on the merits
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: as defined by Section 30-31-2(M), his acts of cultivating or growing mushrooms, even if by artificial means, are not prohibited by Section 30-31-20(A)(1). To interpret Section 30-31-20(A)(1) otherwise, as the State suggests, would require us to read language into the statute that is not there. See Marshall, 2004-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 10, 13, 136 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801 (refusing to read a personal use exception into the CSA, reasoning that to do so “would impermissibly read language into a statute that makes sense as written”). {11} Our holding is also supported by an analysis of the federal counterpart to Section 30-31-20(A)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000) of the Federal Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (federal act). See State v. Carr, 95 N.M. 755, 760, 626 P.2d 292, 297 (Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the presumptions applicability to federal statutes (B) holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction   (C) recognizing a reliance on federal jurisprudence for the interpretation of louisianas arbitration statutes (D) holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes (E) recognizing that the csa is patterned after the federal act and relying on federal interpretation to the extent that the statutes are similar
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: they are not entitled to avoid the judicial lien. DISCUSSION Section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the debtor may avoid most judicial liens “to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled ...” 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) A debtor is entitled to avoid a judicial lien that impairs a homestead exemption even if the debtors have no equity in the property. Kolich v. Antioch Laurel Veterinary Hosp. Inc., (In re Kolich), 273 B.R. 199, 204 (8th Cir. BAP 2002)(citing F.D.I.C. v. Finn (In re Finn), 211 B.R. 780, 782-84 (1st Cir. BAP 1997) and quoting H.R.Rep. No. 835, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1994)), aff'd, 328 F.3d 406 (8th Cir.2003). See also Higgins v. Household Fin. Corp. (In re Higgins), 201 B.R. 965, 967-968 (9th Cir. BAP 1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Whitehead, 226 B.R. 539, 541 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a debt or could only exempt an item of property that exceeded the exemption limit by paying the difference between the value of the property and the exemption limit to the estate (B) holding that congress has made it clear in amending section 522 that a lien will be deemed to impair an exemption even when there is no equity in the property if the sum of all the liens on the property and the hypothetical value of the exemption without liens exceeds the value of the debtors interest in the property in the absence of liens (C) holding that a retained equity interest is property even if it has no market value (D) holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit (E) holding that debtor could not avoid a judicial lien where after accounting for unavoidable liens and mortgages he had no equity in the property and therefore no interest on which to avoid the judicial lien
[EX A]:
(B)