In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: fees, an award of reasonable fees is mandatory, as long as there is proof of reasonable fees ... and the plaintiff has been awarded damages.” Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 462 (5th Cir.2002), citing Tex. Civ. Peac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 38.001(8) (Vernon 2002). Accord Coffel v. Stryker Corp., 284 F.3d 625, 640 (5th Cir.2002) (“[t]he award of reasonable attorneys’ fees is mandatory under § 38.001 if the plaintiff prevails in his or her breach of contract claim and recovers damages”). The only discretion the Fifth Circuit permits is discretion to determine the amount of the attorney’s fees award. See id. The availability of a section 38.001 award is not conditioned on a contractual provision for attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. 1999) (<HOLDING>); Golden v. Murphy, 611 S.W.2d 914, 915 
 Holding statements: (A) holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees (B) holding that prevailing party to contract dispute may recover attorneys fees either pursuant to contract or pursuant to statute (C) holding that prevailing party was entitled to attorneys fees under an option contract which had expired prior to litigation because the parties were litigating their performance under the terms of the contract (D) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees (E) holding defendant waived request for fees pursuant to contract provision by only generally referring to fees in the answer and not citing the contract
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: appropriate relief for such a violation is for the habeas court to “vacate the judgment of conviction and enter a new judgment from which an appeal can be taken.” Id. Defendant argues that the Peak line of eases applies to his situation, and that his appellate rights should thus be reinstated. However, the Peak rule does not apply in defendant’s ease, as the appeal at issue is not an appeal from a conviction. A Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach to an appeal from a supervised release revocation hearing. Borrego v. United States, 975 F.Supp. 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y.1997). This follows logically from the fact that there is no guaranteed constitutional right to counsel at the supervised release revocation hearing itself. See United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel (D) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (E) holding that most of the fundamental constitutional procedural protections that are normally applicable to a criminal prosecution are not required for supervisedrelease proceedings as a matter of constitutional law including a right to counsel
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: without a warrant, the search “is presumptively unreasonable, and evidence obtained from such a search is inadmissible, subject only to a few carefully established exceptions.” United States v. Harrison, 639 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir.2011). “Voluntary consent to search is one such exception.” Id. “Consent may be obtained from the individual whose property is searched, or in certain instances, from a third party who possesses either actual authority or apparent authority to consent to the search.” United States v. Cos, 498 F.3d 1115, 1124 (10th Cir.2007); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (voluntary consent can be obtained “from a third party who possesses common authority over the premis .2d 634 (2012); Sanchez, 608 F.3d at 689 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 720 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept (B) holding that officers had a reasonable belief that defendants father had authority to consent to the search of his sons room and computer because he owned the home and had access to the room and computer at will (C) holding defendants 15yearold daughter had actual authority to consent because she lived full time in the house and had unrestricted access to it (D) holding that the appellant had not changed his residence from his registered address despite the fact that the house had never had electricity service during the time that he had lived there (E) holding that appellants father had authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom where house defendant lived in was owned by his parents room was not locked and defen dants family was not denied access to bedroom
[EX A]:
(C)