In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: personally waive the rights to testify at trial, to have the prosecution witnesses testify in defend other settings. One such case arose when a defendant charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct stipulated to the element that he was more than 36 months older than the victim without waiving his right to a jury trial on that element. State v. Wright, 679 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn.App.2004), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2004). In Wright, we applied a harmless-error analysis to the district court’s failure to obtain appellant’s personal waiver. Id. at 191. In part, we reasoned that proving the age element to the jury would have had “a more prejudicial effect than- the stipulation” because appellant was significantly older than the victim. Id.; see also Hinton, 702 N.W.2d at 281-82 (<HOLDING>). Also, both Wright and Hinton involved 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that stipulation of the appellants undisputed prior convictions was harmless error and reasoning that blakely v washington which does not require a jury determination of prior convictions provides implicit support for the conclusion that a harmless error analysis is appropriate (B) recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding blakely errors are subject to harmless error analysis (D) holding that the trial courts error in not allowing defendant to testify on direct examination as to nature and circumstances of prior convictions was not harmless error where credibility of the defendant was critical to the deliberations of the jury (E) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: use of low-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. While we recognize that drivers may be accustomed to quickly flashing their high-beam headlights at an oncoming vehicle as a signal to dim headlights, there is no evidence in this case that the officer was driving with his high-beam headlights. Furthermore, the statute does not provide any exceptions for the momentary flashing of high-beam headlights. Thus, we must conclude the statute prohibits the use of high-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle, for any length of time and for any purpose. [¶ 12] We recognize that at least one other appellate court has interpreted similar statutory language and reached the opposite conclusion. See Waukesha County v. Meinhardt, 2001 WI App 146, ¶¶ 9-10, 630 N.W.2d 277 (<HOLDING>). In another case involving a similar statute, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that meinhardt did not commit a violation by flashing his highbeam headlights two times at an oncoming vehicle because the plain language of the statute did not prohibit the quick flashing of highbeam headlights (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute (D) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (E) holding the trial judge did not commit reversible error through the chosen method of remedying the batson violation
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: been substantial in gross,” we reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and remanded for a factual determination of whether the alleged “campaign reached the threshold of actionability under section 1983.” Id. at 625. We reiterated this point in DeGuiseppe v. Village of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187, 192 (7th Cir.1995), by explaining that “even minor forms of retaliation” such as “diminished responsibilities” or “false accusations” can be actionable under the First Amendment if sufficiently adverse to chill employee speech on matters of public concern. Since then, we have consistently applied this standard. E.g., Fairley v. Femaint, 482 F.3d 897, 903 (7th Cir.2007) (“Suppose the white guards at a prison mercilessly harass the black guards and make their lives miserabl r.2002) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, even the Fourth Circuit case cited by 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that outside of the employment context speech that would chill a person of ordinary firmness is actionable (B) holding that in the first amendment employment context harassing speech must constitute constructive adverse employment action to be actionable (C) recognizing that code is speech (D) holding that speech must be a threat or coercion to be actionable (E) holding that statute reaching beyond purely commercial speech to chill fully protected speech can merit application of the overbreadth doctrine
[EX A]:
(A)