TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: first, that under New Jersey law a plaintiff assumes the risk of voluntarily participating in a sporting activities, citing Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959) and Pona v. Blvd. Arena, 35 N.J.Super. 148, 113 A.2d 529 (App.Div.1955), and that Buglioli voluntarily participated in a “cat and mouse game.” These cases provide no defense. First, the court knows of no decision after New Jersey adopted its comparative negligence statute interposing “assumption of risk” as a complete defense in a negligence action. To the contrary, a recent case arising from a contact sport accident formulated an appropriate rule by adjusting the standard of care, not by finding “assumption of risk.” See, e.g., Crawn v. Campo, 257 N.J.Super. 374, 608 A.2d 465 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Second, the court finds no New Jersey case 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety (B) holding no evidence of reckless disregard for safety of others when officer entered intersection without stopping and witness did not hear brakes being applied (C) holding that an unlawful act committed with the intent to injure or in a grossly negligent manner that proximately causes death is involuntary manslaughter and that criminal liability is imposed in the latter instance because although the defendants acts are not inherently wrong the defendant has acted or failed to act with awareness of the risk to safety and in wilful disregard of the safety of others (D) holding in actions arising from a contact sport accident plaintiff must show defendant acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others or intentionally (E) holding that cjulpable negligence is negligence of a gross and flagrant character which evinces a reckless disregard for the safety of others

SOLUTION: holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety

PROBLEM: by [the motorist].” Freitas II, 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (citing Desmond, 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353) (brackets in original). In Desmond, the ICA noted that “it is advisable that, at the commencement of the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer inform the parties what procedure he or she will follow.” 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353 (emphasis added). In rejecting Freitas’s argument, this court observed that “procedural due process requires that a person have an ‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (quoting Farmer v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 94 Hawai'i 232, 238, 11 P.3d 457, 463 (2000)); cf. Padilla-Agustin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 21 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Since the hearing officer had advised Freitas 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due process requires not only notice but sufficient information to allow petitioner to prepare and present objection to the agencys preliminary action or decision (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action

SOLUTION: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner

PROBLEM: in the statute that would limit or guide a prosecution for indecent, immoral, obscene, vulgar, or insulting language. Allowing a prosecution where one utters “insulting” language could possibly subject a vast percentage of the populace to a misdemeanor conviction. Id. at 258-59 (emphasis added) (citations, internal quotations, and omissions removed). The court went on to state that, “[the statute], as currently drafted, impinges on First Amendment freedoms.... [It is] unquestionable that [the statute], as drafted, reaches constitutionally protected speech, and it operates to inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Id. at 259. Thus, it is clear that probable cause for Leonard’s arrest is not supported by § 750.337. See Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Michigan’s courts have not commented so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected (B) holding that protected speech cannot serve as the basis for a violation of city ordinances at issue (C) recognizing the preliminary issue in a first amendment challenge is whether the speech at issue is protected or unprotected (D) holding that a city could not use past conduct to enjoin future protected speech (E) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected

SOLUTION:
holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected