In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir.2005). The First Amendment guarantees a prisoner a right to seek redress of grievances from prison authorities and as well as a right of meaningful access to the courts. Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.1995); see also Hasan v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 400 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir.2005) (“Prisoners’ grievances, unless frivolous ..., concerning the conditions in which they are being confined are deemed petitions for redress of grievances and thus are protected by the First Amendment.”); Wolfel v. Bates, 707 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Jones’s complaints of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing first amendment retaliation right (B) holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners grievances (C) recognizing that prisoners undoubtedly exercise first amendment petition right when filing grievances and stating that prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for filing grievances (D) holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials (E) recognizing prisoners first amendment right to eom plain to prison officials about discrimination
[EX A]: recognizing first amendment retaliation right

[EX Q]: as Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, Holland had been given the authority to review the allegations against Vickers and make the ultimate decision to keep her or fire her. Without more than what Vickers has offered as evidence, we cannot- see how a reasonable jury might find a retaliatory motive at work in Holland’s decision. Vickers’ retaliation claim is further undermined by the fact that even though it was Holland who fired her, Bedwell was the focus of her discrimination claims. Vickers failed to put on any evidence to show that Holland’s decision was in any way influenced by Bedwell, who had retired before Vickers’ refusal to sign the releases in April 2001 that triggered her firing. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1311-12 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Nor can Vickers’ Title VII claims draw 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a common employer and administrator does not necessarily influence the administrators decision (B) holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision (C) holding that subordinates bias is only relevant where the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the subordinates influence (D) holding that it is the conduct required to obtain a conviction rather than the consequences resulting from the crime that is relevant (E) holding that the relevant question is whether the courts decision deprived the petitioner of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment
[EX A]: holding that a common employer and administrator does not necessarily influence the administrators decision

[EX Q]: and has not argued that this defendant is a Thimerosal Defendant. Accordingly, the Holders have not shown that the district court e 78 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir.2002) (stating that an order granting a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo). 7 . 343 F.3d 765 (5th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 991, 125 S.Ct. 1823, 161 L.Ed.2d 755 (2005). 8 . 408 F.3d 177 (5th Cir.2005). 9 . 381 F.3d 501 (5th Cir.2004). 10 . 385 F.3d at 571. 11 . Id. at 573 (quoting Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 646-47 (5th Cir.2003)). 12 . Id. 13 . Id. at 574. 14 . Id. 15 . Id. at 575; see also Rainwater v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 636, 638-39 (5th Cir.2004) (noting that the Smallwood "common defense” rule only applies if the defense is "dispositive of all claims against all defendants”). 16 . 408 F.3d at 184 (<HOLDING>). 17 . 381 F.3d 501, 503-04 (5th Cir.2004) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims against a city police chief in his official capacity were really claims against the city (B) holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration (C) holding that claims against vaccine manufacturers were subject to the vaccine act but claims against thimerosal manufacturers were not therefore the cause was properly removed based on a fraudulent joinder theory (D) holding the state law claims were not preempted (E) holding that claims based on asserted violations of the lad and  1983 are not subject to the new jersey tort claims act
[EX A]:
holding that claims against a city police chief in his official capacity were really claims against the city