Given a document, an entity and its sentiment towards the entity, verify if it is the correct sentiment towards the entity. Answer should be yes or no. Note that URLs in the text have been replaced with [Link].

Input: Consider Input: Verify if the sentiment of the following document towards the entity Hershey is Neutral . Higher prices and lower charges sparked a profit increase for Hershey Co. as the nation's second-biggest candy maker continued to push its brands to cost-conscious consumers and gain market share.
 The company also maintained its 2010 adjusted earnings and sales forecasts while boosting its quarterly dividend. The news sent Hershey's stock up 19 cents to $37 in premarket trading.
 Hershey  based in Hershey  Pennsylvania  recently said it would not bid for British rival Cadbury PLC. Cadbury shareholders are expected to vote on Kraft Foods Inc.'s $19.5 billion offer on Tuesday.
 In the prior-year period Hershey's charges totaled 23 cents per share.
 Sales grew 2 percent to $1.41 billion during the quarter which included Halloween and Christmas -- usually a strong period for the maker of Hershey's chocolate bars and Reese's peanut butter cups. Analysts expected $1.42 billion in revenue.
 West said the candymaker will launch its Hershey's Bliss white chocolate during the first half of the year  as well as continue to expand its Pieces product line to include Hershey's Special Dark  Almond Joy and York.
 The company expect to boost its ad spending by 25 to 30 percent to promote brands such as Reese's  Hershey's Kisses  Bliss  Twizzlers  Kit Kat and its namesake. New ad campaigns are also planned for Almond Joy  Mounds and York.
 Hershey said its earnings  combined with improved working capital and higher operating cash flow  led it to raise its quarterly dividend by 2.25 cents to 32 cents. The dividend will be paid on March 15 to shareholders of record Feb. 25.

Output: no


Input: Consider Input: Verify if the sentiment of the following document towards the entity Louis C.K is Neutral . HBO is severing ties with  Louis C.K.  following a New York Times report that the comedian sexually harassed five women  with allegations spanning back to the late '90s.
The premium cable network has confirmed that it has cut  C.K.  from its Night of Too Many Stars charity telecast  an annual event which raises funds for autism services. HBO also announced that it will be pulling the comedian's stand-up specials and previous TV series â including Lucky Louie â from its on-demand platforms.
â Louis C.K.  will no longer be participating in the Night of Too Many Stars: America Unites for Autism Programs  which will be presented live on HBO on November 18 â an HBO spokesperson said  per Variety. âIn addition  HBO is removing  Louis C.K. âs past projects from its On Demand services.â
Meanwhile  FX Networks â the home of  C.K. 's Emmy-winning comedy Louie  where the showrunner has an overall deal and also executive produces Pamela Adlon's Better Things and Zach Galifianakis' Baskets â issued a statement in response to the report.
âWe are obviously very troubled by the allegations about  Louis C.K.  published in The New York Times today. The network has received no allegations of misconduct by  Louis C.K.  related to any of our 5 shows produced together over the past 8 years. FX Networks and FXP take all necessary actions to protect our employees and thoroughly investigate any allegations of misconduct within our workplace. That said  the matter is currently under review.â
Earlier Thursday  the premiere for  C.K. 's upcoming film  I Love You  Daddy  was canceled ahead of the New York Times' story  with the indie's distributor  The Orchard  revealing that the release plan for the film was being reviewed.
âIn light of the allegations concerning  Louis C.K.  referenced in todayâs New York Times  we are cancelling tonightâs premiere of I Love You  Daddy " the statement read. "There is never a place for the behavior detailed in these allegations. As a result  we are giving careful consideration to the timing and release of the film and continuing to review the situation.â
 C.K.  was also scheduled to appear on The Late Show with Stephen Colbert on Thursday night before canceling his appearance  with William H. Macy now set to replace him as a guest  according to the Hollywood Reporter.
Allegations against  C.K.  come on the heels of accusations of sexual misconduct leveled against a number of high-profile Hollywood figures including Harvey Weinstein  James Toback  Kevin Spacey  Roy Price  Brett Ratner  Ed Westwick  Steven Seagal  and Jeffrey Tambor. Hours after the  C.K.  report broke  an allegation of harassment against Mad Men creator Matthew Weiner also surfaced.

Output: no


Input: Consider Input: Verify if the sentiment of the following document towards the entity Kim Jong Un is Neutral . There is nothing the US can do to North Korea that will lead to its renunciation of its nuclear weapons program. That is because North Korea already holds US allies hostage to violence we cannot controlâand may already or will soon pose a similar threat to the US homelandâand thus presents an unacceptable risk of retaliation for any American offensive military action. There is nothing the US can do for North Korea that might induce it to denuclearize  because keeping North Korea on a war footing vis-Ã -vis the US keeps  the regime of Kim Jong Un  in power. There is nothing the international community  including China  can do to North Korea by enforcing sanctions  or for North Korea by relieving it of sanctions  that would convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons because  the regime  is convinced  with some reason  that it is only the threats it poses to others that keep it from suffering regime change. Nevertheless  the US cannot tolerate or co-exist with a North Korean nuclear capability; that is because such a capability would deter the US from protecting its allies were they threatened  extorted or attacked by North Korea. This result would risk dissolution of the American-Pacific alliance and the rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons to former allies that had become intensely nationalistic and anti-American. There is however one option that has yet to be considered and that has some promise.
Itâs true that North Korea used to seek financial assistance in exchange for promises to restrain its weapons programs.  Kim  has changed all that. This isnât because of  his  ferocious and aggressive personality so much as it arises from the evolution of the North Korean regime and its political role in the world.
That role has developed in an ominous new direction since 1989. When Russian subsidies to North Korea disappeared in 1990  the resulting famine killed up to 10% of the North Korean population  but North Korea neither collapsed nor moderated its policies. In fact  we can now see that the development of a nuclear weapons program was a crucial part of  the regimeâs  domestic survival strategy after 1989 precisely because this program provokes US hostility and concern.
During the Cold War  North Korea and South Korea had comparable economic development  and South Korea had a series of highly authoritarian if not totalitarian governments. With the end of the Cold War  South Korea enjoyed a booming economy and a very promising democracy. Internationally  communist governments were collapsing everywhere. But the response of Kim Jung Il was to increase its reliance on military force and put the nation on a war footing for an imminent US invasion. Consumer shortages  famine  rationing were all justified in order to maintain an immense militaryâits active duty army is the fourth largest in the world. The external threat also justified political oppression to identify and destroy traitors. B. R. Myers  a North Korea scholar at Dongseo University in South Korea  has suggested that the famine âmay have strengthened support for  the regime  by [animating a] sense of ethnic victimhood.â Myers concluded in a 2010 book  âit is  the regime âs awareness of a pending legitimacy crisis  not a fear of attack from without  which makes it behave evermore provocatively on the world stage.â Thus US reactions tend to consolidate power in North Korea; and there is nothing we can do to ease the threat to North Korean legitimacy in the long run because the threat to  the regime  derives from global trends that are weakening the domestic hold on power of all industrial nation-state regimes (though  as we shall see  there are steps that can ease  Kim âs domestic anxieties in the near term.)
Moreover  North Korean weaknessâas to which their aggressive foreign policy is a compensationâalso tends to limit US options. I suppose it might be said  âWhen you ainât got nothing  you got nothing to lose.â But it is true with respect to all states that while sanctions can force small foreign policy changes  they cannot effectuate changes that fundamentally threaten the stability and continuity of the government. North Korea sees its weapons as essential to its survivalânot only by keeping its enemies at bay (this is the lesson of Saddam Hussein  Mouammar Khadafy and the Ukraine)âbut nuclear weapons are also essential to the internal stature of  the regime . It is a feature that is not often appreciated of sanctions that they work  or can work  quite successfully  only within a rather narrow sphere because that is their utility. People who say  âSanctions donât work â donât appreciate that if sanctions could result in the kind of policy changes that are wrought from military action  a military response would ensue. Itâs their very limitation that makes sanctions useful.
This suggests that the Chinese  who cannot be indifferent to the proliferation of nuclear weapons to South Korea and Japan  ought to be willing to pressure North Korea into denuclearization. And indeed  pressuring the Chinese to pressure the North Koreans is the substance of current US policy. There are risks in pursuing this policy; China would probably insist on the withdrawal of the THAAD systems from South Korea because they not only protect South Korea from North Korea but also degrade the effectiveness of the Chinese deterrent (even if only marginally). But more important than this is the fact that China really has very little leverage over North Korea. Indeed it should be noted that  Kim  has steadily weakened Chinese influence by purging pro-Chinese North Korean officials. Moreover  there is no negative pressureâcutting off fuel supplies or reducing an already modest trading relationshipâthat could force  the North Korean regime  to change course because  as has been remarked  one does not commit suicide for fear of death. Thus I have concluded that there is nothing the US or China can do to North Koreaâno coercive acts at an acceptable cost to the USâthat will yield the denuclearization of the North Korean arsenal.
But that doesnât mean that there is no conceivable way out of this crisis. On the contrary  one can already see the outlines of a possible negotiation. What follows is a rather radical proposal that has many counterintuitive aspects but which  I have come to believe  represents the best way out of a rapidly deteriorating position. This option would be to induce a nuclear guarantee for  the North Korean regime from China âan instance of Chinese extended deterrence.
Jang Song Thaek  Kimâs uncle  was North Koreaâs principal interlocutor with China. His arrest and executionâas well as the removal of dozens of other officials associated with closer ties to Chinaâmarked a turning point in Kimâs rejection of a foreign policy that attempted to promote economic growth in favor of a âmilitary firstâ policy. His truculent indifference to Chinese sensibilities was confirmed when he ordered the assassination in February of his brother  Kim Jong Nam  who had been living in Macao under Chinese protection. Then earlier this month  Kim Jong Un pointedly chose the week of Xi Jinpingâs BRICS summit in Beijing to detonate a nuclear test. So one mustnât oversell the chance of success for this proposal.
But if the policy I propose is the least bad for the US to pursueâif it is imperative that we at least try this new option before resorting to war or accepting defeatâis it not also the least bad option for North Korea in light of the certain decline of its long-term security in the face of advancing US first-strike technology? Remember that it was  Kim âs awareness of a crisis in legitimacy that drove  him  to the âmilitary-firstâ policy. The integration of China into the international system  rather than the collapse of the Soviet satellite regimes  could show a new path toward the domestic legitimation of  Kimâs regime . Our aim must be to re-orient  Kim âs paranoia  making  him  more afraid of losing an attractive opportunity for security in the eyes of  his  own people than  he  is afraid of dependence on China.
No one will take this radical proposal seriously unless we stop deluding ourselves about the incentives we can realistically employ to compel  the North Korean regime . There is no chance that anything short of an ironclad guarantee of their preservation as a dynastic regime free from outside intervention will modify their behavior. They will starve their people and run almost incalculable risks because they have no other credible choice. And no guarantee that the US gives is credible to the North Korean leadership.
This observation leads one to draw a couple of further conclusions that are sometimes absent in the public debate. The first is that as our alliances are what are actually threatened  we should move swiftly to shore these up. Consultations with our allies in Tokyo  Canberra and Seoul are paramount. What do they want to see from us? How can we avoid embarrassing them in front of their own publics without hamstringing the protection of our legitimate security interests? Second  we should not make threats that validate Kimâs rhetoric by making it appear that we are planning to punish him for his rhetoric. That there is a plot by the Americans to destroy  his regime  is the fundamental premise of his domestic propaganda as well as his thinking.
In summary  economic sanctions  and/or threats of our military action can push  Kim  towards negotiations but in the end those negotiations will be highly likely to founder on  his  need for nuclear guarantees. We need to prepare for the fact that a resolution of the current crisis will likely require a PRC guarantee. Are we prepared to support that? I think we should be. The course I propose is not without costs: it might increase the risk of a Chinese-US confrontation  and it would link Chinese nuclear strategy to a surrogate state that is inclined to get into conflicts. It is  however  a more promising option than any being canvassed at the present. And time  at this juncture  is not on our side.


Output: yes