instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
may grant preliminary injunctive relief in any civil action if the granting of such relief is appropriate under the facts upon which the action is based.” 16 U.S.C. § 3117(a). 3 . As used in ANILCA, (1) The term "land” means lands, waters, and interests therein. (2) The term “Federal land” means lands the title to which is in the United States after December 2, 1980. (3)The term "public lands” means land situated in Alaska which ... are Federal lands.... 16 U.S.C. § 3102(1) — (3). 4 . Although navigability determinations have not yet been made on most of Alaska’s waterways, it is likely that few waterways of significance to fisheries will be classified as non-navigable due to the expansive definition of navigable. See, e.g., Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401, 1402-08 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919, 110 S.Ct. 1949, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that river with depths of 1 to 3 feet and usable by inflatable rafts and small motorboats was navigable (B) holding lake on private land was not navigable in fact and there was no right of public use and enjoyment as lake was not fed by or part of a navigable stream (C) holding that riparians owners have the right of access to the navigable part of the river  the right to make a landing wharf or pier  subject to such general rules and regulations of the legislature (D) holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states (E) holding that congress had the authority under the commerce clause to require private riparian land owners to obtain a license prior to construction of dams even where the river in question was not navigable but could potentially have been made navigable
answer:
(A)


question:
case because in Revenue Cabinet, as here, the sales tax statute did not impose a test for passage of title, and an administrative rule did impose a test for passage of title. Id. at 738-39. Here, Hales makes no claim that the impermanence of its materials results in a generally understood, implicit agreement to pass title at some point before delivery. Moreover, our statute requires an explicit agreement on passage of title before the statutory presumption can be rebutted; there is no obvious provision in this statute for an implicit understanding, which the Kentucky court thought sufficient. Consequently, the facts of Revenue Cabinet aré inapposite and its result is inapplicable to the case at bar. See also Kurtz Concrete, Inc. v. Spradling, 560 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo.1978) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the Commission applied the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title insurer not in business of supplying information in issuing either title commitment or policy of title insurance for purposes of exception to moorman prohi bition against recovery of economic losses in tort further holding that contract defines title insurers liability (B) holding that title passes on mixture of readymix concrete because of usage of trade (C) recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim (D) holding in a slander of title action that attorneys fees are recoverable as part of the costs of removing the cloud from the title (E) holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title
answer:
(B)


question:
summary judgment of obviousness. However, Perricone did move for summary judgment of nonobviousness in 2001. See Dkt. #216. The issue of obviousness being fully briefed by the parties (see Dkt. # # 417, 419, 421) the Court finds that it is appropriate to consider the issue on summary judgment, rather than conducting a trial in the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The Court further finds that Medicis’ motion relies only on prior art otherwise disclosed to Perricone during discovery, and that there is no prejudice to Perricone from the nature of Medicis' discovery responses. Thus, the Court grants leave to file the 2006 motion for summary judgment, and renews the 2001 motions for summary judgment. 8 . See e.g., Monaplastics, Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 378 F.2d 20, 21 (2d Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>) Further, the Court notes that Perricone has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment of obviousness was appropriately granted despite lack of expert testimony because device would have been obvious to persons having ordinary skill in the plastics molding industry and would even have been obvious to ordinary laymen of modest intelligence (B) holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed (C) holding that the determination of whether a products dangers are obvious is made from the perspective of an ordinary user of the product rather than an ordinary person who is unfamiliar with the product (D) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible (E) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care
answer:

(A)