In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

before it was in assumpsit for attorney fees purposes. See Schulz, 67 Haw. at 436, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Higa is not directly on point, its reasoning is a compelling indication of how the Hawaii Supreme Court would rule on the attorney fee question before us. The plaintiffs also seek to distinguish Higa because it involved a client suing his own attorney, and thus in that case there was privity of contract between the two parties. In the present case, Mrs. Helfand was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the defendants and Mr. Helfand. This distinction is irrelevant. Courts have extended the right to sue for breach of contract to intended third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12, 883 P.2d 38, 48 n. 12 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 82 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies (B) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (C) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (D) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract (E) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status
(D)

(8th Cir.2007)). “Continuances are generally disfavored and are not granted without a compelling reason.” Id. We have held the FSA is not retroactive. See United States v. Smith, 632 F.3d 1043, 1047-49 (8th Cir.2011) (concluding “the general savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, requires us to apply the penalties in place at the time the crime was committed”) (quoting United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909-10 n. 7 (8th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. McBride, — Fed.Appx. -,-, No. 10-2689, 2011 WL 2206725, at *2 (8th Cir.June 8, 2011) (unpub. per curiam). But even if we assume Woods can show prejudice, Woods fails to provide any support for his contention the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion. See id. at-, 2011 WL 2206725, at *3 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hawthorne, 414 Fed.Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a second continuance until congress acted on the fsa and assuming error no prejudice exists because the fsa is not retroactive (B) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (C) holding that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in denying a continuance because she acted within reason by accommodating the attorney (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form
(A)

family situation. The federal courts are not well suited to this task. They are not local institutions, they do not have staffs of social workers, and there is too little commonality between family law adjudication and the normal responsibilities of federal judges to give them the experience they would need to be able to resolve domestic disputes with skill and sensitivity. 694 F.2d at 492. 4 . In various unpublished cases, we have continued to limit the domestic-relations exception to “cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree,” Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704, 112 S.Ct. 2206, and cases seeking to modify or interpret a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree. See, e.g., Abdallah v. Abdallah, No. 98-1551, 1999 WL 331631, at *1 (6th Cir. May 13, 1999) (<HOLDING>); Chambers v. Michigan, 473 Fed.Appx. 477, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the domesticrelations exception prevented the plaintiff from challenging in federal court the constitutionality of the statecourt judges decision to consider certain assets and property when calculating the plaintiffs husbands income for the purposes of determining alimony payments because the plaintiff ultimately wanted this court to enjoin the state court from using property  to determine the amount of alimony owed (B) holding that fraud creates an exception to the rule (C) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud (D) holding that under the pre1986 jurisdictional limitation a claim by the state which discovered the fraud investigated the fraud disclosed the fraud to the federal government and which was the original source of the information was jurisdictionally barred (E) holding that the domesticrelations exception barred federal adjudication of a statelaw fraud action because the plaintiff essentially sought a modification of the process in the divorce decree relating to distribution

(E)