In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: court’s credibility determinations “unless the court credited testimony that was essentially unbelievable as a matter of law,” United States v. Smith, 308 F.3d 726, 746 (7th Cir.2002). There is no clear error in the district court’s decision to credit the presentence investigation report and Officer Morrissey’s sworn testimony over the unsworn, hearsay statement of the defendant. See United States v. Torres-Ramirez, 213 F.3d 978, 980-81 (7th Cir.2000) (‘When the sentence rests on testimony under oath ... it is enough that the judge believe the witness — unless the testimony is illogical or contradicted by documents or other physical evidence, making it clearly erroneous to accept the witness’s version of events.”); United States v. Krankel, 164 F.3d 1046, 1054-55 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Campbell directs us to no inconsistencies in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error (B) holding that where defendant did not offer any rebuttal evidence to refute presentence report district court  was free to adopt facts in psi without further inquiry (C) holding that court may satisfy factual basis requirement by examining presentence report (D) holding that bald unsupported assertions by the defendant cannot refute presentence investigation report (E) holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report

Output: holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error


Input: Consider Input: act, 1976 PA 267, MCL 15.261 to 15.275. (3) If the board arbitrarily and capriciously violates section 7(9), the board shall he subject to the penalties prescribed in the freedom of information act, 1976 PA 442, MCL 15.231 to 15.246. B If “a statute gives new rights and prescribes new remedies, such remedies must be strictly pursued; and a party seeking a remedy under the act is confined to the remedy conferred thereby and to that only.” Monroe Beverage Co, Inc v Stroh Brewery Co, 454 Mich 41, 45; 559 NW2d 297 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “[w]hen a statute provides a remedy for enforcement of a common-law right, the statutory scheme is merely cumulative and not exclusive.” Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc, 273 Mich App 187, 201; 729 NW2d 898 (2006) (<HOLDING>). At common law there has always been a remedy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration (B) holding that the plaintiffs claims for unjust enrichment were not barred by the availability of relief under the public works bonding act mcl 129201 et seq because a plaintiff enjoyed the right at common law to recover in quantum meruit from a defendant who had been unjustly enriched (C) recognizing that action for quantum meruit relief exists to avoid unjust enrichment (D) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed

Output: holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration


Input: Consider Input: egregious harm from the trial court’s error in submitting the lesser-included-offense charge. V. Conclusion We sustain appellant’s third issue to the extent that it concerns whether the State was entitled to the lesser-included-offense charge under the first step of the Rousseau lesser-included-offense test. Given our disposition, we need not consider the remainder of appellant’s third issue (concerning whether the State was entitled to the lesser-included-offense charge under the second step of the Rousseau lesser-included-offense test) or appellant’s second issue (concerning the factual sufficiency of the evidence). We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause with instructions to dismiss the indictment. See Hampton v. State, 165 S.W.3d 691, 694 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (<HOLDING>) (footnotes omitted); Konchar v. State, 938 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the greater offense is  by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it (B) holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense (C) holding that court of appealss remedy on remand from reversal for harmful charge error based on failure to meet second step of rousseau lesserincludedoffense test was to remand for a retrial for the lesser offense  because the jurys verdict that the appellant was guilty of the lesserincluded offense  operates as an acquittal of the greater offense  to which jeopardy had attached this prevents a retrial for the greater offense but not for the lesser offense (D) holding that where jury was instructed on both a greater offense and lesserincluded offense and the jury convicted on the lesserincluded offense the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense (E) recognizing that it is within  our power to direct entry of judgment on a lesser included offense when vacating a greater offense if the commission of the lesser offense can be established from facts that the jury actually found citations omitted


Output: holding that the greater offense is  by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it