In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: intended to purchase the entire 9.69 acre parcel described in the purchase and sale agreement. These findings have support in the record. Based on the evidence, the trial court could reasonably have been persuaded that it was highly probable that the parties operated under a mutual mistake as to the description in the deed. [¶ 18] Roger also argues that the doctrine of merger by deed prohibits reformation. “The doctrine of merger by deed provides that once a ... deed is accepted it becomes the final statement of the agreement between the parties and nullifies all provisions of the purchase-and-sale agreement.” Bryan, 665 A.2d at 1022 (quotation marks omitted). Merger by deed, however, does not prohibit reformation upon proof of a mutual mistake of fact at the time of closing. Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). C. Joint Accounts [¶ 19] Roger contends that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed (B) holding in part that party seeking reformation of deed must show the original intent or agreement of parties by clear and convincing evidence (C) holding merger by deed prohibits reformation when one of the parties learns of a mistake before closing and still signs the deed (D) holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed (E) recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: federal courts intervene in the matter. The argument is unavailing, however, where the pending question is whether the Board’s proceedings constitute an effort by the state to impose its regulatory authority in a field preempted by Congress. See Association of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 208 F.3d 1, 2000 WL 298563, at *3 (1st Cir. March 27, 2000)(finding that the court’s initial invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was unwise where “the ultimate legal determination of whether the Massachusetts regulations are preempted by the [federal Clean Air Act] is a question of federal preemption law for the courts alone to decide”); Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 41 (1st Cir.1972)(<HOLDING>). The state defendants also move to dismiss 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and it does not matter that the plaintiff was using state law as the vehicle to press her assertion (B) holding that plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before the puerto rico labor relations board before invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine whether the boards assertion of jurisdiction was proper (C) recognizing the general rule that parties must exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from federal courts  (D) holding that plaintiff could not present his erisa estoppel claim to the district court because he did not properly exhaust it before the administrative review board (E) holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: Juan Rogelio Barajas-Hernandez appeals his 63-month sentence imposed upon conviction after jury trial for illegal reentry of a previously deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm. Barajas-Hernandez first challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for acquittal, based on his contention that the prosecution did not prove his prior conviction at trial as required by Apprendi v. New 44 (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1061, 120 S.Ct. 1572, 146 L.Ed.2d 475 (2000) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that 1996 amendment specifically applies regardless of date of prior conviction constituting aggravated felony (B) holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction (C) holding that the expanded definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively in actions taken on or after september 30 1996 (D) holding that  212c applies to all applications for relief filed after november 29 1990 regardless of when conviction occurred for offenses within the original definition of aggravated felony (E) recognizing that 1996 amendment to definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively


Output: (A)