instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
did not present any evidence before the district court to meet his burden of showing that the affidavit, which directly corroborates Johnson’s testimony before the magistrate judge, is false or unreliable. Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that the district court erred, we readily conclude that any error was harmless. B. Credibility of Witnesses The district court’s findings of fact at a revocation hearing are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316, 318 (11th Cir.1993). “The credibility of a witness is in the province of the factfinder and this court will not ordinarily review the factfinder’s determination of credibility.” United States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412, 413 (11th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We defer to the lower court’s credibility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony (B) holding jury is sole judge of witness credibility and may believe some witnesses and refuse to believe others (C) holding jury as judge of credibility may believe all some or none of the testimony (D) holding in the context of a criminal trial that a courts choice of who to believe is conclusive unless the judge credits exceedingly improbable testimony (E) holding that where testimony is inherently improbable the court may choose to disregard it
answer:
holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony


question:
for these terms in the specifications or prosecution histories of the ’403-S or ’838 patents. Furthermore, the fact that the inventors removed the term “comprising” from Claim 1 of the ’403-S patent does not change the plain meaning of the term “composition,” which remains in the final version of the claim. Moreover, if the court were to adopt the construction of the ’403-S claims put forth by Glaxo, Claim 1 would contradict Claim 1 of the ’838 patent, which retains the term “comprising” and claims the process for producing the compositions described in ’403-S patent. Such a construction would be inconsistent. In light of these findings, the court concludes that the terms “comprising” and “composition” must be construed according to their plain meanings. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (<HOLDING>). As a result, the phrases “immunoglobulin 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that words in claims are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning unless the patentee clearly sets forth a different in the specification or file history (B) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (C) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning (D) recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning (E) holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning
answer:
holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning


question:
Koonin, argued that the indictment was filed one day too late. Id. The government countered that when “computing the time within which a prosecution may be commenced, the first day counted is the day following that on which the offense was committed.” Id. (emphasis added). The Second Circuit agreed with the government’s argument, noting that”[t]he long-established general rule is that a statute of limitations begins to run on the day following the day on which the event giving rise to the cause of action occurred.” Id. at 901 (citing Burnet v. Willingham Loan & Trust Co., 282 U.S. 437, 439, 51 S.Ct. 185, 75 L.Ed. 448 (1931)). This principle, the Court noted, had been applied in criminal as well as civil cases. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 533 F.2d 921, 923, 926 (5th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). As Davis illustrated, this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that government may prove facts outside the overt acts alleged in the indictment (B) holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators (C) recognizing requirement that defendant conspired to commit an overt act in state in furtherance of the conspiracy (D) holding that for an indictment returned on september 5 1974 to be timely the government had to prove that the defendant committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy on or after september 5 1969 (E) holding criminal conspiracy is sustained where the commonwealth establishes the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy a coconspirator may commit the overt act and conspirators are liable for acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy
answer:

holding that government may prove facts outside the overt acts alleged in the indictment