instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
reasonable presumption against waiver should be indulged. Commonwealth v. Hooks, 375 Mass. 284, 288 (1978). A defendant’s illiteracy or low intelligence is not dispositive of his capacity to waive Miranda rights and render a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary confession. See Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 346, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 86-87 (2000) (concluding that the defendant, who had a learning disability and an IQ in the eighties, validly waived his rights in light of his “considerable prior experience with the police and in receiving Miranda warnings,” as well as his “cunning” attempts to exculpate himself “after being confronted with the [ ] evidence against him”); Commonwealth v. Hartford, 425 Mass. 378, 380-81 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Dingle, 73 Mass.App.Ct. 274, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a 15yearold was of suitable intelligence and maturity to validly waive miranda rights specifically focusing on the fact that the juvenile had been advised of his rights on three prior occasions and had once asked for an attorney (B) recognizing that plaintiffs had standing to allege infringements of their first amendment rights where the record established that they had been threatened with enforcement of the statute and that such enforcement would cause them injury (C) holding that language difficulties may impair the ability of a person in custody to waive his miranda  rights in a free and aware manner (D) holding admissible suspects statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his miranda rights (E) holding that irrespective of the suspects limited reasoning ability and iq of 73 evidence that the suspect had held various parttime jobs had been living on his own possessed a drivers license and had prior experience with law enforcement was probative of competence to waive miranda rights
answer:
holding that a 15yearold was of suitable intelligence and maturity to validly waive miranda rights specifically focusing on the fact that the juvenile had been advised of his rights on three prior occasions and had once asked for an attorney


question:
where the-plaintiff seeks to subject private parties to § 1983 liability by bestowing on them the title of state actors. The instant case does not involve a situation where the State has “ ‘so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private party] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.’ ” Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1131 (quoting NBC ¶. Communications Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir.1988) (citation omitted)). The Eleventh Circuit in Harvey, confronting facts similar to the case at bar and the issue of whether involuntary commitment by private parties may be considered state action, found an insufficient nexus between the defendants, a private hospital and private physicians, and the State. See id.; see also Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 258 (<HOLDING>). The court observed that “[b]oth the Supreme 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ccmc and its employees were not state actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus test (B) holding that massachusetts statute did not create a sufficiently close nexus between private hospital and the state to warrant labeling private actors state actors (C) holding that foster parents are not state actors (D) holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability (E) holding that private hospital and physicians who involuntarily committed plaintiff under massachusetts statute were not state actors noting that state regulation even if extensive and receipt of federal funds do not establish state action
answer:
holding that ccmc and its employees were not state actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus test


question:
of section 440.13, Florida Statutes, controls. See Butler v. Bay Center/Chubb Ins. Co., 947 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (procedural changes apply without regard to the date of accident). Section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2005), allows a claimant to make one change in his treating physician during the course of treatment for an accident. The carrier is to authorize an alternative physician who is not professionally affiliated with the prior treating physician. However, “[ujnder the 2005 version of the workers’ compensation law, the employer/carrier is no longer statutorily required to provide a claimant with the choice of three physicians.” Butler, 947 So.2d at 573. To be entitled to a change in physician, claimant must first avail himself of the treatment authorized. Id. (<HOLDING>). Here, claimant was not entitled to a onetime 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing physician assistant as agent of the supervising physician (B) holding that a claimant establishes a prima facie case for compensable medical treatment where a qualified physician indicates treatment was necessary for a workrelated condition (C) holding testimony about plaintiffs mental and physical state before treatment by physician was relevant (D) holding the procedural right to request a onetime change of physician during the course of treatment does not attach until claimant actually begins treatment with the initially authorized physician (E) holding that a claimants benefits were rightly suspended under what is now section 8434043 when the claimant did not return to the authorized physician for treatment
answer:

recognizing physician assistant as agent of the supervising physician