In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,-, 117 S.Ct. 832, 838, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that ERISA preempts state common law tort and contract causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured employee benefit plan. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57. The detailed provisions of ERISA § 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that “would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.” Id. at 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549. Similarly, we have held that state law tort and contract claims as well as violations of a state insurance statute are preempted by ERISA. Tingey, 953 F.2d at 1131 (<HOLDING>). In a factually similar case, we held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and negligent misrepresentations (B) holding plaintiffs causes of action for breach of contract breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the arizona insurance code were preempted by erisa (C) holding that erisa  514a preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it was based on the same conduct as a preempted claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (E) holding that the plaintiffs state common law causes of actions for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as well as a statutory cause of action for unfair insurance practices under the california insurance code were preempted by erisa
[EX A]: holding that erisa preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and negligent misrepresentations

[EX Q]: law did not authorize the arresting officer to require Turbyne to take a breath test when the blood test was unavailable. Gillett, 629 P.2d at 619 n. 10. Nor do our decisions in Gillett and Riley construe the statute as allowing the police to compel a different test when extraordinary circumstances prevent administration of the driver-selected test. The good cause exception we established in those cases applies to excuse the judicial sanction of dismissal of the charges when the police are prevented in circumstances beyond their control from administering the driver-selected test. As Shinaut and Dike demonstrate, when a driver selected to take the chemical test not initially selected, he or she may have voluntarily consented to the search of his or her person. Shinaut, 940 P.2d at 384 (<HOLDING>). When the controlling facts are undisputed, as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation (B) holding that error in excluding a police officers report was harmless where the same evidence was presented by another witness (C) holding that a person must request a reasonable accommodation before he has been terminated he cannot wait until he is terminated and then months later  request reinstatement and demand a reasonable accommodation (D) holding that erroneous accommodation of a citizens request by a police officer does not warrant the sanction of excluding evidence (E) holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada
[EX A]: holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation

[EX Q]: the delay outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. A district court is “required to set out its reasons for granting an ‘ends of justice’ continuance” to provide a record for appellate review, otherwise “the time is not excludible.” United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d 517, 520 (3d Cir.1982). Additionally, once a district court grants a continuance we have “strongly urged” district courts “not to wait and rely on counsel to inform them when defendants are ready to go to trial.” United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 883 (3d Cir.1992). Here, the district court ruled that this was a complex case because of the number of defendants, and the fact that the indictment contained fifty separate charges. See United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 444 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Although Gutierrez attempts to refute that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that speedy trial act requires that an ends of justice continuance be specifically limited in time (B) holding that fivemonth openended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate speedy trial act (C) holding that where the case is technically not closed and the ends of justice may best be served by the admission of crucial evidence it is an abuse of the trial courts discretion to deny the introduction of such evidence (D) holding that an ends of justice continuance may be appropriate where the case is unusual or complex (E) holding that an ends of justice continuance is proper when a case is complex and involves multiple codefendants and multiple overt acts occurring in multiple states and in which the complexity outweighs the interests of individual defendants
[EX A]:
holding that speedy trial act requires that an ends of justice continuance be specifically limited in time