In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Petitioner Jaswinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we grant the petition for review. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s order without discussion, thus we review the substance of the immigration judge’s order. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845 (9th Cir.2003). The IJ erred when she found Singh’s testimony inconsistent and implausible, and therefore the record compels finding Singh’s testimony, credible. Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). First, the IJ erred when she found that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an adverse credibility determination is overturned only if each proffered reason for the determination fails (B) holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination (C) holding that an adverse credibility determination must be supported by a true inconsistency (D) holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum (E) holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true
[A]: (A)


[Q]: as here, the recalcitrant witness is at liberty pending appeal. In so holding, we join all of the circuits which have squarely addressed the issue. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 906 F.2d 78, 82-83 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom. Backiel v. United States, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990); In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 189 (D.C.Cir.1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 785 F.2d 629, 631 n. 4 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Johnson, 736 F.2d 358, 361-62 n. 5 (6th Cir.1984); In re Witness Before Special October 1981 Grand Jury, 722 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir.1983); In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir.1982); Brown v. United States, 465 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.1972). But see In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928, 96 S.Ct. 276, 46 L.Ed.2d 256 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The foregoing cases have noted that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the deadmans statute should not be extended by judicial construction to cases not clearly within its terms (B) recognizing that denying outofeell exercise for extended periods may constitute cruel and unusual punishment (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration (E) holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to guantanamo
[A]: (D)


[Q]: reach Plaintiffs and did reach Plaintiffs explaining that additional life insurance was available at $4.95 per $15,000 in coverage.” (Compl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that Walker did not exercise reasonable care or competence when he made these statements and that Plaintiff and Mr. Kersh “reasonably relied on these representations to their detriment....” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that if she and Mr. Kersh had been informed that they could not purchase $750,000 in life insurance from UHC, “they would have purchased the same through another company.” (Id.) For the reasons given in the preceding section, this state-law claim, which is brought against non-ERISA entities and does not seek benefits under an ERISA plan, is not subject to conflict preemption. See Access Mediquip, 662 F.3d at 385 (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Zoellner, 114 F.3d 713 (8th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insureds declaratory judgment class action claims seeking to retain tort settlements following their insurers claims for reimbursement were claims to enforce their rights under the terms of the plan and to clarify their rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan under erisa (B) holding that erisa did not preempt hospitals claims against erisa plan administrator for misrepresentation under texas insurance code because hospitals claims were not dependent on or derived from the beneficiarys right to recover benefits under the plan (C) holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant (D) holding that claims were preempted where the factual basis of the complaint was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits (E) holding that third partys suit against plan administrator for misrepresentation was not related to erisa plan because the finder of fact need only determine 1 the amount and terms of reimbursement that plaintiff could reasonably have expected given what could fairly be inferred from defendants statements and 2 whether defendants subsequent disposition of the reimbursement claims was consistent with that expectation
[A]:
(E)