In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts.” Mungin v. State, 982 So.2d 986, 998 (Fla.2006). A. Stipulating to Evidence for the Motion to Suppress Parker’s May 7, 1982, Statement In this claim, Parker contends that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the evidence used to decide whether his May 7, 1982, statement was admissible. Parker’s May 7 statement was admitted during the resentencing proceeding through the testimony of Detective Powers. Because Parker had invoked his right to counsel prior to making the May 7 statement, the admissibility of that statement under United States Supreme Court precedent turns on whether Parker initiated the May 7 contact with law enforcement. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The stipulated evidence included hearsay 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available  unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (B) holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (C) holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications (D) holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (E) holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police

Output: holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police


Input: Consider Input: State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444, 221 A.2d 521 (1966))); Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170, 733 A.2d 1159 (1999). Our construction of N.J.S.A 39:4-88(b) is thus consonant with established principles of statutory construction. | IV. Applying statutes that are identical or very similar to the statute before the Court, courts of other states have reached varying conclusions. Several decisions have construed analogous statutes to describe two offenses, as this Court construes N.J.S.A 39:4-88(b). See People v. Butler, 81 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 146 Cal.Rptr. 856, 857 (Cal.Ct.App.1978) (construing Cal. Veh.Code § 21658 to state “two affirmative duties placed upon the operator of a motor vehicle”); People v. Smith, 172 Ill.2d 289, 216 Ill.Dec. 658, 665 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Marx, 289 Kan. 657, 215 P.3d 601, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders (B) holding that plain language of 625 ill comp stat ann 511709 establishes two separate requirements for lane usage (C) holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning (D) holding that in context of motion for reconsideration or to reopen congress envisioned two separate timely petitions for review of two separate final orders (E) holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms

Output: holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders


Input: Consider Input: that “[e]ven if the release plate had not been designed at the time the contract was entered, the sonobuoys conformed to the description of the goods contained in the contract .... ” Def.’s Supp. Br. at 8. Defendant says the description of the sonobuoys in the contract was merely 335 sonobuoys with dual depth capability; the release plate was not significant to the overall sonobuoy design described in the ECP, and was only a passing reference. Def.’s Reply at 4; Def.’s Supp. Br. at 8. Sparton contests these points and argues that the patented inventions were never part of the offer for sale because the ’0465 Contract does not encompass each limitation of the claimed inventions or render them obvious. See e.g., Tec Air Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Mich. Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). In so arguing, Plaintiff points specifically 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the one challenging the patent must in part show that the subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered it obvious by its addition to the prior art (B) holding a determination that an invention was onsale within the meaning of the statute requires that a sale be operable the complete invention claimed be embodied in or obvious from the device offered for sale and the sale or offer be primarily for profit rather than for experimental purposes (C) holding that even credited testimony by an interested party absent corroborating documents is not sufficient to support a finding that a patent was anticipated by prior knowledge or use of the claimed invention (D) holding that the moving party must show prior art references which alone or combined with other references would have rendered the invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (E) holding that an assignment or sale of rights in the invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of the invention within the meaning of section 102b


Output: holding a determination that an invention was onsale within the meaning of the statute requires that a sale be operable the complete invention claimed be embodied in or obvious from the device offered for sale and the sale or offer be primarily for profit rather than for experimental purposes