In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: Joseph F. Nascimento and his minor daughter Kendall E. Nascimento appeal pro se the district court’s dismissal, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), of their civil rights action seeking reversal of a Montana state court decision regarding the custody of Kendall Nascimento. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal and affirm. See H.C. v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should abstain when an exercise of jurisdiction might lead to a parallel federal regulatory review mechanism complicating state administration (B) holding that federal district courts should abstain from interfering with pending state court proceedings (C) holding that courts should only abstain under younger if the state proceedings are coercive and not remedial and citing a number of district court opinions (D) recognizing that the longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings generally requires federal courts to abstain from involvement in state criminal proceedings (E) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law

Output: holding that a court should abstain when an exercise of jurisdiction might lead to a parallel federal regulatory review mechanism complicating state administration


Input: Consider Input: cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071, 113 S.Ct. 1027, 122 L.Ed.2d 172 (1993). Moreover, after Lopez, courts have recognized that this de minimis standard continues in effect. United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1713, 137 L.Ed.2d 837 (1997); United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (10th Cir.1995). This is because § 1956 regulates activities that, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (stating that “where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence”); cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1361, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 463 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce (B) holding that commerce clause did not provide congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of violence against women act inasmuch as provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce (C) recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce (D) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce (E) holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce

Output: holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce


Input: Consider Input: supervisory official may be liable because he or she created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed such a policy or custom to continue. [4] [A] supervisory official may be personally liable if he or she was grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event. [5] [Supervisory liability may be imposed where an official demonstrates “gross negligence” or “deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional practices are taking place. Wright, 21 F.3d at 501; see Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir.1995); Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323-24 (2d Cir.1986) (citations omitted); McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 125 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). A review of the plaintiffs complaint reveals 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice (B) holding that a defendant is entitled to credit only for periods in which defendant is in actual or constructive control of jail or prison officials (C) holding that because the hospital had no actual or constructive notice that the parties were separated at the time services were rendered the separation exception did not apply (D) holding that defendant coughlin had actual or constructive notice of unconstitutional procedures and therefore could not escape personal responsibility (E) holding trial court and appellate court erred in requiring defendant to show he had meritorious defense when record established that defendant had filed answer but had no actual or constructive notice of trial setting


Output: holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice