In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: automobiles are likewise per se reasonable given probable cause, then by the same logic any search or seizure could be carried out without a warrant, and we would simply have read the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution”). The Court cannot allow law enforcement to emasculate well settled constitutional protections in order to cure their own mistake. 9 . The Court notes that the Supreme Court has implied that exigent circumstances are never necessary to justify a warrantless search, but has never expressly stated such a conclusion without first noting that the vehicle in question was somehow readily mobile. See Search And Seizure, supra at 477-81, 91 S.Ct. 2022. As a result, lower courts have split when interpreting its meaning. See United States v. Reed, 26 F.3d 523 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Reis, 906 F.2d 284 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that among the circumstances accepted as providing exigent circumstances for a warrantless search are those where a true emergency exists (B) holding that officers cannot base a warrantless search on an exigent circumstance of their own creation (C) holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest (D) holding that camey notwithstanding the fact that a car is moveable alone is not sufficiently exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search (E) holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: industry is constitutional.” Reply [# 29] at 3. Defendants maintain that “the Court may not rely on a federal regulation (9 C.F.R. § 2.126) or on the Guide to conclude that the Fourth Amendment right at issue is clearly established.” Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Defendants further argue that even if the Court considered the regulation and the Guide, they do not limit the APHIS’ powers of inspection or set policy. Id. at 5. As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that they are not challenging the statutory scheme governing the USDA’s warrantless searches, but rather are challenging the application of that statutory scheme by the Inspector Defendants on May 7, 2013 at Big Cats. See, e.g., LeSueur-Richmond Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261, 268-69 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). In LeSueur, the Fourth Circuit closely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy (B) holding that under the fourth amendment a party may challenge both the constitutionality of the act permitting warrantless searches as well as the conduct of the government officials in a particular case (C) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause (D) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (E) holding there is no requirement that the government obtains a warrant at the first moment probable cause exists  the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of warrantless searches is one of reasonableness under the circumstances

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: 1148, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 443, 253 P.3d 535, 544 (2011) (reaffirming Armenta, 42 Cal.2d 448, 267 P.2d 303, after the adoption of comparative negligence) (“[T]he objective of comparative fault is to achieve an equitable allocation of loss. That objective is not served by subjecting the employer to a second share of fault in addition to that assigned to the employee and for which the employer has accepted liability.”); Loom Craft Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Gorrell, 823 S.W.2d 431, 432 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (retaining the McHaffie rule after the adoption of comparative negligence) (“We believe the better rule is to apportion fault only among those directly involved in the accident, and to hold the entrustor liable for the percentage of fault apportioned to the driver.”); McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826 (<HOLDING>); Gant, 331 Ill.App.3d 924, 264 Ill.Dec. 459, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rule applies regardless of the comparative fault of the employer versus the employee (B) holding that the donovan rule applies regardless of whether the injunction is issued before or after the federal court filing (C) holding that inferred intent rule applies regardless of the age of the actor (D) holding that with respect to noneconomic damages section 768813 requires that an employers comparative fault must be considered by the jury in a negligence suit by an employee against a manufacturer even though the employer is immune from liability under the workers compensation law (E) holding that an employee could not establish pretext when the employer in good faith believed that the employee engaged in misconduct regardless whether the employee in fact engaged in the misconduct


Output: (A)