In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: claim because "she was not diligent in preserving her legal rights”); Felty, 818 F.2d at 1129 ("One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.”) (quoting Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)); United States ex rel. Cogifer, S.A. v. Ins. Co. of North Am., Civ. A. No. 86-183-NN, 1987 WL 19932, at *4 (E.D.Va. Oct. 15, 1987) (unpublished). 11 . See, e.g., Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir. 1990). 12 . See, e.g., Humble Oil, 402 F.2d at 896 (finding equitable estoppel where surety reneged on promise to pay after statute of limitations had run). 13 . See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nelson v. Reliance Ins. Co., 436 F.2d 1366, 1371 (10th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Atlas Erection Co. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation (B) holding that an agreement which required the submission of an affidavit of payment to subcontractors or lien waivers before payment was made by the general contractor was for the direct benefit of the subcontractors (C) holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors (D) holding that estoppel applied where surety repeatedly responded to subcontractors threats to sue with answers which assured them that amicable settlement was just around the corner (E) holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety
[A]: holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation


[Q]: his claims based on injury to his eye and knees. But Mr. Sanders does not state any basis for his challenge to those decisions. Finally, Mr. Sanders claims that he has been deprived of due process and discriminated against based on his race. As already stated, we have jurisdiction to consider constitutional arguments. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). But Mr. Sanders does not provide any facts to substantiate his arguments. Nor do we see any basis for his arguments in the record. In the absence of any evidentiary support, Mr. Sanders’s passing remarks amount to no more than a constitutional label for his otherwise factual disagreement "with the decisions of the Veterans Court and the Board. That does not suffice to create jurisdiction. See Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 225 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal (B) holding that rcw 1040200 does not create a constitutional right to be advised of immigration consequences therefore failure to comply with statute does not create constitutional harm (C) holding that a board decision is required to vest the court of veterans appeals with jurisdiction over a claimants appeal (D) holding that mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim (E) holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court
[A]: holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal


[Q]: intent] at the time it rejected” the plaintiff). Sonic contends that no one replaced Israel, and because Youngblood was the first employee hired into the F & I Department, his age precludes the court from finding Israel has met his prima facie case. Ironically, using Youngblood as Israel’s replacement would allow this court to hold that Israel has met his prima-facie case. Youngblood, who was in his mid-40s, was transferred to the F & I Department after Israel was terminated. Israel was 58 at this time, and although Youngblood was in the age group protected by the ADEA, this does not preclude a finding that his replacement of Israel satisfies the fourth element of the prima-facie case. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prove a primafacie case the employee is not necessarily required to show that the replacement was younger than 40 (B) holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case (C) holding that the fourth prong of a prima facie age discrimination case was satisfied where plaintiff was replaced by two individuals  one who was four years younger than plaintiff and the other who was ten years younger (D) holding that younger abstention is jurisdictional (E) holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination
[A]:
holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case