In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
IV, V, VI and XIV. See Answee, Docket # 8, Exh. A, pp. 13-14. In order to allow the state courts the opportunity to act on or correct the violations alleged, the Applicant must do more than just invoke the magic words “fair trial,” or “due process,” or make only cursory citation to the appropriate constitutional amendments. He must provide legal theory explaining how the admission of the statements or testimony violated these particular federal constitutional rights. See, e.g., Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7-8, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982) (claim on direct appeal that jury instruction was reversible error did not fairly present due process challenge to instruction for habeas exhaustion purposes); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-77, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (<HOLDING>); see, also, Thomas v. Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in preaedpa case habeas applicant failed to fairly present federal claim to state court where despite presenting all necessary facts applicant failed to assert specific argument that he later tried to raise in federal court (B) holding that where defendant failed to raise defense of plaintiffs fraud in federal court defendant is barred from raising that issue in state court (C) holding that habeas petitioner scheduled to be executed in the state of virginia for capital murder could not raise claim of violation of his rights under the vienna convention on federal habeas review where he failed to preserve the claim by raising it in state court proceedings vienna convention does not trump subsequent federal statute requiring habeas petitioners who claim to be held in violation of treaties of the united states to develop factual bases for their claims in state court as a precondition of federal habeas review (D) holding applicants general state court claim was insufficient to exhaust his later more specific federal habeas claim (E) holding that a federal court may deny an unexhausted habeas petition on the merits when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
But he claims that release at age 60 is a geriatric release and the functional equivalent of life without parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also argues that such release violates the principles in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery because release at age 60 provides only grim prospects for any meaningful future outside prison. [¶12.] Even if Charles’s 92-year sentence is equivalent to a sentence of life without parole, that alone does not mean his sentence is unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment precedent. The United States Supreme Court bars mandatory life sentences without parole against juvenile homicide offenders, not discretionary sentences of life without parole. See Miller, 567 U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2469; State v. Springer, 2014 S.D. 80, ¶ 15, 856 N.W.2d 460, 466 (<HOLDING>). [¶13.] In response, Charles asks this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentences of life without parole unique in their severity (B) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (C) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (D) holding that consecutive fixedterm sentences for juveniles who committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are not clearly unconstitutional under graham even when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole (E) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
entitle it to tax any portion of the business’ income, then it is proper to attribute the production of income from those sales entirely to the state or stales which have provided “protection opportunities and benefits” to the business throughout the manufacturing process up to the point of shipment to the purchaser. Allocation of such sales to New Hampshire, the state of shipment, under the “throwback rule” therefore does not constitute taxation of extraterritorial values. Rather, it is an allocation of those sales to the state most entitled to levy a tax in return for the opportunities, protections and benefits which it has afforded the taxpayer. [Id. at 1308-1309 (citation omitted).] See also, Covington Fabrics Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 264 S.C. 59, 212 S.E.2d 574 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Based on the constitutionality of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a threefactor apportionment formula which included a throwback rule in calculating the sales factor satisfied federal constitutional requirements (B) holding that actual apportionment of damages is a question of fact (C) holding that definition of date of injury in section 306c8ix is intended to be utilized for calculating benefits not for determining whether section 311 notice requirements were satisfied (D) holding that the requirements of title iii apply and must be satisfied (E) holding that apportionment of cercla liability is  a matter of federal common law

Ex Output:

(A)