In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: litigation. The district court can correct any abuses at the fees for fees stage under the “reasonableness” standard. The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment (B) holding that time entries such as preparation for hearing or preparation for school visit were too vague and reducing overall fee award by twentyfive percent (C) holding that fee application must be sufficiently detailed to allow court to make an independent evaluation as to what fees are actual and necessary and finding that failure to keep contemporaneous records does not automatically result in denial of the fees but the lack thereof justifies a reduction of the fee to the level proven (D) holding that attorneys fees for the preparation of the fee application are compensable (E) holding that the independent counsel reauthorization act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application
[A]: holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment


[Q]: needlessly leave out of our decisions an important source of information about the child, and in the end, it is the dependent child who suffers. After all, the children count here, not the agency. I believe that we gain nothing, and lose precious information by refusing foster parents standing. Standing to sue simply ensures that a particular party has a sufficient stake in a controversy before the court to obtain a judicial resolution. It should not be a doctrine to close the court house doors on parties who have a real interest in the matter at hand. I believe that the Juvenile Act confers “standing,” subject to traditional jurisprudential limits, for the agency, the grandparent, and the foster parents to file these petitions. See also Silfies v. Webster, 713 A.2d 639 (Pa.Super.1998)(<HOLDING>); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 654 F.Supp. 1567 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party standing in loco parentis has standing to seek custody of child (B) holding that a grandmother who frequently babysat her granddaughter was not in loco parentis and thus lacked standing to seek custody of her granddaughter (C) holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal (D) holding that grandmother in loco parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody (E) holding that domestic partner who assumed a parental status over her partners child and performed parental duties with the partners permission stood in loco parentis to the child and had standing to seek partial custody and visitation
[A]: holding that a grandmother who frequently babysat her granddaughter was not in loco parentis and thus lacked standing to seek custody of her granddaughter


[Q]: Sykes v. Tx. Air Corp., 834 F.2d 488, 492-93 (5th Cir.1987) (noting an “absolute bar” against reviewing district court’s decision to remand under § 1452, whether the reasons are equitable or based on a lack of bankruptcy jurisdiction). However, there are limited circumstances under which we may review a remand order. See In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1523, 1528 (5th Cir.1991) (“[Wjhere an exception to non-reviewability exists, an appellate court has jurisdiction to review the remand order.... ” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Supreme Court has held that provisions barring review do not apply if the district court exceeds its statutorily-defined' authority to remand. See, e.g., Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Company, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case (B) holding that district court had supplemental jurisdiction over claims challenging administrative decision once case was properly removed based on original jurisdiction arising from constitutional claims (C) holding that the district judge who remanded a properly removed case where there was diversity jurisdiction exceeded statutory authority when he remanded that case based on efficiency (D) holding that rule 32 petition should have been granted where defendant was convicted in circuit court on indictment entered while case was on appeal from transfer order because circuit court lacked jurisdiction where we remanded the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings (E) holding review appropriate where district court had remanded case for procedural defects after 30day time limit in  1447c had expired
[A]:
holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case