In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

(Black, J., concurring)). We are also troubled because, given that there was nothing about the officers’ appearance or conduct that revealed that they were engaged in the performance of their duties, Davis lacked fair notice that mere spoken words, which did not disturb the peace, could nonetheless constitute the crime of obstructing the officer’s performance of duty. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311, 60 S.Ct. at 906. “It is an elemental requirement of our constitutional jurisprudence that laws be reasonably intelligible, providing citizens with fair notice as to what conduct is legal and what conduct is illegal.” Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 6:13 (1996) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (<HOLDING>)). We reiterate that we recognize the need to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion (B) recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority (C) holding unconstitutional vagrancy statutes that were purposely designed to grant police broad discretion (D) holding unconstitutional ordinance that gave executive director excessive discretion in deciding whether the grant of a permit would be detrimental to the public (E) holding that district courts discretion is extremely broad
holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion

of the evidence to have determined the outcome.” Id.; accord Snow v. State, 697 S.W.2d 663, 666-68 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985), pet. dism’d, 794 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). A “single egregious error” may constitute ineffective assistance. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. Frequently, it has. Texas Cases Reversing Without Evidence of Trial Strategy In at least 22 cases decided after the Court of Criminal Appeals decided Jackson v. State, Texas courts have reversed even though no evidence of trial counsel’s reasoning was presented. See Woods v. State, 59 S.W.3d 833, 835-38 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. filed); Mares v. State, 52 S.W.3d 886, 893 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. ref'd); Jaubert v. State, 65 S.W.3d 73 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. granted) (designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); Robison v. State, 35 S.W.3d 257, 265 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing rule (B) recognizing a limited exception to the eightcorners rule for a pure coverage question where the insurer is not questioning the merits of the underlying thirdparty claim and the extrinsic evidence goes strictly to an issue of coverage without contradicting any allegation in the thirdparty claimants pleadings material to the merits of that underlying claim (C) recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court (D) holding that procedural bar rule does not apply to ineffectiveness claims (E) recognizing the rule in robinson and reviewing the merits of ineffectiveness claim without evidence of trial counsels strategy
recognizing rule

application of our law. The analogy of D.C.Code offenses to federal offenses is also used to justify the continued trial of D.C.Code offenders in the federal courts in the District, notwithstanding the conferral of all local criminal jurisdiction on the Superior Court. Under D.C.Code § 11-502(3) (1982), a D.C.Code violator also charged with a federal offense may be tried in a joint indictment in federal court. Even if the federal charge is ultimately dismissed, the federal court tries these offenders using federal standards. See United States v. Brown, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 314-15, 483 F.2d 1314, 1317-18 (1973) (applying federal bail rules to defendant charged with D.C.Code offenses tried in federal court); United States v. Belt, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 8, 14, 514 F.2d 837, 844, 850 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The result may be a difference in outcome in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal evidentiary standard for impeachment by prior conviction should apply to dccode offenders tried in federal court (B) holding that a transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit (C) holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes (D) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law (E) holding that plaintiffs noncompliance with dccode  12309 cannot bar federal claims

holding that a transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit