In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1999); In re Fisher, 151 B.R. 895, 898 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1993). Other courts have held to the contrary. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 421 B.R. 341, 354-55 (S.D.Tex.2009) (collecting cases); Bank United v. Manley, 273 B.R. 229, 250 (N.D.Ala.2001); In re Tate, 253 B.R. 653, 662 (Bankr.W.D.N.C.2000); In re Williams, 244 B.R. 858, 865-66 (S.D.Ga.2000). There is also disagreement about whether the bankruptcy court may exercise jurisdiction over a nationwide class of debtors or is limited to exercising jurisdiction over debtors whose petitions are filed within the same judicial district. Compare, e.g., In re Noletto, 244 B.R. 845, 849 (Bankr.S.D.Ala. 2000) (permitting nationwide class) with Barrett v. Avco Fin. Servs. Mgmt. Co., 292 B.R. 1, 8 (D.Mass.2003) (<HOLDING>). The class at issue in this case was limited 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over the governments prosecutorial discretion decisions (B) holding court lacks jurisdiction over putative class members whose bankruptcies were discharged outside of judicial district (C) holding that it is not necessary that all putative class members share identical claims (D) holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members (E) holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: variance criteria rendering its decision arbitrary and capricious; and, 5) erred in “taking” appellants’ property without just compensation. The County supports appellants’ contentions except for the last one, with which it disagrees. The County also contends the Board erred in applying the wrong law. The individual appellees, who opposed the variance applications, support the Board’s decision. Discussion 1. Applicable Law A. State Law Before we address the merits of appellants’ contentions, we shall address the County’s contention that the Board applied inapplicable law. The County asserts that the Board incorrectly applied a presumption that the requested use did not conform to the purpose and intent of the Critical Area Program because, while that presumption was added 677 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In 2002, the General Assembly amended the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that the board did not have to consider whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the entire lot but rather whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the buffer (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that the question of whether it might have been error for the court to have denied leave to amend is not before us because plaintiffs never requested it (E) recognizing that a district attorney must have reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury and that the trial judge must have reasonable discretion in deciding whether the bounds of propriety have been exceeded
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: constructive, or judicially imposed lien, or (4) asserted against real or personal property. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.903; Cardenas v. Wilson, 428 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (noting that 51.903 inquiry into mechanic’s lien determines only that mechanic’s lien is provided by Texas law, not whether the underlying mechanic’s lien was valid). If the motion requires greater inquiry, then it is a motion for declaratory judgment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a) (West 2015); State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) (“We look to the substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of title given to it.”); Nguyen, 2016 WL 2343893, at *2 (citing Becker, 2010 WL 877569, at *2-3 (<HOLDING>)). A motion for declaratory judgment must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (B) holding motion requesting more relief than section 51903 provides was motion for declaratory judgment (C) holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment (D) holding that substance of motion to extend time was a section 1301f motion rather than a section 1301g motion and that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the section 1301f motion (E) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable 
[EX A]:
(B)