In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: the evidence presented by the summary judgment record in a light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex.2006) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005)). When both sides move for summary judgment, and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court considers both sides’ summary judgment evidence and determines all issues presented. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex.2005). Where the trial court does not specify the g rv., Inc., 798 S.W.2d 606, 615 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the absence of a causal connection 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract (B) holding that erisa provides relief only for clearly ascertainable damages with the intent to make plaintiffs whole which precludes recovery for speculative future harm (C) holding that no recovery exists for speculative damages (D) holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative (E) holding such damages available where local law silent on issue speculative nature of damages does not preclude recovery

A: holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract
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Q: 2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals

A: holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision
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Q: fatal to the reasonable suspicion analysis nor completely undermines the officers’ testimony, which the district court found credible. See United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir.2013) (“[I]t is the role of the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.”). Lieutenant Hart was armed with sufficient knowledge to form a reasonable suspicion that the Impala was involved in criminal activity even without a description of its color. He reasonably relied on the information provided by the Cl, whom he knew to be reliable and truthful, and by Detective Bacon, who recently had participated in surveillance involving a controlled purchase by the Cl in the same area. See United States v. Harris, 39 F.3d 1262, 1269 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The Cl informed Lieutenant Hart (through 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is a rebuttable presumption that information imparted by a citizen informant is generally reliable (B) holding that information from confidential informant was reliable and credible where affidavit referred to previous instances in which informant provided correct information to police affiants own investigation and controlled buy of contraband confirmed information and second informant supplied same information to police (C) holding that an unverified tip from a known informant was sufficiently reliable to justify a terry stop and frisk (D) holding that information of criminal activity given by a known reliable informant is enough to sustain a terry stop (E) holding that tip from known reliable informant that was immediately verifiable at the scene could form basis for reasonable suspicion and forcible terry stop

A:
holding that there is a rebuttable presumption that information imparted by a citizen informant is generally reliable
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