In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: if the terms of the health care plan specifically exclude from coverage the cost of an appendectomy, then any injuries caused by the refusal to cover the appendectomy are properly attributed to the terms of the plan itself, not the managed care entity that applied those terms. 4 Respondents also argue that ERISA § 502(a) completely pre-empts a state cause of action only if the cause of action would be pre-empted under ERISA § 514(a); respondents then argue that their causes of action do not fall under the terms of § 514(a). But a state cause of action that provides an alternative remedy to those provided by the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism conflicts with Congress’ clear intent to make the ERISA mechanism exclusive. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S.133, 142 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 5 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan (B) recognizing cause of action (C) holding that ejven if there were no express preemption under erisa  514a of the cause of action in that case it would be preempted because it conflicted directly with an erisa cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa (E) recognizing the cause of action
[A]: (C)


[Q]: the peremptory strike. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). In this case, we cannot say that the Florida state court’s judgment was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, specifically the Supreme Court’s holding in Bat-son. As for the State’s strike of the first black prospective juror, the interaction between the parties and the state court (where, upon being challenged, the State revealed that it wished to strike this juror because two prosecutors had seen her sleeping during the jury selection process, and the trial court then moved onto the next juror) was adequate under Batson, so trial counsel was not ineffective in that respect. See Hightower v. Terry, 459 F.3d 1067, 1072 n. 9 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even assuming that Sneed’s counsel 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this purpose albeit implicitly (B) recognizing that a trial judge can implicitly find a prosecutors proffered reasons credible (C) holding that the trial judge cannot simply rjubber stamp  a prosecutors nonracial explanation no matter how whimsical or fanciful  but in order to permit a questioned peremptory challenge  must conclude that the proffered reasons are first neutral and reasonable and second not a pretext (D) holding that findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate substantial and credible evidence (E) holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors
[A]: (B)


[Q]: for Sarvis is that even if there is a windfall vote, his complaint would still fail to raise the “reasonable inference” that Virginia’s ballot ordering law creates constitutionally significant burdens. The fact remains that, “windfall” or not, the Virginia ballot ordering law still does not “restrict access to the ballot or deny any voters the right to vote for candidates of their choice.” Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d 632, 638 (Alaska 1998). The law instead “merely allocates the benefit of positional bias, which places a lesser burden on the right to vote.” Id. And contrary to Sarvis’s cursory equal protection argument, Appellant’s Opening Br. 12-13, it makes this allocation in a neutral, nondiscriminatory manner. Compare Graves v. McElderry, 946 F.Supp. 1569, 1582 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (<HOLDING>), with Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chicago v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding petition nominating candidate under social democratic party violated party name protection act (B) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (C) holding that an oklahoma law placing democratic party candidates in the highest ballot positions violated the equal protection clause (D) holding that an illinois countys facially neutral twotiered ballot ordering system did not violate the equal protection clause (E) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause
[A]:
(C)