In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

Output: holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241


Input: Consider Input: offense; the maximum sentence is 10 years for each offense, which must run concurrently under Hale. By enhancing only one count and running it consecutively to the second count, appellant was sentenced to 12 years. This sentence exceeds the statutory maximum if both sentences had been enhanced under section 775.084 and run concurrently, or if neither had been enhanced and run consecutively. As such the appellant’s sentence violates Hale. Although appellant was not sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 5 years for the second offense, as explained in State v. Hill, 660 So.2d 1384 (Fla.1995), the requirement that sentences run consecutively is not limited to only the minimum mandatory portion of. a total sentence: The State argues that Hale and its predecessors, Palmer v. State A 1997) (<HOLDING>). Here appellant was sentenced as an habitual 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies (B) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (C) holding fifteen year hfo mandatory minimum sentences on the three robbery convictions were required to run concurrently with the twentyfive year nonhfo mandatory minimum on the murder sentence (D) holding hfo mandatory minimum sentence for robbery must run concurrently with sentences imposed for nonhfo first degree murder convictions (E) holding that the fifteen year minimum sentence imposed under section 924e does not violate the eighth amendment

Output: holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies


Input: Consider Input: assert that, in many of the class members’ cases, there was no “consumer transaction” because the debts arose from phy sician-patient transactions, and as such, Defendants are exempt from the OCSPA. Plaintiffs argue that the physician-patient exemption does not apply to Defendants. The OCPA’s physician exemption in the definition of “consumer transaction” is narrowly construed, and Ohio courts have rejected its application to non-physicians. See Summa Health Sys. v. Viningre, 140 Ohio App.3d 780, 749 N.E.2d 344, 356 (2000) (“While transactions with physicians are exempted from the CSPA, a transaction between a service provider such as a hospital and the consumer is not clearly exempted.”); Elder v. Fischer, 129 Ohio App.3d 209, 717 N.E.2d 730, 734-35 (Ohio Ct.App. 1st Dist.1998) (<HOLDING>); Thorton v. Meredia Suburban Hosp., 1991 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that antitrust claims arising out of an international commercial transaction were arbitrable despite the fact that they were not specifically mentioned in the arbitration clause (B) holding that physicians were specifically excluded from the ocspa but hospitals were not so they must abide by the ocspa (C) holding that this court can consider claims not specifically excluded by a coa (D) holding that all claims submitted by defendant were false because they were acquired by kickback (E) holding that because the record does not indicate that the extraneous documents or averments were excluded by the court  we must assume that they were considered


Output: holding that antitrust claims arising out of an international commercial transaction were arbitrable despite the fact that they were not specifically mentioned in the arbitration clause