In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: be dismissed even if a minute entry is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 4(c), because the trial court judge did not sign the minutes as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-106. We disagree. The only page from the trial court minutes for August 28, 2006, that was filed with this Court was the page that included the entry regarding the defendant’s case. While it is true that the particular page of the minutes extracted to supplement the appellate record does not bear the signature of the trial court judge, there is no proof that the judge did not sign the minutes on a subsequent page not included in the record before us, and we presume that the minutes were signed as required by section 16-1-106. See Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1937) (<HOLDING>) There is no proof in the record that rebuts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body (B) holding that although a corporate officer is not presumed to be personally liable for corporate debts the officer may expressly bind himself or herself to be answerable for such debts (C) holding that even in absence of proof that chancellor signed court minutes it must be presumed that he did so and noting that ejvery officer is presumed to have performed his duty (D) holding it immaterial that one charged with willfully selling unregistered securities had no actual knowledge that he was violating the law because he was presumed to have and is chargeable with knowledge of the laws under which he was undertaking to do business (E) holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it
[A]: holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body


[Q]: even if the 1993 judgment was final and appealable, they may challenge the merits of the 1993 judgment in this appeal from the 1995 order. This appeal is untimely only if the District Court’s 1993 decision — which ordered only that ISP submit a plan to remedy the constitutional flaws in its policy — was a final judgment, appealable to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We believe that the District Court’s 1993 order was no more final under § 1291 than the one at issue in Sherpell v. Humnoke School Dist., 814 F.2d 538 (8th Cir.1987), which held that a district court order to a school district to submit a plan to remedy an unconstitutional atmosphere of racial hostility was not an appealable final judgment. Id. at 539; see also Hendrickson v. Griggs, 856 F.2d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The November 1995 judgment is, therefore, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (B) holding that the modification or dissolution of an injunction in a limitation of liability proceeding is appealable as a matter of right under  1292a1 (C) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (D) holding injunction ordering prison to submit plan for reformation of unconstitutional prison conditions not appealable as interlocutory order under 28 usc  1292a1 (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable
[A]: holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable


[Q]: allowed agents to question beyond the routine inquiry if “suspicious circumstances” exist. Chavira, 9 F.3d at 889. Federal case law has held that suspicious circumstances do not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, and, in determining what constitutes suspicious circumstances, a court examines “the totality of the circumstances.” Massie, 65 F.3d at 848-49. {13} As for moving a vehicle to a secondary area, the court has given Border Patrol agents “ ‘virtually unlimited discretion to refer ears to the secondary inspection area.’ ” Id. at 847 (quoting United States v. Sanders, 937 F.2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir.1991)). Where a routine stop is conducted is “ ‘irrelevant to Fourth Amendment concerns.’ ” Id. (quoting Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d at 753); see also Sanders, 937 F.2d at 1499-1500 (<HOLDING>). The court, however, still requires detentions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dog sniff of an apartment door from a common area is a permissible nonsearch under the fourth amendment (B) holding the correct fourth amendment inquiry assuming the detention is legitimate is whether the questions extended the time that a driver was detained regardless of the questions content (C) holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question when answer could not be implied and that lack of objection waived right to new trial to have jury answer questions (D) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (E) holding that directing defendant to the secondary inspection area to answer additional questions is permissible under the fourth amendment
[A]:
holding that a dog sniff of an apartment door from a common area is a permissible nonsearch under the fourth amendment