In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5524, and thus a two-year statute of limitations applies to this case. See Sameric Corp. of Del, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998). The date when a Section 1983 action accrues, however, is a matter of federal law. Wallace v. Koto. 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). A Section 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599; see also Sanduteh v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, Giles asserts that the City violated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (B) holding that in an environmental contamination ease a cause of action accrues  when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of his or her cause of action and of the identity of a party or parties who may be responsible for the injury (C) holding that a federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the existence of and source of the injury not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong (D) holding that  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (E) holding that a  1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action 

A: holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury
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Q: this is irrelevant to the question of whether a loan was made to Busson-Sokolik in the first place. Finding no clear error on the question of whether the funds were in fact transferred to Busson-Sokolik and no defects in the formation of a valid contract between the parties, we affirm the finding that the sum MSOE transferred to Busson-Sokolik was a loan. 2 . “Abuse of discretion” is the clear standard for evaluating a judge’s decision to impose sanctions in a bankruptcy case. See In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1046 (7th Cir.2000). While the standard for evaluating a judge’s decision not to impose sanctions in a bankruptcy case is somewhat less clear, we adopt the Sixth Circuit’s approach of using the "abuse of discretion” standard. See In re Downs, 103 F.3d 472, 480 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 3 . An appeal is frivolous "when the result 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion (B) holding that the applicable standard of review for evaluating a bankruptcy courts denial of fed r bankrp 9011 sanctions is abuse of discretion and noting similar approaches taken by the ninth and tenth circuits (C) holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit (D) holding that the conclusion that the wiretap was necessary in each situation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and bringing the tenth circuit into accordance with the authority of a majority of other circuits (E) holding that the standard of review is abuse of discretion and an appeal from denial of rule 60b relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review

A: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion
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Q: account of the legislative history, the BAP rightly concluded that on the facts of this case a proof of claim need not necessarily be filed to trigger the waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in section 106(a). This result effectuates Congress’s desire to prohibit the government from participating in the distribution of the bankruptcy estate without relinquishing part of its sovereign immunity. See supra, H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 317, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 6274, (“The governmental unit cannot receive distribution from the estate without subjecting itself to any liability it has to the estate within the confines of a compulsory counterclaim rule. Any other result would be one-sided.”); see also In re OPM Leasing Servs., 21 B.R. 993, 1001-02 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (<HOLDING>); In re Davis, 20 B.R. 519, 520-23 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a debtors adversary proceeding against the university of virginia to determine the dischargeability of a debt is a suit for eleventh amendment purposes (B) holding that sovereign immunity barred a wrongful death claim against the board and stating that the only question is whether the boards sovereign immunity protection was waived emphasis added (C) holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding (D) holding that a claim that sovereign immunity has been waived is itself waived if not argued on appeal (E) holding that west virginia waived sovereign immunity by initiating adversary proceeding even though it had not filed a proof of claim

A:
holding that a debtors adversary proceeding against the university of virginia to determine the dischargeability of a debt is a suit for eleventh amendment purposes
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