In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
by assenting to forfeiture provisions included in plea agreements. In United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir.1999), a criminal defendant entered into a plea bargain under which he “agree[d] to forfeit and otherwise waive any ownership right he might possess in all items seized during the investigation of any of the acts alleged.” The defendant then filed a motion for the return of his property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), and the district court denied the motion. Id. We affirmed the district court’s decision, observing that “[t]he district court was entirely correct in denying Le’s motion because Le ... relinquished any ownership rights he may have had in the property.” Id. at 1278. See also United States v. Grover, 119 F.3d 850, 852 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). On appeal Mr. Montoya suggests that he should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that a rule 41e claimant relinquished any possessory claim he had to the property when he signed a forfeiture agreement at the time he entered into a plea bargain (C) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (D) holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present (E) holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel

Ex Output:
holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea


Ex Input:
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) because Erickson failed to allege specific facts showing a pattern of racketeering activity. See Sanford v. Member-Works, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557-58 (9th Cir.2010) (discussing elements of a.RICO claim and particularity requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)). The district court properly dismissed Erickson’s claims under the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (“RES-PA”) and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) as time-barred because Erickson filed his action more than three years after the alleged violations. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (prescribing at most a three-year statute of limitations for violations of RES-PA); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (an action for damages under TILA must be brought within one year of the alleged violation); see also King, 784 F.2d at 915 (<HOLDING>). However, after the district court dismissed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fiveyear limitation period in 28 usc  2462 runs from date of predicate violation not from date of administrative assessment of sanction (B) holding limitations period for filing petition for postconviction relief runs from date of final judgment not from date of subsequent order revoking appeal bond (C) holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer (D) holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction (E) holding  under section 1144s predecessor statute  that the 180day period runs from the date of the confirmation order even if the fraud is not discovered in the 180day period

Ex Output:
holding fiveyear limitation period in 28 usc  2462 runs from date of predicate violation not from date of administrative assessment of sanction


Ex Input:
Subsection (d) provides that a complaint regarding the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence in a nonjury case may be made for the first time on appeal. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(d) (emphasis added). The State contends that, by implication, the amendment recognizes the general rule — that complaints must be preserved to ensure appellate review — applies to all cases tried before a jury. We disagree. In criminal cases, an appellate court must always review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Rankin v. State, 46 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). “A claim regarding sufficiency of the evidence need not be preserved for review at the trial level and is not waived by the failure to do so.” Id.; see also Grayson v. State, 82 S.W.3d 357, 358-59 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Davila v. State, 930 S.W.2d 641, 648 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review (B) holding that a factual sufficiency complaint in a parental termination case may be reviewed even though it was not preserved in the trial court (C) holding that factual sufficiency claim need not be preserved pursuant to texas rule of appellate procedure 331 (D) recognizing this texas rule (E) holding that a sufficiency challenge must be preserved in the trial court in a parental termination case to be reviewed on appeal

Ex Output:

holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review