In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

guidelines; and (4) that the special conditions of Neffs supervised release were beyond the limits described in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied in all respects. I. BACKGROUND On April 29, 1992, Anthony Neff was arrested on charges of driving while intoxicated by Nassau County Police who found in his possession a receipt from a licensed firearms dealership. The receipt indicated that on April 23, 1992, he had purchased a 12 gauge shotgun. Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”) interviewed the owner of the firearms dealership and discovered that Neff, who was then on parole for a 1989 attempted burglary conviction, had not revealed that he was a convicted felon when he executed ATF form 4473, a necessar 3 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Although this language appears broad in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (B) holding that for purposes of apprendi the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence that may be imposed based solely on the jurys findings (C) holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines
(A)

do not find that MBI has waived this argument on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 49(B). 3 . We also note that MBI did not present any expert testimony, or any other evidence, that would suggest that Orlando's permanent injury to his knee was not caused by the accident. 4 . The prospective juror was struck from the jury pool prior to trial. 5 . MBI also argues that Orlando was only asking for $75,000 in damages. However, Orlando clearly argued that $75,000 was where he thought the jury should begin its discussion for damages, but he did not limit his damages to this amount. Tr. p. 223. 6 . MBI also argues that "[i]f there is no evidence to establish the loss of earning capacity, there can be no recovery on that issue.” Scott v. Nabours, 156 Ind.App. 317, 321, 296 N.E.2d 438, 441 (1973) (<HOLDING>). However, the final jury instructions gave a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the trial court did not err by withdrawing the issue of loss of earning capacity from the jury when there was no evidence in that regard (B) holding that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant was in the custody of the victim officer when he shot and killed the officer due to the undisputed evidence presented at trial including the defendants pretrial statement to police admitting that fact (C) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment (D) holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the defendant had to establish by evidence that outweighed the evidence against him that he lacked the capacity to form specific intent (E) holding that trial court did not err
(A)

a drunk driver’s base offense level for involuntary manslaughter. 162 F.3d at 1252. Reasoning that “recklessness” covers a broad spectrum of behavior, the Tenth Circuit concluded that district courts should be free to depart if the facts indicate “a degree of recklessness that falls on the periphery of reckless conduct.” Id. at 1251. Among the factors justifying the upward departure were the defendant’s high blood-alcohol level, a prior conviction for drunk driving that had put her on notice of the dangerousness of her conduct, and several opportunities to avoid the accident on that day, including being refused service at a bar, having her keys taken from her, and narrowly avoiding a collision with another vehicle. Id. at 1252-53; see also Jones, 332 F.3d 1294, 2003 WL 21399025, at *4 (<HOLDING>). In both Whiteskunk and Jones, the Tenth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court violated fedrcrimp 32 by departing upward in sentence without notice and the psr identified no grounds for departure (B) holding that district courts error was not harmless because the court relied on an improper factor in imposing an upward departure (C) holding that a high bloodalcohol content and prior drunk driving convictions justified an upward departure on extreme recklessness and public safety grounds (D) holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure (E) holding that defendants diminished capacity while grounds for departure from the guidelines sentencing range is not grounds for departure below the minimum sentence set by congress

(C)