In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: v. Eggleston, 202 Ariz. 523, 527, ¶ 16, 47 P.3d 1161, 1165 (App.2002). Second, a statute should be construed in conjunction with other statutes that relate to the same subject or purpose, giving effect to all statutes involved. Id. Third, in furtherance of such harmonization, courts should review the history of the various sections in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature and thereby construe the statutes to further that intent. State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366, 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989). After reviewing the history of the relevant statutory scheme, we conclude that the legislature never intended that the acquisition of land for park purposes be subject to the public auction requirement. See State v. Cornish, 192 Ariz. 533, 537, ¶ 16, 968 P.2d 606, 610 (App.1998) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 12 As part of its comprehensive statutory 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that courts should look to other sources of legislative intent if the statutory language does not convey a clear meaning (B) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent (E) holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: personally waive the rights to testify at trial, to have the prosecution witnesses testify in defend other settings. One such case arose when a defendant charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct stipulated to the element that he was more than 36 months older than the victim without waiving his right to a jury trial on that element. State v. Wright, 679 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn.App.2004), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2004). In Wright, we applied a harmless-error analysis to the district court’s failure to obtain appellant’s personal waiver. Id. at 191. In part, we reasoned that proving the age element to the jury would have had “a more prejudicial effect than- the stipulation” because appellant was significantly older than the victim. Id.; see also Hinton, 702 N.W.2d at 281-82 (<HOLDING>). Also, both Wright and Hinton involved 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that stipulation of the appellants undisputed prior convictions was harmless error and reasoning that blakely v washington which does not require a jury determination of prior convictions provides implicit support for the conclusion that a harmless error analysis is appropriate (B) recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding blakely errors are subject to harmless error analysis (D) holding that the trial courts error in not allowing defendant to testify on direct examination as to nature and circumstances of prior convictions was not harmless error where credibility of the defendant was critical to the deliberations of the jury (E) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: ¶51 L&A’s reasoning is deeply flawed and should be soundly rejected by this court. First, L&A erred in reasoning that “default” must mean a material breach justifying termination rather than the failure to fulfill a contractual obligation. The subcontract itself defines “default,” and the meaning of “default” must also be read in light of the purpose of the bond, which is to guarantee the “prompt and faithful” performance of the subcontract. Obviously, a subcontract has not been promptly and faithfully performed when the principal has breached its contractual obligations, whether the breach is serious enough to justify termination or not. “[I]t is axiomatic that the very purpose of a performance bond is ‘to assure completion of the contract.’ ” U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 369 F.3d at 67 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cleanup costs incurred pursuant to a consent decree were not incurred voluntarily and must be sought through a  113f contribution action (B) holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors (C) holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety (D) holding that bankruptcy court could not enter judgment for 7402564 under  107a for incurred costs when such costs had not been incurred (E) holding that a surety must pay all the costs of completion not simply those incurred after a declaration of default
Example Output:
(E)