instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
in some respect. To me, such an approach invites municipal officials to substitute rank speculation and conjectural claptrap for genuine engineering expertise and constitutes an open invitation for local planners to engage in incompetent fear-mongering about perceived or imagined development risks, no matter how unfounded, unlikely, or controllable such risks may be. Such an open-textured standard for upholding the denial of subdivision applications will all too easily be converted into an impermeable cloak to cover confiscatory regulatory takings, official pandering to neighbors’ antidevelopment biases, political shenanigans, and other such local governmental capriciousness of the sort that we recently condemned in L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202 (R.I.1997) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the mere fact that the municipality 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (B) holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states (C) holding that 42 usc  1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations (D) holding that the petitioner property owners had established 42 usc  1983 substantive and procedural dueprocess violations against town officials who arbitrarily denied the plaintiffs request for subdivision approval (E) holding that plaintiffs had claim under 42 usc  1983 against state where state had created an intermediate care facility but placed plaintiffs on waiting list
answer:
holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983


question:
litigation. The district court can correct any abuses at the fees for fees stage under the “reasonableness” standard. The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment (B) holding that time entries such as preparation for hearing or preparation for school visit were too vague and reducing overall fee award by twentyfive percent (C) holding that fee application must be sufficiently detailed to allow court to make an independent evaluation as to what fees are actual and necessary and finding that failure to keep contemporaneous records does not automatically result in denial of the fees but the lack thereof justifies a reduction of the fee to the level proven (D) holding that attorneys fees for the preparation of the fee application are compensable (E) holding that the independent counsel reauthorization act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application
answer:
holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment


question:
been substantial in gross,” we reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and remanded for a factual determination of whether the alleged “campaign reached the threshold of actionability under section 1983.” Id. at 625. We reiterated this point in DeGuiseppe v. Village of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187, 192 (7th Cir.1995), by explaining that “even minor forms of retaliation” such as “diminished responsibilities” or “false accusations” can be actionable under the First Amendment if sufficiently adverse to chill employee speech on matters of public concern. Since then, we have consistently applied this standard. E.g., Fairley v. Femaint, 482 F.3d 897, 903 (7th Cir.2007) (“Suppose the white guards at a prison mercilessly harass the black guards and make their lives miserabl r.2002) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, even the Fourth Circuit case cited by 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that outside of the employment context speech that would chill a person of ordinary firmness is actionable (B) holding that in the first amendment employment context harassing speech must constitute constructive adverse employment action to be actionable (C) recognizing that code is speech (D) holding that speech must be a threat or coercion to be actionable (E) holding that statute reaching beyond purely commercial speech to chill fully protected speech can merit application of the overbreadth doctrine
answer:

holding that in the first amendment employment context harassing speech must constitute constructive adverse employment action to be actionable