In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 2. Although the substance of the inquiry remains the same, the Supreme Court has counseled that the question whether a defendant can show a violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights “is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). With that said, we do not quarrel with the district court’s analysis on this point. Several distinguished jurists continue to use the “standing” terminology as useful shorthand. See, e.g., United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir.2004) (Selya, J.) (acknowledging after Rakas that the term “standing” “is imprecise,” but adopting the usage “[f]or simplicity’s sake”). But, regardless of terminolo 1 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). As we observe below, the conclusion that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (B) holding a person who is present at anothers home with permission simply for the purpose of consummating a business transaction does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy there (C) holding that for purposes of federal constitutional law a person does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to trash discarded outside the home (D) holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business (E) holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence

A: holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells
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Q: so complete a defense as he might reasonably have desired”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 820, 115 S.Ct. 81, 130 L.Ed.2d 34 (1994); 2d Cir.: United States v. Lawal, 736 F.2d 5, 9-10 (1984) (applying authorities for non-constitutional error to erroneous exclusion of hearsay); 3d Cir.: United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1498-1500 (3d Cir.1988) (making "non-constitutional 'harmless error' determination” for erroneous exclusion of hearsay), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 836, 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989); 4th Cir.: United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 184-85 (1992) (citing Kotteakos as authority for holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay was harmless), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 914, 113 S.Ct. 2351, 124 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993); 5th Cir.: United States v. Barnett, 945 F.2d 1296, 1301 n. 3 (1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1487, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a (B) holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion (C) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right (D) holdingthat erroneous admission of hearsay did not prejudiceresults of trial so as to require reversal (E) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay

A: holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a
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Q: the defendant’s applicable guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).” Id., app. note 1(A). In November 2007, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 706, which reduced the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses under § 2Dl.l(c) by two levels. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). The Commission later made the amendment retroactively applicable. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. May 1, 2008). As indicated, Jefferson sought to have his sentence reduced as result of those amendments. However, they do not apply here because Jefferson was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence required by statute. See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because the District Court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based (B) holding that a defendant whose original sentence was based upon the careeroffender guideline and not  2d11 could not receive a sentence reduction based on amendment 706 because it did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range (C) holding that while amendment 706 was applicable to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (D) holding that amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range where the defendants received statutory mandatory minimum sentences and thus the defendants were not eligible for relief under  3582 (E) holding that while amendment 706 was applica ble to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline

A:
holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based
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