In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: to dedicate all of their disposable income to their plan. The Trustee’s supplemental objection raised, for the first time, whether Section 1325(a)(5) bars a debtor from confirming a plan that strips off a wholly unsecured lien where the debtor has received a discharge in a prior bankruptcy case within the proscribed period set forth in Section 1328(f). Although TD Bank had previously argued that the Debtors’ ability to strip off its lien was contingent upon the entry of a discharge order, TD Bank did not rely on Section 1325(a)(5). IV. Discussion A. Jurisdiction and Venue The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and discharge in a bankruptcy case filed within four years of filing an earlier Chapter 7 petition 253 F.3d 778, 781-83 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). However, there is no prohibition against lien 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage lien can be avoided under nobelman (B) holding that a socalled chapter 20 debtor may strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien (C) holding that an allowed wholly unsecured consensual junior lien may not be stripped off in a chapter 7 case (D) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage on chapter 13 debtors residence could not be stripped down into an unsecured claim by debtors plan (E) holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: the sophisticated user defense, a supplier has no duty to warn the ultimate user if it has reason to believe that the user will realize its dangerous condition. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn.2004); see also Ritchie v. Glidden, 242 F.3d 713, 724 (7th Cir.2001) (stating, under Indiana law, that the sophisticated purchaser defense to a failure-to-warn claim brought under negligence or strict liability theories provides that product suppliers do not have a duty to warn employees or customers of knowledgeable industrial purchasers as to product-related hazards). In addition to limiting a supplier’s duty, the “sophisticated user” concept also affects the element of proximate cause. Crook v. Kaneb Pipe Line Operating P’ship, L.P., 231 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Strong, 667 F.2d at 688 (“Even if [the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury (B) holding in a negligence action that the air traffic controllers failure to warn of an impending danger cannot be the proximate cause of an injury after the pilot himself discovered its presence appreciated the danger and decided to fly ahead into it (C) holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible (D) holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury (E) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: violation of the Act would be substantially reduced if the time that the motions to suppress were under advisement was entirely excludable. Instead of 30 days being excludable, 60 days would have been excludable, thereby reducing the violation of the Act from 59 days to 29 days. In this connection I note that under the Nebraska equivalent of the Act any period of delay involving “the time from filing until final disposition of pretrial motions of the defendant, including motions to suppress evidence” is excluded in computing the 6-month Nebraska speedy trial statutory requirement. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 1985). Under Nebraska law it appears that the entire time a motion is under submission is excludable, not merely 30 days. State v. Brown, 214 Neb. 665, 335 N.W.2d 542 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, there is at least a plausible reason to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (B) holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties (C) holding among other things that there should be excluded from computing the time for trial a period from the filing of a motion on september 18 until finai disposition of the motion by the trial court on its own motion on december 28 that is 102 days (D) holding that the exclusion in rule 48c1 hrpp of periods of delay should be taken from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on or other prompt disposition of the motion citation omitted (E) holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment
Example Output:
(C)