In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: stored on a BBS pending delivery). Because subsection (A) applies only to messages in “temporary, intermediate storage,” however, these courts have limited that subsection’s coverage to messages not yet delivered to their intended recipient. See DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 512; Fraser, 135 F.Supp.2d at 636. Defendants point to these cases and argue that messages remaining on an ISP’s server after delivery no longer fall within the Act’s coverage. But, even if such messages are not within the purview of subsection (A), they do fit comfortably within subsection (B). There is no dispute that messages remaining on NetGate’s server after delivery are stored “by an electronic communication service” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B). Cf. DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 511 (<HOLDING>). The only issue, then, is whether the messages 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca (B) holding that email messages stored on a computer but not yet read were in electronic storage (C) holding that an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of email communications is not vitiated by an understanding that the thirdparty service provider will maintain independent access to them noting that electronic communication is as important to fourth amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the past (D) holding that defendants communications sent into tennessee did not constitute purposeful availment because all were in response to communications initiated by the plaintiff (E) holding that subsection b did not apply because the communications at issue were not being stored by an electronic communication service

A: holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca
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Q: the in-state banking activities of these French and Japanese banks and Plaintiffs’ claims arising from a terrorist attack that occurred in Israel with the support of the Iranian government. It certainly cannot be said that Plaintiffs’ claims “directly arise” out of the banking activities of these local branches. See GCIU, 565 F.3d at 1024. Thus, under traditional legal principles, specific jurisdiction is lacking. Although the Seventh Circuit • has not addressed this issue, two Circuits have reformulated the minimum-contacts inquiry in cases involving third-party discovery, focusing more narrowly “on the connection between the nonparty’s contacts with the forum and the discovery order at issue.” Gucci, 768 F.3d at 137; see also S.E.C. v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 418 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>)., It is unclear whether this test is proper, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that standing alone defendants 4 million in sales in the forum state over a sevenyear period may not have been sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction but that the numerous other contacts with the forum in the case including advertising relationships with dealers and more than 150 visits tipped the balance and led the court to conclude that there were sufficient contacts to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction (B) holding that specific jurisdiction requires plaintiff to show that defendants forum contacts be related directly to the subject of the lawsuit (C) holding no specific jurisdiction where alleged tortious conduct was not related to defendants contacts with texas (D) holding that courts exercise of specific jurisdiction was proper where subpoena enforcement action arose out of nonpartys contacts with the forum (E) holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum

A: holding that standing alone defendants 4 million in sales in the forum state over a sevenyear period may not have been sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction but that the numerous other contacts with the forum in the case including advertising relationships with dealers and more than 150 visits tipped the balance and led the court to conclude that there were sufficient contacts to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction
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Q: an insurance policy from Life Investors. As a result, Mary’s selection of optional insurance did not create a separate, binding insurance contract, but instead arose out of the original Lease. Moreover, Mary did not allege in her complaint that she was an “insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy” as stated in section 15-48-10(b)(4). Instead, Mary’s complaint alleged Harrelson breached its fiduciary duty and breached the parties’ contract by failing to procure the credit life insurance from Life Investors. Because Mary’s asserted causes of action arise out of an automobile lease agreement and not an insurance contract, the circuit court properly held Mary was required to submit her claims against Harrelson to binding arbitration. See Cox, 347 S.C. at 468, 556 S.E.2d at 402 (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION We conclude the Lease between Mary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding section 15  4810b4 is a specific exemption limited only to entities within the insurance industry (B) recognizing only specific limited forms of pleadings (C) holding that section 12a2 did not apply to a private placement memorandum which was subject to a section 42 exemption (D) holding a writ was appropriate when the authorization was not limited as to time and not limited to specific healthcare providers (E) holding that bankruptcy jurisdiction is not within section 5 of the fourteenth amendment

A:
recognizing only specific limited forms of pleadings
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