In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: in favor of William Spencer, et al., (Spencer) and setting the penalties for violation of the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Spencer cross-appeals the denial of post-trial motions and refusal to award attorney’s fees. We affirm on all grounds. I BART’s unjust enrichment claim fads for want of a loss. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 881 (2000) (noting that the elements of unjust enrichment are “receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.”). Even assuming that County of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 158 Cal.App.4th 533, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 (2008), recognized an exception to this rule, BART’s claim does not fall into that exception. See Peterson v. Cellico P’ship, 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1594, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Concrete financial loss is required for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (B) holding that walsh does not support plaintiffs assertion that they need not allege any actual injury to bring an unjust enrichment claim (C) holding that where plaintiffs filed a complaint for conversion unjust enrichment and injunctive relief they had an adequate remedy at law (D) holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed
Example Output: holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement

Example Input: that it can be restored, as when a house suffers smoke and water damage in a fire, the tort-feasor is liable for the costs of restoring the property to its former condition, up to the total value of the property. Applying these rules to fire-damaged trees is problematic. Is it the loss of the tree that is permanent, or the loss to the real estate? A tree that has burned and is dead is permanently destroyed, but the land on which the tree was located can be restored, either immediately by bringing in a fully grown tree or by planting a sapling. The question of “permanent” versus “temporary” damage is ultimately less helpful than the question of how the trees were used and their intrinsic value to the property. See, e.g., Mosteller v. Naiman, 416 N.J. Super. 632, 638, 7 A.3d 803 (2010) (<HOLDING>). One legal encyclopedia explains the use-value 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that quantifying damages for trees is a  complex subject  that depends upon the evidence in the particular case  (B) holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality (C) recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law (D) holding that the question whether section 3553b permits departure in some particular case is subject to plenary review (E) holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis
Example Output: holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality

Example Input: knowledge of the rule or order, supports our adoption of the majority rule. “[Wjhere the legislature includes particular language in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same act, it is presumed that the legislature acted purposefully in including or excluding that particular subject.” State v. Hawk, 170 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tenn.2005) (quoting Bryant v. Genco Stamping & Mfg. Co., 33 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tenn.2000)). By stating that the level of punishment for violations of the rules and regulations promulgated under the 1980 Securities Act is subject to a heightened knowledge requirement, the legislature sent a clear signal that such a requirement does not exist for violations of the Act itself. See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). Our adoption of the majority rule is also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no violation of the travel act (B) holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law (C) holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement (D) holding knowledge of the bankruptcy petition and action taken thereafter was sufficient to find a willful violation of the stay (E) holding that the last sentence of 15 usc  78ffa which matches the second independent clause of section 409a of the 1956 uniform securities act makes it clear that the statute contemplates a willful violation by one who has no knowledge of the violated rule or regulation footnote omitted
Example Output:
holding no violation of the travel act