In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: include reasonable attorney’s fees for legal services benefitting the children. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 151.001(a), (c); In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d at 327, n. 55; Searcy, 17 S.W. at 373; Askey, 11 S.W. at 1101-02. In Hardin v. Hardin, this court cited section 154.001 but did not cite section 151.001 or section 156.401(a). See Hardin, 161 S.W.3d at 24-27. Nonetheless, the Hardin court noted that the duty of a parent to pay attorney’s fees as necessaries is based upon a parent’s duty to support his children. See id. at 25. In addition, the Hardin court cited non-enforcement cases that cited the statutory predecessor to section 151.001. See id. at 25-26 (citing Roosth v. Roosth and Daniels v. Allen); Roosth v. Roosth, 889 S.W.2d 445, 456-57 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Daniels v. Allen, 811 S.W.2d 278, 280 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that father pay attorneys fees to mother as necessaries for the benefit of the children in divorce decree and citing statutory predecessor to section 151001 (B) holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries (C) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay reasonable attorneys fees incurred by mother as necessaries for the children (D) holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule (E) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction may order one parent to pay the reasonable attorneys fees of the other parent as additional child support if the fees are necessaries for the benefit of the children
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: v. Allen, 615 F.3d 1122, 1136 (9th Cir.2010) (emphasizing the parsimonious nature of an effective EA) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b)). The DOE has more than met its burden here. Accordingly, we find that the DOE’s discussion of the 2005 anthrax shipping incident in the DREA and the FREA satisfies NEPA. b. The “Restricted” Experiments We do not reach the issue of whether the DOE’s decision not to include information about “restricted” experiments in the FREA was arbitrary or capricious because the district court properly found that this argument was waived. Here, Tri-Valley CAREs did not address the district court’s ruling that the argument was deemed waived in its opening appellate bricf. Thus, the issue is not properly before us. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Claims not made in an opening brief in a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arguments not raised by a party in its open ing brief are deemed waived (B) holding that arguments not raised in district court are waived (C) holding that arguments not raised before the trial court are waived (D) holding that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived (E) holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: at *3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, January 19, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (citation omitted). In this case, perhaps there were such facts, possibly in the testimony that was struck from the record or in the testimony that might have been elicited from Pugh, had he been called to testify, but these circumstances are not in the record before us. We concur in the sentiments of our sister court expressed in In re J.J.K., that "we are reluctant to deny court-ordered treatment for anyone who is ill. However, within Lthe record] before us, we do not find the State proved its case by clear and convincing evidence as it is required to do.” Nos. 14-03-00379-CV, 14-03-00380-CV, 2003 WL 22996950, at *5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). CORRECTED DISSENTING OPINION EVELYN V. KEYES, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person (B) holding that an opinion of a potential danger to others is not sufficient to support a commitment under this standard (C) holding that bare psychiatric expert opinion of potential danger to others insufficient to support commitment (D) holding that evidence that patient who had a history of not taking medication and who murdered husband during a period when she was off of her medication and delusional tends to confirm the likelihood of serious harm to patient or others (E) holding that evidence that appellant suffered severe delusions became so agitated at the hospital that she had to be physically restrained knocked door off hinges in hospital and engaged in verbal altercations with others was insufficient to support commitment determining that there was no evidence of overt acts that would tend to confirm that appellant would cause serious harm to self or others
[EX A]:
(E)