In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 393 N.W.2d 286, 290-91 (S.D.1986). • GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, (dissenting).. [¶ 26.] I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the lower court on Issue 2. I would hold the trial court erred when it granted partial summary judgment to 01-esens, holding City’s operation of food service at the municipal bar was an ultra vires act. [¶27.] An express grant of authority from the legislature “includes those incidental or implied powers that are necessary to enable a municipality to perform the function authorized.” City of Rapid City v. Rensch, 77 S.D. 242, 246, 90 N.W.2d 380, 383 (1958) (citation omitted). A municipality is vested with discretion as to how it exercises specific powers conferred upon it by the legislature, as long as the methods employed are n , 59 N.W.2d 732, 734 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Actions taken under a municipality’s implied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding municipality had implied authority to enter into a long term contract to establish a golf course although state statute did not specifically grant authority to establish golf courses as public parks (B) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (C) holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority (D) holding that plaintiff had no authority or statutory right for actions proper course was to report actions to proper legal authority (E) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality
[EX A]: holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute

[EX Q]: of class members with only Purchase Claims are represented by class representatives with Purchase Claims, and the settlement provides up to $250,000 for these claims. Moreover, class members with only Purchase Claims do not receive less value for identical claims asserted by other class members. Objectors contend inadequate representation is demonstrated in the settlement’s allocation terms, which designate the vast majority of the fund to Injury Claims, while Purchase Claims are capped at $250,OOO. But varied relief among class members with differing claims in class settlements is not unusual. See Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir.1999) (“[Ajlmost every settlement will involve different awards for various class members.”); see also Prudential, 148 F.3d at 289-90 (<HOLDING>). Such differences in settlement value do not, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (B) holding the court was not required to decide the issue of whether the district court properly certified a rule 23b2 class because the court already concluded that the district court appropriately certified the class under rule 23b3 citing authority for the proposition that a court need only find that a class action may be maintained under any of the three subdivisions (C) holding that once district court entered order approving the settlement of class claims it could not alter the class in the absence of egregious error (D) holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed (E) holding the district court properly certified a national settlement class in a circumstance in which the class was comprised of policyholders who allegedly were the victims of several different types of fraudulent and misleading sales practices and the settlement created an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to determine the kind and amount of relief to be granted
[EX A]: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members

[EX Q]: "fraud” to mean actual or positive fraud rather than fraud implied by law. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 523.08[5], at 523-58 (footnotes omitted). [17] 17. Some courts require the creditor to have reasonably relied on the representations, but the Fifth Circuit does not. See In re Allison, 960 F.2d at 484-85 & n. 3 (citing cases). 18 . Other circuits have applied a uniform standard resembling our "actual fraud” standard to all debts falling under § 523(a)(2)(A). See, e.g., Britton v. Price (In re Britton), 950 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir.1991) ("The Ninth Circuit has employed a five-part test for determining when a debt in nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A).”); Caspers v. Van Home (In re Van Home), 823 F.2d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir.1987) ("To succeed in a F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Lacy, 947 F.2d at 1277 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statecourt breach of fiduciary duty judgment precluded relitigation of same issue in dischargeability proceeding (B) recognizing that even though standards of proof and findings in care and protection proceeding are identical to those in subsequent consent to adoption proceeding collateral estoppel inapplicable because incentive to litigate custody or appeal findings from earlier proceeding which are limited and do not carry same degree of finality may be substantially less than incentive to litigate or appeal findings in adoption proceeding which permanently terminates legal parentchild relationship (C) holding that resolution of issue underlying statecourt fraud judgment precluded relitigation of same issue in nondischargeability proceeding (D) holding that statecourt consent judgment containing findings of fraud precluded relitigation of same issue in dischargeability proceeding (E) holding that because relitigation of issue was barred by collateral estoppel res judicata determination of finality of judgment dismissed for lack of standing was not relevant
[EX A]:
holding that statecourt breach of fiduciary duty judgment precluded relitigation of same issue in dischargeability proceeding