In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir.1978); Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 n. 3 (2d Cir.1977). 7 .The rationale for this rule, as Judge Aldrich stated, is that "to permit copyrighting [in that case] would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms [of expression], could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance ... [and thus] the subject matter would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression. We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated.” Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.1967). 8 . As an example of where dissection was improperly used, see Apple Barrel Productions Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 387-88 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 9 .For example, the court may find that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consideration supports the agreement as a whole (B) holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm (C) holding district court erroneously failed to consider copyrighted show as a whole (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole

Answer: (C)


Question: that is so related structurally to another substance as to be theoretically derivable from it even when not so obtainable in practice (the methoxy of naphthalene).” Webster’s Int’l 608. Thus, while some of the general purpose dictionaries provide support for Defendant’s suggested definition for derivative, others define the term as proposed by Plaintiffs. Technical dictionaries can also assist claim construction by showing how those skilled in the art define “derivatives.” Moba v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[A]s this court has repeatedly counseled, the best indicator of claim meaning is its usage in context as understood by one of skill in the art at the time of invention.”); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, again, the cited sources provide 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning (B) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (C) holding that the specifications reference to a selector sufficed as one skilled in the art would have understood the term (D) holding a technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention unless it is apparent from the patent and the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a different meaning (E) holding that courts may consult scientific dictionaries and technical treatises to deter mine the ordinary meaning of a technical term to persons skilled in the art

Answer: (E)


Question: financially secure couples from unnecessarily obtaining Medicaid assistance. Morris, 685 F.3d at 929 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 100-105, pt. 2, at 65 (1987), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 857); see also Lopes v. Dep’t of Soc. Seros., 696 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir.2012). Congress directed that a couple’s combined resources are counted in determining Medicaid eligibility for an institutionalized spouse, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2)(A), but the income of the community spouse is not included, id. § 1396r-5(b)(l). See Morris, 685 F.3d at 930. Further, “a couple may convert joint resources—which may affect Medicaid eligibility — into income for the community spouse—which does not impact eligibility — by purchasing certain types of [income generating investments].” Id. at 928; see also Lopes, 696 F.3d at 188 (<HOLDING>); James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 218-19 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a spouse was bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party because of her knowledge and acquiescence to the conveyance (B) recognizing the right of a former spouse to seek contribution for payment of community debts not allocated by the divorce decree (C) holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium (D) holding that the employer did not have a plan under erisa where no administrative scheme was required to pay the annuity benefit (E) holding nontransferable annuity for community spouse was not countable resource

Answer:
(E)