In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

that it can be restored, as when a house suffers smoke and water damage in a fire, the tort-feasor is liable for the costs of restoring the property to its former condition, up to the total value of the property. Applying these rules to fire-damaged trees is problematic. Is it the loss of the tree that is permanent, or the loss to the real estate? A tree that has burned and is dead is permanently destroyed, but the land on which the tree was located can be restored, either immediately by bringing in a fully grown tree or by planting a sapling. The question of “permanent” versus “temporary” damage is ultimately less helpful than the question of how the trees were used and their intrinsic value to the property. See, e.g., Mosteller v. Naiman, 416 N.J. Super. 632, 638, 7 A.3d 803 (2010) (<HOLDING>). One legal encyclopedia explains the use-value 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that quantifying damages for trees is a  complex subject  that depends upon the evidence in the particular case  (B) holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality (C) recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law (D) holding that the question whether section 3553b permits departure in some particular case is subject to plenary review (E) holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis
holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality

“multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn.2006) (citations omitted). Both requirements are met here. The district court convicted and sentenced Wallace for two distinct crimes committed upon two distinct victims: once for attempting to rape R.L. and once for stabbing and killing Kenneth Williams. And Wallace does not argue, nor have we found any legal basis to conclude, that the multiple sentences imposed by the district court in this case unfairly exaggerate the criminality of his conduct. See, e.g., State v. Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d 849, 850-51 (Minn.1980) (<HOLDING>). In fact, we squarely rejected the precise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts (B) holding that the district court did not err by sentencing a defendant to consecutive prison terms for seconddegree manslaughter and aggravated assault committed against two separate victims because the multiple sentences did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendants conduct (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding in assault and involun tary manslaughter case that district court has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences based on finding of whether multiple counts involved the same harm (E) holding that separate sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and with intent to rob were barred
holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts

counterclaim sought a determination that CDB had breached the agreements. See Latham v. Allison, 560 S.W.2d 481, 485 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (defining counterclaim as “a claim, which, if established will defeat or in some way qualify a judgment to which the plaintiff is otherwise entitled. It embraces both setoff and recoupment, and also comprehends recon-vention as well as all adversary actions by the defendant in a case.”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 315 (5th ed.1979) (defining counterclaim as a “claim presented by a defendant in opposition to or deduction from the plaintiffs claim”). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling CDB’s motion for JNOV. See generally Hobbs Trailers v. J.T. Arnett Grain Co., Inc., 560 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex.1977) -(<HOLDING>); Barraza v. Koliba, 933 S.W.2d 164, 167-68 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach (B) holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action (C) holding that if appellees breach of contract action had been asserted in a counterclaim or crossclaim article 5539c the predecessor to section 16069 would have applied (D) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (E) recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach

holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach