TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: that any negligent infliction claim remains before us on this appeal (as none has been separately argued) that claim is preempted for the same reasons. III. Conclusion We hold that Humble’s intentional infliction/tort of outrage claim is preempted on the facts of this case, and her race and nationality discrimination claims have been abandoned. Humble’s reasonable accommodation claim under the WLAD is not preempted, and we remand that claim for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Humble requests that a remand to state court for the latter claim be ordered, but we leave it to the district court to make that discretionary determination. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 . 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 2 . Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 216, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Id. at 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904. Without 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 (B) holding that broad language releasing all claims whether in contract tort or otherwise necessarily included a bad faith claim (C) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (D) holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith (E) holding that a state law tort of bad faith was necessarily based on breach of duties contained in the cba and was therefore preempted

SOLUTION: holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301

PROBLEM: of demonstrating that the statute “clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution.” Nixon v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 576 Pa. 385, 839 A.2d 277, 286 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While the General Assembly may enact laws which impinge on constitutional rights to protect the health, safety, and welfare of society, any restriction is subject to judicial review to protect the constitutional rights of all citizens. Id. As detailed below, we conclude that SORNA’s registration requirements violate juvenile offenders’ due process rights by utilizing the irrebuttable presumption that all juvenile offenders “pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(a)(4), because that presumpti 8, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542, 91 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state may not interfere with an unwed fathers custody rights absent proof of unfitness (B) holding unwed father entitled to hearing on his fitness as a parent before children could be taken from him after death of their mother (C) holding unconstitutional a statute providing for children to be declared dependent and removed from their unwed fathers custody based on the presumption that unwed fathers are unfit parents (D) holding that parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on parental fitness before children are removed from their custody (E) holding due process was violated by the automatic rejection of an unwed fathers custodial relationship without granting the father opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent

SOLUTION: holding that the state may not interfere with an unwed fathers custody rights absent proof of unfitness

PROBLEM: does not promise anything to the witnesses prior to their testimony.” Shabazz, 336 F.3d at 165. Moreover, a witness’s "general and hopeful expectation of leniency is not enough to create an agreement or an understanding that [he] would, in fact, receive leniency in exchange for [his] testimony.” Id. at 163 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 . Respondent advises that Deyo’s CPL § 440.10 motion was denied following a hearing. R. Mem. at 28, n. 7. 10 . As respondent notes, Deyo’s affidavit in support of his own § 440.10 motion also was not part of the record on appeal in petitioner’s direct appeal. R. Mem. at 32. 11 . Citation is to the pagination provided by CM/ECF. 12 . Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029; see Richardson v. Greene, 497 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir.2007) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred (B) holding when a district court denies a habeas claim on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claim a coa may issue only when the petitioner shows that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether 1 the claim is a valid assertion of the denial of a constitutional right and 2 the district courts procedural ruling was correct (C) holding that if the court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds the certificate of appealability must show that jurists of reason would find debatable two issues 1 that the district court was correct in its procedural ruling and 2 that the applicant has established a valid constitutional violation emphasis in original (D) holding that when a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds a petitioner is entitled to a coa only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable whether the district courts procedural ruling was correct (E) holding that when a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds a petitioner is entitled to a coa only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would conclude it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable whether the district courts procedural ruling was correct

SOLUTION:
holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred