In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

of the INS were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 471(a), 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 291(a)). 3 . Petitioner argues that it was inappropriate to look to the treatment of his family members in determining the likelihood of petitioner being persecuted if he returns to Algeria, because his situation is not identical to theirs. This is mistaken; relatives' situations in the home country, while not conclusive, are certainly relevant. See Aguilar-Solis, 168 F.3d at 573 ("Without some explanation, the fact that close relatives continue to live peacefully in the alien’s homeland undercuts the alien’s claim that persecution awaits his return”); In re A-E—, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1157, 1160 (BIA 1998) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Petitioner also argues that the BIA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the reasonableness of an aliens fear of persecution is reduced when his family remains in his native country unharmed for a long period of time after his departure (B) holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction (C) holding that an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum based exclusively on activities undertaken after his arrival in the united states so long as he demonstrates that authorities in his country are aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities (D) holding that a witness may testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue (E) holding the respondent  implicitly exercised his right to withdraw his voluntary departure request and instead  elected to remain to pursue his motion
holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction

states that a lack of due diligence should not prevent a party from presenting the new evidence. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 cmt. j (1982); see also Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J.Super. 558, 788 A.2d 834, 840 (2002) (“[T]he judge may consider diligence, or lack of diligence, ... [but] a lack of diligence does not require invocation of collateral estoppel particularly where, as here, plaintiff attempted to obtain Dr. Matthew’s evaluation prior to the arbitration proceeding.”). But see Klein v. Comm’r, 880 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir.1989) (“A party may not assert a change in controlling facts when the facts allegedly showing a change in circumstances could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence.”); Calcutt v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 14, 25, 1988 WL 71262 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the fairness 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial (B) holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel (C) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action
holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial

to initiate an adversary proceeding. As dictated by these Rules, Lawler should have filed a Complaint, paid the appropriate filing fee and secured the issuance of a Summons; he took none of these steps. See, Fuerst v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 5 B.R. 47 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1980) (objection to Discharge dismissed because although the pleading was denominated a complaint, no filing fee was paid and no summons sent); In re Ennis, 50 B.R. 119 (Bankr.Nev.1985) (request for an injunction is an adversary proceeding). As pled by Lawler, the allegations of professional malpractice were solely a defense to the claim filed by Guild. Agger v. Seaboard Allied Milling Cory. (In re Cushman Bakery), 526 F.2d 23, 35 (1st Cir.1975) cert. denied 425 U.S. 937, 96 S.Ct. 1670, 48 L.Ed.2d 178 (1976) (<HOLDING>) When Guild withdrew its claim, Lawler received 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trustees objection to the allowance of a claim is manifestly not the institution of a proceeding that will entitle the trustee to recover on behalf of the estate (B) holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee (C) holding claimant waived right to jury trial on claims brought against it on behalf of bankruptcy estate when it submitted its proof of claim against the estate and subjected itself to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court (D) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate (E) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself

holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee