In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the Chapter 13 Plan, and by selecting which exemptions, if any, the Debtor should claim on Schedule C, the Defendants engaged in providing legal advice to the Debtor in violation of § 110(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. “Advising of available exemptions ... or actually choosing an exemption for the debtor ... requires the exercise of legal judgment beyond the capacity and knowledge of lay persons.” In re Kaitangian, 218 B.R. 102, 110 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1998). See also In re Dunkle, 272 B.R. 450 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2002) (classifying and selecting exemptions violates § 110); In re Moffett, 263 B.R. 805 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.2001) (advising upon available exemptions violates § 110). Such business practice also constitutes the unlawful practice of law. See In re Bachmann, 113 B.R. 769 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 110(Z)(1), the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing legal services organizations first amendment right of associating to advocate legal rights (B) holding that bpps may not engage in legal assistance make inquiries or answer legal questions (C) recognizing that inmates have no freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance (D) recognizing that courts may make reasoned adjustments in legal system (E) holding that many courts have recognized that an employer may make reasonable inquiries into the retirement plans of its employees
[A]: (B)


[Q]: purposes of nonclient standing] is a question of fact.”). Neither party argues that Mark and Marie share some type of legally recognizable confidential relationship, and Marie offered no evidence to the district court that Mark acquired any privileged, confidential information from Marie. In Brown, this court concluded that “disqualification is not warranted absent proof of a reasonable probability that counsel actually acquired privileged, confidential information.” 116 Nev. at 1202, 14 P.3d at 1267 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the context of familial relationships, other courts have declined to disqualify counsel absent proof that counsel actually acquired confidential information from a family member. See, e.g., Addam v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 42 (Ct. App. 2004) (<HOLDING>); DCH Health Services, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a marital dissolution action that a sibling relationship between a husbands attorney and a wifes former physician was insufficient to disqualify the attorney and explaining that the attorneys brother presumably possesses confidential information relating to the wife but there is no evidence that he disclosed any such information to his sister (B) holding that presumption of access to and knowledge of confidential information between attorney and former client notwithstanding attorneys declarations to the contrary may not be rebutted (C) holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney (D) holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts (E) holding that a corporate insider must abstain from trading in shares of his own corporation unless he has first disclosed the material information known to him not because of the relationship between the buyer and seller but because of the relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders and the insider who obtained the confidential information by reason of his position with that corporation that relationship gives rise to a duty to disclose because of the need to prevent the insider from taking unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders
[A]: (A)


[Q]: and honor, and integrity, and I resent this very much.!! You are In Contempt of EVERYTHING that I represent, and standby, and believe. OFFICIALLY: you were NEVER the “president” of anything.!! In an non-jury trial in November 1990, the district court found the defendant guilty of violating section 871 under an objective reasonable person standard for having made the above and other similar comments. The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction. After adopting the objective reasonable person standard already used by this Circuit, the Third Circuit analyzed a number of factors to reach its conclusion that the defendant’s comments were not protected political hyperbole like the comments made in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (<HOLDING>). These factors are helpful to this Court in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding utterance that if they ever make me carry a rifle upon being drafted into the us military the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj was merely a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the president and was thus protected by the first amendment (B) holding that 18year old vietnam protestor who stated if they ever make me carry a rifle the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj did not violate  871 because the comment constituted political hyperbole protected by the first amendment (C) holding that with the commands of the first amendment clearly in mind a comment that the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj was political hyperbole which did not constitute a willful threat against the president (D) holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of political affiliation not protected by first amendment (E) holding that the following statement conditional in nature and made at a political rally was not a true threat if they ever make me carry a rifle the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj
[A]:
(B)