In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: essential element of an elevated breath alcohol level. Consequently, he contends that the judge’s ruling was essentially a determination that the exclusion of the BAT results left the State without sufficient proof to convict Defendant of the DWI charge, and that this constituted an adjudication of his innocence. Defendant also asserts that the judge’s oral comments that he had “reasonable doubt” and that he found Defendant “not guilty” further indicate that the judge deliberated on the merits of the case and acquitted Defendant of the DWI charge. Defendant does not, however, argue that the judge expressly ruled that Defendant was acquitted of the charges, nor would the record support such an assertion. See County of Los Alamos v. Tapia, 109 N.M. 736, 741, 790 P.2d 1017, 1022 (1990) (<HOLDING>). {20} The State concedes that jeopardy 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that when a cause of action is reduced to a judgment the cause of action is merged into the judgment and thereafter only an action on the judgment exists (B) recognizing that an actual express judgment of acquittal precludes retrial regardless of any defects in the process leading to the judgment (C) holding that defects in service of process must be raised in preliminary objections (D) holding on summary judgment that an attorney who failed to timely file an answer leading to a default judgment was on notice that a malpractice claim might be filed against him (E) recognizing that an appeal from a final judgment permits an attack against any nonfinal order or ruling leading up to it
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: That decision will not be disturbed on appeal even in cases in which the record does not reflect that the issue was ever considered by the parties or the trial court. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 671. As appellee points out, Wilson was a case in which the defendant appealed after the trial court denied his motion to suppress, and did not involve a State’s appeal. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress); Flores, 871 S.W.2d at 720. Although distinguishable in this respect, the reasoning of Wilson is still applicable to the instant case and the observations made in Wilson remain true regardless of which party originally initiates the appellate process. Cf. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (<HOLDING>); State v. Brady, 763 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex.App. — 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing though not relying upon the line of cases which hold the government may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the motion to suppress was granted or denied (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (C) holding that standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised for the first time on appeal (D) holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal (E) holding defendants argument the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress was reviewable as a constitutional issue even though defendant failed to raise the issue in a written posttrial motion
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: allegations are correct, then it can be determined from the face of the record that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense and is patently illegal. Crotts is therefore entitled to have his motion decided on its merits. Crotts alleges that, in 1989, he was convicted of burglary of a dwelling, a second-degree felony, and given a guidelines sentence of sixty-six months’ prison followed by eighteen months’ probation. According to Crotts’s motion, his original sentence was not a habitual offender sentence. After being released from prison, Crotts violated his probation and, in 1991, he was sentenced to twenty years’ prison as a habitual felony offender for that violation. If these facts are true, Crotts’s habitual offender sentence is illegal. See King, 681 So.2d at 1140 (<HOLDING>). Although Crotts was sentenced before the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that shull does not apply to habitual offender sentencing and stating that this was not a case where the judge relied upon a reason for departure that was later declared invalid but rather one in which the judge considered his sentence to be one to which the guidelines did not apply (B) holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony (C) holding that a defendant sentenced as an habitual offender who later successfully challenges one of his predicate offenses may have his habitual offender status and sentencing enhancement vacated through postconviction relief or a motion to correct erroneous sentence (D) holding that under habitual felony offender statute a sentence includes the sanction of probation (E) holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation
[EX A]:
(E)