In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. 6 . The Supreme Court of Connecticut has already rejected the ¡ex loci delicti rule in workers’ compensation actions in favor of “interest analysis” and the Restatement (Second) “most significant relationship” approach. See Simaitis v. Flood, 182 Conn. 24, 29-33, 437 A.2d 828, 831-32 (1980); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 181 (1971). 7 . See Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-555 (1977) (measure of wrongful death recovery equal to value of decedent’s life and expenses); Marko v. Stop and Shop, Inc., 169 Conn. 550, 553, 364 A.2d 217, 219 (1975) (<HOLDING>); see also Halstead II, supra, 535 F.Supp. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective (B) holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control (C) recognizing that a violation of the mbta is a strict liability offense (D) recognizing the significance of control in strict products liability (E) recognizing strict product liability actions

A: (E)
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Q: Plaintiff did not meet the notice requirements of the CFRA and the FMLA. Plaintiff did not notify Defendant in advance that Plaintiff would be absent from March 31, 2014 through April 3, 2014. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo., Exhs. Vol. II. Additionally, Plaintiff did not call in sick or ask someone to call Defendant on his behalf on any of those four days of absence, even though Plaintiff made 26 phone calls to individuals or entities other than McCale or Defendant. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo,, Exhs. Vol. II. Thus, unlike in Avila, upon which Plaintiff relies, Plaintiff did not call in sick during his absence from March 31, 2014 through April 3,2014. See Avila, 165 Cal.App.4th at 1258, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, two weeks prior to Plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party (B) holding that absence from prior state was temporary during the time it was contemplated that the parent and child would return to the other state (C) holding that spouse was not required to return to work immediately upon divorce to avoid judicial imputation of income (D) holding that calling in sick during an absence and providing hospital forms describing the illness upon return to work is sufficient notice (E) holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights

A: (D)
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Q: against another,” United States v. Broadie, 452 F.3d 875, 881 (D.C.Cir.2006) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), the government has conceded that Officer Alton lacked probable cause to arrest for PPW. The government nonetheless argues the arrest was valid because there was probable cause to believe Vinton committed the offense of “carrying a dangerous weapon” (CDW), D.C.Code § 22-4504(a), which “does not require proof of intent to use the weapon for an unlawful purpose,” Broadie, 452 F.3d at 881. Because the Fourth Amendment inquiry is objective, an officer’s “subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153, 125 S.Ct. 588; see also Broadie, 452 F.3d at 881 (<HOLDING>). The CDW statute prohibits “carry[ing] within 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause (B) holding that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff because the facts of the case amounted to a contract dispute (C) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (D) holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest (E) holding arrest was valid because there was probable cause of cdw even though officer incorrectly believed at the time that he had probable cause of ppw

A:
(E)
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