In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: how much more of a connection to interstate commerce, if any, must be shown under a substantial rather than a de minimis standard. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 859-60 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 2455 (suggesting in a pre-Lopez opinion that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress could only reach criminal activity “ ‘substantially affecting interstate commerce.’ ”). It is clear, however, that the direct interstate connection required by Instruction 10 is much more substantial than the indirect interstate connection articulated by the government and disapproved of by the Court in Lopez. In Lopez, the connections articulated by the government between the possession of a firearm in a local school zone and interstate commerce were, to say the least, attenuated. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (<HOLDING>); see also Hicks, 106 F.3d at 189 (describing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference (B) holding that adverse inference rule is permissive (C) recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference (D) holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference (E) recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference
[EX A]: holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference

[EX Q]: Specifically, the EEOC regulations interpreting the Act provide that, in determining whether a claimant is disabled because he is significantly restricted in his ability to perform “either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes,” a court may consider: The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs). 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(ii)(B) (emphasis added). In making this determination, the reviewing court must decide whether the plaintiff is restricted in his or her ability to perform ei stems, Inc., 101 F.3d 346, (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). KCC argues on appeal that Burns’s lifting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lifting restriction of ten pounds did not constitute a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity (B) holding as a matter of law that a twentyfive pound lifting limitation particularly when compared to an average persons abilities  does not constitute a significant restriction on ones ability to lift work or perform any other major life activity (C) holding that a lifting restriction did not substantially limit a computer technicians ability to engage in the major life activity of working (D) holding plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who could not perform heavy lifting failed to meet burden of establishing substantial limitation in major life activity of work (E) holding that a twentyfive pounds lifting restriction did not substantially limit any major life activities
[EX A]: holding that a lifting restriction of ten pounds did not constitute a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity

[EX Q]: See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (“There is ... no basis for importing the ‘necessity requirement’ announced in [Craig and Coy ] into the much different context of out-of-court declarations _”). I would hold, therefore, that the Nevada Supreme Court’s failure to insist upon alternative procedures for procuring Autumn’s contemporaneous testimony did not involve an unreasonable application of Roberts, Craig, or Coy. Setting aside Bockting’s assertions of legal error, I must decide whether the Nevada Supreme Court’s unavailability finding “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Under this deferential standard of review, I 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that clearly erroneous standard of review governs district courts factual findings based on state record documentary evidence and inferences from other facts (B) holding that subsection 2254d2 applies  to situations where petitioner challenges the state courts findings based entirely on the state record (C) holding that the state police is a state agency (D) holding that the law of the state of incorporation applies (E) holding that the trial courts putting its findings on the record at the conclusion of the states case was sufficient to satisfy  152538 because that section does not specifically limit the time within which the court must state the findings
[EX A]:
holding that clearly erroneous standard of review governs district courts factual findings based on state record documentary evidence and inferences from other facts