In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: The Washington Supreme Court upheld its similar statute against a special legislation challenge in Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P. 2d 108 (1972). The court found persuasive the fact that “the scope of the Washington provision is not limited as to vocation. The subject statute bars actions against any person having constructed, altered or repaired any improvement upon real property.” Id. at 532, 503 P. 2d at 111 (emphasis original) ; see also Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N. J. 190, 293 A. 2d 662 (1972). We cannot conclude that the 1965 Act is a special law coming within the constitutional proscription. See Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, supra; contra, Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N. E. 2d 588 (1967) (<HOLDING>). II Similarly, we find no violation of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statute authorizing creation of community councils in certain counties was unconstitutional special law (B) holding there was no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor of equipment lease although payments were made to illinois bank the guaranty was accepted in illinois and it provided that it would be gov erned by illinois law (C) holding  122604a companion legislation to  122603 unconstitutional (D) holding the illinois statute unconstitutional as violating a special legislation proscription (E) holding that illinois public policy did not require the application of illinois law to an illinois accident involving only indiana residents insured in indiana
[A]: holding statute authorizing creation of community councils in certain counties was unconstitutional special law


[Q]: first time a party must specify the statute authorizing attorney’s fees is in the Rule 54 motion (unless otherwise provided by statute or court order). In Missouri, attorney’s fees are not recoverable from another party, except when a contract or statute allows it. Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. banc 2009). The second sentence of the Missouri commissions statute is such an exception to the general Missouri rule. Kraft v. Edwards, 946 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Mo.App.1997). The district judge’s ruling that there was no statutory basis for an award of attorney’s fees is erroneous as a matter of law. On remand, the district court should consider whether to award attorney’s fees. See Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 631 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because this case as tried addressed only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award (B) holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained (C) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence (D) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (E) holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances
[A]: holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained


[Q]: judges, the trial management techniques needed to control these lawyers may seem harsh, even abusive. A rigorous standard that restricts sanctions to instances of clearly abusive behavior will reduce the likelihood that councils will sanction appropriate behavior out of inexperience. And quite apart from the problem of inexperience, even judges can act unfairly — indeed vindictively — towards colleagues. A rigorous standard will reduce, though of course it cannot eliminate, the possibility that judicial discipline will be used to sanction unpopular judges engaged in appropriate behavior. Third, judicial discipline, like civil liability for judicial acts, can chill the proper exercise of judicial discretion. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (<HOLDING>); cf. Williams v. United States, 156 F.3d 86, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that imposing civil liability for acts committed to judicial discretion would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation (B) holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts (C) recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction (D) holding that in the context of erisa successor liability is not an independent cause of action but simply a theory for imposing liability based on a predecessors erisa violation (E) holding that the ban on judicial review of actions committed to agency discretion by law is jurisdictional
[A]:
holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts