In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: (“Due process requires that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his ‘day in court.’ ”). The 1992 statute, as applied in this case, provided State Farm no “fair opportunity” to be heard before it was called upon to divest itself of a significant property interest if it chose to preserve its long-recognized right of subrogation. Instead, the statute placed State Farm in the untenable position of being bound by law to the outcome of private settlement negotiations between the Hassens and UniSun that essentially determined its immediate liability for an award of damages, including noneconomic damages, even though it was not a party to the negotiations and had no available means to assert any legal defenses to the Hassens’ claim. Cf. Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So.2d 604 (Fla.1956) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the statute entitled State Farm 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not (B) holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it (E) holding that a corporation is entitled to due process of law insofar as property rights are concerned so that a money judgment may not be entered against it where it was not a party to a cause and was not served with process even though the principal stockholder was a party to the cause
[A]: holding that it is not


[Q]: judicial review of an arbitration award. See UHC Management Co., 148 F.3d at 998 (“ “We may not set an award aside simply because ... the arbitrators erred in interpreting the law or in determining the facts.’ ”) (quoting Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 751). This third challenge is nonetheless partially cognizable, but only to the extent it can be read as an assertion that there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, a statutory ground under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2), as a claim of misconduct by the arbitrators in refusing to hear evidence or to provide a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, another statutory ground under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3), or as an extra-statutory challenge to the “fundamental fairness” of the proceedings. See P & P Indus., Inc., 179 F.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>). Hoffman’s fourth challenge is to the denial 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit (B) holding right to be fundamental (C) holding that section 34810 is an adequate and independent state ground (D) recognizing plain or fundamental error (E) recognizing review for fundamental unfairness of the proceedings as an independent extrastatutory ground
[A]: recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit


[Q]: sweep of the house. During this sweep, the police noticed two weapons and a marihuana growth set-up. Once police saw this, they withdrew from the premises to obtain either a warrant or consent for a more thorough search. But for appellant’s warrantless seizure, police would not have conducted the protective sweep, which led to the discovery of the items for which the police ultimately sought consent to search. The second factor favors appellant. The third factor is more problematic. Courts usually do not deem police misconduct as “flagrant” unless the illegal conduct was engaged in for the purpose of obtaining consent, or the police misconduct was calculated to cause surprise or fear. Id., (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2262, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Garcia v. State, 3 S.W.3d 227, 243 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct (B) holding that police misconduct had a quality of purposefulness and was calculated to cause surprise fright and confusion (C) holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry (D) holding that the core inquiry is whether the police would have discovered the evidence if the misconduct had not occurred (E) holding that the prosecution must establish a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means that the leads making the discovery inevitable were possessed by the police prior to the misconduct and that the police were actively pursuing the alternate line of investigation prior to the misconduct
[A]:
holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct