In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
(Tex.2010) (orig. proceeding). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies creates a jurisdictional bar to proceeding with the claim. See City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex.2008) (“[Njoncompliance [with Chapter 21’s administrative procedures] deprives courts of subject-matter, jurisdiction.”); Smith v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 101 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). A would-be Chapter 21 claimant must first file an administrative complaint with the civil rights division of the Texas Workforce Commission. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.201(a) .(stating that an aggrieved person “may file a complaint with the commission”); id. § 21.0015 (defining “commission” as “the Texas Workforce ■Commission civil rights division”); Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 486-88 (<HOLDING>). The complaint must be filed “not later than 
 Holding statements: (A) holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent (B) holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language (C) holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (D) holding that administrative exhaustion is mandatory despite legislatures use of the word may (E) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional

Ex Output:
holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent


Ex Input:
in nature and may be waived if not timely raised. Section 1445(c) applies to prohibit the removal of a civil action arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of a state. It does not prohibit federal district court’s from exercising supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367. The state worker compensation statutes themselves may affect the court’s jurisdiction by requiring claims to be filed with an administrative agency. However, such is not the case for claims of retaliatory discharge for exercising rights under Michigan’s WDCA. As noted above, the expeditious and inexpensive procedures found in Michigan’s WDCA are not utilized when an employee alleges retaliatory discharge. Such a claim is treated like any other tort and can be filed in state court. See Delke, 460 N.W.2d at 327-28 (<HOLDING>); see also Lamoria, 584 N.W.2d at 600; Chiles 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge (B) holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws (C) recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act (D) holding that retaliation claim did not arise under states workers compensation laws (E) holding that the bureau of workers disability compensation did not have jurisdiction to hear retaliation claims and explaining that the michigan legislatures intent was not to create an administrative remedy for retaliatory discharge

Ex Output:
recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge


Ex Input:
to do it. The Bankruptcy Court provided counsel for Debtor with the opportunity at the October 3, 2013 status conference to address IndyMac’s argument that conversion was appropriate “based on the record that’s before the Court today” due to “lack of compliance with [the Bankruptcy Court’s] status conference order,” including the untimely filing of the status report and the “monthly operating reports [which] are missing” or “chronically late throughout the entire case.” (Suppl. Notice of Lodgment Supp. Mot. Stay, Ex. 7 at 5-6, 8, ECF No. 20-8). The Scheduling Order and the October 3, 2013 hearing provided Debtor with sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard to meet due process requirements. See In re Bijelonic, No. CV 11-08077-JVS, 2012 WL 2263289, at *5 (C.D.Cal. June 15, 2012) (<HOLDING>). Debtor contends that, prior to the October 3, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bankruptcy courts initial scheduling order provided sufficient notice and opportunity to present evidence to meet due process requirements when the bankruptcy court sua sponte converted a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 because a debtor failed to comply with an initial scheduling order by not submitting a status report prior to the second status con ference and failing to appear at the second status conference (B) recognizing the distinction between the reorganized debtor and the converted debtor and holding an asset which was not property of the original chapter 11 estate does not become property of the converted chapter 7 estate (C) holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7 (D) holding that a bankruptcy court is given wide discretion to convert a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 for cause and an order for conversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (E) holding that claims for alleged legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against attorneys that represented the chapter 11 debtor in possession belonged to the bankruptcy estate and upon conversion of the case to chapter 7 such claims belonged to the chapter 7 trustee as successor to the debtor in possession

Ex Output:

recognizing the distinction between the reorganized debtor and the converted debtor and holding an asset which was not property of the original chapter 11 estate does not become property of the converted chapter 7 estate