In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: “good cause for delay.” United States v. Occhipinti, 851 F.Supp. at 526; United States v. El-Gabrowny, 844 F.Supp. 955, 959 (S.D.N.Y.1994). Next, a “sufficient” affidavit must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the facts must be material and stated with particularity; (2) the facts must be such that if true they would convince a reasonable man that a bias exists; and (3) the facts must show the bias is personal, and not judicial, in nature. McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 942 F.Supp. 297, 300 (E.D.Tex.1996) (citation omitted). To be found sufficient as a matter of law, the affidavit must show “ ‘a true personal bias and allege specific facts’ as opposed to mere conclusions and generalizations.” United States v. Occhipinti, 851 F.Supp. at 525; see United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d at 1339 (<HOLDING>). This Circuit has observed that “judicial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unsupported affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusoiy facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment (B) recognizing that an implied contract must result from a meeting of the minds of the parties in mutual assent to the terms and must be based upon a sufficient consideration free from fraud or undue influence not against public policy and sufficiently definite to be enforced (C) holding that course of dealing may render uncertain terms sufficiently definite (D) holding that the facts averred must be sufficiently definite and particular to convince a reasonable person that bias exists simple conclusions opinions or rumors are insufficient (E) holding that unsupported affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment
[A]: holding that unsupported affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusoiy facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment


[Q]: v. Conlee, 370 Ark. 89, 257 S.W.3d 543 (2007). Kyler Road Home Charles first argues on appeal that the circuit court erred by not awarding him an interest in the home on Kyler Road. Although he acknowledges that Myra had acquired this property prior to the marriage, he asserts that he is entitled to an interest in the home because | ^marital funds were used to reduce the debt on the properly and to make improvements. Our definition of marital properly excludes property acquired before the marriage. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b)(1) (Repl.2009). However, we have long held that a non-owning spouse is entitled to some benefit when marital funds have been expended to improve or reduce the debt on the other spouse’s nonmarital property. See Box v. Box, 312 Ark. 550, 851 S.W.2d 437 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Bagwell v. Bagwell, 282 Ark. 403, 668 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property (B) holding that assets acquired subsequent to separation are not considered marital property absent evidence that spouse used marital property to obtain them (C) holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital (D) holding that the trial court erred in finding that marital property was the former wifes separate property based on a nonseparation agreement in which the former husband purported to relinquish any interest in the marital property (E) holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property
[A]: holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property


[Q]: insurers. Plaintiffs contend that coverage is available under the Guaranty Act because the insurance policy at issue is not “ocean marine” insurance under the 1989 amendments to the Guaranty Act. Plaintiffs argue, alternatively, that even if the policy is “ocean marine” insurance, the amendments are substantive and cannot be applied retroactively. Plaintiffs additionally contend that the cut-through endorsement by EAIC is an “insurance policy” under the Guaranty Act because the 1989 amendment excluding cut-through endorsements from the coverage of the Guaranty Act is also substantive and cannot be applied retroactively. Defendant LIGA disputes both contentions and claims that coverage is unavailable under the Guaranty Act for the insurance policy at issue. III. CONCLUSI W.D.La.1987) (<HOLDING>). In an attempt to resolve the conflict, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a standard wcel policy with a maritime endorsement is an ocean marine policy (B) holding that a standard employers liability policy is not an ocean marine policy (C) holding that a professional liability policy provided primary coverage over a general liability policy for acts committed by a pastor during counseling sessions (D) holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate (E) holding that the standard fire policy and a broader homeowners policy were so intertwined that the prescriptive period in the standard fire policy applied to nonfire perils
[A]:
holding that a standard wcel policy with a maritime endorsement is an ocean marine policy