In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: as defined by Section 30-31-2(M), his acts of cultivating or growing mushrooms, even if by artificial means, are not prohibited by Section 30-31-20(A)(1). To interpret Section 30-31-20(A)(1) otherwise, as the State suggests, would require us to read language into the statute that is not there. See Marshall, 2004-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 10, 13, 136 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801 (refusing to read a personal use exception into the CSA, reasoning that to do so “would impermissibly read language into a statute that makes sense as written”). {11} Our holding is also supported by an analysis of the federal counterpart to Section 30-31-20(A)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000) of the Federal Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (federal act). See State v. Carr, 95 N.M. 755, 760, 626 P.2d 292, 297 (Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the presumptions applicability to federal statutes (B) holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction   (C) recognizing a reliance on federal jurisprudence for the interpretation of louisianas arbitration statutes (D) holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes (E) recognizing that the csa is patterned after the federal act and relying on federal interpretation to the extent that the statutes are similar
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: a result, he had assented to the Estate’s producing the letters. Despite their lack of objection prior to producing the documents, the Opposing Parties contend the Estate “inadvertently” produced the documents and, further, that the stipulated protective order in this ease (the “Protective Order”) requires KFI to return the documents. KFI argues the Estate voluntarily produced the documents. As detailed herein, this court finds the documents were not inadvertently disclosed. When parties stipulate to a protective order requiring the return of inadvertently produced documents, the agreement is enforceable if the proponent actually produced the document(s) inadvertently and otherwise complies with the terms of the order. See VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 11-12 (D.Mass.2000) (<HOLDING>). Absent an agreement, courts have applied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in agency adjudications in which the government has not claimed privilege written reports made at the time of an event must be produced when the credibility of the witness on matters discussed in the report is in question (B) holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply fully against the government because the possibility of harm to a private party is often if not always grossly outweighed by the public interest in enforcement of congressionally mandated public policy (C) holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing (D) holding that where the district court decided two issues in the certified order but identified only the damages issue as the controlling question of law the court of appeals could nonetheless address the other issue (E) holding stipulated protective order mandated return of two documents inadvertently produced with approximately 25000 intentionally produced pages proponents established that the production of the materials at issue was not a considered or grossly negligent decision but the result of inattention ie inadvertence
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: that the burglary occur in a dwelling.” Wenner, 351 F.3d at 973. Taylor sets forth a categorical approach, which “generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Using that approach, Rodriguez’s California first degree burglary conviction does not constitute generic burglary because California Penal Code Sections 459 and 460 do not require “unlawful or unprivileged entry” for a burglary conviction. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (“A few States’ burglary statutes, however, define burglary more broadly, e.g., by eliminating the requirement that the entry be unlawful.”); see also People v. Frye, 18 Cal.4th 894, 954, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 (Cal. 1998) (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, the state burglary statute is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in california one may be convicted of burglary even if he enters with consent (B) holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim (C) holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary (D) holding that a california burglary conviction was burglary under a modifiedcategorical approach because velascomedina pled guilty where the indictment alleged unlawful entry (E) holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary
[EX A]:
(A)