In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the jury during final jury instructions not to consider any testimony it had stricken or ordered the jury to disregard during trial. See United States v. Liburd, 607 F.3d 339, 344, 53 V.I. 890 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]hile curative instructions cannot repair every error, we do generally presume that juries follow their instructions.”). Finally, as discussed above in section B, the People presented overwhelming evidence that Augustine was the individual who pulled a gun and started shooting at Officers Greaves, Wharton, and Allen. Based on these factors, Officer Wharton’s statement — given in response to a question — would not have been sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial even if Augustine’s attorney had requested one at trial. See Ethridge v. State, 418 P.2d 95, 100 (1966) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we conclude that the Superior Court did 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt (B) holding mistrial not warranted for improper statement by police officer where court sustained defendants objection and admonished jury to disregard statement and where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for mistrial where the trial court sustained defendants objections to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information and instructed the jury to disregard the question (D) holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection  and admonished the jury to disregard the statement (E) holding that while the prosecutors question was improper in light of the overwhelming evidence there was no reversible error in the denial of defendants motion for mistrial
[A]: holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt


[Q]: challenge to the amount of refund awarded by DOE to a third-party claimant even though they failed to intervene while DOE was deciding the third-party claimant’s award”). Persistent, the defendant analogizes the instant APA claim with that denied in Brooks v. Snow, 313 F.Supp.2d 654 (S.D.Tex.2004). There, the plaintiffs sought a declaration from the court that Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. § 301.722-1 (listing the grounds authorizing the IRS to settle a tax case) was inconsistent with congressional intent, because the regulation omitted delays caused by the IRS in determining tax liability. Id. at 658-59. The court dismissed their complaint, explaining that they had not “allege[d] they ever submitted any offers-in-compromise and, therefore, they have not upp. 239, 255 (Ct.Cl. 1947) (<HOLDING>). Second, and most crucially, this plaintiff 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a refund may include additional taxes paid after the filing of a refund claim so long as the total does not exceed the portion of tax paid prior to the administrative claim (B) holding under section 7422a that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a taxpayers refund claim because the taxpayer failed to file a refund claim before the statute of limitations had run (C) holding that because the amount of the debtors obligation to the government exceeded the amount of their income tax refund the refund did not become property of the estate and could not be exempted (D) holding that a taxpayer only has a refund right after the irs has credited the refund to other underpaid taxes therefore the refund was not part of the bankruptcy estate (E) holding that a subsequent refund request on reassessed taxes was unnecessary as the government already had notice of the plaintiffs claim
[A]: holding that a refund may include additional taxes paid after the filing of a refund claim so long as the total does not exceed the portion of tax paid prior to the administrative claim


[Q]: opinion notes that the State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts granted Finch a hearing before issuing its order denying him the right to take the examination for licensure prescribed in Section 334.040, supra. At this hearing, Finch introduced evidence of his rehabilitation commensurate with that outlined in the majority opinion. Finch’s previous conviction was never disputed and he was fully aware that it was the “roadblock” to his licensure by the board. In my opinion, the Board afforded procedural due process to Finch, particularly so when measured by the standard expressed by Mr. Justice Goldberg (joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart) in his concurring opinion in Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (<HOLDING>) wherein at pp. 107, 108, at p. 1182 of 83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that amenability hearings must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment (B) holding that the facts did not measure up to the standard expressed for determining procedural due process (C) holding that the defendant was denied due process because the procedural rule was not followed in any respect by the trial court (D) holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure (E) holding that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof violates the due process clause and that due process requires at least a clear and convincing evidence standard
[A]:
holding that amenability hearings must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment