instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
of the statute, the FDA’s regulations, the FDA’s internal interpretation, and precedent all demonstrate that a sterilizer for dental hand-pieces is a “device” as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(h). That being so, both SteriSafe and its accessory SteriDot are within the jurisdiction of the FFDCA. Defendant nevertheless posits three reasons why SteriSafe and SteriDot are not devices. First, defendant argues that the government failed to prove that dental handpieces transmit disease and, thus, that SteriSafe actually prevents disease. Such proof is not required. Congress had two purposes in enacting' the FFDCA: (1) to regulate products that actually prevent disease, and (2) to regulate products that falsely claim that they prevent disease. Because of those d 1006 (9th Cir.1952) (<HOLDING>). Defendant next argues that the Steri-Safe is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the doctor who submitted an expert report did not demonstrate knowledge of cancer treatment he was not qualified to offer an opinion that an earlier diagnosis could have produced a better outcome for the plaintiff (B) holding that a machine that allegedly eliminated lumps from womens breasts was governed by the ffdca even though expert witnesses expressed the unanimous belief that appellants instruments are useless for diagnosis or treatment of any human ailment (C) holding the expert witnesses were protected by witness immunity to ensure expert objectivity (D) holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for  trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis (E) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law
answer:
(B)


question:
v. Jones, 993 P.2d 424, 427-28 (Alaska 1999) (construing a statute to give rise to an equitable lien because it established "an interest in and a right to seek reimbursement from" a particular source). 13 . Cf. AS 09.35.160 (giving a judgment creditor and the process server who levies on property under a writ of execution full control over the timing of a sale in satisfaction of the judgment). 14 . See Alaska R. Civ. P. 89(a). 15 . AS 13.16.505. 16 . AS 13.06.050(39). This definition comports with the definition set out in Uniform Probate Code section 1-201(33), which states: " 'Property' includes both real and personal property or any interest therein and means anything that 'may be the subject of ownership." 17 . Cf. Goldstein v. Prien, 143 Cal.App.2d 123, 299 P.2d 344, 346 (1956) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Since AS 13.16.505 prohibits liens from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is improper for a trustee to liquidate claims that benefit only select creditors with the only benefit to the estate being the recoupment of administrative costs (B) holding that there is a difference between a debtor attempting to pursue an action for his own benefit and a trustee pursuing an action for the benefit of the creditors (C) recognizing under analogous section of california code that the right to recover property conveyed by a decedent in fraud of creditors is an asset of his insolvent estate and that the executor or administrator is a trustee thereof for the benefit of creditors (D) holding that directors of an insolvent corporation are trustees for the creditors (E) recognizing that the bangor punta doctrine was not applicable to suit brought by receiver of insolvent insurance company for the benefit of creditors
answer:
(C)


question:
whether a private right of action may be implied. In recent years the Supreme Court has substantially modified the four-part analysis in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), for determining whether an implied right of action has been created by any federal statute. The critical factor in the present analysis is whether there is an indication of any legislative intent to create a private remedy. See Middlesex County Sewage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1, 13, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2622-23, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981); Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 2066, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981). See also Local Division 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. MARTA, 667 F.2d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). In this case this court can find no 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts (B) holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law (C) holding that absent a clear congressional statement courts should not infer that congress intended to alter equity practices (D) recognizing the supreme courts articulation of the new test and stating that the sole question now is whether there is clear evidence that congress intended to provide such a remedy (E) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses
answer:

(D)