instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
with our ability to review the sentence imposed by the district court for substantive reasonableness because, on review, we must compare the sentence imposed with the correctly calculated Guidelines sentencing range. He contends the relevant Guidelines sentencing range is the post-departure Guidelines sentencing range. But it is the pre-departure Guidelines sentencing range that the district court must correctly calculate and that we must use when we review a sentence for substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir.2006) (“[W]e elect to review the district court’s application of the advisory sentencing guidelines only insofar as they do not involve departures.”); see also United States v. Tankersley, 537 F.3d 1100, 1114 n. 11 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). We used the pre-departure sentence for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause (B) holding that a fee application based on claims that were interrelated nonfrivolous and raised in good faith may still be excessive where the applicant achieved only partial or limited success (C) holding forbearance to sue is a good consideration for a promise founded thereon and it is only essential that the claim be asserted in good faith (D) holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law (E) holding mohamed is still good law
answer:
(E)


question:
Ill 1997). AirTouch alleges that the City’s denial will in effect prohibit it from providing personal wireless services because alternative sites leave “gaps” in its service or will be too costly to provide. a. Gap In Coverage AirTouch has presented evidence of a gap in coverage in its wireless services on the Fanita Drive-Highway 125 corridor from Navajo Drive to the Highway 52 Connector. (Tifft Decl. at ¶ 11.) Air-Touch argues that if a decision leaves “significant gaps” in wireless services, § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) has been violated. The City argues that a mere gap is not sufficient; there must be a general ban for that provision to apply. AirTouch is supported by recent decisions of the Second and Third Circuit. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 640-41 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 70 (3rd Cir.) (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  332c7biii applies only to blanket prohibitions and general bans or policies and not to individual zoning decisions (B) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law (C) holding that  332c7b iii does not apply only to general bans and stating that prohibiting only general bans would 1 require a court to wait for a series of denied applications and 2 lead to the untenable result that once personal wire services are available within the jurisdiction of a state or local government  the state or local government could deny any further applications with impunity (D) holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional (E) holding that a district court cannot require a unit of state or local government to abide by a consent decree that does not serve any federal interest
answer:
(C)


question:
on the part of the jurors to impose the death sentence are similarly problematic. Unquestionably, “appeals to the pecuniary interests of jurors are patently improper.” United States v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150, 102 S.Ct. 1016, 71 L.Ed.2d 304 (1982). Nonetheless, after further review of the DA’s closing argument, it becomes apparent that these isolated statements did not constitute an overarching theme or even serve as a significant part of the DA’s case. In addition, the jury instructions explained in detail how the jury should base their decision. In the context of the whole closing argument and the entirety of the trial, these remarks did not amount to a constitutional violation. See United States v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235, 1240 (4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 842, 109 S.Ct. 113, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding any improper delegation did not rise to level of plain error (B) holding that inadmissible testimony did not rise to level of plain error because the overwhelming evidence against defendant leads us to conclude that the error committed did not cause the jury to reach a different verdict than it otherwise would have reached (C) holding that the prosecutors request that the jury send a message to the community was improper in the guilt phase of the trial but was not so flagrantly improper as to constitute plain error (D) holding that an infringement on the defendants fundamental due process right in the form of a comment on the defendants silence by the prosecution did not rise to level of plain error (E) holding that improper argument about purging jurors community of drug conspiracies did not rise to level of plain error
answer:

(E)