In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: an interpretation of section 85.321 that would make any party who holds a mineral interest indefinitely liable to all subsequent interest holders for prior alleged damage to the land. The consequences of such an interpretation run contrary to the legislative intent to protect and encourage the development of Texas natural resources. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59. We are mindful of the consequences of a particular construction. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.023(5); McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 745. Absent a legislative enactment clearly abrogating the common law, we conclude that Emerald does not have standing as a subsequent lessee to pursue a claim under section 85.321 for Exxon’s alleged wrongful actions as a prior lessee. See, e.g., Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 342-43 (Tex.2006) (<HOLDING>). C. Negligence Per Se Because our holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law (B) holding that tex loc govt code  51075 abrogated city of texarkana v city of new boston 141 sw3d 778 texapptexarkana 2004 (C) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract (D) holding that the city of boston was acting as a market participant when it contracted for public works construction (E) holding that distribution of catalogs to city addresses constituted use within city subject to taxation under municipal code provision

A: (B)
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Q: efforts to persuade an Immigration Judge to exercise her discretion to grant him a deportation waiver — the removal of that discretion would constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Furthermore, given that parole eligibility is “considered an integral part of any sentence,” Shepard, 556 F.2d at 654; see also Warden, 417 U.S. at 658, 94 S.Ct. at 2535-36, I think that the availability and likelihood of a deportation waiver should also be so considered. In explaining the basis for its con- elusion that parole eligibility or gain time should be considered part of 86, 68 L.Ed. 549 (1924) (“It is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment.”); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S.Ct. 607, 608, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913) (<HOLDING>) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the amount of sanctions is appropriate only when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior (B) holding that the determination that an alien is an undesirable person is not a conviction of crime nor is the deportation a punishment it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want (C) holding that it is not (D) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (E) holding that habeas review is  for any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation

A: (B)
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Q: 2012 WL 4344571, *3 (S.D.Fla. Sept. 21, 2012) (Moore, J.); see also Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 645 N.Y.S.2d 433, 668 N.E.2d at 406 (equating “arising out of’ and “based on” for purposes of insurance policy interpretation). Thus, the conversion claims, and any liability incurred as a result, plainly arose out of the TCPA-violating fax advertisements in this case. See Policy at 44. As such, the conversion claims are excluded from coverage by the TCPA Exclusion, and Plaintiff therefore owes no duty to indemnify Med Waste for them. Furthermore, the Policy states that “[w]here there is no coverage under this policy, there is no duty to defend.” Id. at 25; see also Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Dania Dist. Centre, 763 F.Supp.2d 1359, 1366 (S.D.Fla.2011) aff'd, 513 Fed.Appx. 890 (11th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Having found that both the TCPA claims and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that duty to defend ends when it is apparent there is no potential for coverage (B) holding that there is a duty to defend if any of the complaints allegations fall within the risk covered by the policy (C) holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify (D) holding that where claims are cast wholly within policy exclusion there is no duty to defend (E) holding exclusion did not absolve insurer of duty to defend because no factual or legal basis currently exists for applying the exclusion

A:
(D)
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