In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
customs and practices of the trade could conclude that WQIS’s liability under Coverage C ceased once the Coverage A limit was reached. See Morgan Stanley, 225 F.3d at 275 (describing when a contract provision is ambiguous). First, the phrase “liabilities covered” in the Coverage C insuring provision could reasonably be read to refer only to liabilities that WQIS was required to cover under Coverage A, that is, up to $5 million per vessel. Under this interpretation, any liability above $5 million was not “covered,” and - therefore defense costs incurred with respect to liabilities above $5 million did not arise from “liabilities covered.” See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on other grounds by 85 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable person could conclude that once 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due (B) holding that allied may not be held liable for portion of attorneys fees paid pretender of defense due to policy provision precluding reimbursement for defense costs voluntarily incurred (C) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself (D) holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the  insurance policy (E) holding where an insurance policy indemnifies defense costs paid as a result of occurrences covered that the insurer need only reimburse defense costs for claims that are established to be covered through judgment and settlement and not for claims only potentially falling within the policys coverage

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
do not find that MBI has waived this argument on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 49(B). 3 . We also note that MBI did not present any expert testimony, or any other evidence, that would suggest that Orlando's permanent injury to his knee was not caused by the accident. 4 . The prospective juror was struck from the jury pool prior to trial. 5 . MBI also argues that Orlando was only asking for $75,000 in damages. However, Orlando clearly argued that $75,000 was where he thought the jury should begin its discussion for damages, but he did not limit his damages to this amount. Tr. p. 223. 6 . MBI also argues that "[i]f there is no evidence to establish the loss of earning capacity, there can be no recovery on that issue.” Scott v. Nabours, 156 Ind.App. 317, 321, 296 N.E.2d 438, 441 (1973) (<HOLDING>). However, the final jury instructions gave a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the trial court did not err by withdrawing the issue of loss of earning capacity from the jury when there was no evidence in that regard (B) holding that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant was in the custody of the victim officer when he shot and killed the officer due to the undisputed evidence presented at trial including the defendants pretrial statement to police admitting that fact (C) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment (D) holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the defendant had to establish by evidence that outweighed the evidence against him that he lacked the capacity to form specific intent (E) holding that trial court did not err

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
as here, the recalcitrant witness is at liberty pending appeal. In so holding, we join all of the circuits which have squarely addressed the issue. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 906 F.2d 78, 82-83 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom. Backiel v. United States, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990); In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 189 (D.C.Cir.1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 785 F.2d 629, 631 n. 4 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Johnson, 736 F.2d 358, 361-62 n. 5 (6th Cir.1984); In re Witness Before Special October 1981 Grand Jury, 722 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir.1983); In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir.1982); Brown v. United States, 465 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.1972). But see In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928, 96 S.Ct. 276, 46 L.Ed.2d 256 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The foregoing cases have noted that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the deadmans statute should not be extended by judicial construction to cases not clearly within its terms (B) recognizing that denying outofeell exercise for extended periods may constitute cruel and unusual punishment (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration (E) holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to guantanamo

Ex Output:

(D)