In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5653(PAC), 2011 WL 3874821 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2011) ("NJ v. DLJ"); NJ Carpenters, 272 F.R.D. 160 (finding Rule 23(a) requirements were met, but not Rule 23(b)(3) requirements). 59 . DI 294, at 30-33. 60 . Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., 714 F.Supp.2d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (stating Section 12(a)(2) standing is limited to “persons who have directly purchased the securities from underwriting defendants in the subject public offering(s), and not in the secondary market”); In re Sterling Foster & Co., Inc., Sec. Litig., 222 F.Supp.2d 216, 244 (E.D.N.Y.2002) ("[P]urchasers in private or secondary market offerings are precluded from bringing actions under Section 12(a)(2).”). 61 . DI 294, at 30; DI 300, at 17. 62 . See IndyMac I, 718 F.Supp.2d at 513 (<HOLDING>). 63 . This of course means that it does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party waived the claims she failed to pursue in her merit brief (B) holding that because  544b1 provides only the power of avoidance it does not confer authority on the trustee to pursue state law damage claims but that the trustee could pursue such claims under  544a1 or 2 if the claims could have been asserted by the debtor corporation (C) holding pinter analysis to apply to claims arising under  12a2 (D) holding that a trustee had no standing to pursue claims of fraud against the debtors accountant because under connecticut law those claims belonged to investors (E) holding wyoming only had standing to pursue section 12a2 claims as to indx 2006ar11

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
before it was in assumpsit for attorney fees purposes. See Schulz, 67 Haw. at 436, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Higa is not directly on point, its reasoning is a compelling indication of how the Hawaii Supreme Court would rule on the attorney fee question before us. The plaintiffs also seek to distinguish Higa because it involved a client suing his own attorney, and thus in that case there was privity of contract between the two parties. In the present case, Mrs. Helfand was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the defendants and Mr. Helfand. This distinction is irrelevant. Courts have extended the right to sue for breach of contract to intended third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12, 883 P.2d 38, 48 n. 12 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 82 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies (B) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (C) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (D) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract (E) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
his judgment and sentences for aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated fleeing to elude, possession of cannabis with intent to sell or deliver, and felon in possession of a firearm. He raises six points on appeal. We find no merit to his arguments with the exception of those raised in point'six regarding issues Jones preserved in his motion to correct sentencing errors filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). First, Jones correctly argues that the habitual felony offender sentencing statute e rida Statutes (2003), should also be stricken because the trial court did not make a finding on the record of Jones’s ability to pay before imposing the fine. See Gonzalez v. State, 939 So.2d 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). Jones also challenges the $65 cost imposed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court not required to find ability to pay before imposing criminal fine (B) holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it (C) holding that the statute in effect at that time ie section 7750832b florida statutes 2003 required the court to conduct an inquiry into the defendants ability to pay the fine before imposing it (D) recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error (E) holding that competent substantial evidence did not support the trial courts conclusory finding that husband had the present ability to pay and noting that the presumption of section 61145a florida statutes is rebuttable

Ex Output:

(C)