In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: is knowing and voluntary, when there is a factual foundation to support it, when the state has agreed to it, then the discretion has ended and the plea must be accepted.” Id. at 1041. We noted, however, that this rule applied only to “unconditional and unqualified” guilty pleas, not to negotiated pleas where the State has agreed to a particular sentence or to the disposition of particular charges, or where the State opposes the plea. Id. at 1041-42 (on motion for rehearing). Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i) provides: “A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may expressly reserve the right to appeal a prior dispositive order of the lower tribunal, identifying with particularity the point of law being reserved.” See State v. Ashby, 245 So.2d 225 (Fla.1971) (<HOLDING>). A trial judge has wide discretion to refuse 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review (B) holding that a defendant in a criminal case might plead no contest conditioned on the right to preserve for appellate review a question of law (C) holding that the defendant failed properly to preserve assignment of error for appellate review because the trial court had no opportunity to consider the defendants contention as presented on appeal (D) holding that there is no due process right to appellate review (E) holding that under state procedural law a timely objection is necessary to preserve a batson question for appellate review

A: (B)
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Q: on behalf of’ MBC. The record also discloses that the contract makes no reference to MBC and was signed by Mullís as “Contractor.” The record further discloses that payments were made to Mullís, not MBC, and that the payments were deposited into Mullis’s personal account, not into MBC’s account in a separate bank. This evidence supports the trial court’s findings and its ultimate conclusion that Mullís was individually liable for any damages suffered by the Brennans. If Mullís wanted to act as agent for MBC and bind the corporation to the contract, he should have signed the contract in his corporate capacity. This would have had the effect of insulating him from liability. See Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), aff'd, 638 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind.1994) (<HOLDING>). Mullís, without any citation to authority, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (B) holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity (C) holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to determine whether the defendant intended to be bound in his personal andor corporate capacity where the agreement contained certain personal guarantees by the defendant but where the defendant signed the agreement only in a corporate capacity with no signature blocks provided for signing in a personally capacity (D) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (E) holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents

A: (D)
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Q: albeit not the one urged by the State. The statute expressly states that the court may not grant a further reduction in excess of “one-half of the remaining mandatory minimum sentence.” Iowa Code § 901.10(2). If, as the State suggests, it is the prosecutor who decides the maximum level of the reduction, it seems more logical that any limitations on the extent of the reduction would be placed on the prosecutor, not the court. Moreover, the fact that the legislature expressly limited the court’s discretion indicates that it gave consideration to the breadth of the court’s power. The legislature could also have expressly limited any reduction by the court to an amount that did not exceed the prosecutor’s request, but it did not do so. See State v. Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Iowa 1999) (<HOLDING>); Adams, 554 N.W.2d at 689 (“legislative intent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the guidelines did not strip the sentencing court of its discretion to impose a concurrent sentence (B) recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard (C) recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so (D) holding it was reasonable trial strategy for counsel to have determined that sentencing by the court was preferable to sentencing by a jury (E) holding that sentencing court had discretion under sentencing statute noting that the legislature has demonstrated its ability to use restrictive language when it desires to do so

A:
(E)
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