In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
victim’s undisputed injuries, this court held that the statute required proof that the bodily injury was a foreseeable, rather than intentional, result of the rights-viólating conduct. Woodlee, 136 F.3d at 1405. At no point did this court even consider the possibility that the statute might not require proof of foreseeability at all, i.e., that the statute, imposed strict liability .on a defendant for bodily .injury resulting from his conduct. Because there is no logical distinction between the statutory language at issue in Woodlee and the language of § 841(b)(1)(E) that we are now tasked with interpreting, I believe that we are bound by Woodlee to interpret § 841(b)(1)(E) as incorporating a proximate cause requirement. See United States v. Ensminger, 174 F.3d 1143, (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). To conclude otherwise creates an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel (B) holding that a panel may not reconsider issues decided earlier in the same case by the en banc court (C) holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court (D) holding that only intervening law from the supreme court or this court sitting en banc can overrule a prior panel decision (E) holding that we are bound by prior panel opinions until they are overruled or abrogated by the supreme court or this court sitting en banc

Ex Output:
holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel


Ex Input:
of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi appears to indicate that the assets must be blocked at the time judgment against the asset is finalized. See 556 U.S. 366, 369, 377-79, 129 S.Ct. 1732, 1735, 1739-40, 173 L.Ed.2d 511 (2009) (“We ultimately hold that the Cubic Judgment was not a ‘blocked asset’ at the time the Court of Appeals handed down its decision.... ”). The controlling determination in that case, though, was that the asset in question was never blocked because Iran’s interest in it arose after the Treasury Department unblocked all Iranian assets. Id. at 376, 129 S.Ct. at 1739. In Holy Land Foundation, the assets were unreachable because they were unblocked during the pendency of the original civil suit, prior to the commencement of any execution proceeding. 722 F.3d at 687 (<HOLDING>). This rule is not just prescribed by law; it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment (B) holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order (C) holding that the governments restraining order against a blocked asset obtained prior to the entry of a civil judgment unblocked it for tria purposes (D) recognizing that a stay contained in anex parte order did not serve to suspend the effectiveness of the restraining notice otherwise any judgment debtor could obtain such an order without notice to the court that a restraining notice had been served or to the judgment creditor and recover his property theretofore properly made the subject of the restraining notice (E) holding that the cubic judgment was not blocked

Ex Output:
holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment


Ex Input:
in the face of an express warranty stating that no security interest exists. To the contrary, case law supports the proposition that an express “free and clear” warranty precludes a finding of actual knowledge of a security interest. The district court in Black Diamond directly considered this issue in the context of § 9-320. Id. The court wrote that “Black Diamond specifically guaranteed that it ‘had good title’ to the coal, had ‘the right to sell’ the coal to Commodities, and ‘that [the coal] shall he free from all liens, encumbrances and claims.’ Consequently, Commodities acquired the coal without knowledge that its purchases violated CIT Group’s inventory lien.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Victory Nat’l Bank of Nowata v. Stewart, 6 Kan.App.2d 847, 636 P.2d 788, 790 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The bankruptcy court in Black Diamond also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding inter alia defendant breached implied warranty of merchantability where an express warranty regarding safety of goods was printed on package and where goods failed to conform to the express warranty (B) holding that where buyer had opportunity to inspect goods and failed to inform seller in timely manner of defects buyer deemed to have accepted goods pursuant to  672606 (C) holding buyer liable for balance of contract price of accepted goods (D) holding that a buyer who purchases goods subject to an express warranty that the goods are free from all liens takes free of any unperfected security interest (E) holding that a statement of conditional sale of goods can be filed with the state auditor before the delivery of goods where statute says the statement must be filed within ten days of delivery of goods

Ex Output:

holding inter alia defendant breached implied warranty of merchantability where an express warranty regarding safety of goods was printed on package and where goods failed to conform to the express warranty