In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: individual has breached a duty of reasonable care. Bolick v. Sunbird Airlines, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 443, 386 S.E.2d 76 (1989), aff'd, 327 N.C. 464, 396 S.E.2d 323 (1990). Sudden emergency does not change or reduce the standard of reasonable care. It is simply one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a person acted reasonably under the circumstances. Id. The sudden emergency doctrine permits the court to call to the attention of the jury that an emergency faced by the actor may influence its determination of whether specific conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. The doctrine of sudden emergency is not a legal defense which operates to bar an action. Id. But cf. Hinson v. Brown, 80 N.C. App. 661, 343 S.E.2d 284, rev. denied, 318 N.C. 282, 348 S.E.2d 138 (1986) (<HOLDING>). External forces that have been found to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency (B) holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead (C) recognizing that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense a party must plead and prove (D) holding that a claim of exemption is an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded (E) holding that to avoid an affirmative defense  a plaintiff must plead specifically matters of affirmative avoidance pursuant to rule 5508

A: holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency
****
Q: because of [the dealer’s] precarious financial condition .... ... [W]e decline to hold BMW/NA negligent and liable for damages since it could not reasonably have anticipated the crimes committed by [the dealer’s] principal, Eichler. Although BMW/NA may have been aware of [the dealer’s] shaky financial condition, that knowledge alone gave BMW/NA no cause reasonably to anticipate that Eichler would either engage in any criminal activity or that he would abscond with customer funds. In fact, no amount of supervision by BMW/NA would have enabled it to foresee Eichler’s thievery. Id. In other cases involving the franchisors of automobile dealerships, the courts have reached similar results. See Colson v. Maghami, No. CV 08-2150-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 2744682, at *9-10 (D.Ariz. July 9, 2010) (<HOLDING>); DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Clemente, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer (B) holding that a franchisor had no duty to supervise its automobile dealership or to warn a customer of the dealership who paid a substantial deposit for a limited edition lamborghini reventon and who did not receive either the car or the return of his deposit (C) holding that an automobile dealership had no duty to prevent the misconduct of the executives of another company who misappropriated company funds to make the purchase of several automobiles from the dealership (D) holding that where no evidence was designated to show that a car buyer knew that a sale violated the rights of the dealership that owned the car the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of indcode  26112019 (E) holding that a car dealership could be held vicariously liable for the intentional tort of its employee who shot out the tires of the plaintiffs truck during a repossession attempt

A: holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer
****
Q: that CPI had sustained actual damages. See DeJong, supra, 162 Ga. App. at 530 (1). There was no evidence that these were liabilities owed by CPI. Consequently, CPI lacks standing to pursue any damages belonging to H&I or NCO. See Augusta Tennis Club, supra, 219 Ga. App. at 94 (1). (b) Oami’s Damages “It is axiomatic that each corporation is a separate entity, distinct and apart from its stockholders.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Accurate Printers, Inc. v. Stark, 295 Ga. App. 172, 175 (1) (a) (671 SE2d 228) (2008). Canton Plaza was owned in the name CPI. Although Oami was the owner of CPI, he did not enter into the contracts underlying this lawsuit — the promissory note and security deed — in his individual capacity. As a result, Oami was not a party to those contracts. Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Oami was not entitled to pursue 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity (B) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation (C) holding that a corporation could be served by delivering a copy of the subpoena to an officer or managing or general agent of the corporation and that the agent could be an individual a partnership or another corporation (D) holding that the individual defendants were acting as principals andor officers of the corporation and therefore there was no third party present to interfere in the relationship to which their corporation was a party (E) holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed

A:
holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation
****