In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 593, 598 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1, 135 L.Ed.2d 1098 (1996), and of mixed questions of law and fact, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). However, the state court’s factual findings underlying those determinations are presumed to be correct and binding, as long as they were made after a full, fair, and adequate hearing on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 1994) (pre-AED-PA); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of es ing that the findings of the trial court on discriminatory intent in Batson challenge are reviewed for clear error); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (B) holding that the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under general statutes  46a60 is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (C) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (D) holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard (E) holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard
[EX A]: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard

[EX Q]: $585,000 compensation for both the value of the condemned property and damage to the remainder. Northborough filed an objection to the commissioner’s decision asserting it had not received just compensation. The State filed an objection claiming the award was excessive. On April 19, 1991, the award was deposited with the clerk of the trial court. Northborough filed a motion to withdraw the $585,000, which the trial court granted on May 2, 1991. The State subsequently took possession of the condemned property and commenced construction on I-45. Prior to the commencement of the jury trial, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether there was a material and substantial impairment of access to the remainder. See State v. Wood Oil Distrib., Inc., 751 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex.1988) (<HOLDING>). The trial court found the improvements to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when ruling on a motion under rule 60b1 the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact unless a request is made (B) holding that the trial court is required to provide reasons for its decision prior to appeal (C) holding the trial court is required to make a determination on impairment of access prior to trial (D) holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds (E) holding that an exhaustion of appellate remedies is required to make a trial courts ruling the law of the case
[EX A]: holding that when ruling on a motion under rule 60b1 the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact unless a request is made

[EX Q]: or development.” Id at 489-90. Applying this interpretation of what constitutes “internal tribal matters,” we held that the Penob-scot Nation’s operation of beano games was “fundamentally unlike” the listed internal tribal matters, was “not embraced within the general term” of “internal tribal matters”, and was, therefore, subject to enforcement under state law. Id. [¶ 16] In Great Northern Paper, we did not discuss the ejusdem generis approach taken in Stilphen. Instead, we adopted the non-exclusive, non-dispositive factors described in Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 486-87 (1st Cir.1997), and we reviewed legislative history, to aid in determining whether the disputed issue related to an internal tribal matter. Great N. Paper, 2001 ME 68, ¶ 48-50, 60, 770 A.2d at 588-89, 591 (<HOLDING>). The factors applied in Great Northern Paper 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government (B) holding that the maine freedom of access act does not apply pursuant to section 62061 to the tribes internal conduct of their government but does apply when the tribe communicates and interacts with other governments (C) holding that the ada does not contain a waiver of sovereign immunity and thus does not apply to the federal government (D) holding that the ada amendments act does not apply to preamendment conduct (E) holding that section 102 of the civil rights act of 1991 does not apply to preenactment conduct
[EX A]:
holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government