In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: UCL and CLRA. In considering whether the plaintiff in Bruno had standing to bring claims arising from the defendants’ gelcap product, when the plaintiff had only purchased the defendants’ liquid product, the court noted that “treatises and the vast majority of persuasive authority indicate that ... the issue of whether a class representative may be allowed to present claims on behalf of others who have similar, but not identical, interests depends not on standing, but on an assessment of typicality and adequacy of representation.” Id. at 530 (citing Greenwood v. Compucredit Corp., No. 4:08-cv-04878, 2010 WL 4807095, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2010); Arevalo v. Bank of Am. Corp., 850 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1017 (N.D.Cal.2011); Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); 7AA Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers have standing to sue (B) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (C) recognizing associational standing when members would have standing in own right (D) holding that because plaintiff had standing to sue for injury arising from his own benefit plan his ability to represent class members with different benefit plans should be analyzed under rule 23 not standing (E) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: of the writ, the CCA examines the substance of the claim to see if it establishes a prima facie case of retardation, and only upon deciding that question can the state court decide whether remand is appropriate.”). 10 . Brown v. Dretke, 419 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir.2005). 11 . 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). 12 . Id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-17, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)). 13 . In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.2005). 14 . Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 & nn. 24-25 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (citing American Association of Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support 5 (9th ed.1992)). 15 . See Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 361-63 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Bri-seno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 (“[T]he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant suffered from significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and related limitations in adaptive functioning (C) holding that a district court did not clearly err in finding materiality where the prior art reference at issue had been considered material by examiners in related foreign patent applications (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that superior court did not clearly err in finding that the parent had not remedied the problematic conduct

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: be difficult except by improper means). Yet, “[sjecrecy is a relative term. The information may be known to several persons and yet still be secret if third parties would be willing to pay for a breach of trust in order to ascertain it.” Taco Cabana Int’l, 932 F.2d at 1125 (quoting A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Products Corp., 268 F.Supp. 289, 299 (S.D.N.Y.1967)). Courts have held that, even where a plaintiff voluntarily discloses the trade secret without the benefit of a confidentiality agreement, the requisite secrecy is retained if the “disclosure occurs in a context that would not ordinarily occasion public exposure, and in a manner that does not carelessly exceed the imperatives of a beneficial transaction.” Taco Cabana Int’l, 932 F.2d at 1124; see also Phillips, 20 F.3d at 631-32 (<HOLDING>); Metallurgical Industries Inc. v. Fourtek, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disclosure of trade secret without protection of express confidentiality agreement was not fatal to trade secret protection where disclosure occurred during sale negotiation (B) holding that the burden of establishing the true existence of a trade secret and its value to the owner remains on the claimant who must submit evidence relating to the six factors that texas law considers for trade secret status (C) holding that supplier lists can be trade secrets under indianas uniform trade secrets act which uses the same definition of a trade secret as montana (D) holding that the lack of a confidentiality agreement does not necessarily defeat an argument that information is a trade secret because where an employee acquires during the course of his employment a special technique or process developed by his employer he is under a duty to keep it confidential (E) holding that the inevitable disclosure theory can be applied under north carolina law where 1 injunction is limited to protecting specifically defined trade secrets and 2 the trade secret is clearly identified and of significant value


Output: (A)