TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: child abuse or neglect or who testifies or otherwise participates in a judicial proceeding arising from a report, petition, or investigation of alleged child abuse or neglect is immune from civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Id. § 261.106(a) (emphasis added). The dissent also correctly points out that “Immunity from liability and immunity from suit are two distinct principles.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). Finally, the dissent even recognizes that “[ijmmunity from liability is an affirmative defense, while immunity from suit deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex.2004); see also City of Hous. v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>); Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar (B) holding bjecause immunity from liability constitutes an affirmative defense not a jurisdictional bar only immunity from suit is properly before us today (C) recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit (D) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (E) holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: Def.’s Mot., Ex. E, Gaskins’ Decl. ¶ 5. Although plaintiff said that he “heard the rumor about [the cubicle] being unsafe[,]” he contends that the cubicle was not in disrepair and was removed solely in retaliation for his EEO complaint. Def.’s Mot., Ex. A, Jones Dep. at 113, 115. However, plaintiff did not testify that he was unable to complete his work assignments; rather, he testified that the result of the cubicle being dismantled was that he “had no place to put none of [his] stuff[,]” which included “records and stuff[,]” although he testified that the cubicle was replaced with a desk, albeit a small one. Id. at 114-15. These facts do not support a finding of an adverse action sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See, e.g., Brodetski, 141 F.Supp.2d at 45 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). III. Conclusion For the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the administrative transfer of a teacher which denied him the opportunity to teach his preferred subject could constitute an adverse employment action (B) holding that plaintiff s allegations that defendants denied him his right to choose a new workstation on two occasions do not constitute adverse employment actions even if they made plaintiff feel slighted or wrong (C) recognizing that employment actions can be adverse even if such actions are subsequently withdrawn (D) holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false (E) recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: ’ II. A. Smith first complains that the district court erroneously refused to admit a 1996 Consumer Reports article regarding the stability of 1995 and 1996 Isuzu Troopers. The article gave 1995 and 1996 Isuzu Troopers a “not acceptable” rating because Consumer Reports’ testing showed that those vehicles had a propensity to roll over. The article, however, specifically disclaimed its applicability to earlier year-model Troopers: “The Not Acceptable rating does not apply to 1994 and earlier Troopers, has been applied to allow the admission of the preliminary or interim evaluative opinions of agency staff members. Indeed, to apply Rule 803(8)(A) in the fashion Smith suggests would swallow whole Rule 803(8)(C) and its limitations. Rule 803(8)(C) provides a hearsay exception r.1988) (<HOLDING>); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court properly refused to admit a tentative internal irs referral report because it did not contain agency factual findings (B) holding that district court properly considered a police report that the defendant had stipulated contained a factual basis for his plea (C) holding that express adoption of factual findings in presentence report is sufficient (D) holding that a district court satisfies its obligation to make factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report (E) holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it

SOLUTION:
(A)