In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
393 N.W.2d 286, 290-91 (S.D.1986). • GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, (dissenting).. [¶ 26.] I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the lower court on Issue 2. I would hold the trial court erred when it granted partial summary judgment to 01-esens, holding City’s operation of food service at the municipal bar was an ultra vires act. [¶27.] An express grant of authority from the legislature “includes those incidental or implied powers that are necessary to enable a municipality to perform the function authorized.” City of Rapid City v. Rensch, 77 S.D. 242, 246, 90 N.W.2d 380, 383 (1958) (citation omitted). A municipality is vested with discretion as to how it exercises specific powers conferred upon it by the legislature, as long as the methods employed are n , 59 N.W.2d 732, 734 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Actions taken under a municipality’s implied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding municipality had implied authority to enter into a long term contract to establish a golf course although state statute did not specifically grant authority to establish golf courses as public parks (B) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (C) holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority (D) holding that plaintiff had no authority or statutory right for actions proper course was to report actions to proper legal authority (E) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality

Ex Output:
holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute


Ex Input:
intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions “could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited.” Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) (“We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse’s liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void.”). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years

Ex Output:
holding that such provisions are valid


Ex Input:
search at the police station, a small amount of marihuana was recovered from the defendant’s back pocket. In support of his decision to deny the defendant’s motion to suppress the gun and marihuana, the judge found that Clinton reasonably concluded, after he saw the pipe with a bore, that the object was a gun. This finding was supported by the evidence. Clinton was entitled to apply his experience of twenty years as a Boston police officer to draw conclusions from his observations, and the judge, in turn, was entitled to consider such experience in making his factual findings. Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 407 (1974). It was proper for Clinton to assume that Ferguson was carrying the gun without a license. See Commonwealth v. Ferrioli, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 492 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the searchincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to an officers search of the defendants vehicle where the officer while subsequently arresting the defendant for druglaw violations based upon that search never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search but rather only issued a citation and reasoning that the rules underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all respectively in the context of a traffic citation (B) holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof (C) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time (D) holding that an arresting officer who had made a warrantless search of the defendants person on the basis of information from a reliable source that the defendant was armed could properly assume that the defendant did not have a license to carry a firearm (E) holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown

Ex Output:

holding that the searchincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to an officers search of the defendants vehicle where the officer while subsequently arresting the defendant for druglaw violations based upon that search never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search but rather only issued a citation and reasoning that the rules underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all respectively in the context of a traffic citation