In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: witness testifying against him was in custody). This right is not subject to the trial court’s discretion; however, the court may preclude repetitive or unduly harassing interrogation. Ramey,. 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68; Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475. Thus: “[A] defendant need not show interest or motive in that any promises of leniency have, in fact, been made to the witness by the State or that any expectations of special favor exist in the mind of the witness, before cross-examining a witness as to possible bias. Further, the defense is entitled to inquire into such promises or expectations whether they are based on fact or are simply imaginary.” Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68, citing Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475-76. See also People v. Tomes, 284 Ill. App. 3d 514, 520, 672 N.E.2d 289 (1996) (<HOLDING>). “To this end a defendant has the right to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required (B) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (C) holding that limitation on scope and breadth of crossexamination did not significantly curtail effectiveness of witness crossexamination because crossexamination was lengthy and extensive (D) holding it is well established that crossexamination to show that a witness might be vulnerable to pressure whether real or imagined from the state regarding a pending charge is a matter of right (E) holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination
[EX A]: recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required

[EX Q]: (Black, J., concurring)). We are also troubled because, given that there was nothing about the officers’ appearance or conduct that revealed that they were engaged in the performance of their duties, Davis lacked fair notice that mere spoken words, which did not disturb the peace, could nonetheless constitute the crime of obstructing the officer’s performance of duty. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311, 60 S.Ct. at 906. “It is an elemental requirement of our constitutional jurisprudence that laws be reasonably intelligible, providing citizens with fair notice as to what conduct is legal and what conduct is illegal.” Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 6:13 (1996) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (<HOLDING>)). We reiterate that we recognize the need to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion (B) recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority (C) holding unconstitutional vagrancy statutes that were purposely designed to grant police broad discretion (D) holding unconstitutional ordinance that gave executive director excessive discretion in deciding whether the grant of a permit would be detrimental to the public (E) holding that district courts discretion is extremely broad
[EX A]: holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion

[EX Q]: Board should be required to bargain with the Union on the disputed items. Washington Teachers’ Union, supra, 556 A.2d at 210. Even if, on our own, we would reach a different conclusion from the PERB’s, we must defer to the PERB’s interpretation unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. In other words, if the Union is unable to demonstrate that the PERB’s decision is rationally indefensible, we are obliged to sustain it. The PERB held non-negotiable the Union’s proposal that the work year for attendance counsellors shall not exceed the length of the normal work year for teachers and attendance officers, and that the attendance counsellor’s work day shall be from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Its conclusions, in our view, were not shown to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Washington Teachers’ Union, supra (<HOLDING>); D.C.Code § 1-613.1(a)(2) (“[t]he basic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement (B) holding that opening day and duty days were not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining (C) holding that implementation and termination of safety incentive programs were mandatory subjects of collective negotiations (D) holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights (E) holding that the terms and conditions placed on applicants are not subjects of mandatory bargaining
[EX A]:
holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement