In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: of discretion standard. See State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 603, 886 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1994). Statements stemming from a state actor’s custodial interrogation of a defendant are not admissible unless he is warned of his Fifth Amendment “right to remain silent” and that “anything said can and will be used against [him] in court.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). ¶ 19 The State concedes here that Appellant was in police custody when Nurse Geyer questioned him at the hospital. Even if a defendant is in custody, however, Miranda warnings are required when a med ical professional conducts an interrogation only if that medical professional is a state actor. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1876, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (<HOLDING>). See also State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 633 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a public safety exception to the requirement that miranda warnings be given in order to use a suspects statement as evidence against him at trial (B) holding that phrase i know i have the right to remain silent together with phrase and knowing that anything i say may be used against me substantially complied with article 3822 warnings even though warnings failed to advise accused that his statement could be used against him at his trial or in court because it advised him his statement could be used against him in any type of context not just those mentioned in article 3822 subsection 2a1 and 2 (C) holding that a defendants jailhouse statements to a courtappointed psychiatrist could not be used against him in the penalty phase of a murder trial because the psychiatrist failed to give the defendant miranda warnings (D) holding that the warnings in their totality satisfied miranda (E) holding that the government cannot use postarrest silence against a defendant because miranda warnings give implicit assurances that silence will not be used against a person and accordingly it would be fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process to allow a defendants silence to be used to impeach him at trial
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: and onto her abdomen onee she submarined. He further indicated that Amanda’s pelvic and leg injuries were caused by- her knees impacting the vehicle’s dash panel. Mr. Lewis concluded that had Amanda not submarined and her seat not collapsed, she would not have sustained these injuries. Additional Evidence Amanda also introduced portions of Nissan’s pre-trial discovery responses wherein Nissan admitted to disposing of its developmental test reports including any reports concerning crashworthiness, front passenger seatbelt spool-out, submarining, and the effectiveness of the Pathfinder’s seatbelt systems. Mr. Whitman explained in detail why he believed that Nissan’s record retention policy was a bad of our sister states. E.g., Stone Man v. Green, 263 Ga. 470, 435 S.E.2d 205, 206 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The undisputed evidence demonstrates that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are as a general rule improper where a defendant has adhered to environmental and safety regulations (B) holding tcpa is remedial statute and that statutory damages are not punitive damages (C) holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa (D) holding a court may not award punitive damages (E) holding that punitive damages are not fines
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: must be compelling proof that the refusal to deal was motivated by anticompetitive purposes, or will produce an anticompetitive effect. See, e.q., Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 133 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 340, 58 L.Ed. 2d 338 (1978) (“[Something more than an agreement between [a manufacturer and a distributor] must be shown. The agreement becomes violative of Section 1 of the Sherman Act only if it is anticompetitive in purpose and effect — in sum, it must be tested by the rule of reason.”) (emphasis in original); Westman Comm’n Co. v. Hobart Int’l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 1728, 100 L.Ed.2d 192 (1988); cf. Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur, Inc., 787 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, regardless whether a combination 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to be preempted as a per se illegal hybrid restraint a regulation must involve a delegation of market power to private parties that is per se illegal because otherwise the hybrid restraint could not be attacked as facially invalid (B) holding that the per se rule does not apply to a vertical agreement between a buyer and supplier and noting that precedent limits the per se rule in the boycott context to cases involving horizontal agreements among direct competitors (C) holding that otherwise lawful nonprice mechanism agreements between a manufacturer and a distributor may be rendered per se unlaw ful if imposed as part of an illegal scheme to fix prices (D) holding that a maximum vertical price maintenance scheme is not per se illegal (E) holding such agreements to be per se illegal
[EX A]:
(C)