In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: issue in question.” Bradley Ventures, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., 371 Ark. 229, 264 S.W.3d 485, 490 (2007). UAMS maintains that collateral estoppel applies to Dodson I and II, barring both of Dodson’s pending claims, but our discussion is considerably narrower. First, I would set aside Dodson I because I am uncertain that the court’s relevant finding was “essential to the judgment.” Powell, 289 S.W.3d at 444. Second, I would set aside Count II, which is Dodson’s impliedeontract claim. Importantly, Count II is premised on UAMS’s conduct after Dodson II, i.e., sending Dodson bills for the embryo storage fees, and therefore cannot be precluded by the earlier chancery court decision. See Ripplin Shoals Land Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); cf. id. at 1042 (“[R]es judicata does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying contract (B) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment (C) holding that a prior judgment regarding a permit to modify an existing bridge does not preclude a plaintiff from challenging a decision on a new application describing and a different bridge design (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit a design defect products liability expert to submit an untimely addendum stating a new claim of failure to warn after defense expert refuted the basis of original design defect opinion (E) holding untimeliness of motion to modify medical insurance payment did not preclude motion to modify maintenance

A: holding that an assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying contract
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Q: their quest had generally confirmed their suspicion. Thereafter it was incumbent upon them to make a decision as to their course of action with “reasonable dispatch.” Occidental Life Ins. Co. of North Carolina v. Pat Ryan & Associates, Inc., supra, 496 F.2d at 1268; Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, supra, 488 F.2d at 917; Baumel v. Rosen, supra, 412 F.2d at 574. The question, therefore, is whether plaintiffs were guilty of unreasonable delay during the period from May 20, 1969 to August 27, 1969. Considering the number of plaintiffs involved and the time necessary for counsel to research legal authorities and draft and prepare the original complaint, this Court concludes that there was no unreasonable delay. Cf. Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 343 F.Supp. 245, 255-56 (D.Md.1972) (<HOLDING>), rev’d, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973) (in jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal (B) holding inter alia that 130 days was reasonable period for researching and drafting of complaint (C) holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay (D) holding that delays of 115 days and 101 days were both substantial (E) holding that a difference between 384 days prepreference average number of days to payment and 547 days preference average number of days to payment did not make the payments out of the ordinary course of business

A: holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal
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Q: 17200 of the Business and Professions Code will not support an award of punitive damages. Id. (citing Newport Components v. NEC Home Electronics, 671 F.Supp. 1525, 1550-51 (C.D.Cal.1987)). Indeed, it is settled law that punitive damages are not available under section 17200. See Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1148, 131 Cal. Rptr.2d 29, 63 P.3d 937 (2003) (“While the scope of conduct covered by the UCL is broad, its remedies are limited. A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered.... We have stated that under the UCL, ‘[prevailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.’ ”) (internal citations omitted); see also Dozier v. Maispace, No. C-05-1761, 2007 WL 518622, *10 (N.D.Cal.2007) (Trumbull, Mag. J.) (<HOLDING>) (citing Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Santa Cruz 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under  1988 (B) holding that neither compensatory nor punitive damages are recoverable under section 17200 (C) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under subsection 216b (D) holding that punitive damages are recoverable in a claim for retaliation under the flsa (E) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under viwda

A:
holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under  1988
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