instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
as this is circumscribed but critical. For the Supreme Court has made plain that qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability” and “is effectively lost if a ease is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (emphasis in original). IV. We thus turn to the sole question over which we have jurisdiction: whether the district court properly concluded that the officers were not entitled to summary judgment under Norman. The officers contend that Ussery suffered only de minimis injuries and so cannot satisfy the requirements for an excessive force claim under Norman. Blue Br. 8, 16-21. We disagree. During the decade when Norman was good law, we never articulated a precise definition of what c 270 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note the telling fact that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where law enforcement officers restrained and abandoned an arrestee for ten minutes causing him to feel frightened vulnerable and humiliated when left alone and immobile in the dark parking lot such that in the months following the incident he had trouble sleeping and was scared to leave his home  the resulting injury was more than de minimis (B) holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him (C) holding that a reasonable officer could not have been expected to anticipate that ten to fifteen minutes of unauthorized detention would amount to a greater than de minimis injury (D) holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody (E) holding that an individuals liberty is restrained only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
answer:
holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him


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9006(b)(3). There is no excusable neglect basis for enlarging the claims bar date included in Rule 3002(c). Accordingly, the excusable neglect standard found in Rule 9006(b)(1) does not authorize extensions of the claims deadline imposed in chapter 13 cases. In re Oscar, 2005 WL 6522763 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Apr. 14, 2005). “[S]ince 1994, the courts have almost uniformly ruled that proofs of claim that are untimely filed in a Chapter 13 case may not be deemed timely filed, and that the claimants thereunder should not take from, or be permitted to recover from, the debtor’s estate under the Chapter 13 plan.” Daniels, 466 B.R. at 217 (listing examples). This Court has consistently held that late claims are not permitted in chapter 13 cases. In re Dumain, 492 B.R. 140, 148 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2013) (<HOLDING>). As such, the Court will not allow Ocwen’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding impairment of secured creditors foreclosure remedy permissible (B) holding that failure to comply with bankruptcy rule 4004 may be waived (C) holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added (D) holding that secured creditors must comply with the bar date imposed by bankruptcy rule 3002c (E) holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor
answer:
holding impairment of secured creditors foreclosure remedy permissible


question:
sentence, or resentencing. See id. § 9546. Consequently, because the only claim at issue in a motion for post-conviction DNA testing is a convicted individual’s eligibility for such testing under the aforementioned provisions of Section 9543.1, when the trial court enters an order either granting or denying the testing, the litigation under this section is at an end: the sole claim between the parties — the Commonwealth and the movant — has been addressed by the trial court and finally disposed of. Thus, under the plain language of Rule 341(b), because a trial court order granting or denying the motion for DNA testing disposes of all claims raised by all parties to the litigation, it is, therefore, a final order. See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 566 Pa. 307, 310-11, 780 A.2d 646, 648 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In the instant matter, the Commonwealth, as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonfinal order is immediately appealable where it finally determined claims of right separable from and collateral to rights asserted in the action emphasis added (B) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (C) holding that pursuant to parap 341b order of pcra court which fully and finally disposed of all issues before it was final and immediately appealable (D) holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court (E) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order
answer:

holding that a nonfinal order is immediately appealable where it finally determined claims of right separable from and collateral to rights asserted in the action emphasis added