In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: lease, for the first time in his reply brief, thus, he has waived it. In most circumstances a litigant who fails to raise an argument until his reply brief wül be deemed to have waived that argument. Wilson v. O’Leary, 895 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1990). This case is before us, however, on a motion for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The inquiry we are faced with is whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support his allegation. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This court has held that when reviewing Rule 12(b)6) motions, we wül consider new factual allegations raised for the first time on appeal provided they are consistent with the complaint. See Hrubec v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 981 F.2d 962, 963-64 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Dawson v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 369, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint (B) holding that the essential inquiry in conversion of a rule 12b6 motion to a rule 56 motion is whether the appellant should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted into one for summary judgment or was taken by surprise and deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the pleadings (C) holding that a plaintiff may attempt to survive a rule 12b6 motion by adding essential new facts in a brief on appeal (D) holding that class claims that fail to meet the requirements of rule 23 may be properly dismissed by granting a rule 12b6 motion (E) holding that plaintiff cannot introduce new allegations or new facts in opposition to a motion to dismiss
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: been completed and 2) further investigation into issues such as whether there was hair in the shotgun hole was not necessary because, if used at trial, it would have been perceived as “tearing apart the victim.” Thus, Roark’s decision to not investigate was essentially a combination of acts within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and one that falls within the category of strategic or tactical decisions that should not be second guessed. Hollon does not present any persuasive argument that' the investigation was below an objective standard. Consequently, we uphold the district court’s determination that Hollon has not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard. D. Suppression of Hollon’s Confession Hollon argues that Roark rendered in ) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the district court determined 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed (B) holding that a petitioner must show  that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had counsel raised the issue (C) holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different (D) holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different (E) holding that where the record supported the district courts conclusion that statements would not have been suppressed and there had been nothing submitted on appeal to lead to a different conclusion the petitioner had not shown any resulting prejudice from the failure to file a motion to suppress and therefore had not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: ordered by the commissioner.” Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 413.014(d); see also Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 413.014(c); 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 134.600 (requiring preauthorization for spinal surgeries). 4 . On the record before us, it appears that Caldera has suffered no out-.of-pocket loss for the costs at issue. And as far as we can tell, Medicare has taken np,steps to recover these funds from ICSP or Caldera. 5 . The parties agreed to sever Caldera's extent-of-injury appeal and his MSP claim. The MSP claim is pending before the 105th Judi- . cial District Court of Nueces County, Texas, but is abated pending the outcome of this declaratory judgment. 6 . Courts across the country have reached this conclusion. See, e.g., Varacalli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 763 F.Supp. 205, 207 (E.D.Mich.1990) (<HOLDING>); Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F.Supp. 1155, 1165 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insureds personal belief that he was not liable for an accident provided no basis for submitting the question of the reasonableness of his delay in notification to a jury when the insured knew the day after the accident that it had been claimed that the cable he had installed had caused the accident (B) holding that under msp any payment that medicare does make is secondary and is subject to reimbursement from sources of primary coverage under the statute regardless of whether those sources can be expected to pay promptly (C) holding that a claim based on an insurers failure to provide emergency benefits under state law is completely preempted because the factual basis of the complaint  was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits (D) holding the state law claims were not preempted (E) holding that the msp preempted a state law that required insurers to offer coordination of benefits at reduced premiums when the insured had other health and accident coverage making medicare the primary payer in direct conflict with the msp
[EX A]:
(E)