In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: WTT Project area as defined by the Corps. NEF contends that we need not consider the State’s argument because the State failed to raise this argument in its initial motion to clarify, instead raising it for the first time in its Rule 59(e) motion. “Rule 59(e) motions are ‘aimed at reconsideration, not initial consideration.’ ” FDIC v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Bank of New England, 897 F.2d 611, 616 (1st Cir.1990)). In World University, this Court held that the defendant’s argument, which it raised for the first time in a Rule 59(e) motion, was barred where there was no reason why the defendant could not have presented its argument prior to its motion to alter or amend the judgment. Id.; see also Engler, 146 F.3d at 374 (<HOLDING>). This rule, however, does not cover the facts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument (B) holding that a party in a habeas case waives an argument by failing to raise it before the district court (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that an argument was barred where the movant could have but did not raise its argument before the district court ruled in the original motion (E) holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court

A: (D)
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Q: completed his nine month term of incarceration and was released from custody on Jply 28, 2017. Any challenge to the procedural or substantive reasonableness of his term' of confinement is thus moot. See United States v. Probber, 170 F.3d 345, 347-49 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing as moot an appeal from a judgment revoking supervised release where defendant had already completed his term of confinement). However, because defendant would still be entitled to a reduction of his term of supervised release if the court were to find such a reduction appropriate, we will analyze whether, as defendant claims, the supervised release component of the District Court’s sentence was either procedurally or substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Mazza Alaluf, 621 F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). Defendant contends that the District Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding substantive reasonableness sentencing challenge to be moot when defendant had completed prison sentence but addressing challenge to supervised release conditions (B) holding that where trial court did not inform defendant of supervised release term during plea colloquy but did advise defendant of term in presentence report and at sentencing defendants sentence stands (C) holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e (D) holding that a completed term of confinement did not render a challenge to the reasonableness of a sentence moot where defendant could receive a reduced term of supervised release (E) holding defendant convicted under  841b1a may receive lifetime term of supervised release

A: (D)
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Q: forbids preventative detention for public safety, “that is, imprisoning accused but unconvicted defendants because they may endanger the public.” Id. at 570-71, 621 A.2d at 1299. Although the constitutional bail provision had been amended in 1982, the Court noted that the amendment had been criticized because it did nothing to allow consideration of an accused’s danger to the community as a basis for pretrial detention. Noting that Proposal 7 was under consideration by the Legislature at that time, the Court stated, “Unless this new concept is enacted, we must continue to evaluate bail statutes as mandated by chapter II, § 40, and as discussed in our prior cases.” Id. at 573, 621 A.2d at 1300; see also State v. Madison, 163 Vt. 390, 396, 659 A.2d 124, 127-28 (1995) (Morse, J.) (<HOLDING>). My review of the drafts of Proposal 7, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  3583e2 allows a district court to modify the conditions of supervised release without extending the term of that release (B) holding that evidence of a threat to a witness by the defendant is relevant as showing an attempt to prevent a witness from testifying and avoid punishment for the crime (C) holding that even though the victim has settled a civil claim and signed a release the state is not barred from seeking or the court from imposing reasonable restitution (D) holding state demonstrated conditions of release would not prevent defendant from posing a significant threat not only to the victim but to other young women (E) holding prohibition lies to prevent a lower tribunal from acting in excess of its jurisdiction but not to prevent an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction

A:
(D)
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