In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000). A properly filed application is “one submitted ac cording to the state’s procedural requirements, such as the rules governing the time and place of filing.” Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir.1998). As described above, Petitioner initiated several state postconviction proceedings which, if properly filed, could toll the one-year period of limitation. The first of these was a motion for reduction of sentence filed and denied on October 8, 1996. This motion was pending until November 7, 1996, when the thirty-day period for filing a timely appeal expired. See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir.2000)(<HOLDING>). The Court finds that the one-year period of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for purposes of  2255 motions a federal criminal judgment becomes final when the time for filing a direct appeal expires (B) holding that a postconviction proceeding is pending under  2244d2 until the time to appeal expires (C) holding that time limit for initiating a tax appeal under kansas jurisdictional statute was a limitation  upon the right itself so that when time expires the right to bring such an action is extinguished (D) holding that postconviction proceeding is a civil suit (E) holding that the other collateral review provision of  2244d2 encompasses federal review

Answer: (B)


Question: 918 F.2d 154, 159 (11th Cir.1990). A district court should grant a preliminary injunction only if the movant clearly shows: 1. a substantial likelihood that the mov-ant will prevail on the merits; 2. that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is, not issued; 3. that the potential injury to the mov-ant outweighs the possible harm to the nonmovant; and 4. that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id. This Court will address each element in turn. 1. SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS To begin, the instant ease is controlled by this Court’s decision in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116 (M.D.Fla.1991). In Luckie, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with AAA pursuant to the AMEX Window. Id. The defendants argued th 2nd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Also, in Merrill Lynch v. Noonan, [Current] 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (C) holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision (D) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (E) holding that a specific customer agreement can supersede the amex constitution and requiring arbitration before one of the fora named in the agreement

Answer: (E)


Question: or offer was made in that case, the automatic suspension remained in place. In In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.1999), the supreme court again recognized the trial court’s discretion to deny suspension of a final “other judgment” and again placed the burden on the appellee to request that the trial court deny suspension of the judgment or to offer to post a bond. In that case, the court first noted the appellant’s exempt status: As a county official sued in his or her official capacity, a district clerk’s notice of appeal operates as a supersedeas bond. As a general rule, a district clerk’s appeal, when perfected, automatically supersedes the trial court’s judgment, and that suspension remains in eff ies for Affordable Util. Rates, 776 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, no writ) (<HOLDING>)).... But [the ap-pellee did not seek denial of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court has discretionary authority under former rule 47f to deny a city suspension of an injunction pending appeal (B) holding that appellate jurisdiction to review special appearance rulings was not limited solely to interlocutory appeal authorized by section 51014a7 of the civil practice and remedies code (C) holding same as to the filing of a notice of an interlocutory appeal (D) holding that mandamus is an appropriate remedy because the trial courts issuance of temporary orders is not subject to interlocutory appeal (E) holding that when a state commission has the right under section 6001 of the texas civil practice and remedies code to supersede an order the trial court cannot deny suspension of a temporary injunction under former rule 43a currently texrapp p 291b pending an interlocutory appeal

Answer:
(E)