In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

first time a party must specify the statute authorizing attorney’s fees is in the Rule 54 motion (unless otherwise provided by statute or court order). In Missouri, attorney’s fees are not recoverable from another party, except when a contract or statute allows it. Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. banc 2009). The second sentence of the Missouri commissions statute is such an exception to the general Missouri rule. Kraft v. Edwards, 946 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Mo.App.1997). The district judge’s ruling that there was no statutory basis for an award of attorney’s fees is erroneous as a matter of law. On remand, the district court should consider whether to award attorney’s fees. See Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 631 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because this case as tried addressed only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award (B) holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained (C) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence (D) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (E) holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances
holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained

provider in the course of treatment. In cases involving successive tortfeasors whose separate causal contributions to the plaintiff’s harm can be measured, the doctrine of joint and several liability applies only to the enhanced portion of the injury. See Keeton et al. § 52, at 352 (discussing distinction between original tortfeasor’s liability, which encompasses entire injury, and treating physician’s liability, which extends only to negligent treatment); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. c. 17. Even though the original tortfeasor may be held hable for both the original and the enhanced injury, the imposition of entire liability is only temporary. The original tortfeasor, whose duty is of a different character and who is not in pari delicto with a successive 35, 42 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Thus liability for the enhanced injury may be 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor (B) holding that contribution will lie where no statute precludes recovery from the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought (C) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because it was not an innocent party (D) recognizing a right to contribution (E) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because claim properly was for contribution
recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor

and its finding that probationer officers must be able to conduct warrant-less searches in order to properly supervise their probationers, we conclude that the statute provides the necessary notice _” (footnote omitted)); Soca, 673 So.2d at 28 (“Florida’s statutes contain no scheme expressly authorizing or regulating the authority of probation officers or supervisors to conduct a probationary search.... Rather, a probation officer’s right to search is based on our holding in Grubbs....”); see also State v. Yule, 905 So.2d 251, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“[T]he authority of the probation officers to monitor and control the probationer ... provided a sufficient basis for them to enter her residence and conduct a warrantless search.”); Ayoub v. State, 901 So.2d 311, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). Extending the same general authority to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warrantless search of probationers home by law enforcement officer for investigatory purposes was reasonable when conditions of probation included a search term and search was supported by reasonable suspicion (B) holding that all special conditions of probation must be orally pronounced at sentencing (C) holding condition of probation requiring probationer to consent at any time to a warrantless search by a law enforcement officer was unconstitutional (D) recognizing that condition requiring submission to search by probation officer need not be orally pronounced because warrantless searches are necessary for proper supervision of probationers citing brown 697 so2d at 929 (E) holding a warrantless probation search condition that is reasonably related to a probationers rehabilitation is a valid limitation to a defendants fourth amendment rights

holding warrantless search of probationers home by law enforcement officer for investigatory purposes was reasonable when conditions of probation included a search term and search was supported by reasonable suspicion