In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith,” though it may be admissible for other purposes. If a trial judge overrules a Rule 404(b) objection, finding the evidence of another crime or wrong admissible for one of these other purposes, the trial judge must also conduct a Rule 403 balancing test. This filtering analysis requires assessing whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of undue prejudice before evidence may be admitted. Watts v. State, 635 So.2d 1364, 1368 (Miss.1994). ¶ 56. Once again, Grindle did not object or in any way argue that the evidence of his subsequent arrest was being elicited in violation of Rule 404(b). So his Rule 404(b) argument is waived. See Ruben-stein v. State, 941 So.2d 735, 760 (¶ 87) (Miss.2006) (<HOLDING>). And by not objecting under Rule 404(b), his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plainerror review applies where the defendant fails to object to a constructive amendment (B) holding that to admit evidence of prior bad acts under rule 404b ala r evid the state must demonstrate that the evidence was reasonably necessary to its case (C) holding rule 16 does not apply to oral statements other than statements of the defendant (D) holding admission of prior bad acts of child abuse was reversible error when the defendant did not have exclusive control over the children during the period when the prior bad acts occurred (E) holding that failure to object to statements of prior bad acts barred argument on appeal that statements violated rules 404b and 403 without conducting any plainerror analysis

A: (E)
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Q: an alcohol concentration of .22. The Commissioner of Public Safety revoked Gergen’s driving privileges, and the district court affirmed. ISSUES 1. Where a district court determines that a person arrested for driving while intoxicated did not make a good faith effort to contact an attorney, is the driver’s right to counsel vindicated even though the telephone provided by the arresting officer is blocked from dialing 800-numbers? 2. Did the police officer violate Minn.Stat. § 481.10? ANALYSIS I. A person arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) has a limited right to consult an attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing, provided the consultation does not unreasonably delay the testing. Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn.1991) (<HOLDING>); see Minn. Const. art. I, § 6 (“In all 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no constitutional right to refuse chemical testing under the implied consent law (B) holding that the implied consent warning given to the defendant was not misleading or coercive because the validity of the implied consent notice is not contingent upon other administrative aspects of ocga  405671 (C) holding that officers not required to give implied consent warnings where statute did not apply (D) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (E) holding that right to counsel under implied consent statute is limited because of the evanescent nature of alcohol

A: (E)
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Q: or serious bodily injury.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (emphasis added). A car can be a deadly weapon. Butler v. State, 928 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd). Randy and Gary collectively testified that Appellant rammed them with his vehicle two or three times, and Randy testified that Appellant caught them even after he drove sixty or seventy miles-per-hour while fleeing from Appellant. Although neither Randy nor Gary testified that they were physically injured by Appellant’s conduct, there is no requirement that the deadly weapon actually cause death or serious bodily injury before the jury can affirmatively answer the deadly weapon question. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B); see also McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497, 503 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). The evidence is legally sufficient to support 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reckless conduct was lesserincluded offense of aggravated assault by threatening another with imminent bodily injury by use of deadly weapon because the danger of serious bodily injury in the lesser offense is necessarily established when a deadly weapon is used in the commission of an offense as required for the greater offense (B) holding that although defendants vehicle was not used with deadly effect it was a deadly weapon because it was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury if not for an oncoming drivers evasive maneuver (C) holding that it was a double jeopardy violation to convict and sentence for both dui with serious bodily injury and driving without a valid license with serious bodily injury based on an injury to a single victim (D) holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a deadlyweapon finding because a motor vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se and there was no testimony in the record that defendant operated his vehicle in a manner that was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury (E) holding section 107a17bs plain language does not require that the actor actually intend death or serious bodily injury an object is a deadly weapon if the actor intends a use of the object in which it would be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury

A:
(E)
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