In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: to establish eligibility-triggering factors: Though Ia-beled as "sentencing factors,” those factors are more appropriately considered as elements of a capital offense. This logic applies equally to the establishment of any sentencing factors necessary to expose a defendant to a higher maximum penalty in the noncapital context. As discussed supra, Fields’s Confrontation Clause challenge relates only to evidence that the government introduced relevant to the jury's ultimate selection decision. The applicability of the Confrontation Clause to the establishment of eligibility-triggering factors is therefore not a question squarely presented by this case, and we decline to resolve it definitively. 19 .See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385, 106 
 Holding statements: (A) holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment (B) holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing (C) holding that if a jury is to be provided the defendant at capital sentencing regardless of whether the sixth amendment requires it the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the sixth amendment (D) holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements (E) holding the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment
[EX A]: holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment

[EX Q]: United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d 865, 880 (6th Cir.1994). B. Sufficiency of the evidence K. Kennedy and Scarborough moved for judgments of acquittal at the close of the government’s proof, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain their convictions. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 29(a). The district court considered and denied the motions, and neither defendant renewed his or her respective motion at the close of all the evidence, see Swidan, 888 F.2d at 1080, or within 14 days after their guilty verdicts,' see Fed. R.Crim.P. 29(c)(1). They have thus failed to preserve their rights to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in the absence of a miscarriage of justice. See Swidan, 888 F.2d at 1080; see also United States v. Faymore, 736 F.2d 328, 334 (6th Cir.1984) '(<HOLDING>).' Both K. Kennedy and Scarborough conceded at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice (B) holding that the defendants insufficientevidence claim was barred by his failure to renew his rule 29 motion at the close of all the evidence because there was no manifest miscarriage of justice (C) holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence (D) holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial (E) holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence
[EX A]: holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice

[EX Q]: on the valuation to place upon [the plaintiff’s] remote contributory negligence.”). Based upon our extensive review of this voluminous record, we have determined that the only prejudicial errors in the trial were Judge Wimberly’s improper supplemental instructions encouraging the jury to recalculate the amount of the verdict, and his failure to independently assess the amoun s not against the clear weight of the evidence, it shall enter judgment on the amount determined by the jury. If, however, the trial court does find that the amount of damages is against the clear weight of the evidence, the court should suggest an appropriate additur or remittitur, with the alternative of granting a partial new trial. See Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 914-15 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Pomeroy v. III. Cent. R.R., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in civil theft claim once jury sets the amount of actual damages it is a ministerial act for the trial court to triple those damages and enter final judgment in that amount (B) holding that the trial court on remand erred when it adopted a new theory of damages contrary to the order of the court of appeals (C) holding that when a trial court determines that the amount of damages awarded by a jury is excessive the court may either suggest remittitur or grant a new trial on the issue of damages (D) holding that issue of attorneys fees should be retried if damages awarded are reduced on appeal and appellate court can not be reasonably certain that trial court was not influenced by erroneous damages award (E) holding that the trial court can and should grant a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict
[EX A]:
holding that in civil theft claim once jury sets the amount of actual damages it is a ministerial act for the trial court to triple those damages and enter final judgment in that amount