In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Welliver was originally entered into by Wellco, Inc. as Welliver’s predecessor. 4 . Ward is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in Bloss-burg, Pennsylvania. 5 . A “turn-key” project is one “in which all owner need do is 'turn the key' in the lock to open the building with nothing remaining to be done and all risks lo be assumed by contractor.” Black's Law Dictionary 1055 (6th ed.1991). 6 . Welliver is located in Elmira, New York. 7 . Ward Excavating is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business located in Troy, Pennsylvania. 8 . The phrases "peculiar risk” and "special danger” are used interchangeably. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 comment a (1965); Ortiz v. Ra-El Dev. Corp., 365 Pa.Su per. 48, 528 A.2d 1355, 1357 n. 2 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Nowhere in their Brief in Opposition to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agreement which required the submission of an affidavit of payment to subcontractors or lien waivers before payment was made by the general contractor was for the direct benefit of the subcontractors (B) holding corporation that contracted with independent contractor not liable to subcontractors employee plaintiff was unable to establish that peculiar risk or special danger caused injury (C) holding in part that the liability insurance company of the subcontractor which had named the general contractor as an additional insured on the subcontractors policy was liable to reimburse the general contractor for a settlement payment the general contractor had made to the subcontractors employee (D) holding that contract charged primary contractor with a duty of care for all employees on the work site including employees of its subcontractors where contract required primary contractor to comply with applicable state and federal safety statutes and regulations made primary contractor responsible for reviewing safety programs of its subcontractors and primary contractor employed a safety officer to oversee its subcontractors operations (E) holding that bankruptcy trustee for contractor could not avoid prepetition payment of funds from contractor to subcontractors
holding that an agreement which required the submission of an affidavit of payment to subcontractors or lien waivers before payment was made by the general contractor was for the direct benefit of the subcontractors

of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi appears to indicate that the assets must be blocked at the time judgment against the asset is finalized. See 556 U.S. 366, 369, 377-79, 129 S.Ct. 1732, 1735, 1739-40, 173 L.Ed.2d 511 (2009) (“We ultimately hold that the Cubic Judgment was not a ‘blocked asset’ at the time the Court of Appeals handed down its decision.... ”). The controlling determination in that case, though, was that the asset in question was never blocked because Iran’s interest in it arose after the Treasury Department unblocked all Iranian assets. Id. at 376, 129 S.Ct. at 1739. In Holy Land Foundation, the assets were unreachable because they were unblocked during the pendency of the original civil suit, prior to the commencement of any execution proceeding. 722 F.3d at 687 (<HOLDING>). This rule is not just prescribed by law; it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment (B) holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order (C) holding that the governments restraining order against a blocked asset obtained prior to the entry of a civil judgment unblocked it for tria purposes (D) recognizing that a stay contained in anex parte order did not serve to suspend the effectiveness of the restraining notice otherwise any judgment debtor could obtain such an order without notice to the court that a restraining notice had been served or to the judgment creditor and recover his property theretofore properly made the subject of the restraining notice (E) holding that the cubic judgment was not blocked
holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment

required then&emdash;and all we require now&emdash;is that the employer show that it established a § 207(k) work period and that the § 207(k) work period was regularly recurring. Id. (citations omitted). Specific reference to § 207(k) is not necessary to satisfy this standard. Consistent with our sister circuits, we decline to require more of employers to qualify for the § 207(k) exemption. See Rosano v. Twp. of Teaneck, 754 F.3d 177, 187-88 (3d Cir. 2014); Calvao v. Town of Framingham, 599 F.3d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2010); Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793, 810 (6th Cir. 2001); Freeman v. City of Mobile, 146 F.3d 1292, 1297 n.3 (11th Cir. 1998); Spradling, 95 F.3d at 1505; Barefield, 81 F.3d at 710; see also Milner v. Hazelwood, 165 F.3d 1222, 1223 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). The City has satisfied the criteria for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no liberty interest was implicated where the public reason for employees dismissal was that their services did not meet the expectations of the public employer (B) holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation (C) holding that defendant need not establish that he was not engaged in unlawful activity under section 776012 (D) holding that employer need not establish the exemption through public declaration (E) holding that insurance company administering employerprovided disability plan was not place of public accommodation under ada because employees received their benefits through employment not through a public accommodation

holding that no liberty interest was implicated where the public reason for employees dismissal was that their services did not meet the expectations of the public employer