In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: litigation. The district court can correct any abuses at the fees for fees stage under the “reasonableness” standard. The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment (B) holding that time entries such as preparation for hearing or preparation for school visit were too vague and reducing overall fee award by twentyfive percent (C) holding that fee application must be sufficiently detailed to allow court to make an independent evaluation as to what fees are actual and necessary and finding that failure to keep contemporaneous records does not automatically result in denial of the fees but the lack thereof justifies a reduction of the fee to the level proven (D) holding that attorneys fees for the preparation of the fee application are compensable (E) holding that the independent counsel reauthorization act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application

A: holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment
****
Q: Discipl. LEXIS 78, *9 (attorney disbursed all settlement proceeds to client less amount he retained for himself, after having been placed on notice that prior attorney claimed an in terest in any settlement funds in violation of Colo, RPC 1.15(b)). III. ANALYSIS OF SANCTION In both the Dunn and McCarthy matters, Rishel engaged in knowing conversion by obtaining funds from third parties for a stated purpose, failing to utilize the funds for that purpose, retaining the funds for an extended period of time after the third parties had withdrawn authorization, and failing to refund the amounts paid to the third parties despite their demand that he do so. The presumptive sanction for knowing conversion of the property of another is disbarment. People v. Dice, 947 P.2d 339, 340 (Colo.1997)(<HOLDING>); Motsenbocker; 926 P.2d at 577 (attorney 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause (B) holding that a lawyers knowing misappropriation of funds whether belonging to a client or third party warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation (C) holding that an attorney should not be disbarred for misappropriation of client funds where there were no aggravating factors the attorneys clients did not suffer actual harm and the attorney established several mitigating factors (D) holding that permanent disbarment was appropriate for failure to remit 2000 in settlement funds to client and failing to answer the charges (E) recognizing that a lawyer hired by a third person to represent a client should exercise judgment on behalf of the client independent from the interests of the third person

A: holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause
****
Q: to the federal district court, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, and moved for summary judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Defendants argued, among other things, that Preston lacked a property interest in his volunteer position with the VFD. Preston rejoined he was a “fire code official” under the Code and IFC and could not be fired except after a hearing and upon a showing of just cause. In December 2009, the district court granted defendants’ motion and dismissed Preston’s case with prejudice. Preston filed a motion to reconsider, see Fed. R.Civ.P. 59, which the district court denied. Preston appeals. II. DISCUSSION Before considering the merits of Preston’s appeal, we briefly examine the latent issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See Clark v. Baka, 593 F.3d 712, 714 (8th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>) (quoting McAdams v. McCord, 533 F.3d 924, 927 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing federal courts duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking (B) holding that even where subjectmatter jurisdiction may go unchallenged on appeal we have an obligation to inquire sua sponte into our jurisdiction over the matter (C) recognizing that even if neither party disputes this courts subject matter jurisdiction under 38 usc  7292 we are obligated to consider the issue sua sponte if there is reason to doubt that jurisdiction exists (D) holding that the court can raise res judicata sua sponte even on appeal (E) recognizing every federal appellate court has a special obligation to consider its own jurisdiction even if it must do so sua sponte

A:
recognizing federal courts duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking
****