In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: hard at Whirlpool, that is not a mitigating factor. Those are things that we are expected to do, all of us. We are expected to work hard at our jobs. We are expected to be involved in our children’s lives. We are expected to be civil to the people that we work and live around. Those aren’t mitigating factor[s]. Those are what every single human being should do. The Defendant is asking for extra credit because he did it sometimes. Appellant argues that these statements misled the jury because Arkansas neither defines nor limits mitigation by statute. And, in fact, he points to decisions by this court wherein the court has held that there is no requirement that the mitigating circumstances reduce culpability for the offense. See Pickens v. State, 292 Ark. 362, 730 S.W.2d 230 (1987) (<HOLDING>). He asserts that the prosecutor’s remarks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence (B) holding that sentencing scheme that permitted a limited range of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional because the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer  not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death (C) holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded (D) holding that relevant evidence supporting a defendants theory of defense should not be excluded unless no other remedy suffices (E) holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor

Answer: holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence


Question: two for support). The fallacy of this position is that it confuses and commingles two conflicting strands of case law which follow opposing judicial routes. As noted above, in every case cited by the majority in footnote two, the fruits of a search were deemed admissible only after the search was found to be constitutional, i.e., distinctions as to admissibility of the fruits of a particular search against the consenting occupant and the nonconsenting occupant were never drawn. There is no authority for the majority’s proposition that the fruits of an unconstitutional search should be admitted into evidence. Indeed such a proposition violates one of the founding principles of the Fourth Amendment. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Most commentators also agree failure to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible (B) holding that the physical fruits of a miranda violation must be suppressed (C) holding that evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed (D) holding that regardless of the applicable framework defendants statement must be suppressed (E) holding that the evidence obtained as part of an illegal stop should have been suppressed even where the defendants consented to the search

Answer: holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible


Question: important state interests); see also 17A Moore’s Federal Practice § 122.05[2][d] (3d ed.2012) (describing the extension of Younger). We have come to view O’Shea as standing for the more general proposition that “[w]e should be very reluctant to grant relief that would entail heavy federal interference in such sensitive state activities as administration of the judicial system.” L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir.1992). O’Shea compels abstention where the plaintiff seeks an “ongoing federal audit” of the state judiciary, whether in criminal proceedings or in other respects. E.T. v. Cantil-Sakauye, 682 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir.2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 476, 184 L.Ed.2d 297 (2012); see also Kaufman v. Kaye, 466 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). In Los Angeles County Bar Ass’n, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (B) holding that abstention was required where the relief sought would be overly intrusive in the administration of the new york court system (C) holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution (D) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (E) holding that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not available in the administrative process

Answer:
holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership