In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: and to seek collateral relief (except for ineffective assistance of counsel),” United States v. Arevalo-Juarez, 464 F.3d 1246, 1248 (11th Cir.2006) (citation omitted), but only in judicial districts that participate in a[n] "early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General of the United States and the United States attorney for the district in which the court resides.” U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1. This court has rejected Bravo’s argument that the “fast track” program creates a sentencing disparity, and we are bound by decisions of prior panels until overruled by this court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Anaya Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 1252-1253 (11th Cir.2006) (addressing fast-track programs); United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). 2 . This court has rejected the government's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a multipanel circuit prior panel decisions generally are binding upon newlyconstituted panels (B) holding that the panel is bound by decisions of prior panels (C) holding that decisions by prior panels are binding (D) recognizing that a prior panels holding is binding on all subsequent panels (E) holding that a prior panel decision is binding on subsequent panels

Answer: (C)


Question: before it was in assumpsit for attorney fees purposes. See Schulz, 67 Haw. at 436, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Higa is not directly on point, its reasoning is a compelling indication of how the Hawaii Supreme Court would rule on the attorney fee question before us. The plaintiffs also seek to distinguish Higa because it involved a client suing his own attorney, and thus in that case there was privity of contract between the two parties. In the present case, Mrs. Helfand was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the defendants and Mr. Helfand. This distinction is irrelevant. Courts have extended the right to sue for breach of contract to intended third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12, 883 P.2d 38, 48 n. 12 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 82 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies (B) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (C) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (D) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract (E) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status

Answer: (D)


Question: The end result was that Carol and I felt forced into selling our inventory and licenses for $17,500.00. At that time we did not have anywhere to store or take our inventory to. We believed there was no other choice. At no time did either Carol or I agree to the termination of rights and obligations under the Business Lease dated October 1,1995. [¶ 15] As in Lamb, the facts relied on by the district court to determine the Pierces had fully performed their obligations and accepted the benefits under the unsigned written termination agreement and thereby voluntarily surrendered the lease are equally consistent with the Pierces mitigating their damages for the Elks’ alleged breach of the lease agreement. Compare Felco v. Doug’s N. Hill Bottle Shop, 1998 ND 111, ¶ 16, 579 N.W.2d 576 (<HOLDING>). The Pierces’ vacation of the premises, sale 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sufficient part performance of an oral trust agreement is required to remove it from the statute of frauds (B) holding that if part performance is relied upon to remove the oral agreement from the operation of the statute of frauds clear and convincing proof of performance in pursuance of the alleged agreement must be adduced by the party seeking to enforce it (C) holding a court must find among other things clear evidence of the existence of an oral agreement for part performance to remove the contract from the statute of frauds (D) holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract (E) holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract

Answer:
(D)