In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Dr. Proctor testified about the 2014 Report’s conclusion that filtered cigarettes increased the risk of adenocarci-noma (a type of lung cancer) by causing smokers to inhale more deeply, and by ventilating in a way‘that “increases certain poisonous compounds.” On appeal, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not have been permitted to use the 2014 Report to bolster the testimony of her expert witness. On this point, we also agree with Defendants. It is well established that “experts cannot bolster or corroborate their opinions with the opinions of other experts who do not testify,” as -“[s]ueh testimony improperly permits one expert to become a conduit for the opinion of another expert who is not subject to cross-examination.” Schwarz v. State, 695 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); accord Tolbert v. State, 114 So.3d 291, 294 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion (B) holding that any probative value of bolstered testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of issues or misleading the jury quoting  90403 fla stat (C) holding that the probative value of contested evidence far outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice where any potential unfair prejudice was cured by a limiting jury instruction (D) holding in a criminal context that the probative value of evidence of other crimes is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice where the court will give a limiting jury charge (E) holding that witness testimony about prior drug purchases from defendant was highly probative of brookins guilt and was not outweighed by any danger of undue prejudice
holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion

Abreu’s App. at 1878.) The defendants do not challenge now, nor did they contest at trial, the accuracy of these statements as related to the bank statements. The declaration that the bank statements were kept in the ordinary course of the banks’ businesses did not add to the Government’s case against the defendants for submitting false loan applications. It was the information contained in the bank statements themselves, which is not contested on appeal, that the Government relied upon to make its case. The authenticity of the bank statements has never been challenged, and the admission of the statements contained in the Rule 902(11) Certifications as related to the bank statements simply had no effect on the verdict. Cf. United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Government of Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 964 
 Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous admission of evidence not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the only other evidence against defendant was the uncorroborated testimony of a cooperating witness of questionable credibility (B) holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt (C) holding the admission of plea allocutions of codefendants to be harmless against a crawford challenge where the government did not emphasize the allocutions which were used only as corroboration for other evidence showing the existence of an enterprise in a rico case (D) holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record (E) holding that trial courts error in failing to sua sponte give instruction was harmless because state did not emphasize this evidence in closing argument and evidence of appellants guilt was otherwise overwhelming
holding erroneous admission of evidence not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the only other evidence against defendant was the uncorroborated testimony of a cooperating witness of questionable credibility

are non-public records; (2) applying the capital collateral litigation work product exemption retroactively to a public records request that predated the October 1, 1995, effective date of the 1995 amendment to section 119.07(3)(£); (3) dismissing his Brady claims; and (4) finding that the clemency materials are exempt from disclosure. We agree with the circuit court that the first category of withheld documents are either not public records or are exempt from disclosure under the work product exemption in section 119.07(3)(i). Even though this particular provision did not take effect until October 1, 1995, the legislative history indicates that the statute is remedial in nature and thus can be applied retroactively. See City of Orlando v. Desjardins, 493 So.2d 1027 (Fla.1986) (<HOLDING>). Roberts also argues that the amended statute 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale (B) holding that the statute does not apply retroactively to claims accruing prior to the effective date (C) holding that a chapter 7 debtor who claimed an invalid exemption in a cause of action had standing to pursue that litigation because the cause of action was excluded from the bankruptcy estate after no party in interest objected timely to the exemption (D) holding aedpa applicable to petition filed on or after aedpas effective date (E) holding that statutory work product exemption in chapter 119 was remedial in nature and thus applicable to cause of action that accrued prior to its effective date

holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale