In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: variance criteria rendering its decision arbitrary and capricious; and, 5) erred in “taking” appellants’ property without just compensation. The County supports appellants’ contentions except for the last one, with which it disagrees. The County also contends the Board erred in applying the wrong law. The individual appellees, who opposed the variance applications, support the Board’s decision. Discussion 1. Applicable Law A. State Law Before we address the merits of appellants’ contentions, we shall address the County’s contention that the Board applied inapplicable law. The County asserts that the Board incorrectly applied a presumption that the requested use did not conform to the purpose and intent of the Critical Area Program because, while that presumption was added 677 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In 2002, the General Assembly amended the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that the board did not have to consider whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the entire lot but rather whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the buffer (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that the question of whether it might have been error for the court to have denied leave to amend is not before us because plaintiffs never requested it (E) recognizing that a district attorney must have reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury and that the trial judge must have reasonable discretion in deciding whether the bounds of propriety have been exceeded

A: (B)
****
Q: with the same deficiency — the court should strike his pleading or, depending on the circumstances, dismiss his case and consider the imposition of monetary sanctions.”). We are not, however, convinced that the instant case was one with respect to which a dismissal with prejudice was appropriate under the circumstances. Moreover, a complaint — so long as it is minimally sufficient to put a defendant on notice of the claims against him — will not fail for mere surplusage. See United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir.2003) (“Surplusage can and should be ignored. Instead of insisting that the parties perfect their pleadings, a judge should bypass the dross and get on with the case.”); Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). We have recognized that “[pleading facts not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony (B) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (C) holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion (D) holding that it is an abuse of discretion  to dismiss a complaint merely because of the presence of superfluous matter (E) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds

A: (D)
****
Q: the damages or otherwise defeat summary judgment. He did not even identify the elements] of the Bank’s breach of contract claim on which his return of the vehicle allegedly raised a fact issue or suggest why it raised a fact issue on any particular element [s]. The requirement that the non-movant “fairly apprise” the trial court of the issues allegedly defeating summary judgment clearly contemplates that the trial court is not required to guess why a non-movant presents certain evidence or consider every possible reason the evidence might defeat summary judgment. In short, Tello’s bare assertion in his affidavit that he returned the vehicle did not “fairly apprise” the trial court what, if anything, he wanted the trial court to do with that information. Cf. Engel, 713 S.W.2d at 771-72 (<HOLDING>). In sum, trial court could not have erred by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding affidavit of attorney filed by nonmovant in response to motion for summary judgment requesting recovery of movants attorneys fees fairly apprised trial court of issue allegedly defeating the motion by stating the fees were excessive and unreasonable (B) recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees (C) holding the trial courts failure to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment after an affidavit was filed in response to the motion was harmless error where the affidavit had no impact on thedecisive statute of frauds issue (D) holding a summary judgment to be final although motion to assess attorney fees remained pending because award of attorney fees is collateral to judgment (E) holding motion for attorneys fees was necessary predicate

A:
(A)
****