In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
are differences between sanctions under Rule 37(a) and substitution of counsel conditioned on payment of fees, the parallel considerations convince us that the Cunningham rationale applies here. Like Rule 37(a) sanctions, the present situation invokes concerns regarding finality, avoiding piecemeal appeals, and availability of effective appellate review.” Id. Cases from the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits further support interpreting Cunningham as applying more broadly than to Rule 37(a) sanctions alone. The First Circuit recognized in Empresas Omajede, Inc. v. Bennazar-Zequeira, 213 F.3d 6, 9 n. 4 (1st Cir.2000), that Cunningham affirmed its precedents denying interlocutory appeals in the sanctions area. See, e.g., United States v. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Appeal of Licht & Semonoff 796 F.2d 564, 573 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable (B) holding sanctions pursuant to rule 26g not immediately appealable (C) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (D) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order (E) holding an order of rule 37a sanctions against an attorney is immediately appealable under  1291

Ex Output:
holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable


Ex Input:
of attorney-client privilege, nor could they. There was thus no error in admitting the bill. J. The Apportionment of Damages Defendants Ashton and Short contend that the Court erred in refusing to apportion damages among the Defendants. This issue as such was first raised in Defendants’ Amended Motion and would not need to be considered by the Court. Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., supra. Prior to the charge of the Court, the parties were advised of the charge and Ash-ton and Short vaguely objected because of the potential for joint and several liability; however they did not propose any points for charge with respect to the apportionment of damages. See Frankel v. Burke’s Excavating, Inc., 269 F.Supp. 1007 (E.D.Pa.1967), aff’d 397 F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. 1968) (<HOLDING>). In any event, under Section 433(b), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that alleged defects in special interrogatories could not be the basis for a new trial when counsel had not pointed out the alleged defect to the court (B) holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment (C) holding that the court had no jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a plea agreement (D) holding because plaintiff had not alleged defendant made a misrepresentation or that the alleged defect posed a safety risk the district court  properly dismissed plaintiffs  fraudulent concealment claim (E) holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect

Ex Output:
holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment


Ex Input:
a particularized need. 4. Seriousness of the Litigation and Issues Holmes maintains that the gravity of her allegations — namely, that IPRA “concealed] its widespread efforts to cover-up unlawful shootings by police officers,” Pl.’s Reply Br. at 3 — warrants disclosing the draft summary reports. In other words, Holmes asserts that the privilege is overcome because IPRA’s deliberative process, which includes the back-and-forth exchange of draft summary reports between supervisors and investigators, is “part of the code of silence.” Id. Where a plaintiff directly challenges a government agency’s deliberative process, courts routinely find that there is a particularized need for disclosure. See, e.g., Smentek v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 2013 WL 2588709, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Ferrell, 177 F.R.D. at 430-31 (finding a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county (B) holding that mandatory visual strip search policy in county jail was unconstitutional (C) holding that public employees working for the office of cook county assessor and receiving their compensation from cook county had no vested right in the expectation of the continuance of this compensation (D) holding that plaintiffs had a particularized need for cook county jail prebudget documents after observing that the plaintiffs theory is that the county allegedly approved the dental services budget despite knowing that it might create unconstitutional conditions at the jail accordingly  the countys deliberative process is directly at issue in this case (E) holding that employees of county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to contract with the federal government were not federal employees even though county jail had to comply with federal rules and regulations

Ex Output:

holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county