In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: background nor his current offense can support the conclusion that he is a worst offender. The maximum sentence was therefore not justified. In deciding to impose the maximum sentence, Judge Michalski relied primarily on his conclusion that Skrepich was incapable of rehabilitation and could not personally be deterred. The judge thus gave primary emphasis to the need to protect the public by isolating Skrepich from the community. While the judge also indicated that a lengthy sentence would serve the sentencing goals of general deterrence and community condemnation, it seems clear that these goals could not, in themselves, support the imposition of a maximum, ten-year term for a first offender convicted of a class B felony. See Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198, 1204-05 (Alaska 1985) (<HOLDING>). The appropriateness of the maximum term 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts failure to explain the effect of supervised release was harmless where the maximum term of incarceration under the actual sentence of imprisonment and supervised release less than six years as well as his worstcase scenario less than nine years was less than the maximum term of incarceration twenty years al lowed by law (B) holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony (C) holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder (D) holding that a term of substantially less than twenty years would serve the objectives of general deterrence and community condemnation in the case of a first offender convicted of seconddegree murder an unclassified felony (E) holding that twenty years was not excessive for second felony offender convicted of simple burglary
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: Inc., and therefore, had standing. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Appellants’ motion for a directed verdict on this ground. VII. Directed Verdict on Negligence Appellants contend the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on negligence. Specifically, they maintain the existence and scope of a duty are legal questions, and no evidence was presented pertaining to duties owed by Appellants to the Association. We find this issue is not preserved for our review. Although Appellants moved for a directed verdict at the close of all testimony, they did not move for a directed verdict on the specific basis that no evidence indicated they owed a duty to the Association. Creech v. S.C. Wildlife & Marine Res. Dep’t. 328 S.C. 24, 34, 491 S.E.2d 571, 576 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Rule 50(a), SCRCP (“A motion for a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue (B) holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue (C) holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review (D) holding the appellants failure to raise a particular issue in its directed verdict motion precludes appellate review of that issue (E) holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: reasonableness standard in Laney v. State, 379 Md. 522, 842 A.2d 773 (2004), within the context of lawful possession of premises. In Laney, the mortgagor of a home that had been foreclosed upon challenged several warrantless searches of the house where he had personal property. Id. at 527-28, 842 A.2d at 777. The searches occurred after title in the home had passed to the Department of Veteran Affairs (“V.A.”) — - the original guarantor of the mortgage. Id. Laney claimed that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house under the Fourth Amendment despite the fact that title had passed to the V.A. because the V.A.’s ownership rights in the house were inferior to his “possessory and private rights” in the house. Id. at 534, 842 A.2d at 780. This Court determined 6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that squatter in home did not have standing to challenge search of house where he was staying (B) holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment which he had occupied solely for the business of packing for distribution for narcotics (C) holding that a squatter had no standing to challenge search of vacant home he frequented for the sole purpose of engaging in drugrelated business transactions  (D) holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned house where he was staying (E) holding that squatter had no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore no fourth amendment standing to challenge search of abandoned structure
[EX A]:
(C)