In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
--------
Question: de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.” Teffeteller v. State, 495 So.2d 744, 745 (Fla.1986). In noncapital cases, too, we have concluded that “resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights.” Trotter v. State, 825 So.2d 362, 367-68 (Fla.2002); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 525 (Fla.2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (“We have consistently held that resentencing proceedings must be a ‘clean slate,’ meaning that the defendant’s vacated sentence becomes a ‘nullity’ and his ‘resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.’ ” (citation omitted)); Walker, 988 So.2d at 8 (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially) (“Generally, courts have held that once a def A 1998) (<HOLDING>); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing (B) holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction (C) holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing (D) holding that even though the defendant did not challenge his prior convictions at the original sentencing lawofthecase principles do not insulate the state from proving them at resentencing (E) holding that at resentencing on violation of probation trial court may revise guidelines scoresheet to reflect prior convictions mistakenly omitted from the original through no fault of the defendant

Answer: (D)


Question: and misunderstanding of the local rules involving summar he district court abused its discretion in denying their Rule 60(b)(3) motion for relief from judgment. See Hesling v. CSX Tramp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir.2005). The Sangis did not provide the district court with clear and convincing evidence that FCC engaged in fraud or other misconduct or that any misconduct prevented them from fully and fairly presenting their case. See Gov’t Fin. Servs. v. Peyton Place, Inc., 62 F.3d 767, 772 (5th Cir.1995). Rather the Sangis offered only allegations of fraud and misconduct. Nor have the Sangis shown exceptional circumstances to merit relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general rule that issues not raised in the lower court may not be addressed on appeal applies only to appellants (B) holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances (C) holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant (D) holding that cjredibility determinations are questions of fact and should only be overturned in extraordinary circumstances (E) holding that rule 60b6 only applies in extraordinary circumstances suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay

Answer: (E)


Question: 29, 2010 hearing on BP’s motion for continuance, Donato Ramos Jr., one of BP’s attorneys, told the court that Zaffirini and Jones were “plaintiffs in addition to being counsel.” Ramos Jr. also told the court that “[tjhere was a Favored[-]Nations Clause in Mr. Zaffirini’s clients[’] oil and gas lease.” Ramos Jr. heard Jones complain to the court about BP’s planned depositions “especially when a bunch of our clients didn’t even go to any of the negotiations.” BP first moved to disqualify Zaffirini and Jones on June 27, 2011, three days before the summary-judgment hearing, and almost seven months after the hearing in which BP’s counsel stated that Zaffirini was representing clients and heard that Jones was likewise representing others in the suit. See Vaughan, 875 S.W.2d at 690-91 (<HOLDING>); In re Davila, 04-99-00571-CV, 1999 WL 735164, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court had sufficient reason to reject the plaintiffs belated attempt to amend her complaint fifteen months after the commencement of her action and nine months after the initial amendment to her complaint (B) holding that by itself three and onehalf months was insufficient to prove causation (C) holding that even a potential conflict can justify disqualification (D) holding that three and onehalf months between the filing of an eeoc charge and the adverse employment action was insufficient by itself to establish causation (E) holding that party waived disqualification complaint by filing her motion six and onehalf months after learning of the potential conflict

Answer:
(E)