In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: hard at Whirlpool, that is not a mitigating factor. Those are things that we are expected to do, all of us. We are expected to work hard at our jobs. We are expected to be involved in our children’s lives. We are expected to be civil to the people that we work and live around. Those aren’t mitigating factor[s]. Those are what every single human being should do. The Defendant is asking for extra credit because he did it sometimes. Appellant argues that these statements misled the jury because Arkansas neither defines nor limits mitigation by statute. And, in fact, he points to decisions by this court wherein the court has held that there is no requirement that the mitigating circumstances reduce culpability for the offense. See Pickens v. State, 292 Ark. 362, 730 S.W.2d 230 (1987) (<HOLDING>). He asserts that the prosecutor’s remarks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence (B) holding that sentencing scheme that permitted a limited range of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional because the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer  not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death (C) holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded (D) holding that relevant evidence supporting a defendants theory of defense should not be excluded unless no other remedy suffices (E) holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor
[A]: holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence


[Q]: options,” including by streamlining communication between the distressed borrower and foreclosing party. See Assemb. B. 278, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); S.B. 900, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). There has been a wave of litigation in state and federal courts challenging various aspects of the MERS System. Almost all of the relevant law is state rather than federal. The results under state law have been inconsistent. See Weber, supra, at 246-56 (cataloguing the “schizophrenic position of state courts” on issues relating to the MERS System). Some state supreme courts have upheld the MERS System on issues ranging from foreclosure authority to recording requirements. See, e.g., Renshaw v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 155 Idaho 656, 315 P.3d 844, 846-47 (2013) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mers lacked standing to foreclose as the lenders nominee (B) holding that because mers receives no payments on the debt it is not the beneficiary even though it is so designated in the deed of trust (C) holding that mers is an ineligible beneficiary within the terms of the washington deed of trust act if it never held the promissory note or other debt instrument secured by the deed of trust and that characterizing mers as the beneficiary has the capacity to deceive and may give rise to an action under the consumer protection act (D) holding that mers may be a beneficiary as nominee for the lender that assignments of the deed of trust between mers members need not be recorded that mers was not liable to the borrower in negligence and that the idaho consumer protection act did not provide a cause of action to the borrower (E) holding that mers was not the beneficiary of a deed of trust under the oregon trust deed act absent conveyance to mers of the beneficial right to repayment and that mers could not hold or transfer legal title to the deed as the lenders nominee
[A]: holding that mers lacked standing to foreclose as the lenders nominee


[Q]: against a physician or health care provider that are not founded upon a breach of an accepted standard of care. Id. The court pointed out that claims that are “health care liability claims” may not be “recast” as other causes of action in order to avoid requirements of the Act. Id. at 242. The underlying nature of the claim determines whether it is truly a health care liability claim, and thus governed by the Act. Id. As one court has noted, “[i]f the cause of action is based on the physician’s breach of the accepted standard of medical care, the cause of action is nothing more than a health care liability claim, no matter how the plaintiff labels it.” Wright v. Folder, 991 S.W.2d 343, 352 (TexApp.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 892-93 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). Just as a health care liability claim may not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statute of limitations for dtpa action including claim for breach of express or implied warranty under the dtpa is two years (B) holding that since the court could disentangle the inadequately pleaded fraud claims from the plaintiffs dtpa causes of action the defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the plaintiffs dtpa claims for failure to meet rule 9b pleading requirements (C) holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan (D) holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action (E) holding that plaintiffs dtpa causes of action were actually negligence claims because they all complained of earles failure to hold to the applicable standard of care
[A]:
holding statute of limitations for dtpa action including claim for breach of express or implied warranty under the dtpa is two years