In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: not contest Alaimalo’s actual innocence. B. Prior Opportunities to Raise Actual Innocence Claim We turn to the question of whether Alaimalo’s actual innocence claim was unavailable to him during his direct appeal and his first § 2255 motion. In making this determination, we consider “(1) whether the legal basis for petitioner’s claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted). An intervening court decision must “effect a material change in the applicable law” to establish unavailability. Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. See also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607, 610 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the supreme courts decision in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 effected a material change in the law because the circuit previously held that accessability of a firearm was enough to support an inference that a firearm was used in a drug crime whereas bailey required active employment of the firearm (B) holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used (C) holding that the supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc  924c1 in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 has retroactive application to cases on collateral review (D) holding that the rule announced in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 applies retroactively on collateral review (E) holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense

A: holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used
****
Q: first time a party must specify the statute authorizing attorney’s fees is in the Rule 54 motion (unless otherwise provided by statute or court order). In Missouri, attorney’s fees are not recoverable from another party, except when a contract or statute allows it. Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. banc 2009). The second sentence of the Missouri commissions statute is such an exception to the general Missouri rule. Kraft v. Edwards, 946 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Mo.App.1997). The district judge’s ruling that there was no statutory basis for an award of attorney’s fees is erroneous as a matter of law. On remand, the district court should consider whether to award attorney’s fees. See Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 631 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because this case as tried addressed only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award (B) holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained (C) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence (D) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (E) holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances

A: holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained
****
Q: or possess child pornography directly contribute to this continuing victimization.”). Also, the fact that the offender did not commit a more serious crime by molesting a child, did not mean his offense was dramatically different from other child pornography cases so as to warrant a substantial downward variance. Id. at 260. We have no difficulty concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the seriousness of the offense by finding that the further distribution of child pornography by defendant involved re-victimization of the children in those images, or by rejecting the claim that the sharing and redistribution of child pornography already in circulation did not result in additional harm. See United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>), petition for cert. filed, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding twentyeight charges against defendant for possession of child pornography were not multiplicious (B) recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography (C) recognizing common use of computers and internet in child pornography offenses (D) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (E) holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession

A:
holding twentyeight charges against defendant for possession of child pornography were not multiplicious
****