In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: 8 . See, e.g., Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 547 (6th Cir.2012); Pacific Dunlop Holdings v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir.1993); Adena Exploration, Inc. v. Sylvan, 860 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir.1988); Penturelli, 779 F.2d 160 at 166; Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 354 (10th Cir.1970); Shimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880, 883 (D.C.1967); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F.Supp. 1314, 1346 (S.D.N.Y.1982). 9 . Interpreting the same language, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois observed that Congress intended “to specifically include as securities 'only that form of splitting up of mineral interests which had been most utilized for speculative purposes.’ ” Fearneyhough v. McElvain, 598 F.Supp. 905, 907 (C.D.Ill.1984) (<HOLDING>). 1 The Lenau [Appellants] signed the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that it is an unusual challenge to a sale that does not distort the validity of the sale and that the exception likely has meaning only when collateral issues are challenged (B) holding that an assignment or sale of rights in the invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of the invention within the meaning of section 102b (C) holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument (D) holding that the sale of the entire leasehold interest in the oil and gas rights in plaintiffs land does not constitute the sale of a security within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 acts notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs retained an overriding oneeighth 18 royalty interest (E) holding that the amount of water rights appurtenant to the land is the amount that is being used thereon before and at the time of the sale

Output: (D)


Input: Consider Input: efforts to persuade an Immigration Judge to exercise her discretion to grant him a deportation waiver — the removal of that discretion would constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Furthermore, given that parole eligibility is “considered an integral part of any sentence,” Shepard, 556 F.2d at 654; see also Warden, 417 U.S. at 658, 94 S.Ct. at 2535-36, I think that the availability and likelihood of a deportation waiver should also be so considered. In explaining the basis for its con- elusion that parole eligibility or gain time should be considered part of 86, 68 L.Ed. 549 (1924) (“It is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment.”); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S.Ct. 607, 608, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913) (<HOLDING>) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the amount of sanctions is appropriate only when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior (B) holding that the determination that an alien is an undesirable person is not a conviction of crime nor is the deportation a punishment it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want (C) holding that it is not (D) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (E) holding that habeas review is  for any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: March 28, 2017). In this case, the State’s explanation for the strike cited a race-neutral observable fact and did not express a belief or assumption about members of the juror’s race or even a subgroup of that race. See generally State v. Weaver, 912 SW2d 499, 509 (I) (Mo. 1995) (no Batson violation where prosecutor’s decision to strike was not based upon assumptions about members of the juror’s minority group). Compare State v. Jensen, 76 P3d 188, 193 (II) (Utah App. 2003) (explanation for strike not gender-neutral where prosecutor assumed that men involved in a protective order “would be on the defendant’s side, since more likely than not men are the respondents to protective orders, rather than women”) (punctuation omitted); State v. Lucas, 18 P3d 160, 162-163 (Ariz.App. 2001) (<HOLDING>) (citation and punctuation omitted). I 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record (B) holding that while the plaintiffs job responsibilities included assisting patients who received epidurals her regular work routine did not require lifting the legs of women weighing 263 pounds who had received epidurals (C) holding explanation that southern men take a negative view of pregnant women who work wrongfully excludes a subgroup of one gender from participation in the judicial process and reinforces prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and women (D) holding that the existence of prior convictions are typically matters of public record of which the trial court can take judicial notice without violating the defendants right to due process (E) recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket


Output: (C)