In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); Hagemeister v. Vanity Fair Properties, 508 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1973, writ dism’d). Thus, collateral estoppel dictates that venue of any subsequent suit involving the same subject matter and the same parties as the initial suit be governed by the venue determination in the initial suit. See Orozco, 681 S.W.2d at 245-46; Pinney, 558 S.W.2d at 36. First, Miller II involves the same parties as the Windsor suit. Both State & County and Windsor were parties to the Windsor suit. Although Ledbetter and Curtiss were not named in the Windsor suit, as officers of State & County, they were in privity with a party; thus, collateral estoppel would apply to them as well. Cf. Getty Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Youell & Cos. v. Getty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant in second suit was in privity for res judicata purposes because his interests were aligned with those of defendant in first suit which concerned same facts (B) holding that res judicata applies when the question of jurisdiction is raised and determined (C) holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings (D) holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings (E) holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties

A: (E)
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Q: not issue a permit to install” a waste disposal system unless that system “[m]eets all applicable county zoning and land use requirements .... ” Taken together, these provisions indicate a clear intent on the part of the General Assembly to locate environmental permitting with the MDE, and zoning with local government. There is no reasonable way to construe these provisions of the Maryland Code as doing anything other than complementing local government’s role in planning and zoning. If we held otherwise, we would be reading an over-broad preemptive intent into an otherwise clear statutory scheme. MRA’s preemption argument fails because it does not account for the dual nature of this process. See Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Comm’rs of Queen Anne’s County, 307 Md. 307, 513 A.2d 893 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Preemption Based on Legislative Changes to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state (B) holding that the relevant body of state law did indeed regulate many aspects of sewage sludge utilization but was not so comprehensive that the acceptance of the doctrine of preemption by occupation is compelled (C) holding that a party did not waive its preemption defense where its answer did not specifically mention preemption but contained a broader defense that was capable of encompassing preemption (D) recognizing that although there was no property in a dead body at common law  the one whose duty it is to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes and that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or mutilating it in any way (E) recognizing that the artful pleading doctrine in practice is subsumed by the complete preemption doctrine

A: (B)
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Q: to file on time was not due to willful neglect. See I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1). On the face of the matter, these determinations would seem to apply equally to the remainder of the penalty (which was calculated according to the same statutory algorithm and imposed for precisely the same late filing). The Commissioner has pointed to no basis for treating one portion of this unitary penalty differently from the other, and the record suggests no such distinction. The whole is but the sum of its parts, and logically, the two portions of the late-filing penalty should stand or fall together. There may be special circumstances that would justify splitting the baby, but the Commissioner has the burden of identifying those circumstances. Cf. Estate of Abraham v. Comm’r, 408 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Absent a plausible explanation, the only 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where notice of deficiency fails adequately to describe the basis on which the commissioner relies for his deficiency determination burden shifts to the commissioner to prove the accuracy of the deficiency determination (B) holding that a party is not entitled to pursue a separate action for deficiency judgment where the foreclosure complaint includes a prayer for a deficiency judgment and the foreclosure court reserves jurisdiction to enter a deficiency judgment (C) holding that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was valid where it determined a deficiency in a different type of tax than did the earlier deficiency notice (D) holding no jurisdiction when trial court granted extension because it found deficiency even though it was not same deficiency complained of by appellant in his motion to dismiss (E) holding that former sec 272f does not require that the commissioner wait until the period for filing a petition as to a deficiency notice expires before issuing another deficiency notice as to the same taxable year

A:
(A)
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