In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: or creating documents with mistakes on them and signing my name to them to make me appear as if I had been inaccurate .... ” Paragraph 25: The sentence “I confidentially complained about this behavior to Bruce Smith, who, instead of taking action to prevent Burchfield from continuing her pattern of behavior toward me, apparently told Burchfield to counsel me.” Paragraph 32: The sentence “I believe that this move was the beginning point of a concerted effort to remove me from the workplace based on my age.” Paragraph 36: The sentence “I believe that Albertson’s did not provide all of the time sheets from all vendors of temporary help.” Paragraph 37: The sentence “I believe that my combination of formal college education and experience, even though I did not obtain a co h Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). With respect to paragraphs 22, 28, 34, 39, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a single conversation to be sufficient evidence of dissolution to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that mere conclusion of affiant without some supporting facts are insufficient to raise fact issue necessary to preclude summary judgment (C) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (D) recognizing that the plaintiffs mere assertions that the defendant had a discriminatory intent were inadequate without substantial factual evidence to raise an issue to preclude summary judgment (E) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party
[A]: (D)


[Q]: unpublished decisions, “[njoticeably absent from the list of factors Pruitt instructs district courts to consider are the merits and substance of the pro se plaintiffs claim.” Rivera v. Kettle Moraine Correctional Inst., No. 14-C-6, 2014 WL 2875897, at *4 (E.D. Wis. June 24, 2014); Kennedy v. Huibregtse, No. 13-C-4, 2014 WL 4924662, at *15 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 30, 2014). On appeal from an adverse judgment in a case where the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion to recruit; the Court of Appeals will consider whether “there is a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have made a difference in the outcome of the litigation” in assessing whether the district court’s abuse of its discretion was prejudicial. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 659 (italics original r. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Mars v. Hanberry, 752 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation (B) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (C) holding that prisoner must allege acts or omissions evidencing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (D) holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs (E) holding that plaintiffs claim must have arguable merit meaning that plaintiffs allegations clearly state a nonfrivolous prima facie case of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need and that the already established evidence indicates more than an extremely slim chance of success on the merits
[A]: (E)


[Q]: to the facts of this case. Division orders are binding until terminated. See id. § 91.402(g) (providing that division orders are binding for the time and to the extent that they have been acted on and made the basis of settlements and payments, and, from the time that notice is given that settlements will not be made on the basis provided in them, they cease to be binding, and that division orders are terminable by either party on 30 days written notice); see also Cabot Corp. v. Brown, 754 S.W.2d 104, 107-08 (Tex.1987); Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.1986); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 618 S.W.2d 240, 25 r, 345 S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. denied); Sun Operating P’ship v. Oatman, 911 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); see also Bailey v. Shell W. E & P, Inc., 555 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the damage for tenancy at sufferance during the holdover period was the monthly rent under the lease versus the apartments fair market value because the lease contained a provision requiring lease payments beyond the lease term (B) holding that the lessors interest in the leased property was subject to liens because it was perfectly obvious that the parties knew that the improvements at issue were the pith of the lease and that except for them the lease would not have been executed and because the improvements were essential to the purpose of the lease (C) holding that lease was ratified when lessors executed division orders showing lower royalties and accepted royalty payments thereon (D) holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division (E) holding that the lower court failed to account for payments made in connection with the marital home including mortgage payments
[A]:
(C)