In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Dubé, who held a hearing on the summary judgment motions on December 11, 2003. On January 14, 2004, Judge Dubé issued his R & R, which recommended that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and that Defendant’s Motion be denied, thereby reversing the decision of the Appeals Council. Having received objections from both parties, the R & R is now ripe for consideration by this Court. Analysis The issues appealed from the Appeals Council are purely questions of law. Although a more restrictive standard of review applies if an appeal of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is based on that decision’s factual findings, no presumption of validity attaches to the Commissioner’s conclusions of law. See Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore; the Court must conduct its own 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the district court was not required to discuss each of the factors on the record a decision to dismiss stands a better chance on appeal if the appellate court has the benefit of the district courts reasoning (B) holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted (C) holding the courts scope of review is  limited to determining whether the commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the commissioners findings of fact  (D) recognizing that when reviewing for clear error we usually must reverse if the district court applied incorrect legal standards to reach its findings (E) holding the district court can reverse the commissioners decision based on her failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: Erickson-Puttmann concedes that her Title VII claim against Gill fails because Gill was not her employer. See e.g., Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly Community Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th Cir.1997) (“Our Court quite recently has squarely held that supervisors may not be held individually liable under Title VII.” (citing Spencer v. Ripley County State Bank, 123 F.3d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir.1997) (per cu-riam))). Lenhardt v. Basic Inst, of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir.1995) (noting that “[e]very circuit that has considered the issue ultimately has concluded that an employee, even one possessing supervisory authority, is not an employer upon whom liability can be imposed under Title VII.”); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the court concludes that summary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii (B) holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii (C) holding individual employees may be liable under title vii (D) holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii (E) holding that there is no individual liability under title vii
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: role of an advocate in prosecuting Srivastava. Likewise, the doctrine of judicial immunity precludes Srivastava’s claims against the judge who presided over her criminal case. See Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir.2000) (judicial immunity shields judges from civil actions for their judicial acts unless they have acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction); John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir.1990) (mere allegations of conspiracy insufficient to overcome judicial immunity). Additionally, Srivastava cannot sue employees of the Marion County Public Defender’s Office under § 1983 because they are not acting under “color of state law,” a requisite element of any § 1983 claim. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317 n. 4, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (<HOLDING>). As for Srivastava’s claim against the officer 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a town manager did not act under color of state law when making allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff (B) holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee (C) holding that a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing the traditional functions of counsel to a criminal defendant (D) holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc  1983 (E) holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action
[EX A]:
(C)