In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: of death which does not meet these requirements is voidable by the donor (if he recovers) or his personal representative. Hulley v. Chedic, 22 Nev. 127,146, 36 P. 783 (1894). In other words, a gift in contemplation of death'is presumptively voidable by the personal representative of the deceased, and the presumption may be rebutted by the donee with clear and convincing evidence of the six elements listed above. Although Goldsworthy and Hulley are the only Nevada cases ever to have examined the gift causa mortis doctrine, and they have never been overruled, at least one Nevada case has suggested (in a different context) that the burden of proof may not be on the donee. North Arlington Medical Building, Inc. v. Sanchez Construction Company, 86 Nev. 515, 521, 471 P.2d 240, 244 (Nev.1970) (<HOLDING>). North Arlington is not really on point, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable (B) holding that inter vivos gift to minor is presumptively effective under nrs 167040 (C) holding that the purpose of nrs 1760551 is to ensure that all time served is credited towards a defendants ultimate sentence (D) holding that belowguidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable (E) holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable

A: (B)
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Q: to exempt every alien who seeks to adjust his or her status under § 245(i) after illegally reentering the United States following removal. Where Congress intended § 241(a)(5) not to pose a barrier to adjustment of status for aliens who illegally reentered the United States, it made a special exception to the general rule. Because Lino does not fall within the exception, she is bound by the general rule disqualifying aliens who illegally reentered the country from seeking adjustment of status. Finally, six circuits have held that § 241(a)(5) precludes aliens subject to reinstatement orders from obtaining adjustment of status pursuant to § 245(i). See De Sandoval v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 440 F.3d 1276, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2006); Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort, 390 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 21 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not have jurisdiction to order reinstatement of previously dismissed action and thus reinstatement order was void and of no effect and previous order of dismissal was still in effect (B) holding that petitioners claim is not one to the attorney generals decision or action to execute a removal order either since the facts relevant to their claim  took place well before any decision by the attorney general to execute a removal order (C) holding that once a petitioners prior removal order has been reinstated he no longer qualifies for any relief under the ina regardless of whether his application was filed before or after the reinstatement decision was made (D) holding that since the basis for the respondents order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening (E) holding that a federal court must order arbitration once it is satisfied that an agreement for arbitration has been made and has not been honored

A: (C)
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Q: for alleged misconduct in processing claims); Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 51-52 (5th Cir.1975) (sovereign immunity applied to claim of alleged wrongful suspension of payments for fraud); Pine View Gardens, Inc. v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (D.C.Cir.1973) (claim for unpaid benefits barred by sovereign immunity). Fewer circuit courts have decided the issue of whether fiscal intermediaries and carriers are entitled to official immunity for discretionary acts taken within the scope of their authority under the Medicare Act. See, e.g., Bushman v. Seiler, 755 F.2d 653, 655-56 (8th Cir.1985) (official immunity granted to consultant of Medicare carrier for reporting fraud to carrier); Peterson v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 508 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Several district courts, however, have held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding by implication that employee of both fiscal intermediary and carrier was entitled to official immunity in connection with suspension of payments for fraud (B) holding that attorney who was retained by city to assist in conducting official investigation into firefighters potential wrongdoing was entitled to qualified immunity in firefighters  1983 claim because official investigation of state employee was activity of the type entitled to qualified immunity (C) holding that carrier was entitled to intervene as of right where the states workers compensation law permitted subrogation of a compensation carrier (D) holding that defendants were entitled to official immunity and not addressing the merits (E) holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity

A:
(A)
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