In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: . The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Iowa, to whom this case was referred with the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3). 3 . Montandon also alleged Title VII claims against Todd and Ehlers in their personal capacities, as well as constructive discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. His wife, Tish Walker Montandon, claimed loss of consortium. The district court dismissed these claims. Because they have not been raised on appeal, they are deemed abandoned. See Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 740-41 (8th Cir.1985). 4 . It remains to be seen whether our holding in Quick will remain the law. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), cert, granted, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2430, 138 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title vii does not address samesex harassment (B) holding that samesex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under title vii (C) holding that title vii does not protect employees from harassment based on sexual orientation (D) holding that samcscx sexual harassment claims are actionable under title vii (E) holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine

A: (A)
****
Q: Court’s finding that Porter was not an independent trustee was not due to confusion regarding the proper role of trustees and agents in a corporate trust, as Sparkman contends. Rather, the Tax Court found that “she had no meaningful role” whatsoever. That Porter testified otherwise does not, in itself, establish that the Tax Court committed clear error. The Tax Court, describing Porter’s testimony as “vague, contrived, and non-credible,” plainly did not believe her, and “the Tax Court, like any other court, ‘may disregard uncontradicted testimony by a taxpayer where it finds that testimony lacking in credibility.’ ” Conti v. Comm’r, 39 F.3d 658, 664 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Lerch v. Comm’r, 877 F.2d 624, 631 (7th Cir.1994)); see also Demkowicz v. Comm’r, 551 F.2d 929, 931 (3d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Wood v. Comm’r, 338 F.2d 602, 605 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony (B) holding that where testimony is inherently improbable the court may choose to disregard it (C) holding that a court is not bound to accept testimony at face value even when it is uncontroverted if it is improbable unreasonable or questionable internal citation omitted (D) holding that a party is not bound by the testimony of a witness it calls (E) holding the tax court not bound to accept taxpayers uncontradicted testimony if it found the testimony to be improbable unreasonable or questionable

A: (E)
****
Q: regulatory and dictionary definitions of “nominal”). The plaintiff asserts that the Secretary’s approval of the Maine HMP exceeds the Secretary’s statutory authority in violation of the APA. See Compl. ¶¶ 7, 59. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the Secretary abused his discretion in approving “nominal” copayments that exceed the Secretary’s own regulatory definition of what constitutes a “nominal” copayment. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C); Compl. ¶¶ 4-5, 23, 55-58; PL’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 28. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that it was an abuse of discretion for the Secretary to approve the HMP because it includes unlawfully high copayments. See PL’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 28 (quoting Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 711 F.2d 370, 381 (D.C.Cir.1983)) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the defendants argue that the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language (B) holding that when an agencys interpretation of its own rules flies in the face of the language of the rules themselves it is owed no deference (C) holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (D) holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law (E) holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference

A:
(B)
****