In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: this Opinion. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Trustee’s Objection to the Debtor’s Claim of exemption in her Toledo, Ohio house, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), be, and is hereby, SUSTAINED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Trustee’s Objection to the Debtor’s claim of exemption in past due rents, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5), be, and is hereby, DISMISSED without prejudice. 1 . As a resident of Michigan, the Debtor along with her bankruptcy petition also filed a contemporaneous motion for a change of venue to the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, which this Court granted. 2 . Pursuant to § 522(b), a debtor's right to claim an exemption in bankruptcy is determined by the state in which the debtor is domiciled. See In re Vaughan, 188 B.R. 234, 237 (Bankr.E.D.K.y.1995) (<HOLDING>). Some states like Michigan permit their 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that the terms residence and domicile are not the same thing but that a debtor may only claim an exemption in property where he is domiciled (C) holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a selfsettled revocable trust even though the settlor and the beneficiary as well as the bankruptcy debtor were the same person (D) holding that the objector must not only show that the facts do not support the exemption but must also prove that the debtor knowingly deceived the trustee and the creditors at the time the exemption was made (E) holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other
[EX A]: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate

[EX Q]: two for support). The fallacy of this position is that it confuses and commingles two conflicting strands of case law which follow opposing judicial routes. As noted above, in every case cited by the majority in footnote two, the fruits of a search were deemed admissible only after the search was found to be constitutional, i.e., distinctions as to admissibility of the fruits of a particular search against the consenting occupant and the nonconsenting occupant were never drawn. There is no authority for the majority’s proposition that the fruits of an unconstitutional search should be admitted into evidence. Indeed such a proposition violates one of the founding principles of the Fourth Amendment. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Most commentators also agree failure to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible (B) holding that the physical fruits of a miranda violation must be suppressed (C) holding that evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed (D) holding that regardless of the applicable framework defendants statement must be suppressed (E) holding that the evidence obtained as part of an illegal stop should have been suppressed even where the defendants consented to the search
[EX A]: holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible

[EX Q]: Court’s finding that Porter was not an independent trustee was not due to confusion regarding the proper role of trustees and agents in a corporate trust, as Sparkman contends. Rather, the Tax Court found that “she had no meaningful role” whatsoever. That Porter testified otherwise does not, in itself, establish that the Tax Court committed clear error. The Tax Court, describing Porter’s testimony as “vague, contrived, and non-credible,” plainly did not believe her, and “the Tax Court, like any other court, ‘may disregard uncontradicted testimony by a taxpayer where it finds that testimony lacking in credibility.’ ” Conti v. Comm’r, 39 F.3d 658, 664 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Lerch v. Comm’r, 877 F.2d 624, 631 (7th Cir.1994)); see also Demkowicz v. Comm’r, 551 F.2d 929, 931 (3d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Wood v. Comm’r, 338 F.2d 602, 605 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony (B) holding that where testimony is inherently improbable the court may choose to disregard it (C) holding that a court is not bound to accept testimony at face value even when it is uncontroverted if it is improbable unreasonable or questionable internal citation omitted (D) holding that a party is not bound by the testimony of a witness it calls (E) holding the tax court not bound to accept taxpayers uncontradicted testimony if it found the testimony to be improbable unreasonable or questionable
[EX A]:
holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony