In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
first time a party must specify the statute authorizing attorney’s fees is in the Rule 54 motion (unless otherwise provided by statute or court order). In Missouri, attorney’s fees are not recoverable from another party, except when a contract or statute allows it. Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. banc 2009). The second sentence of the Missouri commissions statute is such an exception to the general Missouri rule. Kraft v. Edwards, 946 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Mo.App.1997). The district judge’s ruling that there was no statutory basis for an award of attorney’s fees is erroneous as a matter of law. On remand, the district court should consider whether to award attorney’s fees. See Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 631 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because this case as tried addressed only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award (B) holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained (C) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence (D) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (E) holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances

Ex Output:
holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained


Ex Input:
two separate legal insufficiency claims. When the party without the burden of proof suffers an unfavorable finding, the challenge is one of “no evidence to support the finding.” See Creative Manufacturing, Inc. v. Unik, 726 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.). Where the party having the burden of proof suffers an unfavorable finding (failure to find), the proper complaint is that the fact was established as “a matter of law.” See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Company, 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989). Here, Tech filed a verified special denial that it received timely notice. Consequently, Lucero had the burden to plead and secure a finding on notice. See Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center v. Apodaca, 876 S.W.2d 402, 410-11 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied)(<HOLDING>); see also Harrison v. Texas Department of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice (B) holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner (C) holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice (D) holding that where the governmental unit filed a verified special denial that it received timely actual notice the plaintiff had the burden to prove and secure a finding on actual notice at trial (E) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice

Ex Output:
holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice


Ex Input:
permanent resettlement, and thus may ... not be able to make the prima facie showing of firm resettlement under § 208.15 in that manner.” 242 F.3d at 486-87 (noting that we faced such a situation in Cheo). In the event that direct evidence is unobtainable, “the IJ or BIA may find it necessary to rely on non-offer-based factors, such as the length of an alien’s stay in a third country, the alien’s intent to remain in the country, and the extent of the social and economic ties developed by the alien, as circumstantial evidence of the existence of a government-issued offer.” Id. at 487. Such factors may serve as a surrogate for direct evidence of a formal offer “if they rise to a sufficient level of clarity and force.” Id. Again, the Seventh Circuit is in accord. Diallo, 381 F.3d at 694 (<HOLDING>). Opting for a “totality of the circumstances” 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the necessary inquiry  is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest (B) recognizing that such circumstances may exist but holding that the ij erred as he neither considered whether there was an offer at all nor suggested that he was using nonofferbased factors as a surrogate (C) recognizing further that the court need not  and could not  resolve all of the circumstances in which such factors would entitle an employer to judgment as a matter of law (D) recognizing that at a bond hearing there is no limit to the discretionary factors that may be considered  in determining whether to detain an alien pending a decision on  removal (E) holding that appellant was not harmed where defendant never asserted that he was not a us citizen and no evidence in the record suggested he was not a us citizen

Ex Output:

recognizing that the necessary inquiry  is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest