In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED 1 . In the original petition in the Sullivan Suit, Ms. Sullivan averred that she was represented by a power of attorney appointing Mr. Ban-daries as her attorney in fact and caregiver and granting him "full power and authority and in her name and behalf” to "conduct, man .2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair). But see Marleau v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 333 Or. 82, 37 P.3d 148, 156 (2001) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under south carolina law slander is actionable per se where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery (B) holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under missouri law (C) recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages (D) holding that statement made to plaintiffs neighbors that plaintiff committed adultery was not slander per se because adultery is no longer a crime under oregon law (E) holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under louisiana law
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: Plaintiff did not meet the notice requirements of the CFRA and the FMLA. Plaintiff did not notify Defendant in advance that Plaintiff would be absent from March 31, 2014 through April 3, 2014. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo., Exhs. Vol. II. Additionally, Plaintiff did not call in sick or ask someone to call Defendant on his behalf on any of those four days of absence, even though Plaintiff made 26 phone calls to individuals or entities other than McCale or Defendant. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo,, Exhs. Vol. II. Thus, unlike in Avila, upon which Plaintiff relies, Plaintiff did not call in sick during his absence from March 31, 2014 through April 3,2014. See Avila, 165 Cal.App.4th at 1258, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, two weeks prior to Plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party (B) holding that absence from prior state was temporary during the time it was contemplated that the parent and child would return to the other state (C) holding that spouse was not required to return to work immediately upon divorce to avoid judicial imputation of income (D) holding that calling in sick during an absence and providing hospital forms describing the illness upon return to work is sufficient notice (E) holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: (adopting view among states that if two escape clauses within insurance policy operate to negate coverage, those escape clauses are null and void). 8 . Harris v. Magee, 573 So.2d at 653; see o.2d 670, 673 (Miss.1976) ("An insurance company cannot by the provisions in one uninsured motorist endorsement limit its liability and endorsement in a separate policy and defeat the mandatory provisions of the statute."); Talbot, 291 So.2d at 703 (declaring invalid clause which reduced uninsured motorist coverage by amounts paid under medical coverage provisions of policy); Lowery, 285 So.2d at 771-77 (declaring invalid restriction in policy that required "insured" to own the automobile described in the policy until uninsured motorist coverage applied); Harthcock, 248 So.2d at 459-60, 461-62 (<HOLDING>); see also Youngblood, 515 F.2d at 1256-58 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conditioning uninsured motorist coverage on insureds agreement to not settle with other tortfeasors contravenes the um act also declaring void other insurance provision of policy which operated to relieve insurer of payment if insured secured statutory minimum from other source (B) holding that a policy with an excess other insurance clause provides no coverage until a policy with a pro rata other insurance clause is exhausted (C) holding that language requiring insurer to pay all sums which the insured  shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile includes recovery of exemplary damages under uninsured motorist provision of policy (D) holding that policy exclusion for uninsured motorist claims involving permissive users violated mississippi public policy as expressed in the um act (E) holding that while the owner of several vehicles by paying a single premium for um coverage applicable to only one of them secures um coverage for himself and his family while occupying the uninsured vehicles as well as the insured vehicle the number of uninsured motorist coverages available to be stacked should be based upon the number of coverages for which uninsured motorist premiums were paid
Example Output:
(A)