In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: trekker from Nepal who agreed to transport a suitcase from Thailand to the United States. Id. at 658, 663. Customs agents found the suitcase to contain three kilograms of 87% pure heroin, and the defendant was ultimately convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute and importation of heroin. Id. at 658. In affirming the reduction of the defendant’s offense level under the safety valve, the Ninth Circuit observed that the defendant "provided the authorities with substantial information concerning the offense, including the names of those involved abroad," while maintaining that he was innocent of knowing the contents of the suitcase. Id. at 663. Vazquez has not so cooperated with the Government. Cf. United States v. Garcia-Sanchez, 189 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir.1999) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant was not eligible for the safety valve provision because he never even met with the government to offer information and suggesting that given his undisputed association with members of the conspiracy he would have some perhaps useless relevant information to provide the gov ernment even if he were innocent of drug dealing himself (B) holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy (C) holding that evidence was sufficient for jury to find that the defendant participated in the conspiracy even though he did not have a relationship with all of his fellow coconspirators (D) holding there was enough evidence to find the defendant abandoned his child when he claimed to have knowledge of cpss involvement he admitted that for periods of two years and six months he did not attempt any contact with his child and from the date he canceled a home study until the petition was filed he did not attempt to contact the child or cps or provide support even when he was out of jail (E) holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: from representing plaintiffs “in either this or similar actions.” Id. at 1196. Likewise here, Yanny would be prohibited from representing the interests of any party against his former client, the Church of Scientology organization. However, I see no basis for precluding Berry or the Musick, Peeler firm from representing F.A.C.T.Net based on the fact that they formerly represented Yanny in defending him against charges made by the Church of Scientology. Moreover, in suing Yanny as it did, Plaintiffs waived any privilege with respect to any information relevant to the issues raised by their claims and released Yanny from his obligation of secrecy with respect to that information. See Carlson, Collins, Gordon & Bold v. Banducci, 257 Cal.App.2d 212, 228, 64 Cal-Rptr. 915 (Cal.App.1967) (<HOLDING>) That principle of California professional 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that authorization cards are privileged from disclosure to employer (C) holding an attorney is released from those obligations of secrecy which the law places upon him whenever the disclosure of a communication otherwise privileged becomes necessary to the protection of the attorneys own rights (D) holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client (E) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: “insurer” technically is considered part of the “business of insurance” is not material. Barnett Bank, at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1111 (“The word 'relates’ is highly general, and this Court has interpreted it broadly in other pre-emption contexts.”). Thus, for example, the Internal Revenue Service is not part of the “business of insurance,” and yet we have held that a Treasury Regulation, which resulted in a tax on insurance companies, rendered the MeCarran-Ferguson Act “inapplicable by its own terms.” See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 598 F.2d 1211, 1219 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct. 229, 62 L.Ed.2d 169 (1979); see also Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson, 820 F.2d 1406, 1414-15 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035, 109 S.Ct. 1932, 104 L.Ed.2d 404 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Therefore we conclude that Congress expressly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period (B) holding that rule 6e did not extend the period in which a workers compensation carrier was required to pay a compensation award under the longshore and harbor workers compensation act where the act required payment within ten days of filing of the order as opposed to within ten days of service of notice provided for in the rule (C) holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act (D) holding that the longshore and harbor workers compensation act specifically relates to business of insurance (E) holding that an injured workers initial election to seek state compensation does not implicate the exclusivity provision to preclude the worker from later seeking compensation under the longshore act
Example Output:
(D)