In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: as this is circumscribed but critical. For the Supreme Court has made plain that qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability” and “is effectively lost if a ease is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (emphasis in original). IV. We thus turn to the sole question over which we have jurisdiction: whether the district court properly concluded that the officers were not entitled to summary judgment under Norman. The officers contend that Ussery suffered only de minimis injuries and so cannot satisfy the requirements for an excessive force claim under Norman. Blue Br. 8, 16-21. We disagree. During the decade when Norman was good law, we never articulated a precise definition of what c 270 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note the telling fact that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where law enforcement officers restrained and abandoned an arrestee for ten minutes causing him to feel frightened vulnerable and humiliated when left alone and immobile in the dark parking lot such that in the months following the incident he had trouble sleeping and was scared to leave his home  the resulting injury was more than de minimis (B) holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him (C) holding that a reasonable officer could not have been expected to anticipate that ten to fifteen minutes of unauthorized detention would amount to a greater than de minimis injury (D) holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody (E) holding that an individuals liberty is restrained only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
[EX A]: holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him

[EX Q]: litigation. The district court can correct any abuses at the fees for fees stage under the “reasonableness” standard. The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment (B) holding that time entries such as preparation for hearing or preparation for school visit were too vague and reducing overall fee award by twentyfive percent (C) holding that fee application must be sufficiently detailed to allow court to make an independent evaluation as to what fees are actual and necessary and finding that failure to keep contemporaneous records does not automatically result in denial of the fees but the lack thereof justifies a reduction of the fee to the level proven (D) holding that attorneys fees for the preparation of the fee application are compensable (E) holding that the independent counsel reauthorization act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application
[EX A]: holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment

[EX Q]: 1. Defendant argues that the district court erred in not granting him a mistrial after it allowed the government to question Jose Colon-Maldonado (Colon) about the charged conspiracy. The court gave a curative instruction after the evidence was wrongfully admitted, and the fact that the jury acquitted Defendant of Counts One and Two indicates that the jury followed the instruction. See United States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1206 (9th Cir.2004). 2. After the rebuttal witnesses testified, the trial court gave a curative instruction directing the jury to disregard the testimony. There is no evidence in the record that the curative instruction failed to alleviate any prejudice to the Defendant. See United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1140 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). 3. The district court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any prejudice resulting from a misstatement of the law by the prosecutor was cured by trial courts proper instruction on applicable law (B) holding that instruction to disregard cured error from prosecutors improper comment during voir dire (C) holding that prosecutorial blunder did not prejudice the defendant as the blunder was effectively cured by the instruction to the jury to disregard it (D) holding that the prejudicial effect of a direct reference to an accuseds failure to testify normally cannot be cured by an instruction to disregard (E) holding almost any improper argument may be cured by an instruction to disregard
[EX A]:
holding that any prejudice resulting from a misstatement of the law by the prosecutor was cured by trial courts proper instruction on applicable law