In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: with the court, that Mr. Peralta has been granted a labor certification pursuant to a subsequent application filed by his employer. He has been awarded all of the relief that he sought, and there is consequently no live controversy concerning the original denial of his application for the same position with the same employer. As to the appellants whose employers have re-filed new certification applications that are currently pending, we do not think their claims are mooted. In contrast to Mr. Peralta, these parties have not yet received the relief originally sought and thus their original claim that the denial of their first certification application was arbitrary remains a live controversy. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Actually, even after a certification is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending (B) holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided (C) holding that appeals are moot when appellate courts can provide no effective relief (D) holding that a case is not moot so long as the court can fashion some form of meaningful relief for the injured party (E) holding that a previously live case can become moot only if interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation

A: holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending
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Q: from the OSHA inspection after this incident were for repeat offenses, the repeat offense that appears pertinent to this ease was the failure to mark a container of hazardous chemicals so as to identify the chemical. The prior citation for such an offense is not in the record, and we are unable to determine whether the “repeat” aspect of the citation pertains only to the type of citation or to the particular location of the offending container. In any event, our supreme court has not yet held that OSHA citations are evidence that compels the conclusion that a coemployee was substantially certain that injury or death would occur. In fact, in two cases involving OSHA citations, the court has held that such citations would not support that finding. See Ex parte Martin, 733 So.2d at 396 (<HOLDING>), and Harris v. Simmons, 585 So.2d 906, 908 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that witnesss testimony was sufficient to support the trial courts finding that defendant committed battery that resulted in bodily injury (B) holding postaccident citation not sufficient to support finding that coemployee was substantially certain that injury or death would occur (C) holding that preaccident citation would not support a finding that coemployees were substantially certain that injury or death would occur (D) holding evidence sufficient to support trial courts finding in aggravation that the offense was planned (E) holding governments position substantially justified where sufficient support existed in precedent

A: holding that witnesss testimony was sufficient to support the trial courts finding that defendant committed battery that resulted in bodily injury
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Q: fact that the oil traversed part of Transocean’s vessel before entering the Gulf of Mexico. We recognize that the aforementioned incidents involved blameless third parties, whereas here the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon might have contributed to the discharge. By all accounts, if the vessel’s blowout preventer had functioned properly, the oil would not have entered navigable waters in violation of the Clean Water Act. The defendants therefore reason that liability is properly imposed upon the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon. Yet it is well estab lished that this section of the Clean Water Act leaves no room for civil-penalty defendants to shift liability via allegations of third-party fault. See United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1314 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Early in the implementation of the Act’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys (B) holding exculpatory statements by a third party should have been admitted in the punishment phase notwithstanding the hearsay rule (C) holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding defendant liable for penalty notwithstanding fault of a third party

A:
holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys
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