In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: is minimized if officers exercise unquestioned command of the situation. Id., 129 S.Ct. at 786-87. Here, evidence supports the district court’s finding that Hollins’s behavior gave the police reasonable suspicion to believe that Hollins was armed and dangerous when they searched him. First, Hollins repeatedly refused to follow instructions to keep his hands in plain view, and he would slide his hands toward his waist while he was seated in the vehicle. Nervous, evasive behavior, which Hollins exhibited, is one of several factors which may be pertinent in determining reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 756 (11th Cir.2000). Second, Hollins repeatedly refused to obey an officer’s instruction to exit the vehicle. See Maryland, 519 U.S. at 410, 117 S.Ct. at 884 (<HOLDING>). Third, Hollins repeatedly disregarded an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop (B) holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop (C) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous (D) holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction (E) holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred
Example Output: holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop

Example Input: inquiry — • whether New Provo Canyon’s treatment of one individual constituted state action — differs substantially from that in Milonas, irrespective of whether, for purposes of a class action suit, Old Provo Canyon’s treatment of its patients generally constituted state action. Thus, the question here does not present the necessary “like facts” to trigger the stare decisis doctrine. D. Collateral Estoppel For the very same reason, Taylor’s collateral estoppel argument fails. Collateral esto Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553; Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Logistics Control Group, 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.1985) (discussed below). 13 . Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553-54; Lib. Mut. Ins., 969 F.2d at 1388-89; Holloway, 813 F.2d at 878-79; see also Nipper v. Snipes, 1 F.3d 415, 415-417 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Id. at 1553; see also Lib. Mut. Ins., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (B) holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body (C) holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial (D) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (E) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact
Example Output: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint

Example Input: product,” and that Dr. Maddox “rendered his opinion without being prepared to discuss the circumstances of any individual’s exposure”). Betz answered the question with a resounding “No.” However, the Betz question simply is not posed by this case. Substantial exposure to many products does not equate to substantial exposure to one or more of Appellants’ products. But that Dr. DuPont was unable to testify to the relative exposure to each product does not preclude submission of the case to a jury regarding the degree of exposure to Appellants’ products. No Pennsylvania court has held that product identification and the nature of a plaintiffs exposure must be established by expert testimony on peril of dismissal. See Weible v. Allied Signal, Inc., 968 A.2d 521, 527 (Pa.Super.2008) (<HOLDING>); Andaloro v. Armstrong World Indust., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence (B) holding that the link between a defendants property and a plaintiffs childhood exposure to lead paint and dust may be established through circumstantial evidence even if expert opinion testimony is not available (C) holding that the nexus between an asbestos product and plaintiff may be established by direct and circumstantial evidence and that testimony by someone with knowledge relating to the plaintiffs workplace exposure to an asbestoscontaining product is admissible (D) holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury (E) holding that evidence that would normally be admissible may be excluded if the evidence was a direct or indirect product of an unlawful search
Example Output:
holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence