In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: states that a lack of due diligence should not prevent a party from presenting the new evidence. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 cmt. j (1982); see also Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J.Super. 558, 788 A.2d 834, 840 (2002) (“[T]he judge may consider diligence, or lack of diligence, ... [but] a lack of diligence does not require invocation of collateral estoppel particularly where, as here, plaintiff attempted to obtain Dr. Matthew’s evaluation prior to the arbitration proceeding.”). But see Klein v. Comm’r, 880 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir.1989) (“A party may not assert a change in controlling facts when the facts allegedly showing a change in circumstances could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence.”); Calcutt v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 14, 25, 1988 WL 71262 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the fairness 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial (B) holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel (C) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action

A: holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial
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Q: Erickson-Puttmann concedes that her Title VII claim against Gill fails because Gill was not her employer. See e.g., Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly Community Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th Cir.1997) (“Our Court quite recently has squarely held that supervisors may not be held individually liable under Title VII.” (citing Spencer v. Ripley County State Bank, 123 F.3d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir.1997) (per cu-riam))). Lenhardt v. Basic Inst, of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir.1995) (noting that “[e]very circuit that has considered the issue ultimately has concluded that an employee, even one possessing supervisory authority, is not an employer upon whom liability can be imposed under Title VII.”); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the court concludes that summary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii (B) holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii (C) holding individual employees may be liable under title vii (D) holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii (E) holding that there is no individual liability under title vii

A: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii
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Q: 22, 122 S.Ct. 1012 (internal quotation marks omitted). As long as the Commission’s activity falls within one of these specific jurisdictional grants, the “prefatory language of section 201(a)” does “not undermine FERC’s jurisdiction.” Id. at 22, 122 S.Ct. 1012. And the authority that Section 201(b) affords to the Commission has expanded over time because transmissions on the interconnected grids that have now developed “constitute transmissions in interstate commerce.” Id. at 7, 16, 122 S.Ct. 1012. Taken together, these points support the Commission’s assertion of authority over transmission planning matters in the challenged orders, notwithstanding petitioners’ contention that the orders intrude on the States’ authority. First, beca 5 U.S. 295, 299, 73 S.Ct. 706, 97 L.Ed. 1020 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Given that fit, New York v. FERC teaches that 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce (B) holding that transmission of photographs by means of the internet  constitutes transportation in interstate commerce (C) recognizing that federal authority under the fpa extends to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and that fpa section 206 is among those provisions that grant authority in connection with such interstate transmission opera tions (D) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce (E) holding that transmission of photographs by means of the internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce

A:
recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce
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