In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
(applying Tennessee law); see also Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1969). Most other courts, however, have set a lower bar. For example in Mondido v. Cory Corp., 483 F.Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the plaintiff was injured when the glass carafe from her coffee pot broke. The carafe itself was manufactured by Corning, but it was converted into a coffee decanter and sold by Cory, a separate company. Id. at 27. After both companies were found liable, Corning moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict arguing that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence sufficient to support the jury’s determination that the carafe was defective when it left Coming’s plant. Id. The court rejected the motion, noting the plaintiffs evidence that Cory converted the 1967) (<HOLDING>); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed (B) holding that plaintiff had successfully traced the defective condition to the manufacturer where there was no evidence of tampering by the retailer (C) holding that manufacturer had no duty to warn its purchasers retailer and transporter of gas of dangers where those purchasers had operated a gas business for years were familiar with the trade journals and already knew the dangers (D) holding that there was a triable issue of fact whether a defendant who applied a sprayon fireproofing material was an agent for the manufacturer of the material and thus whether plaintiff is in privity with the manufacturer (E) holding a manufacturer strictly liable in tort for injury to plaintiff caused by defective power tool

Ex Output:
holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed


Ex Input:
In my judgment, it is extremely doubtful that the obviously dispensable involvement of the judiciary in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins and ends in the Executive Branch is a proper exercise of judicial power. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. Appx. 697, 702-703 (1864) (opinion of Taney, C. J.); United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48 (1852). It may well follow that the misguided opinion of today’s majority has nothing more than an advisory character. Whether or not that be so, the better rea soning in Justice Souter’s far wiser and far more scholarly opinion will surely be the law one day. For these reasons, as well as those set forth in Justice Souter’s opinion, I respectfully dissent. 1 See, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F. 3d 630 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution (B) holding that a federal court may order a state to pay cleanup costs pursuant to the comprehensive environmental response compensation and liability act of 1980 (C) holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken (D) holding that bankruptcy court may enjoin state environmental reclamation order (E) holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs

Ex Output:
holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution


Ex Input:
(2005). On September 13, 2006, the District Court held a resentencing hearing and imposed the same sentence as before. Section 1326(b)(2) increases the authorized prison sentence from a maximum of two years to a maximum of twenty years if the person’s deportation followed conviction for an aggravated felony. JimenezCohenete argues that, because his prior felony convictions increased the statutory maximum penalty for his reentry offense, those offenses should have been charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends that the Government’s failure to do so violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Put another way, Jimenez-Cohenete challenges the vitality of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (<HOLDING>), in light of subsequent Supreme Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that facts regarding prior convictions need not be charged in an indictment nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that factors increasing a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum of the crime charged with the exception of prior convictions must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that any fact  that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment submitted to a jury and proven beyond reasonable doubt

Ex Output:

holding that factors increasing a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum of the crime charged with the exception of prior convictions must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt