In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: the bankruptcy court’s power to control dissemination of information more broadly. Judge Steven Gerling, for example, observed in In re Bennett, that If the information [sought to be protected] does not represent trade secrets or confidential research, development or commercial information, then whether to permit access to the information is a matter left to the Court’s discretion. It requires the Court to examine the relevant facts and circumstances and then to balance the interests of the party opposing disclosure with that of the public. In re Bennett, 226 B.R. 331, 336 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1998); see also In re Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2nd Cir.1994) (discussing § 107 and use of records for improper purpose); In re Robert Landau Associates, 50 B.R. 670, 675-76 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>); but see In re Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. 675, 679 
 Holding statements: (A) holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter (B) holding that when the trial court signed an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint but refused to enter a final judgment on that order the order refusing to enter judgment was appealable under former ors 190102a (C) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality (D) recognizing inherent authority but vacating order not supported by necessary findings (E) holding that while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judges signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court the city waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the indiana supreme court has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection and more recently this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect
Example Output: holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter

Example Input: 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
Example Output: holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language

Example Input: similarly not designed to apply to “a situation where the employee works an irregular number of hours according to a predetermined schedule.” Id. The section 207(k) exemption applies where the employer has adopted a qualifying “work period.” See Barefield v. Village of Winnetka, 81 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir.1996). The petitioners’ reliance upon language regarding employee consent and the preferability of reducing the agreement to writing in a section 207(f) employment situation is wholly unfounded. In fact, precedent addressing the section 207(k) scenario, as exists in the present ease, specifically holds that a municipality is not “required to obtain the consent of its [employees] before instituting a § 207(k) program.” Lamon, 972 F.2d at 1153 n. 10; see also Barefield, 81 F.3d at 710 (<HOLDING>); Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employees approval is not required under section 207k system (B) holding that state law claims involving fdca section 510k medical devices which are subjected to a relatively cursory approval process were not preempted because the fda had taken the position that its regulations only preempted claims involving section 360ec devises which go through a rigorous premarket approval process (C) holding employees not entitled to dismissal pursuant to section 101106f where employees failed to present the trial court with a sufficient record to satisfy their burden (D) holding that probation department employees are not county employees (E) holding that employees could be required under mandatory securities registration form to arbitrate claims brought under adea
Example Output:
holding that state law claims involving fdca section 510k medical devices which are subjected to a relatively cursory approval process were not preempted because the fda had taken the position that its regulations only preempted claims involving section 360ec devises which go through a rigorous premarket approval process