In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: ” Boone v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 130, 133, 415 S.E.2d 250, 251 (1992). “A battery is an unlawful touching of another.... Whether a touching is a battery depends on the intent of the actor, not on the force applied.” Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 463, 468-69, 534 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2000) (citation omitted). “ ‘[T]he slightest touching of another ... if done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, constitutes a battery for which the law affords redress.’ ” Id. at 469, 534 S.E.2d at 350 (citation omitted). Accordingly, where Vaughn claims he only intended to scare Robinson and did not intend to shoot or wound him, Vaughn would not be entitled, in my opinion, to have the jury instructed on assault and battery. See Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987) (<HOLDING>). A second theory supported by the evidence is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that shooting at a person intending only to scare the person where no touching or wounding occurs supports instructing the jury on simple assault (B) holding that simple assault includes urinating on another (C) holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident   4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor (D) holding that punching another person is a statutory assault (E) holding simple assault is a lesser included offense of recklessly endangering another person

Output: holding that simple assault includes urinating on another


Input: Consider Input: in the record of any possible medical treatment that Monroe County or the individual defendants could have provided to save the life of the Decedent. Phillips argues in her brief that it is not necessary for her to prove chemotherapy would have saved the Decedent’s life. First, she refers to the fright and anxiety both she and the Decedent suffered because of the delay in chemotherapy. In this regard, Phillips confuses the causation issue. In a survival action, damages for the Decedent’s physical suffering and mental anxiety as a result of the alleged deprivation of medical care would have been appropriate. In a wrongful death context, however, no damages are available until the plaintiff has cleared the causation hurdle. See Wilks v. Am. Tobacco Co., 680 So.2d 839, 842 (Miss.1996) (<HOLDING>). Second, Phillips suggests that she need only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (B) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (C) holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother (D) holding that a failure to include a beneficiary in a wrongful death action is a defect because the wrongful death act restricts plaintiffs to a single action (E) holding that mississippis wrongful death statute creates an independent cause of action

Output: recognizing cause of action for wrongful death


Input: Consider Input: was not bound by this ruling when he rendered this decision in 1999 because SSR 00-4p was not effective until December 2000. Perhaps as a result, Money mentions SSR 00-4p on appeal but concedes that we do not need to apply it here. She argues persuasively that this court has endorsed reconciling conflicts between VEs’ testimony and the DOT definitions even in claims not governed by SSR 00-4p. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 126-27 (3d Cir.2002). We do not need to decide this question, though, because the district court’s decision to affirm stands even if such reconciliation was needed. Money apparently did not raise the first issue regarding the error in step four to the district court, and it is therefore waived. See Gass v. V.I. Telephone Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Looking at this issue on the merits, this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court (B) holding issues not raised before local agency are waived (C) holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal (D) holding that issues not raised before a district court are waived on appeal (E) holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal


Output: holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court