In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

that Nusspickel was guilty of the aggravated battery charges even though the jury convicted her on each charge of the lesser-included offense of simple battery and (2) misconduct that had not been charged and proved relating to her alleged contact with one of the victims after the charged incidents. She also asserts that the State cannot carry its burden to show that the judge did not rely on these impermissible considerations. Generally, the trial court’s imposition of a sentence that is within the minimum and maximum limits set by the legislature “is a matter for the trial Court in the exercise of its discretion, which cannot be inquired into upon the appellate level.” Shellman v. State, 222 So.2d 789, 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); see also Booker v. State, 514 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Fla.1987) (<HOLDING>); Darby v. State, 216 So.2d 29, 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard (B) holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable (C) recognizing that this court and the united states supreme court have embraced the notion that so long as the sentence imposed is within the maximum limit set by the legislature an appellate court is without power to review the sentence (D) holding that an appellate court has no jurisdiction to review a sentence imposed by the trial court that is within the limits prescribed by statute which is not the result of oppression prejudice or corrupt motive (E) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines
(C)

548 U.S. at 518, 126 S.Ct. at 2667 (Scalia, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that “compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act can be [a compelling state] interest ... [otherwise] a State could be placed in the impossible position of having to choose between compliance with § 5 and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause”). And we conclude that a plan will be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest when the race-based action taken was reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of the Act. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2490-91, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 1906, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (<HOLDING>); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (B) holding that where the claimed interest is avoidance of liability under section 2 the legislative action must at a minimum remedy the anticipated violation or achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored (C) holding that liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under  1983 where at best the plaintiff has merely claimed that the appellants were aware of alleged violation but did not take appropriate action (D) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (E) holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation
(B)

a maid, and that she had heard about the facts of the case. According to Dunaway, if [M.B.] had divulged this information, his trial counsel would have removed her by a for-cause challenge or by exercising a peremptory strike. “Dunaway’s collateral counsel did not ask [trial counsel] if they would have removed [M.B.] if she had disclosed this information. Moreover, the trial record indicates that [M.B.] served as an alternate juror and was excused before the jury’s guilt phase deliberations began. Dunaway presented no evidence [M.B.] discussed her past associations with Mr. Whigham with members of his jury. If, for some reason, [M.B.] failed to answer questions during voir dire it would not have caused Dunaway to be prejudiced. See Reeves v. State, 807 So.2d 18, 32 (Ala.Crim.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). “The Court finds that this, allegation of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant was not prejudiced when an ill juror after deliberations began left the other jurors accompanied by the trial judge to see a physician (B) holding statute stating that judge could excuse jurors was violated when jury commissioners excused jurors (C) holding no extrinsic evidence was brought into jury deliberations when in drug case two jurors discussed their personal life experiences with crack cocaine (D) holding that prospective jurors should have been excused for cause because they did not affirmatively state that their bias against the plaintiffs would not affect their ability to render an impartial verdict (E) holding there was simply no possibility reeves was harmed by jurors failure to recall their remote connections with reeves and the victim because both were excused before jury deliberations began andthere was no evidence they informed other jurors about their connections with the case

(E)