In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[u]nder [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(l)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, ... a federal habeas [corpus] court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Applying these standards to the present case, the court’s inquiry must be whether the uit Court of Appeals case for the proposition that the application of a statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does not violate the ex post facto clause because it is a protective measure and does not impose any new or different punishment. See United States v. O’Neal (“O’Neal”), 180 F.3d 115, 124-25 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (criticizing Davis). Additionally, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding north carolina felony firearms act did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was a measured public safety provision and its applicability to previously convicted felons was eminently reasonable (D) holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive (E) holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause
holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause

to allege damages through June 30, 2006 is the focus of their motion.”). Because the Government does not oppose Plaintiff supplementing the September 4, 2009 Complaint to seek damages through the end of 2009, the issue before the court is whether Plaintiff may supplement to allege a claim for damages incurred through December 31, 2009, or through December 31, 2010. See System Fuels, 73 Fed.Cl. at 211 (“Supplementation may be limited or curtailed to avoid prejudice.” (citation omitted)). Although Plaintiff may have given the Government an estimate of 2010 damages as early as July 2010, Plaintiff did not identify the specific 2010 damages claimed or provide the Government with supporting documentation of those damages until April 20, 2011 — t 4 Fed.Cl. 727 (2006) (“SMUD III") (<HOLDING>), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 293 Fed.Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that smud is entitled to 53159863 in mitigation costs but staying entry of judgment pending the outcome of this proceeding (B) holding that smud was entitled to 39796234 in damages (C) holding that a plaintiff is entitled to either statutory treble damages or punitive damages whichever is the greater (D) holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of nominal damages when she had failed to request them (E) holding that smud was entitled to mitigation damages for costs incurred from may 15 1997 to december 31 2003
holding that smud is entitled to 53159863 in mitigation costs but staying entry of judgment pending the outcome of this proceeding

certain provisions are met. Fla. Stat. § 624.155 (1999). Before the adoption of section 624.155, Florida courts refused to recognize a cause of action by an insured against his insurer alleging the insurer, in bad faith, refused to settle his claim; i.e., a “first party” bad faith cause of action. Opperman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 515 So.2d 263, 265-67 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987). While “first party” bad faith claims were not permitted, if an insured could allege an independent tort, such as fraud or intentional infliction of emotional distress, he could proceed against the insurer on those claims and receive punitive damages. Greene v. Well Care HMO, Inc., 778 So.2d 1037, 1042 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001); see also Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., 94 So.2d 854, 858 (Fla.1957) (<HOLDING>). GEICO essentially argued during its motion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while punitive damages are normally not recoverable for breach of contract where acts constituting a breach of contract also amount to a cause of action in tort there may be recovery of exemplary damages  however the breach must be attended by some intentional wrong insult abuse or gross negligence which amounts to an independent tort (B) holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship (C) holding that generally punitive damages are not available for a breach of contract (D) holding that the failure to act in good faith  does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract (E) holding that absent an independent tort a plaintiff alleging a breach of contract may only seek to recover the damages flowing from the breach

holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship