In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: rule may be outdated, we have also recognized that “it is uniquely a province of the legislature to change it.” Reiter v. Yellowstone County (1981), Mont., 627 P.2d 845, 849, 38 St.Rep. 686, 690. In Reiter, we noted that because of the operation of section 39-2-503, MCA, the at-will employee was not employed on a “discharge for cause only” basis. We stated, “assuming arguendo that appellant had an implied contract with an implied covenant of good faith, the employer did not act in bad faith because its conduct was statutorily permissible.” 627 P.2d at 849-850, 38 St.Rep. at 690. In other words, under section 39-2-503, MCA, an employer or employee could terminate employment for any or all reasons, provided the reasons or manner of termination did not 7), 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (<HOLDING>); and Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. (1974), 114 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a contract action when employee terminated in order not to receive earned bonuses or commissions (B) holding employee not terminated in bad faith because no evidence suggested that employer discharged employee in order to retain em ployees previously earned sales commissions (C) recognizing contract action and limiting damages to those for breach of contract when employee terminated for refusal to date foreman (D) holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee (E) recognizing a tort action for wrongful discharge when employee was terminated because he refused to commit a criminal act

Output: holding employee not terminated in bad faith because no evidence suggested that employer discharged employee in order to retain em ployees previously earned sales commissions


Input: Consider Input: 1024-25 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (J. Mark) (discussing the split of authority and explaining that Congress codified the result of In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d 797 (3d Cir.1985) which encouraged the use of debt repayment plans by ensuring that property acquired post-petition would not be subject to creditors’ claims if Chapter 13 proved unsuccessful). Courts which held that property acquired post-petition must be property of the Chapter 7 estate after conversion did so because they believed such policy was “necessary to discourage strategic, opportunistic behavior that hurts creditors without advancing any legitimate interests of the debtors.” In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 137 (7th Cir.1991). Lybrook, In re Colder, 973 F.2d 862 (10th Cir.1992), and In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>), base their results on policy concerns that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while state law determines the existence of a claim federal law determines when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes (B) holding for  1983 actions that although state law determines the limitations period federal law determines when the claim arises (C) holding that federal law determines definition of executory contract but that state law determines whether a material breach of the contract could occur (D) holding that date of conversion determines what exemptions apply (E) holding that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state law that determines the outcome of the case

Output: holding that while state law determines the existence of a claim federal law determines when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes


Input: Consider Input: OGA for breach of contract and conversion. The jury found for Hardi 4, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (permitting mother of deceased son to recover mental-anguish damages on her breach-of-contract claim against entity that improperly prepared son’s body for burial); Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734-35 (Tex. 1993) (setting forth elements of IIED claim and holding that defendant’s conduct was not outrageous as matter of law because defendant may assert its legal rights in permissible way, even if assertion causes mental anguish). The second is that mental anguish stemming from the birth and rearing of a health^ child is not a compensable injury. See Pressil v. Gibson, 477 S.W.3d 402, 410-11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); cf. Delgado v. Methodist Hosp., 936 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could recover both doubled damages under the state regulation of manufacturers distributors and dealers act and punitive damages in connection with the common law claim because the act expressly allows both types of damages (B) holding that a plaintiff could recover actual damages under the tcpa for loss of credit if the plaintiff submitted sufficient proof of the amount damages requested (C) holding that a plaintiff could not recover mentalanguish damages because he had failed to rebut the defendants prima facie showing that the alleged trespass was not attended by words or acts of insult or contumely (D) holding that plaintiff could not recover mentalanguish damages in connection with the birth of healthy children (E) holding that in order to recover damages under the lanham act plaintiff must prove that there was a violation that plaintiff has been damaged and that there is a causal connection between the violation and those damages


Output: holding that plaintiff could recover both doubled damages under the state regulation of manufacturers distributors and dealers act and punitive damages in connection with the common law claim because the act expressly allows both types of damages