In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of the statute, the FDA’s regulations, the FDA’s internal interpretation, and precedent all demonstrate that a sterilizer for dental hand-pieces is a “device” as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(h). That being so, both SteriSafe and its accessory SteriDot are within the jurisdiction of the FFDCA. Defendant nevertheless posits three reasons why SteriSafe and SteriDot are not devices. First, defendant argues that the government failed to prove that dental handpieces transmit disease and, thus, that SteriSafe actually prevents disease. Such proof is not required. Congress had two purposes in enacting' the FFDCA: (1) to regulate products that actually prevent disease, and (2) to regulate products that falsely claim that they prevent disease. Because of those d 1006 (9th Cir.1952) (<HOLDING>). Defendant next argues that the Steri-Safe is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the doctor who submitted an expert report did not demonstrate knowledge of cancer treatment he was not qualified to offer an opinion that an earlier diagnosis could have produced a better outcome for the plaintiff (B) holding that a machine that allegedly eliminated lumps from womens breasts was governed by the ffdca even though expert witnesses expressed the unanimous belief that appellants instruments are useless for diagnosis or treatment of any human ailment (C) holding the expert witnesses were protected by witness immunity to ensure expert objectivity (D) holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for  trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis (E) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: to preserve evidence exists between a third party and another in the absence of a special relationship, such as one created by contract or statute. Id. Under that analysis, this court will need to consider the primary purpose of the third-party here, Giant Eagle. (2) “Duty” of a third-party employer to its employee Pennsylvania courts have not directly considered whether the existence of an employer/employee relationship creates a duty on the part of a third-party employer to preserve evidence of a work-related accident for a potential products liability suit by an employee. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is no such duty. See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F.Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D.Ark.1989); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 179 Mich.App. 136, 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither common law nor workers disability compensation act imposed affirmative duty on employer to preserve evidence which might be used in employees thirdparty liability action (B) holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme (C) holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability (D) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (E) holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: him with child molestation; (2) a pretrial arraignment and bail hearing (the CrR 3.2 hearing); and (3) a pretrial evidentiary hearing (the CrR 3.5 hearing) to determine the admissibility of his confession. The question is whether these forms of reliance on Paul’s statements constitute “use” in a “criminal ease” under Chavez. We conclude that (1) and (2) above do constitute such “use.” Although we have not, after Chavez, addressed the scope of the “use” concept for Fifth Amendment purposes, other circuit courts have, with mixed results. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have applied Chavez to bar recovery under the Fifth Amendment unless the allegedly coerced statements were admitted against the defendant at trial. See Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 513-14 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original); Murray v. Earle, 405 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fifth amendment not violated under above rationale (B) holding that the fourteenth amendment  and therefore also the fifth amendment  gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a class of one where the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group (C) holding that a defendants fifth amendment rights were violated when an interpreter was withdrawn by the court (D) holding that because plaintiff did not allege any trial action that violated his fifth amendment rights  ipso facto his  1983 claim fails (E) holding defendants fifth amendment rights had been violated when his probation was revoked based on his failure to complete a sexual treatment program that required incriminating admissions


Output: (D)