TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: case commences from the time the discriminatory conduct causes economic injury and ends upon the date of the judgment. In other words, back pay accrues from the date of the commencement of the discriminatory course of conduct causing financial loss until the date damages are “settled.” Palasota, 499 F.3d at 483 (internal citations omitted); see also Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.1999) (“A prevailing ADA claimant is presumptively entitled to all back pay which would have accrued from the termination date to the entry of judgment, provided it is made to appear that reasonable diligence was exercised in the effort to secure other suitable employment.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Sellers v. Delgado College, 781 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Back pay may be denied “only for reasons 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award of back pay under title vii remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion (B) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to require a defendant to pay all back taxes (C) holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment (D) holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court (E) holding there was no jury trial right where court ordered reinstatement and back pay to teachers fired after desegregation order in discrimination case back pay is equitable

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: or “plain error” exists. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah 1992); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). In the present case, or in any similar case, the only way that a defendant could challenge the constitutionality of section 78 — 3—31(6)(a) would be first to consent to a hearing by a commissioner and then to challenge the validity of that very consent. Such a procedure would likely be futile inasmuch as it would invariably result in the withdrawal of the consent, either by the defendant or by court order. Indeed, absent the approach taken by Ohms, it is unlikely that section 78-3-31(6)(a) would ever be subject to constitutional scrutiny. This is precisely the sort of exceptional circu Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). For example, a legislator cannot appoint 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that utah const art vi  1 limits legislatures ability to delegate legislative powers or functions to others (B) holding that the governor of new york has only those powers delegated to him by the state constitution and the statutes (C) holding that the contact clause reaches every form in which the legislative power of a state is exerted whether it be a constitution a constitutional amendment an enactment of the legislature a bylaw or ordinance of a municipal corporation or a regulation or order of some other instrumentality of the state exercising delegated legislative authority (D) holding that crime definition and penalty powers are essential legislative functions that cannot constitutionally be delegated by the utah legislature to any other person or body (E) holding that legislative functions such as powers of zoning and rezoning cannot be delegated

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: of the Forfeiture Action The first question presented on this appeal is whether administrative forfeiture actions brought within the 120-day time period sufficiently comply with the letter of the law, as provided in § 924(d)(1), when the judicial proceedings are not brought also within the permissible 120 days. Section 924(d)(1) provides, in part: “Any action or proceeding for the forfeiture of firearms or ammunition shall be commenced within one hundred a 738, 741 (S.D.Tex.1998), aff'd, 54 Fed. Appx. 405, 2002 WL 31688616, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct.28, 2002) (concluding that the statute required “either an administrative forfeiture proceeding or a judicial forfeiture action within 120 days of a seizure”); United States v. Fourteen Various Firearms, 889 F.Supp. 875, 877 (E.D.Va.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Twelve Miscellaneous 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in pertinent part that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal (B) holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial (C) holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because both the administrative and the judicial forfeiture actions were not commenced within the 120day timeframe (D) holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings (E) holding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because it was filed without proper authority

SOLUTION:
(C)