In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: do not apply in ... [piroceedings relating to probation." - Ind. Evidence Rule 101(c)(@2). A probation revocation hearing is not to be equated with an adversarial criminal proceeding. Cox v. State 706 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind.1999) (citing Isaac v. State, 605 N.E2d 144, 149 (Ind.1992)). Rather, a revocation hearing is a narrow inquiry, and its procedures are more flexible than those of a criminal proceeding. Id. In revocation hearings, judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability, including expert testimony and scientific evidence. Carter v. State, 706 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind.1999) (noting that it is beyond doubt that urinalysis has achieved a sufficient level of scientific reliability to be accepted into evidence); see also Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 550 (<HOLDING>); of - Pitman v. State, 749 N.E.2d 557, 559 
 Holding statements: (A) holding hearsay admissible in revocation hearings (B) holding that certified charging informations and police reports are deemed admissible in revocation hearings (C) holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress (D) holding that neither rule 11 nor the protections of boykin apply to probation revocation hearings and observing that less process is due in prison disciplinary proceedings than in probation revocation hearings (E) holding that because the rules of evidence including the rule against hearsay do not apply to sentencing hearings the district court did not err in relying on hearsay in ordering restitution

Answer: (A)


Question: was allegedly violated on each date, despite the fact that the EOP contained several different provisions referring to various types of acts. Be cause the Counts in the Complaint merely alleged that Corder “did intentionally or knowingly violate the [EOP] issued in FC-DA No. 05-1-1551 on August 2, 2006[,]” without designating which conduct and sections within the EOP were violated, “the nature and cause of the accusation [could not] be understood by a person of common understanding from a reading of the Complaint itself.” Israel, 78 Hawai'i at 71, 890 P.2d at 308 (internal quotations marks omitted). The Complaint did reference in its caption (as opposed to in the charges) Police Report No. 07-016631 with respect to Count I, Police Report No. 07-021001 with respect t 1078, 1081 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Complaint was defective. II. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the hrpp does not permit a broad and freeranging discovery in criminal cases (B) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (C) holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted (D) recognizing that the facts that a bill of particulars is discretionary with the judge pursuant to hrpp rule 7a and that other discovery rules are limited in scope might prevent a defendant from discovering the states position (E) recognizing the fact that a bill of particulars is discretionary with the judge pursuant to hawaii rules of penal procedure hrpp rule 7a and the fact that other discovery rules given to the defendant are limited might prevent a defendant from discovering the states position

Answer: (A)


Question: tax annual exclusion under section 2503(b) are regarded as taxable transfers_” Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(3). Clearly, the sentence upon which the Eleventh Circuit and now our Court mistakenly rely is concerned with the $10,000 annual exclusion on gifts and has absolutely nothing to do with pre-Act transfers. There is a definitive difference between a taxable transfer that qualifies for the annual exclusion and on which a gift tax therefore is not imposed, such as an annual $10,000 check to a favorite nephew, and a transfer as to which the gift tax is not even applicable, such as a transfer pursuant to an obligation created in an antenuptial agreement executed in 1931 between a man and woman married later that year. See Commissioner v. Copley’s Estate, 194 F.2d 364, 367 (7th Cir.1952) (<HOLDING>). The creation of the Ordway trust in 1917 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is not retroactive (B) holding that the act is retroactive (C) holding that transfers made in 1936 and 1944 pursuant to the 1931 agreement were not taxable because to hold as the commissioner would have us do  would require a retroactive application of the gift tax which we think is not permissible see sec 501b of the revenue act of 1932 (D) holding retroactive application (E) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective

Answer:
(C)