instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
statute and provides for a specific penalty of a fine of $1250. Id. § 321 J.2(2)(a)(2); see State v. Daniel, 574 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Iowa 1998) (“[T]he district court may not use the penalty provisions provided in section 903.1(1) if a specific penalty is provided in another statute.”). Because section 903.1 is only applicable “if a specific penalty is not provided fo'd’ and section 321J.2 does provide for a specific penalty, section 903.1 is not applicable as to the fine portion of the sentence. Iowa Code § 903.1(1) (emphasis added). Furthermore, as we noted above, we read general and specific statutes together, but if an irreconcilable conflict exists between the general and specific statutes, then the specific statute prevails. Lutgen, 606 N.W.2d at 314; see Lee, 561 N.W.2d at 354-55 (<HOLDING>); Sandifer, 570 N.W.2d at 257 (same). In this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1001 controls over the limitations provision of the wrongful death statute (B) holding a specific sentencing statute controls over the general sentencing provisions of section 9031 (C) recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one (D) holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions (E) holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls
answer:
(B)


question:
interest” at issue here because “[pjursuant to the Treaty of 1866 and the Thirteenth Amendment, the Cherokee Nation has no authority to treat its Freedmen citizens as anything less than full equals.” Freedmen’s Opp’n to Crittenden’s Mot. Dismiss [Dkt. # 123] at 14. By raising this argument to eviscerate the Nation’s claim of prejudice, the Freedmen are asking the Court to reach the merits of their claims against the Nation. This the Court cannot do. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has squarely rejected a similar argum pelling claim of sovereign immunity” and finds that the Nation’s interests would be prejudiced if the case were to proceed in its absence. Republic of Philippines, 553 U.S. at 869, 128 S.Ct. 2180; see also Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 1001 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Davis, 192 F.3d at 960) (internal 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity extends to agencies and subdivisions of the tribe (B) recognizing a strong presumption favoring arbitrability (C) holding that there is a strong policy favoring dismissal for nonjoinder due to tribal sovereign immunity but that rule 19b factors must still be considered (D) holding that state did not have jurisdiction over tribe where tribe paid into workers compensation program but had not waived sovereign immunity (E) recognizing the strong policy favoring dismissal when a court cannot join a tribe because of sovereign immunity
answer:
(E)


question:
Third, the injury must not be due to the contributory negligence of plaintiff.” Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 247 Kan. 105, 795 P.2d 915, 933 (1990). It is the second element that fails here. “In medical malpractice cases, the doctrine only applies when a layman could find, as a matter of common knowledge, that the patient’s condition was such that would ordinarily not have occurred if due care had been exercised.” Butler ex rel. Commerce Bank, N.A. v. HCA Health Servs. of Kan., Inc., 27 Kan.App.2d 403, 6 P.3d 871, 887 (1999). As we have already stated, however, the “common knowledge” exception does not apply to the facts of this case. Expert testimony is required to prove Mrs. Esposito’s case, and none is available. For this reason, res ipsa loquitur is unavailable as well. See id. (<HOLDING>). In her appellate briefing, Mrs. Esposito also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding res ipsa loquitur inapplicable in case where both liability and causation had to be established by expert witnesses (B) holding that while a foundation for an inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be based on the testimony of an expert witness the experts testimony must establish that the occurrence indicates the probability of negligence (C) holding that permitting jury to find malpractice from blood draw without expert testimony by applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur instead of eliciting expert testimony as to the standard of care to be reversible error (D) holding the expert witnesses were protected by witness immunity to ensure expert objectivity (E) holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial
answer:

(A)