In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: fact that the oil traversed part of Transocean’s vessel before entering the Gulf of Mexico. We recognize that the aforementioned incidents involved blameless third parties, whereas here the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon might have contributed to the discharge. By all accounts, if the vessel’s blowout preventer had functioned properly, the oil would not have entered navigable waters in violation of the Clean Water Act. The defendants therefore reason that liability is properly imposed upon the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon. Yet it is well estab lished that this section of the Clean Water Act leaves no room for civil-penalty defendants to shift liability via allegations of third-party fault. See United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1314 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Early in the implementation of the Act’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys (B) holding exculpatory statements by a third party should have been admitted in the punishment phase notwithstanding the hearsay rule (C) holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding defendant liable for penalty notwithstanding fault of a third party

Answer: (E)


Question: the sufficiency of the evidence,” we “must affirm the verdict ‘if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the evidence that the elements of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1218, 117 S.Ct. 1709, 137 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997)). hi. A. The principal issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in admitting the text messages obtained from Govan’s cell phone. First, Govan argues that the district court erred by applying the good-faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Govan argues that for the good-faith 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required (B) holding that because evidence supporting search warrant was illegally obtained evidence recovered by executing warrant was fruit of the illegal search (C) holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not bar the use of evidence obtained by police officers acting in good faith and with reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant (D) holding that evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is not barred by the exclusionary rule (E) holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to evidence obtained by police officers acting in reasonable reliance on search warrant later held invalid

Answer: (D)


Question: an immigration judge’s order denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). To the extent we have jurisdiction, it is conferred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s factual determinations, Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812, 816 (9th Cir.2001), and review de novo due process claims, Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir.2000). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Echeverria-Ruiz’s application for withholding of removal because she failed to establish that the guerrillas targeted her because of her political opinion or any other statutorily protected ground. See Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1490-91 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the record does not compel a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioners who apply for withholding of removal must establish that a statutorily protected ground was a reason for their persecution (B) holding that dangers arising from police work do not support a claim of persecution on account of a protected ground (C) holding that random criminal acts bore no nexus to a protected ground (D) holding that harassment by the farc for refusing to cooperate with their demands for money did not establish a nexus to a statutorily protected ground (E) holding that persecution by militants for purpose of recruitment does not establish a nexus to a protected ground

Answer:
(E)