instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
that the people in the venire do not represent a fair and reasonable cross-section of the District of New Mexico. See United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 & n. 4 (1st Cir.1979)(stating that residents of counties, cities, and towns do not constitute a distinct, cognizable group for purposes of Sixth Amendment cross-section analysis); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 582 (10th Cir.1976)(“Mere geographical imbalance, absent evidence that an identifiable and cognizable segment of the community has been systemically excluded or underrepresented by reason of such imbalance, does not violate the statutory and constitutional requirement that the jury panel represent a ‘fair cross section’ of the community.”); United States v. Traficant, 209 F.Supp.2d 764, 780-81 (N.D.Ohio 2002)(<HOLDING>). Considering the foregoing, the Court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant did not prove that italianamericans are a cognizable group (B) holding that residents of a geograph ic area are not a distinct cognizable group and citing united states v test which made clear that a geographic area is not a distinct group for support (C) holding same and citing physicians multispecialty group (D) recognizing women as a distinct group (E) recognizing native americans as a distinct group
answer:
holding that the defendant did not prove that italianamericans are a cognizable group


question:
616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
answer:
holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language


question:
stressed, as to a claim involving a private right. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54-55, 109 S.Ct. at 2797. In the present case, as in Granfinanciera, the action to recover a preference seeks only legal relief, in the form of money damages. Further, Growers Packing has not filed a claim against the bankruptcy estate. In addition, the claim does not appear to involve a public right, but rather stems from an underlying breach of contract dispute involving a private right. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial on this claim, even though a proceeding to recover a preference is deemed “core” under the Bankruptcy Code. See also Friedman v. Gold Advice, Inc. (In re Fort Lauderdale Hotel Partners, Ltd.), 103 B.R. 335 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>). Cf. In re Sunco, Inc., 113 B.R. 764 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that declaratory judgment requiring party to pay a specific sum of money is properly characterized as a money judgment (B) holding that preferential transfer claim was not entitled to jury trial but without any discussion of nature of relief sought or whether a claim against the bankruptcy estate had been filed (C) holding preference claim legal in nature where relief sought was for a definite sum of money (D) holding that where plaintiff sought only equitable relief up through the end of trial and only added claim for legal relief posttrial defendant was entitled to demand jury once legal claim was asserted (E) holding that the eleventh amendment applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought
answer:

holding that declaratory judgment requiring party to pay a specific sum of money is properly characterized as a money judgment