In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir.1996)). We conclude that, although the district court erroneously determined that the principles of Daubert did not apply to the re-creation and Agent Constantino’s testimony, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence. Under Daubert, the district court conducts a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2796; see Fed.R.Evid. 702 . This “gate-keeping” obligation on the part of the district court applies to all types of expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Many factors may bear on this inquiry, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dauberts basic gatekeeping obligation  applies to all expert testimony (B) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (C) recognizing the basic principle of contract law that the obligation of good faith is an implied condition in every contract (D) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (E) holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions

Ex Output:
holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive


Ex Input:
of attorney-client privilege, nor could they. There was thus no error in admitting the bill. J. The Apportionment of Damages Defendants Ashton and Short contend that the Court erred in refusing to apportion damages among the Defendants. This issue as such was first raised in Defendants’ Amended Motion and would not need to be considered by the Court. Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., supra. Prior to the charge of the Court, the parties were advised of the charge and Ash-ton and Short vaguely objected because of the potential for joint and several liability; however they did not propose any points for charge with respect to the apportionment of damages. See Frankel v. Burke’s Excavating, Inc., 269 F.Supp. 1007 (E.D.Pa.1967), aff’d 397 F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. 1968) (<HOLDING>). In any event, under Section 433(b), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that alleged defects in special interrogatories could not be the basis for a new trial when counsel had not pointed out the alleged defect to the court (B) holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment (C) holding that the court had no jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a plea agreement (D) holding because plaintiff had not alleged defendant made a misrepresentation or that the alleged defect posed a safety risk the district court  properly dismissed plaintiffs  fraudulent concealment claim (E) holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect

Ex Output:
holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment


Ex Input:
Even construing the indemnity provision strictly in favor of TPS, see U.S.B. Acquisition Co. v. Stamm, 660 So.2d 1075, 1079 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995), we find no support whatsoever for TPS’s reading of “attorneys’ fees” as applying only to judgments obtained against SBA by third parties. Nor do we find any basis under Florida law for setting aside an express attorneys’ fee provision in a duly executed, arms-length commercial contract. The cases on which TPS relies are inapposite, as they address only attorneys’ fees incurred in establishing the right to common-law indemnity, not contractual indemnity. See, e.g., Bravo Elec. Co., Inc. v. Carter Elec. Co., 532 So.2d 698, 701 n. 3 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1988) (Cowat, J., dissenting); cf. Kuhns v. Koob, 408 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Avis Renh-A-Car 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees and court costs are recoverable under general hold harmless indemnity agreement (B) holding that insured may recover legal fees incurred in defending itself in a declaratory judgment action brought by insurer but not for those incurred in prosecuting cross claims and counterclaims against insurers (C) holding that indemnitee may recover attorneys fees incurred in defending indemnity agreement (D) holding theft act entitles defendant to recover reasonable and necessary attorneys fees in successfully defending theft act claim even if defendant does not recover any actual damages (E) holding that beneficiaries of an alleged will may recover reasonable expenses and attorneys fees when defending a will in good faith

Ex Output:

holding that attorneys fees and court costs are recoverable under general hold harmless indemnity agreement