In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: the future because she continues to own and operate Helping Hands and intends to remain in the childcare services profession. Docket No. 17 at ¶ 112. She posits no other basis for establishing her standing to seek prospective relief against the Secretary. Docket No. 26 at 6-9. Her status as the owner and operator of a child-care facility does not provide her with standing to seek the declaratory and injunctive relief that she seeks. Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 933-934 (8th Cir.2005) (recognizing that an attorney’s status as a member of the bar does not afford him or her standing to prospectively attack the implementation of the professional disciplinary procedures applicable to attorneys practicing in a particular jurisdiction); Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 400, n. 5 (3d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Burns does not allege that she has been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own ineffectiveness (B) holding that plaintiff must on his or her own initiative prove that the product reached him or her without substantial change (C) holding that for a legal malpractice claim to accrue a plaintiff need not know the precise extent of his or her damages or even have suffered all of the damages attributable to his or her attorneys negligence (D) holding that a prisoner cannot establish his or her standing to prospectively challenge the validity of a facilitys disciplinary procedures simply by referring to his or her status as an individual incarcerated in that facility (E) holding that an expert can comply with the timing requirement if an experts research even after his or her deposition revealed that the standard of care in his or her community was the same or similar to the standard of care in the community in which he or she is testifying when the injury occurred
[EX A]: holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own ineffectiveness

[EX Q]: acted outside their jurisdiction. In sum, none of Pasiewicz’s arguments show that Sandahl and Henning violated the Constitution when they arrested him. They and the other officers (Johnson in particular) certainly could have, and we think should have, proceeded with more caution. They get no commendation ribbons for the way they handled this case. Pasiewicz’s claim against the forest preserve district (even assuming it’s a suable entity) for failure to train or supervise its officers properly regarding the laws of search, seizure, and jurisdiction is a born loser. Because the officers did not violate Pasiewicz’s constitutional rights, he did not suffer constitutional injury. Accordingly, under City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed. 1412 (D.D.C.1983) (<HOLDING>), it is worth pointing out that Ross involved 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure (B) holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment (C) holding that whether an officers force was reasonable must be analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment (D) holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment (E) holding that the concept of reasonableness in the fourth amendment logically presupposes an exercise of lawful authority by a police officer
[EX A]: holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure

[EX Q]: waived his attorney-client privilege when his attorney failed to make timely objections to questions that it alleged sought privileged communications. This argument has no merit for two reasons. First, many of the questions Airdata asked did not seek confidential communications. Therefore, no objection was necessary to preserve the privilege. Second, Jenney’s current attorney did make timely objections to those questions actually seeking confidential communications. The fact that Jenney’s attorney had to interrupt him to make the objection is not sufficient to establish a waiver. Because the objections were made as soon as the confidential nature of the communication became apparent, Jenney did not waive the privilege. Cf. Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee, 837 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege (C) holding that disclosure orders adverse to the attorneyclient privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine (D) holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts (E) holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant
[EX A]:
holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege