In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5524, and thus a two-year statute of limitations applies to this case. See Sameric Corp. of Del, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998). The date when a Section 1983 action accrues, however, is a matter of federal law. Wallace v. Koto. 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). A Section 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599; see also Sanduteh v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, Giles asserts that the City violated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (B) holding that in an environmental contamination ease a cause of action accrues  when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of his or her cause of action and of the identity of a party or parties who may be responsible for the injury (C) holding that a federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the existence of and source of the injury not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong (D) holding that  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (E) holding that a  1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action 

Ex Output:
holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury


Ex Input:
defendant’s activities fall outside the FDCPA’s general provisions); Overton v. Foutty & Foutty, LLP, No. 1:07-cv0274-DFHTAB, 2007 WL 2413026, at *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 21, 2007) (recognizing majority position that party whose activities are limited to enforcement of security interests is not subject to all FDCPA requirements, and stating, ”[i]f a person invokes judicial remedies only to enforce the security interest in property, then the effort is not subject to the FDCPA (other than § 1692f(6) and § 1692i(a))[,] [b]ut if the person is also seeking additional relief, such as a personal judgment against the borrower, then the FDCPA applies.”) (collecting cases); Chomilo v. Shapiro, Nordmeyer & Zielke, LLP, Civ. No. 06-3103 (RHK/AJB), 2007 WL 2695795, at *6 (D.Minn. Sept. 12, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Acosta v. Campbell, No. 6:04CV761 ORL28DAB, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that law firm executing nonjudicial foreclosure pro ceeding was enforcing a security interest rather than collecting a debt and hence fell outside the ambit of the fdcpa except for the provisions of section 1692f6 (B) recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of  1692a6   a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to  1692f6 (C) holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt (D) holding that the defendants actions in filing judicial foreclosure proceeding against mortgagor amounted to debt collection activity under the fdcpa and distinguishing decisions involving pursuit of nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under a deed of trust from those in which a defendant has pursued judicial foreclosure proceedings which included seeking judgment on a note  by filing a lawsuit in state court (E) holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa

Ex Output:
recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of  1692a6   a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to  1692f6


Ex Input:
deferential standard. However, there is more. Liberty’s dealings with Plaintiff, particularly during the period before Plaintiff retained counsel, were inconsistent. Plaintiff was preliminarily approved for benefits, and then denied, first because of the pre-existing condition exclusion, then because of a failure to provide “objective medical” evidence of disability, and finally because of the pre-existing condition exclusion. Plaintiff correctly points out that the policy includes no requirement that Plaintiff present objective medical evidence to support her claim. See Canseco v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 93 F.3d 600, 608-9 (9th Cir.1996) (implied additional plan terms are disfavored); Duncan v. Continental Cas. Co., 1997 WL 88374, *4 (N.D.Cal.1997) (<HOLDING>). In deciding Plaintiffs appeal, Liberty relied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurance company could not deny a claim for longterm disability benefits based on a lack of objective medical evidence when the original policy did not refer to the objective medical evidence standard and never defined that term (B) holding that plan administrator could appropriately require objective medical evidence supporting disability claim where such a requirement is not contradicted by any provision of the administrators own policy (C) holding that it was wrong for an administrator to require a claimant suffering from fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome to submit objective medical evidence in support of her claim for benefits when the plan did not require such evidence (D) holding that plan administrator cannot exclude a claim for lack of objective medical evidence unless the objective medical evidence standard was made clear plain and conspicuous enough in the policy to negate layman sic plaintiffs objectively reasonable expectations of coverage  (E) holding that the corroborating evidence need not be medical evidence if the appellant explains why medical evidence is not available

Ex Output:

holding that an insurance company could not deny a claim for longterm disability benefits based on a lack of objective medical evidence when the original policy did not refer to the objective medical evidence standard and never defined that term