In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: manual labor, as well as engaging in such activities as dancing, fighting, and being jailed for public intoxication. We stated that: [an i]njury aggravated or extended in time by the employee’s neglect or disobedience of his physician’s instructions is not com-pensable as to the additional period.... The proposition that one may continue, or even increase, his disability by his willful and unreasonable conduct, and then claim compensation from his employer for his disability so caused, is untenable. Id. at 410, 244 N.W. at 541 (citing Honnold, Workmen’s Compensation, vol.l, § 137, pp. 521, 523). [¶ 11] Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized the rule in Detling, albeit applying their own states’ standards. See Appleby v. Belden Corp., 22 Ark.App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Hill, 318 A.2d 614, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new statute which required proof that asbestos exposure was substantial contributing factor to claimants medical condition could be applied to pending cases and did not abrogate claimants vested right because she was still able to pursue her cause of action and recover for injury caused by her husbands exposure to asbestos statute merely affected methods and procedure by which that action was recognized protected and enforced not the cause of action itself (B) holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute (C) holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions (D) holding a claimants injury report to a fellow employee did not satisfy the act because the claimants supervisor did not learn of the injury until six months later (E) holding that claimants actions in heavy houseeleaning and house painting in contravention of medical restrictions was so unreasonable as to bar compensation for aggravation of her back injury
[A]: holding that new statute which required proof that asbestos exposure was substantial contributing factor to claimants medical condition could be applied to pending cases and did not abrogate claimants vested right because she was still able to pursue her cause of action and recover for injury caused by her husbands exposure to asbestos statute merely affected methods and procedure by which that action was recognized protected and enforced not the cause of action itself


[Q]: with ever since his age of 13 and believes that this criminal record and his continued violation of the law does require a sentence at the top of the guideline range.” Id. at 8. I. A. Commerce Clause Challenge to Section 922(g)(1) Williams first challenges the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute as it applies to his possession of the Smith and Wesson revolver. Williams posits that because he possessed the gun solely within the State of Wisconsin, and because the record reveals no substantial connection between his possession of the gun and interstate commerce, Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to reach his possession of the gun. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Williams did not make this argument below, so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce (B) holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (C) holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that gunfree school zones act of 1990 which proscribed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school exceeded congressional authority under commerce clause because it reached conduct that did not substantially affect or have a meaningful connection with interstate commerce (E) holding that the gunfree school zones act exceeds congress power under the commerce clause
[A]: holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce


[Q]: case in Mitchell. < See id. As in Mitchell,: considering the deed as a whole, the parties clearly intended that the mineral rights in the land be reserved to the grantors. Id. at 274, 243 P.2d at 415; see also Gibson v. Pickett, 256 Ark. 1035, 512 S.W.2d 532, 537-88 (1974) (giving effect to a mineral reservation within a deed's habendum clause even though the deed failed to mention the reservation in its granting clause); Jones v. Am. Ass'n, 120 Ky. 413, 86 S.W. 1111, 1112 (1905) ("[Rleservations or exceptions are enforced, although contained in the habendum clause of the deed, as fully as if set out in the granting clause, when on the whole instrument the intention of the parties is sufficient ly expressed to be enforced."); Price v. Johnson, 78 N.M. 123, 428 P.2d 978, 980-81 (1967) (<HOLDING>). T23 Based on Mitchell and other authorities 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury (B) recognizing that a clause in an insurance policy was susceptible to a construction in favor of the insured but that such a construction would be unreasonable absurd and produce results never intended or contemplated by the parties (C) holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured (D) holding that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (E) recognizing that where a deed is susceptible to alternative construction the construction most favorable to the grantee will be adopted but still finding that in light of the modern rule the reservation in the habendum at issue was not void for repugnancy
[A]:
holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury