In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: the defendants conceded that, as a general rule, homogenous precinct analysis may be more reliable than ecological regression, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in accepting Mag-giotto's numbers and treating the election as arguably split-preference. 5 . The defendants also argue that, even if there is a statutory violation, Section 2 should not be enforced because it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, principles of federalism, and' the "congruence and proportionality” test established by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). We need not address this argument in light of our holding that Section 2 has not been violated. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district courts ruling may be upheld on an alternative ground supported by the record (B) holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record (C) holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses but can resolve such issues  upon evidence which is not materially in conflict (D) holding that to preserve an issue for appellate review the specific legal argument or ground upon which it is based must be presented to the trial court (E) recognizing that courts should not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of
[EX A]: holding that a district courts ruling may be upheld on an alternative ground supported by the record

[EX Q]: [u]nder [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(l)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, ... a federal habeas [corpus] court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Applying these standards to the present case, the court’s inquiry must be whether the uit Court of Appeals case for the proposition that the application of a statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does not violate the ex post facto clause because it is a protective measure and does not impose any new or different punishment. See United States v. O’Neal (“O’Neal”), 180 F.3d 115, 124-25 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (criticizing Davis). Additionally, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding north carolina felony firearms act did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was a measured public safety provision and its applicability to previously convicted felons was eminently reasonable (D) holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive (E) holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause
[EX A]: holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause

[EX Q]: class members did appeal. First they appealed the district court’s order to this court, and this court affirmed (over a dissent). See Gascho, 822 F.3d at 294. Then they sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, securing amicus support from the Attorneys General of seventeen states in the process. See Brief of the Attorneys General of Ala. & Ariz. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Blackman v. Gascho, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1065, 197 L.Ed,2d 176 (2017) (No. 16-364), 2016 WL 6213015. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Blackman, 137 S.Ct. 1065; Zik, 137 S.Ct. 1065. And on March 21, 2017, after the time to request a rehearing expired, the Supreme Court’s decision became final. Only then did the court’s order become definite. Until the order w (6th Cir. 1958) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 361 U.S. 398, 80 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a contempt order labeled by the district court as civil was actually a criminal contempt because the order was retroactive seeking to penalize previous violations and was punitive serving no compensatory purpose (B) holding evidence insufficient to show direct contempt and no basis for indirect contempt because of failure to meet procedural requirements (C) holding that an order which purports to become final upon the happening of an event specified in the order is not a final order and the happening of the event does not operate to render the order final (D) holding that an order under which the amount owed was contingent on a future event was not sufficiently definite and mandatory to serve as the basis for contempt proceedings (E) holding it was within the chancellors  discretion to find that though the husband was in contempt the contempt was not willful
[EX A]:
holding that a contempt order labeled by the district court as civil was actually a criminal contempt because the order was retroactive seeking to penalize previous violations and was punitive serving no compensatory purpose