In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: of judgment); Fed.R.CivJP. 62(a) (requiring prevailing parties to wait until ten days after the date on which a judgment is entered before they may execute on a judgment); Fed.R.App.P. 4 (requiring that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the date on which a judgment is entered). The Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 58 bolster this conclusion. Those notes state that the rule is designed to eliminate uncertainties about precisely when a court rendered a judgment. Such uncertainties had arisen in contexts analogous to the one in the instant case, where courts wrote opinions or memoranda “con 2d 940, 942 (5th Cir.1987) (discussing the Advisory Committee’s concern with eliminating uncertainties); Duffer v. American Home Assurance Co., 512 F.2d 793, 799 (5th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). See generally 11 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial courts judgment must comply with the statutory requirement that the judgment contain written findings of fact and conclusions of law (B) holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment (C) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (D) holding that the trial courts oral pronouncement must conform to the written judgment (E) holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: evidence showing that the defendants used the mark selectively or that they failed to use it pervasively in all their commercial dealings, even if these dealings were low in volume. Furthermore, though the Allard Court granted ownership rights to the defendants based only on oral testimony of various “solicitations” and insubstantial documentary evidence of prior use, the Court noted that there was also good evidence of widespread public recognition of the defendants’ use of the service mark. Evidence of public recognition is only necessary in cases requiring proof of secondary meaning, but such evidence may be probative of a party’s actual use of a mark in cases where secondary meaning is not required. See id.; see also Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 330 F.Supp. 428, 431 (M.D.Fla.1971) (<HOLDING>). Public recognition is probative of a party’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (B) holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff (C) holding that the plaintiff established a right to a slogan based on evidence of public recognition of its use by the plaintiff (D) holding that a plaintiff had established a primafacie failuretohire case notwithstanding evidence that the position sought by the plaintiff was ultimately filled with a person of the same race as the plaintiff (E) holding that mere use of a road will not make a road a public road even though such use is with the knowledge and consent of the landowner unless the use is accompanied by  recognition by public authority or by its maintainance sic

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: of the goods is dispelled by the time any sales are consummated.” Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir.1996). For example, in Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir.1975), the defendant produced “Grotrian-Steinweg” pianos and the plaintiff produced the world-renowned “Steinway” pianos. The court explained: The issue here is not the possibility that a purchaser would buy a Grotrian-Steinweg thinking it was actually a Steinway or that Grotrian had some connection with Steinway and Sons. The harm to Steinway, rather, is the likelihood that a consumer, hearing the “Grotrian-Steinweg” name and thinking it had some connection with “Steinway”, would consider it on that basis. The “Grotrian 3 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the underlying principles of nominative fair use (B) holding that the nominative fair use factors replace the traditional sleekcraft factors for likelihood of confusion where nominative fair use is at issue (C) recognizing nominative fair use as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement (D) holding that nominative fair use is an affirmative defense to a prima facie case of likelihood of confusion similar to the fair use defense (E) holding that nominative fair use involves questions of fact whose resolution is inappropriate on a motion to dismiss


Output: (A)