In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
This Court has reviewed these decisions and is in agreement with their reasoning and conclusions that the public policy exception does not give rise to a protected property interest in continued employment in this case. Likewise, the implied covenant is not the source of a protected property interest. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to at-will employment and affords an employee the right to be dealt with fairly and in good faith. See Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 191 P.3d 205, 213-14 (2008). Breach of the covenant may give rise to an action for wrongful termination but it does not convert at-will employment to term employment nor form the basis for a protected property interest. See Hollister v. Forsythe, 22 F.3d 950, 952-52 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate (B) recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract (C) holding an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was insufficient to create a property interest in continued employment under montanas statutory scheme for at will employment (D) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (E) recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages

Ex Output:
recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate


Ex Input:
without including a message of their own. “[T]here are commonsense differences between speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction and other varieties.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (quotations and citation omitted). Common sense dictates that the use of images of Plaintiff Bosley to sell video tapes, website memberships, or defendants’ other wares, at most, constitute commercial speech. The Supreme Court has noted that “advertising which ‘links a product to a cur rent public debate’ is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (<HOLDING>) “Thus, it seems that the Supreme Court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute reaching beyond purely commercial speech to chill fully protected speech can merit application of the overbreadth doctrine (B) holding that information pamphlets are properly characterized as commercial speech (C) holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech (D) recognizing that noncommercial speech is accorded greater protection under the first amendment than is commercial speech and striking down ordinance that imposed a greater restriction on political than on commercial billboards (E) recognizing that code is speech

Ex Output:
holding that statute reaching beyond purely commercial speech to chill fully protected speech can merit application of the overbreadth doctrine


Ex Input:
to arbitration the question of whether the successor has somehow assumed any of the obligations of the old bargaining agreement.”), with Stardyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 141, 145 n. 3 (3d Cir.1994) (stating that a "successor [is] not bound by its predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement”), NLRB v. Rockwood Energy and Mineral Corp., 942 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir.1991) ("[A] successor is not bound by the substantive terms of its predecessor's labor agreement.”), and United Steelworkers of Am. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 828 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d Cir.1987) ("[A] successor employer is not automatically re quired to adopt its predecessor’s collectively bargained agreements, see NLRB v. Burns.”). 4 . Compare Stotter Div. of Graduate Plastics Co. v. District 65, 991 F.2d 997, 1001 (2nd Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), and Boeing Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a successor corporation had a duty to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its predecessors cba because there was substantial continuity in the business enterprise (B) holding that the operation of a competitive business enterprise which was expected to provide a financial return that would be of benefit to the municipal corporation was proprietary (C) holding that the employer had a protectible interest in its good will where the employee had direct contact with its customers and much of the employers business was repeat business (D) holding  substantial continuity is untenable as a basis for successor liability under cercla (E) holding that in the context of erisa successor liability is not an independent cause of action but simply a theory for imposing liability based on a predecessors erisa violation

Ex Output:

holding that the operation of a competitive business enterprise which was expected to provide a financial return that would be of benefit to the municipal corporation was proprietary