instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
State, after expressing its clear and accurate understanding of the ... issue ..., deliberately steer[s] the District Court away from the question and towards the merits of [the] petition.” Wood v. Milyard, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (internal citation omitted). In Wood, the state had assured the district court that it was “not challenging, but d[id] not concede, the timeliness of the petition.” Id. at 1830. As in Wood, the state’s words and conduct cannot be described as an inadvertent mistake or forfeiture of the exhaustion defense, as was the case in Day, but instead they clearly evidence an express intention to waive the exhaustion requirement. As the First Circuit said, “[t]hat was game, set, and match.” Pike v. Guarino, 492 F.3d 61, 71-72 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits have also held this type of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal (B) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (C) holding that a waived issue ordinarily cannot be resurrected on appeal whereas a forfeited issue may be reviewed for plain error (D) holding statement that  petitioner is correct in her assertion that the claims presented  have been exhausted  was unmistakably clear and could not be resurrected on appeal alteration in original (E) holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court
answer:
holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal


question:
District Attorney’s Office to discriminate in the jury selection process. On April 26, 2007, the PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant relief and the instant appeal followed. Appellant raises the following claim: The lower court erred by limiting Appellant’s hearing solely to proof of a policy or culture of discrimination by the Philadelphia District Attorney and further erred by denying Appellant the opportunity to develop and prove discrimination in his case. Before we proceed with a review of the merits of this issue, we must ascertain whether the PCRA court was correct in its conclusion that Appellant timely filed his fifth PCRA petition for, if he did not, we are without jurisdiction to address his claim. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 941 A.2d 1263 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), any PCRA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed (B) holding that the time requirements of the statute are as much a part of the jurisdictional threshold as the mandate to file for a rehearing and that the time limits must be strictly construed and may not be waived by ferc or evaded by the courts (C) holding pcra time limits are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed (D) holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign (E) holding  2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed
answer:
holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed


question:
request with a statement that counsel has examined these issues and found them to be without merit. Specifically, Coleman asserts that: (1) the Government violated 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 2000), by presenting the testimony of witnesses who were presumably testifying in the hopes of obtaining a sentence reduction; (2) the district court erred at sentencing in converting the value of a half of a kilogram of cocaine powder into crack; and (3) his attorney provided ineffective assistance. Our review of these issues leads us to agree with counsel’s determination on issues (1) and (2). As to issue (3), a direct appeal is not the proper forum in this instance, because ineffective assistance is not clear on the face of the record. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). In light of the above determinations, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner did not procedurally default his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal (B) holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record (C) holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced (D) holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate (E) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
answer:

holding that petitioner did not procedurally default his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal