In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
commencing an action will be assumed to have waived its right to arbitration when its use of the judicial process is clearly inconsistent with seeking arbitration at a later date.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying this law, Judge Weinstein' concluded that choosing to file a claim in court rather than arbitrate constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate. Id. (citing Digitronics Inventioneering Corp. v. Jameson, 52 A.D.3d 1099, 860 N.Y.S.2d 303 (3d Dep’t 2008)). I agree with Judge Weinstein’s well-reasoned decision that, if New York law applies, the decision to litigate disputes over unpaid claims in state court precludes Defendants from now seeking to compel arbitration with respect to those same claims. But see Grand Med. Supply, 2012 WL 2577577, at *2 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, I would reach the same result even 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context fall under the faa (B) holding that the framework for determining any disputed issues concerning arbitration must be determined in the context of the faa (C) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (D) holding that faa was inapplicable where parties involved in action are not parties to an arbitration agreement under which issues are referable to arbitration (E) holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed

Ex Output:
holding that mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context fall under the faa


Ex Input:
(9th Cir.1954) (concluding that expert opinions did not support jury verdict, in part because "[o]pinion evidence is only as good as the facts upon which it is based” and record did not support opinions). Here, for the reasons stated, the record demonstrates that the officers' percep tion of an immediate threat — whether correct or not — was clearly reasonable and therefore that their initial use of deadly force was justified. 9 . The situation Appellants faced here — having to determine in a split-second whether a suspect is using his vehicle as a weapon — is analogous to the scenario of an officer forced to make a split-second decision as to whether to use deadly force against a suspect who he believes has a firearm. See, e.g., McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 215-17 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that use of deadly force was justified when suspect in vehicle repeatedly refused orders to raise his hands and the officer perceived that he was holding something (B) holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger (C) holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon (D) holding that use of deadly force was justified against a suspect when officer forced to make a splitsecond decision relied on his reasonable belief that another officer had seen a gun in the suspects hands even though the suspects hands were handcuffed in front of him and the defendant officer never saw a weapon (E) holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station

Ex Output:
holding that use of deadly force was justified when suspect in vehicle repeatedly refused orders to raise his hands and the officer perceived that he was holding something


Ex Input:
Cordova’s final policymaking authority concerning the termination or transfer of employees. For the aforesaid reasons, I conclude summary judgment should enter against Singer on the § 1981 and § 1983 claims against the School District. B. Liability of Cordova under § 1981. I have concluded the School District is not liable to Singer under § 1981. I consider Defendants’ additional argument concerning the § 1981 claim since it remains of relevance to Singer’s § 1981 claim against Cor-dova. Defendants argue § 1981 does not apply to religious discrimination and the claim should be dismissed insofar as it is based on such discrimination. See Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 n. 3 (10th Cir.1993); Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Singer cites the holding in Shaare Tefila 
 Holding statements: (A) holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination (B) holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex (C) holding that a violation of  1981 requires purposeful race discrimination (D) holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort (E) holding  1981 is directed to racial discrimination although not necessarily limited to the technical or restrictive meaning of race but does not apply to sex or religious discrimination

Ex Output:

holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination