In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: party to file a protest with the contracting agency or to file an action in a district court of the United States or the United States Claims Court.” Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). STANDING The plaintiffs legal standing to appeal the GAO’s decision lies in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.. Section 702 provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review” thereof. The court finds that the plaintiff, as an unsuccessful bidder, has standing to challenge the agency’s decision to award the contract to a third party. See Choctaw Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 761 F.2d 609, 615-16 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). FINDINGS OF FACT The majority of facts are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the losing bidder has standing to challenge the award of a government procurement contract (B) holding that if the government is obligated to rebid the contract and the unsuccessful bidder could compete for the contract once again and therefore has an economic interest and standing to challenge the award (C) holding that without a valid reason for cancelling the procurement  the government violated its duty to conduct a fair procurement (D) holding that the definition of procurement under the tucker act is broader than the definition of procurement contract in the fgcaa such that an agency can engage in a procurement process for the purposes of the tucker act even though it is using a cooperative agreement instead of a procurement contract to memorialize the parties agreement (E) holding that city had implied contract with bidder to treat bidder fairly
[A]: (A)


[Q]: do not find that MBI has waived this argument on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 49(B). 3 . We also note that MBI did not present any expert testimony, or any other evidence, that would suggest that Orlando's permanent injury to his knee was not caused by the accident. 4 . The prospective juror was struck from the jury pool prior to trial. 5 . MBI also argues that Orlando was only asking for $75,000 in damages. However, Orlando clearly argued that $75,000 was where he thought the jury should begin its discussion for damages, but he did not limit his damages to this amount. Tr. p. 223. 6 . MBI also argues that "[i]f there is no evidence to establish the loss of earning capacity, there can be no recovery on that issue.” Scott v. Nabours, 156 Ind.App. 317, 321, 296 N.E.2d 438, 441 (1973) (<HOLDING>). However, the final jury instructions gave a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the trial court did not err by withdrawing the issue of loss of earning capacity from the jury when there was no evidence in that regard (B) holding that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant was in the custody of the victim officer when he shot and killed the officer due to the undisputed evidence presented at trial including the defendants pretrial statement to police admitting that fact (C) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment (D) holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the defendant had to establish by evidence that outweighed the evidence against him that he lacked the capacity to form specific intent (E) holding that trial court did not err
[A]: (A)


[Q]: invocation, rather than the adequacy of the detective's subsequent advisement; Sessoms does not challenge the propriety of the warnings. Nonetheless, that the detectives actively undermined Sessoms’s understanding of his right only further indicates that their failure to provide him with counsel upon his initial request was deliberate, strategic, and unlawful. 6 . This reasoning runs directly afoul of Alvarez v. Gomez, 185 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir.1999), where we construed the suspect's statements ("[c]an I get an attorney right now, man?”, "[y]ou can have an attorney right now?”, and "[w]ell like right now you got one?”) to be unambiguous requests for counsel rather than clarifying questions regarding the right to counsel. Accord Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070-72 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Although Alvarez does not serve as "clearly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent (B) holding suspect must unambiguously request counsel before applying rule established in edwards that police questioning must cease once suspect requests counsel during interview (C) holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel (D) holding that request for counsel was not unequivocal when suspect wrote i need a lawyer on the blackboard among several of other statements while alone in the interview room then responded to officers clarifying questions that he did not want a lawyer (E) holding that the state courts conclusion that a suspect did not unambiguously request counsel was not unreasonable when during a postmiranda interview the suspect stated i think i would like to talk to a lawyer after which the police stopped questioning him left the room and did not resume questioning until the suspect explicitly said he did not want a lawyer and wanted to continue talking
[A]:
(E)