In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: position and whether the party would receive “an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.” Id. at 751, 121 S.Ct. 1808. The doctrine is designed to prevent “intentional self-contradiction” and is improperly applied “when the former position was the result of inadvertence or mistake.” Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prod., 228 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2000). Thus, the court does no disservice to the important purposes underlying holding parties to judicial admissions by acknowledging that a response to an injunctive action is an evolving position, and the facts and legal positions should be taken in view of the emerging facts as they become known to the litigating parties. See SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prod., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). It is also necessary to note that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous (B) holding that a transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit (C) holding that courts should not use doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent evolution of arguments but should permit preliminary constructions made without full development of the record or issues to remain open to revision (D) holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact (E) holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: further hold that the district court did not commit any procedural error or abuse its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (assuming sentencing decision is procedurally sound, appellate court considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant’s proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 1309, — L.Ed.2d - (2010); United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Having reviewed the record independently 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district court committed no significant procedural error despite departing downward from the guideline range for multiple reasons without explaining the weight it was attributing to each reason (B) recognizing that a party has not preserved a claim of procedural error if the party did not raise it in a manner sufficient to alert the district court to the specific error (C) holding that reviewing court first ensures that district court committed no significant procedural error then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence describing factors demonstrating procedural error (D) holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error (E) holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide an indication of what facts it relied on to make a significant variance from the advisory guidelines range
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: was no allegation that the losses put the plan in "at-risk status” under the statute, which is contested here, the court concluded that it was more important that the complaint did not allege that the plan sponsor "is financially compromised and thus unable to adequately fund the Plan so that it may meet its future obligations to pay all vested benefits.” Id. 14 . The Non-Transferee Class does cite cases regarding the per se ERISA violations listed in § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106. But these cases do not stand for the proposition that participants can sue for § 409 relief without showing particularized injury to themselves. Courts addressing § 406 claims still assess whether plaintiffs have constitutional standing. See, e.g., Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 102-03 (2d Cir.2011) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plan beneficiaries had consl rational standing to bring  406 claim for injunctive relief although not for disgorgement or restitution which require particularized injury where beneficiaries could not show individual harm because they received entire amount of promised benefits (B) holding that an individual plaintiff could not proceed under  1132a2 because it affords no remedies to individual beneficiaries (C) holding that beneficiaries of an estate lacked standing under rico to sue for an injury derivative of the estates injury (D) holding that the proceeds of a pension plan could be garnished after they had been paid out to the beneficiaries (E) holding that beneficiaries could not sue attorneys of the trust for legal malpractice because beneficiaries are not direct recipients of the attorneys services
[EX A]:
(A)