In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: a favorable decision, by which we mean that the “prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling” is not “too speculative.” In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1101 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The NMCGA contends that the provision for attorneys’ fees is an “egregious and illegal use of tax dollars.” NMCGA’s Response at 7. It is well established that a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge state and federal spending decisions. Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1399 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, Cl. 183, 184-85 (2006) (<HOLDING>). While NMCGA does not have standing to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties (B) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (C) holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment (D) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (E) holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim
[EX A]: holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties

[EX Q]: reasoning of these cases. Moreover, we believe that declaratory relief is also moot when the challenged acts have already “irretrievably occurred.” Accordingly, we apply the teachings of N.J. Tpk. Auth., that the claim for injunctive relief had become “academic by reason of these changed circumstances .... ” Id. at 27. Here, as in N.J. Tpk. Auth., the challenged action awarding the contracts has already occurred, and the work required by them has already been performed. There is no longer a “ ‘subject matter upon which the judgment of the court can operate’ to make a substantive determination on the merits.” Id. at 30 (quoting Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390, 20 S.Ct. 673, 44 L.Ed. 813 (1900)); see also Jersey Cent. Power and Light Co. v. State of N.J., 772 F.2d 35, 36 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). II. For Appellants to be prevailing parties 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot (B) holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc  1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action (C) holding that a challenge to a mining plan was moot where the action sought to be enjoined hadbeen completed (D) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (E) holding that injunctive claim was rendered meaningless since the state action sought to be enjoined has irretrievably occurred
[EX A]: holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot

[EX Q]: that may be considered in determining punishment are the subject of article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. Art. 37.07 (Vernon Supp.2004). This statute authorizes the admission of evidence in the punishment phase of trial as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing. Id. The circumstances of the offense are relevant to sentencing and may be considered by the trier of fact in determining the punishment to be assessed. Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). One circumstance of the offense that may be considered is the degree of injury to the victim so long as the fact finder may rationally attribute moral culpability to the accused for that injury. Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76, 78-79 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 896 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sexual assault coercion and harassment certainly may violate contemporary standards of decency and cause physical and psychological harm (B) holding in aggravated sexual assault case that testimony regarding psychological trauma suffered by child victim and its physical manifestations properly admitted (C) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable (D) recognizing trauma that new trial would likely bring to victim of child sexual assault (E) recognizing the purpose of missouris child victim witness protection law sec 491675 et seq as an attempt to minimize the emotional and psychological trauma to the alleged child victim
[EX A]:
holding that sexual assault coercion and harassment certainly may violate contemporary standards of decency and cause physical and psychological harm