instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
Court’s finding that Porter was not an independent trustee was not due to confusion regarding the proper role of trustees and agents in a corporate trust, as Sparkman contends. Rather, the Tax Court found that “she had no meaningful role” whatsoever. That Porter testified otherwise does not, in itself, establish that the Tax Court committed clear error. The Tax Court, describing Porter’s testimony as “vague, contrived, and non-credible,” plainly did not believe her, and “the Tax Court, like any other court, ‘may disregard uncontradicted testimony by a taxpayer where it finds that testimony lacking in credibility.’ ” Conti v. Comm’r, 39 F.3d 658, 664 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Lerch v. Comm’r, 877 F.2d 624, 631 (7th Cir.1994)); see also Demkowicz v. Comm’r, 551 F.2d 929, 931 (3d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Wood v. Comm’r, 338 F.2d 602, 605 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony (B) holding that where testimony is inherently improbable the court may choose to disregard it (C) holding that a court is not bound to accept testimony at face value even when it is uncontroverted if it is improbable unreasonable or questionable internal citation omitted (D) holding that a party is not bound by the testimony of a witness it calls (E) holding the tax court not bound to accept taxpayers uncontradicted testimony if it found the testimony to be improbable unreasonable or questionable
answer:
(E)


question:
guidelines; and (4) that the special conditions of Neffs supervised release were beyond the limits described in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied in all respects. I. BACKGROUND On April 29, 1992, Anthony Neff was arrested on charges of driving while intoxicated by Nassau County Police who found in his possession a receipt from a licensed firearms dealership. The receipt indicated that on April 23, 1992, he had purchased a 12 gauge shotgun. Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”) interviewed the owner of the firearms dealership and discovered that Neff, who was then on parole for a 1989 attempted burglary conviction, had not revealed that he was a convicted felon when he executed ATF form 4473, a necessar 3 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Although this language appears broad in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (B) holding that for purposes of apprendi the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence that may be imposed based solely on the jurys findings (C) holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines
answer:
(A)


question:
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2002) (failure to exhaust ineffective assistance claim does not create procedural bar in light of CPL § 440.10(3)(c)); Marchese v. Senkowski, No. 97 Civ.2055, 1999 WL 731011, at *6 n. 4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1999) (same)); accord Affser v. Murray, No. 04 CV 2715, 2008 WL 2909367, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2008) (“But those claims [of ineffective assistance of trial counsel] are not necessarily defaulted. Petitioner could raise them in yet another motion to vacate, and under § 440.10(3)(c) the state court could, in its discretion, review the claims on their merits despite petitioner’s failure to assert them in his previous motion to vacate.”); see also Reyes v. Phillips, 02 Civ. 7319, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19488, *14-18, 2005 WL 2173812, *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (<HOLDING>); but see Caicedo v. Garvin, No. 95 CV 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the lower court was not required to hold a hearing on a motion to transfer (B) holding that because section 440103b was discretionary the court was not prepared to hold that petitioner could not return to file a second section 44010 motion (C) holding premagwood that where a first  2255 motion was granted so movant could file a direct appeal the second  2255 motion was not a successive motion under aedpa (D) holding that substance of motion to extend time was a section 1301f motion rather than a section 1301g motion and that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the section 1301f motion (E) holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive  2255 motion where the movant failed to obtain authorization to file the motion from this court
answer:

(B)