TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: from disciplining him for absenteeism prior to May of 2007. Sánchez contends that AT & T’s offer of other positions was not reasonable because those positions offered lower compensation. He also contends that the offer of shift-swapping was not reasonable because AT & T did not provide the sched ules of other employees, as it had promised. However, we need not decide whether either of these accommodations was reasonable in isolation, because they were not offered in isolation — rather, they were offered as part of a series of attempts by AT & T to accommodate Sánchez. Many courts have found similar accommodations or combinations of accommodations to be reasonable under Title VII. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 77-78, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits (B) holding that employer reasonably accommodated seventh day adventist employee by inter alia agreeing to permit any shift exchanges that employee could arrange on his own (C) holding that employers must when appropriate accommodate a disabled employee by reassignment to a vacant position if employee cannot be accommodated in existing job (D) holding that a seniority and absenteeism system itself provided reasonable accommodation to a seventh day adventist employees religious needs (E) holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury

SOLUTION: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits

PROBLEM: by the parties. These considerations are consistent with the principle [sic] legislative purpose behind enactment of the Uniform Arbitration Act: to provide and encourage an expedited, efficient, relatively uncomplicated, alternative means of dispute resolution, with limited judicial intervention or participation, and without the primary expense of litigation— attorneys’ fees. Id. at 153-54, 423 S.E.2d at 750. The court concluded that “in arbitration proceedings, both the arbitrator or arbitration panel and the superior courts upon confirmation are limited to applying only [our AR.S. § 12-1510] in determining whether attorneys’ fees should be or were properly awarded.” Id. at 155, 423 S.E. at 751; see also Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis, Inc., 380 Mass. 91, 97, 401 N.E.2d 839, 843 (1980) (<HOLDING>). In our view, to permit a trial court to award 
 Holding statements: (A) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees (B) holding that attorneys fee statute does not overpower the policy expressed in our ars  121510 against the award of attorneys fees in arbitration proceedings (C) holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency (D) holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees (E) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees

SOLUTION: holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees

PROBLEM: two problems with this view. As Judge Lansing pointed out in Gillihan I, the first is that: The opening words of subsection (1) make it clear that it does not apply in cases that are subject to subsection (4), and the opening words of subsection (4) establish that it governs “[i]n actions for personal injury, where the amount of plaintiffs claim for damages does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,-000).” Gillihan I at 696, 99 P.3d at 1086. The two subsections do not govern together in personal injury actions, and to read them as though they do, as Gonzalez points out, is to edit the statutory language of I.C. § 12-120. The plurality’s interpretation is strained, and both parties in this case have agreed ural High School Dist. No. 1, 34 Idaho 222, 224, 200 P. 138, 140 (1921) (<HOLDING>); Beker Industries Inc. v. Georgetown Irr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding legislatures removal of language allowing director to approve change in nature of water use prior to bills passage can only be interpreted as intent that director not have that power (B) holding removal of word unanimous from bill prior to passage demonstrates legislative intent to change law from requiring board unanimity to segregate school districts to requiring only majority (C) recognizing that statutes requiring intent are not likely to be invalidated because of vagueness (D) holding change of word shall to may prior to bills passage indicates legislative intent to make purchases upon bids permissive rather than mandatory (E) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law

SOLUTION:
holding legislatures removal of language allowing director to approve change in nature of water use prior to bills passage can only be interpreted as intent that director not have that power