In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
arm’s-length transaction or from making as prompt or searching investigation as might otherwise be expected. In some situations there is no legal duty to use means available for discovering the fraud.... We are not prepared to say, however, that one in a relationship of trust and confidence is always justified as a matter of law in neglecting every precaution until something occurs to arouse his suspicions. Courseview, 312 S.W.2d at 205; Duthu v. Pena, 228 F.3d 409, 2000 WL 1056126, at *7-9 (5th Cir.2000) (unpublished) (collecting cases). This case presents precisely the sort of intentional concealment of ill-gotten profits (in the face of a duty to disclose such profits) that allows a plaintiff to benefit from equitable estoppel. See Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex.1983) (<HOLDING>);. Gibson v. Burkhart, 650 S.W.2d 185, 188-89 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a cause of action accrues once an injury has occurred and manifested itself (B) holding that because a physician lias a duty to disclose a negligent act or fact that an injury has occurred and physician failed to do so cause of action was deferred until victim learned of the right of action (C) recognizing negligent procurement to be a negligence cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action (E) recognizing the cause of action

Ex Output:
holding a cause of action accrues once an injury has occurred and manifested itself


Ex Input:
that the people in the venire do not represent a fair and reasonable cross-section of the District of New Mexico. See United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 & n. 4 (1st Cir.1979)(stating that residents of counties, cities, and towns do not constitute a distinct, cognizable group for purposes of Sixth Amendment cross-section analysis); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 582 (10th Cir.1976)(“Mere geographical imbalance, absent evidence that an identifiable and cognizable segment of the community has been systemically excluded or underrepresented by reason of such imbalance, does not violate the statutory and constitutional requirement that the jury panel represent a ‘fair cross section’ of the community.”); United States v. Traficant, 209 F.Supp.2d 764, 780-81 (N.D.Ohio 2002)(<HOLDING>). Considering the foregoing, the Court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant did not prove that italianamericans are a cognizable group (B) holding that residents of a geograph ic area are not a distinct cognizable group and citing united states v test which made clear that a geographic area is not a distinct group for support (C) holding same and citing physicians multispecialty group (D) recognizing women as a distinct group (E) recognizing native americans as a distinct group

Ex Output:
holding that the defendant did not prove that italianamericans are a cognizable group


Ex Input:
a criminal trial is sometimes treated as evidence tending to prove that the defendant committed th .Super. 293, 299-300, 391 A.2d 923 (App.Div.1978) (same) and Hyland v. Kehayas, 157 N.J.Super. 258, 263-265, 384 A.2d 902 (App.Div. 1978) (same). 2 Furthermore, the Appellate Division's opinion reversing the criminal conviction of Guastella’s co-defendant, Wasyluk, raised a serious question about the merits of the judgment against Guastella. Consequently, even if Guastella had survived long enough for a judgment of conviction to have been entered on the verdict against him, once Wasyluk’s judgment had been reversed, the trial court should not have accepted Guastella’s conviction as nce Co., 215 N.J.Super. 278, 282, 521 A.2d 912 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 152, 526 A.2d 211 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Kahlaid, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal (B) holding that arson committed by a dominant fiftypercent stockholder was attributable to the corporation (C) holding that in an arson case there must be other proof that the offense was committed to corroborate a confession by the defendant (D) holding that a corporation could be served by delivering a copy of the subpoena to an officer or managing or general agent of the corporation and that the agent could be an individual a partnership or another corporation (E) holding that arson committed by stockholder who was the principal managing agent precluded recovery by the corporation

Ex Output:

holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal