In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: or inferences ... based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed.R.Evid. 701(c). In other words, lay testimony must "result[] from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life” and not “from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.” Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee's note (internal quotation marks omitted). "Testimony based solely on a person’s special training or experience is properly classified as expert testimony, and therefore it is not admissible under Rule 701.” Compania Administradora v. Titan Intern’l, Inc., 533 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.2008). This includes testimony about an opinion reached during a parole officer’s investigation. See U.S. v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 216 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Cue’s testimony here does not ”result[] from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding officer could testify based on his training and experience that a defendants actions were consistent with selling cocaine (B) holding that a witness may testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue (C) holding that a law enforcement agent may not testify about an opinion reached during his investigation if the agents reasoning process depended in whole or in part on his specialized training and experience (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying an expert witness in the area of gang identity and investigation based on his training and experience (E) holding an agent from the drug enforcement agency could testify regarding the street value of cocaine where the agent was testifying regarding matters within his personal knowledge and experience as a narcotics officer

A: holding officer could testify based on his training and experience that a defendants actions were consistent with selling cocaine
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Q: 2009 SD 99, ¶33, 775 N.W.2d 221, 235 (2009) (“The community caretaker exception has been recognized only in the context of automobiles by the United States Supreme Court.” (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973))); Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151-52 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (describing Cady as recognizing “a community caretaking function of law enforcement as a reasonable exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement” and acknowledging “the existence of the community caretaking function in Texas”); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 363-65 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (upholding a “seizure” as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment based on the community caretaking doctrine); State v. Ford, 2010 VT 39, ¶ 11, 188 Vt. 17, 998 A.2d 684, 689 (2010) (<HOLDING>); Knight v. Commonwealth, 61 Va.App. 297, 734 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing emergency exception (B) recognizing exception (C) recognizing the community caretaking exception but holding it inapplicable to justify the police action at issue (D) recognizing that the community caretaking exception is distinct from the emergency aid or emergency assistance exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement (E) holding that community caretaker exception applied but citing and relying on cases discussing the emergency aid exception

A: recognizing emergency exception
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Q: entity ....” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2003). 2 . Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 24 (2003). 3 . In Count III of the State Complaint, Gomes named his employer, Ever Ready Trucking, Inc., and two of its principals as co-defendants, liable to Gomes for wrongful termination. That Count and those defendants were subsequently dismissed from the State Court action. 4 . Mass. General Laws ch. 152, § 24 acts as a waiver under the Worker's Compensation Act of any covered worker’s common law rights against his/her employer or co-workers for injuries sustained in furtherance of the employer's interests or in the course of employment, so-called compensable injuries. Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 422 Mass. 563, 664 N.E.2d 815 (1996); cf. O’Connell v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686, 690, 511 N.E.2d 349, 351 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Gomes never filed a claim under the Act 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a coworker commits an intentional tort not related to the interests of the employer  the policies behind the act would not be served by immunizing the coemployee (B) recognizing a tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence (C) holding intentional assault by coworker to be outside the course and scope of employment (D) holding that an employer who commits an intentional tort against his employee cannot claim that the act was accidental so that workers compensation is the employees exclusive remedy (E) holding that extending immunity to contractors under the act would not further the purpose behind the act

A:
recognizing a tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence
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