instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
this suit ... was a necessary incident to the attorney’s effort to establish [the defendants’ claim].” Id. Unlike Bosurgi, however, the plaintiffs allegations provide no “basis for an inference” that CARCO conferred authority on Steele to receive service. Cf. Santos v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 902 F.2d 1092,1094 (2d Cir.1990) (noting that service on defendant State Farm’s attorneys was improper where the plaintiff offered “no basis for an inference that State Farm had authorized its attorneys to accept service of process”). Accordingly, the court determines that the plaintiff has not shown that Steel was an agent of CARCO for service and that the plaintiffs service on CARCO was therefore deficient. United States v. Ziegler Bolt and Parts Co., Ill F.3d 878, 881 (Fed.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); J. and L. Parking Corp. Inc. v. United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even where an attorney exercises broad powers to represent a client in litigation these powers of representation alone do not create a specific authority to receive service (B) recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1 (C) recognizing separation of powers doctrine (D) holding that states grant of general corporate powers to hospital authorities does not include permission to use those powers anticompetitively (E) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client
answer:
recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1


question:
witness testifying against him was in custody). This right is not subject to the trial court’s discretion; however, the court may preclude repetitive or unduly harassing interrogation. Ramey,. 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68; Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475. Thus: “[A] defendant need not show interest or motive in that any promises of leniency have, in fact, been made to the witness by the State or that any expectations of special favor exist in the mind of the witness, before cross-examining a witness as to possible bias. Further, the defense is entitled to inquire into such promises or expectations whether they are based on fact or are simply imaginary.” Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68, citing Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475-76. See also People v. Tomes, 284 Ill. App. 3d 514, 520, 672 N.E.2d 289 (1996) (<HOLDING>). “To this end a defendant has the right to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required (B) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (C) holding that limitation on scope and breadth of crossexamination did not significantly curtail effectiveness of witness crossexamination because crossexamination was lengthy and extensive (D) holding it is well established that crossexamination to show that a witness might be vulnerable to pressure whether real or imagined from the state regarding a pending charge is a matter of right (E) holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination
answer:
recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required


question:
hand, is the loss of an incident of ownership—the right to use. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 470 F.Supp. 105, 108 (1979). A. Because United is seeking loss of use damages related to the time required to replace the property, we are presented with the issue of whether or not loss of use damages are recoverable in a case of total loss of property. While loss of use damages are normally awarded to a party deprived of a vehicle during the period of repair, traditionally, recovery could not be had for loss of a vehicle’s use at regardless of whether the plaintiff furnishes the funds to hire a substitute vehicle, he or she still suffers an injury while deprived of the vehicle and should be awarded damages for the inconvenience. Annot., Recovery For Loss (1964) (<HOLDING>); Chlopek v. Schmall, 224 Neb. 78, 396 N.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent (B) holding plaintiffs could not obtain compensation for both lost value and lost profit (C) holding that plaintiff whose truck was demolished in an accident could not recover lost profits unless he could show that he could not obtain a suitable substitute vehicle (D) holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment (E) holding that in an action to recover damages to a pulpwooder truck where there was testimony that pulpwood machinery could not be rented the jury was properly instructed as to lost profits
answer:

holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent