In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
rights by initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt without probable cause. After trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on these claims. The court held that it is not “clearly established” that malicious prosecution is a violation of constitutional rights, and. thus the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm. Section 1983 creates a cause of action to remedy certain deprivations of federal rights, but it is not a source of substantive rights. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (noting that “[section 1983] is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United State 16 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution (B) holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person (C) holding sbm is not a violation of the defendants fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures (D) holding that there is no fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution and suggesting that such a cause of action might lie under the fourth amendment (E) recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment

Ex Output:
holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution


Ex Input:
making mistakes. Thus, any prejudice against the Defendant was at best minimal and could have been turned to the Defendant’s advantage by his counsel. Even if any prejudice did result, it most certainly did not permeate the entire trial and impact the result as it appears only once in the transcript and never was mentioned later during the trial. See United States v. Beckett, 706 F.2d 519, 520 (5th Cir.1983) (“Prosecutorial misconduct, fortunately occurring only occasionally, mars any trial in which it occurs and gives grounds for appeal. But a conviction should not be set aside if the prosecutor’s conduct, however, wrongful, did not in fact contribute to the guilty verdict and was, therefore, legally harmless.”); see also United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1563-66 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). This ground for a new trial, therefore, is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify (B) holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error (C) holding that prosecutors allegedly improper closing arguments regarding burden of proof defendants failure to testify and other allegations did not case serious doubt upon the correctness of the jury verdict or the fairness of the trial (D) holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify (E) holding that any potential prejudice regarding burdenshifting is diminished by the prosecutors statement that the burden of proof is the governments and the courts explicit instructions regarding the burden of proof in the jury charge

Ex Output:
holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify


Ex Input:
Rainer’s Rule 37 petition on ground one, which was an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and thus that was the claim before the Arkansas Supreme Court on appeal. Although Rain-er acknowledges in his Reply on this appeal, his “ineffective assistance and due process claims are separate but intertwined,” Reply 1, Rainer faults the Arkansas Supreme Court for considering this intertwined argument as it was presented on appeal. Whether or not Rainer maintained a due process claim entirely independent of his ineffective assistance claim, Rainer did not rebut the presumption that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision adjudicated his due process claim on the merits, and the decision is therefore entitled to deference. See § 2254(d)-(e); Nash v. Russell, 807 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). We further hold that the district court, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the rock solid basis for such a deferential standard of review (B) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (C) holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard (D) recognizing that the interaction of general constitutional rules governing pretrial identification procedures and the deferential standard of habeas review affords significant discretion to the state court (E) recognizing the deferential aedpa standard noting this court will take only a limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions  quoting worthington v roper 631 f3d 487 495 8th cir 2011

Ex Output:

recognizing the rock solid basis for such a deferential standard of review