In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 142 (1st Cir.2006). Moreover, the broad scope of the Copyright Act definitions may be of limited assistance as the court applies a “common sense” analysis of whether a particular unfinished work may be covered by VARA. One of the co-sponsors of VARA observed that “we have gone to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the works of art that will be covered.... The definition is not synonymous with any other definition in the Copyright Act....” H.R.Rep. No. 101-514, at 11. In Lilley v. Stout, 384 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C.2005), the district judge noted that “VARA established a new and distinct genus of art: ‘works of visual art,’ which differs in many respects from the pre-existing categories in Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act.” Id. at 86 (<HOLDING>). While this overview leaves much that is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a set of photographs taken to be used as studies for a painting did not qualify for vara protection (B) holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence (C) holding negligence on the part of the attorney does not qualify for such relief (D) holding that use of a pretext phone call did not qualify for protection because the technique is generally known to the public (E) holding that purely reputational damage does not qualify for dueprocess protection
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: who are undeniably state actors, colluded with her in her actions. When all intendments are taken in the Plaintiffs’ favor, therefore, their allegations indicate both that Malac infringed their substantive due process rights and that she can be considered a state actor. Accordingly, Malac’s motion to dismiss is denied. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Barbara Malac’s motion to dismiss [Docket No. 47] is DENIED. The motion of Defendant Agent Cynthia Preston and Defendant Agent Nancy Gingras [Docket No. 50] to dismiss is DENIED with respect to Agent Preston, but GRANTED with respect to Agent Gingras. SO ORDERED. 1 . For the propriety of citing this unpublished Second Circuit opinion, see Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-905 (8th Cir.2000) (Arnold, J.) (<HOLDING>), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.2000) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unpublished opinions are of persuasive value at best and not precedential (B) holding that opinions accompanying the denial of certiorari cannot have the same effect as decisions on the merits (C) holding that even district court cases decided by panels of three have no precedential value (D) holding that unpublished opinions have precedential effect (E) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: of South Dakota and Gant, in his official capacity, are also properly before the court because they have answered the amended complaint. A review of the record reveals that Chris Nelson, in his personal capacity, Jeff Gromer, in his personal and official capacity, and Mike Milstead, in his personal capacity, have not been served, and they have not answered the complaint or amended complaint. 2 . During the evidentiary hearing, Smith appeared to drop the facial challenge to SDCL 23-7-7.1(8). The court will nonetheless briefly address the issue. 3 . In United States v. Stevens, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010), the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of a possible alternative standard with regard to a facial attack that might apply in "a typical case.” Id. at 1587 (<HOLDING>). During the evidentiary hearing, Smith 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a statute is certainly not so plainly unconstitutional that the failure of the trial court  to hold it so can be regarded as a plain error or a culpable neglect of judicial duty internal citation omitted (B) recognizing that a plaintiff may be able to establish that the statute is unconstitutional by showing that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep  citation omitted (C) holding that defendants bear the burden of showing that the challenged act was objectively reasonable citation omitted (D) holding that a statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous internal quotation marks and citation omitted (E) holding that a statute may be facially challenged only  by establishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid ie that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep 
[EX A]:
(B)