In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: District Court Executive is directed to: (a) File this Order; (b) ENTER JUDGMENT consistent with this Order; (c) Provide copies of this Order and the Judgment to counsel; and (d) CLOSE THIS FILE. 1 . These facts can be found in the parties' Statements of Material Facts, submitted with briefing on the pending Motions pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 56.1. The Court deems admitted any material fact asserted by a party and not rebutted by the opposing party. The parties agree on the facts recited in this section, except where otherwise noted. 2 . Several courts have held that Title III applies only to actual places, and that membership organizations are not subject to Title III. See, e.g., Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F.Supp. 217, 223 (E.D.Mo.1996) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hockey organization was not sufficiently linked to a place so not subject to ada (B) holding ada claim was discharged (C) holding that title ii of the ada is not applicable to the federal government (D) holding that national football league was not a place and therefore not subject to ada (E) holding that group organizing bike race was not subject to ada
[EX A]: holding ada claim was discharged

[EX Q]: prejudice. Common v. W. Suburban Hosp. Med. Ctr., 301 Ill.App.3d 939, 235 Ill.Dec. 158, 704 N.E.2d 731, 738-39 (1998) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We quoted Common and echoed its sentiment in Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 614 (7th Cir.2000), where we held that a district court’s failure to permit a plaintiff to amend his complaint in order to comply with section 2-622 was an abuse of discretion. Second, although the district court believed that plaintiffs’ counsel should have known to submit an affidavit and report in accordance with section 2-622, it made no specific finding that the failure to do so was in bad faith or an attempt to delay litigation. See Cookson v. Price, 393 Ill.App.3d 549, 333 Ill.Dec. 22, 914 N.E.2d 229, 232 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Further, it did not explain whether or in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a complaint that a report was not timely served was not subject to the twentyone day deadline to object to the sufficiency of a report under former section 74351a (B) holding no jurisdiction where appellant argued report was no report because it failed to mention appellant in any substantive way but trial court found report was merely deficient on element of causation as to appellant and granted extension (C) holding that it was error for the trial court to refuse to permit plaintiff to amend his complaint to include a new affidavit and report complying with section 2622 where there was no indication that the plaintiffs failure to file the report earlier in the litigation was in bad faith (D) holding that the trial courts failure to dismiss the action to quiet title was error because the plaintiff was not in possession of the land in question but the error was not fatal to the claim because the superior court could sua sponte amend the pleadings to include an action in ejectment (E) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel
[EX A]: holding that a complaint that a report was not timely served was not subject to the twentyone day deadline to object to the sufficiency of a report under former section 74351a

[EX Q]: he contends that he alleged that the Department stripped him of the “integral and material responsibilities of a detective.” According to Thompson, he no longer functions as a detective; he has been effectively demoted to the position of an assistant detective. This court has recognized that the mere “loss of some job responsibilities” does not constitute an adverse employment action. See Williams v. U.S. Dept, of Navy, 149 Fed.Appx. 264, 269-70 (5th Cir.2005); Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 532 n. 2 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Hous. Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 521 (5th Cir.2001) for the proposition that the “loss of some job duties” is not an ultimate employment decision); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511-12 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits similarly agree that “a mere 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer involving no reduction in pay and only a minor change in working conditions does not rise to the level of a material adverse employment action (B) holding that defendants decision to change the office schedule without allowing plaintiff leave to alter his personal schedule did not constitute an adverse action although plaintiff alleged that because of the schedule revisions he was forced to come in two hours early for his shift a mere inconvenience is not sufficiently adverse to sustain a prima facie case (C) recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually (D) holding a transfer or reassignment may rise to the level of an adverse employment condition if it is a significant change in working conditions (E) holding that a change in work schedule and request that an employee perform two additional tasks did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action
[EX A]:
holding that transfer involving no reduction in pay and only a minor change in working conditions does not rise to the level of a material adverse employment action