In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: and seeking to dismiss the four new claims asserted against them in the amended complaint. Also on January 8, 2010, Wells Fargo filed a supplemental motion to dismiss [26], addressing the new claims against it and renewing its request that all counts be dismissed. II. Discussion The Court must determine whether: (1) Giscombe eliminated the deficiencies of his previous shotgun pleading, and (2) if so, whether the complaint should be dismissed for the other reasons asserted by ABN, Citimortgage, and Wells Fargo in their motions to dismiss. A. Legal Standard The sufficiency of Giscombe’s amended complaint depends on whether it is a shotgun pleading; if so, it will fall short of the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The defining characteristic of a shotgun 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the liberal notice and simplified pleading principles underlying the federal rules of civil procedure (B) holding that under leatherman a federal court may not apply a pleading requirement more stringent than that provided for in the federal rules of civil procedure even in  1983 litigation (C) holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted (D) holding that the fact that federal rule of civil procedure 9b requires a heightened pleading standard for some claims but not for a section 1983 claim against a municipality means that the rules do not require a heightened pleading standard for such a claim (E) holding that a shotgun pleading is in no sense the short and plain statement of a claim required by rule 8 of the federal rules of civil procedure

A: (E)
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Q: The State, by contrast, argues that because the court’s summary denial of Pinholster’s claim was an adjudication on the merits, we apply the usual deference required by AEDPA. Under our precedent, the California Supreme Court’s denial of Pinholster’s petition for writ of habeas corpus “on the substantive ground that it is without merit,” Pinholster II, 525 F.3d at 754, constitutes a decision on the merits of his federal claim. See Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that “the California Supreme Court’s denial of a habeas petition without comment or citation constituted a decision on the merits of the federal claims” (citing Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc))); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has not addressed the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted (B) holding that we must first determine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal (C) holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred (D) recognizing that we construe postcard denials such as these to be decisions on the merits citing hunter 982 f2d at 348 (E) recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court

A: (D)
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Q: itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.” Id. at 249, 119 S.Ct. 1215. Huber argues that this language forbids the use of a prior conviction unless the conviction was the result of a jury verdict. This argument misapprehends the rationale behind the prior-conviction exception. Apprendi and Blakely set limits on judicial factfinding. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (“[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”) (em 80 (App.2005) (upholding sentencing enhancement based on prior misdemeanor conviction); Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447, 461 (Ind.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that some courts and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we cannot properly receive and consider evidence that was not presented to and considered by the trial court (B) holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion lacked specificity (C) holding that trial judge properly considered defendants misdemeanor convictions (D) holding when defendant waived objection to introduction of evidence but evidentiary hearing granted and judge considered claim defendants waiver was effectively waived by judge (E) holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith

A:
(C)
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