In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: without including a message of their own. “[T]here are commonsense differences between speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction and other varieties.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (quotations and citation omitted). Common sense dictates that the use of images of Plaintiff Bosley to sell video tapes, website memberships, or defendants’ other wares, at most, constitute commercial speech. The Supreme Court has noted that “advertising which ‘links a product to a cur rent public debate’ is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (<HOLDING>) “Thus, it seems that the Supreme Court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute reaching beyond purely commercial speech to chill fully protected speech can merit application of the overbreadth doctrine (B) holding that information pamphlets are properly characterized as commercial speech (C) holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech (D) recognizing that noncommercial speech is accorded greater protection under the first amendment than is commercial speech and striking down ordinance that imposed a greater restriction on political than on commercial billboards (E) recognizing that code is speech

A: holding that statute reaching beyond purely commercial speech to chill fully protected speech can merit application of the overbreadth doctrine
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Q: in cases decided under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Meyers, 616 F.3d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (characterizing the Segal standard as a "background rule under the old Bankruptcy Act, to which courts still refer in the era of the Bankruptcy Code”); Andrews, 80 F.3d at 910-11 (applying the Segal standard to determine whether post-petition payments under a pre-petition non-compete agreement were property of the debtor’s estate); Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1423 (concluding the Bankruptcy Code "follows Segal insofar as it includes after-acquired property 'sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past’ but eliminates the requirement that it not be entangled with the debtor’s ability to make a fresh start”). But see Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir.2006) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Although the parties frame the issue as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code (B) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (C) holding that the question of whether an interest is a claim for bankruptcy purposes is to be resolved by reference to the text history and purpose of the bankruptcy code (D) holding although congress has specifically approved of segals result segals sufficiently rooted test did not survive the enactment of the bankruptcy code footnote omitted (E) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate

A: holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code
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Q: language, petitioner urges us to entertain jurisdiction on two bases. First he argues that because he challenges the constitutionality of INA § 212(a)(2)(C), resolution of the constitutional claim is a necessary part of the jurisdictional inquiry. Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir.2000) (when determination of the merits is necessary to determine jurisdiction, “the jurisdictional question and the merits collapse into one”). We have held that “the terms of [IIRIRA section 309(c)(4)(G) ] preclude direct appellate review of constitutional issues” and that “[a] literal reading of IIRIRA section 309(c)(4)(G), precluding direct review of constitutional claims, is consistent with one of the central purposes of IIRIRA.” Alfaro-Reyes v. INS, 224 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, because the constitutionality of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because 28 usc  2241 habeas corpus relief is available to review constitutional claims congress preclusion of direct appeals in iirira see tion 309c4g does not offend the due process clause of the constitution (B) holding that iirira  309c4g repealed this courts jurisdiction over petitions for review filed by aliens who are deportable for having committed enumerated criminal offenses but did not repeal 28 usc  2241 (C) recognizing that after iirira habeas review remains available  to raise substantial constitutional questions (D) holding that because the farr act does not expressly mention habeas corpus or 28 usc  2241 it does not eliminate habeas jurisdiction (E) holding that jurisdictionstripping provisions of iirira did not preclude aliens convicted of aggravated felonies from pursuing habeas relief pursuant to 28 usc  2241

A:
holding that iirira  309c4g repealed this courts jurisdiction over petitions for review filed by aliens who are deportable for having committed enumerated criminal offenses but did not repeal 28 usc  2241
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