In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
any physician that described her as obese, much less gave an opinion that her weight imposed additional limitations upon her or exacerbated her other conditions. Therefore, even if Reynolds’ silence on the issue of obesity is not deemed to waive consideration of that issue, it does not appear that evidence existed regarding her obesity that the ALJ should have considered. The ALJ also did not err in assessing Reynolds’ credibility. An ALJ is in the best position to observe witnesses’ de meanor and to make an appropriate evaluation as to their credibility. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir.1997). Therefore, an ALJ’s credibility assessment will not be disturbed “absent compelling reason.” Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir.2001); Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (<HOLDING>). In making a credibility determination, Social 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference (B) holding that the courts conclusion that transfer was appropriate is to be accorded great deference (C) holding that the district courts credibility assessments are entitled to deference and reviewed for clear error (D) recognizing aljs credibility assessment is entitled to great weight and deference (E) holding that an unambiguous plea agreement is entitled to great evidentiary weight

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
the terms of the agreement as to the status of the donor in writing. After the mother and her partner ended their relationship, the sperm donor filed suit to adjudicate his parental rights. The court looked to the plain language of the Texas statute and determined that the sperm donor lacked standing to pursue the paternity action. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 160.702 (Vernon Supp.2006) (“A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”). The “do-it-yóurself” manner in which the artificial insemination was conducted does not alter the fact that B.O.C. was a sperm donor under section 742.14. The statute does not require that the artificial insemination be performed in a clinical setting to apply. Compare McIntyre v. Crouch, 98 Or.App. 462, 780 P.2d 239 (1989) (<HOLDING>), with C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc.2d 9, 639 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the donor nonpaternity statute did not explicitly reference physician involvement the statute applied even though the sperm was not provided to a physician (B) holding that writ was explicitly abolished by statute (C) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (D) holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case (E) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
that only Oxford moved for removal of the default in the December 4, 2007 motion, so the default is still in effect as to B&M. 9 This language falls within the recording requirements for “(ljiens under sections two and four ...” G.L.c. 254, §8. A lien under section one, however, incorporates the above-quoted language by requiring “a like statement. . .” Id. 10 See The American Heritage Dictionary College Edition at 307 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “conditioned” as “[p]repared for a specific action or process”). 11 bn Count II of the Lead case the Plaintiffs assert a claim for breach of contract under 29 U.S.C. §185 against B&M. Count II is not dependent on the existence of the Lien and therefore survives Oxford’s motion. See Driscoll v. Boston Edison Co., 25 Mass.App.Ct. 954, 955 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In May of 2007, however, the clerk entered a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state law controls whether issues decided in a prior state court action are entitled to preclusive effect and setting forth the elements of collateral estoppel under washington law (B) holding that an action under 29 usc  185 may be brought in a state court    but federal law controls over inconsistent state law internal citations omitted (C) holding that federal courts presiding over causes of action created by state law should apply state substantive law but federal procedural law (D) holding that state court with jurisdiction over  301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law (E) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law

Ex Output:

(B)