In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: plenary determination of jurisdiction over five landlocked canals); Weiszmann v. District Engineers, U.S. Army Corp, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir.1976) (same outcome as in Sexton Cove in action brought by landowner); U.S. v. St. Bernard Parish, 589 F.Supp. 617 (E.D.La.1984) (plenary trial determining jurisdictional issue); U.S. v. Lambert 589 F.Supp. 366 (M.D.Fla.1984) (plenary trial determining property was a wetland; proof by preponderance of evidence was measure of government’s burden of persuasion); U.S. v. Ciampitti, 583 F.Supp. 483 (D.N.J.1984) (in action for preliminary injunction, court made own determination that property was a wetland); U.S. v. City of Fort Pierre, 580 F.Supp. 1036 (D.S.D.1983) (plenary trial determining property was a wetland) rev'd, 747 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Parkview Corp. v. Department of Army Corp of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (B) holding property not a wetland (C) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (D) recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate (E) holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover
[A]: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property


[Q]: venture” (FAC ¶ 39) are similarly insufficient. See Cannon v. Douglas Elliman, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-7092, 2007 WL 4358456, at *4 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007) (“[Pjleading a joint venture does not trigger joint employer status because it is possible for joint ventures to separately employ different people .... ”); Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Techs., L.L.C., No. 08-CV-5430, 2009 WL 513496, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) (“Plaintiff joint employer allegations are insufficient because they are legal conclusions, not factual allegations, .... While plaintiff is not required to conclusively establish that defendants were her joint employers at the pleading stage, plaintiff must at least allege some facts in support of this legal conclusion.”) cf. Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 635-36 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs arguments that these Defendants 
 Holding statements: (A) holding under flsa 29 usc  216c (B) holding that the authorization under 29 usc  1132a3 extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary party in interest to a transaction barred by 29 usc  1106a (C) holding under 29 usc  216c (D) holding that the finding that entities constitute a single enterprise under 29 usc  203r is separate and distinct from whether an entity is an employer under 29 usc  203d (E) holding that the defendant is in the best position to prove and should bear the burden of establishing its entitlement to an exemption under 29 usc  1108 from 29 usc  1106b erisas prohibited transactions provision
[A]: holding under flsa 29 usc  216c


[Q]: have entered the plea.”); see also Hernandez, 124 So.3d at 763 (recognizing that a plea colloquy is not meaningless); Smith v. State, 21 So.3d 72, 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“It is well-settled that when a court determines whether an allegation is conclusively refuted by the record, it may rely on the sworn testimony the defendant has given in a plea colloquy. Any allegations that contradict those answers should not be entertained.”) (internal citation omitted). In other words, St. Louis’s admission under oath that he would enter the plea even if it subjected him to deportation demonstrates that he cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed. 1 . Because St. Louis admitted 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the context of a plea that the strickland prejudice prong requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial (B) holding that the defendant could not prove prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance because he has never claimed that but for counsels errors he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted upon going to trial (C) holding that where defendant seeks to withdraw his plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel the prejudice prong of the strickland test is satisfied by demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial alteration in original quoting hill v lockhart 474 us 52 58 106 sct 366 88 led2d 203 1985 (D) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (E) holding that in order to show prejudice defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different
[A]:
holding that the defendant could not prove prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance because he has never claimed that but for counsels errors he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted upon going to trial