In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: trial court’s judgment wherein the appellant was sentenced to a loss of liberty”).’ ““““Berry v. State, 630 So.2d 127, 130 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (footnote omitted). See also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 494, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (‘ “If the accused ... is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.... The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus.” ’) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); Weakley v. State, 721 So.2d 235, 236 (Ala.1998) (<HOLDING>).” “““Thus it is the lack of counsel, coupled 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (B) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (C) recognizing the right to counsel on appeal (D) holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel (E) holding that the right to counsel at arraignment is a jurisdictional matter

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: defendant’s activities fall outside the FDCPA’s general provisions); Overton v. Foutty & Foutty, LLP, No. 1:07-cv0274-DFHTAB, 2007 WL 2413026, at *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 21, 2007) (recognizing majority position that party whose activities are limited to enforcement of security interests is not subject to all FDCPA requirements, and stating, ”[i]f a person invokes judicial remedies only to enforce the security interest in property, then the effort is not subject to the FDCPA (other than § 1692f(6) and § 1692i(a))[,] [b]ut if the person is also seeking additional relief, such as a personal judgment against the borrower, then the FDCPA applies.”) (collecting cases); Chomilo v. Shapiro, Nordmeyer & Zielke, LLP, Civ. No. 06-3103 (RHK/AJB), 2007 WL 2695795, at *6 (D.Minn. Sept. 12, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Acosta v. Campbell, No. 6:04CV761 ORL28DAB, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that law firm executing nonjudicial foreclosure pro ceeding was enforcing a security interest rather than collecting a debt and hence fell outside the ambit of the fdcpa except for the provisions of section 1692f6 (B) recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of  1692a6   a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to  1692f6 (C) holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt (D) holding that the defendants actions in filing judicial foreclosure proceeding against mortgagor amounted to debt collection activity under the fdcpa and distinguishing decisions involving pursuit of nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under a deed of trust from those in which a defendant has pursued judicial foreclosure proceedings which included seeking judgment on a note  by filing a lawsuit in state court (E) holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: Nor did the district court err in failing to adopt as establishing a timely filing" the EEOC’s issuance of a right to sue letter. This form letter contains no statement that the EEOC found the plaintiffs’ charge timely nor any guarantee that a court action based on the charge would be found timely. Even if it had contained such a statement, the district court is not bound by EEOC determinations. See Williams v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1129 (6th Cir.1997) (finding “no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to exclude [an] EEOC letter” from evidence where there was “little if any basis for the district court to conclude that the report had any probative value”); see also EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 1996 WL 557800, at *12 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1996) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). The district court was not required to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court does not err as a matter of law by categorically refusing to admit eeoc cause determinations in either bench and sic jury trials (B) holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendants tendered instruction regarding the voluntariness of his confession (C) holding that the district court did not err by refusing to allow the defendant to absent himself from the trial at which his identification would be an integral issue (D) holding that trial court did not err (E) holding that trial court did not err by refusing to enforce mediated settlement agreement that contained an illegal provision


Output: (A)