In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
his first issue, Samba maintains that the immigration judge placed too little weight on the length of his sentence and the assistance he provided to federal agencies in determining that the offense was a particularly serious crime. We have previously determined that such a claim, “which amount[s] to an argument that the immigration judge ‘abused [his] discretion in weighing the multiple desiderata made relevant by the [BIA’s] definition of a particularly serious crime,’ do[es] not present questions of law and therefore [is] not reviewable under section 1252(a)(2)(D).” Solorzano-Moreno v. Mukasey, 296 Fed.Appx. 391, 394 (5th Cir.2008) (third alteration in original) (quoting Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir.2006)); see also Sung v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that the first issue challenges 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencing judge would commit a statutory error  if the judge failed to consider the applicable guidelines range  as well as the other factors listed in section 3553a (B) holding that the source of the federal funds was not a relevant factor in determining the number of violations (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that the argument that the immigration judge did not consider all of the relevant factors in determining that his children would not suffer the requisite hardship was not a question of law under  1252a2d (E) holding that the family court is required to consider all relevant factors in determining alimony

Ex Output:
holding that a sentencing judge would commit a statutory error  if the judge failed to consider the applicable guidelines range  as well as the other factors listed in section 3553a


Ex Input:
from disciplining him for absenteeism prior to May of 2007. Sánchez contends that AT & T’s offer of other positions was not reasonable because those positions offered lower compensation. He also contends that the offer of shift-swapping was not reasonable because AT & T did not provide the sched ules of other employees, as it had promised. However, we need not decide whether either of these accommodations was reasonable in isolation, because they were not offered in isolation — rather, they were offered as part of a series of attempts by AT & T to accommodate Sánchez. Many courts have found similar accommodations or combinations of accommodations to be reasonable under Title VII. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 77-78, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits (B) holding that employer reasonably accommodated seventh day adventist employee by inter alia agreeing to permit any shift exchanges that employee could arrange on his own (C) holding that employers must when appropriate accommodate a disabled employee by reassignment to a vacant position if employee cannot be accommodated in existing job (D) holding that a seniority and absenteeism system itself provided reasonable accommodation to a seventh day adventist employees religious needs (E) holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury

Ex Output:
holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits


Ex Input:
*3 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 16, 2005) (same). This court finds that transfers of Title VII actions are thus governed by the well-settled public and private factors relevant to section 1404(a) analysis. See Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d at 843. However, plaintiffs are correct that the special venue provision must influence the contours of section 1404(a) analysis. The factors expressly identified as a basis for venue under Title VII — the location of the discriminatory act or decision, the location of relevant employment records, and the location where a plaintiff would have worked but for the unlawful employment practice — should therefore be key factors in analyzing the “interests of justice” prong of section 1404(a) analysis. See In re Horseshoe Entertainment, 337 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In addition, a plaintiffs choice of forum is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the conduct complained of must be an unlawful employment practice under title vii (B) holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii (C) holding that location of relevant employment records should be given significance because it was expressly stated in the title vii venue provision (D) holding that plaintiffs claims under 42 usc  1981 are also governed by the special venue provision of title vii (E) recognizing title vii does not provide the exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims even if the title vii and section 1983 claim factually overlap

Ex Output:

holding that the conduct complained of must be an unlawful employment practice under title vii