In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: variance criteria rendering its decision arbitrary and capricious; and, 5) erred in “taking” appellants’ property without just compensation. The County supports appellants’ contentions except for the last one, with which it disagrees. The County also contends the Board erred in applying the wrong law. The individual appellees, who opposed the variance applications, support the Board’s decision. Discussion 1. Applicable Law A. State Law Before we address the merits of appellants’ contentions, we shall address the County’s contention that the Board applied inapplicable law. The County asserts that the Board incorrectly applied a presumption that the requested use did not conform to the purpose and intent of the Critical Area Program because, while that presumption was added 677 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In 2002, the General Assembly amended the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that the board did not have to consider whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the entire lot but rather whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the buffer (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that the question of whether it might have been error for the court to have denied leave to amend is not before us because plaintiffs never requested it (E) recognizing that a district attorney must have reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury and that the trial judge must have reasonable discretion in deciding whether the bounds of propriety have been exceeded

A: (B)
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Q: previously discussed Wilson’s subjective complaints, then identified specific discrepancies between those complaints and the medical evidence. He noted that though she claimed back pain since 2000, she continued working till November 2002, when her company merged and she lost her job. He also noted that the record established that she walked with a normal unassisted gait, in contrast with her complaints about her problems walking. Additionally, he indicated that the record showed she had never been hospitalized for any orthopedic reason and had never taken any potent pain medication, though she claimed severely debilitating pain. The ALJ’s credibility finding was fully explained and is supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Wilson also contends, given her inability to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the alj did not err in discounting a claimants reports of pain where they were not supported by the medical record (B) holding that alj may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimants pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimants pain (C) holding that alj properly evaluated credibility where he cited specific instances where claimants complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record (D) holding that the alj properly relied on medical evidence undermining claimants subjective assessment of limitations (E) holding that an alj is entitled to make a credibility determination regarding the claimants subjective complaints after specifically addressing these complaints and reviewing the medical evidence in the record

A: (C)
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Q: restrictive covenants in Borowski v Welch, 117 Mich App 712, 716-717; 324 NW2d 144 (1982): When interpreting a restrictive covenant, courts must give effect to the instrument as a whole where the intent of the parties is clearly ascertainable. Where the intent is clear from the whole document, there is no ambiguous restriction to interpret and the rules pertaining to the resolution of doubts in favor of the free use of property are therefore not applicable. In placing the proper construction on restrictions, if there can be said to be any doubt about their exact meaning, the courts must have in mind the subdivider’s intention and purpose. The restrictions must be construed in light of the general plan under which the restrict e City of Enid v Rogers, 874 P2d 818 (Okla App, 1994) (<HOLDING>); Mauldin v Panella, 17 P3d 837 (Colo App, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an amendment of restrictive covenants passed during the running of an automatic 10year extension period was not effective until the end of the 10year extension period (B) holding that a district court may not construe an untimely notice of appeal as a motion for extension of time (C) holding that amendments of the restrictive covenants passed during the initial 20year term would not take effect until the beginning of the automatic 10year extension period (D) holding that the bankruptcy court could not extend a deadline for filing a notice of appeal beyond the 20 day extension period allowed by the bankruptcy rules (E) holding that an amendment passed two years into a 10year automatic extension period was not effective until the 10year extension period expired and stating that to hold otherwise would render the extension provision meaningless

A:
(A)
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