In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: comprehensive plan nor its land use regulations prohibited the development of so-called non-jurisdictional wetlands. On August 17 or 18, 2006, Rish began to clear and fill his property. The neighbors, including Johnson, protested to the County, but to no avail. On August 21, 2006, these parties filed a complaint seeking in-junctive relief alleging that the clearing violated Gulf County’s comprehensive plan because it failed to maintain a 50-foot buffer for the wetlands. The neighbors alleged standing under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2006). The trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that Johnson and the other neighbors did not possess standing to seek relief under section 163.3215. This court reversed. Johnson v. Gulf County et al., 965 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Throughout this litigation, Rish proceeded to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (B) holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention (C) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court (D) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (E) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case
[EX A]: holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention

[EX Q]: the evidence of rape discussed above in Division 1, we conclude that the evidence at Martin’s trial was sufficient to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found as to both murders. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (2) (requiring a review of the statutory aggravating circumstances foundby the jury);UAP Rule IV (B) (2) (providing that, in all death penalty cases, this Court will determine whether the verdicts are supported by the evidence). See also Ring, 536 U. S. 584; Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. 20. Considering both the murders for which Martin has been sentenced to death and Martin as a defendant, we find that the death sentences imposed in his case were not disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Georgia law. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3); Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716-717 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited in the Appendix support this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts statutorily mandated proportionality review concerns whether a particular death sentence is excessive per se or is substantially out of line (B) holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable
[EX A]: holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial

[EX Q]: well-being, and failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that established the actions necessary to obtain the children’s return. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O) (West Supp. 2016). The jury also found that clear and convincing evidence showed that termination of S.J.’s and B.P.T.’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Both appellants’ court-appointed appellate attorneys have filed motions to withdraw and Anders briefs, in support of those motions, stating that after diligently reviewing the record, they believe that an appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776-77 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The briefs meet the requirements of Anders by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in parental termination proceedings the parent is entitled to effective assistance of counsel (B) recognizing that the statutory right to counsel in parental termination cases requires that the appointed counsel provide effective assistance (C) recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights (D) holding that anders procedures apply in parental termination cases (E) recognizing that where the juvenile code sets forth specific procedures governing termination actions those procedures apply to the exclusion of the rules of civil procedure
[EX A]:
holding that in parental termination proceedings the parent is entitled to effective assistance of counsel