In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: child abuse or neglect or who testifies or otherwise participates in a judicial proceeding arising from a report, petition, or investigation of alleged child abuse or neglect is immune from civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Id. § 261.106(a) (emphasis added). The dissent also correctly points out that “Immunity from liability and immunity from suit are two distinct principles.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). Finally, the dissent even recognizes that “[ijmmunity from liability is an affirmative defense, while immunity from suit deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex.2004); see also City of Hous. v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>); Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar (B) holding bjecause immunity from liability constitutes an affirmative defense not a jurisdictional bar only immunity from suit is properly before us today (C) recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit (D) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (E) holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional

A: (B)
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Q: with the same deficiency — the court should strike his pleading or, depending on the circumstances, dismiss his case and consider the imposition of monetary sanctions.”). We are not, however, convinced that the instant case was one with respect to which a dismissal with prejudice was appropriate under the circumstances. Moreover, a complaint — so long as it is minimally sufficient to put a defendant on notice of the claims against him — will not fail for mere surplusage. See United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir.2003) (“Surplusage can and should be ignored. Instead of insisting that the parties perfect their pleadings, a judge should bypass the dross and get on with the case.”); Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). We have recognized that “[pleading facts not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony (B) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (C) holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion (D) holding that it is an abuse of discretion  to dismiss a complaint merely because of the presence of superfluous matter (E) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds

A: (D)
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Q: it was not prejudicial. The same analysis applies to Reyes. D. The Alleged Defects Before the Grand Jury Do Not Warrant Dismissal of the Indictment Ortiz argues that the Indictment should be dismissed because it is “the product of testimony and evidence that was incorrect and wholly insufficient to produce a valid bill of charges.” (Ortiz Mem. at 17). Specifically, Ortiz takes issue with Special Agent Kolvek’s grand jury testimony in which she testified that Ortiz had been that the jury could not have cured the defect, because the defect was insufficient evidence of a conspiracy in 2004, 2005, and 2006. The Court cannot, however, dismiss a facially valid indictment based on insufficient evidence. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that grand jury witnesses may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on illegally seized evidence because any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best (B) holding that the government is not required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury (C) holding that an in dictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence (D) holding that facially valid indictment may not be challenged on the ground that it is based on inadequate evidence (E) recognizing that although no obstruction occurs when an individual lies to fbi agents who might or might not testify before a grand jury it may occur if the agents acted as an arm of the grand jury or indeed that the grand jury had even summoned the testimony of these particular agents

A:
(C)
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