In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: testified that Gollapudi admitted that he prepared and signed the W-2 forms and that they were false. Additionally, although Gollapudi presented evidence that the withholding amounts were true based on his “gross up” method, the District Court found this theory to be without merit based on the testimony of another IRS agent who demonstrated that no withholding was actually made. Moreover, it was established that the alleged withholding was never submitted to the IRS, but rather, was maintained in Gollapudi’s corporate checking account. Furthermore, Gollapudi’s reliance on Reynolds and Borman is misguided. Both of those cases involved § 7206(1) charges for filing the wrong tax form. Reynolds, 919 F.2d at 437 (“Using the wrong form does not violate § 7206(1).”); Borman, 992 F.2d at 126 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, in Reynolds, the theory in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that materiality is not an element of  1542 because any false statement is sufficient (B) holding that plaintiff failed to prove reasonable reliance on a false statement (C) holding that form 4790 is not an administrative rule but is merely incidental to the statute and regulations and therefore false statements on the form can lead to criminal prosecution (D) holding that filing of improper form is not enough to establish false statement for  72061 purposes (E) holding that a false schedule c is an integral part of a tax return and is incorporated therein by reference thus giving rise to liability under  72061
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: only as part of the presentations to a group, or whether appellees had any conversations with Hoagland, and, if so, the content of those conversations. Appellees merely stated they did not make misrepresentations to Hoagland in Texas regarding the business transaction made the basis of the captioned case. We conclude these statements are unsupported factual and legal conclusions. See Ennis, 164 S.W.3d at 703-04 (affirming trial court’s exclusion of nonresident’s statements that he did not have a substantial connection with Texas, plaintiffs’ claims did not result from and were not related to any of affiant’s activities in Texas, affiant did not have any continuing or systematic contacts with Texas, and affiant did not commit any tort in Texas); see also Wright, 137 S.W.3d at 250 n. 8 (<HOLDING>). Kassoffs affidavit is similarly concluso-ry. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute (B) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied (C) holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in houston texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute for plaintiffs claims of various forms of fraud and negligent misrepresentation (D) recognizing strong interest in protecting texas citizens where tort was committed in whole or in part in texas (E) holding nonresidents statement that he had committed no torts in texas was properly excluded as conclusory
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: is equal to the amount of the Trusts for Alison and Georgia.” However, this clause relates to Jae-quelin’s status as a beneficiary of the Trust and not as a third-party beneficiary of the property settlement agreement. Whether the Trust was in existence when the property settlement agreement was executed has no bearing on this analysis. Similar to the trust beneficiary in the above-noted fact pattern, Jacquelin is attempting to enforce a provision that requires funds to be contributed to a trust created for her benefit. Jaequelin’s status is not that of a third-party beneficiary, but that of a “beneficiary,” in the colloquial sense of the word, based on her status as the sole beneficiary of the Trust. Cf. Saks v. Damon Raike and Co., 7 Cal.App.4th 419, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 869, 877 (1992) (<HOLDING>). We also note that cmt. £ emphasizes the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nonsignatory settlor and trust beneficiaries could be compelled to arbitrate under account agreement between trustee and merrill lynch which contained an arbitration clause because agreement was the underlying basis for all the claims of the beneficiaries and there would have been no claims without the agreement (B) holding that the settlor could divest the beneficiaries of their vested interests only by completely revoking the trust because she had limited her ability to eliminate the beneficiaries interests by including language in the trust stating that the interests of the beneficiaries  shall continue until this trust is revoked or terminated internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that trust beneficiaries have no authority to maintain an action as third party beneficiaries of contracts between the trustee and agents of the trustee concerning the internal affairs of the trust (D) holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title (E) holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust
[EX A]:
(C)