In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: on behalf of’ MBC. The record also discloses that the contract makes no reference to MBC and was signed by Mullís as “Contractor.” The record further discloses that payments were made to Mullís, not MBC, and that the payments were deposited into Mullis’s personal account, not into MBC’s account in a separate bank. This evidence supports the trial court’s findings and its ultimate conclusion that Mullís was individually liable for any damages suffered by the Brennans. If Mullís wanted to act as agent for MBC and bind the corporation to the contract, he should have signed the contract in his corporate capacity. This would have had the effect of insulating him from liability. See Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), aff'd, 638 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind.1994) (<HOLDING>). Mullís, without any citation to authority, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (B) holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity (C) holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to determine whether the defendant intended to be bound in his personal andor corporate capacity where the agreement contained certain personal guarantees by the defendant but where the defendant signed the agreement only in a corporate capacity with no signature blocks provided for signing in a personally capacity (D) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (E) holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: omitted). Even if we were to do so, it would not change the outcome, since we see no error in the district court’s ruling regardless of whether the robbery and drug conspiracy were related. 3 . This course of action is permissible, though "we have repeatedly mentioned 'our strong preference for James proceedings.' ” United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1273 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir.1995)). 4 . The conspiracy supporting the introduction of the out-of-court statement need not be the same as the conspiracy charged in the indictment, so long as the statement was in furtherance of the uncharged conspiracy. United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 82 (2d. Cir.1999); see also United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 675 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 5 .Burnett testified at one point that he had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to instruct the jury on additional uncharged conspiracies is not reversible error so long as the jury is instructed that the government has the burden to prove the charged conspiracy (B) holding that although it is proper to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown it is error to instruct the jury on the mcdonnell douglas burden shifting scheme (C) holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error (D) holding failure to instruct jury on requirement of corroboration of informants testimony is error (E) holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: evidence in the record that union funds were used to create or facilitate distribution of these lists, Section 401(g) appears to be inapplicable on these facts. 21 . The majority of courts presented with this issue have similarly recognized the inflexibility of Section 402's mandate with respect to the statutory remedy for established violations of LMRDA. See Usery v. Dist. 22, United Mine Workers of America, 543 F.2d 744 (10th Cir.1976) (citing Wirtz and the “mandatoiy language” of Section 402 in reversing district court's decision not to order new elections following a finding that the defendant had violated Section 401); see also Marshall v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 486 F.Supp. 79, 85 (D.D.C.1980); Wirtz v. Local Union No. 1622, 285 F.Supp. 455, 456 (N.D.Cal.1968) (<HOLDING>); Brock v. Local 630, Int’l Brotherhood of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in light of the established violation of section 401 and the supreme courts decision in wirtz the court has no discretion as to whether or not to order new elections (B) holding that the section is unconstitutional as applied to private individuals in nonfederal elections in light of supreme court precedent (C) holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous (D) holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states (E) holding that the balancing test established by the united states supreme court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision
[EX A]:
(A)