In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir.2000). This decision strongly suggests that, in pertinent circumstances, conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment is, as Home Products suggests, “automatic.” However, it also suggests that the proper procedure is for the district court expressly to “convert” a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See id. (concluding that the district court had not followed the proper procedure, because it had not converted the motion). However, the decision also suggests that whether or not application of summary judgment standards is appropriate ultimately depends upon whether the parties were provided with adequate opportunity to address the merits of the motion according to summary judgment standards. See id. (<HOLDING>). A slightly earlier decision of the Eighth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them (B) holding that appellate review under summary judgment standards was appropriate where the district court despite its procedural error provided the parties with a full opportunity to present all pertinent materials outside the pleadings regarding the issue of response costs and the parties created a complete record on the issue (C) holding issue not properly before the appellate court where appellant fails to demonstrate where in the record an issue was raised in the district court (D) recognizing that the specific argument regarding an issue must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for appellate review (E) holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an issue not argued by the parties
holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them

stored on a BBS pending delivery). Because subsection (A) applies only to messages in “temporary, intermediate storage,” however, these courts have limited that subsection’s coverage to messages not yet delivered to their intended recipient. See DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 512; Fraser, 135 F.Supp.2d at 636. Defendants point to these cases and argue that messages remaining on an ISP’s server after delivery no longer fall within the Act’s coverage. But, even if such messages are not within the purview of subsection (A), they do fit comfortably within subsection (B). There is no dispute that messages remaining on NetGate’s server after delivery are stored “by an electronic communication service” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B). Cf. DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 511 (<HOLDING>). The only issue, then, is whether the messages 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca (B) holding that email messages stored on a computer but not yet read were in electronic storage (C) holding that an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of email communications is not vitiated by an understanding that the thirdparty service provider will maintain independent access to them noting that electronic communication is as important to fourth amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the past (D) holding that defendants communications sent into tennessee did not constitute purposeful availment because all were in response to communications initiated by the plaintiff (E) holding that subsection b did not apply because the communications at issue were not being stored by an electronic communication service
holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca

requirements for filing such a petition. See id. at 148. Although the state had “announced strict rules regarding the granting of second and subsequent ... petitions,” id., the Third Circuit did not consider whether Lovasz’s petition satisfied those rules before concluding that the petition was “properly filed.” In short, the court did not review the merits of the petition. This case is indistinguishable from Lo-vasz. Like Pennsylvania, Washington recognizes exceptions to its bar against successive petitions, see Wash. Rev.Code § 10.72.140, as well as exceptions to its one-year time limit for filing petitions for post-conviction review, see Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100. Dictado invoked one of those exceptions: he claimed his petition was based on newly discovered ev .D.Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>); Hughes v. Irvin, 967 F.Supp. 775, 778-79 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petition was properly filed even though the state court denied it as procedurally barred because the petition was delivered to and accepted by the state court (B) holding that seventh application for postconviction relief which was rejected because evidence on which it was based was not properly authenticated was properly filed (C) holding that second state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit was properly filed (D) holding that a second or subsequent state petition for postconviction relief filed according to the procedural rules of the state constitutes a properly filed application  without regard to the merits of the petition (E) holding that second state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as an abuse of the writ was properly filed

holding that petition was properly filed even though the state court denied it as procedurally barred because the petition was delivered to and accepted by the state court