In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: at 1459-60 (references to subsidiary as “division” of Kodak not equivalent to evidence that two companies operated as “single economic entity”); Akzona, 607 F.Supp. at 238 (language of annual report and employee testimony describing subsidiaries as divisions of parent not sufficient, even in conjunction with other evidence, to establish alter ego relationship). ... In a case presenting similar questions, the Ninth Circuit found no alter ego relationship was created where the parent company guaranteed loans for the subsidiary, reviewed and approved major decisions, placed several of its directors on the subsidiary’s board, and was closely involved in the subsidiary’s pricing decisions. Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir.1980).... Id. at 927-928 (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiffs proffer evidence that CNOFG 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (B) holding that to establish that subsidiary is agent of parent for jurisdictional purposes the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the parent notwithstanding the maintenance of corporate formalities (C) holding that because the corporate parent and subsidiary defendants before it observed all of the corporate formalities necessary to maintain corporate separateness notwithstanding the parents active involvement in the subsidiaries operations the evidence did not establish that the entities were alter egos of one another (D) holding constitutional due process requires that personal jurisdiction cannot be premised on corporate affiliation or stock ownership alone where corporate formalities are substantially observed and the parent does not exercise an usually high degree of control over the subsidiary (E) holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham

A: (C)
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Q: if the terms of the health care plan specifically exclude from coverage the cost of an appendectomy, then any injuries caused by the refusal to cover the appendectomy are properly attributed to the terms of the plan itself, not the managed care entity that applied those terms. 4 Respondents also argue that ERISA § 502(a) completely pre-empts a state cause of action only if the cause of action would be pre-empted under ERISA § 514(a); respondents then argue that their causes of action do not fall under the terms of § 514(a). But a state cause of action that provides an alternative remedy to those provided by the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism conflicts with Congress’ clear intent to make the ERISA mechanism exclusive. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S.133, 142 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 5 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan (B) recognizing cause of action (C) holding that ejven if there were no express preemption under erisa  514a of the cause of action in that case it would be preempted because it conflicted directly with an erisa cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa (E) recognizing the cause of action

A: (C)
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Q: law also can serve as a basis for revoking an arbitration contract, so long as it does not single out arbitration agreements for special treatment. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686-88, 116 S.Ct. 1652. Here, the only possible state statutory ground that Aspen cites for revoking the forum selection clause is N.C. Gen.Stat. § 22B-3, which provides in relevant part: “[A]ny provision in a contract entered into in North Carolina that requires the prosecution of any action or the arbitration of any dispute that arises from the contract to be instituted or heard in another state is against public policy and is void and unenforceable.” Aspen correctly concedes that the FAA preempts section 22B-3. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 4; Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683, 687, 116 S.Ct. 1652 (<HOLDING>); Newman ex rel. Wallace v. First Atl. Res. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that montana law cannot require special notice provisions in arbitration contracts (B) holding membership in new york stock exchange with concomitant obligation to be bound by arbitration provisions of its constitution and rules sufficient to constitute consent to arbitration of covered disputes whether or not arbitration provisions are specifically incorporated in contract (C) holding that proposed invalidation of the entire arbitration agreement even if the court were convinced that the plaintiff could not afford to pay for the arbitration proceedings was unnecessarily radical because the court could instead simply nullify the fee provisions of the arbitration agreement and force the defendant employer to bear the expense of arbitration (D) holding that montana law requiring all arbitration provisions to be typed in underlined capital letters was preempted because congress precluded states from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status (E) holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable

A:
(D)
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