In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: contractor’s work is accepted and end day it is accepted and that, while one “who assumes control over a dangerous condition left by a contractor may be liable,” it “does not necessarily mean that he who creates the danger should escape liability”). Third, the defect in Preston— the design and construction of the pool— was “a patent one as a matter of law.” 227 Cal.Rptr. 817, 720 P.2d at 485. Moreover, other jurisdictions have faced more factually analogous circumstances and have rejected arguments similar to Occidental’s. These cases have imposed liability on former plant owners whose negligent design work resulted in an injury to a third-party after the sale of the plant to a new owner. See Stone v. United Eng’g, a Div. of Wean, Inc., 197 W.Va. 347, 475 S.E.2d 439, 443-44 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Dorman v. Swift & Co., 162 Ariz. 228, 782 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor (B) holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner (C) holding that section 150002 was satisfied with respect to hotel owners claims against former owners architect for negligent design of foundation and drainage (D) holding former plant owner liable for its negligent design of conveyor belt (E) holding that in the context of construction litigation regarding the alleged negligence of design professionals a tort action for negligent misrepresentation alleging damages based purely on economic loss is not available to a party in privity of contract with a design professional

A: recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor
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Q: court’s description of the panel’s rationale as “one over which reasonable jurists may differ” can hardly be construed as a ringing endorsement of Bush v. Gore’s precedential value or its application to the issue of variations in voting technology. Shelley II, 344 F.3d at 918. At the very least, the Ninth Circuit’s unanimous decision in Shelley II divested the panel decision of whatever precedential value it otherwise would have had. Undeterred, the majority struggles to accord such value to Shelley I because the rationale adopted by the majority is virtually identical to the one provided by the Shelley I panel — namely, that the plaintiffs’ novel equal protection claims are controlled by Supreme Court precedents that mandate the equal weighting of votes. Compare Maj. Op. at 870-71 (<HOLDING>), with Shelley I, 344 F.3d at 894-95 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error (B) holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional (C) holding that the counties use of outdated technology results in the weighting of votes differently (D) holding that a plaintiff need only show that the results of a polygraph examination were a factor in the termination of employment and rejecting requirement that results be the sole factor for employees discharge (E) holding that in a statutory fee case the results obtained factor was already subsumed in the lodestar and that results multipliers should be awarded only in some cases of exceptional success

A: holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error
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Q: Cir.1997) (“The text of § 1986 requires the existence of a § 1985 conspiracy.”), which in turn requires an allegation of four elements: (1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons; (2) for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which causes injury to a person or property, or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. See Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir.1994). Defendants contend that Ms. Rhyce cannot allege the first element because, under the single entity doctrine, the individual defendants, as employees of the Fire District, cannot be considered individuals sep arate from the Fire District. See id. at 653 (<HOLDING>); Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal (B) holding that a school board and its employees constitute a single entity incapable of conspiring with itself for purposes of  19853 (C) holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school board president constituted the decision of the board (D) holding that a county ordinance imposing an impact fee on new residential construction to be used for new school facilities did not constitute an unauthorized delegation of power from the county to the school board because the fundamental policy decisions were made by the county and the discretion of the school board was sufficiently limited (E) holding that the supreme court of pennsylvania is a state entity for purposes of the eleventh amendment

A:
holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal
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