instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
it may not be a room that is “used for detentions other than detentions under this section.” Tex. Fam.Code. Ann. § 52.025(a); Baptist Vie Le, 993 S.W.2d at 653-54 (taking juvenile arrested for murder to homicide division of police department violated Family Code requirements for handling child taken into custody). If, after taking a juvenile into custody, authorities do not take him to either a juvenile processing office or a statutorily designated alternative for questioning, but rather obtain a statement from the juvenile in an area used to interview adult suspects, that statement is inadmissible. Baptist Vie Le, 993 S.W.2d at 654-56; In re U.G., 128 S.W.3d at 799; see Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 52.02(a); Salas v. State, 756 S.W.2d 832, 834-35 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); see also Roquemore, 60 S.W.3d at 868; Marsh, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statement inadmissible when instead of following section 5202 officers took juvenile first to police station where they obtained signed written statement from him before taking him to appropriate juvenile detention center (B) holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles (C) holding that defendant was arrested  when the police officer took physical custody of him by grabbing his arm and returned him to the hotel for detention there (D) holding witnesss formal signed written statement given at the police station one hour after the crime following structured police questioning was testimonial (E) holding that police executed an illegal arrest when they took a teenage suspect from his home and brought him in handcuffs to the police station for questioning
answer:
(A)


question:
to the federal district court, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, and moved for summary judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Defendants argued, among other things, that Preston lacked a property interest in his volunteer position with the VFD. Preston rejoined he was a “fire code official” under the Code and IFC and could not be fired except after a hearing and upon a showing of just cause. In December 2009, the district court granted defendants’ motion and dismissed Preston’s case with prejudice. Preston filed a motion to reconsider, see Fed. R.Civ.P. 59, which the district court denied. Preston appeals. II. DISCUSSION Before considering the merits of Preston’s appeal, we briefly examine the latent issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See Clark v. Baka, 593 F.3d 712, 714 (8th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>) (quoting McAdams v. McCord, 533 F.3d 924, 927 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing federal courts duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking (B) holding that even where subjectmatter jurisdiction may go unchallenged on appeal we have an obligation to inquire sua sponte into our jurisdiction over the matter (C) recognizing that even if neither party disputes this courts subject matter jurisdiction under 38 usc  7292 we are obligated to consider the issue sua sponte if there is reason to doubt that jurisdiction exists (D) holding that the court can raise res judicata sua sponte even on appeal (E) recognizing every federal appellate court has a special obligation to consider its own jurisdiction even if it must do so sua sponte
answer:
(E)


question:
States v. Cohen, 99 F.3d 69 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Hurst, 78 F.3d 482 (10th Cir.1996). Although Bellamy is correct to note that the Sentencing Commission expressed its intent that the Chapter 7 policy statements would only be the first step in a process that would ultimately lead to the promulgation of binding revocation guidelines, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(a) (2002), the Commission has not yet moved beyond this first step. Thus, absent any official action by the Commission, we are left with the policy statements and our law interpreting them. Applying our existing view of Chapter 7 to t f appeals have applied this reasoning in reaching the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 323 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Shaw, 180 F.3d 920, 922-23 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an error was not harmless when the district court chose the lowest end of the improper sentencing range after stating that even if the court isnt correct the court believes it is necessary to sentence at this very high range (B) holding that no notice is necessary when a court exceeds a range recommended by chapter 7 (C) holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7 (D) holding that only general rather than specific reasons must be stated when a court strays from the chapter 7 range (E) holding that the district court did not err by failing to specify a final adjusted sentencing range because we apply a presumption of reasonableness only to sentences falling within the initial sentencing range recommended under the guidelines and there is  no intrinsic need to specify an adjusted sentencing range to aid our appellate review
answer:

(B)