In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: proceeding”). Here, the only evidence that th .Crim.App.2000) (stating, in motion to suppress context, “[T]he judge may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony, even if that testimony is not controverted”). Appellant’s and Sanchez’s after-the-fact, out-of-court averrals about appellant’s ability to understand the proceedings and waivers he signed were untimely factual statements in appellant’s self-interest. Even though the State did not offer affidavits to controvert appellant’s and Sanchez’s affidavits, it was within the trial court’s discretion to disbelieve the assertions contained in those affidavits that appellant does not read or speak English. See Charles, 146 S.W.3d at 210; Shanklin, 190 S.W.3d at 167; see also Phuong Anh Thi Le, 300 S.W.3d at 327 (<HOLDING>). The trial court, and not this Court, is in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record (B) holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record (C) recognizing that the bia must defer to the factual findings of the ij unless they are clearly erroneous (D) holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts (E) holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record
[EX A]: holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record

[EX Q]: the harassment,” Murray, 57 F.3d at 250. As the Second Circuit has recognized, “not every response to a complaint should take the form of discharge;” even a mere written warning can be an appropriate response if it conveys the message that further harassment will not be tolerated. Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 63; see also Torres, 116 F.3d at 639 (“[R]esolution will vary from case to case.”). By far the best evidence that Metro-North’s response was effective is that plaintiff has not been sexually harassed by Chapman or any other Metro-North employee since meeting with Ms. Gormley-O’Connor, see Wahlstrom Dep. at 30, 248, nor has Chapman been accused of accosting any other employees since returning from his suspension, see Chapman Dep. at 64, 279; Sinigiani Dep. at 49; cf. Murray, 57 F.3d at 251 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, while factual issues exist as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination (B) holding that where the plaintiffs allegations concerning a hostile work environment consist of facts that occurred more than one year before the filing of the complaint such a claim is timebarred (C) holding that allegations of failure to remedy a hostile work environment provided no basis for relief where the evidence demonstrated that the harassment had ended by the time plaintiffs complaint was filed (D) holding that the allegations of plaintiffs coemployees of sexual harassment by manager were irrelevant to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim absent evidence that plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of the alleged harassment (E) holding that a charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of sex did not support a complaint for hostile environment sexual harassment
[EX A]: holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination

[EX Q]: is that the debtor should always be given the opportunity to repay his debts .... S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5787, 5880 (emphasis added). See also H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 380 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5963, 6336. With regard to this legislative history, at least one court has noted that: [T]he legislative committee's choice of 'absolute' in regard to Section 706(a) is infelicitous to say the least and has spawned an interpretation of the statute couched in hyperbolic terms very much at odds with the equitable considerations of eligibility, good faith and appropriateness which are inherent in a court's review of the facts and circumstances in any request brought on by motion. In re Marcakis, 254 B.R. 77, 79 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2000) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a debtors right to convert his or her chapter 7 case is not absolute (B) holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory (C) holding debtor had absolute right to convert under  706a (D) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (E) holding that a bankruptcy courts decision to convert or dismiss a chapter 11 case is a matter within its discretion
[EX A]:
holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory