In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
opens the door by suggesting the victim’s behavior is inconsistent with that of an abused child. As noted below, many other courts have allowed testimony that a child victim’s behavior or symptoms are “consistent with” child abuse trauma as rebuttal evidence. That is not what happened in this case. Just two years ago, in State v. Favoccia, the Supreme Court of Connecticut thor oughly reviewed the conflicting precedent and policy considerations in reaching the same conclusion we reach today. 306 Conn. 770, 51 A.3d 1002, 1012-22 (2012). The Favoccia court overturned its own precedent to hold that “the trial court abused its discretion in permitting [the expert] to testify about the complainant’s behaviors being consistent -with those generally characteristic 6, 671 N.E.2d 984, 985 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Chamberlain, 137 N.H. 414, 628 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (B) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (C) holding admission of expert testimony not erroneous where expert described typical traits and characteristics of sexually abused children (D) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case (E) holding that the testimony of an expert witness is admissible when the witness outlines the general characteristics of sexually abused children and then states that the victims symptoms are consistent with those characteristics

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
between 1983 and 1986. Stanley’s engineer, Hreha, was present throughout Powers’ deposition. The Court revisits its ruling upon further contemplation of the purpose of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. In a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, there is no distinction between the corporate representative and the corporation. See United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C.1996) (noting that in a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition “[t]he corporation appears vicariously through its designee”). “The Rule 30(b)(6) designee does not give his personal opinion. Rather, he presents the corpo ration’s ‘position’ on the topic.” Id. (citing cases). The designee testifies on behalf of the corporation and holds it accountable accordingly. See Starlight Int’l, Inc., v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 688 (D.Kan.1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Audiotext Communications Network, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed (B) holding that a corporation has a duty under rule 80b6 to provide someone who is knowledgeable in order to provide binding answers on behalf of the corporation (C) holding that an officer or director generally owes a fiduciary duty only to the corporation over which he exercises management authority and any breach of fiduciary duty claims arising out of injuries to the corporation in most cases may only be brought by the corporation itself or derivatively on its behalf (D) holding that individuals assumption of the role of president of the corporation and her authority to sign documents on behalf of the corporation demonstrate that she had the requisite control over the corporation for purposes of finding individual liability under section 5a (E) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
in her favor on her sleep apnea claim, and summary judgment was therefore appropriate on Counts 1 and 3 of plaintiffs first amended complaint. See Biester, 77 F.3d at 1266. D. Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in hiring Mullins and in entrusting a company truck to him because defendant knew or should have known that Mullins suffered from sleep apnea and was at an increased risk of falling asleep on the job while driving. As the district court noted, in order to survive summary judgment on either of these claims, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligent act of Mullins in falling asleep at the wheel. See DeMatteo v. Simon, 112 N.M. 112, 812 P.2d 361, 363 (Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Valdez v. Warner, 106 N.M. 305, 742 P.2d 517, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for a plaintiff to recover on claim of negligent hiring the negligent hiring of the employee must have been the proximate cause of the injury at issue (B) holding that claim that counsel was ineffective for allowing defendant to proceed while incompetent was facially insufficient where defendant did not allege he actually was incompetent to proceed to trial or insane at the time of his offense (C) holding that if plaintiffs could not establish that the particular agent orange causing injury to the plaintiff was manufactured by that defendant then the burden would shift to each defendant to establish that its product could not have caused the plaintiffs injury or alternatively that it should only be responsible for a proportion of the damage (D) holding that the statute of limitations begins to run under federal law when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims (E) holding that to recover on claim of negligent entrustment plaintiff must establish that 1 defendant entrusted its vehicle to the entrustee 2 defendant knew or should have known that the entrustee was an incompetent driver and 3 the entrustees incompetence caused the injury at issue

Ex Output:

(E)