TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: Inc., and therefore, had standing. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Appellants’ motion for a directed verdict on this ground. VII. Directed Verdict on Negligence Appellants contend the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on negligence. Specifically, they maintain the existence and scope of a duty are legal questions, and no evidence was presented pertaining to duties owed by Appellants to the Association. We find this issue is not preserved for our review. Although Appellants moved for a directed verdict at the close of all testimony, they did not move for a directed verdict on the specific basis that no evidence indicated they owed a duty to the Association. Creech v. S.C. Wildlife & Marine Res. Dep’t. 328 S.C. 24, 34, 491 S.E.2d 571, 576 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Rule 50(a), SCRCP (“A motion for a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue (B) holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue (C) holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review (D) holding the appellants failure to raise a particular issue in its directed verdict motion precludes appellate review of that issue (E) holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: uncon-scionability.” Woebse, 977 So.2d at 632 (citing Bland ex rel. Coker v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 927 So.2d 252, 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). Procedural uncon-scionability necessarily takes into account the manner in which the agreement was made. Id. At the hearing, the Estate argued that the facts are identical, really, to the Woebse case, in that it was a five-minute process where she was told to sign here and here, that she didn’t read the agreement. It wasn’t explained as an arbitration agreement to her. It was not explained that it was a voluntary process. Thus, the Estate sufficiently demonstrated that a disputed issue exists as to the making of the agreement so as to require an evidentiary hearing. See Linden v. Auto Trend, Inc., 923 So.2d 1281, 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court should have held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that an evidentiary hearing is necessary only if the party requesting the hearing raises a significant disputed factual issue (C) holding university grievance committee hearing was not an arbitration proceeding even though hearing had significant characteristics of arbitration without substantial evidence to support an arbitration agreement (D) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (E) recognizing that a party may demonstrate that a disputed issue exists as to the making of an arbitration agreement through arguments of counsel at a hearing

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: is demonstrated by the fact that Judge Marx had previously heard "half a dozen" cases in Box Elder County under color of authority as a temporary justice court judge without objection. See Menzies, 845 P.2d at 226 (requiring "public acquiescence" in acts of de facto official); Vance, 671 P.2d at 131 n. 5 (defining a de facto officer as one who acts "under such cireumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, Mr. Pett argues that he did not personally acquiesce to Judge Marx's appointment and instead "objected to [Judge] Marx's authority to act as a justice court judge in this case as soon as [Judge] Marx was appointed." Cf. Menzies, 845 P.2d at 228 (<HOLDING>); Vance, 671 P.2d at 1831 & n. 6 (noting that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court reporter was a de facto official where she assumed authority  under col or of a valid appointment and the public acquiesced in her authority (B) holding that the county attorney had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the county attorneys authority was first made on appeal (C) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection (D) holding that a court reporter had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the reporters qualifications was first made after the jury rendered its verdict (E) recognizing that a trial court has the authority before accepting a verdict and before discharging a jury to send the jury back to correct a mistake in its verdict but concluding that jury had been discharged because jury was allowed to return to court on following day and was allowed to deliberate same issue it previously had decided

SOLUTION:
(D)