In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: entered an order finding probable‘cause that the property was used to facilitate the commission of a felony. Although Flagg’s atto ation of a discovery order will constitute an abuse of discretion where the trial court fails to make express written findings of fact supporting the . conclusion that the failure to obey the court order demonstrated willful or deliberate disregard. Express findings are required to ensure that the trial judge has consciously determined that the failure was more than a mistake, neglect, or inadvertence, and to assist the reviewing court to the extent the record is susceptible to more than one interpretation. Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 495-96 (Fla.2004) (citing Tubero, 569 So.2d at 1273); cf. Ledo v. Seavie Resources, LLC, 149 So.Sd 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Flagg filed a motion to set 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (B) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact (C) holding that where the record plainly reflected ledos willful and deliberate disregard of the courts repeated orders to respond to interrogatory requests the trial courts failure to provide written findings of fact in its order striking ledos pleadings did not require reversal (D) holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment (E) holding that erroneous findings of fact not necessary to support the judgment of the court are not grounds for reversal

A: (C)
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Q: strengthen, not displace, any existing remedies employees may. have at law.” Id. It is clear from these excerpts that the STAA was not enacted to completely preempt state law remedies for retaliation against an employee who refuses to violate safety provisions. See Todd v. Frank’s Tong Service, Inc., 784 P.2d 47, 49-50 (Okla.1989) (noting that Congressional intent surrounding enactment of the STAA demonstrates that state law claims are not preempted); see also Parten v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 923 F.2d 580, 583 (8th Cir.1991) (conclude ing that the Minnesota public policy statute was not an obstacle to the STAA and that Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field of interstate motor carriers); Whitworth v. TNT Bestway Transp., Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1434, 1436 (E.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>); Dobberowsky v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc., 989 
 Holding statements: (A) holding texas exemption law was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause (B) holding that texas whistleblowers act was not preempted by the staa (C) holding a claim of a violation of the texas dtpa is preempted by the carmack amendment (D) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra (E) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied

A: (B)
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Q: a year to file Edwards’s fifty-one page federal habeas petition. War-droup accepted full-time employment and allegedly ceased working on Edwards’s case four months after he had timely filed Edwards’s habeas petition and the limitations period expired. See Mem. Op. at 9. Thus, to the extent that Wardroup “abandoned Edwards,” it was after Wardroup had shepherded Edwards’s federal habeas petition to court. Further, after he accepted this employment, Wardroup submitted a reply to Texas’s response to Edwards’s habeas submission, as well as a notice and full and timely briefing to us on his first COA request. It is difficult to see abandonment here, where Wardroup missed no deadlines and filed substantive arguments. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Stephens, 560 Fed.Appx. 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Edwards has not alleged any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence was sufficient where inter alia the victim woke up to find the defendant on top of her and engaged in sex (B) holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted (C) holding inter alia that appellant must use local cpiu where available (D) holding no abandonment where inter alia counsel never missed a filing deadline and filed a lengthy petition on petitioners behalf (E) holding that court did not prejudice defendant by limiting his counsel to preestablished limitations on inter alia the scope of crossexamination

A:
(D)
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