In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Center. v. National League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 974-75 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that Cedars-Sinai’s claims were not preempted because they were “predicated not on the [service benefits] plan” but on a separate contract between the carrier and the medical services provider). Plaintiffs claim that Plaintiff never received compensation for the emergency care of B.G. directly relates to the processing and administration of the enrollee’s covered claims which is governed by the Service Benefits Plan and the Contract between Blue Shield and OPM. Any obligation that Blue Shield could have to pay Plaintiff stems directly from the B.G.’s enrollment in the Service Benefit Plan and directly relates to the payment of B.G.’s benefits under the plan. See Hayes, 819 F.2d at 926 (<HOLDING>); Botsford, 314 F.3d at 396 (“Because the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tort claims arising out of the manner in which a benefit claim is handled are preempted by fehba (B) holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba (C) holding state law claims arising out of unions refusal to readmit union members preempted by  301 (D) holding that fehba does not completely preempt state law (E) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law

Ex Output:
holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba


Ex Input:
theory, once the police ... [make] a show of authority designed to produce a stop, the Fourth Amendment is implicated. If, in response to unjustified police actions, the suspect thereafter abandons the property he or she is carrying, then the property abandoned, be it illegal drugs, stolen goods, or other evidence, normally cannot be used against the accused. Clancy, The Supreme Court’s Search for a Definition of a Seizure: What is a “Seizure” of a Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment? 27 AvlCRIm. L.Rev. 619, 648 (1990). It is undisputed that Johnson denied ownership of the gun when Silvers showed it to him. Tr. at 53, 71. He can thus be fairly said to have exhibited the requisite intent to abandon the gun. See United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Canady, 615 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding due process is not violated when failure to receive notice is the result of attorneys decision to abandon law practice (B) holding that neither the language nor the legislative history of the fcpa indicates the congressional intent to create a private right of action (C) holding that a demal of ownership indicates intent to abandon (D) holding that shall generally indicates a mandatory intent unless a convincing argument to the contrary is made (E) holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent

Ex Output:
holding due process is not violated when failure to receive notice is the result of attorneys decision to abandon law practice


Ex Input:
rise to a duty of reasonable care to third parties. Shepard, 390 N.W.2d at 241. Thus, the physician’s special relationship to Eric’s mother gave rise to a duty that also extended to Eric, who was, “[a]s plaintiffs son and a member of her household,” a “foreseeable potential victim of [the physician’s] conduct.” Id. Similarly, in Welke, the court concluded that a duty existed for the benefit of a third party where a physician injected his patient with an unknown substance, let the patient drive his vehicle, and the patient subsequently killed another individual while driving. 375 N.W.2d at 406. The third party, the court held, was “an innocent driver within the scope of foreseeable risk” by virtue of the physician’s relationship with his patient. Id.; see also Duvall, 362 N.W.2d at 279 (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich.App. 291, 335 N.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a psychiatrist owed a duty to a person foreseeably injured by his patient (B) holding that psychiatrist has duty to third parties to exercise due care in treatment and release of committed patients (C) holding that when a psychiatrist determines or  should determine that a patient poses a serious threat of danger to a third party the psychiatrist has a duty of reasonable care to that party (D) holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave (E) holding that psychiatrist had duty to protect individuals endangered by his epileptic patient

Ex Output:

holding that a psychiatrist owed a duty to a person foreseeably injured by his patient