In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: to overcome this presumption by persuading the finder of fact, by a prepon derance of the evidence, that the income tax assessments are erroneous. See Sullivan v. United States, 618 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir.1980). Klimek has failed to offer any evidence that the tax assessments are incorrect in the amount the Government claims. He has never challenged in the Tax Court the Notices of Deficiency or the Certificates of Assessments and Payments for tax years 1980 through 1988 and 1990 through 1992. Nor has Klimek ever rebutted or even responded to the Government’s requests for admissions regarding tax years 1980 through 1988 and 1990 through 1992, except to return them with the words “Refused for Fraud” scrawled across them. See Lane v. United States, 328 F.2d 602, 603 (5th Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>). Given the fact that Klimek bears the burden 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial court may enter summary judgment for a nonmoving party under appropriate circumstances (B) holding that a trial court is not required to convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment where external evidence is submitted if the external evidence is irrelevant to the issue (C) holding that if no countervailing evidence is introduced the trial court is  justified in fact required to enter summary judgment for the government the amount of the taxes proved to be due (D) holding that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the court is reviewing administrative record for sufficiency of evidence (E) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion

Output: holding that a trial court may enter summary judgment for a nonmoving party under appropriate circumstances


Input: Consider Input: While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation — 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. § 1103) — which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (“An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal.”). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant’s release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc  1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest

Output: holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute


Input: Consider Input: 385 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966). 34 . Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). 35 . Id. at 741, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (emphasis added). 19 . See id. V 5. 20 . See Opp. Mem. at 3. 21 . Omegle.com Privacy Poli meno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). 50 . Probation Order at 2 ¶ U. 51 . Opp. Mem. at 11. 52 . United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (emphasis added). 53 . See Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57, 88 S.Ct. 507. 54 . Smith, 442 U.S. at 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577. 55 . Opp. Mem. at 11. 56 . Id. 57 . DiTomasso’s Reply Memorandum ("Rep. Mem.”), at 5. 58 . Opp. Mem. at 13. 59 . Id. at 12. 60 . Id. at 13. 61 . Id. at 12. 62 .See Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>), vacated en hanc on other grounds, 532 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of stored email (B) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (C) holding that defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in contents of locked safe stored in his apartment but owned by third party (D) holding that users have reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages despite advance warning that the messages could be read (E) holding appellant failed to show any expectation of privacy in files stored on the computer system in his office was one that society accepts as objectively reasonable


Output: holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells