In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the genus of goods or services for which it seeks protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2), (b)(2); 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.32(a)(6), 2.71(a); TMEP § 1402.01; see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2014) (“Parties that choose to recite services in their trademark application that exceed their actual services will be held to the broader scope of the application.”); Octocom Sys., 918 F.2d at 942 (“[R]egistrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application.... ”). The PTO will generally accept any identification of goods or services so long as it is “specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise.” TMEP § 1402.01; see also In re Omega SA 494 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity (B) holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action (C) holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant (D) holding that it is within the discretion of the pto to require that ones goods be identified with particularity in a trademark application (E) holding that a rule 10b5 claim must be stated with particularity
[A]: (D)


[Q]: The appellant’s first point relied on is also deficient in that it does not comply with Rule 84.04(d)(5) inasmuch as the authority cited by the appellant in support of the claim raised relates only to our standard of review and the manner in which we are to interpret a statute. Rule 84.04(d)(5) provides: In support of each “Point Relied On,” and immediately following the statement of the Point, the appellant or relator shall cite all authorities upon which the argument rests. If more than three authorities are cited, the three authorities on which the appellant, relator, or petitioner principally relies shall be cited first. The appellant does not, as required by the rule, provide any authority for his claimed interpretation of the implicated statutes. See Coleman, 969 S.W.2d at 274 (<HOLDING>). If no such citations exist because this is a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review (B) holding the trial court was without authority to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the amount of the judgment required the appellant to file an application for discretionary review (C) holding that an appellate court may not review errors that have not been assigned by a party or a point of error (D) holding that a claim is waived on appeal when not supported by citation to relevant authority (E) holding that an appellate court is not required to review an appellants point relied on which appears without citation of applicable or relevant authority
[A]: (E)


[Q]: 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the “need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial”). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee’s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as “the formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]” and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him. Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense (B) holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest (C) holding that the searchincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to an officers search of the defendants vehicle where the officer while subsequently arresting the defendant for druglaw violations based upon that search never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search but rather only issued a citation and reasoning that the rules underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all respectively in the context of a traffic citation (D) holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown (E) holding that evidence obtained from a search made subsequent to an illegal stop was admissible when before the search the police officer discovered that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant and the defendant was thereupon arrested pursuant to that warrant
[A]:
(C)