In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
this Opinion. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Trustee’s Objection to the Debtor’s Claim of exemption in her Toledo, Ohio house, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), be, and is hereby, SUSTAINED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Trustee’s Objection to the Debtor’s claim of exemption in past due rents, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5), be, and is hereby, DISMISSED without prejudice. 1 . As a resident of Michigan, the Debtor along with her bankruptcy petition also filed a contemporaneous motion for a change of venue to the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, which this Court granted. 2 . Pursuant to § 522(b), a debtor's right to claim an exemption in bankruptcy is determined by the state in which the debtor is domiciled. See In re Vaughan, 188 B.R. 234, 237 (Bankr.E.D.K.y.1995) (<HOLDING>). Some states like Michigan permit their 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that the terms residence and domicile are not the same thing but that a debtor may only claim an exemption in property where he is domiciled (C) holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a selfsettled revocable trust even though the settlor and the beneficiary as well as the bankruptcy debtor were the same person (D) holding that the objector must not only show that the facts do not support the exemption but must also prove that the debtor knowingly deceived the trustee and the creditors at the time the exemption was made (E) holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other

Ex Output:
holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate


Ex Input:
of the debtor. This distinction appears immaterial under the language of sec. 409.402(7), Stats. 7 In other contexts, a security interest properly perfected at one time may later become unperfected through creditor inaction. See, e.g. sec. 409.103(l)(d)l, (2)(b), (3)(e), Stats, (four month grace periods preserving perfection in collateral removed from jurisdic tion); sec. 409.403(2) (lapse of financing statements after 5 years unless continued). 8 Interestingly, the Ansley court held that a filing under "the name Ansley Farms instead of the debtor's true name — Emory Ansley — is seriously misleading, making [the]. . . security interest unperfected.. . ." Id,., 467 F.Supp. at 55. Other cases reaching similar results are In Re Wishart, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1296 (Bankr.W.D. Mich. 1972) (<HOLDING>); In Re Brawn, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 565 (D.C. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient (B) holding a filing under mccauleys reprographics and mapping insufficient to perfect a security interest in the assets of the debtor corporation (C) holding that the reservation of a claim need not name a defendant but only identify the type of claim the debtor seeks to retain (D) holding a filing under wishart equipment co insufficient to identify the debtor horace wishart (E) holding a filing under john and mayella lintz insufficient to identify the debtor corporation

Ex Output:
holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient


Ex Input:
the above-listed cases and two additional cases not listed in his motion to correct illegal sentences, case numbers 89-4346 and 89-12881. Pursuant to the negotiated plea, Merrell was sentenced to forty-year sentences on each first degree felony punishable by life imprisonment and each life felony, fifteen years on each second degree felony, and five years on the sole third degree felony. The sentence imposed on each count and each case was ordered to run concurrent with the other sentences imposed. Merrell claims that the habitual offender designations imposed for the life felonies were error. While we agree that in 1990, when the sentences were imposed in the instant cases, a habitual offender sentence was not authorized for life felonies, see Lamont v. State, 610 So.2d 435 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>), the forty-year sentences imposed in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony (B) holding that a defendant sentenced as an habitual offender who later successfully challenges one of his predicate offenses may have his habitual offender status and sentencing enhancement vacated through postconviction relief or a motion to correct erroneous sentence (C) holding that the habitual offender act as it existed in 1989 did not apply to those who were convicted of life felonies (D) holding that defendants habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing defendant to present evidence of his subjective belief regarding his status as habitual offender because his belief was irrelevant to offense of driving as habitual offender

Ex Output:

holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony