In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: any evidence that Qualex’s action had any reason to perceive plaintiff as being disabled, any claim that the withdrawal of the offer of employment was motivated by such a perception is purely speculative. As such, plaintiffs claim that defendant Qualex violated the ADA by withdrawing its offer of employment fails as a matter of law. See Hoffman at 1 (“Unsupported speculation does not satisfy a party’s burden to produce some evidence in resisting a summary judgment motion.”). B. The Drug-free Workplace policy. Plaintiffs second claim is that the “Drug-free Workplace” policy maintained by defendant Qualex is a blanket exclusionary policy, leaving no allowance for the legal use of controlled substances. See Rowles v. Automated Production Systems, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 424, 430 (M.D.Pa.2000) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff further argues that defendant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers drug policy violated the ada to the extent that it prohibits the use of all legally prescribed controlled substances without a determination that such prohibition is jobrelated and consistent with business necessity (B) holding highest and best use is to be considered to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value (C) holding that the 60day rule under the wisconsin controlled substances act is mandatory and that failure to set the hearing within that period deprived the trial court of jurisdiction (D) holding that the ada exceeds the  5 power  at least to the extent it extends beyond remedies for irrational discrimination (E) recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: until after the interview ended. Defendants therefore contend that we should ignore contrary testimony by Whalen and Connelly. On summary judgment, however, we do not merely accept the plaintiff's contentions as true. Instead, we must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmovanfs favor. There is no requirement that inferences favorable to the plaintiff may only be based on evidence that she has submitted to us. Here, the justifiable inference favorable to plaintiff is that a question of fact exists regarding this issue. 6 . The Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Al-bright casts some doubt on whether a plaintiff may state a claim for coercion of a confession under both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. See Albright,-U.S. at-,-,-, -, 114 S.Ct. at 813, 814, 817, 820-21 (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit has stated that Albright 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that false arrest supports a claim against state police under  1983 because it violates the fourth amendment (B) recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim (C) holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed (D) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment (E) holding in five separate opinions that  1983 claim based on persons arrest cannot be brought under substantive due process where more specific constitutional provision  fourth amendment  applies
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: to which the benefits administrator must exercise discretion in the discharge of his duties is likewise a significant factor in determining a question of ERISA preemption because it is indicative of the complexity of the benefit program. See O’Connor, 251 F.3d at 267 (“The determination of what constitutes an ERISA plan thus turns most often on the degree of an employer’s discretion in administering the plan.”); Bogue, 976 F.2d at 1323 (ruling that a plan requiring “case-by-case, discretionary application” of the terms required an administrative scheme, and thus brought the benefits plan within the scope of ERISA even though the term of the employer’s obligation to pay was short and the number of participants was small); see also Rodowicz, 192 F.3d at 171; Belanger, 71 F.3d at 455 (<HOLDING>). As such, this factor relates to both the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding benefit program that entailed a purely mechanical determination of eligibility and did not require any discretionary judgment on the part of the administrator was not an erisa plan (B) holding that district courts order remanding an erisa benefits determination to a plan administrator was nonfinal and therefore not appealable after the remand to plan administrator plan participant still could appeal the district courts decision that erisa preempted her state law claim and if successful she would be able to pursue punitive damage (C) holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan (D) holding that a denial of benefits will not be reviewed de novo where the language of an erisa plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (E) holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant
[EX A]:
(A)