In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: stored on a BBS pending delivery). Because subsection (A) applies only to messages in “temporary, intermediate storage,” however, these courts have limited that subsection’s coverage to messages not yet delivered to their intended recipient. See DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 512; Fraser, 135 F.Supp.2d at 636. Defendants point to these cases and argue that messages remaining on an ISP’s server after delivery no longer fall within the Act’s coverage. But, even if such messages are not within the purview of subsection (A), they do fit comfortably within subsection (B). There is no dispute that messages remaining on NetGate’s server after delivery are stored “by an electronic communication service” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B). Cf. DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 511 (<HOLDING>). The only issue, then, is whether the messages 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca (B) holding that email messages stored on a computer but not yet read were in electronic storage (C) holding that an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of email communications is not vitiated by an understanding that the thirdparty service provider will maintain independent access to them noting that electronic communication is as important to fourth amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the past (D) holding that defendants communications sent into tennessee did not constitute purposeful availment because all were in response to communications initiated by the plaintiff (E) holding that subsection b did not apply because the communications at issue were not being stored by an electronic communication service
Example Output: holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca

Example Input: and therefore, need only show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenges for cause. “[A] challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror’s responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied.” State v. Hallal, 557 So.2d 1388, 1389-90 (La.1990). The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (<HOLDING>); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (B) holding that an effective life sentence of fortyfive years for seconddegree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment (C) holding that a prospective juror who would vote automatically for a life sentence is properly excluded (D) holding life sentence mandatory under 21 usc  841b and district court could not depart from the mandatory life sentence unless government made a motion (E) holding that time excluded from a speedy trial clock for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excluded under  3161h1 but may only be excluded when a court makes appropriate reasonableness findings under  3161h7
Example Output: holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence

Example Input: the Cabinet, and Yowell and Codell in their official capacities. Ordinarily, a federal appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review a decision of a state court. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). However, in cases involving removal, the district court is instructed to “take[ ] up the case where the State court left it off.” Duncan v. Gegan, 101 U.S. 810, 812, 25 L.Ed. 875 (1879). Further, although “[a]ny orders or rulings issued by the state court prior to removal are not conclusive in the federal action after removal ... it is well-settled that they do remain binding on the parties until formall S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945) (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state (B) holding that when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state the state is the real substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants (C) holding suits against state officials for monetary damages impermissible where the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state rather than against the officer in his individual capacity (D) holding suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permissible because they are in effect suits against the officials in their individual capacities (E) holding that suits which seek no recovery from state funds but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the states liability insurance coverage fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the state
Example Output:
holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state