TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: period under IAD never commenced); Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 489-90 (D.C. 1997) (rejecting prisoner’s substantial compliance argument and recognizing that court is bound by Fex); State v. Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d 579, 581-82 (Ind. 1996) (requiring strict compliance with IAD procedures and recognizing that procedures are "not mere technicalities”); Pinto v. Warden, C.A. No. 972412, 1999 WL 49378, at *7 (Conn. Super. Jan. 20, 1999) (stating that "[wjhile it is true that earlier decisions of courts were split on when the 180 day period begins, the majority of courts ... have held that the period begins to run once the request is actually received by the appropriate court and prosecutor”); Commonwealth v. Flores, C.A. No. 91-493, 1998 WL 792466, at *3 (Mass. Super. Nov. 6, 1998) (<HOLDING>). 48 . 1993 WL 138993, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court (B) holding that an noa filed by a pro se prisoner is deemed filed on the date that the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for mailing (C) holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing (D) holding that the iad as construed by fex requires that a prisoner must be tried within 180 days of the date when his request for disposition is actu ally received by the state in which the charges are pending not when the prisoner provides that request to his custodial authorities (E) holding time begins when the prisoner knows  the important facts not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: to exempt every alien who seeks to adjust his or her status under § 245(i) after illegally reentering the United States following removal. Where Congress intended § 241(a)(5) not to pose a barrier to adjustment of status for aliens who illegally reentered the United States, it made a special exception to the general rule. Because Lino does not fall within the exception, she is bound by the general rule disqualifying aliens who illegally reentered the country from seeking adjustment of status. Finally, six circuits have held that § 241(a)(5) precludes aliens subject to reinstatement orders from obtaining adjustment of status pursuant to § 245(i). See De Sandoval v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 440 F.3d 1276, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2006); Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort, 390 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 21 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not have jurisdiction to order reinstatement of previously dismissed action and thus reinstatement order was void and of no effect and previous order of dismissal was still in effect (B) holding that petitioners claim is not one to the attorney generals decision or action to execute a removal order either since the facts relevant to their claim  took place well before any decision by the attorney general to execute a removal order (C) holding that once a petitioners prior removal order has been reinstated he no longer qualifies for any relief under the ina regardless of whether his application was filed before or after the reinstatement decision was made (D) holding that since the basis for the respondents order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening (E) holding that a federal court must order arbitration once it is satisfied that an agreement for arbitration has been made and has not been honored

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: according to its terms.” Freelander v. G.&K. Realty Corp., 357 Mass. 512, 516 (1970). Thus, Defendant’s liability for breach could not exceed $480 per year, pursuant to the freely-negotiated limitation of liability clause. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is therefore ALLOWED as to Count II. III.Count III: c. 93A Factual questions remain regarding the relationship, if any, between the breach of contract claims and Plaintiffs c. 93A claim. Chapter 93A claims may be grounded in activities more closely akin to either breach of contract or tort actions. A c. 93A claim more closely resembling a traditional breach of contract action is subject to limitation of liability provisions within the contract. See Canal Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 406 Mass. 369, (377) (<HOLDING>). This is because, in purely commercial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a limitation of liability provision in a sales contract was enforceable to bar a breach of warranty claim brought pursuant to glc 93a 11 (B) holding that a breach of settlement claim should have been brought in the court of federal claims pursuant to the tucker act (C) holding tenants vacating premises allegedly in breach of a lease was not enough to trigger c 93a liability (D) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (E) holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action

SOLUTION:
(A)