In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: waived his attorney-client privilege when his attorney failed to make timely objections to questions that it alleged sought privileged communications. This argument has no merit for two reasons. First, many of the questions Airdata asked did not seek confidential communications. Therefore, no objection was necessary to preserve the privilege. Second, Jenney’s current attorney did make timely objections to those questions actually seeking confidential communications. The fact that Jenney’s attorney had to interrupt him to make the objection is not sufficient to establish a waiver. Because the objections were made as soon as the confidential nature of the communication became apparent, Jenney did not waive the privilege. Cf. Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee, 837 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege (C) holding that disclosure orders adverse to the attorneyclient privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine (D) holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts (E) holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant

A: (A)
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Q: 1999) (same); Hill v. Fidelity Fin. Servs. (In re Hill), 152 B.R. 204, 206 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1993) (same); In re Reese, 194 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr.D.Md.1996) (same); Barclays Am./Mortgage Corp. v. Wilkinson (In re Wilkinson), 186 B.R. 186, 191 (Bankr.D.Md.1995) (same); In re Redditt, 146 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr.S.D.Miss.1992) (stat ing that “[b]y the statute’s own terms, only the trustee has standing to exercise the strong-arm avoidance powers”); Mast v. Borgess Medical Center (In re Mast), 79 B.R. 981, 982 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1987) (same); In re Driver, 133 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.1991) (stating that “a Chapter 13 debtor is not explicitly bestowed with the trustee’s strong arm transfer avoidance powers.”); Hollar v. United States (In re Hollar), 174 B.R. 198, 203 (M.D.N.C.1994) (<HOLDING>). As In re Higgins, most of the majority 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that chapter 13 debtors have standing to bring avoidance actions by reasoning that chapter 13 trustee has standing but little incentive to bring avoidance actions that will result in benefit to debtors of recovering exempt assets (B) holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case (C) holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees  avoidance power (D) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (E) holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13

A: (C)
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Q: cap in determining the amount of benefits another person was able to receive. Id. at 615. Although in Parisi, the child was suffering from the technical entitlement, the case stands for the proposition that a technical entitlement of zero should be counted as zero when computing family máximums. Considering that the purpose of the family maximum is to set a maximum that can be given from one wage earner’s account, Parisi complies with this purpose. IV. BY CITING PARISI, HAS PLAINTIFF RAISED A NEW ISSUE THAT IS NOT PROPERLY INCLUDED IN THIS JUDICIAL REVIEW? “[I]f petitioner wishes to preserve an issue for appeal, he must first raise it in the proper administrative forum_” Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir.1980); See Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, 309 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir.1962) (<HOLDING>). Yet, in Tejeda-Mata the court held this “in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that failure to observe the required process deprives the court of jurisdiction (B) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the petition for review because the aliens did not appeal the ijs denial of their motion to reopen to the board resulting in failure to exhaust their administrative remedies (C) holding that partys failure to file a timely internal administrative appeal as required by regulations of the department of agriculture constituted failure to exhaust administrative remedies and precluded judicial action (D) recognizing that failure by state to provide the required certification deprives appeals court of jurisdiction over appeal (E) holding that failure to take available appeal to board of immigration appeals constitutes failure to exhaust administrative remedies and deprives the court of appeals of jurisdiction to review

A:
(E)
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