In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the evidence of rape discussed above in Division 1, we conclude that the evidence at Martin’s trial was sufficient to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found as to both murders. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (2) (requiring a review of the statutory aggravating circumstances foundby the jury);UAP Rule IV (B) (2) (providing that, in all death penalty cases, this Court will determine whether the verdicts are supported by the evidence). See also Ring, 536 U. S. 584; Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. 20. Considering both the murders for which Martin has been sentenced to death and Martin as a defendant, we find that the death sentences imposed in his case were not disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Georgia law. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3); Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716-717 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited in the Appendix support this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts statutorily mandated proportionality review concerns whether a particular death sentence is excessive per se or is substantially out of line (B) holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable
[A]: holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial


[Q]: required expert testimony at trial. We agree with other appellate courts that the statute does not violate the open courts provision by requiring an expert report sooner rather than later in the litigation. See, e.g., Gill v. Russo, 39 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Knie v. Piskun, 23 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied). Mocega’s fifth point is overruled. Notice of Hearing Mocega’s final two points assert the trial court was required to grant her the grace period provided under art. 4590i, § 13.01(g). A motion under that section is timely if filed before “any hearing” on a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Urquhart’s motion was “heard” by submission on April 3rd. See Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>). Mocega’s motion was not filed until April 
 Holding statements: (A) holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation (B) holding that a hearing does not contemplate an oral presentation unless required by express language or context (C) holding that oral rendition of judgment supported by the courts docket sheet was insufficient express specific written order is required (D) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes (E) holding that express oral agreement with government agent was not binding because among other factors applicable regulations required contract to be in writing
[A]: holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation


[Q]: matter, even if this count were dismissed, Plaintiffs would simply refile with a new caption, putting the case right back where it started. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(f) (district courts are to construe pleadings so “as to do substantial justice”); Dopp v. HTP, Corp., 947 F.2d 506, 513 (1st Cir.1991) (“Pleadings are liberally to be construed, and for the purposes of determining what relief a claimant has sought, complaints ought not to be read grudgingly or with a hypertechnical eye.”); Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d 224, 226-27 (1st Cir.1990) (“It is not fatal to a complaint that a legal theory has been mischaracterized or that the precise language invoking jurisdiction has not been used.”); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612, 622 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Janke Constr. Co., Inc. v. Vulcan Materials 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing authority stating that a plaintiff in a cercla action is allowed to plead alternative theories even if it cannot ultimately seek duplicate recovery (B) holding a complaint sufficiently raises a claim even if it points to no legal theory or even if it points to the wrong legal theory as a basis for that claim (C) holding that the failure to draw the district courts attention to an applicable legal theory waives pursuit of that theory in this court (D) holding that instructing the jury on a legal duty theory when appellant had no legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense was error (E) holding that the failure to plead a particular legal theory when the plaintiff pled two related legal theories was not a bar to recovery
[A]:
recognizing authority stating that a plaintiff in a cercla action is allowed to plead alternative theories even if it cannot ultimately seek duplicate recovery