TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: second and third elements under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), the existence of a sufficient interest, and whether disposition of that interest would effectively impede the putative intervenors’ ability to protect that interest. Among the interests that satisfy these criteria are injury to reputation, see Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 373, 392 (2d Cir.1981), need to protect the attorney-client privilege, see In re Katz (Jamil v. United States), 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.1980), and need to protect the attorney work-product privilege. See United States v. AT & T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1290-92 (D.C.Cir.1980), citing, Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445, 84 S.Ct. 508, 511-12, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 735 F.2d 1330, 1331 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a district court should allow intervention by a client in the first instance as soon as the attorneyclient privilege issue is raised (B) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (C) holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal (D) recognizing intervention to assert both the attorneyclient and work product privileges (E) holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: fact that the oil traversed part of Transocean’s vessel before entering the Gulf of Mexico. We recognize that the aforementioned incidents involved blameless third parties, whereas here the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon might have contributed to the discharge. By all accounts, if the vessel’s blowout preventer had functioned properly, the oil would not have entered navigable waters in violation of the Clean Water Act. The defendants therefore reason that liability is properly imposed upon the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon. Yet it is well estab lished that this section of the Clean Water Act leaves no room for civil-penalty defendants to shift liability via allegations of third-party fault. See United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1314 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Early in the implementation of the Act’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys (B) holding exculpatory statements by a third party should have been admitted in the punishment phase notwithstanding the hearsay rule (C) holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding defendant liable for penalty notwithstanding fault of a third party

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: there was no vexatious litigant order entered against Wolfe at the time he filed in district court, there was no state court judgment from which he could have been seeking relief. Instead of seeking relief from prior state court judgments, Wolfe seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the threatened future enforcement of the Vexatious Litigant Statute. He argues that the statute violates the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause; that it constitutes an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder; and that it subjects vexatious litigants to double jeopardy. In his prayer for relief, Wolfe requests “a declaration that California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 391-391.7 .:. are unconstitutional on the nburgh, 970 F.2d 501, 508 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We construe Wolfe’s references to the prior 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (B) holding that the threat of injury was not speculative because the plaintiffs had been previously charged under the challenged statute (C) holding that plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden to show that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because plaintiffs claims of prohibitive costs were too speculative (D) holding that damages were not available to a plaintiff who challenged an ordinance under a due process theory because the plaintiff had not sought a permit and therefore any claim for damages was purely speculative (E) holding that plaintiffs legal malpractice claim was not ripe until the appeal had been exhausted because plaintiffs harm remained speculative until then

SOLUTION:
(B)