instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability “from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik’s] attendance” it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik’s attendance at the gym — in essence all of Sydlik’s claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release
answer:
holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release


question:
375 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004). Since, as we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we need not consider whether the District’s failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its own case (as opposed to at the close of Smith’s case) further limits our review “to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by the evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice,” Fredrick, 254 F.3d at 162. The District presents two fact-based challenges to the jury’s verdict. First, it argues that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the District had a deliberately indifferent policy or custom under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, it claims that even had such a policy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom (B) holding that county liability under  1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior (C) holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc  1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition (D) recognizing respondeat superior liability (E) holding that municipal liability for purposes of claims brought under 42 usc  1983 must stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom rather than simply from respondeat superior
answer:
holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom


question:
White arrived on the scene to when he arrived with the appellant at the Travis County Jail.” However; in light of M'cNeely, we conclude that this case is distinguishable from Schmerber. Here, although Roop was involved in á traffic accident, nothing in‘the record suggests that this fact significantly ■ delayed the collection of Roop’s blood. Officer White testified that he came into contact with Roop at about- 4:00 a.m., placed Roop under arrest at 4:25, and ordered her blood to be drawn at 5:09. The stop for Roop to use the restroom took just a few minutes, and the drive to the jail took only seven to eight minutes. We are not persuaded that'the mere existence of-a traffic accident constitutes a per se exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw. - See Evans, 2015 WL 545702, at *6 (<HOLDING>). In addition, “[ajlthough the findings of fact 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers cannot base a warrantless search on an exigent circumstance of their own creation (B) holding that the threat of imminent destruction of evidence of criminal activity created an exigent circumstance (C) recognizing exigent circumstance exception to warrant requirement (D) holding that accident investigation by itself is not exigent circumstance (E) holding that blood alcohol dissipation was not sufficient by itself to create an exigent circumstances exception to virginia statutory requirement that the driver be arrested within three hours of the offense
answer:

holding that officers cannot base a warrantless search on an exigent circumstance of their own creation