In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: omitted)). This is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires a finder of fact to consider numerous relevant factors, including “substantially identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership.” Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Rabine, 161 F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir.1998). Intent to evade union obligations, though not the keystone to proving alter ego in some other circuits, is the most critical factor in the Seventh Circuit. Compare Trs. of Pension, Welfare & Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Favia Elec. Co., 995 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Centor Contractors, 831 F.2d at 1312), with Rd. Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, U.A., AFL-CIO v. Dorn Sprinkler Co., 669 F.3d 790, 794 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). 1. Ownership, management, operation, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights (B) holding that intent to evade collective bargaining obligations is merely one factor among many that must be considered (C) holding that exercising control over other participants is one factor among many that should be considered not a requirement for applying the adjustment (D) holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement (E) holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation

A: (B)
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Q: and reimbursement claim based on the plan. Looking to FEHBA’s legislative history, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the purpose of FEHBA was to establish health insurance for federal employees and that insurance carriers “help the government fulfill the basic task of establishing a health benefits program for federal employees.” Id. at 1233. The Jacks court concluded that OPM “has direct and extensive control over these benefit contracts under the FEHBA.” The court determined that even though the plan “allows the carrier the discretion to pursue subrogation,” that “does not foreclose the application of the federal officer removal statute” because “the subrogation provision is necessarily a product of the benefit payment pro F.Supp.2d 848 (W.D.Mo.2011) (<HOLDING>); Van Horn v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that health insurer contracted with fehba was not acting under a federal agency within the meaning of the federal officer removal statute (B) holding that the fact that the insurance carrier voluntarily entered into a mutually agreed upon contract with the opm to administer healthcare benefits to federally employed enrollees does not rise to the level of a relationship defined as acting under a federal officer  (C) holding that a health plan insurer contracting with a government agency under a federal benefits program is considered a person acting under a federal officer (D) holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school (E) holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract

A: (B)
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Q: specifically instructed jurors that they “may not consider Clinton Van Berry’s statements to the FBI on December 17th in any way against Nadine Van Berry.” (1AA225.) See In re Brown, 457 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir.2006) (finding that Crawford was not violated where co-defendant’s out-of-court confession was admitted solely against co-defendant); cf Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (finding Confrontation Clause violation in admission of wife’s testimonial statement as evidence against husband in criminal trial). We find, therefore, no Sixth Amendment violation under Crawford. We also find, as did the District Court, that Clinton’s statements did not “powerfully incriminate” Nadine. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124 n. 1, 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (<HOLDING>). In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the introduction of a jointly tried nontestifying codefendants statement violates the sixth amendment confrontation clause if the statement contains incriminating evidence concerning a defendant (B) holding that limiting instruction was insufficient to avoid confrontation clause violation where codefendants powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statement was admitted in joint trial with petitioner (C) holding that a limiting instruction is required where evidence of a prior conviction is admitted over objection (D) holding that when all references to the defendant in a codefendants statement are replaced with indefinite pronouns or other general terms the confrontation clause is not violated by the redacted statements admission if when viewed together with other evidence the statement does not create an inevitable association with the defendant and a proper limiting instruction is given (E) holding that the clause was not violated by a redacted confession with a proper limiting instruction

A:
(B)
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