instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
339 (2005)). As to appellant’s assertion of error by the court in permitting the cautionary instruction to include the additional language, appellant’s claim is not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 proceeding. Generally, a petition under Rule 37.1 does not provide a remedy when an issue could have been raised at trial or argued on appeal. Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006). To fall within the very limited exception to that rule, the ground must be one so basic that it renders the judgment a complete nullity, such as a lack of jurisdiction, a violation of double jeopardy, or the right to a twelve-member jury. Id. at 26-27, 238 S.W.3d at 32. Appellant did not raise an issue in this claim that falls within the exception. See Phavixay v. State, 373 Ark. 168, 282 S.W.3d 795 (2008) (<HOLDING>). In appellant’s fifth point on appeal, he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (B) holding that proponent of 404b evidence must identify a proper 404b purpose for admission  that is at issue in  the case (C) holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence (D) holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal (E) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper
answer:
(C)


question:
on CRiminal Justice, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). In 1997, the legislature amended the child pornography statute to eliminate a loophole in the existing statute that impeded prosecution of individuals for possession or promotion of child pornography depicted or distributed by computer. Id.; House Comm, on CRiminal JURISPRUDENCE, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). There is nothing in these materials to suggest that the legislature intended to prohibit anything other than pornography depicting actual children. Therefore, we conclude that the Texas child pornography statute prohibits only the possession of visual materials depicting real children. Because the Texas statute only prohibits pornography depicting actual children, the sta App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Appellant also contends that the statute is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding twentyeight charges against defendant for possession of child pornography were not multiplicious (B) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (C) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (D) holding that an overbreadth challenge to a child pornography law was rendered moot by amendment to the statute (E) recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography
answer:
(B)


question:
terms of the trust hereinafter described concerning the other one-half (50%) of the options to purchase shares as a result of owning the “fair value” options. Randall purchased all of the stock options in November 1998, so he acquired them while he and Ginger were married. Also, none of the stock options were awarded for work done outside of the parties’ marriage. Randall was given the opportunity to purchase the stock options because of his management position with his company. The stock option plan recites that management employees were given this opportunity in order to motivate them to exert their best efforts on behalf of the company. However, because Randall bought the stock options in 1998, they were not something that would be awarded in the fu Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, no writ) (<HOLDING>); In re Marriage of Joiner, 755 S.W.2d 496, 498 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that stock plan to which employer and employee spouse both made contributions and whose value was dependent on length of employee spouses employment was a deferred compensation retirement plan (B) holding that stock options that could be purchased but not sold without company consent during marriage were community property even though value of options was dependent upon employee spouses postdivorce employment (C) holding that an extended earnings plan was not an employee pension benefit plan because the payment of benefits was not contingent upon retirement or the employee attaining a certain age (D) holding that a debtors interest in an erisaqualified employercontrolled stock bonus and profit sharing retirement trust was excluded from the debtors estate pursuant to 11 usc  541c2 and applicable state spendthrift trust law where the plan involved no active participation by the employee where the plan included a statutorily required antialienation provision and where the plan precluded borrowing and withdrawals by the debtor except on the debtors death termination of employment disability retirement or termination of the plan (E) holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness
answer:

(A)