In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: defendant to trust the advice of his counsel in weighing the immigration consequences of his decision. Petitioner’s counsel advised him that he would “in all likelihood, receive a sentence of only one to three years’ imprisonment.” (Id.) The fact that this turned out to be true, buttresses the court’s conclusion that it was reasonable for Petitioner to rely on his counsel’s advice in making his immigration decisions. Second, and more importantly, however, case law before IIRIRA held that even an alien who received a sentence longer than five years might have maintained eligibility for § 212(c) relief, provided that the alien had not served five years of his sentence at the time of his removal hearing. See Matter of Ramirez-Somera, 1992 WL 301623, 20 I. & N. Dec. 564, 566 (BIA 1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the fact that Petitioner could have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony (B) holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss prison inmates action under 42 usc  1983 as frivolous without consent of defendants because defendants had not been served yet and therefore were not parties (C) holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious (D) holding the same where the term conviction refers to a defendant who has been found guilty of a listed offense but has not yet been sentenced (E) holding that an immigrant defendant is eligible for  212c relief despite having been sentenced to a fifteen year prison term because he had not yet served five years of the sentence
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: constitutionally obstruct despite the provision of counsel. Indeed, in Benjamin v. Fraser, when considering impediments to pre-trial detainees’ ability to visit with counsel, we recognized that a state could not “ ‘unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts.’ ” Benjamin 264 F.3d at 187, 188 (emphasis added) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) and determining that “both the due process right of access to the courts and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are implicated,” and that there was no error in measures ordered to remedy undue delays associated with attorney visits). See also Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-81, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Nor can I agree with the majority’s holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding same for writ of error coram nobis (B) holding that rule 4as time limits govern an appeal from a district court order granting or denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis (C) holding that the state could not deny an indigent criminal appellant a transcript to appeal pro se from the denial of a writ of error coram nobis or permit that the appellant at the will of the public defender be entirely cut off from any appeal at all (D) holding that federal court may not issue writ of coram nobis for state prisoner (E) holding that in the absence of a valid excuse for delay a coram nobis petition is subject to denial
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: not a proximate-cause witness. Specifically, counsel stated: {¶ 33} “Your Honor, we are not going into long-term care of how this patient is going to be managed forever. We are going to go into standard of care. We are going to go into standard of care for an emergency physician.” {¶ 34} Ultimately, the trial court made its evidentiary ruling based on MVES’s proffer of Dr. Galan as a standard-of-care witness only. Since standard of care is never viewed in hindsight, the court properly ruled to limit Dr. Galan’s testimony to only that information known to Dr. Jackson when he treated Darlene. See Grabill v. Worthington Industries, Inc., 98 Ohio App.3d 739, 744-745, 649 N.E.2d 874, quoting Hetrick v. Marion-Res. Power Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 347, 358-359, 25 O.O. 467, 48 N.E.2d 103 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 35} MVES insists that even if we find that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a grant of equitable relief requires diligence by the claimant (B) holding that foresight not retrospect is the standard of diligence (C) holding that rule 16bs good cause standard focuses on a partys diligence (D) holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met (E) recognizing implied obligation to use reasonable diligence
Example Output:
(B)