In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: by jury is a fundamental guaranty of the rights and liberties of the people. C Prudential that the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right means that the starting point of our analysis is a presumption against the waiver of this constitutional right. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co., 301 U.S. at 393, 57 S.Ct. at 811-12; In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132 (giving right to trial by jury “same protections as other constitutional rights”); accord Ex parte Cupps, 782 So.2d 772, 775 (Ala.2000) (construing scope of contractual jury waiver strictly and narrowly “in deference to the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial”); see also Note, 58 Baylor L.Rev. at 259. But see Lowe Enters. Residential Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 92, 40 P.3d 405, 410 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Despite the existence of a presumption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy (B) holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts (C) holding that german law presumptively confers joint custody upon both parents until a court enters a contrary order (D) holding  without reference to supreme court case law to the contrary  that in nevada contractual jury waivers are presumptively valid (E) holding appellate waivers are enforceable if invoked by the government
[EX A]: holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy

[EX Q]: a “public official,” places a great emphasis on two of the elements: (1) the statutory powers and duties of a position, and (2) whether that position exercised sovereign power. See, e.g., Spaulding, 102 Iowa at 649, 72 N.W. at 291 (concluding that the treasurer of the commissioners of pharmacy was not a public officer because the position of treasurer “was a creation of the commission ... and at all times subject absolutely to their control”); McKinley, 228 Iowa at 1189-91, 293 N.W. at 451 (concluding that county engineer was an “official” because he furnished a bond and took an oath of office; but more importantly because several statutes defining the powers and duties of the county engineer delegated certain sovereign powers to that position); Whitney, 232 Iowa at 71, 4 N.W.2d at 398 (<HOLDING>); Hutton, 235 Iowa at 56, 16 N.W.2d at 20 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (C) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was an employee not an official and therefore entitled to benefits under the workers compensation act (D) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was not an official because she was not required to give bond or take an oath none of the statutes impose upon her the exercise of discretion in any way they delegate no sovereign power to her (E) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment
[EX A]: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment

[EX Q]: that the substantial relationship test effectuates both the duty of loyalty and the duty of confidentiality. In the seminal case setting forth the substantial relationship test, T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., Judge Weinfeld of the Southern District of New York held that only through the substantial relationship test “can the lawyer’s duty of absolute fidelity be enforced and the spirit of the rule relating to privileged communications be maintained.” 113 F.Supp. at 268-69. See also Damron v. Herzog, 67 F.3d 211, 215 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1117, 116 S.Ct. 922, 133 L.Ed.2d 851 (1996) (“[T]he duty of loyalty also continues with respect to those matters substantially related to that representation.”); Felix v. Balkin, 49 F.Supp.2d 260, 268 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (<HOLDING>); Selby v. Revlon Consumer Prod. Corp., 6 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client (B) holding that attorneys should be disqualified where the substantial relationship test is met in order to assure that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship and the loyalty between attorney and client are preserved (C) holding that normal attorneyclient relationship does not bar rule 60b relief when the evidence is clear that the attorney and his client were not acting as one (D) holding that the substantial relationship test also concerns the duty of loyalty to a former client (E) holding that the substantial relationship test embodies a broader concept than the rule of confidentiality  that of continuing fidelity to a former client  a duty of loyalty
[EX A]:
recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client