In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: intended to purchase the entire 9.69 acre parcel described in the purchase and sale agreement. These findings have support in the record. Based on the evidence, the trial court could reasonably have been persuaded that it was highly probable that the parties operated under a mutual mistake as to the description in the deed. [¶ 18] Roger also argues that the doctrine of merger by deed prohibits reformation. “The doctrine of merger by deed provides that once a ... deed is accepted it becomes the final statement of the agreement between the parties and nullifies all provisions of the purchase-and-sale agreement.” Bryan, 665 A.2d at 1022 (quotation marks omitted). Merger by deed, however, does not prohibit reformation upon proof of a mutual mistake of fact at the time of closing. Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). C. Joint Accounts [¶ 19] Roger contends that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed (B) holding in part that party seeking reformation of deed must show the original intent or agreement of parties by clear and convincing evidence (C) holding merger by deed prohibits reformation when one of the parties learns of a mistake before closing and still signs the deed (D) holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed (E) recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title

Answer: (C)


Question: S.E.2d at 629 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Sparks v. Peacock, plaintiff husband filed an action in superior court seeking contributions for payments on promissory notes executed by both he and his wife. Unlike the Garrison litigants, however, the parties in Sparks had not brought an action for equitable distribution in district court. Based on the wife’s motion, the superior court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, this Court acknowledged the jurisdictional nature of section 7A-244, stating that if the parties had indeed brought an equitable distribution action and such action was pending pursuant to section 7A-244, the superior court would not have jurisdiction over the propriety of payments on the promissory note. Id. at 641, 500 S.E.2d at 118 (<HOLDING>); see also Ward v. Ward, 116 N.C. App. 643, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that defendant correctly stated that the district court has jurisdiction over equitable distribution actions and citing section 7a244 (B) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties (C) holding that personal jurisdiction over partner did not follow from jurisdiction over partnership citing sher (D) holding that court of claims has jurisdiction over actions for breach of standard contract (E) recognizing the difference between jurisdiction over an action and jurisdiction over an issue and holding that although section 2074207 vests the family court with exclusive jurisdiction over actions to determine paternity under section 621302a1 the probate court has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of paternity when the issue is essential to the probate courts determination of heirs

Answer: (A)


Question: against a physician or health care provider that are not founded upon a breach of an accepted standard of care. Id. The court pointed out that claims that are “health care liability claims” may not be “recast” as other causes of action in order to avoid requirements of the Act. Id. at 242. The underlying nature of the claim determines whether it is truly a health care liability claim, and thus governed by the Act. Id. As one court has noted, “[i]f the cause of action is based on the physician’s breach of the accepted standard of medical care, the cause of action is nothing more than a health care liability claim, no matter how the plaintiff labels it.” Wright v. Folder, 991 S.W.2d 343, 352 (TexApp.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 892-93 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). Just as a health care liability claim may not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statute of limitations for dtpa action including claim for breach of express or implied warranty under the dtpa is two years (B) holding that since the court could disentangle the inadequately pleaded fraud claims from the plaintiffs dtpa causes of action the defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the plaintiffs dtpa claims for failure to meet rule 9b pleading requirements (C) holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan (D) holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action (E) holding that plaintiffs dtpa causes of action were actually negligence claims because they all complained of earles failure to hold to the applicable standard of care

Answer:
(E)