instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
§ 924(c) conviction is invalid after Bailey and Bousley, it argues we are prohibited from reaching the merits of his claim because Abdullah did not present his Bailey/Bousley challenge on direct appeal or in the § 2255 proceedings below. Alternatively, the government argues the claim is barred by AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. We assume for purposes of this appeal that Abdullah did not procedurally default his Bailey claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. Notwithstanding such an assumption, we conclude the claim is barred because Abdullah failed to adequately raise the issue before the district court in this § 2255 proceeding. Generally, a habeas claim cannot be raised by a petitioner for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Petty v. Card, 195 F.3d 399, 400 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 78, 148 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court (B) holding that the convention claim was procedurally defaulted (C) holding that court may address procedurally defaulted claim on the merits where it is more efficient to do so (D) holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted (E) holding that an argument not raised before the district court is procedurally defaulted
answer:
holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court


question:
If a statement does not contain any expressly exculpatory material, the Government need not produce that statement to the defense. To hold otherwise would impose an insuperable burden on the Government to determine what facially non-exculpatory evidence might possibly be favorable to the accused by inferential reasoning. We are confident that the Supreme Court did not intend the Brady holding to sweep so broadly. United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir.1988); see also Harris v. Kuba, 486 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir.2007) {“Brady does not require that police officers or prosecutors explore multiple potential inferences to discern whether evidence that is not favorable to a defendant could become favorable.”); United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that just such inferential 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b (B) holding that there is no constitutional duty to do a better investigation and that a decision not to conduct a more thorough investigation does not invade an accuseds rights (C) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (D) holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence (E) holding that brady does not place any burden upon the government to conduct a defendants investigation or assist in the presentation of the defenses case
answer:
holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b


question:
regulation of which plaintiff himself is the object, “there is ordinarily little question that the [defendant’s] action or inaction has caused the injury.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555, 112 S.Ct. at 2130. A second factor in deciding whether there is an imminent threat of harm to the plaintiff is the plaintiffs level of certainty that he will engage in conduct that will subject him to injury. See id at 563-64, 112 S.Ct. at 2138. When the plaintiff has been able to state with some certainty an intent to engage in allegedly expected conduct at a relatively specific time in the future, courts have found a sufficiently imminent threat of harm to meet the first element in the Lujan test. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2105, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1301-02 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims (B) holding that a contracts clause violation may support a  1983 claim (C) holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous (D) holding that plaintiffs statement that it bid on every guardrail project in colorado combined with affidavits showing that there had been fourteen guardrail contracts up for bid between 1983 and 1990 created a sufficient certainty that plaintiff would bid on contracts in the future to support standing (E) holding that a business owners testimony was insufficient to establish lost profits where he was not able to specify which contracts they lost how many they lost how much profit they would have had from the contracts or who would have awarded them contracts and explaining that the plaintiffs could have supported their lost profits with testimony that they had lost out on specific contracts but failed to do so
answer:

holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims