In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
claims); see also Stewart, 104 N.M. at 748, 726 P.2d at 1378 (“An insurance policy is a contract and is generally governed by the law of contracts, and the rights and duties of the parties are to be determined by its terms.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, we held that 8.75% was the proper interest to be assessed on the contract damages. {40} Like the trial court in Teague-Strebeck, the trial court in our case awarded damages based on the insurance contract— $100,000 in UM coverage. See 1999-NMCA-109, ¶¶63-64, 127 N.M. 603, 985 P.2d 1183 (observing that the plaintiff “was awarded the benefit of its bargain, the extent of insurance coverage promised by [the defendant’s agent]”); cf. Ellis v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Cos., 1999-NMSC-034, ¶1, 128 N.M. 54, 989 P.2d 429 (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that 8.75% is the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sixyear contract statute of limitations did not apply reasoning that an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on breach of warranty is only nominally based on contract (B) holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional (C) holding that sixyear statute of limitations in  65314 is applicable to violations of  7202 (D) recognizing a sixyear statute of limitations on claims filed under the coal act (E) holding that the sixyear statute of limitations on a written contract is applicable to a cause of action based on a um policy

Ex Output:
holding that sixyear contract statute of limitations did not apply reasoning that an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on breach of warranty is only nominally based on contract


Ex Input:
with a total of 8.3 grams of cocaine in them was consistent with both an intent to sell and with personal use. Id. at 631. We noted that the police did not find any money or drug paraphernalia on the defendant and there were “no other facts which would suggest an intent to sell.” Id. The packaging and weight of the drugs in this case is similar to that in Valentin, giving rise to similar conclusions about Alleyne’s intent. The state attempts to distinguish Valentin in two ways. First, there was no money found on Valentin, while Alleyne had $36 in his pocket and another $20 found in the paper bag with the marijuana. However, neither the amount of money found, nor the denominations of it were inconsistent with personal use. See Williams v. State, 569 So.2d 1376, 1377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). Second, while the arresting officer in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell (B) holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine (C) holding that evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of front seat passenger of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in paper bag in foot well of volkswagen on passengers side near gearshift in presence of marijuana smoke (D) holding that evidence consisting of 10 pieces of cocaine marijuana rolling paper 72 and a weapon was not sufficient to prove intent to sell (E) holding that there was sufficient evidence of intent to sell or deliver where the defendant was in possession of one large cocaine rock and eight smaller rocks

Ex Output:
recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell


Ex Input:
a wrongdoer is nevertheless responsible for its own attorney’s fees. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fedders Air Conditioning, USA Inc., 821 F.Supp. 50, 56 (D.Mass.1993). Haley’s position has a modicum of support to the extent that depriving it of indemnification elevates formality above substance because the same claim brought under a different procedural posture might be indemnifiable. For instance, had Haley been impleaded not as a direct defendant but rather as a third-party defendant in a claim brought by defendant Tnemec, alleging, for example, that Haley made negligent misrepresentations to Tnemec which then caused it to provide improper materials to Caldwell, Haley would arguably be entitled to indemnification. Cf. O’Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084, 1090 (2d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). That theoretical possibility is, however, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party which would have been indemnified if sued as a crossclaimant should be indemnified when brought into the case as a thirdparty defendant (B) holding that a subrogation claim required the parties to try the case as a casewithinacase to determine if the insured would have been liable to thirdparty plaintiff (C) holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication (D) holding that the district court erred in summarily dismissing a  1983 complaint that should have been brought as a habeas petition (E) holding that under the eaja a prevailing party with an unconditional right to be indemnified for his legal expenses by a solvent third party had not incurred attorneys fees

Ex Output:

holding that a subrogation claim required the parties to try the case as a casewithinacase to determine if the insured would have been liable to thirdparty plaintiff