instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
answer:
holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language


question:
trial court wide latitude in sentencing...." State v. Bluff 2002 UT 66, ¶ 66, 52 P.3d 1210. "Generally, we review sentencing decisions to determine whether the court exceeded its permitted range of discretion, and we will reverse only if we determine that the trial court has failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 108, 1 12, 182 P.3d 708 (quotations and citations omitted). ANALYSIS I. Admissibility of Evidence T9 Defendant asserts that the trial court committed plain error when it allowed two witnesses to testify as to the children's credibility in violation of State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), and rule 608(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Rim-masch, TIS P.2d at 392 (<HOLDING>); see also Utah R. Evid. 608(a)(1) ("The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 608a1 bars admission of an experts testimony as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion (B) holding rule applicable to witness (C) holding plaintiffs waived their right to appellate review of the admission of an experts testimony by failing to object to it at trial (D) holding that even if an experts testimony arguably embraced the ultimate issue such testimony is permissible as long as the experts testimony assists rather than supplants the jurys judgment (E) holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
answer:
holding rule applicable to witness


question:
we will address it here. The purpose of Rule 3.7 is to prevent an attorney from being in the awkward position of acting as both a witness and an advocate at trial, which could create some of the following problems: the possibility that, in addressing the jury, the lawyer will appear to vouch for his own credibility; . . . the unfair and difficult situation which arises when an opposing counsel has to cross-examine a lawyer-adversary and seek to impeach his credibility; and ... the appearance of impropriety created, i.e., the likely implication that the testifying lawyer may well be distorting the truth for the sake of his client. (Citations omitted.) Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera-Rios, 846 F2d 94, 99-100 (II) (1st Cir. 1988). Further, there is great po S. Dist. LEXIS 15672 (<HOLDING>); cf. World Youth Day v. Famous Artists 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lawyers willful absence from his clients trial is contemptuous (B) holding that loss of contingency fees that lawyers might have earned from other clients was not foreseeable and directly traceable to clients failure to pay amounts due under contract (C) holding that lawyers who were necessary witnesses in the case under rule 37 were not prohibited from representing their clients in all pretrial matters including discovery (D) holding that the defendants discovery requests were untimely because they were not served in time for the responses to be due before the discovery deadline (E) holding that rule 37 does not prohibit a lawyer who will testify at trial from acting as counsel in pretrial discovery
answer:

holding that a lawyers willful absence from his clients trial is contemptuous