In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: It is axiomatic, however, that states act through their officials and agencies. Thus, under Will, those state agencies and other political subdivisions which carry out the state’s business and have immunity from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment constitute “arms of the state.” Pursuant to Will, such entities would not be considered persons under § 1983. Those political subdivisions which are not provided immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, do not rise to the level of “arms of the state” and would, under Will, be considered to be persons for the purposes of § 1983. See Barket, Levy & Fine v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1086-88 (8th Cir.1991) (bi-state agency is a “person” under § 1983); Magula v. Broward Gen. Medical Ctr., 742 F.Supp. 645, 649 (S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Since the Will decision was handed down, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment (B) holding that an ohio school district is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the state and therefore it is not entitled to assert eleventh amendment immunity from suit (C) holding that the anne arundel board of education is an arm of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that the puc is not an arm of the state and rejecting claim of immunity (E) holding that because hospital district is more like a municipality than an arm of the state hospital district did not have eleventh amendment immunity

A: holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment
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Q: Dr. Proctor testified about the 2014 Report’s conclusion that filtered cigarettes increased the risk of adenocarci-noma (a type of lung cancer) by causing smokers to inhale more deeply, and by ventilating in a way‘that “increases certain poisonous compounds.” On appeal, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not have been permitted to use the 2014 Report to bolster the testimony of her expert witness. On this point, we also agree with Defendants. It is well established that “experts cannot bolster or corroborate their opinions with the opinions of other experts who do not testify,” as -“[s]ueh testimony improperly permits one expert to become a conduit for the opinion of another expert who is not subject to cross-examination.” Schwarz v. State, 695 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); accord Tolbert v. State, 114 So.3d 291, 294 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion (B) holding that any probative value of bolstered testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of issues or misleading the jury quoting  90403 fla stat (C) holding that the probative value of contested evidence far outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice where any potential unfair prejudice was cured by a limiting jury instruction (D) holding in a criminal context that the probative value of evidence of other crimes is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice where the court will give a limiting jury charge (E) holding that witness testimony about prior drug purchases from defendant was highly probative of brookins guilt and was not outweighed by any danger of undue prejudice

A: holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion
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Q: but refuse to do anything about it.”); Aff. of Harry Seymour, Nov. 30, 1992 ("It is my observation that throughout the institution that there is a continuous covering over of filth and dirt, rather than a unified regimen of daily house keeping and cleaning. My observation is that policy is to let area go uncleaned and paint over it when it looks bad or when outside people are touring the area.”); Aff. of James Doane, Mar. 26, 1993 (recounting his efforts, over the course of four days, to replace a broken Pak-A-Pottie and stating that he was told there were none available). 10 . I respectfully suggest that, in making that decision, the Superior Court failed to follow the sequential rule in cases alleging constitutional violations. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (<HOLDING>); see also Fabiano, 352 F.3d at 453 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the question of qualified immunity dovetails with the substantial inquiry in a  1983 action in that both depend on the specific contours of the constitutional right at issue (B) holding that the initial inquiry for a court called upon to rule upon the qualified immunity issue is whether the facts alleged show the violation of a constitutional right (C) holding that the court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff states a claim of a constitutional violation at all and then must determine whether the claimed right was clearly established before proceeding to the qualified immunity question (D) holding that the threshold inquiry assuming as true the facts alleged by the injured party is whether the officers conduct violated a constitutional right (E) holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right

A:
holding that the question of qualified immunity dovetails with the substantial inquiry in a  1983 action in that both depend on the specific contours of the constitutional right at issue
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