In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: The savings clause states that “[compliance with an order [under the MDA] shall not relieve any person from liability under Federal or State law.” 21 U.S.C.A. § 360h(d). While the savings clause almost certainly prohibits a holding that the MDA preempts all state law liability, our interpretation of § 360k(a) does not preclude all liability. Further, nothing in the savings clause suggests that some tort liability, as opposed to other types of liability, must be preserved. Interpreting the savings clause to preserve non-tort liability, such as contract liability, is not only permissible, but also comports with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a savings clause in a recent preemption case. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 817, 826, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, where the preemptive intent of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the illinois consumer fraud act preempted by the federal airline deregulation act to the extent the state law applied to airline frequent flier programs (B) holding consumer claims under the texas deceptive trade practices act nonassignable (C) holding that the airline deregulation act preempts claims under the illinois consumer fraud and deceptive business practices act but does not preempt state breach of contract actions (D) holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act (E) holding that cjlaims for unfair competition and deceptive business practices involving trade names brought under illinois statutes are to be resolved according to the principles set forth under the lanham act and noting that illinois courts look to federal case law and apply the same analysis to state infringement claims
[EX A]: holding the illinois consumer fraud act preempted by the federal airline deregulation act to the extent the state law applied to airline frequent flier programs

[EX Q]: Majority Opinion in Ford, former Justice Newman authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Saylor joined, in which she specifically expressed her agreement “that appellate counsel acted ineffectively by neglecting to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to investigate and present evidence during the penalty phase of Appellant’s history of abuse and mental illness.” Ford, 809 A.2d at 336 (Newman, J., joined by Saylor, J., concurring). 5 . Although Teague's retroactivity analysis did not gamer five votes, a majority of the High Court soon thereafter reaffirmed the Teague plurality's rule and its two exceptions in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). 6 . Compare with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty (B) holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (C) holding that juveniles are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (D) holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing (E) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants
[EX A]: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty

[EX Q]: arises from the events of May 31, 2007. Jones alleges that he was served and ate part of a tamale pie without having been- notified of its pork contents. Nopp declares, however, that he did not order cooks to add pork to the tamale pie and that the tamale pie did not contain pork. Jones’s evidence is not sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the tamale pie contained pork and or whether Nopp ordered cooks to add pork to the dish. The unsworn statements of the inmate cook who told Jones that Nopp had -directed the cook to mix pork in with the meat used in the tamale pie are hearsay, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(c), and cannot properly be considered in opposition to a summary judgment motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4); Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Raymond Mayes, another inmate kitchen worker, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment (B) holding that a court may not consider hearsay contained in an affidavit when ruling on a summary judgment motion (C) holding that the affidavit in question did not satisfy the burden of the party moving for summary judgment where affiants eonclusory statement failed to indicate personal knowledge of the circumstances in question and personal knowledge could not be reasonably inferred from the contents of the affidavit (D) holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court at the summary judgment stage to consider information from an affidavit based on inadmissible hearsay rather than the affiants personal knowledge (E) holding that an affidavit  consisting entirely of inadmissible hearsay is not sufficient to survive summary judgment
[EX A]:
holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment