In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: how much more of a connection to interstate commerce, if any, must be shown under a substantial rather than a de minimis standard. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 859-60 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 2455 (suggesting in a pre-Lopez opinion that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress could only reach criminal activity “ ‘substantially affecting interstate commerce.’ ”). It is clear, however, that the direct interstate connection required by Instruction 10 is much more substantial than the indirect interstate connection articulated by the government and disapproved of by the Court in Lopez. In Lopez, the connections articulated by the government between the possession of a firearm in a local school zone and interstate commerce were, to say the least, attenuated. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (<HOLDING>); see also Hicks, 106 F.3d at 189 (describing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference (B) holding that adverse inference rule is permissive (C) recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference (D) holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference (E) recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference
[EX A]: holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference

[EX Q]: of demonstrating that the statute “clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution.” Nixon v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 576 Pa. 385, 839 A.2d 277, 286 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While the General Assembly may enact laws which impinge on constitutional rights to protect the health, safety, and welfare of society, any restriction is subject to judicial review to protect the constitutional rights of all citizens. Id. As detailed below, we conclude that SORNA’s registration requirements violate juvenile offenders’ due process rights by utilizing the irrebuttable presumption that all juvenile offenders “pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(a)(4), because that presumpti 8, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542, 91 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state may not interfere with an unwed fathers custody rights absent proof of unfitness (B) holding unwed father entitled to hearing on his fitness as a parent before children could be taken from him after death of their mother (C) holding unconstitutional a statute providing for children to be declared dependent and removed from their unwed fathers custody based on the presumption that unwed fathers are unfit parents (D) holding that parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on parental fitness before children are removed from their custody (E) holding due process was violated by the automatic rejection of an unwed fathers custodial relationship without granting the father opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent
[EX A]: holding that the state may not interfere with an unwed fathers custody rights absent proof of unfitness

[EX Q]: Equivalents. As a jury has been demanded, only a jury can resolve the conflicting views of the experts in this non-obvious and extremely complicated patent dispute. “Summary judgment is as available in patent cases as in other areas of litigation.” See Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., .948 F.2d 1264, 1265 (Fed.Cir.1991) (citation omitted); see also Bayer AG v. Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corporation, 212 F.3d 1241 (Fed.Cir.2000); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795 (Fed.Cir.1999). However, I tend to agree with those of my confreres who have held that, in general, summary judgment is appropriate only in cases where the technology at issue is relatively simple and straightforward. See Amhil Enterprises, Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact (C) holding that summary judgment was appropriate because no genuine issue of material fact existed and no expert testimony was required to explain the nature of the patented invention but observing that district courts should approach summary judgment motions in patent cases with great care (D) holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment since the physical evidence and unrebutted expert testimony left no genuine issue of material fact (E) holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate
[EX A]:
holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment