In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action. Id. (emphasis added). A defendant must also “file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” Id. § 1446(d). The removal statutes are construed narrowly. Pritchett v. Off its, including the District of Kansas, have also followed this approach. See, e.g., Berbig v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Inc., 568 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1039 n. 9 (D.Minn.2008) (stating that “a failure to comply with the requirements of [Section 1446(a) ] ordinarily is not grounds to deny removal”); Riggs v. Fling Irrigation, Inc., 535 F.Supp.2d 572, 579 (W.D.N.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Yellow, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1215; In re Methyl 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under alabama law the law of the forum applies to procedural matters and that in most instances the statute of limitations is considered to be a procedural rule (B) recognizing that the procedural defect could be corrected through a reinstatement of the termination proceedings (C) holding that if the states criminal complaint against defendant had a jurisdictional defect the prosecution had the right to attempt to correct the defect and a motion to dismiss is one method of doing this (D) holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect (E) holding while there may be some case law to support plaintiffs argument the majority approach is that the failure to attach process defect is merely procedural and that this particular procedural defect may be cured

A: (E)
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Q: Ill 1997). AirTouch alleges that the City’s denial will in effect prohibit it from providing personal wireless services because alternative sites leave “gaps” in its service or will be too costly to provide. a. Gap In Coverage AirTouch has presented evidence of a gap in coverage in its wireless services on the Fanita Drive-Highway 125 corridor from Navajo Drive to the Highway 52 Connector. (Tifft Decl. at ¶ 11.) Air-Touch argues that if a decision leaves “significant gaps” in wireless services, § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) has been violated. The City argues that a mere gap is not sufficient; there must be a general ban for that provision to apply. AirTouch is supported by recent decisions of the Second and Third Circuit. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 640-41 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 70 (3rd Cir.) (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  332c7biii applies only to blanket prohibitions and general bans or policies and not to individual zoning decisions (B) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law (C) holding that  332c7b iii does not apply only to general bans and stating that prohibiting only general bans would 1 require a court to wait for a series of denied applications and 2 lead to the untenable result that once personal wire services are available within the jurisdiction of a state or local government  the state or local government could deny any further applications with impunity (D) holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional (E) holding that a district court cannot require a unit of state or local government to abide by a consent decree that does not serve any federal interest

A: (C)
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Q: CMI customers pay up to $15,000 to attend “trust academies” run by TES. (Aldridge Trial Tr. at 1287-88, 1295; T. Galley Dep. at 28; S. Galley Decl. ¶¶ 8-9). At these trust academies, customers set up a collection of trusts for the purposes of holding title to customers’ assets and paying their expenses, thereby allowing customers to deduct most of their personal expenses. (RFA 18, 22). CMI and defendant represent that these trusts will allow conversion of up to 97% of income to a tax shelter with “full disclosure to the IRS.” (S. Galley Decl. ¶¶ 14, 22; RFA 16; Fields Dep. at 41-42). The IRS may disregard an entity for tax purposes where such entity lacks economic substance. Richardson, 509 F.3d at 741; see also Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). To determine whether a trust has sufficient 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the economicsubstance doctrine is a judicial tool for effectuating the underlying congressional purpose that despite literal compliance with the statute tax benefits not be afforded based on transactions lacking in economic substance (B) holding complete prohibition on use of crime or accident reports for purpose of soliciting clients too broad a means of effectuating the intended purpose of the law (C) recognizing that an issuer has the primary obligation to pay on letter of credit such that literal compliance with the letter of credits terms for payment is all that is required (D) holding that equitable considerations did not toll the statute of limitations under the tort claims act where plaintiffs conduct was not in strict compliance with congressional waiver of immunity (E) recognizing that the purpose of the setoff doctrine is to prevent circuity of judicial actions

A:
(A)
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