In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: (2013) (ex plaining the FDA’s view that “promoting a drug for an off-label use is a violation” of the FDCA’s misbranding provisions). Based on this view, the FDA has recovered millions of dollars in settlements from drug manufacturers that have engaged in off-label promotion. See, e.g., id. at 232 (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History, (Sept. 2, 2009) (trumpeting a mul-ti-billion dollar fine imposed against a drug company that promoted its drugs for uses and dosages that the FDA specifically declined to approve)). The FDA’s informal interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to some deference from courts. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944) (<HOLDING>). But courts have not always agreed with the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation (B) holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference (C) holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law (D) holding that an agencys informal interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference to the extent it has the power to persuade (E) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference
[EX A]: holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation

[EX Q]: indorsers, and other persons conditionally liable also receive benefits from payment of the debt. If called on to pay, guarantors and the like would have been creditors; the “benefit” to them is that extinguishing the primary debt means that they receive a larger percentage of their claim than they would have had they paid and been converted to general creditors of the bankrupt. Cases under the 1898 Act routinely held that unless a person escapes an obligation to pay and so reaps a larger portion of his claim than do other creditors, he has not received a statutory “benefit”. E.g., Mayes v. Palmer, 208 F. 97 (8th Cir.1913); Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 F. 850 (5th Cir.1924); Mansfield Lumber Co. v. Sternberg, 38 F.2d 614 (8th Cir.1930). See also Bonded Financial, 838 F.2d at 895-96 (<HOLDING>). The Liquidator has not identified, and we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subparagraphs a and b are mutually exclusive and thus any travel between work and home even if it is also for a dual purpose must be analyzed exclusively under paragraph a (B) holding that transferee and beneficiary are mutually exclusive categories (C) holding trial court is sole and exclusive judge of witnesses credibility (D) holding that the remedies are exclusive (E) recognizing that  1983 and  2254 proceedings are mutually exclusive so that if a claim can be properly raised in one of those proceedings it cannot be raised in the other type of proceeding
[EX A]: holding that subparagraphs a and b are mutually exclusive and thus any travel between work and home even if it is also for a dual purpose must be analyzed exclusively under paragraph a

[EX Q]: transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ " (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)). 30 . Id. at 339-40, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (citations omitted). That arbitration agreements are instruments of a fraudulent scheme is not an arbitration-specific defense. Any contract employed as an instrument of a fraudulent scheme would similarly be invalid. In any event, the cases cited by the Court evidence its concern for state laws targeting arbitration clauses. E.g., Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 31 . — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 186 L.Ed.2d 417 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state law governs whether an arbitration clause is enforceable against a nonsignatory under the faa (B) holding that all arbitration provisions dealing with transactions involving interstate commerce are subject to the faa (C) holding that whether in federal or state court a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole and not specifically to the arbitration clause within it must go to the arbitrator and not the court (D) recognizing a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration in the faa (E) holding that montanas firstpage notice requirement which governs not any contract but specifically and solely contracts subject to arbitration conflicts with the faa and is therefore displaced by the federal measure
[EX A]:
holding that state law governs whether an arbitration clause is enforceable against a nonsignatory under the faa