In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: court’s description of the panel’s rationale as “one over which reasonable jurists may differ” can hardly be construed as a ringing endorsement of Bush v. Gore’s precedential value or its application to the issue of variations in voting technology. Shelley II, 344 F.3d at 918. At the very least, the Ninth Circuit’s unanimous decision in Shelley II divested the panel decision of whatever precedential value it otherwise would have had. Undeterred, the majority struggles to accord such value to Shelley I because the rationale adopted by the majority is virtually identical to the one provided by the Shelley I panel — namely, that the plaintiffs’ novel equal protection claims are controlled by Supreme Court precedents that mandate the equal weighting of votes. Compare Maj. Op. at 870-71 (<HOLDING>), with Shelley I, 344 F.3d at 894-95 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error (B) holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional (C) holding that the counties use of outdated technology results in the weighting of votes differently (D) holding that a plaintiff need only show that the results of a polygraph examination were a factor in the termination of employment and rejecting requirement that results be the sole factor for employees discharge (E) holding that in a statutory fee case the results obtained factor was already subsumed in the lodestar and that results multipliers should be awarded only in some cases of exceptional success

A: holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error
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Q: partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court’s order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants’ arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment

A: holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied
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Q: Kodak Co., 98 F.Supp.2d 141, 147 (D.Mass.2000) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Arruda v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 310 F.3d 13, 18-19 (1st Cir.2002). 123 . See id. at 46-47 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1298, at 625-26 (2d ed.1990)). 124 . Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 228. 125 . See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12651(a)(1) & (2); Del.Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1201(a)(1) & (2); D.C.Code §§ 2-308-14(a)(1) & (2); Fla. Stat. §§ 68.082(2)(a) & (b); Haw.Rev.Stat. §§ 661-21(a)(1) & (2); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.175/3(a)(1) & (2); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 5B(1) & (2); Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 357.040(1)(a) & (b); Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 71-5-182(a)(1)(A) & (B); Tex. Hum. Res.Code Ann. § 36.002; Va.Code Ann. §§ 8.01-216.3(A)(1) & (2). 126 . Cf. Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 227-28 (<HOLDING>). 127 .Id. at 232. 128 . See id. at 225 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions (B) holding that the federal false claims act is an antifraud statute to which rule 9bs heightened pleading requirements apply (C) holding that the group pleading doctrine survives the pslra as to rule 9bs particularity requirements but does not apply to the pslras scienter requirements (D) holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim (E) holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983

A:
holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions
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