In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: evaluate each piece of evidence according to its independent worth. B. The Copyright Act of 1909 The plaintiff renewed its copyright in The URANTIA Book in 1983, by which time the Copyright Act of 1976 had become effective. However, the renewal section under which the book falls, Section 304, is identical to that of Section 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909. Furthermore, as the plaintiff correctly states, “[t]he passage of the [1976 Act] did not alter the definition of a Svork for hire’ for the purpose of renewing a copyright originally registered under the [1909 Act].... Thus, whether The URANTIA Book is a ‘eommis-sioned work’ must be decided under the Copyright Act of 1909.” (Pl.’s Br. at 5 n. 4.) See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 217, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 1758, 109 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 606 n. 2 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court (B) holding renewal rights in pre1978 works require court to look to the language of and case law interpreting  24 (C) recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result (D) holding that if statutory language is plain and unambiguous this court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent (E) holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language
[EX A]: holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court

[EX Q]: court’s description of the panel’s rationale as “one over which reasonable jurists may differ” can hardly be construed as a ringing endorsement of Bush v. Gore’s precedential value or its application to the issue of variations in voting technology. Shelley II, 344 F.3d at 918. At the very least, the Ninth Circuit’s unanimous decision in Shelley II divested the panel decision of whatever precedential value it otherwise would have had. Undeterred, the majority struggles to accord such value to Shelley I because the rationale adopted by the majority is virtually identical to the one provided by the Shelley I panel — namely, that the plaintiffs’ novel equal protection claims are controlled by Supreme Court precedents that mandate the equal weighting of votes. Compare Maj. Op. at 870-71 (<HOLDING>), with Shelley I, 344 F.3d at 894-95 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error (B) holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional (C) holding that the counties use of outdated technology results in the weighting of votes differently (D) holding that a plaintiff need only show that the results of a polygraph examination were a factor in the termination of employment and rejecting requirement that results be the sole factor for employees discharge (E) holding that in a statutory fee case the results obtained factor was already subsumed in the lodestar and that results multipliers should be awarded only in some cases of exceptional success
[EX A]: holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error

[EX Q]: which the bank was located. Such a result could never have been contemplated by Congress.” Id. 67-68. See also Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 558, 43 S.Ct. 200, 67 L.Ed. 396 (1923) (“Here, while the suit is one in equity, the statute and decisions relied upon have nothing to do with the general principles of equity or with federal equity jurisdiction, but simply establish a measure of damages applicable alike to actions at law and suits in equity. The case presented by the bills is primarily one involving title to land and seeking an injunction against continuing trespasses. The conversion of the oil, for which damages are sought, is incidental and dependent. The entire cause of action is therefore local”); Collett v. Adams, 249 U.S. 545, 550, 39 S.Ct. 372, 63 L.Ed. 764 (1919) (<HOLDING>); Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the second circuits longstanding doctrine a defendants failure to specifically object to venue at the close of evidence constitutes a waiver of objection to venue (B) holding that the venue provisions of the bankruptcy act were superseded by the local action doctrine (C) holding that former federal venue statute applied to transitory actions only and did not displace local action rule (D) recognizing that special venue statutes are supplemented by the 28 usc  1391 venue provisions applicable to all civil cases (E) holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added
[EX A]:
holding that under the second circuits longstanding doctrine a defendants failure to specifically object to venue at the close of evidence constitutes a waiver of objection to venue