TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: arbitrators, Eventys argues, the circuit court could have assured that both parties would have an opportunity to make their arguments to that forum. Alternatively, Eventys maintains, the circuit court should have considered and expressly ruled upon Eventys’s arguments that the provision purporting to waive class action claims was unconscionable and unenforceable. Eventys further argues that, because the “terms and conditions” did not include a severability provision, the circuit court’s necessary determination that FDUTPA’s remedial purposes are frustrated by the class action waiver provision would then invalidate the entire arbitration provision. For this argument, Eventys relies principally on the analysis in S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski, 976 So.2d 600, 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>), and a group of federal cases holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contractual provisions in an arbitration agreement purporting to prohibit consumers from prosecuting class actions for small sums of money per consumer but for a substantial number of consumers are irreconcilably at odds with the remedial purposes of fdutpa contrary to the public policy of this state and unenforceable for that reason (B) holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute  the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable (C) holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable (D) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (E) holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: those same arguments. Like the majority of the appellate panel that first reviewed this appeal, we are not persuaded to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this evidential ruling. It was for the trial court to assess defendant’s prior conviction’s probative value in light of its remoteness, and we cannot say that the trial court erred in that judgment. The question is not whether we would have made a different determination in the first instance. Rather, we apply the normal, deferential standard and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the use of the prior conviction for impeachment purposes. The conviction was not stale by the standard in use for assessing remoteness. See Harris, supra, 209 N.J. at 436, 444-45, 38 A.3d 559 (<HOLDING>). And, we cannot say that the trial court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible (B) holding two prior convictions more than ten years old admissible where disorderlypersons offenses bridged the gap (C) holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand (D) holding that evidence of two intervening felony convictions removed taint of remoteness from convictions more than 10 years prior permitting analysis under rule 609a (E) holding that prior distribution and possession convictions that were eight and ten years before the charged conduct occurred were not too remote

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: 381. The alleged triggering event was a transfer of corporate shares in exchange for shares in another corporation, but there was no transfer of corporate ownership to outsiders. The court concluded that the meaning of “sale” in the agreement was ambiguous because it was uncertain “whether the actual control of the shares must be transferred,” and therefore “remand[ed] for a jury to consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether the parties intended that the shares needed to change control in a real sense before [the plaintiff’s] rights under the agreement would be triggered.” Id. at 382. Other courts have held that a sale or conveyance may require a real change of ownership or control as well as consideration. See, e.g., NSK, Ltd. v. United States, 115 F.3d 965, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); Mandell v. Gavin, 816 A.2d 619, 625 (Conn. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that both tria  201 and fsia  1610g require plaintiffs to prove some terrorist state ownership in order to attach and execute on property and finding that ownership interest through federal interstitial rule making (B) holding an implied dedication gives rise to a servitude of public use and does not transfer ownership (C) holding that a contract without a minimum quantity term is unenforceable for lack of consideration and mutuality (D) holding that term sold requires both a transfer of ownership to an unrelated party and consideration (E) holding that term court encompasses trial by both judge and jury

SOLUTION:
(D)