In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 593, 598 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1, 135 L.Ed.2d 1098 (1996), and of mixed questions of law and fact, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). However, the state court’s factual findings underlying those determinations are presumed to be correct and binding, as long as they were made after a full, fair, and adequate hearing on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 1994) (pre-AED-PA); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of es ing that the findings of the trial court on discriminatory intent in Batson challenge are reviewed for clear error); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (B) holding that the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under general statutes  46a60 is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (C) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (D) holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard (E) holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard
[EX A]: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard

[EX Q]: see State v. Sosa, 1997-NMSC-032, ¶ 9, 123 N.M. 564, 943 P.2d 1017. {34} Defendant argues that two provisions in the current Delinquency Act suggest the Legislature’s intent to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the Section 32A-2-20 findings. These two provisions, Section 32A-2-24(B) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in probation revocation hearings), and Section 32A-2-16(E) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding), are readily distinguishable from the amenability determination under Section 32A-2-20(B). First, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding is constitutionally mandated. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. Second, a probation revocation hearing, l 7, 1140-41 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>); State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 649, 651, 674 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (D) holding that treatment as a child is not a constitutional right but a right granted by the legislature and statute met basic due process requirements (E) holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard
[EX A]: holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel

[EX Q]: to the agency’s employees or activities. Both statutes qualify as Exemption 3 statutes. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985); Krikorian v. Dep’t of State, 984 F.2d at 465; Fitzgibbon v. CIA 911 F.2d 755, 761 (D.C.Cir.1990); Founding Church of Scientology v. Nat’l Security Agency, 610 F.2d 824, 827-29 (D.C.Cir.1979); Pfeiffer v. CIA 721 F.Supp. 337, 341-42 (D.D.C.1989). Third, the DOC also properly invokes § 12(c) of the Export Administration Act (“EAA”), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411(c)(1), prohibiting public disclosure of information obtained with respect to license applications unless the Secretary determines that the disclo sure is in the national interest. See Wisc. Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. Dep’t of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 281 (D.C.Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Fourth, the DOC properly invokes the Ethics 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that various versions of the statute qualify as an exemption 3 statute (B) holding that  6103 qualifies as an exemption statute (C) holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute (D) holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes (E) holding that rule 6e qualifies as a statute for purposes of exemption 3
[EX A]:
holding that various versions of the statute qualify as an exemption 3 statute