In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 39:4-88(b), the mandate to drive within a single lane to the extent practicable applies, whether or not a deviation from that lane imposes a risk to another driver. The statute’s second clause addresses a related, but discrete, mandate of the Code. It requires a driver to ascertain the safety of switching lanes before conducting a lane change. N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b). Unlike the violation described in the first clause of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b), the violation described in the second clause is avoided if a driver, in a roadway with multiple lanes traveling in the same direction, first determines that departure from a lane may be conducted safely. The Appellate Division’s limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b) to the violation identified in the statute’s second clause would render t .App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the courts of our sister states, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness (B) holding that tex transp code ann  545060a describes one offense (C) holding that no offense alleged where affidavit described offense as felony (D) holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense (E) holding that the statute describes but one offense which can be committed by either or both of two methods
[A]: holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness


[Q]: the notice. (Hilsee Supp. Aff. ¶ 6(b), June 8, 2005). Moreover, the notice campaign began in early December, and the deadline to file opt-outs was April 8, 2005. This timeline, spanning a period of four months, is consistent with court-approved best practices for class notice campaigns. Id. at ¶ 6(c)vi. Accordingly, I FIND that there was sufficient notice leading up to the opt-out deadline. Objectors also assert that because the settlement class could have potentially included millions of Class Members, and only 6,524 have “shown their hands” to be included in the class by filing an inventory form, the notice is inadequate. However, many factors contribute to the claims response rate. See, e.g., Zimmer Paper Prod., Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>); 3 Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (B) holding that notice apprised class members sufficiently of information that notice was intended under the rule to convey (C) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (D) holding that where defendant engaged in customary and court approved notice procedure the response rate was not determinative of the adequacy of the class notice (E) holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice
[A]: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner


[Q]: improperly removed the action as there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy fails to meet the $75,000 threshold. (Dkt. No. 5.) Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of “compensatory, special and general damages in an amount according to proof at trial, but not less than $1,000,000.” (Dkt. No., Ex. A.) Plaintiff further states that the amount of the Note on the property in question is $440,000 (Id.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. The question before the Court is whether, for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Wells Fargo is also a citizen of California. See, e.g., Uriarte v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127497 at *9, 2011 WL 5295285 at *2-3 (S.D.Cal. Nov. 3, 2011) (<HOLDING>). But see Flores v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 2012 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for a domestic corporation the foreign principal place of business does not count (B) holding that the location of a corporations principal place of business for diversity purposes is the state where the corporation has its headquarters or nerve center (C) holding that if a domestic corporations principal place of business is abroad the foreign principal place of business cannot be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes (D) holding that wells fargo is also a citizen of california where it has its principal place of business (E) holding that for diversity purposes a national bank is  a citizen of  the state of its principal place of business and the state listed in its organizational certificate
[A]:
holding that for a domestic corporation the foreign principal place of business does not count