In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: to intervene” as a linguistic tool to highlight how little personal participation the defendant had in the arrest in that particular case. The passage shows how far below the required minimum level of involvement that particular defendant exhibited. Read in whole, Brown more accurately shows that personal participation in an arrest, or supervisory control over the arresting officer, is required in order to establish liability for unlawful arrest — mere presence is not enough. However, even assuming Plaintiffs are correct, and that law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene in other officer’s unlawful arrests, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers or Alma Officers violated clearly established law in this case. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Canine Handlers and Alma Officers were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search (C) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force (D) holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant (E) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied
[EX A]: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim

[EX Q]: claims that respondent was aware World Bowling was purchasing the bowling alley from appellants but was never informed of the details of the purchase. We reject respondent’s contention that it could not have actual knowledge of appellants’ misfiled U.C.C.-l because any details it knew about the purchase of the bowling alley and its contents took place before the U.C.C.-l was filed. First, respondent had notice that the bowling alley contents were encumbered because it was involved with the sale until the time of closing. Second, the plain language of section 386.9-401(2) does not require that knowledge of the contents be gained only after the U.C.C.-l is misfiled and we may not add this requirement to the statute. Martinco v. Hastings, 265 Minn. 490, 497, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Finally, both the district court and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks (B) holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature (C) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (D) holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted (E) holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature
[EX A]: holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature

[EX Q]: matter is before us on a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we cannot look beyond McCormick’s complaint. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1236 (“The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is ... to assess whether the plaintiffs complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” (quotation omitted)). McCormick has never filed an amended complaint containing a factual allegation that the final shift change occurred on January 24, nor has he filed a motion seeking to amend his complaint. In th was aware of the alleged typographical error when he filed his brief in opposition to appellants’ motions to dismiss. At that point in the proceedings, he could have amended his complaint without the permission of the district court. See Glenn, 868 F.2d at 370 (<HOLDING>). McCormick had a reasonable opportunity to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss (B) holding appellate courts have jurisdiction over the district courts orders rejecting as a matter of law qualified immunity raised in a motion to dismiss (C) holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion (D) holding that appellants could have amended as of right after they received the motion to dismiss and prior to the trial courts decision (E) recognizing that they could be amended anyway
[EX A]:
holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss