In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
other non-Virginia cases offer a compelling basis for adopting the per se rule Allied has proposed. In National City Bank v. Fleming, 2 Ohio App.3d 50, 440 N.E.2d 590, 599 (1981), for instance, the court said: It has long been the law of equity that a person who confers a benefit either directly or indirectly upon another in the course of performance of a contract with a third person is not entitled to compensation ... merely because of the failure of performance by the third party. However, where it appears from all the facts that the conferral of such benefit was the product of fraud, misrepresentation or bad faith by the party accepting and retaining such benefit, equity will imply an obligation to make payment therefor. See Costanzo v. Stewart, 9 Ariz.App. 430, 453 P.2d 526 (1969) (<HOLDING>), (emphasis added) (some citations omitted). 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a hospital could not be an erisa beneficiary (B) holding that the thirdparty beneficiary theory did not apply (C) holding that a duty may be owed to a beneficiary of a consensual relationship akin to that of a thirdparty beneficiary of a contract where the professional has actual knowledge that the services being provided are in part for the benefit of such third persons (D) holding that a contract beneficiary may be liable in restitution where the beneficiary by his conduct induces the conferral of the benefit (E) holding change of beneficiary effective where city employee listed a new beneficiary for his group life insurance policy in an employee personal data form next to the words designated beneficiary even though this did not comply with the policy terms

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
as late as February 1994, although the wife stated that she did not think that she lived with them for longer than one year. The wife testified that, during the time that she lived with the husband’s parents, they helped her financially. It appears that the trial court may have considered the husband’s obligation to support the wife suspended during the time that she lived with his parents, as the order reflects that it calculated arrearage beginning in February 1994. Alimony arrearage is a final judgment as of the date due and is not subject to modification. Harris v. Harris, 553 So.2d 129 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). In some instances alimony obligations can be satisfied by means other than direct payment from the husband to the wife. See, Swindle v. Swindle, 429 So.2d 601 (Ala.Civ.App.1983) (<HOLDING>); Frazier v. Frazier, 455 So.2d 883 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate (B) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (C) holding that the standard fire policy and a broader homeowners policy were so intertwined that the prescriptive period in the standard fire policy applied to nonfire perils (D) holding that obligation to pay mortgage on home was satisfied by payment of fire insurance proceeds where husband maintained fire insurance policy (E) holding that when the house  is destroyed by fire and there exists thereon a policy by insurance the money arising therefrom stands in the place instead of such house  the proceeds of the policy therefore take the place of the property loss

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
with the State, and the legislature determined that the plate will bear the message “Choose Life.” The State thus exercises complete editorial control over the content of the speech on the Choose Life plate. As a result, the second factor also weighs in favor of finding government speech. Finally, I consider the third and fourth factors of the SCV test: the “identity of the literal speaker” and “whether the gov- eminent or the private entity bears the ultimate responsibility” for the speech. SCV, 288 F.3d at 621. As to the third factor, I note, as our court did in SCV, that the Supreme Court has held that even messages on standard license plates are associated at least partly with the vehicle owners. Id. at 621; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (<HOLDING>). This association is much stronger when the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge floridas choose life license plate under either the establishment clause or the free speech clause of the first amendment (B) holding that a new hampshire statute requiring vehicles to bear license plates with the state motto live free or die not obscured could not be constitutionally enforced because it violated the defendants first amendment right to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster in the way new hampshire commands an idea they find morally objectionable (C) recognizing first amendment retaliation right (D) holding that vehicle owner had first amendment right to cover the live free or die motto on new hampshire plate (E) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment

Ex Output:

(D)