In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: as here, the recalcitrant witness is at liberty pending appeal. In so holding, we join all of the circuits which have squarely addressed the issue. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 906 F.2d 78, 82-83 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom. Backiel v. United States, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990); In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 189 (D.C.Cir.1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 785 F.2d 629, 631 n. 4 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Johnson, 736 F.2d 358, 361-62 n. 5 (6th Cir.1984); In re Witness Before Special October 1981 Grand Jury, 722 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir.1983); In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir.1982); Brown v. United States, 465 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.1972). But see In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928, 96 S.Ct. 276, 46 L.Ed.2d 256 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The foregoing cases have noted that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the deadmans statute should not be extended by judicial construction to cases not clearly within its terms (B) recognizing that denying outofeell exercise for extended periods may constitute cruel and unusual punishment (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration (E) holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to guantanamo
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: is narrowly crafted to get to the heart of the motion for summary judgment without allowing a lot of potentially unnecessary discovery. Montoya has said he did not show Wilks or Armijo his computer screen, or tell them Todd’s crimes; if Wilks says othexwise, there will likely be a genuine issue of fact requiring .the Court to deny the motions and allow the parties to proceed to trial. It seems fundamentally unfair to dismiss Todd’s case when a deposition of Wilks may make his case. Further, this deposition will not burden any government employees or entities. Accordingly, the Court finds that this limited discovery falls within the exceptions to disallowing discovery once the defense of qualified immunity has been raised. See Garrett v. C.A. Stratmen [Stratman], M.D., 254 F.3d at 953 (<HOLDING>). The Court does not believe this one 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine (B) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted (C) recognizing that a discovery order in the context of qualified immunity is not immediately appealable when the defendants immunity claim turns at least partially on a factual question when the district court is unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of the facts and which are narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim are neither avoidable or overly broad (D) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (E) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, we deny his motion that we disregard them. 2 . Dunn asserts that Officer McClain’s, self-described "evasive maneuver” involved only taking his foot off the accelerator and did not involve braking' or making a quick movement. Regardless, deceleration, whether by braking or discontinuing acceleration, in response to a weaving driver, is evasive, and unsafe weaving does not require that other drivers brake or make quick, furtive movements. See Taylor v. State, 916 S.W.2d 680, 681-82 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, pet. ref'd) (considering swerving into another lane and almost hitting an officers’ vehicle therein to be unsafe driving); see also Yeakley v. State, No. 03-09-00584-CR, 2011 WL 677391, at *4 (Tex.App-Austin Feb. 25, 2011, pet. dism’d) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the drivers refusal to consent to search of automobile did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that vehicle contained narcotics (B) holding that a drivers knowledge that there are concealable weapons in the car available for the drivers use is evidence of possession (C) holding that surrounding drivers use of caution to avoid the appellants weaving vehicle did not render the weaving safe (D) holding that drivers decision to use alternate vehicle to avoid inconvenience of stopping at gas station did not render vehicle temporary substitute (E) holding that where uncontroverted evidence rebuts a presumption that a defendant consented to the drivers use of his vehicle the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
Example Output:
(C)