In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Majority Opinion in Ford, former Justice Newman authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Saylor joined, in which she specifically expressed her agreement “that appellate counsel acted ineffectively by neglecting to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to investigate and present evidence during the penalty phase of Appellant’s history of abuse and mental illness.” Ford, 809 A.2d at 336 (Newman, J., joined by Saylor, J., concurring). 5 . Although Teague's retroactivity analysis did not gamer five votes, a majority of the High Court soon thereafter reaffirmed the Teague plurality's rule and its two exceptions in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). 6 . Compare with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty (B) holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (C) holding that juveniles are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (D) holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing (E) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants
[A]: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty


[Q]: to intervene” as a linguistic tool to highlight how little personal participation the defendant had in the arrest in that particular case. The passage shows how far below the required minimum level of involvement that particular defendant exhibited. Read in whole, Brown more accurately shows that personal participation in an arrest, or supervisory control over the arresting officer, is required in order to establish liability for unlawful arrest — mere presence is not enough. However, even assuming Plaintiffs are correct, and that law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene in other officer’s unlawful arrests, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers or Alma Officers violated clearly established law in this case. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Canine Handlers and Alma Officers were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search (C) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force (D) holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant (E) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied
[A]: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim


[Q]: its discretion in denying the mistrial. See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77. We overrule Appellant’s fifth issue. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 . See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 21.11 (Vernon 2011) & 22.021 (Vernon 2016). 2 . For the purpose of this appeal, we refer to the children using the pseudonyms Alice, Belle, and Cici, rather than using their initials, and their mother as Mother. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 57.02(h) (Vernon Supp. 2016). 3 . Belle also testified that on another date, Appellant attempted to kiss- her on the mouth, but she pulled away from him. She did not mention this during her forensic interview. 4 . Parties do not contest the testimonial nature of the forensic examinations. See Woodall v. State, 336 S.W.3d 634, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hearsay objection does not preserve a confrontation clause challenge (B) holding confrontation clause inapplicable at sentencing (C) holding that in reviewing confrontation clause challenge appellate courts must first determine whether the confrontation clause is implicated (D) holding that hearsay argument for admission of evidence did not preserve confrontation clause challenge on appeal argument could have referred either to rules of evidence or confrontation clause but failed to identify confrontation clause as basis and thus did not put trial court on notice of issue (E) holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment
[A]:
holding that hearsay objection does not preserve a confrontation clause challenge