In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: negligence placed the plaintiff....” Brown v. Philadelphia Coll, of Osteopathic Med., 449 Pa.Super. 667, 674 A.2d 1130, 1135-36 (1996). Russell’s actions were intentional, not negligent. The impact rule, which depends upon the negligence of a defendant, is therefore inapposite to this case. 7 . Because DiSalvio’s federal cause of action survives Russell's Motion to Dismiss, the Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over DiSalvio’s remaining state law claims. 9 . Unlike the School District Defendants, Russell has not argued that this tort is unavailable to plaintiffs in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 10 . The Court similarly rejects Russell’s argument that DiSalvio cannot recover punitive damages from him under her § 1983 claim. See Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 11 . DiSalvio suggests that Magill should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages may be awarded for egregious violations of the lmrda (B) holding that punitive damages may be imposed against employer for tortious conduct of employee (C) holding that punitive damages may be awarded under  1983 when the defendants conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others (D) holding that a supervisor with no personal involvement may be liable for the constitutional violation of a subordinate for culpable action or inaction in the training supervision or control of his subordinates acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation  or reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others (E) holding that since the complaint set out a deliberate indifference claim it follows logically that reckless or callous indifference has been noticed

Answer: holding that punitive damages may be awarded for egregious violations of the lmrda


Question: the justifiable use of deadly force to specific circumstances, such as when the actor “reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another.” Id. § 776.012(1). As discussed at length above, Lieutenant Weippert’s conduct was objectively reasonable and he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Penley posed a threat of great bodily harm to the lieutenant and others. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Penleys, the evidence reveals no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lieutenant Weippert’s use of force was reasonably necessary. Under Florida law, Lieutenant Weippert had no duty to retreat and his use of force was justifiable. See State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 337-38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle (B) holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded (C) holding that after being chased by a carfull of angry men it would have been reasonable for mr rivera a private citizen to believe that deadly force was necessary even if only a single unarmed pursuer had approached his nowstopped car because the pursuer and his friends had already threatened riveras life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a highspeed chase and throwing deadly missiles namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna (D) holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure (E) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car

Answer: holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle


Question: foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is Affirmed, in part, Reversed, in part, VACATED, in part, and Remanded.for further proceedings consistent with this order. 1 . Defendants express some doubts as to whether Type II agreements exist in New York law, or are merely a “creature of the federal courts.” Simone v. N.V. Floresta, 1999 WL 429504, at *9 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1999), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9578, at *27 n. 3. However, New York courts have cited with approval Tribune and Adjustrite, and appear to recognize the possibility of “Type II” preliminary agreements. See, e.g., SNC, Ltd. v. Kamine Eng. and Mech. Contracting Co., Inc., 238 A.D.2d 146, 655 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48 (1997); River Glen Assoc., Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch Credit Corp., 295 A.D.2d 274, 743 N.Y.S.2d 870 (2002) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Defendants argue on appeal that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government was bound by an agreement it treated as binding although it preceded the formal plea agreement (B) holding that the arbitration agreement in a written contract did not apply to a dispute arising from a subsequent oral agreement which did not incorporate the arbitration clause from the written contract (C) holding that agreement did not constitute a binding preliminary agreement to negotiate in good faith a mortgage contract (D) holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law (E) holding that agreement as to form and content did not constitute agreed judgment

Answer:
holding that the government was bound by an agreement it treated as binding although it preceded the formal plea agreement