In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
century context. We hold, therefore, that a plaintiff may not recover for mental anguish for a potential injury to her unborn child that is wholly unsupported by any physical suffering during and after the incident in question and that explicitly has been ruled out by routine medical diagnostics. We are mindful of the fact, however, that pregnancy and childbirth continue to pose great mysteries that escape complete comprehension and control, and that carry risks with them, which, despite the latest advancements in medical research and technology, cannot be fully assessed. This has led some of our sister states to sustain their holdings in cases involving mental anguish suffered by pregnant women in recent decisions. See, e.g., Simons v. Beard, 188 Or.App. 370, 72 P.3d 96 (2003) (<HOLDING>). We emphasize that in an appropriate case this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a woman who was six months pregnant at the time of the accident was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension that her child may be born dead or deformed as a result of striking her abdomen against the steering wheel in the accident (B) holding that a pregnant woman whose baby died just before being born as a direct result of defendantdoctors negligence was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension about the childs wellbeing before death after she learned that the baby was in a transverse position across the upper part of the birth canal and defendant did not undertake any steps to correct the position until after the baby had died (C) holding female supervisors alleged comments that she did not want to add stress to the baby were sufficient direct evidence in a pregnancy discrimination mixed motives case (D) holding woman who claimed she was terminated after giving birth because she became pregnant was part of the protected class (E) holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that the victim suffered before she died based on numerous bruises on her forearms that appeared to be defensive wounds and the large amount of blood found at the scene of the crime indicating that many of the wounds were inflicted before the victim died

Ex Output:
holding that a woman who was six months pregnant at the time of the accident was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension that her child may be born dead or deformed as a result of striking her abdomen against the steering wheel in the accident


Ex Input:
the bankruptcy court’s power to control dissemination of information more broadly. Judge Steven Gerling, for example, observed in In re Bennett, that If the information [sought to be protected] does not represent trade secrets or confidential research, development or commercial information, then whether to permit access to the information is a matter left to the Court’s discretion. It requires the Court to examine the relevant facts and circumstances and then to balance the interests of the party opposing disclosure with that of the public. In re Bennett, 226 B.R. 331, 336 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1998); see also In re Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2nd Cir.1994) (discussing § 107 and use of records for improper purpose); In re Robert Landau Associates, 50 B.R. 670, 675-76 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>); but see In re Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. 675, 679 
 Holding statements: (A) holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter (B) holding that when the trial court signed an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint but refused to enter a final judgment on that order the order refusing to enter judgment was appealable under former ors 190102a (C) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality (D) recognizing inherent authority but vacating order not supported by necessary findings (E) holding that while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judges signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court the city waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the indiana supreme court has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection and more recently this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect

Ex Output:
holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter


Ex Input:
we hold the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motions to dismiss those charges. Moreover, we note that neither counsel for defendant nor for the State objected to the omission of Black’s name in the jury instructions. Despite the trial court’s asking if there were “any corrections or additions from either party as to the jury charge as given,” neither counsel for defendant nor for the State requested any changes. In fact, we recognize that the trial court’s instruction in applying the concerted action theory to the evidence presented “was in fact favorable to defendant.” State v. Harris, 315 N.C. 556, 564, 340 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1986). Accordingly, even if the trial court’s jury instruction had been erroneous, we cannot find that defendant was prejudiced thereby. See id. (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Cox, 303 N.C. 75, 86-87, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that comments that implied that the drug trade would continue if the jury did not convict the defendant were improper (B) holding the trial courts subsequently corrected instruction that the jury must find the defendant personally committed the offenses in order to convict the defendant on those charges did not prejudice the defendant (C) holding that there was no error where one instruction did not inform the jury that in order to convict defendant of attempted murder the evidence must show that defendant had a specific intent to commit murder but where subsequent instruction did inform jury of this requirement and concluding that the instructions when read as a whole adequately informed the jury of the requirement of specific intent to kill (D) holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense (E) holding that the trial judges misconduct at trial did not prejudice the defendant in light of the courts curative instructions

Ex Output:

holding that comments that implied that the drug trade would continue if the jury did not convict the defendant were improper