instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
of the evidence. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. In interpreting Hicks, supra, the Second Circuit has stated definitively as follows: [Defendant] misreads the Supreme Court’s statement in Hicks that once a defendant produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his or her action, the plaintiff must then establish that the defendant’s actions were intentionally discriminatory. [Defendant] takes this statement as requiring the plaintiff to adduce additional evidence after the defendant’s production — evidence beyond that presented in the plaintiffs prima facie case. Justice Scalia took pains to preclude such an interpretation of the Court’s decision when he observed that, upon rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons for its action , 142 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1189, 127 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (B) holding that former employer met its burden of proof that ubc exception applied (C) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (D) holding plaintiffs ultimate burden of proof can be met by combining proof submitted in its prima facie case with evidence that defendants proffered reasons for its acts were false (E) recognizing that a plaintiffs burden in establishing a prima facie case is not onerous
answer:
holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence


question:
first time a party must specify the statute authorizing attorney’s fees is in the Rule 54 motion (unless otherwise provided by statute or court order). In Missouri, attorney’s fees are not recoverable from another party, except when a contract or statute allows it. Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. banc 2009). The second sentence of the Missouri commissions statute is such an exception to the general Missouri rule. Kraft v. Edwards, 946 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Mo.App.1997). The district judge’s ruling that there was no statutory basis for an award of attorney’s fees is erroneous as a matter of law. On remand, the district court should consider whether to award attorney’s fees. See Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 631 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because this case as tried addressed only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award (B) holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained (C) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence (D) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (E) holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances
answer:
holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained


question:
— Protecting People, Not Places Because “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), it “provides sanctuary for citizens wherever they have a legitimate expectation of privacy,” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990), and there is no dispute that Hardin was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection while in Ms. Reynolds’s apartment. But, because “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted,” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133— 34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), Hardin may not assert Ms. Reynolds’s rights, he may assert only his.own. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) (<HOLDING>). And, because Hardin was the subject of an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding search invalid under the fourth amendment when a physicallypresent occupant expressly objected to a search  notwithstanding the consent of a fellow occupant (B) holding that mother who was resident of house shared with adult daughter could give valid consent to search premises (C) holding that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling was reasonable as to one occupant who gave consent but not to another who did not (D) holding defendants girlfriend had authority to consent to search as a joint occupant (E) holding defendant gave a valid and knowing consent to a search of his dwelling and automobile when he agreed to the terms of probation
answer:

holding search invalid under the fourth amendment when a physicallypresent occupant expressly objected to a search  notwithstanding the consent of a fellow occupant