TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: are differences between sanctions under Rule 37(a) and substitution of counsel conditioned on payment of fees, the parallel considerations convince us that the Cunningham rationale applies here. Like Rule 37(a) sanctions, the present situation invokes concerns regarding finality, avoiding piecemeal appeals, and availability of effective appellate review.” Id. Cases from the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits further support interpreting Cunningham as applying more broadly than to Rule 37(a) sanctions alone. The First Circuit recognized in Empresas Omajede, Inc. v. Bennazar-Zequeira, 213 F.3d 6, 9 n. 4 (1st Cir.2000), that Cunningham affirmed its precedents denying interlocutory appeals in the sanctions area. See, e.g., United States v. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Appeal of Licht & Semonoff 796 F.2d 564, 573 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable (B) holding sanctions pursuant to rule 26g not immediately appealable (C) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (D) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order (E) holding an order of rule 37a sanctions against an attorney is immediately appealable under  1291

SOLUTION: holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable

PROBLEM: the in-state banking activities of these French and Japanese banks and Plaintiffs’ claims arising from a terrorist attack that occurred in Israel with the support of the Iranian government. It certainly cannot be said that Plaintiffs’ claims “directly arise” out of the banking activities of these local branches. See GCIU, 565 F.3d at 1024. Thus, under traditional legal principles, specific jurisdiction is lacking. Although the Seventh Circuit • has not addressed this issue, two Circuits have reformulated the minimum-contacts inquiry in cases involving third-party discovery, focusing more narrowly “on the connection between the nonparty’s contacts with the forum and the discovery order at issue.” Gucci, 768 F.3d at 137; see also S.E.C. v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 418 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>)., It is unclear whether this test is proper, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that standing alone defendants 4 million in sales in the forum state over a sevenyear period may not have been sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction but that the numerous other contacts with the forum in the case including advertising relationships with dealers and more than 150 visits tipped the balance and led the court to conclude that there were sufficient contacts to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction (B) holding that specific jurisdiction requires plaintiff to show that defendants forum contacts be related directly to the subject of the lawsuit (C) holding no specific jurisdiction where alleged tortious conduct was not related to defendants contacts with texas (D) holding that courts exercise of specific jurisdiction was proper where subpoena enforcement action arose out of nonpartys contacts with the forum (E) holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum

SOLUTION: holding that standing alone defendants 4 million in sales in the forum state over a sevenyear period may not have been sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction but that the numerous other contacts with the forum in the case including advertising relationships with dealers and more than 150 visits tipped the balance and led the court to conclude that there were sufficient contacts to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction

PROBLEM: vehicles, such as trucks, could also be driven off-road, trucks are occasionally needed for off-road driving for such legitimate purposes as the maintenance of the park grounds and the transportation of large and/or cumbersome machinery. Clearly, off-road motorcycling would serve no such purposes. Thus, like in Wroblewski Shanks has not alleged facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality coupled with a readily apparent justification for the ban. Therefore, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss Shanks’ equal protection claim. C. Substantive Due Process In determining whether there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel, courts have also looked to the substantive branch of the Due Process clause. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3rd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Jonathan Hangartner, Comment, The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that false statements are constitutionally protected (B) holding right to travel emanates from concept of substantive due process (C) recognizing that before due process guarantees are implicated there must be a deprivation by the government of constitutionally protected interest (D) recognizing that a defendants right to be heard in criminal proceedings prior to sentencing is constitutionally protected (E) holding that while there is not a constitutionally protected right of intrastate travel under equal protection there is a constitutionally protected right to intrastate travel arising from the due process clause

SOLUTION:
holding that false statements are constitutionally protected