In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: bankruptcy trustee from selling or administering the homestead, even for the benefit of joint creditors. The legal effect of the non-debtor spouse’s right to assert the Florida constitutional exemption meant that the debtor spouse was still “receiving the benefits” of the Florida constitutional exemption, even though he had not claimed that exemption in his bankruptcy case. Consequently, the debtor was ruled ineligible for the wildcard exemption. The court noted that a different outcome would have obtained if the non-debtor spouse had affirmatively waived the right to claim the homestead protection. No such waiver existed, however, either in Hernandez or in this case. Other courts have also reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., In re Watford, 427 B.R. 552, 559 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2010) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Bennett, 395 B.R. 781, 790 (Bankr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other (B) holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a selfsettled revocable trust even though the settlor and the beneficiary as well as the bankruptcy debtor were the same person (C) holding that where a married debtor files an individual bankruptcy case and claims the  522b3b tbe exemption the debtor indirectly obtains the benefit of floridas constitutional homestead protection by virtue of the nondebtor spouses ability to claim the homestead exemption (D) holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property (E) holding even though debtor would have been entitled to iowa homestead exemption but for former spouses iowa code section 59821 lien debtor could not avoid the lien because it attached to the homestead prior to or simultaneously with debtors acquisition of the interest in the homestead

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: use of low-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. While we recognize that drivers may be accustomed to quickly flashing their high-beam headlights at an oncoming vehicle as a signal to dim headlights, there is no evidence in this case that the officer was driving with his high-beam headlights. Furthermore, the statute does not provide any exceptions for the momentary flashing of high-beam headlights. Thus, we must conclude the statute prohibits the use of high-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle, for any length of time and for any purpose. [¶ 12] We recognize that at least one other appellate court has interpreted similar statutory language and reached the opposite conclusion. See Waukesha County v. Meinhardt, 2001 WI App 146, ¶¶ 9-10, 630 N.W.2d 277 (<HOLDING>). In another case involving a similar statute, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that meinhardt did not commit a violation by flashing his highbeam headlights two times at an oncoming vehicle because the plain language of the statute did not prohibit the quick flashing of highbeam headlights (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute (D) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (E) holding the trial judge did not commit reversible error through the chosen method of remedying the batson violation

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: Clause. Id. at 530. As Hill recognizes, “[t]his holding appears to foreclose much of the defendant’s arguments.” (Appellant’s Br. at 9.) Consistent with our precedent, United States v. Speakman, 330 F.3d 1080, 1082 n. 6 (8th Cir.2003), we hold that the enactment of § 922(g)(1) was not beyond the scope of congressional authority- Hill’s claim that the indictment was defective because it did not allege a substantial affect on interstate commerce also fails. The statute in question requires proof that Hill, a felon, possessed a gun “in or affecting commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The indictment tracks this language, and we fail to see how an indictment under § 922(g)(1) that tracks the statutory elements is defective. See United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 264-65 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). We thus affirm Hill’s conviction for being a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an indictment that is substantially in the language of the code is sufficient inform and substance (B) holding that an indictment under  922g1 was not required to allege a substantial effect on interstate commerce an indictment which tracked the statutory language was sufficient (C) holding initial indictment which was subsequently found to be invalid tolled the thirtyday period and superseding indictment alleging different charges based on same fraudulent acts as earlier indictment was therefore timely (D) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense (E) holding that an indictment phrased in the statutory language was sufficient to satisfy ors 1325507


Output: (B)