In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
victim’s undisputed injuries, this court held that the statute required proof that the bodily injury was a foreseeable, rather than intentional, result of the rights-viólating conduct. Woodlee, 136 F.3d at 1405. At no point did this court even consider the possibility that the statute might not require proof of foreseeability at all, i.e., that the statute, imposed strict liability .on a defendant for bodily .injury resulting from his conduct. Because there is no logical distinction between the statutory language at issue in Woodlee and the language of § 841(b)(1)(E) that we are now tasked with interpreting, I believe that we are bound by Woodlee to interpret § 841(b)(1)(E) as incorporating a proximate cause requirement. See United States v. Ensminger, 174 F.3d 1143, (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). To conclude otherwise creates an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel (B) holding that a panel may not reconsider issues decided earlier in the same case by the en banc court (C) holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court (D) holding that only intervening law from the supreme court or this court sitting en banc can overrule a prior panel decision (E) holding that we are bound by prior panel opinions until they are overruled or abrogated by the supreme court or this court sitting en banc

Ex Output:
holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel


Ex Input:
found it “difficult to maintain on a priori grounds that sex is physically dangerous” to every potential victim under the statute. Id. at 299. The First Circuit examined a similar statute-punishing a person over the age of 18 who engages in sexual intercourse with a person between 14 and 16-in United States v. Sacko, 178 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1999). The court determined that statutory rape crimes fall within the exception to the categorical approach because they “cover[ ] conduct both inside and outside the ‘violent felony’ sphere.” Id. at 4-5. We agree with the First and the Seventh Circuits that statutory rape statutes that include more mature victims and do not contain aggravating factors are not subject to the strict categorical approach articulated in Taylor. See Seaton, 45 F.3d at 111 (<HOLDING>). Thus, this case should be remanded for the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins (B) holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16 (C) holding that if a crime is broadly defined the court can look beyond the elements of the crime (D) holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction (E) holding that conviction of a crime requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime

Ex Output:
holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins


Ex Input:
plan itself and not the employer or the plan’s administrator. Under ERISA, an employee benefit plan is an entity that may sue or be sued in its own right! 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1). However, the circuits disagree on what other parties are subject to suits for benefits. Many jurisdictions hold that the proper defendant in such a suit is either the plan itself or the plan’s administrator or trustee ' exercising management over and control of the plan. Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 34-35 (1st Cir.1998) (the proper party defendant in a § 1132(a)(1)(B) action for benefits under an ERISA plan is the party that controls administration of the plan, ie., by reserving the power to decide disputes, and not a third party service provider); Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that making intentional representations about the future of plan benefits may be an act of plan administration (B) holding that in a recovery of benefits claim only the plan and the administrators and trustees of the plan in their capacity as such may be held liable (C) recognizing that pension plan administrators have the ability to fashion their own plan formulas (D) recognizing that plan participants should be able to access information about the plan administrators fiduciary duties from the plan administrators counsel (E) holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself

Ex Output:

holding that making intentional representations about the future of plan benefits may be an act of plan administration