In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: of record rather than the alien. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also favor notice of counsel of record rather than actual notice of the client. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b) (stating that “whenever service under these rules is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court”). Case precedent also indicates that actual notice of an alien is not required under the INA. See Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 669 n. 6 (3d Cir.1990) (noting in dicta that notice to attorney comprised actual notice to alien); Reyes-Arias v. INS, 866 F.2d 500, 502-3 (D.C.Cir.1989) (finding actual knowledge of attorney constitutes reasonable notice); Newton v. INS, 622 F.2d 1193, 1194 (3d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Anin received notice as required by the INA. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice (D) holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice (E) holding that notice to original attorney not formally withdrawn comprised proper notice

A: holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city
****
Q: to two judicially cognizable interests. Id. at 560. First, the partisan-elections regime makes the process of getting on the general-election ballot more costly and time consuming. As Nix argues, courts have recognized that “[s]uch ballot-access requirements impose an ‘injury-in-faet,’ not only because non-compliance prevents ‘candidates’ from ‘appearing] on the ... ballot,’ but also because even compliance requires ‘significant amounts of time, money, personnel, and energy,’ which are limited ‘campaign resources’ that could have been ‘allocate[d]’ elsewhere.” Appellants’ Opening Br. 19-20 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 856-58 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 n. 9, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Second, Nix alleges that Kinston’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search (B) holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance (C) holding that candidates had ample standing to challenge ballotaccess requirements (D) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract (E) holding that candidates had standing to challenge requirements for appearing on the generalelection ballot as independents even though they could have chosen to run in a party primary

A: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search
****
Q: law enforcement objectives, and the concomitant need for the courts to maintain vigilance, is a recurrent theme in our cases and those of other courts. In United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 881, 93 S.Ct. 211, 34 L.Ed.2d 136 (1972), for example, we upheld the admission of evidence inadvertently discovered during a routine agricultural quarantine search, but were careful to note that “[n]othing in the record suggests that the administrative search in this case was ‘employed as an instrument of criminal law enforcement to circumvent the latter’s legal restrictions....’” Id. at 859 (quoting Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 230, 80 S.Ct. 683, 692, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960)). See also United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); United States v. Epperson, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the courts continued holding that visual observation is no search at all (B) holding that a visual inspection and limited hand search of luggage which is used for the purpose of detecting weapons or explosives and not in order to uncover other types of contraband is a privacy intrusion we believe free society is willing to tolerate (C) holding that a canine sniff of luggage does not constitute a search (D) holding that defendants consent to a search of their luggage was undermined by officers misrepresentation that a drug dog had alerted to their luggage (E) holding that there is no intrusion on a legitimate privacy interest where a dog sniff of an automobile reveals only information regarding contraband items and concluding that society does not recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in the public airspace surrounding a vehicle where the odor of narcotics escapes from the interi or of a vehicle into that public airspace

A:
recognizing the courts continued holding that visual observation is no search at all
****