In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir.2000). This decision strongly suggests that, in pertinent circumstances, conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment is, as Home Products suggests, “automatic.” However, it also suggests that the proper procedure is for the district court expressly to “convert” a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See id. (concluding that the district court had not followed the proper procedure, because it had not converted the motion). However, the decision also suggests that whether or not application of summary judgment standards is appropriate ultimately depends upon whether the parties were provided with adequate opportunity to address the merits of the motion according to summary judgment standards. See id. (<HOLDING>). A slightly earlier decision of the Eighth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them (B) holding that appellate review under summary judgment standards was appropriate where the district court despite its procedural error provided the parties with a full opportunity to present all pertinent materials outside the pleadings regarding the issue of response costs and the parties created a complete record on the issue (C) holding issue not properly before the appellate court where appellant fails to demonstrate where in the record an issue was raised in the district court (D) recognizing that the specific argument regarding an issue must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for appellate review (E) holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an issue not argued by the parties
Example Output: holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them

Example Input: litigation. The district court can correct any abuses at the fees for fees stage under the “reasonableness” standard. The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment (B) holding that time entries such as preparation for hearing or preparation for school visit were too vague and reducing overall fee award by twentyfive percent (C) holding that fee application must be sufficiently detailed to allow court to make an independent evaluation as to what fees are actual and necessary and finding that failure to keep contemporaneous records does not automatically result in denial of the fees but the lack thereof justifies a reduction of the fee to the level proven (D) holding that attorneys fees for the preparation of the fee application are compensable (E) holding that the independent counsel reauthorization act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application
Example Output: holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment

Example Input: in light of the participation in this litigation of defendant Avendrá (a non-party to the Master and 1999 Agreements).” Thereafter, Marriott appealed the court’s refusal to compel CTF to arbitrate, and CTF cross-appealed the court’s order staying CTF’s breach of contract suit pending resolution of the arbitration between Marriott and HPI. II. JURISDICTION We may review the denial of Marriott’s motion to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B), which provides for jurisdiction over appeals from orders “denying a petition under [9 U.S.C. § 4] to order arbitration to proceed[.]” Marriot order that unreasonably delays a plaintiffs right to have its case heard is appealable. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d at 735; see also Haberern v. Lehigh & New England Ry., 554 F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Here, the District Court decided two 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a stay order of indefinite length which singles out a claim for extended delay while others of a similar nature proceed is appealable (B) holding that a stay order is appealable because it amounts to a refusal to hear and decide a case (C) holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment (D) holding that grant or denial of debtors claim of property exemption is final appealable order (E) holding that an order dismissing a claim without prejudice is a final appealable order if the statute of limitations for that claim has expired
Example Output:
holding that a stay order is appealable because it amounts to a refusal to hear and decide a case