In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981))); State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996) (listing the four factors discussed above) (citations omitted). Finally, if the proponent provides a sufficient explanation for the peremptory challenges, the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the peremptory challenges has proven purposeful discrimination. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769; Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2416; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. ¶ 16 Since deciding Batson, the Supreme Court has continually increased the scope of the Batson test. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409-10, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that batson applies to a prosecutors use of peremptory challenges regardless of whether the stricken juror is of the same race as the defendant (B) holding that the constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges (C) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (D) holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause (E) holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race
holding that the constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges

likely causes of the engine failure are related to components of the oil delivery system, components of the cylinder assembly, cracked crankcase or an oil leak in general, etc.” As such, the Court finds that Mr. Klepacki’s opinion regarding the more likely causes of engine failure should be excluded. Plaintiffs Expert Donald Sommer Even assuming, without deciding, that Mr. Sommer is qualified to testify as an expert on piloting and accident reconstruction, including engine failure analysis, the Court must still find that the process he used in forming his expert opinion is suffi ciently reliable under Daubert and its progeny. See Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc., 326 F.3d at 1342 (stating that “one may be considered an expert but still offer unreliable testimony”); cf. McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1257 (<HOLDING>). The Court must also find that the testimony 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal rules of evidence require trial courts to hold hearingsreferred to as daubert hearingsto determine reliability of scientific expert testimony before admission at trial (B) holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility (C) holding that experts causation opinion based on statements made by plaintiff was not inherently unreliable (D) holding that daubert does not create a new framework for analyzing proffered expert testimony based upon technical or other specialized knowledge  (E) holding that rjulings on admissibility under daubert inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered experts methodology
holding that federal rules of evidence require trial courts to hold hearingsreferred to as daubert hearingsto determine reliability of scientific expert testimony before admission at trial

contractual, measures of recovery. Id. 14 . In the Roberdeau case, the insurer paid for $575 of repairs to the insured's station wagon after it was damaged in a collision. See 231 S.W.2d at 949. The insurer then offered to pay $475 (the amount of repairs minus the $100 deductible). See id. The policy stated that the insurer’s limit of liability would not exceed the vehicle’s actual cash value nor the cost to repair or replace the vehicle with another of like kind and quality. As here, the policy also gave the insurer the option of paying for the loss in money or paying for repair or replacement. See id. at 950. The insured refused the offer and sued the insurer for the difference between the vehicle’s actual cash value before and afte d Cas. Co. v. Watson, 298 P.2d 762, 767 (Okla.1956) (<HOLDING>); Barton v. Fanners Ins. Exch., 255 S.W.2d 451, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to find the measure of damages as the difference in market value immediately before and after the collision would be arbitrarily reading out of the policy the right of defendant to make repairs or replace the damaged part with materials of like kind and quality (B) holding that if repairs to a firedamaged vehicle with parts of like kind and quality would not restore the vehicle to its former market value the proper measure of damages was the difference in market value before and after the loss (C) holding that unless the collision resulted in a total loss the measure of recovery is the difference between the fair market value of the vehicle in the condition in which it was immediately prior to the collision and its value thereafter (D) holding there cannot be a complete restoration of the property unless it can be said that there has been no diminution of value after repair of the car and adding that the appropriate and fair measure of damages could be achieved by awarding either the difference between the fair cash value of the car before and after the collision or similarly the cost of repairs plus any diminution in value (E) holding the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the automobile prior to the upset and its value when prepared and presented to the plaintiff for acceptance

holding that to find the measure of damages as the difference in market value immediately before and after the collision would be arbitrarily reading out of the policy the right of defendant to make repairs or replace the damaged part with materials of like kind and quality