TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: the notice. (Hilsee Supp. Aff. ¶ 6(b), June 8, 2005). Moreover, the notice campaign began in early December, and the deadline to file opt-outs was April 8, 2005. This timeline, spanning a period of four months, is consistent with court-approved best practices for class notice campaigns. Id. at ¶ 6(c)vi. Accordingly, I FIND that there was sufficient notice leading up to the opt-out deadline. Objectors also assert that because the settlement class could have potentially included millions of Class Members, and only 6,524 have “shown their hands” to be included in the class by filing an inventory form, the notice is inadequate. However, many factors contribute to the claims response rate. See, e.g., Zimmer Paper Prod., Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>); 3 Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (B) holding that notice apprised class members sufficiently of information that notice was intended under the rule to convey (C) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (D) holding that where defendant engaged in customary and court approved notice procedure the response rate was not determinative of the adequacy of the class notice (E) holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice

SOLUTION: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner

PROBLEM: method (under § 3663) in favor of an incorrect method (under § 1593), the district court erred. Moreover, we hold that the district court’s error was “plain,” because the statutes are clear and because the government openly admitted that its proposed methodology derived from the wrong restitution statute. See United States v. Tuyet Thi-Bach Nguyen, 565 F.3d 668, 677 (9th Cir.2009) (“An error is plain when it is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’ under the law.”). Finally, we hold that the error affected Defendants’ substantial rights and affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The government did not present evidence — and the district court did not make findings — of the victims’ actual losses, as required by § 3663. See Bussell, 504 F.3d at 964 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Joyner, 201 F.3d 61, 81 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that restitution is proper under  2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses (B) holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted (C) holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction (D) holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses  (E) holding that restitution in the full amount of each victims losses does not exceed the statutory maximum

SOLUTION: holding that restitution is proper under  2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses

PROBLEM: to restore a sense of fairness to lost-chance cases. A purely prospective application of Scafidi would clearly frustrate that purpose. VI Also at issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury an ultimate outcome charge. See Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 413 A.2d 322 (1980). Defendant does not contest the proposition that in cases governed by Scafidi an ultimate outcome charge is generally appropriate. Instead, he asserts that any error in not giving the charge was harmless. We disagree. The primary justification for giving a jury an ultimate outcome charge is that it informs the jury about the impact of its decision. In Roman, supra, we stated “that a jury in a comparative negligence situation should be given an ultimate out . 518, 485 A.2d 338 (Law Div.1984) (<HOLDING>). In Scafidi, we acknowledged that the jury’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages (B) holding that where the courts instructions caused a jury to consider erroneous criterion of liability plaintiff was prejudiced and new trial was warranted (C) holding that the seventh amendment does require that the jury also be allowed to determine the amount of any punitive damages awarded (D) holding that when a plaintiff files suit alleging that multiple tortfeasors are responsible for the plaintiffs injury any settlements are to be credited against the amount for which the liable parties as a whole are found responsible but for which only the nonsettling defendant remains in court (E) holding that ultimate outcome charge which would inform jury that any damages awarded to plaintiff in personal injury action would be molded to reflect only that percentage of liability which jury attributes to nonsettling defendant was warranted

SOLUTION:
holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages