In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther’s theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts “a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman.” White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther’s termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, § 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law

Output: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy


Input: Consider Input: claim because "she was not diligent in preserving her legal rights”); Felty, 818 F.2d at 1129 ("One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.”) (quoting Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)); United States ex rel. Cogifer, S.A. v. Ins. Co. of North Am., Civ. A. No. 86-183-NN, 1987 WL 19932, at *4 (E.D.Va. Oct. 15, 1987) (unpublished). 11 . See, e.g., Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir. 1990). 12 . See, e.g., Humble Oil, 402 F.2d at 896 (finding equitable estoppel where surety reneged on promise to pay after statute of limitations had run). 13 . See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nelson v. Reliance Ins. Co., 436 F.2d 1366, 1371 (10th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Atlas Erection Co. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation (B) holding that an agreement which required the submission of an affidavit of payment to subcontractors or lien waivers before payment was made by the general contractor was for the direct benefit of the subcontractors (C) holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors (D) holding that estoppel applied where surety repeatedly responded to subcontractors threats to sue with answers which assured them that amicable settlement was just around the corner (E) holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety

Output: holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation


Input: Consider Input: that the “deliberate withholding of exculpatory information” is included within the “legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion”); Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (quoting and affirming opinion of the district court to confirm the principle that, because “ ‘[t]he task of evaluating the credibility of the alleged exculpatory information, and of determining its bearing on the trial and the prosecutor’s decision whether to confess error and agree to have the verdict set aside, no doubt requires the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,’ ” a prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity for the failure to turn over exculpatory evidence that was discovered shortly after the defendant was sentenced); Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the prosecutor is required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury (B) holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for failing to give defense counsel materially exculpatory evidence (C) holding that a prosecutors decision whether or not to give defense counsel evidence alleged to be materially exculpatory which was either discovered after the  1983 plaintiffs arrest but before his conviction or while the prosecutor was still functioning as an advocate for the state in posttrial motions and preparations for appeal is clearly part of the presentation of the states case and therefore a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for failure to turn over evidence (D) holding that prosecutors were absolutely immune for withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of a court order because the order was issued in response to a defense motion for any exculpatory evi dence and thus required the prosecutors to make judgments (E) holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their knowing or inadvertent failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence


Output: holding the prosecutor is required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury