In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: than the Confrontation Clause, we review for plain error. See United States v. Acosta, 475 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir.2007); United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir.2003). Our consideration of the district court’s decision begins and ends with the first element of plain error review because we conclude that the district court did not err in limiting the scope of Rios’s cross-examination. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (explaining that the first element of plain error review requires that “there must be an error or defect”). A defendant’s right to cross-examination is not unlimited. United States v. Bernegger, 661 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir.2011). The Sixth Amendment confrontation right is satisfied in this regard so Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In sum, establishing a Confrontation Clause 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (B) holding that the district court satisfied the confrontation clause by permitting the defendant to present facts concerning the adverse witnesss plea agreement and incentives to cooperate (C) holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment (D) holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing (E) holding that if a plea agreement is breached the district court may either grant specific performance or allow the defendant to withdraw the plea
[A]: holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement


[Q]: bar, of rule 32:1.3 for dilatory handling of estates despite notices and inquiries from beneficiaries). Johnson’s failure to respond to Neefs phone calls and requests for information, failure to notify Neef of what progress had or had not been made on the case, and failure to provide notice of termination, contact information, return of paperwork, or a return of unearned fees violated rules 32:1.4 (duty to keep client informed) and 32:1.16(d) (duty to protect client’s interests upon termination of representation). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 263, 268 (Iowa 2010) (finding attorney’s neglect of client’s legal matters and failure to keep clients informed about their cases violated rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4, and 32:1.16(d)); Earley, 774 N.W.2d at 307-08 (<HOLDING>). Johnson also violated rule 32:8.4(c) (duty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the attorney violated mlrpc 13 when he did not prosecute his clients claim after filing a complaint or protect against expiration of the statute of limitation for his clients complaint and caused discovery sanctions to be filed for his failure to respond to discovery requests (B) holding an attorney violated his duty of candor to the tribunal by changing his clients interrogatory answers without the clients knowledge (C) holding attorney violated rules 3214 and 32116d when he failed to keep his clients informed about the status of their cases failed to communicate with his clients after their repeated requests for information and failed to  account for or return client money from retainer fees (D) holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan (E) holding that equitable tolling applied when the attorney informed his client there was no such thing as a oneyear filing deadline and consistently lied to his client and the clients wife
[A]: holding that the attorney violated mlrpc 13 when he did not prosecute his clients claim after filing a complaint or protect against expiration of the statute of limitation for his clients complaint and caused discovery sanctions to be filed for his failure to respond to discovery requests


[Q]: evidence and reverse only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Singh v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir.2006). Under this pre-REAL ID Act standard of review, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) or BIA “must identify specific, cogent reasons for an adverse credibility finding” and the reasons must “strike at the heart of the claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination in Yao’s case. There were significant discrepancies in the evidence regarding the length of Yao’s detention, where he was detained at night, and the chain of events that occurred when he arrived at the police station. These discrepancies go to the heart of Yao’s claim. See Chebchoub v. INS, 257 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Yao’s declaration states that he was detained 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellants complaint on appeal that the environment was coercive did not change the fact that he was not in custody when he voluntarily went to the police station was told several times he could leave and did leave after the interrogation (B) holding that discrepancies regarding the events leading up to petitioners departure and the number of times he was arrested went to the heart of his claim (C) holding that a driver was an independent contractor where he had unfettered discretion to determine the days and times he worked with no minimum or maximum number of hours or days imposed by the defendant (D) holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof (E) holding that earlier events set the stage for what followed and that factual disputes regarding those events were material
[A]:
holding that appellants complaint on appeal that the environment was coercive did not change the fact that he was not in custody when he voluntarily went to the police station was told several times he could leave and did leave after the interrogation