In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: may grant preliminary injunctive relief in any civil action if the granting of such relief is appropriate under the facts upon which the action is based.” 16 U.S.C. § 3117(a). 3 . As used in ANILCA, (1) The term "land” means lands, waters, and interests therein. (2) The term “Federal land” means lands the title to which is in the United States after December 2, 1980. (3)The term "public lands” means land situated in Alaska which ... are Federal lands.... 16 U.S.C. § 3102(1) — (3). 4 . Although navigability determinations have not yet been made on most of Alaska’s waterways, it is likely that few waterways of significance to fisheries will be classified as non-navigable due to the expansive definition of navigable. See, e.g., Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401, 1402-08 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919, 110 S.Ct. 1949, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that river with depths of 1 to 3 feet and usable by inflatable rafts and small motorboats was navigable (B) holding lake on private land was not navigable in fact and there was no right of public use and enjoyment as lake was not fed by or part of a navigable stream (C) holding that riparians owners have the right of access to the navigable part of the river  the right to make a landing wharf or pier  subject to such general rules and regulations of the legislature (D) holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states (E) holding that congress had the authority under the commerce clause to require private riparian land owners to obtain a license prior to construction of dams even where the river in question was not navigable but could potentially have been made navigable

A: (A)
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Q: with “complete and final discretionary authority to interpret the plans and maintain control over the operation and administration of the plans.” Accordingly, the Chevron Plan, via the Services Agreement and the SPD, delegates authority to Aetna regarding benefit eligibility for the Medical Plan. Moreover, in this situation, Aetna made a factual determination that certain diagnostic testing and IVIG treatments were not medically necessary. “[F]actual determinations made by [an] administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion.” Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir.1999); see also Chandler v. Hartford Life, No. 05-50688, 2006 WL 1209363, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr.28, 2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp., 168 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion (B) holding that a denial of benefits will not be reviewed de novo where the language of an erisa plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (C) holding that arbitrary and capricious standard applies to section 1132a1b denial ofbenefits claims if the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (D) holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion (E) holding that  rjegardless of the administrators ultimate authority to determine benefit eligibility  factual determinations made by the administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion 

A: (E)
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Q: created by the alleged misstatements.’ As the Court of Appeals has noted, ‘[t]he truth on the market defense is intensely fact-specific and is rarely an appropriate basis for dismissing a § 10(b) complaint for failure to plead materiality.’ Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 2005 WL 2148919, *6 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (citations omitted). To be sure, there has been some debate regarding the applicability of the fraud-on- the-market presumption to analyst cases, albeit in a different context, namely, class certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. See, e.g., Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir.2004) (granting petition for interlocutory appeal to review this “novel question”); Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros. Inc., 232 F.R.D. 176, 185 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (<HOLDING>); DeMarco v. Lehman Bros. Inc., 222 F.R.D. 243, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact (B) holding that estoppel was a question of fact (C) holding that it is not (D) holding that plaintiffs need not offer evidence that analyst reports actually distorted market price because it is a question of fact (E) holding it is a question of fact

A:
(D)
****