In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

the action should pro ceed among the existing parties or be dismissed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b). Defendant neglected to offer any explanation for how and why Mr. Stroud is essential, other than that he was named in the underlying state court case. That is not enough. Mr. Stroud is not a necessary or indispensable party under Rule 19 because this Court can administer complete relief — an order compelling arbitration— among the existing parties and Mr. Stroud himself is not claiming an interest in this arbitration action that will be impaired by his absence. Although failing to dismiss this case may result in piecemeal litigation, that factor alone is not compelling enough to find Mr. Stroud to be an indispensable party. Cf. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). This Court therefore properly limits its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (B) holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived (C) holding that district courts are required to compel arbitration of claims subject to arbitration clause even if the result is piecemeal litigation (D) holding that faa was inapplicable where parties involved in action are not parties to an arbitration agreement under which issues are referable to arbitration (E) holding that in determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists in petition to compel arbitration district court was correct in looking only to citizenship of parties in action before it  parties who signed arbitration agreement  and that nondiverse agents in underlying state case were not indispensable parties as any potential prejudice resulting from piecemeal litigation is overcome by faas strong bias in favor of arbitration
(E)

matter. When it is clear, however, from the relevant parts of the contract taken together and considered with the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement, that the obligation in question was within the contemplation of the parties or was necessary to effect their intention, then such obligation may be implied and enforced. But when the contract between the parties speaks to the obligation sought to be implied, the courts will not write that implied obligation into the contract. Stated conversely, there may be an implied covenant on the part of the lessee (in the absence of any expressed on the subject as in the lease).[ ] Id. (citations, alterations, and quotation omitted). See also Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 123 N.M. 526, 943 P.2d 560, 569 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in accordance with New Mexico law, any 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that endorsement would prevail if inconsistent with policy provisions (B) holding that courts cannot imply covenants which are inconsistent with express provisions (C) holding that state courts may not enforce racially restrictive covenants (D) holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy (E) holding that the law will not imply a contract where there is an existing express contract covering the same subject matter
(B)

discussed, Plaintiffs’ claims and alleged injuries are educational based, and the fact that Plaintiffs contend that the current educational plan is sufficient does not render exhaustion futile. At its heart, this dispute is about a failure to sufficiently provide a public education to Justin and the adverse educational consequences of that failure. Requiring Plaintiffs to proceed under the IDEA’S administrative process in such a case is not futile. See Charlie v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch., 98 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir.1996) (Easterbrook, C.J.) (“Both the genesis and the manifestations of the problem are educational; the IDEA offers comprehensive educational solutions; we conclude, therefore, that at least in principle relief is available under the IDEA.”); N.B., 84 F.3d at 1379 (<HOLDING>); Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 308 F.3d 1047, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief (B) holding that a procedural default in exhausting administrative remedies bars relief in federal court (C) holding that a party may gain judicial review without exhausting its administrative remedies where pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile where strict compliance would cause irreparable harm and where the applicable statute is alleged to be void on its face (D) holding that declaratory judgment was inappropriate where after exhausting administrative remedies a contractor would have to bring separate actions against the state and other parties in state court (E) holding that a plaintiff may not avoid exhausting the administrative remedies by requesting money damages

(E)