In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: agreements and do not own their software outright under Regime 1. 19 . Though this court reviews orders imposing Rule 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion, “[a] district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law_" Giebelhaus, 938 F.2d at 964 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990)). 20 . The Court extended this reasoning in Business Guides to apply the certification requirement of Rule 11 to represented parties who sign court papers, even where they are not required to do so. 498 U.S. at 543, 546-47, 111 S.Ct. at 930-31. 21 . Giebelhaus, 938 F.2d at 965; see also Pony Express Courier Corp. of Am. v. Pony Express Delivery Serv., 872 F.2d 317, 319 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Southeastern’s argument that Lederman and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction (B) holding that a city could not be held vicariously liable for the act of a magistrate who was immune from liability (C) holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii (D) holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable (E) holding that cocounsel who did not sign the answer could not be held liable under rule 11 for its contents

A: holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction
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Q: to warrant such a delay. See id. Moreover, despite his argument to the contrary, Staler did not demonstrate that his criminal trial was invalid due to a fundamental error. See Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106. Stuler was indicted and convicted for violating 26 U.S.C. § 7208. See United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 244 (3d Cir.2007) (noting the elements of 26 U.S.C. § 7203 include that the defendant: (1) was required to file the tax returns; (2) failed to file them; and (3) acted willfully). Stuler’s invocation of a host of unrelated statutes and regulations does not alter the fact that “importing” is not an element of a § 7203 charge. He has therefore failed to satisfy his burden of establishing a funda-' mental error. See United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 184 (3d Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>). Because Stuler showed neither that any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any proceeding which is challenged by the writ is presumed to be correct and the burden rests on its assailant to show otherwise (B) recognizing that an agencys decision to terminate an employee is presumed correct (C) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (D) holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged

A: recognizing that an agencys decision to terminate an employee is presumed correct
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Q: arguments from § 3553 “for a sentence different than the one ultimately imposed,” the party sufficiently “preserves its claim.” Id. at 578. However, we review unpreserved non-structural sentencing errors for plain error. Id. at 576-77. If, and only if, we find the sentence procedurally reasonable can we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir.2009). Because Lackard requested a sentence different than the one ultimately imposed by the district court, we review his sentence for abuse of discretion. King, 673 F.3d at 283. Lackard’s arguments to the contrary, we discern no procedural sentencing error by the district court. Although Lackard asserts that the district court erred when it denied his r Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Although Lackard also asserts that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts refusal to grant a downward departure was discretionary and not because it believed it lacked the authority to depart where the court assessed the facts of the case and concluded that the departure requested does not seem  to have a basis (B) holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure (C) holding that this court laeks the authority to review a sentencing courts denial of a downward departure unless the court failed to understand its authority to do so (D) holding that this court does not review decisions of a district court not to depart downward unless the record reflects that the district court was not aware of or did not understand its discretion to make such a departure (E) holding that the district courts denial of a downward departure was an exercise of discretion and therefore not reviewable

A:
holding that the district courts refusal to grant a downward departure was discretionary and not because it believed it lacked the authority to depart where the court assessed the facts of the case and concluded that the departure requested does not seem  to have a basis
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