In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: rights, it must be settled in court. The permit may thus be perfectly valid, so far as the conservation laws are concerned, and yet the permittee’s right to drill under it may depend upon his establishing title in a suit at law. Id. at 191. While we noted that the Railroad Commission “should not do the useless thing of granting a permit to one who does not claim the property in good faith,” the Railroad Commission’s determination of the propriety of the permit has no effect on the propriety of the permittee’s potentially tortious actions. Id. Of course, statutory remedies may preempt common law actions or other standards that may set the bar for liability in tort, but a permit is not a get out of tort free card. Cf. MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 494, 499 (Tex.2010) (<HOLDING>). But in this case, the statute authorizing the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state common law claim seeking to require automobile manufacturers to install airbags would frustrate the purposes of the federal safety standard regulations adopted under the federal motor vehicle safety act which did not require manufacturers to do so and therefore was preempted by conflict (B) holding design planning and enforcement of bus safety rules for school bus transportation were not operation of motor vehicle under section 4145 (C) holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  (D) holding the federal motor vehicle safety standards do not preempt jury findings that a bus manufacturers buses were defectively designed (E) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling

Answer: (D)


Question: basis in which defendants are considered. I question whether that concern for individuality exists under a system which not only admits expert testimony deduced without examining the subject but also, as in this case, accepts the possibility that jurors will allow that evidence, rather than factors more personal to a defendant’s crime and character, to effectively condemn that individual to death. 1 . As the Court of Criminal Appeals admitted, "the State’s case at [Flores’] punishment [hearing], to some extent, rested upon Dr. Griffith's testimony.” Flores v. State, 871 S.W.2d 83, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983) (allowing the use of psychological testimony on a defendant’s alleged "future dangerousness”); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence (B) recognizing that texas courts have adopted the aamr definition of mental retardation providing that mental retardation must manifest before age of 18 years (C) holding that the sentencing structure allowed the jury to give mitigating effect to petitioners prison record (D) holding that the key under pewy i  is that the jury be able to consider and give effect to a defendants mitigating evidence in imposing sentence (E) holding that the sentencing procedure was inadequate in failing to allow jury to give mitigating effect to defendants mental retardation and abusive background

Answer: (E)


Question: proposition that the licensing of the Blanks’ trademark was an executory contract or that trademark law is “applicable federal law” for purposes of section 365(c)(1). However, they dispute whether applicable trademark law would bar assignment to a third party without consent of the assignor. Whether under the federal common law of trademarks a licensor would have the power to reject “performance by an entity other than the debtor” appears to be an issue of first impression in this circuit. However, the Ninth Circuit and other circuits have come to the conclusion that two other forms of intellectual property, copyrights and patents, are personal and assignable only with the consent of the li-censor and therefore unassumable under section 365(c)(1). See In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 750 (<HOLDING>); In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, Inc., 269 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that applicable federal patent law made patents personal and unassignable without consent of the licensor (B) holding that  1338a jurisdiction inures when a complaint establishes that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the wellpleaded claims (C) holding that an exclusive license granting the licensor a reversionary interest in the patent in the event of the licensees bankruptcy was a grant of all substantial rights such that the licensee could sue for patent infringement (D) holding that the complaint placed the defendant on notice when it alleged ownership of the asserted patent named the individual defendants cited the patents that are allegedly infringed described the means by which the defendants allegedly infringed the patents and pointed to specific sections of the patent law invoked (E) holding that the rationale of the consent decree cases was fully applicable where a stipulated dismissal and settlement resolved pending patent litigation and there were other licensees and alleged infringers who had an incentive to challenge the patents validity

Answer:
(A)