In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: appropriate relief for such a violation is for the habeas court to “vacate the judgment of conviction and enter a new judgment from which an appeal can be taken.” Id. Defendant argues that the Peak line of eases applies to his situation, and that his appellate rights should thus be reinstated. However, the Peak rule does not apply in defendant’s ease, as the appeal at issue is not an appeal from a conviction. A Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach to an appeal from a supervised release revocation hearing. Borrego v. United States, 975 F.Supp. 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y.1997). This follows logically from the fact that there is no guaranteed constitutional right to counsel at the supervised release revocation hearing itself. See United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel (D) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (E) holding that most of the fundamental constitutional procedural protections that are normally applicable to a criminal prosecution are not required for supervisedrelease proceedings as a matter of constitutional law including a right to counsel

A: (E)
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Q: justification was pretextual.” Smith v. District of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C.Cir.2005) (quoting Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C.Cir.2005)). The court should assess the plaintiffs challenge to the employer’s explanation in light of the totality of the circumstances of the case. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1291. The strength of the plaintiffs prima fa-cie case, especially the existence of a causal connection, can be a significant factor in his attempt to rebut the defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289 n. 4 (stating that “a prima facie case that strongly suggests intentional discrimination may be enough by itself to survive summary judgment”); Laurent v. Bureau of Rehab., Inc., 544 F.Supp.2d 17, 23 n. 5 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Meadows v. Mukasey, 555 F.Supp.2d 205, 211-13 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position (B) holding that the plaintiff demonstrated pretext in part by establishing a causal connection (C) holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity (D) holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury (E) holding that the plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection

A: (E)
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Q: or deny relief. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the absence of power to make any ruling at all.”); Knowles v. Knowles, 811 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1991, no writ) (in dicta, stating, "... if the 1975 divorce decree is construed, albeit erroneously, to award her separate property interest in the military benefits to the appel-lee, the trial court’s judgment must be affirmed under the doctrine of res judica-ta. ..."). 10 . Accord Wilson v. Uzzel, 953 S.W.2d 384, 390-91 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, no writ); Echols v. Echols, 900 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1995, writ denied); Barnard v. Barnard, 863 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, no writ); see also Hardin v. Hardin, 597 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex.1980) (dicta). Cf. Berry v. Berry, 786 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>); Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d 610, 612 
 Holding statements: (A) holding res judicata applied to unappealed division of military retirement benefits when that division was not preempted at time of divorce but would have been preempted by later federal act had that act applied retroactively which it did not (B) holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce (C) holding that a transfer was a demotion where there was testimony that few people transferred voluntarily from jobs in the plaintiffs prior division to jobs in the plaintiffs new division  everybody viewed a transfer from the plaintiffs new division to the prior division as a promotion and the two departments had different seniority systems (D) holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division (E) holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement

A:
(A)
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