In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: Center. v. National League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 974-75 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that Cedars-Sinai’s claims were not preempted because they were “predicated not on the [service benefits] plan” but on a separate contract between the carrier and the medical services provider). Plaintiffs claim that Plaintiff never received compensation for the emergency care of B.G. directly relates to the processing and administration of the enrollee’s covered claims which is governed by the Service Benefits Plan and the Contract between Blue Shield and OPM. Any obligation that Blue Shield could have to pay Plaintiff stems directly from the B.G.’s enrollment in the Service Benefit Plan and directly relates to the payment of B.G.’s benefits under the plan. See Hayes, 819 F.2d at 926 (<HOLDING>); Botsford, 314 F.3d at 396 (“Because the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tort claims arising out of the manner in which a benefit claim is handled are preempted by fehba (B) holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba (C) holding state law claims arising out of unions refusal to readmit union members preempted by  301 (D) holding that fehba does not completely preempt state law (E) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law

Output: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba


Input: Consider Input: of other courts have concluded, outside the RICO and Clayton Act context, that "by reason of" should be read to require only "but for” rather than proximate causation. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) ("The words ‘because of' mean ‘by reason of: on account of.’ Thus, the ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took adverse action ‘because of age is that age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act. To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); Robinson Knife Mfg. Co. v. C.I.R., 600 F.3d 121, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Spirtas Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 555 F.3d 647, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in 26 cfr  1263ale3i the language  directly benefit or are incurred by reason of boils down to a butfor causation test (B) holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support (C) holding in an appeal from a postanswer default judgment that third prong of craddock test required appellant to offer to reimburse appellee for legal expenses he incurred in obtaining default judgment even though most of the fees incurred had not been paid (D) holding that pursuant to the eaja courts may not award expenses of an attorney that are not incurred or expended solely or exclusively in connection with the case before the court (E) holding a tribe subject to 1 a tax on the use of certain highway motor vehicles 26 usc  4481a 2 a tax on diesel fuel used in highway vehicles 26 usc  4041a 3 a tax on special fuels used in motor vehicles 26 usc  4041b and 4 a tax on manufacturing in this case a truck chassis assembled by the tribe 26 usc  4061a 4218a

Output: holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support


Input: Consider Input: our circuit has noted that we have “no opinion on whether the habitual residence of a child who lacks cognizance of his or her surroundings should be determined by considering the subjective intentions of his or her parents.” Robert, 507 F.3d at 992 n.4. By “subjective intentions,” we mean the parents’ last “settled mutual intent” for where their child would live. Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Nicolson v. Pappalardo, 605 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2010); Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995). The district court noted the reliance by courts on the shared parental intent standard in cases concerning especially young children. See, e.g., Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 746 (7th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Holder, 392 F.3d at 1016-17). 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that claim meaning will sometimes be readily apparent even to lay judges and that claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words (B) recognizing  parental intent acts as a surrogate in cases involving very young children for whom the concept of acclimatization has little meaning (C) holding the prospective adoptive father of surrogate children did not comply with the interstate compact on the placement of children (D) holding that taking care of three young children one of whom suffered from a serious medical condition and being needed at work were purely personal circumstances not exceptional reasons for release (E) holding that the clear and convincing standard provides appropriate due process in cases involving parental rights


Output: recognizing that claim meaning will sometimes be readily apparent even to lay judges and that claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words