In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: also admitted he personally observed that Gretillat had trouble walking long distances. Indeed, Priske excused Gretillat from making rounds of the facility due to Gretillat’s difficulty walking long distances. In April of 2004, Priske admitted that Gretillat’s forced resignation arose out of Gretillat’s problems with standing and “ambulating.” See, e.g., Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir.1999) (finding “ample evidence” that employee alerted employer to the existence of disability where employee told employer about disability, gave employer information about the ADA, requested an unmonitored telephone line to talk with his “support network,” and displayed symptoms of the disability at work); see also Miller, 61 F.3d at 630 (quoting Hedberg, 47 F.3d at 934) (<HOLDING>). Because Care Initiatives was apprised of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada (B) holding that if all of an employees coworkers knew that he had a heart condition such knowledge would not amount to notice to the employer that the employee was so limited by a disability as to require special accommodations (C) holding that an employer cannot be held liable under the ada if it had no knowledge of the employees alleged disability (D) holding that an employee who claims to have been terminated by her employer for having exercised her right to disability benefits raised a cognizable claim under  510 of erisa notwithstanding the fact that she received the benefits from her employer prior to termination (E) recognizing that employer has notice of limitation when disability manifests itself to the extent that it would be reasonable to infer that her employer actually knew of the disability

Answer: (E)


Question: clause. We conclude that reckless battery is a violent crime under the force clause, an issue not addressed by the Holloway opinion. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 20 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012). We further note that the Holloway court’s conclusion with respect to reckless battery accorded with then-binding instruction from the United States Supreme Court that the residual clause is limited to an offense that “typically involve[s] purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct.” United States v. Holloway, supra at 260, quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008). Last year, however, the Supreme Court retreated from this characterization of the residual clause. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270, 2277 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court iterated that “[t]he phrase 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally  (B) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (C) holding that burglary is violent felony (D) holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause (E) holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act

Answer: (D)


Question: Talasila, Inc. v. United States, 240 F.3d 1064, 1066 (Fed.Cir.) (“[Plaintiff] must be represented by counsel in order to pursue its claim against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims.”), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2001); Finast Metal Prods., Inc. v. United States, 12 Cl.Ct. 759, 761 (1987) (“[A] corporate ‘person’ can no more be represented in court by a non-lawyer — even its own president and sole shareholder — than can any individual.”); Affourtit v. United States, 79 Fed.Cl. 776, 779 (2006) (“A corporation appearing before the United States Court of Federal Claims ... must be represented by an attorney.”). This rule applies despite possible financial hardship imposed on the plaintiffs. See Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 699 F.2d 1366, 1366 (Fed.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); see also Balbach v. United States, 119 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel (B) recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice (C) holding that the plaintiffs substantial financial hardship did not waive the rule requiring corporations to be represented by counsel (D) holding that a corporate entity must be represented by licensed counsel (E) holding that juveniles may waive right to counsel only upon advice of counsel

Answer:
(C)