In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: the rate must make a threshold showing that the rate at issue is unreasonable. Milne, 970 F.2d at 570; Covey, 763 F.Supp. at 482-83. Relevant factors in the determination include “relevant rate comparisons, a carrier’s proffer of a particular rate, and whether the rate would have moved the traffic had it been asserted at the time the shipments took place.” Matter of Brown Transport Truckload, Inc., 144 B.R. 183, 187 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1992). One common method of making a prima facie showing of unreasonableness is to provide affidavit testimony demonstrating a significant disparity between the rates sought to be charged by the carrier and the rates charged by competing carriers at the time in question. See, e.g., Vining v. The Eureka Co., 1992 WL 370520, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 8, 1992) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Brown, 144 B.R. at 187 (noting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo (B) holding eighty percent increase in demanded rates and showing that original rates were competitive with other carriers was prima facie unreasonable (C) holding prima facie showing of unreasonableness made by presenting evidence that tariff rates in effect at time of shipments were well above rates paid to other carriers for same service (D) holding that absence of competitive injury was not a defense to prima facie violation of  2e (E) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review
[EX A]: holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo

[EX Q]: 397 So.2d 874, 874-75 (Miss.1981)). However, in McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., Inc., 626 So.2d 603 (Miss.1993), the Mississippi Supreme Court carved out “a narrow public policy exception” to the employment-at-will doctrine, holding that regardless of whether the employment is at-will, (1) an employee who refuses to participate in an illegal act as in Laws [v. Aetna Finance Co., 667 F.Supp. 342 (N.D.Miss.1987) ], shall not be barred by the common law rule of employment at will from bringing an action in tort for damages against his employer; (2) an employee who is discharged for reporting illegal acts of his employer to the employer or anyone else is not barred by the employmen ming Wheeler); Hammons v. Fleetwood Homes of Mississippi, Inc., 907 So.2d 357, 360 (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). As plaintiffs have presented no evidence to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the mcarn exception requirefs that the acts complained of warrant the imposition of criminal penalties as opposed to mere civil penalties (B) recognizing district courts discretion in assessing civil penalties under 21 usc  842c (C) holding that a claim for civil damages based on alleged violation of criminal statute under which criminal penalties result was properly dismissed because criminal violations are brought not in the name of the individual party but rather by and on behalf of the state of ohio or its subdivisions (D) holding that a judgment that requires the performance of an act is enforceable by civil and criminal contempt penalties emphasis omitted (E) holding double jeopardy clause applicable to civil penalties under the false claims act
[EX A]: recognizing district courts discretion in assessing civil penalties under 21 usc  842c

[EX Q]: of a debt collector carved out by Section 1692a(6)(F)(ii) of the statute. As a result, the Court will not reach the additional bases for the Defendants’ argument pertaining to dismissal of the FDCPA claim. Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii) exempts from the definition of “debt collector” any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity ... concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). Thus, the FDCPA is inapplicable to “collection efforts by those who obtained the right to payment on the debt before the debt was in default.” Franceschi, 22 F.Supp.2d at 253; See also Healy v. Jzanus Ltd., No. 02 CV 1061, 2006 VJL 898067, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2006) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Plaintiffs do not allege the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activities (B) holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt (C) holding that where the defendant obtained a nondefaulted debt under the mistaken belief that the debt was in default and where the defendants subsequent collection activities were based on that mistaken belief the defendant was a debt collector for purposes of the fdcpa (D) holding that the fdcpa did not apply to a collection agency retained by a hospital seeking medicaid reimbursement because the underlying debt was not in default even though the agency identified itself as a debtcollector (E) holding that reporting a consumers debt to a creditreporting agency constitutes collection of the debt under  1692gb
[EX A]:
holding that fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activities