In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

see State v. Sosa, 1997-NMSC-032, ¶ 9, 123 N.M. 564, 943 P.2d 1017. {34} Defendant argues that two provisions in the current Delinquency Act suggest the Legislature’s intent to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the Section 32A-2-20 findings. These two provisions, Section 32A-2-24(B) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in probation revocation hearings), and Section 32A-2-16(E) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding), are readily distinguishable from the amenability determination under Section 32A-2-20(B). First, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding is constitutionally mandated. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. Second, a probation revocation hearing, l 7, 1140-41 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>); State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 649, 651, 674 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (D) holding that treatment as a child is not a constitutional right but a right granted by the legislature and statute met basic due process requirements (E) holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard
holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel

2. Although the substance of the inquiry remains the same, the Supreme Court has counseled that the question whether a defendant can show a violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights “is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). With that said, we do not quarrel with the district court’s analysis on this point. Several distinguished jurists continue to use the “standing” terminology as useful shorthand. See, e.g., United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir.2004) (Selya, J.) (acknowledging after Rakas that the term “standing” “is imprecise,” but adopting the usage “[f]or simplicity’s sake”). But, regardless of terminolo 1 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). As we observe below, the conclusion that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (B) holding a person who is present at anothers home with permission simply for the purpose of consummating a business transaction does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy there (C) holding that for purposes of federal constitutional law a person does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to trash discarded outside the home (D) holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business (E) holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence
holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells

provision is a condition precedent to the customer’s right to file an action against the bank to recover losses caused by the unauthorized signature or alteration”). 7 . An item (e.g., check) that contains less than the required number of signatures amounts to an “unauthorized signature.” See Va.Code 8.3A-403, Official Comment 4. 8 . See March 18, 2011 Hr’g Tr. 18:8-11. 9 . See March 18, 2011 Hr’gTr. 23:10-24:6. 10 . The Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Collins is consistent with its earlier deci sion in Radin v. Crestar Bank, 249 Va. 440, 457 S.E.2d 65, 66 (1995), holding that an attorney who opened a fiduciary account in which he deposited his client's funds was a "customer.” 11 . Cf. Thrash v. Georgia State Bank of Rome, 189 Ga.App. 21, 375 S.E.2d 112, 113 (Ga.Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>). 12 . It is worth noting that at least some 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff an officer and shareholder of a corporation with signatory authority over the corporations checking account was not a customer of the bank and could not file suit for wrongful dishonor of the corporations checks (B) holding that while a state statute granted a foreign corporation the rights and privileges enjoyed by domestic corporations it did not transform such corporations into domestic or resident corporations (C) recognizing that a bank customer may have a tort claim against a bank for the wrongful dishonor of a check (D) holding president of corporation liable as employer where he inter alia maintained control over the corporations employment and pay practices and had the authority to make all major decisions regarding the corporations business affairs (E) holding that a corporations principal place of business for determining diversity jurisdiction under 28 usc  1332c1 is the nerve center meaning the corporations headquarters or the place where a corporations officers direct control and coordinate the corporations activities

holding that while a state statute granted a foreign corporation the rights and privileges enjoyed by domestic corporations it did not transform such corporations into domestic or resident corporations