In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
reliance is essential element of negligent misrepresentation claim). Since Purchasers are estopped from relying on a representation outside of the agreement, they cannot sustain any of the causes of action that require justifiable reliance. Therefore, the fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and FBPA claims fail, even construing the pleadings most favorably to Purchasers. Nevertheless, Purchasers argue that the determination of justifiable reliance is a jury question. While justifiable reliance may be a jury question in a fraud case where no contract exists or where the contract has become void, it is a question of law in a case where the contract language prevails and the contract’s merger clause precludes reliance on oral representations. Compare City Dodge, 232 Ga. at 770 (<HOLDING>) with First Data POS, 273 Ga. at 796 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law (B) holding that in fraud and nondisclosure claims a plaintiff must show actual and justifiable reliance (C) holding that where a merger clause is included in the written contract alleged collateral promises will not be enforced through fraud because under fraud the reliance must be reasonable (D) holding that the only fraud that could vitiate the contract is fraud that would invalidate the merger clause itself ie fraud relating to the merger clause or fraud that invalidates the entire contract including the merger clause quoting 3 corbin contracts  578 (E) holding that justifiable reliance is a jury question where the contract containing the merger clause was found invalid due to an antecedent fraud

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
completed his nine month term of incarceration and was released from custody on Jply 28, 2017. Any challenge to the procedural or substantive reasonableness of his term' of confinement is thus moot. See United States v. Probber, 170 F.3d 345, 347-49 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing as moot an appeal from a judgment revoking supervised release where defendant had already completed his term of confinement). However, because defendant would still be entitled to a reduction of his term of supervised release if the court were to find such a reduction appropriate, we will analyze whether, as defendant claims, the supervised release component of the District Court’s sentence was either procedurally or substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Mazza Alaluf, 621 F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). Defendant contends that the District Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding substantive reasonableness sentencing challenge to be moot when defendant had completed prison sentence but addressing challenge to supervised release conditions (B) holding that where trial court did not inform defendant of supervised release term during plea colloquy but did advise defendant of term in presentence report and at sentencing defendants sentence stands (C) holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e (D) holding that a completed term of confinement did not render a challenge to the reasonableness of a sentence moot where defendant could receive a reduced term of supervised release (E) holding defendant convicted under  841b1a may receive lifetime term of supervised release

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
lead levels, from which “a jury could reasonably infer that if [defendant’s property] was not contributing source [of lead exposure,]” plaintiffs blood lead levels would have decreased while living at that property). And, of course, a plaintiff who overcomes summary judgment still bears the burden of proof as to the element of causation at trial, where expert opinion can play a critical role in persuading a jury. The standard for admissibility of expert testimony as to source causation is thus a vital one in lead paint actions. The Majority holds today that an expert who gives an opinion that a defendant’s property caused a plaintiffs harm does not need to show or explain that other reasonably probable sources did not cause the plaintiffs harm. Majority Op. at 250-51, 164 A.3d at 238 (<HOLDING>) The Majority’s removal of the requirement that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify (B) holding that an expert is not competent to testify as to statutory interpretation (C) holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard (D) holding that it is not the rule that a source causation expert in a lead paint action must exclude other properties before he can testify that the plaintiff was exposed to lead at the subject property (E) recognizing that a plaintiff must produce a medical expert to testify as to causation in all but the most selfevident medical malpractice actions

Ex Output:

(D)