In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: But he claims that release at age 60 is a geriatric release and the functional equivalent of life without parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also argues that such release violates the principles in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery because release at age 60 provides only grim prospects for any meaningful future outside prison. [¶12.] Even if Charles’s 92-year sentence is equivalent to a sentence of life without parole, that alone does not mean his sentence is unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment precedent. The United States Supreme Court bars mandatory life sentences without parole against juvenile homicide offenders, not discretionary sentences of life without parole. See Miller, 567 U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2469; State v. Springer, 2014 S.D. 80, ¶ 15, 856 N.W.2d 460, 466 (<HOLDING>). [¶13.] In response, Charles asks this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentences of life without parole unique in their severity (B) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (C) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (D) holding that consecutive fixedterm sentences for juveniles who committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are not clearly unconstitutional under graham even when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole (E) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: statement “is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” Id. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court departed from its ruling in Roberts and established a new standard for determining when hearsay statements of an unavailable witness may be admitted as evidence against a criminal defendant consistently with the Confrontation Clause. The standard set forth- in Crawford actually expanded defendants’ confrontation rights beyond what was contemplated in Roberts. Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-55, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (requiring unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination to admit testimonial hearsay statements of witnesses not appearing at trial), with Roberts, 448 U.S. at 72-73, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (<HOLDING>). Prior to the decision in Crawford, this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that witness hearsay statements may be admitted whenever they bear sufficient indicia of reliability even without crossexamination (B) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements (C) holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence (D) holding that judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability including reliable hearsay in a probation revocation hearing (E) holding that it would have been proper to admit party opponent admissions although they were based on multiple levels of hearsay and test their reliability on crossexamination but upholding the district courts exclusion of the statements where the hearsay statements lacked any factual content and lacked any indicia of trustworthiness
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993). For relief under the CAT, an applicant must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that she would be tortured if removed to her country of origin. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). Kupczyk bases her application for relief on three specific incidents which occurred in Poland, allegedly due to her status as a Jehovah’s Witness. First, she claims that on July 28, 1996, she was attacked by “a band of thugs” and suffered bruises and abrasions, as well as a broken nose, and had to spend three days in the hospital. She then began receiving phone calls late at n ed to offer any evidence that they are likely to be detained, let alone tortured, should they be removed to Poland or the Slovak Republic. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 183 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). As we cannot conclude that the evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to qualify for protection under the convention against torture an alien must show that he will more likely than not be tortured in his home country if removed (B) holding that the standard for withholding of removal is a showing that it is more likely than not that a petitioner will face persecution upon her return (C) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien established that he will more likely than not be tortured if  removed (D) holding that cat applicant must establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to his native country (E) holding that petitioner must demonstrate it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon his return
[EX A]:
(E)