In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071, 113 S.Ct. 1027, 122 L.Ed.2d 172 (1993). Moreover, after Lopez, courts have recognized that this de minimis standard continues in effect. United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1713, 137 L.Ed.2d 837 (1997); United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (10th Cir.1995). This is because § 1956 regulates activities that, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (stating that “where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence”); cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1361, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 463 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce (B) holding that commerce clause did not provide congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of violence against women act inasmuch as provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce (C) recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce (D) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce (E) holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce
[EX A]: holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce

[EX Q]: 64 L.Ed.2d 795 (1980). We are faced with precisely such circumstances here. In their July 30 telephone conversation, Garcia negotiated with Papo for the purchase of heroin. He also instructed Papo to deliver the heroin to DeJe-sus, a direction that Papo clearly intended to carry out. Garcia’s instructions to Papo and Papo’s evident assent are independently admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 803(3). Under that rule, hearsay statements reflecting a declarant’s intentions or future plans are admissible to prove subsequent acts. Fed.R.Evid. 803 advisory committee note. Accordingly, the July 30 Garcia-Papo conversation is admissible to prove that Papo and Garcia intended to carry out a narcotics transaction in which DeJesus would serve as a middleman. See United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d at 104 (<HOLDING>). The July 30 conversation also is arguably 
 Holding statements: (A) holding coconspirators hearsay statements independently admissible under fedrevid 8033 to show declarants intent to engage in illicit drug transaction (B) holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care (C) holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay (D) holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators (E) holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy
[EX A]: holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care

[EX Q]: evidence that appellant was sometimes delusional, spat on the floor, was angry and irritable toward the hospital staff, had disorganized thought patterns, exhibited rap id mood swings, and that, on the day after she was admitted, appellant wore wet clothes and attempted to disrobe in a common area of the hospital. We have previously held that an expert diagnosis of mental illness, standing alone, is not sufficient to confine a patient for treatment. K.T., 68 S.W.3d at 892; Mezick v. State, 920 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). Additionally, evidence that merely reflects a patient’s mental illness and need for hospitalization is not sufficient to meet the State’s burden under section 574.034 of the Mental Health Code. See, e.g., K.T., 68 S.W.3d at 892 (<HOLDING>); D.J. v. State, 59 S.W.3d 352, 357 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of patients delusion that she was in military and that mail carrier was responsible for her welfare not sufficient to meet required statutory burden (B) holding evidence of patients psychotic behavior delusions that she had undergone surgery by satellite and had electronics implanted in her not sufficient to meet required statutory burden (C) holding evidence of patients schizophrenia auditory hallucinations paranoia irritability and refusal to take medication not sufficient to meet required statutory burden (D) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (E) holding evidence of patients delusion that she was pregnant and had sutures in her vagina not sufficient to meet required statutory burden
[EX A]:
holding evidence of patients delusion that she was in military and that mail carrier was responsible for her welfare not sufficient to meet required statutory burden