In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s detention.” Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381, 97 S.Ct. 1224, 51 L.Ed.2d 411 (1977); see also St 06 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (same). Whether RIDA created an adequate substitute for habeas corpus for those aliens to whom a petition for review is available, however, is different from whether RIDA created any adequate substitute for those aliens for whom it is no longer available. Unlike in previous cases where we have upheld RIDA against Suspension Clause challenges, Singh never had the ability to obtain judicial review of the merits of his removal through a petition for review filed within 30 days of his removal order. Cf. Puri, 464 F.3d at 1043; Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). By the time RIDA created jurisdiction in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law (B) holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (C) holding that  109g2 does not apply when the creditor seeking relief in the first case received the requested relief (D) holding that a rule 60b motion that presents grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief or seeks to add a new ground for relief requires authorization (E) holding that ridas elimination of habeas corpus does not violate the suspension clause where the petitioner had a means for seeking relief direct review  and simply failed to pursue the relief that the statutory scheme allows

A: (E)
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Q: who are undeniably state actors, colluded with her in her actions. When all intendments are taken in the Plaintiffs’ favor, therefore, their allegations indicate both that Malac infringed their substantive due process rights and that she can be considered a state actor. Accordingly, Malac’s motion to dismiss is denied. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Barbara Malac’s motion to dismiss [Docket No. 47] is DENIED. The motion of Defendant Agent Cynthia Preston and Defendant Agent Nancy Gingras [Docket No. 50] to dismiss is DENIED with respect to Agent Preston, but GRANTED with respect to Agent Gingras. SO ORDERED. 1 . For the propriety of citing this unpublished Second Circuit opinion, see Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-905 (8th Cir.2000) (Arnold, J.) (<HOLDING>), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.2000) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unpublished opinions are of persuasive value at best and not precedential (B) holding that opinions accompanying the denial of certiorari cannot have the same effect as decisions on the merits (C) holding that even district court cases decided by panels of three have no precedential value (D) holding that unpublished opinions have precedential effect (E) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted

A: (D)
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Q: involved in the incident, which was for his own lustful gratification. Moreover, while “the definition of sexual penetration announced in Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-97 encompasses any penetration, the Court holds the parameters of the definition of sexual penetration are logically confined to activities which are the product of sexual behavior or libidinal gratification.” Frei v. State, 934 So.2d 318, 325(¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2006)(quoting Roberson v. State, 501 So.2d 398, 400 (Miss.1987)). ¶ 11. This Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court have interpreted Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-97 (Rev.2006) to include common sense applications where the accused attempts to engage in semantics regarding the literal reading of the statute. See Frei, 934 So.2d at 325(¶ 18) (<HOLDING>); see also Hennington v. State, 702 So.2d 403, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that medical report was not material for brady purposes where report at best showed lack of vaginal penetration of sexual abuse victim penetration was not necessary for conviction of sexual abuse of a minor under iowa law (B) holding that a jury instruction listing additional modes of sexual penetration than those listed in the information did not impermissibly amend the charge of sexual assault becausein part the added modes of sexual penetration did not change the applicable statute sentence or level of offense (C) holding that the clergy sexual conduct statute requires general intent and does not impose strict liability because the act of sexual penetration must be intentional (D) holding that penetration of anus and penetration of sexual organ although found in same subsection of section 22021a1b are separate offenses (E) holding that mississippi code annotated section 97395 was not overbroad despite the fact that innocent penetrations can occur during the course of parental activities or clinical duties and the meaning of sexual penetration is legitimately confined to those activities which are done for sexual gratification

A:
(E)
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