In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: the evidence of rape discussed above in Division 1, we conclude that the evidence at Martin’s trial was sufficient to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found as to both murders. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (2) (requiring a review of the statutory aggravating circumstances foundby the jury);UAP Rule IV (B) (2) (providing that, in all death penalty cases, this Court will determine whether the verdicts are supported by the evidence). See also Ring, 536 U. S. 584; Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. 20. Considering both the murders for which Martin has been sentenced to death and Martin as a defendant, we find that the death sentences imposed in his case were not disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Georgia law. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3); Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716-717 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited in the Appendix support this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts statutorily mandated proportionality review concerns whether a particular death sentence is excessive per se or is substantially out of line (B) holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable

A: holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial
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Q: See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.106; State ex rel. WW., No. 12-13-00045-CV, 2013 WL 3156312, at *6 (Tex. App.-Tyler June 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Because W.W. presented evidence to the trial court of his preference to avoid an increased dose ... based upon its side effects and ineffectiveness, it is presumed that the trial court gave his preferences due consideration.”); In re T.O.R., No. 02-12-00376-CV, 2013 WL 362747, at *5 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Jan. 31, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("T.O.R. did not present any evidence to dispute So-biesk’s testimony about the medications’ benefits and the ineffectiveness of alternative treatments.”); M.H. v. State ex rel. M.H., No. 01-09-00205-CV, 2009 WL 2050988, at *4-5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 16, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. A.R.F., No. 12-03-00294-CV, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of conspiracy sufficient and noting lack of evidence that any member of the group did anything but cooperate with the terms of the plan to commit robbery (B) holding evidence sufficient to support trial courts finding in aggravation that the offense was planned (C) holding that the findings of reviewing physicians constituted substantial evidence in support of the secretarys decision to deny benefits (D) holding evidence sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding when patient did not present any evidence to dispute physicians testimony about benefits of treatment with psychoactive medications and lack of alternative treatments (E) holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract

A: holding evidence of conspiracy sufficient and noting lack of evidence that any member of the group did anything but cooperate with the terms of the plan to commit robbery
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Q: to deal “honestly and openly” arose from the special relationship he fostered with plaintiffs over numerous years as their guru and spiritual counselor. It is well established that a fiduciary duty arises when one reposes faith, confidence, and trust in another’s judgment and advice. Van Brode Group, Inc. v. Bowditch & Dewey, 36 Mass.App.Ct. 509, 516, 633 N.E.2d 424 (internal quotations omitted),further appellate review denied, 418 Mass. 1105, 639 N.E.2d 1081 (1994). However, plaintiffs cite no Massachusetts cases, nor is the court aware of any, that recognize a fiduciary duty in the spiritual counseling context. It is true that some jurisdictions have acknowledged such a duty. See Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 10 F.Supp.2d 138, 1998 WL 338213 (D.Conn.1998) (<HOLDING>); DeStefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that first amendment barred consideration of negligent supervision claim against diocese for sexual relationship between adult parishioner and priest while the priest was counseling the parishioner in his position as a hospital chaplain (B) holding that first amendment barred negligent supervision claim against a church regarding sexual relationship between adult parishioner and priest during the course of a marital counseling (C) holding that first amendment barred adult parishioner who engaged in sexual relationship with priest during the course of pastoral counseling from bringing intentional infliction of emotional distress negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims (D) holding that first amendment barred adults breach of fiduciary duty claim against pastor for actions that occurred when parishioner was a minor (E) recognizing fiduciary relationship under connecticut law between parishioner and diocese where parishioner had been sexually abused by diocesan priest

A:
holding that first amendment barred consideration of negligent supervision claim against diocese for sexual relationship between adult parishioner and priest while the priest was counseling the parishioner in his position as a hospital chaplain
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