In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: . . . there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision[s].” Murray v. St. Michael’s Coll., 164 Vt. 205, 210, 667 A.2d 294, 299 (1995). In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under Title VII need show only that “a reasonable employee [in the employee’s situation] would have found the challenged action materially adverse,” meaning that it well might have dissuaded a reasonable employee from engaging in the protected activity. 548 U.S. at 68. ¶ 34. Assuming, without deciding, that this is the standard to apply with respect to retaliation claims brought under 21 V.S.A. § 710(b), we conclude that the limited video surveillance in this case in connectio v., 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 35. But in this case, if the release 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney (B) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (C) holding that because a claimant testified that she had no insurance and could not afford treatment her failure to take medication for her symptoms is not a clear and convincing reason for discrediting her symptom testimony (D) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (E) holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy

A: holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney
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Q: subpoena does not fit within the statutory language. The question surrounding the subpoena’s validity in no way relates to any information that Star Bank would be required to disclose under FCRA, even assuming that FCRA’s requirements apply to Star Bank. {See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) for the definition of a “consumer reporting agency.”) The Hahns’ claimed reliance on whatever Bonynge said regarding the subpoena therefore provides them with no basis to toll the two year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Hahns have failed to demonstrate that the wilful misrepresentation tolling exception applies to their case. We therefore hold that all of their claims raised under FCRA are barred by the statute of limitations. See Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We find no inequity in reaching this result. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim (B) holding that equitable tolling is available to avoid time limitations in the statutory provisions governing veterans benefits (C) holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims (D) holding that an ohio tolling statute violated the commerce clause because it gave nonresident corporations the choice between being subject to general jurisdiction in the state by appointing an instate agent for service of process or being subject to a tolling of the statute of limitations on claims against them (E) holding that a plaintiff must fit within the precise wording of the tolling exception to avoid being barred by fcras statute of limitations provision

A: holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim
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Q: breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B). Thus, it is clear that, under some circumstances, injunctions can constitute claims which are dischargeable in bankruptcy. The court must determine whether this case presents such a circumstance. A number of courts have considered whether an injunction prohibiting future breaches of a noncompete agreement can constitute a claim under Section 101(5)(B), reaching conflicting results based on a variety of reasonings. See e.g., In re Oseen, 133 B.R. 527 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1991) (finding that the injunction did not constitute a claim); In re Udell, 18 F.3d 403 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); In re Ward, 194 B.R. 703 (Bankr.D.Mass.1996) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim (B) holding an appeal of injunction moot where the injunction expired three months before the appellate court heard arguments in the case (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) holding federal injunction countermanding a state court injunction did not violate antiinjunction act (E) holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified

A:
holding an appeal of injunction moot where the injunction expired three months before the appellate court heard arguments in the case
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