In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: The Court is not at liberty to follow the law of other Circuits if it contradicts -the law of this Circuit. Plaintiffs’ other argument relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Delta Coal Program v. Libman, 743 F.2d 852 (11th Cir. 1984) which stated that Summit Office Park applies only when a Plaintiff without standing adds a new party and a new cause of action. Delta Coal Program, 743 F.2d at-857, n.6. (“Here, by contrast, the operative facts and the cause of action are not changed, but only the formally named plaintiff.”). Delta Coal Program, however, does not apply to the present case. First, the district court there permitted the substitution of new plaintiffs, and it was within the court’s discretion to do so. Delta Coal Program v. Libman, 743 F.2d 852, 856 (11th Cir. 1984) (<HOLDING>). Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs did not ask 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties (B) holding that when district court has continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over sapcr matter judge of another district court in same county may rule in matter so long as record is clear that judge is acting on behalf of court with continuing and exclusive jurisdiction (C) holding that the district court has broad authority to take jurisdiction over a matter even when that matter is not brought by a real party in interest (D) holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court (E) holding that the state law of preclusion must be followed even when federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim is exclusive
Example Output: holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties

Example Input: v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 116 F.Supp.2d 937, 950-51 (M.D.Tenn.2000). As other circuits have recognized, the treating physician rule is a standard that was developed in the Social Security context requiring the administrative law judge to give deference to the opinions of a claimant’s treating physician when determining the claimant’s eligibility for benefits. See, e.g., Regula, 266 F.3d at 1139; see also Peabody Coal Co. v. Groves, 277 F.3d 829, 833-35 (6th Cir.2002) (applying the “treating physician presumption” in a Black Lungs Benefit case holding that an AL J may place greater weight on the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician than those of non-treating physicians). Several circuits have adopted the treating physician rule in an ERISA context. Regula, 266 F.3d at 1139 (<HOLDING>); Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 901 (8th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that vicarious liability claim against union based on medical malpractice of treating physician is not preempted by erisa (B) holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate (C) holding that an erisa plan administrator is not bound by an ssa disability determination when reviewing a claim for benefits (D) holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician (E) holding as a matter of first impression that the treating physician rule is applicable in the context of a disability benefits determination under erisa
Example Output: holding that vicarious liability claim against union based on medical malpractice of treating physician is not preempted by erisa

Example Input: “[A]n action can ‘affect’ the exercise of powers by an agency without being aimed directly at [the agency].” Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir.1998). In Hindes, the Third Circuit held that the protections afforded to receivers in § 1821(j) extend to third parties. In rejecting the argument that § 1821(j) does not apply to a non-FDIC third party, the court stated, “the statute, by its terms, can preclude relief even against a third party, including the FDIC in its corporate capacity, where the result is such that the relief ‘restraints] or affect[s] the exercise of powers or functions of the [FDIC] as a conservator or a receiver.’ ” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j)). Cf. Telematics Int’l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp., 967 F.2d 703, 707 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the reasoning in Hindes and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant defrauded fdic when actions diluted value of fdics security interest thereby being likely to frustrate and impair the fdics ability to realize the benefit of the interest (B) holding that section 363f applies only to in rem interests which have attached to the property by way of either the debtors consent to a security interest or the creditors attachment of the property resulting in a lien (C) holding that the doench doctrine protects the fdic even where the fdic does not have an interest in an asset (D) holding that  1821j applied to bar a claim seeking to attach a lien to a certificate of deposit in which the fdic had a security interest because the attachment would ultimately have an effect upon the fdics exercise of its powers as receiver (E) holding that while section 1825b2 does not extinguish an earlier lien or excuse the payment of a tax by the fdic it does deny the ability to use a lien on fdic property as a vehicle for collection of delinquent tax
Example Output:
holding that defendant defrauded fdic when actions diluted value of fdics security interest thereby being likely to frustrate and impair the fdics ability to realize the benefit of the interest