In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
(Tex.2010) (orig. proceeding). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies creates a jurisdictional bar to proceeding with the claim. See City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex.2008) (“[Njoncompliance [with Chapter 21’s administrative procedures] deprives courts of subject-matter, jurisdiction.”); Smith v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 101 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). A would-be Chapter 21 claimant must first file an administrative complaint with the civil rights division of the Texas Workforce Commission. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.201(a) .(stating that an aggrieved person “may file a complaint with the commission”); id. § 21.0015 (defining “commission” as “the Texas Workforce ■Commission civil rights division”); Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 486-88 (<HOLDING>). The complaint must be filed “not later than 
 Holding statements: (A) holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent (B) holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language (C) holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (D) holding that administrative exhaustion is mandatory despite legislatures use of the word may (E) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional

Ex Output:
holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent


Ex Input:
to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. As a matter of first consideration, any court has the duty to determine, sua sponte, whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case. Welch v. McDougal, 876 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied). As material to this question, section 65.023(b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code requires that an application for an injunction to stay proceedings in a suit or execution on a judgment must be tried in the court in which the suit is pending or the judgment was rendered. This requirement is jurisdictional and does not relate merely to venue. See Butron v. Cantu, 960 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); Home Sav. Ass’n v. Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Because the Gard-ners seek to challenge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is  no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court (B) holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions (C) holding that a dis trict court has no authority to issue injunction restraining enforcement of judgment of the county court where as here the judgment solely resolves who is entitled to immediate possession (D) holding that motion to dismiss should not  be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law (E) holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state

Ex Output:
holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is  no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court


Ex Input:
that includes a right of entry or reentry, education, public relief, or naturalization, ordinarily available to others resident in the country. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. Rather than recite the history of the resettlement doctrine here, we rely on Judge Becker’s opinion in Abdille, which comprehensively examines it. 242 F.3d at 483 & n. 4. The bottom line is that until October 1990, when §§ 208.13(c)(2)(i)(B) and 208.15 created the rule of mandatory denial for a firmly resettled alien seeking-asylum and defined “firm resettlement,” an alien’s resettlement elsewhere was only a factor to be considered by immigration judges, the BIA, and the courts in evaluating an asylum claim as a matter of discretion. See Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 91 S.Ct. 1312, 28 L.Ed.2d 592 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99, 104, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution (B) holding that disbarment was proper where the attorney misappropriated payments from clients of his firm for his own use and took steps to conceal his conduct from his firm (C) holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals (D) holding that despite a statutory change from firm resettlement to flight from persecution in the refugee relief acts of 1957 1960 and 1965 firm resettlement was not irrelevant but was one of the factors to be taken into account in determining whether a refugee seeks asylum as a consequence of his flight to avoid persecution (E) holding that where the petitioner purported to provide an exhaustive account of the grounds for his claim of asylum that included no reference to his detention and beating this account of persecution was inconsistent with his later testimony before the ij

Ex Output:

holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution