instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
The defendants, contend that, assuming their conduct was unlawful and negligent as charged in the complaint, it was nevertheless not the proximate cause of the injuries suffered. But a tortfeasor is generally held answerable for the injuries which result in the ordinary course of events from his negligence and it is generally sufficient if his negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries. The fact that there were also intervening causes which were foreseeable or were normal incidents of the risk created would not relieve the tortfeasor of liability. Ordinarily these questions of proximate and intervening cause are left to the jury for its factual determination. [Ibid, (citations omitted).] See also, J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 352, 714 A.2d 924 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 465-66, 545 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prolonged sexual abuse of neighboring adolescent girls by defendants husband with known proclivity for such behavior not a superseding cause of wifes negligent failure to warn victims or take other reasonable steps to prevent harm to them (B) holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims (C) holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person (D) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (E) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse
answer:
(A)


question:
(8th Cir.2007)). “Continuances are generally disfavored and are not granted without a compelling reason.” Id. We have held the FSA is not retroactive. See United States v. Smith, 632 F.3d 1043, 1047-49 (8th Cir.2011) (concluding “the general savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, requires us to apply the penalties in place at the time the crime was committed”) (quoting United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909-10 n. 7 (8th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. McBride, — Fed.Appx. -,-, No. 10-2689, 2011 WL 2206725, at *2 (8th Cir.June 8, 2011) (unpub. per curiam). But even if we assume Woods can show prejudice, Woods fails to provide any support for his contention the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion. See id. at-, 2011 WL 2206725, at *3 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hawthorne, 414 Fed.Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a second continuance until congress acted on the fsa and assuming error no prejudice exists because the fsa is not retroactive (B) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (C) holding that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in denying a continuance because she acted within reason by accommodating the attorney (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form
answer:
(A)


question:
distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops. Carty, supra, 170 N.J. at 641, 644, 646, 790 A.2d 903. That is not to say that a person will not feel some degree of compulsion whenever a police officer makes a request. See State v. McCloskey, 90 N.J. 18, 24, 446 A.2d 1201 (1982); State v. Hickman, 335 N.J.Super. 623, 633, 763 A.2d 330 (App.Div.2000). Surely, during a field inquiry, when a police officer asks a question of a person on the street, although that person is lawfully free to leave, he may feel some compulsion to respond. Nonetheless, we do not mandate that police officers have reasonable suspicion before making an inquiry. See State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. , 934 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Detective Peacock did in this case what 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent (B) holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent (C) holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that the mere assertion of constitutional right to refuse consent to search does not supply probable cause to search
answer:

(D)