In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: for a damages claim. See Williams, 216 S.W.3d at 828-29. Nor can Russell change the facts that render her remaining grounds not justiciable. As long as there is no dispute that the release between Metro and American Century is not binding on Russell, and Metro and its representatives have not been awarded and do not seek attorney fees based on section 417.003 of the Labor Code, there is no way in which Russell could re-plead her claims to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. See Bonham State Bank, 907 S.W.2d at 467; WesternGeco, L.L.C., 246 S.W.3d at 781. The trial court therefore did not err in refusing Russell an opportunity to further amend her pleadings. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 1 . S rters, Inc., 372 S.W.2d 525, 530-31 (Tex.1963) (<HOLDING>); Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 366, 190 
 Holding statements: (A) holding governmental immunity was not implicated in a declaratoryjudgment action seeking an interpretation of a competitive bidding statute as applied to the highway commissions policy of requiring all materials furnished under contracts be manufactured in the united states (B) holding that a declaratoryjudgment action seeking to compel officials to perform their legal duties was not barred by  14 however a portion of the action seeking compensatory damages could not be maintained (C) holding a declaratoryjudgment action was proper to construe compulsory school attendance law and did not implicate governmental immunity (D) holding governmental immunity not implicated and a declaratoryjudgment action proper to seek determination of whether plaintiffs were motor carriers for purposes of tax statute (E) recognizing the protection of preliminary governmental materials

Answer: holding that a declaratoryjudgment action seeking to compel officials to perform their legal duties was not barred by  14 however a portion of the action seeking compensatory damages could not be maintained


Question: the public interest and ‘[considerations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system’ require that the district court defer to local government administrators.” Id. In Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1166, the Sixth Circuit was very clear that, where “decisional law has changed so that the enjoined behavior, which once might have been a violation of federal law, is no longer a matter of federal law at all” the injunction must be vacated. In light of the fact that no federal right underpins the 1974 decree — as well as the fact that the “local government administrators” in this case appear to favor vacating the decree — the court can identify no reason that the 1974 consent decree should remain in effect. Cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (<HOLDING>); Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act (B) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated (D) holding that a court errs when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of  changes in statutory or decisional law (E) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes

Answer: holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act


Question: argue, inmate observance of Ramadan, with its requirements for month long daytime fasting, multiple daily prayers and special diets, is wholly incompatible with the SDC boot camp regimen. There is likewise no doubt that the effective implementation of the program for all participants is a valid penological concern and objective. It follows, in summary, that defendants did not violate Blagman’s First Amendment rights by implementing a twenty week boot camp program designed to aid in the rehabilitation of eligible inmates, even though the program had the incidental effect of precluding Blagman from engaging in religious rituals or practices that are inconsistent with the program’s regimen. See, e.g., Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892, 110 S.Ct. 1595,108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (<HOLDING>). C. Intimidation Claim Blagman’s third claim 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that facially neutral statute may contravene the fourteenth amendment if enacted with discriminatory purpose (B) holding that a law did not violate the first amendment because it did not burden the exchange of ideas and noting most laws restricting a states initiative process would not implicate the first amendment (C) holding that facially neutral laws or acts of general applicability do not violate the first amendment merely because of their incidental effects (D) holding that statute which prohibited polygamy did not violate first amendment (E) holding the statutory scheme of two federal laws was not void for vagueness and did not violate equal protection or due process even though the defendants conduct violated both laws

Answer:
recognizing that facially neutral statute may contravene the fourteenth amendment if enacted with discriminatory purpose