In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: then the trial court erred in allowing prejudgment interest to accrue on that sum at 10% per annum “[bjecause no prejudgment interest statute applies to this case.” Assuming arguendo that their argument was true, then the answer to the problem is found in their own brief. They acknowledge that the prejudgment interest scheme established under § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code applied if no other statute did. See Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 530-31 (Tex.1998) (dealing with Texas Revised Civil Statute art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a), the predecessor to § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code). And, at the time of judgment, see Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy, Co., 113 S.W.3d 400, 414 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), prejudgment interest accrued at the rate of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate (B) holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment (C) holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment (D) holding that the penalty is applicable (E) holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract

A: (B)
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Q: also admitted he personally observed that Gretillat had trouble walking long distances. Indeed, Priske excused Gretillat from making rounds of the facility due to Gretillat’s difficulty walking long distances. In April of 2004, Priske admitted that Gretillat’s forced resignation arose out of Gretillat’s problems with standing and “ambulating.” See, e.g., Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir.1999) (finding “ample evidence” that employee alerted employer to the existence of disability where employee told employer about disability, gave employer information about the ADA, requested an unmonitored telephone line to talk with his “support network,” and displayed symptoms of the disability at work); see also Miller, 61 F.3d at 630 (quoting Hedberg, 47 F.3d at 934) (<HOLDING>). Because Care Initiatives was apprised of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada (B) holding that if all of an employees coworkers knew that he had a heart condition such knowledge would not amount to notice to the employer that the employee was so limited by a disability as to require special accommodations (C) holding that an employer cannot be held liable under the ada if it had no knowledge of the employees alleged disability (D) holding that an employee who claims to have been terminated by her employer for having exercised her right to disability benefits raised a cognizable claim under  510 of erisa notwithstanding the fact that she received the benefits from her employer prior to termination (E) recognizing that employer has notice of limitation when disability manifests itself to the extent that it would be reasonable to infer that her employer actually knew of the disability

A: (E)
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Q: Texas Fund has a legitimate interest in the case and it is in a much better position to protect that interest than any of the other parties. Texas Fund is entitled to intervene in the action to protect its legitimate interests. I foresee no harm or prejudice to any of the other parties by virtue of this intervention. Texas Fund’s intervention in the lawsuit would have little effect on how the case is actually prosecuted before a jury and affects no substantial interest of any of the other parties. Other courts, faced with identical or very similar circumstances, have held that an insurance carrier may intervene as of right in an action brought by the injured party against a third-party tortfeasor. See Smith Petroleum Service, Inc. v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 420 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>); Curtis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 754 F.2d 781, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding if a workers compensation carrier denies liability for medical expenses of its insured the nofault carrier is bound promptly to pay benefits concerning such expenses under its policy (B) recognizing workers compensation insurance carrier owes employee duty of good faith and fair dealing in processing compensation claims (C) holding that rule 6e did not extend the period in which a workers compensation carrier was required to pay a compensation award under the longshore and harbor workers compensation act where the act required payment within ten days of filing of the order as opposed to within ten days of service of notice provided for in the rule (D) recognizing a breachofduty action by an employee against a workers compensation carrier even though the carrier issued its policy to the employer (E) holding that carrier was entitled to intervene as of right where the states workers compensation law permitted subrogation of a compensation carrier

A:
(E)
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