In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. In determining the purpose of section 13-21-101, it is appropriate to look to legislative history as indicative of the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Willer, 817 P.2d at 519-20. The 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101 created the distinction between judgments which the judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal. The General Assembly intended that the amendment, and its market-determined interest rate, apply only to judgments which the judgment debtor appeals. See Act of March 25, 1982, ch. 39, 1982 Colo. Laws 227 (entitled “An Act Concerning Interest Payable on Appealed Money Judgments in Civil Actions” (emphasis added)); see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The statements of the bill’s sponsors also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent (B) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (C) holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period (D) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent (E) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent
[A]: holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent


[Q]: read to give these words effect in light of the law in certain states, under the plain meaning rule, Green Tree’s position must fail. Herrin, 2007 WL 1975573, at *3. The debtor’s position is also supported by the leading commentators on the Bankruptcy Code. Collier on Bankruptcy states, “[o]nly if a mobile home or cooperative is real property under applicable non-bankruptcy law would the limitations on modification apply, even though the mobile home or cooperative is considered the debtor’s principal residence.” 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1322.06[1][a][ii] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. Revised 2005). Moreover, ignoring the term “real property” within § 1322(b)(2) is contrary to the rules of statutory interpretation. See Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 369 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) This Court does not believe that the result in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing courts must interpret statutes to give effect to all language used rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous (B) holding courts must give effect to every provision and word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or superfluous (C) holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute (D) holding that courts must give effect to every word when interpreting a statute (E) holding principle of statutory construction is to give effect to every clause and word of a statute
[A]: recognizing courts must interpret statutes to give effect to all language used rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous


[Q]: a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). District courts within the Fifth Circuit have divided as to whether Woodfield’s fair-notice standard continues to apply to pleading affirmative defenses and counterclaims, or whether Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility standard applies. Compare, e.g., Vargas v. HWC Gen. Maintenance, LLC, 2012 WL 948892, at *2 (S.D.Tex. Mar. 20, 2012) (<HOLDING>); with Floridia v. DLT 3 Girls, Inc., 2012 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the pleading standard set forth in twombly applies to all civil actions (B) holding that where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendants liability it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief  (C) holding that twombly and iqbals plausibility standard applies (D) holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to  523 claims (E) recognizing the circuit split and applying the subjective standard as more stringent without deciding which standard applies
[A]:
holding that the pleading standard set forth in twombly applies to all civil actions