In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

in favor of William Spencer, et al., (Spencer) and setting the penalties for violation of the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Spencer cross-appeals the denial of post-trial motions and refusal to award attorney’s fees. We affirm on all grounds. I BART’s unjust enrichment claim fads for want of a loss. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 881 (2000) (noting that the elements of unjust enrichment are “receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.”). Even assuming that County of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 158 Cal.App.4th 533, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 (2008), recognized an exception to this rule, BART’s claim does not fall into that exception. See Peterson v. Cellico P’ship, 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1594, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Concrete financial loss is required for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (B) holding that walsh does not support plaintiffs assertion that they need not allege any actual injury to bring an unjust enrichment claim (C) holding that where plaintiffs filed a complaint for conversion unjust enrichment and injunctive relief they had an adequate remedy at law (D) holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed
holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement

in the context of an election case, even in the absence of a class action, and concluding that the case was not moot); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n. 5, 93 S.Ct. 1245, 36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973) (concluding that plaintiffs’ class action challenge to New York’s Election Law was capable of repetition yet evading review, although primary election had passed and the petitioners would be eligible to vote in the next primary); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (in challenge to a provision of Tennessee’s election law, concluding that, although plaintiff would be eligible to vote in the next election, the controversy was capable of repetition yet evading review); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 628 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We adopt the approach of the former cases, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appeal was not moot despite the fact that the election had passed because there would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar future controversy emphasis added (B) holding that although the 1972 election had long since passed the case was not moot because the statute under review would apply to other candidates in the future (C) holding that election case was not moot after election because there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining parties would be subject to that same action in the future (D) holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided (E) holding that plaintiffs claims were not moot although the election was over because the same issues would affect minorparty candidacies in the future but failing to address whether fulani herself would be affected
holding that appeal was not moot despite the fact that the election had passed because there would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar future controversy emphasis added

Court held that a federal court should not enjoin a state criminal prosecution begun prior to the institution of the federal suit except upon a “showing of bad faith, har-rassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54, 91 S.Ct. at 754-55. In later cases, the Court has held that the Younger doctrine is “fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); see Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423, 99 S his lower court view, at least by negative inference. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229, 237-39, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 2327-29, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Since the Commonwealth began this eminent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred (B) holding that where the dispositive issue in an administrative proceeding was whether an accident occurred as the plaintiff alleged it did collateral estoppel did not bar litigation of whether the accident was workrelated because that issue had not yet been litigated (C) holding voluntary dismissal permissible because trial court had not yet reached a decision on the merits (D) holding that younger abstention was not appropriate because eminent domain proceeding had not yet begun when plaintiffs began their federal court action (E) holding that debt collector violated fdcpa when it held debtor liable for court costs that had not yet been awarded

holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred