In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: have been required to examine the entire public record and would have discovered the foreclosure judgment....”). These recorded instruments would charge any subsequent purchaser with the information contained in them. Fairmont Funding, 301 A.D.2d at 564, 754 N.Y.S.2d 54 (“The intended purchaser must be presumed to have investigated the title, and to have examined every deed or instrument properly recorded, and to have known every fact disclosed or to which an inquiry suggested by the record would have led.”). The Foreclosure Judgment provides a purchaser with notice that a foreclosure sale was authorized by the court, and at a minimum would require a purchaser to inquire whether a foreclosure sale had occurred. See In re Davidson Rehab Associates, 103 B.R. 440, 444 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, here the Referee’s Report of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien (B) holding that plaintiffmortgagor lacked standing to enforce the terms of a foreclosure sale since there was no statutory authority allowing a mortgagor to enforce the provisions of a sale agreement when a foreclosure purchaser is in default (C) holding that a properly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale quiets title in the purchaser (D) holding that a wouldbe bona fide purchaser could not simply ignore the recorded notices of an impending nonjudicial foreclosure sale and fail to make inquiry as to whether the announced sale had occurred (E) holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser
[EX A]: holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien

[EX Q]: the ISBE would terminate on August 1, 2011, and the consent decree for CPS on September 1, 2012. With the consent decrees terminated, the only remaining action is for the Monitor to file the final report detailing her findings of the agencies’ compliance with the decrees. Then, just a few months before the consent decree for CPS was set to terminate, CPS filed a motion with the district court to decertify the original “Corey H.” class and vacate the consent decree it had agreed to in 1998 and also in 2010. The district court denied the motion and CPS appealed to this court. On appeal, CPS contends that the district court erred by denying its motion on the ground that our decision in Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir.2012), mandates that we d th Cir.1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Even if this case were not moot, we would not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23 (B) holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (D) holding that consent decree could not preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims that could not have been brought at time consent decree was filed and to which they were legally and procedurally entitled (E) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated
[EX A]: holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23

[EX Q]: 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). 17 MRE 801(c). 18 MRE 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules.”). 19 MRE 803A (emphasis added). 20 This Court first recognized the common-law tender years rule in People v Gage, 62 Mich 271; 28 NW 835 (1886), as a permissible rule to allow hearsay in order to corroborate the testimony of a child complainant. “The rule in this State is that where the victim is of tender years the testimony of the details of her complaint may be introduced in corroboration of her evidence, if her statement is shown to have been spontaneous and without indication of manufacture; and delay in making the complaint is excusable so far as it is caused by fear or other equally effective circumstance.” People v Baker, 251 Mich 322, 326; 232 NW 381 (1930) (<HOLDING>). However, this Court held in People v Kreiner, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the record in the case had not been developed sufficiently to determine whether a childs statement was admissible under the tender years exception a new trial was warranted (B) holding that only selfinculpatory aspects of hearsay statement but not other parts of statement are admissible under exception for statements against penal interest (C) holding also that only a childs first statement made is admissible under the exception (D) holding that videotape was admissible under rule 801e1b as prior consistent statement because defense challenged childs credibility (E) holding multiple statements by childvictim and childs mother admissible under residual exception
[EX A]:
holding that because the record in the case had not been developed sufficiently to determine whether a childs statement was admissible under the tender years exception a new trial was warranted