In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: with intent to murder”; therefore, the two convictions did not violate double jeopardy. Id. In addition to comparing the statutory elements of an offense both in the abstract under Blockburger and as applied to the facts of the particular case under Duchac, courts consider other factors relevant to ascertaining legislative intent. These factors include the following: (1) whether there were multiple victims involved; (2) whether several discrete acts were involved; and (3) whether the evil at which each offense is directed is the same or different. As we noted in Goins, “generally, if a criminal episode involves several victims who have personally been victimized, the evidence could sustain multiple convictions.” Goins, 705 S.W.2d at 651 (citing State v. Irvin, 603 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn.1980)(<HOLDING>)). In Goins, however, we held that the multiple 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a single transaction involving multiple obscene materials constitutes but one offense (B) holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured (C) holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (D) holding that killing more than one person in a single automobile accident justified multiple homicide convictions (E) holding that a defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses under  922g on the basis that he belonged to more than one prohibited class or that he simultaneously possessed more than one firearm
[EX A]: holding that a single transaction involving multiple obscene materials constitutes but one offense

[EX Q]: No. 25. The‘government asserts that “defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulgéd,” citing DOC’s written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov’t’s Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government’s position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (B) holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone conversations where inmates received a handbook alerting them that all telephone calls were recorded and were exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials (E) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company
[EX A]: holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth

[EX Q]: for the Court), this Court declared, “[b]y this ruling, we wish to make clear that the Court has relaxed the strict pleading requirements of common law.” Again, just last year, in State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tenn.1999) (Birch, J., writing for the Court), this Court noted, “[i]n conclusion, we wish to emphasize once again the fact that the Court has moved away from the strict pleading requirements of common law.” Relaxation of the strict pleading requirements of the common law is also apparent from recent decisions of this Court holding that an indictment which references the statute defining the offense is sufficient and satisfies the constitutional and statutory requirements of Hill. See State v. Sledge, 15 S.W.3d 93, 94 (Tenn.2000) (Holder, J., writing for the Court) (<HOLDING>); State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 148 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an indictment alleging that the defendant did unlawfully kill the victim during the perpetration of aggravated robbery in violation of tca 3913202 sufficient because it contained a specific reference to the statute which was sufficient to place the accused on notice of the charged offense (B) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense (C) holding that it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself (D) holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient (E) holding that reference to the appropriate statute was sufficient in felony murder indictments alleging that the defendant did unlawfully kill the victims during the perpetration of aggravated robbery in violation of tca 3913202
[EX A]:
holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense