In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Cote’s bias, Hayat alleges, first, that Cote made “several inappropriate racial and religious comments during deliberations.” Hayat presented evidence from Jurors L. and B., as well as from Juror H. via an affidavit by Ha-yat’s private investigator, that Cote made a “racial” comment during deliberations. B. declared that “[d]uring the deliberation process, ... Cote[ ] made the statement they all looked the same when wearing a costume or when put in a costume. I believe Mr. Cote made this statement in connection with a discussion of witness Naseem Khan’s claim that he had seen Ayman al-Zawahiri in Lodi.” Similarly, L. stated that “[djuring deliberations Mr. Cote made racial slurs. As an example, on one occasion ... he said in front of the entire group that they a 236-39 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Where, however, “a juror has been asked 
 Holding statements: (A) holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay (B) holding that rule 606b contains no exception for racially biased statements made during jury deliberations and expressing skepticism about whether constitutional concerns can ever override the rule (C) holding that federal rule of evidence 8034 the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not apply to statements made by doctors (D) recognizing rule (E) holding that the arkansas counterpart to cre 606b applies whether a verdict is reached or a mistrial declared and under the extraneous information exception allows jurors to testify about statements made during deliberations

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
of his experience’ in detecting criminal activity”) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). Based on the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that the officers possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to effect an investigative detention of Mr. Hishaw as he left the apartment in the pickup. Even though the initial stop was justified, we must still assess the reasonableness of the subsequent pat-down search. In order to comport with the Fourth Amendment, that search must have been “reasonably related in scope” to the basis for the stop (i.e., the officers’ suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs). See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In that regard, this circuit has concluded that an 169 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop (B) holding that like burglary car theft is a crime that often involves the use of weapons and other instruments of assault that could jeopardize police officer safety and thus justifies a protective frisk under terry to ensure officer safety (C) holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes (D) holding that when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle the officer may in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officers safety and the safety of others (E) holding that the officer had reasonable belief that the occupants of the vehicle were armed where the officer knew that drug dealers are frequently armed and therefore frisk of the vehicle was permissible

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
(“It is immaterial that [the defendant’s] firearm purchase and domestic violence conviction occurred prior to [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(9)’s enactment because the conduct prohibited by [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(9) is the possession of a firearm .... [Thus,] the application of [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(9) to [the defendant] does not run afoul of the ex post facto prohibition.”); United States v. Boyd, 52 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1236-37 (D.Kan.1999), aff'd 211 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir.2000), (concluding the illegal act was not completed until after 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) became effective because the illegal act in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is the possession of the firearm, not the misdemeanor domestic violence conviction); United States v. Meade, 986 F.Supp. 66, 69 (D.Mass.1997), aff'd 175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir.1999), (<HOLDING>); NAGE, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F.Supp. 1564, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 18 usc  3559c did not violate separation of powers doctrine or ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 usc  922g1 did not violate the ex post facto clause because the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm was not committed until after the effective date of the statute under which he was convicted (D) holding ex post facto clause barred application of mvra to defendant whose criminal conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute (E) holding 18 usc  922g9 penalizes the possession of a firearm after its effective date and therefore does not constitute a violation of the ex post facto clause

Ex Output:

(E)