In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000). A properly filed application is “one submitted ac cording to the state’s procedural requirements, such as the rules governing the time and place of filing.” Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir.1998). As described above, Petitioner initiated several state postconviction proceedings which, if properly filed, could toll the one-year period of limitation. The first of these was a motion for reduction of sentence filed and denied on October 8, 1996. This motion was pending until November 7, 1996, when the thirty-day period for filing a timely appeal expired. See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir.2000)(<HOLDING>). The Court finds that the one-year period of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for purposes of  2255 motions a federal criminal judgment becomes final when the time for filing a direct appeal expires (B) holding that a postconviction proceeding is pending under  2244d2 until the time to appeal expires (C) holding that time limit for initiating a tax appeal under kansas jurisdictional statute was a limitation  upon the right itself so that when time expires the right to bring such an action is extinguished (D) holding that postconviction proceeding is a civil suit (E) holding that the other collateral review provision of  2244d2 encompasses federal review

A: (B)
****
Q: fundamental error analysis. 4 . During this hearing the court allowed Dr. Bail-on to testily telephonically from the hospital at which the patient was located. 5 . Alternatively, an appellate court could remand the matter to the superior court for evidentiary hearings and findings on the effectiveness of appointed counsel. See In re Condry's Estate, 117 Ariz. 566, 568, 574 P.2d 54, 56 (App.1977). In In re Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-4942, 142 Ariz. 240, 242, 689 P.2d 183, 185 (App. 1984), we reversed and remanded the matter to the juvenile court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the parent had received adequate notice of the hearings against him and whether the parent had received effective assistance of counsel. 142 Ariz. at , 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. Carriger, 132 Ariz. 301, 304, 645 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitution requires  an opportunity  granted at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner  for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (B) holding that the due process clause is violated if the prosecution fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant (C) holding if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecutions case to meaningful adversarial testing  the adversary process itself is presumptively unreliable (D) holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (E) holding that the prosecutions suppression of evidence material to guilt or punishment violates due process regardless of the prosecutions good or bad faith

A: (C)
****
Q: Roscitis cannot recover anything above that amount from ICSOP. This frustrates the Legislature’s purpose in passing § 27-2-2.4, which was to “give an aggrieved and injured party the right to proceed directly against an insurer in those circumstances in which the tortfeasor has sought protection under the applicable provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code.” D'Amico v. Johnston Partners, 866 A.2d 1222, 1229 (R.I.2005). ICSOP counters, however, by noting that the Rhode Island Legislature limited recovery under § 27-7-2.4 to “insurance coverage available for the tort complained of’ (emphasis added). Thus, ICSOP argues, it was clearly not the Legislature’s intent to expand the scope of coverage available under an insurance policy. Cf. Barber v. Canela, 570 A.2d 670, 671 (R.I. 1990) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Yet IC-SOP contends that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a related direct action statute ri gen laws  2772 is designed only to provide a remedy to the injured party and not to enlarge the liability of the insurer beyond the limits stated in the policy (B) holding that an injured third party does not have the right to bring a direct action against a tortfeasors liability insurer (C) holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue (D) holding that an insurer which insures a tortfeasor under a liability policy has no obligation of good faith and fair dealing to an injured third party even where the injured third party also carries a separate policy with the insurer (E) holding assignable to injured party insureds claim against insurer for judgment in excess of policy limits

A:
(A)
****