In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: California state prisoner, Roy Lee Brown, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand. Brown contends that his § 2254 petition was timely filed because his state habeas petitions statutorilly tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Brown is entitled to tolling during the time he was seeking one full round of collateral review by the California courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Delhomme v. Ramirez, No. 00-56148, 2003 WL 21947183, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed (B) holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice (C) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (D) holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review (E) holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review

Answer: holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed


Question: to be heard on the motion have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.” E.D. Mich. Local Rule 7.1(h)(3); see Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 385 (6th Cir.2004). Here, the district court found that Moniz “simply is attempting to re-argue [] issues which were already ruled upon by the Court when it dismissed his Complaint,” and thus denied the motion to reconsider. R. 14 (Dist. Ct. Order at 3) (Page ID # 129). This court has stated that a district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reconsider where the motion “merely raise[s] arguments that were already ruled upon.” Graham, 358 F.3d at 385; see also Lommen v. McIntyre, 125 Fed.Appx. 655, 659 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). There was no abuse of discretion in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (B) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for reconsideration where the motion presented nothing new and merely rephrased allegations in the complaint (E) holding under third circuit law that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion

Answer: holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing


Question: arbitration before AAA was barred because the plaintiffs had executed an arbitration agreement stating that all controversies would be determined by arbitration before the NASD, the NYSE, the AMEX, or any recognized arbitration facility provided by any exchange. Id. at 1119. Thus, the defendants argued that AAA was not a proper forum since AAA was not named as a forum in the arbitration agreement. Id. This Court held that the AMEX Window operates as a default provision in the absence of a specific agreement between the parties. Id. at 1120. Thus, this Court concluded that the AMEX Window was superseded by the arbitration agreement and that under the arbitration agreement, AAA was not an available arbitration forum. Id. See also Merrill Lynch v. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109 (2nd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Rutherford, 903 F.2d 106 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an aaa arbitration was a private proceeding and therefore that a decision by the arbitrator pursuant to the federal arbitration act did not constitute state action (B) holding that a specific customer agreement can supersede the amex constitution and requiring arbitration before one of the fora named in the agreement (C) holding that an arbitration in accordance with aaa rules is a binding arbitration (D) holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision (E) holding that a dispute arising out of an insurance policy was not covered by the arbitration provision in the parties separate premium payment agreement because if the party had intended to subject this dispute to the arbitration provision it could easily clearly and unequivocally have done so either by including an arbitration provision in the insurance policy itself or by adding to the above arbitration provision

Answer:
holding that an aaa arbitration was a private proceeding and therefore that a decision by the arbitrator pursuant to the federal arbitration act did not constitute state action