In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: removal of the access can result in a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, if the state’s use is for a purpose other than a road purpose. But, in Judge Armstrong’s view, any modification of a road for road purposes that denies a landowner’s access does not give rise to a compensable taking. In so concluding, Judge Armstrong discounts as “dictum” the Supreme Court rationale in Burk that an abutter’s right of access to a conventional Highway “can be divested only by condemnation of the easement appurtenant to the abutting property.” 200 Or at 231. Judge Armstrong explains that the court’s conclusion in Burk cannot be reconciled with the court’s analysis in more recent cases in the context of regulations that affect road access. See, e.g., Schrunk, 242 Or at 73 (<HOLDING>). If, Judge Armstrong’s concurrence reasons, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access (B) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking (C) holding ripe a claim for a pre1987 taking because prior to first english california law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an action in inverse condemnation (D) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (E) holding that regulatory restrictions on abutting landowners right of ingress and egress are not compensable when landowner has adequate alternative means to access property
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: evidence to conclude that the government’s conduct in this case amounted to a material breach, it denied Malone’s appeal. 87-2 BCA 1119,758, at 99,966. In our view, the government materially breached this contract. According to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241(e) (1981), “the extent to which the behavior of [a] party failing to perform ... comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing” is a significant factor in determining whether that party’s breach is material. The Restatement also states that “[sjubter-fuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith,” as does lack of diligence and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance. Id. § 205 comment d; cf. Lewis-Nicholson, Inc. v. United States, 550 F.2d 26, 32, 213 Ct.Cl. 192 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. United States, 151 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subcontractor could recover damages from general contractor for delay in performance under state law (B) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (C) holding that governmentcaused delay in contractor performance violated implied duty not to hinder performance of other party (D) holding that performance may be valid acceptance (E) holding that prior positive performance evaluations are not dispositive as to whether the employer was satisfied with the employees performance by the time of the termination
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: 11 . Ultimately, Dr. Donner did not testify at trial, in light of Appellant’s decision to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence. 12 . Moreover, Appellant made it clear to counsel that his ultimate desire was to secure an outright acquittal on the theory that the victim’s death was not the result of his actions at all, but was caused by some undetermined, coincidental fatal brain abnormality. Obviously, the prospect of securing an outright acquittal was a difficult task for counsel given the facts adduced at trial. 13 . We note that Appellant does not allege counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to previously raise the allegation of a Brady violation. Accordingly, we could dispose of this issue on the basis of waiver. See Commonwealth v. Roney, 622 Pa. 1, 79 A.3d 595, 609 (2013) (<HOLDING>). However, the Commonwealth has not argued 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a brady violation is waived by guilty plea (B) holding claim of alleged brady violation waived on collateral appeal for failure to raise it at trial or on direct appeal (C) holding that where the fourth amendment question was raised at trial but not preserved on direct appeal in the state court the defendants failure to raise the issue on appeal in the state courts did not suffice to avoid stone (D) holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived (E) holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court
[EX A]:
(B)