In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: February 8, 2011 probation extension order failed to extend his probation period because the October 26, 2005 restitution order was improperly delegated to the probation officer, rather than determined by the circuit court as required by Code § 19.2-305.1(D), thus any subsequent order is invalid. In relevant part, Code § 19.2-305.1(D) states that “[a]t the time of sentencing, the court shall determine the amount to be repaid by the defendant and the terms and conditions thereof.” The amount of restitution to be paid by the defendant is within the sole province of the circuit court to determine and that determination may not be delegated to another department of government. See Code § 19.2-305.2; see also McCullough v. Commonwealth, 38 Va.App. 811, 815, 568 S.E.2d 449, 451 (2002) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the circuit court’s October 26, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing (B) holding part of the sentencing phase of trial the restitution amount is determined following conviction and is a matter resting within the sole province of the sentencing judge (C) holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase (D) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount (E) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses
[A]: (B)


[Q]: character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith,” though it may be admissible for other purposes. If a trial judge overrules a Rule 404(b) objection, finding the evidence of another crime or wrong admissible for one of these other purposes, the trial judge must also conduct a Rule 403 balancing test. This filtering analysis requires assessing whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of undue prejudice before evidence may be admitted. Watts v. State, 635 So.2d 1364, 1368 (Miss.1994). ¶ 56. Once again, Grindle did not object or in any way argue that the evidence of his subsequent arrest was being elicited in violation of Rule 404(b). So his Rule 404(b) argument is waived. See Ruben-stein v. State, 941 So.2d 735, 760 (¶ 87) (Miss.2006) (<HOLDING>). And by not objecting under Rule 404(b), his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plainerror review applies where the defendant fails to object to a constructive amendment (B) holding that to admit evidence of prior bad acts under rule 404b ala r evid the state must demonstrate that the evidence was reasonably necessary to its case (C) holding rule 16 does not apply to oral statements other than statements of the defendant (D) holding admission of prior bad acts of child abuse was reversible error when the defendant did not have exclusive control over the children during the period when the prior bad acts occurred (E) holding that failure to object to statements of prior bad acts barred argument on appeal that statements violated rules 404b and 403 without conducting any plainerror analysis
[A]: (E)


[Q]: 118 L.Ed.2d 543 (1992). Thus, § 1823(e) and the D’Oench doctrine encourage “banks and their customers [to] include the entire extent of their obligations in the bank’s records.” Id.; see also Bell & Murphy & Assoc. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, N.A., 894 F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir.) (“The D’Oench, Duhme doctrine ... favors the interests of depositors and creditors of a failed bank, who cannot protect themselves from secret agreements, over the interests of borrowers, who can.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895, 111 S.Ct. 244, 112 L.Ed.2d 203 (1990); In re NEW Commercial Paper Litigation, 826 F.Supp. 1448, 1461-62 (D.D.C.1992) (describing D’Oench and § 1823(e) as “a regime that places the risk on borrowers if they do not get all of .2d 206 (1994); Oliver v. RTC, 955 F.2d 583, 585-86 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, as originally enacted, § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that doench applies to secret side agreements made by subsidiaries and subsubsidiaries of the failed institution in receivership (B) holding that the doench doctrine extends to claims involving a wholly owned subsidiary of the failed financial institution in receivership (C) holding that the commonlaw doench doctrine applies to bar suit even when the rtc does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement (D) holding receipt of cab fare sufficient financial interest (E) holding that the doench doctrine extends broadly to cover any secret agreement adversely affecting the value of a financial interest that has come within the rtcs control as receiver of a failed financial institution including the financial interest of a whollyowned subsidiary
[A]:
(E)