U.S.-South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act of 2025

Bill: 119-hr-2633
Sponsor: full_name: Rep. Jackson, Ronny [R-TX-13]
Introduced: 2025-04-03
Policy area: International Affairs
Subjects: Africa

Congressional oversight

Diplomacy, foreign officials, Americans abroad

Foreign aid and international relief

Political parties and affiliation

Presidents and presidential powers, Vice Presidents

South Africa

Sovereignty, recognition, national governance and status
Latest action: action_date: 2025-07-22
text: Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 34 - 13.

Summaries:

tv_txt: I 119th CONGRESS 1st Session H. R. 2633 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES April 3, 2025 Mr. Jackson of Texas (for himself and Mr. James ) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs , and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary , for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned A BILL To require a full review of the bilateral relationship between the United States and South Africa and identify South African government officials and ANC leaders eligible for the imposition of sanctions, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the U.S.-South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act of 2025 . 2. Findings Congress finds the following: (1) The actions of factions within the African National Congress (ANC), the political party that since 1994 has held a governing majority and controlled South Africa’s executive branch, are inconsistent with the South African Government’s publicly stated policy of nonalignment in international affairs. (2) The South African Government has a history of siding with malign actors, including Hamas, a United States designated Foreign Terrorist Organization and a proxy of the Iranian regime, and continues to pursue closer ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. (3) The South African Government’s support of Hamas dates back to 1994, when the ANC first came into power, taking a hardline stance of consistently accusing Israel of practicing apartheid. (4) Following the unprovoked and unprecedented horrendous attack by Hamas on Israel on October 7, 2023, where Hamas terrorists killed and kidnapped hundreds of Israelis, members of the South African Government and leaders of the ANC have delivered a variety of antisemitic and anti-Israel-related statements and actions, including— (A) on October 7, 2023, South Africa’s Foreign Ministry released a statement expressing concern of escalating violence , urging Israel’s restraint in response, and implicitly blaming Israel for provoking the attack through continued illegal occupation of Palestine land, continued settlement expansion, desecration of the Al Aqsa Mosque and Christian holy sites, and ongoing oppression of the Palestinian people ; (B) on October 8, 2023, the ANC’s national spokesperson, Mahlengi Bhengu-Motsiri, said of the devastating Hamas attack, the decision by Palestinians to respond to the brutality of the settler Israeli apartheid regime is unsurprising ; (C) on October 14, 2023, President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa, accused Israel of genocide in statements during a pro-Palestinian rally; (D) on October 17, 2023, South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor accepted a call with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh; (E) on October 22, 2023, South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor visited Tehran and met with President Raisi of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is actively funding Hamas; (F) on November 7, 2023, in a parliamentary address, Foreign Minister Pandor called for the International Criminal Court to issue an immediate arrest warrant charging Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with violations of international criminal law; (G) on November 17, 2023, South Africa, along with 4 other countries, submitted a joint request to the International Criminal Court for an investigation into alleged war crimes being committed in the Palestinian territories; (H) on December 5, 2023, the ANC hosted 3 members of Hamas in Pretoria, including Khaled Qaddoumi, Hamas’s representative to Iran, and Bassem Naim, a member of Hamas’s political bureau in Gaza; (I) on December 29, 2023, South Africa filed a politically motivated suit in the International Court of Justice wrongfully accusing Israel of committing genocide; (J) in March 2024, South African Foreign Minister Pandor was quoted saying South Africa will arrest Israeli-South Africans who are fighting in the Israeli Defense Forces upon their return home and could strip them of their South African citizenship. Minister Pandor also implicitly encouraged protests outside of the United States Embassy; (K) on October 7, 2024, the ANC commemorated only the Palestinian lives lost to Israel, while accusing Israel of genocide; (L) in October 2024, South Africa filed its Memorial to the International Court of Justice, accusing Israel of genocidal actions to depopulate Gaza through mass death and displacement; (M) in November 2024, South Africa appointed Ebrahim Rasool as their Ambassador to the United States, who previously hosted senior Hamas officials to South Africa when he was the Premier of the Western Cape and, in 2020, was a speaker at an annual event hosted by the Iranian regime to celebrate Hezbollah’s resistance against Israel; and (N) the ANC’s ongoing attempt to rename the street that the United States Consulate in Johannesburg is located on as Leila Khaled Drive , including a quote from ANC first Deputy Secretary General Nomvula Mokonyane saying we want the United States of America embassy to change their letterhead to Number 1 Leila Khaled Drive . (5) The South African Government and the ANC have maintained close relations with the Russian Federation, which has been accused of perpetrating war crimes in Ukraine and indiscriminately undermines human rights. South Africa’s robust relationship with Russia spans the military and political space, including— (A) allowing a United States-sanctioned Russian cargo ship, the Lady R, to dock and transfer arms at a South African naval base in December 2022; (B) hosting offshore naval exercises, entitled Operation Mosi II , carried out jointly with the PRC and Russia, between February 17 and 27, 2023, corresponding with the 1-year anniversary of Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine; (C) authorizing a United States-sanctioned Russian military cargo airplane to land at a South African Air Force Base; (D) reneging on its initial call for the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw its forces from Ukraine and actively seeking improved relations with Moscow since February 2022; (E) dispatching multiple high-level official delegations to Russia to further political, intelligence, and military cooperation; (F) United States sanctioned oligarch Viktor Vekselberg donating $826,000 to the ANC in 2022; and (G) the ANC publishing an article in their newspaper, ANC Today, in October 2024 promoting Russian propaganda about the war in Ukraine. (6) South African Government interactions with the PRC Government and ANC interactions with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who are committing gross violations of human rights in the Xinjiang province and implement economically coercive tactics around the globe, undermine South Africa’s democratic constitutional system of governance, as exemplified in— (A) ongoing ANC and CCP inter-party cooperation, especially with the fundamental incompatibility between the civil and democratic rights guaranteed in South Africa’s Constitution and the CCP’s routine suppression of free expression and individual rights; (B) allowing the private Test Flying Academy of South Africa, which the Department of Commerce added to the Entity List on June 12, 2023, to recruit former United States and NATO fighter pilots to train Chinese People’s Liberation Army pilots; (C) South Africa’s hosting of 6 PRC Government-backed and CCP-linked Confucius Institutes, a type of entity that a CCP official characterized as an important part of the CCP’s external propaganda structure , the most of any country in Africa; (D) South African Government support for, and ANC participation in, a political training school opened in Tanzania funded by the Chinese Communist Party where it trains political members of the ruling liberation movements in 6 Southern African countries. The school instills CCP ideology into the next-generation of African leaders and attempts to export the CCP’s system of party-run authoritarian governance to the African continent; (E) cooperation with the PRC under the PRC’s global Belt and Road Initiative which, while trade and infrastructure-focused, is designed to expand PRC global economic, political, and security sector-related influence; (F) the widespread presence in South Africa’s media and technology sectors of PRC state linked firms that the United States has restricted due to threats to national security, including Huawei Technologies, ZTE and Hikvision, which place South African sovereignty at risk and facilitate the CCP’s export of its model of digitally aided authoritarian governance underpinned by cyber controls, social monitoring, propaganda, and surveillance; and (G) the South African government’s clear appeasement to the CCP in demanding that Taiwan relocate its representative office out of Pretoria and downgrade its status to that of a trade office. (7) The ANC-led South African Government has a history of substantially mismanaging a range of state resources and has often proven incapable of effectively delivering public services, threatening the South African people and the South African economy, as illustrated by— (A) President Cyril Ramaphosa’s February 9, 2023, declaration of a national state of disaster over the worsening, multi-year power crisis caused by the ANC’s chronic mismanagement of the state-owned power company Eskom, resulting from endemic, high-level corruption; (B) the persistence of South African state-owned railway company Transnet’s insufficient capacity, which has disrupted rail operations and hindered mining companies’ export of iron ore, coal, and other commodities, in part due to malfeasance and corruption by former Transnet officials; (C) outbreaks of cholera in 2023 and 2024, the worst in 15 years, which were due in part to the South African Government’s disease prevention failures, as President Ramaphosa admitted on June 9, 2023, including a failure to provide clean water to households; and (D) rampant state capture, that emerged and grew during the administration of former President Jacob Zuma and has damaged South Africa’s international standing and profoundly undermined the rule of law, continues to negatively impact the economic development prospects and living standards of the South African people while deeply damaging public trust in state governance. (8) In November 2024, South Africa appointed Ebrahim Rasool as Ambassador to the United States. Rasool had previously made public comments describing President Trump as extreme and in March 2025, Rasool characterized President Trump as a white supremacist . Secretary of State Marco Rubio subsequently declared Rasool as persona non grata in the United States. 3. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) it is in the national security interest of the United States to deter strategic political and security cooperation and information sharing with the PRC and the Russian Federation, particularly any form of cooperation that may aid or abet Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine or its international standing or influence; and (2) the South African Government’s foreign policy actions have long ceased to reflect its stated stance of nonalignment, and now directly favor the PRC, the Russian Federation, and Hamas, a known proxy of Iran, and thereby undermine United States national security and foreign policy interests. 4. Presidential certification of determination with respect to South Africa (a) In general Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, shall certify to the appropriate congressional committees and release publicly an unclassified determination explicitly stating whether South Africa has engaged in activities that undermine United States national security or foreign policy interests. (b) Accompanying report The certification required by subsection (a) shall be accompanied by an unclassified report submitted to the appropriate congressional committees, with a classified annex if necessary, providing the justification for the determination. 5. Full review of the bilateral relationship (a) Bilateral relationship review The President, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the United States Trade Representative, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies that play a substantial role in United States relations with South Africa, shall conduct a comprehensive review of the bilateral relationship between the United States and South Africa. (b) Report on findings Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes the findings of the review required by subsection (a). 6. Report on sanctionable persons Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a classified report that includes— (1) a list of senior South African government officials and ANC leaders the President determines have engaged in corruption or human rights abuses that would be sufficient, based on credible evidence, to meet the criteria for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the authorities provided by the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act ( 22 U.S.C. 10101 et seq. ); and (2) with respect to each person identified pursuant to paragraph (1)— (A) a detailed explanation describing the conduct forming the basis of the person’s inclusion on the list; and (B) (i) the expected timeline for sanctions described in paragraph (1) to be imposed with respect to such person; or (ii) if the President does not intend to impose sanctions with respect to such person, a detailed justification describing the rationale and legal authorities underlying such negative determination. 7. Definitions (a) ANC The term ANC means the African National Congress. (b) Appropriate congressional committees The term appropriate congressional committees means— (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. (c) CCP The term CCP means the Chinese Communist Party. (d) PRC The term PRC means the People’s Republic of China.