GOLDEN DOME Act of 2025

Bill: 119-hr-4107
Sponsor: full_name: Rep. Messmer, Mark B. [R-IN-8]
Introduced: 2025-06-24
Policy area: Armed Forces and National Security
Latest action: action_date: 2025-06-24
text: Referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, the Judiciary, and Transportation and Infrastructure, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

Summaries:

tv_txt: I 119th CONGRESS 1st Session H. R. 4107 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES June 24, 2025 Mr. Messmer (for himself, Mr. Fallon , Mr. Harrigan , Mr. Wittman , Mr. Crenshaw , Mr. McCormick , Mr. Wilson of South Carolina , Mr. Bergman , Mr. Luttrell , Mr. Jackson of Texas , Mr. McGuire , Mr. Van Orden , Mr. Yakym , Mr. Finstad , Mr. Mast , Mr. Shreve , Mr. McDowell , Mr. Baird , Mr. Hamadeh of Arizona , Mr. Mills , Mr. Steube , Mrs. Houchin , Mr. Begich , Mr. Gimenez , and Mr. Stutzman ) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services , and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs , the Judiciary , and Transportation and Infrastructure , for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned A BILL To improve the missile defense capabilities of the United States, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Ground and Orbital Launched Defeat of Emergent Nuclear Destruction and Other Missile Engagements Act of 2025 or the GOLDEN DOME Act of 2025 . 2. Findings; sense of Congress (a) Findings (1) Missile Defense review Congress finds that the 2022 Missile Defense Review found the following: (A) Since the release of the 2019 Missile Defense Review, missile-related threats have rapidly expanded in quantity, diversity, and sophistication. (B) United States national security interests are increasingly at risk from wide-ranging missile arsenals that include offensive ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic weapons. (C) In support of the homeland missile defense mission, continued modernization and expansion of all current deployed systems with capabilities guarding against the homeland threat, including the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, will remain essential to our comprehensive missile defeat approach. In addition, the United States will also continue to improve defensive capabilities to address the threat of evolving hypersonic missile, cruise missile, and unmanned system strikes by any adversary against the homeland. (D) The continued evolution and progress of missiles and unmanned systems as a principal means by which adversaries seek to project conventional or nuclear military power makes missile and unmanned system defense a core deterrence-by-denial component of an integrated deterrence strategy. (E) Missile and unmanned system defense capabilities add resilience and undermine adversary confidence by introducing doubt and uncertainty into strike planning and execution, reducing the incentive to conduct small-scale coercive attacks, decreasing the probability of attack success, and raising the threshold of conflict. (F) Should deterrence fail, missile defense capabilities sufficient to negate long-range missile threats of any type are among the most critical national security capabilities for the United States. (2) Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States Congress finds that, in its October 2023 report, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States recommended the following: (A) The United States should develop and field homeland integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China, and determine the capabilities needed to stay ahead of the North Korean and Iranian threat. (B) The Secretary of Defense should direct research, development, test and evaluation into advanced integrated air and missile defense capabilities leveraging all domains, including land, sea, air, and space. These activities should focus on sensor architectures, integrated command and control, interceptors, cruise and hypersonic missile defenses, unmanned systems, and area or point defenses. The Department of Defense should urgently pursue deployment of any capabilities that prove feasible. (3) Commission on the National Defense Strategy Congress finds the following: (A) In its July 2024 report, the Commission on the National Defense Strategy found the following: (i) There is an increasing threat from expanding ability of China, Russia, and North Korea to deliver nuclear weapons against the United States, including the territories of the United States. (ii) The military planners of the Department of Defense and United States Northern Command need to prepare for a worst-case scenario in which nuclear and other strikes are launched against the United States, which could be done in large numbers with specialized delivery systems. (B) In the report described in subparagraph (A), the Commission shared the same threat assessment about missile attacks as the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and agreed with the recommendation that the United States should enhance missile defense for the homeland. (4) Policy Congress finds that it is the policy of the Federal Government that — (A) the Federal Government will provide for the common defense of the citizens of the United States and the United States by deploying and maintaining a next-generation missile defense shield; (B) the Federal Government will deter and defend the citizens and critical infrastructure of the United States against any foreign attack on the United States homeland; and (C) the Federal Government will guarantee the secure second-strike capability of the Federal Government. (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) as the advanced long-range missile and unmanned system threat continues to evolve, the threat of attack by ballistic, cruise missile, hypersonic missile, and unmanned system remains a significant threat to the United States with potentially catastrophic consequences; (2) China is rapidly expanding and modernizing its conventional forces to include ballistic missile systems posing an increasing threat to citizens, forces, and allies of the United States; (3) over the past 40 years, the sophistication and quantity of threats, including ballistic, hypersonic, cruise, and unmanned systems has become substantial; (4) contending only with rogue nation threats and accidental or unauthorized missile launches is no longer sufficient in the current and reasonably foreseeable future threat environment; (5) by empowering the United States with a second-strike capability, the Golden Dome will deter adversaries from attacks on the homeland; (6) to improve capabilities to defend adequately against increasing numbers and sophistication of threats to the homeland, rapid development and deployment of space-based sensors and interceptors which take advantage of lower cost and technical commercial advances in recent years must be among the Defense Department’s highest priorities; (7) there is a need to fully integrate undersea, ground, air, and space-based sensors, interceptors, and command nodes through a secure and redundant communications architecture; (8) there is a need to clearly delineate and appropriately empower the leaders and agencies responsible for development, integration, and execution of the Golden Dome; (9) the United States must make achieving total domain awareness, from the seafloor to Outer Space to cyberspace, to provide early warning and defeat of missile threats from both the northern and southern hemispheres across all warfighting domains a top priority; (10) a central component of Golden Dome will be the network and command and control systems; (11) substantial command and control and fire control capabilities exist now, but require investment to support any Golden Dome reference architecture; (12) a flexible, open-architecture approach for the Golden Dome will support spiral development; (13) Golden Dome prioritizes the defense of United States citizens in the homeland against all air and missile threats from all countries and requires prioritization of critical assets to inform the Commander of United States Northern Command and the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command; (14) significant additional missile defense modeling and simulation tools that measure friendly and adversary effects, such as kinetic, non-kinetic, directed energy, are required; (15) the Executive order directs the acceleration of the deployment of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor layer (HBTSS) and is encouraged by the fact that HBTSS has already been demonstrated successfully on-orbit by the Missile Defense Agency and is in active production with Space Development Agency; and (16) the space-based sensor industrial base has available capacity to accept the additional orders necessary to respond to the Executive order’s explicit direction to accelerate the deployment of HBTSS. 3. Definitions In this Act: (1) Commercial solution (A) In general The term commercial solution means a product, other than real property, that— (i) is of a type customarily used by the general public or by nongovernmental entities for purposes other than governmental purposes; and (ii) (I) has been sold, leased, or licensed to the general public; or (II) has been offered for sale, lease, or license to the general public. (B) Inclusion of commercial products, components, and services The term commercial solution includes commercial products, components, and services in alignment with the Federal Government’s preference for the acquisition of commercial products and commercial services, as set forth in sections 1906, 1907, and 3307 of title 41, United States Code, and sections 3451 through 3453 of title 10, United States Code, which establish acquisition policies more closely resembling those of the commercial marketplace and encourage the acquisition of commercial products and commercial services. (2) Congressional defense committees The term congressional defense committees has the meaning given such term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code. (3) Golden Dome The term Golden Dome shall means the holistic missile defense architecture described in this Act. (4) Missile The term missile means a ballistic, hypersonic, cruise, hypersonic cruise, or loitering munition. (5) Program Manager The term Program Manager means the Golden Dome Direct Report Program Manager appointed under section 4(a)(4)(A). (6) Secretary The term Secretary means the Secretary of Defense. (7) Unmanned system The term unmanned system means a remote-operated or autonomous unmanned system of any size maneuvering in land, sea, air, or space that is capable of single attacks, swarm attacks, or sensor and data collection and reconnaissance. 4. Improving United States missile defense capabilities (a) Development of a holistic missile defense strategy; Golden Dome administration (1) Development of a holistic missile defense strategy Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall develop a holistic missile defense strategy informed by discussions with and suggestions from such other government agencies as the Secretary deems necessary to determine which critical infrastructure must be defended, against which adversaries, and from which specific capabilities, including from both missiles and unmanned systems. (2) All-domain awareness The strategy developed pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include plans for a system of layered sensors from the seafloor to space and cyberspace to provide persistent all-domain awareness. (3) Integrated, redundant command and control The strategy developed pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include plans for integrated, secure, open, and redundant command and control software and technology architecture for the nationwide missile defense system and shall designate a clear human chain of command for control of such systems and responses. (4) Leadership (A) Establishment of a Golden Dome Direct Report Program Manager There is established a Golden Dome Direct Report Program Manager, who shall be appointed by the Secretary from among the general officers of the Army, Air Force, Space Force, or flag officers of the Navy and Marine Corps. (B) Grade The individual serving as the Program Manager, while so serving, shall have the grade of general without vacating the permanent grade of the officer and will be placed directly under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Department of Defense order of precedence. (C) Responsibilities The Program Manager shall be responsible for the acquisition, contracting, development, testing, and initial operations and sustainment of Golden Dome. (D) Reporting and authority Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, the Program Manager shall— (i) report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; (ii) have the acquisition authorities equivalent to Defense Acquisition Executives, including milestone decision authority, contracting authority, direct hiring authority, direct liaison authority with congressional oversight committees, original classification authority, expedited military construction authority, and technical authority for missile defense of the homeland; (iii) have full authority to budget for Golden Dome and perform oversight of funds identified to be in support of Golden Dome across all categories of budget authority, regardless of reprogramming thresholds; and (iv) establish Golden Dome program elements and programs consistent with the format used by the President for submittal of the budget of the President pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, to facilitate oversight by Congress. (E) Exception from certain manual and directive Programs or projects carried out under the authority of this section shall not be subject to the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual and Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, or successor manuals and directives. The Program Manager shall use all lawful acquisition and procurement methods necessary outside of this process to carry out the accelerated implementation and execution of Golden Dome. (F) Protection from intervention Unless otherwise directed by the President, the Secretary, or statute, no officer other than the Secretary of Defense may intervene to exercise, authority, direction, interference, including unreasonable delays in answering requests for information or other requests relating to the implementation or execution of Golden Dome or its subsystems, or control over the Program Manager in the discharge of responsibilities specified in subparagraph (C) and authority specified in subparagraph (D). (G) Authority to work with other Federal agencies (i) In general The Program Manager may work with other Federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the various elements of the intelligence community, to expedite research, testing, and execution of any Golden Dome-related systems. (ii) Priority for decision requests In any case in which a Federal agency receives a decision request under clause (i) relating to the planning and implementation of Golden Dome, the head of the Federal agency shall prioritize the decision request. (5) Leveraging distributed, advanced, additive manufacturing The Secretary shall develop and implement a plan for leveraging distributed, advanced, or additive manufacturing to rapidly develop technologies and munitions critical for the strategy required by paragraph (1). (6) Leveraging commercial solutions To the maximum extent practicable, the architectures developed by the Department of Defense as part of Golden Dome shall use commercial solutions, including subcontracting by prime contractors at all tiers to incorporate commercial items or nondevelopmental items as components of items, supplied to the Department of Defense for rapid deployment. (7) Testing requirements (A) In general The Secretary of Defense and the Program Manager shall ensure that a robust testing regime is established for all kinetic and nonkinetic interceptors or similar systems throughout the system’s lifecycle . To the maximum extent practicable, testing shall include execution of end-to-end missile defense detection, tracking, and destruction techniques that exercise multiple components of the Golden Dome system. (B) Testing schedule (i) In general In carrying out subparagraph (A), the Secretary and the Program Manager shall ensure that, not later than 540 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a demanding testing cadence begins, commencing with a virtual exercise commencing on or before the date that is 540 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (ii) Test plans Not later than 90 days before carrying out a test under this paragraph, the Secretary and the Program Manager shall present to the congressional defense committees a detailed plan for the test. (iii) Briefings In any case in which the Program Manager fails to conduct a test under this paragraph in accordance with a timeline specified in this paragraph, the Program Manager shall provide the applicable subcommittees of the congressional defense committees an in-person briefing in each month for with the test is delayed. (C) Live-fire exercise requirement At a minimum, kinetic and nonkinetic systems deemed to be mission essential by the Secretary to the capabilities of Golden Dome shall be tested on a semiannual basis in a live-fire exercise, starting after the virtual test described in clause (i). (D) Participants (i) Required participation Each exercise under this paragraph shall include the following participants: (I) The Program Manager. (II) A representative from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. (III) A representative from each of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Space Force. (IV) A representative from the National Security Agency. (V) Representative from North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) or United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). (VI) A representative from Indo-Pacific Command. (ii) Invited for participation For each exercise under this paragraph, the Program Manager shall invite the participation of the following: (I) A representative from the Coast Guard. (II) A representative from the Federal Aviation Administration. (III) A representative from the congressional defense committees. (E) Waivers (i) In general Pursuant to a request submitted to the Secretary under clause (ii), the Secretary may waive the requirement in subparagraph (B) for an individual system. (ii) Requests The Program Manager may submit to the Secretary a request for a waiver of the requirement in subparagraph (B) for an individual system. (iii) Congressional notification Not later than 14 days after granting a waiver under clause (i), the Secretary shall provide the congressional defense committees an in-person briefing of the waiver with a detailed explanation of the reasons for the decision of the Secretary to grant the waiver. (F) Annual reports Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than once each year thereafter, the Secretary shall, in consultation with the heads of such government agencies as the Secretary considers relevant, submit to the congressional defense committees a report detailing key regulations preventing rapid, iterative testing of systems vital to Golden Dome. (b) Accelerating development of non-Kinetic capabilities The Secretary shall use all authorities available to the Secretary to accelerate development of non-kinetic capabilities to negate missile or unmanned system threats prior to launch or after launch. Such capabilities may include cyber (offense and defense), supply chain interdiction, artificial intelligence-driven battle management, electromagnetic spectrum, directed energy weapons, and high-power microwave defense options capable of defeating large-scale missile or unmanned system attacks. (c) Accelerating development of information fusion platform using artificial intelligence To detect threats The Secretary shall use all authorities available to the Secretary to accelerate development and rapid prototyping of high technology readiness level (TRL) capabilities in order to acquire and field an information fusion, software-centric platform that utilizes machine learning and artificial intelligence technologies capable of delivering air, land, space, and maritime domain awareness and early warning capabilities for homeland defense across disparate novel and legacy systems. Such platform shall employ a common data layer that can support the rapid integration of new sensors and effectors across all tiers of the integrated air and missile defense system. (d) Acceleration of development for proliferated warfighter space architecture of Space Development Agency (1) In general In support of Golden Dome, the Director of the Space Development Agency shall use all authorities available to the Director to accelerate development and rapid fielding of satellites and associated systems for tranches 3, 4, and 5 of the proliferated warfighter space architecture of the Agency. (2) Status of Space Development Agency The Space Development Agency shall remain an independent element of the United States Space Force, and shall be exempt from the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System requirements process. (e) Accelerating Space Sensor Layer for Golden Dome The Secretary of Defense shall, acting through the Program Manager and in coordination with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the Director of the Space Development Agency, use all the authorities available to the Secretary to accelerate the deployment of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor by procuring, not later than December 1, 2025, at least 40 space vehicles with Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor payloads. (f) Requirement for next generation interceptor fielding and silo construction The Program Manager shall, with support from the Missile Defense Agency, take such actions as may be necessary to expand Next Generation Interceptor production and silo construction at Fort Greely, Alaska, to field up to 80 interceptors at Fort Greely for defense of the United States. Interceptor testing and initial fielding shall be completed not later than January 1, 2028. (g) Requirement for combatant commands To account for missile defense interceptors and sensor requirements in their annual requests For each fiscal year beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act, each commander of a combatant command shall include the missile defense interceptor requirements, terrestrial-based sensor requirements, space-based sensor requirements, and counter-unmanned system requirements of the combatant command of the commander in the supporting information for the Department of Defense submitted along with the budget of the President to Congress for such fiscal year pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code. (h) Accelerating development of Glide Phase Interceptor (1) Use of authorities to accelerate development The Program Manager shall use all authorities available to the Secretary to accelerate development of the Glide Phase Interceptor to defend against hypersonic threats to the United States homeland. (2) Report on potential for parallel development Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall submit to the Secretary and the Program Manager a report on the potential for parallel development of capabilities, revised program schedule, and the risk associated with pursuing only one alternative for the Glide Phase Interceptor. (i) Accelerating production and fielding of ground mobile interceptors The Program Manager shall use all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate the production and fielding of ground mobile interceptors and radars for forward deployment and homeland defense as the Secretary and President consider appropriate. (j) Accelerating development of resilient positioning, navigation, and timing for missile defense systems The Program Manager shall use all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate development and fielding of resilient positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) solutions that can operate effectively in ground positioning system (GPS)-denied environments. Such solutions may include the following: (1) Quantum-enhanced inertial navigation and atomic clock technologies to maintain continuous positioning, navigation, and timing functionality in ground positioning system-degraded or denied scenarios. (2) Enhanced terrestrial-based navigation systems for greater assured positioning in ground positioning system-contested environments. (3) Robust data fusion techniques that integrate multiple positioning, navigation, and timing sources, such as radar-based tracking, vision-aided navigation, and low-Earth orbit (LEO) signals, to sustain operational effectiveness during electronic warfare (EW) attacks or cyber intrusions. (4) Commercially available, field-proven alternative positioning, navigation, and timing solutions that leverage advanced sensor fusion, artificial intelligence-driven error correction, and resilient positioning, navigation, and timing processing to provide assured navigation for mobile and fixed defense platforms, including those currently deployed in hypersonic tracking and integrated air and missile defense applications. (k) Accelerating development of autonomous agents To defend against cruise missiles and unmanned systems The Program Manager shall use all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate development of autonomous agents to cost-effectively defend the United States homeland and forward-deployed armed forces against raids of both large cruise missiles and unmanned systems as the Secretary considers appropriate. (l) Accelerating development and fielding of low-Cost scalable interceptor The Program Manager shall use all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate development, test, and fielding of a low-cost scalable interceptor that can augment existing production lines and provide resiliency to the integrated air and missile defense system. (m) Accelerating development and deployment of space-Based sensors and interceptors (1) In general The Program Manager shall use all authorities available to the Secretary to accelerate development and deployment of proliferated space-based sensors and interceptors capable of ballistic and hypersonic missile intercept. (2) Requirement The Program Manager shall ensure that development and deployment described in paragraph (1) will— (A) substantially avail itself of commercial space capabilities to reduce cost and time to deploy; (B) ensure that space-based interceptors and ground-based interceptors are fully integrated; and (C) provide an autonomy layer that supports time-critical targeting through advancements in information technology and mitigates latency issues. (n) Report To reduce cost savings per round for space-Based interceptors Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Program Manager shall submit a feasibility study to the congressional defense committees outlining multiple methods for reducing the cost per round of various space-based interceptors including kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities and informed by traditional and nontraditional defense technology companies. (o) Accelerating modernization of certain terrestrial domain capabilities The Program Manager shall use all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate modernization of terrestrial-based radar capabilities, including those located at or known as Cobra Dane, Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) in Greenland and Cape Cod, Homeland Defense Radar and Maui Space Surveillance Complex in Hawaii, and the Alaska Radar System. (p) Modernization of perimeter acquisition radar attack characterization system The Program Manager shall use all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate the modernization and digitization of the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System (PARCS) to improve detection of intercontinental and sea-launched missile threats, as well as improve space domain awareness capabilities. (q) Site selection and program execution plan for southern hemisphere-Facing early warning radar system Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Program Manager shall submit to Congress a report detailing a site selection and proposed program execution plan for a southern hemisphere-facing early warning radar system capable of detecting threats from next generation complex missile attacks. (r) Site selection and program execution plan for highly flexible missile defense sites Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Program Manager shall submit to Congress a report detailing a plan for a highly flexible, and if necessary mobile, terrestrial missile defense network capable of defending critical nodes across the United States, including noncontiguous States and territories, from likely attack vectors. (s) Site selection and program execution plan for construction of Alaska-Based Aegis Ashore system Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Program Manager shall submit to Congress a report detailing a site selection and proposed program execution plan for an Alaska-based Aegis Ashore missile defense system. (t) Completion and certification of Aegis Ashore system in Hawaii The Program Manager shall use all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate completion and certification of an Aegis Ashore system based in Hawaii. (u) Acceleration of munitions production for missile defense The Program Manager, working with the Services, shall use all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate production of critical munitions used for missile interception, including Standard Missile 3 Blocks IB and IIA and PAC–2 and PAC–3 munitions, to ensure their availability as an additional sub-layer of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. (v) Expedited military construction authority (1) Waiver of regulations Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may waive all legal requirements the Secretary, in such Secretary’s sole discretion, determines necessary to ensure expeditious construction, deployment, testing, and operation of Golden Dome, including mission and life support. Any such decision by the Secretary shall be effective upon being published in the Federal Register. (2) Federal court review (A) In general The district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all causes of action or claims arising from any action undertaken, or any decision made, by the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1). A cause of action or claim may only be brought alleging a violation of the Constitution of the United States. The court shall not have jurisdiction to hear any claim not specified in this subparagraph. (B) Time for filing of complaint Any cause or claim brought pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be filed not later than 60 days after the date of the action or decision made by the Secretary. A claim shall be barred unless it is filed within the time specified. (C) Ability to seek appellate review An interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of the district court may be reviewed only upon petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. (w) Acceleration of integrated air and missile defense technology exchanges (1) In general The Secretary shall, in collaboration with the Secretary of State, look for and exploit opportunities to accelerate technology exchanges and transfers of integrated missile defense technology, including over the horizon radar with trusted allies under current defense agreements and arrangements. (2) Utilizing partner technology The Secretary may utilize the technology of trusted partners to fill capability gaps in Golden Dome that are identified as an urgent need by the Program Manager. (3) Rule of construction Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require the Secretary to exchange technology with a foreign country if the President or the Secretary determines that doing so would present a grave national security threat to the United States. (x) Development and securing of supply chains critical to missile defense (1) In general The Secretary shall, in collaboration with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of the Interior, identify critical shortages and vulnerabilities in supply chains critical to missile and unmanned system defense component production and shall use all authorities available to the Secretaries to develop and secure such supply chains. (2) Advanced data analytics techniques and artificial-intelligence-driven supply chain mapping tools In carrying out paragraph (1), the Secretary may leverage advanced data analytics techniques and artificial-intelligence-driven supply chain mapping tools to assess supply chain vulnerabilities related to missile defense and unmanned systems defense systems, and other critical technologies. (y) Authorization for procurement and fielding of dirigibles to support missile defense (1) In general The Secretary of the Army may procure and field such dirigibles, including airships and aerostats, in support of the missile defense of the United States homeland from ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, and unmanned systems as the Secretary of Defense determines are necessary to the defense of the United States from long-range missile threats. (2) Requirements The requirements of paragraph (1) cover— (A) high altitude air defense systems to detect, characterize, track, and engage current and emerging advanced missile and unmanned system threats; and (B) both short-term and long-term solutions that leverage the innovative dirigible and associated sensor development that the Armed Forces, partners of the United States, such as Israel, and United States industry have undertaken during the 30-year period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act. (3) Consideration In carrying out paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Army shall consider the use of dirigibles in supporting resilient military and emergency communication networks in a crisis. (z) Requirement for acceleration of procurement and fielding of air moving target indicator systems The Program Manager shall use all the authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate the procurement and fielding of air moving target indicator (AMTI) systems capable of detecting, tracking, and distinguishing airborne moving targets from stationary or cluttered backgrounds. (aa) Requirement for accelerated development and expansion of integrated undersea surveillance system The Program Manager shall use all the authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate the development and expansion of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System to detect and track undersea threats like submersibles that carry missiles near United States shorelines. 5. Protection of the space industrial base (a) Finding Congress finds that robust competition in the space industrial base is essential to assuring United States space superiority and the ability of the United States Space Force to provide national security mission-critical space warfighting systems and operations across the joint force. (b) Requirement To maximize competition Chapter 382 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: 4821. Preservation of space industrial base (a) In general The head of an agency shall, to the maximum extent practicable— (1) ensure that space acquisitions employ procedures that maximize competition; (2) ensure that mission-critical national security space-based systems that deliver tactical data from low Earth orbit within a program and across the Armed Forces shall be procured from an open competition allowing for competition between multiple vendors, and those vendors’ products shall comply with interfaces and standards that maximize resilience and interoperability with Department of Defense systems; and (3) ensure that a contract or other agreement for a mission-critical space-based tactical data delivery system acquired or contracted as-a-service must require the performance, cost, and speed of delivery of the capability to be demonstrably competitive to any existing program currently delivering that capability which it seeks to replace or substitute, and use reasonable best efforts to avoid the as-a-service contract if the agency head believes in good faith that it will result in a major contraction in the space an industrial base available to support the Department of Defense. (b) Implementation The head of an agency shall, to the maximum extent possible, ensure that acquisition, contracting, and other procurement officials develop guidance— (1) to achieve and act in accordance with the requirements of subsection (a) and with the intent to deliver mission-critical space-based tactical data delivery systems in accordance with government standards and interfaces; and (2) to prevent the major reduction and consolidation of the space industrial base. . 6. Protection of United States assets from incursions Section 130i of title 10, United States Code, is amended— (1) in subsection (a)— (A) by striking Notwithstanding and inserting (1) Notwithstanding ; (B) by striking any provision of title 18 and inserting sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 119 and 206 of title 18 ; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: (2) The Secretary of Defense shall delegate the authority under paragraph (1) to take actions described in subsection (b)(1) to the commander of a combatant command, the Secretary concerned, or such other official of the Department of Defense as the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate. ; (2) in subsection (b)(1)(B), by inserting before the period at the end the following: , including through the use of remote identification broadcast or other means ; (3) in subsection (e)(4)— (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ; or and inserting a semicolon; (B) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); and (C) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new subparagraph: (C) would support another Federal agency with authority to mitigate the threat of unmanned aircraft systems or unmanned aircraft in mitigating such threats; or ; (4) by redesignating subsections (g), (h), (i), and (j) as subsections (h), (j), (k), and (l), respectively; (5) by inserting after subsection (f) the following new subsection: (g) Exemption from disclosure Information pertaining to the technology, procedures, and protocols used to carry out this section, including any regulations or guidance issued to carry out this section, shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552(b)(3) of title 5 and any State or local law requiring the disclosure of information. ; (6) by inserting after subsection (h), as redesignated by paragraph (4), the following new subsection: (i) Applicability of other laws to activities related to the mitigation of threats from unmanned aircraft systems or unmanned aircraft Sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 119 and 206 of title 18, and section 46502 of title 49, may not be construed to apply to activities of the Department of Defense or the Coast Guard, whether under this section or any other provision of law, that— (1) are conducted outside the United States; and (2) are related to the mitigation of threats from unmanned aircraft systems or unmanned aircraft. ; (7) in subsection (k), as so redesignated— (A) in paragraph (1)— (i) by striking subsection (j)(3)(C) and inserting subsection (l)(3)(C) ; and (ii) by striking December 31, 2026 and inserting December 31, 2030 ; and (B) in paragraph (2)— (i) by striking 180 days and inserting one year ; and (ii) by striking November 15, 2026 and inserting November 15, 2030 ; and (8) in subsection (l), as so redesignated— (A) in paragraph (1)— (i) in subparagraph (B), by inserting the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, after the Committee on the Judiciary, ; and (ii) in subparagraph (C), by inserting the Committee on Homeland Security, after the Committee on the Judiciary, ; (B) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (6) as paragraphs (4) through (7), respectively; (C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph (3): (3) The term combatant command has the meaning given that term in section 161 of this title. ; and (D) in paragraph (4), as redesignated by subparagraph (B)— (i) in clause (viii), by striking ; or and inserting a semicolon; (ii) in clause (ix), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and (iii) by adding at the end the following new clauses: (x) protection of the buildings, grounds, and property to which the public are not permitted regular, unrestricted access and that are under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of the Department of Defense and the persons on that property pursuant to section 2672 of this title; (xi) assistance to Federal, State, or local officials in responding to incidents involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons, high-yield explosives, or related materials or technologies, including pursuant to section 282 of this title or the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq); (xii) activities permitted by section 2692(b) of this title; or (xiii) emergency response that is limited to a specified timeframe and location. . 7. Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act $23,023,100,000 for fiscal year 2026, of which— (1) $500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to SM–3 Block 1B; (2) $500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to SM–3 Block IIA; (3) $1,000,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to development, testing, and additional procurement of ground mobile interceptors and radars; (4) $1,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to PAC–2 and PAC–3 Munitions and MM–104 Patriot batteries; (5) $500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to Alaska-based Aegis Ashore station construction; (6) $460,000,000 shall be available for Next Generation Interceptor production and expansion of missile interceptor fields available at Fort Greely, Alaska, to up to 80 units with the Next Generation Interceptor; (7) $260,000,000 shall be available for construction of an additional Next Generation Interceptor site in the continental United States as the Secretary deems necessary; (8) $250,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to completion and certification of Hawaii Aegis Ashore system and upgrades to the Maui Space Surveillance Complex; (9) $100,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to Space Development Agency satellite sensors; (10) $750,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to modernization of terrestrial-based domain awareness radars; (11) $2,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to research and development relating to non-kinetic missile defense capabilities across the military departments; (12) $ 5,900,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to research and development and deployment of space-based missile defense and sensor networks; (13) $3,100,000,000 shall be available for the requirements of this Act relating to procurement of Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor space vehicles; (14) $63,100,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to Missile Defense Complex (MDC) and Fire Team Readiness Facility (FTRF); (15) $50,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to procurement and fielding of dirigibles; (16) $750,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to innovation and modernization of all domain sensor capabilities, of which $76,000,000 shall be available to procure and rapidly field a high technology readiness level machine learning and artificial intelligence information and data fusion platform; (17) $450,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to counter-hypersonic programs for advanced glide phase interceptors; (18) $1,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to research, development, and deployment of positioning, navigation, and timing systems; (19) $ 90,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to procurement and fielding of the Integrated Undersea Sensor System; (20) $2,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of this Act relating to procurement and fielding of air moving target indicator systems; (21) $100,000,000 shall be available for requirements relating to integrated command and control software and technology architecture; (22) $75,000,000 shall be available for the development and fielding of a new low-cost, highly scalable ground interceptor; and (23) $125,000,000 shall be available for the development and fielding of autonomous agents to defend against cruise missile threats and unmanned systems.