True Reciprocity Act of 2023

Bill: 118-s-3040
Sponsor: full_name: Sen. Sullivan, Dan [R-AK]
Introduced: 2023-10-16
Policy area: International Affairs
Latest action: action_date: 2023-10-16
text: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Summaries:
action_date: 2023-10-16
action_desc: Introduced in Senate
text: <p><strong>True Reciprocity Act of 2023</strong></p><p>This bill requires the Department of State to submit to Congress (1) a report comparing the manner in which the United States and China treat one another's diplomats and other officials, journalists, businesses, and nongovernmental associations; and (2) a strategy for addressing imbalances in such treatment.</p>

tv_txt: II 118th CONGRESS 1st Session S. 3040 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES October 16, 2023 Mr. Sullivan (for himself and Mr. Van Hollen ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To establish the principle of reciprocity in the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the True Reciprocity Act of 2023 . 2. Reciprocity in the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (a) Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) In a number of areas, the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China is unacceptably nonreciprocal. (2) The imbalance in the relationship creates avenues of influence for the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in the United States that the United States does not enjoy in the People’s Republic of China. (3) Diplomats, Members of Congress, and other officials of the United States are highly restricted with respect to where they can travel and with whom they can meet in the People’s Republic of China. (4) The Government of the United States requires diplomats of the People’s Republic of China to notify the Department of State of some travel and meeting plans, and the Government of the United States requires such diplomats to obtain approval from the Department of State for some travel within the United States. However, when such approval is required, it is almost always granted expeditiously, and access and interactions are unimpeded. (5) Diplomats of the People’s Republic of China based in the United States generally avail themselves of the freedom to travel within the United States and lobby city councils, mayors, State legislators, and Governors to support initiatives of the People’s Republic of China and refrain from passing resolutions, issuing proclamations, or making statements critical of the Government of the People’s Republic of China. (6) According to the Integrated Country Strategy of the Department of State on the People’s Republic of China (approved May 3, 2022, and updated February 2, 2023), Local [PRC] law enforcement and security services frequently employ extrajudicial means against U.S. citizens without regard to international norms, including the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the 1980 U.S.-China Bilateral Consular Convention. These include broad travel prohibitions, known as exit bans. These are sometimes used to prevent U.S. citizens, who are not themselves suspected of a crime, from leaving the PRC to pressure relatives or associates in the United States who are wanted by PRC law enforcement to return to the PRC. PRC officials also arbitrarily detain and interrogate U.S. citizens for reasons related to state security … [and] the PRC criminal justice system often subjects U.S. citizens to overly lengthy pre-trial detention in extremely difficult conditions while investigations are ongoing, and detention facilities arbitrarily prevent/limit detainees’ access to lawyers, medical treatment, and mail. (7) The People’s Republic of China is considered one of the least free countries to operate in as a journalist, ranked 179 out of 180 in the 2023 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders, above only North Korea. The ranking of the People’s Republic of China stems from the country’s near complete lack of independent journalism. (8) In 2022, Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net annual report ranked the People’s Republic of China as the world’s worst abuser of internet freedom for the eighth consecutive year, with censorship intensifying during the 2022 Beijing Olympics. (9) According to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, the Government of the People’s Republic of China restricts the activities of journalists from the United States and journalists representing United States media outlets by denying entry into the People’s Republic of China or restricting access to people and places, attempting to censor their reporting, and harassing their colleagues and sources. (10) The Government of the United States generally allows journalists not affiliated with publications designated as foreign missions under the Foreign Missions Act ( 22 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. ) and other citizens of the People’s Republic of China to travel freely within the United States, including on college and university campuses and in the halls of Congress. (11) The Government of the People’s Republic of China continues to either directly or indirectly fund Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms operated on campuses of institutions of higher education in the United States and in K–12 public school districts, in many cases rebranding them to avoid recent scrutiny, but similar institutes funded by the Government of the United States in the People’s Republic of China have been forced to close. (12) Under the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Management of the Activities of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations in Mainland China, since 2017, foreign nongovernmental organizations operating in mainland China have been required to submit to supervision by the Government of the People’s Republic of China. (13) Since 2019, the People’s Republic of China has imposed sanctions on employees of United States nongovernmental organizations, including the National Endowment for Democracy, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute. (14) The Government of the People’s Republic of China has failed to fulfill key commitments to the World Trade Organization, including with respect to forced transfers of intellectual property, joint venture requirements, subsidies, and nontariff barriers, that would level opportunities for trade, investment, and United States influence in the People’s Republic of China. (15) The Government of the People’s Republic of China provides massive subsidies for agriculture, fishery, aluminum and steel, and technology manufacturing and services that distort domestic and global competition in favor of businesses of the People’s Republic of China and at the expense of market access for United States companies. These discriminatory and distortionary policies harm United States security at home and give the Government of the People’s Republic of China unfair advantage in its global competition with the United States. (16) The Government of the People’s Republic of China uses multiple policy tools, including caps on foreign equity ownership, data localization, and other administrative procedures, to coerce foreign companies to transfer technology as a precondition for market access. These policies pose immediate and far-reaching challenges for United States companies and limit market access for United States products and services in ways that Chinese counterparts do not face in the United States market. (17) The internet and online restrictions imposed by the Government of the People’s Republic of China hamper the operations of United States businesses in the People’s Republic of China, and certain United States technology companies have been pushed out and effectively banned from doing business in the People’s Republic of China. (18) Businesses of the People’s Republic of China, both state- and party-owned businesses and private businesses, are tied to representing state and party interests, and the access of those businesses to the United States furthers those interests. (b) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States— (1) to establish the principle of reciprocity in the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China in order to expose the full range of instruments of influence of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in the United States; (2) to clearly differentiate, in official statements, media communications, and messaging, between the people of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party; (3) that any negotiations on trade restrictions or investment with respect to the People’s Republic of China should be concluded in a manner that addresses nonreciprocal arrangements between the two countries; (4) that any agreements resulting from such negotiations should, to the extent possible— (A) ensure that the People’s Republic of China commits to structural changes in its trade and economic policies; (B) ensure that the People’s Republic of China meets previously made bilateral and multilateral commitments; (C) hold the People’s Republic of China accountable to those commitments; (D) address national security concerns related to the targets of Chinese investments in the United States, United States investments in the People’s Republic of China, and the export and import of technology; and (E) take into account ties of Chinese businesses to the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, and the People’s Liberation Army that enable those businesses to influence United States business, government, and society in ways closed to United States businesses attempting to exercise the same influence in the People’s Republic of China; (5) to seek a relationship with the People’s Republic of China that is founded on the principles of basic reciprocity across sectors, including economic, diplomatic, educational, and communications sectors; (6) to prioritize the principle of reciprocity in the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China as a goal in the Integrated Country Strategy of the Department of State on the People’s Republic of China; (7) to recognize that engagement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party can be useful, but only in the context of reciprocity and when the terms of such engagement advance United States interests; and (8) to coordinate with allies and partners on policy approaches to reciprocity in the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party. (c) Report and strategy required (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees— (A) a report comparing the manners in which the United States Government and the Government of the People’s Republic of China treat one another’s diplomats and other officials, journalists, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations; and (B) a strategy for addressing imbalances in the treatment described in subparagraph (A). (2) Elements of report The report required by paragraph (1)(A) shall include the following: (A) A summary of obstacles that United States diplomats and other officials, journalists, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations encounter in carrying out their work in the People’s Republic of China. (B) A summary of United States Government regulations and policies with regard to the activities of diplomats and other officials, journalists, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations of the People’s Republic of China in the United States. (C) A description of the efforts that officials of the United States have made to rectify any differences in the treatment of diplomats and other officials, journalists, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations by the United States and by the People’s Republic of China, and the results of those efforts. (D) An assessment of the adherence of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, in its treatment of United States citizens, to the requirements of— (i) the Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967 (21 U.S.T. 77); and (ii) the Consular Convention, signed at Washington September 17, 1980, and entered into force February 19, 1982, between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. (E) An assessment of any impacts of the People’s Republic of China’s internet restrictions on reciprocity between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. (F) A summary of other notable areas in which the Government of the People’s Republic of China or entities affiliated with that Government are able to conduct activities or investments in the United States but that are denied to United States entities in the People’s Republic of China. (G) Recommendations for any changes in law necessary to improve reciprocity in the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. (3) Form of report; availability (A) Form The report required by paragraph (1)(A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified index. (B) Availability The unclassified portion of the report required by paragraph (1)(A) shall be posted on a publicly available internet website of the Department of State. (d) Definitions In this section: (1) Appropriate congressional committees The term appropriate congressional committees means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. (2) Reciprocity The term reciprocity means the mutual and equitable exchange of privileges between governments, countries, businesses, or individuals.