Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2023

Bill: 118-s-3395
Sponsor: full_name: Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH]
Introduced: 2023-12-05
Policy area: International Affairs
Latest action: action_date: 2023-12-05
text: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Summaries:

tv_txt: II 118th CONGRESS 1st Session S. 3395 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES December 5, 2023 Mrs. Shaheen (for herself, Mr. Wicker , and Mr. Durbin ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2023 . 2. Findings Section 2 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 ( Public Law 108–347 ; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended to read as follows: 2. Findings Congress finds the following: (1) Consistently, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the illegitimate leader of Belarus, engages in a pattern of clear and persistent violations of human rights, democratic governance, and fundamental freedoms. (2) Alyaksandr Lukashenka has overseen and participated in multiple fundamentally flawed presidential and parliamentary elections undermining the legitimacy of executive, judicial, and legislative authority in Belarus. (3) On August 9, 2020, the Government of Belarus conducted a presidential election that was fraudulent and did not meet international standards. There were serious irregularities with ballot counting and the reporting of election results. The Government of Belarus also put in place restrictive measures that impeded the work of local independent observers and did not provide sufficient notice to the OSCE to allow for the OSCE to monitor the elections, as is customary. (4) Independent election monitors recognized Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as the legitimate winner of the August 9, 2020 election for president in Belarus following her candidacy after her husband, opposition leader Sergei Tikhanovsky, was imprisoned for challenging Lukashenka for president in 2020. (5) Following threats to her safety, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was forced into exile in Lithuania after Mr. Lukashenka claimed victory in the fraudulent 2020 elections, and since that time, the Government of Lithuania has hosted the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the Belarusian Democratic Leader, and the Government of Poland has hosted the Belarusian United Transitional Cabinet. (6) Thousands of employees at Belarusian state-owned enterprises went on strike across the country to protest Mr. Lukashenka’s illegitimate election and the subsequent crackdowns on peaceful protestors to the contested results of the election, including at some of Belarus’s largest factories such as the BelAZ truck plant, the Minsk Tractor Works, and the Minsk Automobile Plant. (7) After the August 9, 2020, presidential election, the Government of Belarus restricted the free flow of information to silence the opposition and to conceal the regime’s violent crackdown on peaceful protestors, including by stripping the accreditation of journalists from major foreign news outlets, disrupting internet access, limiting access to social media and other digital communication platforms, and detaining and harassing countless journalists. (8) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to subject thousands of pro-democracy political activists and peaceful protesters to harassment, beatings, enforced disappearance, and imprisonment, particularly as a result of their attempts to peacefully exercise their right to freedom of assembly and association, including following violent crackdowns on peaceful protestors and mass detentions of peaceful protesters resisting the results of the contested 2020 election. (9) Women serve as the leading force in demonstrations across the country, protesting police brutality and mass detentions by wearing white, carrying flowers, forming solidarity chains , and unmasking undercover police trying to arrest demonstrators. (10) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, suppresses independent media and journalists and restricts access to the internet, including social media and other digital communication platforms, in violation of the right to freedom of speech and expression of those dissenting from the dictatorship of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. (11) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has criminalized access to independent media sources and media channels, including foreign media, by designating such sources and channels as extremist and conducting arbitrary arrests and detainments of media workers, activists, and users. (12) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues a systematic campaign of harassment, repression, and closure of nongovernmental organizations, including independent trade unions and entrepreneurs, creating a climate of fear that inhibits the development of civil society and social solidarity. (13) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has pursued a policy undermining the country’s sovereignty and independence by making Belarus political, economic, cultural, and societal interests subservient to those of Russia. (14) Against the will of the majority of the Belarusian people, Russian President Vladimir Putin has propped up the Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime, including by offering security assistance, providing significant financial support, and sending Russian propagandists to help disseminate pro-regime and pro-Kremlin propaganda on Belarus state television. (15) Efforts by the Government of the Russian Federation to subsume Belarus into its sphere of influence and consider Belarus as part of the Russian empire or as a Union State include security, political, economic, and ideological integration between Russia and Belarus, which intensified in 2020 after President Putin supported Mr. Lukashenka’s illegitimate election and resulted in the Government of Belarus permitting Russian troops to use Belarusian territory to conduct military exercises ahead of the February 2022 further invasion of Ukraine and staging part of the February 2022 further invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory, including by providing Russia with the use of airbases which allowed Russia to shoot artillery and missiles from Belarusian territory into Ukraine. (16) The United States Government and United States partners and allies have imposed sanctions on Alyaksandr Lukashenka and the Government of Belarus in response to anti-democratic activities and human rights abuses for more than 20 years, including in response to the Government of Belarus’ support for Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine, which include property blocking and visa restrictions and export restrictions. (17) The Kremlin has provided the Government of Belarus with loans amounting to more than $1,500,000,000 dollars to prop up Lukashenka’s illegitimate regime and Russia continues to provide Belarus with access to an economic market to avoid the impacts of United States and allied countries’ sanctions on key Belarusian industries. (18) The Government of Belarus is relied upon by the Government of the Russian Federation to increase production of ammunition and other military equipment to facilitate the Kremlin’s crimes of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity during the illegal war in Ukraine. (19) Since before the 2022 further invasion of Ukraine, the Government of Belarus has hosted Russian troops on Belarusian territory and enabled the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty by Russia in February 2022 and since the further invasion of Ukraine, the Government of Belarus has also hosted Russian mercenary fighters and reportedly hosted Russian nuclear warheads. (20) The international community has seen credible evidence that children forcibly removed from Ukraine by Russia during the further invasion of Ukraine have transited through the territory of Belarus or been illegally removed to the territory of Belarus with support from Alyaksandr Lukashenka and been subjected to Russian re-education programs. (21) The Government of Belarus’ continued support of Russia, especially in the unprovoked further invasion of Ukraine, and continued oppression of the Belarusian people may amount to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. (22) The Government of Belarus also threatens the safety, security, and sovereignty of European countries, including NATO allies Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, by facilitating illegal migration through the territory of Belarus, resulting in efforts by the United States to support a Customs and Border Patrol Technical Assessment in Latvia to ensure European allies and partners can secure their borders. (23) The Government of Lithuania and other United States partners and allies host independent Belarusian free media, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Minsk bureau, and facilitate information and content in the Belarusian language, which the Lukashenka regime has dismissed and de-facto outlawed as an inferior language to Russian for the purpose of facilitating Russification campaigns in Belarus. (24) The governments of Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and other European partners host members of the Belarusian pro-democracy movement, including political leaders, free and independent media, and exiled civil society groups and provide essential support to these individuals and groups that make up the Belarus democracy movement. (25) The Government of Belarus has further attempted to suppress freedom of movement of Belarusian people and Belarusian diaspora and retaliate against those Belarusians living overseas and who have fled the Lukashenka regime by refusing to provide overseas passport services. (26) The International Civil Aviation Organization found that the Government of Belarus committed an act of unlawful interference when it deliberately diverted Ryanair Flight 9478 in order to arrest two Belarusian citizens, including an opposition activist and journalist. (27) The Belarus democracy movement has legitimate aspirations for a transatlantic future for the people of Belarus and continue to seek justice for those imprisoned and oppressed by the Lukashenka regime and resist Russian encroachment on Belarusian territory, culture, and identity. . 3. Statement of policy Section 3 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 ( Public Law 108–347 ; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended to read as follows: 3. Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States— (1) to condemn the conduct of the August 9, 2020, presidential election and crackdown on opposition candidates, members of the Coordination Council, peaceful protestors, employees from state-owned enterprises participating in strikes, independent election observers, and independent journalists and bloggers; (2) to recognize Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as the Democratic Leader of Belarus; (3) to refuse to recognize Alyaksandr Lukashenka as the legitimately elected leader of Belarus; (4) to seek to engage with the United Transitional Cabinet as the executive body that represents the aspirations and beliefs of the Belarusian people and as a legitimate institution to participate in a dialogue on a peaceful transition of power and support its stated objectives of— (A) defending the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus; (B) representing the national interests of Belarus; (C) carrying out the de-facto de-occupation of Belarus; (D) restoring constitutional legality and the rule of law; (E) developing and implementing measures to thwart illegal retention of power; (F) ensuring the transition of power from dictatorship to democracy; (G) creating conditions for free and fair elections in Belarus; and (H) developing and implementing solutions needed to secure democratic changes in Belarus; (5) to continue to call for the immediate release without preconditions of all political prisoners in Belarus; (6) to continue to support the aspirations of the people of Belarus for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; (7) to continue to support actively the aspirations of the people of the Republic of Belarus to preserve the independence and sovereignty of their country and to pursue a Euro-Atlantic future; (8) not to recognize any incorporation of Belarus into a Union State with Russia, as this so-called Union State would be both an attempt to absorb Belarus and a step to reconstituting the totalitarian Soviet Union; (9) to condemn efforts by the Government of the Russian Federation to undermine the sovereignty and independence of Belarus, and to continue to implement policies, including sanctions, that serve to punish Russia for its anti-democratic and illegal actions involving Belarus; (10) to continue to reject the fraudulent victory of Mr. Lukashenka on August 9, 2020, and to support calls for new presidential and parliamentary elections, conducted in a manner that is free and fair according to OSCE standards and under the supervision of OSCE observers and independent domestic observers; (11) to continue to call for the fulfillment by the Government of Belarus of Belarus’s freely undertaken obligations as an OSCE participating state and as a signatory of the Charter of the United Nations; (12) to support an OSCE role in mediating a dialogue within Belarus between the government and genuine representatives of Belarusian society; (13) to support international efforts to launch investigations into the Government of Belarus and individuals associated with the Government of Belarus for war crimes and crimes against humanity against the people of Belarus and the people of Ukraine for their actions during the further invasion of Ukraine; (14) to support a United States diplomatic presence to engage with the people of Belarus, including the regular appointment of a United States Special Envoy to Belarus until such a time that the credentials of a United States Ambassador to Belarus are recognized by the Government of Belarus; (15) to continue to work closely with the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries and international organizations, to promote the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in Belarus; (16) to remain open to reevaluating United States policy toward Belarus as warranted by demonstrable progress made by the Government of Belarus consistent with the aims of this Act, as stated in this section; (17) to express concern in the event that social media or technology companies move to block independent media content or participate in media blackouts that prevent free and independent media services from transmitting information into Belarus; (18) to continue to support Belarusian language and cultural programs, including by supporting Belarusian language independent media programs, and Belarusian civil society, including efforts to restore democracy and the regular function of democratic institutions in Belarus; (19) to work with the Belarusian democratic movement and European allies and partners to ensure Belarusian nationals living outside of Belarus have access to national identification documentation following the Lukashenka regime’s decision to stop supplying overseas passport services to Belarusians; (20) to provide technical support to the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and European allies and partners to develop and implement national identification documents (New Belarusian Passport) that will enable the more than 2,000,000 Belarusians living abroad to access freedom of movement and essential services while maintaining Belarusian national identity and unity; (21) to include Belarusian nationals living in Ukraine as of February 24, 2022, in the Uniting For Ukraine program to provide a pathway for Belarusian nations and their immediate family members outside of the United States to come to the United States and stay for a period of not more than two years of parole and subject those Belarusian nationals to the same qualifications for entry into the program as Ukrainian nationals; (22) to engage in the United States-Belarus democratic movement strategic dialogue when necessary to reaffirm commitments to promoting freedom and democracy in Belarus and promote efforts to restore free and open presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus that are conducted consistent with OSCE standards and under the supervision of OSCE observers and independent domestic observers; (23) to refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the Lukashenka regime to enter into any international agreements or treaties; (24) to advocate for the inclusion of the Belarus democratic movement to participate in international institutions and be granted Permanent Observer Status by the United Nations General Assembly; (25) to establish a Belarus service at Voice of America through the United States Agency for Global Media that broadcasts in the Belarusian language; (26) to continue to support the Governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland in providing critical support to the Belarusian government, civil society, and media in exile; (27) to transfer when applicable existing bilateral funding for Belarus toward sustaining pro-democracy and civil society initiatives outside the territory of Belarus; (28) to continue to ban ticket sales for air travel to Belarus until such a time that civilians do not face random arrests by the Government of Belarus, a ban that was enacted following the unlawful actions of the Government of Belarus to deliberately divert Ryanair Flight 9478; and (29) to continue to work with international allies and partners to coordinate support for the people of Belarus and their legitimate aspirations for a free, open, and democratic society and the regular conduct of free and fair elections. . 4. Special Envoy for Belarus (a) Special Envoy The President shall appoint a Special Envoy for Belarus within the Department of State (referred to in this section as the Special Envoy ). (b) Qualifications The Special Envoy— (1) should be a person of recognized distinction in the field of European security, geopolitics, democracy, and human rights; and (2) may be a career foreign service officer. (c) Central objective The central objective of the Special Envoy is to coordinate and promote efforts— (1) to improve respect for the fundamental human rights of the people of Belarus; (2) to sustain focus on the national security implications, for the United States, of Belarus’s political and military alignment; and (3) to respond to the political, economic, and security impacts of events in Belarus on neighboring countries and the wider region. (d) Duties and responsibilities The Special Envoy shall— (1) engage in discussions with Belarusian officials regarding human rights and political, economic, and security issues in Belarus; (2) support international efforts to promote human rights and political freedoms in Belarus, including coordination and dialogue between the United States and the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, Belarus, and the other countries in Eastern Europe; (3) consult with nongovernmental organizations that have attempted to address human rights and political and economic instability in Belarus; (4) make recommendations regarding the funding of activities promoting human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the development of a market economy in Belarus; (5) review strategies for improving protection of human rights in Belarus, including technical training and exchange programs; (6) develop an action plan for holding to account the perpetrators of the human rights violations, documented in the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights report on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and its aftermath (Human Rights Council Resolution 49/36); (7) engage with member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European Union with respect to the implications of Belarus’s political and security alignment for transatlantic security; and (8) work within the Department of State and among partnering countries to sustain focus on the political situation in Belarus. (e) Role The position of Special Envoy— (1) shall be a full-time position; (2) may not be combined with any other position within the Department of State; (3) shall only exist for the period during which United States diplomatic operations in Belarus at the United States Embassy in Minsk have been suspended; and (4) shall oversee the operations and personnel of the Belarus Affairs Unit of the Department of State. (f) Report on activities Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following five years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Special Envoy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the activities undertaken pursuant to subsection (d) during the reporting period. (g) Termination The position of Special Envoy for Belarus Affairs and the authorities provided by this section shall terminate on the date that is five years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 5. Strategic dialogue with the Belarus Democracy movement (a) Strategic dialogue The President shall direct the Secretary of State to host a strategic dialogue with the Belarus Democracy Movement not fewer than once every 12 months following the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Central objective The central objective of the strategic dialogue required under subsection (a) is to coordinate and promote efforts— (1) to consider the efforts needed to return to democratic rule in Belarus, including the efforts needed to support free and fair elections in Belarus; (2) to support the day-to-day functions of the Belarus Democracy Movement, which represents the legitimate aspirations of the Belarusian people, and ensure that Belarusians living outside the territory of Belarus have adequate access to essential services; and (3) to respond to the political, economic, and security impacts of events in Belarus and Russia on neighboring countries and the wider region. (c) Termination The strategic dialogue with the Belarus Democracy Movement and the authorities provided by this section shall terminate on the date that is five years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 6. Assistance to promote democracy, civil society, and sovereignty in Belarus Section 4 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 ( Public Law 108–347 ; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended— (1) in subsection (c)— (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting , including by establishing a Belarus service at Voice of America to include broadcasts in the Belarusian language after within Belarus ; (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting in the Belarusian language after and Internet media ; (C) by striking paragraphs (11) and (14); (D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (10) as paragraphs (4) through (11), respectively; (E) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph: (3) countering internet and media censorship and repressive surveillance technology that seeks to limit free association, control access to information, and prevent citizens from exercising their rights to free speech; ; (F) in paragraph (11), as redesignated by subparagraph (C), by inserting and the development of Belarusian cultural programs after supporting the development of Belarusian language education ; (G) in paragraph (12), by inserting , including refugees from Belarus in Ukraine and refugees from Ukraine fleeing Russia’s unprovoked war following the February 2022 further invasion of Ukraine after supporting political refugees in neighboring European countries fleeing the crackdown in Belarus ; (H) in paragraph (13)— (i) by inserting and war crimes after human rights abuses ; and (ii) by striking the semicolon and inserting ; and ; and (I) by redesignating paragraph (15) as paragraph (14); (2) in subsection (f), by striking 2020 and inserting 2023 ; and (3) by striking subsection (g). 7. International broadcasting, internet freedom, and access to information in Belarus Section 5 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2004 ( Public Law 108–347 ; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended— (1) in subsection (a)(1), by inserting and Voice of America after Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty ; and (2) in subsection (b)(1)— (A) by striking 2020 and inserting 2023 ; (B) in subparagraph (A) by inserting , including through social media platforms, after communications in Belarus ; and (C) in subparagraph (C) by inserting , including by ensuring private companies do not comply with media blackouts directed by or favored by the Government of Belarus after access and block content online . 8. Sanctions against the Government of Belarus Section 6 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2004 ( Public Law 108–347 ; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended— (1) in subsection (b)— (A) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as paragraphs (3) through (6), respectively; (B) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph: (2) The release of Ukrainian nationals illegally held in Belarus, including those illegally transferred to Belarus after the 2022 Russian further invasion of Ukraine. ; (C) in paragraph (3), as redesignated by subparagraph (A), by inserting , and people who protested the support of the Government of Belarus for the further Russian invasion of Ukraine and cooperation of the Government of Belarus with Russia after August 9, 2020 ; and (D) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by inserting , or for providing support in connection with the illegal further Russian invasion of Ukraine after August 9, 2020 ; and (2) in subsection (c)— (A) in the subsection heading, by inserting and the February, 24, 2022, Further Invasion of Ukraine after election ; (B) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (9) as paragraphs (6) through (10), respectively; (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraph: (5) assisted the Government of Belarus in— (A) supporting security cooperation with the Government of Russia in advance of the February 24, 2022, further invasion of Ukraine; (B) supporting the presence of Russian mercenaries in the territory of Belarus; or (C) supporting ongoing security cooperation with the Government of Russia, including the Government of Belarus’ decision to host Russian tactical nuclear weapons; ; and (D) in paragraph (6), as redesignated by subparagraph (B), by inserting , or in connection with the 2022 Russian further invasion of Ukraine after August 9, 2020 . 9. Multilateral cooperation Section 7 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020 ( Public Law 108–347 ; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended— (1) in paragraph (1); by striking ; and and inserting a semicolon; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting ; and ; and (3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraphs: (3) to condemn the continued collaboration between the Government of Belarus and the Government of Russia, particularly as it relates to the further invasion of Ukraine, and further the purposes of this Act, including, as appropriate, to levy sanctions and additional measures against the Government of Belarus for its complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the territory of Ukraine; and (4) to provide technical assistance to the Belarus democracy movement on the creation and international recognition of national identity documentation following the Lukashenka regime’s decision to cease overseas passport services for Belarusian nationals, with the objective of maintaining Belarusian national identity and unity but providing Belarusians living overseas with freedom of movement and the ability to access essential services. . 10. Participation of Belarus in uniting for Ukraine The Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2004 ( Public Law 108–347 ; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended— (1) by redesignating sections 8 and 9 as sections 9 and 10, respectively; and (2) by inserting after section 7 the following new section: 8. Participation of Belarus in uniting for Ukraine (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) there are a significant number of Belarusian nationals residing in Ukraine and suffering from Russian aggression during the further Russian invasion of Ukraine; and (2) Belarusian nationals may experience threats to their physical security due to political persecution or retribution or human rights abuses if they return to Belarus. (b) Uniting for Ukraine participation (1) In general Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide a pathway for Belarusian nationals living in Ukraine following the February 24, 2022, further invasion of Ukraine to participate in the Uniting for Ukraine program. (2) Exception The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security may delay implementation of the pathway required under paragraph (1) if they determine that it is counter to United States national security interests. . 11. Reports Section 9 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2004 ( Public Law 108–347 ; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note), as redesignated by section 8(1) of this Act, is amended— (1) in subsection (a)— (A) in paragraph (1), by striking 2020 and inserting 2023 ; and (B) in paragraph (2)— (i) in subparagraph (G), by striking ; and and inserting a semicolon; (ii) in subparagraph (H), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and (iii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: (I) an assessment of how the Government of Russia is working to achieve deeper security cooperation and interdependence or integration with Belarus; (J) a description of the Government of Belarus actions to support the 2022 further Russian invasion of Ukraine and ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine; (K) a description of how the Government of Belarus supports, adopts, and deploys Russian disinformation campaigns or Belarusian disinformation campaigns; and (L) an identification of Belarusian officials involved in continued support to Russia and the further invasion of Ukraine and an identification of Russian officials involved in continued support to Belarus and the further invasion of Ukraine. ; (2) in subsection (b)(1)— (A) by striking 2020 and inserting 2023 ; (B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ; and and inserting a semicolon; (C) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and (D) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: (C) an identification of efforts by the Government of Belarus and the Government of Russia to circumvent sanctions, including those imposed by the United States in response to the further invasion of Ukraine; (D) an assessment of the shared assets and business interests of Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka and the Government of Belarus and the Government of Russia; and (E) a determination on the possibility for Belarus to host free and fair elections during the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2024 and the presidential election scheduled for 2025, including a proposal of how the United States may support a return to democracy in the anticipated elections in Belarus. ; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection: (c) Report on efforts To enable Belarusians living outside the territory of Belarus to travel freely (1) In general Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2023, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing efforts to provide Belarusians living outside the territory of Belarus with national identification documents. (2) Elements The report required under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements: (A) An assessment of the European Union’s efforts to provide Belarusians living overseas with national identification documents that maintain Belarusian nationality but enable Belarusians living overseas to travel freely and access essential services. (B) A description of efforts to provide technical assistance to the Belarus democratic movement on the creation of national identification documents that fulfill the needs described in subparagraph (A). (3) Form The report required by this subsection shall be transmitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex. . 12. Definitions Section 10(1)(B) of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 ( Public Law 108–347 ; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note), as redesignated by section 10(1) of this Act, is amended by striking Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and inserting the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs .