CEASE Act

Bill: 118-s-3225
Sponsor: full_name: Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]
Introduced: 2023-11-02
Policy area: International Affairs
Latest action: action_date: 2023-11-02
text: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Summaries:

tv_txt: II 118th CONGRESS 1st Session S. 3225 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES November 2, 2023 Mr. Risch (for himself, Mr. Barrasso , Mr. Hagerty , and Mr. Ricketts ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To impose sanctions with respect to any foreign person that the President determines engages in or has engaged in a significant transaction or transactions, or any dealings with, or has provided material support to or for a military or intelligence facility of the People's Republic of China in Cuba, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Countering Espionage And Surveillance Entities in Cuba Act or the CEASE Act . 2. Findings Congress finds the following: (1) On January 11, 2021, the Department of State designated the Government of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism for repeatedly providing support for acts of international terrorism in granting safe harbor to terrorists, and Cuba remains a significant national security threat to the United States. (2) The People’s Republic of China and Cuba have maintained close strategic relations since 1960, including through diplomatic, military, economic, and intelligence cooperation, reaffirmed by the People's Republic of China designating Cuba as good brother, good comrade, good friend , a title that is not shared by any other country in the world. (3) The relationship between the Government of Cuba and the Government of the People’s Republic of China heightens the national security threat to the United States. (4) A staff research report entitled China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean published by the by the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission in October 2018 asserts that the military relationship between the People's Republic of China and Cuba is characterized by frequent senior-level meetings and technical assistance provided by China’s military to Cuba’s military . (5) The report also asserts that the People's Republic of China has a physical presence at multiple Soviet-era intelligence facilities at Lourdes, Bejucal, and Santiago de Cuba to collect signals intelligence . (6) In April 2019, September 2020, and January 2021, the Department of State updated the List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (commonly known as the Cuba Restricted List ) to include entities and subentities under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba. (7) Recommendations issued in 2022 by the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector stated that the People's Republic of China remains the most sophisticated counterintelligence and cyber threat to the United States . (8) According to the most recent report submitted to Congress by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 108B of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3043b ) (commonly referred to as the Annual Threat Assessment ), the People’s Republic of China is expanding its global intelligence and covert influence posture and represents the broadest, most active, and persistent cyber espionage threat to the United States. (9) On June 10, 2023, the White House confirmed reports that the People’s Republic of China has been operating and upgrading intelligence collection facilities in Cuba since at least 2019, and the People’s Republic of China will keep trying to enhance its presence in Cuba . (10) The People’s Republic of China and Cuba have expanded defense relations in recent years, including military-to-military strategic mutual trust and practical cooperation , such as regular institutional and senior leader visits between the two countries and the establishment of joint artificial intelligence centers. 3. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the growing military and intelligence collaboration between the Government of People's Republic of China and the Government of Cuba is a threat to the United States and the peace and stability of the Western Hemisphere; (2) the Secretary of State should ensure that United States diplomatic personnel abroad understand, and are communicating with foreign officials, the reasons for concerns of the United States with respect to the military and intelligence partnership between the Government of Cuba and the Government of the People’s Republic of China; and (3) the Secretary of State should ensure that United States diplomatic personnel abroad are urging foreign governments to cooperate more effectively to address the threat from military and intelligence cooperation between the Government of Cuba and the Government of the People’s Republic of China. 4. Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States— (1) to hold accountable any foreign person that engages in or has engaged in a significant transaction or transactions, or any significant dealings with, or has provided, directly or indirectly, material support to a military or intelligence facility of the People’s Republic of China in Cuba; (2) to seek the speedy termination of access by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to military and intelligence facilities in Cuba; and (3) to be prepared to reduce sanctions imposed under section 5 in response to the verifiable termination of access by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to and withdrawal of personnel, including advisers, technicians, and military personnel, from such facilities. 5. Imposition of sanctions with respect to military and intelligence facilities of the People's Republic of China in Cuba (a) In general The President shall direct the Secretary of State to impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any foreign person that the Secretary determines engages in or has engaged in a significant transaction or transactions, or any significant dealings with, or has provided material support to or for a military or intelligence facility of the People's Republic of China in Cuba. (b) Sanctions described The sanctions described in this subsection with respect to a foreign person are the following: (1) Asset blocking The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. ) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. (2) Exclusion from the United States and revocation of visa or other documentation In the case of a foreign person who is an alien, denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1201(i) ), of any visa or other documentation of the alien. (c) Implementation; penalties (1) Implementation The President shall exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section. (2) Penalties A person that knowingly violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (b)(2) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1705 ) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section. (d) Exceptions (1) Importation of goods (A) In general The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions authorized under this section shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. (B) Good defined In this paragraph, the term good means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. (2) Compliance with United Nations headquarters agreement Sanctions under subsection (b)(3) shall not apply to an alien if admitting the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations. (e) Termination of sanctions Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees (and Congress has not enacted legislation disapproving the determination within that 30-day period) that Cuba has closed and dismantled all military or intelligence facilities of the People's Republic of China in Cuba. (f) Waiver (1) In general The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person if the President, not later than 10 days before the waiver is to take effect, determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is in the vital national security interest of the United States. (2) Justification The President shall include with a certification submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to a waiver a detailed justification explaining the reasons for the waiver. (g) Definitions In this section: (1) Alien The term alien has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1101 ). (2) Appropriate congressional committees The term appropriate congressional committees includes— (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (3) Foreign person The term foreign person means a person that is not a United States person. (4) Person The term person means an individual or entity. (5) United States person The term United States person means— (A) an individual who is a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or (C) any person in the United States. 6. Report on assistance by the People’s Republic of China for the Government of Cuba (a) In general Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing— (1) diplomatic engagement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Cuba; (2) the military and intelligence activities of the Government of the People's Republic of China in Cuba, including any military or intelligence facilities used by that government in Cuba; (3) the purposes for which the Government of the People's Republic of China conducts those activities and uses those facilities in Cuba; (4) the extent to which the Government of the People's Republic of China provides payment or government credits to the Government of Cuba for the continued use of those facilities in Cuba; and (5) any progress toward the verifiable termination of access by the Government of the People's Republic of China to those facilities and withdrawal of personnel, including advisers, technicians, and military personnel, from those facilities. (b) Form The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include a classified annex. (c) Definitions In this section: (1) Agency or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba The term agency or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba means an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in section 1603(b) of title 28, United States Code, with each reference in that section to a foreign state deemed to be a reference to Cuba . (2) Appropriate congressional committees The term appropriate congressional committees includes— (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (3) Government of Cuba The term Government of Cuba includes the government of any political subdivision of Cuba and any agency or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba. 7. Report on specific licenses that authorize transactions with sanctioned persons (a) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the committees specified in subsection (c) a report that includes— (1) a list of specific licenses issued by the Secretary of the Treasury during the period specified in subsection (b) that authorize any transaction with a person with respect to which sanctions have been imposed under section 5 or any relevant Executive order; and (2) a copy of each such license. (b) Period specified The period specified in this subsection is— (1) in the case of the first report required by paragraph (1), the 180-day period preceding submission of the report; and (2) in the case of any subsequent report required by that paragraph, the 90-day period preceding submission of the report. (c) Committees specified The committees specified in this subsection are— (1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.