Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022

Bill: 117-s-4320
Sponsor: full_name: Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]
Introduced: 2022-05-26
Policy area: International Affairs
Subjects: Diplomacy, foreign officials, Americans abroad

Emergency planning and evacuation

Government buildings, facilities, and property

Terrorism
Latest action: action_date: 2022-07-21
text: Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 458.

Summaries:
action_date: 2022-05-26
action_desc: Introduced in Senate
text: <p><b>Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022</b></p> <p>This bill modifies various requirements pertaining to the security of U.S. diplomatic facilities. For example, each U.S. diplomatic mission must have an emergency action plan that addresses a range of threats. Currently, the plan is only required by statute to address the threat of large explosive attacks from vehicles. </p>

action_date: 2022-07-21
action_desc: Reported to Senate
text: <p><b>Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022</b></p> <p>This bill modifies various requirements pertaining to the security of U.S. diplomatic facilities. For example, each U.S. diplomatic mission must have an emergency action plan that addresses a range of threats. Currently, the plan is only required by statute to address the threat of large explosive attacks from vehicles. </p>

tv_txt: II 117th CONGRESS 2d Session S. 4320 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES May 26, 2022 Mr. Risch introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To enhance security at United States diplomatic facilities, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 . 2. Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (title VI of division A of appendix G of Public Law 106–113 ) was a necessary response to bombings on August 7, 1998, at the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania that were destroyed by simultaneously exploding bombs. The resulting explosions killed 220 persons and injured more than 4,000 others. Twelve Americans and 40 Kenyan and Tanzanian employees of the United States Foreign Service were killed in the attacks. (2) Those bombings, followed by the expeditionary diplomatic efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrated the need to prioritize the security of United States posts and personnel abroad above other considerations. (3) Between 1999 and 2022, the risk calculus of the Department of State has swung too far toward the elimination of risk, leading to a marked decrease in the ability of United States diplomats around the world to advance the interests of the United States through access to local populations, leaders, and places. (4) America’s competitors and adversaries do not have the same restrictions that United States diplomats have, especially in critically important medium-threat and high-threat posts. (5) The Department of State’s 2021 Overseas Security Panel report states that— (A) the requirement for setback and collocation of diplomatic posts under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 606(a) of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 has led to sky-rocketing costs of new embassies and consulates; and (B) the locations of such posts have become less desirable, creating an extremely suboptimal nexus that further hinders United States diplomats who are willing to accept more risk in order to advance United States interests. 3. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the setback and collocation requirements referred to in section 2(5)(A), even with available waivers, no longer provide the security such requirements used to provide because of advancement in technologies, such as remote controlled drones, that can evade walls and other such static barriers; (2) the Department of State should focus on creating performance security standards that— (A) attempt to keep the setback requirements of diplomatic posts as limited as possible; and (B) provide diplomats access to local populations as much as possible, while still providing a necessary level of security; (3) collocation of diplomatic facilities is often not feasible or advisable, particularly for public diplomacy spaces in countries with repressive governments, since such spaces are required to permit the foreign public to enter and exit the space easily and openly; (4) the Bureau of Diplomatic Security should— (A) fully utilize the waiver process provided under paragraphs (2)(B) and (3)(B) of section 606(a) of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999; and (B) appropriately exercise such waiver process as a tool to right-size the appropriate security footing at each diplomatic post rather than only approving waivers in extreme circumstances; (5) the return of great power competition requires— (A) United States diplomats to do all they can to outperform our adversaries; and (B) the Department of State to better utilize taxpayer funding to advance United States national interests; and (6) this Act will rebalance the Department of State’s risk and provide United States diplomats the tools they need to compete in the 21st century, while saving United States taxpayers potentially billions of dollars in reduced property and maintenance costs at embassies and consulates abroad. 4. Definition of United States diplomatic facility Section 603 of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (title VI of division A of appendix G of Public Law 106–113 ) is amended to read as follows: 603. United States diplomatic facility defined In this title, the terms United States diplomatic facility and diplomatic facility — (1) mean any chancery, consulate, or other office considered diplomatic or consular premises, consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna April 18, 1961, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, or otherwise subject to a publicly available bilateral agreement with the host government (contained in the records of the United States Department of State) that recognizes the official status of the United States Government personnel present at the facility; and (2) do not include— (A) U.S. Customs and Border Protection preclearance facilities, as established pursuant to section 629 of the Tariff Act of 1930 ( 19 U.S.C. 1629 ) and section 103(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(7) ) and Open Source Centers; (B) contractor-owned facilities; and (C) facilities at which United States Government personnel will be present not more than 60 consecutive days and where the Secretary determines that operational conditions, security considerations, and mission goals support exclusion. . 5. Security requirements for United States diplomatic facilities Section 606(a) of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (title VI of division A of appendix G of Public Law 106–113 ) is amended— (1) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking the threat and inserting a range of threats, including that ; (2) in paragraph (2)— (A) in subparagraph (A)— (i) by striking abroad and inserting in a high risk, high threat post ; and (ii) by inserting and Voice of America correspondents on official assignment after military commander ; and (B) in subparagraph (B)— (i) in clause (i), by inserting if applicable, after at the site, ; (ii) in clause (ii)— (I) in subclause (I), by inserting at a post designated as high risk, high threat under section 104 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 ( 22 U.S.C. 4803 ) before the period at the end; and (II) in subclause (II), by inserting at a post designated as high risk, high threat under such section 104 after consulate building ; and (iii) in clause (iii), by striking waivers and inserting instances of split operations in which United States diplomatic facilities are not colocated ; and (3) in paragraph (3)— (A) by amending subparagraph (A) to read as follows: (A) Requirement (i) In general Each newly acquired United States diplomatic facility shall be constructed or modified to meet the measured building blast performance standard applicable to a facility sited not less than 100 feet from the perimeter. (ii) Leased facilities If the Department of State is required to commence or restart diplomatic operations in a country or city without a previously constructed diplomatic facility and there is insufficient time to construct a facility before such commencement, the Secretary of State— (I) shall make every effort to lease an existing facility with the maximum setback and security features that can be reasonably expected; and (II) shall submit a setback waiver, with a period of 1 year after leased occupancy to process the setback waiver. ; and (B) in subparagraph (B)(ii)— (i) in subclause (I), by inserting at a post designated as high risk, high threat under section 104 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 ( 22 U.S.C. 4803 ) before the period at the end; (ii) in subclause (II), by inserting at a post designated as high risk, high threat under such section 104 after consulate building ; and (iii) in subclause (III), by striking an annual and inserting a quarterly .

tv_txt: II Calendar No. 458 117th CONGRESS 2d Session S. 4320 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES May 26, 2022 Mr. Risch introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations July 21, 2022 Reported by Mr. Menendez , with an amendment Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic A BILL To enhance security at United States diplomatic facilities, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 . 2. Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (title VI of division A of appendix G of Public Law 106–113 ) was a necessary response to bombings on August 7, 1998, at the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania that were destroyed by simultaneously exploding bombs. The resulting explosions killed 220 persons and injured more than 4,000 others. Twelve Americans and 40 Kenyan and Tanzanian employees of the United States Foreign Service were killed in the attacks. (2) Those bombings, followed by the expeditionary diplomatic efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrated the need to prioritize the security of United States posts and personnel abroad above other considerations. (3) Between 1999 and 2022, the risk calculus of the Department of State has swung too far toward the elimination of risk, leading to a marked decrease in the ability of United States diplomats around the world to advance the interests of the United States through access to local populations, leaders, and places. (4) America’s competitors and adversaries do not have the same restrictions that United States diplomats have, especially in critically important medium-threat and high-threat posts. (5) The Department of State’s 2021 Overseas Security Panel report states that— (A) the requirement for setback and collocation of diplomatic posts under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 606(a) of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 has led to sky-rocketing costs of new embassies and consulates; and (B) the locations of such posts have become less desirable, creating an extremely suboptimal nexus that further hinders United States diplomats who are willing to accept more risk in order to advance United States interests. 3. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the setback and collocation requirements referred to in section 2(5)(A), even with available waivers, no longer provide the security such requirements used to provide because of advancement in technologies, such as remote controlled drones, that can evade walls and other such static barriers; (2) the Department of State should focus on creating performance security standards that— (A) attempt to keep the setback requirements of diplomatic posts as limited as possible; and (B) provide diplomats access to local populations as much as possible, while still providing a necessary level of security; (3) collocation of diplomatic facilities is often not feasible or advisable, particularly for public diplomacy spaces in countries with repressive governments, since such spaces are required to permit the foreign public to enter and exit the space easily and openly; (4) the Bureau of Diplomatic Security should— (A) fully utilize the waiver process provided under paragraphs (2)(B) and (3)(B) of section 606(a) of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999; and (B) appropriately exercise such waiver process as a tool to right-size the appropriate security footing at each diplomatic post rather than only approving waivers in extreme circumstances; (5) the return of great power competition requires— (A) United States diplomats to do all they can to outperform our adversaries; and (B) the Department of State to better utilize taxpayer funding to advance United States national interests; and (6) this Act will rebalance the Department of State’s risk and provide United States diplomats the tools they need to compete in the 21st century, while saving United States taxpayers potentially billions of dollars in reduced property and maintenance costs at embassies and consulates abroad. 4. Definition of United States diplomatic facility Section 603 of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (title VI of division A of appendix G of Public Law 106–113 ) is amended to read as follows: 603. United States diplomatic facility defined In this title, the terms United States diplomatic facility and diplomatic facility — (1) mean any chancery, consulate, or other office considered diplomatic or consular premises, consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna April 18, 1961, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, or otherwise subject to a publicly available bilateral agreement with the host government (contained in the records of the United States Department of State) that recognizes the official status of the United States Government personnel present at the facility; and (2) do not include— (A) U.S. Customs and Border Protection preclearance facilities, as established pursuant to section 629 of the Tariff Act of 1930 ( 19 U.S.C. 1629 ) and section 103(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(7) ) and Open Source Centers; (B) contractor-owned facilities; and (C) facilities at which United States Government personnel will be present not more than 60 consecutive days and where the Secretary determines that operational conditions, security considerations, and mission goals support exclusion. . 5. Security requirements for United States diplomatic facilities Section 606(a) of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (title VI of division A of appendix G of Public Law 106–113 ) is amended— (1) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking the threat and inserting a range of threats, including that ; (2) in paragraph (2)— (A) in subparagraph (A)— (i) by striking abroad and inserting in a high risk, high threat post ; and (ii) by inserting and Voice of America correspondents on official assignment after military commander ; and (B) in subparagraph (B)— (i) in clause (i), by inserting if applicable, after at the site, ; (ii) in clause (ii)— (I) in subclause (I), by inserting at a post designated as high risk, high threat under section 104 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 ( 22 U.S.C. 4803 ) before the period at the end; and (II) in subclause (II), by inserting at a post designated as high risk, high threat under such section 104 after consulate building ; and (iii) in clause (iii), by striking waivers and inserting instances of split operations in which United States diplomatic facilities are not colocated ; and (3) in paragraph (3)— (A) by amending subparagraph (A) to read as follows: (A) Requirement (i) In general Each newly acquired United States diplomatic facility shall be constructed or modified to meet the measured building blast performance standard applicable to a facility sited not less than 100 feet from the perimeter. (ii) Leased facilities If the Department of State is required to commence or restart diplomatic operations in a country or city without a previously constructed diplomatic facility and there is insufficient time to construct a facility before such commencement, the Secretary of State— (I) shall make every effort to lease an existing facility with the maximum setback and security features that can be reasonably expected; and (II) shall submit a setback waiver, with a period of 1 year after leased occupancy to process the setback waiver. ; and (B) in subparagraph (B)(ii)— (i) in subclause (I), by inserting at a post designated as high risk, high threat under section 104 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 ( 22 U.S.C. 4803 ) before the period at the end; (ii) in subclause (II), by inserting at a post designated as high risk, high threat under such section 104 after consulate building ; and (iii) in subclause (III), by striking an annual and inserting a quarterly .

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 . 2. Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (title VI of division A of appendix G of Public Law 106–113 ) was a necessary response to bombings on August 7, 1998, at the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that were destroyed by simultaneously exploding bombs. The resulting explosions killed 220 persons and injured more than 4,000 others. Twelve Americans and 40 Kenyan and Tanzanian employees of the United States Foreign Service were killed in the attacks. (2) Those bombings, followed by the expeditionary diplomatic efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrated the need to prioritize the security of United States posts and personnel abroad above other considerations. (3) Between 1999 and 2022, the risk calculus of the Department of State impacted the ability of United States diplomats around the world to advance the interests of the United States through access to local populations, leaders, and places. (4) America's competitors and adversaries do not have the same restrictions that United States diplomats have, especially in critically important medium-threat and high-threat posts. (5) The Department of State’s 2021 Overseas Security Panel report states that— (A) the requirement for setback and collocation of diplomatic posts under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 606(a) of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 ( 22 U.S.C. 4865(a) ) has led to sky-rocketing costs of new embassies and consulates; and (B) the locations of such posts have become less desirable, creating an extremely suboptimal nexus that further hinders United States diplomats who are willing to accept more risk in order to advance United States’ interests. 3. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the setback and collocation requirements referred to in section 2(5)(A), even with available waivers, no longer provide the security such requirements used to provide because of advancement in technologies, such as remote controlled drones, that can evade walls and other such static barriers; (2) the Department of State should focus on creating performance security standards that— (A) attempt to keep the setback requirements of diplomatic posts as limited as possible; and (B) provide diplomats access to local populations as much as possible, while still providing a necessary level of security; (3) collocation of diplomatic facilities is often not feasible or advisable, particularly for public diplomacy spaces whose mission is to reach and be accessible to wide sectors of the public, including in countries with repressive governments, since such spaces are required to permit the foreign public to enter and exit the space easily and openly; (4) the Bureau of Diplomatic Security should— (A) fully utilize the waiver process provided under paragraphs (2)(B) and (3)(B) of section 606(a) of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 ( 22 U.S.C. 4865(a) ); and (B) appropriately exercise such waiver process as a tool to right-size the appropriate security footing at each diplomatic post rather than only approving waivers in extreme circumstances; (5) the return of great power competition requires— (A) United States diplomats to do all they can to outperform our adversaries; and (B) the Department of State to better optimize use of taxpayer funding to advance United States national interests; and (6) this Act will better enable United States diplomats to compete in the 21st century, while saving United States taxpayers millions in reduced property and maintenance costs at embassies and consulates abroad. 4. Definition of United States diplomatic facility Section 603 of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (title VI of division A of appendix G of Public Law 106–113 ) is amended to read as follows: 603. United States diplomatic facility defined In this title, the terms United States diplomatic facility and diplomatic facility mean any chancery, consulate, or other office that— (1) is considered by the Secretary of State to be diplomatic or consular premises, consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna April 18, 1961, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and was notified to the host government as such; or (2) is otherwise subject to a publicly available bilateral agreement with the host government (contained in the records of the United States Department of State) that recognizes the official status of the United States Government personnel present at the facility. . 5. Guidance and requirements for diplomatic facilities (a) Guidance for closure of public diplomacy facilities Section 5606 of the Public Diplomacy Modernization Act of 2021 ( Public Law 117–81 ; 22 U.S.C. 1475g note) is amended by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following new subsection: (a) In general In order to preserve public diplomacy facilities that are accessible to the publics of foreign countries, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022, the Secretary of State shall adopt guidelines to collect and utilize information from each diplomatic post at which the construction of a new embassy compound or new consulate compound could result in the closure or co-location of an American Space that is owned and operated by the United States Government, generally known as an American Center, or any other public diplomacy facility under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 ( 22 U.S.C. 4865 et seq. ). . (b) Security requirements for United States diplomatic facilities Section 606(a) of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 ( 22 U.S.C. 4865(a) ) is amended— (1) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking the threat and inserting a range of threats, including that ; (2) in paragraph (2)— (A) in subparagraph (A)— (i) by inserting in a location that has certain minimum ratings under the Security Environment Threat List as determined by the Secretary in his or her discretion after abroad ; and (ii) by inserting , personnel of the Peace Corps, and personnel of any other type or category of facility that the Secretary may identify after military commander ; and (B) in subparagraph (B)— (i) by amending clause (i) to read as follows: (i) In general Subject to clause (ii), the Secretary of State may waive subparagraph (A) if the Secretary, in consultation with, as appropriate, the head of each agency employing personnel that would not be located at the site, if applicable, determines that it is in the national interest of the United States after taking account of any considerations the Secretary in his or her discretion considers relevant, which may include security conditions. ; and (ii) in clause (ii), by striking (ii) Chancery or consulate building .— and all that follows through 15 days prior and inserting the following: (ii) Chancery or consulate building Prior ; and (3) in paragraph (3)— (A) by amending subparagraph (A) to read as follows: (A) Requirement (i) In general Each newly acquired United States diplomatic facility in a location that has certain minimum ratings under the Security Environment Threat List as determined by the Secretary of State in his or her discretion shall— (I) be constructed or modified to meet the measured building blast performance standard applicable to a diplomatic facility sited not less than 100 feet from the perimeter of the property on which the facility is situated; or (II) fulfill the criteria described in clause (ii). (ii) Alternative engineering equivalency standard requirement Each facility referred to in clause (i) may, instead of meeting the requirement under such clause, fulfill such other criteria as the Secretary is authorized to employ to achieve an equivalent engineering standard of security and degree of protection as the numerical perimeter distance setback described in such clause seeks to achieve. ; and (B) in subparagraph (B)— (i) in clause (i)— (I) by striking security considerations permit and ; and (II) by inserting after taking account of any considerations the Secretary in his or her discretion considers relevant, which may include security conditions after national interest of the United States ; (ii) in clause (ii), by striking (ii) Chancery or consulate building .— and all that follows through 15 days prior and inserting the following: (ii) Chancery or consulate building Prior ; and (iii) in clause (iii), by striking an annual and inserting a quarterly .

July 21, 2022 Reported with an amendment