One Health Security Act

Bill: 117-s-5354
Sponsor: full_name: Sen. Gillibrand, Kirsten E. [D-NY]
Introduced: 2022-12-22
Policy area: Health
Latest action: action_date: 2022-12-22
text: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

Summaries:
action_date: 2022-12-22
action_desc: Introduced in Senate
text: <p><b>One Health Security Act</b></p> <p>This bill establishes an interagency policy council that is focused on matters pertaining to One Health and national security. <i>One Health</i> refers to a multisectoral and transdisciplinary approach for achieving optimal health outcomes for people, domestic and wild animals, plants, and their shared environments and ecosystems.</p> <p>Specifically, the council must advise the President about, develop a strategy for, and generally coordinate federal activities related to One Health Security (i.e., the operational and functional security of the United States against naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate biological threats, including identified threats, criminal acts, terrorist acts, supply chain failure and system failure, cyberattacks, or other relevant threats affecting One Health and national security).</p>

tv_txt: II 117th CONGRESS 2d Session S. 5354 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES December 22 (legislative day, December 21), 2022 Mrs. Gillibrand introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions A BILL To assess, prevent, prepare for, respond to, recover, and mitigate biological threats by establishing the One Health Security Council.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the One Health Security Act . 2. Findings; sense of Congress (a) Findings Congress finds the following: (1) Health threats at the human-animal-plant-environment interface pose risks to public health, animal health, environmental health, plant health, and global health security. (2) Population growth— (A) strains food supplies, threatens food sustainability and nutrition, and exacerbates the consequences of intensified food production in the plant and animal sectors; (B) contributes to natural habitat loss, biodiversity loss, and exploitation of wildlife, which has led to the closer proximity of wild animals to domesticated animals and people; (C) increases urbanization and population density in certain regions; and (D) leads to the increased movement of humans, animals, plants, and products made from plants and animals that increases risk of disease transmission. (3) Diseases that are shared between animals and humans are responsible for— (A) approximately 60 percent of all human infections, including all pandemic outbreaks since the 1970s; (B) up to 75 percent of new or emerging infectious diseases affecting humans; and (C) more than 80 percent of the biological agents that could be intentionally released as biological weapons. (4) Plant diseases are responsible for— (A) estimated worldwide yield losses on food crops of between 10 and 20 percent, including up to a 40 percent loss on maize, potato, rice, soybean, and wheat crops; and (B) disrupting trade by contaminating commodities with plant pathogens and insect pests. (5) Changes in the environment have increased the risk of food insecurity and zoonotic and plant diseases emerging in new geographic areas and different times of year by creating— (A) hospitable conditions for— (i) many zoonotic disease vectors, such as mosquitoes and ticks; (ii) plant diseases, vectors, viruses, and pests, such as mildews, aphids, and nematodes; and (iii) the territorial expansion of such diseases, vectors, and pests into places inhabited by humans and wildlife; and (B) an increase in extreme weather events, such as wildfires, hurricanes, floods, and droughts, leading to— (i) the displacement of animals that are seeking refuge in new areas; (ii) mass gatherings of people and domestic animals seeking shelter, resources, and medical attention; (iii) the destruction of fields of plant crops and livestock farms; and (iv) the displacement of wildlife that often feed on surviving agriculture. (6) Human conflict creates major risk for disease outbreaks and food insecurity due to— (A) the movement of displaced people and animals; and (B) the destruction and neglect of agricultural products resulting in reduced crop yields and the inability to transport food. (7) Antimicrobial resistant bacteria, viruses, fungi, parasites, and other microbes impact the ability of health professionals, including physicians, veterinarians, and plant disease specialists, to manage infectious diseases of humans, animals, and plants. (8) Antimicrobial resistant infections kill an estimated 35,000 Americans annually and more than 700,000 people annually worldwide, resulting in a long-term global pandemic of resistant infections. (9) Addressing complex health-related issues that span human, animal, plant, and environmental health requires coordinated efforts, interagency collaboration, and funding mechanisms that are not constrained to the narrow missions of individual Federal agencies. (10) While One Health efforts to mitigate the emergence and impact of pandemics requires a global perspective, there is a critical need for investment in United States national networks and disease surveillance in order to effectively predict and mitigate local emergence of threats that may be missed by global surveillance. (11) The National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security states, Biological threats can affect humans, animals, plants, and the environment, resulting in significant health, economic, social, and national security impacts. It is therefore important to address biological threats using a One Health approach that recognizes the interconnections among people, animals (domestic and wildlife), plants, and the environment. . (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) supporting global health security requires mobilizing an interagency council to operationalize the One Health concept and approach, which links human, animal, plant, and environmental health; and (2) the United States Government needs to create, support, and allocate funds to interagency projects with effective outcomes, including— (A) coordinated and well-funded surveillance and investigation programs designed to identify emerging One Health challenges, including emerging infectious diseases and pathogen resistance to current treatments; (B) comprehensive One Health monitoring, prevention, mitigation, and outreach programs; (C) innovative research and education efforts focused on addressing current and future One Health challenges; (D) organized and funded crisis resilience exercises to verify crisis management, response, and recovery capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels; (E) statutory authority for Federal agencies to participate in multiagency One Health projects that are critical to national security; (F) prioritized project execution through a One Health Security Council; and (G) comprehensive, equitable, all-species inclusive, and safe care in response to biological threats. 3. Definitions In this Act: (1) Animal The term animal includes companion, domestic, aquacultural and agricultural livestock, captive and free-ranging wild animals, including invertebrates, such as pollinators. (2) Antimicrobial resistance The term antimicrobial resistance means the process by which microbes, including bacteria, viruses, fungi, parasites, and other microbes, evolve resistance to the effects of a drug used to treat the illnesses they cause. (3) Commercial trade The term commercial trade means trade in animals, plants, other sources of food, and associated products, including production, if— (A) the purpose of such trade is to obtain an economic benefit, whether in cash or otherwise; and (B) such trade is directed toward the sale, resale, or exchange of wildlife, or any other form of economic use or benefit. (4) Council The term Council means the One Health Security Council established under section 4. (5) Dual use biomedical research The term dual use biomedical research means biomedical research intended for legitimate purposes, but having the potential for both benevolent and malevolent applications. (6) Network The term Network means the One Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness Network. (7) One health The term One Health — (A) recognizes the interconnection between people, animals (including domestic and wildlife), plants, and their shared environments (including ecosystems); (B) refers to a collaborative, multisectoral, and transdisciplinary approach, working at the local, regional, national, and global levels, with the goal of achieving optimal health outcomes for the linked systems described in subparagraph (A); and (C) includes matters related to— (i) zoonotic and vector-borne diseases; (ii) the evolution of antimicrobial resistance and stewardship of antimicrobials against organisms, including viruses, bacteria, fungi, and parasites (both pathogenic and non-pathogenic); (iii) risks to animals, plants, other sources of food, and the health of the natural environment, including soil, air, and water; (iv) the use of animals, plants, and the environment as sentinels for human and ecosystem health risks; (v) non-zoonotic infectious diseases associated with global trade; (vi) crises adversely affecting domestic and global commerce in animal populations, plant crops, imported food products, and other sources of safe and nutritious food; (vii) the risks to biodiversity and the well-being of all life on Earth; and (viii) other contexts related to the interconnectedness and shared biological and social systems from comparative medicine and translational research across different species of animals and humans to noncommunicable diseases from exposure to environmental toxins and contaminants inevitably affecting all life forms. (8) One health security The term One Health Security — (A) means the operational and functional security of the Nation’s One Health systems against naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate biological threats, including identified threats, criminal acts, terrorist acts, supply chain failure and system failure, cyberattacks, or other relevant threats affecting One Health and national security; and (B) requires the integration of professionals with expertise in security, law enforcement, and intelligence to join the veterinary, agricultural, environmental, ecological, and human health experts who are essential to One Health and national security. (9) Other sources of food The term other sources of food means any food that is not from a plant or animal source, such as fungi and algae. (10) Plant The term plant includes— (A) commercial, local, public, and private plants used in agriculture, forestry, and nurseries; and (B) native, imported, and endangered plants, including weeds. (11) Spillover The term spillover means a single event during which a pathogen in 1 species moves into another species. (12) Wildlife The term wildlife means mammals, birds, fish, reptiles, and amphibians of wild origin, whether removed directly from the wild or born or bred in captivity. (13) Wildlife market The term wildlife market — (A) means a commercial market that sells, processes, or slaughters wildlife or their products for human consumption; and (B) does not include markets in areas where no other practical alternative sources of protein or meat exists, such as markets in rural areas that may trade in wildlife and on which indigenous people rely to feed themselves and their families. (14) Zoonotic disease The term zoonotic disease means any disease that is transmissible between animals and humans. 4. One Health Security Council (a) Establishment There is hereby established, in the Executive Office of the President, an interagency policy council, which shall be known as the One Health Security Council . (b) Functions The Council shall— (1) advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to One Health Security and to enable Federal agencies to cooperate more effectively in matters involving One Health Security; (2) assess and appraise— (A) the objectives and commitments of the United States to protecting One Health Security; (B) the actual and potential capacity of the United States to protect One Health Security; (C) the objectives and goals of the National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan on Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security; and (D) the risks of not fulfilling related objectives and commitments; (3) make recommendations to the President concerning— (A) the matters described in paragraph (2); and (B) policies to effectively coordinate on matters of common interest to Federal agencies involved with One Health Security; and (4) coordinate the United States Government response to One Health Security threats, including by— (A) reducing the threat of zoonotic disease impacts on public health and national security; (B) reducing the occurrence of infectious diseases of humans, animals, and plants and their antimicrobial resistance to treatments; (C) addressing other cross-cutting, multi-sectoral needs, including pandemic prevention and noninfectious health threats, such as ecosystem health, chemicals, toxins, and natural disasters; (D) fostering collaborative and innovative efforts among academic, private, and government entities to improve— (i) One Health surveillance, detection, prevention, response, mitigation, and recovery efforts and capabilities; and (ii) antimicrobial stewardship; (E) coordinating the acquisition, analysis, and dissemination of information relevant to novel and emerging health threats, such as medical intelligence and biosurveillance, including— (i) the role and impact of misinformation and disinformation on relevant information to One Health; (ii) the role of risk communication; (iii) adaptive strategies to improve communication and dissemination of scientific and evidence-based public health information to the public, to improve such communication between Federal, State, local, and Tribal health officials, and, as appropriate, to address misinformation and disinformation; (iv) the most effective methods for the dissemination of information, including between Federal agencies and members of the Council; and (v) the best practices for communicating information to populations that may be impacted by such misinformation and disinformation; (F) fostering a sustainable network of health care institutions that is able to provide comprehensive care to patients infected with zoonotic diseases, while keeping the health care workforce safe; and (G) promoting a regulated and transparent research network that can study emerging diseases, with a focus on routes of transmission and medical countermeasures. (c) Objectives The Council shall ensure that Federal, State, Tribal, and local governments are taking a whole-of-country approach to One Health Security policies and programs for the United States that— (1) supports interdisciplinary, cross-sectoral collaboration designed to address the complex systems underlying health threats in humans, animals, plants, and the environment, especially zoonosis and antimicrobial resistance, food security, and natural disasters; (2) ensures alignment and structural balance among agencies, academia and the private sector in addressing One Health Security challenges and opportunities; (3) promotes integrated action for early detection, prevention, mitigation, and response to health threats, especially zoonotic disease spillover and outbreaks around the world; (4) addresses the cooperative and timely dissemination of data among agencies and institutions and with the public, and the handling of communications; and (5) ensures that all deliberations, discussions, and meetings involving Federal agencies are subject to the recording provisions of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the Administrative Procedures Act ). (d) Leadership (1) Chair The National Security Advisor shall serve as Chair of the Council. (2) Vice chair There shall be up to 3 Vice Chairs of the Council, who shall be selected among the representatives of the Federal agencies referred to in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (H), and (M) of subsection (e)(1). Vice Chairs shall serve terms of 3 years, rotating in alphabetical order by name of department or agency. If the Chair is absent from a meeting of the Council, a Vice Chair, who shall be designated by the Chair, shall assume the responsibilities of the Chair during such absence. (e) Composition (1) In general The Council shall be composed of the heads of— (A) the Department of State; (B) the Department of Health and Human Services; (C) the Environmental Protection Agency; (D) the Department of Agriculture; (E) the Department of Commerce; (F) the Department of Defense; (G) the Department of the Treasury; (H) the Department of Homeland Security; (I) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; (J) the National Science Foundation; (K) the Department of Energy; (L) the Department of Justice; (M) the Department of the Interior; and (N) such other offices of the United States Government as the President may designate. (2) Appointments The head of each agency or organization listed under paragraph (1)— (A) shall— (i) represent such agency on the Council; or (ii) appoint a senior-level staff member to represent such agency on the Council; and (B) may modify an appointment under subparagraph (A)(ii) at any time other than during a Council meeting. (3) Involvement of other federal agencies Council members shall actively invite the Federal agencies and subagencies that have One Health Security responsibilities— (A) to participate, in a nonvoting capacity, in Council meetings and activities, as appropriate; and (B) to remain actively engaged with the Council on an ongoing basis, including by sharing and discussing One Health Security-related research, programming, policy, and funding. (4) Staff (A) In general The Council may hire staff members to assist in carrying out its responsibilities under this section. (B) Expertise Council members shall strive to hire staff who have— (i) varied, cross-cutting expertise in a variety of global One Health topics, including human, animal, plant, and environmental health, conservation, epidemiology, biodiversity, food security, ecology, economics, sociology, data analysis, and medical sciences; (ii) expertise specific to the ecological determinants and prevention of zoonotic and vector-borne disease spillover, amplification, and spread; (iii) expertise specific to health communication; (iv) One Health education; and (v) national security and intelligence. (f) Meetings (1) In general The Council shall meet not less frequently than quarterly to review progress, share new information and knowledge, and attend to other business. (2) Agenda The Chair of the Council, in consultation with the Vice Chairs, is authorized to convene Council meetings and set the agenda for such meetings. Meeting agendas shall be made available to the public. (3) Remote attendance authorized Council members may participate in Council meetings from remote locations. (4) Participation with stakeholders In order to facilitate the coordination of One Health Security efforts, representatives of key stakeholders shall be invited to attend not fewer than 2 Council meetings per year in a nonvoting role. Such stakeholders may include— (A) the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; (B) the United Nations Environment Programme; (C) the World Organisation for Animal Health; (D) the World Health Organization; (E) the International Monetary Fund; (F) the World Bank; (G) nongovernmental organizations; (H) academic institutions; (I) professional organizations representing veterinarians, physical and mental health professionals, plant pathologists, environmental scientists, people with disabilities, and other relevant experts; (J) national laboratories, foundations, or other private sector groups; and (K) State, territories, Tribes, and local governments. (g) Major activities The Council shall— (1) develop a comprehensive One Health Security Strategy; (2) beginning 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, provide annual recommendations to Congress regarding the optimal distribution of One Health Security funding, including the disbursement of appropriated funds through interagency agreements, to support— (A) One Health educational activities and programs— (i) for primary and secondary education students through the Department of Education; and (ii) primary, secondary, and tertiary education students through the National Science Foundation; (B) the National Plant Diagnostics Network; (C) the National Animal Health Laboratory Network; (D) One Health educational programs for the public, including sponsored annual conferences and readiness exercises, which shall be conducted not more frequently than semiannually by the National Park Service, the Army Educational Outreach Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Service to achieve the global One Health goals and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals; and (E) intramural and extramural programs intended to achieve the purposes set forth in the One Health Security Strategy that are led by international organizations, such as the stakeholders listed in subparagraphs (A) through (K) of subsection (f)(4) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora Secretariat; (3) provide continuous updates on internationally reportable high-risk incidents adversely affecting the security and stability of One Health Security programs and efforts; (4) analyze the scope and context of all One Health Security-related activities receiving Federal funding, including activities partially funded with non-Federal funds, to identify opportunities, gaps, duplications, existing relationships, organizational strengths, and the degree to which such activities align with the goals identified by the Council and the One Health Security Strategy; (5) make recommendations to Congress and relevant executive branch agencies regarding the scope and context of One Health Security-related activities receiving Federal funding, including the role and impact of misinformation and disinformation related to One Health Security-related activities; (6) facilitate public-private partnerships, including zoological and aquatic parks, and government-university partnerships to accelerate impact, increase cost-effectiveness, and better address the root drivers of spillover and spread; (7) regularly consult with foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and international organizations, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Health Organization, the World Organisation for Animal Health, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the United Nations Environmental Programme that carry out One Health Security-related activities; (8) provide guidance to the Office of Management and Budget regarding the types of activities that should be classified as related to One Health Security and global One Health; (9) identify research gaps and opportunities, particularly those that can be addressed by researchers and research organizations in the United States; and (10) identify specific crisis response and incident response capabilities of each State for spillover events and other health threats and submit semiannual reports to Congress describing each State’s One Health crisis readiness. (h) Decision Making (1) One health security strategy (A) Comment period The Council shall— (i) provide a 60-day public comment period before finalizing the One Health Security Strategy; and (ii) incorporate the input received from the public during such period, as appropriate. (B) Voting and resolving disagreements If the Council requires a vote or cannot reach consensus regarding any element in the One Health Security Strategy, including strategic goals, programming priorities, and funding priorities, the Council members shall vote on the competing options, with the presiding Chair casting the deciding vote, if necessary. The option supported by a simple majority of Council members shall be included in the One Health Security Strategy. When casting votes, Council members shall consult with their relevant subagencies, as needed. Each department or agency will be allowed only 1 vote regardless of the amount of representation or stakeholders present at the meeting. (2) Quorum If 1 or more Council members impede the ability of the Council to perform its duties by repeatedly failing to attend Council meetings or refusing to vote on Council matters, a majority of Council members who are present and voting shall constitute a quorum and may approve previously noticed decision items through a simple majority. Council meetings may not commence without the participation of a quorum of at least 8 voting members. (3) OMB observer The Director of the Office of Management and Budget may send an observer to any Council meeting at which the Council is expected to make a decision regarding the distribution of Federal funding to a project. Such observer may not vote on Council matters. 5. One Health Security Strategy (a) In general The One Health Security Strategy required under section 4(g)(1) shall build from, link with, and contribute to existing domestic and international One Health Security-related efforts, including— (1) efforts outlined by the Global Health Security Agenda, the interagency Task Force for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, the Presidential Advisory Council on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, and the Presidential Task Force to Combat Wildlife Trafficking; (2) existing strategies, such as the National Security Strategy, the Global Health Security Strategy, the National Health Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking, and the National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security; (3) Federal investments related to such efforts and strategies, such as the Biomedical and Advanced Research and Development Authority, the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, the World Health Organization, the World Organisation for Animal Health, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the United Nations Environmental Programme; and (4) the programs and activities described in the inventory and capabilities assessment carried out pursuant to section 7(b). (b) Elements The One Health Security Strategy shall include— (1) a definition of the scope of One Health Security that— (A) aligns with existing practices by the member agencies of the One Health Security Council to the extent possible and considers governmental and nongovernmental definitions for One Health, such as definitions offered by the World Health Organization’s One Health High-Level Expert Panel, the Quadripartite organization’s One Health Joint Plan of Action, and the National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security, published in October 2022; and (B) includes— (i) zoonotic disease and vector-borne disease prevention, detection, and response and all aspects of prevention of resistance to pathogen treatments; (ii) issues related to the matters described in clause (i), such as— (I) legal and illegal wildlife trafficking and commercial trade, including wildlife markets, animal husbandry, habitat destruction, and degradation; (II) biodiversity loss; and (III) climate change; (iii) plant disease prevention, detection, response, and surveillance; (iv) risk of intentional misuse of advances in biotechnology; (v) accidental release of biological agents; and (vi) threats posed by terrorist groups or adversaries seeking to use biological weapons; (2) short-term (1 year) objectives, intermediate-term (2 to 3 years) objectives, and long-term (4 years or more) objectives; (3) prioritized areas for further study and targeted technological investments, such as— (A) targeted vaccines, the development of novel vaccine pipelines, and judicious antimicrobial usage for people, plants, and animals to reduce antimicrobial resistance; (B) new diagnostic test pipelines to rapidly detect and monitor pathogens in animals, plants, and humans; (C) advanced technologies for animal, human, and plant disease surveillance, conservation and other related surveillance, and actionable data, including wastewater surveillance and use of predictive analytics, user behavior analytics, or certain other advanced data analytics methods that extract value from large and multiple data sets to improve and target surveillance; (D) data sharing best practices among Federal agencies and partners that can utilize data in disease surveillance; (E) research networks, such as the National Emerging Special Pathogens Training and Education Center’s Special Pathogens Research Network, to study novel countermeasures for emerging zoonotic pathogens; (F) the manufacturing and timely distribution of vaccines, therapeutics, and remedies to biological threats; and (G) other research priorities identified by the Council; (4) prioritized activities to prevent and address One Health Security threats, including zoonotic, vector-borne, and plant disease amplification and spread, including— (A) pathogen and risk identification and mitigation in advance of spillover; (B) surveillance and containment activities, including efforts to incentivize and encourage early reporting of risk alerts, spillover events, localized outbreaks, and routine surveillance; (C) global efforts to coordinate antimicrobial resistance response in humans and animals; (D) efforts to eliminate wildlife trafficking; (E) efforts to stop habitat destruction or degradation, deforestation, and biodiversity loss; (F) efforts to promote food security and safety through animal, plant, and other sources of food disease and health surveillance, including in populations dependent on wildlife for protein; (G) efforts to reduce consumer demand for wildlife, wildlife products, and restricted and endangered plants, including protected wood and other tree products, identified in Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, done at Washington March 3, 1973 (27 UST 1087; TIAS 8429); (H) efforts to support integrated emergency response to identified spillover crises and related threats; (I) protocol development to improve holistic response to and recovery from disease outbreaks in animals, plants, and humans; (J) One Health workforce development to prevent and respond to disease outbreaks and other health threats affecting animals, plants, humans, and the environment; (K) efforts to identify and mitigate dissemination of misinformation and disinformation related to One Health; (L) other efforts to protect the collective health of animals, humans, plants, and the environment, especially those conducted through global collaborations and partnerships; (M) enhanced partnerships with academia to teach plant health and disease surveillance in universities to address workforce gaps; and (N) preparing and equipping health care institutions for managing patients with emerging zoonotic diseases in a safe and equitable manner; (5) a description of proposed incentives to encourage national and subnational engagement in One Health Security efforts, particularly community education and mobilization activities and participation in data collection and reporting activities in support of the One Health Security Strategy; (6) anticipated measures of success, including benchmarks to monitor progress of short-, medium-, and long-term objectives; (7) a description of how the strategy reflects and builds from existing Federal organizational activities, relationships, and capabilities; (8) a description of how the strategy addresses gaps, especially those identified in the inventory and capabilities assessment carried out pursuant to section 7(b); (9) direction, oversight, and coordination of the One Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness Network; and (10) semiannual readiness exercises to test, validate, and improve the emergency response operations of the One Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness Network. 6. Advisory committees (a) Technical Advisory Committee (1) In general The Council shall establish and semiannually convene a Technical Advisory Committee, which shall be composed of United States Government One Health Security experts who represent a variety of sectors, including experts in human, animal, plant and environmental health, conservation, emerging pathogens, and ecology. (2) Member selection priorities The Council shall prioritize the selection of committee members with existing expertise that will help advance the objectives of the One Health Security Strategy, including experts from academia, nongovernmental organizations, industry, and State, local, territorial, and Tribal governments. (3) Guidance The Technical Advisory Committee shall provide technical and programmatic guidance to the Council relating to the implementation of One Health Security programs, which shall be included in annual reports that are available to the public. (4) Additional recommendations In addition to the guidance described in paragraph (3), the Technical Advisory Committee may provide additional recommendations to Congress, Federal agencies, or international organizations that are outside the scope of the Council’s responsibilities under this Act. (b) Scientific Advisory Committee (1) In general The Council shall establish a standing Scientific Advisory Committee, which shall be composed of global One Health academics based at institutions of higher learning, including— (A) individuals with expertise in human, animal, plant, and environmental health, conservation, and ecology; and (B) experts from foreign countries, as appropriate. (2) Member selection priorities The Council shall prioritize the selection of committee members with existing expertise that will help advance the objectives of the One Health Security Strategy, including experts from academia, nongovernmental organizations, industry, and State, local, territorial, and tribal governments. (3) Guidance The Scientific Advisory Committee shall— (A) provide regular updates to the Council regarding recent scientific advances and opportunities; (B) provide scientific guidance to the Council to inform strategic direction; (C) provide scientific guidance to the Task Force for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria regarding the operation of the One Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness Network; and (D) not later than the last day of each fiscal year, submit an annual Spillover Threat Report outlining remedial and corrective actions relevant to the effective operation of the One Health Security System to the Task Force for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria. 7. Reports (a) Initial work plan Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Council shall submit the initial 12-month work plan to— (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate ; (2) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate ; (3) the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate ; (4) the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate ; (5) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate ; (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate ; (7) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives ; (8) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives ; (9) the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives ; (10) the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives ; (11) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives ; and (12) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives . (b) Inventory and capabilities assessment (1) In general The Council shall carry out a synthesized inventory and capabilities assessment that includes— (A) an inventory of current One Health Security-related activities by each Federal agency; (B) a description of each Federal agency’s existing capabilities and authorizations; (C) a description of the interagency collaboration within each participating Federal agency to achieve One Health Security goals; and (D) a collective gap analysis of Federal agency crisis response readiness issues. (2) Report Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Council shall submit a report to the congressional committees listed in subsection (a) that contains the information described in paragraph (1). (c) One Health Security Strategy Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Council shall submit the One Health Security Strategy to the congressional committees referred to in subsection (a). (d) Annual reports Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Council shall submit a report to the congressional committees listed in subsection (a) that includes— (1) an updated One Health Security Strategy, as appropriate; (2) an implementation plan for the upcoming 12-month period; (3) a financial report that includes an accounting of funds appropriated to carry out this Act; (4) the latest version of the Council’s monitoring and evaluation plan; (5) a monitoring and evaluation report for the reporting period; (6) summaries of the minutes from Council meetings held during the reporting period; (7) the status of One Health Security-related activities receiving Federal funding; (8) prevailing strategic guidance and priorities; (9) an executive summary of the challenges and achievements of the Council during the reporting period; (10) a summary of the progress made toward building the One Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness Network in accordance with section 8, including— (A) the total funds appropriated, obligated, and expended to build the One Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness Network; (B) an assessment of the efficacy of One Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness Network programs receiving Federal funding; and (C) other activities undertaken by the One Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness Network; (11) a summary of additional personnel hired with funding appropriated pursuant to section 8, disaggregated by Federal agency; (12) a description of the partnerships developed with other institutions of higher learning and nongovernmental organizations to carry out the One Health Security Strategy; and (13) a copy of the annual Spillover Threat Report prepared by the Scientific Advisory Committee pursuant to section 6(b)(3)(D). (e) Monitoring and investigations If the Council determines that a foreign country or syndicate is engaged in illegal deforestation or illegal trade or trafficking of wildlife, or that increasing or decreasing existing or potential sanctions or law enforcement actions with respect to such country would expedite the achievement of Council goals, the Council shall submit a report to the President and Congress that describes the evidence supporting such determination, which may include recommended sanctions or law enforcement actions against such country. (f) Dual-Use research Oversight of federally conducted or federally supported dual use biomedical research, such as the review of policies or frameworks used to assess and appropriately manage safety and security risks associated with such research, taking into consideration national security concerns, the potential benefits of such research, considerations related to the research community, transparency, and public availability of information, and international research collaboration. (g) Public availability All of the reports required under this section shall be made available to the public and may include a classified annex, as necessary. 8. Authorization of appropriations (a) Startup funding There is authorized to be appropriated $55,000,000 to the Office of Management and Budget (referred to in this subsection as OMB ) for fiscal year 2023, of which— (1) $45,000,000 shall be allocated by the Council among the appropriate Federal agencies— (A) to collect key information; (B) to conduct key research; and (C) to initiate other key activities, as determined by the One Health Security Council; and (2) $10,000,000 may be used to carry out the internal operations of the Council, including staffing, travel, and other administrative expenses. (b) Second-Year funding (1) In general There is authorized to be appropriated $500,000,000 to the OMB for fiscal year 2024. The Council is authorized to allocate such funding among the appropriate Federal agencies to carry the functions of the Council. Of such amounts— (A) 75 percent may be spent for new or expanded One Health Security activities; and (B) 25 percent may be spent to flexibly respond to developing events and fill gaps left by congressional and agency decisions. (2) Recommendations Not later than September 30, 2023, the Council shall submit a report to the congressional committees listed in section 7(a), the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate , and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives that contains recommendations that— (A) describe the optimal allocation of amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1); (B) reflect the Federal agency competencies identified in the inventory and capabilities assessment carried out pursuant to section 7(b), including the utilization of existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, as appropriate; and (C) are made in accordance with the decision-making parameters described in section 4(h). (c) Ongoing funding (1) In general There is authorized to be appropriated $900,000,000 to the OMB for fiscal year 2025, and for each fiscal year thereafter. The Council is authorized to allocate such funding among the appropriate Federal agencies to carry out the functions of the Council. Of such amounts— (A) $675,000,000 may be expended each fiscal year for new or expanded Global One Health activities; and (B) $225,000,000 may be expended each fiscal year to flexibly respond to developing events and fill gaps left by congressional and agency decisions. (2) Recommendations Not later than September 30, 2024, and not later than the last day of each subsequent fiscal year, the Council shall submit a report to the congressional committees listed in section 7(a), the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate , and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives that contains recommendations describing the optimal allocation of amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) for the following fiscal year. (d) Disbursement Amounts appropriated pursuant to this section— (1) may be disbursed through the appropriate Federal agencies to nongovernmental organizations and international organizations for approved One Health Security activities; or (2) may be expended for programs conducted by Federal agencies in accordance with appropriations Acts and the approved One Health Security Strategy. (e) Supplement and not supplant Amounts appropriated pursuant to this section shall supplement, and may not supplant, any existing funding for global One Health Security-related activities. (f) Cross-Cutting budget code The Director of the OMB, in accordance with the guidance received from the Council pursuant to section 4(g)(10), shall establish a cross-cutting budget code to identify existing and new One Health Security-related activities and funding levels by Federal agency. (g) Compliance with recommendations Any Federal agency engaged in One Health Security-related activities shall— (1) comply with Council recommendations when making funding decisions for such activities; and (2) use Council recommendations to guide funding decisions pertaining to One Health Security-related activities funded outside of the jurisdiction of the Council.