North Korea Policy Oversight Act of 2022

Bill: 117-s-4824
Sponsor: full_name: Sen. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ]
Introduced: 2022-09-13
Policy area: International Affairs
Latest action: action_date: 2022-09-13
text: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Summaries:
action_date: 2022-09-13
action_desc: Introduced in Senate
text: <p><strong>North Korea Policy Oversight Act of 2022</strong></p> <p>This bill requires additional reports and briefings related to North Korea.</p> <p>The Department of State shall periodically report to Congress on diplomatic engagement with and by North Korea. The bill contains various additional reporting requirements, such as&nbsp;for the President to report a detailed strategy for implementing certain policies related to achieving North Korea's denuclearization.</p> <p>The State Department shall brief Congress after each high-level U.S.-North Korea diplomatic talk.</p> <p>The President shall notify Congress no later than five days after entering into any agreement with North Korea related to North Korea's nuclear and missile program. The notice shall include the agreement and an assessment of the extent to which the State Department can verify North Korea's compliance with the agreement. The President shall also periodically report on North Korea's compliance with the agreement and other related matters. </p>

tv_txt: II 117th CONGRESS 2d Session S. 4824 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES September 13, 2022 Mr. Menendez (for himself and Mr. Hagerty ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To provide for proper oversight of North Korea policy, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the North Korea Policy Oversight Act of 2022 . 2. Definitions In this Act: (1) Appropriate congressional committees The term appropriate congressional committees means— (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (2) Nuclear nonproliferation treaty The term nuclear nonproliferation treaty means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483). 3. Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) The world faces a greater risk of nuclear conflict today than at any time since the height of the Cold War, due to Russia’s threatened use of nuclear weapons during its invasion of Ukraine, China’s pursuing a rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal, Iran’s continued efforts to pursue nuclear weapons, and Kim Jong-un’s relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in the face of global condemnation and severe economic sanctions by the international community. (2) The North Korean nuclear program did not arise instantaneously, but is the culmination of the rogue regime's illegal efforts over 7 decades to acquire a viable deterrent that threatens both the United States and our critical allies in the Indo-Pacific region. (3) North Korea has conducted 6 nuclear tests since 2006, with each test increasing in explosive strength and sophistication. (4) North Korea's last nuclear test, occurring on September 3, 2017, was its largest nuclear explosion to date, registering a 6.3 magnitude earthquake according to the United States Geological Survey with an estimated yield of 140 kilotons. (5) According to open source analysis, North Korea has produced enough fissile material for at least 30 to 60 nuclear weapons. (6) North Korea maintains a robust ballistic missile portfolio that includes a diverse array of delivery systems capable of striking targets throughout the region, including short-range Scuds, medium-range No-Dong missiles, an increasingly capable cruise missile program, and intercontinental ballistic missiles that are potentially capable of targeting the United States homeland. (7) The Department of Defense estimates that North Korea currently wields approximately 200 launchers capable of firing short and medium range ballistic missiles. (8) Since January 2022, North Korea has conducted 13 ballistic missile tests, including at least three assessed in open source analysis to be intercontinental ballistic missiles. (9) Rigorous international economic sanctions applied since the passage of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 ( Public Law 114–122 ), including by the United States and the United Nations Security Council, intensified pressure on the regime and focused international attention on the urgency of the challenge posed by the Kim regime in Pyongyang. (10) The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the international community by illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017). (11) The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its own people and citizens of other countries, including the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. (12) In 2018 and 2019, the United States and North Korea engaged in intensive diplomacy, including three leader-level summits between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-Un, resulting in the first leader-level commitment from North Korea to denuclearize, as stated in the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement. (13) The stakes for the security of the United States and United States allies are such that all credible diplomatic options must be prioritized, resourced, and fully pursued, in addition to maintaining robust and credible deterrence. (14) Economic pressure and sanctions provide critical leverage in any such diplomatic negotiations and must be maintained and strengthened until the North Korean regime takes meaningful and verifiable actions toward denuclearization. (15) The North Korean regime has a record of failing to live up to its diplomatic commitments, rejecting good faith efforts by United States and international negotiators, and leveraging talks to extract concessions such as sanctions relief. (16) In order to prevent the North Korean regime from further developing, using, or disseminating nuclear or ballistic weapons, technology, and related material, the United States Government should continue a campaign of economic pressure and sanctions, counter-proliferation, containment, and deterrence until North Korea completely, verifiably, and irreversibly denuclearizes. (17) The North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 states that there can be no sanctions relief unless North Korea has made significant progress toward completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantling all of its nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons programs, including all programs for the development of systems designed in whole or in part for the delivery of such weapons . (18) The United States Government has successfully pursued a policy of deterrence, which has kept the American people safe from a nuclear attack from the Russian Federation, China, and other states with nuclear weapons, which have a combined nuclear arsenal of more than 7,000 warheads. (19) Over time, the United States policy of deterrence, containment, and diplomacy to reduce nuclear weapons risks protected the American people and contributed to the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union. (20) The United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan are all free societies that are committed to the principles of inclusive democracy, respect for human potential and individual freedom, and the belief that the peaceful spread of these principles will result in a safer and brighter future for all of mankind. (21) The Governments and people of the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan can help realize this future through further strengthening their economic, political, social, cultural, and security relationships. (22) The Governments and people of the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan share a commitment to free and open markets, high standards for the free flow of commerce and trade, and the establishment of an inclusive architecture for regional and global trade and development. (23) The United States-Japan and United States-Republic of Korea security alliances have evolved considerably over many decades and will continue to share greater responsibilities and dedicate themselves to a secure and prosperous region and world. (24) Robust military posture, including regular training and exercises, by the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, is critical to ensuring peace and stability in Northeast Asia. (25) In the absence of an imminent threat to the United States or its allies, a preventive war against North Korea would pose extraordinary risks to the United States and security in Northeast Asia and would require consent of Congress under article I of the Constitution. (26) With China engaging in a strategic breakout , as noted by United States Strategic Commander Admiral Charles Richard in August 2021, the United States faces an unprecedented strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region as China’s nuclear weapons program will alter the nuclear balance in the Indo-Pacific, including Northeast Asia. (27) An effective policy of deterrence requires— (A) clear, consistent, and credible messaging of costs to an adversary such that it recognizes that its use of nuclear weapons would result in massive retaliation; and (B) the vigorous use of diplomatic, economic, military, and other coercive tools to ensure stable deterrence and prevent an adversary from proliferating material or technology. (28) The United States requires a comprehensive diplomatic strategy that outlines the fundamental principles, actions, and verification and compliance mechanisms necessary to properly engage the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the full denuclearization of North Korea. 4. Statements of policy (a) In general It is the policy of the United States— (1) to pursue all credible diplomatic means to achieve the complete and verifiable dismantlement of North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic and cruise missile programs; (2) until such time as denuclearization is achieved— (A) to deter North Korea from using weapons of mass destruction or leveraging those weapons to coerce United States allies; (B) to contain attempts by North Korea to proliferate such weapons and technologies; (C) to ensure that the United States and allies maintain credible deterrence against North Korea, including the presence of United States military troops in the Korean Peninsula and Japan, as well as the development and deployment of new military capabilities; and (D) to continue the maximum pressure campaign against North Korea and its enablers, in cooperation with the United Nations and the international community; (3) should diplomacy and deterrence fail to result in the complete, verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, to reserve the right to utilize all available options to protect and defend United States national security interests and meet United States treaty obligations; and (4) to uphold the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and not recognize North Korea as a legitimate nuclear weapons state. (b) Diplomacy It is the policy of the United States— (1) to pursue diplomatic engagement, as appropriate and consistent with United States national security interests, with the North Korean regime for the purposes of— (A) advancing meaningful negotiations regarding denuclearization, including the Government of North Korea abandoning and dismantling its unlawful missile and nuclear weapons programs, ceasing its proliferation activities, and coming into compliance with all relevant international agreements and United Nations Security Council resolutions; (B) reducing the risks of military miscalculation; and (C) creating opportunities for the development of confidence building measures as part of a broader effort to denuclearize North Korea; (2) to formulate and carry out policy affecting the Korean Peninsula in close cooperation with United States allies, particularly the Republic of Korea; (3) to encourage all nations to deny North Korea the ability to maintain diplomatic missions on foreign soil until such time as the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea takes credible and verifiable steps toward denuclearization; (4) to encourage all nations to fully implement and enforce United Nations sanctions with respect to North Korea, including sanctions related to ending the practice of hosting overseas North Korean workers; (5) to increase the effectiveness of United States sanctions by seeking to work through the United Nations and with other like-minded countries to ensure a multilateral approach to sanctions; (6) to provide unmistakable assurance to Japan and the Republic of Korea, including through extended deterrence commitments and the presence of forward-deployed United States military forces, that the United States is committed to fulfilling its treaty obligations if they are attacked; (7) to resist actions by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to use North Korea issues as a way to draw the attention of the United States Government away from other important regional issues and challenges; (8) to provide support for North Korean refugees and asylum seekers in accordance with United States law; (9) to promote the human rights and dignity of the North Korean people, including through the United Nations and other multilateral institutions; and (10) to seek opportunities for humanitarian actions, such as family reunification and the return of human remains. (c) Economic pressure It is the policy of the United States to sustain and calibrate economic pressure on North Korea until the regime undertakes meaningful and verifiable actions toward denuclearization, including by— (1) encouraging all nations to robustly implement and enforce existing United Nations sanctions; (2) leveraging the strength of the United States financial system to deny access by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and those with whom such government facilitates illicit financial transactions to the United States and global markets, including through the use of secondary sanctions; (3) encouraging all nations, consistent with United Nations Security Council resolutions, to end the practice of hosting North Korean citizens as guest workers, recognizing that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit source of revenue for the Kim regime and its nuclear ambitions; (4) working with the international community on rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from North Korea, including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United Nations Security Council resolutions that have banned nearly every major export from North Korea; and (5) strictly implementing and enforcing United States laws with respect to sanctioning entities, including Russian and Chinese entities, that knowingly engage with sanctioned entities from North Korea or trade in items prohibited under United Nations Security Council resolutions. (d) Proliferation of nuclear and missile technology It is the policy of the United States— (1) to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons, missile technology, or related material to or from North Korea and other states or non-state actors; (2) to support the efforts of the international community to detect, interdict, and prevent the transfers of nuclear or missile technology or related items to or from North Korea; (3) to prioritize close coordination with global partners, including through technical assistance and capacity building, to enhance the ability of the global community to monitor, interdict, and prosecute entities that engage in transfer of nuclear weapons, missile technology, or related material to or from North Korea; and (4) consistent with United States obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to encourage all countries that are party to such treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency agreements to abide by their obligations and commitments. (e) Alliances and military posture It is the policy of the United States— (1) to reaffirm the importance of the United States-Japan and United States-Republic of Korea alliances for maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond; (2) to reaffirm United States extended deterrence commitments to Japan and the Republic of Korea, and to back up such commitments with concrete actions such as prioritizing nuclear modernization to sustain credible deterrence; (3) to reaffirm the importance of the forward-deployed presence of United States military forces in Japan and Korea, and affirm close alliance coordination on any adjustment of United States military posture in the region; (4) to strengthen United States efforts to confront emerging or asymmetric challenges, including cyber and space; (5) to safeguard maritime security and ensure freedom of navigation, commerce, and overflight in the Indo-Pacific region; and (6) to cooperate with allies and partners in the provision of public goods to the region, including humanitarian relief and disaster response. (f) Military measures It is the policy of the United States— (1) to keep United States security commitments to United States allies in the face of North Korea’s continuing threat, including taking necessary actions for United States self-defense and the defense of United States allies, including joint military exercises, modernization of weapons systems deployed in the region, and robust counter-provocation planning by the United States and Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command; (2) consistent with longstanding United States interests in maintaining stability in Asia, to develop and deploy effective and reliable anti-ballistic missile capabilities to defend the United States homeland, United States forces in the region, and United States allies Japan and South Korea; (3) to formulate and carry out military planning and operations impacting the Korean Peninsula in close cooperation with United States allies, particularly the Republic of Korea and Japan; (4) to deter North Korea in a manner that bolsters the force posture and military strength of our alliance and partner networks in the broader Asia-Pacific region; and (5) to maintain, as necessary and appropriate, credible and overwhelming military options against the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, consistent with efforts to deter the regime from use of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and related technology. (g) Human rights It is the policy of the United States— (1) to continue to make it a priority to improve information access in North Korea by exploring the use of new and emerging technologies and expanding nongovernmental radio broadcasting to North Korea, including news and information, to increase information dissemination in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ( DPRK ); (2) to commit to exploring appropriate opportunities for coordinating efforts to plan for humanitarian needs in the DPRK; (3) to press for non-choreographed access for the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; (4) to continue to seek cooperation from foreign governments to allow the United States to process North Korean refugees overseas for United States resettlement; (5) to urge the Government of the People’s Republic of China to halt forcible repatriation of North Koreans; (6) to promote democracy, human rights, and a market economy in North Korea; (7) to increase the availability of nongovernmental controlled information inside North Korea; and (8) to uphold the North Korean regime to resolve the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by the North Korean regime and to emphasize the need for their safe return. (h) Information dissemination efforts It is the policy of the United States— (1) to increase the flow of information, news, and cultural programming into North Korea, including through radio and television broadcasts, digital media, and other means; (2) to increase the flow of information to North Korean citizens, including through radio and television broadcasts, digital media, and other means; and (3) to fulfill all requirements under United States law, including the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, with regard to providing resources for freedom of information efforts into North Korea, and to regularly consult with Congress regarding such efforts. (i) Strategy required (1) In general The President shall submit to the national security committees a detailed strategy, which may include a classified annex, for the implementation of policies outlined in subsections (b) through (h), augmented by briefings to the national security committees on a quarterly basis or as requested. (2) National security committees defined In this subsection, the term national security committees means— (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. 5. Diplomatic strategy (a) Diplomatic strategy report (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for a period of two years, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes— (A) how the diplomatic negotiations with the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are expected to proceed; and (B) actions taken by the United States Government to address the threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (2) Elements Each report required under paragraph (1) shall include— (A) an overview of ongoing efforts by the United States Government to develop diplomatic strategies to ensure that North Korea returns to negotiations with the United States, as well as a negotiation strategy for the United States Government in the event that North Korea returns to negotiations with the United States, including an assessment of strategies— (i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization of North Korea; (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the ballistic and cruise missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and (iii) to continue the maximum pressure campaign, in coordination with United States allies; (B) an assessment of— (i) the roadmap toward peaceful denuclearization of North Korea and the elimination of the nuclear, ballistic, and cruise missile threats posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; (ii) specific actions that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would need to take for such roadmap to become viable; (iii) specific actions that the United States Government could possibly take for such roadmap to become viable; (iv) specific actions that other countries in the Indo-Pacific, including the Republic of Korea, Japan, China, and Russia, could possibly take for such roadmap to become viable; and (v) specific actions that international and regional institutions could possibly take for such roadmap to become viable; and (C) a summary of the United States strategy to increase international coordination and cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally, including sanctions implementation, enforcement, and interdiction— (i) to encourage credible diplomatic engagement by the DPRK; and (ii) to address any threat posed by the nuclear, ballistic, and cruise missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (3) Form Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (4) Updates Should the United States and North Korea engage in bilateral or multilateral diplomacy to achieve, implement, or verify that North Korea’s denuclearization is ongoing, the President shall augment the first strategy report submitted with written updates on the negotiation process, to be submitted to the appropriate congressional committees every 45 days thereafter. (b) Policy of the United States with respect to sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Not later than 30 days after terminating any sanction with respect to the activities of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of that government, or any other person as provided for in Executive Order 13687 or Executive Order 13722, to the extent relevant, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report regarding the cessation of any illicit activity, including any implicated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017), by that government or person. (c) Alliances and military posture and extended deterrence (1) Report on United States force posture in the United States Indo-Pacific command area of responsibility (A) In general Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period of two years, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report providing an assessment of the effect of any negotiations or agreements with the DPRK on United States security interests and United States military presence and alliance implications in the United States Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility. (B) Elements The report required under subparagraph (A) shall include— (i) a review of current and emerging United States national security interests in the United States Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility; (ii) a review of current United States military force posture and deployment plans of the United States Indo-Pacific Command; and (iii) the views of counterpart governments, including military commanders in the region, of the impact of negotiations or agreements with the DPRK on United States extended deterrence commitments to the Republic of Korea. (2) Report on United States force posture in the United States Forces Korea area of responsibility (A) In general Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every year thereafter for a period of two years, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report providing an assessment of the effect of any negotiations or agreements with the DPRK on United States security interests and United States military presence and alliance implications in the United States Forces Korea area of responsibility. (B) Elements The report required under subparagraph (A) shall include— (i) a review of current and emerging United States national security interests in the United States Forces Korea area of responsibility; (ii) a review of current United States military force posture and deployment plans of the United States Forces Korea; and (iii) the views of counterpart governments, including military commanders in the region, of the impact of negotiations or agreements with the DPRK on United States extended deterrence commitments to the Republic of Korea. (3) Report on United States force posture in the United States forces Japan area of responsibility (A) In general Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period of two years, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report providing an assessment of the effect of any negotiations or agreements with the DPRK on United States security interests and United States military presence and alliance implications in the United States Forces Japan area of responsibility. (B) Elements The report required under subparagraph (A) shall include— (i) a review of current and emerging United States national security interests in the United States Forces Japan area of responsibility; (ii) a review of current United States military force posture and deployment plans of the United States Forces Japan; and (iii) the views of counterpart governments, including military commanders in the region, of the impact of negotiations or agreements with the DPRK on United States extended deterrence commitments to Japan. (4) Authority to consolidate reports Any reports required to be submitted under this subsection to the appropriate congressional committees that are subject to a deadline for submission consisting of the same unit of time may be consolidated into a single report. The consolidated report shall contain all information required under this Act with respect to the reports comprising such consolidated report. 6. Briefings (a) Member briefings (1) In general Following each round of diplomatic talks between the United States and North Korea, the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence shall hold, for the appropriate congressional committees and congressional leaders, briefings on the negotiations. (2) Classification The briefings required under paragraph shall be held in a classified format. (b) Staff briefings (1) In general Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, shall hold monthly briefings for cleared national security staff members of the appropriate congressional committees. (2) Classification The briefings required under paragraph (1) shall be held in a classified format. 7. Congressional hearings During each quarterly period that diplomatic talks undertaken between the United States and North Korea continue, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives shall, as appropriate, hold hearings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the negotiations. 8. Oversight of agreements with North Korea (a) Transmission to congress of nuclear agreements with north korea and verification assessment with respect to such agreements (1) Transmission of agreements Not later than 5 days after reaching an agreement with North Korea relating to the nuclear and missile program of North Korea, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees, the majority and minority leader of the Senate and the Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader of the House of Representatives— (A) the agreement, including all related materials and annexes; and (B) a verification assessment report prepared by the Secretary of State in accordance with paragraph (2). (2) Verification assessment report (A) In general The Secretary of State shall prepare, with respect to an agreement described in paragraph (1), a report assessing— (i) the extent to which the United States Government will be able to verify that North Korea is complying with its obligations and commitments under the agreement, including how North Korea might attempt to conceal its program; (ii) the adequacy of the safeguards and other control mechanisms and other assurances contained in the agreement with respect to North Korean nuclear and missile programs to ensure North Korea activities are limited to the subset of activities permitted under the agreement; and (iii) the capacity and capability of the United States and international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, to effectively implement the verification regime required by or related to the agreement, including whether the United States or international organizations will have— (I) sufficient access to— (aa) all nuclear facilities that span the entire nuclear fuel cycle; (bb) facilities associated with the nuclear weaponization program; (cc) facilities associated with its missile program; and (dd) declared and undeclared sites; and (II) the ability to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of covert nuclear-related activities. (B) Classified annex The report required under subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted in unclassified form, but shall include a classified annex prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified information. (b) Sense of congress on north korea final agreement It is the sense of Congress that any binding agreement between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should be submitted to the United States as a treaty and subject to the advice and consent of the Senate in accordance with article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States. 9. Additional reports (a) Verification and compliance reports (1) In general Not later than 90 days after entering into an agreement with North Korea, the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on North Korea’s record of verification and compliance. (2) Classification The report required under paragraph— (A) may be submitted in classified form; (B) shall contain an unclassified executive summary; and (C) may contain an unclassified annex. (b) Semi-Annual report Not later than 180 days after entering into an agreement with North Korea, and not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter for a period of two years, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report on North Korea’s nuclear and missile program and the compliance of North Korea with the agreement during the period covered by the report, which shall include— (1) a description of any action or failure to act by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that breached the agreement or is in noncompliance with the terms of the agreement; (2) a description of the status and activities of any North Korea nuclear facilities related to the nuclear fuel cycle, including mining and exploration, milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactors, reprocessing, and storage; (3) a description of the status and activities of any North Korea nuclear facilities related to the North Korean nuclear weaponization program, including research and development, education and training, and testing; (4) a description of the status and activities of any North Korea missile facilities, including research and development, production, testing, and basing; (5) a description of any delay by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of more than 1 week in providing inspectors access to facilities, people, and documents in North Korea as required by the agreement; (6) a description of any covert nuclear activities undertaken by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including any covert nuclear weapons-related, covert fissile material activities, covert missile activities, or research and development; and (7) a description of any transfer or diversion by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its nuclear materials, components, technology, or equipment to state or non-state actors. 10. Report on North Korean cyber activities to fund its weapons program (a) Finding As North Korea continues to be cut off from the international financial system, North Korea increasingly relies on new methods and means—such as cryptocurrency, digital currency, and cyberattacks—to finance its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs. A February 2022 United Nations report found that North Korean hackers stole more than $50,000,000 in cryptocurrencies between 2020 and mid-2021. The report follows the United Nations’ 2019 findings that North Korea had accumulated an estimated $2,000,000,000 in stolen assets to facilitate its weapons program through cyberattacks. (b) Report (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on North Korea’s use of cyberattacks and cryptocurrency and other digital currency to finance its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs, including through the evasion of sanctions. (2) Elements The report required under subparagraph (A) shall include— (A) a review of how North Korea uses cyberattacks, including stealing virtual assets, to support its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs; (B) a discussion of how cryptocurrency exchanges and exchange operators facilitate North Korean theft, and recommendations for sanctioning persons and entities linked to illicit cryptocurrency exchange; (C) a review of how the United States Government is tracing, disrupting, interdicting, and deterring these attacks, including— (i) efforts to deter telecommunications companies from facilitating North Korean cyberattacks directed at digital financial platforms; (ii) efforts to deter over-the-counter (OTC) brokers and other actors from laundering digital assets and converting such assets to fiat currencies; (iii) efforts to coordinate cryptocurrency regulations with partners and allies, including through forums like the United Nations, the Financial Action Task Force, the Group of Seven, and the Group of Twenty; and (iv) efforts to increase intelligence sharing on cyber threats with partners and allies to better trace North Korean cyberattacks and cyber theft of digital assets; and (D) a review of how the United States Government is working with its allies and partners, as well as international institutions and the private sector, to trace, disrupt, interdict, and deter North Korea’s cyberattacks. 11. Imposition of sanctions with respect to use of cryptocurrency to evade sanctions imposed with respect to North Korea and abduction by North Korean persons of citizens of Japan Section 104(a) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 ( 22 U.S.C. 9214(a) ) is amended— (1) in paragraph (14), by striking ; or and inserting a semicolon; (2) by redesignating paragraph (15) as paragraph (17); (3) by inserting after paragraph (14) the following: (15) knowingly uses or has used, or directly facilitates or has directly facilitated the use of, cryptocurrency, a digital currency, or a comparable monetary instrument to evade sanctions with respect to North Korea imposed by the United States or pursuant to an applicable United Nations Security Council resolution; (16) is a North Korean person and knowingly participated in or facilitated the abduction of a citizen of Japan; or ; and (4) in paragraph (17), as redesignated by paragraph (2) of this section, by striking (14) and inserting (16) . 12. Report on the political, economic, social stability of North Korea Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly submit to Congress a classified report on the political, economic, and social stability of North Korea. 13. Special representative for North Korea (a) In general There is established, within the Department of State, the Office of the Special Representative for North Korea (in this section referred to as the Office ). The head of the Office shall have the rank and status of ambassador and shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The head of the Office shall report directly to the Secretary of State. (b) Duties The head of the Office shall have such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of State shall prescribe, including implementing the policy of the United States towards North Korea, preparations for possible negotiations with North Korea, and long-term planning for various scenarios with respect to the Korean Peninsula. (c) Independence of the Office The Office of the Special Representative for North Korea shall maintain management and budget independence and shall maintain an adequate number of dedicated staff. (d) Briefing Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Department of State shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on the structure and priorities of the Office, including with respect to staffing and management.