To provide for measures to strengthen dialogue with the Russian people and support Russian civil society, and for other purposes.

Bill: 115-hr-6426
Sponsor: full_name: Rep. Espaillat, Adriano [D-NY-13]
Introduced: 2018-07-18
Policy area: International Affairs
Subjects: Alliances

Business ethics

Collective security

Conflicts and wars

Congressional oversight

Cultural exchanges and relations

Digital media

Diplomacy, foreign officials, Americans abroad

Europe

Finland

Foreign language and bilingual programs

Foreign property

Government ethics and transparency, public corruption

Human rights

International exchange and broadcasting

Internet and video services

Internet, web applications, social media

Ireland

Middle East

Military operations and strategy

News media and reporting

Political parties and affiliation

Protest and dissent

Russia

Sanctions

Subversive activities

Sweden

Syria

Telephone and wireless communication

Ukraine

Visas and passports
Latest action: action_date: 2018-07-18
text: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, and Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

Summaries:
action_date: 2018-07-18
action_desc: Introduced in House
text: <p><b>CPR for Russian Civil Society Act</b></p> <p>This bill directs the Department of State to: (1) conduct a study on streamlining visa procedures for Russian students and persons involved in professional and cultural exchanges, and (2) enhance screening of certain senior Russian political figures and oligarchs and others associated with President Vladimir Putin.</p> <p>The bill requires reports to Congress regarding: (1) efforts to strengthen strategic stability with Russia, (2) cultural exchange and educational programs with Russia, and (3) Russian proxies.</p> <p>The Department of State shall convene a meeting of U.S. technology companies that sell or license tools that allow the Russian government to suppress civil society activists. The meeting shall focus on developing a code of conduct to restrain U.S. companies from aiding such efforts.</p> <p>Additional funds are provided to increase the International Broadcasting Operations Fund's Russian language programming.</p> <p>The State Department shall compile and make public a list of Russian-based persons who recruited or facilitated the transfer of Russian personnel for the Donbass war in Ukraine or the targeting of civilians in Syria. Such persons shall be prohibited from entering the United States.</p>

tv_txt: I 115th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 6426 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES July 18, 2018 Mr. Espaillat introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs , and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary , and Armed Services , for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned A BILL To provide for measures to strengthen dialogue with the Russian people and support Russian civil society, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This title may be cited as the CPR for Russian Civil Society Act . 2. Strengthening dialogue with the Russian people (a) Improved visa screening procedures for Russian visitors Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall conduct a study on how to streamline and simplify visa procedures for Russian students and persons involved in professional and cultural exchanges in order to reduce the overall visa processing period and facilitate people-to-people exchanges. Such study shall examine average visa wait times for successful visa applicants from Russia and overall rejection rates of Russian nationals applying for visas. (b) Enhanced screening for Putin allies In conjunction with the study undertaken pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall develop enhanced visa screening procedures for the following individuals: (1) Persons identified as the most significant senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation , as listed in a classified annex to a report issued on January 29, 2018, pursuant to section 241(a)(1) of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, but who are not already included in the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury. (2) Persons who are not otherwise included in the specially designated nationals list but who promote Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policies of repression, as determined by the Secretary of State. (3) Persons who benefit from or act as agents of Russian persons on the specially designated nationals list. (c) Improved tracking of exchange programs Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on current cultural exchange and educational programs with Russia. Such report shall include the following: (1) A list of existing programs funded by the United States Government dedicated to United States-Russia cultural and educational exchange and research, including funding levels for each program. (2) Information relating to funding of the programs specified in paragraph (1), including overall history of such funding since 1991, relative to funding for other regions with such exchange and research programs. (d) Strategic stability (1) Report Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in concurrence with the Secretary of State, shall submit to Congress a report on efforts to strengthen strategic stability with Russia. (2) Annual meetings The Secretary of Defense, in concurrence with the Secretary of State, shall host an annual bilateral meeting, through 2023, with Russian counterparts in order to discuss relevant issues of common interest, including maintaining strategic stability and open lines for crisis communications. 3. Support Russian civil society (a) Fight Putin’s censorship Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall convene a meeting of senior leaders of United States technology companies that sell, license, or otherwise facilitate the installation of tools that allow the Government of Russia to censor, harass, or suppress the activities of civil society activists. Such meeting shall focus on developing a common code of conduct to restrain United States companies aiding and abetting the Government of Russia’s efforts to suppress Russian civil society, fundamental freedoms in Russia, and efforts to expose corruption on the part of the Government of Russia. (b) International broadcasting operations fund (1) In general In addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated for the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ International Broadcasting Operations Fund, there is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 to expand Russian language programming and to provide for the dissemination of accurate and independent information to the Russian people through online media, radio, television, cellular telephone, short message service, and other communications. The Broadcasting Board of Governors shall identify those countries that serve as Russian vacation destinations and further target United States international broadcasting and programming activities towards such countries. (2) Use of amounts To achieve the objectives described in paragraph (1), amounts in the International Broadcasting Operations Fund referred to in such subparagraph may be used to develop— (A) additional transmission capability for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, including through additional shortwave and medium wave transmissions, satellite, and Internet mechanisms; (B) additional proxy server capability and anti-censorship technologies to counter efforts by the Government of Russia to censor political and civil society activities, such as blocking of the Telegram app, and investigations into corruption on the part of the Government of Russia; (C) technologies to counter efforts to block SMS text message exchange over cellular phone networks; and (D) additional digital programs and operations for Voice of America in Russia. (3) Conforming amendment to expanded broadcasting in countries of the former Soviet Union Paragraph (1) of section 8(e) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 ( 22 U.S.C. 8927(e) ; Public Law 118–272 ) is amended by striking 2018 and inserting 2020 . 4. Publicize Russian misdeeds (a) Donbass recruitment (1) Report Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall compile and publicly release a list of Russian-based persons, including organizations and their executives, who recruited or otherwise facilitated the transfer of Russian personnel for— (A) the war in the Donbass; or (B) targeting of civilians in Syria. (2) Visa ban Notwithstanding any other provision of law any persons identified in the list required under paragraph (1) shall be prohibited from entry to the United States. (b) Report on actions by Russian proxies Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a list of the following: (1) Persons, including corporations with United States subsidiaries, acting in Europe and the United States as front companies or intermediaries of the Government of Russia, and the executives of such persons. (2) Politicians serving or acting as proxies of the Government of Russia. (3) Russian media entities, including producers and reporters, who— (A) traffic in forgeries, fabrications, and altered media products with intent to obfuscate factual reporting; or (B) instigate conflict and violence in Europe or the United States. (4) Non-Russian persons that have knowingly or negligently provided hardware or other forms of assistance to the Government of Russia that has furthered Russia’s efforts to— (A) filter online political content; (B) disrupt cell phone and Internet communications; (C) monitor the online activities of Russian citizens; or (D) discriminate against or suppress the activities of independent civil society institutions. (5) Each person that— (A) receives subsidies from the Government of Russia, thereby eroding market opportunities for private businesses; (B) provides financial or material support to Russia-backed forces actively involved in aggression against Russia’s neighbors; (C) provides financial or material support to propaganda outlets of the Government of Russia that legitimize Russian aggression; or (D) provides financing or material support to political and nongovernmental persons or entities, including the United Russia political party, determined by the Secretary of State to be engaged in the suppression of fundamental freedoms in Russia. (c) Previously listed entities The lists required under this section may also include entities already identified in the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury. (d) Form The lists required under this section shall be unclassified but may be submitted in classified form. (e) Provision The Secretary of State shall transmit the unclassified lists required under this section to the heads of state of— (1) NATO member states; (2) Sweden; (3) Finland; and (4) Ireland.